

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1987

II

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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II

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Official Report of Debates

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The proceeding of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU
comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general
index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSSENS Hugo	SP
BOGAERTS August	SP
DECLERCQ Tiji	CVP
DEJARDIN Claude	PS
PECRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP

Substitutes

MM. BEYSEN Edward	PVV
CEREXHE Etienne	PSC
CLOSE Robert	PRL
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
du MONCEAU	
de BERGENDAL Yves	PVV
NOERENS René	PVV

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
de CHAMBRUN Charles	National Front
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GREMETZ Maxime	Communist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF
Mrs. LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist
MM. MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
MERMAZ Louis	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PORTIER Henri	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRE René	RPR
BICHET Jacques	UDF
BOHL André	UCDP
BORDU Gérard	Communist
CHARTRON Jacques	RPR
CHENARD Alain	Socialist

MM. DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUT Xavier	UDF (App.)
LACOUR Pierre	UCDP
MONTASTRUC Pierre	UDF
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
PRAT Henri	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SIRGUE Pierre	National Front
SOUVET Louis	RPR

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MECHTERSHEIMER Alfred	Die Grünen
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
DUVE Freimut	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. GLOTZ Peter	SPD
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
LODIGIANI Oreste	Socialist
MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
GOERENS Charles	Dem.
HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM. KONEN René	Dem.
LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
van den BERGH Harry	Labour
de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr. van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

MM. de BEER Leopold	Liberal
EISMA Doeke	D66
EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM. van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
van TETS Govert	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr. Donald COLEMAN	Labour
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Mr. Edward GARRETT	Labour
Sir Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr. Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr. James HILL	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
Lady Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir John PAGE	Conservative
Mr. Stephen ROSS	Liberal
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr. John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. Robert BROWN	Labour
John CORRIE	Conservative
Thomas COX	Labour
Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Reginald FREESON	Labour
Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
MM. Bruce MILLAN	Labour
Michael MORRIS	Conservative
Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. Robert PARRY	Labour
Peter REES	Conservative
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
MM. John STOKES	Conservative
Stefan TERLEZKI	Conservative
John WARD	Conservative
Alec WOODALL	Labour

I
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 1st June 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Opening of the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly.2. Election of the President of the Assembly.3. Address by the President of the Assembly.4. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.5. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session (Doc. 1091). | <ol style="list-style-type: none">6. Action by the Presidential Committee (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee</i>, Doc. 1102).7. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.8. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee</i>, Doc. 1099). |
|--|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Edwards, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

4. Election of the President of the Assembly

Only one candidate was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Goerens.

In accordance with Rule 10 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Mr. Goerens was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Goerens took the Chair.

5. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Three candidates had been proposed for posts of Vice-President, namely, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Pécriaux and Mr. Soell.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Pécriaux and Mr. Soell were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1091)

The Assembly adopted the draft order of business for the first part of the session.

7. Observers

The President welcomed the observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Turkey.

8. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1102)

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur.

The Assembly took note of the report of the Presidential Committee.

9. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Cahen answered questions put by MM. De Decker, Close, Declercq, Tummers, Caro, van der Werff, Rumpf, Soell, Valleix and Inan (*Observer from Turkey*).

10. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council

(Presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1099)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur.

11. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Three candidates had been proposed for the three remaining posts of Vice-President, namely: Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Valleix and Mr. van der Werff.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Valleix and Mr. van der Werff were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age was as follows: Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. van der Werff, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Soell and Mr. Pécriaux.

12. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council

(Debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1099)

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Antretter, Soell and Close.

Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speaker: Mr. van den Bergh.

The debate was adjourned.

13. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the Delegations of Belgium and France:

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

Belgium

- Mr. Bogaerts as a titular member in place of Mr. Dejardin.

General Affairs Committee

Belgium

- Mr. Dejardin as a titular member in place of Mr. Bogaerts;

France

- Mr. Bassinet as a titular member in place of Mr. Mermaz;
- Mr. Pontillon as a titular member to fill a vacant seat.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

France

- Mr. Mermaz as an alternate member in place of Mr. Bassinet.

14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 2nd June, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Antretter)	Luxembourg
MM. Adriaensens	MM. Böhm	MM. Burger
Bogaerts	<i>Steiner</i> (Büchner)	Hengel
Declercq	Holtz	
<i>Close</i> (Dejardin)	Irmer	
Péciaux	Kittelmann	
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Mrs. Luuk	Netherlands
Mr. Steverlynck	MM. Mechtersheimer	MM. Aarts
	Müller	van den Bergh
	Niegel	<i>Eisma</i> (de
	Reddemann	Kwaadsteniet)
France	Rumpf	Stoffelen
MM. Bassinet	Scheer	Tummers
Baumel	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Schmitz)	<i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der
Caro	MM. <i>Bühler</i> (von Schmude)	Werf-Terpstra)
<i>Prat</i> (Collette)	Soell	van der Werff
<i>Fourré</i> (Galley)	Unland	
<i>Bordu</i> (Gremetz)		
Jeambrun		
Jung		
<i>Chénard</i> (Koehl)		
Mrs. Lalumière		
MM. Matraja	Italy	United Kingdom
<i>Pontillon</i> (Mermaz)	MM. Antoni	Sir Frederic Bennett
Oehler	Bianco	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Valleix	Ferrari Aggradi	MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Garrett)
	Giust	<i>Woodall</i> (Hardy)
	Milani	Sir Paul Hawkins
Federal Republic of Germany	<i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Sarti)	Lord Hughes
Mr. Ahrens	<i>Colajanni</i> (Vecchiotti)	Dr. Miller
		Sir John Osborn
		Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Wilkinson)

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Cavaliere	United Kingdom
MM. de Chambrun	Cifarelli	Mr. Coleman
Croze	Fiandrotti	Sir Anthony Grant
Portier	Frasca	MM. Hill
Seitlinger	Gianotti	Jessel
	Mezzapesa	Earl of Kinnoull
	Pecchioli	Lady Jill Knight
Italy	Rauti	Sir John Page
Mr. Amadei	Rubbi	Mr. Ross
	Sinesio	Sir Dudley Smith

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd June 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II:
Political activities of the Council (*Resumed debate on the
report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1099*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance Part II: Political activities of the Council

*(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs
Committee, Doc. 1099)*

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. van der Sanden, Irmer, Eisma, Baumel, Müller, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Caro and De Decker.

Mr. Pécriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speaker: Mr. Valleix.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. du Monceau and Burger.

The debate was adjourned.

4. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations proposed by the Luxembourg Delegation: Mr. Burger as a titular member in place of Mr. Goerens.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Irmer Kittelmann	Luxembourg
MM. <i>Noerens</i> (Adriaensens)	Mrs. Luuk	Mr. Burger
Bogaerts	MM. Müller	Mrs. <i>Hennicot-Schoepges</i>
<i>De Bondt</i> (Declercq)	Niegel	(Goerens)
<i>Close</i> (Dejardin)	Reddemann	Mr. Hengel
Péciaux	Rumpf	
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> (Scheer)	Netherlands
Mr. <i>De Decker</i> (Steverlynck)	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Schmitz)	MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts)
	Mr. Soell	<i>Eisma</i> (de
		Kwaadsteniet)
		Stoffelen
		<i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der
		Werf-Terpstra)
		van der Werff
France		
MM. Bassinet		United Kingdom
Baumel		Sir Frederic Bennett
Caro		MM. Edwards (Garrett)
<i>Prat</i> (Jeambrun)		<i>Woodall</i> (Hardy)
Koehl	Italy	Sir Paul Hawkins
<i>Pontillon</i> (Mermaz)	MM. Amadei	Lord Hughes
Oehler	Antoni	Lord <i>Newall</i>
Valleix	Bianco	(Earl of Kinnoull)
	<i>Gorla</i> (Cifarelli)	Dr. Miller
	Giust	Sir John Osborn
Federal Republic of Germany	Milani	Sir John Page
MM. Ahrens	<i>Pollidoro</i> (Pecchioli)	Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Wilkinson)
<i>Zierer</i> (Bohm)	<i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Sarti)	
	Sinesio	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Holtz	Netherlands
MM. de Chambrun	Mechtersheimer	MM. van den Bergh
Collette	von Schmude	Tummers
Croze	Unland	
Galley		
Gremetz	Italy	United Kingdom
Jung	MM. Cavaliere	Mr. Coleman
Mrs. Lalumière	Ferrari Aggradi	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
MM. Matraja	Fiandrotti	Sir Anthony Grant
Portier	Frasca	MM. Hill
Seitlinger	Gianotti	Jessel
	Mezzapesa	Lady Jill Knight
Federal Republic of Germany	Rauti	Mr. Ross
MM. Antretter	Rubbi	Sir Dudley Smith
Büchner	Vecchiotti	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd June 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by the President of the Assembly.
2. Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1093*).
3. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1099*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

4. Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council

*(Presentation by Mr. Poos,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1093)*

The second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Poos answered questions put by Mr. Valleix, Sir John Osborn, MM. Caro, Machete (*Observer from Portugal*), Burger, Elmquist (*Observer from Denmark*) and Caro.

5. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the French Delegation:

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

- Mr. Fourré as a titular member in place of Mr. Galley;
- Mr. Galley as an alternate member in place of Mr. Fourré.

Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions

- Mr. Galley as a titular member in place of Mr. Fourré;
- Mr. Fourré as an alternate member in place of Mr. Galley.

6. Change in the order of business

On the proposal of Mr. De Decker, the Assembly agreed to add at the end of the orders of the day for the afternoon sitting on Wednesday, 3rd June, the report of the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations on the voice of Europe after Reykjavik – debates in national parliaments, Document 1097, previously intended for the following day.

Speaker: Sir Paul Hawkins.

**7. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance –
Part II: Political activities of the Council**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs
Committee and votes on the draft recommendation
and draft order, Doc. 1099)*

The debate was resumed.

Speaker: Sir John Osborn.

*Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly,
took the Chair.*

Speakers: MM. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*),
Katsaros (*Observer from Greece*) and Bayülken
(*Observer from Turkey*).

*Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly,
resumed the Chair.*

Speaker: Mr. Elmquist (*Observer from
Denmark*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur, replied to the
speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft
recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to
unanimously. (This recommendation will be
published as No. 446)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft
order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously.
(This order will be published as No. 68)².

**8. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were
agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 3rd
June, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m.

1. See page 20.

2. See page 21.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. <i>Noerens</i> Adriaensens) Bogaerts Declercq Dejardin Pécriaux Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Steverlynck	MM. Ahrens <i>Steiner</i> (Antretter) Kittelmann Reddemann Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> (Scheer) Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Schmitz) Mr. <i>Bühler</i> (von Schmude)	MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Tummers <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) <i>de Beer</i> (van der Werff)
	Italy	United Kingdom
France	MM. Giust <i>Pollidoro</i> (Pecchioli) <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Sarti)	Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Garrett) <i>Woodall</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins Lord Hughes Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Sir John Page
MM. <i>Pontillon</i> (Bassinot) Caro <i>Bordu</i> (Gremetz) <i>Lacour</i> (Jeambrun) Matraja <i>Fourré</i> (Mermaz) Valleix	Luxembourg	
	MM. Burger Hengel	
The following representatives apologised for their absence:		
France	Mrs. Luuk MM. Mechtersheimer Müller Niegel Rumpf Soell Unland	MM. Rauti Rubbi Sinesio Vecchiotti
MM. Baumel de Chambrun Collette Croze Galley Jung Koehl Mrs. Lalumière MM. Oehler Portier Seitlinger	Italy	Netherlands
	MM. Amadei Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi Fiandrotti Frasca Gianotti Mezzapesa Milani	Mr. van den Bergh
Federal Republic of Germany		United Kingdom
MM. Böhm Büchner Holtz Irmer		Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Anthony Grant MM. Hill Jessel Lady Jill Knight Mr. Ross Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 446***on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance –
Part II: Political activities of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Protesting against the fact that the thirty-second annual report of the Council reached it only on 27th April 1987;
- (ii) Noting that at the ministerial meeting on 28th April no action was taken on the proposal to draw up a European security charter;
- (iii) Noting and regretting that no effective decision has yet been taken on the Assembly's budgetary requests and that the words used by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council need clarification;
- (iv) Noting that the Council has taken no practical action on its intentions to reorganise the WEU services;
- (v) Noting and regretting that the Council has given no answer to the countries which have applied for membership of WEU and Portugal in particular;
- (vi) Noting that the absence of effective and adequate information given to the public on the Council's activities leaves considerable doubt about its intention to set up a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Convene as swiftly as practicable a conference of heads of state and of government of the signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty and of countries effectively determined to take part in a European security organisation in the context of the Atlantic Alliance in order to define jointly security requirements for the next ten years and the rôle to be attributed to WEU to this end;
2. Respond favourably to Portugal's application before the end of the year.

ORDER 68***on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance –
Part II: Political activities of the Council***

The Assembly,

Anxious to play a useful part in preparing a conference of European heads of state and of government on security,

INSTRUCTS ITS GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE to organise as early as possible, and not later than spring 1988, a colloquy which would be open to the public and bring together a number of prominent Europeans not at present exercising governmental duties to draw up specific proposals:

- (a) for defining the matters that the conference of heads of state and of government on security should include in its agenda;
- (b) for directing the reactivation of WEU

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd June 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987 (*Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Docs. 1088 and 1105*).
2. European space policy until 2000 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1098*).
3. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987

(Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Docs. 1088 and 1105)

The reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration were presented by Mr. Linster, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Giust.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Linster, Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1105.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 447)¹.

1. See page 24.

4. European space policy until 2000

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1098)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir John Osborn and Mr. Fourré.

Mr. van der Werff, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speaker: Sir Paul Hawkins.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

5. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg

Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Fischbach answered questions put by Sir John Osborn, MM. Valleix, Bayülken (*Observer from Turkey*), Elmquist (*Observer from Denmark*) and Valleix.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts Declercq Dejardin Péciaux <i>du Monceau</i> (Mrs. Staels-Dompas) Steverlyncx	MM. Ahrens Antretter Mrs. Luuk MM. Müller Niegel Reddemann <i>Bühler</i> (von Schmude) <i>Schmidt</i> (Soell)	MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Tummers <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) van der Werff
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet <i>Pontillon</i> (Jeambrun) <i>Bohl</i> (Jung) <i>Prat</i> (Mrs. Lalumière) <i>Fourré</i> (Matraja) <i>Chénard</i> (Mermaz) Oehler Portier Seitlinger Valleix	MM. Antoni Giust Milani <i>Pollidoro</i> (Pecchioli)	MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Garrett) <i>Woodall</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins Lord Hughes Lord <i>Newall</i> (Jessel) Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Wilkinson)
	Luxembourg	
	MM. Burger <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Rumpf Scheer Schmitz Unland	MM. Sinesio Vecchiotti
MM. Baumel Caro de Chambrun Collette Croze Galley Gremetz Koehl		Netherlands
	Italy	Mr. van den Bergh
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Amadei Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi Fiandrotti Frasca Gianotti Mezzapesa Rauti Rubbi Sarti	United Kingdom
MM. Böhm Büchner Holtz Irmer Kittelmann Mechtersheimer		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hill Earl of Kinnoull Lady Jill Knight Sir John Page Mr. Ross Sir Dudley Smith

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 447***on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1986 (revised) and 1987, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
- (a) the presentation of the budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 has been simplified by reducing the number of sub-heads and grouping all social charges under one sub-head and all expenditure on staff under one head but that ordinary expenditure has not been separated from extraordinary expenditure as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendation 433;
 - (b) consequently, because of the effect of extraordinary expenditure, the growth rate of these budgets cannot be accurately compared with the rate of inflation fixed for applying the zero growth criterion;
 - (c) furthermore, the evolution of budgets since 1985 shows an increase above the zero growth rate since the requirements of reactivating WEU – including the restructuring of the ministerial organs – have been taken into account in this budget;
 - (d) in addition, the payment of pensions to newly-retired officials could no longer be included in the operating budget without jeopardising the activities of the various organs;
 - (e) the zero growth rate obviously no longer being of any value, the Council should establish a more objective and effective criterion for preparing WEU budgets;
 - (f) analysis of the various categories of expenditure in the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU shows that expenditure on staff alone represents about 90% of total operating expenditure;
 - (g) this percentage could be improved considerably and amounts under Head I “Permanent staff” could be used for other operating expenditure if the two seats in London and Paris were combined to allow their now separate services to be merged;
- (iii) Regretting that:
- (a) three posts assigned to the Secretariat-General remained vacant throughout 1986 whereas the Council refused the creation of new posts in the WEU Assembly;
 - (b) the Council has given a new interpretation of criteria for dual grading which entirely ignores the wishes of the staff to achieve career prospects subject to certain conditions of seniority;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that at the close of the ministerial meeting on 28th April 1987 Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, informed the Assembly that the Council of Ministers had decided to agree to a separate budget for pensions and to recognise the Assembly’s budgetary independence within the limits of agreed appropriations, this decision to take effect immediately,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apply the same criterion for increasing WEU budgets as is applied by the EEC in establishing its budget;
2. Apply to the operating budget of the Assembly for 1987 the growth rate of 2.79 % agreed upon for its budget as a whole, including pensions, i.e. an increase of F 379 983;
3. Examine the possibility of:
 - (a) uniting the ministerial organs of WEU in a single seat and preparing one table of establishment integrating the services now divided between the two seats;
 - (b) establishing dual grading at every level of the hierarchy to improve the staff’s career possibilities.

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd June 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. European space policy until 2000 (<i>Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1098</i>). | 2. The voice of Europe after Reykjavik – debates in national parliaments (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1097</i>). |
|---|---|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. European space policy until 2000

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1098)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1098.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 448)¹.

4. The voice of Europe after Reykjavik – debates in national parliaments

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1097)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by

Mr. Burger, Rapporteur in place of Mr. Goerens.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Bordu.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Burger, Rapporteur, and Mr. Tummers, Vice-Chairman of the committee, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to. (This resolution will be published as No. 76)¹.

5. Adjournment of the session

The President adjourned the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly.

The sitting was closed at 3.40 p.m.

¹. See page 27.

¹. See page 28.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts Declercq Dejardin Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Steverlynck	Mr. Ahrens Italy MM. Amadei Giust	MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Tummers <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) van der Werff
France	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Bordu</i> (Gremetz) <i>Pontillon</i> (Mermaz) Portier Valleix	MM. Burger <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Woodall</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins Lord Hughes Lord <i>Newall</i> (Jessel) Sir John Osborn
The following representatives apologised for their absence:		
Belgium	MM. Büchner Holtz Irmer Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk MM. Mechtersheimer Müller Niegel Reddemann Rumpf Scheer Schmitz von Schmude Soell Unland	MM. Milani Pecchioli Rauti Rubbi Sarti Sinesio Vecchietti
France	Italy	Netherlands
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro de Chambrun Collette Croze Galley Jeambrun Jung Koehl Mrs. Lalumière MM. Matraja Oehler Seitlinger	MM. Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi Fiandrotti Frasca Gianotti Mezzapasa	Mr. van den Bergh
Federal Republic of Germany		United Kingdom
MM. Antretter Böhm		Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Garrett Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hill Earl of Kinnoull Lady Jill Knight Dr. Miller Sir John Page Mr. Ross Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 448
on European space policy until 2000

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that a resolute space policy helps the development of pioneering technology by fostering progress in advanced industrial sectors and intellectual, cultural and human resources in Western Europe;
- (ii) Convinced that such a space policy can, in the long run, provide solutions to problems of energy and raw material supplies, the pollution of the biosphere and also famine, poverty and illiteracy in the third world, while fostering day-to-day progress and a better standard of living for the populations of our own countries;
- (iii) Determined that Western Europe, through ESA, should be fully independent in space matters before the end of the twentieth century;
- (iv) Considering that to enhance scientific capability and make optimum use of relatively limited intellectual and financial resources every possibility of European co-operation in both civil and military space research must be exploited;
- (v) Anxious to back up the already considerable results achieved by ESA's Ariane programme and confirmed by Arianespace in the commercial market;
- (vi) Stressing the urgency of establishing space co-operation for the security of the Western European countries, particularly in activities recognised to be stabilising, such as monitoring and communications,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Support the aim of the European Space Agency (ESA) to make Europe independent in space before the end of the century by ensuring that it has all the means necessary, which may mean doubling the present budget in the next decade;
2. Encourage the establishment of liaison between ESA and the authorities responsible for space policy in each country of the agency to ensure that all European bodies handling space research are kept mutually informed of current or planned civil and military programmes in order to avoid any pointless waste of intellectual and financial resources and better prepare for the difficult choices which will inevitably have to be made in the future;
3. Facilitate as far as possible operations by the European Ariane launcher to ensure that it has at least a half share of the market for commercial launches, inter alia by:
 - concluding without delay an agreement with the United States Government defining principles according to which the cost of commercial launches should take account of the costs borne by governments, particularly those relating to launching sites;
 - making arrangements to avoid having western satellites placed in orbit by Soviet launchers proposed in the world market if such offers continue to be made without reciprocity and at a cost which does not respect commercial principles;
4. Endeavour to conclude as early as possible an intergovernmental agreement with the United States on the space station in order to bring it into being more quickly while consolidating western co-operation, this being an opportunity for Europe, with its partners, to take part in technological progress linked with this programme and to advance towards independence;
5. With the assistance of the WEU agencies for security questions, examine the repercussions of establishing a European military programme for communications, navigation, observation and reconnaissance satellites;
6. Systematically strengthen European space co-operation which has already made Europe the third space power in the world and encourage the space dialogue with the United States each time it may lead to balanced solutions for the future.

RESOLUTION 76***on the voice of Europe after Reykjavik –
debates in national parliaments***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that many proposals and ideas have been put forward in the parliaments of member countries for achieving closer European co-operation in security matters;
- (ii) Gratified that the governments of most member countries have shown their determination to hold closer consultations in WEU, which they consider to be the appropriate framework for strengthening co-operation;
- (iii) Gratified that, thanks to many initiatives taken by members in certain national parliaments, a true dialogue on the various aspects of WEU's activities has been developed with the respective governments, which led one delegation to conclude its information report by noting that the reactivation of WEU had stopped being a subject of discussion and had become a fact;
- (iv) Regretting nevertheless that the answers given by governments on their activities in keeping the public informed are not yet satisfactory,

INVITES parliaments and governments

To maintain and deepen a fruitful, continuing dialogue on the basis of recommendations adopted in order to:

1. Contribute to the success of jointly-prepared concepts of European security matters;
2. Make a joint European position on security matters carry greater weight in the Atlantic concert and in the East-West dialogue;
3. Give useful impetus to the successful reorganisation of WEU;
4. Ensure that the public is clearly and more meaningfully informed.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 1st June 1987

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Election of the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 1091).
7. Observers.
8. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1102).
Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Werff (*Rapporteur*).
9. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
10. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council (*Presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 1099).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ahrens (*Rapporteur*).
11. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
12. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council (*Debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 1099).
Speakers: Mr. Antretter, Mr. Soell, Mr. Close, Mr. van den Bergh.
13. Changes in the membership of committees.
14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Edwards, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT. – I shall not be standing for the British Parliament again, although I have been a member of parliament for thirty-two years. This will therefore be the last occasion

when I shall have the honour of presiding over the opening sitting of this important Assembly.

Off and on, I have been a delegate to this Assembly for thirty years, apart from three years that I spent in the European Parliament and two with the North Atlantic Assembly. Twenty years ago I was Chairman of the Defence Committee and was the Rapporteur of that committee on three occasions. I have therefore had reasonable experience of the work and the developments of this important European organisation, and I wish it well in the future.

During the past few years, the right of this Assembly has been extended considerably, and we have been fortunate to have had at our service a very energetic President, who accepted new responsibilities as the President of this Assembly. It is thus very sad for me to say that this is the last occasion when I shall meet my good friends, the members of seven different parliaments, friends from across parliamentary and political frontiers with whom I meet and work in committee.

I have learnt much from our work and have developed friendships that will last me for ever. I thank you, good folk, for the co-operation that I

¹. See page 14.

The President (continued)

have received from you during these years, and I say goodbye to this Assembly as an official representative.

4. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

Under Rules 7(2), 10(2) and 10(10), only a representative, who may not be a member of his national government, may stand as a candidate for the office of President, and his candidature must be sponsored by three or more representatives.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Goerens. The nomination has been properly made and is in the form prescribed by the rules. If there is no objection, I may declare Mr. Goerens elected by acclamation in accordance with Rule 10(4).

Is there any opposition to the sole nominee?...

I believe that the Assembly is unanimous.

I proclaim Mr. Goerens President of the Assembly of Western European Union. I congratulate him and invite him to take the Chair.

(Mr. Goerens then took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, thank you most sincerely for your confidence in me. You may be sure, of course, that I will be the President of the whole Assembly whose wishes I feel I reflect in paying tribute to the work done by Mr. Jean-Marie Caro as President over the last three years.

You will, I am sure, understand my postponing the address that is usual in these circumstances to the next sitting. I would, however, like to extend today our sincere thanks to our old friend and colleague, Bob Edwards, for whom this is the last time he will be Provisional President of the Assembly. Like some other members of the British Delegation he is not standing again at this month's general election. He has had a long and remarkable parliamentary and political career and, as he told this Assembly when presiding at the opening of our June 1984 session, he has always been a committed and unrepentant European.

We salute him for his efforts in favour of the European ideal. We wish him a long and happy retirement and we extend the same wishes to all our other colleagues for whom this will be their last session in this Assembly.

5. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 7(2) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10(2) and (10) of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

Three nominations have been submitted in the prescribed form.

The candidates are, in alphabetical order, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Péciaux and Mr. Soell.

The other seats will be filled later.

If there are no objections, I propose that these three Vice-Presidents be elected by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Péciaux and Mr. Soell elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and congratulate them.

6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1091)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session, Document 1091.

Are there any objections to the draft order of business?

The draft order of business is adopted.

7. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, with your permission I would like to welcome the observers from Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Turkey who pay us the honour of attending our proceedings.

8. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1102)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee, Document 1102.

I call Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur of the Presidential Committee.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have the following comments to make in my presentation of Document 1102. Two tasks, one requested by the Assembly and the other suggested by Mr. Caro, have occupied the Presidential Committee in the first half of 1987. They were the budgetary negotiations with the Council of Ministers and the organisation of an extraordinary session. In addition to this there were, of course, the committee's normal activities and what followed on from them. First of all there was the Luxembourg session at the end of April. The date was cleverly chosen by the President to enable the Assembly to state its views before the Council of Ministers met. As the home country of the President of the Council, Luxembourg was also a very suitable venue for the meeting.

There were, however, some difficulties in the Presidential Committee's political activities between the sessions. The reduction of the budget meant that very careful account had to be taken of the opportunities open to the Presidential Committee and the Assembly.

Then the Presidential Committee received the invitation from the Supreme Soviet to visit Moscow. Mr. President, this was an event, in the sense that the Soviet Union had previously been inclined to call Western European Union the false serpent of NATO. Now we were being recognised via an official invitation. The Presidential Committee then considered its proper course of action. It concluded that this recognition by the eastern bloc should certainly be accepted, and that means must therefore be found to implement this. The Presidential Committee consequently decided to allow the Bureau to visit Moscow, provided that all political groups were represented.

After the visit, the Presidential Committee set out in a memorandum by President Caro what it had sought to achieve and what it had not sought to achieve in Moscow. Its aims included making contacts and opening up a dialogue that might provide opportunities in the future. What the delegation could not do, of course, was negotiate. As parliamentarians we are not authorised to do that and moreover the Assembly has no executive power. We did take this opportunity to make Western Europe's wishes with regard to the

zero and zero-zero options perfectly clear. We were happy to hear on the last day of our visit that Mr. Gorbachev had made a speech in Prague which in part corresponded to the points we had emphasised in Moscow. If the Assembly is to continue to perform its task, it must obviously provide stimulus for this aspect of the reactivation of Western European Union, and continue to be extremely active in this respect in the future.

The second point concerns the Presidential Committee's budgetary activities. You will recall that there are in fact two problems. One concerns the pensions of the officials who have served us very faithfully and are entitled to these pensions. However, the strange situation we faced was that these pensions were charged to our running costs, so that we were actually unable to recruit new officials to replace those who left. Your predecessor's consultations with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Poos, revealed that the Council is willing to exclude this portion of our financial obligations – because that is how we all see them – from the normal running costs and to make separate provision for them. Mr. President, I believe this is an extremely important result for the Presidential Committee because it again gives us scope to operate as we would like.

It was also made clear to Mr. Poos that this Assembly felt rather handicapped because it had no way of managing the funds independently, and because everything had to be approved by so many governments. During the consultations in Luxembourg it also became apparent that the Council was very sympathetic to the Assembly's desire for some independence in the management of the budget and acknowledged its entitlement to this independence. After all, it consists of parliamentarians who are intelligent and conscious of their duties. The Council therefore recognised that there is a problem here and that some independent budgetary management – subject to the rules of agreed directives, of course – should be possible.

The last point discussed in the consultation between President Caro and the Chairman of the Council was the problem of inflation. Here again President Caro came to an excellent agreement with Mr. Poos, the Chairman of the Council. This applies both to inflation and to the calculation of inflation rates, for which many different methods exist. It was concluded that a realistic approach should be adopted and that the activities of the Office of the Clerk and of our Assembly should not be restricted.

These matters will, of course, require further study and evaluation. Consultations with the Council will, of course, be necessary on the basis of the Assembly's instructions to the President. On the other hand, it is clear that some

Mr. van der Werff (continued)

important steps have been taken in the past six months towards a new approach on our part. I refer on the one hand to the work of the Assembly and its committees and on the other hand to the structure of the Office of the Clerk and what the Clerk, Mr. Moulias, has said about it in the memorandum on the subject.

Mr. President, I am happy to be the first to speak for two reasons: firstly, because I am able to compliment you on your election; secondly, because I can be the first to say how much we shall miss Jean-Marie Caro, despite the fact that you have taken his place. Fortunately, he will remain with us. In addition, Dutch is not always used in this chamber. I am very happy to have been able to address the Assembly in Dutch. This applies not only to the Dutch representatives but also to the Dutch-speaking Belgians.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. van der Werff, for your excellent report.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Assembly therefore takes note of the report on action by the Presidential Committee.

9. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, to whom I extend a warm welcome.

I will also take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Goebbels, representing the Chairman-in-Office, and the ambassadors and their colleagues.

Mr. Cahen, would you please come to the rostrum.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, let me first offer you my warmest congratulations on becoming President of the Assembly. For me your election has a twofold significance. First it is a recognition of your very great personal merit. You have been a particularly active, enthusiastic and effective member of this Assembly and in selecting you to direct its proceedings the Assembly has recognised all your qualities and decided to have at its head a leading figure ideally suited to such high office. But, as I say, your election has a second significance. It has come at a time when the Luxembourg chairmanship of the reactivated WEU is ending. It is most appropriate that at that moment another Luxembourger should pick up the torch.

But I would also like to express to Mr. Caro on leaving office my great admiration for the work he has done and my full appreciation, as a servant of Western European Union, for his remarkable efforts in the reactivation of our organisation. We all owe him a huge debt of gratitude.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, members of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU, it is thanks to you and the initiative you took in December 1985 that it has now become traditional for the Secretary-General of the organisation to be invited to address you at each of your ordinary plenary sessions. Believe me when I say that I am most grateful.

Firstly, of course, because I am fully aware that it is a very great honour and privilege to be invited to your rostrum. But also because of the growing importance of the dialogue between the parliamentary organ and the intergovernmental organs as the reactivation of our Western European Union goes forward.

As I have said before, it is of course the leaders elected to represent the peoples of our Europe – that is the members of our governments and you the members of our Assembly – who have to conduct this exchange of views when it takes on a political character. It is in this context that the two ministers, Mr. Poos and Mr. Fischbach, and Secretary of State Goebbels will be giving you an account of the remarkably active period of Luxembourg chairmanship which has produced substantial results.

It may still be useful, however – and I am most grateful that it should be your wish – that the Secretary-General, who is responsible for the day-to-day work of WEU and, therefore, to some extent for its progress, should report to you on the state of the organisation, speaking for himself on matters for which he has responsibility. This seems to me to be particularly necessary because there appears to be some misunderstanding on this point between the parliamentary body and the intergovernmental institutions of WEU.

I am in particular led to this view by certain aspects of the remarkable reports submitted to the present session of your Assembly – I am thinking in particular of Mr. Ahrens's report – and by comments from Assembly members to whose views, as you know, I always pay particular attention.

Not that I am complaining that the Assembly is very demanding or even critical towards the intergovernmental bodies and their servant, the Secretariat-General. Far from it. That is not only your rôle, but also your democratic duty. Throughout the existence of our organisation you have fulfilled that rôle and that duty even during the difficult years.

Mr. Cahen (continued)

Today, I am glad to be able to say that you have not relaxed your vigour, determination and demanding attitude during the period of reactivation. By your action, you must still spur it on to further progress. Here and now, however, I wonder whether the spur is always applied in the right place.

Let me explain. Your aspirations and aims are very like mine. Our purpose is to ensure the successful reactivation of Western European Union and, through it, to work out a European security identity in the framework of Atlantic solidarity without which there can be no credible defence for the West and therefore for Western Europe. Neither you nor I would be here if we did not believe deeply in that purpose and its achievement. But while I perceive perhaps more concern than satisfaction on your side regarding the progress of reactivation, I sense in the inter-governmental bodies and I feel personally not a lack of concern, because much remains to be done, but more satisfaction than concern. There must, therefore, be some misunderstanding. It must be cleared up.

To do so, we should perhaps go to the heart of the matter and ask ourselves two questions: what in the final analysis is this reactivated WEU? Is it starting to play the rôle it was given when the decision to reactivate was taken? It is clear that the reactivated WEU fulfils the commitments entered into by its members when they signed the Brussels Treaty and the Paris Agreements.

It is, however, something different and something more, and this is important. It is different because the conditions which prevailed in March 1948 and October 1954 no longer exist and the future to which the seven member states looked when they decided in 1984-85 to reactivate our Western European Union could not be exactly the same as that which was in their thoughts almost forty years ago.

What has been added is that over and above the alliance created by the Brussels and Paris agreements – an alliance which retains all its value within the Atlantic context to which all our countries belong – our reactivated organisation has been given the completely new function of providing European political co-operation on security, which it has proved impossible to achieve between the Twelve.

The “new WEU” is not therefore simply the old one aroused from somnolence by reactivation, to be judged exclusively on the renewal of the activities of its various pre-1985 structures. On the contrary it must be judged by considering: firstly, whether it has been able to set up the new bodies needed for the new duties it has been given while adapting its existing structures;

next, whether having done so, it has started to carry out the tasks assigned to it. I think I can answer both questions in the affirmative – and here I am addressing myself in particular to Mr. Ahrens, the author of a remarkable report which I have read with great interest.

The secret of the success of political co-operation between the Six and the Nine, then Ten and now Twelve lies in the fact that it brings together for regular, in-depth consultations the people responsible in the capitals, whether they be ministers, political directors or experts. That is what now happens in Western European Union also.

Ministerial sessions – attended by foreign and defence ministers – and meetings of the Permanent Council, the co-ordinating body for the whole of WEU's activities, are now supplemented by meetings of political directors and a representative of equivalent rank from the ministry of defence, of a special working group with general terms of reference enabling them to discuss any security problem whatsoever and composed of assistant political directors or directors of politico-military services in the foreign ministries again with a representative of equivalent rank from the defence ministries and, lastly, of experts who come together in the same dual context in working sub-groups.

All these new structures are, on the WEU intergovernmental level and with the Council of Ministers and Permanent Council, at the heart of the organisation and provide the focal point where member countries can bring their views on security closer together.

These views are in fact coming closer together as has recently been clearly demonstrated on two occasions. The first was the ministerial meeting on 13th and 14th November held in the aftermath of Reykjavik. The second was the latest ministerial meeting held on 27th and 28th April, the substance of which was reported to you by Mr. Poos, the Chairman-in-Office, in Luxembourg.

Better still, in the interval between these two ministerial meetings, consultations went on continuously at the other levels. In an international situation which is changing rapidly, particularly as regards East-West relations, these consultations enabled useful exchanges of information and ideas to take place and points of view were brought significantly closer together.

It seems to me, moreover, that all this has been well understood by the media and through them by the general public. I understand and share your concern that the public should be better informed of what we do and made more fully aware of what the problem of European security is for them in the framework of Atlantic solidarity. You are right. This is the only way to

Mr. Cahen (continued)

achieve a consensus among our peoples, without which there can be no sound and dynamic defence policy or a peace policy based on it. I have understood and shared your concern and your regret that the press has not taken more interest in the progress of our work, with the result that the general public is not informed. The Chairman and members of your Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations have often spoken to me about this. It is now a thing of the past. It was my pleasure to prove this to you by publishing two special issues of the Secretariat-General's press review, one reproducing the most important of the very many articles which appeared during the months preceding your extraordinary session and the ministerial Council last April, the other, articles appearing in the days following those meetings.

Furthermore, the ministerial exchanges of view in April and November and the discussions held at the other levels in the interval, not only revealed a substantial convergence of views between the member states of WEU concerning current developments, but also showed that these converging views reflect common longer-term basic positions as regards their security interests.

This being so, the competent intergovernmental bodies buckled down to working out these positions in detail and were able to submit a first report on the subject to the ministers in Luxembourg on 28th April. The ministerial Council took note of the report and asked for it to be carried further and in greater depth for their autumn session. A genuine in-depth assessment of the security interests of Western Europe – seen, of course, as I have already said, in the essential context of Atlantic solidarity – is therefore in progress at this moment. It meets a need revealed last November in the aftermath of Reykjavik and also responds to the appeal made to you on 2nd December by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac, for a start to be made on defining the principles of Western European security.

But work on such a project is no matter for improvisation. If it is not to be a mere hastily-drafted declaration but, as must be the case, is to reflect a common awareness of our countries' security interests and similar views on the subject, an in-depth study is required. Through patient discussions between delegations, a common platform identifying the principles of European security will emerge. I can assure the Assembly that this work is in hand, that it is going well and even astonishingly quickly for such a vast project and that the high-ranking experts from the capitals, meeting under my chairmanship, are not idle.

It is not for the Secretary-General to comment on any possible enlargement of the organisation. This is above all a matter for the member states and Article XI of the treaty is clear on this point.

But may I perhaps suggest to the observers who have honoured us by attending and to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the formulation by the Seven of this platform, which they all accept, will be a valuable guide to the countries which have expressed interest in our organisation as to their commitments to other than the substance of the treaty if they join. It is surely hard to imagine that they would join us if they do not share our basic options on our security problems.

As the ministers stated in the communiqué they adopted on 28th April "the reactivation of the organisation... is now a fact". It is now a fact, both as regards new structures and as regards substance, and it is also attracting the attention of the media.

The administrative services have been reorganised in London and those in Paris will follow in order to provide the best possible service for the reactivated WEU. But we must realise that they are not the essential element. What are essential are the intergovernmental meetings at all levels because they can produce convergent and common positions shared by member states through which a European security identity can be hammered out. The administrations for which I am responsible are simply there to service these meetings so that they can be as effective as possible.

The misunderstanding which seems to exist between you and the parliamentary and intergovernmental organs of our WEU suggests that the latter must keep the former better informed. I will work for this. Let us note, nevertheless, that progress has been made in this area.

As your extraordinary session and the ministerial meeting coincided, the Chairman-in-Office was able to report to you immediately on its results.

Secondly, you now receive the annual report in two parts, one before the first part of your plenary session and the other before the second part.

I am well aware that the part of the Council's thirty-second annual report due to be examined first by the appropriate committees and then by your Assembly during this session did not reach the Office of the Clerk until late in April. We must take steps to ensure that this report reaches you earlier in future. I cannot, however, promise that you will have it by the dates you have suggested, that is in August and in February respectively. It would be dishonest of me to give you such a commitment here. It is not simply a matter of drafting the report. It has to be closely

Mr. Cahen (continued)

studied, discussed and finally approved by the member countries. In a now reactivated Western European Union, each public decision becomes important. This means that our governments are concerned that the parliamentarians should only receive documents, and in particular the annual report, which reflect the views on which they are agreed very accurately. This can involve very careful consideration and lengthy negotiations on texts and seems to me to rule out any possibility of meeting the dates you have suggested. I can assure you, however, that everything will be done to ensure that from now on you will have the annual report and the replies to your questions and recommendations as quickly as possible.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, over the last few months, major changes have been taking place at growing speed in the international scene of which our countries are part. This is in particular true of East-West relations. These changes are bound to have a major impact on the strategic situation of our countries.

For them and for our Europe, therefore, they involve major challenges. In particular, the challenge to be able to influence the course of events within the framework of essential Atlantic solidarity which must be reinforced, even though certain features of the transatlantic relationship may be modified by one or other of the growing number of international developments. The challenge also to safeguard the frequently delicate balances on which the peace of our continent has rested for more than forty years.

In these circumstances, it is more than ever necessary for our countries to discuss and consult together about their security. That is certainly why in Luxembourg last November, Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, said: "If Western European Union did not exist it would have to be invented".

But fortunately it does exist, it has been revived and the discussions and consultations I just mentioned are well under way in the inter-governmental organs and are becoming more intensive with every day that passes. For your part you, as European militants, are working vigorously and enthusiastically along the same lines in another context.

In this way, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a European security identity is progressively taking shape; it will enable our Europe to take up the challenges facing it and to play its full rôle in the Atlantic solidarity of which all our states are part. This is the Europe of which Claudel said:

"God did not forge this great work at a single stroke for it to stay eternally in pieces.

Look to the new challenge, you people whose veins course with the blood of countless races!

Look to your heritage and the sharp swell and fall of the carpet unfolding beneath your feet!

Like an artífex blinded by the sight and perception of what Europe is."

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Secretary-General, for your address and for the kind things you have said about me.

Should there be any questions from the members of our Assembly would you agree to answer them?

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I would deem it an honour, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I listened to our Secretary-General's excellent address with great interest. He was perfectly right to quote Paul Claudel and to introduce a European approach and spirit in what he said. We all know how essential it is for the construction of Europe that Europe itself should tackle the problems of its own security. Whilst we are aware that some of our governments may still be reluctant to take the plunge, we all feel that the study of the problem of Europe's security has become a *sine qua non* if the political construction of our continent is to go forward.

Mr. Secretary-General, you said how pleased you were at the developments in WEU's work. You were right and there is no doubt that representatives who have been attending the Assembly for a number of years – at least since before 1984 – and who knew the WEU Assembly over the previous five years, are in a position to measure how far the organisation has come and the difference between what it was then and what we know it to be today.

The ministers for foreign affairs and national defence hold meetings – admittedly in London – in the Permanent Council and the political directors and the representatives of the high commands of our different countries meet in your presence. This is probably the basic requirement for progress in the construction of a Europe of defence. Unfortunately, as Mr. Ahrens brought out so well in his report, this idea has not yet penetrated to public opinion in our countries.

Mr. De Decker (continued)

There is still a long way to go for public opinion to realise that WEU really plays a vital part in the framing of Europe's security policy.

When I raise these problems in Belgium, members of the public there often comment that, whilst it is true that our governments in the seven member countries are reactivating WEU, they are not increasing our budgetary resources accordingly. I can only agree with them and am bound, therefore, to voice my doubts about the credibility of the seven countries' commitments as regards their real wish to revitalise WEU and accord it the means of becoming what it ought to be.

As regards budgetary aspects, Secretary-General, I would like to raise what is a sensitive, perhaps even taboo, subject in this organisation: the problem of our agencies. I discovered only recently – although I have been attending for six years now – that 50% of the WEU budget is swallowed up by its agencies. And yet we all know that the real core of the work is done by the Secretariat-General and the Assembly. The agencies may have a rôle – they ought to have one – particularly in the field of armaments standardisation. But I see that the Standing Armaments Committee has not met for a very long time. At all events it does not meet at the level it should, namely that of directors-general for armaments in our seven countries.

Other agencies, like the Agency for the Control of Armaments, have a rôle that today has been completely overtaken by events in our organisation and in the European political context. I ask you, Secretary-General, and you, Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, whether it is not high time to try to recoup from the budget for the agencies the resources necessary for the proper functioning of the Secretariat-General and the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Thank you Mr. De Decker for raising some important questions.

I am first of all grateful to you for agreeing with me that WEU is in fact reactivated. You rightly say that the fact is not yet sufficiently realised by public opinion in our various countries. At the time when I had the honour of taking up my present office, the press had absolutely nothing to say about Western European Union and the public had little idea of what it meant. Today WEU is talked about, probably not enough, but some progress has been made.

You say that our governments are not sufficiently militant in promoting WEU. They are

increasingly so, including those which initially had their reservations about reactivation, but our organisation, which is a European organisation, suffers to some extent from the same disease as the Communities and political co-operation: a disease I will call the intermittence of the commitment to Europe in our member states. It is rare for all the countries involved in the construction of Europe, be they twelve or seven, to want the same thing at the same time and with the same intensity. It is difficult even for two people to live together in such conditions and it is infinitely more difficult for a group of seven or twelve. As far as WEU is concerned, I am happy to say that this intermittence would seem at the moment to be on the wane and that everyone is working in the same direction. This is a considerable advance.

You also raised the problem of the budget. As Secretary-General of WEU with responsibility for keeping the engine running and the car moving, I would clearly like to have more fuel in the tank than I have. But although budgets are very important, political will is more important still. We already have the political will and that is the main thing. That is what keeps the organisation moving forward.

If we could have the budget as well, that would be magnificent, but our member states, or most of them, have domestic budgetary problems to cope with. You, Mr. De Decker, are a member of the Belgian Parliament and the Defence Committee so I will not dwell on our budgetary problems nor those of our neighbours. But there should be an extra effort for WEU even if only for the reason that when our member states had relatively comfortable budgets our organisation was dormant and no one gives food to people asleep. Organisations that were not asleep at the time had their budgets increased. When we woke up we were hungry but we had nothing to eat. So perhaps it would be useful to make a special effort for our organisation, forgotten as it was through its own fault, from 1973 to 1984.

This is true, but what counts for me as Secretary-General is political will. The budget is important but it has to come second. And if it does not come at all we still have to go forward.

You rightly referred to the reorganisation of our administrative organs and the agencies. For me there are not agencies and a Secretary-General, but, as I said a moment ago, an administrative organisation that serves WEU, its ministerial Council, its Permanent Council, its intergovernmental structures and, though not wishing to take the place of the Office of the Clerk, the Assembly. We all form one unit and we are all devoted to the same cause.

Given that the reactivated WEU is not quite the same thing as the old WEU – but something

Mr. Cahen (continued)

more and different – the structures must obviously be changed including, I agree, the agencies. It is true that the SAC no longer has the same *raison d'être* as before, nor is it the same as it was, and that we have to consider, as WEU, and with the Independent European Programme Group, the CNAD and the Eurogroup, what our real rôle is in the way of co-operation in the field of armaments. We had a meeting on this subject last week in London with the direct representatives, the national armaments directors, who, after all, are our users. When asked whether they saw a rôle here for us they answered in the affirmative and when asked what that rôle was they replied that they preferred to decide on a case-by-case basis.

It is up to our users to tell us what they expect of us, which is what we have done. But for the ministerial session in October, the Secretary-General will be making some extremely precise proposals to the ministers for the restructuring of the agencies in the manner that I have described.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – After paying tribute to the Secretary-General whose dynamic energy and strong faith in WEU are certainly on a par with his commitment to the organisation I shall go straight to the heart of the subject. Without wishing to minimise in the least the impetus that has been given to WEU since its reactivation or the fact that the public is now better acquainted with it, I have to say that I am still not convinced. Meetings of experts, political directors, ministers and so on are all very nice but what in practice has come out of them?

Europe is at a crossroads. To my mind, there is no doubt that the Geneva negotiations will end in an agreement between the United States of America and the USSR, for totally different reasons but because it will be in the interests of both countries. In these circumstances, what is Europe's position? We shall see one whole part of the nuclear deterrent – which I call the intermediate deterrent – collapse. At European level, without the cruise and Pershing II missiles we shall have no means of reaching deep into the Soviet Union. So deterrence at European level will cease to exist.

There is one conclusion from this that is obvious to all: we have to strengthen our conventional forces. Whilst budgetary restraint is what we know it to be, and though our various European countries have promised a 3% increase in their budget, there are some including my own that have fallen short of the 3% and practically none that is in a position to fulfil its commit-

ments. Consequently, Mr. Secretary-General, our Assembly must look into this problem.

Next, without wishing to anticipate what I shall be saying tomorrow following on the report by Mr. Ahrens, we have to consider, in a realistic atmosphere, practical ways of strengthening our conventional deterrence.

Lastly, when we no longer have a European deterrent and when, like it or not, the United States and Europe become decoupled – because we would be forced into nuclear escalation, as there has been talk of strategic submarines and we know what that would mean in terms of the ultimate retaliation – what could we think of to counter the conventional superiority of the Soviets? This will surprise you but my suggestion to this Assembly is that we go back to work on designing the neutron bomb.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Close, for your questions. I know the Assembly has always wanted a political Secretary-General and with these questions the Senator really has me wearing ministerial shoes.

I can answer his first question without too much difficulty. He wants to know what the ministers and their officials in Western Europe are doing in response to a swiftly-changing situation that is highly disturbing for our continent. In November and April and also in the period between, they considered the situation in which they were placed by Reykjavik, the problem of the ABM treaty, Mr. Gorbachev's proposals of 28th February, the American response and the results of the meeting between Mr. Shultz, the American Secretary of State, and Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shevardnadze. Some points of convergence and even shared positions have emerged. You will no doubt ask me why they have not been set out in a public statement and why we did not let the public and our allies know what we felt.

The answer is very simple. In the present stage of the reactivation of Western European Union, which is a wholly new feature on the European scene, the transatlantic scene and the East-West scene we have both to consolidate our position and to avoid giving any impression of a division within the alliance or sending the wrong signals to our opposite numbers in the Warsaw Pact. For the moment we are not publicly taking any common stances. In other words we are not publicly speaking with a single voice or publicly singing the same song. What we are doing, on the basis of the points of convergence that we have and with our seven separate voices, is to sing the same song to our allies, bilaterally or within the Atlantic Alliance. As and when it appears that we

Mr. Cahen (continued)

are no longer a factor of division – in or outside the alliance – but on the contrary a strengthening factor we shall be able increasingly to adopt a public position and speak with a single voice.

The second question is more difficult. You say, in so many words, that we are faced with a situation in which one component of the flexible response, i.e. the cruise and Pershing missiles, will disappear from the European theatre and that we therefore have to adjust by finding something in their place in particular by strengthening our conventional forces. Of course, you have my assurance that our ministers are taking a keen interest in the problem. I believe that it is in WEU that they will probably be best able both to discuss the problem and to make their decisions and to convince public opinion – because what is involved is the security of Europe.

Thirdly, you referred to decoupling. My answer is that frankly, at this stage at least, I do not think it will happen. My real fear is that, aware of our concern voiced with increasing vigour and in particular by WEU, the Americans may react by striving to prove that there is no decoupling and that they wish, more than ever, to be committed to Europe.

There is a certain change in attitude to be seen, not just on the part of the American administration or even the Senate but also on that of certain prominent people. This change goes some way towards allaying our misgivings and those voiced by public opinion. I believe that there is not so much a decoupling but more what I would call an end to the status quo. Over the last few years, the Atlantic Alliance has lived in a comfortable status quo for many different reasons and strangely enough because the message coming to us from Soviet Russia may not have been very pleasant but was always predictable. It was easy, it was always no. Today, it seems to me, we are at the end of the status quo because of the change in the Soviet leadership, all these proposals and new ideas it is showering us with and the impact that this must necessarily have on our strategy. You referred to the possible disappearance of long-range missiles in Europe and the effect this will have on our other forces. It is quite clear that if the strategic defence initiative is completely or partly implemented there will have to be changes in our strategy with the accent on the offensive, no longer the defensive. So this would clearly mark the end of the status quo. It is a source of concern because it is a challenge to our imagination in finding new solutions and the will and courage to put them into effect. This is the situation facing our countries and with which, backed by public opinion through the agency of the Assembly, we must cope so that new solutions are adopted by our governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Declercq.

Mr. DECLERCQ (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I apologise for being the third Belgian to speak in this debate. This is not because the Secretary-General is also of Belgian origin but because of the interest we take in this subject.

First and foremost, I should like to congratulate the Secretary-General on the statement he has just made and on the enthusiastic way in which he expressed his belief in Europe and Western European Union.

I should just like to refer again to a very practical problem that has already been mentioned by Mr. De Decker and to draw the Assembly's attention most explicitly to the following facts. Of the total budget for WEU's activities, a quarter goes to the Secretariat-General, a quarter to the Assembly, and half – I repeat, half – to the agencies. If we look at the staff complement, the figures are even more revealing: sixty officials in the agencies, as against ninety in the Secretariat. If I am mistaken, the Secretary-General will no doubt put me right. On the subject of the activities of the agencies there is a critical question that must be asked: when we in the various countries call for an increase in WEU's budget, one question that inevitably arises is: what is happening to the agencies? To what extent is serious thought being given to reorganising these agencies? Mr. De Decker has already pointed out that one of them, the Agency for the Control of Armaments, dates back to 1949. It undoubtedly had its uses, but recent developments have made it completely obsolete. And yet it remains in existence. One may wonder what this agency's present task is, and what it actually does.

Secondly, I would ask the Secretary-General to confirm or deny the following. I understand that many interesting studies have been carried out by the agencies, but that they have never been published. They are stowed away in drawers somewhere. They are never seen by the Assembly. My question therefore is: *ut quid perditio hic?*

I urge that the proposals to be drawn up for the reorganisation of the agencies be submitted to the Assembly for evaluation and possibly amendment. This will enable the Assembly to cast a critical though sympathetic eye over their reorganisation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I would point out that several of you have asked to put questions to Mr. Cahen. I would ask you to be as brief as possible and to ask more questions and make fewer comments.

I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, would you like me to listen to all the speakers first and then answer them all at once?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your suggestion. I do feel it would be better, in the interest of our proceedings, if all the speakers first asked their questions and the Secretary-General then answered them all together.

I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on your election. A good liberal is close to the party to which I belong, and we see a good Luxembourger as a kind of compatriot.

I too shall take advantage of the Secretary-General's enthusiasm. My question has already been discussed on several occasions. I put this question to him again, chiefly because he referred in such clear terms to our concerted approach in our work for Western European Union. In 1964, when Western European Union celebrated its tenth anniversary, a rather informal account of its first ten years was published. This happened again ten years later. But in 1984 there was no hint of any such project. In that year a motion was tabled urging the publication of a similar historical survey on WEU's thirtieth anniversary for a wider public, in the form of a popular and scientific reference work. If we are going to talk about contacts with the public and the importance of our work, using all kinds of fine phrases, we should not make a secret of our own history. I therefore think it important to bring the motion and the correspondence on it to light once again. It is important that we be told straight away in answer to this short question that the desired publication will be appearing soon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As President for the whole of the Assembly I am doing my best to see that everyone with a constructive contribution to make can be heard, which applies to your group, Mr. Tummers, and others. I just wanted you to know that.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, not previously having had an opportunity to do so, I first wish to congratulate you on your election. I want you to know that you can count on the support of the whole of the Assembly including, if you please, my own. You may be sure that the team we formed before will continue in the future.

Secretary-General, may I say how much I appreciated your address and then make two comments coupled, of course, with two related

questions. The first concerns disarmament and the second the budget.

On disarmament I note that in spite of the joint efforts of the Council and the Assembly, including the April session in Luxembourg, the Council has not yet come out of its shell and spoken with a clear European voice in the broad and sometimes dramatic debate on disarmament. It is a pity but no surprise. Strictly speaking, logic might be said to argue in favour of this non-surprise.

Like me, Secretary-General, you were present at the Council meeting in Bonn in April 1985 whose agenda included disarmament problems and you will remember that, at the request of Mr. Richard Burt, the American Under-Secretary of State, the WEU Council of Ministers – in fact it was a group of experts – had to cancel that debate on disarmament problems although the Assembly had repeatedly requested the Council to hold one.

The dilemma is familiar to everyone: how can you discuss disarmament without first being able to discuss defence and define objectively the minimum, indispensable conditions for the defence of our countries?

Hence the repeated requests by the Assembly: let us define our European defence doctrine properly in the framework of the alliance and then take our part in the debate on disarmament on that basis.

But between 1984 and the Luxembourg meeting in 1987 the Council did nothing to get into training, so to speak, for this collegiate debate. It has failed to utilise the provisions of the Brussels Treaty or to fulfil all its obligations including that – to which you yourself, Secretary-General, have today referred with some reserve – of producing an annual report dealing with current political events – we are politicians – and not those of yesterday, so that we may form our judgment.

My question, Secretary-General, is this. In the hope that the political rôle you are increasingly called upon to play will become decisive would it be possible for the Secretary-General of Western European Union to tell the Council that the weakness of Europe's voice on the subject of disarmament is not solely due to differences in national policies but is also bound up with the fact that the Council, in agreement with the Assembly, has not had the courage – as you said a moment ago – to shoulder its responsibilities to the full? If it had done so it is probable that at Luxembourg the Council would have been able to respond to a greater extent than it did.

I feel that before putting the blame on others we have to set our own house in order. The Council has not been sufficiently inspired by the

Mr. Caro (continued)

political will to grapple with disarmament problems within the framework of a European defence policy. That was my first question.

My second question, which is more down to earth, has to do with the motor car you are so fond of, Secretary-General. You spoke about the budget, suggesting that we had to recognise the difficulties. That is what you said and, though I usually take you very seriously, I could not suppress a smile which I imagine might have been on your face, too, though perhaps a little less openly. To come here to the Assembly, Secretary-General, and tell us that the WEU budget could create problems for our governments because of economic difficulties today is to expect us to have the power to perceive difficulties that seem to have diminished with the years; one has only to look at the rates of inflation in the various member countries.

The WEU budget is a pittance, a drop in the ocean. It is so small it is almost too shameful to mention. The tiny amount we need to survive in 1987 in normal conditions is what? The price of one, two, three or four Citroën 2 CVs? Your car, you will agree, is nothing like the Rolls you often dream about.

So let us not compare the incomparable. Here again, Secretary-General, it is a matter of political will. Would you please, as Secretary-General, and with the political influence that I sincerely wish to be yours and in which you have our support, explain to the Council that this is not the way to speak to this Assembly nor the kind of argument to use. I am all the more certain about what I say because the Luxembourg Chairman-in-Office is in no way put out by these views, having spoken in terms that have had our warmest support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Werff.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too should like to thank the Secretary-General for another excellent statement on our position. But I wish to make three comments and ask one real question.

In the past – last year in Bonn, for example – we have said that the United States views the development of WEU with some reservation. The United States is, of course, a large country, but we are talking here specifically about the State Department and the Pentagon. To what extent has WEU's position so far changed? I will revert to this in another context in a moment.

Where my second comment is concerned, I agree with what Mr. Declercq said about the agencies. The task of the first agency is described in Document 1101, and is chiefly concerned with

the analysis of verification problems. Mr. President, the verification problems will perhaps be the most difficult of all to solve. Not, as is often assumed, because a country secretly constructs certain installations or begins producing certain systems. These problems principally arise where a country fails to comply with international arrangements despite the agreements that have been reached. What does the other contracting party then do? Mr. President, history tells us that the other party is particularly prone to act like an ostrich and see nothing. If it is willing to see what is going on, it puts an enormous effort into catching up and starts producing additional weapons on a large scale. In both cases, the verification proposals are in fact the most important aspect of the negotiations. The most serious problem in this respect has been not secret but overt violations. I am now thinking of Versailles in this context, but this will continue to be the most serious problem in the future. How does the agency intend to address itself to this specific problem? I agree with Mr. Declercq that the studies should be made available.

As for the second agency, we are told that it is important to analyse public opinion in the Western European member countries on the strategic relationships. Mr. President, I am sorry to say that as a politician I am less interested in the views the public holds than in the views it ought to hold. The real problem is not the analysis of public opinion; as responsible parliamentarians and executives, we should be able to explain to the public what dangers may threaten our democratic institutions in the future.

The question I really want to ask is this: when the cost of WEU is discussed, the ministers always ask how savings can be effected. As we all know, the government in The Hague is very keen on savings and has suggested that if all WEU's activities were concentrated in one place, it might be a little more economical. The government was not referring to its own seat, but to Brussels as WEU's possible location. I want to ask the Secretary-General whether this has political consequences. Would a seat in Brussels lend an extra dimension to liaison with the European NATO partners and bodies such as the IEPG? Is that the intention? I have heard – but it is difficult to know if this is true – that London appreciates the arguments. But this is a problem on which I should like to hear the Secretary-General's comments.

Mr. President, by way of reassurance, let me say in connection with the Dutch economy drive that in its deliberations on public spending – a kind of holy cow in the Netherlands – the Dutch Government is prepared to set aside funds for WEU above the zero growth rate in real terms. This can be seen in Answer 27 of Parliamentary Document 16 625, No. 89. This position came as

Mr. van der Werff (continued)

a complete surprise to all the parliamentarians in The Hague.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rumpf.

Mr. RUMPF (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I have three questions to put to the Secretary-General.

First, the Secretary-General said, rightly in my opinion, that the closer the superpowers come to agreement on aspects of disarmament, the more WEU will assume its true rôle. My question is this: is there a special need for him and for us to decide on an enlargement of WEU, to which he has also referred today?

Second, the Secretary-General quoted German Foreign Minister Genscher as saying that if WEU did not exist, it would have to be invented. I could ask my Foreign Minister himself, but I will ask the Secretary-General: in what form should WEU be invented in that case: in the form in which it now exists, or in an enlarged form; in a form in which the Council of Ministers more or less says what goes, or in the form of a parliamentary assembly in which the democratically elected representatives from the parliaments of the member countries take a decision and the Council acts accordingly? In what form, I ask, should WEU be invented? I feel this is of interest in terms both of general and of budgetary policy. Mr. van der Werff has made this clear, and it is a point that others have raised too.

My third and last question. The talk is always of Mr. Gorbachev's proposals. I do not really know of any Gorbachev proposals. The only ones I know of are our own proposals, those associated with the NATO twofold decision, for the zero option, and those connected with the slogan "make peace with fewer and fewer weapons". Mr. Secretary-General, do you also believe that what we are discussing and deciding on today – we shall be discussing Mr. Ahrens's report later – is our own future? By this I mean, if we come out unequivocally in favour of the double zero option here, shall we not also be strengthening and supporting the European pillar of NATO in WEU? If the Council is always so active in WEU, where is its spectacular response to Mr. Gorbachev's spectacular proposals?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Secretary-General, I would like to refer to a problem that concerns both the Assembly itself and relations between the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat. I have now been a member of this Assembly for two-and-a-half years and a Vice-President for a year.

In discussions with colleagues I have the impression, as they have, that the debates on the links between defence and disarmament policy often fail to achieve the level and precision that we have frequently achieved in the committees and subcommittees of the national parliaments. For the past six years I have been a member of the Subcommittee on Disarmament and Disarmament Control, a subcommittee of the German Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee. Various experts in this field – not only in the German Parliament but in many other national parliaments too – complain that the process of constant debate between the representatives of the ministries and the parliamentarians does not take place here as it does in the corresponding committees of the national parliaments. In the national parliaments there is a constant exchange of experience. The parliamentarians have wide-ranging contacts, of course, and so often gather more information more quickly than the representatives of the ministries. During this process of constant debate proposals emerge that can be amended as necessary during the debate itself.

When I look at our organisation here in WEU, it seems to me that there is really no body with sufficient time to provide for this process of constant debate. Mr. Secretary-General, I would earnestly request you to state quite frankly if you believe that, with the institutions available to it, the Assembly of Western European Union is adequately equipped to achieve the process of constant debate I have described. The question I am raising now has already been put by Mr. Caro, Mr. Rumpf and many others, and I look forward to receiving a reply to it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I congratulate the Secretary-General on his dynamic and lively address. It is true that we are used to this; everybody knows he is a first-class debater and we are glad that that should be so. Everything else that needed saying has already been said.

He quoted Claudel. Long live Claudel. He could very well have written "the annunciation to Europe". The quotation was justified.

Secretary-General, I want to ask you a question on the basis that the present period of intensive diplomatic relations on defence and disarmament is either a terrible risk – and we would bear the gravest responsibility if we succumbed to it – or an opportunity to be seized if we are capable of doing so.

WEU cannot be neutral or indifferent to this issue.

Luckily Mr. Gorbachev waited, so to speak, for the reactivation of WEU to make his pro-

Mr. Valleix (continued)

posals and President Caro has carried the flag of European defence proudly aloft in the name of the Assembly. President Goerens can only have our best wishes for the continued performance of that mission in close accord with an active Secretariat-General and you, Secretary-General, at its head.

That brings me to my first question. To what extent do these discussions strengthen the rôle of our agencies – since they could make an active contribution given the urgency that these negotiations sometimes have? Or are the agencies, on the contrary, trailing behind on these vital issues?

For my part I prefer to believe that the agencies are strengthened rather than left behind.

My second question is of a similar kind, but still connected with the great issues now being debated.

In what way will budgetary problems help us – the Secretariat-General and Assembly together – to shoulder our task properly in the essential dialogue between Europe and America and communist Soviet Russia?

The question is all the more topical in that it is on our order of business for Wednesday. Are you already able, Secretary-General, to give us some answer? In fact the question has already been put and we seemed, during these last few weeks, to have moved slightly backward by comparison with Luxembourg. Can you reassure us?

One last comment. With the urgent problems of the moment and given the rôle of a WEU that is now heard and listened to, for which we have the Secretariat-General and our Assembly to thank, is it advisable to complicate our action with problems that, to me, seem very secondary at present?

WEU meets in Paris. The Secretariat-General has its offices in London. In the present state of affairs let us work with the tools we have and strengthen them but without complicating their use by problems of environment and geography.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Inan, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Mr. President, allow me as a faithful observer to congratulate you on behalf of all the observers on your election as President of this Assembly.

There are so many observers in the chamber they are almost enough for a quorum.

Mr. President, in the Secretary-General's long speech only one small paragraph, unfortunately, was devoted to enlargement. It is an almost discouraging, not to say saddening, indicator of the interest there is in enlargement. I remember that last year, in December, in the same chamber, the Chairman-in-Office said that 1986 would be a year of consolidation and revival – which has never ended – and that the principles of enlargement would be formulated in 1987. What principles are contained in this paragraph, which I would not permit myself to describe as empty but which is both discouraging and contradictory?

The Secretary-General said that the countries concerned should state their positions clearly and agree on a document in line with our defence objectives. But governments and states are not children. When they apply to join an organisation they accept its rules. Unless the principles of the organisation are changed for everybody. We have the impression that the more interest the non-member European countries take in the organisation the less interest the member countries take in them. Mr. President, it is not good to keep people and still less governments in the waiting room too long. This should never be the case for states. But it has been for Portugal, in spite of the fact three other countries – Spain, Greece and Turkey – have now shown their interest. Yet there is still no answer.

You will not always find the same climate at national and international level. You will not find the same élan or the same enthusiasm. If these countries and nations are left in uncertainty they will grow weary of waiting. The day will come when nobody will knock on your door any more.

The world is changing quickly. I quite agree with Mr. Rumpf that Mr. Genscher is certainly not thirty-three years behind the times. If he wanted to recreate Western European Union it would not be in its 1954 form but in that which present circumstances necessitate and dictate. We have to be realistic.

Every time I go away from this Assembly I wonder what message I can take back to my country's parliament and government on the enlargement question. There is nothing much in my suitcase and I wish I had more, Secretary-General. Would you please convey my message to the government? I would like to have an encouraging response. As observers, we are tired of hearing vague and hollow phrases every time and nothing else.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I thank all the speakers for the interest they have shown in my address and for

Mr. Cahen (continued)

the many important questions they have asked. I would also like to express my gratitude for their kind words about me.

Putting the questions into groups, five relate to the agencies, what they cost, what they produce and secondarily what is done with the results of their work.

Yes, the agencies do, it is true, represent approximately 50% of the organisation's budget. It is also true that the situation could be improved by their rationalisation. This will be the object of proposals that I shall be presenting to the Council, with the agreement of the agencies, next October. They could have more importance, be more active, cost less and have fewer staff. We could have a major research centre consisting of a few high-level experts with the right to call on temporary consultants, as the need arises, which would cost less and give you more satisfaction. But I feel that the rôle of the agencies or such a research centre is still important for our organisation.

What do these agencies do? For the moment, they produce studies. I believe the work assigned to them needs to be reviewed. We should stop giving them precise jobs over a long period and focus them instead on what I could call centres of interest within which the Council of Ministers, the Permanent Council, the other governmental organs and, why not, the Assembly, could ask for detailed studies.

As far as the communication of their studies to the Assembly and the public is concerned, the truth is – and I plead guilty – that the member states have not yet managed to define and approve conditions for the transmission of revised and corrected versions because there could well be highly confidential data in the reports supplied to the agencies by the national military or civil administrations. So it would always be as interesting a version as possible but one from which any content that would be dangerous to pass on the Assembly and, through the Assembly, to the public will be deleted.

As far as the budget is concerned, Mr. Caro, it is true that the increase needed by WEU – the Assembly and why not the Secretariat-General as well? – is not much in absolute terms, but our member states have budgetary problems and are afraid that if they give us a particular increase they will be asked to do the same for other organisations. Mind you, they should make an exception for us because we have been starved for ten years.

Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). – The others get more than we do.

Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of Western European Union) (Translation). – I know, but we chose the wrong time to wake up. Now we have to get the member states to realise this. We have had no appreciable increase for ten years so we deserve to be made an exception: Assembly and Secretariat-General too if you do not mind.

That brings me to the limitation of armaments control. It is true that when reactivation was launched in 1985 some people in Washington were concerned about the revival of WEU because they saw it as a possible divisive element in the alliance and above all because, in their eyes, the institution might, as it woke up, send the wrong signals to the other side of the iron curtain. This is exactly what prompted the letter from Richard Burt – which I knew about, having been a political director at the time: it was I, incidentally, who drafted Belgium's proposed reply – that did not ask us not to discuss disarmament but said: for God's sake do it but keep a low profile because otherwise the people on the other side are going to imagine there is a disagreement within the alliance and try to drive a wedge between us.

Since then we have been very busy on problems of the control, limitation and reduction of armaments, particularly in Luxembourg last November and thereafter. It is true, as I have already said, that we have not taken any public stance, again because of the same concern not to appear divided. But our positions, which were convergent, have each time been communicated to our allies either bilaterally by our different governments or within the alliance. I believe that due account has been taken of them and that they are the origin of the efforts in Washington to move in our direction because of our fears of decoupling to which Senator Close referred a moment ago. So we have to raise this same problem. We have a fairly low profile and, for the moment, to act otherwise would perhaps be premature. We have to assert ourselves as what we ought to be – the European pillar of the alliance. When we have done this then, yes, we can change the profile because it will reinforce the alliance and that is what we want. In the meantime, however, we should perhaps not have too high a profile for the rest of the world but keep a useful profile, internally, for our allies.

It has rightly been said that we ought to have a security doctrine so that we can speak out loud on questions of the control, limitation and reduction of armaments. I wholly agree. I would not say a defence doctrine because defence is NATO, the alliance. WEU equals security, the political side of the alliance, enabling us to exert our influence as we should. A security doctrine is exactly what we are trying to produce.

It is fairly easy, as I said when I spoke, to bring out a paper on European security problems. On

Mr. Cahen (continued)

that point I owe you a confession. I teach in Brussels University and one day I gave my students studying for their degree an exercise which required each of them to produce a document on European security principles.

The result was not uninteresting and, all in all, could have been accepted by all our member states. But of course it was only a superficial and rather rhetorical document. What is needed is that our countries should compare their views on security because the fact is that there are major differences if not of substance then at least of emphasis. These differences have to be studied in order to see why they converge or diverge and whether a given divergence cannot be converted into convergence. Then we would have a doctrine that would not be just a declaration but a very substantial consensus of ideas on security – a real European doctrine. I hope – because we are working on it – that we will be able to submit such a doctrine to the ministers in October and thereafter produce a real and substantive declaration of principles.

Much has been said about public opinion. This is a vital issue and the Assembly has a vital rôle in that regard. It is important for the public in our countries to be informed about what we are doing and to know that European security, the shield in which our nations are to participate, depends on what the European governments do in this field. We shall never, therefore, be able to do enough to make WEU known throughout the media and above all to create a public awareness of WEU. Considerable progress has been made in this direction in the last few years. When I became Secretary-General it was difficult to find a single article in the press about WEU, its activities or European security. The only articles published were those that you and I wrote. Nowadays, journalists and reporters have taken over and that is a considerable step forward.

As regards the centralisation of the institutions the question asked was whether this should be in Brussels or elsewhere although perhaps the vital need, before that, is to reorganise and be active. The question is on the agenda of the Council of Ministers but I am not at all sure the answer will come in the near future. As Secretary-General, of course, my answer must be that good management calls for concentration in one and the same place rather than dispersal. For the moment, concentration is not planned for the immediate future.

With regard to the possibility of enlargement, I have also been asked questions under two main headings. First I was asked whether, if I had to set WEU up afresh, I would keep to its present membership or whether I would enlarge it. The other question was why I did not say more about

enlargement in my speech. I made it clear that this was not a proper subject for the Secretary-General to speak on because it is a perfect example of the issues that are the preserve of the member states. Moreover, Article XI of the treaty is very clear on this point. As I already said, the efforts we are making to have a common security platform will be useful for the countries wanting to join WEU because they will know exactly what they are committing themselves to. Not all the countries that want to join necessarily have exactly the same strategic options as those of the seven member states. In other words some member states might find it necessary to change some of their strategic options. This has to be said. Why not? Some observers from the countries I am referring to are basically very much in agreement with me on this point. As to whether I would prefer a broader or narrower Western European Union I can only repeat that this a matter for the member countries. It is for them to decide whether to bring in other countries interested in our organisation. However much I would like to play a political rôle I cannot go further than that in the framework of the treaty.

I was also asked, if I had to recreate WEU, what rôle I would want the parliamentary Assembly to play. Would it be more important and more or less dynamic than that of the national parliaments? If I had to make a new WEU I would give maximum weight to the Assembly because it is through the Assembly that we shall create the essential consensus on the idea of a European defence. That having been said, it is true that all international, and particularly European, assemblies suffer from not having exactly the same powers as national parliaments. Where do we look for the origin of national parliaments? Power and money. It was they who determined how much should be given to the king and to the state and it was from these sources that all parliamentary power stemmed. The same is not true of international parliaments and, for the European Parliament, the opposite is true. The parliaments that developed over the centuries were able to restrict the spending of the monarch and the state. The only power the European Parliament has is to increase it. In parliamentary terms this is a contradiction. That is the problem for your Assembly – to which I must pay tribute because, in spite of the difficulties and the handicaps, it is playing an extremely important rôle. The fact is that, during WEU's ten years of slumber it was in you that the heart of the organisation continued to beat and its spirit to survive. Without you there could have been no reactivation. WEU unquestionably carries considerable weight in spite of its limited powers which follow the pattern of international parliamentary organisations at least until further notice.

Mr. Cahen (continued)

One speaker used the word "spectacular" about our organisation. The important thing is not to be spectacular but to be effective and to have mounting influence in Europe, in transatlantic relations, in East-West relations and beyond that throughout the world. That is what we are in process of doing. When we have attained that efficacy and that influence we shall then, by the nature of things, be spectacular, not for the pleasure of being so but because we shall be important.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Secretary-General for answering the many questions you have been asked.

10. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council

(Presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1099)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day call for the presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council, Document 1099.

I call Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should first like to congratulate you, Mr. President, very warmly on your election as President of this Assembly. I am pleased that you personally were elected, but I am also pleased because your election confirms that all the members of this Assembly have an equal opportunity, regardless of whether they come from small countries or large ones. As matters now stand, Mr. President, your presidency, coupled with the presidency of the Council, means that Western European Union is firmly in Luxembourg hands. But I feel sure the Grand Duchy will not abuse this position!

I should also like to thank the Secretary-General. His lively and committed statement and the comprehensive and thorough way in which he has given his answers prove once again to my satisfaction how right the Assembly was to call, year after year, for a political secretary-general, rather than a mere administrator and senior civil servant.

Mr. President, I have the honour to present the second part of the report which I have to submit to the Assembly on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. The report had to be divided in two because the Council's thirty-second annual report was not received until 27th April. This

naturally gave rise to some very critical comments in the committee, which covered the whole gamut of co-operation with the Council. A particular point of criticism was that the Council has not taken up Prime Minister Chirac's proposal for a European security charter. But the Council's obvious failure to adopt what are, after all, very moderate budgetary proposals from the Assembly came in for just as much criticism. Although the Chairman of the Council, Minister Poos, when questioned, answered in optimistic vein, these answers have yet to be followed by deeds. Not even the tiresome and positively nonsensical business of charging the cost of our staff pensions to the Assembly's budget has been changed yet. Certain members – Mr. De Decker and Mr. Declercq – have just put forward proposals for the internal restructuring of WEU's financial resources. This restructuring would be to the benefit of the secretariat and the Assembly and to the disadvantage of the agencies.

Mr. President, I believe we should consider these suggestions here. When I look at the tasks of some of the agencies, I sometimes doubt whether they continue to meet present-day requirements. As I said in Rome, the reactivation of WEU, or rather its reanimation, since it was in a state of suspended animation, should not mean picking up where we left off years ago, but creating a new WEU. But a new WEU will entail new agencies. Even then I was expressing doubts as to whether a military expert, however good he might be, could really give valid answers to questions raised by conflict studies. In other words, it may be impossible to restructure the agencies without affecting the staff and making changes.

Mr. Secretary-General, I believe I am speaking for the Assembly when I assure you of our full support in these matters. I am also sure that we shall be discussing budgetary matters tomorrow, after the speech by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and especially after the debate on Mr. Linster's report.

Despite all the criticism of what I consider to be deficient co-operation and deficient flow of information between the Council and the Assembly, we must, I feel, look closely at the problems the Council has to solve. It will then be realised that it is not always easy for the Council to inform the Assembly promptly and comprehensively.

Take the proposal for the establishment of a European security charter. This proposal, which, as I said in Luxembourg, seems to me to be a consequence of French security policies in recent years and did not therefore come out of the blue, had clearly not been agreed with the governments of the other six member countries. It is said that one government in particular reacted with annoyance and obvious hesitation and has

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

so far adopted a fairly guarded position. So it is understandable, ladies and gentlemen, if in this difficult situation the Council does not state its views particularly clearly.

Or take the question of enlarging Western European Union that has now been before us for some considerable time. Since Portugal submitted its application in 1984, it has become known more or less officially that other countries would also like to join. It is understandable, of course, that the Council should consider all these applications together and must therefore examine the possible effects of the first applicant's accession on other applicants and that it should therefore consider whether the accession of one country would not perhaps set a precedent that would prove binding in the future.

Thirdly, there are the measures to reactivate WEU, which have been under discussion since Rome, but unfortunately, as I have said, only under discussion, at least as far as we know officially. We all know this is a sensitive issue. Reactivation must not create the impression that the seven member states are forming a bloc within the European NATO countries, excluding the countries which do not belong to WEU, or that closer co-operation within WEU is directed against the United States.

Mr. President, it is quite certainly true – as we have just heard from the Secretary-General, who has encouraged us in many respects – that more progress has been made in these matters within the Council and its working groups than the Assembly knows officially. From time to time we hear something about this from our national representatives on the Council, though at the same time they are anxious for us to understand that written information is not readily handed out. In that case I would say to the ministers and ambassadors here: we must join in finding other channels of communication and information. This might be done in various forms, such as the mixed committee that we have in the Council of Europe. Though I do not underestimate the difficulties, the flow of information must be greatly improved and the dialogue between Assembly and Council must be stepped up if the Assembly is to fulfil its mandate in accordance with the Charter.

I should now like to say a few words about some of the subjects which the committee refers to in the draft recommendation and the draft order, or has discussed in particular depth.

In paragraph 1 the committee recommends that the Council convene a conference of heads of state and of government of the signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty and of

countries effectively determined to take part in a European security organisation in the context of the Atlantic Alliance in order to define jointly security requirements for the next ten years and the rôle to be attributed to WEU to this end. I would point out that in addition to the seven member states of WEU, the committee deliberately invites the other West European countries to attend such a conference and to make their contributions.

Paragraph 2 sets a time-limit which the Assembly believes should be observed for a favourable response to Portugal's application for membership. I have just said that I can understand why the Council is considering Portugal's application in a wider context. But I would stress that the committee took the unanimous view that the way in which Portugal's application has remained before the Council for years could be seen as inconsistent with diplomatic and western courtesy. I have put this very discreetly. The words used in committee were more direct. I should also point out that the reference to Portugal is not an attack on the other applications. Portugal is mentioned because we have been considering its application for years and discussing it with our counterparts in the Portuguese Parliament.

In the draft order the General Affairs Committee is instructed to organise a conference of elder statesmen. Here we were guided by the idea that such politicians, who are well-known in Europe but are no longer exercising governmental duties, are able to speak more freely and frankly about these major problems than can politicians constantly faced with elections in all our countries. This is surely the only reason why we are sometimes surprised suddenly to hear statements from one country or another which do not seem absolutely consistent to us and certainly could not always necessarily have been deduced from past policy. We think it would be good to have discussions with experienced politicians who have at some time been responsible for the nations and the development of Europe, and to listen to their opinions. It will certainly not be easy to prepare a conference or colloquy of this kind. Selection will also create difficulties. At all events, the colloquy should be held before the conference of heads of state and government, so as to help the politicians now in power to form their opinions.

A final word, Mr. President, on the relationship between the European Community and WEU, because this too was discussed at great length in committee. In the report I have laid particular emphasis on the statements by the Commission's President, Mr. Delors, and the correspondence between Mr. De Decker and his prime minister. From other sources, too, we have the definite impression that the European

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

Community is taking a greater interest in security policy. It is, of course, difficult to draw a clear dividing line. The European Parliament will not allow anyone to forbid it to state its views on security or defence policy questions as well. European political co-operation, which, of course, is also concerned with the relationship between the Twelve and the East European countries, will be unable to exclude security policy questions in this process. But we believe it must be made clear – and, ladies and gentlemen, we should also use our political contacts with the members of the European Parliament to this end – that the Twelve cannot take responsibility for these matters and that this responsibility must continue to rest with Western European Union. I believe this needs to be made clear as a matter of urgency and I call on you all to do what you can to help.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Ahrens.

11. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have been informed of three new candidates for the three remaining posts of Vice-President of the Assembly, namely: Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Valleix and Mr. van der Werff.

If there are no objections, I propose that these three Vice-Presidents be elected by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Valleix and Mr. van der Werff elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

The order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age is as follows: Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. van der Werff, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Soell and Mr. Péciaux.

12. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council

(Debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1099)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We now come to the debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council, Document 1099.

I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Ahrens's written and oral reports reveal once again what heavy work the Council is still making of implementing the intentions announced by the foreign and defence ministers nearly three years ago in Rome. Today we know less than ever what the ultimate aim of European security policy is, or what practical contribution WEU is making to it.

In his excellent report Mr. Ahrens rightly recalls that one of the main reasons for the 1984 decision to reactivate WEU was to ensure that the public might play a larger rôle in Europe's efforts in the security field. But what is the reality three years later?

Although more members of governments now refer in their speeches to the need, or even their determination, to continue the process of reactivating WEU, the governments represented in the Council of Ministers have not yet presented the public with actual results in one single problem area that are convincing enough for the public to gain the impression that this organisation is capable of playing a decisive rôle in the determination and shaping of Europe's destiny in matters of security and defence. There is certainly no sign of public involvement. Even information, the necessary preliminary to involvement, is lacking.

I will explain this with the help of a few practical examples. What do we hear about the Council's activities in the area of arms control and disarmament, the vital subject that has been keeping us in suspense in Europe since Reykjavik, if not earlier? A recent article in the International Herald Tribune on the outcome of the WEU Council's spring meeting on 27th and 28th April in Luxembourg was headed: "West Europeans agreed they had nothing to say".

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not share this negative view. But it is one of many examples of how WEU's activities are currently received by the media.

I welcome the fact that so much of the communiqué issued after the Council's meeting in Luxembourg is devoted to the WEU member countries' position on the disarmament negotiations in Geneva. But if we look at the text carefully, we find no indication as to what the governments actually intend to do to ensure that more account is taken of Europe's security interests in these negotiations. So once again I doubt whether the Council will comply with the Assembly's recommendation and present a joint WEU position on Mr. Gorbachev's proposals at the forthcoming meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

The results are even more meagre when we try to glean something from the written version of

Mr. Antretter (continued)

the Council's thirty-second annual report. Furthermore, Mr. President, the subject "Disarmament and arms control" is conspicuous by its absence from the lists of contents in both parts of the annual report. In both cases it is hidden away under the heading "East-West relations". This gives the impression that there is opposition in the Council to making too open a reference to these problems. This section certainly does little more than generally reiterate old positions. It is no good looking here for topical statements.

We representatives can, of course, put questions to the Council. But what do we get for our pains? Mr. Close, for example, forwarded several questions on the disarmament issue to the Council on 26th November 1986. It took the Council until 21st May 1987, almost six months later, to send on its answers, consisting mainly of a repetition of the statements in the Luxembourg communiqué. With an information policy like this, it seems almost ironic when the Council confirms in answer to the last question that it shares the view of the honourable member that public awareness on defence issues is important.

Ladies and gentlemen, what is the situation as regards co-operation on armaments? In the Luxembourg communiqué the ministers stressed, among other things, the importance of closer and more systematic co-operation in the field of conventional weapons. But what is actually being done to solve the outstanding problems with regard to the standardisation and interoperability of weapons systems?

Nor is it very encouraging to hear the answers our own governments give to these questions. In March of this year I asked the Federal Defence Minister about the fate of the joint German-British-Italian howitzer project, and about the possibility of supporting it within WEU. The defence ministry replied that there were no plans to support this project within WEU, since the organisation had no responsibilities in this area. Then, what is WEU here for? Can we still give credence to the section of the Rome declaration in which the ministers emphasised that: "As regards armaments co-operation, WEU should be in a position to play an active rôle in providing political impetus"? What was the Standing Armaments Committee established for in the first place? It has not met for quite some time, and we still know nothing about the Council's plans for its future. Finally, we are bound to ask what the new agency for the development of equipment co-operation - Agency III - was set up for.

Since the three agencies for security questions began their activities early in 1986, the Assembly has heard absolutely nothing about any results

they might have achieved. And yet in a document on WEU's public relations, adopted in 1985, the Council announced that it would be instructing these agencies to prepare material specifically for public relations purposes. Nothing has come of this.

We can only speculate about the eventual structure of the WEU organs. The Luxembourg communiqué says that the ministers had heard a report by the presidency. Although we hear of the existence of numerous reports or interim reports - an interim report on European security interests in the present strategic context, a report prepared by the special working group analysing the politico-strategic implications of the SDI research programme and an outline study on problems of security in the Mediterranean, for example - what we do not hear is what they contain.

Ladies and gentlemen, if the Council is not even giving us parliamentarians the opportunity, however modest, of joining in the deliberations, how does it imagine the general public can be enabled to follow the Council's and governments' motives and thinking on security policy?

I will conclude with a few words on the proposal for a WEU summit meeting of the heads of state and of government. I very much welcome this initiative and feel it should have been taken earlier, because the Council's long delay over the applications received from other countries has greatly complicated matters in the meantime. When Portugal was the only country seeking membership, the Council could have given it a positive answer without any difficulty. Now it is forced to take simultaneous decisions on at least four quite disparate applications. This also means that it must consider carefully who, apart from the present members, is to be invited to the summit meeting. The subjects to be discussed at this meeting must also be prepared very carefully if practical results are to be achieved. At all events, the outcome must not be a reprint of the Rome declaration, a declaration of fine words and benign hand-outs, a succession of declarations of intent. This time, real decisions on security policy must emerge.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would first like to thank Mr. Ahrens, the Rapporteur. In spite of the difficult conditions in which he had to write the second part of the report, he has succeeded in highlighting the most important issues that we have before us in this Assembly.

In particular we should note his direct tackling of the problems about which nothing is being

Mr. Soell (continued)

done in WEU. Large sections of public opinion side with Mr. Jacques Delors, the President of the Commission of the European Communities, in his view that the reactivation of WEU was simply a subterfuge designed to conceal the fact that governments were unwilling to concern themselves with security matters.

Even if we members of the Assembly take a different view of reactivation and recognise that some progress has been made, we have to admit that, since the reactivation agreements signed in Rome in October 1984, the governments of the member countries have done nothing but pour cold water on public opinion and its ideas about WEU. The impression has gained ground – and not just among the public in Germany – that the most important stimulus in WEU reactivation was fear of the anti-arms race movement. Now that the strength of that movement has waned, some governments seem to have lost all interest in reactivation.

This kind of attitude is prejudicial to Europe's common security interests, particularly at a time when East-West relations are undergoing radical change.

Just recently, and more specifically since the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, the public in member countries has been asking itself why the voice of Western Europe is not to be heard when the talk is of linking defence problems with disarmament problems. No reply has yet been forthcoming.

On the contrary, governments and public opinion in Western European countries are primarily concerned about all the new disarmament initiatives like those once again proposed by the Soviets at the Warsaw Pact summit in East Berlin.

These proposals were outlined at the meeting that the Bureau of the Assembly had in Moscow in early April. We were already wondering then whether the Soviet Union was ready to agree to asymmetric reductions not only in troops but also in weapon systems and to have "non-provocative" defence structures. Our questions received affirmative answers. At the Moscow discussions it also came out clearly that the Soviet Union was beginning to see the importance of its relations with Western Europe in a new light. This change is based on considerations that may be summed up as follows:

The new Soviet leadership believes that a polycentrist world will be more stable than the bipolar world we have at the moment. The process of political union under way in Western Europe is accepted as a fact. For as long as Western Europe fails to be politically united it will carry far less weight than the United States

in the eyes of the Soviet Union. In view of the fact that the two parts of Europe have experienced war in their own countries, they are better able to explain to others, and therefore to the United States, what war means. The Soviet Union is convinced that it will never be attacked by even a united Western Europe on its own. The "new thinking" has made the Soviets realise more clearly that tensions between the superpowers also reduce the freedom for manoeuvre of Western Europe; as Western Europeans, we added, at the talks in Moscow, that the margin for manoeuvre of the countries in Eastern Europe in the frozen grip of the Soviet Union was also reduced.

There are no grounds for euphoria because of these new Soviet assessments. What we could ask for, however, is the will to take an objective look at the Soviet proposals and to give constructive answers. Without that will, the credibility of a common security policy of national governments and parliaments would certainly be lessened in public opinion in Western Europe.

At the same time, there would be seriously increased fears that the ambiguities surfacing for various reasons in certain governments' attitudes with regard to major disarmament measures – in the case of the zero-zero option for example – would make the western alliances incapable of structural disarmament. A point that is particularly regrettable, and Mr. Ahrens rightly criticised it, is that the "harmonisation" of the views of the various governments "about the true security situation in Europe", particularly in the field of armaments control and disarmament and with regard to the changing East-West relations, has so far not materialised nor even begun to materialise.

If that harmonisation fails to be achieved during the next few months, particularly as regards a concrete mandate for negotiations between the Atlantic and the Urals on conventional disarmament – of particular interest to Western Europe – the claim to want to reactivate WEU will lose all semblance of credibility.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – My address will be a rather more elaborate version of the points I raised a little time ago after the Secretary-General's speech. It will be confined to four items I believe to be important for the future work of our Assembly.

My first point is one I had occasion to raise last week in Quebec at the parliamentary assembly of the North Atlantic Council. It is a question of reminding our American friends that the advocates of the deployment of Euromissiles used two arguments when speaking in their national parliaments: the recoupling of the

Mr. Close (continued)

United States and Europe and the restoration of deterrence at European level because the cruise and Pershing II missiles would enable us to hit Soviet territory. The opposition's argument was then: what is the point of this new arms race, this redeployment, because we still have thousands of nuclear warheads in Europe plus the nuclear submarines? It was said this would be an intolerable escalation.

Our American friends seem to have short memories because, after the Reykjavik summit and the Geneva negotiations, we are now being asked to forget the arguments we used. A few days ago Mr. Weinberger even repeated the argument that the left used against it. The conclusion is simple: we have lost face and some of our political credibility.

Secondly, I am convinced that the Geneva negotiations will succeed, for one thing because the United States and Mr. Reagan in particular see an immediate domestic policy advantage in them and for another because the Soviet Union and Mr. Gorbachev will draw considerable psychological benefit from them not only among their own public but also in Europe. The result will be that a whole spectrum of what I call intermediate nuclear deterrence will disappear; for me, the distinction between very long-range, long-range, medium- or short-range missiles is artificial.

What will then be the situation in Europe? In the West we had missiles that were capable of reaching the Soviet Union. They will disappear. All the others are battlefield or medium-range missiles. In the East, however, all the missiles are strategic whether their range be 4 000 km or 30 km because the preferential "reception" area will be the Federal Republic of Germany.

I wonder if we are not about to return to the strategy of massive retaliation abandoned in 1960 for obvious reasons, or the Rapacki plan of famous memory.

Thirdly, given this situation, it is clear that Europe has to do something because the flexible response strategy seems to me increasingly compromised. I believe there is a consensus on the response, namely the strengthening of our conventional forces. Everyone agrees on the principle but opinions differ about how it is to be done because all European countries will ultimately be faced with a practically impossible budgetary situation, or what has been called structural disarmament given that a tank or aircraft now or in the 1990s will cost ten times what it did in the sixties.

Take my country's case. If we had to replace our air force fleet – 144 combat aircraft – at the rate of 500 million Belgian francs apiece it

would swallow up the whole of our present defence budget for a period of ten years. In a situation like that, the Assembly – and that is its rôle – would have to study a number of problems. It would first have to look at the possible overhaul of our structures which are still offensive and rather like those of the Anglo-American allies at the time of the Normandy landings. Next there would be the choices of equipment to be made and priorities to be established. Would it still be reasonable to buy tanks at astronomic prices when we could have third-generation missiles capable and certain of destroying them in a few seconds? You may remember the television pictures of the fighting in Chad. In one afternoon, Milan missiles – I am not advertising for French products which, as everyone knows, are excellent, further proof having recently been given us in the Persian Gulf – costing 600 000 francs, knocked out 40 tanks worth 100-200 millions. The cost-effectiveness ratio has to be considered. Another basic point is the use of reserves. If the nuclear deterrence pillar crumbles away and if we have increasingly to rely on conventional weapons do you for one second think that a tenuous defensive line 800 km long from the Elbe to the Alps, with strictly nothing behind it, would stand up to a surprise offensive and the blow it would be capable of striking at selected points?

It is not a question of a three to one superiority, which means nothing any more, but ten or twelve to one. If we do not replace defence in line by defence in depth we shall lose the battle of Europe in three days.

We have to study how long mobilisation takes, and the organisation and rôle of our millions of reservists currently little used or not used at all. To me it seems a paradox that, with such a wealth of reservists, we have to rely on rapid American reinforcements – five weeks – to consolidate, should the need arise, the defence of Europe.

President Reagan has spoken out about a serious incident in the Persian Gulf. I understand the reaction of Americans saying: why should our sailors get themselves killed in the Persian Gulf to defend the economic interests of Europe and Japan, which are greater than those of the United States in that area? What was Europe's answer? Nothing. The problem of out-of-area risks, whether it be in the Middle East or Southern Africa could also concern this Assembly.

Lastly, I referred a moment ago to the enhanced radiation missile, the so-called neutron bomb. If the Federal Republic of Germany is really going to be the battleground for nuclear weapons whether they come from friend or foe it seems to me that it would be useful to have a weapon that would be the only answer to the

Mr. Close (continued)

superiority of Soviet armour and would cause only insignificant and secondary damage to the weapons that are part of our present arsenal. The Assembly should, if we are to remain credible in the eyes of our public opinion, set itself a precise programme.

(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair).

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, for the umpteenth time our organisation, WEU, finds itself in a kind of crisis, at least if I judge the mood correctly. Everyone is grumbling, not only about our own activities but about the activities of the Council of Ministers in particular. I believe this grumbling and complaining about our rôle, this grumbling and complaining because our importance is not sufficiently appreciated, may well go on for the next ten years, unless we try to plot a course. I should like, in all modesty, to say something about this.

The basic problem faced by Western European Union, the European countries, the European governments and European parliamentarians, has arisen through our unwillingness to make fundamental choices in the various bodies where aspects of European policy are discussed. I will explain what I mean by this. We believe that Western European Union must discuss the security aspect of European policy. Mr. Delors, good Frenchman that he is, naturally wants to make something of his presidency of the Commission of the European Communities as well, and has also discovered security policy. He believes the debate on the political aspects of security policy should take place in the Commission. All Europeans become nervous whenever such discussions take place because reference is made to the importance of NATO. The important economic aspects of defence policy are discussed by the Independent European Programme Group, to which the French fortunately belong. The Eurogroup discusses similar aspects. The result is that various interrelated aspects are discussed in a very large number of bodies, without the necessary choices being made at political level to define where we should be discussing what. That, in my opinion, is the problem of Western European Union, because a few years ago we failed – and the governments failed – to make WEU responsible for co-operation in the area of defence equipment. We decided to consider the security aspects, as long as they do not concern NATO, but we are not really doing that. We said that political co-ordination must begin in WEU. We really are going about things in a half-baked way.

What I want to say to our Rapporteur is this – and I agree with him in this respect: if we do not specify – and I have the impression that the Council of Ministers has made more progress here than we have – the subjects for which we think Western European Union must have political priority, the complaints there have been up to now will continue in the future. I urge that we discuss, very positively and without trying to lower the level of co-operation within NATO, the security aspects of NATO's policy for Europe, including the economic aspects that are important here, and I suggest that Western European Union should be the central organisation as regards the production of weapons systems, to a far greater extent than it has been up to now.

I believe that what I have just said is more urgent than ever before. This brings me to my second comment. The two zero options are very likely to be taken up. I feel we should be happy with that, because it undoubtedly means that the European dimension will gain in importance, especially as regards security policy in the conventional sphere. Whether you feel that the present level should be maintained, or that more should be done – this is the main question that will be asked. I am also thinking of public opinion, which we have discussed on so many occasions. Virtually no one in Europe knows of the existence of Western European Union but public opinion can be activated if we make this very specific aspect of European policy, the conventional balance in Europe, for which we have a direct responsibility, the main topic of discussion in Western European Union in the years to come. There has been a great deal of denigration of the agencies here, and rightly so, because we scarcely even see anything of them. I have the general impression that the agencies tend to be places to which retired generals and officials are posted until they reach 65, without having any real significance. The agencies, WEU itself and the Council of Ministers should make the conventional problems in Europe, irrespective of their effect, the central political issue in the future.

Thirdly, I find it absurd – and I mean no offence to anyone – to have the kind of political discussion with the Secretary-General that we had before this debate. With all due respect for the Secretary-General, I consider it beneath the dignity of a parliamentary assembly to appear to have more discussion of political matters with the Secretary-General than with the representative of the Council of Ministers.

I mean no discredit to the Secretary-General, but it is unacceptable. In order to activate the Council and the Assembly and familiarise the public with our activities, we need political debates with representatives of the Council of Ministers. Things must not go on as before. I

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

have been a member of this Assembly for several years, and what I have often witnessed goes roughly as follows: in all humility a member of the Assembly, an independent parliamentarian, puts a modest question to a minister, who is then kind enough to give the Assembly what is usually a rather inane answer. That is the level of the political debate between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. WEU cannot possibly gain political influence and political importance as an assembly unless we drop the half-baked rôle the Assembly has been playing for years and persuade the Council of Ministers to join in a genuine political debate with the Assembly. There is another example. I do not know if you follow this; there is very little point in it anyway. The answers the Council regularly gives to questions put by the members of the Assembly, but usually not until ten, twelve, fourteen or eighteen months have elapsed, are generally so vacuous as to be a disgrace to parliamentary dignity.

In conclusion, I have one or two more comments. In the coming years the Assembly's reaction to the new applications to join WEU from various countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece and perhaps others, will be important. I quite appreciate why the Council is reticent in its response to these applications – that has been the case here, too – but in certain respects I think it is a mistake. I consider the applications from various countries and the interest shown in the Assembly's work by Norway and Denmark to be an important political signal from a number of European countries that they want to make a contribution to the formulation of plans for European security policy. Although I quite see the practical problems involved, I feel it is arrogant of the current members of Western European Union – and I have had a taste of this atmosphere – to think the debate on the European security problem can be confined to them alone. It is quite obvious that a number of other countries which are not members of WEU but are members of NATO have at least as much interest in this problem as the present member countries. I urge the Council of Ministers and the Assembly, given the practical problems as well, to respond favourably to the views of countries that do not belong to WEU, because they may provide an impetus for a wider-ranging debate than exists at present on the future of European security policy.

Mr. President, here we are, three years later, still talking about the reactivation of WEU. I think this is scandalous: we simply cannot go on saying the same things over and over again for three years. WEU – and I am referring specifically to our Assembly – can only gain the respect of the general public and of the Council of Ministers, which generally regards us as a *quantité*

négligeable, and can only become politically influential if it is prepared to take on the Council, if it is prepared to formulate policy more lucidly and if it acts more like a parliament than it has in the past. Unless the parliamentary Assembly becomes politically active in this way, I do not think there is any chance of real activation and influence in the future, let alone respect from the public. So we must stop complaining about the inadequacy of the rôles played by the Council of Ministers, the Secretary-General and the agencies. It is parliamentarians like us who must play an enterprising and authoritative rôle and provide a serious impetus for the reactivation of WEU that we have been talking about for years.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

13. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have been informed of changes in the membership of committees.

First, the Belgian Delegation proposes that on the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments Mr. Bogaerts be a titular member in place of Mr. Dejardin and that on the General Affairs Committee Mr. Dejardin be a titular member in place of Mr. Bogaerts.

Secondly, the French Delegation proposes that on the General Affairs Committee Mr. Pontillon be a titular member and that Mr. Bassinet be a titular member in place of Mr. Mermaz; and that on the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges Mr. Mermaz be an alternate member in place of Mr. Bassinet.

Is there any opposition?...

The changes are agreed to.

14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 2nd June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1099).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?..

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd June 1987

SUMMARY

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|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Attendance register.2. Adoption of the minutes.3. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council (<i>Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1099</i>). | <p><i>Speakers:</i> The President, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Irmer, Mr. Eisma, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Müller, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Caro, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Valleix, Mr. du Monceau, Mr. Burger.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">4. Change in the membership of a committee.5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. |
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The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1099)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day call for the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council, Document 1099.

I call Mr. van der Sanden.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, after yesterday's debate,

during which Mr. van den Bergh made what amounted to a political statement and devoted rather less time to Mr. Ahrens's report – the second part of Mr. Ahrens's report, I should say – I feel it would be a good thing to add a few comments on this second half of the response to the Council's thirty-second report.

My impression is that Mr. Ahrens – and with him, the General Affairs Committee – has tried to produce a kind of shock effect on the Council. I have just been making a mental comparison with the landing of the small German plane with its nineteen-year-old pilot in Moscow's Red Square. That must have had the same effect there as the report presented by Mr. Ahrens today for our approval has had here. I have just had another look at the draft recommendation. If you consider paragraphs (i) to (vi), you will see the following striking words and phrases: the first of these paragraphs contains the word "protesting", the second the words "no action", the third "no effective decision", the fourth "no practical action", the fifth "no answer" and the sixth "the absence of effective and adequate information". That is enough for the Council to be going on with! It really could not be put any clearer than that. It seems to me that the solution proposed by the General Affairs Committee for waking up the Council must have the same shock effect.

The rather forceful criticisms we find in Mr. Ahrens's report chiefly apply, in my opinion, to the actual functioning of the Council of Ministers. I should not be surprised at this, because as the first Rapporteur replying to the thirtieth report of the Council – the first to be submitted to the Assembly after the Rome decision to reactivate WEU – I too had to impress on the Assembly that something had to be done about mentality, the mentality that is typical of the Council's attitude towards the Assembly.

1. See page 16.

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

This may be a bit of an exaggeration, but we feel the Council's thinking goes something like this: "You Assembly of representatives of the people – and we accept that that is what you are – you are, of course, here as a result of the Brussels Treaty, but it really is rather tiresome of you to take your work as seriously as you do. We, the Council of Ministers, are the ones who really know best how to arrange, or perhaps not arrange, security matters internally, among ourselves. And if we do not agree among ourselves, you, the Assembly, really must not interfere". Mr. President, that is the impression I have had for the last three years, after and despite the decisions on reactivation, decisions which we naturally wholeheartedly endorsed.

As the Assembly feels increasingly involved in the work of Western European Union, especially since the reactivation decisions, the members of this Assembly must also be enabled to do their work in the best way possible. I have a very practical question to put to the Rapporteur in this context. Since it is clear that, as the problems with which the Assembly and therefore the Council concern themselves become more complex, the workload facing the members of the Assembly increases, should it still be necessary, as the treaty requires, for the national delegations to be members of both the Council of Europe and the Assembly of WEU? Would it not be sensible to seek to split these delegations? We could then – to put it bluntly – probably be more of a nuisance to the Council than we have been in recent years.

Mr. President, I will now look at the actual proposals the Rapporteur is putting to us. He proposes the organisation of a colloquy followed by a kind of summit conference of the heads of state and of government. I wonder whether this should be seen as a kind of "testimonial to poverty" as regards the Council. Is not the Assembly now telling the Council: "You are not up to your job, you of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council in London are obviously incapable of finding appropriate solutions to the problems uppermost in the minds of the public throughout the world and hence in this part of it as well". What are we now proposing? We, the Assembly of Western European Union, are going to convene a kind of court of appeal. Now the heads of state and government are to descend from on high to meet together and tell the Council of Ministers precisely what it must and must not do. The Council would simply have to abide by this for the time being. Mr. President, if this is the approach to be adopted, I shall not, of course, be so happy, because the control exercised by a parliamentary body, or this Assembly, over the Council will then be slightly weakened by the interposition of this

conference of heads of state and of government. I must tell you that this in itself is not a very desirable development. For the Rapporteur, it seems that beggars cannot be choosers. I feel the poverty of our situation has been borne in on him so acutely that he is willing to grasp at this expedient to achieve our common objective.

The report drawn up by Mr. Bianco last year raised a wide range of questions. What replies has the Assembly actually received? I think the Rapporteur has answered that question in his report: virtually none. What is Mr. Ahrens in fact doing? What he is doing, in the name of the General Affairs Committee as well as his own, is this. Without counting them, I have the impression that Mr. Ahrens has included even more questions in his report than Mr. Bianco did in his last year. If only for the statistics, it would probably be worth counting up Mr. Bianco's and Mr. Ahrens's questions to the Council. But the fact remains that we are still waiting for down-to-earth answers of substance from the Council of Ministers.

Mr. President, I feel this Assembly has taken a clear political stand on the matters that now require an answer from Western European Union as a matter of urgency. It is also clear that we are now telling the Council of Ministers that it must take up the gauntlet and actually respond to the urgent questions of importance to the Assembly at the moment. I would add once again – probably once too often – that we regard the work this organisation is supposed to do as necessary work. In the attempts to tackle the world's problems there should in fact be no difference between the Council's and the Assembly's approach. The two should be thinking along the same lines – after all, our aim is the same. As I have said before, when we talk about Western European Union, we are not talking about a completely uncommitted co-operative body where we agree if we agree, and if we do not, we say "Too bad", and go home. No, we are talking about a Western European Union in which we join in trying to do the very necessary work of achieving the highest possible level of security in our society.

Mr. President, a brief comment on the substance of this. Although I am not basically in favour of holding the proposed summit conference, it may in fact be necessary, because the Council is obviously not doing enough to take the decisions that should be taken.

Mr. Ahrens's report also criticises the Council's failure to take any decisions in Luxembourg on the establishment of a European security charter, as proposed by Prime Minister Chirac during the Assembly's last part-session. I would emphasise that I share the view that the establishment of a European security charter of this kind must in no way be allowed to interfere with

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

NATO's activities or our relations with the United States, our greatest ally. But this does not alter the fact that we in Europe must be able to specify the limits to what we can and what we want to do.

I see that the Rapporteur in fact shares the fear I expressed during the discussion of the first part of his report. I asked him then if we still had enough time to draw up a European security charter of this kind. I could now put this question again in the light of the proposal for a summit conference and in the light of international developments, which include the stream of proposals pouring in on us from both the United States and the Soviet Union. Do we have time to think about a European security charter, while developments may be proceeding without our knowledge? I do not think that should be allowed to happen, in other words that we should be able to exert as much influence as possible on our allies in the United States. So I am pleased with the statements we find in the report that President Reagan himself has recognised that Western European Union does not want to develop activities without NATO and outside NATO, but genuinely intends to maintain the goal of unanimity among the allies. This means that the sensitive reactions in the United States are now probably a thing of the past. But I think it would be a good thing – I ought really to be saying this to the Council of Ministers – if we made a clear reference to this statement by President Reagan in the NATO consultations, so as to avoid a recurrence of the misunderstandings that have occurred in the past.

My next point concerns the question of enlargement. Mr. Ahrens knows that I feel an early decision should be taken on Portugal's application. I believe Portugal is entitled to that. We agreed on this in the General Affairs Committee and at the Assembly's session in Luxembourg.

As for the other European NATO countries, I should like to make it absolutely clear once again that on tactical and also on practical grounds I think it would be better for the Council first to finish off its work on the reactivation decisions and then to consider the undoubtedly difficult and complex questions arising in connection with the further enlargement of WEU.

Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that in the play of political forces between the two superpowers, where world peace and security are at stake, Europe – if I may put it this way – has always played a rather subordinate rôle because it is itself divided. Time grows short. This means that we in Europe must first reach agreement and speak with one voice, in NATO, for example. Only then can there also be a major

improvement in the atmosphere between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Irmer.

Mr. IRMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, only when we take a closer look at the title of the report we are discussing today, "The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance", and especially the subtitle, "Political activities of the Council", do we begin to appreciate what has been achieved here in both respects: nothing at all. The previous speaker put it very forcibly: it says here that we protest against the report appearing so late; we regret that the Council has not done this and that. This is a shameful and in fact a shocking result.

The Rapporteur, Mr. Ahrens, cannot be blamed in any way. Quite the contrary. He has endeavoured with a great deal of commitment to make the best of this lamentable situation, but what is a rapporteur to do in a position like this?

I feel this regrettable situation should make us think very carefully about two things. First, what do we want? What is our task? Second, what instruments, what resources do we have at our disposal for performing this task? Our task is clear. We want a common European defence policy within the NATO alliance. That is an urgent need, because it is unacceptable that the European voice should be heard as little within NATO as it is at present. We undoubtedly have a wide range of security interests in common with our American partners. But there are also large areas where our interests differ.

Take the geographical situation. We naturally view a conflict in the Mediterranean, like the one involving Libya in April of last year, completely differently from the citizens of the United States. Europeans attach more importance to the conflict in the Middle East, simply because of its geographical proximity, than do the Americans. Let us imagine Pershing missiles deployed at the gates of Stuttgart and Amsterdam. This would affect our citizens quite differently from the citizens of Chicago or San Francisco.

But what are we Europeans doing in this situation? We are squabbling and failing to agree. If the American President wants to know what the Europeans are thinking, he cannot ring up one office or one president and say: "Mr. President, what would the Europeans like?" No, he has to make ten, twelve, fourteen, sixteen telephone calls. He has to ask ten, twelve, fourteen, sixteen times: "How would the Europeans like this?" He then gets ten, twelve, fourteen, sixteen different answers from which to elicit what the Europeans want. This is a hopeless situation.

Mr. Irmer (continued)

What does the American President do? What would any sensible person do in his place? He does what he thinks right and the Europeans are left empty-handed.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, that is the outcome of the present situation. I am exaggerating slightly, but in principle the fact is that we are becoming more or less friendly satellites of our allies. But that is not how it should be. We Europeans must analyse and define our security interests and then decide what we are aiming at. We must make a point of our European interests in the alliance. We are as far removed from that situation as we have ever been, and I find myself wondering why. It may be that we have the wrong institutions and that we have in the end accepted the fragmentation of the institutions we happen to have.

Yesterday the Rapporteur, Mr. Ahrens, said – rightly if we consider the legal side – that responsibility for defence matters rests with WEU, not with the European Community. That is correct. But then, ladies and gentlemen, we should ask ourselves if WEU, at least in its present state and with its present structure, is the appropriate political body for actually developing a common European defence policy, even though that is legally its responsibility. The recommendation from the General Affairs Committee is indicative: it calls for a conference which would not be confined to WEU's present members but would, sensibly, extend beyond them. When I consider European security and defence policy, I should like the Danes to have just as much of a say as the Portuguese. Why should consideration be given here to the security interests of the Belgians or the Germans or the Italians, but not to those of the other European members of NATO? It does not make sense. It is therefore necessary to question whether WEU, with its present structure, is not in urgent need of enlargement if it is to meet its responsibilities.

There is a second point I should like to raise. What does this Assembly do? It can complain. It can lament. It can provide valuable impetus. But does it exercise the slightest vestige of control? This goes right back to the roots of our authority. Which of us – there may be certain exceptions: our past President, Mr. Caro, for example, who was undoubtedly helped in his election to his national parliament by the fact that he was President of this Assembly, and the same may also be true of our new President, Mr. Goerens – but which of us ordinary members was elected to his national parliament because he also has a seat in this Assembly? Which of us thinks, when preparing for re-election, that his activities here might have any particular part to play? No, we are elected as national representatives. When the

decision is taken, the focus is on national problems. We sit here by indirect right, deriving from our democratic legitimation elsewhere. This, of course, hampers us in the proper fulfilment of our responsibilities.

There is another thing – and I am grateful that the previous speaker referred to it: how are we to cope with the workload? We have duties to discharge in our national parliaments. I have to return to Bonn this evening, I cannot stay here until the end. On Thursday, our Federal Chancellor is making a government statement which is being prepared in the committees. Excessive work is preventing us from meeting the responsibilities we have here.

As I said, the European institutions are fragmented. On the one hand, we have the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which is responsible for human rights, the environment, culture, all the finer things in life. On the other hand, we have the European Parliament, which, according to what Mr. Ahrens said yesterday, is really responsible only for economic questions. That has changed. The single European act has formalised what the European Parliament has been doing in recent years. It has been made partly responsible for foreign policy, for what used to be known as European political co-operation. But I ask you: how can European political co-operation or European foreign policy be separated from security and defence policy? It is surely logical that, in implementing the single European act, the European Parliament should also concern itself with defence policy, and it has increasingly been doing so since it was directly elected. I would remind you of Mr. Haagerup's report, drawn up as long ago as 1981, and of Mr. Klepsch's report, both of which concern aspects of European defence policy.

Here we sit, in the WEU Assembly, with no power and no authority and we are supposed to do something in this small sector of defence policy. That is surely impossible. How are we to formulate defence policy without discussing unemployment, the economic structure and all the political interrelationships in Europe as well? I urge that we seriously consider whether the instruments available in Europe are in fact still sufficient, given the present structure, to deal with the problems. I believe that we in this Assembly should also say very loudly and clearly that we must work towards a European union with full powers in the political sector, without omitting or excluding any areas. From this it must logically follow that a democratically legitimated assembly can spur on the Council of Ministers, check its activities, and force it to do certain things, namely and in particular, seriously to address the pressing political problems.

Mr. Irmer (continued)

It is easy for the Council of Ministers, of course. It is always the same people who – wearing different hats – meet both here and there. They meet at different places and perhaps under different chairmen, but the same ministers who form the European Community's Council also form WEU's Council. The same people meet again when the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe sits. But the assemblies are split and have no power.

Ladies and gentlemen, I recently made the suggestion – and I will conclude with this – that we might consider whether the tasks incumbent on us here could not be assigned to the members of the European Parliament who represent the member countries of WEU though this would entail an amendment to the treaty. They are always meeting. They have far more time for this work than we have. They are directly elected and have a direct mandate relating to European unification. But we are drawn from our national parliaments and do our work here on the side, as it were.

I realise it is rather unusual for a member to question his own position and his own authority. It would mean no one would come here unless he happened to have a seat in the European Parliament as well. But to be logical, and in view of the work that needs to be done, I feel we should give some thought to this proposal, or at least consider whether a first step could not be taken here.

Finally, I want to say that the development of a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance has priority. Our peoples want it and our governments say they want it. In fact, everybody wants it. Why does it not come about? WEU's Council has done nothing to achieve it, or, if it has done anything, we have heard nothing about it. And that in itself is a scandal, ladies and gentlemen.

This Assembly must insist with all its might on the development of further initiatives here. We must have no taboos. We must ask ourselves: is WEU, and especially this Assembly, the right body? I think not. We must develop into a European union with comprehensive powers. Then the institutions and instruments at our disposal will be capable of dealing with this great task.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I want to compliment Mr. Ahrens on his report. Although it is a small step, it is a further step in the direction of a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, designed to maintain

security in Europe. I will just say a few words about Mr. Ahrens's recommendations.

He proposes a conference of heads of government, which is rather like Mr. De Decker's proposal. I understand that Mr. Ahrens also wants to involve the countries which have applied to join WEU. I shall touch on this point in a moment. It is also similar to the proposal Mr. Delors made a few months ago when he wanted to organise a summit conference on European security questions following Mr. Gorbachev's proposals.

In connection with Mr. Irmer's statement I note that the European Community will ultimately be the political forum for security matters. The new single European act is a small step forward in this respect, but for the time being we still depend on Western European Union when we are discussing European security. Countries such as Ireland are also members of the European Community, occupying a special position and for the moment preventing the Community from saying anything definite about security problems. I would say to Mr. Irmer that we must regard WEU as a staging post. It comprises seven members, who are all members of the Atlantic Alliance and also of the European Community. If these seven members can regularly say something unequivocal about the European pillar of security policy – and we regularly do our best in this respect here – the activities of this union of seven members can, as it were, be "slotted in" to the European Community, with its twelve members. I see this as a phased process. My party believes that WEU has a rôle to play for the time being.

To revert to Mr. Ahrens's proposal, he wants a major summit conference of the heads of government. I feel it is still rather too soon for that. The same applies to Mr. Delors's proposal. We must take care not to put forward proposals which are not feasible. The establishment of a European security charter is, of course, central to the agenda again for this summit conference. If we put this subject on the agenda prematurely for so serious an event as a summit conference, we must remember that on 28th April the ministers of defence and foreign affairs did not find it possible to issue a statement on a European security charter. We must therefore be very careful about saddling another body with this subject. Very careful preparations must be made. First of all, the defence and foreign ministers must agree on substantive improvements within Western European Union. If this is not done, the kind of summit conference that is proposed will simply be counter-productive.

I am also interested in Mr. Ahrens's reaction to the idea that all the countries applying for membership of WEU should now be involved in a summit conference of this kind. Mr. Ahrens is

Mr. Eisma (continued)

thinking of Portugal in this context, but it is difficult to single out Portugal from among the countries which have so far applied for membership: Spain, Greece and Portugal. Why invite only Portugal to this summit conference? Why not the other two countries? We must be very careful about taking a decision on this before it has been officially established who is to become a member of Western European Union. Let us not forget that the European Community is proof that excessively rapid enlargement can be counter-productive. We must first put our own house, with its seven countries, in order. We should be warned against too early a decision. As the British say: you can take a horse to the water but you cannot make it drink. This must be our motto when we talk about organising new summit conferences.

It was decided in the General Affairs Committee this morning that a colloquy would be held at the beginning of March next year. We are very much in favour of this. This is the occasion when applicant countries can make their views known. We must gather together the right people at the right time, but we must ensure that the defence and foreign ministers first prepare the European security charter. Only if the preparatory work is done is there any guarantee that a future summit conference has a chance of success. If we hold a summit conference prematurely I believe it will be a fiasco.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, with Bonn's approval of the zero-zero option Europe has surrendered completely. After much talking between governments, experts and military technologists the western response on European missiles is now virtually decided and our debate has lost much of its significance. Without enthusiasm and ingloriously the Atlantic Alliance is going to accept the deal proposed by Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. For many Europeans this amounts to an act of resignation. Following the shock of Reykjavik the Europeans see themselves caught in the trap of the first zero-zero option unwisely suggested by themselves some years previously in the hope that it would be turned down by the USSR, and they now see Mr. Gorbachev putting forward exactly the same idea – one might also say the trap – and gaining the initiative through a series of increasingly surprising and clever proposals aimed at winning over the general public who always want peace from their leaders.

The paradox is that NATO is liable to deprive itself of the good missiles in its arsenal while retaining the bad, thereby relinquishing the

weapons which could protect us and maintain our ability to attack Soviet territory. All those who are rushing to accept these proposals fail to realise that by doing so they are depriving us of our ultimate weapon with which we could launch operations against Soviet territory from Europe.

This is the reason why the USSR has done everything to bring about the withdrawal of the Pershing IIs which are alone capable of reaching Soviet territory and has displayed in its efforts a determination and strength of will which I should very much like to see on the western side.

The resulting paradox is that we shall gradually find ourselves in a naked and empty Europe between two imposing arsenals which will remain untouched, because our dear European pacifists, the "greens" and the neutralists who are campaigning for the zero and zero-zero options and the rest fail to say a word about the 12 000 Soviet missiles which will not be touched or about the thousands of missiles which will continue their existence inside the American fortress. The result will be a Europe virtually stripped of defence between two super-powers which will increasingly exercise their strategic and nuclear condominium throughout the world.

Is that what the Europeans want? What an abdication! What a historic opportunity of keeping a capacity for European action will be lost.

What is needed is what Europe lacks – political will and a determination to defend itself, but the fact is that for the last twenty years there have been three kinds of Europeans: those who wish to defend themselves, those who wish to be defended by the Americans without any effort on their part and those who wish to do nothing but live peacefully in a sort of neutral oasis.

In this situation, we must ask ourselves some questions as it is clear that no one can be opposed to disarmament measures provided they are verifiable and balanced. However, the problem of real and genuine verification is wholly unresolved.

The paradox is that we are going to eliminate Europe's nuclear weapons and so leave the Warsaw Pact with its crushing superiority in conventional forces.

As the zero and zero-zero options are under discussion, why do the western allies not suggest a triple zero option? The third zero would cover tank divisions, conventional weapons and aircraft. When discussions are taking place on the removal from Europe of the American missiles which alone gave us the absolute assurance of security why not add to the disarmament agenda

Mr. Baumel (continued)

the unbelievable Soviet superiority in conventional forces which, in the absence of American or European missiles, will expose Europe to very grave danger? The fact is that for thirty years our state of equilibrium has been the result of a double imbalance with a nuclear imbalance in favour of the West. That will be lost.

Europeans cannot fail to be surprised by the present enthusiasm of the two superpowers for the disappearance of European nuclear weapons leaving, as Mr. Raimond, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, has pointed out, a very large number of nuclear warheads in the United States and the Soviet Union.

The elimination of the American missiles stationed in the west of the continent will not stop Europe being threatened by the 11 000 Soviet nuclear warheads facing Western Europe and capable of delivery with an accuracy which has been greatly improved in recent years.

We are in a completely contradictory situation. The Europeans are accepting proposals which mean the denuclearisation of Europe, or in plain terms its political demise followed by its strategic nullification, but at the same time they are not uttering a word about the other imbalances menacing Europe or about the need to reinforce conventional forces, as the response that can be made to the tragic reduction of nuclear forces in Europe is to strengthen the West's conventional armaments.

But which government and which parliamentarian in this Assembly will dare suggest that their parliament should double or treble defence budgets to enable the West to restore the balance at a time when Europe is afflicted by unemployment, recession and inflation?

It is therefore Utopian to believe that we shall be better able to defend Europe without nuclear missiles and without making the slightest additional effort with regard to our land forces and weapons systems, particularly as the proposals from some quarters for the development of intelligent electronic weapons systems are extremely costly and will find acceptance nowhere.

That is why we think that our present situation is a matter for the gravest concern, and we must sadly admit that since Reykjavik Europe has probably failed to measure up, as it should and could have done, to the demands of one of the last great moments in history. It has failed to do so because it has been unable to establish a common position. One after the other the European nations, with the exception of France, have given way. For the sake of good relations with our German neighbour, France did not set out clearly, officially and publicly its deeply held convictions. It tried at any cost to reach

agreement to co-operate between itself and Germany, and the result is disappointing as Mr. Kohl has wholly accepted the proposals from the East.

In this situation we feel that we should try to begin at the bottom, that is to say with the elimination of weapons liable to turn Europe into a nuclear battlefield while retaining a reduced number of missiles of greater deterrent potency which can be targeted on the only country where any decision to start a war would be taken – the Soviet Union.

Instead of this we are witnessing, as I remarked just now, the immunisation of Soviet territory thus leaving Europe exposed to the full gamut of aggression and threats. In this tragic scenario we might at least have hoped to see a clearer display of European solidarity, but alas Reykjavik was followed not by a backlash but by moaning and groaning.

Paris is therefore in an awkward situation, as we have our own individual, independent attitude to this security and defence problem. We believe, I think, that the minimum response in present circumstances would be for us to stop protesting ineffectually against what cannot be changed and for the European governments to approve a safeguarding statement, taking note of the forthcoming agreement but reserving our future position by stating clearly that it concerns only American weapons, and those in Europe in particular, but not any which might be available to the Europeans today or tomorrow, assuming that European defence could one day become a reality. Such an initiative would be theoretical at the moment, but it would leave the door open for the European defence which must at some time be envisaged.

In circumstances of necessity and growing difficulty there is no option for Europe but to direct its thoughts, not to the celebrated European pillar which has been talked about for years but only exists in the imagination of some, but to the basis of action for the practical defence of Europe founded largely on the will of the powers determined to defend themselves, which are essentially the Federal Republic of Germany with its conventional army, the United Kingdom with its forces and France.

These are the three factors essential for the defence of Europe.

I have no wish to hurt anyone, especially not our friends and allies, but it is true that the real defence of Europe is largely dependent on these three conventional, naval and nuclear arsenals. An effort must be made to do something, whatever the cost.

Perhaps we can hope that something will be done within WEU. Listening to the Secretary-

Mr. Baumel (continued)

General yesterday I felt great admiration for the optimistic and evocative way in which he presented our activities. I am very sorry to tell him that to outside opinion and to the press, which devotes only a few lines to our debates, Western European Union appears more like a puppet theatre than a political and military headquarters.

I therefore believe that we should think deeply about what is to happen next. What has been done belongs to the past. Let us be realistic – all is not lost. It is our strength of will, our actions and above all the support of public opinion which will prevent Europe being the principal victim of what are now called “the new East-West relations”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should first like to thank Mr. Baumel for the description he has just given. He has put his finger on various sores that are causing us a good deal of pain at the moment. The fact that we are now discussing a report entitled “The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance” means that the whole thing can only be considered in a very euphemistic light, because there is precious little evidence of a pillar. It is crumbling everywhere. The description seems to have more to do with relics than reality.

So here we are, standing once again – I repeat, once again – at the Wailing Wall when we see that the Council of Ministers is not giving us any answers, that no action is taken, that announcements are not followed up. You will recall the great meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Venice last year, where they were closely guarded from the air, from the sea, from all sides, though I really have no idea why, because it was a media event, not a political event for which guards would have been needed. When you see all this, you are bound to get the impression that Europe has no problems, that Europe takes vital decisions on disarmament questions, that our security is absolutely guaranteed. Otherwise the ministers could not have behaved in the dilettante way they have for the last few years.

We all know that the real situation is quite different. We know that the fulcrum of world politics has long since moved away from Europe. It was once around the Mediterranean basin, then it moved to the Atlantic area, between the United States and Europe and it is now shifting to the Pacific region. Europe is becoming peripheral and no longer has any idea of its possible significance.

Added to this, at the meeting in Reykjavik and what followed, the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have evidently resumed a policy which in some ways reminds me of Yalta, the meeting that took place at the end of the second world war, where Roosevelt and Stalin made decisions on Europe. There was only one real expert on Europe taking part in this dialogue, and that was Mr. Stalin, while Mr. Roosevelt was largely sustained by illusions, as they very soon proved to be after 1945, when any hopes of creating new democracies – for instance in Eastern Europe – were dashed. This situation ought really to make any responsible European politician stop and think and cause him to do all he can to secure a joint European geo-political initiative, particularly on defence policy, by at least a given number of key countries in Europe.

At this point I should like to make a few comments on what Mr. Irmer said just now about the rôle of this Assembly. He believes that the European Parliament could, in principle, perform this Assembly's function. In theory, I agree with him, but I doubt if it is possible in practice, ladies and gentlemen, because the European Parliament is a very much larger creature – if I may put it that way – than the WEU Assembly. Although the European Parliament is directly elected, it has no power, as we know. The people there cannot even solve the problem of farm prices, so how do they expect to solve the problem of European defence? I believe that if anything is counter-productive to the European idea, it is the European Parliament. We shall see this borne out at the next direct elections to the European Parliament, when probably not even half the population of the Federal Republic will cast their votes, because they are not prepared to commit themselves to something which is basically impotent. The outcome of this development is that the countries associated for defence purposes in WEU must again become one, effectively operative element. We have gone on and on complaining. We have uttered warnings, which had no effect, but perhaps for once some eyes will be opened.

I have a few words to say about the enlargement of WEU. Personally, I am extremely sceptical about this. When I look at the European Community, for example, I observe that its enlargement has not strengthened the European idea. Imagine the European Community being expected to speak with a single voice on foreign and defence policy issues: with Greece there, and Ireland, and France, and the Federal Republic. The situation would be far more complicated in the European Community than it is with the seven countries who have joined together to form Western European Union. Hence my reiterated objection to enlarging this nucleus of the

Mr. Müller (continued)

Seven in the belief that the more members it has, the more powerful this organisation will be.

I believe the opposite is more likely to be true. The nucleus that still exists here and was created after the second world war on the basis of the Brussels Treaty on quite specific grounds should be revealed again, and it should be made clear with the modified Brussels Treaty what its real task has always been.

The great risk we face – Mr. Baumel has addressed this issue with his comments on the double zero option – is that the special situation of Europe's defence should be decoupled from the United States. This danger, this threat to Europe can only be overcome if Europe has the political will to recall its own strength – and perhaps its own weakness, too – in defence policy matters; to recognise it and to attempt from this position to take initiatives, rather than always looking to Big Brother in Washington and expecting him, as it were, to pull Europe's chestnuts out of the fire. We Europeans have failed dismally, especially in the last few days and weeks and months.

Mr. Baumel said just now in connection with Reykjavik that Europe had failed to measure up to the demands of one of the last great moments in history. I do not want to leave it at these fine literary phrases. I could quote Bismarck, who spoke of the cloak of history which can only be grasped once as it passes by. My view is not as literary as this, but I should like to point out that in recent weeks and months it has been Europe that has not recognised the signs of the times, that it has been the statesmen of Europe – and I would include the French President, because Mr. Baumel talked so much about French policy – who, far from keeping an eye on the cloak of history, have kept it on the cloaks of the television editors and the media, because it is they who largely determine the climate of public opinion today. The politicians no longer call the tune, on the contrary, they follow where the media lead.

The great danger I see today is that, if the pillar we were talking about continues to crumble, and more and more sand runs out of it, the whole European idea could be at risk, in some countries at least. I will not conceal my grave concern about my own country, the Federal Republic, where more and more people can be heard saying that there should be a separate German way, there should perhaps be a chance now of achieving reunification in the context of a debate on disarmament, and the Soviet Union, which has pursued a strategic policy in Europe for decades, might be tempted to put out some lime twigs on which one bird or another might settle.

Ladies and gentlemen, no one who considers European policy and the rôle of Russia – I repeat, Russia – in European policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can deny that there has been some continuity in this policy, irrespective of whether it has been a foreign policy determined by the Czar or by the Bolsheviks. I believe that we, who are also a component part of European policy, should regard these European policy trends as a reason for considering how we can regain our own positions, how we can secure Europe – Europe, which means so much to world democracy and freedom and to human rights – in such a way that its independence is preserved.

I have one more thing to say in conclusion about Mr. Ahrens's report. Of course I welcome a colloquy of this kind. Of course I hope that something positive will come of this colloquy or summit meeting, or whatever it may be called. But I must say this: we do not have much time left to try and find something we could do. It is not five minutes to midnight but only a few seconds to midnight, if I may put it that way. I can only hope that the events of the past few weeks will have opened the eyes of various people in the ministries to a need that has now become urgent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

This is a particularly important occasion as Sir Frederic is taking the floor for the last time in our Assembly.

On behalf of the Assembly I thank you, Sir Frederic, for all you have done for the Assembly in so many capacities, in committees, the Presidential Committee and within the Assembly itself.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President, for that unexpected and unrequested courtesy and privilege, which I much appreciate.

This is my valedictory speech in the Assembly. I have served here constantly for well over a decade and, whatever the result of the elections in the United Kingdom on 11th June, I shall not again be able to address the Assembly as I do today.

You, Mr. President, have been good enough to grant me the opportunity to make a few personal remarks. That enables me to thank or congratulate a number of people.

First, I congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election. I wish you a successful three years. They will not be easy but I am sure that you have the courage to use them wisely. I pay tribute to our outgoing President, Mr. Caro, who has looked after WEU and changed it from the insignificant entity that it was when he took office.

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

Whether it is achieving the right measure of confidence and support from governments is another thing. However, Mr. Caro has done what he can to bring the WEU Assembly alive again even if he has not altogether succeeded in conveying the same sense of importance and urgency to the member governments, or at least some of them.

I should like to say what a happy period it has been for me working with the Secretary-General on the other side of the road with whom I have enjoyed a relationship unusual for a parliamentarian with an official. There was complete confidence and we have worked quietly together to try to further aims which, even if he cannot say so publicly, I know he has in his heart for the well-being of the Assembly.

I have been touched by the messages I have received, not only from political groups but elsewhere, and the friendship it has been possible for me to enjoy from so many colleagues of different political parties as well as my own and my allies. I should like to recall the time I went to Beijing and my hand was completely squashed in a large Mercedes-Benz by an over-zealous Chinese guard. It was a communist colleague who undid the door, took me in and bathed my hand and gave me a large vodka. One cannot expect any better tribute than that.

It would be invidious to run through the names of the staff but, because of my most active membership of the General Affairs Committee, I owe a great deal to Mr. Burgelin, who provides for us a unique service in having to supervise, look after and guide reports emanating from so many different political and national sources. He will be one of those who will live in my memory. The same applies to Mr. Borcier, who is himself nearing retirement and who has done his best to obtain publicity for an organisation that too often has not deserved it through its own fault. Nevertheless, he has striven hard to obtain that help for us.

Finally – I hope that my Prime Minister is not listening – I want to thank someone who does a lot of work and whom I regard as the most competent and efficient person I have ever met. That is why I hope that the Prime Minister is not listening. Maureen Basse does a wonderful job here quietly and without causing trouble for anybody. There I must end my list for reasons of brevity but I want to thank all the members of the staff in that respect.

I now turn to the substance of my speech. I happen to think along lines similar – that is fortunate because it does not always happen – to those of the two preceding speakers. I do not usually read speeches: in fact I have never done

so before – I suppose that that results from my training as a barrister in England. However, today I shall largely read the valedictory speech I made in Strasbourg on East-West relations simply and solely because, if I may say so with conceit, I have read through it several times and do not think that I could say it any better, even after reflection.

I believe that Europe today, as a result of Mr. Gorbachev's various initiatives, is in a highly dangerous situation. His various initiatives, whatever else they have done, have so far acted as a divisive force within Europe and across the Atlantic. Whether that is deliberate, conscious or unavoidable is not for me to say but is for the future to decide. It is neither warmongering nor anti-peace to tell the truth as I see it. For my part, at my age, I have to remember other voices and other rooms. There were many in the 1930s who were called warmongers when they warned of the dangers ahead deriving from an imperialist Nazi power. The most costly war in history in blood and misery ensued as a result of taking at face value those who said they had no intention of in any way expanding their territorial ambitions in Europe. We know what happened as a result.

We who are critical of Mr. Gorbachev's intentions are often told that we are being unreasonable and should not expect the Soviet Kremlin and Mr. Gorbachev to dismantle the whole Russian Soviet system merely to please us in the liberal pluralist democracies. We know that he will not do that and it is unreasonable to ask him to do it because it would be an act of political and economic suicide for him to undertake. None of us should expect him so to do and it would result in failure. However, those of us who are cynics are not asking that. We are not asking Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues to alter the economic and important social system but simply to cease doing things that cannot be said to be an essential part of any socialist or Marxist philosophy anywhere. We are not asking him to do anything about internal policies that would be or could be regarded as interference by him in the internal, economic or social attitudes of another power.

We are asking simply for a few negative things. We are asking him to do things that will not harm in any way the internal structure of the Soviet Union and the political system that currently obtains there. For example, we are asking him to cease repressing freedom of all expression and outlook in the satellite states. It is not part of a Marxist creed to use military power to repress freedom of expression in other countries. We are asking him to stop financing Cuban mercenary forces dedicated, admittedly and openly, to destabilising countries in South America, Central America, South Asia and Africa.

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

We are also asking him to use his power to dismantle the infamous Berlin wall, which some of us visited recently, and where 75 victims have now been scored and have been shot for trying to escape from what is described on the media and in propaganda as a Russian-dominated paradise into what is described in some sections of the media as the capitalist hell that obtains in the West. Yet these men, women and children have been shot for no greater sin than trying to leave a situation that they find unendurable. It cannot be to condemn the political philosophy of the Soviet Union to ask it to cease doing things of a barbarity practically unexampled in history.

There is a long list, but I shall mention only one more. We are asking Mr. Gorbachev, above all, to stop talking about what his intentions are, backed up by certain optimistic elements in the media. We are asking him simply to cease slaughtering and torturing Afghan peasants and people. Is that an unreasonable request if we are to believe in his credibility? We are asking really for fewer words and more deeds, and I do not think that such a demand is wrong, unreasonable or the result of a warmongering attitude.

Let us recall one significant disarmament factor. We have enjoyed peace and security in Europe by maintaining a unique nuclear deterrent and not, as some would have us believe, by trying to match levels of conventional weapons. I want to recall some history to those here today. At the beginning of both the second world war and the first world war the two sides had a near parity of conventional weapons and not the gross imbalance that now exists. However, that did not stop those wars. That was because there was no unique deterrent. We should be asking for a deterrence and not merely an adequate means to defend ourselves if attacked. That is because we do not want a war to happen in which we have to use our deterrent. In war, one sort of weapon can be matched against another, and to ask for a deterrent is not to request the build-up of conventional forces. That past has shown that whatever we do in that context the existence of rival conventional forces does not stop wars. Indeed, the building up of conventional weapons has led in the past to the starting of wars.

It seems that once again we are in danger of losing our way, despite all the lessons of history, by concentrating our energies and efforts on improving our defence capacity if and when a war breaks out and not on maintaining a deterrent. That does not seem to be a very logical policy to pursue.

I should like to recall that we have enjoyed a high level of peace and security in Europe. The reason for that lies in the unique nuclear

deterrent that we have possessed in order to prevent wars and because the USSR, although militarily enormously powerful, has been economically weak. It has been unable out of its own resources to feed even its own people. That great power that can send people to space still has to go into the market to buy food to feed its own people.

I pose a question for all seriously to consider. Of course we must welcome what Mr. Gorbachev is doing in Russia to improve the economy, but are we all sure in our hearts that a stronger Russia will be more or less a potential danger than the economically weaker one that we face now? What lesson in history is there to justify the thought that as a great power becomes stronger it becomes more peaceably inclined?

On the other side of the equation, as both Mr. Baumel and Mr. Müller have said, there is the current situation in the United States. I returned depressed from my most recent Council of Europe mission to that country, a mission under the chairmanship of Mr. Baumel. I was driven to the conclusion, although we were told from the minute that we landed in Washington until the moment that we flew away that European security and European freedom were still fundamental requirements of American policy, that it is difficult to be absolutely sure, whether in terms of the Reykjavik summit or those that have taken place elsewhere, that these splendid declarations are necessarily to be relied upon in ten years' time rather than tomorrow or the next day.

When we talk about arming ourselves we have to think what our position will be a decade or more from now and not of our position today or tomorrow. It would be a brave man who declared himself to be absolutely sure what the attitude of the United States will be to Europe's security a decade or two decades from now. Sophisticated technology is improving the opportunities of a large sovereign power far away to look after its own basic requirements and security without going overseas.

When I was in Washington I came to the conclusion that under the surface there was a significant element in domestic political American attitudes to an early arms control agreement that had little to do with the needs of European security and all too much to do – these are hard words but they are correct – with trying to gain a political plus for a president and a party in the wake of the Irangate scandal. An arms control agreement would be one of the most obvious ways in which to improve the tarnished prestige of America domestically.

I cannot pretend that I leave this Assembly at the end of this sitting with a feeling of happiness about Europe. I feel that we shall have to have a

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

complete re-appraisal of Western Europe, the heritage of Europe and the responsibilities that we shall have to take on if Europe is to look after itself, which it will have to do certainly within fifteen to twenty years, if not ten. As Mr. Müller said, we shall have to kindle that spirit.

I remain unashamedly a cynic, but an unhappy one. I pray that I shall be proved wrong in my cynicism. There will be no joy in being able to say in a world shattered by the same naïvety that nearly destroyed us all in the free West in 1939: "I told you so."

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Frederic. Allow me to add that WEU is a home where you will always be welcome.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I am very pleased to follow Sir Frederic, whose kind words I greatly appreciate. I would like to say again how agreeable it has been to work in his company and with his collaboration. With his departure the Assembly is losing a man of experience, wisdom and conviction who fights for the ideas he believes in and is reluctant to compromise though always ready for collective action with respect for the qualities of others provided they also respect his. His has been an outstanding example of parliamentary behaviour which it is a pleasure to recall. We shall remember the example he has set and will, I am sure, retain the friendship built up with him over the years here and in the Council of Europe. Sir Frederic will be remembered as one of the outstanding politicians in the history of our Assembly.

I come now to the report under discussion and wish to congratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. Ahrens, and say at once that his document has my fullest approval. I hope that it will be supported by the largest possible majority, not only for the sake of the political credibility of our Assembly in the present challenging circumstances but also because of the powerful arguments forming the basis of the proposals presented to us on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Now that I can speak a little more freely and with less restraint – although I have sometimes gone to the limits of the acceptable – I will say that Jacques Delors did well when he suggested a European summit on defence problems in the context of the Twelve. Jacques Delors saw the political situation as it really is and he made his proposal firstly because the twelve members of the Community are not just any countries but countries whose failure to act in political concert would jeopardise the Community's future and Europe's political organisation. But how is it possible to talk about European political

co-operation if the subject of "defence" is permanently excluded. Defence is in fact the foundation for all the conditioned reflexes of national foreign policies which cannot be worked out jointly without the necessary consultation. Jacques Delors was also right in realising that WEU was also failing to move forward. In the words of Mr. Müller – what is difficult for twelve ought to be easier for seven – and that is what we have all invariably been weak enough to believe. The Seven were doing nothing, and when Jacques Delors said "Action!" the reply was: "Impossible. The Treaty of Rome, areas of responsibility and some countries, like Ireland, virtually rule it out". Broadly speaking, this was the line taken by the Chairman-in-Office of the Community Council of Ministers, our friend Mr. Tindemans. And the answer was: this is a matter for WEU. And we agreed, saying to ourselves: what a stroke of luck, thanks to Jacques Delors and Leo Tindemans WEU is at last going to establish its position and international credibility at a time when the disarmament debate is arousing expectations and questions among Europeans. What is Europe going to do? Who is to speak for Europe? When and how is this to happen? The way ahead seemed clear.

In the Assembly we did our utmost, in agreement with the Council, to speak for Europe, and the appreciation expressed to the Luxembourg chairmanship in this connection is no pretence, far from it. But the result has been a political agenda crowded with subjects to which we are well accustomed.

Cast your minds back, ladies and gentlemen. In 1985 President Reagan's strategic defence initiative proposal was considered and our governments decided that there should be a co-ordinated European reaction. This was followed a week later by unco-ordinated reaction and unilateral responses.

With regard to the disarmament issue which we discussed yesterday with the Secretary-General, it has been difficult for WEU to engage in the debate, at least publicly, and the Secretary-General's replies to the remarks I made to him yesterday bear eloquent witness to our continuing disarray on this fundamental question which has meant some inability to engage in public collegiate examination and to agree on a European position.

And the issue of terrorism from 1985 to 1986 is not for us but will be discussed elsewhere – in Tokyo or perhaps in the Communities, although three successive meetings showed the Council to be incapable of dealing with this problem.

And so we come to 1986-87 with Reykjavik and Mr. Gorbachev's famous speech at the end of February 1987. Europe remains in a permanent dilemma while Mr. Gorbachev asks the

Mr. Caro (continued)

Europeans for their response and the United States does the same after Mr. Shultz's trip. Both parties use the same language, state the same requirement and appear for their own individual reasons to have a similar timetable.

We were meeting at that time in Luxembourg, and the meetings were happily arranged to coincide. What good relations we then had with the Council and what an extraordinarily rapid link there was between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly during those two days of intensive work, with the Assembly acting as a sounding board for the basic debate on ideas, in our rôle as representatives of the whole range of European public opinion with all its trends, beliefs and desires.

An excellent relationship with a Council properly under pressure from the Assembly; a Council trying with real urgency to respond to the Assembly's expectations and letting it be known through its Chairman that it has decided to do everything possible to achieve a common stance on this fundamental aspect of the East-West dialogue but this point has not yet been reached.

Let us then follow the historical trend of our Assembly, to which some ascribe an authority not found elsewhere, an authority essential to the great debate of society today, an authority which is the very foundation of our various national sovereignties and thereafter, if fate allows, of what might be European independence and sovereignty within a European framework and with European principles along lines which it is up to us to define having regard to our history, our traditions and the future we wish to forge.

If we wish to draw conclusions would it be wrong to suppose – and I am not a pessimist – that, in a situation where our whole political and economic environment acknowledges the intrinsic and crucial value exclusively vested in Western European Union, the fact that nothing happens in spite of this is due to the fact no one wants anything to happen? As Jacques Baumel said a short time ago, and I now repeat in more moderate terms, the announcement to Europe of the German position on Mr. Gorbachev's double zero proposals was conveyed to us parliamentarians and I imagine to you government delegates by this morning's radio and press reports, except in the case of those lucky enough to receive official despatches. If the spirit of the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg had been followed, the Council of WEU should have been informed first of the position of the Federal Republic of Germany so that the other European states could be urged to agree a joint European position with the Federal Republic of Germany.

This is indeed our political objective. I will even go further, and those who know my philosophy will not be surprised to hear me repeat the point. As a Frenchman and deputy for Alsace, I tell you that, if we wish to think as Europeans and follow a European path, we must first think of the possible theatre of operations in the event of a war. As a Frenchman and as an Alsatian I know I must make an effort – which becomes easier with practice – to think like my German friends. Until I have fully absorbed the attitude of mind and the responses of our German friends to the European defence issue I shall always fail to get to the truth of the matter. They are the first to be exposed, and their nation is cut in two. These are problems unknown to us which we can and must shoulder with them, and as soon as that happens the question moves beyond Germany as it moves beyond France with its nuclear deterrent and beyond the United Kingdom with its nuclear forces into the dimensions of European solidarity. This is the great debate awaiting us tomorrow. But there is not only Germany on the European political stage; there are also France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Norway and the other nordic countries with which we share a common destiny. This is the European option.

Does that mean that we shall at once transform our WEU into a vast forum without knowing where we are going? Not at all. I am the first to say that if we have a doctrine it is the Brussels Treaty. As we asked the Council to apply it, let us apply it also in the Assembly. If we really wish to concern ourselves with security problems we must first make it plain that we are capable of defending the principles and fundamental conditions of our defence. Once we are able to provide for our defence, bearing in mind the present changes in the United States position, we shall be able to defend a joint position on disarmament.

Joint agencies must operate and be kept properly informed. Enlargement is an aspect of tomorrow's European Community.

The European Commission will not meet the 1992 dateline if a coherent foreign and defence policy does not emerge by then, as otherwise the essential element will be missing. Even if we are not yet ready because of the requirements of what I shall term political verification and perhaps legal safeguards which are regularly cited by the Council, let it not be thought for goodness' sake that we are failing to respect Article XI of the Brussels Treaty which allows us to open our organisation to others.

Let us not give the impression to Portugal, Spain, Greece or Turkey, who have made official approaches, or to Norway and Denmark, who wish to maintain the closest possible relations

Mr. Caro (continued)

with us, that we are excluding these countries from co-operation with us on foreign policy and defence – issues which are fundamental to a coherent European position in the great debate and dialogue between continents.

The whole problem is in essence a problem of communication and explaining to the public. All I have just said contains nothing novel and represents only an attempt to summarise and identify the facts as we know them. We are confronted by the global demands of the two superpowers. The emergence of Europe with its abundance of individual peculiarities and its respect for its component states demands that existing organisations should function to the best of their ability, respecting treaties but trying as far as possible to embrace every element of the indispensable political will.

In his report, Mr. Ahrens asks us to take another leap forward, and the fact is that reactivation will be brought about by electric shock from outside and also by repeated awakening of our political conscience. These awakenings lead us to demand that our heads of state and government define this European presence in the great continental dialogue on defence, in conjunction with all the efforts being made in the European Community, to establish our security. They lead us to assert Europe's right to speak with a single voice. Even if the essential is not fully achieved, at least a large step will have been taken. We have to change our methods, alter our language. It is not fair to leave our peoples constantly at the mercy of an excellently crafted speech by that great media manipulator Mr. Gorbachev. We must also win minds with striking ideas and show that the West and the Europeans especially know where they want to go. Thanks to public opinion we shall be able to make headway against those who wish to reduce our influence and launch an attack on us which, though not military perhaps, would be liable to destroy our determination to build a peaceful and organised Europe.

Ladies and gentlemen, I sincerely hope that this report will be approved and that the essential measures are taken after its adoption to ensure that governments assist us in the proposed undertaking.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, it is very difficult to speak after Mr. Baumel, Mr. Müller, Sir Frederic Bennett and Jean-Marie Caro in particular. Our Assembly may have lost a great president but it has gained a great speaker and politician, and I wish to thank him for the brilliant European speech he has just made.

Like General Close, Mr. Baumel and Sir Frederic Bennett I would like to say why, in my opinion, nothing has changed in Moscow. The masters of the Kremlin still have their two major objectives: to uncouple the defences of Europe and the United States and to weaken Europe.

When the Soviets deployed their SS-20 missiles, their aim was to uncouple European security from that of the United States. Ladies and gentlemen, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that, when they now propose to withdraw their SS-20s in exchange for the withdrawal of cruise and Pershing missiles, their aim continues to be that of uncoupling European security from that of the United States. When they deployed their SS-20s, they did so in the certainty and deep conviction that Europe and the alliance would be unable to respond to this specific threat to Western Europe.

When we took the twin-track decision in 1979 and during the next five or six years, they gambled that we would lack the political will to follow suit by deploying medium-range American missiles which could reach Soviet territory from Europe. Luckily they were wrong!

So, when Mr. Gorbachev suggests withdrawing his SS-20 missiles against the withdrawal of the cruise and Pershing missiles, nothing has changed. The purpose of uncoupling us from the United States is as obvious and certain as ever.

Looking at what is now known as the double zero option, I rather have the feeling that there is one zero too many. We are going to withdraw long- and short-range intermediate missiles, and I truly believe that in withdrawing the long-range INF we are committing a historic mistake for the fundamental reason that we shall thereby reduce our ability to apply our flexible response strategy because there will then be nothing between the tactical operational theatre nuclear weapons and the strategic intercontinental or submarine-launched missiles, which are all strategic in nature and represent the highest level of the flexible nuclear response. The absence of intermediate nuclear weapons between the very-short-range tactical armaments and the long-range strategic missiles considerably weakens the credibility of the flexible response strategy in Europe, and that is very serious.

There is a zero too many because, as Mr. Baumel has very rightly said, we are going to commit the terrible mistake of withdrawing American weapons stationed in Europe which can reach the Soviet Union and can exert pressure on the people in Moscow who might decide on conflict and take the risk – which we all hope they will not take – of a war in Europe. So, by withdrawing these weapons we reduce our ability to deter the Soviets from entering into a European conflict.

Mr. De Decker (continued)

But, as I said, the second Soviet objective is to weaken and divide Europe. By withdrawing their short-range intermediate missiles they are, of course, meeting one of our wishes since when the SS-20s were withdrawn we also wanted to see the removal of weapons threatening us from closer countries like the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia – a measure which would clearly oblige us to remove our missiles of the same type or to undertake not to manufacture them. So, as General Close has pointed out, we are limiting nuclear forces in Europe to short-range nuclear weapons stationed solely on the territory of the two Germanies.

It is plainly essential to listen to our German friends' views on this subject, but I fear it will raise very serious problems of solidarity between Germans and non-Germans in the European Community, WEU and the alliance. The presence of long-range cruise missiles in the five countries – comprising not only Germany but Benelux, Italy and the United Kingdom – had the great advantage of expressing the solidarity of the European members of the alliance on the defence of our continent. By withdrawing these nuclear weapons from our five countries and leaving them only in Germany we are rejecting such solidarity in the extreme case of a conflict in Europe, and that seems to me to be exceedingly dangerous.

I hope that the journalists among us today, having heard all this morning's speakers, will understand that the WEU Assembly is playing its part by treating Mr. Gorbachev's disarmament proposals without that naive enthusiasm or weak relief to which we are all too accustomed, even from our governments. Here, in this parliamentary Assembly which provides a link between our governments and public opinion, we look upon this double zero option not with enthusiasm but with a very great deal of uncertainty and questioning, and as far as I am concerned with a lot of anxiety.

Ladies and gentlemen, I thank Mr. Ahrens for having devoted half his report to the suggestion I made in reply to Mr. Delors that a summit of the heads of state and government of our seven countries should be arranged to produce a political response to these questions and queries. As Mr. Caro has pointed out, Mr. Delors was probably right politically in calling for a summit of the heads of state and government of the Twelve. As the Twelve co-operate politically it is reasonable to hope that one day they may also make a serious approach to the security policy of our continent.

For the moment, two facts are clear. Firstly, it is not permitted by the Treaty of Rome. Secondly, among the EEC member states one –

Ireland – is neutral while in others like Greece the political situation is in a state of constant flux. We know that even if these questions were discussed by the Twelve their present political situations would make it impossible for the European governments to reach a coherent, rapid and effective decision on this subject.

Mr. Martens, the Prime Minister of Belgium and Chairman-in-Office of the European Council, went to see President Mitterrand after Mr. Delors's proposals. At the press conference following this meeting at the Elysée their embarrassment was obvious. They felt that it would be difficult to debate this matter within the European Community and felt, intuitively perhaps, that the discussion could be more easily conducted in WEU.

I also have the impression that, like the public in our countries, our heads of state and government also know too little about WEU. Only our ministers for foreign affairs and our defence ministers are aware of it. Our heads of state and government have never met in their capacity as heads of security for the seven member countries of Western European Union.

This was the reason for my letter to Mr. Martens. And, in this context, that is why I am very pleased that our Assembly, thanks to Mr. Ahrens's report and to the work of the committee chaired by General Close, can today endorse the wish for a summit conference of heads of state and government as those ultimately responsible for the security of our countries.

As Mr. Caro has said, this European security conference could review the situation and express the wishes of our democratic countries for the defence of our liberty and the construction of Europe.

(Mr. Péciaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am tempted to ask whether there is anything to add following this morning's substantial contributions.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have been wanting to reactivate WEU for several years, and we are applying ourselves to the task with determination and dedication. As a result our plenary Assembly, especially under Mr. Caro's presidency, "picked up speed" and it is very fortunate for Europe that it did so, as it means that we have not been entirely left standing by the disarmament initiative launched by the Soviet Union.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

However, we have difficulty in keeping up with events at the rate at which they are now moving. It is clear that our Assembly has trouble in keeping abreast of the rapid succession of disarmament proposals.

I note in passing – and it is a point which has not been mentioned this morning – the self-evident historical truth that totalitarian structures are invariably better placed to take initiatives and to engage in political action, and God forbid, military action as well, more easily than states with a democratic system. The latter have to pay attention to public opinion and must act with the consent of their citizens. They also have to co-ordinate their actions.

We cannot, for example, fail to notice the contrast between our own efforts, however dedicated and praiseworthy these may be, and the command exercised by the USSR. However, we have only one obligation and that is to succeed!

How much more difficult work is on our side! A comparison with Mr. Gorbachev's recent performance in Bucharest is revealing. There were no reports of debates lasting for hours and hours or even days or of any differences of view! These are truths which need to be grasped, as in a democracy habit sometimes outweighs objectives and values. In this context our habits do not always serve us well!

What is the situation today?

If you will allow me a paradox, Europe is today the battlefield of disarmament. It is an unfortunate fact that we do not necessarily hold all the trumps or, I repeat, the means of responding to the succession of initiatives launched by the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party.

How do I see the situation? In much the same terms as previous speakers. Like Mr. Baumel, however, I must stress that in these East-West negotiations Europe curiously finds itself, not necessarily by choice but as a matter of fact, confronted by solutions which may well be among the worst which could have been chosen from its point of view.

But what freedom of choice do we have? There lies the drama of our debates and the crux of our questionings. With regard to Euromissiles I share the views of Mr. Baumel and Mr. De Decker and I am afraid we are taking the wrong path. To leave Europe to its own devices with a denuclearised zone more favourable to the Soviet Union than to Europe itself is a great danger. It is clear here that the debate is being conducted above our heads. Sir Frederic Bennett spoke of Yalta, but this is very different as Yalta

belongs to the past and, with all the risks that it entailed, we have since surprisingly lived in peace thanks to the balance of terror. We are pleased that attempts are being made to move away from this situation, but only on condition that a balance is maintained, and that is not clearly established. Ultimately by following this path we run the risk, from direct negotiations between the United States and the USSR, firstly of a serious strategic mistake affecting Europe and secondly of bringing the present European solidarity into question. This has just been pointed out by Mr. De Decker, and I completely support his analysis. He referred to the case of Germany and its partners and to our own attitude which must be one of complete solidarity. But is there not some risk in this? If so, the USSR has secured a tactical advantage.

Turning to Euromissiles I am, again, not in favour either of the zero option or of the double zero option. Mr. Baumel mentioned a triple zero option and I would almost say "Why not?" as the French positions are very clear. It is obvious that these negotiations must be comprehensive and must therefore cover the whole range of armaments including conventional and chemical weapons. If not, they are a snare, and an East-West agreement reached over Europe's head could produce a Europe which was free but exposed to the designs of an eastern power nursing imperialistic ambitions.

There are many questions to be asked about the effects and consequences of current developments.

In this connection I wish to reassert that France, together with the United Kingdom, shares its partner's refusal to allow its own deterrent force to be included in this external debate. This is in the overall West European interest. We must therefore keep this deterrent force and we must not forget that the current negotiations are moving towards the concept of creating a sanctuary. Whether on the American or Soviet side we must not forget that their unassailable national laboratories and their arsenals will remain. Europe must therefore retain this deterrent trump card.

We are, ladies and gentlemen, confronted by this great debate. As I said at the beginning, it does not seem to me that we have managed to match our pace to that of the successive initiatives of the Soviet leader. Our activities do include some highly positive elements, especially with regard to reactivation, but we must also acknowledge the inadequacies of our rate of response in relation to current needs. I would like to draw attention to what I regard as some particularly worrying aspects of the present highly dramatic situation and of the combined efforts of WEU, the Assembly and the Council.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

With regard to the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat-General, which is its active, hard working and trustworthy servant, it is a matter of satisfaction that this reactivation brings together the will of the Assembly, the proven capabilities of the Secretariat-General and, on occasion, those of the Council of Ministers, though on occasion only. Just as we are passing through a crisis in the western world with Europe as the battleground of disarmament, we are witnessing disengagement from America and may also see decoupling within Europe, if I may so describe it. It must be recognised that the two are cumulative. A loosening of the links within Europe can only result in a loosening of all the links between us and the United States. We have some friendly grievances, but grievances just the same to put to our American allies. The subject is after all serious. Their attitude has changed slightly, as they now consult their European partners, who still have difficulty, however, in speaking with a single voice. The proof is provided by the immediate situation in which it seems that our British and German friends are now officially agreed on the double zero option, but where are we going?

Mr. Baumel was quite right in saying that the very fact that views are expressed here one after the other, albeit in a certain order which is liable to be changed, is in itself a disturbing feature. It means, ultimately, an admission by Europe that it cannot speak with one voice. This being the case, our Assembly does what it can, but its powers are, of course, limited. It draws the attention of the Council of Ministers to the necessity and urgency of trying to gain control over the present developing situation, which has not yet run its course but which should, if possible, be ended by concerted action to halt this succession of agreements week after week.

Imagine for a moment the inner satisfaction this gives the Soviet leaders playing the rôle of the cats in this cat and mouse game. This difficult situation demands that we take urgent action to present a more united front. Mr. Secretary-General, the Council of Ministers must recognise its vital obligation to call a halt to these separate pronouncements and a concerted position must, if possible, be agreed, even if it does embrace different shades of view. That would be so much better than a succession of responses at sixes and sevens. I am obliged to say here that France will obviously not be able to adjust its position to the declared views of some of its partners. Let there be no decoupling, Mr. Secretary-General. It is the unanimous wish of the Assembly that these circumstances should be the occasion for tightening up WEU's internal mechanisms, not with the executive opposed to the legislative, but as the expression of our

common will to do everything to act in closer concert.

Decoupling – the word can be used at different levels – is also liable to occur with the United States. Their disengagement from Europe will meet with understandable national satisfaction among Americans – it will be one burden less. There will also be greater indifference to Europe. An aeon ago – twenty years – I was received by Mr. Sam Yorty, Mayor of Los Angeles. General de Gaulle had just made a declaration about a certain “Québec libre” and other issues which had raised considerable ripples in America of a difficult and diverse character. The Mayor of Los Angeles explained to me that tendentious statements of this kind and a personality like General de Gaulle were needed to awaken interest over there in what was going on in Europe. While that is all very humorous and amusing it also means that this reaction seen from the Pacific – and America is a continent – has certain attractions, as Mr. Müller remarked just now. I greatly appreciate his geopolitical approach and believe that it will prove valid in the future. By our cohesion we must counter all the results of the current disarmament process in terms of the future and psychologically understandable American lack of interest in Europe.

I would finally like to point out that in this whole matter there is one thought which is not often voiced – what is the objective of the Soviet peace effort? In principle the effort can only be welcomed if the search is for real peace. The peace of deterrence was real, but will the peace of disarmament be the same? What is the USSR looking for? We must avoid a priori anti-communism but equally it is our right and duty to look at the post-disarmament prospects which are being opened up.

In this area there are only two options. The USSR may be sincere in its efforts and capable of a controlled quest for peace, in which case the world stands to benefit, but we must be careful as tsarist imperialism is an old historical tradition, as was briefly remarked this morning. Are we not now witnessing a kind of historical replay in the guise of communist imperialism? Or shall we witness a renaissance of imperialism in future years – and perhaps faster than we think – as the Soviet Union modernises and increases its might through a concerted system or worldwide trade?

The meetings of fraternal parties likely to be held in the coming months – on the initiative of the Soviet General Secretary – are evidence of the existence here and now of a kind of communist internationalism which has certainly nothing to do with the Comintern but must be taken into account when forecasting the future of the modern world.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

I would now like to refer briefly to a subject which has been somewhat neglected, that of disarmament and the difficulty of our debates. Our discussions lead us in various directions and are concerned with institutions, political expediency, enlargement and the suitability of various forums for this kind of debate. I personally do not agree with the analysis made by the presidents of the European Commissions and my position differs somewhat from that of my friend Mr. Caro.

My view is that, as the Twelve already have enough trouble in fixing agricultural prices, there is no clear evidence that the European Communities would do better. That being the case, it would not be right for us to progress towards strengthening WEU, come what may, and initially between the Seven, without increasingly associating our partners in spirit who wish to join. I refer here both to Portugal, which has already made its application, and to Greece, Spain and Turkey. My words relate particularly to Turkey which has such a specific, unrewarding and therefore essential task in acting as the shield for Western Europe. It is because Turkey is on the borders of Europe that I now tell our Turkish friends, and I believe I can speak for France – how sympathetic we are to its application. They are well aware that the Community, and France especially, are ready to accept their European responsibilities.

I come now to the practical conclusions. For our friends who wish to join in our work we must now devise some new procedures so that, even if we are experiencing technical difficulties in responding favourably to their applications for membership, they can participate as more than mere observers. I would like these applicants to be associated at various levels, *de facto* if not *de jure*, by more effective procedures establishing a closer link than the current arrangements for observers. Our Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges could be consulted on this subject.

I now come to the proposals in Mr. Ahrens's report, whom I congratulate on his appointment as Chairman. These proposals are both simple and concrete and consist basically of the proposal for a meeting of heads of state or government open to WEU members and possibly to representatives of applicant countries. These proposals are interesting, although there are two points which worry me. The first is the time scale for our action when present events are moving so fast. I am particularly sorry that after the proposals made on 2nd December last by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, we have not been able to go faster and further towards defining a charter or agreement summarising for us what could be our undisputed gospel on defence. A

document of that kind would make us all much more comfortable as we could then rely on it as a clearly expressed instrument of solidarity, known to the public and serving as a commandment for any statesman speaking on behalf of Europe.

I know that special groups or rapporteurs are working on this as an interim report is being prepared, but I am greatly concerned that we cannot hope to get this project really off the ground before the meeting in The Hague next October. I am happy to take note of this meeting, but I repeat that anything which could accelerate the presentation and finalisation of a European security charter would be welcome. As to the proposed big meeting, do we have one or two years to wait? Here I allude to Mr. Baumel's remarks. If the disarmament process goes ahead rapidly and, as is to be feared, over our heads, it is important that Europe should not drop its guard but should on the contrary avail itself of all the means it still has to provide an individual and global guarantee for each of its countries and for its defence capability. With this in mind I do not believe that we still have a year or two to organise a meeting of this kind.

I would like this point to be made quite clear in your proposal, Mr. Ahrens. That is of course the gist of your document but the point is perhaps not expressed with sufficient determination in the recommendation submitted to us. The present situation calls for a quickening of pace.

I would remind you in conclusion that liberty and democracy are fragile and are not gifts of nature or of heaven, though they may be of heavenly inspiration. We have to defend them every inch of the way at a time when disarmament is in the foreground of events. This is the joint task of WEU, the Assembly, the Secretariat-General and the Council, acting together. Peace today and liberty tomorrow need each other. Let us not spare any effort to strengthen our union in relation to our great American ally and the Soviet world. Let us remember, for our governments and peoples, that pacificism and peace are different things. Let us not be afraid of taking initiatives and of sometimes even exerting pressure on our governments in order to strengthen Europe and preserve its peace and happiness.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. du Monceau.

Mr. du MONCEAU (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, speaking as a newcomer attending a WEU Assembly sitting for the first time I have some diffidence in voicing a few remarks and suggestions.

Mr. du Monceau (continued)

I naturally join all those who have congratulated the Rapporteur on so faithfully reflecting our worries, concerns and hopes and summarising proposals designed to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

I have heard some representatives criticising the expression "European pillar" – I think wrongly. I would remind you merely that it was used for the first time not by a European but by President Kennedy in the sixties and that as recently as five days ago it was repeated, seriously and with conviction, by the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Weinberger, in reply to a question put to him in Brussels. If the Americans believe in the need to build this European pillar of defence, it seems to me that we should be wrong to criticise.

I would now like to make an observation and a suggestion. In my view, a democratic and political parliamentary assembly requires the presence of the ministers responsible for policy, who can and must respond to our concerns on defence matters. As a newcomer here I see on the government bench some good friends and fellow countrymen, some eminent and senior civil servants and even representatives of our international institution – but do they have political responsibility?

They will compile excellent reports which will be sent to their ministers and in a few weeks or months we shall perhaps have a reaction. What I feel, Mr. President, is disappointment.

I have heard our Secretary-General speaking with great conviction and I have known him long enough to know that he is very sincere, but when I read the following words by an eminent professor in a study on the activities of WEU prepared at the Belgian Royal Military Academy: "However, Western European Union has so far hardly been more than a debating centre", I conclude that we should quickly institute a procedure enabling the Assembly to demand and obtain the presence of the ministers concerned.

It seems to me that this is the best way to make ourselves heard, and it also meets the need to pick up echoes from outside our Assembly.

Like some Belgian christian democrats, I wonder whether the ministers of defence and foreign affairs of the seven WEU member states should not form a European security and defence council so that WEU could reply as quickly as possible and with a single voice to proposals like those of Mr. Gorbachev and to the dangerous siren song which is menacing our vital cohesion and threatening to produce what Mr. Caro recently called a kind of political retreat.

As regards the desired and desirable expansion of WEU, let us first consolidate before discussing any enlargement, however useful and necessary it may be. I do not think many words are needed on this subject. Let us be welcoming, by all means, but let us begin by organising ourselves.

As a final and possibly naive suggestion, would it not be more useful and serve our European credibility better if our Assembly were composed of European parliamentarians? The defence and security policy could then be progressively co-ordinated with the work of the European Parliament. I believe that the aims of WEU, its credibility and its political will for the security and defence of Europe would be made clearer to the general public.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I as head of the Luxembourg Delegation wish our compatriot, the new President, good health and clear judgment in continuing the valuable work of his predecessor, Mr. Caro, for whom we have the highest regard.

As this morning's last speaker I would repeat that Mr. Ahrens has, with his usual frankness, arrived at a sound diagnosis. The most important problem for us is defence. He has proposed a conference of the heads of state and government of the Seven and of the countries interested in joining WEU. Luxembourg joins France in supporting such expansion.

It is also suggested that a European security charter should be drafted, making greater use of the mass media. It is a fact that news is of decisive importance in everyday life whether of politics, sport or even private affairs.

It is alarming that opinion polls conducted in various countries suggest that the Soviet Union's position on disarmament and peace is given greater credibility than that of NATO. In my opinion, peace and security imply not only a disarmament effort but also and above all a real effort in respect of human rights and freedom of movement – in other words a sincere attitude backed by real actions and not by propaganda moves.

When I saw the Berlin wall, the frontier of the German Democratic Republic, close to Lübeck, and more recently the Czech frontier at Furth im Wald, I realised that there was still much to do to reach honest, durable and peaceful bilateral agreements. Unfortunately, only time will tell whether Mr. Gorbachev is dealing without ulterior motives as regards firstly disengaging Europe from its ally and secondly dividing Europe.

Mr. Burger (continued)

Mr. Gorbachev clearly has his eyes very much on Europe and that is worrying. I was assured by Mrs. Rosanna Ridgway, whom we met in Washington with the Political Committee, that the United States would not sign any agreement with the USSR without consulting its European ally.

The essential condition is logically that Europe should be able to speak with one voice, and as soon as possible. The proposal in Mr. Ahrens's report is WEU's last chance to unite its efforts in a purpose serving the security interests of all Europeans, as strength lies in union and our enemy is always the same.

In spite of the changed Soviet tactics, Mr. Gorbachev will always be a communist, a communist aware of the economic and technological backwardness of the eastern bloc, a communist who knows the weaknesses of the West, and a communist who has learnt how to master the media. In my opinion vigilance is the watchword and I shall vote for Mr. Ahrens's report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – My thanks to Mr. Burger, who was this morning's last speaker.

The debate is adjourned.

4. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Luxembourg Delegation proposes that Mr. Burger replace Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, as a titular member of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Are there any objections?...

The change is agreed to.

Mr. Burger will therefore submit the report on the voice of Europe after Reykjavik – debates in national parliaments on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by the President of the Assembly.
2. Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council (Presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 1093).
3. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1099).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m.)

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd June 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1093*).
Replies by Mr. Poos to questions put by: Mr. Valleix, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Caro, Mr. Machete (Observer from Portugal), Mr. Burger, Mr. Elmquist (Observer from Denmark), Mr. Caro.
5. Changes in the membership of committees.
6. Change in the order of business.
Speaker: Sir Paul Hawkins.
7. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1099*)
Speakers: Sir John Osborn, Mr. Inan (Observer from Turkey), Mr. Katsaros (Observer from Greece), Mr. Bayülken (Observer from Turkey), Mr. Elmquist (Observer from Denmark), Mr. Ahrens (Rapporteur).
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, “The deepest thing about it is its sleep”. This, I am told, is supposed to have been said about Western European Union just prior to 1984. Today it is no longer true and the most

sceptical observers are prepared to admit that the reactivation of WEU is now well under way. It may not be complete, agreed, but it has already reached the point where real prospects can be glimpsed.

In the conclusions to his report on the reactivation of WEU, Mr. Ahrens put it this way: “There is no doubt that the Reykjavik meeting following the launching of the SDI programme, created circumstances favourable to Western Europe assuming greater responsibility for its own security, as is proved by the decisions taken by the Council in Luxembourg, Mr. Chirac’s address and the favourable response to it in certain member countries.” He goes on: “The main thing for the Assembly is that in this situation the reactivation of WEU has developed so as not to be merely a surge of European dynamism which might soon be called in question by the trend of special interests and events, but is carried into effect by the establishment of new structures which alone can give permanency to the outcome of political decisions taken today.”

Although results are still modest measured against the hopes raised by the Rome declaration, reactivation is now a fact.

Mr. Caro, that tireless architect of reactivation at the level of the Assembly, driven by an unshakeable determination to see that reactivation succeeds, has never relaxed his pressure on successive Council chairmen. His countless approaches to Mr. Genscher, Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Poos, sometimes on a personal basis and

1. See page 19.

The President (continued)

sometimes at the head of a Presidential Committee delegation, and his many speeches and statements have won him the respect of all our governments and all the members of our Assembly on whose behalf I would like to pay him a special tribute.

Thanks to you, Mr. Caro, the enlargement of WEU, which is one of your greatest enthusiasms, has become reality at least as far as the parliamentary Assembly is concerned. For this to happen, you managed to get a proposal accepted authorising the Spanish and Portuguese Delegations to take part in the work of the Assembly as observers.

During your period of office, no opportunity for enhancing the prestige of our Assembly was allowed to pass. I sincerely hope that you will continue to use your talents in the service of our Assembly.

Ladies and gentlemen, being elected President of the Assembly at this particular moment means taking on a task that is both difficult and fascinating. As a national of a member state whose political and military power on the world scene is obviously slight, I would like to thank you for the many expressions of friendship that you have offered to me and, through me, my country.

Having been born in 1952, the year when the treaty instituting the European Defence Community was signed, I witnessed neither the horrors of the second world war nor the promising beginnings of the long march towards European unification. Winston Churchill's famous speech at Zurich in 1946, the decision to set up the Council of Europe in 1949 and Robert Schuman's speech in 1950 proposing the creation of the ECSC all happened before I arrived.

So my generation already has to look in the history books to find out about the first attempts at European unification. By contrast, the dramatic events in the early 1960s like the Cuban missile crisis and the building of the wall of shame in Berlin left their mark on our minds. The emancipation of the third world countries, too, is a matter of concrete reality for my generation.

To conclude from this that that generation is uninterested in its country's security or the alliance of which it is part would clearly be an over-simplification. Actually, the state of mind of the 1980s seems to me too superficial to justify the claim that "all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds" as far as security is concerned.

The side effects of the peripheral conflicts, and the risk of a chain reaction, are evident. So it seems to me essential to draw attention to the

special way in which the younger generation feels and assesses the threat.

But do not misunderstand me. This in no way means that the younger generation wants nothing to do with the military aspects of security. We are, incidentally, well placed to know. Our threefold parliamentary mission at the national level and in the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe and WEU confronts us, almost daily I would say, with the delayed-action bombs threatening us from within. One is the unacceptable level of unemployment in most of our countries and another the ecological crisis which, in the absence of a deliberate policy taking due account of the need for sound management of our natural resources, is no good sign for the future. Though I have mentioned only these two facets of the threat from within, it does not mean there are no others. On the contrary, I have deliberately referred to these aspects of security in the wider sense because there are some people who cannot resist the temptation of exploiting these evils for more than doubtful purposes.

In a democratic régime nothing constructive can be done without trust. So let us try to merit the trust of our fellow citizens by sparing no effort to find answers to the principal concerns of our time.

Do these few thoughts of a more general nature imply that WEU's specific rôle in defence, as defined in the modified Brussels Treaty, is not what our countries expect of it? Not at all. The truth is that an appeal to solidarity in defence will only draw a favourable response from our societies to the extent that we demonstrate our solidarity when it comes to finding answers to other major concerns of our day. It is on this that our credibility will depend.

With WEU's mission now recognised and clearly defined, the next point is to review briefly the ways and means available to our Assembly to achieve its objectives. The fact is that the European Communities, that have such huge budgetary resources, do not have the rôle of defining the broad principles of a European defence policy whereas WEU, to which the single act assigns that function, is cruelly short of funds.

Mr. Chairman of the Council, with your permission I shall turn to you, as my predecessor so often did, to ask you to continue with your efforts to secure a favourable response to our Assembly's budgetary demands. Our views do not differ on this point. During your chairmanship, which will come to an end in a few weeks time, the points of agreement between the Assembly and the Council outweighed those of disagreement.

The President (continued)

It needs saying, Mr. Chairman, that in fact there are many things we share including the same recognition of the need to get the car our Secretary-General is so fond of going again and even to get its tank filled.

As regards our personal relations, Mr. Chairman, I shall confine myself to these few comments in order to dispel the slightest doubt there may be about the aims of Luxembourg which will always be ready to serve and never seek to impose itself.

As to my personal convictions, I do not intend to keep you in the dark. I advocate a united Europe, including a "security" dimension, and I campaign for the emancipation of such a Europe destined to play a greater rôle in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. We know that, since the second world war, our national states on their own would have had bleak prospects for the future in the absence of any European co-operation.

Is the future one of continental states – China – USSR and the United States? Europe too? Perhaps. But if it wants to get to the start-line at the same time as the others it would be wrong to bank on them turning up late.

Assuming it wants to reach its objective in the year 2000 at the latest, we only have twelve years left. I hope that the closeness of that date will spur us to put behind us quarrels whose derisory nature no one can dispute.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is my programme, those are my hopes.

4. Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council

*(Presentation by Mr. Poos,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1093)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now call for the presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council, Document 1093.

I call Mr. Poos.

Mr. POOS *Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council* (Translation). – Mr. President, how could I fail to express the satisfaction, not to say delight, of all our compatriots at seeing you elected – the first Luxembourger ever – as President of this European Assembly? There is no question that the Assembly has chosen you largely because of the wide range of your qualities. For my part

there is just one that I would like to single out: you have always and in every situation put the higher interests of this organisation above partisan considerations. So the luck of the calendar has Luxembourg presiding even though it is for a very short period, over the two WEU organs at once, the Assembly and the Council.

The honour conferred on you today is on a par with the satisfaction we have had in directing the work at Council level over the last twelve months. I would not wish to go on to the points on which I had prepared myself more particularly to speak without expressing all my gratitude to the outgoing President, Mr. Caro, who, through his unflinching dynamism over the last three years, has greatly helped to make the reactivation of WEU a reality. I do not for a moment doubt that the experience acquired in his period of office as President will also be available to his successor.

Mr. Caro, you deserve WEU's gratitude.

Of the three opportunities I shall have had to address this Assembly this is without a doubt the most perilous.

Whereas in December you were content, particularly here, to hear the President outline his intentions and his programme, the April occasion was already, in many respects, a more difficult exercise. It was unprecedented – being an extraordinary session coinciding with a ministerial meeting – and I had the privilege of briefing you on the results of the Council discussions immediately after the event.

Today, however, it is a question of taking stock: of the actions that have been started, the studies that have been produced and the reports that have been written.

I propose to talk to you without beating about the bush. If I had to describe the state of mind I am in today in a few words and therefore very succinctly, I would say that the satisfactions I have felt over the last twelve months largely outnumber the few misgivings and question marks that I would not wish to conceal from you either.

That will be the first part of my address. Then, after taking stock, I would not like to leave the rostrum without explaining to the Assembly what I, as Chairman-in-Office, feel to be the requirements of European security in the light of the new cards that have now been dealt in East-West relations.

That will be the subject of the second part of what I have to say.

I think I can say that if there is one thing we have unquestionably succeeded in together it is that WEU is now talked about.

This organisation, so greatly criticised and largely forgotten, has recently been experiencing

Mr. Poos (continued)

a renewal of interest that has surprised even its keenest supporters, those who kept their faith in WEU throughout this long crossing of the desert. The countless articles and commentaries in the specialised press and the many speeches of Europe's highest-placed leaders are evidence enough. In that context, the speech by Mr. Chirac, the French Prime Minister, at this very rostrum of your Assembly was without any doubt a major event. Under the same heading I should mention the speech, breaking completely new ground, made by Sir Geoffrey Howe, my British colleague, in Brussels. Lastly, it would be wrong not to include the explicit reference to WEU in Chancellor Kohl's recent government statement when presenting his cabinet to the Bundestag.

International events, dominated since October last year by the "Reykjavik happening", certainly have a lot to do with it because it is true that for the first time in many years there are prospects of wide-ranging substantial changes affecting the future of the old continent's security. The fact remains that the modest contribution we have made by the action we have taken to put WEU in a good shape is unquestionably a major cause for satisfaction.

Apart from this aspect, which has to do with what political observers and therefore public opinion think of our organisation, it is the substantial work accomplished at all levels which entitles me to assert that reactivation has effectively become a fact.

More than just a reason for satisfaction, the mounting interest in the consultations in the various bodies concerned is wholly remarkable. Probably the most timely decision taken during the course of our chairmanship was that senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs, together with political directors and even their opposite numbers in the ministries of defence, should be closely associated with this work.

Regardless of the definition of the organisation's future structures and the difficulties arising out of the dispersed locations of its constituent parts, the constant and above all committed presence of the officials who actually advise the political authorities in the member states is invaluable. Their presence has very quickly enabled the work of the Council to be focused on the heart of the matter: Europe's security interests.

The interim report tabled at the Council meeting in April, which will be finalised during the next few weeks, is unquestionably of vital importance in its effort at clarification. Many of our citizens are currently in some doubt about the direction and content of security in Europe

and I sincerely hope that, once it has been finalised, this document will have the widest possible distribution firstly among the public in our own countries and then those of our allies so that misunderstandings about our intentions and even ill-concealed worries may in this way be quickly dissipated.

That leads me to the third positive item: the appreciation of all our allies for the Chairman's unceasing efforts to preserve the confidence of all our partners including those who are not, or not yet, members of our organisation.

The danger of the reactivated WEU being regarded as a club within a club and causing a fatal divide within the alliance that could, let it be said, only benefit our opponents was clearly perceived by Luxembourg when it took over the chairmanship of the organisation.

Over and above the direct conversations at the highest level and the very frank exchanges of letters between George Shultz, the American Secretary of State, and myself, I feel I can only say that, thanks to the restraint and care with which our various actions and in particular the ministerial discussions have been conducted, that danger has been avoided. It enabled Mr. van den Broek, who will be succeeding me in a few weeks at the head of the organisation, to say after our recent ministerial meeting in Luxembourg that the Luxembourgers had successfully met what, in principle, was an impossible challenge: "to reactivate the organisation without causing trouble with our non-member allies".

A thing which, ultimately, is even more important than the three points I have just made is the fact, repeatedly demonstrated in recent months, that there is now a real desire to take part and therefore be associated with reactivation.

Sufficient evidence of that was the intensity of the discussions we had between foreign affairs and defence ministers both in November and in April. Their simultaneous presence at the same table and the frankness of the exchanges are very worthy of comment, although this is hardly reflected in the dry language of the communiqués.

Those who could find no better word to describe reactivated WEU and referred to it as a kind of "ginger group", an expression that raises many a smile, were probably not wrong. In WEU, Europe now has a suitable forum for discussing the specific problems arising out of its especial vulnerability within the Atlantic Alliance.

As against these grounds for satisfaction there are, unfortunately, as in any human enterprise, shortcomings whose continued existence really betrays an attitude of latent mistrust of the process under way within our organisation. This

Mr. Poos (continued)

is mainly to be observed at the level of financial management. These budgetary quarrels have to stop. They have no place in a reactivated WEU.

In reality, as you recently stressed at a meeting between the Presidential Committee and myself, it seems to me vital that the mission given to Mr. Cahen, the Secretary-General, at the proposal of the Chairman-in-Office, should quickly hammer out guidelines that will enable relations between your Assembly and our Council to be normalised.

The thorny question of enlargement that persisted throughout the period of our chairmanship and became more acute as the number of applicants rose has not been dealt with either, to my mind, as it should have been. The four candidates being, as it happens, faithful allies and three of them member states of the Community, the very minimum in such circumstances would have been to have given them an interim and therefore delaying reply.

In view of the Council's inability to arrive at a consensus and agree a timetable and objective eligibility criteria, wisdom dictated the proposal conveyed to you last April, namely to take another look at this question but not until spring next year.

To conclude this part of my address, I sincerely hope that these questions to which I know your Assembly attaches very great importance may be resolved with the active help of the future Chairman of the Council and pave the way to a new understanding between our two institutions reflecting our wish for even more friendly and therefore fruitful relations.

Mr. President, your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, the nature of the developments now under way and of the changes that are likely to take place on the world scene in the months and years to come is such as to pose some very serious questions. They will call for exceptional effort from European leaders if they are going to make their views count and defend the interests of Europe.

The success of Atlantic solidarity and the open policy of the new Soviet leaders now mean we can envisage a new phase in East-West relations. The Reykjavik summit and the resumption of the Geneva negotiations have opened the way to the first disarmament agreement since the post-war period. I specifically said "disarmament" since all the previous agreements were concerned only with the limitation of armaments.

Confined to nuclear weapons in its first phase, this agreement will nevertheless create a

momentum enabling further negotiations to be envisaged in two fields of particular interest to Europe: conventional and chemical weapons.

As many colleagues pointed out at the last informal ministerial session of the Council of Europe, we are presented with an historic opportunity and we must not fail to seize it.

For over forty years the defence pact agreed in the Atlantic Alliance has enabled Western Europe to live in security and to attain unprecedented prosperity. The question of whether this prodigious result – as anyone remembering the countless tragedies marking Europe's history will agree it is – is due to our defence system does not in fact matter. The essential thing to me is the fact that the treaty signed in Washington on 4th April 1949 wholly fulfilled its purpose, which, if I may remind you, was the maintenance of peace and security and the defence of our freedom and our common cultural heritage.

During that period, the NATO defence doctrine has undergone some major changes. We have moved from the doctrine of "massive retaliation" that we had to start with to the "flexible response". This doctrine has proved and is continuing to prove its soundness both in terms of political integration and military deterrence.

It would consequently be inconceivable to challenge a doctrine that has served the purposes of our alliance so well but the changes that are likely to take place in the near future in the military field following the disarmament agreements that the United States and USSR are talking about in Geneva require us to make the necessary adjustments to our strategy to bring it into line with the new requirements of our security.

Given the continuing numerical advantage of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces in central Europe and in view of the exceptionally grave consequences of any premature recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict – witness the Chernobyl disaster – it is essential that the Europeans, within the alliance, provide themselves with a platform or a charter setting out their security requirements in clear and unequivocal language.

I wanted to inform you of the ideas of the presidency on this subject and, in spite of the fact that the report which is being produced on it by the Council is not yet finished, I think I can identify twelve essential principles which I believe should be adopted at the present stage of our work:

One, the primary objective of a European security policy is to prevent any form and any threat of military conflict by an adequate deterrent and defence.

Two, for the moment and in the foreseeable future, the security of Western Europe cannot be

Mr. Poos (continued)

ensured without a defence structure including both conventional and nuclear capabilities combined in visible and inseparable fashion to make a credible deterrent.

Three, a strong conventional component constitutes the paramount condition for Western Europe's forward defence strategy.

Four, the security of Western Europe is inconceivable outside the Atlantic Alliance. The continued presence of American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe safeguarding the link between European and American security is indispensable.

Five, the nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom make a major contribution to European security.

Six, every European state should enjoy equal security and in return every European state must contribute to common defence according to its capacity to do so.

Seven, a European security policy and the defence contribution underlying that policy requires the broadest possible consensus of European nations on the essential objectives of that policy.

Eight, increasing the effectiveness of European countries' defence effort will depend on improving co-operation on armaments.

Nine, military security and détente are complementary. The ideal instrument for this basic concept is an armaments control policy whose object is to maintain and strengthen stability at as low a level of armaments as possible.

Ten, the global balance in the elements on which Europe's security is founded must be preserved at every stage of the armaments control process.

Eleven, armaments control policy must not lead to any territory of a potential adversary of Europe being made a sanctuary.

Twelve, the security of Europe cannot be considered in isolation from the rest of the world. In assessing the risks, the European states must take into account the tensions and conflicts outside Europe where such developments could affect their security.

This list of principles clearly indicates the two essential and priority objectives our seven governments are pursuing: – to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance; NATO needs a strong and united Europe which has a common concept of its security interests and defends them publicly. This requirement is in everyone's interest including that of the United States; – to declare our readiness for and therefore interest in

political dialogue with the other part of Europe; whilst the progress which must be made with disarmament over all categories of weapons must come first it must not rule out other issues. The continued division in Europe does not make it any the less of an historic absurdity. We need to bridge this divide by peaceful means. War and the use of force have never been and never will be instruments of European policy although that policy must, of course, be prudent, realistic and open.

Aside from progress with balanced and mutually advantageous economic co-operation, our basic yardstick for assessing real improvement in East-West relations will remain the position as regards human rights in the countries of East Europe.

The release of all prisoners of conscience, and political prisoners in all the Warsaw Pact countries, the reunification of families too long divided and the free movement of men and women constitute the test we shall apply to the policy of openness of the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Just as there can be no question of granting Moscow unilateral advantages at our expense we should not fail to encourage Mr. Gorbachev in his policy and take him at his word whenever what he says contains a positive message for the whole of Europe.

In the present context of East-West relations, therefore, WEU needs to act and respond as a genuinely coherent entity and not give the impression of yielding to pressure from any side.

Mr. President, before stepping down from the rostrum, let me thank both you and your Assembly for the friendliness of our relations and to ask once again for your confidence for the future, with particular regard to the efforts of the future Netherlands Chairman.

Reactivated WEU will only progress with the help of everyone, not only all its organs but above all on the basis of a consensus among its seven member countries.

In the case of highly political and very sensitive subjects like the question of our collective security and transatlantic relations it is my duty to tell you that they do not always lend themselves to public debate. Whilst it is perfectly legitimate for your Assembly to seek to be informed as promptly and fully as possible, as the report recently presented by Mr. Ahrens stressed, the concern for discretion in the diplomatic action of the chairman is equally legitimate.

In this context, Mr. President, kindly allow me before I conclude to confirm that the Luxembourg Chairman-in-Office was not unmoved by the many public calls from many European

Mr. Poos (continued)

leaders – the President of the French Republic, you yourselves, the President of the Commission of the European Communities, Prime Minister Martens and others I forget – for a summit meeting whose purpose would be to express an agreed attitude on the part of European member states to the recent proposals of the General Secretary of the CPSU on intermediate nuclear weapons. I would like you simply to know that the chancelleries concerned are fully informed of the readiness of the present Chairman to take the necessary steps once it is everybody's wish.

For the rest, I would like to confirm, if that is necessary, our profound attachment to this Assembly as the ideal channel for explaining to public opinion the effort that needs to be made to strengthen Europe's security. It is only in that way we shall be able to cement that solidarity that a community of destinies, of shared prosperity and dangers, calls for.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Chairman of the Council for your address.

Several of our colleagues have said that they wanted to ask you questions.

I call Mr. Valleix for the first question.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Like everybody here I appreciated the high quality of your speech, Mr. Chairman-in-Office of the Council because, once again, you blended serenity and determination with great clarity. At the end you even associated prosperity with dangers, a daring association but a true reflection in fact of the way things are today.

After the meetings we have had, particularly the last one, I share the pleasure of our Presidents, Mr. Caro and Mr. Goerens, at having been able to have a real dialogue in Luxembourg in the context of a quite exceptional meeting. True, as Mr. Ahrens pointed out, we may not be able to have one every year but, at all events, it was a welcome initiative that we shall, I hope, be able to repeat and, who knows, the sooner the better because we shall never share the same road enough.

My question relates wholly to what is going on today and goes back to the thoughts I presented to the Assembly this morning. The way things are going it is clear that the reactivation or revival of WEU – which is not an idle word although it does not, of course, wholly correspond to our ambitions and our hopes – is nevertheless a fact and has made progress in many ways. We give the Secretary-General, whose efforts are coupled with those of the Assembly, due recognition of this fact.

Will not the difference in pace between the reactivation effort and the acceleration of current

events, particularly in the capital issue of disarmament, eventually leave reactivation behind, if I may say so, whilst disarmament forges ahead.

I said this morning that Europe, at the moment, is the battlefield of disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, what action do you, and tomorrow your successor, intend to take to ensure that our ministers and governments stay more closely geared to events in defining this security charter whose main principles you have listed to us in a presentation which was one of the main features of your address to us this afternoon?

How can we set the seal on this agreement when officially there are no meetings before that in The Hague in October? It is a long way off.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, there is a NATO meeting in a few days time. Will Europe be able then to speak with one and the same voice? What can we expect in Chancellor Kohl's speech to the Bundestag the day after tomorrow? In short, can we hope for better co-ordination and for the European chorus to be more or less in tune both in NATO and, above all, vis-à-vis our Soviet "partners"? Or are we, whilst hoping for WEU reactivation, going to watch broken-hearted as our Europe united in WEU, which would like to increase its membership, breaks into pieces?

Mr. Chairman, have you any reassurances to give us? Could some procedure be envisaged in the present paradoxical situation in which our reactivation efforts are in opposition to events which are out of our hands?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Valleix, for your generally favourable appraisal of the progress of WEU reactivation. True, it is still far short of our expectations but nevertheless it does provide evidence to public opinion at home and the rest of the world of a real advance.

To my mind, external events – what you call the acceleration of events – have served WEU's purpose. The seven governments have been made to face up to their responsibilities. The importance of an organisation like ours and its essential nature has been demonstrated.

I hope it will be possible within the next few months to finalise, under the chairmanship of my successor Mr. van den Broek, the twelve points of the charter which I have just listed and faithfully reflect the present stage of the work in the Council organs. The existence of such a charter, which, of course, must be kept flexible so as to allow for the changes that, in East-West

Mr. Poos (continued)

relations in the years to come, will enable European interests to be better concerted and better presented to our partners and those with whom we have to negotiate.

As regards the stance of the German Government, you are not unaware that, over the past weeks, many informed consultations have taken place not only in the political parties but in governments. The fact that the six partners of the Federal Republic of Germany were to some extent agreed made possible this stance, that presented some difficulty internally. Finalised yesterday it will be announced publicly to the Bundestag on 4th June next.

There now is a European view with regard to the agreement on intermediate missiles. That agreement will be finalised at a meeting of the NATO Permanent Council at the end of this week. It will then, probably, be ratified by the NATO Council when it meets in Reykjavik during the following week.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. Poos on his office. He has emphasised the importance of East-West relations and he cited the twelve principles. We have debated Western European Union as a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The alliance must bring together defence ministers and foreign ministers with a strong administrative back-up if it is to succeed.

My question is addressed primarily to Mr. Poos as Foreign Secretary of a Western European Union member country. In cricketing terms it might be regarded as a body-liner.

The United States of America decided some time ago to escort ships in and out of the Gulf. One of those ships was struck by an Exocet missile belonging to Iraq. The United States of America appears to be providing naval cover for oil exported from the Gulf, about 92% of which is exported to countries other than the United States.

President Reagan will raise the issue with the heads of state at the economic summit in Venice. As Foreign Secretary, what is your view, Mr. Poos, about the best method or umbrella to achieve a co-ordinated response? One might say that the European Economic Community should treat the issue as a foreign affairs matter. The subject has been debated here often enough and it is often said that it is not a NATO problem. In asking you to reply to the question I highlight the need to talk about foreign relations and defence – together – on a much wider scale. Do you think that Western European Union has a part to play?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – This is a very important question. Europe is indeed concerned about the course of events in the Gulf and more still about the Iraq-Iran war which is destabilising one of the vital areas in the world for the West's oil supplies.

However, as the NATO Secretary-General said, the Gulf war is not the alliance's internal affair. It concerns us but it should not be dealt with directly by the organs of the Atlantic Alliance or those of WEU, which explains why the WEU Council has never discussed it.

What is wanted is bilateral collaboration between the United States and certain major European powers: I am thinking of France and the United Kingdom in particular. We need trilateral negotiations on safeguarding the West's interests in that part of the world. I am thinking of our military interests and the safeguarding of the sea lanes. But I definitely feel that we must not make this a NATO-WEU question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, my question relates to your reply to Mr. Valleix which concerns present events. What are the intentions of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council with regard to consultations between the governments of the member states concerning the German Government's stance on the reply to be given to Mr. Shultz on the subject of Mr. Gorbachev's proposals? According to the information you yourself, Mr. Chairman, were kind enough to give our Assembly in Luxembourg, the convergence that was hoped for an all sides was to lead on to consultation, not only between capitals but also within the Council, on the key position of the European response with regard to disarmament. We are still living with that assumption and those expectations.

In the reply you have just made to Mr. Valleix however I think I heard you say that you thought there would be a European reply on the occasion of the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council. That means that the European reply would be given within the alliance as usual, by way of bilateral talks, whether co-ordinated or otherwise. But, once the Bundestag has taken its stand on the presentation by Chancellor Kohl and the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, there will be no submission of the matter to the Council of Ministers of Western European Union for the co-ordination of policies on which you, Mr. Chairman, and we the Assembly took our stand by a unanimous vote.

Mr. Caro (continued)

This seems to me to be a major problem in the present debate, given the fact that several member countries of the alliance, strangely enough the seven countries of Western European Union and, if I may add, my own country in particular, surely need concerted action among Europeans as such with a view to a co-ordinated reply within the alliance. Could I, with the explanations that I hope will confirm the facts, have a precise answer?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – When the ministers of the Seven last met on 27th April in Luxembourg, the problem was clearly not ripe for a definitive decision which explains why the Luxembourg discussions were not conclusive. But you are not unaware that they helped to clarify ideas and in particular to assist the Federal Republic of Germany to decide its final options. It has to be understood that that country feels itself to be most concerned particularly by the shorter-range nuclear missiles because it could well become the battlefield if that type of armament were to be used.

Of course, the calendar and the acceleration in the East-West process have not helped us because it was only yesterday that the German Government decided its position. Up to now, as far as I know, the other member states have not yet been officially informed of the German Government's decision, but we know that the Bundestag will be informed on 4th June, that there will be a debate and probably a vote of confidence on the proposed measures or decision. Now it so happens that the NATO Permanent Council is already due to meet on 5th June next, the day after the Bundestag debate. That being so it is difficult to imagine a European meeting to concert views between the two. In practice, however, since everyone knows of the decision of the German Government through the press there will be no basic divergences, since all the other countries have more or less officially declared themselves in favour of the zero-zero option subject to retention of the 92 Pershing missiles, which are also the subject of debate in the German Government. The Reykjavik ministerial meeting scheduled for the following week should normally simply rubber stamp the positions taken at the NATO Council meeting on 5th June. Although this procedure does not exactly correspond to the objectives of European co-ordination within WEU, it should enable us to achieve the results we want, namely to give the Americans a clear and precise mandate for their negotiations with the other party in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Are there any other questions?

I call Mr. Machete, Observer from Portugal.

Mr. MACHETE (*Observer from Portugal*) (Translation). – You said, Mr. Chairman, that the Council had postponed its decision on the enlargement of WEU to the spring of next year. Do you not think that, in a way, this weakens the efforts of the European members of NATO to strengthen political co-operation with regard to defence and the construction of the European pillar in the alliance?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – It is very easy for me to reply to the observer from Portugal because you must know that, throughout my period in office as Chairman, I have continually urged that we accept the Portuguese and Spanish applications for membership. I also think that the interest that the four applications show there to be in WEU is an encouraging sign. But enlargement is a process with difficult political and legal implications, which explains why the decision has not yet been taken. I would nevertheless remind you that it has not been postponed sine die because we agreed at our last ministerial meeting to return to the enlargement problem once the reactivation of WEU was completed, in other words at the ministerial meeting in spring 1988.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Minister and friend, I would like to ask you first where we stand with the Political Committee for European Security consisting of senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence, secondly, whether Mrs. Rosanna Ridgway's visit had anything to do with this committee and, thirdly, what the future of the committee is with the Netherlands about to take the chair?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The Political Committee for European Security definitely exists. It is already working but without an official birth certificate because the final document on the missions and tasks of WEU has not yet been formally adopted by the Council of Ministers. The political directors meet regularly, as an adjunct to the European meetings, to discuss security questions which are outside the competence of the European Communities. The creation of this consultative body at administrative and political

Mr. Poos (continued)

level has also been discussed with our American partners who seem to have no objection. I can tell the Assembly that this process of European consultation on security questions no longer arouses any apprehension or suspicion on the part of our American allies as we have cleared up these questions in meetings between the Chairman-in-Office and the American administration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Elmquist, Observer from Denmark.

Mr. ELMQUIST (*Observer from Denmark*). – Like my colleague from Portugal, Mr. Machete, I am here as an observer to represent the Danish Parliament, the Folketing. I have been listening with great care to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and I should like to know how the twelve points that he has raised compare with the draft recommendations in Mr. Ahrens's report, on which we shall be voting this afternoon. How does the idea in the first paragraph to convene as swiftly as practicable a conference of heads of state and government compare with the twelve points that have been put before us this afternoon? I appreciate that it is rather early to ask for a reaction when the draft recommendations have not been voted upon, but does the Chairman of the Council of Ministers think that they are in compliance with his twelve points? I have in mind the convening of a conference in a broader context than a WEU basis.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The applications to join WEU that have reached the Bureau of the Chairman-in-Office do not, I am sorry to say, include one from Denmark. I would have preferred to have had such an application from the Danish Government and Parliament among my papers. We regard Denmark as a faithful member of the European Community and of the Atlantic Alliance; it could perfectly well have its place in WEU as well.

But that was not the point of your question which concerned the compatibility with Mr. Ahrens's report of the twelve points under discussion in the WEU organs for a European security charter. It is up to this Assembly first to discuss that compatibility, to give its answer and to convey to the Council of Ministers its directives with regard to the changes or amendments it wants to make to these twelve points as its contribution to the decision which is to be taken very soon.

Regarding a summit of member countries, I think I gave you an answer in my address: the present Chairman-in-Office – and I have no doubt that it will be the same in the future – is fully prepared to organise such a meeting but, for it to take place, there clearly has to be a consensus among the Seven. Unfortunately that has not been forthcoming so far, which I very much regret.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I would like to ask you a supplementary question. I know too well the way you think and the action you have taken to be for one second tempted to put you in the wrong but, as Chairman of the Council, you speak for all the governments of our member countries. Disarmament is the key problem of the day; we have all been intensely involved in it. All of us, governments and members of parliament, have been keen to demand that Europe should speak with one and the same voice. You have put your weight behind that effort, Minister, and you know that we have appreciated this and have paid tribute to you for it. However, in the reply you gave me a moment ago – and I totally agree with the way you think – you said we are unfortunately victims of the calendar.

You are right, these are facts that you hit like a wall if you fail to see them. But Mr. Chairman, whilst the European governments decided to take their time before replying to Mr. Shultz and not to give a hasty answer to a request that was too categorical, at least by the deadline set, do you not think that the Council could also bear in mind that there are three entities asking for a reply from Europe? First there was Mr. Gorbachev who asked your opinion in Prague. Three days later there was Mr. Shultz, but, at the same time or at least thereafter, there was also our Assembly, your Assembly, European public opinion.

At a time when the political test is at issue – you used the word “test” yourself a moment ago – can we accept, particularly if our relations of trust with the United States have been managed as you have just told us – and I am delighted to hear it – at a time when consultation among Europeans would seem to be such as to allow a common position to be worked out, regardless of the differences in assessment there may be depending on whether you talk of double zero, triple zero or even quadruple zero, because we know that ballistic missiles are also involved, how is it possible that the Council cannot also think about methods and set a timetable that includes an opportunity for Europeans to deliberate, in their legitimate institutions, in order to enable those institutions to be active as the treaties require them to be?

Mr. Caro (continued)

At so important a juncture as this, I would be sorry if a problem of timetables prevented Europe's voice from being heard when, as you say yourself, it is ready to speak, and from being heard in its own time and place, provided Europe does speak with one and the same voice in the North Atlantic Council, even at the level of the Permanent Council.

I very much hope that the Council realises the importance of this political event. The thing should not be minimised because there is no difficulty in substance. The problem is one of working procedures. All our machinery – Chancellery, Secretariat-General, Council of Ministers and Assembly – is ready to move into this rôle. I think this is the moment to do so or, if we do not, to record officially our regret so that this is the last time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think this last contribution comes at an appropriate time to close this discussion. I fully share the concerns and thinking that your ex-president has just voiced. With him I regret that neither this Assembly nor the Council of Ministers has so far been able to define the European position, vis-à-vis Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Shultz or public opinion in Europe, or Europe's security options on the subjects which are on the negotiating table in Geneva.

I shall convey this feeling of the Assembly, which I wholly share, to the governments of the member states. The events that have taken place in recent months should teach us a lesson. Here again, I come back to the definition of the charter and the common principles which seem to me essential and likely to facilitate a European response in the future.

For there is no concealing the fact that, in the next few months and years, during the implementation of the Geneva agreement on Euromissiles and during the negotiations that will follow and swiftly spread into the other, chemical and conventional, fields of disarmament a rapid definition of Europe's position will be required of your Assembly and the Council of WEU.

When next autumn we have completed our reactivation, armed with what we have learnt in recent weeks, we will be able to respond more quickly and, above all, play a more active part in relation to the rest of the world and our own public.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, I thank you sincerely for having replied to all these questions with the skill typical of your chairmanship. I would also like to thank the small but very efficient team that has given you its support.

5. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The French Delegation proposes the following changes in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Fourré as a titular member in place of Mr. Galley, and Mr. Galley as an alternate member in place of Mr. Fourré; in the membership of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions: Mr. Galley as a titular member in place of Mr. Fourré and Mr. Fourré as an alternate member in place of Mr. Galley.

Are there any objections?...

The changes are agreed to.

6. Change in the order of business

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I wish to propose a change in the order of business.

You have yourself prepared an excellent report entitled "The voice of Europe after Reykjavik – debates in national parliaments" which is down for debate on Thursday morning.

From the information I have been able to gather, only a few members of the Assembly seem to have their names down to speak. That being so I wonder whether it would not be more efficient and convenient to have the debate on this report at the end of business tomorrow afternoon.

I have spoken to Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Socialist Group and Mr. Reddemann, Chairman of the Federated Group, and they both agree. If the Assembly also agrees this would enable us to bring forward the debate and perhaps shorten our proceedings.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. De Decker, it is no longer my report but that of Mr. Burger.

I will put this proposal for change in our order of business to the Assembly.

Are there any objections?...

The proposal is agreed to.

I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – For clarification, Mr. President, do I understand that the Assembly will close tomorrow evening and that there will be no business on Thursday? Such a change will make a great deal of difference to some members who have booked hotels and so on. I wish to be sure so that we may all make other arrangements. I had not understood from what you said that that would be the effect of the change.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. De Decker has proposed we change our order of business and has told us that the two other chairmen of political groups were in agreement. I have consulted the Assembly which has approved the proposal. We therefore have a clear decision and that is that. I can well understand that it may raise problems for certain colleagues but I also think that, for practical reasons, the decision was the right one.

7. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1099)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – part two: political activities of the Council and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1099.

In the resumed debate I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – First, Mr. President, I wish to congratulate you on your appointment. I should like to thank Mr. Caro for his leadership over an important three years, and I should like to endorse the views expressed by Sir Frederic Bennett, who has taken the very strong line that WEU is about defence rather than disarmament and that we should not forget that.

I have listened to the debate today and to the debate yesterday on the report of the Council to the Assembly of WEU. We heard an excellent address by the Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen. The rôle of the Secretary-General in the reactivated WEU is becoming increasingly important and I value Mr. Cahen's contribution.

The report that we have before us has been produced by Mr. Ahrens. It recommends a colloquy to which the public would have access. That fills me with a certain alarm if it is to be other than a public relations exercise for WEU. It recommends that there should be a meeting of ministers of defence and foreign ministers to

continue those meetings that have taken place in Bonn, London and Luxembourg, and possibly to prepare an agenda for the meeting of the heads of state, as we have discussed.

The report is about strengthening the pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, and that is vital. There was an important debate on this subject in Luxembourg. My contribution was about procurement and meaningful disarmament. I had just taken part in a visit of my country's parliamentary and scientific committee to SHAPE and NATO headquarters in Brussels and Mons. I attended a meeting with General Rogers just after Mr. Gorbachev had made his offer to remove intermediate nuclear weapons, which followed on President Reagan's initiative of 1981.

Mr. Baumel spoke this morning about the political will in Europe to determine its own defence. For a quarter of a century I have been convinced that Western Europe can survive only as a political, economic and military entity. The peoples of our countries, let alone their national parliaments, would resist a move to what is implied by the European federalism, but at heart I am, I admit, a European federalist. I accept that because of the sovereignty of each country in Europe, and the individual cultures of each country and the separate languages, this is an ideal to be aimed for into the next century and not a matter for today.

Members of parliament from our countries are involved in a number of institutions. Some go to the North Atlantic Assembly and the European Parliament which has an interest in industry, including defence procurement. I remember representations to Western European Union by Mr. von Hassel and Mr. Klepsch of Germany. I also remember representations from some of my British colleagues including Mr. Tom Norman. Commissioner Narges has responsibility for industry and is concerned with the ability of European industry to supply.

Many of us in the Council of Europe and Western European Union are also members of national parliaments. Those of us here must in future find a better way to "take along" – to use an English slang phrase – members of our national defence and foreign affairs committees when European aspects are considered. I should like to see treaty revisions so that those who attend the Western European Union Assembly are different from those who attend the Assembly of the Council of Europe. To that end I support the view of Mr. van der Sanden.

If my country is anything to go by, I find that too many parliamentary debates, including those on defence and disarmament, tend to consider such matters as national issues rather than European or international issues. The Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, wrote in March to the Pres-

Sir John Osborn (continued)

ident outlining the rôle of Agency I involving the Soviet Union's tactics and arms control and disarmament issues. He referred to the fact that Agency II deals with threat assessment and the conclusion of the agencies, let alone their deliberations, should be better understood in our committees in future.

I have had meetings in my country with the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. George Younger, and Lord Trefgarne. Indeed, Lord Trefgarne has addressed the Assembly in the past. There are technical aspects of verification. I have alerted Mr. John Wilkinson, the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, to the work that must be undertaken. However, that work also involves ministers and is a NATO problem and as much a NATO problem as ours and must be an interest of the Science and Technology Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.

My attention has been drawn to the United Nations' reports on this subject. However, some questions following Geneva and other talks must be answered. What access does a verification team have to nuclear and conventional forces? Who would constitute such teams? Would there be teams from armed forces, sappers, engineers, REME senior staff or civilian technicians? Would all that be under the NATO umbrella? If so, what safeguards would there be for the European theatre? There are many questions, and as Chairman of the British-Soviet parliamentary group I have listened with interest and respect to Sir Frederic Bennett's wide-ranging warning about the dangers following Mr. Gorbachev's response in peace and disarmament offers to the West. I am reminded that arms control has a limited rôle to play in European security.

My country is in the throes of a general election. One party is willing to accept unilateral nuclear disarmament and depend on conventional forces in Western Europe that are inferior to those in the Soviet Union. That point was hotly contested by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, in the press and on television last week. However, to ask the United States of America to withdraw its forces – and particularly cruise and Pershing missiles – without a realistic deal with the Soviet Union is a hostage to United States' isolationism, which is strong, particularly in the Democratic Party. The Western European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance must now make a better contribution to its own defence and be less dependent on the American taxpayer.

That point brings me to Agency III and the unacceptable fact that European defence forces are too sovereign and each European country too greatly dependent and reliant on its own sov-

ereign forces and equipment. The political will to achieve greater standardisation and greater efficiency with defence procurement still has a long way to go. It involves industry ministers in each country and the Commissioner of the EEC, Mr. Narges. Only last December Lord Carrington spoke about a European concept of defence R and D. British scientists are perturbed by the fact that defence R and D accounts for about 50% of total R and D expenditure.

Western European Union must be aware of Sir Frederic Bennett's injunction. That is why I welcome the fact that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions will promote a symposium on European research, European standardisation and procurement policies for defence. That must involve spokesmen from national governments, representatives from national parliaments and particularly representatives from the industry, science and technology committees of those parliaments. However, it must include representatives from the industries that supply our defence forces.

I want to return to the points made by the Secretary-General. I hope that Agency III will report to the Secretary-General and show encouraging progress in procurement and co-ordination of defence research. As the Secretary-General said in his speech, much of the initiative of Western European Union depends on ministers and their back-up staffs.

I have made these comments because I hope that the next report to the Council will cover these matters in greater detail and show the Assembly where it should concentrate its attention and work. Finally, I want to return to the question that I asked Mr. Poos about a European answer to the request to be made by President Reagan. I accept Mr. Poos's reply. However, I think that inevitably his reply will disappoint the people of Europe and the administration of the United States of America. The Assembly must find a way to care for Europe's defence interests together on a wider scale rather than relying on bilateral deals between the United States of America and one or two countries including Great Britain. Much work remains to be done and I hope that the Secretary-General and the new President will give thought to that work.

(Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Inan, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would first of all like to say a big thank you to yourself and to Mr. Caro for having so neatly righted an injustice committed by another French friend, our colleague, Mr. Baumel, in his statement this

Mr. Inan (continued)

morning. With a gesture, Mr. Baumel dismissed not only four members of this organisation from the defence of Europe but also the other European countries which have been involved in its collective defence for nearly forty years. This he said in front of the representatives of Norway which defends the northern flank and us, representatives of Turkey, a country which on its own and with an army of 800 000 men defends 37% of our common frontiers with the Warsaw Pact countries.

To claim that Europe is defended by three countries only is not European thinking, Mr. President.

I too visited the United States from 10th to 13th May last with the Political Committee of the Council of Europe referred to this morning by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Burger. We had wide-ranging contacts with the representatives of the Department of State and members of Congress. I would like to tell this Assembly about some of my own findings.

The first is that, at the moment, public and private life in the United States is dominated by the post-war generation. This new generation has no awareness of the circumstances in which the Atlantic Alliance was set up, the imbalances of the conventional forces in central Europe and the scale of those of the Warsaw Pact, or of the threats to us from the East. It is more concerned with economic competition from the Pacific and particularly Japan in electronics, and from the European Economic Community. That is its over-riding preoccupation.

My second point is that we heard it stated – more firmly by the members of Congress than by the administration – that the United States had decided to enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons. Let Europe take note. Our continent is, moreover, more or less resigned to it and several speakers today have taken that line. We seem to be headed for a change in a system that has safeguarded stability and peace in Europe and across the Atlantic for over forty years. The vital element in that system – the nuclear umbrella of the United States – is on the verge of being almost completely withdrawn from Europe which, as a result, will be in a state of transition. A new system of defence, equilibrium and stability will need to be devised if possible.

Such transitional periods are the most hazardous. Changing the essential components of a system that has proved itself by safeguarding our peace and stability for over forty years without providing another reliable system to take its place means running enormous risks.

Mr. President, Europe is no longer what it was forty years ago when economically it was almost in ruins. In the economically, technologically and politically advanced Europe of today, its countries ought to be able to organise its defence.

Observing quietly from this bench, the speeches we heard yesterday and this morning have not, I must admit, given us much heart. As I said every effort is being made to avoid responsibilities. It saddens us.

We thought that Europe, confronted with this challenge – or even without this challenge – could and should be able, at a time when it is becoming larger and is busy constructing its economic unity, to create its own parallel defence system. As everyone knows and keeps saying: an economic system cannot last without a defence system. In fact what do we hear? The Seven are in difficulty in their relations between themselves and also in regard to enlargement.

It reminds me of the French expression “*les calendes grecques*”. Last year, the Chairman-in-Office said that the principles would be hammered out this spring. Now the date is 1988. Heaven knows what we will be told when that comes.

This is evasion of responsibility. I am afraid that the momentum developed, by circumstances in European public opinion, for creating Europe's own defence system at last and for co-operating with North America on an equal footing, if that is possible, in a system where the co-operation is not only one way, may be lost. Once again we are about to let an historic opportunity go by.

We hear it said that Europe should form a single nucleus and that its enlargement would weaken it. We have also heard it said that in Europe there are only three countries bearing the burden and responsibility of defence. Personally I would have preferred not to be here at this debate. The image I personally had formed was rather stronger, more advanced and more encouraging than what I have seen and heard these last two days.

I come back to Mr. Ahrens's report where he deals with enlargement and the application for membership by a country which I can name as being Greece. In paragraph 11 of the report, in the explanatory memorandum, he devotes three paragraphs to the difficulties he feels the application poses for the organisation. It is not up to me to add to them, but Turkey's application is referred to in parallel with that of Greece. The difficulties and quarrels which unfortunately divide the two countries are said to be obstacles to their admittance to the organisation. We raised this point in committee and Mr. Ahrens

Mr. Inan (continued)

was kind enough to include our view on the matter in the report.

The approach to the problem is still negative. Reminding the two countries of the disputes between them – which they, therefore, have to resolve before knocking on the door – is not a positive approach. Moreover, Mr. Ahrens himself is better placed than anyone to understand this because it was within the European and international bodies that his own country and France were reconciled.

I would recall, at this stage in our proceedings, that, among the many factors impelling the Turkish Government to apply to join the European Economic Community, one was the fact that the integration of Greece and Turkey might perhaps make it possible to find common ground for lasting understanding and rapprochement between the two countries.

Once again I appeal to our European partners, friends and allies: please do not play one country off against the other, do not add fuel to the rivalries and quarrels between them and do not automatically bring in Turkey when you are talking about Greece or vice versa. Pushing one country along one path and the other along another will not help solve their problems nor create an atmosphere of understanding and co-operation. On the contrary this type of written or spoken statement or attitude poisons the atmosphere, creates misunderstanding between the two sides and complicates things even more. The presence of these two countries in the Atlantic Alliance today has been very useful and has had a major restraining influence, preventing their relations from deteriorating. The two countries are in fact also in the European defence organ which will help to develop understanding and co-operation between them. That is why I make this appeal and once again request the Rapporteur to reconsider paragraph 11 (ii) in his report and not to take a negative approach to Greece's application in parallel with that of Turkey.

The two names of these countries should not always be coupled in a negative light. Personally I think this kind of attitude is not a positive contribution to the relations between the two allied countries in that region. We see the same kind of approach in the Economic Community and elsewhere. It is wrong. I hope that Greece has the same reaction to this kind of attitude.

I shall not labour the point any further, Mr. President, I would simply say that a colloquy is planned for next year on European defence objectives. Then – Heavens knows when – there will be a summit of European countries, in some framework which is not yet very clear. Frankly it is like telling events: "Wait for us, we are not yet

ready to cope with what you have in store". It is like saying to Mr. Gorbachev: "You are going too far and too fast. We are not in such a hurry. Our train is racing along but we, the passengers, are going too slowly". It is like telling the Americans: "Wait for us, please, wait a bit longer". It is no answer and no solution. I think that I am speaking with the voice of the European man in the street, European public opinion and European governments and decision-makers. Whilst events are moving so rapidly, our decision-makers are moving slowly but I am not sure whether they are also moving in the right direction. I have my doubts. In that case there will be one exception but, unfortunately, it will not be favourable to Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Katsaros, Observer from Greece.

Mr. KATSAROS (*Observer from Greece*). – Thank you, Mr. President. I also wish to make a few comments on Mr. Ahrens's report regarding Greece's interest in joining WEU. First, his suggestion that Greece considers WEU an alternative solution to NATO is, I am afraid, weak since Greece fully recognises that WEU is not such a substitute. Greece has already come to an agreement about NATO bases on its territory and is proceeding to negotiate on all other matters affecting its relations with NATO and the United States of America.

Mr. Ahrens's second argument, which was mentioned by the former speaker, dealt with relations between Greece and Turkey and the danger of a clash between the two countries. This is only a presumption. On the other hand, the only conceivable threat comes from our neighbours. It seems that they intend to change the status quo of the Aegean seabed, whereas Greece has declared that it demands nothing of anybody.

The participation of Greece in WEU will discourage the risks of a warlike situation. This is not the reason why Greece is showing interest in joining WEU but simply a comment on certain references in the report.

On the matter of terrorism and Middle East relations, Greece has condemned terrorism without any reservation. Greece differs in its opinion on the ways and means of facing terrorism but that does not weaken NATO's position. Each European country has its own perceptions of the Middle East and South Africa and such matters because of traditional, geographical, economic and other factors.

I shall speak about the doctrine according to which membership of WEU is linked to EEC membership. Mr. Ahrens expresses the view that that does not correspond with present European facts. However, it should not be overlooked that

Mr. Katsaros (continued)

both the EEC and WEU have a principal rôle to play in Europe's unity.

Greece and the eleven other EEC countries have recently signed and ratified the single European act that provides for full co-operation in financial, political and international matters. Are weapons industries included in such co-operation? Are defence matters excluded from political co-operation? The report is not in keeping with the Community tradition that WEU should be the union of the twelve countries. This position was explained by several speakers this morning. In fact, Greece's acceptance into WEU would help to maintain peace in the Mediterranean and give a broader dimension to WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bayülken, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. BAYÜLKEN (*Observer from Turkey*). – My taking the floor after my countryman, Mr. Inan, should not give rise to any pretensions on our side that our talking to this Assembly is because of the size of Turkey or because of the size of its contribution to the defence of Europe. It is the interest that we have in WEU that encourages us to take the floor, and also a technical procedural matter. I see that here observers speak after the honourable delegates are exhausted by speechmaking. However, in the Parliamentary Assembly observers are just recognised even among the delegates.

I shall start with my observations and evaluations of the report by Mr. Ahrens. I believe that the report is a succinct but excellent work as it puts in the right perspective the required scheme to reactivate WEU and to prescribe the content of a European security charter. I should like to commend the report, which tells us of the still existing opportunities in realising the aims of the Rome declaration of 1984 as well as the risks awaiting WEU's credibility if governments are not determined enough in translating the reactivation into deeds.

To support Mr. Ahrens's views in that respect, permit me to remind our esteemed colleagues of the bitter contradictions through which our governments and western public opinion had to evaluate some important, even vital, requirements of European security. We all recall that in the face of the growing dangers of SS-20s deployed some years ago against Western European NATO countries, all the WEU countries included had to implement the provisions of the double-track decisions of 1979. As a result, in many WEU countries strong reactions were displayed against the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles at the time. It took both time and able manoeuvring to appease these reactions.

In unbelievable contrast, following the Reykjavik summit, were the reactions that we observed, both governmental and from the public. They were reactions that rightly linked the security of Europe and the need for some sort of missiles in Europe, IRBMs and others, to strike a balance between Warsaw Pact countries and Western Europe. Can there be better proof that there exists in Western Europe, according to public opinion, a dangerous lack of information about the rôle of WEU and equally about the fundamental requirements of security for Western Europe?

We should not be too ready to criticise public opinion. If those who occupy the governmental benches were better equipped and more ready to take a lead, there would have been no need for the defence ministers of NATO to discuss IRBM missiles and other related subjects over so many years. I speak from personal experience. The result of the committee meetings of the defence ministers since 1981 has been the creation of a zero option, but there were others who did not propose that approach.

There is a need to determine as soon as possible the contents of the European security charter. If Europe clarifies its identity in a realistic manner, no harm will be posed to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. On the contrary, there would be demonstrated a viable and therefore a more durable linkage between the two pillars of the alliance. The United States would be released from a statute that can be likened to the maxim: *primus inter pares*. For all these reasons, the openly expressed will of European countries that are NATO members to contribute to European security should not be treated in a way that gives the impression that it is not duly appreciated.

We have listened carefully today to many distinguished speakers, including the Minister, on some of the principles of European defence. I wish to refer to two of the principles to which Mr. Poos referred. They relate to the ideas of the presidency about the security of Europe. Principle 6 states: "Every European state should enjoy equal security and in return every European state must contribute to common defence according to its capacity to do so." Mr. Poos referred also to principle 7, which reads: "A European security policy and the defence contribution underlying that policy requires the broadest possible consensus of European nations on the essential objectives of that policy."

There is no need for me to prove that Turkey is making an important contribution to the defence of Western Europe, which my colleague, Mr. Inan, was good enough to outline. I am sure that it is something that is recognised by all those who are members of this Assembly. I am sure

Mr. Bayülken (continued)

that there is not too much difference between our objectives and those that are set out in the Atlantic treaty charter, in the alliance preamble and in other alliance provisions. Those provisions are not so different from those that are contained in the Brussels Treaty and in the modified version of that treaty.

There are those who talk about juridical and political difficulties. What are these difficulties? Portugal is already a member of the European Community. Two other countries which applied, Spain and Greece, are also members. Turkey has been an associate member of the Community since 1964. In 1973 I had the honour as Turkey's Foreign Minister to sign the transitional protocol between Turkey and the EEC. That document was signed in Ankara in June 1973, fourteen years ago. Turkey agreed with its partners in the European Community that the economic strategy of achieving parity with members of the Community so as to become a full member of it - 1992 was the target - was good and sound. What has changed in the meantime? What sort of difficulties are we facing?

Are there any political difficulties in respect of Turkey? Those who advance such ideas should be much more precise. In joining my voice with that of Mr. Inan, who represents the party that is in power in Turkey - my voice being one of the independents in the Turkish parliament - I can say that there would be deep dissension within my country, which has a privileged and important place within the alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. After the United States, Turkey contributes the second largest force at the disposal of NATO defences. It makes a tremendous defence effort that demands about 5% of its GNP. Turkey shows by this approach that it would be happy to join Western European Union, which includes important and distinguished countries. However, we are told that there are juridical or political difficulties. Such views are too much to stomach.

I shall conclude my remarks by referring to the illustrious French writer, Voltaire. It is clear that one of his famous anecdotes is clearly apposite: "Il faut parfois supporter un petit mal pour un grand bien."

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Elmquist.

Mr. ELMQUIST (*Observer from Denmark*) (Translation). - I am at this meeting as an observer of the Danish Parliament which has been closely following the work of your organisation for many years, sending two of its members as observers to each of your plenary

sessions. This is my second visit but since I find myself among many parliamentarians from the Council of Europe I feel I am among friends.

Officially, Denmark is not on the list of applicants for membership of WEU as the Chairman-in-Office of the Council has pointed out but the Danes follow the work of your organisation with close attention.

Fifteen days ago, the Danish Parliament held a full day's debate on the problems of security and defence. Our verdict, with a large consensus, on the negotiations under way between the United States and the Soviet Union was positive and optimistic - too much so for some people. In our view this is the beginning of a move in the right direction, a start not to be missed.

At the debate, the spokesmen of the political parties and the minister responsible discussed the rôle of Europe, in other words, the question of how the European countries could find the platform they need to reach agreement, express themselves and exert an influence on their own destiny especially in the field of defence and security.

Several of us proposed WEU as a possibility to be considered but it has to be said that the majority consider WEU to be too narrow and, with all the respect due to you, Mr. President, still too weak. After following your proceedings yesterday and today I am a little surprised at the relatively sparse attendance of members of the Assembly and the fact that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers is not taking part in the discussions.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has managed to organise what are called "sandwich debates" during which the spokesmen for the political groups address the Assembly and not only the Chairmen-in-Office but also any other ministers present in Strasbourg take part.

I am here as an observer and I must let the Assembly manage its own affairs but I must confess my surprise at seeing the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg leaving the chamber immediately after answering the last question.

So WEU wants to enlarge and reactivate itself - but by what procedures? Do the Assembly and perhaps the Council intend to keep strictly to the formal procedures or is a more pragmatic approach in mind? In the second paragraph of the draft recommendation Mr. Ahrens puts forward a more pragmatic formula.

The Danes attach great importance to the Atlantic Alliance. European co-ordination among the Eurogroup within NATO should help to strengthen the European pillar in the alliance. The same structures do not exist; there is for

Mr. Elmquist (continued)

example no parliamentary assembly like this one. The decision-making procedures are different and, in WEU, the discussion is about European union which is not the case in NATO. But the Eurogroup comprises an increasing number of European countries and, in the framework of NATO as a whole, it is possible to draw direct inspiration from our most important partner from the security standpoint, namely the United States which, what is more, is one of the two superpowers.

In Denmark, we also wonder whether EPC – European political co-operation – could one day be the framework for co-operation on security and even defence in Europe. This European political co-operation is separate from the Treaty of Rome and, if the need arose, provision would have to be made for other administrative structures because the European Commission in Brussels cannot act as the mainspring. The new secretariat for which the single act provides might perhaps serve to consolidate the structures of this European political co-operation.

To conclude, I would like to thank the Assembly for having invited us here as observers. We have not yet reached our final conclusion in our country on these highly complex and extremely important questions but you may be sure that we shall continue to follow your work with the closest attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should first like to thank the many members who have given their views on the report. I shall confine myself to these comments and say very little about the various remarks on other subjects.

I can begin by saying that relations between the Council and the Assembly of WEU generally came in for criticism and that some members also felt the efficiency of WEU as a whole was suffering as a result of the lack of contact between the Council and the Assembly.

Mr. Elmquist, who is here as an observer, has just made what I consider to be some pertinent observations. He referred to ways of improving contacts between the organs that we have long found successful at the Council of Europe. Think of the Joint Committee, think of the participation of parliamentarians in the ministerial conferences. So it is not just a question of accepting a formal report: we must also develop other procedures for talking to each other and asking critical questions.

I can sympathise with the Council's unwillingness to publish everything it discusses in printed form, but we cannot, I believe, have any sympathy at all for the fact that we are virtually deprived of information. It was claimed in this connection that the Federal German Government should have first discussed in the Council the decision it took yesterday concerning an agreement between the parties forming the Federal German Government. I do not agree with the Chairman of the Council that it was only lack of time that prevented this discussion from taking place in the WEU Council. That problem could have been surmounted. But, ladies and gentlemen, does not a claim of this kind in fact presuppose a different WEU? Is there any point at all at the moment in putting problems of such import before the WEU Council for discussion? Do we not need a WEU in which the activities of all the member states in the area of security policy are really concentrated? That is a critical question that we must surely ask ourselves when we voice such demands.

The second point I should like to take up is the relationship between the Communities and WEU. One member said that we needed a European union with comprehensive powers even in the area of security policy, and that this would undoubtedly be the outcome of the implementation of the single European act. This union with comprehensive powers may, God willing, become reality one day, but at the moment it is still a long way off.

I believe Mr. De Decker was right when he said that, given the present composition of the Communities, they could not discuss security matters. Mr. Müller also voiced the criticism that the European Parliament – and the same is undoubtedly true of the Commission – was already hard put to it to cope with its present workload.

It was proposed that this Assembly should be composed of members of the European Parliament. I do not think that would be a good idea. The strength of this Assembly and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is that we are all members of our national parliaments as well and exercise control over our governments. The members of the European Parliament are unable to do this.

In any case, we must realise one thing – and this again brings me back to what I said on the first point: unless WEU is restructured and strengthened, defence policy will also be gradually transferred to the Communities. Mr. Caro said he sympathised with the President of the Commission, Mr. Delors. I too sympathise with him. I welcome his remarks, to the extent that they roused us, and perhaps our governments, a

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

little from the lethargy that had begun to spread again since the lofty declarations of Rome.

Several members referred to the rôle of the mass media and stressed its importance. I am sure we shall be talking about this again tomorrow, when we come to discuss the report which you, Mr. President, have submitted.

Ladies and gentlemen, a new generation has now grown up in Europe which has not had to experience the sad times that we had to live through in our youth. I am referring here to experiences and memories which are still fresh in the minds of many of us. But we must tell this new generation over and over again that freedom, peace and democracy are not God-given, but must be aspired to, won and safeguarded all the time. We must not only work for peace, freedom and democracy: we must also tell the public, and especially the young people, in our countries about this work.

On the proposals contained in the report before you I have this to say: in general the proposal for a summit conference on European security has been well received. Some members – Mr. van der Sanden and Mr. Valleix for instance – asked if it was not too late. Others warned against haste, pointing out that a conference of this kind needed to be carefully prepared.

I share the view that we have not much time left, and that this conference must achieve a great deal more than was said in Rome. Perhaps the twelve points submitted to us by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council today form a suitable basis for further discussion at this summit conference.

On the subject of the enlargement of WEU opinions differ. Some members – Mr. du Monceau and Mr. van der Sanden – said we should think first of the reactivation of WEU and only later, when the work of reactivation was more or less completed, of its enlargement. Others said that, on the contrary, we should begin by enlarging WEU, because the resulting broader base was essential to the establishment and formulation of European security policy.

I personally believe that the two – reactivation and enlargement – are linked. I believe the critical comments Mr. Elmquist has just made and the evaluation of his observations should make us stop and think very carefully. At a meeting of the General Affairs Committee in Copenhagen I asked if WEU in its present form was at all attractive to other countries and if we should not begin by doing rather more to put our own house in order.

I can also understand the urgings of our Greek and Turkish counterparts in this connection. But I would ask them to appreciate that, legitimate though their requests may be, more must be done about bilateral relations between their two countries. As for the settlement of territorial disputes, or the Cyprus question – this does not concern us here, but we are all members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe too – it seems to me that not all the opportunities for bilateral solutions have yet been exhausted. I believe that a serious attempt by these two countries to settle their disputes is a precondition for a favourable decision on their applications.

The proposal for a colloquy made in the report found general approval. I can tell you in this context that at its meeting this morning the General Affairs Committee began thinking about the practical business of holding this colloquy. The names of some of the politicians who might attend were mentioned. We shall continue our discussions when the committee next meets.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a new chapter is most certainly beginning in the history of European security policy. A new, reactivated WEU must participate in the formulation of a new policy. I am convinced – as I believe we all are – that what is known as the double-zero option: the abolition of medium- and shorter-range missiles, will come. Opinions on this option differ in the Assembly. While some members see it as the first step in the direction of safeguarding peace with a smaller arsenal of lethal weapons, others see it as a threat to the West's security and credibility and even to its solidarity. We shall be discussing this further in our Assembly.

I believe we agree in two respects. What is needed first is the greatest possible degree of security for all the countries of Western and Eastern Europe, with a minimum of troops and weapons of all kinds. Secondly, solidarity must be maintained. Solidarity must not suffer either in Western Europe or in the alliance. But this presupposes that every country continues to enjoy the same degree of security in the future. In maintaining this solidarity too, Europe will be unable to do without a new Western European Union.

I thank you, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, and ask you on behalf of the General Affairs Committee to approve the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Rapporteur.

The Assembly now has to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1099.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless

The President (continued)

five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Does any member request a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

We shall now vote on the draft order contained in the same document.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Does any member request a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft order is agreed to unanimously².

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 3rd June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987 (Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Documents 1088 and 1105).
2. European space policy until 2000 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 1098).
3. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m.)

1. See page 20.

2. See page 21.

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd June 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987 (*Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation*, Docs. 1088 and 1105).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Linster (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Giust, Mr. Linster (*Rapporteur*).
4. European space policy until 2000 (*Presentation of and*
5. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.
Replies by Mr. Fischbach to questions put by: Sir John Osborn, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Bayulken (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Elmquist (*Observer from Denmark*), Mr. Valleix.
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987

(Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Docs. 1088 and 1105)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day call for the presentation of and debate

on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987 and vote on the draft recommendation, Documents 1088 and 1105.

I call Mr. Linster, Rapporteur.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, please allow a Luxembourg parliamentarian to congratulate you on your election, in an accent as distinctive emotionally as it is linguistically. In Luxembourg, despite the political differences that may sometimes divide us, we know you as a man who is not only able, dynamic and fair-minded but also capable of all the necessary frankness and honesty on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. President, you will certainly need all these qualities and all the political weight conferred on you by your election by the parliamentarians of our seven countries in order to continue President Caro's work of increasingly involving the Assembly in the decisions which must make WEU the spearhead of European security policy and the leading advocate of this policy where the public is concerned.

Mr. President, if our parliamentary Assembly, which has all the necessary moral and intellectual resources, does not very soon receive all the funds, technical resources and staff needed for this essential and urgent mission, that mission will not be achieved. That is why I said in Luxembourg and repeat here this morning

1. See page 23.

Mr. Linster (continued)

that discussion of the Assembly's finances and budget is essential to the political debate.

Under a Luxembourg Chairman of the Council, Mr. Jacques Poos, whose devotion to duty and efficiency have repeatedly been acknowledged by the Assembly, considerable and significant progress has been made towards the financial independence of our Assembly and a distinct improvement in its financial base. But the progress reported by Mr. Poos in Luxembourg still needs to be consolidated and translated into hard, tangible and above all, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, irreversible facts. It has, moreover, to be rounded off by a final breakthrough as regards growth rate, which I do not need to tell you is absolutely essential to the viability, not to say the financial survival of our Assembly and the effectiveness of its work. Let us hope, Mr. President, that under another Luxembourg presidency – your own – this consolidation can be achieved and the further necessary progress made without too much delay.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I see that at the end of my statement to the elected President I went straight into the report, or the conclusions, which I have to present to you this morning.

Article VIII (c) of the charter requires our Assembly to express its views on the annual budget of the ministerial organs. In this instance, we are concerned with the revised budgets for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987. Since time is short, and pursuant to an old custom, I have considered only the financial aspects of these budgets in my report, while adding a few comments of a general nature.

I would therefore refer you to Document A/WEU/BA (87)1, because I wish to pass on a number of ideas on the Assembly's finances which came to me when I was studying the budgets of the ministerial organs.

I should not, however, wish to go any further without paying tribute to Sir Dudley Smith, who has shown his skill, fighting spirit and tenacity in seeking to improve the Assembly's finances in the four years he has been Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. His qualities have certainly made a major contribution to the initial success we can now record. I would therefore ask the British members who are still here to convey to him our committee's thanks for his chairmanship, which was fair, effective and, to use an English phrase, very much up to the mark.

Mr. President, if a logical link is to be forged between the budgets of the ministerial organs and of our Assembly, several clearly established

facts in the financial practices of the ministerial organs should be emphasised.

Firstly, the budget of these ministerial organs for 1986 was revised upwards before the annual growth rate for 1987 was applied. This is preferential treatment on the part of the Permanent Council and the Council of Ministers which can only make us, the elected representatives of the people, green with envy.

Then, the growth rate has in no sense been zero for the ministerial organs, not even in real terms. It must be remembered that vacant posts have resulted in the generation of financial reserves for the ministerial organs. They have enabled appropriations to be transferred from the head for expenditure on personnel to operating expenditure. I do not for the moment want to comment on the fact that, while our staff needs remain unsatisfied, those posts, although already agreed, have been left vacant for a very long time. Judging from the staff policy of the ministerial organs and from the transfers of appropriations from one head to another by the ministerial organs, I conclude that these organs have assumed their freedom to determine their staff policy and their financial independence within the limits of their appropriations, for which we have constantly been asking in vain for many years.

This observation leads me logically to the budgetary and financial problems of our Assembly. When consulting the relevant documents – A/WEU/BA (87) 1 and 6 – you will have noted that at the beginning of May, immediately after our Assembly's extraordinary session, I presented a supplementary report on the budgets of the ministerial organs and a revised draft recommendation. After the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration had adopted my report in Palermo on 27th February 1987, some new facts emerged which we were able to take into account in Luxembourg, and this led me to modify the original draft recommendation. In the draft recommendation and my report I had placed the emphasis chiefly on four essential demands, which I will summarise as follows:

First, the abandonment of the zero growth rate criterion applied to all the Assembly's budgets, including pensions, a principle that does the viability of our Assembly no good at all, as you all know. Second, its replacement with a more realistic criterion allowing a growth rate equal to that adopted for the institutions of the European Communities and especially for the Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg to be applied to the operating budget. Third, the separation of the pensions budget from the operating budget, where the growth rate is concerned. Fourth, the Assembly's budgetary independence within the limits of the growth agreed annually.

Mr. Linster (continued)

Well, you heard what the Chairman-in-Office of the Council had to say in Luxembourg and you know that the Council has recognised the principles of establishing a separate budget for pensions, irrespective of the growth rate, and of independence.

In conclusion, I should like to make four comments which I consider to be essential:

If, as some people claim, the Luxembourg decisions still need to be formalised, everyone must realise, as the committee does, that this is a formality and will not be the subject of a secret renegotiation at which the members of the Permanent Council, hiding behind their governments, arrive at solutions which do not match up to the Luxembourg decisions. I would add that we shall not put up with the butler watering the wine that our host offered us in Luxembourg, nor with his cheating us of the bottles or substituting them. We must make it absolutely clear that we intend to take the coin offered us by Mr. Poos in Luxembourg at face value, in the true sense of the words.

Budgetary independence implies that, among other things, we shall be able, like the ministerial organs, to make transfers from one expenditure head to another; otherwise, independence will be meaningless; immediately to begin applying the growth rate fixed at 2.79%; to turn to account without delay the appropriations released as a result of the exclusion of the pensions from the growth rate from now on, so that in particular the Office of the Clerk may be restructured and certain members of the staff may be given the promotion that is very long, not to say too long overdue.

My third comment concerns the time-limits for the implementation of the decisions which Mr. Poos announced in Luxembourg. In answer to a clearly worded question from Sir Dudley Smith, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council said that these decisions took immediate effect. So there should be no beating about the bush: action must be taken, as the old saying goes: "Hic Rhodus, hic salta". That is the clear and unmistakable message addressed to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Council by our committee and with it, I hope, the Assembly. Be bold and resolute, Mr. Chairman, and do not be deceived by those who would take refuge behind formalities of which we have more than enough.

My final comment concerns the revised recommendation. The committee has retained quite a number of paragraphs in the preamble, which are still topical, and three recommendations, which remain essential: uniting the WEU ministerial organs in a single seat with one table of establishment, if only for reasons of economy

and financial efficiency; establishing the dual grading that has long been requested, to improve the career prospects of staff everywhere, and particularly of our own; last but not least, replacing the zero growth rate with the growth rate applied to the various institutions of the European Communities. Until the zero growth rate has been abandoned, our final battle will not have been won. This last demand is still essential, because even if the zero growth rate is applied in real terms and in the context of the Luxembourg decisions, there will still be no revival of the Assembly's political activities and consequently, in our opinion, no reactivation of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – My thanks to the Rapporteur. I should like to congratulate you, in my turn, on your election to this important post.

I would ask the Assembly to note that this afternoon's sitting will be followed by a meeting of the Presidential Committee for the discussion of the budgetary problems to which you have referred.

The debate is open and I call Mr. Giust.

Mr. GIUST (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would first of all like to congratulate Mr. Linster most sincerely on his accurate and full report and, at the same time, on his election as Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. If he performs that office – as he certainly will – with the same energy and clearheadedness he has shown this morning in dealing with the report he will definitely add stature and authority to his committee.

As I have already had several occasions to say, Mr. President, we are part of an organisation in which the situation is not the same as in national parliaments. In them the Budget Committee is one of the most authoritative organs in decisions on expenditure. In WEU, however, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration strives to be so but it has neither the legal nor the operative capacity to influence the policies of WEU itself. For that reason, although I shall be voting for the draft recommendation and congratulate the Rapporteur on what he has said, the amendments he has proposed and the final understanding reached, I feel it is my duty to draw everyone's attention – and I do so, Mr. President, having in mind your statement a moment ago regarding the important meeting to take place this evening in order to discuss budgetary matters in the Presidential Committee – to the hope that this meeting will strengthen the determination to get across the points which must be made with regard to the budget. In fact, and this is the first point I want to make, whatever view we have of the authority and scope for action of our Assembly and the Com-

Mr. Giust (continued)

mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, we have to acknowledge that in fact our power of decision is limited to 10%, possibly even less, of WEU's total expenditure.

Mr. Linster has endeavoured to voice a judgement – and he has done so very well – on the relative positions of the three agencies and, by implication, that of the Secretariat-General and the ministerial organs. There is no doubt that, in the present case, the Assembly expresses no more than a theoretical vote, a vote of confidence, and certainly not an analysis of the spending and activities of those organs over which it has no authority. It is only in a position to formulate very limited and general observations about expenditure and therefore on the general policy of WEU.

The position taken by Mr. Poos both at the Luxembourg meeting and in his statements yesterday is certainly to be appreciated. What he said on behalf of the Council of Ministers is certainly evidence of good will supported by his own and much appreciated personal conviction. Unfortunately that improves things only slightly. In fact the limited result in the way of exceeding so-called zero growth raises for all of us the problem of the central nature of the Assembly in appraising the Council of Ministers and giving it the right, as was said in yesterday's debate, to become the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Let me, again very briefly, recall a number of views expressed by the Rapporteur. We cannot go on with the ambiguous situation of having two centres. It is right that this subject, a problem of expenditure and logic in the functioning of an organisation like ours, should be raised in this chamber, Mr. President.

On this point I must draw your attention to the strange situations that are caused by the existence of two headquarters. Mr. Zierer was quite right, some time ago, to put his question on the geographical split, taking the example of WEU officials in London and Paris. To me it does not seem fair or right that 80% of WEU officials should be British or French. This does not seem fair on the other five national delegations that share, with equal rights and contributions, in our work, alongside the two I have just mentioned.

I believe this example of the number of officials is typical of the imbalance there is, also illustrated by the affair of the two headquarters.

I would like to conclude, Mr. President and ladies and gentlemen, with a still more relevant point about the functional efficiency of our Assembly. We should not, so to speak, be only receivers of inputs, that is, decisions of the

Council of Ministers and the other ministerial organs. Mr. Linster was again right to make a case for independence in the general judgment on the budget and our Assembly's right to make decisions upon it both as regards the distribution of spending within the budget and as regards the general expenditure of the Assembly and the WEU ministerial organs.

Once again, Mr. President, we need to recall everything that has been said in the past inside and outside this chamber on the importance of the Rome declaration regarding the need for the reactivation of WEU as a European defence organisation. We should repeat it in order to confirm once again in this chamber that the right of budgetary independence is primarily a political statement on the reactivation of Western European Union. As long as that does not happen and as long as we are called to meet in this chamber simply to ratify and applaud the favour done us in raising above zero growth, Western European Union cannot be the political expression of the national delegations of the seven countries that took the political decision to set it up for the military security of our Europe.

It is with this principle and this prospect in mind that once again I thank Mr. Linster the Rapporteur and the committee as a whole, in the hope, Mr. President, that you too will press the same views vigorously at this evening's meeting. I am sure that the document that we shall soon be approving will not remain simply a theoretical – if necessary and formal – assertion but above all a hope, I would almost say an outcry, from this Assembly that WEU should really become the European pillar of defence, ensuring greater security for the seven member countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall simply say how glad I am that Mr. Giust, who, I believe, was speaking on behalf of many other members of the committee, stressed the extent to which claiming and obtaining financial independence for the Assembly is a political decision linked to its reactivation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1105.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly will vote by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Does anyone request a vote by roll-call?...

The President (continued)

As this is not the case, the Assembly will vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

4. European space policy until 2000

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1098)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on European space policy until 2000, Document 1098.

I call Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we come now to a topic quite different from those we have been discussing since the start of the part-session. The debate which follows – and I hope some of my fellow delegates will be able to take part – concerns Europe's future in space until the year 2000, or perhaps 2005, as that is the theoretical timetable for the completion of the Hermes programme.

The topic continues to be a thoroughly live issue and the space debate in Europe is at present very lively and practical. But the debate is not confined to Europe; it is also going on in the United States and there are problems elsewhere, too, for example with the Proton launcher in the Soviet Union.

It might be said that the space issue was currently at a standstill, as the intensive efforts and development of recent years have been marking time, both in the United States and in Europe, partly because of the Challenger shuttle tragedy – and our sympathy still goes out to our American friends on that subject – and partly because of the admitted failure of Ariane, just a year ago.

If things are at a standstill, then the standstill has never been more mobile. If we go to the United States, as the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions did at the end of March, we find that the Americans, like the Europeans, have exceptionally full programmes for the future.

In short, the situation is paradoxical, and that is why your committee and the Bureau agreed to

discuss this aspect of space, which we have already considered in the past. The present situation is in fact notable for the considerable advances already made, the current stagnation affecting the western world in particular, and the exhilarating prospects for the future, which will undoubtedly leave their mark on our civilisation.

The committee which went to the United States was represented by a large number of persistent and outstandingly studious members. In the absence of its Chairman, Mr. Wilkinson, whom I must excuse in view of his obligations associated with the electoral campaign in his country, it is up to me to stress that the committee's United States mission owes its success not only to the work of the Chairman but also, I am pleased to say, to the quality and commitment of the committee's new Secretary, Mr. de Gou.

We observed in the United States – and here already is a political comment – how greatly the Americans had been shaken by the Challenger disaster and how intolerant, and impatient, they are at the period of reorganisation which will not now be concluded before the end of 1988, with the launching of a new shuttle, which had been hoped for earlier.

From these findings and impressions I draw a conclusion which seems to me to carry a political message: it appears that in the situation that affects them now, our American friends are more inclined to engage in dialogue with Europe.

For instance, here is one, highly personal impression. At Martin Marietta, a young engineer of forty spoke to us in terms which would have been out of place two or three years ago, when no such ideas would have been entertained. He said, more or less: "We have to reckon with you Europeans. In aviation you have the Airbus Industrie, and Americans of our generation cannot afford to disregard that. On space questions it will certainly be necessary for us to work together at times."

This kind of comment reflects a change of attitude which must be taken into account and which I hasten to pass on to you.

Ladies and gentlemen, my other subject is particularly topical in terms of the timetable, regardless of the circumstances I have just mentioned.

Very soon, in November 1987, a ministerial meeting will announce the new space programme, involving costs much higher than those approved in Rome in January 1985. I refer here to the European space programme, and to the meeting of representatives of the thirteen member countries of the recently enlarged European Space Agency.

¹. See page 24.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

The matter is also topical because the negotiations between Europe and the United States on the space station are reaching a critical phase.

The subject is topical not only because of the timetable but also because of the particular character of the space environment. This was what I meant when I referred to the upsets experienced with shuttles, launchers and vehicles capable of putting satellites into orbit. On any assumption we must expect some ground to be lost where Europe is concerned and the more open attitude in the United States that I mentioned just now.

Account must also be taken of another factor which should encourage us, not into a precipitate response but into action and commitment. It is clear that the Soviets, notwithstanding some setbacks, have scored some major successes in space, which to me provide confirmation of their lead over the West.

This statement is supported by two observations. When visiting the United States Space Command in Colorado Springs, which monitors all world satellite movements including those of the Soviet Mir satellite on behalf of NATO and therefore for the United States and Canada as well, we were struck by the announcement that the West had no anti-satellite weapon, though the Soviet Union already had such a system.

When I asked him about this, the general in command of the base simply replied: "Congress did not agree to allocate the necessary funds". I repeat here what I said yesterday during the debate on disarmament: when it comes to defence and the major issues, the totalitarian systems have far greater room for manoeuvre than the democracies, because they have only to give orders, whereas we have to reach our decisions democratically, and therefore sometimes fail to reach them at all.

I will conclude my remarks on the space environment by saying something about the need to make the public and our governments more conscious of space issues.

Public opinion in our countries is well-disposed towards the space effort, as landing a man on the moon is a media event which our fellow citizens greatly relish. Apart from the purely scientific interest of these experiments, manned flights are consequently supported by this public enthusiasm. In years to come, public support in our countries will be essential to the effort we shall inevitably have to make in space.

The awareness of our governments must also be increased. The current European programme will be drawn up in detail next November, and, as the budget estimates are not approximate but

real in the sense that they allow for increasing cost levels, we must expect government allocations to the space budget to double between now and the year 2000.

It is in these circumstances that I venture to say to you: "Let us get to work." This is an obligation that we parliamentarians, who are the link between the public and governments, are bound to shoulder.

These are the general observations I wanted to make.

I turn now to a very substantial report, to which our secretariat and the committee secretary made a major contribution. Without inflicting a detailed reading on you, I will point out that the report provides the most up-to-date summary of space matters as they now stand. It contains references to virtually all aspects of space.

It is, however, important that I revert to a few topics in the report which provide the basis for the six-point draft recommendation on which you will be voting. You will doubtless have noticed that this recommendation is fairly short compared with previous documents on these subjects. I wanted it to be more political than scientific or technical, and that is why it deals with certain agreements in preparation and sounds a warning with regard to certain practices that are developing among our European partners.

This recommendation, based on existing conditions, will provide easy means of verification in coming months, and, Mr. Secretary-General, will enable us, in conjunction with the Council of Ministers, to take stock on the basis of this political schedule. One of the purposes of the recommendation is to initiate dialogue and create productivity in our European space efforts.

I shall refer to a further two points: the competition between the various countries and the European Space Agency, and the choices to be made between the civil and military programmes. We must also take note of the current upsurge of projects in Europe and the world, and must establish priorities so that Europe can be independent by the end of the twentieth century.

Another major debate springs from the accidents to the American shuttle and the Ariane rocket, and I refer here to launcher policy and the definition of expenditure and real production costs.

It is equally obvious that we cannot dissociate ourselves from co-operation between Europe and the United States, particularly as far as the western space station is concerned. Following the meeting of our committee this morning and in

Mr. Valleix (continued)

the light of the debates which have taken place in this forum since the beginning of the week, it seems that an armaments control agency will become an increasingly essential tool for Europe. WEU is certain to have something to say about that.

“Distinction between civilian and military programmes” is the title of Chapter III of my report. You will certainly have noted – the figures are striking – that in 1983, the year for which the most recent statistics are available, 62% of the world space budget, or some \$35 billion, were invested in military space programmes, compared with 38% in civilian space programmes. It is interesting to observe that, for the same year, the Soviet space budget was \$13.5 billion, compared with \$8 billion for the United States. It is hardly necessary to add that the figures for Europe, Japan and India were negligible.

Those are the facts, and the question whether or not the military use of space should be controlled or prohibited has been overtaken by events. The United States is well aware of this, but the fact that it has been outstripped by the Soviet Union obliges it to force the pace of its military development efforts, not without difficulty and not without arguments in Congress, as you know.

When we visited the United States we learnt that Congress's efforts were common knowledge and the talk we had with our American colleagues confirmed the Americans' determination in this area. Hence the possible development of the strategic defence initiative.

There is another difficulty which should be mentioned under the heading of civilian and military programmes. Together with the European effort at co-operation in the civilian domain, we are witnessing a fairly rapid development in the work of national organisations, in a form of competition with the European Space Agency, which is itself expanding not only as regards its programmes but also in the growing number of member countries. France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany now have their own space agencies, and this must in essence be seen as a favourable development, because the deeper our countries' commitment, the more active their partnership will become.

Ladies and gentlemen, it seems to me to be crucial that our Assembly and each one of us should welcome a constructive sharing of positive national efforts, though they must not be detrimental to the vital European co-operation. Do I need to remind you that Europe is the third space power after the United States and the Soviet Union? We must remember that we have no right to jeopardise that position.

I would now like to say a quick word on launcher policy. Following the shuttle disaster and the Ariane 5 failures, we are now faced with a resurgence of traditional launcher technology, and there is a revival of non-recoverable commercial launchers in the market. Ariane accounts for 50% of the world launcher market and this position is perhaps easier to achieve than to sustain, although we must make every effort, difficult as it may be, to keep this market by the deployment of all the European resources necessary – provided they are honest, of course.

Our campaign must be systematic: our competitors are not asleep. The United States is deprived of its shuttle for another year and a half. President Reagan himself made a statement in August 1986 which simultaneously prohibited shuttle flights for a number of years and initiated the Delta II programme carried out by McDonnell Douglas. This is covered in paragraphs 89 and 90 of my report, and I shall therefore not labour the point, but it must be recognised that the contracts awarded are already considerable, and the launcher programmes have development dates of 1988, 1989 and 1990.

Delta II has a standard launch capability into geostationary or low orbit of 1.4 tonnes to 1.8 tonnes. Also in the United States, Martin Marietta is developing the Titan III programme which can put 4 500 kg into geostationary transfer orbit. Contracts have also been awarded for the Titan II and Titan IV programmes. General Dynamics is working on Atlas and the Atlas G-Centaur, which will be a modified model, launched from the Vandenberg base, which we visited. So the Americans are moving towards very substantial cost reductions, especially with the so-called heavy-lift launchers which have a payload capability of 45 to 68 tonnes, in accordance with SDI programme requirements. Boeing and Hughes Aircraft Company are also involved in these programmes, as is Rockwell International, and we are now working on payload capabilities of some tens of tonnes.

But the United States is not alone, ladies and gentlemen. The Soviet Union is working on payload capabilities which should enable it to manufacture equipment suitable for mounting on its Mir space platform to provide accommodation for up to 200 astronauts. In a word, we can see behind the launcher technology the development of highly intricate programmes which have nothing in common with what we are familiar with at present. Attention is drawn to this point in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation.

Developments within Europe at national level are dealt with in paragraphs 128 to 151 of the report. I hope that our German and Italian colleagues will not mind my making no special

Mr. Valleix (continued)

mention of their problems, for the simple reason that they are being redefined at the moment. Italy and France are making quite considerable efforts. France is involved in the field of European military space programmes with its Helios and Syracuse II satellites, and the United Kingdom with its Skynet system.

Co-operation is taking place in military matters, and this is therefore the moment for us to remember that the Soviet proposals on arms control advanced at Reykjavik and the debates now in progress are equally good reasons for Europe not to fall behind, if we are to embark on disarmament. Disarmament can be genuine only if it is verifiable and actually verified, capable of being monitored and actually monitored. In future months and years we must therefore contemplate the prospect of a European space programme. The Council must seriously consider this question, which is touched on in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation.

International co-operation at multilateral or bilateral level is dealt with in other paragraphs. So much is happening that I shall not go into it point by point, but will simply remind you that there are some elements in the international space effort which we fail to appreciate. Japan was late in starting to compete with Europe, but it has moved ahead quite fast with its H-1 launchers, etc. A perhaps less well-known fact is that the Chinese have made great strides in this competition, to which they have allocated the considerable sum of nearly 20 billion francs a year over the last twenty years or so. They are endeavouring to secure a foothold on a world market, particularly for their launchers, and will shortly be putting satellites of Chinese manufacture into orbit.

I have not so far mentioned India. The space budget of that enormous third world country is already large and has the very specific purpose of providing telecommunications relays, as ground-based links are a rarity. India's space programme aims at fighting illiteracy, improving meteorological data and indirectly combating famine. In short, India is a typical example of a country where space is used for specific purposes appropriate to developing countries. This experiment is all the more attractive because it benefits other disadvantaged countries. Europe could well support this programme.

I have a special comment to make on the Soviet Union where bilateral co-operation is concerned. In the United States we were questioned, not aggressively but closely, about our European partnerships. Jealousy is not the issue here, as we are in good company. Several European countries have collaborated in space programmes with the Soviet Union concerning

astronauts, laboratories and the use of Soviet launchers. I mention this problem because it is of some importance, not merely because the Americans alluded to it, but quite simply because they themselves are to some extent involved in the matter. The subject is consequently referred to in paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation.

There are advantages in trying to civilise space and circumscribe the areas of threat, but it is not a good idea to do so unsystematically, for one simple reason: there is no reciprocity with the Soviet Union. We place orders with them, but the reverse procedure is unknown.

In the second place, they have no respect for commercial principles – a concept which is, of course, lost on them. This means among other things that services can be supplied without any regard for the real cost, and that may cause difficulties for the western market. Our recommendation therefore refers to this point and suggests that such arrangements be avoided in future if we do not have an assurance of reciprocity and respect for commercial principles.

I would add, as an unwritten axiom, that reciprocity also means reciprocity in matters of confidentiality, as guaranteed by the Chinese. It is not enough to tell us that customers can convey their own satellites to the launch site and thereby monitor proceedings until the last moment. The Soviet Union does not go that far, and caution is therefore indicated.

Ladies and gentlemen, to keep to essentials and conclude by dealing rapidly with the space station, I will confine myself to some general remarks, as all the details are contained in the report.

The western space station is programmed for 1995. You will have observed that, once again, we are very much behind the Soviet Union, which is in the process of creating the Mir space station which by 1995 will doubtless have a manning capability of dozens and dozens of space personnel, or astronauts. It is therefore important that we direct our efforts and allocate the resources necessary to the success of the western space station. As you know, Europe can take part in this project, and we hope that the normalisation of relations between the United States and Europe will enable agreement to be reached on co-operation in this field.

You know that on the European side, apart from the programmed Ariane 3, 4 and 5 launchers, the extended space participation scheme includes the Hermes and Columbus programmes and possibly the Pallas project for a European space station. When we talk of aiming at autonomy in space matters by the year 2000, that involves implementing a programme of this kind, and I have indicated the foreseeable budget implications.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

With regard to co-operation with the United States, co-operation on the space station has already been virtually agreed, both by the European Space Agency and by Canada and Japan. Since the details of the various participation arrangements are mentioned in the report, I shall not go into them here.

We have now reached the critical moment. Last April when we returned from the mission to the United States, the Americans had presented Europe with a draft agreement and we at once altered our draft recommendation. It transpired that the Americans wanted to insert a military clause, so to speak, into the space station project, but the fact that no reference is made to this in the present draft recommendation must make the text easier to adopt.

Our European countries and the European Space Agency are preparing their reply.

This project is of major importance, because in this worldwide competition we are left with no choice. The question as to whether or not the military should be given access to space has been superseded, and as far as the space stations are concerned there is every likelihood of a military presence. Mir, module upon module of it, will be the world's first major space station and it will be Soviet!

As you can see, ladies and gentlemen, this subject could not be a more immediate or burning issue, since it has both military and civilian implications and the associated scientific and technological research and achievements are equally important to the most disadvantaged peoples and to our own modern world.

Space, which offers us new raw materials, new energy sources, new superconductive systems and new laboratory techniques, signifies an enormous leap forward, which is bound to affect the environment of future generations.

My last point concerns the space agency for monitoring satellites. You are aware that this idea was put forward by France and that the committee discussed it on two or three occasions, with Mr. Fourré in particular. The issue is not raised in the draft recommendation because the time does not seem to be ripe politically. It represents the logical extension to space of the consequences of possible disarmament agreements. I mention the subject openly on this platform – though it would be premature, politically speaking, to put it in writing, but apposite to stimulate WEU's thought processes – because I hope that, in the present stage of its reactivation, WEU will confirm its determination to give Europe its chance, so that disarmament continues to be synonymous with peace in the

future, as it is today under the threat of terror. If not, it would be a confidence trick.

That is the substance of what I wanted to say, Mr. President. Please forgive me for having spoken at some length, but space is an inexhaustible topic and this report deals with subjects of immediate concern.

Competition is wide open. The link between Europe and the United States must also be reinforced in this area of prime importance. Nevertheless, Europe's ambition must be to prepare itself, as Japan is already doing and others will do in the near future, for an autonomous space capability by the year 2000.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

Before calling the first speaker in the general debate I wish to draw your attention, ladies and gentlemen, to the fact that this debate will provide the last occasion for two members of the British Delegation to address this Assembly. I refer to Sir John Osborn and Sir Paul Hawkins, and I need not say how greatly we regret their departure. I pay special tribute to both on behalf of the Assembly.

I now call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you for those kind words, Mr. President. When I made my maiden speech in the House of Commons, I asked for the indulgence of the House, and this morning I may reminisce over forty years as well as looking to the future. I hope, therefore, that I shall have your indulgence, Mr. President, and that of the Assembly.

First, I congratulate Mr. Valleix on his wide-ranging and comprehensive speech on European space policy until 2000 and on the report itself. I hope that it receives the attention that it deserves.

Nearly fifteen years ago, I joined the Western European Union Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. The Chairman was Duc Pierre de Montesquiou and the Secretary was Hugh Huigens, who left that office only a year ago.

This debate is taking place before the Paris air show at Le Bourget, a time for the industry to show its military and civil achievements and concepts in aviation and aerospace. My first visits to Le Bourget were dominated by the Anglo-French concept, the Concorde, which I supported from the early 1960s, over twenty-five years ago. Concorde has been a great technological advance, if not a commercial achievement.

Before I entered the House of Commons I was a supplier to the aircraft industry and I fre-

Sir John Osborn (continued)

quently attended the Farnborough air show. It was sponsored by the Society of British Aircraft Companies, but SBAC stands now for the Society of British Aerospace Companies. My first attendance was in the early 1950s as a personal guest of Lord Hives of Rolls-Royce, the company which was pioneering the commercial use of the jet engine.

As you have suggested, Mr. President, this could be my last speech of many in the British Parliament, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and this Assembly since I entered the House of Commons in 1959. Most of my speeches have been directed to industrial, scientific or technological issues and their implications. I was one of the first British members of parliament to visit the European launcher site in Kourou in French Guiana in the early 1970s. In the early 1960s I backed the British space programme, involving the De Havilland company, Blue Streak and Black Knight. It was decided to cancel those projects, but out of them grew the European space programme.

To an increasing extent the programme has been monitored, assessed and encouraged by WEU through the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. WEU has been much more effective in this subject than any other assembly, including the European Parliament or the Council of Europe. The body that has sponsored this space programme in Europe has been the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. Mr. Valleix has referred in his report to the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe, which took place in Munich in September 1985. The subsequent report appeared under Mr. Lenzer's name, he being the chairman. It has been one of many useful colloquies that have brought together many of those who are interested in aerospace.

The European Space Agency is restricted to the peaceful uses of space. That extends to space communications and the several separate organisations, some of which are based in Europe. The first such organisation was Intelsat, which came out of the NASA programme.

Space and satellite communications are financially sound and profitable activities for which users pay. That has been a commercial outcome of the space programme. Yesterday the Assembly debated the rôle of a reactivated WEU and above all the work of the three agencies and the rôle of the Secretary-General. In aerospace there must be greater cohesion and dialogue among governments, their officials and the ministers responsible for aerospace and technology. I have a feeling that until there is reactivation there will be a lack of co-ordination. That comment is

directed not so much to the present Secretary-General as to his predecessors.

But for the general election in Great Britain, the Secretary-General would have had a visit to his London headquarters by British members of parliament who are interested in technology. I would have organised such a visit. Among the group of members of parliament visiting him would have been members of the committee of my country that addresses itself to scientific affairs. As I am a life member of that committee, although no longer a member of parliament, I hope that I shall still be able to visit the Secretary-General to examine with him the extent to which I am justified in making my assertion about co-ordination.

It is suggested that the Assembly will be taken much more seriously in future and in a more business-like manner following a truly reactivated WEU. In that context I find the fifth recommendation especially appealing. It deals with a European military programme of communications, navigation, observation and reconnaissance satellites. Mr. Valleix touched upon that subject at the meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions this morning. I raised the issue of verification, which I took up during the discussion in Luxembourg and during the debate on Mr. Ahrens's report yesterday. Political will is one consideration, but another is technical, involving seismology, communications and surveillance, and particularly surveillance from satellites. I believe that WEU should have an appreciation of the problems. I welcome the fact that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions will examine the technical aspects of verification as a practical means of achieving mutual and balanced force reductions.

I was a member of the group that visited the United States during March and April. I also participated in a tour of the United States three years ago. I have not had the opportunity, however, of bringing up to date my impressions of co-operation with the United States.

Recommendations 4 and 6 refer to intergovernmental agreements with the United States on the space station and on the need to encourage a space dialogue with the United States. I shall return to that point at the end of my contribution.

Partnership can, however, be based only on independence and strength on the European side. The information that Mr. Valleix has given us on Ariane 2 and 3 is interesting. Ariane 4 will be able to place 8 000 kg in low earth orbit, or 4 200 kg in geostationary transfer orbit, and should be in service next year. Ariane 5 is scheduled to be ready by 1995 and is planned to have even greater reliability and to be able to lift two pay-

Sir John Osborn (continued)

loads of 2 500 kg in a geostationary orbit. When the aerospace sub-committee of the Science and Technology Committee of the Council of Europe visited Toulouse in March it was given a briefing on Hermes. That project will be based on Ariane 5 and will be a manned mini-space plane. It is referred to in the report. Much international support has already been obtained for it.

I note that Mr. Valleix has made little or no reference to Hotol, a project envisaged by British Aerospace. The protagonists of Hermes reminded me when I raised the subject of Hotol in Toulouse that Hermes is known technology based on Ariane 5, whereas the Hotol concept has to be proved. I hope, however, that the committee will encourage the Hotol concept.

The members of the committee who visited the United States will have been brought up to date with the details of the Challenger disaster, which was referred to by Mr. Valleix, and on the setback to the shuttle programme. I first discussed that programme as a member of this committee when visiting the United States in 1975. I again enjoyed a private briefing in 1980.

The shuttle programme, the space station programme and the concept of Columbus are therefore very real to me as a member of parliament. It probably is equally real to many schoolboys, as it is to those who work in the industry, although the majority of the public and of the elected representatives in our national parliaments will remember only what they have seen on television or read in the press. The programme is ambitious, however, and it must be the subject of international co-operation, and this committee is one of the few bodies aware of that fact.

I congratulate Mr. Valleix on a lucid and ambitious report. Space is a challenge and there is a European dimension that must be grasped. This Assembly must ensure that the work of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions is taken up and that the Council not only gives it the necessary attention but displays the leadership that it deserved. The Council must display that leadership, and we must monitor that aspect from the Assembly.

My colleague and the Chairman of the committee, John Wilkinson, would have been present but for the general election. He would have wanted to be here to support Mr. Valleix in person. I shall do that in his place. There is work and there is challenge in this area.

I mentioned earlier Columbus and the space station. This week in Paris I had a meeting with Mr. Frank Davidson, whom I first met last year. He presented me with a book – “Big is Beautiful” – which is the outcome of a series of sem-

inars on macro and conceptual engineering sponsored by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His initial work was on the Channel tunnel in 1956 – a separate interest that involves Mr. Valleix and me in view of that project's Anglo-French implications. The Channel tunnel is too much regarded as a financial problem, but it is an exercise in human co-ordination, the management of engineering and industrial enterprise.

The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions visited Hydro Quebec in Canada eighteen months ago when we were given a presentation on the James Bay project. When completed it will have an electricity generating capacity equivalent to the normal electricity consumption of the United Kingdom – 50 000 to 60 000 megawatts. That is what we mean by the concept of macro engineering. Concorde is another example of that. Sir George Edwards, on the British side, had a remarkable ability to co-ordinate design and engineering to achieve the only example of commercial Mach 2 flying.

The space station is another example of conceptual engineering, and the scale of what President Reagan and NASA, with backing from the western world, has embarked upon makes the mind boggle. In all this work there must be a strong dialogue between governments and scientists and engineers. One inevitable catalyst must be the science and technology committees of national parliaments.

The political will for a space programme certainly falls into this category. The Science and Technology Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly has an important rôle, but so has the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of WEU. That brings me back to the Secretary-General, whom I have come to know from his work in London, and the ministers. The Council of Ministers has an important rôle to play in this area.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I thank you for your indulgence. It has been a pleasure to work in Western European Union, particularly on the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, on which I have served off and on for fifteen years. It is appropriate that my last contribution to the Assembly should have been on European space policy until 2000. This Assembly has work to do: I wish it well.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – I should like to begin by congratulating Mr. Valleix on a very informative report which focuses, as everyone will of course know, on the necessary link between the civil and military

Mr. Fourré (continued)

spheres of the space sector. This leads me to my first comment.

Such reports, presented here at WEU and centring on space problems, regularly come up against the major difficulty of obtaining information on all military programmes worldwide. Moreover, in paragraph 18 of the report Mr. Valleix refers to the scale of the United States' and Soviet Union's military programmes. In paragraph 19 he points out that more than 62% of the total budget was spent on military programmes and that this share has increased considerably since these figures were forwarded to us in 1983.

What do we know of the United States' and Soviet Union's military programmes? Virtually nothing, as we ourselves observed in the United States during our committee's recent visit. The United States is clearly unwilling to divulge information on any military programme. Everyone knows that the same is true of the Soviet Union. This is rather a pity, since in this organisation military problems are our particular concern. Nevertheless, meeting points do of course exist, especially where European co-operation is concerned. This is what the Rapporteur was bringing to our attention when he referred to all those aspects of international co-operation.

He also forced us to face the problems of competition, in the civilian sector in particular, with the United States and the Soviet Union. He referred to the extremely important aspect of possible fruitful collaboration in the future especially as experience both with commercial practices and in the area of technical co-operation sometimes leaves us with a sense of frustration – when we recall, for example, the unhappy experience with Spacelab.

As regards commercial practices, the Rapporteur should provide us with the details, because they will have to be reassessed on the basis of their real value, considering the cost of each and having regard at all times to the need for reciprocity. This is particularly true of the Soviet Union, as the Rapporteur says in his draft recommendation.

To talk of space today is, of course, to talk of current programmes, as the report makes abundantly clear, but it also means thinking about preparing for the period following the year 2000. Some questions remain unanswered. At their forthcoming meetings the ministers of the countries involved in the European Space Agency will undoubtedly have some particularly important decisions to take.

Sir John Osborn referred to one of the points that is essential to preparations for the future.

The choice that will have to be made between *Hotol*, *Sänger* and *Hermes* – not from a technical point of view, because it now seems to be generally accepted that there is little technical competition, in the true sense of the word, between them – but from the angle of financial competition. I am personally afraid, and almost convinced, that it will be particularly difficult for the European countries, in view of their budgets and the current world economic situation, to commit funds on any major scale to both national programmes and European programmes, or to international co-operation. Consequently, at a given moment, very clear choices will undoubtedly have to be made.

While I have no fears about the political will to join in this co-operation, I am afraid that at a given moment these financial difficulties will raise the problem in a different form.

European co-operation is necessary, in fact indispensable. I personally feel we should begin by thinking about European co-operation before considering the possibility of international collaboration other than within our European sphere.

The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has been working on this subject for years. I too should like to say how much we shall miss Sir John Osborn and all the skill he has always shown in this committee at making progress in the field of research in general and in the scientific world. Despite the importance of our activities, both in committee and in this chamber, there is no sign of the Council's paying very effective attention to us, either in this field or, unfortunately, in various others.

The Rapporteur says so, in fact, in paragraph 148. He refers us to our Recommendation 410 on the military use of space, adopted on 21st June 1984, and to the Council's reply of 27th November 1984 – a speedy reply – which ran as follows: "The Council has taken note with interest of the Assembly's recommendation and the proposals therein. However it is not in a position, at this stage, to give precise and detailed replies."

More than two years later, we have received no further reply. I personally regret, like the Rapporteur, that the Council does not pay more attention to our work on a subject that will be decisive for our future and from the military point of view.

Mr. President, I want to say how happy I am that an old proposal which I personally have referred to on several occasions in this chamber and in the Council of Europe has been taken up both by our Rapporteur during this debate and by the European Parliament in a text adopted recently, in March 1987, on European space

Mr. Fourré (continued)

policy. This proposal was submitted by France to the United Nations in 1978 and concerns the creation of an international satellite agency which would enable us to take very effective monitoring action vis-à-vis disarmament.

As the Soviet Union and the United States were manifestly incapable of reaching agreement on the establishment of an agency of this kind, I had suggested considering the possibility of creating a European agency. The Council should, it seems to me, give this some thought. In committee, acting on a proposal from the Rapporteur, we have this morning called for more thought to be given to this subject. Sir John Osborn also referred to the need not only to establish an international satellite agency, but also to take into account all the technical resources that will enable us to assess any agreement of the type being widely discussed at the moment. It is a most interesting subject, and one about which we must think very seriously.

Clearly, I fully endorse the draft recommendation that has been submitted to us, and if I had a choice to make as regards priorities, I would prefer to place the emphasis on paragraph 5, which recommends that the Council: "With the assistance of the WEU agencies for security questions, examine the repercussions of establishing a European military programme for communications, navigation, observation and reconnaissance satellites." I would hope that the Council will examine this proposal very soon and send us the appropriate replies as quickly as possible.

(Mr. van der Werff, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you very much, Mr. President. I had intended to open my speech by congratulating Mr. Goerens on becoming the President. I hope that as acting President you will pass my congratulations to Mr. Goerens. Mr. Goerens is a man after my own heart. He was a valued contributor to the important colloquy held in Villars last year. Strangely enough, that conference was entitled "European agriculture until the year 2000". That debate had almost the same title as today's debate. However, I shall not accuse my very good friend, Mr. Jean Valleix, of having pinched the title. I hope that my very best wishes will be passed on to Mr. Goerens.

Mr. Goerens and the Assembly have many problems to solve and there are many battles to be won over the coming years.

I want to pay a sincere tribute to our outgoing President. Mr. Goerens and others have already paid such tributes to the strength of the outgoing President and the way in which he raised the status of Western European Union within Europe. That was an outstanding achievement. I agree with all the tributes and want to add one more: the retiring President had a wonderful, outgoing personality. He was very human and became a real friend to us all.

As the President has already said – and I want to thank him for his kind words – my time with this Assembly will come to an end this week. I have thoroughly enjoyed it for the past twelve years and I believe that I have made many friends of different political beliefs and nationalities. I shall miss that most.

In passing, Mr. President, may I say that it might perhaps make the lives of members of a future Assembly a little easier if our French hosts could be pressed to introduce a better form of interpretation mechanics. I may be getting old, but my ears are drummed with the speaker in his own language, which overlays the interpretation in my language. If the volume is turned up, one's eardrums are damaged. Perhaps I may make a practical point that does not involve space technology but relates to something a little more mundane – it might make our Assembly's debates a little easier to understand and bear if action were taken about the interpretation system.

I have thoroughly enjoyed every moment here. Our hosts, the French, have always made our stay in Paris delightful. I have also always enjoyed the meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. I congratulate my very good friend, Jean Valleix, on his excellent report. I have enjoyed many happy times with him as Chairman and member of that committee. I particularly remember a visit that lasted the best part of a week when we travelled from Bordeaux down the west coast of France. The visit was absolutely spot on in terms of the arrangements. We experienced the delights of sampling the wines of Bordeaux in many charming chateaux. We visited Mr. Valleix's home and got to know his lovely wife. We visited many establishments on the west coast, which certainly opened my eyes. We visited the ballistic centre and met a remarkable man. I do not know what he was and I have forgotten his name but he was an outstanding man who spoke every language under the sun. His grandparents came from Germany so he could speak German; he was also fluent in English and Japanese. He spent the day with us and introduced us to this great programme that France has begun.

We met another remarkable man and celebrated his eightieth birthday. He was knighted by the Queen in Paris. He was head of Turbomeca

Sir Paul Hawkins (continued)

and had co-operated with Rolls-Royce in Great Britain.

I was impressed by the co-operation in so many aspects of French and British life. We heard of a village called Les Horseguards. It was so named because the Horse Guards, having fought Napoleon, settled in that area and named it accordingly. We were also reminded of the many battles on the rugby field between people from the west of France and Great Britain. I am sad to say that the French beat us these days at that game. The co-operation among France, Britain and many other countries has been much improved by WEU. It is assisted by such visits during which we learn more about the national life of other countries.

I have thoroughly enjoyed the meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and I congratulate Jean on his excellent report. His résumé presented in Luxembourg was remarkable. I understand more about space now that I have read the report and heard Jean's explanation of it in Luxembourg. I am too old to understand all the technical and intricate problems involved in space activity but I have no doubt that the subject will have a great impact on all our lives.

As I said in Luxembourg, all who have the privilege of belonging to this Assembly are members of their national parliaments and have to fight elections. We must make clear to our colleagues in national parliaments and to our constituents the great importance of the space programme and how it will impact on our lives – I believe to the great benefit of the ordinary man and woman in the street. It is essential that we explain the benefits in simple language that the man and woman on the street and in the village will understand. As Mr. Fourré said, the programme is extremely expensive and will take a lot of understanding if it is to be backed by all nations. We must co-operate with other nations; we cannot do it alone.

I wish the Assembly the greatest possible good fortune for the future. May its strength and standing in Europe and in the world be greatly increased over the next few years. I shall watch its achievements with delight and hope one day to be in France when I shall sit in the public gallery.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Paul. I shall convey your kind words about Mr. Goerens and Mr. Caro. I compliment you and Sir John Osborn. You are both longstanding members of the Assembly. I remember Sir John in the early 1970s. I thank you on behalf of us all for your magnificent and important contributions to our work. Of course your excellent contributions

were to be expected because you are both members of the mother of parliaments.

We share some inconveniences in the hemisphere but we do our best.

The debate is closed.

I invite Mr. Valleix, the Rapporteur, to give us his reaction to the debate.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall reply briefly as basically our agreements outweigh our differences. I am again sorry that our Chairman, Mr. Wilkinson, is not here, as he would certainly have had a message to convey, but I do thank Mr. Wilkinson's stand-in, Sir John Osborn, for having given it.

I wish to tell Sir John Osborn how greatly he will be missed by the committee, and in saying this I speak from the heart and on behalf of all the committee members. Our friendship has been sealed and confirmed during our excellent working relationship. Sir John, please do not forget us in your prayers and your counsels. I would like to add that our Chairman, Mr. Wilkinson, has contributed a great deal by his earlier reports, as has also Mr. Lenzer, my predecessor. Both have worked hard on these space matters, and, as you know, Mr. Lenzer was the moving spirit behind the Munich colloquy just two years ago.

I would tell Sir John that we did indeed think of new techniques involving space aircraft and shuttles, but I did not refer to them expressly firstly because they have not yet been fully developed and engineered and secondly because a certain amount of confidentiality is maintained by the inventors and their countries. However, Sir John, I do direct your attention to paragraph 193 where we refer to cost estimates in the European programmes: "This estimate takes into account operational costs of the launchers and other infrastructure mentioned in paragraphs 201 to 211 of this chapter and even costs having regard to the autonomous space station and reusable launcher with advanced air-breathing engines which will be developed to ensure European independence in space in the beginning of the next century."

Reference is implied here to the British Hotel project and the German Sänger project. I am glad to confirm our interest in these projects. I direct the Assembly's attention to the fact that paragraph 72 also refers to pioneering techniques now being developed.

You will note that in 1986 the American National Commission on Space presented a development programme to the White House including proposals for high-performance electric propulsion systems such as ion engines and mass-drive reaction engines. There, ladies and

Mr. Valleix (continued)

gentlemen, is something to stimulate our imagination and possibly our research.

Thank you, Sir John, for your report and more especially for your always very positive and effective contributions to the work of the committee, which are reflected in the report. Our thanks also go to our colleague, Mr. Fourré, with his deep specialised knowledge of the subject. These two gentlemen are engineers and their expertise has been most useful to the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Our colleague, Mr. Fourré, mentioned the military aspect and we have each in turn quoted the same references. As in the field of aviation, it is unfortunately child's play to make the transition from civilian to military applications – a transition which may be costly and above all dangerous. I say “unfortunately” because the risk is also on our doorstep, not simply within our capacity. Tomorrow it will often be simple to switch from the civilian to the military uses of space, and that is another reason why WEU should continue to be vigilant with regard to this problem. Mr. Fourré has again mentioned the problems of competition which are, indeed, an aspect of capital importance and I am very ready to acknowledge the fact. I thank you, Mr. Fourré, for raising again the proposal for a monitoring agency, which you have often argued in committee.

I hope that the presentation of this report and this morning's discussion will give the Assembly fresh impetus in the coming months in the light of the outcome of the disarmament negotiations. The further disarmament talks progress and the greater the distance covered, the more urgent will it become to establish this monitoring agency. Would you therefore look at paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation, which is one of its capital points.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

Your predecessor in the chair, Mr. President, has no doubt taken note of the problems of spatial resonances raised by Sir Paul Hawkins. I point out here that the space concerned is that in the assembly hall. Echos there certainly are, Sir Paul, but if that has enabled you to lend a closer ear to the French, I can only welcome the fact.

Thank you, Sir Paul, for what you said about a visit to south-west France which has left me with memories as fresh as your own. I appreciate Sir Paul's hint that the best wines on earth may easily be the best in space, and that is a point worth recalling in the present debate. It was Sir Joseph Szydkowski, chairman and managing director of Turbomeca at the time, who was so

very proud to have been made Sir Joseph by the Queen – a well merited honour, as in 1940 he managed to evacuate some prototype aircraft from the path of the advancing German army.

Sir Paul's contributions to the work of the committee have always been full of good sense and realism, and one result was that in Luxembourg recently we corrected the preamble to the recommendation to take greater account of the need to refer to public opinion in our countries, which he has just mentioned. We are democratic countries, and when we consider an effort to be essential – as we do in the case of space – no political or human solution is valid without public involvement.

I also hope that we are not saying goodbye but only au revoir to our two friends Sir John Osborn and Sir Paul Hawkins.

Finally, the increasingly heavy but inevitable costs mean that there has to be greater European co-operation in space matters, not just to make savings but also to prevent duplication either in scientific or technological investments or in intellectual input or the use of brain power. Our researchers need to complement, not duplicate, each other!

If the course of disarmament negotiations brings us to a position in six months' or a year's time where we can say that we have arrived at the “post-disarmament stage”, or are “proceeding to the achievement of disarmament”, then I would remind you that the further we go in that direction, the greater will be the need for a European space monitoring agency. Mr. Fourré put the date some time after the year 2000. Please forgive the somewhat short-term character of this morning's presentation.

Is space a challenge or a matter of good fortune? It is my belief that Europe has in any case to pick up the challenge and seize its good fortune.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with our orders of the day the vote on the draft recommendation will be taken this afternoon.

**5. Address by Mr. Fischbach,
Minister of Defence of Luxembourg**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, to whom I extend a special welcome.

Would you please come to the rostrum, Minister.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President,

Mr. Fischbach (continued)

ladies and gentlemen, my colleague Jacques Poos yesterday reviewed the main activities of the Council over the last few months. As I agree with his analysis and conclusions, I shall try to avoid repetition and shall refer to only a few aspects of WEU's activities under the Luxembourg presidency and then comment in more general terms on the international situation and specifically the problems currently facing Europeans in the area of arms control.

The questions concerning the future development of the organisation have not all been resolved. It is still not very clear what its general rôle should be. It should certainly be a forum for debate and consultation. But should it really confine itself to debate, which by nature is always somewhat academic? Does WEU really not have other potential to tap without encroaching on the Atlantic Alliance which remains the prime instrument of any western security policy?

In recent months various new tasks for the organisation have been described, defined and adopted. The identification of European security interests is among the most important. In fact, it is probably one of the most important tasks that WEU has ever undertaken. The manner in which this task will be performed may help to define its general mission and so to give the organisation its identity.

Working methods and procedures have continued to improve, thanks primarily to greater involvement of the seven governments in WEU's activities. The creation of a special working group has provided the foreign and defence ministries with a flexible structure for more vigorous and effective action. Experience since the beginning of the year has undoubtedly been encouraging.

However, the structural reform is far from complete. The organisation still does not know if it will have to work at two different places or at one. The restructuring of the auxiliary technical organs, the agencies, has not really begun despite various declarations of intent and even various attempts. In this respect there is still a certain feeling of unease.

One of the most positive aspects of the last ten months has been the more harmonious involvement of the defence ministries in WEU's procedures. The defence ministers are now making an active and equitable contribution at all levels of work. The foreign and defence ministers now form a well-established joint team.

This has been noted on various occasions, most recently at the latest Council meeting in Luxembourg, which was also attended by the

defence ministers for a discussion of their rôle and tasks in WEU and for an in-depth exchange of views on European security problems. Their representatives first met in Luxembourg in January and then on two occasions, quite recently, in London to discuss co-operation in arms procurement and the management of defence resources.

At all these meetings there was agreement on a number of issues. First, WEU should not duplicate work already being done elsewhere, as in the IEPG or the Conference of National Armaments Directors, for example. Then, the work should be directed to concepts rather than to operational matters. Finally, the defence ministries are concerned with political as well as technical matters.

I wish to emphasise the political rôle which the defence ministers must play in WEU. They have their own responsibilities, particularly for the management of resources. Everyone realises that the establishment of a new balance at conventional level will require a very major budgetary effort, which can be approved only by those who are responsible for the management of resources, and they are the defence ministers.

Some of the subjects of particular interest to the defence ministries have become more topical as a result of recent developments in arms control.

The meetings of defence ministers in the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defence Planning Committee have shown that both the military and the political authorities of the Atlantic Alliance are well aware that significant reductions in nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, or the complete elimination of certain categories of nuclear weapons, will necessitate urgent adjustments in the area of conventional weapons. Above all, the capacity to contain a prolonged conventional attack must be improved if Europe is to prevent nuclear reductions from worsening its overall strategic position.

In pursuit of this objective the West must rely on its strong points, which may be found in the area of technological innovation. It must rationalise its defence effort, and this can be achieved through closer co-operation in arms procurement and particularly through a better distribution of rôles and responsibilities in the alliance.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on the question which I feel lies at the heart of today's debate: what rôle must be played, in the future defence strategy of the western alliance, by conventional forces on the one hand and nuclear forces on the other?

Mr. Fischbach (continued)

Since they established a common security system and a common strategy, the western countries have always relied, more or less entirely, on nuclear weapons to safeguard their territory. They have also seen nuclear systems in their various forms – ranging from tactical to strategic weapons – as the best means of linking their security to that of their American ally.

This nuclear dependence has always made some people feel uneasy. The Europeans believed that, because of the thousands of nuclear systems deployed in the form of totally destructive weapons, artillery shells, airborne bombs and so on, there was a danger of the early use of nuclear force transforming Europe into a nuclear battlefield.

The United States saw in the early use of nuclear force the danger of a rapid escalation to an intercontinental exchange, thus involving American territory. On the other hand the Europeans were forced to insist, as a means of deterrence, that the alliance should declare its firm intention to resort, if need be, to nuclear force if subjected to an attack which it could not contain by other, conventional means.

In other words, the Europeans do not want their territory to become the theatre for a massive and prolonged conventional war which might ultimately be just as devastating as a nuclear war. This has been the dilemma of the alliance's security policy from the outset. There may be no truly satisfactory solution to this dilemma. In the nuclear age absolute security, if it existed, would not be far removed from absolute horror. And the relative security which can and must be the Europeans' goal cannot be achieved without certain risks.

Maintaining and improving this relative security is a constant challenge to the Europeans. They must meet it, on the one hand, by continually adapting their defence systems to the changing requirements. They must also meet it by an unremitting effort to control armaments with the aim of increasing the stability of existing strategic relations.

At the moment the main effect of the arms control proposals has been to throw the western allies into confusion. In their public declarations, of course, they are almost unanimous in welcoming the progress being made. But this optimism and calm conceal the serious concern that some of them feel.

It is true that what is happening at the moment in the area of arms control is rather surprising. The Soviet Union says it is prepared to abandon its SS-20s, forming a system which it started deploying barely ten years ago and which is very accurate and very effective in military terms. In

the case of intermediate systems with a range of more than 1 000 km, they would be giving up three times more nuclear warheads than the Americans. And yet certain western countries are pulling long faces. Some people are therefore saying: "The Europeans do not know what they want. They are now rejecting what they proposed six years ago."

The same goes, these critics say, for the systems with a shorter range of between 500 and 1 000 km. At first we insisted that an agreement on longer-range missiles must be followed by negotiations on the reduction of shorter-range systems. Now, despite their truly crushing superiority in the shape of their SS-12s and SS-23s, as against a few tens of rather outmoded Pershing IAs on the European side, the Soviets have agreed. And yet certain Europeans will continue to express doubts. This is improper, the critics say, and they urge the sceptics to work out a consistent line at last.

However, should this apparent generosity on the part of the Soviet Union not give rise to some distrust or at least some caution in the West? In other fields the Soviet Union has not been as generous, this being true, for example, of the MBFR negotiations, where they have not yet agreed to the slightest reduction that would have taken account of their numerical superiority.

Could the West Europeans have more to lose from reductions or the elimination of entire categories of nuclear weapons?

Is the Soviet Union aware, perhaps more so than we are, of the value that nuclear systems have less in military terms than in political and psychological terms? Could it be that they believe the disappearance of these weapons from Europe would open the way to new political options to their advantage?

Could it be that it is speculating that the guarantee of American security, the link with the United States of America would be irreparably weakened, and that Western Europe would lose some of its will to maintain its own identity?

The discussions among the western countries at the Atlantic Council in Reykjavik in just over a week's time will, for example, be very important. The Europeans must work out with the Americans, a joint position that takes account of Western Europe's long-term interests. They must together ensure that the negotiations on the reduction of nuclear forces reduce the risk of war and, above all, increase general stability.

WEU has a major rôle to play in this context. It brings together countries which are all sensitive and also vulnerable on a number of points. If they want to avoid being left on the fringes of the current debate on a global strategy, the Euro-

Mr. Fischbach (continued)

peans must ensure that note is taken in future discussions of the aspects on which they are particularly sensitive and vulnerable. WEU can play a vital rôle working out a common European position.

In the weeks and months to come Western European Union must prove its genuine right to exist.

Ladies and gentlemen, I should not like to leave this rostrum without joining my colleague, Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, in congratulating my friend Charles Goerens very sincerely and cordially on his election as President of your Assembly. Having known Mr. Goerens for a long time, I should like to congratulate the Assembly on having finally chosen a man whose human and intellectual qualities, whose political awareness and parliamentary experience will be of great value in this post. I wish him a great deal of courage and above all a great deal of success while he continues in this high office and the personal satisfaction that is essential to anyone who assumes political responsibility at a high level.

I should also like to congratulate President Caro on the personal commitment he has shown throughout the Luxembourg presidency. If Western European Union now has a younger and, I would say, more dynamic image than ever before, it is basically his achievement. His ideas and his many initiatives have certainly helped to revitalise WEU. I am convinced that, even though he has now left the presidential chair, Mr. Caro will continue to work for the greater good of Western European Union and for its reactivation, a goal so dear to his heart.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Speaking for the Assembly, I wish to thank you, Mr. Fischbach, for your message to us. I specially appreciate the congratulations and kind words to myself.

I believe you are prepared to answer questions, Minister?

I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. Fischbach as Minister of Defence of Luxembourg on his address and most informative presentation. Members of the public through the work of the Assembly and especially by the comments made by Mr. Fischbach must be informed about Western European Union in an administrative sense. They must be aware of the impact of the Council in strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Mr. Fischbach has opened that hidden book to this Assembly and to the public.

Today Mr. Fischbach referred to the dialogue between the western allies and the Soviet Union

to achieve an agreed reduction in intermediate nuclear forces and short-range nuclear weapons. He also spoke about the difficulty of achieving a Western European consensus.

My question is more of an administrative nature. In many countries the same ministers who attend the NATO Council will attend the Western European Union Council. I assume that Mr. Fischbach will be in Reykjavik next week. Will the Council of Western European Union be able effectively to represent the Western European pillar to the alliance, bearing in mind the reactivation that has taken place?

We have in this Assembly referred to two aspects – defence procurement and research for defence. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions can consider those aspects and make a recommendation through the Assembly. In your view, Mr. Fischbach, are the ministers prepared to work on that as well?

I want to consider the dialogue between the United States of America primarily and the Soviet Union. Verification of any agreement is paramount. I have referred in this Assembly to the need for the Western European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to have some say in that verification. Are the committees of Western European Union and representatives of member countries looking into that subject? That subject will be considered by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Pandora's box has been opened by you, Mr. Fischbach. This Assembly and the public welcome that. Would you now give us a little more information?

Mr. PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I thank the delegate for his intervention and am flattered by his words of appreciation.

The North Atlantic Council will be meeting next week in Reykjavik for its spring session but will be attended by the ministers for foreign affairs. At the last NATO meetings, both Mr. Poos and I had an opportunity to brief our colleagues about the course of WEU's work, and on the deliberations and positions adopted at the Luxembourg meeting of the WEU Council.

The questions you raise concern the defence ministers rather than the ministers for foreign affairs. You have stressed the need for co-operation in arms procurement, and this is, in fact, one of the main concerns of the defence ministers, who meet regularly in the Independent European Programme Group for the essential purpose of discussing the harmonisation and

Mr. Fischbach (continued)

standardisation of military equipment for the exact purpose of improving the transatlantic dialogue, which operates in one direction only – in favour of the United States and to the detriment of Europe. However, following Congress's decision to table a number of amendments, I think the Americans are ready to improve the transatlantic dialogue and to co-operate more closely with European industries.

As regards verification measures, any dismantling of tactical or strategic nuclear weapons obviously requires watertight checks. You also know the Americans and Russians are still a long way from agreement on verification measures, and a great effort is still needed, particularly from the Russians, to meet the legitimate worries of us Europeans and our American allies. So, even if the negotiations seem to be progressing, and there is every reason to hope they will reach fruition very shortly, it must be realised that agreement on verification is a prior condition for any nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix and request that he confine himself to asking a question and does not make another speech.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I will put my remarks in the form of a question if you wish, Mr. President.

Minister, I have heard and read various statements about duplication. In the case of meetings of defence ministers it has been asked whether there is any point in WEU's addressing topics already dealt with by the IEPG. I do not necessarily take this view and I should be grateful, Minister, if you would let us have your thoughts on this, seeing that WEU's work is one thing whereas IEPG's action creates a bridge with the Atlantic Alliance and enables the debate to be widened.

I personally would like to see WEU expressing European positions before the Europeans state any views in NATO. Could you reassure me on this point?

My second question concerns disarmament, towards which we seem to be moving. You have very properly pointed out the need for verification measures, and these are indeed highly important, but disarmament does not mean peace at any price! Everybody knows that conventional weapons are expensive. At present, our defence effort is insufficient, and it will have to be sustained or increased even after a disarmament yet to become fact. Do you consider, Minister, that our governments and public opinion will have the "strength of character" needed to sustain this political resolve and the

determination to defend ourselves with or without disarmament?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – It does not seem to me there need be any duplication between the work of WEU and IEPG. On the contrary, it is WEU's business to provide the necessary political stimulus for the partners in the IEPG – which was specially created for co-operation on armaments – to discuss concrete projects on the table of the Council of Ministers. This view is shared by my colleagues.

The second question is about disarmament, and this is certainly vital, though you are quite right to say it must not be secured at any price. As most of our countries have only limited scope for expanding defence budgets, other ways of increasing our efforts must be found. As I said in my address, the essential requirement is to manage our resources more rationally. We must then intensify co-operation in weapons procurement and encourage joint projects.

As far as the redistribution of the defence burden is concerned, we must clearly consider a more rational allocation of rôles and costs. The special WEU working group has already started studying all these problems.

Lastly, not only the military authorities but also responsible politicians now accept that nuclear disarmament means we must think about modernising our conventional forces. You are aware of General Rogers's favourite concept of FOFA, or follow-on forces attack, which postulates a state of highly dependable conventional stability in which, by exploiting the capabilities of modern technology, it would be possible to handle any enemy surprise attack by giving our forces at least the means to halt it at the second line. This is the prime concern not only of the military authorities but also of defence ministers, and this fact was restated at their last Council meeting in Brussels.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bayülken, observer from Turkey.

Mr. BAYÜLKEN (*Observer from Turkey*). – I thank Minister Fischbach sincerely for his lucid and realistic statement. He said that on conventional weapons the Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union did not seem to be ready to make any substantial concessions in the MBFR negotiations. They have over 60 000 tanks and powerful artillery – at least twice as large as NATO's artillery. They have conventional, not nuclear, missiles that could be used in the battlefields and a navy that goes beyond the concept of defence of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. On the Caucasian front Turkey pins

Mr. Bayülken (continued)

down at least twenty divisions of the Soviet Union, more than 4 000 tanks and many other military weapons and, on the Balkan front, together with Greece, pins down about thirty divisions, more than 40 000 tanks and many other important conventional weapons.

Turkey has applied to become a member of WEU. How does Mr. Fischbach evaluate Turkey's request to become a member, and how would he like that request to be answered by WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – In reply to the observer I would say the credibility of the member states of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO depends on future progress with the reduction of conventional forces.

Mr. President, your Assembly knows very well that in December last year the NATO partners suggested to the member states of the Warsaw Pact that direct negotiations be opened between the blocs without intermediaries. Unfortunately, we have occasionally to acknowledge that problems emerge not only in the East, but sometimes in the West also. We have to admit to the difficulties now being experienced by the Europeans in arriving at a common position to be argued in negotiations with the Warsaw Pact countries.

I shall say no more, and can only hope that present difficulties will be overcome as quickly as possible to the maximum benefit of our member states. We have to make some very quick and significant progress on conventional weapons if we wish to retain credibility, as it is the member states which have demanded the restoration of a balance in the conventional field. Everything must therefore be done to see that this is achieved as soon as possible.

You also mention the problem of enlargement and ask specifically whether Turkey, which is effectively an applicant, would be welcome within WEU. You have practically answered this question yourself. There are, of course, a number of countries wishing to join Western European Union, and some have already met prior conditions for entry. We know the Council decided in Luxembourg recently that WEU should first be strengthened and only then enlarged.

You also know that Spain and Portugal, which are members of NATO and the EEC, are certainly the first countries which will make their voices heard as applicants to join WEU. It is clearly still too soon to reply to this question, but it is a fact that the admission of Turkey to WEU

raises rather more important – or should I say sensitive – questions, which must be settled before it is proposed that that country formally applies to join WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Elmquist, observer from Denmark.

Mr. ELMQUIST (*Observer from Denmark*) (Translation). – Minister, as observer from the Danish Parliament I have listened with great interest to your statements concerning the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe. Speaking of WEU member countries you said that WEU member states remained convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons on European territory – nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory not only of the Soviet Union's allies but of the Soviet Union itself – was essential to the deterrence of any kind of aggression. Only thus could the doctrine of flexible response be maintained and the United States' commitment to Europe be assured.

Could you please enlighten me on the following three points?

Firstly, are your words to be understood not to refer to European nuclear weapons, that is to the French and British nuclear forces? Do they refer directly to the American nuclear weapons which must remain on European territory?

Secondly, does that not imply some distrust of the American guarantees? On the European side and within WEU there is some lack of confidence in the American political guarantee to maintain the flexible response in the absence of some form of American "hostage" in the shape of nuclear weapons. There is no faith in the broad umbrella if the nuclear weapons are located, say, in the United States or the Atlantic. They have to be here in Europe.

Thirdly, do your words mean that you rule out completely the idea of a European zone free from nuclear weapons?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I shall reply briefly to the three questions which are obviously very important.

As co-Chairman of the Council I can speak on behalf of my colleagues and, in principle, I rule out a denuclearised zone in Europe – which I think is equivalent to the expression you used – because it would be too dangerous, as we know, and could well give rise to misunderstandings which would be unacceptable at the present time.

You know very well that the question also arises regarding the withdrawal of the SS-20s from the Asian part of the Soviet Union and that

Mr. Fischbach (continued)

nuclear weapons as flexible as the SS-20, which are stationed in Asia, could be very quickly moved to the European part of the Soviet Union.

These are some of the verification problems we would be faced with, making it impossible for us to accept a denuclearised zone in Europe without further thought. In any case it is impossible because all intercontinental systems and all strategic weapons are capable of reaching European territory. So we should not refer to a denuclearised zone in Europe but to a world denuclearised zone in a situation without strategic or nuclear weapons capable of reaching European territory. In such circumstances every country could advocate a global denuclearised zone encompassing all countries and all member states with nuclear weapons.

In your first question you asked whether the phrase, nuclear presence in Europe, was meant to include the French and British weapons systems. No weapons system could be excluded as both are, of course, member states located in Europe. There is no way of excluding or disregarding these member states which belong, what is more, to the Atlantic Alliance, although it is easier to give an answer to the question on British nuclear weapons since they, in an emergency, would be integrated in the alliance and under the command of SACEUR. This would not be the case for French nuclear weapons which, in the event of war, would remain under French command.

You asked whether the fact of wanting to maintain nuclear weapons in Europe did not signify a certain mistrust of our American partner. On the contrary, insofar as we shall be asking the Americans to maintain both a conventional and a nuclear presence in Europe, it is an expression of confidence in our American friends. That is why we insist on the nuclear presence because we want it to be known, – and I believe this to be very important – that deterrence is only valid by virtue of its two components: the conventional and nuclear components.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I would like to quote Mr. Poos again who, when he listed yesterday the twelve essential principles that should be adopted at the present stage of the work – I am talking about the European security charter – said: “Five, the nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom make a major contribution to European security”.

I think that this is the correct viewpoint rather than the interpretation I think I just heard.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – You heard yesterday the conclusions drawn by the Chairman-in-Office which I wholly support. I simply wanted to reply to the very specific question that was put to me.

There are, ultimately, several options. The French option is not to be ruled out. I said that, qualitatively, a distinction has to be drawn between French and British nuclear weapons as the former would remain French in the event of a crisis whereas the latter would be integrated in the Atlantic Alliance.

I did not wish to say more than that; on the contrary I wished to stress the fact that you cannot leave the strategic forces belonging to these two countries out of the nuclear capability.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That brings us to the end of the debate. My special thanks to you, Mr. Fischbach, for having replied to the many questions put to you.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. European space policy until 2000 (Vote on draft recommendation, Document 1098).
2. The voice of Europe after Reykjavik – Debates in national parliaments (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on draft resolution, Document 1097).

This report will be presented by Mr. Burger who has been kind enough to take my place as Rapporteur.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12. 55 p.m.)

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd June 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. European space policy until 2000 (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1098*).
4. The voice of Europe after Reykjavik – debates in national parliaments (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the*

Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1097).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Burger (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Bordu, Mr. Burger (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Tummers (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee*).

5. Adjournment of the session.

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. European space policy until 2000

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1098)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day call for the vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1098.

In accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Does anyone request a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously².

4. The voice of Europe after Reykjavik – debates in national parliaments

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1097)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on the voice of Europe after Reykjavik – debates in national parliaments and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1097.

I call Mr. Burger, to whom I owe my sincere thanks for taking my place because, as President of the Assembly I am not allowed to present the report myself.

I call Mr. Burger, Rapporteur of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, after the election of my worthy compatriot Charles Goerens to be President of our Assembly I shall now be a full member of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. It is therefore my honour, ladies and gentlemen, to present my oral report on Document 1097, at the close of our session.

1. See page 26.

2. See page 27.

Mr. Burger (continued)

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, presenting a report on debates in national parliaments is perhaps a hazardous enterprise. In the post-Reykjavik situation, there is no question that, among all the subjects discussed at the summit of the superpowers, the problem of nuclear disarmament in Europe has had the greatest repercussions in the debates in Western Europe. Unfortunately, it is precisely in this field that our Assembly has so far been unable to adopt a common position on which members of parliament could have based themselves in national debates.

However, the results of Reykjavik did have a major impact on a number of documents adopted last December. There was Mr. Bianco's report on the political activities of the Council – Recommendation 438 – and Mr. Close's report on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations – Recommendation 441. These two reports stressed the importance of arriving at common European positions on disarmament and arms limitation and of bringing them home to our American allies within the Atlantic Alliance.

The purpose of the report that I have the honour to present to you, therefore, is not an in-depth analysis of the positions taken with regard to the concrete problems dealt with in Reykjavik but to highlight the thinking and statements of those who have to consider the impact of that summit on transatlantic cohesion and on the efforts needed to establish closer European co-operation.

Let me say that the analysis relates solely to the seven European countries and that the documentation made available to the Rapporteur was not complete. Even so, I feel that the reports of parliamentary debates provide sufficient information for certain conclusions to be drawn. These are summarised in Chapter IV and the main points are set out in the draft resolution.

Chapter II gives summaries of debates, where they concern subjects directly related to the Reykjavik meeting. For simplicity, the debates in member country parliaments are considered in alphabetical order, with a summary in each case followed by a timetable.

It is worth noting that, in the debates, several governments linked the consequences of Reykjavik directly to the reactivation of WEU. Among the many voices urging that Western Europe should unite its interests in the matter of security policy, the governments of several member countries publicly stated that they would regard WEU as a suitable framework for implementing such an objective.

On the parliamentary side, there was more diversity in the suggestions for achieving the same result. The great number of encouraging proposals shows, nevertheless, that Europeans are still far from sharing the same concepts. Our main task, which is to broadcast those ideas recommended by our Assembly and to get them better known, therefore remains crucial.

Chapter III analyses specific action undertaken to follow up the work of our Assembly in the various fields covered by its recommendations. A matter for satisfaction is the fact that many representatives and, among them, several members of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations have been very active recently and have made it their business to ask questions and to speak on the various aspects of the work of WEU on the basis of the recommendations adopted. Perhaps this may also be seen as an indirect effect of the post-Reykjavik situation.

In some national parliaments a real dialogue has developed with the respective governments. To encourage this kind of development, the draft resolution invites all member "parliaments" and governments to maintain and deepen a fruitful, continuing dialogue on the basis of our recommendations.

There is one more specific subject I would like to deal with in conclusion. I would like to draw your attention to the answers that governments have given about their activities in informing the public about "Europe's defence problems" and far more particularly "the rôle of WEU". The replies under this heading are not always very concrete and, apart from the press conferences given after ministerial meetings and the considerable personal activity of the Secretary-General of WEU, it does not seem that the "Council and governments" are making any serious effort to implement a real "information policy". NATO, for example, has an "information service" in each member country with a "large budget". Should we not consider having a similar service for the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, namely WEU? I think our committee ought to look at this question in one of its future reports.

That decision was, moreover, taken at the committee's meeting this morning. I would add that it is, indeed, both regrettable and dangerous that Mr. Gorbachev should have such perfect mastery of media management, in most cases to the detriment of the views of Western Europe and WEU on disarmament and détente.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we have to act quickly and effectively with regard to information about Western Europe otherwise the younger generations, in particular, will be lost for good to WEU and the causes it defends.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Burger.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Bordu.

Mr. BORDU (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it has to be recognised that this session raises considerations today that were not foreseeable only a few days ago.

Indeed, everyone agrees that the Reykjavik summit was a major event bringing, of course, other equally major events in its train. It is reasonable to say that the shock did not produce the same impact everywhere. Responses vary greatly from country to country, depending on national political attitudes. That, incidentally, explains Bonn's position in this regard. The idea of the possible elimination of certain nuclear weapons in Europe and sharp cuts in the others as a step towards the total elimination of nuclear arms from the planet, a total ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of present stocks of such weapons and a massive, balanced, simultaneous and controlled reduction of conventional weapons and forces seems to have thrown most of our countries' governments into disarray.

Could it be that the idea put forward so many times by WEU itself since 1981, namely the need to reduce all armaments to the lowest possible level, was only a propaganda ploy and not a concrete wish for disarmament based on the certainty that the Soviet Union would not be a party to effective disarmament – a certainty that has visibly collapsed today? The gauntlet thrown down by the West has been picked up.

All the political forces holding power in Europe seem to believe that security is impossible without the certainty of military superiority over the potential adversary. And yet it is that philosophy of military superiority that has led the world from balances to imbalances and to efforts to catch up with the other side, finally reaching the present overkill situation with all its terrible dangers for peace in terms not of the security of our countries but of the threat of a nuclear conflict which would destroy mankind and the militarisation of space accompanied by even worse devices if nothing happens to change the course set by Mr. Reagan.

The idea is often put about that the only reason the Soviet Union has for its present proposals is that it needs the money it is spending on keeping its place in the arms race to meet the requirements of the nation. We agree. Reducing expenditure on armaments would certainly mean, within a certain time, the end of a burden that is too heavy for all countries. I specifically said all countries and not just one. And you have to be Mr. Baumel – as the press noticed this

morning – to claim we need to double or even treble our current spending on armaments: that would make it really unbearable. But it is wrong to see only that aspect of things. In reality, the Soviet Union has not, to my mind, wanted to hide its head in the sand; it has realised that if we do not embark very quickly on a process of disarmament, if we do not – to start with – get rid of the threat of nuclear weapons, mankind will continue to slide towards self-destruction.

It is that which we basically have to realise. It is that which has to be recognised in political and government circles in Western Europe.

The question is not whether we go on with the arms race to try to bring the Soviet Union to its knees and get rid of the socialist régimes in Europe, for these nations would find the strength to face up to new escalations particularly as austerity, with all the troubles it brings, would intensify for the people in our own western countries. The question is whether we are prepared to admit that it is high time to call a halt to this race towards mutual destruction and the elimination of life on earth.

The commitment to not only nuclear but also chemical and conventional disarmament would not, of course, obviate the need for national defence and even co-operation in the framework of our existing alliances for a long time to come. As far as we French communists are concerned, as we have said unambiguously, we are not in favour of unilateral disarmament by France; on the contrary we are, as we have said no less clearly, in favour of maintaining an effective national defence at all the stages of any disarmament programme.

Gradual disarmament certainly poses questions as regards the reorganisation of military capabilities. But the basic question to our mind is this: do we or do we not believe that real security can only be guaranteed by a balanced reduction in armaments and an effective verification of the measures agreed at all stages and the search for and definition of collective and common security measures guaranteeing the security of each and every one of us.

So instead of thinking dynamically and positively about how to advance in the proposed direction we cling to all the reasons I have heard again here whose only object is to hold on to the philosophy of military superiority we have been following for forty years.

We cannot accept, I am told, the denuclearisation of Europe. But who is proposing to denuclearise Europe? Only the two superpowers would have their strategic intercontinental arsenals and Europe would be a hostage, added to which Europe and the United States would decouple. Who proposed that? We are regularly hearing such things said.

Mr. Bordu (continued)

The proposal to get rid of medium-range nuclear missiles, 1 000-5 000 km, and shorter-range missiles, 500-1 000 km, will not on its own denuclearise Europe. To begin with, American ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons which could wipe out the USSR on their own will still be there in the seas around Europe. Next, at least at this stage, nobody is questioning the existence of the British and French strategic forces. It is worth noting, in this connection, that about 40 megatonnes would be necessary for the almost complete destruction of a country like the United States or the USSR and that France, alone for example, will have about 100 megatonnes once its nuclear submarines are equipped with the new medium-range M-4 and M-5. We must be serious in approaching this question of the balance of power.

But what is more, Mr. Gorbachev's proposals are not confined to nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Another proposed objective is to halve over the next five years the arsenals of strategic intercontinental missiles, presently totalling about 10 000 nuclear warheads on either side – Mr. Baumel and Mr. Close please note, these are the correct figures – and to aim at the total elimination of these weapons by the year 2000, in other words in the short space of thirteen years.

That leaves the question of very-short-range tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets propose that negotiations on reducing and eliminating these take place in the EDC or, in other words, the CSCE, coupled with conventional weapons and forces. The debate would naturally be an open one and the object should not be to find ways of keeping them and adding to them in order to make up for supposed differences but how to get rid of them.

Here, the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional weapons is immediately brought up. First of all, does the Warsaw Pact really have overall superiority? Its superiority in numbers of tanks, guns, and aircraft is agreed but the western countries are claimed – and no one denies it – to have superiority in anti-tank weapons and others like the "Exocet" and also in ships and submarines which could be responsible for conventional imbalance.

In any case, if there really is an imbalance, would it not be wiser and more responsible, and a better contribution to security, to negotiate a balanced reduction, in other words, the removal of existing differences, rather than to propose, as some of us in this chamber do, measures to catch up in fields where we are supposed to be behind and to resume study of the deployment of the neutron bomb. The only thing the other side

could do then would be to catch up again or to offset believed leeway in other sectors.

There is no way out, this is arms escalation. It is another lap in the race to insecurity implicit in these suicidal suggestions. Particularly since at their Budapest session the countries of the Warsaw Pact proposed, as a basis for negotiation, a reduction on each side of 100 000 to 150 000 troops with the related arms over a period of one or two years as a first stage with the ultimate target of the demobilisation of 500 000 men on either side or in other words 1 000 000 men complete with equipment, over a period of four to six years. This is a basis of discussion, so we have to discuss it, not turn it down.

Yes. It is a process of negotiation, in many forms no doubt, that will be necessary to arrive at the elimination of nuclear weapons, the balanced and progressive reduction of conventional weapons and forces and the banning of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. Regarding chemical weapons, the Soviets, after stopping production, have made constructive proposals supplementing the proposals made elsewhere. Here again it is evident that an agreement could be quickly reached.

Some of us need to give up our warlike attitudes and the urge to bid ever higher. The basic choice is simple: either we continue to prefer the retrograde spirit of nuclear escalation until the world is destroyed – and no one says this is not possible – or we set Europe on the path of disarmament which can lead to real security. At the same time this would make it possible to meet urgent needs for which nothing is left because of the bottomless pits of military spending whose further increase has again been proposed in this chamber.

The truth is that it is high time to stop having defence budgets compete with those for education, health, training and culture particularly when millions of people throughout the world today are living – if that is the word – in a state of chronic poverty and undernourishment.

As far as we are concerned, we are doing and shall continue to do everything we can to ensure that an end is put to the threat of nuclear war, in accordance with the wishes of the public at large among whom polls show high percentages to be disturbed and concerned about the arms race. "Vox populi" is the voice of reason; it must be heeded. That is why, incidentally, we shall be making our contribution to see that in response to the appeal from thousands of personalities of different persuasions centred on the "Appel des Cent", the biggest demonstration France has known in recent years is held in Paris on 14th June next. There will be hundreds of thousands of French men and women marching in a chain through the heart of Paris and assembling in the afternoon at the Issy-les-Moulineaux heliport.

Mr. Bordu (continued)

The expression and pressure of public opinion are crucial, as has just been shown by the decision taken by the Bonn Government. This is not, as has been said here, another step towards the defeat of Europe but a contribution to the birth of hope for a peaceful Europe in which peaceful co-operation will thrive between all its states to the benefit of the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The present deafness to each other's arguments on the capital question of disarmament has to stop. Mutual understanding is needed and this is the right time to tackle the problem. The political will to succeed is essential and that is what our Assembly's delegation to Moscow led by Mr. Caro, ex-President of this Assembly, seems to have understood. Mr. Gorbachev's message to the WEU delegation was roughly this: "True we have our differences, let us solve them by discussion. If you, the West, have any reservations tell us what they are and we will look at them". The report of the Presidential Committee presented to us this session duly records the constructive attitude of the Soviets because we read that in Prague, on 9th April, Mr. Gorbachev responded to remarks on the zero option made by our delegation during the Moscow talks.

Rather than continuing along the road of a constant and continuing increase in the level of armaments let us seek the path of security and peace – this is our proposal – in a process of disarmament opening the way to life rather than death.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Burger, Rapporteur for the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I shall be very brief. We are in a democratic assembly and I thank Mr. Bordu for having expressed his opinion on Western European Union and his possible disagreement with the lowest possible level. My last word is that WEU considers that security is not solely a problem of disarmament but also a problem of détente and that questions like human rights, free circulation etc. have to be taken into account.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to take this opportunity to say something about this report. I am speaking as Lady Knight's replacement. The report has been submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

I find it sad that so few of the people chosen by the public to work in this place for peace and security are in the chamber when a report on relations with the public comes up for discussion. Clearly, it is particularly difficult for parliamentarians in this place to realise that they themselves must do something to rebut the complaint that so little interest is taken in WEU; it cannot simply be refuted by gestures from the Council of Ministers and others.

We had one parliamentarian speaking so egocentrically here this morning that I felt obliged to leave the chamber and go for a walk in the market. As I was doing so, I wondered whether the people who were busy in the market knew what was going on in this building. Would they know which European institution was meeting at the end of the market today? I do not think anyone could have told me that this was Western European Union, with a Mr. Goerens as its President. That is a great pity. I feel that when people travel through Paris by bus and point to institutions which have something to do with the representation of the people, those with any sense of national pride will say, "That is our assembly". That is not true of WEU. I do not need to dwell on this or emphasise it, but I hope members will read it in the official report of debates for this sitting.

However, we should not only point the finger at others. I feel our committee must consider how we can make our relations with the public more effective. We must not put all our trust in the media. We must not simply say that we shall make sure we are doing something that will get into the newspapers but, aside from the media, we must find through our committee an additional channel responsible for ensuring that the public knows how we intend to promote peace and security. After all, the public elected us for this task.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We now come to the vote on the draft resolution contained in Document 1097.

In accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Does any member wish to request a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was taken by sitting and standing)

The draft resolution is adopted¹.

¹. See page 28.

5. Adjournment of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We have now come to the end of this part of the session. Before we break up, I would like to thank all of you, the members of the Permanent Council, the Secretary-General and the representatives of the country holding the chair who have been kind enough to take part in our proceedings.

My thanks, also, to the permanent and temporary staff and in particular to the interpreters who enable us to understand each other.

I declare the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 3.40 p.m.)

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