

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November 1982

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

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The proceedings of the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume III : Assembly documents.

Volume IV : Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
Mrs. HERMAN-MICHIELSENS Lucienne	PVV
MM. MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
MICHEL Joseph	PSC
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

Substitutes

MM BIEFNOT Yvon	Socialist
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
HOYAUX Jacques	Socialist
LAGNEAU André	PRL
STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksume

FRANCE

Representatives

MM BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF/CDS
DURAFFOUR Paul	Soc. (App.)
FRÊCHE Georges	Socialist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
MAYOUD Alain	UDF
OEHLER Jean-André	Socialist
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
PONCELET Christian	RPR
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
SPÉNALE Georges	Socialist
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VIAL-MASSAT, Théo	Communist
WILQUIN Claude	Socialist

Substitutes

MM BARTHE, Jean-Jacques	Communist
BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BEIX Roland	Socialist
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BERTILE Wilfrid	Socialist
BIZET Émile	RPR (App.)
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist

MM. FORTIER Marcel	RPR
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JAGER René	UCDF
JOXE Pierre	Socialist
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LE MONTAGNER Louis	UCDP
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist
ROSSINOT André	UDF

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALTHAMMER Walter	CDU/CSU
BARDENS Hans	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
JUNG Kurt	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MÄNNING Peter	SPD
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
UNLAND Hermann Joseph	CDU/CSU
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM BÄHR Egon	SPD
EICKMEYER Karl-Arnold	SPD
HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
HORN Erwin	SPD
JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM PENSKY Heinz	SPD
RÖSCH Klaus	FDP
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHLÜCKEBIER Günter	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinnrich	FDP
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
TOPMANN Günter	SPD
WITTMANN Fritz	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
Mrs. GHERBEZ Gabriella	Communist
MM. MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. AJELLO Aldo	Radical
AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
CALICE Giovanni	Communist
CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
DELLA BRIOTTA Libero	Socialist
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
GUNNELLA Aristide	Republican
MARTINO Leopoldo Attilio	Communist
ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
POZZO Cesare	MSI-DN
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs. ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM. SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STERPA Egidio	Liberal

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
PRUSSEN Robert	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
van den BERGH Harry	Labour
van EEKELEN Willem	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
MM. BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
MERTENS Chel	Democrats 66
van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
van der WERFF Ymenus P.W.	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Thomas COX	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr. James HILL	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM. Fred MULLEY	Labour
President of the Assembly John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
MM. Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Thomas URWIN	Labour

Substitutes

MM David ATKINSON	Conservative
Ronald BROWN	SDP
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Anthony DURANT	Conservative
Kenneth EASTHAM	Labour
Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Sir Russell FAIRGRIEVE	Conservative
MM. Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
Edward GARRETT	Labour
Harry GOURLAY	Labour
Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Mr. John MORRIS	Labour
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM. John OSBORN	Conservative
Laurence PAVITT	Labour
Keith STANTON	Conservative
John WILKINSON	Conservative

AGENDA

**of the Second Part of the Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session
Paris, 29th November-2nd December 1982**

- I. Political Questions**
1. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia *Report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*
 2. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism *Report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*
- II. Defence Questions**
1. State of European security *Report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
 2. The Falklands crisis *Report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
- III. Technical and Scientific Questions**
- Energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements *Report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*
- IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions**
1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 *Report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*
 2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 – The Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts *Report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.*
 3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1982 *Report tabled by Mr. Stainton on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*
- V. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly**
- Revision of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly *Report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*
- VI. Relations with Parliaments**
1. Booklet on WEU and its activities *Report tabled by Mr. Berchem on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*
 2. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion *Report tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*

DRAFT ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session
Paris, 29th November-2nd December 1982

MONDAY, 29th NOVEMBER

Morning

Meetings of Political Groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session.
5. Revision of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolution.
6. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.

TUESDAY, 30th NOVEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism:
Resumed debate.

11 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence.
3. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia:
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

3.30 p.m.

2. Address by Mr. Fioret, Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
3. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia:

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY, 1st DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1983:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft budget.
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 – The Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.
3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1982 :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stainton on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft opinion.

10.30 a.m.

4. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
5. State of European security :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. State of European security:
Resumed debate.

3.15 p.m.

2. Address by Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

3. State of European security :

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

4. The Falklands crisis:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere on behalf on the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

THURSDAY, 2nd DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Booklet on WEU and its activities:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Berchem on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Debate.

3. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Debate.

CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

*Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly
for the Financial Year 1981*

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

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REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE AUDITOR OF THE ASSEMBLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981.

APPENDICES

Appendix I : Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1981.
Financial position as at 31st December 1981.

Appendix II : Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1981.

Appendix III : Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1981.

Appendix IV : Provident Fund – Account for the financial year ended 31st December 1981.

***Report of the external Auditor
to the Assembly
of Western European Union
on the accounts for the financial year 1981***

General

1. The following financial statements, together with an explanatory memorandum, were submitted to me by the President :

- (a) Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1981 and financial position as at 31st December 1981 (Appendix I).
- (b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1981 (Appendix II).
- (c) Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of Western European Union, London, in respect of contributions to the Assembly of Western European Union budget for 1981 (Appendix III).
- (d) Account of the provident fund for the financial year ended 31st December 1981 (Appendix IV).

2. My examination of the accounts has been carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

*Summary of income and expenditure
(Appendix I)*

(a) *General*

3. The budget as revised provided for expenditure of F 11,326,000 of which F 460,000 was expected to be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the balance by contributions.

4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted to F 10,510,643. Income amounted to F 11,306,470 comprising F 10,866,000 from contributions requested and received and F 440,470 from miscellaneous receipts. There was thus a budgetary surplus of F 815,357 (as shown in Appendix II) and a shortfall in miscellaneous receipts of F 19,530 leaving an excess of income over expenditure of F 795,825.

(b) *Pension scheme*

5. Under the common pension scheme implemented in 1977 by the co-ordinated organisations, Western European Union, Council of Europe, NATO, OECD and the European Space Agency, pension benefits payable by the Assembly of WEU are charged to the Assembly's budget and staff contributions under the scheme are credited to the budget as miscellaneous income. In 1981 these staff contributions amounted to F 286,521 (Appendix I).

6. Staff members who had been employed before 1st July 1974 and who had decided to join the new scheme were required to meet the cost of validating their past service through surrender of their provident fund holdings. Where these were insufficient for that purpose because of withdrawals, staff members were required to meet the deficiency, plus compound interest at four per cent per annum, by payment over a period of five years from 30th June 1978. In 1981, payments by staff members under these arrangements amounted to F 39,983 and were credited to the budget as miscellaneous income.

Provident fund

(Appendix IV)

7. The provident fund continues to operate for those members of staff who opted to remain affiliated to the fund when the pension scheme was introduced. The assets of the provident fund of the Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of the provident funds of the other organs of Western European Union in joint deposits administered by the office of the Secretary-General. The joint deposits were held in French francs, sterling, United States dollars and German marks and due to variations in the exchange rate between the French franc and the other currencies a gain of F 1,785 was made in the value of the deposits. This gain has been credited to the accounts of the staff members in proportion to their deposits.

8. The balance held in the provident fund at 31st December 1981 on the accounts of Assembly staff members totalled F 2,096,450.

9. I have received a certificate from the depositary showing the amount of the joint deposits held at 31st December 1981 and a statement from the office of the Secretary-General confirming the share of those deposits standing to the credit of the Assembly's provident fund in the office's books at 31st December 1981.

10. I wish to record my appreciation of the willing co-operation of the officers of the Assembly during my audit.

Gordon DOWNEY

*(Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom)
External Auditor*

18th June 1982

Explanatory Memorandum

(communicated by the President to the Auditor of the Assembly in connection with the financial year 1981)

1. The statements attached hereto refer to:
 - (a) Summary of income and expenditure – financial position as at 31st December 1981 (Appendix I);
 - (b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II);
 - (c) Contributions (Appendix III);
 - (d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).
2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits indicates that a sum of F 815,357 remains unexpended, whereas the final balance of income over expenditure was F 795,827. The difference between these two figures, F 19,530, represents:

	F	F
– Bank interest	74,074	
– Sundry receipts	23,564	
– Sale of publications	16,328	
– Contributions 7 %	286,521	
– Reimbursement of loans on validation	<u>39,983</u>	
		440,470
– Receipts for 1981 estimated in the budget		<u>460,000</u>
– Shortfall in receipts		<u>19,530</u>

Validations of pensions

3. On 31st December 1981 there remained one outstanding loan on validation of pensions totalling F 32,140. In accordance with the regulations the outstanding loan must be cleared in 1983.

Transfers

4. Excess expenditure amounting to F 65,676 has been met by transfers within sub-heads.

Contributions

5. All contributions were received from the Secretary-General WEU London before 31st December 1981.

Provident fund

6. The Assembly's funds are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the entire fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

7. The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of the funds. These are at present held in French francs, sterling, German marks, United States dollars with the International Westminster Bank Ltd., London.

8. The Assembly's provident fund on 31st December 1981 amounted to F 2,096,450 as shown at Appendix IV. At 1st January 1981

there remained loans to three staff members amounting to F 126,000. Repayments of F 58,100 reduced the loans outstanding as at 31st December 1981 to F 67,900.

9. The President would like to take this opportunity of expressing the appreciation of the Assembly for the help which was extended to the Office of the Clerk by the United Kingdom Comptroller and Auditor General.

Fred MULLEY
President of the Assembly

3rd May 1982

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1981

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)	10,866,000
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Miscellaneous

(A) Sundry receipts

Bank interest	74,074
Sundry receipts	23,564
Sale of publications	16,328

(B) Pensions

Contributions (7 %)	286,521
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc)	<u>39,983</u>

440,470

11,306,470

Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix II)	10,510,643
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Excess of income over expenditure	<u><u>F 795,827</u></u>
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Financial position as at 31st December 1981*Assets*

Cash at bank	1,008,715
Sundry advances	100,910
Accounts receivable	148,168
	<u>1,257,793</u>

Liabilities

Accounts payable	461,966
Excess of income over expenditure	<u>795,827</u>

F 1,257,793

Certified correct :

Fred MULLEY
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Hugo ADRIAENSENS
*Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct.

Signed: Gordon DOWNEY
Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom
External Auditor

18th June 1982

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE AND

DETAILS	Total budget for 1981 ¹
HEAD I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF	
<i>Sub-Head 1</i> (a) Salaries of permanent establishment	4,856,000
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B and C), including travelling expenses and insurance	65,000
<i>Sub-Head 2</i> <i>Allowances, social charges, etc.</i>	
(A) <i>Allowances</i>	
(a) Household allowance	175,000
(b) Children's allowance	165,000
(c) Expatriation allowance	410,000
(d) Compensatory rent allowance	15,000
(e) Overtime	30,000
(f) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-French staff	
(g) Education allowance	70,000
(h) Allowance for language courses	2,000
(B) <i>Social charges</i>	
(a) Social security	426,000
(b) Supplementary insurance	163,000
(c) Provident fund	105,000
(C) <i>Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials</i>	
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers	1,600
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons	1,500
(c) Removal expenses	3,400
(d) Installation allowance	7,000
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials	10,000
(f) Medical examination	8,500
Total of Head I	6,514,000

1. Documents 851 and 872, Addendum

X II

UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981

Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-			
		4,856,000	4,555,880	300,120
		65,000	9,698	55,302
		175,000	155,613	19,387
		165,000	143,320	21,680
	12,596	397,404	347,592	49,812
		15,000	12,465	2,535
		30,000	29,422	578
		70,000	61,475	8,525
		2,000	1,100	900
12,596		438,596	438,596	-
		163,000	161,410	1,590
		105,000	102,586	2,414
		1,600	-	1,600
		1,500	-	1,500
		3,400	-	3,400
	5,041	1,959	-	1,959
5,041		15,041	15,041	-
		8,500	4,466	4,034
17,637	17,637	6,514,000	6,038,664	475,336

DETAILS	Total budget for 1981
<p>HEAD II - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY</p> <p><i>Sub-Head 3</i> 1. <i>Temporary staff</i></p> <p> Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly</p> <p> 2. <i>Linguistic staff</i></p> <p> (A) <i>Interpretation services</i></p> <p> (a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly</p> <p> (b) Interpretation services required for meetings of Committees between sessions</p> <p> (B) <i>Translation services</i></p> <p> Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly</p> <p> 3. <i>Insurance for temporary staff</i></p> <p> 4. <i>Installation of equipment for sessions</i></p> <p> 5. <i>Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions</i></p>	<p>609,000</p> <p>236,000</p> <p>230,000</p> <p>513,000</p> <p>5,000</p> <p>270,000</p> <p>57,000</p>
Total of Head II	1,920,000
<p>HEAD III - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</p> <p><i>Sub-Head 4</i> 1. Premises</p> <p> 2. Work on the building</p> <p><i>Sub-Head 5</i> Capital equipment</p>	<p>283,000</p> <p>83,000</p> <p>17,000</p>
Total of Head III	383,000

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
			609,000	568,372	40,628
			236,000	225,892	10,108
21,016			251,016	251,016	-
		27,794	485,206	472,052	13,154
			5,000	3,515	1,485
			270,000	261,321	8,679
6,778			63,778	63,778	-
27,794	27,794		1,920,000	1,845,946	74,054
		3,370	279,630	251,039	28,591
3,370			83,000	78,530	4,470
			20,370	20,370	-
3,370	3,370		383,000	349,939	33,061

DETAILS	Total budget for 1981
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS	
<i>Sub-Head 6</i> Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents	325,000
<i>Sub-Head 7</i> Office supplies and hire of machines	210,000
<i>Sub-Head 8</i> Printing and publishing of Assembly documents	910,000
<i>Sub-Head 9</i> Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	30,000
<i>Sub-Head 10</i> Official cars	67,500
<i>Sub-Head 11</i> Bank charges	500
Total of Head IV	1,543,000
HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE	
<i>Sub-Head 12</i> Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	85,000
<i>Sub-Head 13</i> Expenses for representation and receptions	132,000
<i>Sub-Head 14</i> Committee study missions	3,000
<i>Sub-Head 15</i> Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	215,000
<i>Sub-Head 16</i> Expenses of experts and the auditor	50,000
<i>Sub-Head 17</i> Expenditure on information	180,000
<i>Sub-Head 18</i> Expenses for groups of the Assembly	180,000
<i>Sub-Head 19</i> Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000
<i>Sub-Head 20</i> Non-recoverable taxes	12,000
Total of Head V	860,000
HEAD VI – PENSIONS	
<i>Sub-Head 21</i> Pensions, allowances, etc.	
(A) <i>Pensions</i>	
(a) Retirement pension	58,000
(b) Invalidity pension	
(c) Survivors' pension	30,600
(d) Orphans' pension	15,400
(B) <i>Allowances</i>	
(a) Household allowance	
(b) Dependants' allowance	
(c) Education allowance	
(d) Relief allowance	
(C) <i>Severance grant</i>	
(D) <i>Supplementary insurance</i>	2,000
Total of Head VI	106,000
TOTAL	11,326,000

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1981,

Fred MULLEY
President of the Assembly

George
Clerk of

Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-			
		317,855	315,129	2,726
7,145	7,145	217,145	217,145	-
		910,000	832,687	77,313
		30,000	26,105	3,895
		67,500	63,097	4,403
		500	7	493
7,145	7,145	1,543,000	1,454,170	88,830
		85,000	68,632	16,368
4,702		132,000	100,749	31,251
		7,702	7,702	-
	9,423	205,577	149,980	55,597
4,721		54,721	54,721	-
		180,000	144,541	35,459
		180,000	180,000	-
		3,000	736	2,264
		12,000	9,197	2,803
9,423	9,423	860,000	716,258	143,742
		58,210	58,210	-
210		30,347	30,347	-
97	253	15,497	15,497	-
	54	1,946	1,612	334
307	307	106,000	105,666	334
65,676	65,676	11,326,000	10,510,643	815,357

d for up to 31st March 1982, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

OULIAS
Assembly

Hugo ADRIAENSSENS
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration

APPENDIX III

**STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY
BUDGET FOR 1981**

Member states	600ths	Contributions overpaid in 1980		Budget surplus 1980		Revised budget for 1981	Net contributions required
		F		F		F	F
Belgium	59	(-)	3,087	(-)	35,595	1,068,490	1,029,808
France	120	(-)	6,279	(-)	72,396	2,173,200	2,094,525
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(-)	6,279	(-)	72,396	2,173,200	2,094,525
Italy	120	(-)	6,279	(-)	72,396	2,173,200	2,094,525
Luxembourg	2	(-)	104	(-)	1,207	36,220	34,909
Netherlands	59	(-)	3,087	(-)	35,595	1,068,490	1,029,808
United Kingdom	120	(-)	6,279	(-)	72,396	2,173,200	2,094,525
	600	(-)	31,394	(-)	361,981	10,866,000	10,472,625

APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1981

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward :</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1981	1,625,632		
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	156,849	Withdrawals	14,500
Repayments of loans by staff members	58,100		
Interest received during the year	268,584		
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1981	1,785	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1981	2,096,450
	<u>2,110,950</u>		<u>2,110,950</u>

Fred MULLEY
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Hugo ADRIAENSENS
*Chairman of the Committee on
 Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion this statement is correct.

18th June 1982

Gordon DOWNEY
*Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom
 External Auditor*

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1981*

**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981 ¹**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1981, together with the Auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee.* Mr. Adriaensens (Alternate: *Michel*) (Chairman); Mr. Jager (Alternate: *Lagorce*), Lord Hughes (Alternate: *Lord McNair*) (Vice-Chairmen), MM. Ahrens, Althammer, *Biefnot*, Delehedde, Durant (Alternate: *Atkinson*), Eastham (Alternate: *Grieve*), *Jeam-*

brun, Kriebs (Alternate: *Margue*), Martino, Mertens (Alternate: *van der Werff*), Orione, Petrilli, *Schleuter*, Schulte, Sprung, Stainton (Alternate: *Sir Frederic Bennett*), Tripodi, Tummers (Alternate: *Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics*

*European security and the evolution of the situation in
South-West Asia*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Lord Reay, Rapporteur*

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Report presented by Lord Reay, Rapporteur, on his visit to Jordan and Egypt,
8th-12th November 1982

1. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of committee*: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi (Alternate: Cavaliere), Urwin (Alternate: Lord Hughes) (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile, Della Briotta, Conti Persini (Alternate: Amadei), De Bondt, van Eekelen

(Alternate: Scholten), Gessner, Hardy, Kurt Jung, Lagneau, Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots, van der Sanden, Günther Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Thoss, Valiante, Vecchiotti, Wilquin.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia

The Assembly,

Recalling Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371 and 386;

Deploring and condemning the massacres in Lebanon from 16th to 18th September 1982;

Nevertheless welcoming the determination shown by the Lebanese people to restore national unity;

Welcoming the presence of French, Italian and United States armed forces to protect the civilian population;

Considering that the occupation of Lebanon by the Israeli and Syrian armies makes it impossible to restore unity and terminate the acts of violence being committed there;

Considering further that a settlement of the Palestinian problem is one of the prerequisites of the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East;

Considering that this settlement implies the application of Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and recognition of the right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers and of the right of the Palestinian people to independence and sovereignty;

Considering that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank is an obstacle to the restoration of peace and casts doubt on the will of the Israeli Government to achieve this;

Welcoming the fact that the proposals contained in the final act of the meeting of heads of Arab states in Fez on 9th September 1982 show considerable progress towards the application of Resolution 242;

Noting that recent events show more clearly than ever that the Palestinian people needs a homeland;

Considering that at the present juncture the PLO is the only organisation which can speak for the Palestinian people;

Considering that the dispersal of the Palestinian people in the Arab countries will not solve the problem but will create unacceptable conditions for the persons concerned;

Welcoming the declaration by President Reagan on 1st September 1982 as an essential contribution to the restoration of peace in the area;

Considering that the pursuit of the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to the security of the whole area;

Condemning the continued Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan as a serious violation of the Charter of the United Nations, a grave threat to the countries in the area and a negation of Soviet proposals for demilitarising the Indian Ocean;

Reaffirming the close relationship between the security of Europe and the peaceful solution of conflicts which upset political balances in the Middle East and South-West Asia,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Reaffirm the support of all its members for any initiative aimed at applying Resolution 242 and its radical opposition to the establishment of further Israeli settlements on the West Bank;
2. Urge the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon except if their presence has been requested by the Lebanese Government;
3. Use all the means available to member countries to support the restoration of the Lebanese state;

4. Supply humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people;
5. Urge the Israeli Government to disclose without delay what it intends to do with those imprisoned during the occupation of southern Lebanon;
6. Urge the Israeli Government to allow the International Red Cross immediate and full access to those imprisoned during the occupation of southern Lebanon and to arrange their earliest possible release, to complete the inquiry into the Beirut massacre and to publish a full report on the inquiry;
7. Demonstrate its belief that the question of Palestinian refugees cannot be solved by dispersing them but only by the early establishment of a Palestinian homeland;
8. Urge member countries to refuse any connection with the Afghan Government as long as there is Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan;
9. Increase member countries' financial, non-military technical and food assistance to Afghan refugees on Pakistani territory.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Lord Reay, Rapporteur)

I. General features of the area

1. South-West Asia is not a well-defined geographical area and has hardly any ethnic, economic or political unity. The only fact that can be stressed is that Islam is generally predominant although Islamic traditions are numerous and varied. The Islamic revival has been felt everywhere in recent decades, although in different forms. They range from a reversion to very orthodox traditions among the Moslem Brothers, whose strength was demonstrated by events in Egypt, at the end of 1981, to a more liberal development in Turkey, from different forms of "Arab socialism" in Iraq and in Syria, to forms which are both religious and republican, yet still difficult to define, in Iran, and to deep-rooted divisions in a number of countries.

2. To this first difficulty of circumscribing the area should be added a second stemming from the fact that the political form of national state which is dominant in the West has not yet taken clear shape in part of South-West Asia. Admittedly, certain states such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Jordan and Egypt – not to speak of Israel, of course – have shown a remarkable degree of national cohesion in the twentieth century, particularly when they have had to face threats from without in recent years. But these states themselves include minorities whose attachment to the central power is uncertain, such as the Kurds in Iran, Turkey and Iraq, the Palestinians in Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the Gulf countries, the Baluchis in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Arabs in Iran. The difficult coexistence between ethnic, linguistic and religious communities raises problems everywhere and was largely contributory to the break up of Lebanon and its invasion by armed forces from abroad: Syrian in 1976, Israeli in 1982.

3. As compared with these states, the feeling of belonging to an Arab community is still strong in the countries lying between the Red Sea and Mesopotamia. But this community has always had the utmost difficulty in finding political expression. The Arab League has been insufficiently powerful and although in times of particularly acute crises an Arab front may have taken shape it has never lasted and differences between Iraq and Kuwait, Iraq and Syria and the Palestinians and Jordan have so far prevented any lasting cohesion. In June 1982, Israel even came to grips with Syria on Lebanese territory without arousing serious

reactions in the rest of the Arab world. It is still impossible to foresee what will become of Arabism. Will it bring the Arab countries together in an alliance or a confederation in the foreseeable future?

II. International aspects of the area's problems

4. For a long time, Europe's interests seemed relatively clear: some stability had to be maintained in existing states so as to protect economic, cultural or even political ties, some of which were of very long standing. The installation of the state of Israel in Palestine in 1948 raised serious problems but it was hoped that the territory could be shared between two states, one Jewish, the other Arab, once the frontiers were defined.

5. In 1919, the Jewish community in Palestine numbered only 65,000, but this figure rose rapidly during the period of the British mandate, due in particular to Hitlerian persecution. In spite of certain restrictions on immigration imposed by the mandatory power as from 1936, the community numbered 425,000 in 1939, i.e. almost a third of the population of Palestine. Since 1920, it had had its own political organisation. The National Council, responsible for the administration of the people, encouraged the acquisition of land by the Jewish community to which it supplied arms and a military organisation. Clashes between the Jewish and Arab communities, which had begun in 1920, therefore increased as from 1936 and assumed the dimensions of a true civil war with the approach of the date fixed by the British Government for the end of its mandate in Palestine on 14th May 1948. Certain Jewish organisations, particularly the Irgun, were then carrying out terrorist operations, the best known of which was the blowing up of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on 22nd July 1946.

6. With this date in mind, on 29th November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly for its part adopted by 33 votes to 13 with 10 abstentions a plan for the partition of Palestine between the two communities, the Jewish community being granted 55% of the territory. But this plan, accepted by neither of the two communities, did not manage to prevent intervention by all Palestine's neighbouring states on 15th May 1948 and the pursuit of a war between the new state of Israel and the Arab countries. The armistices which put an end to this

war in spring 1949 allowed Israel to occupy 78 % of the territory of Palestine whereas at that time the Jewish community represented only about 40 % of the population of the country. Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip and Transjordan, the West Bank territory it had annexed in 1950. In order to ensure a Jewish majority within its frontiers, the state of Israel opposed the return of those Arab inhabitants of Palestine who had fled the country during the war which henceforth gave rise to a refugee problem for which the United Nations took responsibility through the intermediary of UNWRA. Most of these refugees were in Jordan.

7. The situation thus created remained highly unstable, on the one hand because no peace treaty defined Israel's frontiers and the de facto division of Palestine in 1949 was contested by all the Arab countries and on the other because the activities of the Palestinians chased off their land meant that permanent insecurity reigned over the territory controlled by Israel. As a result, there was a series of attacks and frontier incidents which on three occasions led to generalised conflict: in 1956, 1967 and 1973.

8. The war launched by Israel on 5th June 1967 as a reaction to the closing of the Strait of Tiran by Egypt had particularly serious consequences for the area since it allowed Israel in the space of six days to vanquish successively Egypt, Jordan and Syria, to occupy the whole of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, taken from Syria, and again to chase away a large proportion of the inhabitants of these areas and the 1949 refugees living there. A large part of them came together again in eastern Jordan.

9. Although on 22nd November 1967 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 242 proclaiming "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and the right of every state in the area "to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries" and calling for "the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied", this resolution, confirmed on several occasions by the United Nations General Assembly and endorsed by most western countries, including European countries, has never been applied. However, as from 1967, the situation was further changed by several new developments:

10. (i) On 27th June 1967, Israel decided to annex eastern Jerusalem which had been left to Jordan under the 1949 armistice. In 1981, it also annexed the Golan. Finally, pleading security requirements, it established numerous military and agricultural colonies on the West Bank and everything indicates that it is considering annexing this area, which it calls "Galilee" and "Samaria".

11. (ii) Diplomatic activity by the United States following the failure of Egypt's attempt in October 1973 to free the Sinai led to the conclusion of a separate peace agreement between Israel and Egypt on 26th March 1979 following the Camp David negotiations. The essential provisions were the progressive handing back of the Sinai to Egypt accompanied by partial demilitarisation of the area and Israel's promise to grant autonomy to the Palestinians within five years. However, although Israel did in fact complete the evacuation of the Sinai in 1982 its promise to grant the right of self-determination to the Palestinians is being interpreted extremely restrictively since it is not considering allowing them any territory.

12. (iii) Palestinian resistance became organised around several movements which soon came together in the PLO and caused many murderous incidents between Israel and Jordan, to such an extent that the latter was forced in September 1970 to dispose of several of these movements by force. The most militant elements of the Palestinian resistance movement then took refuge in Syria and above all in Lebanon.

13. (iv) Although the Syrian Government managed to control the activities of Palestinian movements on its territory the same was not true in Lebanon where the presence of 300,000 to 400,000 Palestinians endangered the delicate balance between the Lebanese communities on which the national pact of 11th November 1943 was based. Intercommunity clashes increased, degenerating into civil and religious war in 1975. The Syrian army intervened to restore order in Lebanon in 1976 but soon became involved in the country's internal conflicts, where it supported the Palestinian and Moslem armed forces while Israel helped the Christian militia in the south of the country. The stationing of a United Nations force close to Lebanon's southern frontiers did not put a stop to military operations by either side.

14. (v) Palestinian refugees in Lebanon sought new forms for their struggle to make up for their military inferiority as compared with Israel and they increased their terrorist action both on Israeli territory and throughout the world, attacking not only Israeli nationals but also nationals of many Arab countries accused of betraying the Palestinian cause.

15. (vi) The assassination of an Israeli diplomat in London on 4th June 1982 provided a pretext for a generalised attack by Israeli forces, helped by certain Christian militia forces, against southern Lebanon. On 6th June, Syrian forces stationed in Lebanon and the United Nations force were unable to prevent the Israeli army occupying the south of the country and embarking upon a siege of western Beirut, held by

Moslem Lebanese and Palestinians, until the intervention of Mr. Philip Habib, representing the United States, allowed the Palestinian militants to be evacuated and dispersed among several Arab states in Asia and Africa in August 1982.

16. However, since the second world war the growth of Soviet strength and the interest shown by the Soviet Union in the area have made it a stake in the international balance. The Soviet foothold in Iran at the end of the war was of brief duration but the first sign of an active policy. The failure of the Franco-British expedition in Suez in 1956 led to a revival of Soviet political activity in the area and made the United States in turn intervene during the crisis in Lebanon in July 1958.

17. The growth of the Soviet fleet from 1965 onwards, including the appearance of aircraft-carriers in the Mediterranean and then the Indian Ocean, followed by the creation of permanent bases, emphasised the importance the Soviet Union attached to the area and provided political support for countries or parties with which the Soviet Union was in sympathy, although Soviet forces have not however intervened directly in the area. Nonetheless, this presence brought two new facets to South-West Asian problems. First, it considerably increased the risk of any conflict in the area spreading and becoming internationalised and second it made it essential for a large-scale American fleet to be present in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and for the necessary bases to be installed if western interests were to be defended.

18. The trade embargo imposed in October 1973 by all the Arab oil-producing countries in the area following the war between Israel and its neighbours had considerable repercussions, on the one hand because it gave these countries the impression that their oil resources could be used as a political weapon against the West and on the other hand because it was an opportunity to start an escalation of oil prices which was a major factor behind the economic recession from which the world has not yet emerged. This made it clear that the Gulf area was of considerable importance for the whole western world as the source of about half of its oil consumption. Western Europe at that time depended on the Gulf for more than half its energy and almost three-quarters of its oil.

19. Since then, the facts of the problem have changed. The discovery and exploitation of new gas and oil deposits, the development of nuclear energy production, a strict policy of energy saving and finally the recession itself have considerably reduced the West's dependence on the Gulf countries.

20. In 1981, world oil production amounted to 2,859 million tonnes of oil, i.e. 58.5 million barrels per day, while consumption amounted to only 2,705 million tonnes, i.e. 58.3 million barrels per day. But while for the eastern countries the production of 12.1 million barrels per day almost equalled their consumption of 12.9 million barrels, the same was not the case for the OECD countries which consumed 37.7 million barrels per day while producing only 15 million. They therefore had to rely on the OPEC countries which produced 22.5 million barrels per day but consumed only 2.3 million. 17.5 million barrels were then produced daily by the Middle East countries in spite of the cutback in production imposed by Libya, Kuwait and Algeria with a view to keeping up oil prices and in spite of the considerable reduction in exports by Iran and Iraq due to the war between them. Because of this overproduction, oil prices had remained at about \$35 per barrel after having risen from about \$13 to \$35 between 1978 and 1981.

21. Thanks to the economic crisis, to the discovery of new resources, particularly in Africa and Mexico, to the energy savings made, to the development of alternative energy sources and to the building up of large stocks it might therefore appear that the western countries have to a large extent freed themselves of the need to acquire Middle East oil at any cost. However, this would be an excessively optimistic view. In fact, oil is still a source of energy and an essential raw material for the western economies and the resources recently discovered far from equal those offered by the Middle East on the one hand because very considerable investment is required for their exploitation and on the other because the reserves discovered are limited. While they correspond to fifty years' output at the present rate in the case of the Middle East, they give promise of only forty years' output at the same rate in Latin America, twenty-five in the Soviet Union and the Far East and less than fifteen in the United States and Canada. This means that in the event of economic recovery growth in oil demand will mainly concern the Middle East, and the West's dependence on the Middle East, the extent of whose consequences was clear in 1956 and above all in 1973, is very liable to return to its former level.

22. This observation brings out the full significance of two major events in 1980, the Iranian revolution followed by the war with Iraq, and the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces. Although this invasion brought Soviet armed forces nearer to the Gulf it also considerably increased the area's mistrust of the Soviet Union. As a result, the latter's political influence was weakened. Meanwhile, the rapprochement between the United States and

Egypt allowed one aspect of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours to be settled through the Camp David agreements.

23. It is not certain that Europe is always well placed to make a contribution to problems in this area, but there are fields in which it may be, and one of the purposes of this report should be to define and spell out the action Europe might take. Indeed, if differences are not solved soon perhaps the conditions might arise for Soviet intervention beyond Afghanistan and the chances of the development of peace and stability in the area would again be jeopardised.

III. *The conflict between Israel and its neighbours*

24. By adopting Recommendation 386 in June 1982, the Assembly clearly showed in the difficult debate preceding the vote that there was a wide degree of consensus between its members, on the one hand to condemn the Israeli aggression in Lebanon and confirm the right of the Palestinians to a homeland, and on the other hand to recall Israel's right to security within frontiers recognised by the international community and to condemn all forms of terrorism. Finally, the Assembly expressed its attachment to the continued existence of the Lebanese state.

25. It seems plain that the motivation for Israel's invasion of the Lebanon was, by crushing the PLO, to reduce the resistance to its stated policy of incorporating permanently the West Bank into the state of Israel. The PLO presented little military danger to Israel and had in fact observed the cease-fire introduced in 1981. It was only following repeated Israeli violations of the cease-fire that the PLO themselves shelled northern Galilee. The Israeli violations must be viewed as provocations deliberately designed to give them a justification for invasion.

26. Whether the humiliation of the PLO in Lebanon, and its elimination as a military force, will produce for Israel the desired result will depend on several factors: first, the resistance shown within the West Bank itself, second, the unity and persistence shown by neighbouring Arab countries on behalf of the Palestinians, third, the tolerance of the United States toward Israeli policy, fourth, the pressure applied by international opinion on behalf of the Palestinians, in particular on Israel and on the United States.

27. It must be recorded that no Arab country achieved, and hardly attempted to achieve, anything to help the PLO in its most desperate hour of need in Lebanon. However, it would

be rash to assume from this that Arab countries will never again act on behalf of the Palestinians, singly or in concert, and even militarily. Many Arab countries have extremely large Palestinian minorities, as may be seen in the table hereafter, and several have shown evident fear of what the effect of the military humiliation of the PLO on these minorities may be. The first effect on Arab countries appears to have been to increase their pressure on the West to meet Palestinian aspirations.

How the Palestinians are scattered¹

Israel (pre-1967 borders)	530,600
West Bank	818,300
Gaza	476,700
Jordan	1,160,800
Lebanon	347,000
Kuwait	278,800
Syria	215,500
Saudi Arabia	127,000
United States	110,000
Elsewhere	<u>325,000</u>
Total	<u>4,389,900</u>

28. As far as the United States is concerned, one of the effects of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and of the predicament of the PLO seems to have been a move towards a greater degree of recognition of the PLO and a more widespread critical attitude towards Israel for its actions. Similarly, in the rest of the world, the PLO has managed to extract out of the situation a greater degree of international recognition.

29. At all events a turning point has probably been reached in the history of the Palestinian liberation movement. In the past, unable to operate militarily from within Palestine, it has sought to do so – or at least keep a visible military capability alive – from within some other country, first Jordan, then Lebanon. Jordan eventually found the presence of the PLO as an armed force intolerable, and expelled the PLO in 1970. The PLO was only able to establish and maintain armed camps in Lebanon because of the extreme weakness of the Lebanese state. It seems unlikely in the future that the PLO will be able to find a home for an armed force, unless, at least, it is very strictly controlled by the host government.

30. At the moment it is not obvious whether this loss of its military arm will in the long run strengthen or weaken the Palestinian liberation movement. It is clear that the PLO has gained

1. 1981 figures from the Palestine Institute of Statistics.

very little from its previous tactics. Its military aspect has enabled the Israelis to brand the PLO, very successfully in the eyes of the American public, as a terrorist organisation. The PLO has also been far too slow to accord Israel recognition. A conditional recognition of Israel could never have done the cause of the PLO any harm. Yet it delayed until what it used to call its trump card became virtually unplayable. Only when in extremis in West Beirut did the PLO begin apparently to shift its ground.

31. It is also not at all clear what the future holds for Lebanon. The rest of the world would welcome a representative Lebanese Government with authority over its whole national territory. But whether the divisions between Christians and Druze and Moslems (and between different sects of Moslems) will permit this, remains to be seen. There are also the ambitions of Israel and Syria to contend with. Israel should now withdraw from Lebanon, together with all other foreign forces, apart from any that may be freely invited to remain by a legitimate and representative Lebanese Government.

32. This must be considered a grim moment as far as the prospects for a long-term peaceful settlement in the Middle East are concerned. On the one hand stands the Palestinian resistance movement, demanding a home, militarily crushed, but certainly not politically dead, in fact very possibly growing in political strength. Opposed stands Israel refusing on any terms to negotiate with the PLO, adamantly opposed to the creation of an independent Palestinian state, and acting as fast as it can to pre-empt the possible use for this purpose of the only suitable territory, namely the West Bank. Israel's settlement policy is pursued no longer in the name of security, but in the name of Greater Israel, of territory for the sake of territory. One is sometimes even left to wonder whether its ambitions do not also extend in the direction of Jordan.

33. How therefore can peace be reached? No other ideas for a territorial solution exist except the West Bank, refused by Israel. Neither the Palestinians nor the Jordanians want to create a state on Jordanian territory. Only the United States – without which, as Senator Fulbright once said, Israel would not now exist as a state – could possibly force Israel to give up the West Bank peacefully against its will. Even then, given the rate of expansion of Israeli settlements, and the policy of harassment and expulsion which the Israelis can be expected to pursue towards the West Bank Arabs, there can only be a very few years left before such a solution will cease to be diplomatically attainable. After then, either the Palestinians' aspirations will remain unmet, or there will eventually be

further wars at what cost to the West and the rest of the world can only be guessed.

34. No doubt the United States is feeling Arab pressure to bring about a settlement. The United States may also be growing alarmed at the extent to which its failure to control Israel is costing it all influence in the Arab world, and makes the possibility of strategic co-operation with Arab states, for example over the rapid deployment force, a complete dead letter.

35. What should Europe do in these circumstances? Plainly the primary rôle is not going to be played by Europe. But Britain and France already imposed an arms embargo on Israel; this could be followed by other countries of Western Europe. The EEC postponed implementation of its financial agreement. Israel would also be extremely hurt if European countries were to ban imports from Israel, which come principally to the EEC. If European countries are ever to consider this weapon, now is the time, and it should be linked to the question of a final Palestinian settlement, not simply withdrawal from Lebanon.

36. European countries may also be asked to take part in a peacekeeping force. Such a request would have to be treated on its merits. Preferably it should come from a legitimate and representative Lebanese Government.

IV. *The Iraqi-Iranian war*

37. On 20th June 1982, the Iraqi Government announced that it had had to withdraw its forces after eighteen months of fighting on Iranian territory. The stated wish to form a front against the Israeli aggression in Lebanon seemed to be a pretext to conceal the inexorable effects of military defeat. The Iranian authorities for their part refused to cease operations as long as Mr. Saddam Hussein remained in power in Baghdad, and in July Iranian forces invaded Iraq. They were soon however in difficulties.

38. During the invasion of Iran, apart from the assistance several Arab states granted Iraq and which Israel and Syria, and through Syria the Soviet Union, granted Iran, the conflict remained localised, possibly due in the main to the fact that relations between the United States and Iran had seriously deteriorated because of American diplomats having been held hostage by Iranian revolutionaries for almost a year and because the Soviet Union, engaged in a costly war in Afghanistan, did not wish to become involved in an affair which concerned two states where it did not wish to jeopardise its interests.

39. As long as fighting continues, it is hard to see how Europe can act. The prospect of a summit meeting of representatives of the non-aligned countries in Baghdad in the autumn is in itself a considerable means of pressure for the restoration of peace, whereas the means of persuasion available to Europe in this matter are very limited. But it is to be expected that between now and the end of the year events will have taken a new turn.

40. Whatever reservations one may have about the methods of the Iranian Government, they should not prevent the resumption of normal relations with the West if Iran so wishes. The cohesion demonstrated by the Iranian people in face of the Iraqi offensive showed a consensus among the population in considering the present régime to be representative of the Iranian state, and it is not for foreign countries to contest a régime recognised by the majority of the population as long as it no longer resorts to measures contrary to international law, as was the case in taking American hostages.

41. While the future of the Iraqi régime seems somewhat threatened at the moment, the way it evolves to bring about peace with Iran and receive the summit meeting of non-aligned countries if it takes place will be a relatively clear indication of the kind of economic partner it will prove to be for the West in view of the fact that, apart from deliveries of military equipment, the Western European countries continue to have normal relations with Iraq. A return to peace should allow them to be improved.

42. What exactly are the limits of Iran's ambitions in its invasion of Iraq, and in particular, whether Iraq will be more successful in fighting Iran when it is the invaded country and not the invader, what will be the impact of Soviet involvement, we will have to wait and see. Iran has probably the long-term aim of maximising its influence in the Middle East, in particular at the expense of Saudi Arabia and other conservative or moderate régimes, and no doubt using this influence against the United States, "The Great Satan", and its western allies. If it achieved this position it would no doubt be ruthless in the use of the oil weapon against the West. But to acquire this position it would have to destroy the influence of Saudi Arabia, and to do this it might at first see it in its interest to drive the oil price down, simply to remove Saudi Arabia's controlling hand on the oil price.

43. In any case the more powerful Iran becomes, on present indications, the greater the dangers, both economic and political, for the West. On the other hand, the Soviet Union probably fears a triumphant fundamentalist Iran as much as the West does. This is the

most stabilising factor operating in the situation. All at the moment depends, therefore, first on Iraq's capacity to defend itself, and second on the Soviet Union's actions to limit Iran's victory, both by aiding Iraq and by withholding assistance from Iran.

V. *Afghanistan*

44. The Assembly has paid particular attention to developments in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion, having adopted, in November 1980 and June 1981, two recommendations submitted by Mr. Hardy and Mr. Forni respectively on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. Moreover, the committee has set up a sub-committee specially responsible for following events in the area. On 18th May 1982, it was addressed by a representative of the Afghan resistance movement.

45. As far as can be seen, there does not seem to have been much change in the situation in Afghanistan. The number of Soviet forces stationed there has remained steady at about 90,000. There has been a marked increase in the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the control exercised by government forces with Soviet support, at least in the principal operations, still seems to be restricted to a few towns and the main lines of communication. It is now estimated that the number of refugees has risen to about 3.5 million, or 17 % of the original population of Afghanistan.

46. There is little doubt that this trend serves the aims of the Soviet Union and the Kabul government insofar as, lacking adequate outside assistance, the Afghan resistance movement's material position is increasingly difficult. It is badly armed and is short of munitions which can be used in its weapons which are of very varied origin. Scorched earth tactics and regrouping the population round the towns creates supply problems which are increasingly difficult to solve. There are ever greater obstacles to frontier crossings by refugees but nevertheless no satisfactory solution can be found to the problem of refugees arriving in neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan. Seriously threatened by the presence of Soviet forces on its frontiers, frequent frontier incidents and flights over its territory, Pakistan is being extremely cautious and will not tolerate the transit of armaments for the Afghan resistance movement through its territory. Access routes between Afghanistan and China are strictly controlled by Soviet forces and cannot be used for part of the year because of the weather. One may wonder what the future holds for the Afghan resistance movement, disunited politically and increasingly cut off from the world outside.

47. Information about loss of human life, battles, the types of weapons used by the Soviet Union and in particular chemical weapons and the domestic situation is still extremely inaccurate, fragmentary and contradictory. It is therefore difficult to make a valid assessment of the Afghan resistance movement's ability to survive, but it is evident that the West would bear very heavy responsibility if it gave verbal encouragement without supplying the assistance which is increasingly essential for the movement's survival. However, it has to be noted that its ability to supply military assistance is limited, its humanitarian assistance to the refugees is still negligible and diplomatic assistance in the form of a policy of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union is hard to envisage now because it was not carried out at the time of invasion.

48. The question for Europe is: how active a policy can it pursue with respect to Afghanistan? Of course, it must continue to insist on the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the right of self-determination for the Afghan people. No recognition can ever be given to an Afghan Government dependent on an occupying Soviet force. On the other hand a more active and open policy of supplying weapons to the Afghan resistance movement carries great risks of provoking Soviet retaliation on Pakistan.

VI. *The Gulf area*

49. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union's consequent closer presence to the Middle East oilfields, the military humiliation of the PLO in Lebanon and the consequent risk of inflaming the large Palestinian minorities in Gulf countries, and above all the menacing growth in the fortunes of Iran, with its apparently unbridled ambitions and its hostility to moderate Arab governments and to the West as a whole, are the main clouds casting their shadows over the Gulf area. And a formidable threat they amount to, given the small size and military near-impotence of the countries concerned.

50. Europe has few means of intervening. Of the Western European countries, France is at present the only one to maintain a significant naval force in the Indian Ocean and to have permanent naval bases close to the Gulf and at present it is difficult to imagine it being joined by any other country. No European country has land forces in the area, apart from a very small French force in Djibouti and units under United Nations command in southern Lebanon and Sinai. In other words, Europe now has no real means of action in the area.

51. It has been suggested, for example in "The Uncertain Ally - British defence policy 1960-1990" by John Wilkinson and Michael Chichester, that certain European countries could build up forces which could be deployed if necessary in the area - in other words along the lines of the American rapid deployment force. However, it must be stressed that the actual use of such a force is politically difficult to imagine. In the first place, it needs to exist to support a definite policy; secondly, it could only be used at the invitation of a country in the area. Its proposed existence also raises the controversial question of removing troops from the Rhine, and accordingly would call in question Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty, because all such proposals for the use of forces outside the NATO area threaten to draw on forces at present committed within the NATO area. A reduction in the level of troops provided for in Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty would require the agreement of the majority of members of the WEU Council.

52. As far as the United States rapid deployment force is concerned, any European participation carries the risk of Europe being nothing more than the instrument of American policy in any use which might be made of the force. For several reasons Europe could hardly desire so close and risky an identification with American policy in the Middle East at the present time, despite the common national interests they share. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the deployment of the American force would imply the withdrawal of American forces from Germany, at any rate temporarily. This would raise the question of whether conventional forces of sufficient deterrent value remained in Western Europe, and would tend to associate European members of the alliance with any use of the force in the Middle East, even though there was no formal attachment.

53. Accordingly consultations would seem desirable between all members of the NATO alliance on the political and military implications of any use of the United States rapid deployment force. The idea behind the rapid deployment force was to counter Soviet penetration; but it must be said that even governments friendly to the West, and afraid of Soviet penetration, were equally afraid of the rapid deployment force, of the uses to which it might be put, and of the domestic and external reactions its use might provoke.

54. Nevertheless, despite all these difficulties and discouraging factors, it cannot be right for WEU to shirk the fact that Western Europe has a colossal dependence on freedom of access to the Gulf, and the threats that are arising to this freedom of access. There would surely be circumstances in which the United States would

be ready to intervene militarily to protect this access. That being the case, and since the interests to protect are every bit as much European as American, if not more so, then WEU should not be too squeamish to face up to the possibility of a western intervention taking place, and it should be discussed between all partners of the western alliance.

VII. *Developments in the Middle East during summer 1982*

55. Israeli military action in southern Lebanon continued in August 1982 with the occupation of Tyre, Saïda and Beirut through to the Bekaa as far as Syrian lines. The Israelis inflicted serious losses on Syrian forces, pushing them back to near the Beirut-Damascus road. During these operations, shelling and bombing devastated all towns of any size and many more minor localities as well as the Palestinian refugee camps. The Israelis used their troops for police operations during which several thousand persons were arrested and interned in camps in the occupied area or on Israeli territory. West Beirut, mainly inhabited by Lebanese Moslems and where the Palestine Liberation Organisation had its headquarters, was surrounded and bombed continuously causing many victims, particularly among Lebanese civilians.

56. The work of an American mediator appointed by Mr. Reagan's government succeeded, at the end of August, in making representatives of Israel and the PLO accept a cease-fire and an agreement to evacuate Palestinian guerrillas from West Beirut under the supervision of an international buffer force of American, French and Italian troops. Only combatants with their personal weapons were evacuated, not their families, who remained in Beirut. Those evacuated were dispersed to several Arab countries (the two Yemens, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Syria and Iraq), each of which had agreed to receive a limited quota¹. Once this mission had been accomplished, the intervention force withdrew from Beirut on 1st September and the Israeli army occupied the west of the town, where it arrested and interned a large number of persons.

57. On 16th September, forces either from Major Haddad's militia or from the Christian Phalangists were instructed by the Israeli forces to hunt out Fedayeen from two camps in East Beirut, Sabra and Chatila, which were encircled by the Israeli army. For two days and two nights, these forces conducted a systematic mas-

sacre of the inhabitants of the camps, including women and children, until the Israeli army intervened on 18th September to stop them.

58. These events provoked strong reactions throughout the world and loud protests, even in Israel, where the Labour Party, and even apparently certain elements of the government majority, protested vigorously about the methods adopted by Mr. Begin, the Prime Minister, and Mr. Sharon, Minister of Defence, who on 27th September had to agree to set up a commission of inquiry into the massacres.

59. On 21st September, the new President of the Lebanese Republic, Amin Gemayel, called for the return of the international force to assist the Lebanese army in recovering control of the whole country. Israeli forces evacuated the centre of Beirut on 27th September to allow this force to take over. On 28th September, President Reagan announced that the force would stay until Lebanon had been completely evacuated by all foreign forces, but so far, although Israel and Syria have always declared that the presence of their forces on Lebanese territory was purely provisional, neither has indicated when it intended to withdraw them, which makes the future of Lebanon highly uncertain.

60. It should be added that the measures taken against Palestinians in Lebanon are inhuman and cannot be allowed to continue. Those arrested and interned, as well as those evacuated to other Arab countries, are separated from their families. Furthermore, consideration is apparently being given to expelling many of the Palestinians living in Lebanon and one may wonder what welcome they will receive elsewhere.

61. Events in Lebanon during the summer resulted in a series of major proposals for restoring peace between Israel and the Arab countries. These proposals clearly show a rapprochement between the views of the Arab countries and those upheld in recent years by the United Nations and the countries of the European Community. This can be explained by the military defeat of the PLO in Lebanon and the fact that countries which had hitherto been favourably inclined towards the Israeli Government objected to the Israeli offensive.

62. On the Arab side, a peace plan which had been drawn up by the then Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Emir Fahd¹, in August 1981, provided the basis for an agreement between the Arab countries, except Libya, at the Arab summit meeting in Fez on 7th September 1982².

1. European Security and the Middle East, Brief prepared by Lord Reay, December 1982, Map 10.

1. *Ibid.*, Document 22.

2. *Ibid.*, Document 24.

63. On the western side, the invasion of Lebanon led President Reagan, on 25th June, to issue a warning to Israel against any further settlements on the West Bank. The Israeli response was immediate: on 28th June, the government decided to create twenty-three more settlements in the area. On 1st September, President Reagan announced a new and major peace initiative by the United States in the framework of the Camp David agreements aimed at guaranteeing at one and the same time peace, the security of Israel and the legitimate needs of the Palestinian people¹.

64. There is not a very wide gap between the Fez proposals and those of President Reagan, and both are close to the positions adopted by the EEC countries, particularly in the nine-power declaration of 18th June 1979. If it is borne in mind that on 20th September King Hussein of Jordan agreed to the principle of his country being associated with Palestinian self-government and that the Soviet Government approved the final act of the Fez summit meeting, it can be seen that there is a wide

international consensus on the bases for negotiations.

65. The only remaining obstacle to peace negotiations is Israel's uncompromising stand in opposition to the Fahd Plan, the Fez final act and also the Reagan proposals. What then are Mr. Begin's true intentions? Putting two and two together: the new settlements on the West Bank and support for certain communities in Lebanon or even Syria, some observers have wondered whether the intention is not to break up the Arab countries in the area by encouraging politico-religious fundamentalism, thus leaving the way open for Israeli political and military domination and ensuring the permanent annexation of the West Bank after that of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Good will on the part of Israel in evacuating Lebanon, abandoning the policy of settlements on the West Bank and defining conditions for negotiations and for the independent status which Israel is prepared to allow the Palestinians in application of the Camp David agreements would alone be able to refute these accusations.

1. *Ibid.*, Document 23.

APPENDIX

*Report presented by Lord Reay, Rapporteur,
on his visit to Jordan and Egypt**8th-12th November 1982*

The Rapporteur, in conformity with the decision of the WEU Presidential Committee taken at its meeting in Paris on 14th October 1982, visited Jordan and Egypt between 8th and 12th November. His principal interviews were with, in Amman, Crown Prince Hassan, Mr. Hassan Ibrahim, Minister for the Occupied Territories' Affairs, and Mr. Bahjat Talhouni, President of the Senate; and in Cairo with Mr. Butros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Mohamed Abdellah, Chairman of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee. He was, in addition, given great assistance in Amman by Mr. Peter Salah, Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Information, by Senator Ahmad Al-Khalil, and by Mr. Shihab Madi, Director of Crown Prince Hassan's political office; and in Cairo by Counsellor Aly Maher at the Foreign Office.

The Rapporteur was impressed by the positive and energetic approach of Jordan to the peace negotiations. Jordan is engaged in an exhaustive process of diplomacy with the PLO, on the one hand, and on the other, in conjunction with other Arab moderate states, with the United States, in an attempt, in the first instance, to put together a delegation which can be accepted as a party to the negotiations by all other parties. Because of the Rabat decision of 1964, which committed the Arab states to accept the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, Jordan dare not assume the task of negotiating alone on behalf of the Palestinians. The United States refuses to meet the PLO as long as they have not recognised the state of Israel. Jordan has evidently tried to persuade the PLO to make a statement of conditional recognition of Israel, or to accept United Nations Resolution 242, which the PLO never has accepted and which includes recognition. The PLO has so far refused, not wishing to go any further than it has done in the past in case it finds that it has played what it considers to be its last card, and has gained nothing. Israel insists that the PLO is simply a terrorist organisation, and will not recognise them, whatever declarations they make.

However, within these apparently forbidding parameters, the Jordanians by no means consider that it is impossible to make progress. Various permutations can be imagined for a negotiating team to represent both Palestinians and Jordanians. The present is seen as a

period of intense exploratory diplomatic activity. After the Committee of Seven has completed its tour of world capitals (at the time of writing it has still to visit Paris, Moscow and Peking), King Hussein is due to visit Washington before Christmas.

At the same time, both Jordan and Egypt are acutely conscious of the limited amount of time available. The Jordanians say that they were called in at five minutes to midnight. An Egyptian spokesman pointed out that, at the time of speaking, 71 days had already been wasted since the Reagan initiative, which Israel had defied without producing any American reaction, out of the 500 or so days available before the American Presidency is plunged once more into an election campaign. After that campaign, there will very possibly be a new administration requiring a year or so to study the problem. But by that time Israel will have reached its next target of 100,000 additional settlers on the West Bank and the area will be virtually irrecoverable for the Palestinians.

The Jordanians also have a fear which goes beyond the actual loss of the West Bank and the Gaza strip to the Israelis. They are concerned at what Israeli intentions may be with regard to the Palestinian population, in the wake of a de facto annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. The Jordanians are afraid that the Israelis will expel these Arab populations into Jordan – they even fear existing Palestinian populations in the Lebanon will be expelled into Jordan – either directly, or indirectly by making life increasingly unpleasant for them, thereby threatening the stability of Jordan (which already has a population 60% Palestinian), and if the result was to be the overthrow of the Hashemite dynasty, enabling the Israelis to say "Look, there is your Palestine state". This would fit in with what Israeli Defence Minister Sharon has already said respecting the proper home for the Palestinians. Since the Palestinians have no wish to abandon claims to their West Bank home, this eventuality is no more appealing to them than to the Jordanians, and the fear of it must therefore be assumed to have played a part in bringing the PLO and Jordan together again.

The principal goal of Egyptian foreign policy is to reintegrate Egypt into the Arab world. Events in Lebanon have certainly

served to bring Egypt and the rest of the Arab world closer together, if only because belligerency lost ground. The Fez declaration also renounced violence, and therefore tended to have the same effect. The Egyptians can fairly claim that beneath the surface of formal diplomatic recognition, there is much exchange of contacts at many different levels – political, military, investment, student – between Egypt and other Arab countries. Egypt has developed a project of integration with Sudan, with a common market, a permanent secretariat and a joint parliament. It supplies military material to Iraq. Moreover, the government makes a point of not entering into disputes with other Arab countries, ignoring provocations when they are offered. Since Egypt, therefore, will seize any opportunity to advance its aim of re-establishing its position in the Arab world, it is anxious to find a rôle to play in the peace process. It can therefore be expected to take a constructive attitude. As the Rapporteur left Cairo, it was reported in the newspaper that Yasser Arafat had been officially invited to Cairo for talks.

There can be little doubt that the process of Arab-Egyptian reconciliation has a lot further to go, but at the formal diplomatic level reconciliation is probably some way off. It would be difficult for other Arab countries to have official accreditation to an Arab capital where there was an Israeli ambassador. Egypt may have withdrawn its ambassador to Israel in protest at the massacres in Lebanon, but Israel

is not going to oblige Egypt in a hurry by withdrawing its ambassador from Cairo.

Internally, the Egyptian Government's main problem is probably economic, and in particular, the traditional hard choice between maintaining evermore expensive subsidies on food and other consumer items, including petrol, and provoking discontent by an attempt to remove or reduce them.

In conclusion, the Rapporteur would like to report his impression that Europe is very much seen as having a rôle to play in the Middle East peace process. The Arab desire seems to be that Europe should understand the facts and dangers of the situation, and the just aspirations of the Palestinians, and should continue freely to express its own opinions on the matter, not fearing, but not seeking to confront, the United States. It is well understood, at least since the Venice declaration, and the events leading up to it, that Europe's position is entirely different to that of the United States. It seems to be felt that Europe, by expressing its own views, may, along with other influential sources of opinion, ease the process of change in United States policy which is seen to be the key to progress. At present they should probably see further acts of recognition within Europe towards the PLO as the most constructive contribution Europe could now make towards influencing policy and securing a similar recognition in the United States, and thereby increasing the chances of a negotiated settlement.

*European security and the evolution of the situation in
South-West Asia*

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “ the occupation of Lebanon by the ” insert “ PLO ”.
2. Leave out the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
3. In the ninth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ considerable progress towards the application of Resolution 242 ” and insert “ progress towards the re-establishment of peace in the Middle East ”.
4. Leave out the tenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
5. At the end of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add “ provided it abandons its military structure ”.
6. After the fifteenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Condemning recourse to chemical weapons and the continual massacres of the civilian population in Afghanistan, ”.
7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ aimed at ” to the end of the paragraph and add “ solving the problems which now constitute obstacles to the re-establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East; ”.
8. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows :
“ Call for the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan; ”.
9. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ connection with the Afghan Government ” insert “ and to assist the Afghan resistance movement ”.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 9th and 10th sittings, 30th November and 1st December 1982 (amendments 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 negatived; amendment 3 not moved; amendments 6, 8 and 9 agreed to).

*European security and the evolution of the situation in
South-West Asia*

AMENDMENTS 10, 11 and 12¹

tabled by Mr. Dejardin.

10. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after “applying” insert “United Nations resolutions on the Palestinian question, including”.

11. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “to complete” to the end of the paragraph and insert “and to publish in full the conclusions of the inquiry into the massacres at Sabra and Chatila”.

12. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 10 as follows :

“Should either of the belligerents not agree to negotiations, envisage restrictive measures, if not an embargo, on deliveries of military equipment, arms and munitions to either of the belligerents, Iran or Iraq.”

Signed: Dejardin

1. See 9th and 10th sittings, 30th November and 1st December 1982 (amendment 10 not moved; amendment 11 agreed to; amendment 12 negatived).

*European security and the evolution of the situation in
South-West Asia*

AMENDMENTS 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17¹

tabled by Lord McNair

13. In line 1 of the twelfth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “not” insert “finally”.

14. In line 2 of the twelfth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “problem” to the end of the paragraph and add “and may meanwhile have disadvantageous consequences for the host countries;”.

15. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “people” add “and to all foreign minorities in Lebanon which require it”.

16. After paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Remind the Lebanese Government of its obligations under the universal declaration of rights towards those whom it has arrested or detained;”.

17. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new paragraph as follows :

“Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

(i) urgently to study the feasibility of removing from Lebanon all Palestinians who are willing to leave and of transporting them, without prejudice to their eventual destination, to any countries willing to receive them, and

(ii) to implement such a plan if found to be possible,

while nevertheless reaffirming its belief that eventually a Palestinian homeland is both inevitable and desirable;”.

Signed: Lord McNair

1. See 9th and 10th sittings, 30th November and 1st December 1982 (amendments 13, 14, 16 and 17 negatived; amendment 15 agreed to).

*European security and the evolution of the situation in
South-West Asia*

AMENDMENT 18¹
tabled by Mr. Enders

18. Leave out the ninth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
“Welcoming the fact that the final act adopted by the heads of Arab states at their meeting in Fez on 9th September 1982 contains elements of substance which show considerable progress towards the application of Resolution 242;”.

Signed: Enders

1. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to).

*European security and the evolution of the situation in
South-West Asia*

AMENDMENTS 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24¹

tabled by Mr. Blaauw

- 19 In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “unity” to the end of the paragraph.
20. In line 1 of the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “it” insert “anyhow”.
21. Leave out the tenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
22. In line 1 of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “the only” and insert “an”.
23. In line 2 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “the” insert “present, internationally-recognised”.
24. In line 3 of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add “call on the Lebanese Government to complete their inquiry into the Beirut massacre and to publish a full report on the inquiry”.

Signed: Blaauw

1. See 9th and 10th sittings, 30th November and 1st December 1982 (amendments 19, 20, 22 and 23 negatived; amendment 21 not moved; amendment 24 agreed to).

*European security and the evolution of the situation in
South-West Asia*

AMENDMENTS 25 and 26¹

tabled by Mr. Bassinet

25. Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper.
26. In line 1 of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "only" and insert "most important".

Signed: Bassinet

1. See 9th and 10th sittings, 30th November and 1st December 1982 (amendments negatived).

*European security and the evolution of the situation in
South-West Asia*

AMENDMENT 27¹
tabled by Mr. Wilkinson and others

27. In line 1 of paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “Government” and insert “régime”.

Signed: Wilkinson, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mrs. Knight

¹ See 10th sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendment agreed to).

*European security and the evolution of the situation in
South-West Asia*

AMENDMENT 28¹

tabled by Mr. Wilkinson

28. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “financial” to the end of the paragraph and add “and technical assistance to Pakistan and food aid to Afghan refugees”.

Signed: Wilkinson

1. See 10th sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendment agreed to).

Western European Union

INFORMATION REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments
by Mr. Berchem, Rapporteur*

This report has been circulated separately as a booklet.

*Conditions for improving relations
between the WEU Assembly and public opinion*

INFORMATION REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments
by Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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submitted by Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur

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Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. The purpose of the present report is to examine action taken on the suggestions made by the committee in the report on conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion (Document 912) presented by your Rapporteur at the June 1982 session. To this end, your Rapporteur has drawn up a list of these requests, grouped according to the Assembly body to which they are addressed, and has endeavoured to review action taken and results obtained on each of them. Thus, it can be noted that in several fields the committee's suggestions have been followed up, but much remains to be done.

2. *Inter alia*, your Rapporteur presented the requests which concern the Presidential Committee when it met in Paris on 14th October. The delay was largely due to the fact that the arrangements made had not yet had full effect. This is also the reason why your Rapporteur was not able to distribute the present document earlier.

I. Proposals to the Presidential Committee

3. (i) The Assembly has to realise that it will be much easier to attract the interest of members of national parliaments and of journalists if the Assembly debates topical subjects in the field of European defence. The Assembly of Western European Union is the only parliamentary assembly which is entitled to discuss matters of European "foreign" policy and European defence. Therefore two conclusions can be drawn. For the sake of the credibility of the Assembly the committees, when preparing reports, have to restrict themselves to matters strictly connected with the aims and content of the Brussels Treaty. The second conclusion is that if a report and/or the debate on that report does not reveal anything new and/or any politically relevant fact we cannot expect the press and our colleagues at home to be interested. At the same time it is not good for the credibility of the Assembly if we do not discuss topical subjects. Seen from that point of view the Assembly must discuss the twofold decision by the North Atlantic Council, the peace movements in the European countries, the relations between WEU and the United States, and so on.

4. (ii) Regarding the Assembly's debates, your Rapporteur believes they would undoubtedly gain a wider hearing and have a greater impact

on the parliaments of member countries, thanks to the press in particular, if fewer questions were debated at each session and if the reports dealt with topical matters, which is not the case today.

5. Your Rapporteur therefore suggests that the number of reports submitted by each committee be limited and that one subject be left open until shortly before each session in order to cover any topical question that arises. Another solution might be for each committee to appoint a Rapporteur who would be given a certain possible freedom in the way he handles his subject so that his report might be adapted to the requirements of the day.

6. These two suggestions relate to fields not covered by rules but which affect committee practice when programmes of work are being drawn up and Presidential Committee practice when agendas of sessions are drawn up. Permanent results cannot therefore be expected, but there is hope of a *de facto* improvement.

7. Several remarks may be made:

8. The three subjects of reports referred to in the first paragraph were agreed upon. Two were debated at the June 1982 session on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee presented by Mr. Mommersteeg and Mr. van Eekelen respectively (Documents 918 and 914), and the third is on the agenda of the December 1982 session on a report by the General Affairs Committee to be presented by Mr. Lagorce.

9. Similarly, by withdrawing from the agenda of the December 1982 session two reports which had initially been included, the Presidential Committee acceded to a request by the committee. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for its part, by asking Mr. Blaauw to present a report on the state of European security, left him the necessary freedom to adapt his report to current questions. It can but be hoped that this example will be followed.

10. (iii) It happens only too often that debates are interrupted by addresses by ministers followed – and this is worthwhile – by questions and answers. Your Rapporteur suggests that ministers be invited to address the Assembly in the framework of the debate on specific reports. They should speak on the report and not only answer questions but take part in the debate on the report as a whole, or at least a

substantial part of it. There would thus be a true exchange of views with a minister or, in any event, with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on a topical subject of interest to the press and public opinion. The minister might open the debate after the Rapporteur has presented the report, and wind it up, as is customary in the parliaments of member countries. Your Rapporteur cannot over-emphasise the value of this suggestion.

11. (iv) A member of the committee stressed the value for members of the Assembly and the press of taking votes immediately after debates and not grouping them since it is difficult for a journalist one day to write about a report and the relevant debate and the next day or the day after give the result of the vote. If he did so, he would be neither read nor understood by the public. It is for the Assembly to follow up this sensible remark.

12. (v) Special attention should be paid to the meetings between representatives of the Assembly and of the Council. It is obvious that there is a relationship between the importance of a meeting (i.e. the subject of the meeting) and who is present at the meeting (i.e. ministers or ambassadors). The Rapporteur is inclined to believe that if there are hardly any subjects of importance to deal with it is preferable not to organise such a meeting between Assembly and Council representatives. On the other hand the Assembly is entitled to expect better "ministerial" representation of the Council if more important subjects are to be discussed.

13. (vi) Your Rapporteur thinks that it might be worthwhile from every point of view for the Assembly, at a forthcoming session, to organise a meeting between some of its members and journalists who follow sessions in order to obtain their opinions on how its methods of work might be adapted. The Presidential Committee or the Committee for Relations with Parliaments might be made responsible for this contact which could be a friendly meeting with broad terms of reference.

14. All these requests were submitted to the Presidential Committee by your Rapporteur at its meeting on 14th October 1982, the first meeting since the Assembly's June session. Although it cannot be said that any formal decisions were reached in this connection, it was clear that the first two in any event corresponded to concerns of the President of the Assembly and that they would encounter no objection of principle. Your Rapporteur reserves the right to raise these requests again at the earliest opportunity.

II. *Proposals to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*

15. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments plays a very particular kind of rôle, which is defined in a special rule of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, Rule 42 *bis*. This rule lays down that paragraphs 6 and 7 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure on candidatures for membership of committees and the composition of their bureaux shall apply to the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, thus implying that the other rules on committees do not apply, particularly Rule 42 on reports of committees, Rule 41 on procedure in committees and Rule 40 on the powers of committees.

16. On the other hand, paragraph 5 of Rule 42 *bis* allows it to invite to its meetings the administrative secretaries of national delegations, i.e. non-parliamentarians, and furthermore its composition (two members per member country) takes no account of the weighting which exists in the composition of other committees, thus implying that it cannot adopt recommendations for presentation to the Assembly.

17. Conversely, it has three duties under Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure:

- (i) to select, from the texts adopted by the Assembly, those which, in its opinion, should be debated in the parliaments ;
- (ii) to make all necessary arrangements with a view to calling the parliaments' attention to the work of the Assembly and inviting them to follow up this work ;
- (iii) to submit to the Assembly, twice each year, a report on its activities.

18. These remarks throw light on the content of the present report. It is normal and desirable for the Committee for Relations with Parliaments to examine and report to the Assembly on how it hopes the Assembly's work might be brought more closely to the attention of parliaments. It should be added that several times and in various ways it has been brought out at recent sessions that the Assembly, and particularly the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, considered the press's interest in the Assembly's work to be an essential factor in its effectiveness both as regards public opinion in general and also the parliaments of member countries.

19. It is inevitable for the tasks and responsibilities of the committee to be extended in two ways:

- (a) the committee should be renamed the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations ;

- (b) the rules should be changed in order to enable the committee to present a draft recommendation or order to the Assembly.

20. Your Rapporteur communicated this request to the Presidential Committee at its meeting on 14th October 1982 and the latter decided to submit it to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges so that it might report on it at the June 1983 session. It appeared that a change in the name of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments should not encounter any major obstacles but that the conditions in which that committee could take decisions raised delicate problems which the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges should examine most attentively.

21. Your Rapporteur wishes to underline that the difficulties he has encountered in ensuring implementation of the requests of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments contained in the present report strengthen his conviction that the committee cannot work properly until it is empowered to adopt texts upon which the Assembly can vote. The adoption of an order including the present requests would quite clearly have brought such implementation forward by several months. The present situation is a source of dissatisfaction because of the time which elapses before the committee's requests are transmitted to the Assembly and can but help to discourage its members from taking initiatives.

III. *Proposals to the chairmen of national delegations*

22. (i) Each delegation should prepare a report on each Assembly session for circulation to all members of parliament in the member countries at the earliest possible date. Most delegations do so, but the practice might be generalised.

23. (ii) National delegations might organise meetings and contacts after each session of the Assembly so as to report to the parliamentary press of their own countries on what happened during the session. It is therefore for the delegations and their secretariats to take such initiatives, and too much cannot be done to encourage them in this sense.

24. While the first of these requests corresponds to increasingly general practice, the second requires a new special effort by national delegations and your Rapporteur has therefore decided to write to the chairmen of delegations, sending them the relevant suggestions of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

IV. *Proposals to the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*

25. (i) It would be desirable for the Committee for Relations with Parliaments of the WEU Assembly to establish and maintain frequent contacts with its counterpart in the Council of Europe and take advantage of the latter's experience.

26. (ii) The primary function of the committee is to select texts from among those adopted by the Assembly for transmission to national parliaments. In your Rapporteur's opinion the committee should limit its selection to those texts which contain practical and concise proposals that governments can implement and not select any texts drafted in broad terms and dealing only with questions of general principle.

27. (iii) Your Rapporteur feels that it is worth considering whether the committee should discuss selections more intensively, determine priorities among texts suggested for selection and agree on "campaign tactics" with regard to their follow-up at national level.

28. (iv) Discussing such tactics is important, since a parliamentary question is not always the best way of dealing with a subject. More use might be made of direct approaches to governments. Moreover, in different countries different methods have to be applied. There is room for differentiation in proposals for action on Assembly texts.

29. (v) Members of the committee could be invited:

- (a) to participate more actively in the discussion of proposals concerning texts with a view to agreeing on more differentiated action at national level;
- (b) to invite to its meetings rapporteurs from other committees to enable them to give advice about the best approach to "selling" the adopted texts to national parliaments and to the press;
- (c) to discuss whether
 - the number of texts to be selected after each part-session should be further limited;
 - the material provided by the secretariat is appropriate;
 - further model questions should be prepared by the secretariat.

30. (vi) It is therefore for members of the committee to adapt the questions they put in the light of their countries' specific problems. They have moreover always understood this, but they might be asked to make a further effort

not to give up the idea of putting a question to their governments on a recommendation adopted by the WEU Assembly merely because the wording proposed by the Chairman of the committee seems inappropriate to the situation in their countries.

31. A follow-up procedure should be worked out *inter alia* to consider, for instance once a year, whether a continuing action could be effective.

32. (vii) A member of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments suggested that a Rapporteur be appointed to compare the replies of the various governments to the questions put in national parliaments. This suggestion might be adopted, and the committee's next Rapporteur could be asked to carry out this comparison for the recommendations adopted in 1981, or at least some of them.

33. (viii) It would be desirable for the next Rapporteur of the committee to bring together all the committee's earlier decisions in order to see what action was taken on them and what results were achieved, so as to select those which were not satisfactorily applied and thus describe the way in which the committee has carried out its duties under Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure and what it should do to improve the way in which it fulfils its rôle.

34. (ix) What use do members of the Assembly make of the "Monthly Information Bulletin" or the "Monthly Index of Documents"? Your Rapporteur suggests that a questionnaire be sent to members of the Assembly to ascertain whether they really wish to receive such documents and that, if necessary, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and possibly the Presidential Committee re-examine the usefulness of publishing them.

35. (x) Moreover, certain documents are difficult to use because the information given reaches members of the Assembly in separate parts. Your Rapporteur is thinking of the questions put by members of the Assembly to their governments in the national parliaments and the answers received. Instead of distributing both questions and answers separately, they might be published collectively prior to each Assembly session, which is already done, but in future they might be grouped so as to make them easier to consult in accordance with a procedure which will be described below, the aim being to give a far clearer picture of the policies of the governments of member countries on matters dealt with by WEU.

36. The first six requests concern the committee's work at the meetings it holds at the close of each Assembly session. Your Rapporteur proposes to recall them at the meeting to be held during the December 1982 session.

37. The requests relating to the committee's next report should be implemented on the same occasion when the subject of the committee's report for June 1983 has to be agreed upon and the Rapporteur appointed.

38. On the second request, a first comment is that to date the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly has not received a single question, nor a fortiori an answer, relating to recommendations adopted during the June 1982 session.

39. Conversely, there has been some response to several other requests:

(i) The report submitted by Mr. Berchem on an outline booklet on WEU and its activities includes, with regard to each chapter, a reminder of the principal recommendations made by the Assembly to the Council on each of the WEU organs and the Council's replies. This reference obviously enhances the information which the booklet gives on WEU and its activities and fully meets the committee's wishes.

(ii) As an experiment, your Rapporteur gives at appendix to the present report the answers given to questions put in national parliaments on Recommendation 371 on European security and events in the Gulf area. This recommendation was chosen because of the number of questions put and the interest and diversity of the answers received. This appendix should allow the committee to say how it intends to pursue this attempt.

40. Experience has brought out a difficulty, i.e. the time that elapses between the date the questions are put and the date on which answers are obtained. This means that a collection of questions and replies cannot be prepared less than one year after the adoption of a recommendation by the Assembly, thus detracting considerably from their interest.

41. Work has also begun on the ninth request since the questionnaire referred to has been sent to members of the Assembly who have been asked to reply before 15th November 1982.

42. Action on requests (i) to (vi) depends on the committee and its members. Your Rapporteur wishes them to be as zealous as they were in 1981 in putting questions to their governments and keeping the committee informed.

V. *Proposals to committee chairmen*

43. A major effort should be made to ensure that matters dealt with are followed up after

recommendations are adopted. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments cannot do this alone and each Assembly committee might take responsibility for examining action taken by the Council or by the governments of member countries on the recommendations which it submitted to the Assembly.

44. Each committee might examine ways and means of doing this. An appropriate means might be the formation of a sub-committee for this purpose. This was the solution adopted by the General Affairs Committee for following problems raised by a recommendation on developments in the Middle East which was adopted in June 1981. This experience might be worthy of closer examination.

45. It should be added that the General Affairs Committee has set up a sub-committee to examine action taken on the report submitted by Mr. De Poi in December 1981 on European union and WEU. Your Rapporteur will also write to the chairmen of the other committees informing them of the suggestions of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

VI. Proposals to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

46. Between four and ten weeks after each session, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments for its part issues a booklet giving a summary of debates and addresses by ministers together with the texts of recommendations adopted.

47. Your Rapporteur considers that the summary of debates takes insufficient account of the ideas voiced by the various political groups. Only speeches by rapporteurs and committee chairmen are summarised and the amendments tabled are not included.

48. In future, the Chairman of the committee will endeavour to ensure that certain speeches and amendments, particularly those made on behalf of political groups, are summarised or, in the case of amendments, reproduced in the booklet on the session.

49. Your Rapporteur will ensure that the booklet on the December 1982 session meets this request.

APPENDIX I

*Recommendation 371¹ on European security and events in the Gulf area²,
reply of the Council and questions and answers
in national parliaments*

RECOMMENDATION 371

The Assembly,

Recalling its Recommendation 361;

Noting that the situation brought about by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has not changed since then but that the consequences for the Afghan people have become considerably worse;

Considering that this invasion also constitutes a direct threat to the security of all southern Asian countries as well as to peace in the world;

Recognising that the lack of progress towards peace between Israel and its neighbouring countries makes it impossible to restore stability throughout the Middle East;

Deploring the prolongation of the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran;

Deploring, in condemning Israel's air attack on Baghdad, the resultant increase in tension throughout the whole Middle East which reduces the credibility of the West, especially of the United States, in seeking to provide compromise solutions to intractable problems in the area;

Considering that it is of vital interest to Europe to maintain good relations with all the Arab countries but not to intervene in any way in the internal affairs of any of these countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Demonstrate the will of its members to oppose any intervention by the Soviet Union in the Middle Eastern countries;
2. Concert its efforts with the United States to afford assistance to the Afghan resistance movement;
3. Furnish substantial economic aid to Pakistan in order to help it to receive refugees on its territory without unacceptable social and economic damage to its own economy and also provide that country with the defensive armaments it urgently needs for its own security;
4. At the same time express Europe's determination to oppose Soviet military intervention and its will not to intervene in disputes which remain confined to the area;
5. Offer active support and help to all efforts made by the countries of the area to assume collectively their own security;
6. Actively and jointly seek agreement between all countries likely to supply weapons to Iraq and Iran with a view to halting arms supplies to the two belligerents;
7. With a view to making Europe less dependent on Middle Eastern oil producers, propose consultations with the governments of other oil-consuming countries designed to promote an energy policy aimed at a progressive reduction in world oil consumption;
8. Express its condemnation of any aggression against countries in the area, and propose that the United Nations use appropriate sanctions against any aggressor whatsoever.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1981.

2. Report tabled by Mr. Forni on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, Document 871 and Addendum.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

1. The Council note that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had a detrimental effect on international relations. They are aware of the threat to the stability of the region of which the Gulf is a part and which has developed over the past two years. They are determined to oppose any attempts by the Soviet Union to exploit the situation. In this context, they continue to deplore the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops. They welcome the initiatives taken by the Islamic Conference, the European Council and the United Nations Secretary-General to promote a political solution in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolutions of 14th January 1980 and 20th November 1980. The Permanent Council of WEU wish also to recall the recent proposals put forward by the European Council, as expressed in its declaration of 30th June 1981. Indeed, they note that these proposals remain on the table and offer a reasonable, practical framework for moving towards an internationally-acceptable settlement of this problem. The governments of Western European Union await, from the Soviet Union, a positive and constructive response to this initiative. They repeat their call for an immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan and call on all parties to work for a peaceful settlement which would enable Afghanistan to return to its traditional independent and non-aligned status.

2. The Council believe that one of the major elements of the situation in Afghanistan is the existence of a nationwide movement of resistance to Soviet intervention and to the setting-up of a puppet régime in Kabul. The opposition of the Afghan people to the Soviet invasion has also been demonstrated by the continuing exodus of Afghan refugees (now numbering considerably more than 2 million) into Pakistan and Iran.

The Council regret that the International Red Cross has not been allowed to carry out its humanitarian mission in Afghanistan.

3. In order to alleviate the grave humanitarian problems caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Council believe it is essential that states should also give economic aid to Pakistan to help provide for the Afghan refugees. The WEU member states express their support and admiration for the generosity and humanity with which Pakistan has taken in so many refugees.

4. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman have recently formed the Gulf Co-operation Council, in order to increase their co-operation in many spheres. European states, concerned about the maintenance of stability in the Gulf area, have noted the wish of the Gulf states to co-operate among themselves without asking for external support. They therefore heartily welcome the creation of the Gulf Co-operation Council and the objectives which it is pursuing. WEU member states recognise the need for continuous and close contacts of every kind between Europe and the Gulf states, as evidenced by the increased number of high-level visits between the two regions. European states, moreover, attach much importance to the continuation of contacts through such means as the Euro/Arab dialogue. Europe's greatest contribution to the stability of the Gulf can be made by the continuation of the European Council's efforts on the Arab/Israel dispute, the core of which is the Palestinian problem and which remains the primary concern of all Arab Gulf states.

5. The Council welcome the efforts being made to solve the Iran/Iraq war by the Islamic Conference, the special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and by the non-aligned movement. The Council are ready to support any measures which seem likely to be effective in bringing an end to the hostilities and which can command the necessary international approval. The Council recall that on 23rd September 1981, immediately after the worsening of the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Foreign Ministers of the Nine at their meeting in New York recalled, in a declaration concerning the conflict, the supreme importance that the entire international community attaches to ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Gulf which should in no way be impeded.

6. The WEU member states are concerned to do what they can to maintain and enhance stability in the Gulf area. They have in the past expressed their condemnation of all acts of violence in the Middle East and would do so again if the need arose.

7. In view of the sharp increase in the price of oil over the past few years, the countries of WEU are all concerned to work for lower energy consumption, whether at European or world level,

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th November 1981.

through such bodies as the International Energy Agency, as regards those states which are members. There is already regular consultation with governments of other states which face the same need. All oil-consuming countries share an interest in seeing a stable world energy market. As for the Gulf producers, the Council note that certain of them have made significant reductions in their oil production.

Questions and answers in national parliaments

Luxembourg

Chamber of Deputies

Question put by Mr. Prussen on Recommendation 371 (22nd June 1981)

What is the government's attitude towards this recommendation and is it prepared to support and ensure implementation of the proposals it contains?

Reply by Mrs. Flesch, Minister for Foreign Affairs (6th July 1981)

The Luxembourg Government has no intention of tackling the matters referred to in Recommendation 371 communicated to the WEU Council. These matters are the subject of systematic discussions at every level in the framework of political co-operation between the ten member countries of the European Community. Numerous positions have been adopted and made public and there have been confidential discussions and decisions.

Very recently, on 29th and 30th June, the European Council, bringing together the heads of state or of government of the member countries of the European Community and their Ministers for Foreign Affairs, discussed all the problems raised by the Near and Middle East. A copy of the position adopted is attached. In this context, particular attention should be paid to the formal declaration on Afghanistan.

European Council declaration on Afghanistan

1. The European Council notes with deep concern that the situation in Afghanistan remains an important cause of international tension, that Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan and that the sufferings of the Afghan people continue to increase.

2. The European Council recalls its earlier statements, notably those issued at Venice on 13th June 1980, and Maastricht on 24th March 1981, which stressed the urgent need to bring about a solution which would enable Afghanistan to return to its traditional independent and non-aligned status free from external inter-

ference and with the Afghan people having the full capacity to exercise their right to self-determination. In keeping with the resolutions voted by the United Nations, the Islamic Conference and the New Delhi Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, the European Council has made it clear on several occasions that it will support any initiative which could lead to the desired result.

3. The European Council considers that the time has come for a fresh attempt to open the way to a political solution to the problem of Afghanistan. They therefore propose that an international conference should be convened as soon as possible, for example in October or November 1981, and that the conference should consist of two stages, each stage being an integral part of the conference.

4. The purpose of stage one would be to work out international arrangements designed to bring about the cessation of external intervention and the establishment of safeguards to prevent such intervention in the future and thus to create conditions in which Afghanistan's independence and non-alignment can be assured.

5. The European Council proposes that in due course the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Pakistan, Iran and India and the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, or their representatives, be invited to participate in stage one of the conference.

6. The purpose of stage two would be to reach agreement on the implementation of the international arrangements worked out in stage one and on all other matters designed to assure Afghanistan's future as an independent and non-aligned state.

7. Stage two would be attended by the participants in stage one together with representatives of the Afghan people.

8. The member states of the European Community will be ready at a later stage to make further proposals on the detailed arrangements for the proposed conference.

9. The European Council firmly believes that the situation in Afghanistan continues to

demand the attention of the international community. It is convinced that this proposal offers a constructive way forward and therefore calls on the international community to support it fully with the aim of reducing international tension and ending human suffering in Afghanistan.

Middle East

The European Council noted the report of the Presidency as well as Mr. van der Klaauw's oral comments on his contacts with the parties concerned with the Middle East conflict.

It concluded that the efforts undertaken by the Ten to promote the conclusion of a peaceful settlement should be continued energetically and without respite, taking account of the results of the missions decided upon in Venice.

Accordingly, the European Council decided, on the basis of the results of the mission just completed by the President-in-Office, to instruct ministers to elaborate further the practical possibilities available to Europe to make an effective contribution towards a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, through internal reflection, appropriate contacts being maintained with all parties concerned, including the United States.

As regards the attack by the Israeli air force on the Iraqi nuclear plant on 7th June 1981 the European Council can only endorse the resolution adopted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council.

Lebanon

Recalling its earlier statements concerning Lebanon, the European Council noted with interest the results of the work of the Arab quadripartite committee. The Council earnestly hoped that positive results would be obtained at the committee's next meeting in Beit-ed-Dine, so as to achieve a genuine national reconciliation which can give Lebanon internal security and foster its stability in peace with its neighbours.

Belgium

Chamber of Representatives

Question put by Mr. Dejardin on Recommendation 371 (27th July 1981)

The acts of warlike folly committed recently by Israel, both in Iraq with the bombing of a nuclear plant and in Lebanon with the bombing of civilians and airborne raids

and landings, have revived tension in the Middle East and further delayed hopes of lasting peace in the area.

However, tension is not confined to the action and attitudes of Israel towards its neighbours, including the persecution of the Palestinian people. The situation in the Middle East is also disrupted by the interminable deadlocked war between Iran and Iraq, the absurd repression of the Kurds in Eastern Turkey and Iran, the real civil war being waged by Islamic fundamentalists in Iran against all ethnic and religious minorities, including the Bahais, etc.

The political Middle East under tension detrimental to peace and a hotbed of serious strife now in fact therefore extends from Istanbul to Pakistan and from the Caucasus to the Arabian Peninsula.

Does the Minister not consider that the steps taken by the ten member countries of the European Community to promote the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East might be extended to the Gulf area in order to assure countries in that area of Europe's support for any measures they may take to ensure their collective peace and security?

Reply by Mr. Nothomb, Minister for Foreign Affairs (1st September 1981)

I have the honour to inform the honourable member that, aware of the danger to peace constituted by the tension now disrupting the Middle East, the Belgian Government takes every possible opportunity to demonstrate its serious concern about any event which might further destabilise an area to whose security and integrity it is deeply attached.

It consequently encourages and supports any action and initiative likely to promote the restoration of peace and balance in the area.

The Belgian Government therefore welcomed with great satisfaction the formation of a council for co-operation between the Gulf countries and, in a message published in the international press, I conveyed to the heads of state and of government of the member countries of that council my wishes for the success of their undertaking on the occasion of their first summit meeting in Abu Dhabi on 26th May 1981.

Like Belgium, its partners in the European Community, involved in an effort to promote the conclusion of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, believe that a global settlement of the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries, of which the Palestinian problem is the nucleus, and the consequent calming of the

tension which has prevailed for more than thirty years, will allow the area as a whole to recover its integrity and balance in peace.

France

Senate

Question put by Mr. Jeambrun on Recommendation 371 (24th July 1981)

Does the Minister for External Relations consider that the steps taken by the ten member countries of the European Community to promote the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East might be extended to the Persian Gulf area? Such an attitude would have the merit of assuring countries in that area of Europe's support for any measures they may take to ensure their collective security.

Reply by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations (30th September 1981)

The situation in the Arab-Persian Gulf may effectively be analysed as an element of the overall problem of security in the Near and Middle East. There are specific aspects to this situation, however, which preclude considering extending to this area steps taken by the European Community countries specifically to promote the restoration of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours which implies the settlement of the Palestinian question. The first condition for the success of possible European action with regard to the Gulf is that it must be requested, or at least accepted, by the states in the area. But to date no Gulf state has asked the Ten to intervene in any way. On the contrary, all the countries in the area subscribe to the principle that the security of the Gulf is their sole responsibility. This principle has just been recalled by the conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the member countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council held in Taif on 1st and 2nd September under Saudi Arabian chairmanship. This conference again rejected any foreign interference or intervention in the area. The French Government for its part has stated on several occasions that it too considered the security of the Gulf to be the responsibility of the states of the area, which should acquire the necessary means of ensuring this security.

United Kingdom

House of Commons

Question put by Mrs. Knight on Recommendation 371 (28th October 1981)

Mrs. KNIGHT asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will propose that the steps taken by the ten member countries of the European Community to promote peace in the Middle East should be extended to the Gulf area in order to assure countries in that area of Europe's support for any measures they may take to ensure their collective security.

Reply by Mr. Hurd, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

At the Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels last month, Foreign Ministers of the Ten welcomed the increased co-operation among the six member states of the newly formed Gulf Co-operation Council, with all of whom the Ten have close and friendly relations. They also agreed to establish informal contacts with the Gulf Co-operation Council in order to consider the scope for possible co-operation between the Gulf Co-operation Council and the Ten.

We have also welcomed the valuable contribution that the formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council will make towards enhancing regional stability and security. We believe that it should be primarily for the Gulf states to determine their own security needs, and have expressed willingness in principle to help should the states of the region ask us to do so.

Questions put by Sir Frederic Bennett on Recommendation 371 and replies by Mr. Atkins, Lord Privy Seal (7th December 1981)

Sir Frederic BENNETT asked the Lord Privy Seal if, in the light of Recommendation 922 (1981) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the situation of refugees from Afghanistan, Her Majesty's Government intends to take any additional measures.

Mr. ATKINS. — Her Majesty's Government continue to play their full part in the programme of assistance to the Afghan refugees. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced in Pakistan on 8th October the allocation of a further £2 million for this purpose. The government continue to work for a peaceful settlement which will enable the Afghan refugees to return to their homes in safety and honour.

Sir Frederic BENNETT asked the Lord Privy Seal what is his policy towards the organisation of an international conference on the Afghanistan crisis.

Mr. ATKINS. — Her Majesty's Government consider that the European Council proposals of 30th June for holding an international conference on Afghanistan continue to offer a

reasonable and practical means of moving towards a political settlement.

Sir Frederic BENNETT asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will publish details in the Official Report of the political and financial support the government have given to the programmes of international organisations involved in the assistance of refugees from Afghanistan and for the Government of Pakistan's programme of assistance.

Mr. ATKINS. — Since January 1980 Her

Majesty's Government have given or pledged some £7.8 million for the Afghan refugees, including some £4.25 million through the European Community. This assistance has been in cash, emergency supplies, and food aid, given mainly to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees programme. It also includes a cash pledge to the Pakistan Government of £1.5 million, which is subject to Parliamentary approval. The Government fully support the work of international organisations in giving assistance to the Afghan refugees.

APPENDIX II

Table of action in the parliaments of member countries
(Totals by country for each session)

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							Total
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	16	40	13	14	2	3	8	96
1977	4	18	4	15	1	1	14	57
1978	17	49	12	21	4	10	14	127
1979	9	45	12	10	10	1	10	97
1980	0	32	16	14	12	0	8	82
1981	15	40	12	9	18	2	38	134
Total	122	377	245	320	65	101	285	1,515
Annual average ...	4.69	14.50	9.42	12.31	2.50	3.88	10.96	8.32

APPENDIX III

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1978

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1978	312									-	33
	313	x	2	2					2	6	
	314	x	2	2		1	2	3	2	12	
	315			2		2				4	
	316									-	
	317				2	1				3	
	318	x	1	3		1			2	7	
	319									-	
	320									-	
	321					1				1	
Nov. 1978	322					1				1	72
	323	x		6		1				7	
	324					1				1	
	325		7	2	2	1				12	
	326	x	2		4	3			2	11	
327									-		
328	x	2		2	4	2	2	4	16		
Other action			4	7	4	4		3	2	24	
June 1979	329	x	2	2	2		2		2	10	37
	330									-	
	331		2							2	
	332									-	
	333	x	2	2					2	6	
	334									-	
335	x	2	2	4				6	14		
Resolution 63						3			3		
Other action				2							
Dec. 1979	336									-	47
	337	x			2		2		2	6	
	338	x	1	2						5	
	339	x		2						2	
	340									-	
	341	x	2	2			8			12	
	342									-	
	343									-	
344									-		
Other action		5	3	6	7		1		22		

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1980	345									-	56
	346									-	
	347					2				2	
	348			7						7	
	349	x		1	2		6	2	2	13	
	350					2				2	
	351			2	2					4	
	352	x		2	4	2				8	
	353			2		2				4	
	354				6					6	
Other action			4		2			2	8		
Dec. 1980	355					2				2	44
	356										
	357										
	358	x		6	4	2	2		2	16	
	359	x			4		2		4	10	
	360										
	361										
	362						2			2	
363						2			2		
Other action			10	2					12		
June 1981	364	x	2	2					2	6	75
	365	x	2	4					2	8	
	366	x	2	4			2		2	10	
	367	x		2			2			4	
	368	x	2	2					2	6	
	369	x	2	2					10	14	
	370	x		2			2	2		6	
371	x	2	2			2		4	10		
Other action			7	2					9		
Dec. 1981	372	x		4			2		2	8	49
	373	x		4	2				2	8	
	374			2	2		2			6	
	375			2	2					4	
	376										
	377										
Other action		3	3	2	2		3	10	23		

*Energy requirements and the security of Europe –
Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur*

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the committee.

² *Members of the committee* Mr. Vallet (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Alternate: Jessel) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), Adriaensens (Alternate: Biefnot), Amadei, Antoni, Barthe (Alternate: Lagorce), Fiandrotti, Forma, Fortier (Alternate:

Bassinnet, Fourré, Garrett, Sir Paul Hawkins (Alternate: Sir Russell Fairgreive), MM. McGuire, Manning, Prussen, Spies von Büllenheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Topmann, Worrell.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's
contribution to meeting these requirements***

The Assembly,

Considering the need for close relations between Western European countries and Norway on such subjects as security, economic, energy, space and other research and development policies ;

Considering also the relationship between the Norwegian energy supply and other important energy resources outside Western Europe and the fact that before 1990 more Norwegian gas cannot be available to replace all or part of Soviet gas ;

Aware of the risk of all Western European countries importing concurrently their energy supplies from outside Western Europe and of the wastefulness of duplicate pipelines ;

Considering that Western Europe and the United States do not always make the same analysis and do not always have the same view of East-West economic relations ;

Considering the need for a close study of European energy requirements in the next decades so as to ensure Europe's energy supplies, particularly natural gas, essential for its security ;

Considering also the need to study the present rôle of COCOM, the co-ordinating committee of the allied countries which supervises high technology and defence exports to Eastern European countries, and to update COCOM's list of prohibited items,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote and reinforce relations between Norway and the other countries of Western Europe in security, economic, energy, space and other research and development policies;
2. Promote studies on:
 - (a) European energy requirements in the next decades and the consequent problems for Europe's security and defence;
 - (b) high technology exports to Eastern European countries liable to have military applications;
 - (c) the possibilities of setting up an interconnected intra-European gas pipeline network;and report to the Assembly on the results of these studies;
3. Promote an energy policy designed to guarantee member countries regular and adequate supplies of energy to meet their security requirements.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. On 15th June 1982 the committee decided to visit Norway and to submit a report on this visit at the December 1982 session. Subsequent political developments induced the committee to change the title and content of the report from "European security and technological developments in Norway" to "energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements". This was considered expedient in view of the new situation arising from plans for the Siberian pipeline for bringing Soviet gas to Western Europe.
2. Everybody is convinced that to ensure the continuity of supplies of energy and raw materials the greatest possible diversification of sources of supply is desirable for Europe. In this context, the question of imports of energy from Eastern European countries is to be examined.
3. Oil and raw materials, sea lanes for their transportation and markets in which to earn the money to pay for them have now become strategic stakes.
4. Imports from Eastern European countries are composed of 8 % machinery, 17 % semi-finished goods and the remainder oil, gas and raw materials. Since 1973 Europe has been unable to achieve joint action, co-operation and the definition of a medium- and long-term energy policy. Some common objectives were fixed in 1974 and on 22nd and 23rd June 1980 the energy position was discussed at the summit conference in Venice. Guidelines to be implemented by 1990 were drawn up for better use of energy, lower oil consumption and the use of other energy resources such as coal and nuclear means.
5. No wonder Mr. Fiandrotti said in his report of 18th May 1982 (Document 917) that the committee was not satisfied with the Council's replies as they did not indicate the reasons why a common energy policy still could not be developed, nor whether the energy policy guidelines for the 1990s should be stringent or not.
6. The committee's visit to Norway was especially planned to obtain a clear picture of the Norwegian Government's policy on energy matters and on the possibilities of replacing Eastern European by Western European, and especially Norwegian, energy sources. This is

one of the arguments advanced by the United States Government against Western European assistance to the Soviet Union for opening up the Siberian gasfields.

7. In the following chapters your Rapporteur has given an outline of Norwegian policy in general and its energy and research and development policy in particular. Your Rapporteur wishes to conclude his report with a chapter on new developments in energy requirements and the question of the Siberian pipeline.

I. General aspects of the Norwegian external political situation

8. Norway has been an independent country for only 77 years and this still seems to influence its foreign policy. Following a referendum in 1972 Norway refused to join the European Economic Community. Nevertheless, it has now established close economic and political co-operation with the EEC. Its closest ties are of course with its Scandinavian kinsmen with whom the Nordic Council was formed. In addition, its attitude towards the United States and the USSR has an important place in Norway's foreign policy. Traditionally, contacts with Russia have always been limited and their common border has always been a peaceful one. However, when the Soviet Union became a superpower, geopolitical pressure built up in the northern region of Norway and its security problems increased considerably. This does not mean, however, that the very large military complex, the Soviet Kola base, is directed against Norway, but it is clear that the Soviet Union would derive a significant strategic advantage if it could control northern Norway. It has certainly always shown its willingness to achieve strategic gains whenever possible at not too heavy a cost.

9. Development of oil and gas activities on Norway's continental shelf and the prospects of new oil and gas discoveries under the seabed off northern Norway and in the Barents Sea have added to the significance and sensitivity of the northern area.

10. Norway joined the Atlantic Alliance in 1949, thus allowing Norwegian defences to be strengthened in case of emergency. Through NATO, the United States is, apart from the Scandinavian countries, its most important ally in security matters and the relationship with the

United States is a lifeline of Norwegian foreign policy. Norwegian national security calls for the main part of its regular land forces to be deployed in northern Norway. These 5,000 men however can in no way constitute a threat, particularly since the three northern provinces, although very extensive geographically, are inhabited by only some 400,000 people. A regional balance of forces is therefore not possible.

11. The alliance fully realises the common interest of maintaining the territorial and political integrity of Norway. Allied reinforcements have to be trained if they are to be credible. There has to be sufficient infrastructure to receive and support such reinforcements. Combined exercises are therefore held with American, British, Canadian, Danish and Dutch forces. Exercises are not held however in the province of Finmark where there is a common frontier of some 200 kilometres with the Soviet Union. The infrastructure and exercises are additionally necessary because of the Norwegian policy of not permitting foreign military bases on Norwegian soil in peacetime. Nor does the government permit the stationing of nuclear or chemical weapons.

12. In spite of current economic difficulties, Norway has met the NATO agreement for defence spending with an annual increase of 3 % in real terms.

13. Although for reasons of internal policy Norway is firmly committed to work for arms control and disarmament, it nevertheless supports the NATO decision of December 1979 relating to the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

14. In this context, the question of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries should be mentioned. It is public knowledge that the only nuclear weapons in the northern area are stationed in the Soviet Union. A separate agreement between the Soviet Union and the Nordic countries whereby the latter would relinquish the option to receive and to deploy nuclear weapons at any time in return for a guarantee from the Soviet Union that nuclear weapons would not be used against the area is therefore conceivable. But would it be in the security interests of Norway?

15. On 4th December 1981, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Sverre Strøm, stated in the Storting:

“I should like to emphasise that at no time will there be any question of Norway, on its own or together with other Nordic countries, taking up negotiations with the Soviet Union on this issue.

As concerns our immediate vicinity otherwise, there is no reason to conceal the fact that Norway has the world's largest naval base as a neighbour on the Kola peninsula. Over 500 vessels are stationed here. There are no less than sixteen airfields, of which eight are operative. Through transfers from other areas, the Soviet air forces in the Kola region could thus be doubled or trebled in the course of a short time.”

16. A very different matter would of course be the concept of such a zone as an integral part of a broad European disarmament and arms control arrangement to be negotiated and entered into by the Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact countries.

17. Norway has not supported proposals to extend the geographical area of NATO responsibility but fully appreciates that several members of the alliance have security responsibilities outside this area.

18. Norway is a part of Western Europe, geographically, politically, economically and culturally. Although not a member of the European Community, it is following with particular attention the accelerating political co-operation among the Ten which also affects Norwegian political interests. Contact arrangements have been made with the Presidency of the Ten in order to achieve a two-way channel of communications. According to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Sverre Strøm:

“Our chief problem is not that we know too little about the policy decisions, but rather that we do not have enough opportunity to influence them. In future the government will actively assess Norway's relationship to this foreign policy co-operation. The aim is to arrive at the best possible working procedures so that Norwegian interests may be safeguarded...

.....

The mutual economic dependence between Norway and the Economic Community is increasing. This applies to fields such as oil and gas, industrial establishments and shipping. In 1980 a good 70 % of Norwegian exports, including oil and gas, went to the Economic Community countries and 48 % of our imports came from the Economic Community area. The Community is accordingly our principal trading partner and the most important market for our merchant shipping services.”

19. In parallel, Norway tries to maintain a bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union which in times of tension is not always very

easy. It has tried to reach a bilateral agreement on the demarcation line in the offshore economic zones between the Norwegian and Russian islands in the Barents Sea. So far, no agreement has been reached and therefore economic activities in the area have been halted¹.

20. A new factor in Norway's relations with other countries is the oil and gas discoveries which, of course, also influence the Norwegian domestic situation. The government recognises its international responsibilities in terms of world energy supplies and Norway is already a substantial supplier of oil and gas to Western Europe. In the abovementioned statement, the Foreign Minister declared:

“Our extensive petroleum operations put Norway in a special position compared to other western countries: we are in fact the only net exporter of petroleum. In the first half of the 1980s oil and natural gas will constitute approximately 35 % of our total exports and between 15 and 20 % of our GNP. It is therefore obvious that petroleum operations will have consequences for our foreign policy and that events in other parts of the world will affect this important sector of our economy. Petroleum operations have increasingly drawn attention to Norway abroad. This applies first and foremost to our traditional trading partners. As regards Western Europe, we have become a very important supplier of oil and gas, but also the United States and Canada are following developments closely.”

II. Norwegian research policy

General remarks

21. Immediately after the second world war, the organisation of research in Norway was based on the Anglo-Saxon system of sectoral research by research councils and institutes linked to the various ministries concerned. These ministries not only felt an obligation to finance research relevant to their fields of responsibility but in many cases they have built up their own institutional infrastructure to handle such research. As from the 1960s, but especially after 1976, co-ordinating bodies were created. The research councils for industry, the humanities, agriculture and fisheries tried to co-ordinate the activities and especially the budgets of their institutes and a central committee has been set up to promote co-ordination between the sectoral councils and to advise the government on science policy issues.

22. The cabinet research board is now chaired by the Minister of Culture and Science and the department of science policy of the ministry acts as the secretariat for the cabinet research board. This secretariat is also directly involved in the co-ordination of Norwegian participation in international research co-operation. Other members of the cabinet board are the Ministers of Finance, Industry, Oil and Energy, Social Affairs and Agriculture. An inter-departmental committee of civil servants representing all ministries has also been established to help and advise the cabinet board and its secretariat.

23. The key task of the cabinet research board, which has met five times in 1982, is to study the research and development sections of the national budget. It also has made a study of structural and organisational problems and the balancing of diverse interests.

24. Questions for co-ordination are researcher job security, conditions for contract research in public institutions, the balance between applied research, technological development and basic research, international aspects and many others. The problems not only require discussion but also decisions from the cabinet research board.

25. Since 1977 public funding of research and development has been relatively low and public institutions have therefore shown greater interest in external financing. In addition, new laws concerning job security for government employees have recently prevented public institutions from launching new projects with new personnel. Public jobs, even temporary, must in principle be established by parliament and are therefore not created easily, although latterly special arrangements have been made for contract research. The private research sector has been more dynamic in recent years. As a result, not only is a growing proportion of Norwegian research and development being financed privately but more is also being carried out in non-government research and development organisations and institutes.

26. Most private financing comes from the international oil companies which have been encouraged by the Norwegian Government to have as much as possible of their research and development in connection with the North Sea activities carried out in Norway as this would help them to obtain future drilling rights.

27. Total expenditure on research and development in Norway was 3,229 million Norwegian kroner¹ or 1.39 % of the gross domestic product. The biggest share, 49 %, was spent in

1. See map at Appendix III.

1. One Norwegian kroner equals approximately one French franc.

the business enterprise sector. About half of the government's funds are spent in the higher education sector. Many in Norway fear that the rapidly-increasing research and development connected with the oil resources on the continental shelf will out-grow the research effort hitherto made in other fields, especially in the universities. In this light the importance of science policy organs dealing with the system as a whole, like the central committee for Norwegian research, will be enhanced and in the future greater emphasis might be laid on centralised decision-making in research and development policy.

III. The Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research

28. This council promotes technical and related scientific research and ensures that the findings are used for the benefit of Norwegian industry as a whole. Council funds are mainly granted through the Ministry of Industry which is the sponsoring authority. Other funds are granted by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and to a lesser degree by other ministries. The council supports research in the fields of continental shelf activities, manufacturing, building and construction, shipping and transport. The budget for 1981 was 860 million kroner, of which 300 million in income from projects commissioned in Norway and abroad.

29. The council consists of 40 representatives, 13 of whom are drawn from business, 12 from public administration, 12 from research institutions and 3 staff representatives. The board consists of 8 members and the total number of employees is about 3,650. Members of the council, the board and the committees in charge of different fields are prominent leaders of science, business and administration and represent a solid contact base with the users of research results. This guides research towards practical applications whether in the field of fishing, environment, automation or industry and mining. The board is keenly aware of the need to spend public money wisely. Its committees are not permanent. As soon as objectives have been reached the committees are disbanded and their personnel reallocated for other tasks. The Ministry even appointed a commission of independent consultants, including a team from the science policy research unit of the University of Sussex, to study the organisation of the council and its organs.

30. The council also participates in international research. For a long time already, Norwegian scientists have had contacts with the United Kingdom and United States as many

Norwegian academics have received their education in those countries. Norway is most interested in the work of OECD, the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society and European co-operation in the field of scientific and technical research (COST). Norway is currently involved in projects such as the development of a network for data transmission between research centres, the development of a network of buoys for oceanographic and meteorological data collection, studies of organic micro-pollutants and the treatment of sewers.

31. In the Nordic framework it participates in Nordforsk, a research organisation of the Nordic countries. There are also bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom and Germany, and Norway is an associate member of the European Space Agency.

Space

32. The government has entrusted the co-ordination of space activities to the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. The Council has the benefit of the opinions of the Norwegian space activity committee, which has three sub-committees: one for space research, one for space applications and one for remote sensing. It has two space facilities: the Andøya rocket range and the Tromsø telemetry station. The Andøya rocket range has been in operation since 1962 and is used for launching sounding rockets and scientific balloons. Many trajectories are possible and a large area can thus be covered both in latitude and in longitude. The Tromsø telemetry station is used for national and co-operative programmes such as the French Arcad-3 satellite project, the European incoherent scatter association (Eiscat) in which participate Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It consists of scatter radars built for ionospheric research. Of great interest for the Norwegian scientists are studies of the aurora, polar dynamics and magnetic fields. There is an auroral observatory in Tromsø.

33. The purpose of Eiscat is to study the upper layers of the atmosphere. On 26th August 1981, the facility started its activities after a planning and construction period lasting more than ten years. The natural science research councils of Finland, France, West Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom contributed to the construction of the facility and its operating stations at Tromsø in Norway, Sodankylä in Finland and Kiruna in Sweden. The main purpose is to study the ionosphere, the upper layers of the earth's atmosphere where the aurora borealis originate. The observing equipment consists of two

independent radar systems which are established at the three abovementioned sites.

34. The council is also participating in a series of satellite systems aimed at, among other things, increasing safety in shipping, coastal zone surveillance, distress alarm system and localisation of distress signals. These are practical space applications whose interest is at once perceptible to everyone and which can be used in everyday life.

35. Norway, and especially Norwegian industry, was never interested in joining the European space organisations but, although it still has not joined ESA, it became an associate member in 1981 and participates in the Marots-Marecs programme, telecommunications and remote-sensing programmes as well as the earth resources research programme. Norway is very much interested in the development of a maritime satellite system for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications; off-shore platforms are also included in the system. Other satellite programmes in which Norway is interested are those related to improving accuracy in navigation and pollution surveillance of the seas. It is also studying participation in trials and demonstrations with the Canada/France/USSR/United States search and rescue satellite project (COSPASSARSAT): these satellites will be in polar orbit. Norway is participating in the European earth resources satellite programme because of its interest in the synthetic aperture radar. A national aspect is the Norwegian remote-sensing experiment (Norsex) which will continue until the end of 1982. With other Scandinavian countries it is preparing a communication satellite for telecommunication and television purposes which should come into operation in 1986-87. The authority here is the Norwegian telecommunications administration.

36. The relationship between Norway and ESA will have to be decided upon in four years' time. In the association treaty of 1981 it was agreed that in 1986 the Norwegian Government would take a decision on full membership.

The Norwegian defence research establishment

37. This is a civilian institute directly responsible to the Ministry of Defence. It was established in 1946 and formed around a nucleus of scientists with experience in wartime defence research, mainly acquired in the United Kingdom. The establishment today has approximately 500 employees of whom 180 have a scientific background from universities or institutes of technology. Its main missions are to promote basic research and advise the Ministry of Defence on scientific and technological problems. It has no fixed structure and for each project there is a responsible project

leader who reports to the head of division and through him to the director. The aim of the missions is to strengthen the defence of Norway.

38. The armed forces are in continuous contact with the research activities of the establishment through their representatives on the board of the establishment. The establishment is particularly interested in research related to the geophysical Norwegian environment, oceanography, terrain, weather, etc., which is of importance to military operations; it carries out operational research on long-term problems of force structure planning, weapon research and fundamental research of potential military interest. It is also interested in rocket, satellite and balloon investigation of the polar upper atmosphere.

39. It is organised in two groups and five divisions: the mathematics section, operational analysis group and divisions for electronics, physics, toxicology, underwater warfare and weapons and, finally, equipment.

40. As an example in the electronics field was given the activities in microcomputers, inexpensive transistors, fire-control components, small radars and cryptographic equipment. Norway has hardly any defence industry, although many of these high technology instruments are assembled at the establishment itself according to requirements defined by the Ministry of Defence or the armed forces. The lack of a defence industry is a dominant feature of the Norwegian industrial arena. The same is true of several European countries of a similar size. But in the framework of effective voluntary co-operation it should be possible for Norway to be actively associated with European production. Co-operation on broad, truly European bases can but strengthen the necessary solidarity.

IV. The institute for energy technology

41. The institute was founded in 1948 under the name of Institutt for atomenergi. In 1953, by Order in Council the institute was established as an independent foundation. Its activities are divided geographically between two sites, Halden in south-eastern Norway, where the international OECD Halden reactor project is located, and Kjeller, outside Oslo, as the main centre.

42. The institute with its 510 employees and a gross turnover of 130 million kroner (1981 figures) is one of the major research institutes in Norway. The institute changed its name from Institutt for atomenergi to Institutt for energiteknikk (institute for energy technology - IFE) in 1980.

43. The following facts are relevant to the general orientation of the institute's work: Norway is a country whose high production costs are still increasing faster than in many other industrialised countries; among the industrialised countries, Norway is in a favourable energy resource situation. It is a net exporter of petroleum products. For many years to come, it will be able to use hydropower for increased electricity production; furthermore a basic research programme in nuclear technology is maintained at the institute to ensure this technology as a possible future option – this will also allow the institute to be effectively able to advise the Norwegian authorities on the national and international implications of atomic energy matters.

44. The present basic aims are: efforts contributing to improving the competitiveness of Norwegian industry; efforts to improve understanding and solutions of problems connected with production and transport of petroleum products from the North Sea; maintenance of a reliable system for production and distribution of radioactive products, including pharmaceutical products, and other irradiation products and services; maintenance of a limited but realistic nuclear energy research and development programme; energy system analyses; energy conservation projects; studies of alternative renewable energy sources.

45. International co-operation has been a keyword throughout the history of the institute. Its first research reactor, Jeep I, was started up in 1951 and was operated through a co-operation agreement with the Netherlands – an agreement that lasted well into the 1960s. Scientists from all over the world participated in the early nuclear research activities at Kjeller. This international co-operation has continued through the operation of the Nora research reactor in the mid-1960s, the OECD Halden project and a number of other research projects that the institute has hosted, or in which institute staff have actively participated.

46. The Halden project has been, and is, the institute's main international undertaking. It was established in 1958 as a joint project of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency through an agreement between national nuclear centres of different OECD countries sponsoring an experimental research programme with the Halden boiling water reactor. The institute is the owner and operator of the reactor installation. Subsequent to the first agreement, which covered a five-and-a-half-year period, six successive three-year agreements have been entered into. Eleven signatory countries participate in the present three-year agreement which started in January 1982.

47. The main research and development activities are in petroleum technology, process technology and reactor technology.

48. The institute's work in petroleum technology is directed towards central assignments for the Norwegian oil industry and the Norwegian petroleum directorate. In the field of reservoir technology, methods and tools have been developed for the efficient planning and use of oil and gas reserves on the Norwegian continental shelf. In the areas of process control and fluid flow technique, the institute is working on projects of significance to the technical, economic and safety aspects of shelf activity. The same applies to the institute's work in materials technology where the emphasis is on corrosion problems.

49. The institute's research and development activities at Kjeller and Halden are firmly based on co-operation with and contracts for Norwegian industry, and the institute has established a series of spearhead projects in advanced process technology. The central assignment is the mathematical simulation of complex processes and control systems. The Halden project's programme for the development of computer-based control and surveillance systems is an open door to international development in the field. It is used in a series of development contracts for the Norwegian process and computer industry. Within energy-intensive industries, work is directed in particular towards process models which quantify and control smelting, rolling and casting processes. The institute's research and development activities in mathematical physics are an effective background for research in industrial process technology.

50. The institute's hydrometallurgical work is at present concentrated on process development for the production of aluminium oxide from Norwegian raw materials. Several years ago a sophisticated chemical separation technique for the production of super pure yttrium oxide which is used in making colour television screens was developed at the institute. An industrial-scale plant was built at Kjeller, and it is now being operated by Norwegian and Japanese interests.

51. The institute's nuclear energy activity is principally based on the international Halden project's fuel and safety research programme. Activity has been concentrated on studies of the behaviour of reactor fuels under normal operation as well as in certain types of accident. Beyond the joint programme, fuel irradiations are carried out on a contract basis for participants, with subsequent laboratory investigations at Kjeller.

52. In the project's other main field of work – that of process control and surveillance, systems are being used to reduce the frequency and consequences of irregularities in the operation of reactor installations and other complex systems, with particular stress on installation surveillance, alarm management and fault analysis.

53. Considerable work is also put into the development of a prototype version of an on-line system for the surveillance of nuclear reactors. Methods are also being developed to secure high reliability in computer systems where the emphasis is on the man-machine communication link.

54. These activities at Halden also constitute a basis for the institute's development work for Norwegian industry within the computer process field.

55. One research reactor is in operation at Kjeller: Jeep II, which replaced Jeep I in 1967.

56. Activities directly associated with the operation of the reactor revolve around isotope production, irradiation services and research in physics.

57. Work in the isotope laboratory includes production, control and distribution of radioactive medical provisions and chemicals, reactor and gamma irradiated materials together with the development of new products based on radioisotopes and irradiation techniques.

58. Products are also exported, mainly to other Scandinavian countries, and the export quota is at present about 25 %. In 1981, the annual turnover of products and services was 13 million kroner, as against 11 million kroner in 1980.

59. Pure research in physics is mainly based on the use of the neutron rays from the Jeep II research reactor. Emphasis is on studies of chemical and magnetic structure, phase transitions and hydrodynamic instabilities.

60. In general research organisations should be able to respond effectively to new demands of society and changed priorities in national policy.

V. Energy policy

61. Norway has by far the largest continental shelf area of all European countries. The area south of latitude 62° N, which is the area so far opened to petroleum activities, represents only one-sixth of the Norwegian continental shelf. Of this area, only about 20 % is covered by exploitation licences. So far, more than 200 wells have been drilled on the Norwegian continental shelf of which the main blocks are Eko-

fisk, Frigg and Statfjord. Production is between four and five times the volume consumed in Norway. Norway has become the first net oil exporting country in Western Europe, and oil accounts for 16 % of total exports, whereas overall petroleum activities are already contributing 50 % more to the Norwegian gross national product than agriculture, forestry and fisheries together.

62. Compared to most other industrialised nations Norway's energy situation is considered very comfortable. The per capita consumption of energy is close to the Western European average. The petroleum resources on the continental shelf belong to the nation and are administered and exploited to provide the maximum benefit for Norway. Maintenance of national supervision of activities on the Norwegian continental shelf allows an insight into these activities. By law Norwegian authorities or companies participate directly at all levels of operations. For this purpose a state-owned oil company, Statoil, was given a central rôle in all petroleum activities.

63. Foreign oil companies first applied for rights to explore for oil on the continental shelf in the early sixties. In 1969 the first discovery of commercial interest was made at the Ekofisk field and regular production started there in 1974. The production of oil and gas for sale from the Norwegian continental shelf was 48.8 million tons oil equivalent in 1981. Domestic consumption that year was approximately 7 million tons oil equivalent. At the end of the 1980s, production will be some 60 million tons and thereafter will fall rapidly. Proven recoverable reserves south of 62° N are estimated at 2,500 million tons oil equivalent; 60 % of this being gas and 40 % oil.

64. Substantial gas reserves have been established in two major gasfields, Sleipner and Troll. These fields have not been declared commercial but will be so from 1983 onwards. The first gas from the Sleipner field could be piped in 1990-91. The gas from the Troll field will not be piped until later in the 1990s as this is technically an extremely difficult field because of deep water (250 metres), a soft and uneven seabed, severe weather conditions and a shallow reservoir of gas with a thin oil layer underneath.

65. Production on the continental shelf north of 62° N would be even more difficult and involves technological problems for which solutions are not yet available.

66. Because of substantial experience in maritime technology through the shipping and shipbuilding industry, Norway had a basis for taking a full part in petroleum activities in the 1960s and 1970s. Special efforts will now have

to be made for a substantial increase in research activities with regard to exploration and exploitation.

67. Most of oil production will be distributed by the companies, especially the international oil companies involved in the operations. As indicated earlier, the combined oil and gas production will fall as from 1990 in the absence of new field developments. There is therefore a strong economic and political incentive to maintain activities in this sector. All Norwegian gas that could technically be produced before 1990 has already been sold to European buyers. Until then Norwegian gas could therefore in no case be an alternative for Siberian gas. The government has a positive attitude to further deliveries of Norwegian natural gas to Western Europe in the 1990s provided the companies involved in each gasfield present development plans and gas sales agreements that ensure the economic basis for development. Deliveries could be 10 to 12 billion cubic metres in the mid-1990s and 35 billion at the turn of the century.

68. As indicated earlier, hydropower is an important sector of Norwegian energy production. The construction of small hydroelectric power plants started some 100 years ago but in the postwar period electricity production from hydropower increased considerably. The exploitation of low-cost water power resources has led to major investment in power-intensive industries and some 30,000 persons are directly employed in these industries. The development of hydropower networks has also provided the basis for a mechanical and electro-technical industry, for power stations and transmission plants, and for the equipment of power-intensive industrial production at home and abroad. For Norway hydropower resources represent a considerable economic advantage over other countries which have to base their power production on thermal power stations. Additional supplies of electricity could in the future be provided by hydropower and it is the government's policy to promote its development, also because of the environmental advantages over electricity production based on oil and coal.

69. Production of coal and coke in Norway is relatively small, providing only 6 % of total energy consumption. The biggest consumer of coal is the cement industry and coke is used mainly in the iron and steel industry. Coal is extracted from the island of West Spitsbergen. For the total consumption of 460,000 tons, imports from Poland, the United States and the United Kingdom are necessary.

70. In Norway there are no commercial nuclear power plants, only two research

reactors. Norway is not planning to build nuclear power reactors in the near future.

71. For renewable sources of energy, research and development programmes are mainly related to biomass, ocean waves, thermal energy and wind. Apparently the most promising is research on a wind turbine adapted to Norwegian conditions.

VI. *Europe's energy requirements*

72. More than half the energy consumed in Europe is imported, although the level of dependence of each European country on imports varies widely. Belgium and Luxembourg import more than 93 %, Italy 83 %, France 82 %, the Federal Republic of Germany 60 %, the United Kingdom only 17 % and the Netherlands 8 %. The last two countries have sufficient energy resources to allow them to export to their neighbours. The individual policies of these countries for reducing their dependence on imports cover a vast spectrum. 25 % of Belgium's electricity depends on nuclear energy; France is building up its nuclear energy power plants to produce 60 % of its electricity. Italy is using oil to fuel its conventional power plants and the Netherlands is using its gas for the same purpose. Germany is still largely dependent on coal and the United Kingdom, apart from very large coal reserves, also has its own North Sea oil. There is a clear division between the have and the have-not countries, the latter asking for common policies and supply lines which the haves wish to guard jealously for themselves.

73. The energy question is of great importance for Western European countries and the Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council of Ministers, Mr. Tindemans, even said that it was in the energy sector that a return to nationalism was probably the most threatening.

74. The European Community's main supplies come from three countries - Libya, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. Oil accounted for 51 % of Europe's energy consumption in 1981 compared to 61 % in 1973. The drop in imports was caused by the economic crisis, conservation measures, increased domestic production, North Sea oil and the use of other sources of energy instead of oil. This is clearly illustrated by the closing of refineries in Europe. Since 1973 oil prices have soared twelvefold while consumption in western countries has dropped about 10 %. As a result, refining capacity in the major industrial countries exceeded consumption by about 40 % according to OECD statistics and according to the International Energy Agency Europe will, in the decade to come, need only 60 % of its

refining capacity. The main oil companies are ready to cut their refining capabilities, most of the closures being planned to be made in the United Kingdom, France and West Germany. Important cuts are also expected in Italy and the Netherlands where there is a large crude processing centre for re-export.

75. In 1980-81, oil market prices fell as world oil consumption dropped. In 1981 the reduction was 5 % and at the same time non-OPEC production of oil increased by 4 %. The combined effect of these two factors reduced OPEC oil production by from one-fifth to one-quarter in 1980 and even more in 1981. The decline in demand has occurred not only in Western European countries but also in the United States and forced an actual reduction in prices from \$36 to \$32 per barrel. In the end the official dollar price was \$34 but whether this price will hold is questionable. An end to the recession might well increase oil demand but will also promote investments in substitutes for oil, conservation and new sources of energy.

76. Building strategic oil stocks is one of the most effective steps the Western European countries can take to improve their preparedness to meet a future demand for oil. Reliance on other energy resources is of great importance, especially the development of nuclear energy. However, the outlook here is not bright as many leading countries are hesitant about building nuclear power reactors. Even in the United States, where the government is in favour of nuclear power, no new nuclear power plants are being built. Economic and financial obstacles have become the largest threat to nuclear power. High interest rates, escalating construction costs, low electricity rates and uncertain construction schedules have made the United States utilities extremely cautious. The economic benefits of nuclear power over oil are therefore camouflaged and not brought into the open. Certain nuclear projects have been suspended; elsewhere, except in France, no progress has been made.

77. As far as gas is concerned, there exists a sort of European gas market made possible by the many pipelines that have been laid during the last decade. In the intra-European trade there is a gas pipeline from the Netherlands to Italy through France. With the completion of the trans-Mediterranean gas pipeline from Algeria and Tunisia to Italy, the north-south connection is completed. Still missing is a south-east/north-west pipeline bringing gas from the Gulf to Europe. Gas demands for domestic, commercial and industrial uses have increased very quickly since the early 1970s. As energy consumers and governments had negative expectations about oil availability,

major gas projects could bring the necessary diversification, reduce oil dependency and enhance energy security. The spread of gas was also encouraged by the development of new pipeline techniques and complex logistical systems of gas transportation and distribution.

78. It is therefore not surprising that European governments and industry looked for an east-west pipeline as well. They have so far maintained the Soviet pipeline project despite American pressure. They are convinced that they are securing a relatively cheap and safe supply of energy while complying with the oil substitution policy adopted at western summit conferences and reflected in the Council's reply to the Assembly's recommendation. Here your Rapporteur might refer again to Mr. Fian-drotti's report¹ which stated:

“95. In Siberia, the Soviet Union has one of the biggest gas reserves in the world and wishes to use this to best avail. Its gas exports produce the hard currency necessary to buy technologically-advanced equipment and essential food-stuffs. Contracts have been concluded with five Western European countries to construct a double pipeline from the Siberian gasfields *inter alia* to Germany, France and Italy. The contract covers a period of 20-22 years, and gas will be delivered within 6-10 years. In economic terms, there are positive arguments to accept such a barter deal: gas against pipelines. It is advantageous for the Western European countries and the Soviet Union. It helps to diversify the energy supplies of the countries concerned and produces hard currency for the Soviet Union. If Western Europe failed to conclude or terminated the contracts, its exports to the Soviet Union would fail as the Soviet Government would have less money to pay for them. Third, the export of Soviet gas would expand world supplies of gas and would thus ease the pressure on gas prices.

96. A geopolitical argument is that opening up Siberia and its gasfields will provide the Soviet Union with many new minerals and energy resources, thus reducing the Soviet Union's need to turn to other countries for its energy supplies.

97. There are also strategic arguments for the export of Soviet gas. As mentioned by the Council, it is a means of diversifying Western Europe's sources of supply, making Europe less dependent on supplies from the Middle East. The

1. Document 917, 18th May 1982.

manufacturing of pipelines is of great importance for the European steel industry which is now in a difficult period. To import gas also avoids Western European stocks being depleted.

98. The United States Government has invoked two strategic arguments against this reasoning, namely that the western-financed pipeline system provides the Soviet Union with an important strategic asset which, in case of crisis or war, it can use for its own purposes. Second, if the Soviet Union had to build this pipeline alone it would be unable to use much of its steel production for defence purposes, for instance. The United States Government has also emphasised that Western European countries should avoid economic dependence on the Soviet Union. In 1986, the earliest date for the finished pipeline, the Federal Republic of Germany and France would depend on Soviet exports for 30 % of their gas consumption. For the Federal Republic, this would represent about 5 % of its total energy consumption. ”

79. Western Europeans are convinced that the pipeline is a commercially sound venture and that the risk of supply interruptions or cut-backs is manageable. Some United States counter-proposals, such as shipping liquefied natural gas from Alaska to Europe in submarine tankers, strike the European shipbuilders as pure science fiction. Since Norwegian production possibilities cannot be exploited before the early 1990s there is no solution other than to follow through the agreements and contracts with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the European governments do not see why they should be forced to comply with American law as opposed to their own laws and interests.

80. On 18th June 1982, the United States Government decided to oppose European pipeline exports to the USSR when American technology was involved. At the end of August the export of United States goods and services to two French firms was halted on the grounds that they had violated the United States embargo on pipeline shipments to the Soviet Union. Identical measures were taken against British, German and Italian firms. The United States Government maintained that the ban on the sale of oil and gas technology and equipment to the Soviet Union served American interests despite possible harm to American firms or firms of allied countries. It considered that the pipeline sanction would place a significant strain on the Soviet Union in terms of time, energy and finance. The French Government said that it would not participate in an economic war against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it underlined the need to keep

Franco-American relations on a friendly basis as they were considered much broader and more important than the pipeline controversy. It was considered more a question of sovereignty and free trade, which considerations were shared by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

81. Originally the Soviets had hoped to sell as much as 40 billion cubic metres of gas a year between 1984 and 2008 ; a quarter of it would be sold to West Germany and some 8 billion cubic metres to France and about the same amount to Italy. The rest would be sold to the smaller European countries with which individual contracts had been signed. Since 1981 the total volume has been scaled down for lack of demand, diminishing expectations of Soviet purchases of equipment and probably also because of political implications. When the pipeline is fully operational deliveries are not likely to exceed two thirds of the originally-planned volume or some 26 billion cubic metres a year. This will also mean a reduction of the need for American compressor technology and the Soviet Union will have to forego substantial hard currency earnings since the larger volume could have been supplied at low marginal cost. Its earnings will therefore be closer to \$ 5 billion than \$ 10 billion. This scaling down of the entire programme should make it easier for all partners concerned to reach an acceptable compromise, particularly since the American embargo is not an effective sanction on the Soviet Union and might seriously jeopardise relations between the partners of the Atlantic Alliance and destroy America's commercial reliability.

82. There remains of course the argument related to security if Western Europe becomes more dependent on Russian energy and therefore economically dependent on the Soviet Union. Could a cut-off of supplies actually cripple Europe's ability to defend itself in case of crisis or warfare? The answer depends on how far the European pipeline network can replace Soviet gas by gas from other sources in that event.

83. In any event, there seems to be no possibility of finding an alternative source of gas, developing the fields and bringing the gas to the European market by 1984 – the time Soviet deliveries are to start. However, could gas from other sources be made available later to reduce European dependence on Soviet gas and what would be the price? Would it be economical to supply gas from the North Sea and the new fields off northern Norway for transportation to Central Europe by pipeline or as liquefied natural gas? At the other extreme, could offshore fields in the Southern Atlantic, the Canadian Arctic and the Gulf area offer alternative sources of energy? In the case of Nor-

way, this seems certainly possible after the 1990s if the Norwegian Government decides to move new energy activities to the northern regions. The necessary gas reserves and technology are available. It will be about eight years before the implementation of these projects allows the supply of natural gas from the Soviet Union to be supplemented and, above all, before resources such as Frigg or Groningen, which will by then have run out, can be replaced.

84. To have a true network of intra-European gas pipelines, the main thing is to connect the British network with the rest of the continent. Europe would then have a network allowing it to face up to a sudden interruption of one of its sources of natural gas supplies. Such a measure would thus enhance the security of European supplies. However, from both a commercial and an economic point of view, the interconnection can be planned effectively only if accompanied by a meaningful policy of large-scale stockpiles representing the equivalent of 20 to 25 % of annual consumption. However, the present stagnation of energy demand, the uncertain trend of energy prices and the cost of capital equipment, swollen by inflation and burdened by very heavy interest rates, make governments and industrialists hesitant about committing themselves to extremely expensive long-term projects.

85. One of the most useful means of reducing such risks would be for all the European countries concerned to take co-ordinated measures, particularly the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, energy-exporting countries, which should agree to take part in a general network of intra-European gas pipelines. In this respect, the building of new pipelines to bring Norwegian gas from such new deposits as Sleipner and Troll to Western Europe should be studied. At present, Norwegian natural gas from the North Sea is taken by gas pipeline from the Frigg area to Scotland and gas from Ekofisk to Emden in the Federal Republic of Germany. Here, the building of a new 1,300 km pipeline has just been agreed upon to take gas from the Statfjord area in the north to Emden via Ekofisk. For the future, the stake is a big one; it consists of deciding how to transport the new resources from the Sleipner and Troll area situated between Ekofisk and Frigg. Use of the pipeline to Scotland seems at present to be the solution receiving the greatest attention, particularly as supplies for the Frigg-Scotland pipeline will run out as from 1992-93.

86. Such a solution would allow the arrival points of Norwegian gas in Western Europe to be diversified and thus help to increase the security of Europe's energy supplies. However, it assumes that the British and European net-

works will be connected up by means of an extension of the Scottish network towards the continent.

VII. *Norsk Data*

87. During its visit to Norway the committee was received at Norsk Data, a private firm which develops, manufactures and markets general-purpose small- and medium-size computers and computer systems in the price range of 100,000 to 2,500,000 Norwegian kroner. It has wholly-owned subsidiaries in eight countries, mainly Western Europe and America, which handle sales and customer support. Norsk Data's chief competitors are United States computer companies. The computers are used for technical and administrative applications and are sold to public authorities, defence agencies, commercial organisations and private companies.

88. From the very outset Norsk Data, which was set up by three Norwegian scientists trained in the United States at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was convinced that in order to succeed it had to compete with American firms which dominated 80 % of the market and even in Europe have 66 % of the computer market. It was necessary to be both cheaper and better to beat American firms. Consequently, 16 % of the staff of Norsk Data work on long-term research and development. Norsk Data's profitability is closely linked to productivity which in turn depends on management philosophy and research work. Norsk Data is endeavouring to retain and improve its leading position in its sector of production. It uses the latest technology and is continually renewing it. For Norway, its management style is original. Its personnel of some 800 are also shareholders in the company.

89. Norsk Data holds a special position among European computer companies since, without protection from the government or support for research and development, Norsk Data has become a European competitor for the American mini-computer companies. As to why Norsk Data succeeded where several large European companies failed, the main reason advanced by its leaders was that the time to build a new computer was proportional to the size of the company. Norsk Data was able to manufacture its first computer in one year, its second computer in eighteen months and its largest new computer, the ND-500, within three years. Continuing rapid technological development is a characteristic of the computer industry.

90. Software will assume increasing importance in the usefulness of computer systems and therefore 75 % of the research and development

staff of Norsk Data is working on the development of general software and, with the assistance of consultants and customers, the development of complete systems for specific purposes.

91. At Norsk Data it was explained that its computers are now being used at the OECD Halden reactor which is an international centre to develop new aids for reactor operators. A realistic control room is being built to study the behaviour of the operating crews. The signals from the reactor plant and in-core instrumentation are connected to a data acquisition system which collects large amounts of data from the different experiments on test fuel behaviour in various operating conditions. The computers and the test fuel data bank system have been built by Norsk Data.

92. At the joint European torus (JET) at Culham, England, fifteen computers from Norsk Data will be installed in order to provide control, diagnostics, test, communications, storage and analysis functions. The resulting data will be made available to laboratories and institutes of the member countries of the European Community as well as Sweden and Switzerland which are also members of the joint undertaking. The main objective of JET is to obtain and study plasma in conditions which approach those needed in a power-producing fusion reactor. The JET should constitute a major step towards the development of the nuclear fusion reactor as a new energy source.

93. The new Norsk Data 500 computer will be the main storage and analysis instrument.

94. The total cost of the JET will be some £ 123 million, 6 % of which is computer costs.

95. Norsk Data computers are also used for F-16 simulator training systems in the United States as well as in Europe. Research with defence applications has always been a major objective of Norsk Data which has also provided important electronic equipment for F-16 aircraft.

96. Norsk Data computers and the new ND-500 are also used for Eiscat – the European incoherent scatter facility mentioned earlier in the report.

VIII. *Norwegian law of the sea policy*

97. On 30th April 1982 the United Nations convention on the law of the sea was adopted by 130 countries, 17 countries abstained and 4 voted against. The Norwegian delegation led by Ambassador Jens Evensen voted in favour of the convention as instructed by the government which believed that the text was an acceptable

compromise between the opinion of some 160 states and constituted a valuable contribution to the future prospects of the developing states. Decision-making was by consensus which meant that all the 400 articles and the seven or eight annexes presented the best possible solution for all participants concerned. The consensus principle did not mean that decisions were unanimous but that even if some states were not happy about the outcome of one or other article they would not vote against it but give tacit agreement. It also meant that after each agreement there was a cooling-off period before voting as a last resort. The cooling-off period could then be used to compare the effects of different chapters of the convention in order to see whether a compromise in one place could be offset by a compromise elsewhere. The delegates could not, of course, bind their states to ratifying the convention and in the end the consensus principle was not maintained as four countries, although for different reasons, voted against the convention. First of all the United States because of the mining provisions and the review procedure; Venezuela because of the delimitation rules which brought it into conflict with Columbia; Israel because of indirect references to the PLO; and Turkey because of the delimitation rules. Some western countries which abstained were Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Some western countries which voted in favour were the Scandinavian countries, Canada, France, Greece and Portugal. Australia and New Zealand also voted for it.

98. The basic difference between the attitudes of the western countries was that some of them considered the old rules acceptable and some that they were antiquated and unable to meet the needs of the technological revolution.

99. Security elements are important but the convention has not been drawn up specifically with military purposes in mind, nor can the convention be considered as a factor in progress towards disarmament. It is basically a ruling for the peacetime use of the oceans and the seas.

100. Norwegian policy has always been different from the Anglo-American point of view as the latter accepted the three-mile limit starting at the coast proper, whereas Norway was always in favour of a four-mile limit starting from a strait baseline between the outer fringe of its islands.

101. In a law suit against the United Kingdom at the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 1949, the Norwegian views were accepted by the court as being correct. This gave Norway a legal base for its policy and led to subsequent steps with regard to 12-mile

fishing zones and the continental shelf agreements. The first one was adopted in 1960 and in 1963 continental shelf delimitation agreements were concluded with the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden. It was also agreed then that if an oil-field straddled the delimitation line there would be joint development of such a field by the countries concerned.

102. In the north, in the Barents Sea, however, the Soviet Union was not willing to discuss such a delimitation agreement.

103. In 1976 and 1977 the continental shelf limit and the 200-mile economic zone were adopted, mainly with regard to fishing and minerals. The continental shelf and the 200-mile economic zone became of great importance when scientists pointed out that, because of over-fishing, herring, cod and haddock, plus certain other types of fish were in danger of becoming extinct. Talks have been started between the EEC, the Soviet Union and Iceland on the prohibition of fishing certain kinds of fish at certain periods in order to gain time to replenish stocks.

104. There is the so-called "Pip" resolution which would allow the Americans and the Europeans a free hand in the Clipperton area of the Pacific to exploit the nodules. This area is for the moment the only exploitable area and the main western industrialised countries could become concessionaires for the next thirty years.

105. This resolution would enter into force if the industrialised countries signed the convention on the law of the sea. It could be a bridge between the developing and developed countries. Should the convention not be signed there would be deep bitterness after so many years of work on extremely complicated issues. A compromise might also be reached on the transfer of technology and the review of the convention.

106. Finally, it will be the task of the coastguards of the member countries to enforce the EEC fishery convention.

IX. *Norwegian defence policy*

107. Norwegian defence policy is based on a national defence effort set in the context of NATO. It is of course strongly influenced by its geographical position (joint frontier of 200 km with the Soviet Union) and its history (April 1940). In 1948, Norway envisaged a Scandinavian defence union, but even with Sweden's aid this was not felt to be an acceptable solution as the resources were not deemed sufficient for adequate defence.

108. Because of its geographical position Norway comes under two NATO commands: SACEUR and SACLANT. SACLANT is especially responsible for defending the outlying islands belonging to Norway and the maritime routes between Norway and the American continent. Norway proper is part of SACEUR and more especially of NATO's Northern European Command with headquarters at Kolsås, near Oslo.

109. To facilitate good relations with its north-eastern neighbour, the stationing of foreign troops and nuclear and chemical weapons is not authorised on Norwegian soil. No allied exercises are carried out in the eastern-most province. If the Norwegian army holds exercises in the north-eastern province the Soviet Union is notified. This is a confidence-building measure which has now been practised for the past thirty years. The Norwegian Government could change these unilateral measures if the need were felt.

110. On the Kola Peninsula, which is only some 10 to 100 km from the north-eastern frontier, the Soviet Government has established the biggest naval base in the world with some 400 warships and 70 % of the Soviet fleet of ballistic missile-carrying submarines. Apart from the strategic submarines, the Kola base also houses a large number of nuclear and conventional submarines and 70 % of the missile-launching surface vessels. Moreover, the Kola base has a large number of frigates, minesweepers, aircraft-carriers and air reconnaissance squadrons. The army has two divisions and there is a naval infantry regiment.

111. Total Norwegian forces – army, navy, air force and home guard – number some 280,000 men, of whom about 40,000 are regulars. Mobilisation exercises and transportation possibilities from south to north are therefore of great importance. Some battalions can be ready in twenty-four hours and brigades in forty-eight hours. Air transportation is extremely important as the refresher training of many units is done in the north of Norway because of its strategic position. At the same time mobilisation arrangements and transport facilities by air, sea, rail or road can be tested. Weapons and equipment for these units are stocked in northern Norway. Norway has adopted a total defence concept which means that all relevant civilian agencies and manpower have prearranged tasks; civil defence also plays an important rôle.

112. Norwegian peacetime deployment in northern Norway includes one brigade in the Troms area and two battalion groups near the Norwegian-Soviet border. In an emergency, two-and-a-half more brigades would be mobilised in the north and three air squadrons are

based there permanently. Most Norwegian naval units are also assigned to defend northern waters and many are deployed there in peacetime.

113. In crisis or in war SACEUR's rapid reinforcement plan would be implemented and external reinforcements from Canada, the United States, United Kingdom and other European countries would be moved into the area. To this end, regular combined exercises are held and the NATO nations must show their determination to act quickly when a deteriorating international situation calls for mobilisation and reinforcement.

114. During the committee's visit to the headquarters of AFNORTH in Kolsås, it was briefed on the general aspects of the headquarters, its composition and subordinate commands and more especially on the new command and control information system being developed and implemented in the northern region of NATO.

115. In the 1970s it had become clear that the manual handling of command and control could not effectively process the mass of information coming to the headquarters. The purpose of the new command and control information system is to provide commanders and staff with the timely, relevant and accurate information necessary to execute command and staff functions. The system will provide automated support for command centre operations of tactical air, land and naval operations. The system will also be used by the Norwegian national command as well as by the AFNORTH subordinate commands. Requirements were ultimately combined into a single procurement for the whole of the northern area. Funding authorisations were given in 1979 and in January 1980 a programme management office was established with regional responsibility to co-

ordinate and harmonise the different aspects. The overall system will be installed in 1983-86.

116. For continuity of operations the system built is capable of withstanding the failure of a major component.

117. The system includes the following parts: a data-processing sub-system, using computers and peripheral equipment from Norsk Data, a display sub-system with microprocessors and the possibility to project the operational situation against a map background and, thirdly, a communications sub-system allowing the flow of information from the communication network to interphase with the command and control information system and maintain the currency of the data base.

118. The northern region will be the first region to have fully-integrated modern automated management, which will be implemented in the mid-1980s and will serve the northern region into the next century. Later the system will be fully integrated with other systems now to be developed in Allied Command Europe.

119. The committee was further briefed on new developments and improvements in communications and electronics. The initial voice-switched network and the telegraph automatic relay equipment will be support systems for the new command and control information systems. The network will be installed at Kolsås and subordinate commands during the next three or four years. Through the telegraph automatic relay equipment, the transmission and receipt of messages between major NATO commands will then be possible.

120. The systems are all computer-controlled, are part of the NATO networks and will modernise the communications capability of the Northern European Command and eventually the whole of NATO.

APPENDIX I

*European Parliament resolution
of 16th September 1982 on the Soviet gas pipeline
and the extension of the United States embargo
to firms based in the Community*

The European Parliament,

A. Concerned by the danger to American-European relations of the dispute over the construction of the gas pipeline ;

B. Deeply regretting President Reagan's decision of 18th June 1982 to extend to foreign subsidiaries and licensees of American firms the prohibition on exports to the Soviet Union by American companies of material in connection with the Urengoi pipeline ;

C. Endorsing the rejection by several European governments of this attempt to apply extraterritorially and retroactively American legislation ;

D. Considering that Russian gas supplies will represent only 4 % of the Community's total energy consumption when they reach their estimated peak in 1990, and that the purchase of natural gas from the USSR could form a part

of a European Community policy to increase its diversity in energy supplies ;

E. Whereas compliance with the embargo would result in the loss of a European sales market, increase unemployment, involve the unilateral breach of contracts and damage international trading confidence,

1. Asks the Council again to urge the American authorities to revoke the embargo and to raise the issue at the GATT ministerial meeting on 23rd-26th November unless the embargo has been revoked ;

2. Urges the Community institutions to establish with the United States and other members of the OECD a concerted approach to the management of economic relations between western countries and state trading countries ;

3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in political co-operation and the President and Congress of the United States of America.

APPENDIX II

Imports of Soviet natural gas

On behalf of the EEC Commission, Mr. Davignon answered written question 684/82 put by Mr. Pearce as follows:

Natural gas from the USSR, which has the world's largest reserves, offers a means of meeting Community requirements and a measure of diversification away from the Community's much larger dependence on imported oil.

It is estimated that natural gas from the USSR, including the new contracts, would only represent 5.4% of the Federal Republic of Germany's total energy consumption in 1990. The figure for the Community as a whole would be just under 4%, assuming the quantities of gas currently under negotiation were agreed.


The Commission nevertheless recognises the importance of ensuring the security of natural gas supplies to the Community and proposed a series of measures in its communications to the Energy Councils of October 1981 and March 1982.

The latter Council noted that the Commission would, after further studies, make more specific proposals for measures to reinforce the security of supplies.


This work, now being carried out in conjunction with officials of member states, should allow some conclusions to be drawn in time for the November 1982 Energy Council.

APPENDIX III

European oil and gas pipelines



Source : Natural gas supplies and prospects in the Community, EEC.



Source : The Economist, 18th April 1981.

***Revision of Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43
of the Rules of Procedure***

REPORT¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges²
by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur***

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DRAFT RESOLUTION

on the revision of Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43 of the Rules of Procedure

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Grieve (Chairman); MM. Michel, Schulte (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Beix (Alternate: Caro), Eastham (Alternate: Cox), Edwards, Eijsink, Giust, Glesener, Howell (Alternate: Jessel), Hoyaux, Joxe

(Alternate: Delehedde), Mondino, Manfred Schmidt, Sénès, Spies von Büllenheim, Sterpa, Unland, Vial-Massat, van der Werff.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution

***on the revision of Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43
of the Rules of Procedure***

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To draft Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43 as follows:

1. *Rule 10*

Paragraph 6 shall read:

“ The six Vice-Presidents shall then be elected on the same ballot paper. Those who on the first ballot obtain the votes of a number of Representatives or Substitutes equal to more than half the number of the Representatives to the Assembly shall be declared elected. If the number of those elected is less than the number of vacancies to be filled, a second ballot for the remaining vacancies shall be held following the same procedure. If a third ballot is necessary, those candidates who then receive the greatest number of votes cast shall be declared elected. In the event of a tie, the candidates senior in age shall be elected. The Vice-Presidents shall take precedence in accordance with the order in which they have been elected and, in the event of a tie, by age. ”

Paragraph 7 shall read:

“ If the number of candidates does not exceed the number of posts to be filled and there are no objections, the candidates shall be declared elected. In this case, the Vice-Presidents shall take precedence in accordance with their age even if they have not been nominated simultaneously. ”

2. *Rule 14*

Paragraph 1 shall read:

“ The Presidential Committee shall consist of the President of the Assembly, who shall be Chairman ex officio, his predecessors as long as they remain Representatives or Substitutes of the Assembly without interruption, the Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the permanent committees. If absent, or unable to discharge his duties, the President may be replaced by one of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and the Chairman of a permanent committee by a Vice-Chairman of that committee. The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee. ”

3. *Rule 29*

Paragraph 2 shall read:

“ Amendments must be signed by their author. Amendments shall, if time permits, be printed and distributed before their consideration by the Assembly. The President shall have the power not to select amendments for consideration if, in his opinion, there has not been adequate time for members of the Assembly to study such amendments. ”

Paragraph 3 shall read:

“ Amendments shall relate directly to the text which it is sought to alter. Unless otherwise decided by the President of the Assembly, they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time. ”

Paragraph 8 shall read:

“The reference back of an amendment to committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the Chairman or Rapporteur of the committee.”

The French text of paragraph 9 shall read:

“Le renvoi d'un amendement à la commission n'interrompt pas nécessairement la discussion. L'Assemblée peut impartir à la commission un délai dans lequel elle devra présenter ses conclusions sur les amendements renvoyés.”, the English text not being revised.

Add a paragraph 10 as follows:

“When amendments are being considered, unless the President of the Assembly decides otherwise, the only members who may speak shall be the mover of the amendment, or another member speaking in its favour, one member opposed to the amendment and the Rapporteur or the Committee Chairman.”

4. *Rule 34*

Rule 34 shall read:

“1. The Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or secret ballot is required.

2. The Assembly shall vote by roll-call:

- (a) when an absolute majority is required, in accordance with Rule 35, 1 (a), of the Rules of Procedure;
- (b) on the draft reply to the annual report and on a draft recommendation or opinion considered as a whole, whenever five or more Representatives or Substitutes present in the chamber so desire;
- (c) in other cases, whenever ten or more Representatives or Substitutes present in the chamber so desire.

3. The roll shall be called in alphabetical order, beginning with the name of a Representative drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of mouth and shall be expressed by “Yes”, “No”, or “I abstain”. Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall be responsible for the counting of votes and shall announce the result. The votes shall be recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the sitting in the alphabetical order of Representatives' names.

4. Voting on nominations shall take place by secret ballot. Only those ballot papers bearing the names of persons who have been duly entered as candidates shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of votes cast.”

5. *Rule 35*

Rule 35 shall read:

“1. The majorities required are the following:

- (a) for the adoption of amendments to the Charter, for the adoption of a motion to disagree to the annual report or to any part of the report or for the adoption of a request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee: a number of Representatives or Substitutes equal to more than half the number of Representatives to the Assembly;
- (b) for any other decision: a majority of the votes cast;
- (c) for appointments other than those provided for in Rule 10 above: an absolute majority of votes cast at the first ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot.

2. Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast.”

6. *Rule 36*

Rule 36 shall read:

“ 1. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half of the Representatives to the Assembly or their Substitutes have signed the register of attendance provided for in Rule 24 above.

2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of Representatives or Substitutes present, unless, at the request of a Representative or Substitute before the voting has begun, the President has ascertained that the number of Representatives or Substitutes who have signed the register of attendance is less than a quorum.

3. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed. It may be taken at any time once there is a quorum. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to committee. ”

7. *Rule 38*

The French text of paragraph 4 shall read:

“ Un groupe ne peut comprendre moins de neuf Représentants ou Suppléants ”, the English text not being revised.

8. *Rule 40*

Paragraph 1 shall read:

“ Committees shall examine questions and documents which are referred to them by the Assembly or by the Presidential Committee. ”

9. *Rule 43*

Paragraph 6 shall read:

“ Any request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee shall be put to the vote by roll-call. Its adoption shall require a favourable vote by a number of Representatives or Substitutes equal to more than half the number of Representatives to the Assembly. ”

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. Rule 10

Paragraphs 6 and 7

The purpose of this amendment is to specify more clearly that if the number of candidates does not exceed the number of posts to be filled and there are no objections the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents is determined by age only and not by the date of election.

2. Rule 14

Paragraph 1

Provision for former Presidents of the Assembly to sit on the Presidential Committee was included in Rule 14, paragraph 1, through an amendment adopted by the Assembly on 10th December 1969.

Its purpose was to allow the Presidential Committee to benefit from the experience gained by former Presidents of the Assembly as long as they remained members of the Assembly.

However, at the December 1981 session this provision was criticised. It was in fact pointed out that a former President who left the WEU Assembly and who then returned to the Assembly a few years later would become a *de jure* member of the Presidential Committee again although he would have been unable to keep in touch with the Assembly's business.

The committee therefore feels that the Rules of Procedure should specify that a break in the term of office of a Representative or Substitute has the effect of making a former President ineligible for *de jure* membership of the Presidential Committee. It therefore proposes to amend paragraph 1 by replacing "former Presidents of the Assembly who are Representatives or Substitutes to the Assembly" by "his predecessors as long as they remain Representatives or Substitutes of the Assembly without interruption".

Some committee members, however, would have preferred it to be stipulated that only the President's immediate predecessor is entitled to *de jure* membership of the Presidential Committee and that this would be limited to a period of one year.

3. Rule 29

Paragraph 2

Simplified wording.

Paragraph 3

In spite of the provisions of this paragraph, the President sometimes has to submit to the Assembly, with its agreement, amendments grouped together.

It is thus possible, in certain cases, to shorten a discussion which an unduly large number of amendments would have made tedious and to improve the clarity and coherence of debates.

In order to take account of exceptional circumstances which may arise, the committee unanimously proposes that the second sentence of paragraph 3 be amended to read: "Unless otherwise decided by the President of the Assembly, they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time".

Paragraph 8

It is specified that it is an amendment which is referred back.

Paragraph 9 (French text only)

The text of this paragraph has been lined up on the English text which is more precise.

Paragraph 10

This new paragraph incorporates a provision from the note on the organisation of debates and limiting speaking time in the Assembly of the Council of Europe. However, it makes the President and not the Assembly responsible for taking a decision to make an exception to the rule.

4. Rule 34*Paragraph 1*

The purpose of this wording is to clarify the presentation of all the provisions of the rule.

Paragraph 2

(a) It seems necessary to show that a roll-call is necessary to ascertain that there is an absolute majority.

(b) It is proposed to bring the rules of the WEU Assembly into line with those of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

(c) The present wording of paragraph 2 seems to lack precision because it does not indicate whether the request for a roll-call vote must be made in writing or whether it may be made by a Representative or Substitute from the floor. It is in fact by counting the number of Representatives present in the chamber who endorse the request for a roll-call vote that the President notes that at least ten Representatives or Substitutes are making the request.

The wording seems complex insofar as it seeks to avert the danger of a manoeuvre by which members of the Assembly could request a roll-call and then leave the chamber to prevent there being a quorum and thus make a vote impossible. This fear is unfounded since the rules relating to the quorum have been revised to make the quorum depend not on the number of Representatives or Substitutes taking part in the vote but on the number of signatures on the attendance register.

The committee therefore proposes the following wording:

“(c) whenever ten or more Representatives or Substitutes present in the chamber so desire.”.

5. Rule 35

The purpose of this amendment is to separate the paragraphs more logically and to delete *absolue* from sub-paragraph (b) of the French text. This word does not exist in the English text and has no meaning in this context.

Finally, it is proposed to amend Rule 35 (a) by including the words “a request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee” so as to take account of the provisions of Rule 43, 6, on urgent procedure.

6. Rule 36

The purpose of this drafting is:

Paragraph 1

To replace “majority”, which may be interpreted in several ways, by the more specific expression “more than half the Representatives to the Assembly or their Substitutes”.

Paragraph 2

To make clear that the President acts at the request of a Representative or Substitute.

Former paragraph 3

To delete this paragraph which was applicable when voting by roll-call was a means of determining whether or not there was a quorum but which has become pointless since a quorum is determined by the number of signatures on the register of attendance.

New paragraph 3

By deleting the first part of the paragraph, to avoid having to postpone a vote until a subsequent sitting when there might be a quorum later in the same sitting.

7. Rule 38*Paragraph 4*

The present text of this paragraph is not absolutely identical in the two languages since the French text seems to refer only to the formation of political groups. But the minimum number of Representatives or Substitutes required by the Rules of Procedure applies not only to the formation of a group but also to its continued existence. Any properly-formed group whose numbers fall below this threshold ceases to exist.

This is clear in the English text of the rule.

The French text should therefore be brought into line with the English text, which is more comprehensive.

The committee unanimously proposes to draft the French text of paragraph 4 as follows:

“Un groupe ne peut comprendre moins de neuf Représentants ou Suppléants.”

8. Rule 40*Paragraph 1*

Rule 40 was not amended in the general revision of the Rules of Procedure. Its wording corresponded to that of former Rule 26 which provided that unless the Assembly decided otherwise the examination of a matter in committee should be preceded by a general debate.

But Rule 16, paragraph 2, revised in December 1980, now lays down that:

“Any item referred to a committee by decision of the Assembly or of the Presidential Committee shall also be included in the Assembly’s register.”

The committee therefore unanimously proposes to add at the end of Rule 40, paragraph 1, the words:

“or by the Presidential Committee.”

9. Rule 43*Paragraph 6*

Only a roll-call makes it certain that there is an absolute majority as defined in Rule 35, 1 (a). The new drafting therefore spells out the need to resort to a roll-call stemming from the conditions for a majority laid down in the present paragraph 2.

**DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1983¹**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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Summary of estimates of expenditure and income for the financial year 1983
Allocation of expenditure under heads and sub-heads
Analysis of estimates and expenditure
Explanatory Memorandum
Comparison between the draft budget for the financial year 1983 and the budget for the financial year 1982

Summary of estimates of expenditure and income for the financial year 1983

Details	Estimate for 1983 F
<i>Head I</i> : Expenditure for staff	8,262,000
<i>Head II</i> : Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly	2,445,000
<i>Head III</i> : Expenditure on premises and equipment	516,000
<i>Head IV</i> : General administrative costs	2,015,000
<i>Head V</i> : Other expenditure	1,084,000
<i>Head VI</i> : Pensions	240,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	14,562,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS	442,000
NET TOTAL	14,120,000

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee and approved by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Adriaensens (Alternate: *Michel*) (Chairman); Mr. Jager (Alternate: *Lagorce*), Lord Hughes (Alternate: *Lord McNair*) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, Althammer, *Biefnot*, Delehedde, Durant (Alternate: *Atkinson*), Eastham (Alternate: *Grieve*), *Jeam-*

brun, Krieps (Alternate: *Margue*), Martino, Mertens (Alternate: *van der Werff*), Orione, Petrilli, *Schleiter*, Schulte, Sprung, Stainton (Alternate: *Sir Frederic Bennett*), Tripodi, Tummers (Alternate: *Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Allocation of expenditure under heads and sub-heads

Details	Estimate for 1983 F
<i>Head I – EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF</i>	
Sub-Head 1 : Salaries of permanent establishment	5,497,300
Sub-Head 2 : (A) Allowances	1,005,700
(B) Social charges	906,000
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials	112,000
(D) Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, allowances, etc.)	<u>741,000</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD I	8,262,000
<i>Head II – EXPENDITURE RELATING TO SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY</i>	
Sub-Head 3 : 1. Temporary staff	682,500
2. Linguistic staff	1,143,000
3. Insurance for temporary staff	5,000
4. Installation of equipment for sessions	350,000
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions	82,500
6. Provision for revising emoluments	<u>182,000</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD II	2,445,000
<i>Head III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</i>	
Sub-Head 4 : 1. Premises	396,000
2. Work on the building (joint areas)	60,000
Sub-Head 5 : Capital equipment	<u>60,000</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD III	516,000
<i>Head IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS</i>	
Sub-Head 6 : Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of documents	420,000
Sub-Head 7 : Office supplies and hire of machines	270,000
Sub-Head 8 : Printing and publishing of Assembly documents ...	1,250,000
Sub-Head 9 : Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	37,000
Sub-Head 10 : Official cars	37,500
Sub-Head 11 : Bank charges	<u>500</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD IV	2,015,000
<i>Head V – OTHER EXPENDITURE</i>	
Sub-Head 12 : Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	110,000
Sub-Head 13 : Expenses for representation and receptions	170,000
Sub-Head 14 : Committee study missions	3,000
Sub-Head 15 : Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	264,000
Sub-Head 16 : Expenses of experts and the auditors	62,000
Sub-Head 17 : Expenditure on information	230,000
Sub-Head 18 : Expenses for groups of the Assembly	230,000
Sub-Head 19 : Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000
Sub-Head 20 : Non-recoverable taxes	<u>12,000</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD V	1,084,000
<i>Head VI – PENSIONS</i>	
Sub-Head 21 : (A) Pensions	221,000
(B) Allowances	15,500
(C) Severance grant	-
(D) Supplementary insurance	<u>3,500</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD VI	240,000

*Analysis of estimates of expenditure**Head I – Expenditure for staff**Sub-Head 1*

SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

*Estimate : F 5,497,300**(a) Basic salaries**Estimate : F 5,422,300*

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
The Clerk	Hors cadre ¹	1	393,500
Senior Counsellors	A6	2	690,900
Counsellors	A5	3	970,700
First Secretaries	A4	2	554,400
Secretaries	A3 ²	2	428,100
Secretaries-Translators/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator	A2	3	567,400
Chief Accountant	B6	1	183,600
Personal Assistants	B4 ³	5	655,400
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	5	555,400
Switchboard Operator	B3	1	119,400
Head of Reproduction Department	C6	1	116,300
Assistants in Reproduction Department	C4	2	187,200
		28	5,422,300

*(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B and C), including travelling expenses and insurance**Estimate : F 75,000*

1. On the basis of Grade A7, step 6 + 6 % + representation allowance (F 7,700 per year).
2. Creation of a new post.
3. Regrading of a Grade B3.

Sub-Head 2

ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

(A) ALLOWANCES

*Estimate : F 1,005,700**(a) Household allowance**Estimate : F 192,400*

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Clerk	Hors cadre	1	23,100
Senior Counsellor	A6	1	20,700
Counsellors	A5	3	58,300
First Secretary	A4	1	16,600
Secretaries	A3	2	25,700
Personal Assistants	B4	2	15,200
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	2	14,300
Head of Reproduction Department	C6	1	7,000
Assistants in Reproduction Department	C4	2	11,500
		15	192,400

*(b) Children's allowance**Estimate : F 170,000*

8,450 F per year per child : F 170,000

*(c) Expatriation allowance**Estimate : F 468,200*

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Senior Counsellors	A6	2	124,400
Counsellors	A5	1	65,400
First Secretary	A4	1	55,500
Secretaries	A3	2	85,600
Secretary-Translator/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator	A2	2	62,100
Personal Assistants	B4	2	42,200
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	2	33,000
		12	468,200

*(d) Compensatory rent allowance**Estimate : F 10,100**(e) Overtime**Estimate : F 33,000**(f)**(g) Education allowance**Estimate : F 130,000**(h) Allowance for language courses**Estimate : F 2,000*

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES*Estimate : F 906,000***(a) Social Security** *Estimate : F 610,000*28 officials *F 610,000***(b) Supplementary insurance** *Estimate : F 181,000***(c) Provident fund** *Estimate : F 115,000*14 % of basic salaries × 822,000 F *F 115,000*
(for 3 officials who opted to continue with the provident fund)**(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS***Estimate : F 112,000***(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and cost of marking examination papers***Estimate : F 10,000***(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons***Estimate : F 10,000***(c) Removal expenses***Estimate : F 40,000***(d) Installation allowance***Estimate : F 30,000***(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials***Estimate : F 15,000***(f) Medical examination***Estimate : F 7,000***(D) PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, ALLOWANCES, ETC.)***Estimate : 741,000*

Head II – Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly

Estimate : F 2,445,000

Sub-Head 3**1. TEMPORARY STAFF****Temporary staff required for sessions of the Assembly**

Function	Paris : 10 days		
	Daily remuneration F	No.	Total F
Heads of the sittings office	665	1 <i>a</i>	26,000
	815	1 <i>b</i>	
Heads of sections	560	2 <i>a</i>	28,300
	710	2 <i>b</i>	
Sergeant-at-Arms	615	1 <i>b</i>	7,400
Secretaries for the Assembly	465	3 <i>a</i>	28,800
	615	2 <i>b</i>	
Précis writers	465	3 <i>a</i>	36,100
	615	3 <i>b</i>	
Verbatim reporters	615	14 <i>b</i>	160,000
	785	6 <i>c</i>	
Assistants	300	6 <i>a</i>	191,000
	260	10 <i>a</i>	
	430	4 <i>b</i>	
	390	27 <i>b</i>	
Head ushers	215	2 <i>a</i>	5,200
Ushers	195	12 <i>a</i>	36,000
	345	3 <i>b</i>	
Offset/Assemblers	195	10 <i>a</i>	23,400
		112	542,200

- a.* Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside France.
c. Recruited as free-lance staff.

Travelling expenses F 140,300
F 682,500

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

(A) Interpretation Services

(a) Interpretation services required for sessions of the Assembly

Function	10 days	
	No.	Total F
Interpreters	12	252,000
	12	252,000

Travelling expenses F 18,000
 F 270,000

(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions F 300,000

(B) Translation Services

Temporary translators for sessions of the Assembly

Function	Daily remuneration F	No.	Estimate ¹ F
Revisers	710	3a	210,000
	1,141	4b	
Translators	570	3a	204,000
	952	5b	
Assistants	260	4a	139,000
	300	3a	
	430	3b	
	390	2b	
		27	553,000

1. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside France.

Travelling expenses F 20,000
 F 573,000

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate : F 5,000

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS

- Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment	F 340,000
- Installation of telephone booths	F 10,000

Estimate : F 350,000

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS

- Removal expenses	F 5,200
- Medical service (Doctor and Nurse)	F 16,000
- Hire of typewriters, a technician and screens	F 20,300
- Servicing of lifts	F 16,000
- Cleaning	F 15,000
- Overtime for switchboard staff	F 8,500
- Snacks for reproduction service	F 1,500

Estimate : F 82,500

6. PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, PER DIEM ALLOWANCES)

Estimate : F 182,000

Head III - Expenditure on premises and equipment

Estimate : F 516,000

Sub-Head 4

1. PREMISES

- Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment	F 15,000
- Joint overheads, furniture for the premises and insurance	F 340,000
- Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture ...	F 26,000
- Miscellaneous	F 15,000

Estimate : F 396,000

2. WORK ON THE BUILDING
(joint areas)

- Work on the building	F 30,000
- Changing the switchboard	F 30,000

Estimate : F 60,000

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

- 5 typewriters F 60,000
- Estimate* : F 60,000

Head IV – General administrative costs*Estimate* : F 2,015,000*Sub-Head 6*

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEX CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

- Postage F 268,000
 - Telephone F 132,000
 - Telex F 15,000
 - Transport of documents F 5,000
-
- Estimate* : F 420,000

Sub-Head 7

OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES

- Purchase of duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies
 - Hire of machines for photocopying and printing
- Estimate* : F 270,000

Sub-Head 8

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

- Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents)
 - Printing of Reports of the Council
 - Printing of Texts Adopted
 - Miscellaneous – Bulletins, printing of the Agenda and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc.
 - Reprints
 - Brochures
- Estimate* : F 1,250,000

Sub-Head 9

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

Estimate : F 37,000

Sub-Head 10

OFFICIAL CARS

- Hire of official cars for the President
 - Maintenance, garage, petrol and insurance for the official car of the Clerk
- Estimate : F 37,500*

Sub-Head 11

BANK CHARGES

Estimate : F 500

Head V – Other expenditure

Estimate : F 1,084,000

*Sub-Head 12*TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY,
CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS

Estimate : F 110,000

Sub-Head 13

EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate : F 170,000

Sub-Head 14

COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate : F 3,000

Sub-Head 15

OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate : F 264,000

Sub-Head 16

EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR

Estimate : F 62,000

Sub-Head 17

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate : F 230,000

Sub-Head 18

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate : F 230,000

Sub-Head 19

CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate : F 3,000

Sub-Head 20

NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate : F 12,000

Head VI – Pensions*Estimate* : F 240,000**Sub-Head 21**

PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC.

(A) Pensions*Estimate* : F 221,000

(a) Retirement pension	<i>Estimate</i> : F 166,000
(b) Invalidity pension	<i>Estimate</i> : pro mem.
(c) Survivors' pension	<i>Estimate</i> : F 36,400
(d) Orphans' pension	<i>Estimate</i> : F 18,600

(B) Allowances*Estimate* : 15,500

(a) Household allowance	<i>Estimate</i> : 6,200
(b) Dependants' allowance	<i>Estimate</i> : 9,300
(c) Education allowance	<i>Estimate</i> : pro mem.
(d) Relief allowance	<i>Estimate</i> : pro mem.

(C) Severance grant*Estimate* : pro mem.**(D) Supplementary insurance***Estimate* : F 3,500**Income****(A) Sundry receipts***Estimate* : F 105,000

(a) Sale of publications	F 15,000
(b) Bank interest	F 75,000
(c) Social security reimbursements	F 15,000

(B) Pensions*Estimate* : F 337,000

(a) Contributions (7 %) (× F 4,592,644)	<i>Estimate</i> : F 322,000
(b) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.) ..	<i>Estimate</i> : F 15,000

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 14,120,000. The budget for 1982 amounted to F 12,282,000. The difference is therefore F 1,838,000 (14.96 %).

2. *Head I – Expenditure for staff*

The increase (F 1,010,000) in the estimate for this head covers :

(i) the creation of a Grade A.3 post (F 400,000), made up as follows:

– Salary and allowances	F 325,000
– Installation allowance, removal and arrival expenses	<u>F 75,000</u>
	F 400,000

(ii) the alignment of the salary of the Clerk with that of the Clerk of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or the Deputy Secretary-General of WEU, i.e. a Grade A.7, step 6, salary, plus 6 % (instead of the former 1 %) (F 26,000) ;

(iii) the regrading of a Grade B.3 post to B.4 (F 1,200) ;

(iv) annual increments ;

(v) following a decision by the WEU Council's Budget Committee, the creation of a sub-head "Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, allowances, etc.)". Salaries and allowances have been calculated on the basis of those in force on 1st January 1982. The new sub-head therefore makes provision for possible adjustments during the period 1st July 1982 to 31st December 1983. This increase amounts to a total of F 741,000.

3. *Head II – Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly*

Sub-head 3.1 – Temporary staff

Sub-head 3.2 (A) – Interpretation services

Sub-head 3.2 (B) – Translation services

Sub-head 3.6 – Provision for revising emoluments

Salaries for temporary staff (as in the Council of Europe) are calculated on the basis of salary scales for permanent staff. The figures given are those in force on 1st January 1982 and a new sub-head is included entitled "Provision for revising emoluments (salaries and per diem allowances)". The expected increase amounts to a total of F 182,000.

Sub-head 3.4 – Installation of equipment for sessions.

The interpreters' booths have been made to conform with the standards laid down by the IACA, which led to an increase in the cost of installations in 1982. The increase of F 45,000 takes account of the expected increase in expenses relating to the two part-sessions to be held in Paris in 1983.

4. *Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment*

Sub-head 4.2 – Work on the building (joint areas)

This estimate covers the Assembly's share of expenditure on repairs to the building and the hire-purchase of a new switchboard over a period of five years.

Sub-head 5 – Capital equipment

The sum of F 60,000 is for the purchase of five typewriters to replace those purchased in 1971 and 1975.

5. *Head IV – General administrative costs*

Sub-head 6 – Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of documents

The increase (F 50,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to an expected increase in postal rates and telephone charges and the hire of a telex and related expenditure.

Sub-head 7 – Office supplies and hire of machines

The increase (F 33,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the higher cost of paper and office supplies. This sub-head also covers the hire of a photocopying machine and of an addressograph machine.

Sub-head 8 – Printing and publishing of Assembly documents

The increase (F 140,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in the cost of printing and of paper.

Sub-head 10 – Official cars

An official car having been purchased for the Clerk in 1981, account is taken only of the cost of maintenance, garage, insurance, etc., for this car, plus the hire of an official car for the President.

6. *Head V – Other expenditure*

Sub-head 12 – Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs

The increase (F 14,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes account of the expected increase in travelling expenses and per diem allowances.

Sub-head 13 – Expenses for representation and receptions

The increase (F 20,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices.

Sub-head 15 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk

The increase (F 24,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increase in travelling expenses and per diem allowances foreseen in 1983.

Sub-head 16 – Expenses of experts and the auditors

The increase (F 6,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in fees payable to the auditor and experts.

Sub-head 17 – Expenditure on information

The increase (F 27,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in the cost of living.

Sub-head 18 – Expenses for groups of the Assembly

The increase (F 27,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in the cost of living.

7. *Head VI – Pensions*

The increase in the estimate for this head corresponds to the payment of a pension of a Grade B.4 official who has retired.

8. *Sundry receipts*

Expected receipts in 1983 include:

- (i) sale of publications;
- (ii) bank interest;
- (iii) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave;
- (iv) income resulting from the contribution of 7 % from staff subscribing to the pension fund and the reimbursement of loans and withdrawals.

**Comparison between the draft budget for the financial year 1983
and the budget for the financial year 1982**

Head I – Expenditure for staff

Sub-Head 1

SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

(a) Basic salaries

Estimate for 1983	F 5,422,300
Budget for 1982	<u>F 5,388,000</u>
Net increase	F 34,300

1981 expenditure : F 4,555,880

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2.

(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B and C), including travelling expenses and insurance

Estimate for 1983	F 75,000
Budget for 1982	<u>F 72,000</u>
Net increase	F 3,000

1981 expenditure : F 9,698

These salary scales are the same as those in force on 1st January 1982. See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2.

Sub-Head 2

ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

(A) ALLOWANCES

(a) Household allowance

Estimate for 1983	F 192,400
Budget for 1982	<u>F 195,000</u>
Net decrease	F 2,600

1981 expenditure : F 155,613

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(b) Children's allowance

Estimate for 1983	F 170,000
Budget for 1982	<u>F 183,000</u>
Net decrease	F 13,000

1981 expenditure : F 143,320

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(c) Expatriation allowance

Estimate for 1983	F 468,200
Budget for 1982	<u>F 453,000</u>
Net increase	F 15,200

1981 expenditure : F 347,592

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the allowance.

(d) Compensatory rent allowance

Estimate for 1983	F 10,100
Budget for 1982	<u>F 20,000</u>
Net decrease	F 9,900

1981 expenditure : F 12,465

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of officials qualifying for an allowance.

(e) Overtime

Estimate for 1983	F	33,000
Budget for 1982	F	33,000

Estimate unchanged

1981 expenditure : F 29,422

(f)**(g) Education allowance**

Estimate for 1983	F	130,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>100,000</u>
Net increase	F	30,000

1981 expenditure : F 61,475

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(h) Allowance for language courses

Estimate for 1983	F	2,000
Budget for 1982	F	2,000

Estimate unchanged

1981 expenditure : F 1,100

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES**(a) Social security**

Estimate for 1983	F	610,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>470,000</u>
Net increase	F	140,000

1981 expenditure : F 438,596

This takes account of increases in 1982.

(b) Supplementary insurance

Estimate for 1983	F	181,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>184,000</u>
Net decrease	F	3,000

1981 expenditure : F 161,410

(c) Provident fund

Estimate for 1983	F	115,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>116,000</u>
Net decrease	F	1,000

1981 expenditure : F 102,586

This calculation is based on 14 % of basic salaries for staff having opted to remain in the provident fund scheme.

(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS

(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers

Estimate for 1983	F	10,000 ¹
Budget for 1982	F	<u>1,600</u>
Net increase	F	8,400

1981 expenditure : nil.

(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons

Estimate for 1983	F	10,000 ¹
Budget for 1982	F	<u>1,500</u>
Net increase	F	8,500

1981 expenditure : nil.

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(c) Removal expenses

Estimate for 1983	F	40,000 ¹
Budget for 1982	F	<u>3,400</u>
Net increase	F	36,600

1981 expenditure : nil.

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(d) Installation allowance

Estimate for 1983	F	30,000 ¹
Budget for 1982	F	<u>7,500</u>
Net increase	F	22,500

1981 expenditure : nil.

Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements.

(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials

Estimate for 1983	F	15,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>12,000</u>
Net increase	F	3,000

1981 expenditure : F 15,041

Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1983.

(f) Medical examination

Estimate for 1983	F	7,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>10,000</u>
Net decrease	F	3,000

1981 expenditure : F 4,466

(D) PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, ALLOWANCES, ETC.)

Estimate for 1983	F	741,000
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New sub-head. See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2 (v).

1. The increase in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the recruitment outside France of a Grade A3 official, married and with two children.

*Head II – Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly**Sub-Head 3*

1. TEMPORARY STAFF

Tempory staff required for sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1983	F	682,500
Budget for 1982	F	<u>671,000</u>
Net increase	F	11,500

1981 expenditure : F 568,372

The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

(A) Interpretation Services

(a) Interpretation services required for sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1983	F	270,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>270,000</u>
See Sub-Head 6		

1981 expenditure : F 225,892

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions

Estimate for 1983	F	300,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>267,000</u>
Net increase	F	33,000

1981 expenditure : F 251,016

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(B) Translation Services

Temporary translators for sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1983	F	573,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>560,000</u>
Net increase	F	13,000

1981 expenditure : F 472,052

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate for 1983	F	5,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>5,000</u>
Estimate unchanged		

1981 expenditure : F 3,515

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS

Estimate for 1983	F	350,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>305,000</u>
Net increase	F	45,000

1981 expenditure : F 261,321

This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS

Estimate for 1983	F	82,500
Budget for 1982	F	<u>65,000</u>
Net increase	F	17,500

1981 expenditure : F 63,778

This increase corresponds to the expected rise in the cost of living.

6. PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, PER DIEM ALLOWANCES)

Estimate for 1983	F	182,000
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New sub-head. See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment*Sub-Head 4*

1. PREMISES

Estimate for 1983	F	396,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>356,000</u>
Net increase	F	40,000

1981 expenditure : F 251,039

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs and the hire of committee rooms.

2. WORK ON THE BUILDING
(joint areas)

Estimate for 1983	F	60,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>53,000</u>
Net increase	F	7,000

1981 expenditure : F 78,530

This represents the Assembly's share in work to be carried out in the building and for changing the switchboard. See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

Estimate for 1983	F	60,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>27,000</u>
Net increase	F	33,000

1981 expenditure : F 20,370

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.

Head IV – General administrative costs*Sub-Head 6*

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEX CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1983	F	420,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>370,000</u>
Net increase	F	50,000

1981 expenditure : F 315,129

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 7

OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES

Estimate for 1983	F	270,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>237,000</u>
Net increase	F	33,000

1981 expenditure : F 217,145

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 8

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1983	F	1,250,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>1,110,000</u>
Net increase	F	140,000

1981 expenditure : F 832,687

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 9

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

Estimate for 1983	F	37,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>33,000</u>
Net increase	F	4,000

1981 expenditure : F 26,105

Sub-Head 10

OFFICIAL CARS

Estimate for 1983	F	37,500
Budget for 1982	F	<u>35,500</u>
Net increase	F	2,000

1981 expenditure : F 63,097

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 11

BANK CHARGES

Estimate for 1983	F	500
Budget for 1982	F	500
Estimate unchanged		

1981 expenditure : F 7

*Head V – Other expenditure**Sub-Head 12*TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN
OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS

Estimate for 1983	F	110,000
Budget for 1982	F	<u>96,000</u>
Net increase	F	14,000

1981 expenditure : F 68,632

Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments.

The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of the Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee.

Sub-Head 13

EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate for 1983	F	170,000
Budget for 1982	F	150,000
Net increase	F	20,000

1981 expenditure : F 100,749

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 14

COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate for 1983	F	3,000
Budget for 1982	F	3,000
Estimate unchanged		

1981 expenditure : F 7,702

Sub-Head 15

OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate for 1983	F	264,000
Budget for 1982	F	240,000
Net increase	F	24,000

1981 expenditure : F 149,980

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 16

EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS

Estimate for 1983	F	62,000
Budget for 1982	F	56,000
Net increase	F	6,000

1981 expenditure : F 54,721

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 17

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate for 1983	F	230,000
Budget for 1982	F	203,000
Net increase	F	27,000

1981 expenditure : F 144,541

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 18

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate for 1983	F	230,000
Budget for 1982	<u>F</u>	<u>203,000</u>
Net increase	F	27,000

1981 expenditure : F 180,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 19

CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate for 1983	F	3,000
Budget for 1982	F	3,000
Estimate unchanged		

1981 expenditure : F 736

Sub-Head 20

NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate for 1983	F	12,000
Budget for 1982	F	12,000
Estimate unchanged		

1981 expenditure : F 9,197

*Head VI – Pensions**Sub-Head 21*

PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC.

*(A) Pensions**(a) Retirement pension*

Estimate for 1983	F	166,000
Budget for 1982	<u>F</u>	<u>70,000</u>
Net increase	F	96,000

1981 expenditure : F 58,210

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(b) Invalidity pension pro mem.

1981 expenditure : nil

(c) Survivors' pension

Estimate for 1983	F	36,400
Budget for 1982	<u>F</u>	<u>36,000</u>
Net increase	F	400

1981 expenditure : F 30,347

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(d) Orphans' pension

Estimate for 1983	F	18,600
Budget for 1982	F	<u>18,000</u>
Net increase	F	600

1981 expenditure : F 15,497

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

*(B) Allowances**(a) Household allowance*

Estimate for 1983	F	6,200
Budget for 1982	F	<u>-</u>
Net increase	F	6,200

1981 expenditure : nil

(b) Dependants' allowance

Estimate for 1983	F	9,300
Budget for 1982	F	<u>-</u>
Net increase	F	9,300

1981 expenditure : nil

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(C) Severance grant

pro mem.

(D) Supplementary insurance

Estimate for 1983	F	3,500
Budget for 1982	F	<u>2,000</u>
Net increase	F	1,500

1981 expenditure : F 1,612

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1983*

AMENDMENT 1¹
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen

1. Under Head 1 – Expenditure for Staff – reduce the total by F 26,000, the sum proposed to maintain the salary of the Clerk at its present level of Grade A7, step 6, plus 1%.

Signed: Stoffelen

1. See 10th sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendment agreed to).

**OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1982¹**

*submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Stainton, Rapporteur*

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DRAFT OPINION

on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1982

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Stainton, Rapporteur
Additional memorandum on WEU staff

APPENDICES

- I. Table of establishment of Western European Union
- II. Progress report on the joint pensions administrative section of the co-ordinated organisations
- III. Pensions
 - (a) Appropriations for pensions for the various organs of WEU (1978-82)
 - (b) Number of pensions paid out by WEU (1978-82)
- IV. Budgetary establishments of the organisations as at 30th June 1981 by countries
- V. Membership of the co-ordinated organisations

Draft Opinion

*on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial year 1982*

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated except to note that the financial provisions for 1982 assume an inflation factor of 8 % for the United Kingdom and 13 % for France and allow for no growth in real terms. However the Assembly still awaits the results of the study made by the Council in 1981 on the efficiency of the ministerial organs.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Adriaensens (Alternate: *Michel*) (Chairman); Mr. Jager (Alternate: *Lagorce*), Lord Hughes (Alternate: *Lord McNair*) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, Althammer, *Biefnot*, Delehedde, Durant (Alternate: *Atkinson*), Eastham (Alternate: *Grieve*), *Jeam-*

brun, Krieps (Alternate: *Margue*), Martino, Mertens (Alternate: *van der Werff*), Orione, Petrilli, *Schleiter*, Schulte, Sprung, Stainton (Alternate: *Sir Frederic Bennett*), Tripodi, Tummers (Alternate: *Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. Stainton, Rapporteur)*

1. Article VIII (c) of the Charter of the Assembly stipulates that "The Assembly shall express its views in the form of an opinion or recommendation on the annual budget of Western European Union as soon as it has been communicated".

2. For many years the Assembly has not commented on the budget of the ministerial organs but your Rapporteur feels that the present report should give consideration to some of the financial implications arising from political decisions which might affect this budget.

3. If the budget of the ministerial organs is reviewed for the last years, the figures are as follows:

	1972	1982
Secretariat-General	£ 245,055	£ 1,113,957
Standing Armaments Committee	F 1,999,290	F 7,696,630
Agency for the Control of Armaments	F 4,344,608	F 16,461,940

4. The magnitude of apparent increase is entirely illusory however when measured against retail price indices in, for example, both France and the United Kingdom¹. This decade of inflation embraces the two oil price crises and underlines the economic and financial difficulties with which all member countries have had to wrestle. During this period the numerical staffing of the ministerial organs has remained constant and no major item of capital expenditure has been incurred.

5. The breakdown of the 1982 budget is shown in the table below.

6. For an assessment of the total cost of WEU, the expenditure of the Assembly which, in 1982, amounted to F 12,282,000, should also be taken into account, giving an overall projected expenditure of approximately F 49,000,000.

1. Ref. INSEE: France 287.57%; United Kingdom 378.31%.

	A*	B*	C*	TOTAL B+C
	£	Francs	Francs	Francs
Salaries and allowances	1,362,452	9,879,000	19,894,300	29,773,300
Pensions	104,880	1,199,500	2,803,100	4,002,600
Travel	25,860	166,300	484,700	651,000
Other operating costs	168,905	593,950	855,450	1,449,400
Purchase of furniture, etc.	36,600	19,950	43,900	63,850
Buildings	—	44,380	79,890	124,270
Total expenditure	1,698,697	11,903,080	24,161,340	36,064,420
WEU tax	505,865	3,499,950	6,820,900	10,320,850
Other receipts	46,000	440,000	209,000	649,000
Pension receipts	32,875	266,500	669,500	936,000
Total income	584,740	4,206,450	7,699,400	11,905,850
NET TOTAL	1,113,957	7,696,630	16,461,940	24,158,570

* A - Secretariat General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

7. The final accounts and the reports of the President of the Assembly and the Auditor¹ are submitted to the Assembly for approval, and thereafter to the Council. As far as the budget of the ministerial organs is concerned, it does not have access to the final accounts and the Auditors'² report which is submitted each year to the Council at the close of the financial year. But it should be recalled that the Assembly is only called upon "to express an opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs".

8. The total establishment of the ministerial organs is as follows:

Secretariat-General	48
Standing Armaments Committee	28
Agency for the Control of Armaments	<u>52</u>
Total	128 ³

9. In 1981, the Council undertook a study of the ministerial organs of WEU with the aim of achieving greater efficiency. The outcome of this report has not been communicated to the Assembly and reference was made to this fact in the draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs for the financial year 1981.

10. In Chapter VI of the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council it is stated that:

"As pointed out by the Council in their reply to Recommendation 365, the budget situation in the member countries at the present time calls for rigorous economies.

The budgets of the WEU ministerial bodies for 1981, which were still under scrutiny when the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council was transmitted to the Assembly, were approved by the Council in April; they came within the limits of the rates of inflation forecast for France and the United Kingdom. Recapitulatory tables for these budgets, as adopted and then revised, are annexed to this document.

Also in April 1981, the Council charged an ad hoc working group with a study aimed at identifying all acceptable measures that might be taken to achieve economies, together with greater efficiency in the organisation's methods of work and use of the staff of the WEU

ministerial bodies, without impairing the organisation's ability to meet its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty, the Protocols and the Council's Decision of 7th May 1955.

During this study, it was noted that as a result of excellent co-operation, certain expenditure effected for the benefit of the Assembly was borne by the budgets of the two WEU ministerial bodies.

The recommendations of the ad hoc group were taken into account by the Council in the detailed discussions which they devoted to the preparation of the budgets of the WEU ministerial bodies for 1982."

11. It should be noted that the budget for 1982 does not reflect any modifications to the structure of the ministerial organs.

12. It could be said that the total cost of the ministerial organs, which in 1982 represents F 37,303,262 (or about 76 % of the total cost of WEU), and the number of staff employed (128) are small compared to other European and international organisations. Nevertheless, it is only on the basis of functions delegated under the terms of the Brussels Treaty that the budget and the number of staff can be examined in a logical and valid manner.

13. Both the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee, in their replies to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council, dealt with the subject in detail (Documents 908 and 913). Whilst it can be argued that it must be left to governments to decide whether they consider that after more than 25 years of existence the structure of the organs of WEU is satisfactory, such a view must severely curtail the effective comment of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

14. Attached for the guidance of members of the Assembly is an additional memorandum on certain aspects of WEU staff career prospects.

Additional memorandum on WEU staff

Careers and conditions of employment for staff in the co-ordinated organisations

1. For a number of years now the Assembly has been drawing the attention of the Council to the lack of career prospects for staff in the co-ordinated organisations and particularly within WEU. The situation was last highlighted in paragraph 3 of the Assembly's

1. Parliamentary auditor, currently the United Kingdom Comptroller and Auditor General, appointed by the Assembly.

2. Three auditors on a three-year rotating system appointed by the Council.

3. See Appendix I.

Recommendation 340 adopted on 4th December 1979:

“ 3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy and in particular:

- to review the structure of grades;
- to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy;
- to study the type and length of contracts;
- to co-ordinate staff rules;
- to review the indemnity for loss of job;
- to study methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another;
- to make clear the financial consequences of their proposals ;”.

2. To which the Council replied as follows:

“ 3. The Council have considered the possibility of setting up a committee of senior experts, but have come to the conclusion that the problems which such a group of experts would be qualified to consider should be discussed beforehand between the co-ordinated organisations themselves and, in the framework of the Co-ordinating Committee, with experts from the member governments.

Certain co-ordinating agencies are looking at the problem and any conclusions which may emerge from this consultation should be awaited.

In these circumstances, the Council recognise that the specific problems listed by the Assembly in point I.3. of its recommendation should receive the attention of the organisation and, in particular, of its Secretary-General:

(a) With regard to the grading system and the introduction of a dual grading system the problems are still under consideration at the administrative level.

(b) The staff rules of each of the organisations contain many provisions, in particular regarding types and duration of contracts, which all have to take into account the specific circumstances of

each organisation; nevertheless, those responsible within the organisation make every effort to harmonise these provisions wherever possible.

(c) The Council consider that the indemnity for loss of job is satisfactorily dealt with by the staff rules, particularly for staff members with long service in the organisation.

(d) The methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another are governed by both the staff rules and the pension scheme rules of each of the organisations concerned; as far as the Council are aware, this problem has given rise to little difficulty; only experience will show whether it will be possible in the future to consider simplifying these rules.”

3. There have been no developments since. The situation is aggravated by the fact that because of serious economic problems in member countries, governments wish to keep the budgets of the co-ordinated organisations at nil growth.

4. It would be to the advantage of Councils of the co-ordinated organisations if indeed they were to agree on the establishment of a committee of experts since such a body would be obliged to look not only at the grading structure of staff but also at the whole problem of modernisation within the organisations in the context of technological advances.

5. Sight should not be lost of the fact that the permanent staff of the five co-ordinated organisations plus two organisations with observer status represent a total establishment of some 11,000 officials¹. It is only proper that member governments give urgent consideration to the careers of these officials in an overall as opposed to a merely budgetary sense.

6. It might be found possible to extend co-ordination between the organisations. The administrative unit which was set up to deal with pensions pending the ultimate creation of a truly independent body was a step in the right direction. It could well be that this example points to other areas of co-operation within the co-ordinated organisations (e.g. computerised facilities) were member governments to take the appropriate initiative.

1. See Appendix IV.

APPENDIX I

Table of establishment

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

	A ¹	B ¹	C ¹	Total A, B, C	Office of the Clerk		
Secretary-General	1	-	-	1	Clerk	1	
Deputy Secretary-General	1	-	-	1		-	
Director of the Agency	-	-	1	1		-	
Assistant Secretary- General	1	1	-	2		-	
A7	-	-	1	1		-	
A6	1	-	3	4		2	
A5	2	1	6	9		3	
A4	-	4	8	12		2 ²	
A3	3	-	1	4		1	
A2	2	-	2	4		3 ²	
L5	1	-	-	1		-	
L4	1	1	-	2		-	
L3	1	3	2	6		-	
L2	1	-	-	1		-	
B6	-	-	-	-		1	
B5	-	-	-	-		-	
B4	8	4	9	21		4	
B3	7	7	6	20		7	
B2	5	-	3	8		-	
B1	2	-	-	2		-	
C6	-	-	-	-		1	
C5	-	-	1	1		-	
C4	1	4	-	5		2	
C3	8	3	9	20		-	
C2	2	-	-	2		-	
	48	28	52	128			27

1. A - Secretariat General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

2. Including four secretaries Translations/Publications.

APPENDIX II

*Progress report on the joint pensions administrative section of the co-ordinated organisations*I. *Work done*

1. The activities of the joint pensions administrative section during the financial year 1982, and in 1983, may be summarised as follows:

A. *Pensions study unit*

- The pensions study unit provided the secretariat for PACCO and prepared the agenda and minutes of seven meetings, and also of two joint sessions with the CPAPOC Working Party on Pensions.
- On the basis of studies and research, it produced some thirty working papers with the object of clarifying the interpretation of a number of provisions in the pension scheme rules. In these reports, it analysed the situation, set forth the various options and made proposals which were considered by the competent committees and authorities.
- It helped in amending or supplementing several implementing instructions and produced some dozen documents clarifying the meaning of certain clauses in the rules, where, however, no change of wording was required.
- It took part in the preparation of a specific programme for the deductions and reductions involved in computing pay and recorded on the monthly pay-slips.
- The unit's documentation service began publication of a series of explanatory leaflets on some of the more complex provisions of the rules, for the use not only of retired staff but also of serving staff wishing to learn about their future entitlements and obligations.
- The pensions study unit is pursuing negotiations with national pension schemes or other international organisations with the object of reaching reciprocal agreements on the transfer of pension rights in application of Article 12 of the rules. These efforts have already been successful in two member countries.

- Lastly, the pensions study unit has taken an active part in the design of a new and improved software system which it is intended should be shared by the two computation units. This has involved thoroughly "dissecting" the pension scheme rules and completely revamping the printouts.

2. Over and above its usual administrative and management duties, the pensions study unit will endeavour during the coming financial year to improve and develop its services to the co-ordinated organisations, continue its analyses and studies on general or specific questions concerning the pension scheme rules, further extend negotiations with outside bodies concerning the transferability of pension rights and lastly, standardise and co-ordinate certain administrative procedures for which the five organisations continue to be responsible.

B. *Pensions computation unit I*

3. During the 1982 financial year the unit has:

- prepared further computerised files concerning pensioned staff;
- verified basic data supplied by the co-ordinated organisations;
- made monthly payments to some 750 pensioners fully operational;
- produced "assessments of pension entitlement" and pension certificates for pensioners;
- designed and put into operation the specific programme for deductions (loans, advances, adjustments, contributions to the APSCOD), social security contributions and reductions for benefits from other sources (invalidity pensions, family allowances, etc.);
- computerised the handling of arrears and changes in scales so that they are incorporated in pension payments as soon as they occur, and with no time-lag by comparison with payments to serving staff;
- extended the computerisation of calculations relating to tax adjustments;
- provided all the data required for preparing annual tax returns as well as for

statements required by national tax authorities;

- prepared new printouts for the issue of statistics.

4. The unit's primary task, on which work began in 1982 and is scheduled to continue through to the end of 1983, is to devise and put into operation a new system - one which is both more flexible and more sophisticated - taking into account all the recommendations made by PACCO since the section was set up. This new computerised system means redesigning all the unit's operations and procedures.

C. Pensions computation unit II (NATO)

5. The work of pensions computation unit II has been concerned with setting up and operating the "Pensions" component of the PMIS (personnel management information system). Data from 26 NATO organisations, centralised by 16 of them, have been collected and processed and the subsequent figures concerning some 500 pensions, worked out on the basis of scales expressed in 12 different currencies, have been transmitted to the organisations concerned. A comprehensive data file has been compiled, and this has meant that the retroactive increase in respect of the scales applying on 1st July 1981 could be computed for these same organisations.

6. New programmes have been prepared with the object of meeting, as far as available

resources will allow, the requests from users of pensions computation unit II, namely:

- (i) the production and use of a magnetic tape intended as backing store for payment by the Banque Bruxelles-Lambert of pensions from organisations in Brussels computed in Belgian francs and payable in Belgium;
- (ii) the production of a printout of bank transfers for the services of the financial controller of the international secretariat;
- (iii) changes in the computing programme so as to incorporate deductions in respect of contributions to the association of pensioned staff;
- (iv) the opening on behalf of the unit of a special bank account for payment of the tax adjustment;
- (v) the preparation of a supplementary file of pensioners' addresses so as to permit automatic printing of addresses on self-adhesive labels.

7. During the 1983 financial year, unit II is planning to draw up payslips, finalise the tax adjustment programme and create an individual data file of pensions and the different printouts required by the organisations using unit II so as to help them in keeping a check of and paying pensioners for whom they are responsible.

APPENDIX III

Pensions

(a) Appropriations for pensions for the various organs of WEU (1978-1982)

	1978			1979			1980			1981			1982		
	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)
Secretariat-General	£ 666,705	£ 27,425	4.11	£ 786,660	£ 66,420	8.44	£ 895,600	£ 81,500	9.10	£ 1,021,160	£ 104,160	10.20	£ 1,113,957	£ 104,880	9.41
Standing Armaments Committee	F 4,747,625	F 365,000	7.68	F 5,299,865	F 421,200	7.94	F 5,975,945	F 602,000	10.07	F 7,034,670	F 861,800	12.25	F 7,696,630	F 1,199,500	15.58
Agency for the Control of Armaments	10,207,655	704,300	6.89	11,928,930	2,007,400	16.82	13,013,155	1,905,000	14.63	14,907,470	2,217,100	14.87	16,461,940	2,803,100	17.02
Office of the Clerk	7,778,000	62,000	0.79	8,515,000	83,000	0.97	9,632,000	91,000	0.94	10,866,000	106,000	0.97	12,282,000	126,000	1.03

(b) Number of pensions paid out by WEU (1978-1982)

Pensions	1978					1979					1980					1981					1982				
	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total
Retirement	4	16	8	1	29	5	17	8	1	31	7	19	8	1	35	7	17	9	1	34	7	18	13	2	40
Survivors'	1	5	1	1	8	1	7	2	1	11	1	8	3	1	13	1	10	3	1	15	1	9	3	1	14
Orphans'	3 ¹	-	-	1	4	3 ¹	1 ¹	-	1	5	1 ¹	2 ¹	-	1	4	-	1 ¹	-	1	2	-	1 ¹	-	1	2
Invalidity	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1
Totals	9	21	9	3	42	10	25	10	3	48	10	29	11	3	53	9	28	12	3	52	9	28	16	4	57
Total establishment ² ..	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149

SG = Secretariat-General.
 ACA = Agency for the Control of Armaments.
 SAC = Standing Armaments Committee.
 O of C = Office of the Clerk.

1. Paid in conjunction with a survivor's pension.
 2. Excluding hors cadre officials.

APPENDIX IV

Budgetary establishments of the organisations as at 30th June 1981 by countries

Countries	Co-ordinated Organisations															Observers						Total		
	OECD			Council of Europe			NATO + SHAPE			ESA			WEU			ECMWF ¹			EPO ²					
	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Germany	2	—	2				210	415	625	144	95	239							350	318	668	706	828	1534
Belgium				1	1	2	708	1258	1966	1	—	1										710	1259	1969
Canada							—	—	—													—	—	—
Denmark							6	19	25													6	19	25
Spain										5	1	6										5	1	6
United States	2	—	2				41	8	49	5	1	6										48	9	57
France	658	1088	1746	290	551	841	103	189	292	161	152	313	43	61	104							1255	2041	3296
Italy							153	393	546	27	35	62										180	428	608
Japan	2	—	2																			2	—	2
Luxembourg . .							168	673	841													168	673	841
Norway							19	57	76													19	57	76
Netherlands . .							276	382	658	510	268	778							508	356	864	1294	1006	2300
Portugal							3	4	7													3	4	7
United Kingdom							9	7	16				12	33	45	82	63	145				103	103	206
Turkey							42	71	113													42	71	113
Greece							7	1	8													7	1	8
Grand total . .	664	1088	1752	291	552	843	1745	3477	5222	853	552	1405	55	94	149	82	63	145	858	674	1532	4548	6500	11048

1. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting.

2. European Patent Office.

APPENDIX V
Membership of the co-ordinated organisations

Member countries	Co-ordinated organisations					Observers	
	OECD	Council of Europe	NATO	ESA	WEU	ECMWF ¹	EPO ²
EUROPE							
Germany	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Austria	x	x				x	x
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Cyprus		x					
Denmark	x	x	x	x		x	x
Spain	x	x		x		x	
Finland	x					x	
France	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x			x	x
Ireland	x	x		x		x	x
Iceland	x	x	x				
Italy	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Liechtenstein		x					x
Luxembourg	x	x	x		x		x
Malta		x					
Monaco							x
Norway	x	x	x				x
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Portugal	x	x	x			x	
United Kingdom ..	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Sweden	x	x		x		x	x
Switzerland	x	x		x		x	x
Turkey	x	x	x			x	
Yugoslavia						x	
AMERICA							
Canada	x		x				
United States	x		x				
ASIA							
Japan	x						
AUSTRALASIA							
Australia	x						
New Zealand	x						
TOTAL	24	21	15	11	7	17	16

1. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting.

2. European Patent Office.

*Problems for European security arising
from pacifism and neutralism*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur*

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on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism

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submitted by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur

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APPENDIX

- (a) Comparison between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
- (b) Comparison between the Soviet Union and the United States

1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 2 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile (Alternate: Caro), Conti Persini, De Bondt (Alternate: Michel), Della Briotta, van Eekelen (Alternate: Blaauw),*

Gessner, Hardy, Kurt Jung, Lagneau, Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: Biefnot), van der Sanden (Alternate: van der Werff), Günther Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Thoss (Alternate: Margue), Valiante, Vecchiatti, Wilquin.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on the problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism***

The Assembly,

Considering that the development of neutralist and pacifist movements in Europe and throughout the world makes it all the more necessary to examine the justification of the security, defence and disarmament policy pursued by the western countries ;

Noting that deterrence, which is the basis of this policy, depends largely on the existence of strategic nuclear weapons ;

Considering that implementation of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 is encountering very negative reactions from many citizens of WEU member countries ;

Welcoming the opening of the START negotiations – including the part of the Geneva negotiations on so-called Eurostrategic weapons – and the resumption or revival of other negotiations designed to reduce the level of forces and armaments in Europe and elsewhere ;

Considering that unilateral initiatives in disarmament matters might cause these negotiations to fail and jeopardise the foundations of Europe's security ;

Considering that pacifist movements in East and West are anyhow entitled to call for new initiatives from the members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact to achieve substantial progress in the negotiations on disarmament ;

Considering that assistance to the third world is morally, economically and politically essential for all industrialised countries, quite apart from any considerations relating to their defence budgets ;

Noting that the situation of each Western European country forces each country to shape its defence policy and attitude towards disarmament according to its own particular conditions and strongly influences the course followed by pacifist movements ;

Considering nevertheless that any serious progress towards European political union requires close co-ordination of national policies in these fields ;

Considering that WEU is an appropriate framework for consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance on all matters relating to defence and disarmament,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Follow attentively and encourage participating states to ensure the success of the various ongoing negotiations on the limitation or reduction of armaments and forces in Europe and in the rest of the world ;
2. Announce its unambiguous support for any proposal for the complete renunciation by the United States and the Soviet Union of medium-range nuclear weapons or, failing that, for the establishment of a true balance at the lowest possible level and to agree to the deployment of such weapons on the territory of member countries only as long as this goal has not been attained ;
3. Ensure that full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact is regularly made public ;
4. Ensure that in any event Western Europe's development assistance policy is pursued and strengthened, particularly in the framework of the European Communities ;
5. Effectively concert the defence policies of member countries and their positions towards disarmament with a view to working out a European approach to such matters.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In December 1981, Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, stressed the importance of the WEU Assembly examining the problems raised by the development of pacifist movements and their activities and the progress which neutralism seemed to be making among European public opinion, particularly in autumn 1981. This appeal was heeded since two Assembly committees took up the matter and the Presidential Committee decided to include in the agenda for the June 1982 session a report on this subject by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, postponing until December a report by the General Affairs Committee on these questions.

2. The report submitted by Mr. Mommersteeg on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe at the Assembly's June 1982 session (Document 918) made a very full and well-informed analysis of the spread of movements aimed at mobilising public opinion against nuclear weapons, and in particular against the deployment of American nuclear weapons in Europe, in accordance with the dual decision taken by the North Atlantic Council in December 1979. This major and interesting work will spare your Rapporteur much research and allow him to go straight to the political aspects of the question, taking due account of any information obtained about the evolution of pacifist movements in Europe and elsewhere since June 1982.

3. The present report follows up a working paper examined by the General Affairs Committee on 8th July 1982. Your Rapporteur wishes to thank all committee members who took part in that preliminary discussion which was particularly fruitful and interesting. It allowed your Rapporteur to pursue his study in greater detail and he has willingly incorporated many of the remarks made about his initial draft. There were others however which he could not endorse, but he has endeavoured to mention them in this report as objectively as possible although expressing his own reservations.

II. Neutralism

4. The first question is what is meant by neutralism and pacifism. To the best of your Rapporteur's knowledge, the notion of neutralism emerged in France immediately after the

first signs of the cold war and is fairly close to the notion of non-alignment which subsequently spread to other parts of the world, including Yugoslavia and many countries which became independent following decolonisation, India being one of the main champions.

5. Neutralism then stemmed from the idea that the two military blocs which were being formed were based on military, political, economic and ideological domination by the two great powers which emerged from the second world war, i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union. Neutralists considered it necessary for their countries to remain outside the systems of alliance so as to avoid such domination and in particular to be free to determine the course of their economic and social development. For France, it was a question of choosing a middle path between the excessive dirigism of the Soviet Union and liberalism, which some also considered excessive, of the American type in order to be able to carry out the economic and social programme of the resistance movement. The distance between this concern, that of Tito at the time of his break with Moscow and that of many leaders in the new states, was not very great, although these various countries' economic and social programmes were far from identical. In the political field proper, for France it was a question of being able to maintain or re-establish a government coalition in which the communists, who then had more than 25 % of the votes, could have retained a place. Finally, in foreign policy, neutralism was the refusal if not of the Atlantic Alliance at least of any integrated military system, and it played a definite rôle, although the extent was difficult to measure, in the adoption of the previous question which prevented the French National Assembly from ratifying the draft treaty on the European Defence Community in August 1954. It is not impossible that the interstate nature of the protocols modifying the Brussels Treaty helped to win over those who were drawn towards certain aspects of neutralism.

6. This clearly shows the fundamental difference between neutralism and a policy of neutrality as pursued, each in its own fashion, by Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Finland. Neutralism was the rejection of the policy of military blocs which might alienate the domestic and foreign policies of states. It did not reject the choice of permanent neutrality, or

even alliances of free and sovereign states for their joint security.

7. The concept of neutralism has naturally evolved considerably since 1954, particularly because the Atlantic Alliance has proved to be flexible and has respected the right of its members to guide their policy as they think fit. The way France's withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structure, the economic and social choices of the government which came to power in 1981 and the participation of communists in that government were accepted by the other members of the Atlantic Alliance, even if they did not approve, diverted a large fraction of French public opinion away from neutralism. Furthermore, the evolution of the Soviet Union and its hold on the Eastern European countries, particularly after the events in Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, showed that in the eastern bloc self-determination existed neither for the Soviet people nor for its allies and that a western defence policy offered the only possible framework for protecting the right of the European nations to decide on their political and social régime.

8. Thus, the neutralism of the fifties now no longer has at all the same meaning and one may wonder whether neutralism still exists in Europe other than in the form of anxiety that the European countries may, because of the existence of two military blocs, become involved in a war in which there would be a high risk of nuclear weapons being used. This form of neutralism, which is not very different from a refusal to accept any true defence policy, is closer to pacifism than to post-war ideological neutralism.

9. Seen in this light, a certain number of aspects of neutralism today deserve attention :

10.(i) Under the guise of refusing military blocs it rejects the Atlantic Alliance, or in any event a number of its consequences for Western Europe, without accepting the fact, however evident it may seem, that the alliance has had beneficial effects for Europe. On the one hand, although it has not totally eradicated the innumerable causes of conflict which for centuries have split Western Europe, it has at least reduced them to a point of far less gravity. The fact that no one any longer considers there is a hereditary or even potential enemy among his neighbours and that no one any longer thinks of resorting to force as a means of settling any problems which may arise in relations between states is a huge step forward in the history of European mankind. A community organisation of Western Europe, in the economic field at least, was possible only because there was a defensive alliance. Moreover, this alliance has allowed a relative balance of forces and mutual deterrence to be maintained, enabling our continent to

avoid armed conflict for thirty-eight years, which is unprecedented in its history. There is absolutely no guarantee that the dissolution of this alliance would not lead to an imbalance of forces which would be liable to revive dreams of domination and allow dangerous speculation about the ability or desire of one or other country to resist. The balance of terror is certainly not the most desirable form of relations between states and the dissolution of the blocs may be considered as the aim of a collective security policy. Neutralism makes it a means of strengthening peace, which is in any case not evident.

11.(ii) It should be noted that the very people who are trying within the Warsaw Pact to obtain greater freedom or to move away from Soviet domination clearly reject any form of neutralism and proclaim their loyalty to alliance with the Soviet Union. Such words were not enough of course to reassure the Soviet Union or to avert the invasion of Czechoslovakia and pressure on Poland, probably because they were not thought to be sincere. However, the liberalisation of the Eastern European régimes can be considered only in the context of the overall evolution of the eastern bloc and not by certain countries breaking away and moving towards neutralism. It cannot therefore be hoped that the neutralism emerging in Western Europe will spread to the East through contagion. It is hardly likely and probably not very desirable for the peoples of the area and for peace in Europe, as proved by the Polish affair.

12.(iii) The consequence of dismantling the western defence system in Europe would be to leave each Western European country in a position of weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union which, without even having to resort to force, would be able to impose on them certain constraints in their political, economic or social lives, their external relations and individual freedom. Rightly or wrongly, this process has often been called Finlandisation. Finland's situation may admittedly not seem intolerable to outside observers nor, which is more important, to the Finns. Nevertheless, Finland's fate largely depends on balances stretching well beyond its frontiers, and there is nothing to show that, between the Soviet Union and a neutralised Europe, Finland would be able to protect the freedom it has preserved in more favourable circumstances. The picture conjured up by the word Finlandisation is extremely vague and is only a very imperfect reflection of what a neutralised Western Europe's fate might be in a Soviet-dominated continent.

13.(iv) In such conditions, the logic of true neutralism for Western Europe would be to acquire by and for itself sufficient means of deterrence to be able to ensure its own security without

having to take account of interference from outside. It is a long way from this and its economic difficulties since 1973 leave little likelihood of it being able to achieve this in the foreseeable future. Short of that, neutralism for Europe would be a weakness, not a force. It would not be a guarantee but a threat to its freedom. It would not be a factor of peace but a danger of war in Europe.

14.(v) These remarks obviously do not apply to Germany as a whole to the same extent as the rest of Europe, and it is quite understandable that the prospect of reunification for the German nation would make it easier to accept the idea of Finlandisation as a price of reunification, particularly for the citizens of the GDR for whom, after all, Finlandisation would not mean less freedom. However, certain German members of the committee recalled most usefully that pacifist or neutralist demonstrations in the GDR in 1981 and 1982 were severely put down, whereas pacifist or neutralist demonstrations in the Federal Republic were given wide coverage in the press and other media of Eastern European countries.

15.(vi) All these considerations show clearly that although the Soviet Union is not always behind neutralism in Western Europe it is trying to derive the maximum benefit from it, while doing its utmost to stifle neutralism in Eastern Europe. Conversely, Western European neutralist movements, whether or not inspired, assisted or encouraged by the Soviet Union, serve Soviet strength, which does not hesitate to back their action. Just as the development of a form of neutralism in Europe in the years preceding the second world war cannot be attributed solely to the influence of Hitlerism, its development in present-day Europe cannot be attributed solely to Soviet influence. However, it has to be recorded that just as the absence of cohesion or of the desire of many European countries to defend themselves strongly contributed to the general collapse in face of Hitlerian aggression, today the development of neutralism which refuses to build up the military means required for the policy it advocates might sorely tempt the Soviet Union and provide it with opportunities to use its strength to impose its will on Europe.

III. *Pacifism*

16. The notion of pacifism has far more ancient and varied roots. There were protests in the nineteenth century against the use of force by states as a means of action for promoting their interests. From the very outset, the international workers' movement denounced such methods and made peace one of its major aims. It was joined by other move-

ments, sometimes Christian, sometimes non-religious, which multiplied before and particularly after the second world war.

17. The originality of pacifism is not to advocate the peaceful settlement of conflicts but to place peace before all else and underline that no cause is worth the sacrifice of human lives implicit in modern warfare. The first world war, whose causes were far removed from the vital interests of the European nations but which was responsible for the death of more than ten million people and nearly five years' suffering for almost all the inhabitants of Europe, obviously gave considerable impetus to this tendency, particularly among the left-wing parties and socialists. It emerged as a fight against the militarist tendencies then coming to the fore in many European societies, the rejection of military budgets, calls to reduce military service and unremitting objections to the armaments policy pursued before and after the war.

18. It is evident that the rise of fascism and its conquest of Europe were a serious blow to pacifism which bore its share of responsibility for the weakness shown by the European democracies towards Hitler. Unlike the first world war, the second left little room for pacifism and left-wing parties everywhere were in the vanguard in the anti-fascist struggle throughout Europe.

19. Thus, whereas neutralism is a purely political concept based on a certain analysis of the world situation, pacifism is based on purely moral concerns, passing over political considerations to oppose anything relating to war, armaments or armed forces. Conscientious objection is one of its traditional forms. However, the situation in Europe in the fascist era showed the limits of protest which, separating peace from every other value, risked helping the cause of those who were trying to override Europe and make war the instrument of their domination. This was an experience which cannot be forgotten by the generations then alive and the facts must be constantly recalled for subsequent generations.

20. For a long time pacifism was merely a protest, a refusal of everything in modern society that might lead to war or hostilities. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, pacifists felt they were strong enough to consider action which was not just intended to impress public opinion by symbolic gestures, like German socialists who, after 4th September 1870, risked imprisonment by organising demonstrations against continuing the war against France following the fall of Napoleon III. Thus, within the international workers' movement, a concept of general strike emerged with the specific purpose of preventing governments from resorting to force. But the cir-

cumstances in which the first world war broke out prevented international socialism from uniting to put a halt to the governments' policy of conquest and it subsequently paid dearly for the helplessness it then showed.

21. Although the division of the workers' movement on the one hand and the rise of fascism on the other considerably weakened the possibilities of action of those with pacifist leanings between the two wars, new means of expression and new strategies have been worked out in recent years. Immediately after the second world war, the peace movement, very clearly dominated by communist parties, endeavoured to rally public opinion in Western European countries against American policy which insisted on the rearmament of the Federal Republic as a condition for maintaining American forces in Europe. The Korean war, the Atlantic Pact, the European Defence Community and later the Vietnam war were stepping stones for agitation directed mainly against the organisation of western defence although the true aim, for those organising it at least, was to support Soviet policy. Events in the GDR, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia progressively undermined any credence there may have been in a movement whose true goal, as it became increasingly evident, was not peace.

22. The same cannot be said about the more recent shape of the pacifist movement, although one may conclude that in the last resort the same cause is espoused. Pacifism today is based mainly on the particularly inhumane nature of any war involving nuclear weapons. Hence it is no longer a movement pursuing particular political objectives but the expression of a profound reaction which is quite understandable when it is borne in mind that there would be little chance of any war in Europe not crossing the nuclear threshold. Thus, the Christian churches, or related associations, which hitherto had remained aloof from pacifist demonstrations, are now prominent, be it the catholic church, particularly in the United States and to a lesser degree in France, or protestant churches in the Netherlands, Germany, the Scandinavian countries and even, more cautiously, the United Kingdom. The same is true of many associations of a non-political nature, including ecologists.

23. More than its predecessors, this new pacifism has sought to make proposals and to define concepts of security which are no longer based on the accumulation of armaments, particularly nuclear arms. It emphasises the waste of wealth represented by military expenditure in a world where the true problems are the development of the third world and the horrors of modern warfare. At the same time it points to the meagre results obtained in disarmament negotiations in whatever framework they may

have been held and urges society to bring pressure to bear on the governments by all available means to make them take steps, if necessary unilaterally, to set the world on a new course. Certain pacifist associations such as the movement for a non-violent alternative bring together persons who are highly respectable because of their political impartiality, moral and intellectual values and standing among young people to work out a possible defence policy in which non-violence would no longer be merely an objective but also a means of action by states and peoples to ensure their security. This research is of great interest because it is based on a serious analysis of the notion of deterrence. Its aim is not to dispense with deterrence but to achieve it by means which would be unlikely to arouse reactions of fear on the part of the potential enemy. However, one may wonder how effective such deterrence might be and how much impact it may have in practice.

24. Another aspect of the present form of pacifism is its partial or total rejection of nuclear weapons. Sometimes it totally rejects a defence policy based on the balance of terror, i.e. any form of nuclear deterrence, or calls for a solemn declaration by governments not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, which is almost the same since renouncing first use of such weapons would be tantamount to renouncing their use to retaliate against a conventional attack, thus annulling any deterrent effect. At other times there is less radical opposition to nuclear weapons, the intention being to strengthen their deterrent rôle rather than limit it. This is the case of opposition to enhanced radiation weapons and, generally speaking, to so-called theatre nuclear weapons. Here the basic idea is that only fear of massive retaliation has a deterrent effect, whereas the possibility of waging a limited nuclear war makes it possible for the great nuclear powers to envisage winning a war without resorting to strategic nuclear weapons. While recognising that only strategic nuclear weapons play the essential deterrent rôle, your Rapporteur considers however that in present circumstances it would be dangerous to give a potential adversary the impression that he might have a choice of weapons and hence some hope that the West might hesitate to use strategic weapons in response to a limited attack.

25. These remarks apply only for pacifism as it is known in the West. But it now appears that a similar form of pacifism is emerging in Eastern Europe, particularly in the GDR and the Soviet-Union. This is a welcome sign, not because pacifism would weaken these countries but because it can provide an area of agreement between East and West by encouraging the east-

ern countries, in matters relating to disarmament, to take account of pacifist views and hence foster East-West rapprochement on matters which are essential for peace. It should be noted however that pacifist demonstrations are still considered seditious in Eastern Europe and are therefore fought and repressed, particularly in the Soviet Union and the GDR. Thus, at its fifth meeting in September 1982 the Central Committee of the *Freie Deutsche Jugend*, the youth branch of the SED, decided to conduct a vigorous campaign against the effects of the pacifist movement on young people in the GDR and inter alia against the spread of conscientious objection.

26. It can therefore be seen that the pacifist movement is disturbing in both East and West. On each side, there is a tendency to attribute its influence to manoeuvres by the other side so as to evade the highly pertinent questions it raises for our societies. But to look just beyond suspicion which may stem from its opposition to government policies and examine the reasons guiding it and the elements of society supporting it, one has to note that on both sides these reasons are respectable, and these social groups are particularly worthy of interest since apart from intellectual circles they also represent the younger elements of society. It would therefore be morally contestable and politically imprudent not to take full account of its aspirations, to refuse a dialogue with it and not to weigh carefully its arguments, even if it seems difficult to accept some of its conclusions.

IV. *The revival of agitation since 1980*

27. In recent years, there has been agitation in Western Europe which has sometimes hastily been qualified as neutralist and pacifist and which reached a peak in October 1981. This agitation had an echo in the United States and in the German Democratic Republic. Having been analysed in Mr. Mommersteeg's report your Rapporteur will not therefore go back over it. He will merely bring out a few features in order to draw conclusions.

28. A first comment concerns the link between agitation and nuclear weapons. It is a definite fact that the prospect of American intermediate-range nuclear weapons being deployed in Europe, although not the origin of the protest movement, gave the movement, which had existed since nuclear weapons came into being, particular importance and significance. Moreover, it is not difficult to see how this weapon of mass destruction, with ill-controlled side effects, can instil considerable horror and fear resulting in the belief that anything would be better than nuclear war.

The fact that, unlike strategic nuclear weapons which are launched from aircraft, submarines or silos in the United States or Soviet Union, intermediate-range weapons are for deployment in Europe itself, on permanent sites dispersed in many areas, has drawn attention to the dangers their presence represents for many sections of the population of Europe. Tactical nuclear weapons, also deployed in Europe, had not provoked such strong reactions because, being mobile, they were less in evidence and did not form the same kind of target.

29. Hence it would be a mistake to attribute to Soviet propaganda alone a movement whose scale was demonstrated in Mr. Mommersteeg's report and which affects many circles which can hardly be suspected of being influenced by Moscow. This obviously does not mean that such propaganda has been inactive and it has certainly done its utmost to exploit a favourable situation in order to weaken the West's determination to resist and to create a gap between the European and American partners of the Atlantic Alliance. Certain committee members pointed out that the Soviet Union was financing some pacifist movements, including the World Peace Council. One member recalled a remark by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, that \$ 15 million are believed to have been spent by the Soviet Union on pacifist campaigns in Western Europe in 1981. But Soviet propaganda would certainly not have managed to give the protest movements the impetus they gained when directed against the NATO dual decision of December 1979 if fertile ground had not been found in Europe and, to a certain extent, in the United States where the uncompromising policy pursued by President Reagan, especially towards the Soviet Union, revived the fear of a nuclear war in which the United States might not be spared.

30. Among today's pacifist movements, there is obviously no complete unity of doctrine nor even of fundamental motives, insofar as it is possible to determine what they are. Several trends can be distinguished however:

31.(i) Opposition to theatre nuclear weapons, caused mainly by the NATO dual decision of December 1979 and the prospect of the development of enhanced radiation weapons, the so-called neutron bomb, which would also be theatre weapons. This opposition is largely based on a concept of deterrence which corresponded to circumstances twenty or thirty years ago but far less to the present situation. In fact, true deterrence, exercised by the United States, then also by the United Kingdom and finally by France, was based on the doctrine of massive retaliation, alone capable of diverting a potential adversary from aggressive intentions by convincing him that any war would bring unacceptable destruction to his own territory.

This doctrine now seems out of date where United States and Soviet strategy in Europe are concerned because the existence of short- or medium-range weapons which can be used against the attacking force makes the immediate use of intercontinental-range weapons less credible: is it imaginable that, when countries are able to stop a conventional attack, they will risk their own territory being laid waste? But it is particularly difficult to make public opinion understand the reasoning behind deterrence, that a country wishing to avoid war must equip itself to fight a war, since what distinguishes a deterrent policy from a policy of war is not the weapons, which remain the same, but the use it is intended to make of them.

32.(ii) A distinction between the possession of nuclear weapons and their use, which has led certain pacifists to ask the western governments to undertake not to be the first to use such weapons. It is not necessary to underline the danger of this idea whose effect, if adopted, would be to leave the way open for a potential enemy with far more troops and conventional weapons to use them without risk of nuclear retaliation. This would destroy deterrence and make war more probable without even really preventing nuclear escalation after the outbreak of war.

33.(iii) The formation of denuclearised zones, for long proposed by certain Eastern European countries, particularly in the Rapacki plan, is again being considered by certain pacifist movements, mainly in Scandinavia. Although such proposals might be considered for regions where there is no risk of conventional attack by a stronger enemy, in Europe they would have the same effect as an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

34.(iv) The appeal for western countries to abandon completely the possession of nuclear weapons, taken up inter alia by the conference of American catholic bishops, is liable to become one of the main themes of pacifist movements in the next few months. Coming from the United States, this call is expected to find a wide response in the third world. It is based on the full horror of nuclear war but takes no account of the fact that conventional war would probably be hardly less horrific, at least in Europe, nor of the fact that the aim of nuclear weapons is not war but deterrence and that their disappearance, outside the framework of a general agreement on disarmament, would make war more likely.

35.(v) Not far removed from this primarily anti-nuclear pacifism is the action of ecological movements which have spread in the last ten years and whose electoral results in certain countries are a measure of their strong influence on public opinion, particularly as clearly

many people who do not vote for the ecologists are alive to their concerns. Ecologists can admittedly be distinguished from pacifists because their main concern is the protection of the natural surroundings rather than external or defence policy. But they are close in their more or less radical opposition to any military or civil activities which make use of nuclear activity.

36.(vi) The claim for a new balance between expenditure on armaments and that for assistance to the third world is based on two considerations, one purely humanitarian which underlines the scandal of the extreme poverty of a large part of the world population and the other, more political, which recalls that poverty is a far greater danger to tomorrow's peace than any military threat whatever. There is nothing to say in answer to these two arguments, which are perfectly fair, and if it is considered that the requirements of the third world should be given priority, there is no excuse for the slender assistance granted by the industrialised countries. But this has no direct connection with armaments. If they are useless, there is no excuse for accumulating them. But if it is considered that there is a real threat from outside, there would be no excuse for abandoning them. Consequently analysis of the military threat must govern armaments policy and analysis of the situation of the third world must determine assistance policy, there being no grounds for linking the two elements.

37.(vii) In several countries, particularly the United Kingdom, pacifist movements are proposing unilateral disarmament measures in the hope that such decisions will lead other countries to follow suit. At its conference in September 1982, the Labour Party, while confirming its loyalty to NATO, adopted a motion calling for such measures in the field of nuclear weapons. It must be wondered first whether this would effectively be the case and then whether such measures would not in the long run have the reverse effect of that sought because, a priori, they would deprive disarmament negotiations of their content.

38.(viii) Finally, as your Rapporteur noted above, in other countries, including the Netherlands, the Federal Republic and the Scandinavian countries, pacifist movements have adopted a neutralist tone, whereas in others, such as France, still-powerful neutralist tendencies have little link with pacifism and in yet others, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, pacifism is important but in no way associated with neutralism. The committee pondered on the reasons for these differences. Some members attributed the lack of influence of the peace movement in France to its links with communism and underlined the difficult position in which events in Poland

placed this movement. These remarks are certainly to the point, but are they adequate explanation? What rôle was played by the fact that certain Western European countries have nuclear weapons while others have none? What part was played by more ancient cultural or religious traditions? Whether or not the left, closer to the pacifists than the right, is in power certainly has some effect. Your Rapporteur is convinced that it is impossible to reduce to simple and unequivocal elements the complex facts which explain the reactions of the various peoples of Europe to pacifism today.

39. These protest movements or proposals can therefore be assimilated neither to neutralism nor to pacifism in the traditional sense. They do not necessarily deny that a Soviet threat exists and in general do not refuse the means of countering it. The famous slogan "Better red than dead" heard in certain demonstrations in Germany does not seem to take due account of these movements' main roots which cannot therefore be confused with traditional pacifism. Therefore, while they have a neutralist aspect because of their desire to take account of political and military facts and not allow Western Europe to become over-dependent on decisions taken in Washington and a pacifist aspect because of their absolute rejection of certain weapons, they cannot be confused with either.

40. Finally, it must be noted that these are worthy reactions, not only because of their motives but also because of their scope and the determination and moral and intellectual qualities of many of their proponents. Hence, pacifism cannot be assimilated to an enemy who must be fought, an aberration which must be put right at all cost or a blind instrument used by an external power. In the United States in particular, but in many European countries too, it seems to meet deep-rooted national aspirations. It must be taken seriously and a true dialogue must be held with the leaders of pacifist movements in order to find the means of ensuring true European security, due account being taken of the nature of the danger from without and of the threats which western activities might also involve for peace.

V. *The imperatives of European security*

41. There are two categories of reasons for taking full account of the spread of pacifist and neutralist movements in the West. First, the intrinsic value of their concerns, proposals and claims, second the extent of the movements, their ability to mobilise public opinion and the influence of those who help them, in short their political weight. Democratic régimes cannot

turn a blind eye to what a large proportion of their citizens want and think. It is therefore important to answer their concerns and, although the answer cannot always be fully positive, it must nevertheless take account of the arguments put forward and not merely reject requests which a large section of society has at heart. One question is how large is this section. It is often difficult to assess the number taking part in big pacifist demonstrations, their commitment and their enthusiasm. For instance, the fact that in France far fewer people take part in such demonstrations than in Italy, Germany or the Netherlands may be due to political considerations and may not necessarily mean that pacifism has less of a hold on French people than on people in neighbouring countries.

42. Still more important is the impact of the ideas upheld by pacifist and neutralist movements. It is evident that in the period of crisis through which the world is now passing military expenditure is a waste of resources which could be better used elsewhere, particularly for investments in the third world. Similarly, the accumulation of nuclear weapons places peace on unhealthy foundations and creates dangers, whose scale is difficult to assess, of war being started by mistake or by accident, or of escalation in the event of hostilities. Moreover, the same is true of conventional weapons which, in the last decade, have caused millions of victims in vast areas of the world and whose improvement, at the same time as the miniaturisation of nuclear weapons, makes it increasingly difficult to envisage war stopping at the nuclear threshold.

43. The only way of meeting the challenge of pacifism and neutralism is therefore to show a genuine will first to limit armaments and forces and then to achieve true disarmament. It is easy to understand that the meagre results the world has achieved in this field have raised doubts about the seriousness with which the governments have tackled the question of disarmament and encouraged considerable scepticism about speeches made on this subject in the United Nations and elsewhere. It should be added that the American decision not to ratify the SALT II agreements after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan rightly or wrongly gave the impression that a process of limiting armaments by negotiated consent between the two great powers had been interrupted. This may help to explain the spread of pacifist initiatives in America and in Europe since it might be wondered whether, following this break in a process already started, there was a way of disarming other than by unilateral decisions taken in individual countries or means of bringing pressure to bear on states other than by resorting to demonstrations or

strikes, such as a peace movement which is in the process of acquiring a European structure and strategy seems to be organising throughout Europe in 1983.

44. Your Rapporteur nevertheless remains convinced that the only form of disarmament which can consolidate peace is one which ensures the security of all, i.e. that any unilateral initiative would involve serious dangers because peace is based on a certain balance of forces. Overall security and disarmament can be protected by structuring international society, by negotiated decisions and by specific and controlled measures, whereas unilateral decisions would deprive these negotiations of meaning and jeopardise their success.

45. This is particularly true of the western countries because in almost every field the Atlantic Alliance forces are now in a position of inferiority compared with those of the Warsaw Pact and any unilateral disarmament on their part would increase their inferiority and hence the chances of armed conflict. While the Warsaw Pact lead seems to have only limited implications where strategic nuclear weapons are concerned, this is not so for conventional weapons, particularly tanks, artillery and combat aircraft and, above all, intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Even the United States navy has been caught up by the Soviet Union. At the request of the committee, your Rapporteur has had a comparative table of these forces drawn up, which is given at appendix.

46. Furthermore, the relatively small proportion of their gross national product earmarked for defence (5.9 % in the United States, 5.1 % in the United Kingdom, 3.9 % in France, 3.4 % in the Netherlands, 3.3 % in Belgium, 3.2 % in the Federal Republic and 2.4 % in Italy) has prevented the countries of the Atlantic Alliance from replacing their armaments at the same rate as the Soviet Union, which appears to spend between 12 and 14 % of its GNP on defence, while the other members of the Warsaw Pact spend about the same proportion as the western countries. It is therefore probable that the quantitative inferiority of western armaments is no longer offset by qualitative superiority as was the case ten years ago.

47. Europe can ensure its security by associating a true disarmament policy with a defence policy which retains the elements of credible deterrence by convincing Europeans themselves, then their American partners and finally the Soviet Union, that it does not intend disarmament to be a renunciation or the beginning of neutralisation, but that it has a place in a coherent operation of which it is a major aim.

Certain pacifists wish disarmament to be a means of achieving détente and peace, but in present circumstances it can but be a consequence of this although subsequently it may help to consolidate what has been achieved. To tackle the problem of disarmament in isolation from military necessities and political realities would be a threat to the peace and freedom of Western Europe.

48. No more than for its security, there is no reason why Europe should rely wholly on the United States for everything connected with disarmament. It can certainly not act without the United States, and a committee member recalled that the North Atlantic Council should place greater emphasis on the European wish to associate defence and disarmament as already expressed in the Harmel plan. This would require close consultations on disarmament matters between the European members of the alliance. The WEU Council could and therefore should be the framework for such consultations because this is its own particular area of responsibility. Faced with the desire of the peace movement to adopt a European strategy, it is of some importance for the governments of Western European countries to concert their response, which need not be identical, so as not to react according to national or local situations and thus disperse Europe's approach to its defence and disarmament requirements. Economic difficulties in all our countries are strong encouragement for such reactions. In a European Community economy it is difficult to envisage unduly wide differences in the military burden on national economies. This does not mean that cuts in military expenditure must be avoided, but they should perhaps be limited in the immediate future with a view to negotiating a balanced reduction with the Warsaw Pact.

49. Such a step will surely find encouragement in the policy pursued by President Reagan, who can in no way be accused of being unaware of the Soviet threat. This policy is highly positive and encouraging since it led to the START negotiations being opened in Geneva together with negotiations on so-called Eurostrategic nuclear weapons on a basis which should be satisfactory to pacifists, i.e. the zero option or the controlled elimination of all medium-range nuclear weapons. This proposal is in the interests of all insofar as the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons known as instruments of limited warfare is a particularly serious danger because it might give the impression that an attack in Europe might lead to the total nuclear destruction of this area without the two great powers being fully involved. It is not by chance that the announcement of the deployment of these weapons caused the most widespread pacifist

demonstrations in Europe, and one of the lessons to be learned from these demonstrations should be to make the destruction of these weapons one of the first aims of disarmament, which fully conforms to President Reagan's proposals.

50. Moreover, very probably the United States Government's determination to adopt this approach has shown the green light for a whole series of negotiations which appeared to be marking time, be it the MBFR talks, the conference of the Disarmament Committee or the United Nations special session on disarmament. Admittedly, no agreement seems imminent in any of these frameworks but the resumption of diplomatic activity in the disarmament field – provided it is not merely a question of appeasing the pacifist movements but is based on a true will to succeed – will presumably show these movements that the western countries are determined to reach agreement with the Soviet Union and its allies for an effective reduction of armaments or, one way or another, they will force the Warsaw Pact countries to assume their responsibilities towards their own citizens and towards the rest of the world by revealing whether they consider disarmament to be merely a tactic designed to weaken the West or whether it is really a goal.

51. Another question on which the new pacifist movement may be right is probably that any war in Europe could well lead to a nuclear exchange on its territory. Already a conventional war on this territory would have deadly and highly devastating effects because of the density of the population and the extreme fragility of present-day industrial and urban civilisation. Although military planners now tend to think that any war would be short for lack of sufficient means to wage a long one, such reasoning is no more infallible than the same way of thinking was in 1914. Hence it is essential for war no longer to be envisaged as a means of pursuing a policy but it should be realised that, victorious or not, it would lead to the destruction of all the values upheld by the West.

52. What is less evident is that the presence of nuclear weapons increases the risk of war and even of nuclear war. It may even be considered that the existence of such weapons has removed much of the threat of war from the areas they protected, and countries equipped with them have had to find peaceful means of ending the many conflicts which have arisen between them in the past thirty-five years. Conversely, it is in areas where there were no nuclear weapons to play a deterrent rôle that armed and often deadly conflicts have increased during the period in question.

53. Where NATO's dual decision in 1979 may be called in question is in the extent to

which it would make nuclear weapons an instrument of strategic fighting rather than of a policy of deterrence. It is on this point that the discussions which have been going on in the United States for the last twenty years raise a problem. While strategic nuclear weapons are the ideal instrument of deterrence, the military array of the West must not hide such weapons or make their use in the event of attack more uncertain but, on the contrary, it must enhance them and convince a potential aggressor that he cannot hope to wage battle and win without risk of such weapons being used.

54. In other words, the aim of the western allies should not be a balance of forces and weapons at every level but, on the contrary, deployment limited to the requirements of deterrence. An American force which, as everyone knows, is only too small, is essential for Europe's security, not so that it may fight Soviet forces but because its very inadequacy proves that the strategic force of the United States will be involved should there be an attack on Western Europe. Similarly, short- or intermediate-range nuclear weapons do not have to equal in quantity those deployed by the Soviet Union lest they give the impression that the West is prepared to accept a conflict limited to a given nuclear level. Their presence is necessary to convince the Soviet Union that it cannot hope to stop escalation at the level of its choice. If Western Europe had no short- or intermediate-range nuclear weapons to confront the some 350 SS-20 missiles now deployed by the Soviet Union in Europe, it would be possible for a potential aggressor to speculate on his superiority in the conventional field and confront the United States with the impossible choice between abandoning Western Europe to its sorry fate or releasing an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons which would ravage American territory. The existence of a limited number of such weapons, on the contrary, is enough to convince a potential aggressor that a conventional attack would lead to escalation and hence gives true weight to the American deterrent.

55. This in no way signifies, as certain committee members thought, that your Rapporteur considers the doctrine of massive retaliation should be resuscitated. On the contrary, the doctrine of flexible response must be given its full deterrent value by not allowing it to become just a combat doctrine. But here again the main aim should be to reach an agreement banning the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons by the West but also obliging the Soviet Union to renounce its SS-20 and other missiles (SS-4s and SS-5s).

56. Because of its limited means, France has to base its security on a minimum level of deterrence: its conventional forces, its tactical

nuclear weapons and its eighteen intermediate-range missiles are not enough to stop an invasion, but this limited deployment gives full deterrent value to strategic nuclear weapons which, although also limited, should be enough to convince an enemy that he would sustain intolerable losses and damage in the event of an attack on Western Europe. Consequently, French defence policy, whose principles have not been modified by the recent change of majority, seems to meet security requirements quite well, not only those of France but also of most Western European countries which admitted, in the North Atlantic Council declaration in Ottawa in 1974, that the fact that two European members of the alliance "possess nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent rôle of their own" contributes to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the alliance. This declaration noting the specific deterrent rôle of the French and British nuclear forces appears to correspond quite closely to the present views of most European members of the alliance which in fact no longer have much objection to them while the French Government for its part has on several occasions, particularly since May 1981, recalled that it considers France's security area begins far beyond its national frontiers.

57. But it is not simply a matter of armaments. There is every reason to think that pacifist reactions in Europe since December 1979 also express uneasiness of a political nature in view of the fact that the strategy implemented in the framework of NATO is in fact defined in the United States and adopted by the latter's European allies in the North Atlantic Council under political, military and often economic pressure. The overwhelming domination of the United States in the defence field indeed makes it almost impossible for its partners to oppose the application of measures already decided upon by the United States Government, even if these partners do not feel such measures meet their true interests. The threat, explicit or more often implicit, of a withdrawal of American forces from Europe, whose effect would be to undermine NATO's deterrent strength, is generally enough to win over those who might be tempted to oppose such decisions. But it is evident that this situation is not likely to calm the legitimate anxiety of the populations. In this connection, one may wonder about the degree of consensus reached in the North Atlantic Council in December 1979 since several countries that took part in reaching this decision seem to be having the greatest difficulty in carrying it into effect at home.

58. This problem, raised by American preponderance in the alliance, is even more serious when United States policy seems to waiver. In

the last ten years this has often happened, particularly where nuclear strategy is concerned, and the recent article by four leading Americans in Foreign Affairs, asking for the development of western conventional forces in NATO, was not likely to reassure that portion of European public opinion which is wondering whether the Americans truly wish to place the deterrent strength of their strategic nuclear force at the service of their allies.

59. It is certainly not without significance that the two European countries with a deterrent capability of their own, the United Kingdom and France, have not experienced anti-nuclear reactions comparable to demonstrations in the Federal Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium and even Italy. Is the reason not to be found in the dependence of the latter countries on American decisions where defence policy is concerned? The question is worthy of consideration.

60. Finally, if the message transmitted by the 1981 demonstrators is taken seriously, it is clearly urgent to advance towards disarmament. Indeed, if the West does not show it is prepared to embark resolutely on the road to disarmament provided its security is ensured, it will give the impression that it is not really determined to succeed.

61. In your Rapporteur's view, these are the main points on which Western Europe can satisfy the movements rightly or wrongly called pacifist and neutralist, not in order to silence them and then calmly resume an arms policy but to take account of the requirements of a strategy of deterrence based not only on the accumulation of armaments but also and above all on the desire of nations to defend their peace and independence at any cost. By questioning this desire, the development of pacifism and neutralism might weaken European positions vis-à-vis the United States, ruin the deterrent strength of the Atlantic Alliance and consequently make war in Europe more conceivable. It cannot therefore be ignored and the alliance must answer the questions it raises but without jeopardising Europe's security. Indeed, there is every indication that the Soviet Union's aim, for the moment at least, is probably not so much to invade Western Europe as to reduce it to a situation in which the European countries have no choice but to renounce certain aspects of their internal and external sovereignty in face of Soviet pressure, this being currently but probably mistakenly called Finlandisation. This would then be a form of neutralisation involving a paralysis of external policy guaranteed by pro-Soviet political forces holding positions of responsibility. Under such pressure, democracy based on the free alternation of different majorities in the government following the choice of the electorate would be

likewise jeopardised. The attainment of this aim might be actively fostered by pacifist and neutralist movements which, on the one hand, would give the American partners in the Atlantic Alliance the impression that Europe did not wish to defend itself against attack, thus bringing grist to the mill of advocates of the withdrawal of American forces from Europe, and, on the other hand, would make it difficult for the European governments, particularly at a time of economic difficulties, to pursue the effort necessary for ensuring their countries' security and gaining the confidence of their American allies.

VI. Conclusions

62. After the widespread demonstrations in autumn 1981, pacifist agitation calmed down relatively in 1982, although some observers considered it had played a major rôle in the Dutch elections in September. But the signs are that agitation will resume on a large scale, in Western Europe at least, in 1983 when the deployment of American medium-range missiles is due to begin. A strategy for 1983 was drawn up at a meeting of leaders of the peace movement in Paris in September 1982. The first action is planned to take place in the Federal Republic on 12th December with the participation of Americans, Belgians, Dutch and Italians to obstruct the twenty-five sites where it is planned to install these missiles. A second is planned in Sicily in May 1983 and a third in all the European capitals on 28th October. Other more local demonstrations are envisaged.

63. It is therefore evident that all the problems raised by the pacifist movement will return to the centre of European politics next year, which fully justifies the request made by Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, to the WEU Assembly in December 1981 that it deal with matters raised by neutralism and pacifism. As the Council has to reply to Assembly recommendations, it was obviously not left out of this proposal. Clearly it was not a matter of planning a strategy to fight the movement but of asking the WEU Assembly what it considered should be the response to many Western Europeans espousing a neutralist or pacifist ideology. As this ideology is spread throughout Western Europe, European answers must be found.

64. This is not necessarily easy, since although Western European security forms a whole not all countries have the same requirements. There are various reasons for this, particularly the nearness of the threat, whether or not a country possesses nuclear weapons, and

above all the ability to decide on their use, and the extent and nature of a country's overseas commitments. These considerations have an effect on the size and trend of pacifist movements in each country and are a major obstacle to political and military rapprochement, the need for which in the interests of overall security and real progress towards European political union cannot be denied. These are two aspects of WEU's main rôle under the modified Brussels Treaty and it is therefore its task to work out replies.

65. Your Rapporteur considers these replies must be positive on the essential aspect: the search for peace and disarmament. But at the same time they must take account of a number of facts which, in spite of the Afghanistan and Polish affairs, seem to have been left on one side by the peace movement which is more anxious to achieve tangible results as quickly as possible than to take account of the complexity of the international situation, whereas the rôle of politicians is above all to base peace on the security of the people for whom they are responsible. Your Rapporteur would sum up the essential requirements for consolidating peace in Europe as follows:

(i) Disarmament is a true factor of peace only if negotiated, balanced and controlled so that it does not become an element of imbalance, insecurity and hence tension.

(ii) Disarmament must not jeopardise a system of credible deterrence which ensures peace in Europe. It therefore has to be progressive.

(iii) Medium-range nuclear weapons must be deployed in Europe as long as the Soviet Union does not follow up the proposals for a general renunciation of such weapons.

(iv) New impetus should be given to all the negotiations on the limitation and progressive reduction of the nuclear armaments of the United States and the Soviet Union and conventional weapons in all countries, particularly in Europe.

(v) There should be more consultation between the European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance so as to give Western Europe all necessary guarantees about the deterrence protecting it.

(vi) The Western European countries for their part should concert their defence and disarmament policies with a view to making specific disarmament proposals which are not liable to jeopardise their security. WEU, at both government and Assembly level, is the natural framework for this.

(vii) A special effort should be made to assist the development of the third world, whatever the results of disarmament negotiations.

(viii) Public opinion should be better informed about the levels of forces and armaments deployed by East and West so as to prevent pacifism covering up the defence of certain countries' own interests.

(ix) Representatives of pacifist movements should be listened to and their statements dis-

cussed in each country's debate on internal policy, and the Eastern European countries should be reminded of the degree of freedom of expression they should be granted, particularly on the occasion of the CSCE meeting in Madrid.

APPENDIX

(a) Comparison between NATO and the Warsaw Pact

	<i>NATO</i>	<i>Warsaw Pact</i>
Manpower (thousands)	4,998	4,821
Reserves (thousands)	5,079	7,138
Main battle tanks	17,629	27,300
Artillery	9,829	10,300
Nuclear warhead launchers	1,662	3,151
Submarines :		
- with cruise missiles	0	54
- attack	184	174
Surface vessels	1,351	1,437
Combat aircraft	3,543	7,756

(b) Comparison between the Soviet Union and the United States

	<i>United States</i>	<i>Soviet Union</i>
Population (millions)	230	269.6
GNP (000 million) \$:	2,925	Roubles: between 339 and 614
<i>Defence budget</i> in 000 million \$:	216	Roubles: between 17.5 and 192
as % GNP	6.1 %	between 8.4 and 15 %
Total armed forces (thousands)	2,116	3,705
<i>Army</i>		
Manpower (thousands)	791	1,825
Tanks	12,130	50,000
Nuclear warhead launchers	144	1,300
<i>Navy</i>		
Major combat vessels	204	290
Attack submarines	90	204
Cruise missile submarines	0	69
<i>Air force</i>		
Combat aircraft	3,650	4,480
<i>Strategic nuclear weapons</i>		
ICBM	1,052	1,398
Submarines :		
- submarines	32	83
- launchers	518	989
Long-range aircraft	436	150

Source : IISS : *The Military Balance 1982-83*.

<i>Nuclear warheads</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>Soviet Union</i>
ICBM	2,000	5,500
SLBM	5,000	1,300
Strategic bomber	2,000	400
Total strategic	9,000	7,200
All other	15,000	8,800
Grand total	24,000	16,000

Source: United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, 13th November 1981, page 17.

*Problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism*

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. In the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “very” and “many”.
2. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “designed” and insert “intended”.
3. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “might cause those negotiations to fail” and insert “would cause those negotiations to fail and would”.
4. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “in East and West”.
5. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “third world” insert “including the Latin American countries”.
6. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “each Western European country” and insert “a few Western European countries”.
7. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add “within the time limit laid down in the NATO decision of December 1979”.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 8th and 9th sittings, 30th November 1982 (amendments 1, 3, 4 and 7 agreed to; amendments 2, 5 and 6 negatived).

*Problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism*

AMENDMENT 8¹
tabled by Mr. Hardy

8. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “anyhow”.

Signed: Hardy

1. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to).

*Problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism*

AMENDMENT 9¹

tabled by Mrs. Knight and others

9. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Europe's security" insert "and deploring the growing evidence of Soviet involvement with and funding of pacifist movements pursuing unilateral disarmament in the West".

Signed: Mrs. Knight, Spies von Büllenheim, Sir Frederic Bennett, Atkinson, Grant and Sir Paul Hawkins

1. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to).

*Problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism*

AMENDMENTS 10, 11 and 12¹
tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and Mrs. Knight

10. In line 3 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “level” to the end of the paragraph.
11. In the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “very”.
12. In the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “negative” insert “as well as probable”.

Signed: Spies von Büllenheim, Mrs. Knight

1. See 8th and 9th sittings, 30th November 1982 (amendment 10 withdrawn; amendment 11 not moved; amendment 12 negatived).

*Problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism*

AMENDMENT 13¹

tabled by Mr. Smith

13. In line 4 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “attained” add “within the framework of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979”.

Signed: Smith

1. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment not moved)

*Problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism*

AMENDMENT 14¹
tabled by Mr. Lagorce

14. Add an eleventh paragraph to the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows :
“Regretting that Recommendation 379 on the activation of the WEU Council and its dependent bodies has not been effectively followed up by the Council,”.

Signed: Lagorce

1. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to).

*Problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism*

AMENDMENT 15¹

tabled by Mr. Hardy

15. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Follow attentively and encourage participating states" and insert "Demand that participating states strive".

Signed: Hardy

1. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to).

*Problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism*

AMENDMENT 16¹

tabled by Mr. Lagorce

16. In line 4 of the French text of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “*que tant que*” and insert “*qu’aussi longtemps que*”.

Signed: Lagorce

1. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to).

*The Falklands crisis*REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, van den Bergh (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr (Alternate: *Ahrens*), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini, Bizet, Bonnel (Alternate: Mrs. *Herman-Michielsens*), Cox, Dejardin, Duraffour, Edwards (Alternate: Dr. *Miller*),

Fosson (Alternate: *Giusti*), Grant, Kittelmann, Lemmrich, Maravalle, Mayoud, Ménard, Pecchioli (Alternate: *Amadei*), Pignion, Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, *Smith*, *Steeverlynck*, Vohrer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- (iv) Aircraft-carriers
- (v) Nuclear-propelled submarines
- (vi) Design of warships
- (vii) To sum up

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- (b) European political co-operation – Communiqué issued by the ten Ministers for Foreign Affairs – 2nd April 1982
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- (e) European political co-operation – Declaration by the Ten – 10th April 1982
- (f) European Communities – Text of the regulation promulgated by the Council on economic sanctions against Argentina – 14th April 1982
- (g) Eurogroup – Communiqué issued after the meeting of the eleven Defence Ministers – 5th May 1982
- (h) NATO Defence Planning Committee – Communiqué issued after the meeting of Defence Ministers – 7th May 1982
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- (m) United Nations General Assembly resolution on the question of the Falklands Islands (Islas Malvinas) – 5th November 1982

II. Statement by Mr. Haig, United States Secretary of State – 30th April 1982

III. Negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom (1965-February 1982)

IV. Arms delivered to or ordered by Argentina – by exporting country

Introductory Note

In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

NATO headquarters, Brussels:

13th September 1982

H. E. Mr. Vincenzo Tornetta, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy; Admiral Fantoni;

H. E. Sir John Graham, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom; Colonel Lefevre, Delegation to the Military Committee;

Admiral R. H. Falls, CN, Chairman of the Military Committee; Rear Admiral H. G. Urbanus, Deputy Director, International Military Staff;

Mr. Stephen Ledogar, Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States; Lt. Colonel D. Mahley, Defence Plans;

H. E. Dr. H. G. Wieck, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

14th September 1982

Captain G. L. Graveson, Deputy SACLANTREPEUR.

Embassies in Rome:

15th September 1982: Mr. Charles R. Stout, Political Counsellor; Mr. John Y. Walleth and Mr. Robert R. Rackmales, First Secretaries, United States Embassy.

22nd September 1982: H. E. Mr. Leopoldo Bravo, Ambassador of Argentina.

23rd September 1982: H. E. Mr. José Maria de la Jara, Ambassador of Peru; Mr. Joaquin Piriz, Chargé d'Affaires of Uruguay.

24th September 1982: H. E. Mr. Mariano Fontecilla, Ambassador of Chile.

29th September 1982: H. E. Mr. G. Ghislain Hardy, Ambassador of Canada.

The committee as a whole met in Paris on 2nd September 1982 when it discussed an outline of the present report, was addressed by Mr. François Heisbourg, Technical Counsellor in the Private Office of the French Minister of Defence, and on 3rd September when it visited the command posts of the French Air Defence Forces and of the Strategic Air Forces at Taverny.

The committee met in Portugal from 20th to 22nd October 1982 when it discussed a draft of the report, visited the Operations Room at Headquarters IBERLANT in Oeiras, and was addressed by:

Vice-Admiral Elias Da Costa, Portuguese Navy, Commander-in-Chief, Iberian Atlantic Area;

Rear Admiral Williams, United States Navy, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Iberian Atlantic Area;

Commander Peter Lucas, Royal Navy, Chief of Staff, IBERLANT;

Commander Burns, United States Navy, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, IBERLANT;

General Lemos Ferreira, Chief of Portuguese Air Force Staff, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff;

Admiral Sousa Leitao, Chief of Naval Staff;

General Lopes Alves, Deputy Chief of Army Staff;

Mr. Carlos Pardal, Portuguese Secretary of State for Defence.

The committee met finally in Paris on 8th November 1982 when it adopted the report as a whole.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in this report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation
on the Falklands crisis

The Assembly,

- (i) Firmly condemning the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 1982 in flagrant violation of international law and of the statement by the President of the Security Council the previous day;
- (ii) Taking note of the rapid and effective operation of European political consultation leading to the statement of condemnation issued by the Ten on 2nd April and the declaration of economic sanctions on 10th April;
- (iii) Taking note of the agreed statement of the President of the United Nations Security Council on 1st April and of Security Council Resolution 502 of 3rd April 1982, but regretting that the Security Council was unable to ensure implementation;
- (iv) Regretting that the initiatives of the United States Secretary of State, the President of Peru and the Secretary-General of the United Nations failed to secure a negotiated withdrawal of the Argentine forces;
- (v) Welcoming the position adopted by the United States and by NATO after the failure of the attempted negotiations;
- (vi) Regretting that the Council was not convened in application of Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (vii) Welcoming the determined and successful action taken by the United Kingdom to restore international order in application of Resolution 502 of the Security Council and in conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;
- (viii) Deploring the loss of life that resulted from the conflict;
- (ix) Concerned at the weakening of allied forces in the North Atlantic Treaty area following the necessary deployment of larger British forces outside the area for the long-term defence of the Falkland Islands, and noting that NATO can learn many lessons from the conflict;
- (x) Concerned at the deterioration in relations between the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and Latin America,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to seek agreement in the European Community and in NATO on the following objectives:

1. Measures to be considered by NATO countries within the treaty area to compensate for the deployment of British forces outside the area as long as these forces are necessary for the defence of the Falklands;
2. The early restoration of good relations between the countries of the alliance on the one hand and of Latin America on the other, and in particular the normalisation of relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina;
3. An urgent study by NATO of the lessons it can learn from the conflict including:
 - (a) the need for consultation and decisions not only on developments beyond the NATO area which may threaten vital allied interests, but also on those which may threaten national interests in cases of self-defence, even if the Soviet Union is not involved;
 - (b) the need for proper assessment of voluminous and conflicting information to permit the early identification of attack;
 - (c) the performance of defence equipment;
 - (d) the need for a common and restrictive policy on the export of defence equipment to non-allied countries.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. Immediately after Argentine forces attacked and occupied the Falkland Islands on 2nd April 1982, the Presidential Committee referred the matter to the Defence Committee for report. On 20th April, it adopted a draft recommendation "firmly condemning the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 1982 in flagrant violation of international law". Subsequently, on 19th May 1982, it adopted a first report on the Falklands¹ which was submitted to the Assembly on 16th June 1982, the day after the Argentinian forces surrendered. In view of the rapid evolution of events, the Assembly agreed, at the request of the committee, to refer the report back to the committee without debate.

1.2. The present revised report takes account of the information which has become available since the fighting ended but it has obviously not been possible to include the results of the wide-ranging British inquiries to be concluded by the end of the year². Inter alia, this report examines the lessons which the alliance might draw from the conflict and the events which led up to it, and also refers to the future of relations between Europe and Latin America.

II. European and allied consultations and collective defence measures

2.1. As soon as Argentina's intentions became clear with the departure of the invasion fleet from Argentine ports on 31st March, the United Kingdom undertook urgent consultations and discussions in three international frameworks which should be studied separately:

- the United Nations Security Council;
- European political co-operation; and
- NATO.

(a) Security Council

2.2. Article 24 of the United Nations Charter provides that members of the organisation "confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international

peace and security...". Following urgent consultations with the members of the Security Council and before the Argentine attack on the Falkland Islands started, the President of the Security Council on 1st April made an agreed statement¹ on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council accordingly calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to exercise the utmost restraint at this time and in particular to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region and to continue the search for a diplomatic solution."

2.3. On 3rd April, immediately after confirmation of the Argentine invasion on 2nd April, the Security Council adopted Resolution 502² with only one vote against (Panama) and four abstentions (China, Poland, Soviet Union and Spain):

"Determining that there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

1. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities,
2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),
3. Calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

Coming after Argentina's armed invasion in flagrant violation of international law, this text, in favour of which France, the United Kingdom, the United States and seven non-aligned countries voted, and which neither China nor the Soviet Union vetoed, noted that there had been a "breach of the peace", as referred to in Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, but not an "act of aggression" in the terms of the same article. However, by calling for the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces, this resolution showed that the great majority of world opinion had taken a stand against the aggression by Argentina. The only contrary vote came from the one Latin American country represented in the Security Council, Panama.

1. Document 907 Revised.

2. Lord Franks' commission of inquiry; Ministry of Defence white paper.

1. Text at Appendix I (a).

2. Text at Appendix I (d).

2.4. The day after Resolution 502 was adopted, Argentine forces invaded the territory of South Georgia and on 5th and 6th April the first elements of the British intervention force left Portsmouth. A period of attempted mediation followed, during which the then United States Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, the President of Peru and the Secretary-General of the United Nations endeavoured to negotiate a compromise between Argentina and the United Kingdom which would lead to the withdrawal of Argentine forces in accordance with Resolution 502. After British forces had landed in South Georgia and Argentine forces on that territory had capitulated on 25th April, Mr. Haig finally renounced his mission and, in his statement¹ on 30th April, announced that Argentina had rejected the latest United States proposals providing for the establishment of an interim tripartite British, American and Argentine authority in the islands:

“In the light of Argentina’s failure to accept a compromise, we must take concrete steps to underscore that the United States cannot and will not condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes.”

After attempts by Peru, the Secretary-General of the United Nations began to seek a compromise on 7th May. In reply, the British representative submitted a draft interim agreement² on 17th May which provided for the withdrawal of British and Argentine forces to 150 nautical miles from the islands and the appointment of a United Nations administrator to ensure the administration of the islands in consultation with the existing bodies representative of the local inhabitants. This proposal was rejected by Argentina on 19th May, and its refusal marked the end of the period of attempted mediation.

2.5. After British forces had landed on the islands on 21st May, the Security Council on 26th May unanimously adopted Resolution 505³ on the proposal of six non-aligned members of the Council. This text confirmed Resolution 502 and urged the Secretary-General to continue his task of mediation and to try to negotiate a cease-fire, if necessary sending United Nations observers to supervise its application.

2.6. On 4th June, after British forces had suffered serious losses but were within days of final success, a draft Security Council resolution⁴, tabled by the non-aligned members, was finally vetoed by the United Kingdom and the

United States, although the latter’s representative subsequently declared that she would have abstained if she had received instructions in time. This draft provided for an immediate cease-fire by both sides and the simultaneous application of Resolutions 502 and 505.

2.7. Although a great majority of the world community showed it was opposed to the Argentine aggression and called for the withdrawal of Argentine forces, in the long run the majority failed to support the United Kingdom in the military action it finally took in the exercise of its right of legitimate defence, although six weeks had elapsed without Argentina withdrawing its forces as required by Resolution 502.

(b) European Community

2.8. Reactions to the Falklands crisis were the fastest ever in the framework of European political co-operation. The European Community countries unanimously *condemned* the armed intervention the very day it happened¹; the governments of the ten countries each imposed a full embargo on exports of arms to Argentina; on 10th April a ten-power declaration² called for the immediate application of Security Council Resolution 502 and announced the preparation of other measures – subsequently taken in the framework of the Rome Treaty with the regulation³ of the Council of the European Communities of 14th April banning imports from Argentina until 17th May. However, the ban did not apply to imports already on the way or in the framework of a contract concluded before 14th April.

2.9. This faultless solidarity nevertheless showed signs of cracking before the two-and-a-half-month crisis ended. On 17th May, the Ten initially decided to extend the economic sanctions for only seven days on a Community basis for eight of the ten countries and by exclusively national decision in the case of Ireland and Italy. These two countries subsequently lifted their own sanctions against Argentina but undertook not to undermine the embargo decided upon by the other countries which, on 24th May, extended Community economic sanctions for an indefinite period, although Denmark extended sanctions only on the basis of a national decision.

2.10. Three Community countries – France, Ireland and the United Kingdom – and one country which had applied for membership, Spain – are members of the Security Council. This shift in the position of the Ten is

1. Text at Appendix II.
2. Text at Appendix I (j).
3. Text at Appendix I (i).
4. Text at Appendix I (l).

1. Text at Appendix I (b).
2. Text at Appendix I (e).
3. Text at Appendix I (f).

reflected in the votes expressed in the Security Council. Resolution 502 of 2nd April was in fact voted for by France and Ireland in addition to the United Kingdom; Spain abstained, as did China, Poland and the Soviet Union. On 4th June, ten days before the final surrender of the Argentinian forces, Ireland and Spain voted for the draft resolution calling for a cease-fire which the United Kingdom and the United States vetoed, while France abstained.

2.11. The embargo on exports of arms decided upon by each individual Community country remained intact far longer (see Chapter IV).

(c) *NATO*

2.12. Consultations and discussions in NATO – particularly in the North Atlantic Council where all ten European Community countries except Ireland are represented – were different from those in the framework of European political co-operation for two reasons. First, during the period 31st March to 30th April, the United States sought to maintain its position as mediator and a friend of both sides in the conflict, Argentina and the United Kingdom. Second, the Falklands conflict was quite clearly outside the area defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, within which an armed attack on one party to the treaty is considered to be an attack against all the parties.

2.13. Although the provisions of Articles 3: “...the parties... by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” and 4: “The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened” are not geographically limited by the text of the treaty, use of the organisation for consultations on events “outside the area” has developed only very slowly because of the reluctance of several alliance countries to discuss such matters. The most recent statement of the position in this connection was given in the texts adopted at the Bonn NATO summit meeting on 10th June 1982 (at which Spain was represented for the first time). Inter alia, it was stated that:

“All of us have an interest in peace and security in other regions of the world. We will consult together as appropriate on events in these regions which may have implications for our security, taking into account our commonly identified objectives. Those of us who are in a position to do so will endeavour to respond to requests for assistance from sovereign states whose security and independence is threatened.”

while the document on integrated defence adopted by representatives of the countries contributing to the integrated military structure contains the following paragraph:

“Noting that developments beyond the NATO area may threaten our vital interests, we reaffirm the need to consult with a view to sharing assessments and identifying common objectives, taking full account of the effect on NATO security and defence capability, as well as of the national interests of member countries. Recognising that the policies which nations adopt in this field are a matter for national decision, we agree to examine collectively in the appropriate NATO bodies the requirements which may arise for the defence of the NATO area as a result of deployments by individual member states outside that area. Steps which may be taken by individual allies in the light of such consultations to facilitate possible military deployments beyond the NATO area can represent an important contribution to western security.”

2.14. It is considered in NATO that “developments beyond the NATO area” which “may threaten our vital interests” are only events involving a risk of conflict with the Soviet Union or its allies. This was not the case of the Falklands conflict, during which the Soviet Union’s actions were cautious although its statements showed less moderation.

2.15. In the circumstances, the consultations in the North Atlantic Council were not held in the framework of “events outside the area” in the now established meaning of the term. In view of the initially “neutral” position of the United States, the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council received instructions to “inform” its partners in the alliance rather than “consult” them. After the first emergency Council meeting, held at the request of the United Kingdom on 2nd April, and before final confirmation of the Argentine invasion was received in Brussels, the communiqué¹ issued by the Secretary-General merely noted that “members of the Council expressed deep concern at the dispute...”.

2.16. It is believed that in the following days the United Kingdom kept its partners informed, through the NATO Military Committee, of movements of forces due to the intervention force being sent to the South Atlantic. The position with regard to forces assigned or earmarked for assignment to NATO is examined below (paragraph 2.25 et seq).

1. Text at Appendix I (c).

2.17. On 5th May, the eleven European members of NATO, meeting in the framework of Eurogroup¹, were the first to “condemn Argentina’s armed invasion of the Falkland Islands”, and this condemnation was endorsed by the NATO Defence Planning Committee² meeting at ministerial level on 7th May, one week after the United States had adopted a position³ on 30th April in favour of a certain degree of support for the United Kingdom’s military actions. All fifteen NATO countries endorsed the condemnation of Argentina in the final communiqué⁴ issued after the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Luxembourg on 17th and 18th May:

“...the allies condemn Argentina for its aggression against the Falkland Islands and Dependencies and deplore the fact that after more than six weeks she has still not withdrawn her forces in compliance with mandatory Resolution 502 of the Security Council.”

2.18. However, in Bonn on 10th June, when the conflict was at its height, the NATO heads of state and of government, which for the first time included a representative of Spain, which had acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty since the Luxembourg meeting, made no reference to the Falklands conflict in the various texts adopted. Spain, which has close relations with Latin America, would not have endorsed the text adopted at the previous meeting.

2.19. Following the surrender of Argentine forces on 15th June 1982, the Deputy Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Da Rin, issued an official statement:

“This development, to which the solidarity of the United Kingdom’s allies has certainly contributed, will open the way for a negotiated solution which has always been Britain’s basic objective.

A diplomatic settlement would restore international legality and contribute also, it is to be hoped, to effacing the deep wounds caused by this tragic conflict.”

(d) Collective defence measures

2.20. When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, defence planning was concentrated mainly on the European continent and the Atlantic sea lanes. At the time, no one raised the question of the threat represented by the Soviet surface fleet: it was still small in size

and at most able to conduct defensive operations in Soviet home waters. Nearly all the NATO plans of the day aimed at warding off a ground attack on the European continent and a submarine attack in the Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer. At that time, too, the United States and the other friendly or allied countries controlled the world’s key points: Panama, Suez, Aden, Singapore, Dakar, Hanoi, the Persian Gulf, Luanda, Freetown, Lorenzo Marques, Beira and the vital ports and bases of South Africa.

2.21. The present situation is very different. Although Soviet superiority in troops and conventional weapons in Europe has not diminished, the danger of an attack in Europe is less to be feared than a crisis breaking out elsewhere in the world. The Soviet fleet has become ocean-going where the size of its ships is concerned and is in the process of becoming so in numbers too.

2.22. In the case of events outside the area which “may threaten our vital interests”, the NATO countries are in agreement on “sharing assessments and identifying common objectives”. They have agreed to examine “the requirements which may arise for the defence of the NATO area as a result of deployments by individual member states outside that area. Steps which may be taken by individual allies in the light of such consultations to facilitate possible military deployments beyond the NATO area can represent an important contribution to western security” (see paragraph 2.13 above).

2.23. NATO is currently examining the steps to be taken in the specific case of an American intervention force having to be sent to the Persian Gulf area. The other allies would have to envisage the measures to be taken inside the NATO area to compensate for the withdrawal of certain American forces from the area. Short of a major increase in the defence effort, such compensatory measures might, for instance, be to make available to NATO at earlier notice certain European forces now earmarked for later assignment – in other words, an improvement in the combat readiness of such forces. Other possible measures are the assistance the European countries are able to give in facilitating the deployment of the American forces: right of navigation and overflight, air-field and port facilities, refuelling and infrastructure en route.

2.24. In the Falklands crisis, these arrangements were not brought up since the vital interests of the alliance as a whole were not considered to be threatened. However, the deployment of British forces had serious consequences for the NATO area’s defence capability.

1. Text at Appendix I (g).

2. Text at Appendix I (h).

3. Mr. Haig’s statement at Appendix II.

4. Text at Appendix I (k).

2.25. So-called "NATO" forces are in reality national forces which can be classed in three main categories:

- (i) a very few forces which operate under the control of NATO military headquarters (and in the last resort of the Defence Planning Committee) in peacetime. These are mainly air defence forces, and also the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, STANAVFORLANT, consisting of some six to eight frigates or destroyers supplied by as many different countries;
- (ii) forces assigned to NATO, whose place of deployment is decided upon in consultation with the NATO military authorities and which come under NATO command when the Defence Planning Committee declares the alert, but which remain under national operational command in peacetime. These are mainly land and air forces stationed in forward areas of the mainland of Europe;
- (iii) earmarked forces which may come under NATO command within a period of time ranging from a few days to several weeks after the alert. Apart from STANAVFORLANT, naval forces and land and air reserves and forces based in rear areas are included in this category.

2.26. Being naval units and, for the army, units of the United Kingdom mobile force based in the United Kingdom, British forces sent to the Falklands during the hostilities (see Chapter VI) were nearly all in the third, earmarked, category. The only forces withdrawn from Germany, and probably "assigned", were perhaps a few small engineering and ordnance units. The weakening of NATO area forces was therefore only in the category of forces available to NATO after a certain lapse of time. The NATO military authorities seem to have been kept informed by the United Kingdom each time it was no longer possible to respect the time limits for making various units available and the NATO military commands, particularly SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic), examined the resulting consequences for NATO's defence capability.

2.27. Compensatory measures by other allies might have been considered, or even recommended, by the NATO authorities, such as shortening the time required for earmarked units other than British units to be made available, improving combat readiness or bringing into the area naval units which were outside it at the time. However, there is no sign of the

alliance's political authorities having authorised such compensatory measures, probably because they noted no crisis situation in the area. The Soviet Union in fact made no move to benefit from the situation through military action or preparations. Moreover, the expected duration of the conflict was considered too short to warrant taking compensatory measures.

2.28. However, while most of the British units used during the conflict have now returned to the NATO area, a fairly large garrison will probably be kept in the Falklands - 4,000 men at present, its size in the long term is not yet known. In addition, the large number of ships lost will not be made up for several years. Consumption of munitions was also high, particularly missiles which cost far more than a simple shell and take longer to replace.

2.29. The consequences of the conflict were not all negative for the alliance - far from it. In NATO circles there is much emphasis on the fact that apart from the military lessons referred to in Chapter VI the level of training and preparation of the British forces used in the Falklands is now very high and that their operational experience will spread throughout NATO forces not only through hierarchical channels but also through personal contacts established during joint exercises. Makeshift improvisations with the installation, in a few days, of landing-decks for STOVL aircraft on container and Ro-Ro merchant navy ships, are experiments studied with great interest by the NATO military authorities, very impressed by the availability of 2,000 civilian merchant seamen, all of them volunteers.

2.30. However, the committee feels that two aspects have to be examined. It is already understood in NATO that compensatory measures should be taken by other allied countries within the NATO area when the forces of a member country are moved outside the area because the vital interests of the alliance are threatened. These compensatory measures should also apply when forces of one country are moved outside the area because that country considers its own interests threatened and exercises its inherent right of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, even when the Soviet Union is not involved. Second, the long-term consequences of the reduction in British equipment referred to in paragraph 2.28 must be examined by the NATO military authorities and appropriate compensatory measures envisaged.

(e) *Western European Union*

2.31. The modified Brussels Treaty is entitled "Treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence"; so that its

Council might also have been considered for urgent consultation on the Falklands crisis. However, Article I provides that economic co-operation under the treaty shall not duplicate or prejudice the work of other economic organisations; Article IV that the parties will rely on NATO military authorities for military matters; and Article V limits automatic military assistance to cases of armed attack "in Europe". WEU bodies would not therefore have been appropriate for discussion of economic sanctions; of the effects of the crisis on allied defence in Europe; or of possible military assistance.

2.32. Nevertheless Article VIII.3 expressly provides that at the request of any party "the Council shall be immediately convened" to permit consultation "with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise". The committee regrets that no member country chose to convene the Council in connection with the Falklands crisis.

III. The future of European and North American relations with the Latin American countries

3.1. The background to the negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom between 1965 and February 1982 is summarised briefly in Appendix III.

3.2. During the South Atlantic crisis which followed the Argentine attack on the Falkland Islands, the Latin American countries, except Chile and to a lesser extent Brazil, in general sided with Argentina, although recognising the principle that international conflicts should be solved by peaceful means and not by force.

3.3. This position was due to their links with Argentina, a fellow country, and also to the fact that the Falklands conflict was seen as a problem of decolonisation.

3.4. Argentina and the other Latin American countries reacted strongly to the United States' attitude, considering it had betrayed them. They felt they could no longer rely on American assistance in the event of difficulties since the United States, instead of remaining neutral in the conflict, was on the contrary believed to have supplied assistance and armaments to the British fleet.

3.5. Venezuela may have kept its distance recently, fearing that the United States might oppose its claims to part of the territory of Guyana in the event of a conflict similar to that over the Falkland Islands breaking out.

3.6. For all these reasons, and since the OAS proved wholly ineffective, thought has been

given to setting up a new association of American states, excluding the United States. But this idea seems to have been abandoned and there is growing awareness of the need to reshape Latin American organisations in order to associate their members more closely with the North American countries, the EEC and Japan.

3.7. The Latin American countries also have grievances against the EEC countries and Canada because of the economic sanctions they introduced.

3.8. The situation is thus dangerous and made even more tense because of the seriousness of an economic crisis liable to encourage a persecution complex which would jeopardise relations with the countries of the Atlantic Alliance to the advantage of the Soviet Union, which might cleverly and perseveringly try to take advantage of the situation to increase its presence on the continent.

3.9. It is therefore necessary and urgent to resume contacts and to re-establish friendly relations of co-operation, while clearly bearing in mind a new fact: the events which marked the Falklands conflict brought out the need first to achieve greater political and economic cohesion and unity among the Latin American countries, this being essential for tackling relations with the United States and Western Europe with which Latin America feels linked at ethnic, historical and social levels.

3.10. Latin America's regional relations with the United States and the EEC countries must therefore not be governed by a spirit of strategic opposition but be based on mutual respect and a confrontation of unilateral and regional political and economic interests which may prove complementary. This concept is illustrated by the results of the last meeting of the Latin American Economic System (SELA) advocating a global agreement with the European Community.

3.11. Following the Anglo-Argentinian conflict over the Falklands, regional relations will be developed insofar as Latin America emerges as an active part of the western system. This calls for the co-operation of North America and the Community for the common good, i.e. international political and economic stability.

3.12. It can also be seen that the future of Latin America's relations with the United States and Western Europe is not a matter of challenging a defensive military bloc, the Atlantic Alliance, which is even considered to be an effective instrument for world peace, just as the Latin American continent is important for Europe's security since strategically it is a very sensitive area for world balances.

3.13. By re-establishing relations with the Latin American countries, the West must take account of these new feelings; similarly, it must not overlook the fact that the crisis throughout these countries is fanned by extreme poverty, the economic decline and financial collapse which are characteristic of the whole area and the destabilising activities of international communism which often finds support due to lack of comprehension in North America.

3.14. This situation implies that the EEC must prepare an organised basic plan for assistance to all countries without political discrimination, aiming first and foremost at financial recovery and the application of trade measures guaranteeing outlets for local products and industry.

3.15. The European Community, Japan, Canada and the United States should draw up an agreement similar to the Lomé Convention in order to concert action for the recovery of the area.

3.16. In order to re-establish relations in full, the talks which the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Colombo, had with the Argentinian, Brazilian and Peruvian authorities proved useful; even more useful will be the conference to be held by the European Parliament and the Latin American Parliament in Brussels in spring 1983 with a view to examining relations between Europe and Latin America.

3.17. All Latin American countries attach the greatest importance to the normalisation of relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina on the basis of negotiations with no prior conditions. Some go so far as to make the acceptance of negotiations an essential condition for the development of a profitable, co-operative dialogue between the West and Latin America.

3.18. Without concealing the difficulties involved in resuming negotiations, the United States and Canada also consider them essential, as do the EEC countries, this being shown by the European political co-operation meeting held in Copenhagen on 13th and 14th September 1982.

3.19. The evolution of world opinion is shown in the resolution¹ of the United Nations General Assembly adopted on 5th November 1982 by 90 votes (including the United States and Greece) to 12 (including the United Kingdom) with 52 abstentions (including all other WEU countries).

1. Text at Appendix I (m).

IV. *International transfers of military equipment*

4.1. Argentina is an interesting and typical case in the history of exports of arms outside the alliance. Among the third world countries, Argentina is a major arms importer; its policy in this connection is dictated by considerations which may influence the arms trade in general but, like most Latin American countries¹, it has not procured Soviet equipment:

- (i) the third world countries seek to diversify their arms procurement for reasons which are more political than economic;
- (ii) they try not to link their military procurement with one of the two superpowers;
- (iii) the foothold gained by the four major European arms producers in trade with the third world countries has increased the latter's logistic and training difficulties;
- (iv) the European countries have made a considerable contribution to creating national military production capabilities in the third world countries;
- (v) the place taken in the international arms market by the exportation of the national production of third world countries has reduced the Europeans' margin of manœuvre.

4.2. The South Atlantic crisis has had repercussions on almost all the problems of sales of arms to the third world, but what has affected Europeans most is the lack of prior political co-ordination among the allies. Although the specific case of the Falklands conflict could not be foreseen at the time contracts for the supply of military equipment were concluded between Argentina and the various alliance countries, a conflict in the area could not be excluded, given the existence of numerous territorial claims. Nevertheless, there seem to have been no prior consultations between allied supplier countries in spite of the many relevant bodies for international consultations in which all the WEU countries take part: the CNAD in NATO, the SAC in WEU and the IEPG, which latter even set up sub-group 5 of Panel 3 to handle the very question of exports. In the event, Argentine forces equipped with Belgian, French, German, Italian, Netherlands and even British weapons fought British forces and even sank British warships with French missiles

1. The exceptions being Cuba, Guyana, Nicaragua and Peru.

some of whose components are produced by four United Kingdom firms¹.

4.3. According to SIPRI² statistics, Argentina is the second Latin American importer of major military equipment, after Peru but before Chile and Brazil, and the fourteenth of the twenty leading third world importers, particularly since 1977. Prior to that date, Argentine military imports never exceeded 3.1% of total imports. In 1978, the figure was 9.3%. According to ACDA³ figures, during the period 1970-79 Argentina imported \$1,195 million of armaments (1978 constant prices). These were warships, submarines, combat aircraft, helicopters, missiles and armoured vehicles, most of them European. During the seventies, it even began to export its own military output. Unlike the other third world countries which re-export arms purchased from the industrialised countries (e.g. Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia), Argentina is one of two Latin American countries (the other being Brazil) which export nationally-produced weapons, generally produced under licence. This is the case of TAM tanks and Pucara aircraft.

4.4. In the seventies, Argentina produced light aircraft, including the Pucara IA-58, and the OH-6 helicopter, under French and American licences respectively. In the eighties it has had talks with the German firm Dornier on producing the Alpha-Jet trainer aircraft. Argentine naval shipyards have built destroyers, frigates, patrol craft and ocean reconnaissance ships and assembled German submarines. Where armoured vehicles are concerned, the AMX-13 was produced under French licence as from 1969 and the TAM (Tanque Argentino Mediano) tank under German licence. Another version of the TAM, the VCTP (infantry combat vehicle), went into production in 1980. In the eighties, the *Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares* expects to meet most national military requirements. These are mainly light weapons and new items such as a radio-guided supersonic naval missile and a fire-and-forget rocket produced by the Armed Forces Technical and Scientific Research Centre. It is believed that 68% of anti-tank missiles are assembled in Argentina and the rest imported from Germany.

4.5. Argentina has the highest military expenditure in Latin America, although it has fewer armed forces than Brazil and Mexico. Like Chile and Peru, more than 2% of its GNP is earmarked for military expenditure. It is

therefore among the six leading arms importers in Latin America (with Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Peru and Venezuela). It has always turned to the western countries for equipment for its armed forces: first the United States but also the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Austria and even Israel.

4.6. Between 1950 and 1960, the United Kingdom dominated the European market for military exports to Argentina but during the sixties France took a share in the market with its Mirage V supersonic aircraft. Various Latin American countries then asked the United States for more sophisticated arms such as the F-5 supersonic aircraft, but the idea of the Alliance for Progress launched by President Kennedy made the United States give priority to the economic development of third world countries and to refuse to supply them with the latest arms. At that time, only France stepped into the breach left by the American restrictions. In the seventies, its example was followed by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. In 1978, an embargo on new contracts for the supply of American military equipment to Argentina was decided by the Carter administration as a reaction against violations of human rights committed by the authoritarian Argentinian régime. This time, all the Europeans took advantage of it. No new contracts for sales of American military equipment to Argentina have been signed since 1978, although last year Congress authorised the new administration to lift the 1978 embargo provided President Reagan certified that Argentina had made progress in the field of human rights – which he has not yet done. All the arms contracts in force at the beginning of the Falklands crisis were signed by European industries, and the last deliveries of equipment (since the 1978 American embargo) prior to the invasion of the Falklands came from Europe.

4.7. The outbreak of the South Atlantic conflict produced immediate reactions in supplier countries. They decided to place an embargo on all exports of weapons, spare parts and other military equipment to Argentina. The first to do so were the members of the EEC (on 2nd April 1982), the embargo being explicitly mentioned in the ten-power declaration in the framework of European political co-operation on 10th April 1982:

“In this context the Ten noted that their governments have already decided to apply a complete embargo on the export of arms and military equipment to Argentina.”

This embargo is not included in the regulation promulgated by the EEC Council on 14th April 1982 on economic sanctions against Argentina

1. Daily Telegraph, 29th July 1982

2. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook 1982.

3. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World military expenditures and arms transfers 1970-79.

in view of the fact that, according to Article 113 of the Rome Treaty, the EEC has no defence responsibilities. Consequently, they were individual decisions taken by the ten countries. On 5th and 13th April respectively, Canada and New Zealand and on 30th April the United States announced similar embargoes.

4.8. Once hostilities had ended, however, exports were resumed more quickly than the United Kingdom might have wished in the absence of an explicit declaration by Argentina terminating hostilities. After the meeting of EEC Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Luxembourg on 20th June 1982, Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, declared that in spite of the embargo having been lifted on products imported from Argentina the embargo on arms exports would be maintained as long as no juridical solution had been found to the South Atlantic conflict. Two months later (9th August), the French Ministry of Defence spokesman said:

“Existing contracts¹ between Paris and Buenos Aires will be honoured, relations between the two countries again being normal, and it is not out of the question that others will be concluded.”

On 28th September 1982, the Federal German Ministry of Defence spokesman said the Federal Republic had decided to lift the embargo on military supplies to Argentina. Mainly concerned were three contracts signed in the late seventies between the Argentine navy and the German Thyssen Nordseewerke, Thyssen Rheinstahl and Blohm and Voss shipyards. The first was for the construction in Germany of two TR-1700 submarines and supplying Buenos Aires with components for four further submarines of the same type to be built in Argentina; delivery of the first (launched at the end of 1980) is planned for 1983. The second contract provided for the construction in Germany of four Meko-360 destroyers, the first two of which (launched in 1981) are to be delivered at the end of this year. The third contract provided for the construction in Argentina of six Meko-140 frigates, the first of which (launched at the beginning of 1982) was not yet ready at the time of the conflict. These three German weapons systems have equipment produced in Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The day after the German embargo was lifted, the British press revealed that the British Government had even authorised Rolls-Royce to export to Germany turbines intended for German vessels built for Argentina. At the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European Community on 20th September

1. Additional Super-Etendard aircraft equipped with Exocet AM-39 missiles.

1982, according to the press¹, the British Secretary of State, Mr. Pym, is said to have told his colleagues:

“The haste shown by France, Germany and Holland in resuming arms contracts amounted to giving the thief a premium after all.”

4.10. Supplies of arms to Argentina are only a special instance of the international transfer of arms to non-allied countries, particularly American, European and Soviet arms to third world countries. Available data show that this trade is snowballing for various economic, trade and political reasons which encourage exports and imports:

- (i) exports are encouraged by the strong competition between European industries, compelled to amortise the cost of armaments research and development by seeking longer production runs than required for the limited demands of their own armed forces;
- (ii) imports are encouraged by the feeling of insecurity prevailing in third world countries, which claim the right to procure the arms they consider necessary for their own defence.

The committee has examined this matter on several occasions².

4.11. The problem has always proved difficult to solve. It is difficult for the European producer countries to agree on a voluntary limitation of their exports on the one hand because of the competition which exists between the European allies and between the latter and the Soviet Union, and on the other because any policy of denying arms to third world countries is strongly resented by them who see it as a neo-colonialist move by former colonial powers.

4.12. At present, two types of solution might be envisaged, foster coproduction agreements or seek regional agreements. (i) Present European coproduction agreements contain special provisions relating to exports requiring sometimes the agreement and sometimes the opinion of the other partners, each programme being a special case. Reduced competition resulting from coproduction, the possibility of research costs being amortised on longer domestic production runs and the need to take the partners' export policy into consideration tend to reduce

1. Daily Telegraph, 24th September 1982.

2. Particularly in the report on the international trade in armaments, Document 500, 4th December 1969. Rapporteur: Colonel Bourgoïn.

exports¹. (ii) The other means of collaboration which may be envisaged in this connection is the signature of regional agreements by the importing countries, possibly associated with the exporting countries. This has already been proposed several times in Latin America and Africa to limit all imports of armaments which might endanger the existing balance in a given area.

V. Warning and alert

5.1. The concept of warning of impending attack – essential if defence measures are to be implemented – cannot be discussed in isolation from the whole background of relations between parties to a dispute and the various signals which, deliberately or at times unwittingly, each party may have been giving to the other through its declarations and actions, and on which the other party will have made its assessment of the situation and based its policy.

(a) Signals

5.2. Argentina's claim to the Falklands is historical, dating back to a Spanish settlement on East Falkland for forty-four years up to 1811, and a small settlement established by Buenos Aires from 1820 to 1831, removed by a United States vessel, and for four months at the end of 1832 until its final removal by British forces in January 1833, reasserting a British claim to sovereignty dating from 1765. Since January 1833, all the Falkland Islands have been under British administration and inhabited by British settlers.

5.3. Argentina pressed its claim to sovereignty in the United Nations and in December 1965 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2065 invited Argentina and the United Kingdom to proceed with negotiations to find a peaceful solution to the problem of the Falkland Islands. Bilateral talks in 1970 and 1971 led to agreements on social, economic and commercial relations which provided for transport between Argentina and the islands by sea and by air, and for postal and telecommunications services. Oil supplies to the island from Argentina were agreed in 1974 and Argentina developed the Port Stanley airstrip providing an air link with the mainland. Throughout, Argentina sought to negotiate a transfer of sovereignty; while the United Kingdom insisted that sovereignty could not be transferred without the consent of the inhabitants.

1. The Chairman of the Matra company told the Defence Committee of the French National Assembly on 10th June 1982 that co-operation led to export markets being limited, not extended.

5.4. From the mid-1970s, such negotiations with the military régime in Buenos Aires were made difficult for the United Kingdom because of the internal policy of repression organised, or at least tolerated, by the military authorities which led to the assumed deaths of from 6,000 to 15,000 *desaparecidos*. During an economic survey of the Falklands Islands in 1976, an Argentine vessel fired shots across the bows of a British research ship, *Ambassadors* were withdrawn from London and Buenos Aires, and fuel supplies to the islands cut off by Argentina in October 1977. Not for the first time there were then threats of an invasion in the Argentine press, and intelligence reports reaching the British Government in November 1977 led, it was disclosed by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Callaghan, in a speech following the Argentine invasion of 2nd April 1982, to the despatch of a nuclear-propelled hunter-killer submarine to the area of the Falklands accompanied, at a distance of some hundreds of miles, by two frigates, essential for communications purposes. Reports differ as to whether Argentina was privately informed of these precautionary defence measures or not, and therefore it is not clear whether the despatch of the submarine acted as a deterrent or not. Bilateral talks were resumed between the two countries in December 1977 but without substantial results.

5.5. Attention has focused on proposals discussed with the Falkland Islands inhabitants by a British Foreign Office Minister, Mr. Nicholas Ridley, in November 1980 when he suggested four options: a transfer of sovereignty; a transfer of sovereignty with leaseback of administration to Britain for a specified period (99 years); a freeze on political arrangements pending a strengthening of commercial and economic ties with Argentina; or the breaking off of negotiations. Large numbers of Argentine journalists attended Mr. Ridley's public meetings with the islanders who rejected any proposal other than a freeze on political negotiations. On 2nd December 1980, speakers of all parties in the House of Commons were insistent that the wishes of the islanders should be paramount. At meetings in New York in February 1981, between representatives of Argentina, the United Kingdom and the inhabitants of the islands, the British proposal for a freeze on political negotiations was rejected by Argentina.

5.6. Decisions announced in the British defence white paper of April 1981 and thereafter provided for significant reductions in the long term of surface vessels in the Royal Navy – a reduction of as much as one-third in destroyers and frigates – albeit with increased emphasis on maritime patrol aircraft and hunter-killer submarines. The ice patrol ship *Endurance* of 3,600 tons, equipped with two 20 mm guns – the only vessel maintained in the

area of the Falkland Islands – was to be withdrawn from service in May 1982.

5.7. In March 1981, a slightly more moderate military leader, General Viola, had been installed as president of the Argentine junta but following a period of ill health was replaced in December 1981 by General Galtieri who, incidentally, retained his position of Chief of Army Staff. Prior to becoming president, General Galtieri had visited the United States twice in 1981 and was reported to have been negotiating on possible United States military bases in Patagonia. Certainly the Reagan administration had seen in General Viola, and in General Galtieri in particular, a useful partner in Latin American relations in general, designed primarily to exclude Soviet influence from the area, although the administration had not gone as far as rescinding the 1978 Carter embargo on the conclusion of any further arms supply contracts with Argentina.

5.8. With hindsight it can be seen that the combination of these various developments may well have led the Argentine junta to assume that the British Government was not very deeply committed to retaining sovereignty over the Falkland Islands; was chiefly hampered in negotiations by the obduracy of the inhabitants; and was certainly not planning to defend the islands. Unaccustomed to heeding parliaments themselves, the military junta took no account of all-party opposition in the House of Commons to any transfer of sovereignty. Apart from the various British negotiators who had met their Argentine counterparts, the United Kingdom authorities in London, for their part, appear to have remained largely oblivious to the strength of Argentine feeling on the issue.

(b) Diplomatic warning

5.9. The change in government with the appointment of General Galtieri and the new Foreign Minister, Mr. Costa Mendez, led to a postponement until February 1982 of the next round of bilateral talks due to be held in New York. Again with hindsight, a number of warning signs of impending invasion can now be discerned from diplomatic developments.

5.10. In January, the Argentine paper *La Prensa*, as it had done at times in the past, predicted an Argentine invasion of the Falklands, but added that it would occur before the 150th anniversary of British occupation – which would be January 1983. The new Argentine negotiator, Mr. Ros, was repeatedly questioned about the impending invasion by Argentine journalists before his departure for New York.

5.11. In New York in February, the new Foreign Office Minister, Mr. Luce, was met with a demand from Mr. Ros for urgent negotiations within a fixed timetable to lead to Argentine sovereignty by the end of the year. However, the communiqué issued on 26th February 1982 spoke of the “cordial and positive spirit” of the talks at which it was agreed to submit to the two governments proposals for regular meetings of a negotiating commission and an attempt at least to achieve agreement in twelve months. On his return to Buenos Aires, however, it was reported that the compromise negotiating procedure proposed by Mr. Ros had been rejected by the junta.

5.12. On 19th March, some 60 Argentine scrap-metal workers were landed at the port of Leith on the South Georgia dependency by an Argentine naval transport, and hoisted an Argentine flag. They were demolishing an old whaling station under commercial agreement with the owners, a British firm, and their landing in itself does not appear directly linked to the subsequent invasion of the Falklands although it clearly had the blessing of the Argentine navy which supplied the transport. Following a British protest and a request that the party either comply with immigration formalities with the British authorities at the neighbouring port of Grytviken, or else leave the island, the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires was understood to have been assured that the party would be removed, and indeed on 21st March the Argentine flag and all but twelve of the workers left. Quite suddenly at this point, the situation in South Georgia, some 1,500 km from the Falklands, deteriorated dramatically. On 25th March, the remaining Argentine personnel were resupplied by a second Argentine naval transport and two Argentine corvettes were reported to be in the neighbourhood of the Falklands. The following day Mr. Costa Mendez, the Argentine Foreign Minister, announced that the naval transport had been despatched to South Georgia to give “all the diplomatic protection and security necessary” to Argentine nationals.

5.13. The only military force Britain had in the area was a small company of fifty marines in the Falklands and the ice patrol vessel *Endurance*. Following the incident on South Georgia, *Endurance* finally left Port Stanley with twenty-one of the marines to enforce the departure of the illegal Argentine working party, but with the arrival of three Argentine warships in the area, it was powerless to do so. At this time, about forty Royal Marines, flown to Uruguay as regular relief for the marines on the island, were transported to the Falklands by the British Antarctic survey ship, *John Biscoe*, but were left on the islands as reinforcements – only twenty-four hours before the invasion.

(c) Alert

5.14. Details of intelligence reports reaching London are not of course known, nor, although it has access to them, are they likely to be revealed by Lord Franks's commission which is due to report by the end of the year.

5.15. The highest level of intelligence assessment in the British Government machine is the Joint Intelligence Committee composed chiefly of a senior Foreign Office official, the head of the Cabinet Office Security and Intelligence Section, and the head of the Intelligence Service. It compiles a weekly report from the submissions of its Current Intelligence Groups – sub-committees dealing with different geographical areas. The JIC weekly report or “Red Book” contains summaries from all sources, open and clandestine, of developments in different parts of the world and a confidential, more detailed appendix with very restricted circulation which may contain vital pieces of intelligence material. It is circulated to ministers on the Cabinet Overseas and Defence Committee.

5.16. Probably inspired press reports are now claiming that the Latin American CIG assessments of Argentine intentions for a few weeks prior to the invasion were quite alarmist, but that the JIC assessment reaching ministers was much blander¹, stressing that invasion threats had often been made before.

5.17. Definite evidence of the impending invasion appears from press reports to have reached London only on Monday, 29th March, although there is some dispute about the particular ministerial level that the information reached. Uruguay, whose navy had been on joint manoeuvres with the Argentine navy the previous week, had asked if the inhabitants of the Falklands wished to leave the islands before the invasion. Hard military evidence of preparations for the invasion may very well not have been evident because a very large opposed landing did not have to be attempted. Argentina would have full intelligence on the small company of fifty British marines on the island who had no artillery or any heavy equipment. The Argentine landings at Port Stanley at dawn on 2nd April involved only 2,000 men, albeit with artillery and some armour; the landing fleet had left Argentine ports only on 31st March. After the capture of Port Stanley on 2nd April, the Argentine garrison and its equipment on the Falklands were built up steadily by sea and air in the three weeks that elapsed between the invasion and the arrival of the first British forces in the area. There was, of course, no longer any need for secrecy.

5.18. It is worth asking, with hindsight, what measures might have been taken to prevent the

conflict once the British authorities had finally come to believe that an invasion was imminent (29th March).

5.19. As the Falkland Islands are less than two days' steaming from Argentine ports, but several weeks from British ports, and as the forces on the spot were negligible, no military measures were possible in the time available.

5.20. The United States was asked to intervene diplomatically, and finally President Reagan had a direct telephone conversation with General Galtieri on 1st April. Coming as it did, however, a day after the Argentine invasion fleet had sailed, it could have stopped the landings only with much loss of face for the junta. But even at this stage an unambiguous warning that the United States would be obliged to side with the United Kingdom if Argentina used force to settle a dispute, might well have been decisive. To judge from Argentine bitterness when the United States finally did take sides on 30th April, such a direct warning does not appear to have been given on 1st April.

5.21. The emergency consultation in the Security Council leading to its president's agreed statement of 1st April calling on both parties “to refrain from the use or threat of force” has been described (paragraph 2.2). This statement should have had considerable deterrent effect coming as it did from the world body, but in itself carried no threat of sanctions. If the functioning of European political co-operation described in paragraph 2.8 et seq could have been expedited by even twenty-four hours to produce a warning communiqué *before* the Argentine landings that if it used force Argentina would encounter the solidarity of the Community countries, would incur economic sanctions and certainly an arms embargo, then the invasion might have been averted. A similar warning from NATO would have been no less effective, but could not have been negotiated prior to a decision by the United States to side with the United Kingdom.

(d) Conclusion

5.22. Diplomatic warning of impending attack, and even hard intelligence of military preparation for attack, may very often seem ambiguous to democratic governments bent on finding peaceful solutions to a dispute, and controlling inflationary defence costs at the same time. Two measures however will improve the chances of clear warning being given: first ensuring the presence on the spot of reasonable defence forces; second pursuing an unambiguous and declared policy of not yielding to force, while being prepared for reasonable mutual concessions through negotiation. These measures

1. The Economist, 19th June 1982, pages 41 et seq.

together will impose on any potentially belligerent adversary the need to make deliberate and large-scale preparations for any attack which, in turn, are more likely to provide clear and more timely warning to the threatened party.

5.23. Urgent consultation in European political consultation and where possible NATO, as well as in the Security Council, should be used in an attempt to avert a conflict, as well as to condemn it, and to support an ally after it has broken out.

VI. *Military lessons*

(a) *Conduct of operations*

6.1. Following the Argentine landings on the Falklands on 2nd April, the first elements of a British task force left Portsmouth on 5th and 6th April, sailing via Ascension Island – a British island in the South Atlantic containing an airfield normally operated by personnel of the United States which has satellite communications facilities on the island. 5,000 miles

from the United Kingdom and 3,500 from the Falklands, Ascension Island served as an important staging area throughout the operations.

6.2. From announcements made on 9th and 14th April the naval combat vessels in the task force comprised some eighteen vessels including the major units shown in Table 1. By the end of April, the task force amounted to some seventy vessels including thirteen Royal Fleet Auxiliary support ships and thirty-nine requisitioned or chartered merchant vessels including three passenger liners and the large container ship *Atlantic Conveyor*, some of which were fitted with improvised flight decks to carry helicopters or, in the case of *Atlantic Conveyor*, Harrier aircraft. The total force eventually reached about 100 ships, including a maximum of fifty-two merchant vessels. British nuclear-propelled hunter-killer submarines also took part in the operations, but information on their numbers and movements was not released. Some 13,000 men of the Royal Navy (excluding Marines) and Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and 2,000 merchant seamen were involved.

TABLE 1

Major naval units in the British task force

<i>Aircraft-carriers:</i>	Hermes	(Sea Harrier aircraft ; Sea King, Wessex helicopters ; Sea Cat missiles)	
	Invincible	(Sea Harrier aircraft ; Sea King, Wessex helicopters ; Sea Dart missiles)	
<i>Destroyers:</i>	Country class {	Antrim Glamorgan	(Exocet, Sea Slug, Sea Cat missiles ; Wessex helicopters)
Glasgow			
Coventry			
<i>Frigates:</i>	Type 21 {	Alacrity	(Lynx helicopters ; Exocet, Sea Cat missiles)
		Antelope	
		Arrow	
		Ardent	
Type 22 {	Broadsword	(Lynx helicopters ; Exocet, Sea Wolf missiles)	
	Brilliant		
Rothesay class {	Plymouth	(Wasp helicopters ; Sea Cat missiles)	
	Yarmouth		
<i>Assault ships:</i>	Fearless Intrepid	(Wessex helicopters ; Sea Cat missiles)	
<i>Logistic landing ships:</i>	Sir Galahad Sir Tristram		

6.3. British ground forces taking part in the operation totalled about 10,000 including one infantry brigade, two parachute battalions and some 2,000 to 3,000 Royal Marines. Fourteen RAF Harrier GR-3 ground-attack aircraft joined the fleet, operating together with twenty-eight of the naval interceptor version of the Harrier normally carried on the aircraft-carriers. Additional air force units operating included a small number of Vulcan bombers; Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft; and Hercules and VC-10 transports which lifted large quantities of supplies to Ascension Island.

6.4. Following the surrender of Argentine forces on South Georgia on 25th April, operations against the Falklands Islands themselves began with a bombing attack and naval bombardment of the Port Stanley airfield on 1st May, and the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano by a submarine on 2nd May. After a period of air battles, bombardments, and reconnaissance landings on the islands, the major British landing was made at San Carlos, some 100 km from Port Stanley, on 21st May and, following subsidiary landings at Bluff Cove some 25 km from Port Stanley, the Argentine forces, most of which had been concentrated in Port Stanley throughout, surrendered on 14th June. The Argentine Foreign Minister on 5th July announced that there was a "de facto cease-fire on the part of Argentina", but did not confirm that there was a final end to hostilities. Speaking in the United Nations General Assembly on 3rd October, Mr. Juan Ranon Aguirre Lanari, the new Argentine Foreign Minister, said:

"The hostilities in the area have ceased de facto, as everyone knows, and it is not the intention of my government to take the initiative to change this situation."

There has been no more formal statement from the Argentine Government.

6.5. United States forces were not involved in the Falklands conflict, but, following Mr. Haig's statement¹, on 30th April, the United States supplied undefined military assistance. Information released in Washington on 24th October said that substantial amounts of arms had been supplied including Shrike anti-radar missiles; limpet mines to sink ships; Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles; Harpoon air-launched anti-ship missiles and a resupply of 100 of the latest AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

6.6. Following the cessation of hostilities, Britain is stationing a substantial garrison on the island which at present amounts to 4,000 men, including 1,000 combat troops, and an

unspecified number of Phantom air-defence fighters. For these the Port Stanley runway has been lengthened to 1,800 metres, with arrester gear, and will be further extended to 2,160 metres.

6.7. The casualties in men and material suffered by both sides in the conflict are shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4.

TABLE 2
Casualties to personnel

	United Kingdom		Argentina	
	Dead	Wounded	Dead or missing	Wounded
Army	124		261	883
Navy	85		430	169
Marines	26			
Air force	1		55	-
Other	19			
Total	255	777	746	1,052

(b) *Particular features of the conflict*

6.8. The British task force was operating at very great distances from its only (United Kingdom) base although using Ascension Island (still 3,000 miles from the Falklands) as a staging post, and possibly using South Georgia, 800 miles from the Falklands, as a sheltered anchorage. Air defence for the force were shipborne missiles and Harrier aircraft. The Argentine air force was land-based, but in its turn was operating at the limits of its range. The conflict was chiefly a battle between the Argentine air force and the Royal Navy in the first phase, and between the air force and troops on the landing beaches during the last three weeks. The Argentine navy remained in port after the sinking of the Belgrano. The land battle was much more a test of troop training, morale and leadership against very difficult terrain and weather than a test of equipment except the invaluable helicopters.

6.9. There was no declaration of war between the United Kingdom and Argentina; Britain has made no demand for reparations despite heavy naval losses. Targets in Argentina were not attacked by British forces, although it appears that small reconnaissance detachments may have operated there. The potential air threat following the attack on Port Stanley airfield obliged Argentina to maintain air defence on the mainland.

1. Text at Appendix II.

TABLE 3

Aircraft losses

By type of aircraft:		By weapon system:	
<i>Argentina</i>			
A-4 Skyhawk	31	<i>Ground forces:</i>	
Mirage III and V	26	Sabotage	11
Canberra	1	Rapier missile	13
Pucara	15	Blowpipe missile	8
Mentor T34	4	<i>Sea-based forces:</i>	
Aeromacchi 339	1	Sea Dart missile	8
Light aircraft	2	Sea Wolf missile	5
C-130	1	Sea Cat missile	6
Unidentified aircraft	19	Gun	3
Puma	7	Harrier with Sidewinder missile	31
Chinook	1	ground attack	19
Huey Bell	1	<i>Other lost on ground:</i>	9
TOTAL	<u>109</u>	<i>Fire from Argentine forces:</i>	<u>3</u>
		TOTAL	<u>109</u>
<i>United Kingdom</i>			
Sea Harrier	6	<i>Accident:</i>	4
Harrier GR-6	<u>3</u>	<i>Ground forces:</i>	
TOTAL	<u>9</u>	Roland missile	1
		Blowpipe missile	1
		AA guns	<u>3</u>
		TOTAL	<u>9</u>

TABLE 4

Naval vessels sunk

<i>United Kingdom</i>		<i>Argentina</i>	
Type 42 destroyer	2	Cruiser	1
Type 21 frigate	2	Submarine	1
Logistic landing ships	2	Patrol boat	1
Container ships	1	Cargo boat	1
		Trawler	1

6.10. For the United Kingdom the problem of logistics supply over vast distances became supremely important, and without the ability to charter and requisition large numbers of merchant ships, without any declaration of emergency, the operation would not have been possible. The amount of successful improvisation in many fields was impressive, enabling ships and aircraft designed essentially for operations in the North Atlantic, where they will never be more than 600 miles from a friendly shore base, to be adapted for operations over a much greater range. Flight decks were fitted to merchant ships; in-flight refuelling probes to Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft and Hercules

C-130 transports; Sidewinder missiles to RAF Harrier aircraft to give them a defence capability.

(c) Performance of equipment

6.11. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence is to issue a white paper towards the end of the year on the Falklands operation which will contain more information than that currently available. An interim report has, however, already been issued on 5th August and the following points serve to illustrate some of the lessons that NATO may learn from performance of weapons systems in the conflict.

(i) Aircraft

6.12. The only fixed-wing aircraft accompanying the British task force were the two versions of the Harrier – the navy interceptor and the RAF ground attack. The Harrier is a first generation vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft although, because of the reduction in payload or flying time resulting from a completely vertical take-off, in operational terms it is more correctly described as “short take-off and landing” or “short take-off and vertical landing”. It can operate at 550 knots at sea level although capable of exceeding Mach 1 in a dive. At first sight this aircraft would appear no match for the faster Mirage-III, Mirage-V and Kfir aircraft of the Argentine air force capable of Mach 2 at altitude and 750 knots at sea level. Operating, however, at extreme range from the Argentine mainland, the Mirages are unlikely to have flown at supersonic speeds in the vicinity of the Falklands because of the high fuel consumption involved. The Harrier's speed would be closer to that of the Skyhawk A-4. In the event, however, the air battle was not a contest of speed; the extreme manoeuvrability of the Harrier and the high training of its pilots, made it more than a match for the other aircraft. A force of twenty-eight interceptors shot down thirty-one aircraft in air combat, and a further twelve were destroyed on the ground. No Harrier was lost in combat, although five were lost through accident or were destroyed by ground fire.

6.13. The Vulcan, originally a strategic bomber designed to carry nuclear weapons, was pressed into service as a conventional bomber and made a small number of attacks on Port Stanley airfield from Ascension Island, requiring in-flight refuelling at least twice on each mission. While the runway, built on solid rock, was cratered in one attack, it was not put out of action; however, aircraft and radar installations on the ground were destroyed.

6.14. Although attention has focused on the sinking of two ships by Exocet missiles, most damage was done to the vessels of the task force by conventional World War II pattern bombs dropped by the Mirage and Skyhawk aircraft in very low-level attacks pressed home with determination by the Argentine pilots. The lesson of World War II is demonstrated again that a task force, operating within range of land-based attack aircraft, is vulnerable.

6.15. Little information has been made available about the performance of helicopters. They were obviously invaluable to both sides, particularly in the amphibious landings of the British force and subsequently in support of the land battle both to provide fire support and transport of troops and equipment in very diffi-

cult terrain. Those available must always have seemed too few.

(ii) Anti-ship missiles

6.16. The Argentine forces had a small number of Exocet missiles, both shore-based and carried in a few Super Etendard aircraft. The Exocet is credited with the sinking of the destroyer Sheffield and the container-ship Atlantic Conveyor. The early success of this sea-skimming, radar-homing missile is said to have modified the tactics of the task force, obliging the aircraft-carriers to be maintained during most of the daylight hours to the east of the Falklands where they were virtually out of range of Argentine aircraft. It is not clear, however, whether such missiles will in future dominate naval warfare as there may have been exceptional circumstances in both these sinkings.

6.17. The Sheffield was reported to have been taken by surprise with its radar temporarily out of action because of interference with its satellite communications system in use at the time for a transmission to the United Kingdom. The warhead of the Exocet did not explode, and the fire which spread rapidly throughout the Sheffield was caused by the missile's remaining propellant which continued to burn. The Sheffield was not fitted with the only anti-missile missile with the task force – the Sea Wolf – only now coming into service, and carried by only two frigates among all the task force vessels.

6.18. The Atlantic Conveyor was accidentally hit by an Exocet aimed at the destroyer Antrim, but deflected by chaff from the latter. A third vessel, the destroyer Glamorgan, was hit by a shore-based Exocet, but was not sunk.

6.19. Some defensive measures can therefore be effective against Exocet. These include the Sea Wolf anti-missile missile and relatively simple chaff dispensers which jam the missile's radar. Guns with a very high rate of fire, such as the United States 3,000 rounds a minute Phalanx, are also available with an anti-missile capability.

(iii) Surface-to-air missiles

6.20. The success of the surface-to-air missiles fitted to naval ships is shown in Table 3 above. They accounted for fewer aircraft than the Harrier. It is understood that some of the missile systems functioned better than others, but none were completely effective against simultaneous attacks by many aircraft. In the case of one system, while the missile actually on the launcher can be held immediately ready, once it is fired the reload from the magazine takes more than a minute before it is ready for

firing – a long time to wait in the face of air attack.

6.21. The Rapier missile accompanying the ground forces was in action for the last three weeks following the San Carlos landings. It is credited with the destruction of thirteen aircraft and undoubtedly provided good air defence of the landing beaches and can be fired in close proximity to own troops because fused to explode only on contact, not in proximity. But there are reports that this missile too took some time for its guidance system to stabilise after coming into action, so it was not always available immediately on landing.

(iv) Aircraft-carriers

6.22. The two small aircraft-carriers, Hermes and Invincible, accompanying the British task force, are not capable of operating conventional fixed-wing aircraft. The Invincible has a flight deck of 168 metres and normally carries ten Sea King helicopters and only five Harrier aircraft. United States aircraft-carriers of the Kittyhawk class by comparison are 320 metres overall with 240 metres of angled flight deck, still equipped with steam catapults. They carry some eighty-five relatively high-performance fixed-wing aircraft including the F-14 or F-4 interceptor capable of a speed in excess of Mach 2; A-7 and A-6 attack aircraft, electronic counter-measures aircraft and four airborne early-warning E-2 aircraft.

6.23. The British task force lacked long-range radar warning that airborne radar can give. Combined with a high-performance F-14 interceptor, the E-2 early-warning aircraft are claimed to give relative invulnerability to air attack to the United States carriers. The large carrier concept is, however, extremely expensive compared with a small carrier of the size of the Invincible. The success of the Sea Harrier as an interceptor could be considerably enhanced, however, if the task force could be provided with airborne early warning.

6.24. The naval argument as to whether the large carrier is too expensive and too vulnerable to other forms of attack, especially from sea-skimming and long-range missiles, will continue, but clearly in the Falklands conflict the Invincible was thought to be vulnerable to land-based air attack.

(v) Nuclear-propelled submarines

6.25. No information was released about the numbers or movements of the nuclear-propelled hunter-killer submarines employed in the Falklands operation. One of them, the Conqueror, sank the cruiser General Belgrano on 2nd May, and thereafter the whole of the Argentine fleet remained in port. On this

basis, the British submarines can be held to have completely removed the naval threat. Capable of submerged speeds as high or higher than those of surface vessels, and able to remain submerged for weeks at a time if necessary, the nuclear-propelled submarine is a formidable weapon. However, for communications purposes, it will normally need to be accompanied, albeit at a considerable distance, by surface vessels; it is not suitable for navigating in shallow waters; it is noisier, and therefore potentially easier to detect, than modern diesel-electric submarines and is, of course, considerably more expensive than them.

6.26. As mentioned in paragraph 5.4 above, Britain had previously deployed a nuclear-propelled submarine in the area of the Falklands during the potential crisis in 1977. It may then have acted as a sufficient deterrent to Argentine invasion.

(vi) Design of warships

6.27. One feature revealed in the Falklands conflict is the vulnerability of modern design warships to fire hazard when struck by bombs or missiles. Press reports have attributed this variously to the large amounts of plastic material in electric cables on modern ships, to the use of aluminium in the superstructure to save weight, or even to the use of thinner steel sheet in the superstructure than hitherto. Naval architects will certainly be paying attention to the need to improve both fire-fighting equipment and fire-resistant properties in the design of ships.

(vii) To sum up

6.28. At strictly military level, the events most characteristic of the Anglo-Argentine conflict for possession of the Falkland Islands clearly illustrate the tasks attributable to naval air forces, the principles governing the conduct of naval warfare and the means required for implementing the former and applying the latter in an appropriate manner.

6.29. In particular, and apart from the evolution of naval air operations which depends mainly on political events, the final outcome of the conflict was favourable to the British task force which managed to obtain sea control of the whole area concerned and then the power projection of its naval air strength over the disputed territory thanks to air support, amphibious landing and supply and reinforcement operations.

6.30. Events in the South Atlantic confirm that, even when they have a geographical advantage, countries which, when necessary, do not have appropriate naval air arrangements are not able to provide support for their own air

and land forces, with the result, even if their positions are stronger and deeper, that they cannot avoid enemy attacks. In other words, if there is not limited sea control of areas of naval interest, which can be achieved only with a quantitatively and qualitatively appropriate naval air force equipped with all the surface, submarine and air elements, it is impossible to ensure the in-depth defence of the area concerned and to bring in the supplies and reinforcements essential for the air and land front.

6.31. Furthermore, the Argentine conflict amply demonstrated the fact that air forces, even if numerous and wholly available for naval air operations, but not trained or specially equipped, unlike naval forces, are not in a position to obtain tangible results, whereas naval air forces trained to operate at sea and equipped with appropriate weapons systems can inflict substantial losses on the enemy, even with limited offensives. Thus, British units suffered losses due to the Argentine naval aviation's Etendards and Skyhawks, which won the greatest victories against the Royal Navy.

6.32. On the other front, the British task force showed how, in the framework of a naval force composed of surface and submarine units, the presence of even a few carrier-based air forces with V/STOL aircraft – whose performances and equipment may be improved subsequently – is one of the main elements on which the planning and implementation of any naval aviation operation must be based; this element is in fact an irreplaceable weapons system available to the naval commander for countering a threat from afar effectively and at the right moment, particularly if it is from missiles.

6.33. Events also confirmed the effectiveness of submarines, coupled with the irreplaceable task of surface ships, and in particular those specialising in command and control duties and of platforms appropriate for carrier-borne air forces for accurate air defence and for anti-submarine and surface combat which must however have an appropriate active and passive self-defence capability against threats of all types.

6.34. It was in fact clearly shown that certain savings made in the formation of naval units and, more generally speaking, in the structure of the fleet following budgetary restrictions or, worse, unforeseen reductions in funds for programmes already under way, ultimately detract from the performance of the equipment and its survivability, in the long run leading to losses far greater than the savings initially made.

6.35. Similar considerations also apply to the decision-making process which leads to the abandonment or postponed procurement of equipment and weapons systems needed for

fully guaranteeing the in-depth defence of naval forces.

6.36. In this respect, it is significant that the British system should be without airborne early warning systems and that all-round and point defence are inadequate against attacks from aircraft and missiles.

VII. Conclusions

7.1. The committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation to which the explanatory memorandum relates as follows:

Draft recommendation: *Explanatory memorandum:*

Preamble:

- (i) and (iii) *Chapter II, paragraphs 2.1 to 2.7.*
- (ii) *Chapter II, paragraphs 2.8 to 2.11.*
- (iv) *Chapter II, paragraph 2.4.*
- (v) *Chapter II, paragraphs 2.12 to 2.19.*
- (vi) *Chapter II, paragraphs 2.31 to 2.32.*
- (vii) *Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.1 to 6.6.*
- (viii) *Chapter VI, paragraph 6.7.*
- (ix) *Chapter II, paragraph 2.26 et seq.*
- (x) *Chapter III.*

Operative text:

- 1 *Chapter II, paragraph 2.30.*
- 2 *Chapter III.*
- 3 (a) *Chapter II, paragraph 2.30.*
- (b) *Chapter V, paragraph 5.22.*
- (c) *Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.11 to 6.27.*
- (d) *Chapter IV.*

VIII. Opinion of the minority

8.1. The report as a whole was adopted in committee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions. The minority held that the report should have laid some of the responsibility for the conflict on the United Kingdom and sought to include a demand for the immediate application of the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 5th November calling for negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom. It believed that the European Community was not competent to consider the points in the operative part of the draft recommendation, and was opposed to paragraph 1 of that text.

APPENDIX I

*Official texts***(a) Agreed statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council, Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, Zaïre***1st April 1982*

After holding consultations with members of the Council, I have been authorised to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

“The Security Council has heard statements from the representatives of the United Kingdom and Argentina about the tension which has recently arisen between the two governments.

The Security Council has taken note of the statement issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which reads as follows:

The Secretary-General, who has already seen the representatives of the United Kingdom and Argentina earlier today, renews his appeal for maximum restraint on both sides. He will, of course, return to headquarters at any time, if the situation demands it.

The Security Council, mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, expresses its concern about the tension in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). The Security Council accordingly calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to exercise the utmost restraint at this time and in particular to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region and to continue the search for a diplomatic solution.

The Security Council will remain seized of the question.”

(b) European political co-operation – Communiqué issued by the ten Ministers for Foreign Affairs*2nd April 1982*

The Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Ten condemn the armed intervention of the Argentinian Government in the Falkland Islands, violating the declaration made on 1st April by the President of the Security Council of the United Nations which is now dealing with the matter. They urgently call upon the Argentine

Government to withdraw its forces immediately and to abide by the United Nations Security Council appeal asking it to refrain from the use of force and to continue efforts towards a diplomatic solution.

(c) Statement by the Secretary-General of NATO after the urgent meeting of the North Atlantic Council*2nd April 1982*

Members of the Council expressed deep concern at the dispute between a member of the alliance and a state with which all have friendly relations and reiterated the call made to the parties by the President of the Security Council yesterday to refrain from the use or threat of force and to continue the search for a diplomatic solution.

(d) United Nations Security Council Resolution 502¹*3rd April 1982**The Security Council,*

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 2345th meeting of the Security Council on 1st April 1982 (S/14944) calling on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion on 2nd April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina,

Determining that there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

1. *Demands* an immediate cessation of hostilities,

2. *Demands* an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

1. *Voted for:* France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Zaïre; *voted against:* Panama; *abstained:* China, Poland, Soviet Union, Spain.

3. *Calls* on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

(e) *European political co-operation – Declaration by the Ten*

10th April 1982

1. Representatives of the Ten discussed the grave situation resulting from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina.
2. They recalled that in their declaration of 2nd April the Ten had already condemned the flagrant violation of international law which the Argentine military action constituted.
3. The Ten remain deeply concerned by the continuation of this crisis, which endangers international peace and security. They therefore attach the greatest importance to the immediate and effective implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 in all its aspects, namely an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands, and a search for a diplomatic solution by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom.
4. To these ends, and in a spirit of solidarity among the member countries of the Community, the Ten decide to take a series of measures with respect to Argentina which should be put into operation as soon as possible. They will likewise take the measures necessary to ban all imports of Argentine origin into the Community. In this context the Ten noted that their governments have already decided to apply a complete embargo on the export of arms and military equipment to Argentina.
5. With respect to economic measures, these will be taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Community treaties.
6. Given that the situation resulting from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by the Argentine armed forces is a cause of grave concern for the entire international community, the Ten call on other governments to associate themselves with their decisions, so as to ensure the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 with the least possible delay.

(f) *European Communities – Text of the regulation promulgated by the Council on economic sanctions against Argentina*

14th April 1982

The Council of the European Communities,

Whereas the serious situation resulting from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina, which was the subject of Resolution 502 of the Security Council of the United Nations, has given rise to discussions in the context of European political co-operation which have led in particular to the decision that economic measures will be taken with regard to Argentina in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Community treaties ;

Whereas following the measures already taken by the United Kingdom the member states have consulted one another pursuant to Article 224 of the treaty establishing the European Economic Community ;

Whereas in the context of these consultations it has proved important to take urgent and uniform measures and whereas the member states have therefore decided to adopt a Council regulation pursuant to the treaty ;

Whereas in these circumstances the interests of the Community and the member states demand the temporary suspension of imports of all products originating in Argentina ;

Whereas import documents issued and contracts concluded before the entry into force of this regulation should not be affected by it ; whereas, however, transitional provisions should not be applied to imports into the United Kingdom which were the subject of United Kingdom measures with effect from 7th April ;

Having regard to the treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 113 thereof ;

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Has adopted this regulation:

Article 1

Imports of all products originating in Argentina for the purpose of putting them into free circulation in the Community are hereby suspended.

Article 2

1. This regulation shall not preclude the putting into free circulation of products originating in Argentina

- accompanied by import documents issued before the date of its entry into force which mention Argentina as the country of origin, or
- to be imported in execution of contracts concluded before that date, or
- in course of shipment to the Community at that date.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to imports into the United Kingdom of products covered by this regulation which were the subject of measures adopted by the United Kingdom with effect from 7th April.

Article 3

This regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

It shall apply until 17th May 1982.

Before that date, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, shall examine whether it is appropriate to extend, amend, or, if necessary, repeal this regulation.

This regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all member states.

(g) Eurogroup – Communiqué issued after the meeting of the eleven Defence Ministers

5th May 1982

(Extract)

Ministers condemned Argentina's armed invasion of the Falkland Islands and the dependencies as well as her failure to comply with Security Council Resolution Number 502. Ministers noted the importance of maintaining the principle that aggression or occupation of territory by force should not be allowed to succeed, and urged the need to seek a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties concerned on the basis of the implementation of Security Council Resolution Number 502 in all its parts.

(h) NATO Defence Planning Committee – Communiqué issued after the meeting of Defence Ministers

7th May 1982

(Extract)

Ministers endorsed the statement by Eurogroup Ministers, in their communiqué of the previous day, in which they condemned Argentina's armed invasion of the Falkland Islands and the dependencies as well as her failure to comply with Security Council Resolution Number 502; noted the importance of maintaining the principle that aggression or occupation of territory by force should not be allowed to succeed; and urged the need to seek a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties concerned on the basis of the implementation of Security Council Resolution Number 502 in all its parts.

(i) United Nations Security Council Resolution 505

26th May 1982

Following is the text of the resolution on the Falklands/Malvinas adopted unanimously on 26th May 1982 by the Security Council. The text was presented by Guyana, Ireland, Jordan, Togo, Uganda and Zaire, members of the Security Council:

“ The Security Council,

Reaffirming its Resolution 502 (1982) of 3rd April 1982,

Noting with the deepest concern that the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated,

Having heard the statement made by the Secretary-General to the Security Council at its 2360th meeting on 21st May 1982, as well as the statements in the debate of the representatives of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Concerned to achieve as a matter of the greatest urgency a cessation of hostilities and an end to the present conflict between the armed forces of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

1. *Expresses appreciation to the Secretary-General for the efforts which he has already made to bring about an agreement between the parties, to ensure the implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982), and thereby to restore peace to the region ;*

2. *Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices bearing in mind Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) and the approach outlined in his statement of 21st May 1982 ;*

3. *Urges the parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) ;*

4. *Requests the Secretary-General to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually-acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including if necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of the cease-fire ;*

5. *Requests the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council as soon as possible and in any case not later than seven days after the adoption of this resolution. ”*

**(j) British draft interim agreement
delivered by the British Representative
at the United Nations,
Sir Anthony Parsons, to the United Nations
Secretary-General for communication
to the Argentine Government**

17th May 1982

Draft interim agreement

The Government of the Republic of Argentina and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, responding to Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) adopted on 3rd April 1982 under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Having entered into negotiations through the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for an interim agreement concerning the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), hereinafter referred to as "the islands",

Having in mind the obligations with regard to non-self-governing territories set out in Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, the text of which is annexed hereto,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

(1) No provision of this interim agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either party in the ultimate peaceful settlement of their dispute over the islands.

(2) No acts or activities taking place whilst this interim agreement is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty over the islands or create any rights of sovereignty over them.

Article 2

(1) With effect from a specified time, 24 hours after signature of this agreement (hereinafter referred to as time "T"), each party undertakes to cease and thereafter to refrain from all firing and other hostile actions.

(2) Argentina undertakes:

(A) to commence withdrawal of its armed forces from the islands with effect from time "T";

(B) to withdraw half of its armed forces to at least 150 nautical miles away from any point in the islands by time "T" plus 7 days; and

(C) to complete its withdrawal to at least 150 nautical miles away by time "T" plus 14 days.

(3) The United Kingdom undertakes:

(A) to commence withdrawal of its armed forces from the islands with effect from time "T";

(B) to withdraw half of its armed forces to at least 150 nautical miles away from any point in the islands by time "T" plus 7 days; and

(C) to complete its withdrawal to at least 150 nautical miles away by time "T" plus 14 days.

Article 3

With effect from time "T", each party undertakes to lift the exclusion zones, warnings and similar measures which have been imposed.

Article 4

On the completion of the steps for withdrawal specified in Article 2, each party undertakes to refrain from reintroducing any armed forces into the islands or within 150 nautical miles thereof.

Article 5

Each party undertakes to lift with effect from time "T" the economic measures it has taken against the other and to seek the lifting of similar measures taken by third parties.

Article 6

(1) Immediately after the signature of the present agreement, Argentina and the United Kingdom shall jointly sponsor a draft resolution in the United Nations under the terms of which the Security Council would take note of the present agreement, acknowledge the rôle conferred upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations therein, and authorise him to carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein.

(2) Immediately after the adoption of the resolution referred to in paragraph (1) of this article, a United Nations administrator, being a person acceptable to Argentina and the United Kingdom, shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and will be the officer administering the government of the islands.

(3) The United Nations administrator shall have the authority under the direction of the Secretary-General to ensure the continuing administration of the government of the islands. He shall discharge his functions in consultation with the representative institutions in the islands which have been developed in accordance with the terms of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, with the exception that one representative from the Argentine

population normally resident on the islands shall be appointed by the administrator to each of the two institutions. The administrator shall exercise his powers in accordance with the terms of this agreement and in conformity with the laws and practices traditionally obtaining in the islands.

(4) The United Nations administrator shall verify the withdrawal of all armed forces from the islands, and shall devise an effective method of ensuring their non-reintroduction.

(5) The United Nations administrator shall have such staff as may be agreed by Argentina and the United Kingdom to be necessary for the performance of his functions under this agreement.

(6) Each party may have no more than three observers in the islands.

Article 7

Except as may be otherwise agreed between them, the parties shall, during the currency of this agreement, reactivate the exchange of notes of 5th August 1971, together with the joint statement on communications between the islands and the Argentine mainland referred to therein. The parties shall accordingly take appropriate steps to establish a special consultative committee to carry out the functions entrusted to the special consultative committee referred to in the joint statement.

Article 8

The parties undertake to enter into negotiations in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, with a sense of urgency, the completion of these negotiations by 31st December 1982. These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties and without prejudgement of the outcome.

Article 9

This interim agreement shall enter into force on signature and shall remain in force until a definitive agreement about the future of the islands has been reached and implemented by the parties. The Secretary-General will immediately communicate its text to the Security Council and register it in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done... in the English and Spanish languages, in a single copy.

For the Republic
of Argentina

For the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland

(k) Final communiqué issued after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in ministerial session, Luxembourg

18th May 1982

(Extract)

.....

14. In view of the fundamental importance which they attach to the principle that the use of force to resolve international disputes should be resolutely opposed by the international community, the allies condemn Argentina for its aggression against the Falkland Islands and Dependencies and deplore the fact that after more than six weeks she has still not withdrawn her forces in compliance with mandatory Resolution 502 of the Security Council. They call for a continuation of the efforts to achieve a satisfactory negotiated settlement in accordance with this resolution in its entirety.

.....

(l) United Nations Security Council revised draft resolution proposed by Spain and Panama, vetoed¹ by the United Kingdom and the United States²

4th June 1982

The Security Council, reaffirming its Resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) and the need for implementation of all parts thereof,

1. Requests the parties to the dispute to cease fire immediately in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and to initiate, simultaneously with the cease-fire, the implementation of Resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) in their entirety;

2. Authorises the Secretary-General to use such means as he may deem necessary to verify compliance with this resolution;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council within 72 hours and to keep the Council informed concerning the implementation of this resolution.

1. The voting was: *for*: China, Ireland, Japan, Panama, Poland, Soviet Union, Spain, Uganda, Zaire (9); *against*: (Veto) Britain, United States (2); *abstained*: France, Guyana, Jordan, Togo (4).

2. The United States Representative stated after the vote that she would have abstained if she had received her new instructions in time.

**(m) United Nations General Assembly
resolution on the question of
the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)¹**

5th November 1982

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) ;

Realising that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace ;

Recalling its Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14th December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16th December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14th December 1973 and 31/49 of 1st December 1976 ;

Recalling further Security Council Resolutions 502 (1982) of 3rd April 1982 and 505 (1982) of 26th May 1982 ;

Taking into account the existence of a de facto cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic and the expressed intention of the parties not to renew them ;

1. The voting was: *for*: 90 (including Greece, Spain and the United States); *against*: 12 (including the United Kingdom); *abstained*: 52 (including all other WEU countries).

Reaffirming the need for the parties to take due account of the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly Resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII) ;

Likewise reaffirming the principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes,

1. Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) ;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of this resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above, and to take the necessary measures to that end ;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the progress made in the implementation of this resolution ;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)".

APPENDIX II

Statement by Mr. Haig, United States Secretary of State

30th April 1982

(Extracts)

The South Atlantic crisis is about to enter a new and dangerous phase, in which large-scale military action is likely. I would like to bring you up to date on what we have done, and why, and what we must now do. We have made a determined effort to restore peace through implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 502. That resolution calls for:

- an end to hostilities ;
- the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the islands ; and
- a diplomatic settlement of the fundamental dispute.

The United States made this extraordinary effort because the stakes in human lives and international order required it. From the outset, the United States has been guided by the basic principle of the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The collapse of that principle could only bring chaos and suffering.

We also made this effort because the crisis raised the vital issues of hemispheric solidarity at a time when the communist adversaries seek positions of influence on the mainland of the Americas and latent territorial disputes in much of the hemisphere call for unity and the resolute defence of principle.

We acted as well because the United States has the confidence of the parties. The United Kingdom is our closest ally, and Prime Minister Thatcher's government looked to us to pursue a peaceful solution. We have also recently developed a better relationship with Argentina, as part of our success in revitalising the community of American states. President Galtieri also requested our involvement.

.....

As the prospects for more intense hostilities arose, we put forth an American proposal... It involves: a cessation of hostilities; withdrawal of both Argentine and British forces; termination of sanctions; establishment of a United States-United Kingdom-Argentine interim authority to maintain the agreement; continuation of the traditional local administration, with Argentine participation; procedures

for encouraging co-operation in the development of the islands; and a framework for negotiations on final settlement, taking into account the interests of both sides and the wishes of the inhabitants.

We had reason to hope that the United Kingdom would consider a settlement along the lines of our proposal, but Argentina informed us yesterday that it could not accept it. Argentina's position remains that it must receive an assurance now of eventual sovereignty, or an immediate de facto rôle in governing the islands which would lead to sovereignty.

For its part, the British Government has continued to affirm the need to respect the views of the inhabitants in any settlement.

The United States has thus far refrained from adopting measures in response to the seizure of the islands that could have interfered with our ability to work with both sides in the search for peace. The British Government has shown complete understanding for this position. Now, however, ... the President has therefore ordered:

- the suspension of all military exports to Argentina ;
- the withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales ;
- the suspension of new export-import bank credits and guarantees ; and
- the suspension of commodity credit corporation guarantees.

The President has also directed that the United States will respond positively to requests for matériel support for British forces. There will, of course, be no direct United States military involvement.

American policy will continue to be guided by our concerns for the rule of law and our desire to facilitate an early and fair settlement. The United States remains ready to assist the parties in finding the settlement. A strictly military outcome cannot endure over time. In the end, there will have to be a negotiated outcome acceptable to the interested parties. Otherwise, we will all face unending hostility and insecurity in the South Atlantic.

APPENDIX III

Negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom

(1965-February 1982)

16th December 1965

The twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065 (XX) which noted the existence of a dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom about sovereignty over the Falkland Islands: it invited the two governments to negotiate and seek a peaceful solution. (This resolution is one of a series of resolutions on ending colonialism.) Argentina voted for the resolution and the United Kingdom abstained.

1966

On 18th July, the two countries started preliminary talks in London. For the British, there was no question of discussing the question of sovereignty.

On 28th September, there was a symbolic invasion of the Falklands by Argentinian commandos. The Argentinian Government dissociated itself from this invasion and from the anti-British demonstrations.

1967-71

On 19th December 1967, the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution urging the two countries to continue negotiations and find a peaceful solution as soon as possible.

The negotiations were continued in 1968; the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs undertook, in the various parliamentary assemblies and during a visit to the Falklands (23rd-28th November), not to relinquish sovereignty over the islands to Argentina against the wishes of their inhabitants.

On 12th December, Argentina said it could not accept this position. The negotiations were continued in 1969 and 1970 with more particular attention being paid to the problem of communications since in 1969 Argentina said it was prepared to study ways of establishing and improving direct links between the continent and the islands.

On 1st July 1971, the two countries reached agreement on measures for establishing regular sea and air communications, improving postal, cable and telephone connections and accepting inhabitants of the Falklands in schools and hospitals in Buenos Aires.

1973-77

The return to power of General Juan Peron revived the controversy between the two countries at the end of 1973. On 14th December 1973, the United Nations General Assembly adopted another resolution, No. 3160 (XXVIII), urging the two parties to find a solution in order to put an end to the colonial situation. Relations deteriorated seriously at the end of 1973 when the United Kingdom announced its intention of sending an economic delegation to the Falklands: the Argentinian Ambassador in London was recalled on 28th October 1975 and the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires on 19th January 1976. In December 1976, the United Nations General Assembly adopted another resolution which recalled earlier resolutions "and called upon the two parties to refrain from taking decisions which would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands were going through the process recommended in the abovementioned resolutions". The United Kingdom voted against it.

The conclusions of the report of the economic delegation in 1976, which mentioned the need for closer relations with Argentina, led the United Kingdom to resume negotiations in 1977. After a series of consultations with the inhabitants of the Falklands and with Argentina in February, the two parties issued a memorandum preparing for Anglo-Argentinian negotiations on political relations, including the questions of sovereignty and economic co-operation in the archipelago, the dependencies and the South Atlantic as a whole. Two working groups were set up to this end, but with no concrete result (15th December 1977).

1978-82

Negotiations were resumed in February 1978 and again in April 1979 (inter alia with a representative of the islands' legislative council present) but without great success. It was not until 16th November 1979 that diplomatic relations were re-established at ambassadorial level.

In April 1980, a series of preparatory talks was organised on very varied subjects. On 26th and 27th February 1981, further talks were held in New York, two members of the

islands' council being present. Argentina refused the British proposal to freeze the dispute for an agreed period, allowing the two countries to co-operate in exploiting the archipelago's resources. In the United Nations, Argentina warned the United Kingdom that it would not allow the Falklands to continue to exist as a British colony and asked for further serious negotiations.

In February 1982, a second series of official talks was held in New York. Argentina proposed measures for advancing the negotiations (creation of a standing committee). The United Kingdom refused. However, both parties asserted their determination to find a solution. The joint communiqué issued on 27th February declared that the talks had been held "in a cordial and positive spirit".

APPENDIX IV

*Arms delivered to or ordered by Argentina
– by exporting country*

		<i>Latest orders</i>
<i>France</i>		
Combat aircraft:	Mirage III and Super-Etendard	1981
Helicopters:	A-103 Alouette, SA-315 Lama, SA-330 Puma	1981
Air-to-air missiles:	R-530	1978
Air-to-sea missiles:	Exocet AM-39	1980-81
Sea-to-sea missiles:	Exocet MM-38 and MM-40, Otomat	1979
Surface-to-air missiles:	Roland	1981
Frigates:	Aviso A-69	1979
Anti-tank missiles:	SS-11, Hot	1980
Armoured combat vehicles:	AMX-VIC, VBC-90, ERC-90	1981
Mortars:	81 mm	
	+ licence to produce the Pucara aircraft in Argentina	
	+ licence to produce the AMX-13 tank in Argentina	
<i>United Kingdom</i>		
Combat aircraft:	B-62 Canberra	
Transport aircraft:	Short Skyvan	
Ship-to-air missiles:	Sea Cat, Sea Dart	
Destroyers:	Type 42	
Helicopters:	Lynx	1980
Aircraft-carriers:	Colossus (sold by the Netherlands)	
Minesweepers:	Ton class	
Armoured vehicles:	Shorland	
Surface-to-air missiles:	Tigercat, Blowpipe	
<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>		
Anti-tank missiles:	Cobra, Mamba	
Submarines:	TR-1400	1979
Destroyers:	Meko-360	1979
Fast attack vessels:	Type TNP-45	1979
	+ licence to build Type 209 Salta-class submarines in Argentina	
	+ licence to build TR-1700 submarines in Argentina	1980
	+ licence to build Meko-140 frigates in Argentina	1980
	+ licence to produce the TAM tank in Argentina	
	+ licence to produce the TAM VCTP armoured vehicle in Argentina	

		<i>Latest orders</i>
<i>Italy</i>		
Helicopters:	A-109 Hirundo	1979
Transport aircraft:	G-222	
Combat and training aircraft:	MB-326, MB-339	1980
Ship-to-air missiles:	Aspide (Albatros system)	1979
Naval communications equipment and radar:		1979-80
Naval guns:	Oto Melara 76/62 and Breda 40/70	
<i>Netherlands</i>		
Transport aircraft:	F-27, F-28	
Naval communications equipment + British aircraft-carrier Colossus		1980
<i>Belgium</i>		
Armoured vehicles:	BDX	1979
<i>European co-productions</i>		
Anti-tank missiles:	Hot (France/Fed. Rep. of Germany)	1980
Anti-tank missiles:	Roland (France/Fed. Rep of Germany)	1981
Helicopters:	Lynx, Puma (France/United Kingdom)	1980-81
Sea-to-sea missiles:	Otomat (France/Italy)	1979

Sources : Jane's Review, Interavia, Defence Today, International Defence Review, Jane's aircraft, Jane's weapons systems, Jane's ships, etc. SIPRI Yearbooks, SIPRI Arms Trade Registers, IISS Military Balance, yearbooks.

*Argentine military equipment**Navy*

Type	Weapons system	On board matériel	Country where built	Laid down
Submarines	2 Type 209 Salta class		Argentina (licence Fed. Rep. of Germany)	1970
	1 ex-US Guppy		United States	1940
	4 TR-1700 (on order)		Argentina (licence Fed. Rep. of Germany)	1980
	2 TR-1400 (on order)		Fed. Rep. of Germany	1980
Cruiser	1 ex-US Brooklyn class	SAM Seacat	United States United Kingdom	1930
Aircraft-carrier	1 ex-NL Colossus ex-UK		United Kingdom*	1940
		S-2E Tracker reconnaissance aircraft	United States	
		A-4Q	United States	
		Super Etendard strike aircraft	France	
		S-61D Sea King helicopter	United States	
		A-103 Alouette helicopter	France	
Destroyers	2 Type 42		United Kingdom	1970
		Lynx helicopter	United Kingdom/ France	
		SSM Exocet MM-38	France	
		SAM Sea Dart	United Kingdom	
	5 ex-US Fletcher Summer Gearing class		United States	1940
		SSM Exocet MM-38	France	
	4 Meko 360 (on order)		Fed. Rep. of Germany	1980
		SSM Exocet MM-40	France	
SAM Aspide		Italy		
	Gun Breda 40 mm	Italy		

Type	Weapons system	On board matériel	Country where built	Laid down
Frigates	3 A-69 Aviso	SSM Exocet MM-38	France**	1970
	6 Meko 140 (on order)		France	
		Argentina (licence Fed. Rep. of Germany)	1980	
		Lynx helicopter United Kingdom/ France		
Fast attack craft (missiles)	2 Type TNC 45	SSM Exocet MM-40	France	1970
		Gun Oto Melara/Breda	Italy	
Fast attack craft (torpedo)	2	Otomat (on order)	Fed. Rep. of Germany	1970
			Italy/France	
Fast attack craft (torpedo)	2		United States	1940
Coastal patrol craft	4		Israel	1970
Patrol craft	5		United States	1940
	3		Argentina	1950
Minesweepers	6		United Kingdom	1950
Landing craft	1		Argentina	1970

* Sold to the Netherlands in 1948 and purchased by Argentina in 1969.

** Built for South Africa but sold to Argentina after the 1976 embargo.

Air force

Type	Weapons system	Producing country	Last order by Argentina
Bombers	Canberra B-62 T-64	United Kingdom United States	
Fighter/Interceptors	Mirage III Dagger	France Israel	1978 1981
Ground attack	A-4P Skyhawk MS-760 Paris	United States Argentina (licence France)	
	MB-326G/MB-339 IA-58A Pucara	Italy Argentina (licence France)	1980
ASM	Super-Etendard A-4Q Skyhawk	France United States	1980
Air-to-air missiles	R-530	France	1978
Air-to-surface missiles	Exocet AM-39 AS-11/12	France France	1981
Helicopters	Bell-206, 212, 47G, UH-1H CH-47 Boeing Vertol Sikorsky S-61D, SH-3D Hughes 500 M WG-13 Lynx	United States United States United States United States United Kingdom/ France	1978
	A-109 Hirundo A-103 Alouette SA-330 Puma	Italy France United Kingdom/ France	1980 1979 1979
	SA-315 Lama	France	1981
Reconnaissance	IA-35 Ianquero S-2E Tracker SP-2H P-95 Bandeirante	Argentina (licence France) United States United States Brazil	1978

Army

Type	Weapons system	Producing country	Year of	
			entry into service in country of origin	last order by Argentina
Medium tanks	M-4 Sherman TAM (Tanque Argentino Mediano)	United States	1940	
		Argentina (licence Fed. Rep. of Germany)	1970	
Light tanks	M-41 AMX-13	United States	1950	
		Argentina (licence France)	1950	
Armoured personnel-carrier	Half-track M-3 M-113 MOWAG Roland Shorland BDX	United States	1940	
		United States	1950	
		Switzerland	1950	
		United Kingdom	1960	
		Belgium	1970	1979
Armoured cars	VBC-90 ERC-90 (on order)	France	1970	
		France	1970	1971
Mechanised infantry combat vehicles	AMX-VCI TAM VCTP	France	1950	
		Argentina (licence Fed. Rep. of Germany)	1970	
Anti-tank missiles	SS-11 Mathogo (Bantan) Cobra Mamba Hot (on order)	France	1960	
		Argentina (licence Sweden)	1970	
		Fed. Rep. of Germany	1960	1969-70
		Fed. Rep. of Germany	1970	
		Fed. Rep. of Germany/France	1970	1980
Anti-aircraft missiles	Tigercat Blowpipe Roland	United Kingdom	1960	1970
		United Kingdom	1960	1981
		Fed. Rep. of Germany/France	1970	1981

The Falklands crisis

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Caro

1. In the draft recommendation proper, after "Recommends that the Council", add a new paragraph as follows :

"Ensure in future the full exercise of the important provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, with particular regard to paragraph 3 of Article VIII, so that the Council of Western European Union may act in emergencies by being convened immediately in the event of a threat to peace in whatever area this threat should arise;"

Signed: Caro

1. See 12th sitting, 2nd December 1982 (amendment not put to the Assembly).

*State of European security*REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 14 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, van den Bergh (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr (Alternate: Ahrens), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini, Bizet (Alternate: Caro), Bonnel (Alternate: Mrs. Herman-Michielsens), Cox, Dejardin, Duraffour, Edwards (Alternate:

Dr. Miller), Fosson (Alternate: Giust), Grant, Kittelmann, Lemmrich, Maravalle, Mayoud, Ménard, Pecchioli (Alternate: Amadei), Pignion, Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, Smith, Steverlynck, Vohrer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

8th February 1982 – London

Vice-Admiral R.J. Hays, Commander-in-Chief, United States Navy, Europe;

Captain B.R. Outhwaite, Royal Navy, Director of Naval Operations, Ministry of Defence; Representative of DS5 and of Air Staff.

4th March 1982 – Iceland

Mr. Hannes Hafstein, Political Directory, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Reykjavik;

Mr. Helgasson, Secretary-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs;

Lt. Commander Mel Sundin, United States Navy, Headquarters Iceland Defence Force, etc, Keflavik; Commander Gwinn; Mr. Magnusson, Civilian Affairs.

Monday 15th March – Washington

Mrs. Avis Bohlen, Acting Deputy Director, Office of European Security and Political Affairs; Mr. Smith, State Department;

Mr. Peter B. Swiers, Deputy Director, Office of Theatre Military Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, State Department; Mr. Dave Schwartz (INF);

Rear Admiral S. Shapiro, Director of Naval Intelligence, Pentagon ;

Rear Admiral R.J. Kurth, Director, Political-Military Policy and Current Plans Division, Pentagon.

Tuesday 16th March – Norfolk, Virginia

Captain P.D. Hoskins, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and briefing staff;

Vice-Admiral Sanderson, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet.

Thursday 7th October – Aarhus, Denmark

Rear Admiral Sven Thiede, Flag Officer Denmark.

The committee as a whole met in Canada from 8th to 12th March 1982 where it was addressed by:

The Hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne, Minister of National Defence;

Mr. P. de W. Mathewson, Chief, Policy Planning, Department of National Defence;

Mr. T.C. Hammond, Director, Defence Relations Division, Department of External Affairs; Mr. John Legg.

The committee also met with Mr. Marcel Prud'Homme, Chairman of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the Canadian House of Commons and members of his committee and of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Canadian Senate, and with Mr. Len Hopkins, Chairman of the Canadian Parliamentary Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly, and members of his delegation.

The committee met in Paris on 2nd September 1982 when it was addressed by Mr. François Heisbourg, Technical Counsellor in the Private Office of the French Minister of Defence, and on 3rd September when it visited the command posts of the French Air Defence Forces and of the Strategic Air Forces at Taverny.

The committee met in Portugal from 20th to 22nd October 1982 when it discussed an outline of the present report, visited the Operations Room at Headquarters IBERLANT in Oeiras, and was addressed by:

Vice-Admiral Elias Da Costa, Portuguese Navy, Commander-in-Chief, Iberian Atlantic Area;

Rear Admiral Williams, United States Navy, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Iberian Atlantic Area;

Commander Peter Lucas, Royal Navy, Chief of Staff, IBERLANT;

Commander Burns, United States Navy, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, IBERLANT;

General Lemos Ferreira, Chief of Portuguese Air Force Staff, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff;

Admiral Sousa Leitao, Chief of Naval Staff;

General Lopes Alves, Deputy Chief of Army Staff;

Mr. Carlos Pardal, Portuguese Secretary of State for Defence.

The committee met finally in Paris on 8th November 1982 when it adopted the report as a whole.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in this report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation***on the state of European security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the continued increase in the ocean-going capability of the Soviet navy and concerned at the increased opportunity this provides the Soviet Union to project its power, particularly in unstable parts of the world;
- (ii) Believing therefore that more attention should be paid to maritime surveillance;
- (iii) Recalling its Recommendations 254, 278 and 288, welcoming the accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty with the full approval of that country's democratically-elected parliament, and hoping that European security will be strengthened in due course through the integration of Spanish forces into the military structure of NATO;
- (iv) Recognising the important special nature of the contribution to allied defence made by many of the smaller countries of the alliance through their geographical position as well as through their defence effort;
- (v) Noting, however, the small proportion of national product devoted to defence by certain allied countries, including those with above average per capita income;
- (vi) Welcoming the increased emphasis being placed on conventional defence but reiterating its view that a balanced security policy must be designed to prevent all war, not only nuclear war.

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments, acting where appropriate in the North Atlantic Council:

1. To improve further existing NATO and bilateral co-operative arrangements for NATO-area and world-wide surveillance of Soviet naval vessels, surface and sub-surface, and of other militarily-significant Soviet vessels, in particular through:
 - (a) stressing the need to make use of all surveillance resources – satellite, airborne, surface and sub-surface, shore and bottom-based;
 - (b) remedying shortages of modern maritime patrol aircraft, and retaining in service adequate numbers of diesel-electric submarines and frigates;
 - (c) modernising NATO surveillance co-ordinating centres, and improving communications links between these centres and between them and national centres;
2. To co-operate fully with other NATO governments:
 - (a) to call for Spanish liaison officers to be appointed forthwith to all appropriate NATO command headquarters;
 - (b) to plan and adjust command arrangements to accommodate the contribution of Spanish forces to NATO;
3. To urge on all allied countries the need to maintain and improve the defence effort, despite the general recession, and at the same time to pursue actively arms control negotiations in all forums.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. This report, in the tradition of many earlier reports of the committee of the same title, deals with a number of different topical subjects of direct interest for European security. The growing strength of the Soviet fleet, which has now acquired a world-wide ocean-going capability, has made it desirable to examine the problems of maritime surveillance. Separate sections deal with the contribution to allied defence made by Canada, Portugal, Iceland and, more briefly, Denmark following the visit by the whole committee to the first two countries and by the Rapporteur to Iceland and to the Danish naval headquarters. The report also welcomes the accession of Spain to NATO; the committee had originally intended to visit both Spain and Portugal to examine the manner in which the new Spanish contribution could be integrated into the NATO military structure in the light of the existing NATO structure in the Iberian and Mediterranean area, but the parliamentary elections held in Spain on 28th October led the committee to ask for its visit to that country to be postponed. Lastly, the report draws attention to the importance of conventional weapons in the defence of Europe, with particular reference to the important recent speeches by General Rogers.

II. Maritime surveillance

(a) Soviet navy

2.1. Ships of the Soviet navy may now be found in any ocean in the world, albeit not frequently in any large numbers except in the Eastern Mediterranean and home waters. The overall naval balance¹ has not changed significantly since the committee reported last year², but construction continues steadily of the new classes of ocean-going surface vessel to which the committee then drew attention. The Kirov nuclear-propelled cruiser of 25,000 tons, which started sea trials in May 1980, is now in service, a second is being fitted out and a third is being built. The new 12,000 ton conventionally-propelled cruiser designated by NATO "Black-Com-I" is now in service and more are being built. The Udaloy guided-missile destroyer, which began sea trials in November 1980, is in service and two more are being

built. The slightly smaller Sovremenny anti-surface vessel guided-missile destroyer of 7,000 to 8,000 tons is in service and more are being built.

2.2. Soviet aircraft-carriers are still limited to the Kiev and Minsk, which, like the British *Invincible*, have VTOL aircraft capability only, but a third is now on trials and up to two more are being built. There are still no confirmed reports of a full-size Soviet aircraft-carrier with high performance fixed-wing capability like those of the United States navy, although one may be in the process of being built.

2.3. Soviet naval superiority continues to reside in its submarines. Its cruise-missile submarines in particular find no counterpart in western navies. The NATO navies continue to be superior in surface vessels, overwhelmingly so in aircraft-carriers, but also in destroyers and frigates, which are needed to counter the Soviet submarine threat. In long-range maritime patrol aircraft and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, NATO countries have some 348 compared with 135 for the Soviet Union.

2.4. A particular characteristic of the Soviet navy is its division into four very distinct fleets: Northern; Baltic; Black Sea; and Pacific. Except for the subsidiary Pacific base at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka peninsula, the exits to the major seas and oceans for the last three all pass through narrow straits bordered by allied countries. The Northern fleet has access to the Norwegian Sea through the 200-mile gap between North Cape and Bear Island, and then through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap to the Atlantic. The number of days at sea of Soviet naval units in peacetime is less than that of the major ocean-going navies of the NATO countries; even the strategic ballistic missile submarines spend proportionally less time on permanent patrol than those of the United States. Exceptions to this pattern are the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean, numbering about forty vessels of all types on average, smaller numbers in the Indian Ocean, and the occasional fleet exercises held in the open ocean during which a number of vessels may transit from one fleet base to another.

2.5. Because of the two foregoing factors, it is likely that if the Soviet Union were planning to initiate hostilities it would be obliged to undertake a "surge" deployment both of ballistic missile submarines and of surface fleet units to the open oceans beforehand, so as to escape

1. Appendix I.

2. European security and the South Atlantic, Document 888, 26th October 1981, Rapporteur: Dr. Miller.

their destruction in the allied-held straits and narrows through which they have to pass. In peacetime, therefore, NATO has a twofold surveillance requirement: (i) to observe continuously the Soviet fleet exits so as to detect immediately surge deployment, as well as to keep a check on all Soviet surface ships and submarines operating away from their bases; (ii) to follow in the open ocean vessels known to have left their bases, particularly major naval units and vessels engaged in particular tasks such as the Soviet intelligence-gathering ships which are often positioned where they can intercept radio communications and radar and sonar emissions of NATO forces.

(b) *NATO surveillance resources*

2.6. With the exception of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) and, when activated, the Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED), allied naval and air force units that might be used for surveillance remain under national command in peacetime, although they may periodically operate under NATO control during exercises. NATO responsibility for maritime surveillance in peacetime is essentially a matter of co-ordinating national surveillance activities with a view both to reducing gaps between national coverage, and avoiding unnecessary duplication in other areas. There are a number of surveillance co-ordination centres established in NATO naval headquarters such as those at Norfolk, Virginia (SACLANT); Northwood, London (CINCCHAN and CINCEASTLANT); Kolsås, Norway (CINCNORTH); Oeiras, near Lisbon (IBERLANT) and Naples (COMMAR-AIRMED). These centres are mostly continuously activated and maintain an updated plot of Soviet surface naval vessels from information supplied by the various national forces in their area. Information is routinely exchanged between these centres which need very good communications and handle a large volume of signals traffic.

2.7. In addition to passively receiving information from national sources, they can request modifications or additions to national surveillance programmes, e.g. request that a maritime patrol aircraft cover a slightly different area where Soviet vessels are known to be operating, or even request a special sortie to cover the area. Where a Soviet vessel is being shadowed by a vessel from the NATO navy – a tattletail – through the SCCs a request can be passed on to the next area for a vessel from another NATO country to take over as shadow.

2.8. Surveillance resources available to NATO countries include fixed assets such as shore-based optical and electronic equipment

in observation posts and bottom-based submarine surveillance systems which may cover gaps of a few hundred miles. The United States SOSUS (sound surveillance system), comprising arrays of passive listening devices on the bottom, connected by cable to a shore-based computer, is known to be installed in shore stations in a number of allied countries, although the precise locations have not been officially published. It is reported, for example, to cover the North Cape-Bear Island gap to the north of Norway¹ and it would be likely to cover the GIUK gap further south and probably the Straits of Gibraltar from the United States base at Rota in Spain.

2.9. The United States is currently upgrading the SOSUS shore facilities, taking advantage of newer technology and is also developing for surveillance in the open ocean the surveillance towed array sensor system (SURTASS). This is a very large towed array of submarine sensors, perhaps extending a mile or more, to be towed by a specially-designed vessel and capable of locating and identifying submarines in very large ocean areas, perhaps up to 100 miles or more. Funds for the first twelve SURTASS ships are included in the fiscal year 1984 budget². Smaller tactical towed array sonars are in operation with some NATO navies and under development for others.

2.10. Some observation satellites, with optical and infrared sensors, and electronic surveillance equipment, operated by the United States and the Soviet Union, have maritime surveillance applications.

2.11. The surface escorts of the navies of NATO countries, destroyers and frigates, are at times used for surveillance by shadowing Soviet surface vessels. Hull-mounted, and variable-depth sonar give them a tactical submarine detection capability over a range of ten miles or more in favourable water conditions. Towed arrays of course increase this range. Helicopters on ships considerably increase the surveillance range, both for surface ships and, with dipping sonars, for submarines. Long-range maritime patrol aircraft fitted with surveillance radar can locate all vessels in a very large area of ocean in one high-level sortie, but positive identification of a particular vessel, to distinguish it from general maritime traffic, will require a closer approach and take more time. Equipped with expendable sonar buoys, these aircraft have a submarine detection capability within tactical ranges from each buoy dropped. Shorter-range shore-based reconnaissance air-

1. Report by the North Atlantic Assembly Sub-Committee on Defence Co-operation (anti-submarine warfare), July 1982.

2. United States Secretary of Defence annual report to Congress, fiscal year 1983, page III-24.

craft have an important rôle to play in positive identification of vessels in straits and narrows.

2.12. Apart from communications problems, submarines themselves have excellent surveillance capabilities. Diesel-electric submarines, because they are smaller and quieter than nuclear-propelled submarines, can operate in comparatively shallow waters, even relatively close inshore, when on picket duty and can observe ship movements in areas near to naval bases. The larger and more expensive nuclear-propelled submarines of the United States and United Kingdom navies (one is shortly to enter service with the French navy also) have a submerged speed sufficient to enable them to follow surface units at sea.

2.13. The particular contribution of certain NATO countries is described under the country headings below. The general conclusion to be drawn from the Rapporteur's enquiry into surveillance arrangements is that they are certainly successful at present in normal peacetime conditions, as far as Soviet surface vessels are concerned. As far as submarines are concerned, there is a reasonable detection rate but no certainty at the point where they pass through chokepoints. Once in the open ocean, however, a good deal of luck is needed to detect any submarines. To maintain successful surveillance, a combination of all resources referred to above is required; certainly diesel-electric submarines and escort vessels will always be required in adequate numbers despite certain advantages of maritime patrol aircraft and nuclear-propelled submarines. NATO resources in maritime patrol aircraft in particular are already overstretched in covering the normal daily operation of Soviet naval forces, and are inadequate during major Soviet naval exercises, or to meet the requirements of surge deployment of Soviet naval units in a crisis.

III. *Certain national contributions to allied defence*

(a) *Iceland*

3.1. Iceland has no armed forces of its own but makes a big contribution to allied defence because of its strategic position in the North Atlantic between Greenland and the United Kingdom. British and subsequently United States troops were based in Iceland during the war to prevent a German landing and Iceland then permitted the construction of an airfield and provided a harbour for convoys. After the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, some consideration was given to the stationing of a multilateral force in Iceland for mutual defence purposes, but, in view of its satisfactory experience with the presence of the United States during the war, Iceland eventually concluded a bilateral agreement with that country on the

basis of which the United States maintains its units in Iceland today.

3.2. One of the four political parties – the People's Alliance – opposes Iceland's membership of NATO. Formed from the Communist Party and some Social Democrats in 1956, the People's Alliance is participating with two other parties in the present government under an agreement which notes its different stance on defence policy, with which its ministers do not deal in government. A similar situation has occurred on a number of occasions in the past, and at the present time, following Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and martial law in Poland, membership of NATO does not seem to be a serious political issue in the country.

3.3. Iceland's foreign policy is of course closely related to its economic interests and centres in particular on fishing rights. Membership of NATO, which provides it with a seat on the North Atlantic Council, and the right, albeit rarely exercised, to send a representative to bodies such as the Military Committee, probably gives Iceland an insight and a voice in more aspects of Atlantic affairs than its other diplomatic relations would provide, and is therefore particularly welcomed in the Foreign Ministry which has a special section dealing with relations with NATO and the United States base.

3.4. Iceland is particularly anxious to preserve its distinctive language and culture, and the agreement with the United States provides that nearly all United States military personnel and their families reside within the main base around the airport of Keflavik, reducing to a minimum general contact with the local population.

3.5. United States forces in Iceland come under the Commander Iceland Defence Force who comes directly under the United States national Commander-in-Chief Atlantic. The defence force commander has under him island defence units proper, which include a squadron of twelve F-4 interceptor aircraft, two ground-based radar stations and two AWACS E-3A early warning aircraft. Collectively, these provide long-range air defence cover around Iceland into the Greenland-United Kingdom gap. There is a separate detachment of three HH-3E helicopters and a tanker for in-flight refuelling which provides search and rescue capability all round the coast of Iceland and regularly prove of great assistance to the Icelandic fishing fleet.

3.6. The island commander acts also as the anti-submarine warfare commander for which purpose he has a deployed squadron of nine P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft which can fulfil a surface and sub-surface surveillance

function throughout the area of the Greenland-United Kingdom gap and well into the Norwegian Sea.

3.7. The air defence force undertakes an average of 120 interceptions for identification purposes per year, 95 % of which concern the Soviet Tu-95 Bear, operating as a maritime patrol aircraft in international waters outside Iceland's sovereign air space of 12 nautical miles. The operation of the maritime patrol aircraft from Iceland is believed to provide a very high level of submarine detection in the Greenland-United Kingdom gap, but not in the open ocean beyond. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom occasionally arrange for maritime patrol aircraft to stage at Keflavik, usually on national surveillance missions which are reported to the Keflavik operations centre for air safety reasons, or such planes may occasionally be tasked by the Keflavik operations centre itself.

3.8. Total United States service personnel in Iceland are about 3,000, accompanied by 2,000 dependents, and provide considerable civilian assistance to Iceland including maintenance of the Keflavik runway used also as Iceland's main international airport, as well as the helicopter search and rescue facilities.

(b) Canada

3.9. With a population of 24 million, Canada had a defence budget in 1981 of US \$5.1 billion, representing 1.8 % of the GDP, and the unified Canadian Forces of 83,000 men and women represent 1 % of the work force. These percentages are the lowest in NATO after Luxembourg (1.3 % and 0.8 % respectively), despite the higher than average Canadian per capita income. The Canadian forces are not differentiated into a separate army, navy and air force, are maintained through voluntary enlistment as are the forces of the other NATO countries, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States. Canada has no tradition of conscription, except for a period during World War II although service in Europe was then still voluntary.

3.10. The land forces of 13,000 provide two brigade groups in Canada and a mechanised brigade group in Europe. Leopard I tanks have recently been acquired.

3.11. The Canadian maritime command operates three Oberon-class submarines and twenty-three destroyers and frigates of which four are modern vessels of 3,500 tons, about ten years old, but seventeen of them are more than twenty years old. There are three logistic support ships with ASW helicopters. The fleet is divided with about two-thirds, including the

most modern units, on the Atlantic coast based at Halifax and the remainder on the Pacific coast.

3.12. The air force has some 200 combat aircraft. Interceptor air defence of Canada is still largely assured by the twenty-year old F-101 Voodoo aircraft but it is to be replaced by the F-18, which is on order. The maritime air group has nineteen Aurora maritime patrol aircraft, which is a special version of the P-3 Orion with different avionics. Air defence of Canada is closely linked with that of the United States in the North American Aerospace Defence Command, for which the distant early warning line has four radars in Canada, backed up by the second line, the pine tree line, in the more populated areas of Canada. One of the main command posts is sited at North Bay in Canada, the other at Colorado Springs in the United States. Canada contributes about 10,000 service personnel to NORAD and the United States about 46,000. The maritime patrol aircraft perform certain civilian functions also in Canada; they are equipped for operations in the Arctic area, and make a useful contribution to NATO capability.

3.13. Canadian forces in Europe deployed in the southern part of the central front under CENTAG and 4-ATAF, comprise a mechanised brigade group with Leopard tanks and three fighter squadrons with a Canadian version of the F-104. There are 5,400 personnel. There is, in addition, a Canadian air-sea transportable force which is committed for use in north Norway in an emergency.

3.14. Canada, with its large and sparsely populated land area, offers valuable training facilities to European countries including Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and is prepared to welcome further users to its training facilities.

3.15. A report of the Canadian Senate Subcommittee on National Defence published in January 1982, dealing with manpower in Canada's armed forces, was critical of many aspects of current Canadian defence policy. Among sixteen recommendations, it called for a reassessment of current defence priorities and manpower requirements; recommended an increase in Canadian troop levels in Europe to 7,800 by 1985 and subsequently to about 10,000 by 1987; it called for the recruiting of 6,400 more regular personnel and a review of the commitment to provide the air-sea transportable force to north Norway which was not considered the best use of Canada's limited military manpower and resources. It called for no increase in maritime and air command manpower until such time as their equipment was modernised or brought up to strength.

(c) Denmark

3.16. Denmark is another of the smaller countries of the alliance which, like Iceland and Portugal, make a vital contribution to allied defence because of their strategic geographical location. The Danish islands themselves are situated astride the narrow channels leading out of the Baltic and the island of Bornholm, some 100 miles further east, provides a valuable observation post to the north of the Polish coast. The Danish territories of Greenland and the Faroes are both strategically situated forming part of the land obstacles in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, separating the Norwegian Sea from the North Atlantic.

3.17. Denmark, with a population of 5.1 million, has a defence budget of some \$ 1.6 billion (1980) representing 2.4 % of the GDP. The armed forces of 32,000 men represent 1.6 % of the working population. Danish defence policy does not admit the stationing of nuclear weapons or the permanent stationing of foreign forces on its territory in peacetime, but allied troops regularly participate in exercises on Danish territory, and one subordinate NATO headquarters – Commander, Baltic Approaches – is located at Karup on the Jutland peninsula. A three-year defence agreement between the political parties ensures continuity in defence planning despite changes of government. Although not providing for a 3 % increase in defence spending in real terms, the agreement is indexed and provides some increase.

3.18. The commander of the Danish fleet, Flag Officer Denmark, who becomes a subordinate NATO commander – Commander Naval Forces Baltic Approaches – when an alert is declared, is responsible to his national authorities in peacetime chiefly for continuous surveillance of the Danish Straits through which some 60,000 vessels of all types pass each year which, together with a further 50,000 passing through the Kiel canal, account for all the traffic in and out of the Baltic. The Danish Straits are an international waterway but historically passage has been regulated by Denmark, the latest ordinance governing the passage of foreign warships and military aircraft having been promulgated on 27th February 1976. This provides for the free passage of surface ships provided there are not more than three of them at any one time and that they show their national flag; submarines are required to navigate on the surface and again show their flag. The regulations provide that military aircraft may not overfly the Danish Straits without advance permission, and may not carry ammunition or photographic film, or operate electronic equipment when doing so. Denmark claims territorial waters of 3 nautical miles with baselines across bays, as

do both West and East Germany whereas Poland claims 6 nautical miles and is intending to increase it to 12 nautical miles, which is claimed by Sweden and the Soviet Union.

3.19. Danish resources for surveillance of the straits include nine coastal radars, including one on Bornholm, which provide complete cover of all the straits but not the whole of the wider area of the Baltic around Bornholm, lookout stations and sea-bottom sensors to detect submarines. Small naval cutters and fast patrol boats are assigned to each naval district covering the different straits and the area of the North Sea adjacent to the Kattegat. Lynx helicopters of the naval air wing, shore-based or shipborne, are available for identification when required and photograph warships passing through the straits. Draken reconnaissance aircraft of the Danish air force can also be tasked for maritime surveillance. Danish minelayers are used in a surveillance rôle in the Baltic west of Bornholm and the Danish navy also has five submarines which operate in the Baltic.

3.20. In a period of alert, the surveillance assets can be increased with more observation posts along the coast manned by the home guard and with the use of a further thirty-five reserve coastal patrol craft.

3.21. The Danish navy considers that it identifies every foreign warship passing the Danish Straits, including all submarines. Submerged navigation would be technically very difficult, and would almost certainly be detected. Such passage has not so far been attempted by Warsaw Pact submarines. Warsaw Pact warship movements in and out of the Baltic amount to about 100 each year including submarines, with a further 200 auxiliary vessels. In the western Baltic off the Polish coast, Denmark has been able to undertake extensive surveillance of all Warsaw Pact exercises and activities. Movements of Soviet vessels in or out of the Baltic are reported to neighbouring NATO countries and assignment of a tattletail surface ship to shadow them is handed over from one NATO country to the next as Warsaw Pact vessels cross national ocean boundaries.

3.22. Denmark with limited resources operates continuous surveillance night and day every day of the year using patrol craft at all times and calling out other fleet units as necessary, which amounted to 100 unscheduled days at sea to the west of Bornholm in 1981. The naval war headquarters is being modernised with automation of surveillance installations and future plans will provide for automatic data links with adjoining NATO surveillance centres.

3.23. On the Danish territory of Greenland there are two important United States bases

with an airfield at Thule, surveillance and radar installations and a BMEWs (ballistic missile early warning station) together with radars which extend the DEW (distant early warning) line that crosses Canada. There is a Danish air force base on the Faroe Islands which co-operates with United Kingdom air defence, but no foreign units.

(d) Portugal

3.24. With a population of 10 million, Portugal has a defence budget of \$841 million, representing 3.6% of the GDP. There are 90,000 men in the armed forces (more than in Canada), 2.3% of the work force, maintained through compulsory service of sixteen months for the army, and twenty-four months for the navy and air force.

3.25. Portugal again is one of the smaller NATO countries whose geographical position at the most westerly point on the European continental land mass makes it invaluable for naval operations and maritime patrol aircraft, in close proximity to the dense north-south maritime trade route in the Atlantic. With NATO-financed infrastructure, Portugal provides two airfields for maritime patrol aircraft and important naval fuel and ammunition storage facilities, magnificent anchorage in the large natural harbour at Lisbon, as well as major NATO communications facilities, and in the Madeira Islands at Porto Santo, the most southerly NATO air base – although, with the entry of Spain, still more southerly facilities may be available in the Canary Islands.

3.26. NATO headquarters of Commander-in-Chief Iberian Atlantic Area is based at Oeiras near Lisbon. A post that was upgraded from commander to commander-in-chief at the time of Spain's accession to NATO, it is now held by a Portuguese vice-admiral, with a United States rear-admiral as deputy commander-in-chief; there is a British chief-of-staff. The previous post of commander was always held by a United States admiral with a Portuguese deputy. The staff of the NATO headquarters is about 200 contributed by Portugal (42%), the United Kingdom (30%) and the United States (28%). There is a liaison officer from France, but not, as yet, from Spain. Equipment in the headquarters requires modernisation.

3.27. IBERLANT is a chiefly naval command subordinate to SACLANT. On declaration of the alert, it assumes responsibility for maritime operations in the sea area between the Tropic of Cancer and 42° North, extending from just west of the Straits of Gibraltar at 5°55' West to the line of longitude 22° West. The area includes the Madeira Islands. CINCIBERLANT's responsibilities would also include air and

ground defence of the Portuguese mainland, although there is at present no significant threat. The adjoining NATO command to the east is that of CINCSOUTH covering the Mediterranean which extends up to the Straits of Gibraltar, but the Mediterranean between 5°55' West and 0° is declared an area of common interest to CINCSOUTH and CINCIBERLANT.

3.28. The Portuguese armed forces have undergone considerable reorganisation over the last ten years following the independence of its former overseas territories and the establishment of a parliamentary democracy in the country. The army has undergone the biggest transformation, reducing from about 180,000 to the present approximately 40,000 men, while the navy has been reduced from 18,000 to 13,400 and the air force from 21,000 to 12,000. Following the committee's previous visit to Portugal in 1976, it reported on the national military project to reduce the army from the then 45,000 to 26,000 – a figure which has not yet been reached.

3.29. Portugal now provides one armoured brigade for rapid deployment to north-east Italy, as well as contributing one battalion to ACE Mobile Force. The chief problem of the armed forces is one of equipment in view of the limited economic base of the country. Portugal will require assistance from other countries to re-equip but is anxious to make a significant contribution to allied defence with its own forces, and not merely to provide a geographical contribution. The M-47 and M-48 tanks and the G-91 and A-7 aircraft are largely obsolete. Portugal has now no long-range maritime patrol aircraft and its navy of three submarines and seventeen frigates, although not more than ten to fifteen years old, require more modern weapons systems. There is a shortage of mine counter-warfare vessels. Priority should probably be given to equipping properly the rapid-deployment armoured brigade and modernising naval weapons. A maritime patrol capability could be a valuable asset for NATO. The Soviet Union is exhibiting a growing interest in the South Atlantic, operating its maritime patrol aircraft out of Havana in Cuba, Conakry in Guinea, and Luanda in Angola.

3.30. An amendment to the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 entered into force on 30th October 1982 ending the "transitional period" of the democratic system. The Council of the Revolution, composed of members of the armed forces under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, under the original constitution had certain residual constitutional responsibilities and was responsible for decisions concerning the armed forces, including promotions

and aspects of military policy. The amendment to the constitution has dissolved the Council of the Revolution and two further laws on national defence and on the armed forces received parliamentary approval. The amended constitution took effect on 30th October. This legislation defines more clearly the authority of the Ministry of Defence over the armed forces, and it is anticipated that reorganisation of the army in particular will proceed more rapidly to the goal of 26,000 men.

3.31. The accession of Spain to NATO will raise some difficult problems of command structure when the Spanish armed forces are integrated into the military structure of NATO. Portugal is essentially involved in the maritime command area of SACLANT and the opinion of the Portuguese authorities, both military and political, appears very clearly to be that Portugal must remain part of the SACLANT area, and that Portuguese land and air forces must remain under Portuguese command, and not form part of an integrated command for the Iberian peninsula. Portugal considers that Spain is essentially a Mediterranean country and should come under SACEUR.

(e) Spain

3.32. The committee postponed its visit Spain following the announcement of Spanish elections on 28th October, and does not therefore comment in detail on Spanish defence policy. Arrangements for the integration of Spanish armed forces into NATO will no doubt await a referendum on the question of Spanish membership of NATO, which is likely to be held, although the principle of Spanish membership is not likely to be challenged. Press reports¹ of statements by Mr. Alberto Oliart, the Spanish Minister of Defence, at SHAPE on 9th June 1982, said that he was calling for an exclusive southern Spanish command within the NATO command structure, which would include Gibraltar, the Canary Islands in the Atlantic, the Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean and Spain's two small enclaves in Morocco at Ceuta opposite Gibraltar and Melilla.

3.33. Although Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty as originally drafted in 1949 extended the geographical area of the mutual defence obligations to include "the Algerian departments of France", this clause ceased to be operative in 1963 by virtue of a unilateral French statement which followed the Algerian vote on self-determination the previous year. The inclusion of Ceuta and Melilla in a NATO command would pose political problems for

many NATO countries. To find an effective military command structure, some detailed negotiations will have to be undertaken but there appears to be a strong case for establishing a Spanish naval command in the western Mediterranean, presumably as part of AFSOUTH. There is something of a vacuum in the subordinate COMEDOC area which was formerly the responsibility of France before its withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO. It would obviously be desirable to leave the maritime arrangements of IBERLANT largely intact, no doubt with a subordinate Spanish island commander on the Canaries, but there would be scope for some Spanish responsibility in the Biscay area and some joint command should be sought especially for the air defence of the Iberian peninsula.

3.34. Deployment of Spanish armed forces so far has very largely been an aftermath of the Franco régime, with a concentration in the area of Madrid for internal security purposes. Spain could play an important rôle in NATO as a source of mobile reserves, but plans for adapting Spanish armed forces to the new circumstances will obviously await political decision following the elections.

**IV. Conventional weapons
and NATO strategy**

4.1. In a number of public speeches at his headquarters in Casteau and before the Royal United Services Institute in London on 28th and 29th September, General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has publicised SHAPE planning for the NATO six-year goals 1985-90. He has called for a large increase in conventional defence equipment based on modern technology comprising first improved reconnaissance systems using TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft, radar helicopters, AWACS aircraft and satellites, linked to computerised intelligence fusion centres. These would be associated secondly with a new generation of long-range conventional weapons akin to Pershing and air-launched cruise missiles equipped with conventional warheads and possibly releasing terminally-guided smart submunitions capable of destroying individual tank targets. The object of these combined systems would be to permit NATO to strike at the second échelon of any Soviet offensive in the rear areas where its second wave of forces would be building up. The cost of this new conventional defence technology is estimated by SACEUR to amount to a 1% increase on defence budgets to the end of the present decade, over and above the 3% increase in real terms to which NATO countries are already supposed to be committed. On average it is

1. The Guardian, 10th June 1982.

said to amount to £ 7 per head of NATO population over six years, but the burden would have to fall more heavily on some countries than on others. General Rogers recognised that there would have to be some "sacrifices in social benefits".

4.2. His proposals were designed to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons in Europe, particularly the shorter-range battlefield nuclear weapons in the present 6,000 warheads stockpile, which should be used as a counter in negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve a similar elimination of short-range nuclear weapons with Soviet forces. General Rogers was not proposing to abolish all nuclear weapons – he sought to retain longer-range purely retaliatory weapons, together with such numbers of cruise and Pershing missiles that would be deployed in the light of the INF negotiations with the Soviet Union – nor to renounce the option of first use if necessary.

4.3. It is clear from the publicity attending them that these proposals are intended in part to answer the demands of some of the non-nuclear movements of recent years, some of which have come from authoritative quarters. The committee has already drawn attention¹ to the article by Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. George Kennan, Mr. Robert McNamara and Mr. Gerard Smith² calling for a NATO commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Field Marshal Lord Carver who was United Kingdom Chief of Defence Staff from 1973 to 1976 in his recent book "A policy for peace" has written:

"The urgent need is for NATO to abandon the concept that it can avert conventional defeat by initiating nuclear war: it would only result in an even greater defeat... Its politicians and officials must stop thinking that the existence of nuclear weapons of any kind means that they can economise on conventional forces."

4.4. The Soviet Union, in the speech delivered by Mr. Gromyko on behalf of President Brezhnev to the second special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly in July, gave a unilateral Soviet undertaking renouncing the initial use of nuclear weapons – hitherto Soviet proposals for such a declaration had required reciprocity on the part of other nuclear powers.

4.5. In addition to the problem of public attitudes to nuclear weapons, and the danger that such attitudes may come to affect public

support for the defence effort in general, there is the military problem of the uncertainties introduced into planning by nuclear weapons. While a military commander can assume that he is able to use any of the conventional weapons under his command to respond to any attack on his forces, because the use of nuclear weapons remains subject to political authorisation in all circumstances a military commander does not know in advance whether they will be available or not in a particular situation. At the end of his briefing referred to above, General Rogers is reported as saying that "the anti-nuclear groups want the same thing as I do".

4.6. At a time when SACEUR is stressing the need for improving conventional defence, the French Minister of Defence has appeared to take the opposite course. "France is the only country which has dared to draw all the conclusions of its status as a nuclear power. It is to this priority – the nuclear weapons programme – that we have sacrificed what was secondary, where savings should be made", said the Minister of Defence, Mr. Hernu, to the parliamentary finance committee on 7th October. New plans for a French model army are mentioned which may reduce its strength somewhat. France has denied a report that a decision has already been taken to produce enhanced radiation warheads, but is keeping the option open.

4.7. At the latest biannual Franco-German summit meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd October, held under the 1963 bilateral treaty, President Mitterrand stressed that he had discussed military and strategic questions with Chancellor Kohl, but denied that Germany would be associated with French nuclear strategy or asked to finance it. German sources after the meeting stressed that Germany remained equally committed to its defence links with the United States and NATO. It was, however, decided to establish a joint committee of officials from the two countries' ministries for foreign affairs and of defence which would meet quarterly, in the interval between the summit meetings.

4.8. The committee draws attention to these various important proposals which it intends to examine in more detail in a future report which will follow also the progress of current negotiations on nuclear arms control. While it welcomes the increased emphasis placed on conventional defence, it reiterates its view that a balanced security policy must be designed to prevent all war, not only nuclear war.

V. Conclusions

5.1. The committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation.

1. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe, Document 918, 19th May 1982, Rapporteur: Mr. Mommersteeg.

2. Nuclear weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, Foreign Affairs, spring 1981.

5.2. Appendix III shows the proportion of national product devoted to defence by the allied countries, plotted against their per capita income; it reveals little or no correlation between the two. The defence effort as a proportion of national product varies widely from 1.3 % for Luxembourg to 5.9 % for Greece, and is obviously more closely related both to historical patterns of defence activity and to individual countries' perception of exter-

nal threat, not only from the Soviet Union. The committee comments on the defence efforts of Canada and Portugal, countries visited by the committee, and more briefly Denmark, in Chapter III (b), (d) and (e) above.

5.3. Paragraphs in the draft recommendation relate to this explanatory memorandum as follows:

Draft recommendation:

Preamble:

- (i)
- (ii)
- (iii)
- (iv)
- (v)
- (vi)

Operative text:

- 1
- 2
- 3

Explanatory memorandum:

- Chapter II (a).
- Chapter II (b).
- Chapter III, paragraphs 3.32 to 3.34.
- Chapter III.
- Chapter III and Chapter V, paragraph 5.2.
- Chapter IV.

- Chapter II (b).
- Chapter III, paragraphs 3.32 to 3.34.
- Chapter IV.

VI. Opinion of the minority

6.1. The report as a whole was adopted in the committee by 14 votes to 1 with 1 abstention. The minority held that the report should have dealt also with many other topics including nuclear and conventional defence, the situation in Greece and Turkey, disarmament and arms control, and should have dealt more fully with the consequences of Spain's accession to NATO.

APPENDIX I

The overall naval balance – NATO and Warsaw Pact vessels over 500 tons full load only, excluding ballistic-missile submarines

Country	SSGN	SSG	SSN	SS	Aircraft-carriers	Over 5 000 t cruisers	Under 5 000 t destroyers	1 100 t and over frigates	Over 500 t Under 1 100 t corvettes	Long-range maritime patrol aircraft
Belgium								4		
Canada				3			4	19		19
Denmark				5				10		
France				21	2	2	19	23		33
Fed. Rep. of Germany				24			7	7	6	19
Greece				10			16	6		
Italy				9		3	5	11	8	14
Netherlands				6			3	12	6	10
Norway				14				5	2	7
Portugal				3				17		
Spain				8	1		11	20		6
Turkey				14			15	2		
United Kingdom			11	16	2		12	44		28
United States			85	5	14 (4N)	27 (9N)	84	79		216
NATO	-	-	96	138	19 (4N)	32 (9N)	176	259	22	352
Warsaw Pact	49	20	56	154	2	39 (1N)	67	187	37	85 ²
USSR	49	20	56	148	2 ¹	39 (1N)	66	183	25	85 ²
East Germany								2	6	
Poland				4			1			
Bulgaria				2				2	3	
Romania									3	

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1. A third on trials.

2. Plus 50 long-range ASW ; plus 80 Backfire naval air force long-range bomber.

SSGN = nuclear-propelled cruise-missile submarines.

SSG = conventionally-propelled cruise-missile submarines.

SSN = nuclear-propelled attack submarines.

SS = conventionally-propelled attack submarines.

Cruisers: includes helicopter cruisers.

(N) = including nuclear-propelled.

Source: - IISS Military Balance 1982-83.

- Jane's Fighting Ships 1982-83.

B. MANPOWER EFFORT – 1981


	Period of compulsory ¹ military service			Total in armed forces ² military personnel	Total armed forces ² (military and civilian) as percentage of active population
	(months)				
	Army	Navy	Air force	(e)	(e)
Belgium	10 ³	10 ³	10 ³	109	2.8
France	12	12	12	575	3.0
Germany	15	15	15	495	2.5
Italy	12	18	12	505	2.4
Luxembourg	voluntary			1	0.8
Netherlands	14-16	14-17	14-17	107	2.7
United Kingdom	voluntary			331	2.1
TOTAL WEU				2,123	2.5
Canada	voluntary			82	1.0
Denmark	9	9	9	32	1.6
Greece	22-32	26	24	186	6.2
Norway	12	15	15	40	2.6
Portugal	16	24	24	90	2.3
Turkey	20	20	20	741	4.4
United States	voluntary			2,120	2.9
TOTAL NON-WEU				3,291	3.5
TOTAL NATO				5,414	2.8

Sources :

1. IISS Military Balance, 1981-82.
 2. NATO press communiqué, M-DPC-2 (81) 20, 8th December 1981.
 3. Eight months if served in Germany.
- e = estimate.

APPENDIX III

Defence expenditure as percentage of GDP plotted against income per capita – 1981



	Per capita income \$	1981 Defence expenditure as % of GDP
Belgium	10,216	3.3
France	10,590	4.2
Fed. Rep. of Germany ..	11,966	3.4
Italy	6,115	2.5
Luxembourg	9,959	1.3
Netherlands	9,816	3.2
United Kingdom	9,025	5.0
WEU	9,384	3.7
Canada	11,676	1.8
Denmark	11,097	(2.4)*
Greece	4,019	5.9
Norway	13,766	2.9
Portugal	2,340	3.6
Turkey	1,344	4.8
United States	12,559	5.8
NATO	9,934	4.7

* 1980.

State of European security

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3¹

tabled by Mr. Dejardin

1. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :
“Recalling its Recommendations 254, 278 and 288 on the accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty approved by the majority of the then Spanish Parliament;”.
2. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “despite the general recession” to the end of the paragraph and insert “by restructuring defence budgets so as to strengthen the operational elements of conventional forces without, because of the economic, social, and general budgetary recession, having to increase these budgets in real prices, whilst actively pursuing arms control negotiations in all forums.”.

Signed: Dejardin

1. See 11th sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendments negatived).

State of European security

AMENDMENT 4¹
tabled by Mr. Morris and others

4. Leave out paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :
“(a) to invite Spanish liaison officers to be appointed to all appropriate NATO command headquarters;”.

Signed: Morris, Cox, Miller

1. See 11th sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendment agreed to).

State of European security

AMENDMENT 5¹
tabled by Mr. Urwin and others

5. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Urwin, van den Bergh, Lagorce

1. See 11th sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendment not moved).

State of European security

AMENDMENTS 6 and 7¹

tabled by Mr. Pignion

6. In line 2 of paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “parliament” to the end of the paragraph.

7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “not only” and insert “particularly”.

Signed: Pignion

1. See 11th sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendments negatived).

State of European security

AMENDMENT 8¹
tabled by Mr. Rösch

8. In line 1 of paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “satellite”.

Signed: Rösch

1. See 11th sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendment negated).

*Written questions 229, 230 and 231
and the replies of the Council*

QUESTION 229

*put by Mr. Valleix
on 5th May 1982*

Two military transport aircraft, the Franco-German second-generation Transall and the Franco-Italian military version of the regional transport aircraft ATR-42, are to be built in the 1980s.

Are other member countries being invited to participate in the construction of one or both of these aircraft?

What will be the consequences of the construction of the aircraft for a possible military version of the Airbus?

What consequences will building the ATR-42 have for the possible building of a 150-seat Airbus (A-320)?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 21st July 1982*

With regard to the aircraft construction programmes referred to by the honourable parliamentarian, viz. the building of the Franco-German second-generation Transall and the Franco-Italian regional transport aircraft ATR-42, no participation other than by the three countries mentioned is envisaged at the present time. It should however be pointed out that the second of these programmes is still at the planning stage. It should furthermore be noted that the German air force has no plans to introduce a second-generation Transall and that the Franco-German co-operation is purely an industrial co-operation with the aim of introducing a second-generation Transall into the French air force.

In view of the different type and purpose of Transall and ATR-42 on the one hand and the Airbus on the other, development of the Franco-German and Franco-Italian programmes

referred to cannot have any implications for the Airbus, for which no military version is at present being considered.

QUESTION 230

*put by Mr. Günther Müller
on 25th June 1982*

Does the Council consider that possible consultations in the framework of NATO on the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union for limiting nuclear weapons allow the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to give due prominence to their views on this question? Does it consider that consultations between European powers, in WEU for instance, would further this aim?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 27th October 1982*

Consultations on the issue of nuclear arms limitation negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have indeed taken place within the framework of NATO ever since this issue became valid.

Accordingly, the INF negotiating position of the United States and in particular the zero option proposal, aiming at a total renunciation of longer-range INF missiles by the United States and the USSR, were established in close consultation and with the active contribution of other NATO partners who are parties to the decision of 12th December 1979 on the modernisation of longer-range INF and on negotiations aiming at the reduction of such weapons. A special forum, the special consultative group (SCG), was established in order to ensure a thorough and regular consultation between the United States and these countries, a consultation which in fact associates these countries to the negotiation. A suitable procedure of consultation on a regular basis has been established within the alliance with regard to

the negotiations on the reduction of strategic arms (START). For the above reasons there clearly exists no need to have recourse to other fora for this kind of consultation.

QUESTION 231

*put by Mr. Günther Müller
on 25th June 1982*

Did the Council receive prior notification of the proposals made by President Reagan in Bonn on 9th June 1982 for limiting the numbers deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe to 700,000 each? Does it believe this level would leave enough American conventional forces on the mainland of Europe to sustain the deterrent effect of American strategic nuclear weapons which has sheltered Europe for more than thirty years?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 8th October 1982*

The new western proposal for an integrated MBFR agreement announced by President Reagan in Bonn on 9th June 1982 was the subject of close consultation within the NATO alliance. Those WEU countries who participate in the MBFR negotiations played a full part in developing the new proposal in NATO prior to the NATO summit in Bonn.

They are convinced that common collective ceilings of 700,000 ground forces and 900,000 ground and air forces on each side would permit sufficient United States and other allied conventional forces to remain in the area of reductions in Central Europe to guarantee the alliance's collective deterrence and defence capability.

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 378 to 387

RECOMMENDATION 378¹
on the evolution of the situation in Poland

The Assembly,

Recalling its Order 53 and Recommendation 370 ;

Considering that the existence of a military dictatorship in Poland constitutes a flagrant violation of the final act of the Helsinki conference ;

Considering that Poland's serious economic difficulties do not justify the replacement of the dialogue between the state authorities and Solidarity by a policy of repression ;

Considering that the public acts of the Soviet Union reveal interference in the internal affairs of Poland and pressure on the Polish Government for the establishment of that dictatorship ;

Noting that the situation thus created in Poland is such as to cause Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to be applied ;

Regretting that no member government of WEU has judged it necessary to examine in the framework of the Council the implications of this situation for the security of Europe ;

Believing that as long as repression persists in Poland there can be no question of re-establishing normal relations with Poland and its allies, starting with the Soviet Union ;

Firmly recalling that the re-establishment of such normal relations depends on :

- (a) the termination of martial law in Poland ;
- (b) the release of all political prisoners and in particular of Solidarity members ;
- (c) the resumption of the dialogue between the government, Solidarity and the Catholic church,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure close exchanges of views between the European and American members of the North Atlantic Alliance in order to co-ordinate measures taken and to be taken in respect of both Poland and the Soviet Union in accordance with the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 11th January 1982 ;
2. To this end, continue to work out in the most appropriate European framework a joint policy towards the Soviet Union and Poland, particularly in economic and financial matters, in both the long and short term ;
3. Further, invite member countries to suspend economic and financial assistance to Poland in present circumstances ;
4. Also invite member countries to pursue and develop their humanitarian assistance to the Polish people insofar as it does not strengthen the authorities responsible for the military coup d'état on 13th December 1981 ;
5. Meet to follow closely the development of the situation in Poland and hold a continuing dialogue with the Assembly on this question ;
6. Conduct talks with the countries of Eastern Europe on the application of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe particularly in connection with serious examination of events in Poland.

1. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 8th February 1982 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 378***

1. In their reply to Recommendation 378 the Council would like to draw the attention of the Assembly to the continuing and intensive consultations which took place within NATO, in the European Council and between members of WEU.

The NATO meeting of 11th January resulted, as the Assembly is aware, in broad agreement on an attitude to be adopted towards Poland and the Soviet Union.

In their reply on 3rd February to the statement by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on 8th January 1982, the Council already stated that the member countries of WEU have remained in close contact with their European and Atlantic partners.

The European Council renewed its call to the Polish authorities to end with the minimum delay the state of martial law, release those arrested and restore a genuine dialogue with the Church and Solidarity.

A further exchange of views with the transatlantic partners regarding the western position is ensured through consultations in the NATO Council.

2. Joint policies in the economic field towards the Soviet Union have been worked out in the framework of the EEC as is shown e.g. by its decision to restrict imports from the Soviet Union. Western countries have decided with regard to Poland that the question of the rescheduling of Poland's 1982 official debts should for the time being be held in suspense. They also took restrictive measures concerning officially backed credits, including the decision not to make any new credits available to Poland at the present time. For the longer term it should be noted that during discussions of the European Council on 29th and 30th March 1982, the heads of state and of government discussed the basis on which East-West economic and commercial relations had been conducted. The heads of state and of government agreed that these questions, including the important and related question of credit policy, should be the subject of careful study by the European Community and by their own and other governments, both nationally and internationally and in close consultation with other members of the OECD. Thus the EEC introduced a proposal in this organisation to upgrade the Soviet Union from the intermediate to the relatively rich category for export credits.

3. Member countries of WEU as well as other NATO countries have suspended economic and financial assistance to Poland on the understanding that no basis for the re-establishment of normal relations and consequently for continuation of such assistance exists as long as no positive development takes place in Poland to end martial law, release those in detention and restore a genuine dialogue with the Church and Solidarity.

4. In their communiqué on 4th January, Foreign Ministers of the Ten declared their total sympathy with the Polish people and their readiness to continue their direct humanitarian aid to them. The NATO Foreign Ministers affirmed during their 11th January meeting their willingness to continue and increase humanitarian aid to the Polish people for distribution and monitoring by non-governmental organisations to ensure that it reaches the people for whom it is intended. Furthermore, EEC Ministers concluded on 27th January that the funds which were released by their decisions should be used to finance humanitarian assistance in the form of gifts.

It should be noted that both the EEC and NATO countries specifically stipulated that such aid should be channelled only through non-governmental organisations and be conditional on it reaching the Polish people.

5. WEU member countries have met regularly and are continuing to do so, either through the medium of the WEU Council or in other multilateral fora, to discuss the situation in Poland. The Council will not fail to inform the Assembly of further developments.

6. WEU member countries were represented at ministerial level at the resumption of the CSCE meeting in Madrid in February of this year. Regrettably the violations of the principles of the Helsinki final act, of which the repression in Poland constitutes a particularly grave element, had not only prevented the Madrid meeting from achieving positive results, but also put at risk the entire CSCE process. WEU member countries as well as other member countries of the EEC, which remain committed to the continuation of the CSCE process, have expressed the hope that, when the Madrid meeting resumes in November, the prevailing circumstances would be more conducive to the achievement of a positive outcome.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th May 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 379¹

*on the political activities of the WEU Council –
reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council²*

The Assembly,

Noting the satisfactory aspects of the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council;

Nevertheless deploring the prolongation of the WEU Council's inactivity throughout 1981;

Drawing attention to the importance of the proposals for reactivating WEU made in December 1981 by Mr. Lemoine, French Secretary of State to the Minister of Defence;

Stressing that these proposals should be explained and if possible further elaborated by the French Government and should elicit a response from its six partners;

Noting that the dangers to peace and security in Europe are now more serious than ever;

Recalling that WEU is still the only European organisation with effective responsibilities in defence questions and, consequently, disarmament,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Make an in-depth examination of the proposals concerning WEU made by the French Government with a view to determining the extent of agreement France's partners are able to reach on the basis of these proposals and report to the Assembly if possible at the next part-session or in any event within a year;
2. Extend its consultations to questions raised by the evolution of European public opinion in the face of threats to Europe's security;
3. Inter alia, consider the means available to the governments of member countries for countering international terrorism with a view to strengthening them through greater co-operation;
4. Extend its discussions to all threats to the security of Western Europe, wherever they arise;
5. Prepare the ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council by consultations in the framework of WEU on European defence and on the development of Soviet-United States conversations on the limitation of armaments;
6. Undertake, at meetings of the Permanent Council, frequent and regular exchanges of views on topical questions relating to European defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance;
7. Examine how the experience acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments might be used to contribute to the solution of monitoring problems raised at all international conferences on disarmament;
8. Ensure that the possible extension of tasks given to the SAC does not result in that body being relieved of its present responsibilities.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 14th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (1st sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Vecchietti on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 913).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 379

The Council, who are fully aware of the evolution of the international situation and of the threat facing Europe, are examining the various problems raised in the present recommendation.

I. They note, first of all, that Western European Union is the only European organisation which by treaty has been given competence in matters of defence. Consequently, its Assembly is of special importance, being the only European parliamentary body empowered by statute to discuss defence questions, including the control of armaments.

Proposals which the French Government have put forward take account of this unique position of the Assembly, possessing as it does the ability to reach the peoples of WEU member countries.

Having regard to the questions legitimately voiced by European public opinion and the importance of democratic dialogue, through which peoples reach a better understanding of the defence efforts needed, the Council support the notion expressed in the address to the Assembly on 1st December 1981 by the State Secretary of the French Ministry of Defence that the Assembly should extend its debates to all the extremely varied themes which raise the problems relating to the security of European countries.

In this connection, the Council note with great interest that the Assembly General Affairs Committee has prepared a report on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism.

As regards the Standing Armaments Committee, which also was the subject of proposals by the State Secretary of the French Ministry of Defence, the Council recall that this body was set up on 7th May 1955 to promote co-operation in the matter of armaments. If in this respect the international secretariat of the SAC were occasionally to assist the Assembly in the study of clearly-defined themes, this could only be done under a procedure involving a case-by-case examination by the Council, under whom the SAC is placed. It is clear that such work could not have the effect of relieving the SAC of its responsibilities nor could it affect its competence, these being the Council's exclusive responsibility.

II. The WEU Assembly, which is duly qualified to deal with matters of defence and security in Europe, is also a parliamentary body in direct touch with public opinion in the various member countries. Its elected members are in the best position to know the preoccupations of the peoples they represent, their reactions to threats to their security, their resolutions or their doubts about the means of meeting them. They are also in a better position to inform these peoples and arouse their awareness to matters affecting defence and security in Europe. Consequently, the debates of the WEU Assembly undoubtedly make an important contribution to the Council's reflections. The Council, for their part, will not fail to follow with the greatest possible attention the movement of ideas among European public opinions and their impact.

III. The WEU Council are aware of the various dangers that the increase in terrorism represents for Europe. They note that discussion of this question takes place in other European fora.

IV. Under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty the Council are empowered to examine a wide range of questions. In a context which makes their task particularly difficult, they perform their functions in such a way that it would not be appropriate to speak of prolonged inactivity on the part of the Council. They will continue to exercise the responsibilities incumbent on them, and in so doing assert Europe's presence in consultations on security, armaments control and disarmament. The WEU Council consider it desirable that in these spheres the provision of information and the harmonisation of attitudes should take place in various bodies and at various levels, avoiding as far as possible any duplication. The fact that all the WEU member countries are members of the Atlantic Alliance and share the conviction that defence of the continent of Europe and global defence are inseparable, does not remove the justification for abiding by the mandates and for pursuing specific approaches.

V. The methodology adopted by the Armaments Control Agency undoubtedly offers an example to which the Council attach great value. As indicated to the Assembly on several occasions, the Council are however aware that such control procedures between allies are very difficult to transfer to other circles.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 380¹***on the application of the Brussels Treaty
– reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply thereto;
- (ii) Noting that the Council and Assembly alike recognise that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instrument of European security;
- (iii) Believing that several arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve any useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that "in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe";
- (iv) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;
2. In application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by reducing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III;
3. Call on member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO, and are not already bound by Article VI of Protocol No. II, to make unilateral declarations concerning the level of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and station as agreed with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the high contracting parties;
4. To include in future annual reports a statement on the levels of all assigned forces;
5. To communicate its annual report, as in the past, before the end of February.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 908).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 380

The Council welcome the fact that the Assembly recognises that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty retain their full value and that it stresses the importance of WEU in the sphere of security.

1. The Council recall their position, namely, that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe. This is why Annex III of that protocol has been amended on several occasions since 1958. The Council have received with great interest and are considering the Assembly's recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV ("Long-range missiles and guided missiles") and VI ("Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes") of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III according to the procedure laid down in Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. As regards varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, the Council welcome the fact that, as a result of the debate and vote by the Assembly, the initial draft recommendation was amended to take account of certain legal and political considerations.

The Council are considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem.

3 and 4. The overall system organised under the treaty and its protocols, the implementation of which, as regards level of forces, regularly appears in the annual report, enables the Council to be informed of and to assess the situation of the level of forces and their armaments assigned to SACEUR for the common defence.

The level of forces thus assigned results from the undertakings made by the member states within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as stated notably in II.5 and 6 and IV of the final act of the nine-power conference, held in London between 28th September and 3rd October 1954. The forces assigned by the various countries to the common NATO defence are in fact defined on the basis of a plan which is kept up to date within NATO. Decisions relating to the forces result from the joint effort of the member countries in accordance with the capacity of each to contribute and with the aim of ensuring at all times an adequate level of forces.

Consequently, there appears to be no need to invite the states concerned to make unilateral declarations to the WEU Council concerning a matter which is already dealt with in the multilateral context of NATO. Nor does there appear to be any possibility of including in future annual reports any statements on the level of forces other than those which are already given.

5. The Council will endeavour, as in the past, to communicate its annual report to the Assembly before the end of February.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th November 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 381¹

***on the harmonisation of research in civil and military
high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh
annual report of the Council***²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the need to ensure a better place for Europe in industrial and trade competition with the United States and Japan;
- (ii) Considering how fast technology evolves and the difficulty member countries experience in keeping abreast with progress in the various fields of advanced technology;
- (iii) Considering the need to develop and produce high technology weapons capable of ensuring a balance of forces with the Warsaw Pact;
- (iv) Considering the budgetary difficulties of member states and the problems they consequently have to face because of the sharp rise in the cost of research and development of modern weapons;
- (v) Considering that greater harmonisation of the research and development efforts of the member countries, in spite of disparities in the relevant budgets, and more intensive European co-operation would allow these difficulties to be overcome more easily;
- (vi) Noting the part of the Council's twenty-seventh annual report on scientific, technological and aerospace questions and the indications it gives on energy and security on the one hand and space activities on the other;
- (vii) Considering the reply of the Council to Recommendations 331 and 365 and the statements by Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, to the Assembly on 3rd December 1981,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Invite the Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat, in fields within their competence, to assist the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in preparing the second part of its report on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields;
2. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to draw up a list of military research and development programmes which, because of their cost, technical complexity or special interest, might be worthwhile matters for European or international co-operation and report to the Assembly within a year;
3. Study the possibility of increasing the security and energy interdependence of member countries;
4. Invite the governments of member countries :
 - (a) to decide on a choice of projects for European co-operation in fields such as micro-electronics, biotechnology and maritime, nuclear and space technology;
 - (b) to implement these projects with the greatest flexibility and also perseverance in bi- or multilateral frameworks;
 - (c) to make provision for training the corresponding experts;
 - (d) to promote exchanges of research workers between European countries, thus enabling the setting up of European teams ;
 - (e) finally, to ensure the financing of these projects.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fiandrotti on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 917).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 381

1. The Council will consider the Assembly's interesting request to invite the Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat, in fields within their competence, to assist the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in preparing the second part of its report on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields.

2. The Council are currently examining a number of proposals concerning the Standing Armaments Committee's activities. In this context, the Council consider as opportune the Assembly's proposal that the Standing Armaments Committee draw up a list of military research and development programmes which, because of their cost, technical complexity or special interest, might be worthwhile matters for European or international co-operation.

3. With regard to the necessity of increasing the security and energy independence of member countries, the Council recall that the countries are already studying, within the framework of the European Communities and, for those who are members of it, the International Energy Agency (IEA), the possibility of increasing supplies through concerted action, to enable each of them to reduce its vulnerability to possible sudden crises.

The Council also point to the measures taken by the member countries to encourage greater autonomy in the energy field, through a reduction of the extent of their dependence on oil imports and more rational and efficient use of energy, as well as increased use of nuclear energy.

More particularly, and in accordance with the recommendations of the INFCE (International Fuel Cycle Evaluation) study, the value of the use of fast-breeder reactors has been recognised.

Finally, to ensure greater continuity in energy supplies, the Council believe that sources of supply should be diversified to the greatest degree possible.

4. In the field of microelectronics, the Council recall that, on 30th August last, the Esprit project, a European strategic research and development programme in the information technology sector, was submitted to the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community. Specific pilot projects for implementing this programme have already been identified for research into:

- (a) advanced microelectronics;
- (b) advanced data processing
- (c) software technology;
- (d) office automation and computer integrated manufacturing.

As regards co-operation in the space sector, it must be pointed out that WEU member countries have for several years played an active part in the work of the European Space Agency, whose purpose is to promote scientific and applied research in the space field and to make European industry in this sector competitive in world markets.

ESA is actively involved in many scientific meteorological and earth-observation satellite projects and also in telecommunications and data-processing systems projects.

Finally, still in the field of space co-operation, the member countries are considering setting up an operational European meteorological satellite system. Negotiations have been in progress since January 1981. They are expected shortly to reach a positive conclusion.

In the field of biotechnology, on 7th December 1981 the EEC launched a five-year (1982-86) indirect action programme. This programme, which concentrates on the development of second-generation enzyme reactors and the improvement of genetic engineering techniques, is designed to obtain improved yields in the agricultural and food production sectors. As regards the training of experts and exchanges of experts between European countries, a satisfactory level of co-operation has been achieved, thanks to the numerous bilateral and multilateral European scientific co-operation agreements between member countries and through the international organisations. Among the most important initiatives, the Council wish to mention that the EEC, NATO and the MBL (Molecular Biology Laboratory) have extensive expert training programmes which also cover the developing countries. The Council agree that these projects should be given adequate resources.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 382¹
on disarmament²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament opened on 7th June 1982 ;
- (ii) Aware that since the first special session in 1978 there is negligible progress to report on arms control and none on disarmament ;
- (iii) Aware that in the meantime world military expenditure has increased to more than \$ 500 billion a year ;
- (iv) Recalling its Recommendation 323 of 21st November 1978,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view:

1. To promote disarmament:
 - (a) by fostering wider but balanced commercial relations between East and West, and between North and South ;
 - (b) by investigating the possibility of developing weapons systems that would be manifestly defensive ;
 - (c) by guaranteeing respect for the principles set out in the United Nations Charter, and in particular the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33), the right of security and legitimate defence (Article 51) and the right of peoples to self-determination;
2. To secure a substantial reduction in the level of nuclear weapons in the world as a whole, and in Europe the "zero option" in the INF talks and the establishment of a substantially-reduced level and a proper balance of conventional forces ;
3. To seek the earliest agreement on the following specific disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures:
 - (a) at the world level:
 - (i) a complete ban on the production, stockpiling and use of chemical and mycotoxin weapons, through a resumption of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the first place ;
 - (ii) a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing, through a resumption of the trilateral talks between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union in the first place, to conclude an agreement on the terms already agreed in 1980 ;
 - (iii) amendment of the 1967 outer space treaty to ban all weapons for use in or from outer space ;
 - (iv) the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency on the lines of the report of the United Nations Secretary-General ;
 - (v) the establishment of a register to be prepared and published by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of international transfers of armaments ;
 - (vi) the appointment of a United Nations working group of experts to examine alternative defence systems excluding nuclear weapons ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Vohrer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 909).

(b) at the European level:

- (vii) a phase one agreement on MBFR together with permanent measures of verification to remain operative for the duration of the agreement ;
- (viii) a conference on disarmament in Europe on the lines of the French proposal of 1978 ;
- (ix) enhanced confidence-building measures in Europe ;

4. To secure reductions in armaments in third world countries through the example to be set by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in reducing their nuclear and conventional forces and dismantling and scrapping surplus or obsolete weapons, and, when measures of actual disarmament are implemented, in diverting to developing countries the funds thus released.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 382

1. (a) The Council support efforts to foster wider but balanced commercial relations between East and West and between North and South. This can help to intensify mutual relations and hence to improve the international atmosphere in general.

(b) Although some weapons are less suitable for attack than others in certain situations, there are no weapons that are suitable exclusively for defence or attack. The Council also draw attention to the fact that the defensive character of the western alliance determines its equipment and that the development and introduction of weapons systems are effected accordingly.

(c) The Council take the opportunity of reaffirming their full commitment to support all efforts to guarantee respect for the principles set out in the United Nations Charter, and in particular the principle of non-use of force in international relations (Article 2, paragraph 4), the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33), the right of security and legitimate defence (Article 51) and the right of all peoples to self-determination. The Council share the view that enhanced respect for these principles contributes to creating favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process.

2. To the extent that the Assembly refers to the MBFR talks in Vienna in this paragraph the reply on this subject is given in the context of paragraph 3 (b) (vii).

The Council believe that the western initiatives that led to the inception of both START and INF negotiations are a major contribution to arms control, stability and peace.

The Council wish to point out that a "substantial reduction in the level of nuclear weapons", as the Assembly's recommendation reads, can only be attained by balanced agreements. Only mutually agreed reductions will promote stability, while unilateral reductions are not necessarily verifiable and can be reversed at will.

With regard to the INF talks, the Council would like to emphasise strongly its adherence to the "global approach" put forward by the United States and supported by the European allies. A geographical approach focused exclusively on "Europe", as referred to in the Assembly's recommendation, does not take into account the fact that long-range INF can threaten Europe from outside. This narrow approach is advocated by the Soviet Union in order to sustain its claim that equality in INF force already exists "in Europe"; it is contrary to the West's realistic point of view that, due to the range and the mobility of the weapons concerned, only global reductions and limitations can serve the desired purpose.

3. (a) (i) The Council share the Assembly's concern regarding the speedy imposition of a complete and verifiable ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons at universal level. In this context, the Council would like to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that the use of chemical and biological weapons including toxins is already prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and, moreover, that under the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction, the mere possession of toxins is illegal.

The Council welcome the decision of the Committee on Disarmament taken in February 1982 to give a new and enlarged mandate to its chemical weapons ad hoc working group providing for the negotiation and elaboration of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Several WEU members have recently taken initiatives aimed at fostering and intensifying the chemical weapons negotiations, particularly by making feasible proposals on the crucial issue of verification. The Council regard the Committee on Disarmament as an appropriate negotiating forum.

(ii) Efforts to reach a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests are currently in progress in the Committee on Disarmament which, at its 1982 session, set up a new ad hoc working group to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress towards a nuclear test ban.

(iii) In this context the Council would like to recall the initiative taken by most WEU member states that resulted in the United Nations General Assembly adopting at its 36th session a resolution

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 9th November 1982.

on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The goals set forth in this resolution go beyond the mere amendment of the 1967 outer space treaty as advocated by the Assembly's recommendation. The Council believe that, in conformity with the abovementioned resolution, special attention should be given to negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems as an important step in preventing an arms race in outer space.

(iv) Some WEU member countries have actively participated in the United Nations study on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency. The Council, being fully aware of the need for verifying compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements, welcome discussion of all serious proposals that would lead to internationally acceptable means of verification.

(v) The Council hold the view that arms control and disarmament agreements must be based on reliable and pertinent data. The collection of such data by the United Nations serves to improve the conditions for the worldwide efforts to achieve arms control and disarmament. The organisational arrangements for collecting, arranging, processing, making available and publishing such data need to be expanded. The proposal to set up registers with the United Nations Secretary-General therefore deserves to be supported. One of these registers could be devoted to weapons exports and imports throughout the world.

(vi) No concrete steps have been taken as yet to develop alternative defence systems which could adequately ensure western security in the event of a renunciation of nuclear weapons. The appointment of a United Nations working group of experts on this subject therefore offers little prospect at present of achieving practical results.

(b) (vii) The western countries concerned submitted a proposal for an interim phase I agreement in Vienna on 20th December 1979. This initiative was designed to simplify the MBFR negotiations by concentrating in a first phase on reduction of American and Soviet land forces, and thus initially requiring agreement only on the size of their land forces in the area of reductions. It was hoped that this simplified approach would provide an impetus towards a comprehensive phase II agreement involving the forces of other participants in the area of reductions.

However, the East repeatedly demanded that there should be a firm contractual link between the proposed phase I and phase II agreements. In the final analysis, the East's aim was to have all participants incorporated in an agreement from the very outset.

The western countries concerned have complied with this eastern requirement in their draft treaty, tabled in Vienna on 8th July 1982. The draft treaty provides for a binding commitment by each side from the outset to effectuate the reductions needed to reach the common collective ceiling. These reductions would take place in four stages, each of which would of course have to be satisfactorily verified before progress to the next one. This process would lead to the establishment of common collective ceilings of 700,000 land forces and 900,000 combined land and air forces, and hence to parity of forces in Central Europe. With this comprehensive proposal the western countries concerned are offering a constructive solution to the linkage question resulting from the previous approach, with its two separate, phased agreements.

The WEU member countries concerned consider it essential that before the conclusion of an MBFR agreement there be agreement between the two sides on the data concerning the actual level of their forces in the area of reductions and that therefore the East join western efforts to clarify the discrepancies regarding data for Warsaw Pact forces in the area of reductions. It is also essential that an agreement should include measures to verify agreed reductions and compliance with residual ceilings, and to build confidence between participants. The draft treaty submitted by the western countries concerned contains the package of such "associated measures" first proposed by NATO participants in December 1979 (some of which concern a wider geographical area). These measures would be implemented as soon as the agreement became effective so as to perform their function of verification and confidence-building. It is hoped that the East will recognise the importance of this major concession on the part of the western countries concerned and will themselves show a corresponding readiness to work constructively towards a resolution of the remaining questions of agreement on the data base and "associated measures".

(viii) and (ix) The Council are convinced that confidence-building measures are not only important for security and stability in Europe but also a potential basis for more extensive arms control agreements. The Council have therefore strongly supported from the outset the French proposal of 1978 for the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe.

Since the start of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid it has been the common aim of the western participating countries to obtain the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe

designed to go clearly beyond, in an initial phase, the confidence-building measures set out in the Final Act of the CSCE.

A conference on disarmament in Europe should be a part of the CSCE process. The mandate which would set it up would therefore be adopted as part of a substantive and balanced concluding document at the Madrid follow-up meeting. The initial objective of the conference should be to establish new types of confidence-building measures applicable to the whole of Europe. In intensive negotiations conducted since 1980 the thirty-five participating countries have reached agreement in principle on three of the four basic elements of the mandate for such a conference. There is agreement that confidence- and security-building measures to be negotiated at the conference will have to be militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable. However, agreement has not been reached so far on the zone of application of the measures; the Soviet Union is not prepared to allow them be applied to all of its European territory without a "corresponding" (but unspecified) extension westwards.

The violation of the Helsinki Final Act caused by developments in Poland resulted in serious strains on the negotiations in Madrid. The meeting was suspended by consensus of the thirty-five participating countries until 9th November 1982.

The Council recall the fundamental demands with regard to the situation in Poland (lifting of martial law, release of all political detainees, resumption of the dialogue between the government and free trade unions) made by the Assembly at its meeting in Paris in June.

When the Madrid meeting is resumed the WEU member countries will pursue the negotiation of a substantial and balanced concluding document including a mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe, with agreement on the four basic elements referred to above. In its view, the draft concluding document RM 39 submitted by the neutral and non-aligned countries in December 1981 could provide a suitable basis for negotiations.

4. The Council share the Assembly's concern at the volume of world military expenditure. In third world countries, too, resources that could serve to promote economic and social development are being increasingly used for military purposes. It is therefore important that these countries, too, share in the responsibility for reducing armaments worldwide and hence alleviating the financial burden posed by them.

In East-West relations, the WEU member states are in favour of establishing parity and stability at the lowest possible level of military forces through balanced and verifiable agreements. Progress achieved in this manner would at the same time be a major contribution to greater stability in the world as a whole. Arms control agreements between East and West are important for other regions as well because of the example they set and because they demonstrate that stabilising agreements can in fact be achieved.

Arms control and disarmament measures can lead to more resources being released in all countries of the world for economic and social development and thus improve the opportunities for assisting other countries through economic co-operation.

RECOMMENDATION 383¹
on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe²

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that the balance of all nuclear forces can be assessed only as a whole, but noting that the Soviet Union has a disturbing superiority in heavy intercontinental missiles and in intermediate-range forces, while the United States lead in total numbers of nuclear warheads has been reduced;
- (ii) Believing that arms control and adequate defence measures are two sides of a balanced security policy designed to prevent war, not only nuclear war;
- (iii) Stressing the importance of the conventional component of the NATO deterrent forces;
- (iv) Reiterating its belief that the NATO dual decision of 17th December 1979 remains the basis both for adjusting the imbalance in intermediate-range forces, an imbalance which has been increased by the deployment of 300 SS-20s so far reported, and for negotiating the zero option;
- (v) Regretting that SALT II remains unratified although at the time of its signature endorsed by the Assembly and all NATO governments as a step in a necessarily continuous process of strategic arms control negotiations, and that nearly three years have elapsed since its signature without further progress;
- (vi) Welcoming the declaration of the United States Government that it will refrain from actions which undercut existing strategic arms agreements as long as the USSR shows equal restraints, and comparable statements of the Soviet Union, and appealing to both governments to formalise those statements at the opening of the START negotiations;
- (vii) Believing that in view of the mutual benefits of such control the strategic arms reduction talks should be opened urgently and pursued independently of other aspects of East-West relations, and welcoming therefore President Reagan's speech of 9th May 1982 calling for them to open at the end of June, and making realistic proposals for significant reductions of strategic nuclear weapons;
- (viii) Hoping also that the opening of those talks will have a beneficial effect on the INF negotiations which must be conducted in the framework of START;
- (ix) Stressing the need for a verifiable comprehensive test ban in order to block the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons;
- (x) Stressing the importance of concrete confidence-building measures of the type agreed at Helsinki as a precursor and complement of balanced reductions in the armouries of both sides;
- (xi) Seeing in most peace demonstrations both in Europe and the United States, an expression of deep and justified concern about the dangers of an unrestricted arms race and the possibility of nuclear war;
- (xii) Regretting however the unilateral trends and over-simplifications apparent within movements which ignore the need for military stability, both nuclear and conventional, and for objective analysis of the facts in order to negotiate reductions;
- (xiii) Welcoming the publication of "NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons" for which the Assembly has repeatedly called, and believing that a continuing effort must be made by governments and parliamentarians to inform the public objectively about the nature of the threat and the basis of allied defence and arms control policies;
- (xiv) Regretting that in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union public opinion has no opportunity to discuss freely the concepts on which European and international security should be based,

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 918).

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- A. Call on member governments acting in the North Atlantic Council,
1. To continue the present much improved close and continuous consultations to ensure that an agreed allied position is maintained on all aspects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control;
 2. To ensure that preparations continue in the countries concerned for the deployment from 1983 of the agreed levels of ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles less any reductions previously agreed in the INF talks;
 3. To press for the earliest agreement in the INF talks on the zero option for land-based missiles, and the step-by-step pursuit of these talks to include other weapons systems, and the eventual inclusion of battlefield systems in these or the MBFR talks;
 4. To welcome the resumption of the SALT process through the proposed opening of START in June, and to press for the closest linking of these to the INF talks and the continued mutual respect of all SALT limits during the negotiations;
 5. To give increased emphasis to the negotiation and adoption of effective procedures for verification, as essential for any agreement on arms control and reduction;
 6. To ask the United States Government to examine seriously Senator Jackson's proposal for a joint United States-Soviet Union command post in a neutral country to deter the possibility of war by accident or miscalculation;
 7. To bring up to date and publish from time to time on an agreed objective basis the NATO comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, and to urge the Soviet Union to be equally forthcoming and objective in publishing force comparisons;
- B.1. Call on member governments to pursue active information policies, to ensure that public opinion is objectively informed both about the nature of the threat and about the purposes of allied defence and arms control and reduction policies;
- B.2. Develop a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 383

1. The Council welcome the continued interest of the Assembly in the matter of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) and take careful note of the Assembly's views. The Council endorse many of the opinions expressed in the recommendation and its preamble, notably the need for arms control and defence measures to complement each other in a balanced security policy, and the importance of the 1979 double decision as the basis for redressing the imbalance in INF.
2. The Council agree with the Assembly on the need to continue the current consultations amongst the allies on the subject of the INF negotiations. They welcome the addition of regular briefings of the North Atlantic Council, by the leaders of the United States Delegation to these INF negotiations, to the continued series of meetings of the Special Consultative Group for those member countries which participated in the dual decision of December 1979.
3. The Council further agree with the Assembly on the importance to be attached to preparations for the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles. NATO's resolve in implementing its 12th December 1979 decision was the key factor in persuading the Soviet Union to enter into arms control negotiations in Geneva and will continue to be crucial to achieving concrete results. Members of the Council who participated in the December 1979 decision will continue to do all within their power to promote early progress towards negotiated agreement on the basis of the so-called "zero option" or "zero-level outcome" for American and Soviet longer-range land-based INF missiles. They reconfirm that the negotiations should, as a priority, relate to these systems which constitute the greatest threat. They do not rule out the possibility that in the event of agreement, subsequent phases of the negotiations may relate to other INF systems. They believe that it would be premature to prejudge the forum in which any arms control agreement covering short-range or battlefield nuclear systems might be considered.
4. The Council are happy to repeat the welcome which has been given by member governments to the renewal of strategic arms control through the opening of the START talks and to the assurances that what has been achieved through existing agreements will not be undercut pending the negotiation of a START agreement, subject to reciprocity. The Council endorse the Assembly's concern to see effective verification measures in any arms control agreement.
5. The Council doubt that the United States Government need outside encouragement to keep under review the existing measures to prevent any possibility of war by accident or miscalculation and in this respect have noted the initiatives outlined by President Reagan in his speech in Berlin in June 1982.
6. The Council agree that the figures published on the forces of the integrated military structure of the alliance and of the Warsaw Pact, such as those in the NATO force comparisons paper published in the spring of 1982 may need to be updated from time to time. They also accept that member governments will need to continue their active information policies to ensure that public opinion is well informed about alliance security policy, and the threat faced by members of NATO.
7. As regards a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council, the European members of the alliance discuss the issues on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council with each other as well as with their North Atlantic allies, as part of normal consultations. A number of these subjects are also discussed by the members of the European Community as a normal part of the Community's political co-operation procedures.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th November 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 384¹
on the evolution of the situation in Poland²

The Assembly,

Recalling its Order 53, Recommendations 370 and 378 and the statement by its Presidential Committee of 8th January 1982 ;

Recalling the decisions taken in the framework of European political co-operation ;

Considering that the measures taken by the Polish Government, particularly on the occasion of 1st May 1982, to alleviate martial law fall far short of meeting the three conditions set by the North Atlantic Council on 11th January 1982 for re-establishing normal relations with Poland;

Regretting that the economic measures agreed by the North Atlantic Council to back up these conditions have not been applied more strictly ;

Welcoming the fact that participants in the Madrid conference have refused to pursue their work in the circumstances created by the crackdown on 13th December 1981 ;

Noting that events in Poland at the beginning of May and recourse to further measures of constraint show that the Polish Government has found no means other than force to impose a policy rejected by the great majority of the population,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that consultations between the European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance are pursued and strengthened with a view to co-ordinating the measures taken and to be taken in respect of both the Polish and the Soviet Governments in order to convince them to meet the conditions set by the North Atlantic Council and the European organisations for re-establishing normal relations with Poland, i.e.:

(a) the de facto and de jure abolition of the régime imposed by martial law in Poland ;

(b) liberation of all political prisoners;

(c) resumption of the dialogue between the government, free trade-unionism as formerly embodied by Solidarity and the Catholic church;

2. Continue for its part to consider regularly the application of European measures;

3. Assert that if these conditions are not fulfilled the resumption of the Madrid conference on the application of the final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe would be seriously imperilled.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Michel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 915).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 384

1. The Council have taken note of the Assembly's Recommendation 384 on the evolution of the situation in Poland.

2. The Council recall that following the communiqué of 4th January of the ministerial meeting in the context of European political co-operation and the declaration of 11th January of the Atlantic Alliance, there has been continuing close and active consultation within those bodies to co-ordinate the policies of member states in respect of Poland. The Council fully expect that this co-ordination will be maintained and that the member states involved will continue to keep the situation in Poland under careful review.

3. The Council concur with the Assembly's view that relaxations to martial law in Poland announced on 1st May and subsequently on 21st July, fall short of the three objectives outlined in the communiqué of the Ten of 4th January and in the declaration of the Atlantic Alliance of 11th January. The Council deplore the continuation of martial law, the continuing detention of a significant number of Poles and the deliberate absence of a dialogue with the church and Solidarity.

The Council note with deep concern the outlawing of the independent trade union Solidarity on 8th October. They believe that this is inconsistent with the Final Act of Helsinki and contrary to various statements made by the Polish leadership since 13th December 1981. The Council consider the recent outlawing of Solidarity to be a retrograde step which will render more difficult the restoration of normal relations with the West.

4. The Council assure the Assembly that the member states of WEU will continue their efforts within European political co-operation and the Atlantic Alliance to persuade the Polish Government to honour their undertaking to re-establish civil liberties and the process of reform and to permit the revival of a genuinely free trade union movement. The Council believe the events of 31st August and the mass protests that have followed the dissolution of Solidarity are further reminders that only through genuine dialogue can Poland achieve lasting political and economic stability.

5. As already stated in the communiqué of the Ten of 4th January and in the declaration of 11th January of the Atlantic Alliance, the Council note with concern and disapproval the serious external pressure and the campaign directed by the USSR and other eastern countries against the efforts for renewal in Poland.

For its part, the Council will continue to follow closely the effect of measures applied to Poland and the Soviet Union by western governments. The Council will keep the Assembly informed of their considerations.

6. The Council note the Assembly's views concerning the CSCE follow-up meeting at Madrid. The decision to resume the Madrid meeting on 9th November was taken by consensus. The WEU member countries continue to attach importance to the CSCE process as a useful tool for furthering their objectives both with a view to better implementation of the Final Act and in order to develop a management of relations in general with the East.

7. At the Madrid meeting the WEU member countries will express their preoccupation about the situation in Poland during the review of implementation. They will continue to strive for a balanced and substantial concluding document of the Madrid meeting for which the draft introduced by the neutral and non-aligned countries could form the basis. Some essential and reasonable amendments are however necessary in order to reflect the situation in Poland in the concluding document.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 9th November 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 385¹*on international aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Conscious of the political will it has consistently demonstrated through the organisation in the last ten years of no less than five symposia so as to promote improved co-operation and collaboration in the conception, design, development, production and procurement of high technology defence equipment, especially missiles and aircraft;
- (ii) Reaffirming its belief that the ensuing military benefits of such collaboration, namely enhanced co-operation, interoperability and where possible standardisation in equipment of the armed services of the western Alliance, would to a large extent offset the advantage of commonality of armaments currently enjoyed by the forces of the Warsaw Pact;
- (iii) Aware that the military aircraft, space and guided missile sectors of European industry play an increasingly important social and economic rôle in many regions of Europe in maintaining employment and in stimulating new technological developments, especially in times of recession;
- (iv) Recalling that the incentive for international collaboration in the aeronautical industry must be not just the economic and political advantages for governments, or the military benefits for armed forces but the commercial interests and industrial development of participating aerospace companies;
- (v) Convinced that existing institutions such as the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) of NATO, the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) of Western European Union and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) should be made to operate effectively and their work harmonised, particularly as many of the same people are involved;
- (vi) Recognising that aeronautical collaboration has taken place within a variety of industrial organisational structures from simple prime and sub-contractor relationships through joint companies to complete industrial consortia and that the organisational requirements for one particular aerospace project do not necessarily lend themselves to another;
- (vii) Considering that families of aircraft and of military aerospace equipment represent a cost-effective return on investment, not least for the smaller countries of Europe, and that to this end existing consortia such as Airbus Industrie and Panavia offer the basis for further projects;
- (viii) Appreciating that the fiscal, legal, and financial environment within which transnational consortia have to operate impose impediments to aeronautical collaboration in Europe not shared by competitor aerospace companies in the United States and that the objective for Western Europe should be to provide itself with a comparable industrial aeronautical capability;
- (ix) Convinced that the pursuit of a genuinely balanced North Atlantic market for high technology defence equipment with the United States of America demands not only enhanced collaboration among the member states, but also a change in American policy towards a satisfactory opening for European production,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strengthen the effectiveness of the Standing Armaments Committee as an agency for the promotion of co-operation, interoperability and where possible standardisation in defence equipment of the WEU countries by increasing the SAC's establishment of expert staff and enhancing the level of political support accorded to its work by the governments of the member nations of WEU;
2. Persuade the governments represented in WEU to reinforce the vital function of the Independent European Programme Group in harmonising national operational requirements and re-equipment timescales on a European scale by assigning the chairmanship of the IEPG to a defence minister on a rotational basis and by regular progress reports by the IEPG to the Assembly of WEU;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 916).

3. Seek to make the most effective use of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) since a concomitant to the mutual defence commitments of the Atlantic Alliance must be a common approach not just to strategy but to matériel procurement and logistics;
4. Reinforce political will within the WEU nations at the highest governmental level to pursue a collaborative approach to the re-equipment requirements of the European armed forces of the Atlantic Alliance by placing policies for the achievement of a balanced and equitable European and Atlantic-wide market for armaments firmly on the agenda for heads of government meetings and for the more regular and routine meetings of Alliance defence and foreign ministers;
5. Urge defence ministry staffs of the WEU countries to bear in mind, in addition to the operational requirements of their individual national armed forces, criteria such as overseas marketability of defence equipment, the need to control costs by avoiding a higher degree of technical sophistication than that required to achieve substantial superiority over any likely threat, and the benefits, both industrial and military, of securing other Alliance nations to share in the production and procurement of the high technology defence equipment;
6. Promote the earliest possible involvement of industrial interests including existing European consortia in the conception and definition of future aerospace projects either nationally or through the European Defence Industrial Group (EDIG) or preferably both so as to achieve a market and commercial orientation of such projects from the design stage, the first and foremost of which should be a new European combat aircraft;
7. Press the national governments within WEU to pursue industrial policies towards the aeronautical sector more favourable to the development of an independent European capability in aerospace than to the costly maintenance of purely national aerospace capabilities and to ensure to this end that a collaborative strategy within Europe be maintained involving the fullest utilisation of existing consortia for the design, development and production of new aeronautical projects;
8. Invite the member governments of WEU to reaffirm to the European Communities the need for carefully-considered proposals to be put to the Council of the EEC for the establishment of a harmonised framework of company law and of harmonised tax systems so as to facilitate the operation of transnational consortia within the EEC;
9. Emphasise strongly to member governments of WEU the importance of applying the family of aircraft concept in the European framework whenever excessive competition is liable to weaken Europe's industrial potential;
10. Impress upon the governments of the member nations the need to make clear to the Government of the United States that the evolution of a balanced and equitable Atlantic-wide market in military aerospace products is a paramount political necessity, which will also require the support of Congress for the lifting of restrictions on European imports such as the Speciality Metals Amendment.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 385

The Council welcome the interest that the Assembly, by virtue of its competence in defence matters, displays in European aeronautical co-operation. The colloquy on international aeronautical consortia held in London on 9th and 10th February 1982 under the auspices of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions is further evidence of this interest, as is the recommendation on the conclusions of this meeting, which forms the subject of the reply below.

1. The development of co-operative armaments programmes, particularly in the field of aeronautics, is a lengthy task calling for a pragmatic approach and patient efforts. The seeking of consensus between industrial, economic, military and political interests explains why progress is difficult. Nevertheless, as recognised unanimously by the participants in the London colloquy, co-operation is an absolute necessity. The exorbitant and ever-increasing burden of the research, development and production costs of aeronautical programmes is an argument for European co-operation, particularly through suitable consortia, whenever such co-operation, with all the diversity required, is possible. Airbus Industrie, Euromissile, and Panavia are illustrations of such an approach.

Inspired by a constantly reaffirmed political will, the various competent international bodies, each within the framework of their respective responsibilities, have a particular rôle to play in this co-operation. The machinery available to them for consultation must function as efficiently as possible.

The Standing Armaments Committee was set up in 1955 with the aim of increasing the efficiency of the forces of the countries of WEU by improving their logistics and the use of the resources available to them for equipping and supplying their forces and, by sharing, in the best interests of all, the research on, development of, and production of armaments. The Standing Armaments Committee has carried out its task in a variety of ways for many years. It maintains an interest in operational research and several technical areas; furthermore, it was instructed by Council to carry out a study of the armaments industry of the WEU member states. The completed parts of this study have been transmitted to the Council, who have kept the Assembly informed. At the 1974 Conference of National Armaments Directors, it emerged that many more countries were interested in co-operation than the member states of WEU. As a result of this conference, the Independent European Programme Group was set up. That body is now an important instrument of European multinational co-operation in the sphere of armaments. The fact that its composition is not identical with that of WEU suggests that members of the WEU Assembly should receive progress reports on its work by way of national procedures. The IEPG is already directed by a high-level political figure.

The Conference of National Armaments Directors of the Atlantic Alliance is a body through which the countries of the alliance are able to co-operate in the definition and execution of equipment and research projects. It is a forum where information on military requirements, national concepts and programmes as well as emerging technology is exchanged in order to promote equipment collaboration and standardisation. Considerable efforts are made, moreover, to rationalise and co-ordinate the activity of its subsidiary groups.

Finally, the military staffs of the WEU member countries are fully aware of the need to have a solid industrial basis for equipping their forces as economically as possible, thereby promoting marketable equipment at competitive prices.

2. Like the European institutions, the governments are fully aware of the emergence of a civil aircraft industry within Europe and are endeavouring to advance along the difficult path towards harmonising legal and fiscal systems. As regards the armaments industry, and in particular military aircraft, the security interests of the WEU member countries cannot be ignored. The latter consider, therefore, that questions of a structural nature should remain within the province of the bodies competent in defence matters.

3. The governments of the WEU member countries are fully aware of the importance of the family of aircraft concept, of which the Airbus is a striking reality. In the military sphere, the application of this concept is undoubtedly more difficult, but the variety of prospects that it offers will nevertheless be thoroughly explored.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1982.

4. The governments of the WEU member countries have already made clear to the American authorities the importance that they attached to the opening of a balanced and genuine transatlantic dialogue. The special metals amendment, if it were to be adopted, would be an obstacle to the strengthening of such relations. The approach made to Congress for the lifting of the amendment is of course supported by the WEU member countries, which moreover, have sought to achieve this end on several occasions.

RECOMMENDATION 386¹
on the situation in the Middle East²

The Assembly,

Deploring the outbreak of war in the Middle East ;

Recalling WEU Recommendations 341 and 349 adopted by the Assembly by overwhelming majorities;

Endorsing Resolutions 508 and 509 of the United Nations Security Council;

Recalling its often-repeated condemnation of acts of terrorism anywhere in the world and asserting that retaliatory military actions, especially those involving the maiming and killing of innocent civilian population, are totally unacceptable;

Noting that the establishment of lasting peace in the area is essential for Europe's security and for stability in the world;

Regretfully noting that the provisions of the Camp David accord relating to the future status of the Palestinians have still not been carried into effect ;

Considering that the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government over the whole Lebanese territory is essential for the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East ;

Wishing its General Affairs Committee follow developments in the Middle East and to report to it at its next session,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Express clearly Europe's determination to uphold Lebanon's sovereignty and to assist in its restoration;
2. Condemn unreservedly the present Israeli aggression and call for the evacuation of all non-Lebanese armed forces from Lebanon other than the United Nations interim force in Lebanon which should be strengthened;
3. Recall that the problems of maintaining peace in the Middle East cannot be solved without ensuring the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination within a national territory and recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 17th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Della Briotta on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 923).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 386

1. The Council unreservedly condemn the violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon and express their determination to support all efforts aimed at re-establishing the authority of the Lebanese Government over all its national territory. The member countries of WEU affirm their solidarity with a friendly country whose population has suffered so cruelly and whose stability is dangerously threatened. They strongly hope that after the election of the new President the Lebanese people will be able to bring about national reconciliation and they are prepared to assist in the relief and reconstruction of the country.

2. The Council strongly condemn the cycle of violence, especially the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. They express their profound revulsion at the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut. Following these tragic events, the governments of the WEU countries welcome United Nations Security Council Resolution 521, and consider that deployment of multinational forces in Beirut, in which forces belonging to France, Italy and the United States are participating, will contribute significantly to the security of the civilian population of Beirut.

The Council are convinced that a return to lasting peace in Lebanon and the restoration of its national sovereignty require the rapid and complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country except those authorised by the Government of Lebanon whose authority should be fully re-established over all its national territory. The Council support all efforts designed to achieve these objectives.

3. The Council are convinced that, looking beyond the solution of the Lebanese problem, the Middle East can only enjoy lasting peace and true stability through the participation of all parties in a comprehensive settlement which should be based on the principles of security for all states, justice for all peoples of the region and renunciation of force by all parties concerned. Such a settlement should be founded on mutual recognition by all the parties involved of Israel's right to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers and also of the right of self-determination for the Palestinians with all that this implies. For such negotiations to be possible, the Council consider that the Palestinian people must be represented and the PLO will have to be associated with negotiations.

In view of the principles mentioned above, the Council welcome President Reagan's new initiative contained in his speech on 1st September 1982, which offers an important opportunity for peaceful progress towards a solution of the Palestinian question and the reconciliation of the parties involved. In this connection, they underline the importance of the statement adopted by Arab heads of state and government at Fez on 9th September, which they see as an expression of the unanimous will of the participants, including the PLO, to work for the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East encompassing all states in the area, including Israel. Finally, the Council believe that discussions of the Franco-Egyptian draft resolution by the Security Council could play a useful part in establishing a common basis for a resolution of the problems of the area.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th November 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 387¹
*on European-United States co-operation for
 international peace and joint security²*

The Assembly,

Considering that the cohesion of the free world is an essential condition for the maintenance of peace, European security and economic recovery;

Noting that the European and American partners of the Atlantic Alliance remain fully convinced of this fact;

Noting that western cohesion is being challenged by increased tensions in international relations and the present serious economic recession;

Regretting that measures required for collective security are not really understood by the public and therefore do not receive as much support from public opinion as they might;

Noting that such reactions and challenges, amplified by modern means of communications, give rise to mistrust on both sides of the Atlantic;

Welcoming the initiatives to improve consultations between Europe and North America within the framework of existing institutions;

Considering that events in Afghanistan and Poland require that any measures aimed at improving relations between members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact should be the subject of close collective examination to prevent the impression that faits accomplis are being accepted;

Welcoming the intensive consultations within NATO on the INF negotiations at Geneva;

Expressing support for an early beginning of the START negotiations and vigorous pursuit of the other disarmament negotiations;

Considering the need to arrive at a consensus on the military threat posed to the Alliance and on the balance of forces;

Considering further that public support for armament decisions would increase if these measures were presented as a counterweight to Warsaw Pact programmes and allowed for constraints by that side;

Considering that frequent contacts between parliamentarians from European and North American member countries of NATO are essential for a better understanding of public opinion and should be organised as effectively as possible;

Welcoming the outcome of the meetings of heads of state or government at Versailles and Bonn which reaffirmed the solidarity and cohesion of the free world in maintaining peace and international security as well as in promoting economic co-operation based on respect of the principles of GATT,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Prepare a comprehensive report on the European defence effort within the framework of NATO on sharing the burden of common defence;

II. Urge member countries

1. In agreement with the United States and the other members of NATO, to specify the principles to which all members of the Atlantic Alliance should conform in their economic relations with the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, with particular regard to those items of strategic or

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 17th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van Eekelen on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 914).

technological significance whose export is limited, the credit conditions granted and the conclusion of long-term contracts;

2. To make full use of existing machinery for consultations in the political, military and economic field to allow them to react quickly and in a concordant manner in an emergency or crisis;
3. To consider ways of improving transatlantic consultation, in particular by informal meetings at ministerial and high official levels, thus improving the effectiveness of existing institutions;
4. To ensure that NATO governments continue to base their public assessments of the balance of forces on a common document along the lines of their recent publications ;
5. To present new decisions in the armaments field against the background of specific Warsaw Pact programmes and capabilities in order to discourage new incentives to the arms race;
6. To support a policy of vigorous and determined negotiations for a controlled limitation of nuclear weapons ensuring a balance of forces as a prerequisite for the security of Europe and of the whole western world.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 387

I. The Council welcome the Assembly's interest in the European defence effort within the NATO framework. This is an important question. The member countries of WEU which participate in the integrated military structure note in this connection that Eurogroup is at present updating a report on this subject. In the view of its authors, this report should help to lessen possible misunderstandings in North America regarding contributions to the European defence effort within the alliance. The United States Government has already given much attention to this matter, in particular by laying before Congress the Weinberger report on the allies' contributions to common defence.

II.1 As regards their economic relations with the eastern countries, divergent views may have arisen between western countries. The Council recall that since the beginning of the year, these countries have met in various fora in order to reach a common approach remaining consistent with their political and security interests. A concerted, realistic and cautious approach towards the eastern countries is certainly one of the major concerns of the WEU member countries.

2. The Council support the idea that consultations should take place in order to respond in an effective manner to an emergency or crisis. In this respect the Council attach particular importance to the consultations within the framework of existing machinery. They recall that in the event of a specific crisis the member countries of the alliance have at their disposal a wide variety of facilities for adequate consultation enabling them to react accordingly.

3. The Council are of the opinion that informal meetings at ministerial level can contribute to an improvement in transatlantic relations. Such a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the alliance took place on 2nd and 3rd October in Canada.

4 and 5. In spring 1982, NATO published for the first time an official comparison of the forces of the NATO integrated military structure and of the Warsaw Pact. This document obtained the full support of all the member countries of the alliance participating in the integrated military structure. The Council regard it as of great importance that the alliance countries concerned should continue to base their public statements about the balance of forces as much as possible on a commonly agreed document such as the abovementioned force comparison. Moreover, these countries agree that new decisions in the armaments field need to be explained in relation to the threat to which they are designed to respond.

6. The Council fully agree with the Assembly on the importance of a vigorous and determined pursuit of arms control negotiations with the aim of achieving a balance at a lower level of forces. WEU member countries played an active rôle in the elaboration of the comprehensive series of western initiatives which have been taken only recently. In this respect one may wish to recall the initiatives regarding the INF, START and MBFR negotiations as well as the western proposal continuing the mandate of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe. The member countries will, to the extent they are involved, do their best to encourage a successful outcome of these negotiations.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1982.

Telex wire services

MOTION FOR AN ORDER¹

tabled by Mrs. Knight and others

That the Presidential Committee should institute a study, as a matter of urgency, into the cost and practicability of instituting at the Palais d'Iéna a telex wire service, which would be available to delegates for the submission of press reports to the Press Association, Reuters, etc. in their home countries, with the intention that this might operate as from the summer Assembly in 1983.

Signed: Knight, Stoffelen, Page, Böhm, Berchem, van der Werf-Terpstra, Dejardin, Smith, Glesener, Herman-Michielsens, Forma

1. See 12th sitting, 2nd December 1982 (order agreed to).

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