

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1987

I

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

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Assembly Documents

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The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BOGAERTS August	SP
DECLERCQ Tiji	CVP
DEJARDIN Claude	PS
PECRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP

Substitutes

MM. BEYSEN Edward	PVV
CEREXHE Etienne	PSC
CLOSE Robert	PRL
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
du MONCEAU	
de BERGENDAL Yves	PVV
NOERENS René	PVV

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
de CHAMBRUN Charles	National Front
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GREMETZ Maxime	Communist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF
Mrs. LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist
MM. MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
MERMAZ Louis	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PORTIER Henri	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRE René	RPR
BICHET Jacques	UDF
BOHL André	UCDP
BORDU Gérard	Communist
CHARTRON Jacques	RPR
CHENARD Alain	Socialist

MM. DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
LACOUR Pierre	UCDP
MONTASTRUC Pierre	UDF
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
PRAT Henri	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SIRGUE Pierre	National Front
SOUVET Louis	RPR

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
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BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MECHTERSHEIMER Alfred	Die Grünen
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
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Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
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DUVE Freimut	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FPD
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KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
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Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
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ITALY

Representatives

MM. AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
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FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
LODIGIANI Oreste	Socialist
MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
GOERENS Charles	Dem.
HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM. KONEN René	Dem.
LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
van den BERGH Harry	Labour
de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr. van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

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MM. de BEER Leopold	Liberal
EISMA Doeke	D66
EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM. van der SANDEN Piet van TETS Govert WORRELL Joop	CDA Liberal Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr. Donald COLEMAN	Labour
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Mr. Edward GARRETT	Labour
Sir Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr. Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr. James HILL	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
Lady Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir John PAGE	Conservative
Mr. Stephen ROSS	Liberal
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr. John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. Robert BROWN	Labour
John CORRIE	Conservative
Thomas COX	Labour
Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Reginald FREESON	Labour
Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
MM. Bruce MILLAN	Labour
Michael MORRIS	Conservative
Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. Robert PARRY	Labour
Peter REES	Conservative
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
MM. John STOKES	Conservative
Stefan TERLEZKI	Conservative
John WARD	Conservative
Alec WOODALL	Labour

AGENDA

**of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session
Paris, 1st-4th June 1987**

I. Report of the Council

Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council to the Assembly

II. Political questions

The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council

Report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee

III. Defence questions

Reports deferred

IV. Technical and scientific questions

European space policy until 2000

Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions

V. Budget and administrative questions

Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987

Report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

VI. Parliamentary and public relations

The voice of Europe after Reykjavik – debates in national parliaments

Report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

**OPINION ON THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEARS 1986 (REVISED)
AND 1987 ¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. Linster, Rapporteur*

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on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987

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submitted by Mr. Linster, Rapporteur

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- II. Aspects of the 1986 budget (revised) and the 1987 budget
- III. The zero growth criterion
- IV. Various categories of expenditure in the operating budget
- V. Action taken on Assembly Recommendation 433

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- I. Trend of budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU between 1986 and 1987
- II. Variations in the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1986 and 1987
- III. Evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1983
- IV. Organisation and staff of the ministerial organs of WEU in 1987
- V. Recommendation 433 of the Assembly and reply of the Council

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Sinesio, Bohl (Alternate: Hunault) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Beysen, Chartron (Alternate: Jeambrun), Declercq, Dhaille, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi (Alternate: Giust), Freeson (Alternate: Woodall), Haase, Mrs. Herfkens, MM. Linster, Morris (Alternate: Lord Mackie), Oehler, Mrs. Pack (Alternate: Glos), MM. Pollidoro, Rauti, Stokes, van Tets, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1986 (revised) and 1987, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
 - (a) the presentation of the budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 has been simplified by reducing the number of sub-heads and grouping all social charges under one sub-head and all expenditure on staff under one head but that ordinary expenditure has not been separated from extraordinary expenditure as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendation 433;
 - (b) consequently, because of the effect of extraordinary expenditure, the growth rate of these budgets cannot be accurately compared with the rate of inflation fixed for applying the zero growth criterion;
 - (c) furthermore, the evolution of budgets since 1985 shows an increase above the zero growth rate since the requirements of reactivating WEU – including the restructuring of the ministerial organs – have been taken into account in this budget;
 - (d) in addition, the payment of pensions to newly-retired officials could no longer be included in the operating budget without jeopardising the activities of the various organs;
 - (e) the zero growth rate obviously no longer being of any value, the Council should establish a more objective and effective criterion for preparing WEU budgets;
 - (f) analysis of the various categories of expenditure in the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU shows that expenditure on staff alone represents about 90% of total operating expenditure;
 - (g) this percentage could be improved considerably and amounts under Head I “Permanent staff” could be used for other operating expenditure if the two seats in London and Paris were combined to allow their now separate services to be merged;
- (iii) Regretting that:
 - (a) in its reply to Recommendation 433, the Council considered it difficult to follow up the Assembly’s wish for greater budgetary independence;
 - (b) three posts assigned to the Secretariat-General remained vacant throughout 1986 whereas the Council refused the creation of new posts in the WEU Assembly;
 - (c) the Council has given a new interpretation of criteria for dual grading which entirely ignores the wishes of the staff to achieve career prospects subject to certain conditions of seniority;
 - (d) in spite of the Council’s undertaking to consider the possible installation of new machines in the light of “requirements, the versatility of the equipment and the budgetary implications”, the Assembly has again been refused a telex whereas the ministerial organs have been allowed to purchase telecopying equipment without any comparative study having been made,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Stipulate that in the framework of applying the procedure for approving Assembly budgets a global amount should be granted for Heads II to V of its budget for each financial year;
2. Examine the possibility of:
 - (a) abandoning the zero growth principle for preparing annual budgets and replacing it by a more rational criterion, taking as a reference the growth rate applied by the EEC for drawing up its budget;

- (b) studying the problem of drawing up a pensions budget separate from the operating budget and communicating the conclusions of this study to the Assembly;
- (c) uniting the ministerial organs of WEU in a single seat and preparing one table of establishment integrating the services now divided between the two seats;
- (d) authorising the Assembly without delay to create the three new posts included with priority in the draft 1987 budget;
- (e) studying the problem of dual grading at every level of the hierarchy to improve the staff's career possibilities.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Linster, Rapporteur)

I. Preliminary considerations

1. According to Article VIII (c) of the Charter of the Assembly, "the Assembly shall express its views in the form of an opinion or recommendation on the annual budget of Western European Union as soon as it has been communicated".

2. The present report has been prepared in application of this provision and relates to the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987.

3. In accordance with the criteria governing the preparation of reports on previous financial years, the present report does not cover the activities of the Council and the security agencies since the Presidential Committee refers these parts to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

4. Moreover, it seems impossible to examine these budgets as an expression of the activities of the various WEU organs because the studies conducted by the security agencies since they were set up have not yet been completed. As the Council said in the first part of its thirty-second annual report:

"In the first half of 1986 the agencies began their work, the results of which will constitute internal working documents intended to contribute to the Council's reflection on the subjects addressed."¹

5. Furthermore, the organisation of the agencies is subject to a complete review after the two-year transitional period lasting until the end of 1987.

6. This being so, your Rapporteur considers that the last two budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU cannot be examined from the standpoint of cost-effectiveness. Conversely, general views might be expressed which could be taken into account when the organisation of these organs is revised, as mentioned in paragraph 5 above.

II. Aspects of the 1986 budget (revised) and the 1987 budget

7. As is customary, the budgets for 1986 (revised) and for 1987, after consideration by the Budget and Organisation Committee, were set

1. Document 1074, Section II.2, paragraph 1.

out in documents C-B (86) 16 and C-B (86) 17, which incorporated the changes recommended to the Council by that committee. But as these documents contained only one set of tables showing amounts under the various heads and sub-heads of the two budgets, it was necessary to refer to the basic documents submitted to the Budget and Organisation Committee under references B (86) 16 and B (86) 18.

8. The abovementioned documents are not appended to the present report. Your Rapporteur considered that as the summary tables at Appendices I and II set out all the main budgetary facts, there was no need to overburden his report, thus allowing substantial savings to be made in the cost of printing.

9. As in previous years, the two budgets in Documents B (86) 16 and B (86) 18 were presented in three parts: the first gave summary tables, the second contained the explanatory memorandum and the third dealt with pensions. Each part had two sections: Section A related to the Secretariat-General and Section B grouped the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the three new agencies for security questions.

10. Your Rapporteur notes that the presentation of the budget takes account of certain changes decided upon largely as a result of remarks by the WEU auditors. He can but welcome the reduction in the number of sub-heads in the operating budget from 58 to 32 and in the pensions budget from 14 to 8. He considers that these reductions and the grouping of all social charges under one sub-head and all expenditure on staff under one head have made the WEU budgets clearer and, as was desirable, more like the Assembly's budgets which have already been drawn up in this manner.

11. Conversely, your Rapporteur regrets that the Council has not followed the Assembly's recommendation to show two categories of expenditure: ordinary expenditure and extraordinary expenditure².

12. The need for this distinction has already been explained in the report submitted last year by Mr. Sinesio³. The two new budgets merely confirm this necessity: for the Secretariat-General, for instance, taking Head III "Other operating costs", it seems that there was an increase of F 45 325 in the revised budget for 1986 whereas in reality this was not a true increase in the amounts initially allocated but a

2. Recommendation 433, paragraph 1 (b).

3. Document 1054, paragraphs 21 to 24.

transfer, from the financial year 1985 to the financial year 1986, of amounts relating to the financing of certain exceptional security work carried out later than planned. For the opposite reason, i.e. the completion in 1986 of exceptional maintenance work on the premises, amounts under the same Head III allocated to the Secretariat-General for 1987 are 30% lower than those for 1986.

13. Again for the Paris agencies, Head III reveals an abnormal evolution, i.e. an increase of F 125 600 in the revised budget for 1986 and a decrease of F 31 300 compared with 1987. This can be justified only by the exceptional implications of extraordinary expenditure which, in any event, distort statistical data on the evolution of the budgets as a whole.

14. The same is true for pensions budgets. The payment in 1986 of leaving allowances for three London officials and of three supplements to leaving allowances for three Paris officials, one leaving allowance and an indemnity for loss of job quite obviously represent considerable extraordinary expenditure.

15. It has to be concluded that the nominal growth rate of a net grand total budget compared with the previous one can in no way be compared with the zero growth rate fixed for France or the United Kingdom. It would therefore seem expedient to give more thought to the zero growth criterion.

III. The zero growth criterion

16. In its reply to Assembly Recommendation 426, the Council said:

“The strict application of the zero growth criterion is the objective of member states for both their national budgets and those international budgets to which they contribute. In principle, this objective applies to the overall total of the budget. As far as pension costs are concerned, it is recognised that these will continue to increase until the pension scheme has been in operation long enough for the levelling-off stage to be reached. It is also recognised that, by the very nature of the scheme and its impact on the relatively small budget of WEU, erratic variations in expenditure from year to year will result. The Council will continue to monitor how far these costs have an adverse effect on operating expenditure.”

17. Yet the evolution in WEU budgets (ministerial organs and Assembly) with effect from 1985, as set out in the table below, shows that in the last two years the favourable economic situation of the industrialised countries allowed the

United Kingdom and France to reduce their respective inflation rates considerably, while these budgets benefited from a definitely higher growth rate.

Budgets	Secretariat-General	Trend of prices in the United Kingdom	Paris agencies	Assembly	Trend of prices in France
1985	100	100	100	100	100
1985 revised	111.74	-	97.50	-	-
1986	127.54	103	99.32	108.65	102.2
1986 revised	141.47	-	103.96	110.65	-
1987	143.25	105.5 *	108.94	113.73	104.2 *

* Estimate.

18. But the figures must be read correctly because, on the one hand, up to 1985 the WEU organs supported the cumulative effects of what was clearly negative growth in their budgets in real terms and, on the other, inevitably, in 1985, 1986 and 1987 these budgets had to be increased by a rate higher than the inflation rate.

19. The restructuring of the ministerial organs (in particular the Secretariat-General), the increase in the salaries of permanent staff as a result of the increase – with retroactive effect – of the level of purchasing power in France and the United Kingdom on the one hand and Belgium on the other⁴, the increase in the pensions budget due to the payment of new pensions which has considerably increased the growth rate in this budget and, finally, an adjustment in the purchasing power lost in earlier years are all fully justifiable reasons for the abovementioned evolution in the growth rate.

20. For these reasons, your Rapporteur concludes that the zero growth criterion has now had its day: while it was an appropriate instrument for controlling the evolution of budgets when countries were facing annual inflation rates of more than 14%, it now simply encourages the WEU organs to underestimate their requirements. The need for an end-of-year revision of these estimates is the inevitable consequence: the statistical data given in the table at the end of paragraph 17 merely endorses this point.

21. Your Rapporteur considers it high time to restore normal conditions in procedure for preparing and approving the budgets of the various WEU organs so that a true and beneficial dialogue may be established between them and the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee. No

4. According to procedure in force in the co-ordinated organisations (159th report of the Co-ordinating Committee), salary scales are calculated for Belgium. These scales are then multiplied by comparative economic coefficients for other countries in order to ensure that all staff of the same grade and step have the same purchasing power.

one can say this dialogue now exists. What is true is that, as matters now stand, at meetings with this committee the main task of representatives of the organs concerned is to defend their budgetary proposals as well as they can against a priori cuts requested by governments.

22. Those who have the upper hand in this game are inevitably those who have the closest contact with national delegations, i.e. the Secretariat-General compared with the Paris organs and the ministerial organs compared with the Assembly. In his explanatory memorandum last year, Mr. Sinesio stressed this situation which affects the Assembly in particular. Your Rapporteur will revert to this point later. But, for the moment, considering the dissonance between the often petty reasoning of the Budget and Organisation Committee, particularly in regard to the Assembly, and what the ministers say, your Rapporteur wonders whether the necessary consultations are held between national financial experts and representatives of the foreign ministries.

23. A last consideration seems appropriate: strict application of the zero growth criterion could not be compatible with assertions about reactivating WEU. This criterion was therefore abandoned in practice in 1986 and 1987. It is now for the Council to lay down more realistic criteria to govern the preparation of budgets and their discussion by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and the Council.

24. Your Rapporteur learned with the keenest interest that at the meeting with the Presidential Committee in Luxembourg Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, explained the proposal he had made to his colleagues in a restricted framework that, for increases in the administrative expenditure of WEU, procedure should be established in parallel with practice in the Community bodies, i.e. to limit the growth rate of provisional estimates of expenditure of all organisations to the maximum growth rate of expenditure calculated each year by the Commission of the European Communities. Such a parallel would have the merit of avoiding fruitless discussion and laying down a precise, objective guideline for the preparation of WEU budgets while leaving the organs concerned responsibility for determining the priority to be given to various items of expenditure. As far as the Assembly in particular is concerned, it should be ensured that, for the preparation of its administrative budget, it has discretionary powers within the limits of the maximum growth rate fixed, similar to the gentleman's agreement governing relations between the Council of the European Communities and the European Parliament in such matters. Your Rapporteur feels the present presidency would welcome such an approach.

25. As for pensions, which continue to increase both in number and in cost (cf. Appendix III), it would appear that the need to separate them from the operating budget is being perceived more clearly by the Council, although there is not yet unanimity on this point. Referring again to Community practice, the Chairman-in-Office suggested considering pensions as inevitable expenditure. The sum necessary to meet such expenditure should therefore be excluded from the general growth rate of administrative expenditure. Mr. Poos also said the Secretary-General had been asked to produce for the Council a study of the foreseeable trend of expenditure on pensions in the next few years. Three solutions now seem possible:

- the governments might assume full responsibility for financing pensions, outside the operating budget;
- an independently-managed pension fund might be set up in WEU into which the contributions of staff and the organisation would be paid;
- the management of this fund might be handed over to a private insurance company.

26. Your Rapporteur can but welcome this initiative, which concords with relevant recommendations the Assembly has addressed to the Council for some years⁵. He trusts the results of this study will be communicated to the Assembly without delay.

IV. Various categories of expenditure in the operating budget

27. The expenditure of the ministerial organs of WEU is divided into five budget heads. It is interesting to note that of these Head I "Salaries, wages and other remuneration to personnel, provident fund, social and supplementary services" alone represents 88.6% of total operating expenditure of the Secretariat-General and 92.8% of that of the Paris agencies.

28. The high cost of expenditure for staff compared with the total available makes WEU budgets extremely rigid. With the present structure of the various WEU organs (see Appendix IV), those responsible for budgetary management have very little leeway for establishing priorities in their programmes of work. In fact, the proportion over which they have any power of decision is hardly more than 10% of the budget. Hence the zero growth criterion should appropriately have been applied, if necessary,

⁵ Recommendations 409 adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1984, 429 adopted on 4th December 1985 and 433 adopted on 4th June 1986.

only to this proportion. This argument too shows how irrational is current practice, which extends application of this criterion to the total budget, including pensions.

29. Your Rapporteur believes this situation could be considerably improved if all the WEU ministerial organs were grouped in one seat. The advantages of such an operation – which might be conducted when the planned review of the WEU structure takes place at the end of the transitional period (31st December 1987) – are clear from the standpoint of the efficiency of the various services. From a budget point of view, it would make available large sums which would represent a considerable saving or might be used for study and research activities which are the basic institutional tasks of the WEU organs. A decision on possible unification is moreover often implicit in the committee's considerations regarding certain proposals for savings or rationalisation, although the single seat has not been decided upon.

30. The Assembly had already asked the Council in Recommendation 409, adopted on 21st June 1984, to consider the possibility of uniting the London and Paris seats. Replying to this recommendation, the Council said:

“ Discussions on the reactivation of WEU have not yet reached the stage at which the new tasks of the organisation, the Council and its subsidiary bodies can be clearly defined. Conclusions on these matters must first be reached before the future structure, size, location and other administrative requirements can be foreseen. ”

31. The question of uniting the two seats was also referred to in Recommendation 426 adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985. In its reply, the Council said:

“ The question of establishing a single seat should in any case be examined in the light of the advantages and disadvantages of such an option. ”

32. Your Rapporteur considers that since the tasks of the WEU organs have now been defined and all factors for or against uniting the seats analysed, the Council is in a position to take a decision on the matter. Moreover, a decision is necessary in order to remove the uncertainty which is now detrimental to the activities of the WEU organs and impedes medium- and long-term planning of their activities in the context of the reactivation of the organisation.

33. With this in mind, your Rapporteur considers particular attention should be paid to the tables of establishment of the Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies. Last year, the report on the budgets of the ministerial organs for 1985 (revised) and 1986 mentioned that two grade B posts were shown as vacant in the budget of the

Paris agencies. When studying the new budgets, your Rapporteur saw that in addition to these two posts three further posts (1 grade A4, 1 grade B3 and 1 grade B2) remained vacant in the Secretariat-General in 1986.

34. It may therefore rightfully be concluded that the staff of the ministerial organs, as foreseen in the tables of establishment approved by the Council, exceed true requirements. Furthermore, the fact that the Council has once again refused to allow the Assembly to introduce the three new posts proposed in the 1987 budget as a matter of priority reveals a degree of inequity that should be cleared up without delay.

35. It should also be noted that amounts in the budget for vacant posts form a reserve which can be used for other purposes not specified when the budgets were prepared. In applying the overall budget, this creates a privilege for some organs to the detriment of those which, like the Assembly, have no reserves. In this context, your Rapporteur points out that certain national budgetary legislation or regulations forbid unexpended salary appropriations to be used for other purposes and he wonders whether a ban on the transfer of salary appropriations to other heads should not be introduced into budgetary practice in all the WEU organs.

36. These considerations make it desirable for the Council, when the WEU structure is reviewed (as referred to above), to study the anomalies which seem evident when the tables of establishment of all the WEU organs are compared and to remedy them by effecting, where appropriate, transfers of posts from one organ to another.

37. It should be noted that the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee reduced the estimates under the other budget heads, i. e. Head II “ Travel ”, Head III “ Other operating costs ”, Head IV “ Purchase of furniture and equipment ” and Head V “ Buildings ”. For the Secretariat-General, the trend of expenditure on travel (Head II) showed a considerable increase in 1986 (financed by the supplementary budget) and a sharp reduction in 1987, bringing it down to a level lower than initial estimates for 1986. A considerable reduction in appropriations for 1987 was also made under the same head for the Paris agencies.

V. Action taken on Assembly Recommendation 433

38. The Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 433 (cf. Appendix V) has been referred to frequently in the present explanatory memorandum in connection with specific matters such as the presentation of WEU budgets, vacancies for certain posts in the minis-

terial organs when the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly was refused the right to introduce new posts, financing the pensions budget and application of the zero growth criterion. Reference should also be made to other points in this reply, including paragraphs 3 (modifying procedure for approving Assembly budgets), 6 (dual grading) and 7 (installation of a telex).

39. On procedure for approving Assembly budgets, the Council considers it difficult to grant greater autonomy "because of different budget control procedures in member countries". Your Rapporteur finds it hard to grasp the meaning of this justification, particularly as the Council at the same time urged the Assembly to simplify certain aspects of the presentation of its budgets as approved for the budgets of the ministerial organs as from 1987, whereas the Assembly – as specified in paragraph 10 above – started applying these simplifications in its budget for the financial year 1985.

40. It should be emphasised that the question of budgetary independence raised by the Assembly is basically political. It is not a matter of extending this independence but of recognising it, by acknowledging that Assembly budgets, once approved by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee, express political options which, by their very nature, could not normally be submitted to technical consultative organs. Moreover, the latter do not always seem to have an accurate knowledge of the requirements and methods of work of a parliamentary assembly.

41. Your Rapporteur feels that a less restrictive interpretation of procedure in force as now applied would allow the Council to respect both the governments' prerogatives in this field and the Assembly's budgetary autonomy. For this purpose, it would suffice for it to allocate to the Assembly, before the preparation of each budget, an overall amount for Heads II, III, IV and V and to leave it the responsibility for dividing this sum between these heads – and within the limits of the overall amount – in accordance with its own order of priority.

42. Head I "Permanent staff" and the pensions budget would be excluded from this overall amount since salaries and pensions vary according to scales worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee for all the co-ordinated organisations and approved by the Council of each organisation.

43. On dual grading, the Council's reply is contrary to what has so far been the root of the problem. One can but note that dual grading, introduced by the Council for the staff of the ministerial organs, "is not intended to create promotion possibilities over and beyond the approved establishment table, but to facilitate recruitment". Yet the basic problem, to which

the Assembly has been drawing the Council's attention for years⁶, remains as serious as ever. The staff associations have not failed to convey the staff's feelings and wishes in this connection. The fact is that the small number of staff and the specialised knowledge required for many posts do not generally allow internal promotions: staff in general – and grade B staff in particular – thus have to remain at the same grade throughout their working lives. Some of them who have reached the top of their grade cannot even hope for a progression in their salaries. The Council cannot remain indifferent to this situation. Replying to Recommendation 340 adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979, it said that "with regard to the grading system and the introduction of a dual grading system the problems are still under consideration at the administrative level". More than seven years have passed since this reply during which the problem has merely become worse. The Assembly can but underline the urgency of giving the staff a positive answer.

44. Finally, in regard to the installation of a telex, as recommended by the Assembly, your Rapporteur has noted the refusal of this request made in the Assembly's budget for 1987 and representing an all-inclusive cost of F 20 000 (initial expenditure, licence fee, subscription, hire, maintenance), it being understood that the cost of using it – which it was virtually impossible to estimate – would be charged to Sub-Head 18 "Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents". He has also noted that, conversely, the Council approved an estimate in the 1987 budget of the ministerial organs for the purchase of telecopying equipment for use by the Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies.

45. It is regrettable that in spite of the Council's undertaking to consider the possible installation of new equipment in the light of "requirements, the versatility of the equipment and the budgetary implications" and "in the context of budgetary considerations on the whole", no comparative study was made before the telecopying equipment was selected. As for the telex, it should be recalled that already in 1980 (document B (80) 5) a study on the financial implications of its possible installation was started by the Secretariat-General but never completed due to the hostility of certain national delegations. The Assembly must insist on its request since the telex – according to a study conducted in 1982 following Assembly Order 57 – is a working instrument likely to facilitate communications considerably, particularly with the parliaments of the WEU member countries and of other countries and with press agencies.

6. Recommendations 240 adopted by the Assembly on 20th November 1973, 250 adopted on 19th June 1974, 340 adopted on 4th December 1979, 357 adopted on 2nd December 1980 and 433 adopted on 4th June 1986.

APPENDIX I

Trend of budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU between 1986 and 1987

	Secretariat-General (£)			Paris agencies (French francs)		
	1986	1986 revised	1987	1986	1986 revised	1987
A. Operating budget						
I. Staff	1 549 357	1 609 177	1 809 323	34 723 600	34 988 200	36 936 300
II. Travel	54 620	72 900	49 545	690 000	641 200	500 000
III. Other operating costs	251 890	297 215	165 030	2 160 700	2 286 300	2 255 000
IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	5 215	6 125	8 234	65 000	67 400	30 000
V. Buildings	—	—	10 000	70 000	70 000	78 400
Total expenditure	1 861 082	1 985 417	2 042 132	37 709 300	38 053 100	39 799 700
Receipts	612 485	638 840	686 702	12 608 100	12 467 600	12 970 100
Net total	1 248 597	1 346 577	1 355 430	25 101 200	25 585 500	26 829 600
B. Pensions budget						
Pensions and allowances	225 930	284 820	299 065	5 787 500	6 707 600	6 999 000
Pensions receipts	57 285	59 285	62 669	1 037 000	1 047 000	1 085 000
Net total	168 645	225 535	236 396	4 750 500	5 660 600	5 914 000
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	1 417 242	1 572 112	1 591 826	29 851 700	31 246 100	32 743 600

APPENDIX II

*Variations in the budgets of the ministerial organs
for 1986 (revised) and 1987 compared with previous budgets*

	Secretariat-General (£)					Paris agencies (French francs)				
	1986	1986 revised		1987		1986	1986 revised		1987	
		(+ or -)	%	(+ or -)	%		(+ or -)	%	(+ or -)	%
A. Operating budget										
I. Staff	1 549 357	+ 59 820		+ 200 146		34 723 600	+ 264 600		+ 1 948 100	
II. Travel	54 620	+ 18 280		- 23 355		690 000	- 48 800		- 141 200	
III. Other operating costs	251 890	+ 45 325		- 132 185		2 160 700	+ 125 600		- 31 300	
IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	5 215	+ 910		+ 2 109		65 000	+ 2 400		- 37 400	
V. Buildings	-	-		+ 10 000		70 000	-		+ 8 400	
Total expenditure	1 861 082	+ 124 335	6.68	+ 56 715	2.85	37 709 300	+ 343 800	0.91	+ 1 746 600	4.58
Receipts	612 485	+ 26 355		+ 47 862		12 608 100	- 140 500		+ 502 500	
Net total	1 248 597	+ 97 980	7.84	+ 8 853	0.66	25 101 200	+ 484 300	1.92	+ 1 244 100	4.86
B. Pensions budget										
Pensions and allowances	225 930	+ 58 890	26.07	+ 14 245	4.99	5 787 500	+ 920 100	15.90	+ 291 400	4.34
Pensions receipts	57 285	+ 2 000		+ 3 384		1 037 000	+ 10 000		+ 38 000	
Net total	168 645	+ 56 890	33.73	+ 10 861	4.82	4 750 500	+ 910 100	19.16	+ 253 400	4.48
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	1 417 242	+ 154 870	10.92	+ 19 714	1.25	29 851 700	+ 1 394 400	4.67	+ 1 497 500	4.79

APPENDIX III

Evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1983

(a) Appropriations for pensions for the various organs of WEU (1983-1987) taking receipts into account

	1983			1984			1985			1986			1987		
	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)
	£	£		£	£		£	£		£	£		£	£	
Secretariat-General	1 096 345	67 830	6.18	1 069 190	65 265	6.10	1 241 669	122 910	9.89	1 572 112	225 535	14.34	1 591 826	236 396	14.85
Standing Armaments Committee	8 445 340	1 131 450	13.39	8 839 380	1 206 130	13.65	9 379 190	1 593 700	16.99	31 246 100	5 660 600	18.11	32 743 600	5 914 000	18.06
Agency for the Control of Armaments	16 914 550	2 004 500	11.85	19 126 150	3 106 300	16.24	19 924 940	4 129 200	20.72						
Office of the Clerk	13 893 000	- 97 000	- 0.70	14 762 200	336 000	2.28	15 470 900	300 500	1.94	17 118 700	546 700	3.19	17 596 375	942 000	5.35

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(b) Number of pensions paid out by WEU (1983-1987)

Pensions	1983					1984					1985					1986				1987			
	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ASQ	O of C	Total	SG	ASQ	O of C	Total
Retirement	7	20	14	3	44	7	23	13	2	45	9	23	13	2	47	12	36	4	52	14	38	4	56
Survivors'	1	9	3	1	14	2	9	4	1	16	3	9	4	1	17	4	13	1	18	4	13	1	18
Orphans'	-	1 ¹	-	1	2	3	1	-	-	4	3	1	-	-	4	4	1	-	5	4	1	-	5
Invalidity	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	1	2	1	-	1	2	1	-	1	2
TOTALS	9	30	17	5	61	13	33	17	4	67	16	33	17	4	70	21	50	6	77	23	52	6	81
Total establishment ²	45	51	27	27	150	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149	49	70	26	145	49	70	26	145

- SG - Secretariat General.
- ACA - Agency for the Control of Armaments.
- SAC - Standing Armaments Committee.
- ASQ - Agencies for Security Questions.
- O of C - Office of the Clerk.
- 1. Paid in conjunction with a survivor's pension.
- 2. Excluding hors cadre officials.

APPENDIX IV

*Organisation and staff
of the ministerial organs of WEU in 1987**Secretariat-General*

No.	Grade	Function	No.	Grade	Function		
1.	HG	Secretary-General			Section – Registry and Library		
2.	HG	Deputy Secretary-General					
3.	B4	Personal Assistant to SG					
4.	B4	Personal Assistant to DSG	24.	A2	Head of Section		
		<i>Political Affairs Division</i>	25.	B4	Documentation Clerk		
			26.	B2	Roneo Operator		
			27.	B2	Roneo Operator		
5.	A6	Head of Division			Section – Secretarial Pool		
6.	B3	Secretary to Head of Division					
		Section – Council Secretariat	28.	B4	Head of Section		
7.	A4/5	Head of Section (A4)	29.	B2/3/4	Assistant (B4)		
8.	A2/3	Committee Secretary (A2)	30.	B2/3/4	Assistant (B4)		
9.	A2/3	Committee Secretary (A2)	31.	B2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B3)		
		Section – Policy and Research	32.	B2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B3)		
			33.	B2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B3)		
			34.	B2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B3)		
			35.	B2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B2)		
10.	A3/4		Head of Section (A4)	36.	B2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B2)	
11.	A2/3		Researcher (A3)	37.	B2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B2)	
			<i>Public Relations</i>	38.	B2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B2)	
12.	A4	Public Relations Officer	39.	B2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B2)		
		<i>Linguists</i>			Section – General Services		
13.	LT5	Head (Reviser F/E)	40.	B1		Telephonist	
14.	LT4	Reviser E/F	41.	B1		Telephonist	
15.	LT3	Translator F/E	42.	C3		Messenger	
16.	LT3	Translator E/F	43.	C2		Messenger	
17.	LT2	Translator E/F	44.	C3		Chauffeur	
		<i>Administration Division</i>	45.	C3		Chauffeur	
			46.	C4		Head Security Guard	
			47.	C3		Security Guard	
18.	A5		Head of Division	48.		C3	Security Guard
19.	B3		Secretary to Head of Division	49.		C3	Security Guard
20.	B4	Administrative Assistant	50.	C3	Security Guard		
		Section – Finance and Budget	51.	C3	Security Guard		
21.	A3/4		Controller (A4)				
22.	A2		Accountant (B5)				
23.	B4	Financial Assistant (B2)					

*Agencies for security questions**Agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions (Agency I)*

Post No.	Grade of post	Function
AS I - 1	HG	Director of Agency I ¹
AS I - 2	A5/6	Expert
AS I - 3	A4/5	Expert
AS I - 4	A2/3/4	Expert
AS I - 5	A2/3/4	Expert
AS I - 6	A4/5	Expert ²
AS I - 7	B4	Personal Assistant to the Director
AS I - 8	B4	Assistant
AS I - 9	B3	Shorthand typist
AS I - 10	B3	Shorthand typist
AS I - 11	B2	Shorthand typist

1. Dual function: Director of Agency I and Director of the ACA.

2. Dual function: Expert of Agency I and Deputy Director of the ACA.

Agency for the study of security and defence questions (Agency II)

Post No.	Grade of post	Function
AS II - 1	HG	Director of Agency II
AS II - 2	A5/6	Expert
AS II - 3	A4/5	Expert
AS II - 4	A2/3/4	Expert
AS II - 5	A2/3/4	Expert
AS II - 6	B4	Personal Assistant to the Director
AS II - 7	B4	Assistant
AS II - 8	B3	Shorthand typist
AS II - 9	B3	Shorthand typist

Agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments (Agency III)

Post No.	Grade of post	Function
AS III - 1	HG	Director of Agency III
AS III - 2	A5/6	Expert
AS III - 3	A4/5	Expert
AS III - 4	A2/3/4	Expert
AS III - 5	A2/3/4	Expert
AS III - 6	B4	Personal assistant to the Director
AS III - 7	B4	Assistant
AS III - 8	B3	Shorthand typist
AS III - 9	B3	Shorthand typist
AS III - 10	B2	Shorthand typist

Joint services

Post No.	Grade of post	Function
<i>(a) Administration and Legal Affairs Division</i>		
SC Adm - 1	A6	Head of Division Legal Adviser of WEU Chairman of Budget Committee
SC Adm - 2	B3	Secretary to Head of Division
SC Adm - 3	A3/4	Assistant Legal Adviser
<i>Finance and Administration Section</i>		
SC Adm - 4	A4/5	Head of Section
SC Adm - 5	A3/4	Deputy Head of Section Head of Finance and Accounts Office
SC Adm - 6	B4	Assistant for the Building and General Services
SC Adm - 7	B4	Accountant
SC Adm - 8	B4	Accountant
SC Adm - 9	B4	Administrative Assistant and Secretary of the Section
SC Adm - 10	B4	Administrative Assistant and Shorthand typist
SC Adm - 11	B2	Administrative Clerk
SC Adm - 12	C4	Under Assistant for General Services Storekeeper
SC Adm - 13	B3	Telephonist
SC Adm - 14	B3	Telephonist
SC Adm - 15	C5	Chief roneo operator
SC Adm - 16	C4	Roneo operator
<i>(b) Linguist Service</i>		
SC L - 17	L4	Translator-Reviser
SC L - 18	L3	Interpreter-Translator
SC L - 19	L3	Interpreter-Translator
SC L ¹ - 20	L4	Translator-Reviser
<i>(c) Documentation Office</i>		
SC Doc - 21	A3/4	Head of Office
SC Doc - 22	A2/3	Documentalist
SC Doc - 23	B4	Assistant documentalist
SC Doc - 24	B3	Clerk-Shorthand typist
SC Doc - 25	B3	Documentation Clerk-Typist

1. Present grade L3 - Upgrading requested.

Post No.	Grade of post	Function
<i>(d) Security/Archives Office</i>		
SC Sec/Ar. - 26	A3/4	Head of Office
SC Sec/Ar. - 27	B4	Assistant for Archives and Registry
SC Sec/Ar. - 28	B3	Clerk responsible for Security
SC Sec/Ar. - 29	B3	Clerk-Shorthand typist
SC Sec/Ar. - 30	C4	Head Security Guard
SC Sec/Ar - 31	C3	Security Guard
SC Sec/Ar - 32	C3	Security Guard
SC Sec/Ar - 33	C3	Security Guard
SC Sec/Ar - 34	C3	Security Guard
SC Sec/Ar - 35	C3	Security Guard
SC Sec/Ar - 36	C3	Security Guard
SC Sec/Ar - 37	C3	Security Guard
SC Sec/Ar - 38	C3	Security Guard
SC Sec/Ar - 39	C3	Security Guard
SC Sec/Ar - 40	C3	Security Guard
SC Sec/Ar - 41	C3	Security Guard
<i>Service vehicles</i>		
AS-VS - 42	C4	Driver-mechanic
AS-VS - 43 ²	C4	Driver-mechanic

2. Present grade C3 - Upgrading requested.

APPENDIX V
RECOMMENDATION 433 ¹

*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1985 (revised) and 1986* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1985 (revised) and 1986, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
- (a) the budgets for 1985 (revised) and 1986 take account of the new structure of the ministerial organs of WEU achieved in conformity with the directives set out in the Rome declaration;
 - (b) each of these budgets is the subject of an initial three-part document (recapitulation, explanatory memorandum and pensions) for the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and of a document revised on the basis of the recommendations adopted by that committee and transmitted to the Council;
 - (c) examination of the budgets consequently requires knowledge of the abovementioned documents and of the others produced during the year but which are not sent to the Assembly on a regular basis;
 - (d) the way WEU budgets are now presented draws no distinction between ordinary and extraordinary expenditure although the latter may have a considerable effect on statistics on the evolution of budgets and consequently detract from the objective application of the zero growth criterion or of any other criterion for budgetary trends agreed by the governments;
 - (e) the 1985 budget allowed considerable excess resources to be built up which were used for the sole purpose of restructuring the ministerial organs, no account being taken in this context of the requirements of the Assembly although the ministers expressed their wish in Rome in October 1984 to have the Assembly "play a growing rôle";
 - (f) the new breakdown of duties shown in the recent establishment tables of the ministerial organs increases the need to review procedure for approving Assembly budgets in order to provide a better guarantee of its autonomy and independence;
 - (g) the task of managing pensions in WEU has grown to such an extent that an independent body should be given responsibility for this task;
- (iii) Regretting that:
- (a) two Grade B posts are shown as vacant in the budget of the Paris agencies whereas the Assembly's proposal to create two new Grade B posts in the Office of the Clerk has been rejected;
 - (b) the programme for the modernisation of equipment makes no provision for purchasing a telex, the lack of which is keenly felt by all the services of WEU as well as by parliamentarians;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that the Council, in attributing grades to the various types of duty, has adopted the dual-grading criterion which the Assembly has often recommended in the past,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL:

1. Examine the possibility of:
 - (a) combining in a single budgetary document all the information now given in many different documents;
 - (b) showing in the two parts of the budget (operating budget and pensions budget) two categories of expenditure: ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, to make it easier to follow the evolution of these budgets;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Sinesio on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1054).

2. Transmit to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly all budgetary documents relating to its budgetary decisions;
3. In consultation with the appropriate Assembly bodies, review procedure for approving Assembly budgets so that it corresponds better to the principle of its autonomy and independence;
4. Give favourable consideration to the proposals to create two new Grade B3 posts which are given top priority in the Assembly's draft budget for 1986;
5. Further to Assembly Recommendation 357, promote the creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions and, to this end, organise consultations with the other co-ordinated organisations;
6. Study the problem of dual-grading at every level of the hierarchy and lay down a general rule on the subject applicable to all WEU staff;
7. Authorise the installation of a telex in the London and Paris offices, it being understood that the telex installed in Paris would be available to all WEU organs in accordance with methods of use and cost-sharing to be agreed among them;
8. Promote harmonisation of the technical equipment of the organs of WEU to achieve future cost-saving and engage a management consultant from a member government or private industry to investigate this matter and make recommendations.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 433***

1. (a) The form in which the budget of the ministerial organs is presented is the outcome of careful study by the Budget and Organisation Committee. It has been reviewed and amended during the past two years. The intention is to submit to governments in one document all the information necessary to form a judgment. This same document, once approved by the Council, is made available to the Assembly.

Because of the evolving process of reform, the documentary aspect has been, exceptionally, more complex. A number of documents were necessary as adjustments were made to take account in particular of staff changes. Equally, certain aspects of the budgets involved classified material which could not be made generally available.

(b) A subdivision into ordinary and extraordinary expenditure and income has been considered in previous years several times by the Budget and Organisation Committee. It was concluded however that such a presentation would not be satisfactory in the case of the WEU budget where so clear a distinction between these categories of expenditure cannot be made. Governments have preferred to maintain the present system on the assumption that a substantial and detailed explanation for each item of expenditure is given in Part II of the budget.

2. The Council will ensure that documents relating to budgetary decisions affecting all parts of the organisation or matters of budgetary policy will be transmitted to the Office of the Clerk where no problems of confidentiality or security classification are involved.

3. The Council at present applies the procedures established under the Financial Regulations and the agreements reached previously between the Council and the Assembly, by which the Council is required to examine and express an opinion on the Assembly's budget before it can be finally adopted. The question of amending this procedure has been raised in the past. There has frequently been formal and informal consultation at joint meetings and in the course of contacts between representatives of the Presidential Committee, the President of the Council and the Secretary-General.

As the Council stated in paragraph 6 of its reply to Recommendation 429, it has noted the Assembly's wish for greater autonomy. However, it would be difficult to meet this wish because of different budget control procedures in member countries. Nevertheless, the Council has approved some simplifications – along the lines desired by the Assembly – in the way the ministerial organs' budget is presented, which the Assembly might find appropriate for its own budget.

4. The creation of two new B3 grade posts must be seen in the light of detailed job requirements, not only in the context of the Assembly itself, but also in the wider context of WEU as a whole and the overall budgetary limits required by governments.

5. The creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions would involve the co-operation of other international organisations and would have to take account of complex legal and managerial considerations. It is a matter which the Council will pursue having due regard to the evolving situation regarding pensions.

6. The general principle of dual grading is that the higher of the two grades represents the approved position in the establishment table. The lower of the two grades is added to enable the organisation to recruit staff who are judged to possess the basic qualifications called for but may not have had previous experience.

Dual grading, therefore, is not intended to create promotion possibilities over and beyond the approved establishment table, but to facilitate recruitment.

7. Recognising the importance of effective communication between the various organs of WEU, the Council is currently studying the possibilities for improving the present practices; a number of suggestions may be contemplated, including that put forward by the Assembly for the installation of a telex, or the use of facsimile equipment or even the installation of a system which could be based on the ones used by other bodies such as European political co-operation.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th October 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 20th October 1986.

The final choice would of course depend on requirements, the versatility of the equipment and the budgetary implications. The installation of new equipment should therefore be examined by the appropriate bodies in this light, and in the context of budgetary considerations on the whole.

8. The approach to the use of a private consultant should not be piecemeal, particularly in view of the cost of consultancy. In the Council's opinion, a management consultant would be cost-effective only in the context of a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of the whole institutional structure of WEU and in view of the budgetary constraints arising from the application of the principle of zero growth.

ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session
Paris, 1st-4th June 1987

MONDAY, 1st JUNE

Morning

Meetings of political groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session by the provisional president.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session.
7. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Werff, Vice-President of the Assembly.
Debate.
8. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
9. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.

TUESDAY, 2nd JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council:
Resumed debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council to the Assembly of Western European Union:
presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
2. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation and draft order.

WEDNESDAY, 3rd JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. European space policy until 2000:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

12 noon

3. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

European space policy until 2000:

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

THURSDAY, 4th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

The voice of Europe after Reykjavik – debates in national parliaments:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Debate.

Vote on the draft resolution.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

*Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council
to the Assembly of Western European Union*

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ANNEX

Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly dated 17th March 1986.

I. Activities of the Council and its Secretariat-General in London
(Period covered: second half of 1986)

A. Organisation

1. Meetings of the Council

During this six-month period the Council held eleven meetings, including the Luxembourg ministerial meeting on 13th-14th November, in which it gave further thought to the tasks and future structures of the organisation against the background of international developments which imparted added urgency to improved European consultation on security matters. During this time it has borne in mind that institutional decisions should be taken on completion of the transitional period for WEU reorganisation.

There were two meetings of the enlarged Council, at which the political directors and representatives of the ministries of defence were present in London on 24th October. This reflected the desire of member governments to involve the defence side more closely in the Council's work.

Ministers decided in Luxembourg on a number of practical measures to improve WEU's handling of the substantive issues relating to European security interests. The Permanent Council will continue to co-ordinate all the organisation's activities. The practice of holding regular meetings of political directors will significantly strengthen the process of consultation within WEU, as will the participation of representatives of defence ministries. A special working group, comprising representatives of both foreign affairs and defence ministries, was also set up in Luxembourg to provide a body of expertise to study questions relating to European security interests.

The aim of these new initiatives is to ensure that representatives of the member countries can hold regular and frequent consultations in the framework of WEU on a broad range of security issues affecting Europe. This should further improve the pace and development of reactivation, ensuring that WEU provides a true forum for European consultation on security issues with the aim of strengthening Europe's contribution to the alliance.

2. Press and information

In their Bonn communiqué, ministers recalled the contribution that WEU could make to achieve a wider consensus among public opinion on the defence effort being made by the European countries.

Accordingly, a first step has been taken with the setting up in September 1986 of a unit within the Political Division of the Secretariat-General to be responsible for relations with the press and for providing information.

In addition, this unit provides information and documentation for the benefit of the permanent representations in London.

The press and information unit is also responsible for answering the many requests by the public for information about the activities of WEU. The number of such requests has increased appreciably in recent months.

The Secretary-General continues to perform the important task of providing information on WEU by participating in public seminars, by undertaking speaking engagements and by publishing articles.

B. Questions relating to defence and European security interests

1. East-West relations

During the period under review, the Council has regularly discussed East-West relations.

This question, especially when viewed in the context of the implications for Europe of the Reykjavik meeting on 11th and 12th October 1986, was one of the principal topics of discussion at the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg.

Maintaining peace in freedom is the prime objective of the security and defence policies of WEU member states within the alliance: their aim is to prevent any type of war – nuclear and conventional.

The maintenance of deterrence, based on adequate conventional and nuclear defences, is an essential element of these policies. It also guarantees the common security of the alliance members.

The effort to achieve arms control and disarmament is an integral component of western security policy. Verifiable and equitable agreements aimed at enhancing overall stability at lower levels of forces and armaments must therefore be pursued.

As regards chemical weapons, the member countries of WEU have on many occasions

stated their desire for a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of such weapons and the destruction of all existing stockpiles. On 12th December 1986 in Brussels, the foreign affairs ministers of the Atlantic Alliance again expressed their willingness to seek at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament a convention which meets this objective.

As far as INF are concerned, the member states of WEU maintained their view, during the second half of 1986, that any agreement on this subject must not neglect the existing imbalances in shorter-range United States and Soviet INF missiles and that it must provide for a commitment to follow-on negotiations on these missiles. In this connection, it is emphasised that reductions in nuclear weapons will increase the importance of removing conventional disparities and eliminating chemical weapons.

2. SDI

The SDI special working group continued its work in the six months in question, along the lines indicated by ministers in Venice on 29th-30th April 1986. It convened five times and continued the exchange of information on questions relating to participation in SDI research.

While being aware of the work being done in the appropriate alliance framework regarding questions covering air defence in Europe and ATBM, the group has had some useful exchanges of views on these issues. It agreed that the question of SDI and the enhancement of air defence in Europe should be addressed as two separate issues.

Moreover, the group began to develop a possible framework for a long-term analysis of the politico-strategic implications of conceivable developments in ballistic missile defence on the basis of hypotheses which were outlined in the progress report to ministers presented in Venice. Although it is impractical to draw conclusions at present, due to the fact that the analysis depends on many variable hypotheses and that many essential questions remain unanswered, particularly at this early stage of BMD research, some common perceptions have nevertheless emerged.

The group received technical contributions from the Paris agencies to help it in its work.

Ministers in Luxembourg took note of the progress report and instructed the group to carry on its study of this issue and to present, at their next ministerial meeting in the spring of 1987, the report on the group's activities since its inception at the Bonn meeting in April 1985. It was decided that the group should be subsumed within the new high-level special working group,

which would look at a broader range of issues relating to European security interests.

The final meeting of the group in its old form was on 15th December, when it discussed priorities for the new phase in WEU's work.

3. Enlargement

During the second half of 1986, the Council's position remained as stated in its reply to Written Question 265 and in the first part of its thirty-second annual report.

4. Security in the Mediterranean

Events in the Mediterranean area are a continual reminder of the great importance of this region for the common security of Europe. In Luxembourg, ministers decided to pursue, in WEU, their reflections on security in the Mediterranean.

To this end, the French and Italian Delegations have agreed to undertake an examination of this subject, leading to the possible convening of a working group.

5. International terrorism

Ministers in Luxembourg confirmed the importance which member states attach to the fight against international terrorism. Many collective efforts are being made by WEU member countries in other international, and in particular European, bodies to combat terrorism.

6. Co-operation between European security and defence research institutes

During the last six months, there have been contacts between these institutes to discuss forms of co-operation that might be relevant to WEU's activities. To date, no collaborative programmes have yet been drawn up.

7. European seminar on defence matters

At the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, the French Government offered to organise in 1988 an initial session of a European seminar on defence matters, lasting approximately one week, at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale (IHEDN). The purpose of this seminar would be to bring together some sixty participants drawn from various backgrounds in the WEU member states for conferences and joint activities on general topics relating to European security interests.

II. Activities of the ministerial organs in Paris

A. Tasks given by the Council (Period covered: second half of 1986)

The Assembly was informed in March 1986, in a letter from the Secretary-General to President Caro¹, of the activities of the agencies for security questions. During the latter half of 1986, the Council undertook a new examination of their mandates and reached the following decisions:

- *Agency I* will focus its activities on two main areas:
 - the first relates to the proposals concerning verification put forward in the context of current arms control negotiations;
 - the second relates to Soviet tactics towards Western European countries concerning arms control and disarmament issues.

The Permanent Council has also requested that the agency follow changes in the Soviet positions on disarmament and arms control.

- *Agency II* has been tasked to continue its reflections on resource management
 - by analysing national defence budgets
 - and on the non-military aspects of the threat, as well as to examine how public opinion in the member countries of WEU perceives the strategic balance.

With particular regard to resource management, the agency is studying methods of achieving genuine comparability of criteria between the western countries, and the rational management of defence budgets. The analysis of these budgets is under way.

- *Agency III* has been tasked to study defence technology from specific viewpoints such as the impact of SDI and the influence of various factors on transfers of technology involving the Seven.

Furthermore, Agency III will draw up inventories of the various policies on co-operative equipment programmes and defence technology.

A process of reflection is also under way on the rôle and future tasks of the Standing Armaments Committee.

The mandates given to the agencies may be revised once the governments have reached an agreement on their final structure.

1. See annex attached hereto.

B. Institutional tasks (Period covered: 1986)

1. Implementation of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty on forces of Western European Union

(i) Level of forces of member states

For the year under review, the Council has continued with its customary tasks of forces control in implementation of Protocol No. II.

In accordance with the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984, the control of conventional weapons listed in Annex IV to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty has been abolished as from 1st January 1986. The effect of this decision is that the control procedure for conventional armaments, previously carried out in application of the agreement of 14th December 1957 implementing Article V of Protocol No. II, is no longer relevant.

(a) Forces under NATO command

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that it may satisfy itself that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receives information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspection carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end. The information, as at the end of 1985, was conveyed at the appropriate time.

The same procedure is under way for 1986.

Furthermore, the Council takes the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in its resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual report.

For the year 1985, the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the

United Kingdom examined the level of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council.

The Council noted that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as at present in force. It also took note of a declaration on French forces made by the representative of France.

The same procedure is under way for the year 1986.

(b) Forces under national command

As stated above, the Council has continued with its control of forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe and remaining under national command – internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces – specified in the agreement of 14th December 1957.

(ii) United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe

The Government of the United Kingdom has informed the Council that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1986 in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty was 54 371. The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1986 there were on average 836 men redeployed in this way to Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.

Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom has informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force in 1986 was:

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/Equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/Attack	Tornado	6
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguar	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Rapier	
	surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
	Chinook	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1

2. Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments

(i) Conventional weapons

For the reasons already given, the Agency's controls on conventional weapons have been abolished.

(ii) Situation concerning the control of atomic, chemical and biological weapons

(a) Atomic weapons

Since the situation has remained the same as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic weapons.

(b) Biological weapons

All the member countries again gave their agreement, for 1986, on the renewal of the list of biological weapons subject to control as accepted by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the fact.

As in previous years, however, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological weapons.

(c) Chemical weapons

The Agency asked member countries for their agreement to renew in 1986 the list of chemical weapons subject to control. This agreement was given and the Council noted the fact. The Agency therefore continued to use this list for its control activities in 1986.

In implementation of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned, in its questionnaire, whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage. As in the past, all these states replied in the negative.

In addition, the Agency asked all the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold. Since all the member states replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1986.

The competent authorities of the country concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, precise and complete reply to the request for information – aimed at facilitating the control of non-production of chemical weapons – which

was sent to them by the Agency in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Council in 1959 and with the directive received from the Council in 1960. In addition, the procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used.

3. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee

The Standing Armaments Committee did not meet in the period covered by this report. The SAC's future rôle in the reactivated WEU will be determined by the outcome of the Council's deliberations on how WEU could provide political impetus in the field of armaments co-operation, in accordance with the Rome declaration and the Bonn communiqué.

Furthermore, Agency III, which was instructed to take over the international secretariat of the SAC by the ministers at their Bonn meeting, has continued the routine activities of the SAC and its subsidiary working groups as follows:

1. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods for wheeled vehicles.

The group of experts, which met twice at the Paris offices of WEU, has continued its work.

2. Activities of Working Group No. 8 on operational research.

The group held two meetings in 1986, one of which was coupled with a visit to the laboratory of the European Space Research and Technology Centre (ESTEC) in the Netherlands.

The two meetings were partly devoted to the revision of the five-language glossary.

3. Activities of Agency III in its function as international secretariat of the SAC.

In addition to helping the above-mentioned working groups and attending the annual meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee, the secretariat was represented at meetings of the Conference of National Armaments Directors at NATO headquarters in Brussels in February, April and October.

III. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

(Period covered: second half of 1986)

The significance which the Council attaches to its relations with the Assembly is clear from the many discussions it has devoted to this subject and from the meetings it has had with Assembly representatives.

The Council believes that the Assembly has an important rôle to play since it is the only European parliamentary body specifically empowered by treaty to discuss questions of European security interests.

A. Formal procedure for exchanges

The Council has pursued its efforts to improve the formal procedure for exchanges with the Assembly, notably to expedite the replies to recommendations and written questions; it has also split the annual report into two six-monthly parts in order to provide the Assembly with the most up-to-date and complete information.

B. Meetings

The number of ministers attending the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly should be seen as evidence of the importance which governments attach to WEU and its parliamentary body.

Presidency ministers have sought to maintain close personal contact with the Assembly, especially in the run-up to, and following, the Luxembourg ministerial meeting on 13th and 14th November.

The Secretary-General participated in a meeting of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations held in London on 17th November 1986.

Timetable of meetings

17th July 1986, Luxembourg: meeting between Mr. Jacques Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council and Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Marc Fischbach, Luxembourg Minister for the Armed Forces, and Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, President of the Assembly.

16th October 1986, Luxembourg: meeting between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the Assembly committee on relations with the Council.

14th November 1986, Luxembourg: (following the ministerial Council) meeting between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly.

17th November 1986, London: meeting between the Secretary-General and the Assembly Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

C. Documents sent to the Assembly

1. First part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council on its activities;
2. Council replies to Recommendations 432

to 437 adopted by the Assembly during the first part of its thirty-second ordinary session;

3. Replies to Written Questions 265 and 267 to 272 put by members of the Assembly.

IV. Activities of the Public Administration Committee
(Period covered: 1986)

A. Meetings of the committee

The Public Administration Committee, which meets once every six months, held its two meetings of 1986 in Colmar, from 28th to 30th May, and in Luxembourg, from 1st to 3rd October.

These meetings were as usual devoted to exchanges of information on significant administrative developments in the member countries during the preceding months and to the preparation of the annual seminar for government officials which, in 1986, was to take place in the United Kingdom.

The Secretary-General of WEU, in talks with the chairman of the committee, said that he would like the future PAC programme to be drawn up in such a way that its work would be useful to the WEU Council; the delegates had discussed this possibility during the two meetings of 1986; one of the proposals put forward was that the seminar topics chosen should, with effect from 1987, reflect the current preoccupations of the ministerial organs of WEU.

B. Seminars for government officials

The thirty-fifth seminar for government officials was held at Wiston House, Steyning, Sussex, United Kingdom, from 23rd to 29th November 1986 and was organised by the Civil Service College on the following subject: "Improving the management of the procurement of goods and services".

The 1987 seminar is to be held in Italy on the subject "Public administration and security problems".

C. Study visits

The aim of these visits, which are made by officials from one WEU country to another member country, is to enable the visitor to spend one or two weeks in the administration of the host country studying in his own specialist field.

In 1986, four such visits were made.

V. Budgetary and administrative questions
(Period covered: 1986)

(a) The new establishment tables applicable to the Secretariat-General were approved by the Council of Ministers at their meeting in Rome on 14th November 1985. Newly-recruited staff will be offered contracts of fixed duration.

(b) The Council of Ministers also decided in 1985 on the reorganisation of the WEU subsidiary bodies and the establishment of the new agencies for security questions in Paris.

The Council will again consider the organisation and staffing of the agencies at the end of 1987.

The establishment tables applicable to the agencies are therefore in force only for the duration of this transitional period, and newly-recruited staff have been offered contracts up to the end of this transitional period.

(c) The establishment tables comprise a number of dual gradings, the principle of which is that the higher of the two grades represents the approved position in the establishment table. The lower of the two grades is added to enable the organisation to recruit staff who are judged to possess the basic qualifications called for but may not have had previous experience.

Dual grading, therefore, is not intended to create promotion possibilities over and beyond the approved establishment table, but to facilitate recruitment.

(d) Vacancies in the A-grade functions have been filled mainly by officials seconded by their national governments.

(e) When the new temporary establishment tables of the agencies were put in operation, it

was possible for all existing staff, with the exception of one A grade who had to be paid a loss of job indemnity, to fill the posts.

(f) After drafting and subsequent approval of the budget for 1986, the annual salary adjustments with effect from 1st July 1985 proved to be considerably higher than anticipated; moreover, a correction to the economic parity index for France proved to be +5.6%, also effective from 1st July 1985, whilst an even greater correction for the United Kingdom is expected (provisionally budgeted as +10%).

Unforeseen early retirements and departures by staff from the Secretariat-General gave rise to a considerable increase in the pension budget (pensions and leaving allowances), whilst the departure, with loss of job indemnity, of one A grade in the agencies caused appreciable extra expenditure.

As a result, it was necessary to draw up a revised budget for 1986 for the ministerial organs.

(g) The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts held seven meetings in 1986. In addition, there were thirteen meetings of the Committee of Heads of Administration, nine joint meetings of the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General with the Standing Committee of Staff Associations, as well as two meetings of the secretaries-general.

(h) The main subjects dealt with in the framework of co-ordination, some of which are still under review, were as follows:

- the improvement of staff participation in the framework of co-ordination;
- the periodic adjustment of salaries and allowances;
- the triennial review of salaries incorporating a review of the salary adjustment procedure and the allowances;
- the wage restraints on salaries of A/L and of B/C grades.

ANNEX

*Letter from the Secretary-General
to the President of the Assembly*

17th March 1986

Dear President,

I am instructed by the Council to give you the following information about the staff and activities of the new agencies for security questions:

- As from 1st January, each agency has had a Director: General Rambaldi heads the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions (Agency I) as well as the restructured ACA. The former head of the international secretariat of the SAC, Mr. E. Hintermann, heads the agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments (Agency III). A senior United Kingdom civil servant, Mr. I. Dawson, appointed by the ministers at their meeting on 14th November 1985 in Rome, has taken charge of the agency for the study of security and defence questions (Agency II).

Full details of the establishment table will be forwarded as soon as all the posts have been filled.

- As indicated in the Bonn communiqué, the rôle of these new agencies will be to carry out studies requested by the Council.

A number of studies have already been envisaged, all or some of which will give rise to interim reports which could be presented to the ministers at their meeting in Venice:

- Agency I is to study Soviet tactics towards Western European countries concerning arms control and disarmament issues. It will also be expected to turn its attention to the future of conventional arms control and the essential problem of verification.
- In close relation and co-ordination with the tasks of Agency I, Agency II is to study threat assessment, the contribution of the WEU member countries to the response to the threat and the question of resource management.
- Agency III is to study aspects of the competitiveness of the European armaments industry and the implications of developments in the world armaments market, together with the problems of technology transfer among European allies.

Other tasks have been envisaged and are to be undertaken during the transition period up to the end of 1987.

All these studies will constitute internal working documents for the Council and contribute to its reflection on the subjects addressed.

In order to ensure the availability of the information they require, the agencies are establishing links with the relevant international bodies and national administrations. In this connection, it is important to note that it is ensured that any classified information they release to the WEU ministerial organs will be handled in accordance with their security regulations and will be restricted to the exclusive use of these organs.

As to the suggestion of providing the ministerial organs with a computerised documentation centre, this will have to be evaluated having regard to the budgetary priorities and will have to be further examined by the Council.

I realise that this is only a partial reply to the many questions raised at our recent meeting in Paris. These questions are currently being examined by the Council. As Mr. Andreotti stated in his letter of 8th February, you will be informed of its reactions in the near future.

Yours sincerely,
A. Cahen

*The voice of Europe after Reykjavik –
debates in national parliaments*

DRAFT REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur*

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DRAFT RESOLUTION

on the voice of Europe after Reykjavik

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submitted by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur

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- (i) New impetus to the reactivation of WEU
(Recommendations 432 and 438)
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- (v) Scientific, technological and aerospace questions
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- (vi) Financial questions
(Recommendation 433)

IV. Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Lady Jill Knight (Chairman); Mr. Frasca (Vice-Chairman); MM. Büchner, Cavaliere, de Chambrun, De Bondt, Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Buhler), Mr. Goerens, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Dr. Müller (Alternate: Coleman), Mr. Noerens (Alternate: Mrs. Staels-Dompas), MM. Seitlinger, Tummers, Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution
on the voice of Europe after Reykjavik

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that many proposals and ideas have been put forward in the parliaments of member countries for achieving closer European co-operation in security matters;
- (ii) Gratified that the governments of most member countries have shown their determination to hold closer consultations in WEU, which they consider to be the appropriate framework for strengthening co-operation;
- (iii) Gratified that, thanks to many initiatives taken by members in certain national parliaments, a true dialogue on the various aspects of WEU's activities has been developed with the respective governments, which led one delegation to conclude its information report by noting that the reactivation of WEU had stopped being a subject of discussion and had become a fact;
- (iv) Regretting nevertheless that the answers given by governments on their activities in keeping the public informed are not yet satisfactory,

INVITES parliaments and governments

To maintain and deepen a fruitful, continuing dialogue on the basis of recommendations adopted in order to:

1. Contribute to the success of jointly-prepared concepts of European security matters;
2. Make a joint European position on security matters carry greater weight in the Atlantic concert and in the East-West dialogue;
3. Give useful impetus to the successful reorganisation of WEU;
4. Ensure that the public is clearly and more meaningfully informed.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Rarely has a world-scale political event aroused so much attention among European political leaders as the rapprochement on disarmament achieved at the Soviet-United States summit meeting in Reykjavik and, particularly, the prospect of agreement on eliminating INF missiles in Europe. Further impetus was given to government thinking about European security by Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 28th February 1987 in which he proposed that "the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe be singled out from the package of issues, and that a separate agreement on it be concluded, and without delay".

2. How is the public reacting to events? Is the population of a continent where defence and security matters are still a matter of national sovereignty in the various countries aware of the European dimension of the problem? Your Rapporteur will give two examples illustrating the problem of European awareness:

3. On 9th January 1987, a few days before the resumption of the Soviet-United States negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva, the United States negotiator, Mr. Kampelman, gave a televised press conference with participants from Bonn, London, The Hague, Paris, Rome and Oslo. During the discussion, the United States ambassador had to answer twenty-three questions put on every aspect of the negotiations. Six of these questions related to European security matters but only one person present asked whether Europe should not play a more active rôle in this connection.

4. During another televised press conference on 10th March 1987, and therefore two weeks after Mr. Gorbachev's new proposals, Mr. Kampelman had a further discussion with journalists and others from London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Brussels and The Hague. Nationals of all WEU member countries except Luxembourg were thus able to put questions. Sixteen of the twenty-five questions put related to the consequences of an agreement on eliminating Euromissiles and Soviet supremacy in conventional forces. But once again only one person present raised the problem of the European countries concerned playing a more active rôle in negotiations. No questions were put on whether the United States would now be interested or not in being informed of a joint European position on disarmament.

5. Your Rapporteur is not giving these brief examples in order to draw premature conclu-

sions but to stimulate interest in a more detailed analysis of the state of European awareness of Europe's security. Apart from the media, parliaments are the most appropriate forum for public opinion to be expressed.

6. The WEU Assembly has constantly made every effort to help to develop European awareness of defence and security matters, and disarmament in particular. All the recommendations on disarmament so far adopted by the Assembly (Recommendations 382, 383, 408, 415 and 425) were selected at the time by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations for debate in national parliaments. Where developments in 1986 were concerned, parliamentarians could not use an Assembly position as a basis since the two draft recommendations presented by the committee concerned could not be adopted, which was one of the reasons for convening an extraordinary session of the Assembly in Luxembourg at the end of April 1987. Although this situation has not facilitated the work of members of the Assembly in their national parliaments, the results of the Reykjavik meeting and the evolution of East-West relations were assessed in other reports and recommendations that were adopted, for instance Recommendations 438 and 441. Your Rapporteur has therefore concentrated on finding interventions advocating the definition of joint European positions in accordance with the abovementioned recommendations.

7. So as not to go beyond the framework of the present report, it should be mentioned that there can be no question of analysing in depth the development of all the debates on specific subjects discussed after Reykjavik such as the zero option for Euromissiles, reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, SDI problems and the interpretation of the ABM treaty, short-range nuclear weapons and chemical and conventional weapons.

8. It should be made clear that the analysis covers only seven European countries, and your Rapporteur is aware of the fact that to discern the voice of Europe as a whole would require a far broader report covering all European countries. Secondly, your Rapporteur has not had access to full documentation. As usual, it is not possible to take account of confidential discussions in national committees. Only a few summary records of meetings are published in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. Your Rapporteur nevertheless considers his study gives sufficient information to allow certain conclusions to be drawn, which are set

out in Chapter IV. To make his task easier, your Rapporteur considered debates in the WEU member parliaments in alphabetical order (Chapter II) insofar as they were directly concerned with the Reykjavik meeting. Chapter III analyses action taken by parliamentarians to follow the work of the Assembly in particular, this being one of the main tasks of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

II. Reykjavik and its repercussions on debates in the parliaments of WEU member countries

(i) Federal Republic of Germany

Summary

9. There has been increasing endorsement of greater efforts to unite European interests in security policy and it was primarily the government that linked this aim publicly with the revival of WEU. Mr. Chirac's proposal to draw up a charter of the principles of European security was approved by the Chancellor.

10. One of the specific ideas put forward was the intensification of co-operation between France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom (Chancellor Kohl in the Bundestag on 6th November 1986). There was also the idea of European security policy being represented at the negotiations between the superpowers by one of the European heads of state or of government (Mr. Dregger in the Bundestag on 20th March).

Chronology

11. On 16th October 1986, the Bundestag debated the results of the Reykjavik meeting.

12. Mr. Voigt deplored the fact that Europeans had not consulted each other before or after the Reykjavik meeting in the European Community, in European political co-operation or in NATO so as to work out a joint position. Europeans should not remain on the sidelines but submit their own proposals.

13. Mr. Soell also deplored Europe's lack of influence on decisions taken by world powers. He pointed out that European summit meetings had so far been held merely to discuss the price of milk, the wine market or the quality of beer.

14. In a debate in the Bundestag on 6th November 1986, Chancellor Kohl considered Europeans should not be surprised by the historical dimension of the rapprochement achieved in Reykjavik and by the new prospects which would have serious repercussions on relations within the alliance and on western strategy. The problem of parity in conventional weapons was of growing importance. A new framework had to be found to discuss the control of conven-

tional weapons with the participation of France and Spain.

15. The Chancellor informed the Bundestag about the agreement reached at the last Franco-German summit meeting on enhancing consultations between the Federal Republic, France and the United Kingdom on disarmament and security matters. On the same occasion, Mr. Dregger said inter alia:

“In Reykjavik, we were absent from negotiations of which we were the subject. We Europeans will not sit at the table with the world powers as long as we allow ourselves the luxury of national divisions and retain contradictory strategic concepts such as those which, for instance, oppose France and the other European NATO partners. All this was overtaken a long time ago by technical developments and world policy.

It would be logical for the heads of state and government of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany to work out a European position for disarmament talks now being held between the superpowers and to consult the other NATO allies so as to express this position jointly.

The main point of a European disarmament concept would be to associate nuclear and conventional disarmament so as to preserve the totality not only of the superpowers' security interests but also those of Europeans.”

16. On 26th November 1986, during the debate on the 1987 budget, Chancellor Kohl called on Europeans to work out a joint definition of their security interests and to have it included in the dialogue between the world powers. Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs, stressed the importance of WEU in this connection:

“Unite European interests and protect European interests: this is what we have managed to do in Western European Union. All I can say is this: if you had attended this debate between the seven members of Western European Union on the need to negotiate not only on medium-range missiles but also on short-range missiles and to achieve a balance of conventional forces at the lowest level, you would have been surprised to see how far the views of the Federal Government converged with those of its principal European partners on security policy matters.

Conversely, it was thanks to a Franco-German initiative that we took the

decision at NATO's spring meeting in Halifax to invite the Soviet Union to negotiations on the balance of conventional forces so that we could be sure, precisely in the event of a reduction in nuclear weapons, to be able to maintain, by conventional means, our aim of preventing war."

He continued by expressing his conviction that the meeting of the WEU Council in Luxembourg had clearly confirmed that there was greater European awareness and also a greater convergence of European views.

17. In a press conference on the government's foreign policy aims, held on 13th January 1987, Chancellor Kohl approved Mr. Chirac's proposals for drawing up a charter of European security principles. He said *inter alia* that:

"Close agreement and a common approach by Europeans in various areas of security policy are becoming increasingly urgent. We have laid the foundations together with our French friends. Truly European interests, which are called in question by the dialogue between the great powers, also require co-ordination anchored in an institution.

The Federal Government is convinced that WEU might be an appropriate instrument for this purpose. In this connection, I formally approve the conclusions and proposals of Mr. Chirac, the Prime Minister of France.

- We must give WEU the means to carry out this task from an organisational point of views. The first steps have been taken in this direction.
- We must also give WEU political impetus so that it can also put over with authority the facts of Europe's security policy interests.

Such a development in WEU would strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It is directed against no one."

18. In his government statement in the Bundestag on 18th March 1987, Chancellor Kohl said:

"We must consolidate the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. NATO needs a strong and united Europe, capable of defining and expressing a collegiate view of its security interests in a manner that is clearer and more visible from without. This is in our interests and in those of the United States; to defend the freedom of Europe is also to defend the United States.

We wish to continue to develop Western European Union, which is the appropriate forum for this purpose. Together with France, Britain, Italy and the Benelux countries, we shall energetically continue our efforts to reactivate Western European Union."

19. During the debate on the government statement on 20th March 1987, Mr. Dregger expressed the following views:

"Addressing the WEU Assembly on 2nd December, Mr. Chirac, the French Prime Minister, advocated drawing up a European security charter and made a remarkable statement on the subject. We should endorse these ideas, and I know this is what we are doing, but also develop them. Why should a European security policy worked out jointly by Europeans not be presented at the superpowers' negotiating table by a European head of state or government?"

20. On the same subject, Mr. Ehmke said:

"If there are to be European security consultations, European political co-operation must be extended and new life injected into WEU. This is what we have been demanding for a long time, but nothing has yet happened.

.....

We must not go on wondering whether we must act now in WEU or in European political co-operation; we must make up our minds."

(ii) Belgium

Summary

21. Debates in Belgium have continued to turn, on the one hand, on problems relating to the installation of cruise missiles at Florennes and, on the other hand, many questions were put by parliamentarians on the threat of Soviet nuclear missiles and European security problems in the context of the negotiations between the world powers with the active participation of members of the Belgian Delegation to the WEU Assembly, who often based themselves on the work of this Assembly and its recommendations (441, for instance). The government adopted a positive approach to Mr. Chirac's proposals and confirmed that after Reykjavik many countries turned spontaneously towards WEU. Specifically, Mr. De Decker proposed convening a special meeting of heads of state or of government of the seven WEU countries to examine present developments in the control of armaments.

Chronology

22. In the Senate, Mr. Close put the following six questions on 5th November 1986 on "the vital need to ensure European security":

"During the discussions between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik, consideration was given to eliminating intermediate-range missiles (cruise and Pershing II missiles on one side and SS-20s on the other) with the exception of a hundred SS-20s based in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and a hundred missiles of an equivalent type based in the United States.

This pre-agreement said nothing about the SS-21, 22 and 23 missiles deployed by the Soviet Union in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

Would the Minister give me his views on the following points:

1. Since the SS-21s, 22s and 23s remaining in place and the hundred SS-20s based in Asia are mobile and can be brought back to Europe at very short notice, what remains of deterrence at European level and the link between the United States and Europe widely quoted as undeniable justification for the deployment of Euromissiles in five countries?

2. Even if these agreements do not materialise because of the impossibility of reaching agreement on the strategic defence initiative, it can be seen that the Soviets are conducting a vast psychological offensive to bring European and American points of view into opposition, which is their major strategic objective.

What is Europe's answer on this subject in the framework of NATO and more particularly of Western European Union?

3. How is it conceivable that it was not possible to define a joint European position taking account of the requirements of a strategy based on nuclear deterrence and the security of Europe before the Reykjavik talks began?

4. In what I consider to be the unlikely event of a five- and ten-year timetable leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, can it reasonably be assumed that the United States' space system would be in place and operational in such a short lapse of time?

If not, does the Minister not consider that Europe would be in the position of a hostage in view of the considerable Soviet

superiority in conventional forces and chemical weapons?

5. In the light of the lessons learned from a truncated summit meeting, does the Minister not consider that strengthening the European pillar of the alliance in the framework of WEU should be effected urgently in a spirit of political and military co-operation which I consider to be sadly lacking?

6. Is it not therefore essential to conduct a vast campaign to inform public opinion and to make it aware of the necessary conditions for guaranteeing Europe's security and averting the risks of a third world war?"

23. On 2nd December 1986, Mr. Tindemans answered as follows:

"The Reykjavik pre-agreement did refer to Soviet short-term missiles.

Following the line of the American negotiating position in Geneva, the pre-agreement stipulated that there must be a ceiling on such missiles, even if only under the collateral measures.

It is true that the geographical location of these systems was not discussed in Reykjavik but the withdrawal of the SS-22s and 23s deployed in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia was formally linked by the Soviet Union with the zero option.

In this connection, the communiqué issued by the Warsaw Pact in Budapest on 11th June said that, in the event of complete dismantlement of American medium-range missiles in Europe, Soviet longer-range tactical missiles would be eliminated in turn on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia.

Admittedly, how this undertaking was to be formalised was not specified.

I answer the specific questions put by the honourable senator as follows:

1. The LRINF agreement provides for a ceiling on the SRINF (short-range missiles) threat.

Numerically, therefore, it remains more or less as it was prior to 1978, i.e. about 700 systems within the 150 to 1 000 km range.

Since 1979, one has to add Soviet SS-20s to this threat (now, in addition to the 112 remaining SS-4s, there are 441 SS-20s with a total of 1 323 nuclear warheads of which 994 targeted on Europe).

The West has deployed 252 nuclear warheads on 108 Pershing IIs and 144 cruise missiles.

While it is true that the withdrawal of INF means some loss of linkage, which is moreover difficult to assess in view of the subjective element which plays a part in this area, this loss must be seen in relation to the gain obtained by the elimination, apart from the last SS-4s, of 1 223 Soviet nuclear warheads in exchange for the withdrawal of the 252 American warheads.

It should be noted that 152 of these would be destroyed but that the remaining 100 would be maintained on American territory to match the 100 warheads (33 SS-20s) that the Soviet Union would keep in Asia.

2. In answer to the Soviet Union's psychological offensive, Europe will assert western cohesion in NATO and at European level, particularly in WEU.

3. The United States' negotiating position in Reykjavik followed the line agreed upon by its allies. Only the long-term prospects for the elimination of all ballistic weapons had not been the subject of detailed discussions with the allies, but President Reagan's general ideas were known.

4. A ten-year timetable for the total elimination of nuclear weapons is not part of the American position. The United States has proposed the total elimination of ballistic weapons and the Soviet Union the total elimination of strategic weapons.

From the American standpoint, deterrence with a nuclear component (bombers, cruise missiles) would thus be maintained after the ten-year period.

However, it is clear that the problem of the conventional imbalance in Europe will arise still more as progress is made towards nuclear reductions.

Hence the importance of NATO's decision in Halifax on 30th May 1986 to prepare for negotiations on establishing a stable conventional balance in Europe at a lower level. The question of the conventional imbalance is now part of the general negotiating process.

5. On the initiative of Belgium, the WEU Council decided at its ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986 to give the process of reactivating the organisation the necessary bases for its continuity and development,

including the establishment of a system following the model of European political co-operation to cover politico-strategic areas not discussed by the Twelve.

6. It is clear that the zero option will necessitate an overall re-examination of appropriate means of ensuring implementation of both nuclear and conventional deterrent strategy.

It is also clear that Belgium, like its allies, is still in favour of a flexible, credible and balanced strategy."

24. The proposal by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France, to draw up a European security charter was the main subject of a question put by Mr. Beysen in the Chamber of Representatives on 4th December 1986, when he also asked what steps the government intended to take to reactivate WEU. On this last point, Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations, said *inter alia* that since 1983 Belgium had been doing its utmost to give new life to WEU:

"The meeting on 12th and 13th November 1986 was a success. This was largely due to events in Reykjavik. When the proposals made in Reykjavik were analysed, there was a sudden reaction among a number of countries which have since then turned spontaneously towards WEU. They consider more should be done in WEU if we are to have an idea of what is necessary for European security and what strategy is needed to safeguard our security.

.....

At the same time, the Europeans also realised their security problem, in a way because of events in Reykjavik, and WEU was again considered to be a forum in which there could be discussions among Europeans."

On Mr. Chirac's proposal, Mr. Tindemans said he had learned of it from press reports:

"If the French – since they are present there as full members – make proposals on discussing security and drawing up a European charter we must – and from the outset – adopt a very positive attitude."

25. On the basis of Assembly Recommendation 441 on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations, Mr. De Bondt and Mr. Noerens put the following questions in the Senate on 13th February 1987:

"With reference to the results of the Reykjavik meeting and the resumed Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of armaments, important parts of which

concern the security of Europe, does the government share the view that there is an urgent need to define European positions on disarmament and the limitation of armaments in order to convey these positions in time to the United States?

What conclusions does the government believe should be drawn so far from WEU's work on the limitation of armaments and disarmament and does the government believe that this organisation should play a greater rôle in defining a joint European approach in these matters?

What is the government's position in regard to the proposal by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, for a charter of European security principles and does the government support the idea that WEU is the correct framework for implementing this proposal?"

26. On 17th March 1987, Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations, answered as follows:

"1. Most of the work of the WEU Council at its meeting in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986 consisted of an in-depth assessment of the results of the Reykjavik meeting.

2. There was a wide consensus of views. Europeans support the efforts being made by the American negotiators in Geneva to conclude a separate agreement on the elimination of INF. Such an agreement, which may lead to a zero option in Europe, should be accompanied by adequate constraining provisions in respect of shorter-range weapons systems. The European allies also support the United States' position on a 50% reduction in strategic arsenals and the maintenance of the ABM treaty for a period of ten years so as to allow the process of arms reduction to start.

3. In developing their joint deliberations and endeavouring to harmonise their positions in WEU, member states are not necessarily seeking to agree upon a single point of view specific to them, but rather to stimulate consultations with the other members of the alliance, whether American or European. This is in fact the level at which western positions should be agreed upon.

4. Belgium has indicated its interest in the proposals made by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, at the last meeting of the WEU Assembly. They make an active contribution to work in WEU on defining

the true requirements of Europe's security in the changing context of East-West strategic relations."

27. At the end of March 1987, Mr. De Decker asked the Prime Minister to invite heads of state and government of the seven WEU member countries to hold a special meeting in Brussels on present developments in regard to arms control.

(iii) France

Summary

28. The debate on European security problems and the consequences of the dialogue between the world powers is so intense in the National Assembly and Senate that it is very difficult to select from the many interventions those which express the main trends of the discussion which developed last year. However, it is clear that serious concerns were expressed in the debates by parliamentarians and by members of government on the risks that would be incurred by eliminating Euromissiles.

29. Many speakers deplored that Europe had not been present in Reykjavik and that Europe did not speak with one voice. Here the strengthening of WEU was mentioned several times and particularly in a detailed speech by Mr. Caro in the National Assembly. Various ideas were put forward including the creation of a European secretariat-general for defence (Mr. Bouvard) or a European security council (Mr. Pelletier).

Chronology

30. On the disarmament plan tabled by Mr. Gorbachev at the beginning of the year, Mr. Genton, then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces Committee, adopted the following position in the Senate on 27th May 1986:

"The intended elimination over a three- or five-year period of SS-20, Pershing II and cruise missiles deployed in Europe would procure for Western Europeans only fallacious, blind peace of mind, neglecting the destructive capability – which cannot be called residual – of missiles such as the SS-21, 22 and 23.

Nor should we forget the conventional and chemical forces present in Europe. Security is indivisible and must be viewed from every point of view. What would happen to Europe's independence if we had to give up offsetting, by nuclear deterrence, the Red Army's superiority in troop levels and conventional weapons?"

31. On behalf of the government, Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said:

"Within the wider limits of disarmament in general, France considers the question

of conventional weapons should be handled on the same basis as that of nuclear weapons. Because of the conventional imbalance in Europe, it must not be underestimated. This is why France instigated the conference on disarmament in Europe held in Stockholm and considers it to be the most appropriate forum for considering the new Soviet proposals made in Potsdam by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This is an area in which it is essential for us to consult our allies – particularly the United States – and concert our positions with them. We are conducting such consultations not only on a bilateral level and in the Atlantic Alliance but also in Western European Union, where we can tackle among Europeans all East-West matters and co-operation in armaments matters.”

32. On 24th October 1986, during the debate on the 1987 budget in the National Assembly, several deputies spoke of the consequences for Europe of the Reykjavik meeting, including Mr. Bouvard, who advocated the creation of a European defence secretariat-general and encouraging attempts to revitalise WEU.

33. During the debate on the defence budget in the Senate on 27th November 1986, Mr. Giraud, Minister of Defence, referred to his concern about the consequences of the Reykjavik rapprochement.

34. While sharing these concerns, on the same occasion Mr. Lecanuet, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, described the consequences he considered should be drawn for French policy:

“I have always asserted the need to associate the strongest possible French military force with the network of joint European defence through active co-operation between member states of the European Economic Community, be it a matter of armaments or of strategy.

I have also always asserted that France and its European partners should include their military strength frankly in the Atlantic Alliance and that the Atlantic Alliance can be real, i.e. deterrent, only if it includes the presence in Europe of American military deterrent forces.”

35. During the debate on the 1987 budget on 1st December 1986, Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, took the opportunity of summing up the government's position:

“The total elimination of American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe, followed by complementary nego-

tiations on shorter-range nuclear weapons deployed by those two countries on our continent, would obviously not be without consequences for Europe's security while conventional and chemical imbalances remained and naturally Europe could still be reached with longer-range strategic systems.

With these prospects in mind, we started consultations with our closest European partners. The matter was raised jointly by the ministers of defence and foreign affairs of the seven WEU member countries at their recent meeting in Luxembourg.”

36. Mr. Lecanuet and Mr. Genton deplored Europe's absence from the Soviet-American dialogue on a matter of immediate interest to it, and the former expressed grave concern at the prospects for European security:

“We must be careful that relations between Europe and the United States do not deteriorate and progressively lose their meaning. It would be a real historical tragedy to allow such a process to be pursued without doing everything in our power to reverse it.

.....

Europe will exist as a political reality present in the world only once it has decided to ensure its own defence and security. This political aim is a prior condition to the solution of all the other problems which often stir our minds and which arise in the European Economic Community.

We shall be unable to assert our community of destiny with the other nations of the European Economic Community without guaranteeing that our military intervention, in the event of danger, would be assured, significant and co-ordinated with that of NATO integrated forces. Such a guarantee would lead not to the reintegration of French forces in the NATO integrated command in peacetime but to prior harmonisation of defence plans to ensure optimum use of the resources of the entire alliance.”

37. The debate on the bill authorising *ratification of the single European act* afforded other opportunities of considering new concepts for European security in the post-Reykjavik situation. A report submitted by Mr. de Lipkowski on 18th November 1986 on behalf of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee on the abovementioned bill concluded that:

“The concept of European defence is registering no progress.

It is inconceivable that a group of 320 million men continues to rely for its security on an ally outside Europe, i.e. the United States. France has done its full duty for its security and also for that of Europe. Its deterrent force, like that of Britain, makes a significant contribution to that defence. The French and British efforts are not enough.

Europeans are not entitled to continue to feel they are exempt from thinking about European defence which, without denying any of our loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance, must be a complement to it. In the meantime, while the two great powers almost reached an agreement that would have been detrimental to it at Reykjavik, and while the American strategic defence initiative should lead Europeans at last to start thinking hard about their defence, Europe persists in refusing to consider the matter.

Yet what future would there be for this European entity if its spirit of defence were lacking? Far from being a leading actor on the international stage, it would become a prey. A strong and plausible Community must be based on three sound pillars: a competitive economy, advanced technology and a determined defence effort.

Alas, we have not reached that stage. A relaunching on the basis of the idea of defence would thus be impossible."

38. During the debate on the ratification of the single act on 20th November 1986, Mr. Caro made a speech in which he referred specifically to the security aspects:

"Finally, we must note that the single act does not imply the European Community assuming responsibility for security matters, except a rather vague reference to the political and economic aspects of security to which Community activities in this field would be confined, at least for the next five years.

Can it be deduced that the presence among the Twelve of countries which do not view their security problems in the same way as their partners is the principal reason for the paralysis of the Community where defence matters are concerned? A so-called informal meeting of ministers for foreign affairs and defence of the seven members of Western European Union was held in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November. It perhaps provided a few elements of an answer to this question.

At that meeting, it emerged that the dangers that would have been involved for

Europe in the disarmament agreement that the United States seems to have tried to conclude with the Soviet Union in Reykjavik had been clearly perceived by all and that the Seven were at last determined to agree on upholding, particularly in the North Atlantic Council, the requirements of European security. At the same time, the Seven decided to set up an intergovernmental working group on security in the Mediterranean, i.e. on all the threats to Europe stemming from instability in the region with their terrorist-related consequences.

The ministers of the Seven thus gave a welcome answer to the recommendations the WEU Assembly, of which I have had the honour of being President for more than two years, has been making for a long time. In this capacity, I have done my utmost to put these views over to governments and I am gratified to note that at last they seem determined to follow them up. In so doing, they are in no way contradicting the provisions of the single act since this recognises the responsibilities of the WEU countries in security and defence matters.

.....

We must now pay careful attention to what is happening among the Seven in order to assess the determination of European governments to meet jointly the challenges stemming from the wealth of current events over the last six months. There is indeed no point in agreeing on formulae, institutions and procedures if they do not provide Europe with the means of mobilising its available forces in order to assert its interests in the world whenever necessary.

.....

In any event, there is no contradiction between a single European act aimed at laying down the means the Twelve intend to use in sectors where the treaties setting up the European Community gave them responsibility and the reactivation of WEU as now being conducted by the Seven. The two steps are complementary and I tried to express this by referring the idea of a European political area to the WEU Council.

This area must now be filled by keeping the Twelve regularly informed about what is happening among the Seven, and the single act, while not very precise on this point, nevertheless opens the door for co-ordination between the two institutions which must henceforth tackle questions

relating to Europe's security, each one for the aspects for which it is responsible.

I have been convinced for a long time that solidarity between the Western European countries is a fact we cannot evade. It is imposed on us by geography and by the diminishing economic, political, technological and military part that Europe plays in the world. I therefore consider it evident that when seven – and, I hope, soon nine – European countries manage to speak with a single voice on foreign policy, security and defence matters, they will put forward the point of view of Western Europe as a whole.”

39. In his speech, Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, regretted that:

“... Europe was not in a position to speak with a single voice, as would be desirable, particularly on the problems of European security. However, the framework offered by political co-operation or by Western European Union allows France to express its opinion among its partners.

.....

We have been able to note, just as Mr. Caro said but perhaps to a more limited extent, that the French position thus expressed had an influence on our partners' positions, even if they do not yet say so publicly.

.....

While it is difficult to build European defence, this is largely due to the German problem and the division of Germany. The co-operation we have embarked upon with our Western European partners, whether in regard to armaments or on political and strategic matters, to a certain extent makes up for this shortcoming.

All forms of bilateral and sometimes multilateral co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, Italy and Spain indirectly strengthen the building of Europe.”

40. In the same context, Mr. Bosson, Minister Delegate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible for European affairs, added:

“Where our external security is concerned, I wish also to quote the example of WEU. Speaking under the scrutiny of President Caro, I wish to state that France, at the last meeting of the Council of Ministers of that organisation, was the most advanced delegation in all matters that were the subject of proposals – enlargement to Spain and Portugal,

increased material and financial means for the organisation, mandate given to its Agency III to extend its studies, increase in the number and level of meetings between senior officials concerned and creation of European defence study meetings at the IHEDN. On all these points, French proposals were ahead of those of the other six countries.”

41. On 10th December 1986, when the Senate debated the single European act, several senators referred to the proposals by the Prime Minister to the WEU Assembly for drawing up a charter of European security principles. While Mr. Lecanuet and Mr. Pintat welcomed the idea, Mr. Faure deplored that:

“... we are a long way from Robert Schuman's dream of a united states of Europe. Even if I were alone here I would continue hammer and tongs to proclaim my devotion to that great idea which, it is true, consisted of safeguarding nations with all their affective, cultural, past and present features, but also of going beyond the states to set up a power in Western Europe, a great power which would have been present in Reykjavik, whereas we have no one to blame but ourselves for our absence.”

42. Mr. Pontillon said he was not against the idea of a security charter if that implied seeking and effectively implementing a joint guarantee for all:

“Co-operation in European security does not depend only on the ability of our governments to agree on the concept of a combat aircraft or on the performances of a tank but above all on our joint ability to face up to the prospect of a significant reduction in the American conventional commitment and a proportional reduction in the nuclear guarantee.

We must now act rather than react; we must go beyond the wishful thinking stage, i.e. the assessment of possibilities of co-operation, and at last be an actor in the great debate on defence and the control of armaments.”

43. On the rôle of Western European Union, Mr. Pelletier expressed the idea of setting up a European security council.

“Security Europe? Western European Union – WEU – exists but it has so far been the sleeping beauty that the Prime Minister was recently right to try to awaken. However, WEU can but be a forum. What we need are structures and means of action which do not bow to the supranational sirens to which Pierre

Mendès France fell victim in 1954 with his plan for a European army.

In my opinion, a European security council should be set up to hold periodical meetings of ministers for foreign affairs and defence, with chiefs of staff taking over in the interval.

Our rapid action force, because of the polyvalence of its units and tasks, might, if needed, provide an essential element.

Other national units would have to be formed to set up this European intervention force whose rôle might be limited to safeguarding the Community's supplies. Each unit would be national and under national command but might be made available to a European command which would determine joint deployment plans when the security of supplies was threatened.

Hence it would be a conventional force respecting states' sovereignty but certain elements should also be prepared, if necessary – there is a great need for this – to counter international terrorism.

In doing this, the purpose is not to revive the EDC (European Defence Community) but to affirm a Community will."

44. Answering speeches and questions, Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, stressed the importance of developing the rôle of the WEU Council of Ministers. He then referred again to the Reykjavik meeting:

"The problem is indeed that of nuclear deterrence and of the global nature of deterrence, i.e. not only the problem of nuclear weapons but also that of conventional and chemical weapons. I am not sure that what made Europe see the light after Reykjavik was fear.

However, it is a fact that Europe, as many speakers stressed, felt it had not been consulted or not sufficiently consulted on a matter which was of such importance for Europeans.

.....

If the discussion on European defence is put realistically and topically, it is certainly based on ambiguity. Is the purpose a strengthening of the cohesion of Europeans in the Atlantic Alliance? No one wants this to be weakened since the presence of American conventional and nuclear forces, as I have just stressed, is necessary for the defence of Europe. On this point, France's position has never varied.

Conversely, as the Prime Minister told the WEU Assembly on 2nd December, greater cohesion between Europeans and a stronger expression of their support for certain principles they share should help to make the alliance more effective and stronger.

If the purpose is to envisage Europe having totally independent means, we shall then consider that the coupling between the two shores of the Atlantic is an element of security.

Here too, as the Prime Minister said on 2nd December, the Atlantic Alliance is not threatened by risks of division. We have something of a feeling, justified or not, that decisions crucial for Europe might be taken without the latter having any say in the matter. Here we come back to the previous problem. Europeans must therefore consult each other more on security matters. As I said earlier, WEU is an appropriate framework."

45. On 18th December 1986, Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly after information reports had been presented on the activities of the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and Western European Union. Answering Mr. Caro, Mr. Raimond considered WEU was a good framework for discussing the security and defence of Europe, as shown by Mr. Chirac's address at the last session of the WEU Assembly, in which he proposed the adoption of a charter of European security principles. He added that the enlargement of WEU to include Spain was justified by the fact that it had the same security concerns.

(iv) *Italy*

Summary

46. Examining topical international political problems in Italy, your Rapporteur has recorded a number of parliamentary initiatives which show the keen public interest in that country in European security matters. In all discussions it is possible to see the remarkable significance attached by parliament and government to the work of WEU and of its Assembly in particular. Assembly recommendations are quoted in debates and are used as the basis of questions to the government. When the government adopts positions on subjects such as Italian participation in the SDI research programme and the prospects of disarmament following Reykjavik, it often refers to discussions in the WEU Council. The wish to be kept informed in the most appropriate manner is demonstrated by the fact that certain committees organised hearings of foreign experts.

Chronology

47. For instance, on 5th March 1986 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies was addressed by Ambassador Nitze of the United States on the state of East-West relations and the American-Soviet negotiations in Geneva following the proposals made by Mr. Gorbachev on 15th January 1986. After his address, the ambassador answered many questions put by some ten members of the committee.

48. The problem of Euromissiles, the position of French and British nuclear forces and Soviet conventional superiority were the main interests of most of those who put questions. Parliamentarians were also interested in the participation of Europeans in the SDI research programme and wished to know whether the United States was prepared to consult its European allies continuously on this programme. Several speakers stressed the importance of keeping a careful watch on the reactions of European public opinion to questions relating to their security. The European aspect of the various problems was therefore clearly foremost in all speeches.

49. On 26th June 1986, the same committee sought more information by inviting Ambassador Petrovsky, Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. The threat to Europe stemming from the Soviet military system, particularly the SS-20s, was the main subject of questions. One parliamentarian asked how the division of Europe could be overcome.

50. In the Senate on 3rd April 1986, the Foreign Affairs Committee discussed government statements on Italian participation in the SDI research programme and on the prospects of negotiations on disarmament and the control of armaments made by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence. On that occasion, Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs, while emphasising the government's determination to contribute actively to the success of the disarmament negotiations, confirmed the importance of close consultations with the European allies in WEU. Several senators, including Mr. Orlando, Mr. Milani and Mr. Schietroma, stressed this aspect.

51. In the days following the Reykjavik meeting, several senators put questions on its consequences. These included Mr. Milani and Mr. Pasquino, who asked on 14th October 1986:

“

3. what action the government intends to take, including in the Eurogroup of the Atlantic Alliance and in the European Community, to ensure that the European countries, which were left completely out

of the stage of the United States-Soviet dialogue which has just come to an end and indeed out of the strategic defence initiative (decided upon, implemented and developed unilaterally by the United States without even formal discussion in NATO) can again play a dynamic, constructive rôle in order to bring about new détente, no longer based on fragile bipolarity but enhanced by the effective presence of European countries from both blocs.”

52. In a question put in the Senate on 16th October 1986, Mr. Gualtieri, Mr. Ferrara Salute, Mr. Covi and Mr. Venanzetti asked the government:

“

(a) what steps it intends to take to strengthen European solidarity and contacts between the United States and Europe with a view to promoting the return of both the United States and the Soviet Union to the negotiating table;

(b) what line of conduct the Italian Delegation will follow at the conference on security and co-operation in Europe which is to be opened in Vienna in November 1986.”

53. The various questions were debated by the Senate on 22nd October 1986. Mr. Orlando, Mr. Pozzo, Mr. Milani, Mr. Chiarante and Mr. Gualtieri called *inter alia* for Europe's voice to be heard and for a politically united Europe to be set up. Mr. Gualtieri recalled the steps taken to reactivate WEU.

54. Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs, spoke during the debate, saying:

“ There is an equally important aspect which concerns us as Europeans. If, for instance, as some believe, now that the Euromissile question has reached maturity, we can obtain results in this area as well as with the freezing of short-range missiles, the discussion would then return to the level of conventional weapons. This is certainly a complex negotiation but it is starting on a somewhat encouraging basis, i.e. the positive result of the Stockholm conference.

.....

The question arose as to whether the negotiations on the reduction of forces should be held in the context of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe or elsewhere and, in the latter case, whether they should be held in Vienna in the context of the MBFR talks – I apologise for using these letters but they are now an

everyday thing – or whether an ad hoc forum should be created. I think it is a secret for no one that we have not yet managed to reach agreement on this point. France, for instance, is in favour of the CSCE, while other countries – including certain neutral and non-aligned countries – object, saying they do not wish to be mixed up with a negotiation which they consider should be confined to the member countries of the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance.

.....

I consider there can be no question of an effort to reduce conventional forces without the participation of France or another European country.”

55. The Chamber of Deputies debated the results of the Reykjavik meeting on 28th October 1987 on the basis of many questions on Italy's participation in the SDI research programme. Several deputies called for a stronger European influence in the conduct of East-West policy.

56. On 11th December 1986, Senators Milani, Pasquino, Cavazzuti and Fiori asked what was the government's position on the dynamic rôle Europe could play to relaunch East-West negotiations after Reykjavik, and on 21st December, during the debate on the budget, the Senate debated a draft recommendation urging the government to make every effort to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on Euromissiles on the basis of the rapprochement achieved in Reykjavik and to ensure that an agreement was concluded between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact on a balanced reduction of conventional forces.

57. On 21st January 1987, Mr. Masciadri put a question in the Senate, asking for the opinion of the Minister of Defence on Recommendation 441 on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations, adopted by the WEU Assembly on 4th December 1986, concerning inter alia the definition of European positions on armaments and the limitation of armaments and efforts to ensure that the Geneva negotiations resulted in an agreement on a verified worldwide ban on chemical weapons. He also asked the minister for his opinion on the problem of a balance of conventional forces in Europe in order to facilitate an agreement on the reduction of the number of Euromissiles without jeopardising the security of Europe. The government's answer is not yet known.

(v) *Luxembourg*

Summary

58. In the context of the debate on the prospects of nuclear disarmament in Europe, WEU's

rôle in developing a specifically European identity in security matters is a major subject of government statements, which underlines the seven governments' deep-rooted attachment to the indivisibility of United States and Western European security. Members of the Luxembourg Delegation to the WEU Assembly played an active part in all debates, often on the basis of recommendations adopted by the Assembly. Two parliamentarians criticised the dual Council of Europe/WEU mandate and Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges proposed combining the WEU Assembly mandate with that of the North Atlantic Assembly.

Chronology

59. In a foreign policy statement in the Chamber of Deputies on 27th February 1986, Mr. Goebbels, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, gave the following views on Europe's rôle:

“Where Europe is concerned, we cannot limit ourselves between now and the end of the century to being passive onlookers as the great powers act. Being a credible, loyal partner in the alliance means that we for our part remain active and assume our share of responsibility in the process of détente and defence. This is particularly true insofar as the Ten, then the Twelve of the Community have not yet succeeded in acquiring a defence dimension.

That is why we shall take our future rôle as Chairman of Western European Union very seriously. As you know, there is a political will to reactivate WEU and make it, if appropriate, the nucleus of future European defence. However, it must be clear that this reactivation and the future rôle that might be assigned to WEU must not be detrimental to the European Community insofar as a number of members of the latter could not belong to this reactivated organisation. Nor must the reactivation process weaken the Atlantic Alliance.

On the contrary, if the reactivation our government is supporting is to have meaning, it must aim to strengthen both the Community and the Atlantic Alliance.

Insofar as Spain and Portugal have announced their intention to join the organisation, the question of future European defence will probably be highly topical in the coming months.”

60. On 5th and 6th March 1986, Mr. Goerens, Mr. Hengel, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges and Mr. Burger spoke during the debate in the Chamber of Deputies on the government foreign policy

statement, asking inter alia for details of the government's position on European security and the reactivation and enlargement of WEU.

61. On 26th November 1986, answering a question put by Mr. Hengel on the government's position on Recommendation 432, Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said of disarmament problems:

"Arms control and disarmament have always played a large part in WEU's discussions. Thus, the first part of the ministerial meeting held in Luxembourg in November was devoted to an analysis of the aftermath of Reykjavik: what would be the consequences for Europe of the proposals discussed by the United States and the Soviet Union at that meeting? This analysis will be pursued at the level of political directors and defence experts."

62. On 20th January 1987, Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence, answered a question put by Mr. Urbany on disarmament, which included the following points:

".....

2. At its ministerial meeting in Halifax last May, the Atlantic Alliance set up a high-level working group which is now defining a joint approach to negotiations on conventional weapons. Quite recently in Brussels, the ministers for foreign affairs of the alliance adopted a declaration on the control of conventional weapons. In this declaration they said they were prepared to start East-West talks with a view to establishing a new mandate for negotiations on the control of conventional weapons covering Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Negotiations on strengthening conventional stability in Europe might also be encouraged by a constructive answer from the Warsaw Pact to the proposals the West submitted in the MBFR talks on 5th December 1985."

63. In the government foreign policy statement on East-West relations, security, disarmament and WEU on 22nd January 1987, Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said:

"Beyond the hopes raised in Reykjavik, no one can gloss over the fact that the prospects chosen by the two highest authorities of the Soviet Union and the United States caused some emotion in Europe. Moreover, since that event the community of destiny of America and Europe embodied in the Atlantic Alliance has been at the centre of very intense diplomatic activity. Is this surprising? I do not think so. There are at least two major explanations for it, one a contradiction and the other a paradox:

In Reykjavik, Europe was conspicuous by its absence. The complaint of certain leaders of the old continent who denounce American preponderance in the alliance was therefore well and truly started up again. But it must be noted that this situation is not due to the deliberate will of the American Government but is the result of the division of Europeans themselves. That is the contradiction.

On the other hand, it would also seem that certain Europeans, who in the past have never stopped asking the American authorities to take brave initiatives and hold constructive talks, are now very critical of the prospects opened up in Reykjavik. Is this not a paradox?

We are now really at the heart of a debate which, although very well known, is nevertheless in present circumstances of special significance for Europe and Luxembourg.

As it has the chairmanship-in-office of Western European Union (WEU), our country has been trying for six months to channel all the initiatives and proposals having a direct link with European security. The stake is a high one. It goes far beyond institutional vicissitudes. If democratic Europe wishes to co-operate on an equal footing with the United States of America in its due place, it must assume more responsibility for its own security.

Only at this price can Europe establish a more balanced transatlantic relationship within the alliance.

The fact that seven governments have recently spoken so openly of their security problems and in this context recalled their determination to act to preserve peace on the European continent seems to me an important gain. By stressing the vital interest of maintaining an adequate deterrent capability in Europe throughout all the stages of the disarmament process, they showed their deep-rooted attachment to the indivisibility of the security of the United States and of Western Europe.

The session of the WEU Assembly held in Paris at the beginning of December in which certain members of this chamber played an active part deliberately followed the same line. Innovative ideas were even put forward. I am thinking in particular of the proposals made by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac on the definition of a European security charter. The coming weeks will show whether we are facing a salutary leap forward in the history of WEU.

But the idea of a non-nuclear world might cause a complete upheaval in the overall strategy of the alliance to the detriment of Europeans in view of the prevailing imbalance of conventional weapons in favour of the Warsaw Pact countries. As the importance of nuclear arms recedes, conventional weapons come even more into the limelight. It is therefore not exaggerated to claim that at the heart of the negotiations on European security lies the search for a true balance, at lower levels, of conventional forces and armaments. This is the aim of the negotiations which are in principle to start in the framework of the CSCE, the Atlantic Alliance having given a favourable opinion. Other talks – I mean the MBFR negotiations which have been under way for thirteen years and whose aim is precisely a reduction of conventional forces in the Central Europe region – will give us a better grasp of the enormous difficulty of the task before us.

In the coming negotiations, which will doubtless leave their mark on the year 1987, it is essential to develop Europe's own identity, to maintain close consultations in the context of the alliance and to call on public opinion to distinguish between reliable, concrete disarmament proposals and sheer propaganda manoeuvres. For this purpose, the government will rely on the assistance of members of the chamber."

64. During the debate that followed this statement, speakers included Mr. Dondelinger, Mr. Angel, Mr. Margue, who deplored the dual Council of Europe/WEU mandate, and Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, who proposed combining the mandate of the WEU Assembly with that of the North Atlantic Assembly.

(vi) *Netherlands*

Summary

65. It was mainly in the Second Chamber of the States General that a continuing, intensive debate was held on European security matters in the context of the dialogue between the two great powers in 1986. The Second Chamber voted in favour of continuing negotiations on the basis of the Reykjavik pre-agreement. However, many questions were put on the consequences of the zero option and the positions adopted in other Western European countries. While stressing the importance of WEU, the government advocated better liaison between European forums in order to enhance the European contribution to the alliance. In a draft motion tabled on 10th December 1986, Mr. Engwirda and Mr. Eisma proposed a government initiative to set up a European satellite organisation.

Chronology

66. On 17th November 1986, the Standing Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Second Chamber put many questions on nuclear disarmament, the concept of European security in various organisations, Western Europe's contribution to the Atlantic Alliance and the dispersal of forums for discussing security questions.

67. The government's answer underlined the importance of Western European Union:

"Discussions on security matters in European political co-operation are limited to the political and economic aspects. Part of the discussion on the European dimension of security is therefore held in other forums. These – Western European Union, Eurogroup and the IEPG – have their own history, tasks and membership.

The government considers the possibilities offered by the various forums should be used to the maximum. It is also important for France, which does not belong to the NATO integrated military organisation, to be involved as far as possible in Western Europe's discussions on security and co-operation in armaments matters.

An attempt is being made to avoid duplication of work in the various forums and we do not want other forums to be set up.

While recognising the different membership, tasks and features of each of the forums dealing with Western European security co-operation, greater cohesion should be sought in their work... Better liaison between the European forums would strengthen the European contribution to the alliance. European discussion of the results of the proposals made at the Reykjavik summit meeting will also encourage the closest possible cohesion between the various European forums."

68. On 10th December 1986, three draft motions were tabled on security policy, including one by Mr. Engwirda and Mr. Eisma asking the government to take or endorse the initiative of setting up a European satellite organisation while the Netherlands held the chairmanship-in-office of WEU.

(vii) *United Kingdom*

Summary

69. During the continuing, intensive debate in both houses of the British Parliament, the government specified that WEU did not wish to set up a formalised inner group of certain member

countries and stressed the importance of maintaining the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance. On Mr. Chirac's proposal to draw up a European security charter, the government confirmed that it endorsed many of his concerns. In particular, it endorsed Mr. Chirac's assertion that deterrence in Europe required a strategic link between the two sides of the alliance and the presence of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe. Six members of the United Kingdom Delegation to the WEU Assembly tabled a draft resolution in the House of Commons on 4th March 1987 drawing attention to the dangers of disturbing disparities in conventional, chemical and shorter-range nuclear weapons. On European co-operation in defence matters, the Prime Minister confirmed that the United Kingdom had encouraged such co-operation, inter alia through reactivated WEU. In a speech to the Royal Institute for International Affairs in Brussels on 16th March 1987, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, called for an effective WEU.

Chronology

70. In a government statement to the House of Lords on 15th October 1986 on the results of the Reykjavik summit meeting, Lady Young, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, welcomed the fact that the unity of the alliance had not been called in question by the results of the meeting.

71. During the ensuing debate in which about a dozen members of the House of Lords spoke, Lord Kennet asked whether the government would not agree that a proper European foreign and defence policy must now be quickly developed that could allow Europe to be present at negotiations which affect our very existence.

72. On 13th November 1986, in the debate in the House of Lords on the speech from the throne relating to foreign affairs, several members advocated strengthening Europe's position. Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement, said he was convinced more effective European co-operation was necessary. But in present circumstances there was no cheaper or as effective European alternative to the Trident system.

73. On 8th December 1986, Lord Kennet put a question in the House of Lords on action taken on Chancellor Kohl's proposal to the Bundestag on 6th November on seeking increased German-French-British contacts on disarmament and security matters. In her answer, Lady Young, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, recalled that the WEU member countries had recently agreed procedures to increase consultation on security and disarmament issues in order to strengthen the European contribution to the alliance. There was no question of a

formalised inner group. Europeans were committed to maintaining the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance. Exchanging views on matters of direct concern to Europe improved discussion within the alliance and strengthened the transatlantic bond.

74. After further speeches, Lady Young confirmed that European states were consulted regularly and closely. Lord Beloff had asked about the government's position towards Mr. Chirac's proposal on drawing up a European charter of security principles. Lady Young confirmed that the government shared many of the concerns expressed by the French Prime Minister. It welcomed his support for the text which the British Prime Minister had agreed last month with President Reagan at Camp David and concurred wholeheartedly with Mr. Chirac's emphasis on the importance of nuclear deterrence and the rôle of the British and French nuclear forces. The government welcomed in particular his assertion that deterrence in Europe required a strategic linkage between the two sides of the alliance and the presence of American conventional and nuclear forces on our continent.

75. On 15th December 1986, in a wide-ranging debate in the House of Commons on the future of NATO, Mr. Spicer expressed concern about the United States' future commitment to NATO. The amendments tabled by Senators Mansfield and Nunn aimed at withdrawing American troops over a period of five years. Mr. McNamara had been concerned at the fact that Europeans were behind the Americans in advanced technology. NATO's strength depended to a large extent on the industrial strength of the European nations and it had therefore asked for the creation of a sound industrial basis in Europe so that the latter would be an ally rather than a customer of the United States.

76. Mr. Freeman, Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, said inter alia that the Americans would question the security of their conventional forces in Europe if they had to withdraw their nuclear weapons from Europe. The withdrawal of their nuclear forces would be detrimental to NATO's main doctrine, that of flexible response. Conventional forces could not replace nuclear forces. If the Americans had to withdraw their nuclear forces from Europe, the entire NATO strategy would collapse.

77. On 13th January 1987, during a debate in the House of Commons on the British army, the validity of NATO strategy in Europe and in particular the consequences of the Soviet Union's conventional superiority were widely debated. Mr. Hamilton, Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, recalled the frustration felt by many Americans over what they considered to be a lack of commitment by Europe to

its own defence. If the United Kingdom refused to share the cost of European defence, it might strengthen the position of Americans who advocated the withdrawal of American troops from Europe.

78. On 23rd January 1987, the government said, in answer to a question by Mr. Dubs, that it intended to raise the troop levels of the British Army of the Rhine to 56 000 by the end of the decade and to improve its equipment.

79. On 19th February 1987, answering a question put by Mr. Soames on the government's achievements since 1983, the Prime Minister said Britain had promoted closer European defence co-operation, notably through a revived Western European Union. On the government's objectives, she said it would continue to contribute to peace with freedom and justice in Europe by maintaining effective defences in co-operation with its NATO allies.

80. On 4th March 1987, six members of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Assembly, i.e. Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Wilkinson, Sir Anthony Grant, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir John Osborn and Mr. Hill, tabled an early day motion in the House of Commons on the United Kingdom's response to the Soviet arms offer, in which they drew attention inter alia to:

“... alarming disparities between Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces on the central front, apart from the specific menace of SS-20s, namely military manpower of 55 divisions against 24, 22 000 tanks to 9 000, tactical aircraft 4 000 to 2 400, artillery 7 000 to 5 000 and an overwhelming Soviet superiority in chemical warfare weaponry, and most ominously shorter-range nuclear weapons in a ratio of at least seven to one in favour of the Warsaw Pact, many of which can, from their present sites, destroy Western Europe, including a substantial part of the United Kingdom, while none of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's short-range missiles can destroy any target within the Soviet Union...”

81. In a speech to the *Royal Institute for International Affairs* in Brussels on 16th March 1987, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, advocated closer consultations between Europeans on defence matters. He said:

“That is what we have been attempting, increasingly, to do within WEU. We have tried to make it into a forum where foreign and defence ministers can talk through the problems of European defence, as a prelude to bringing a clearer and dis-

inctive European contribution into the deliberations of the alliance as a whole.

.....

A better European defence effort, galvanised perhaps through WEU, can lead to a more substantial European pillar of the alliance. It can help the United States to justify to sceptics the maintenance of its own contribution to European defence.”

III. The impact of the work of the WEU Assembly on debates in member countries

82. Under Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations selects from the texts adopted by the Assembly those which, in its opinion, should be debated in national parliaments. It was obviously aware of the situation following Reykjavik when, at its meeting on 3rd December 1986, it gave first choice to political texts, and principally Recommendation 438 on the political activities of the Council and Recommendation 441 on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations. Moreover, events in the Mediterranean area last year led it also to select Recommendation 439 on European security and the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, your Rapporteur has no information as to whether this last recommendation was quoted in debates in the countries the most concerned.

83. Moreover, many parliamentarians made use of ideas contained in other recommendations in taking initiatives and intervening in their parliaments. Action taken on Recommendation 441 was considered in the previous chapter. The other main subjects are examined below. They concern the evolution of WEU, more particularly following the Reykjavik summit meeting.

(i) New impetus to the reactivation of WEU (Recommendations 432 and 438)

84. In the activities of national delegations, the French Delegation took a welcome initiative. On 18th December 1986, Mr. Valleix, Chairman of the delegation, submitted a special information report to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly on the activities of WEU in 1985-86. This document is a very good source of information for non-member parliamentarians and concludes on an optimistic note, as follows:

“During the period under review, the reactivation of WEU obviously stopped being a topic of discussion and became a fact. The parliamentary Assembly played a

driving rôle in its implementation in circumstances which were not always easy.

.....

Today, the achievements are undeniable. First of all, the reactivation of WEU has entered people's minds. It is now accepted that WEU is both the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the only adequate institutional framework for discussing security matters.

.....

The Assembly has continued to be the 'conscience' of WEU and was quickly able to tackle essential questions such as the European answer to the SDI or the aftermath of Reykjavik.

... The prospects described by Mr. Chirac in his address, particularly the proposed charter of European security principles, cannot fail to provide food for thought for members of WEU in the years to come. Similarly, his endorsement of the enlargement of WEU to include Spain and Portugal should accelerate a process which so far has been considered to be very slow.

There are factors here which are very encouraging for the work of the entire French parliamentary delegation. "

85. Several individual initiatives in other countries deserve mention. For instance, in the House of Commons on 13th February 1987, Mr. Murphy asked the government about its policy towards the Council of Europe and Western European Union. He deplored the fact that public opinion knew little about Western European Union. In his answer, Mr. Eggar, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said he considered:

" It is important that we bring to public attention the work done by both those organisations, and, in particular, the importance of their rôles in the process of European integration. By a quirk of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954, which founded WEU, the same national representatives are members of both parliamentary assemblies, but the issues debated in the assembly and other institutions of each organisation are different, as is their internal structure and recent history.

.....

The essence of WEU is the commitment in Article V of the revised Brussels Treaty whereby all seven signatories undertake to provide assistance in the event of an attack on any one of them. This commitment to

common defence is stronger and more binding than the commitment in the comparable article of the NATO treaty, a fact that is often overlooked. The Brussels Treaty also obliges the British Government to maintain an army and an air force on the continent of Europe in peacetime. This was a unique obligation on our part – something that we had never in our history previously contemplated. WEU thus embodies our, and our partners', fundamental commitment to a collective security. This commitment is set firmly within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. WEU is the means whereby the 'European pillar of the alliance', to use President Kennedy's phrase, can be effectively strengthened.

In its activities, WEU does not therefore seek to duplicate work done in NATO, but rather to reinforce it by ensuring that the European input is co-ordinated and coherent. It is the only European forum in which both foreign and defence ministers can meet for joint consultations on security. Their discussions are prepared by regular exchanges at official level. The fact that discussion of security questions among all twelve members of the European Community within the framework of European political co-operation is limited in scope reinforces the importance of WEU. Its membership consists of countries which take their defence obligations seriously. It includes the two European nuclear powers and all five of the INF-basing countries – that is to say, the countries on whose territory the United States systems introduced into Europe under the terms of the 1979 dual-track decision are deployed.

The WEU Council of foreign and defence ministers has met at approximately six-monthly intervals since reactivation, exchanging views on a wide range of substantive security issues. British ministers have played a leading rôle in those discussions. The most recent meeting at Luxembourg last November was particularly significant in providing the opportunity to consider the implications for Europe of the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting in October. Our WEU partners later welcomed the Prime Minister's understanding with President Reagan, reached at Camp David just a day after the Luxembourg WEU meeting, as being in the interests of Europe as a whole.

The government attach considerable importance to the rôle of parliamentarians in WEU. The Council's recognition of the

Assembly's work was amply demonstrated in Paris in December last year when the French Prime Minister and five other ministers from different WEU countries, including my noble Friend the Minister for Defence Procurement, addressed the Assembly at its part-session. I know that this record turn-out did not please everyone. Some regard it as a burden which interfered unduly with the Assembly's debates, and governments must clearly take account of these concerns in planning their future representation. At the same time, however, the significance for WEU of this ministerial interest should not be forgotten. If the organisation is to take its place in Europe, and if the Assembly is to play its part, there will inevitably be a renewed impetus to the dialogue between governments and the Assembly. That so many ministers wished to speak at the session last December is testimony to those developments.

My noble Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who has addressed the WEU Assembly in Paris on many occasions, has frequently made clear in her speeches the significant public rôle which the government see for the WEU Assembly. It is the only European body specifically empowered by treaty to debate security and defence questions, and has unique possibilities to generate better public understanding of the issues involved. The dissemination of the Assembly's reports can be of assistance in this area and it is important that, through dialogue with the Assembly, governments' views can become more widely known and form an essential element of the debate."

86. In Luxembourg on 26th November 1986, Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, answering a question put by Mr. Hengel on Recommendation 432, announced certain concrete steps to be taken by his government and gave the following details:

"In drawing up a memorandum on reactivation prepared on the basis of texts submitted by other delegations and at meetings between the various members, Luxembourg stressed certain points which should help the reactivation of the organisation."

87. On the other hand, the Italian Government's answer to a question put by Mr. Masciadri on 21st January 1987 on several points in Recommendation 438 on the political activities of the Council is not yet known.

(ii) *Informing public opinion*
(Recommendations 432 and 438)

88. Several representatives stressed this important matter, including Mr. Close, who asked the Belgian Government on 5th November 1986 whether it did not consider it essential to conduct a vast campaign to inform public opinion and to make it aware of the necessary conditions for guaranteeing Europe's security and averting the risks of a third world war.

89. In regard to the public relations activities of the Council and of the Secretariat-General, Mr. Antretter tried to obtain information on several occasions. His last question on the subject was put in the Bundestag on 22nd December 1986:

"Is the Federal Government aware that, contrary to its answer of 6th June 1986 to my Question 83, the new public relations unit created in the Secretariat-General of WEU in London has not yet started work since the corresponding post has still not been filled?"

What steps does the Federal Government intend to take to ensure that this public relations unit, created on its initiative, is staffed without delay so that it may start work?"

90. In its answer, the government recognised that:

"The new public relations unit of the Secretariat-General of WEU in London was created on 1st January 1986. However, the corresponding post of Head of the Press Service has not yet been filled. An official from another section of the Secretariat-General is at present carrying out the work. The Secretary-General has given an assurance that he will ensure that this post is filled as soon as possible and in the prescribed manner.

The Federal Government has asked its representative to the WEU Permanent Council to ensure that this post is filled without delay."

91. In regard to member governments' activities in this field, on 26th November 1986 Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, answered a question put by Mr. Hengel as follows:

"Inter alia, governments keep the public informed by the dialogue with the Assembly which plays a particularly important rôle in this connection. The press is kept regularly informed of the activities of WEU. For instance, a press

conference was organised at the close of the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 14th November."

92. This answer obviously does not settle the basic problem. The Assembly has already said many times that it could not be responsible for the governments' information work. It is essential for parliamentarians to insist that their governments do not confine their action to press conferences.

93. On the other hand, it is gratifying that the United Kingdom Government on 20th February confirmed, in answer to a question put by Mr. Terlezki on whether it would make it its policy to make a regular report to parliament on the activities of Western European Union, that the next report would be made after the spring meeting in Luxembourg. In his speech to the House of Commons on 13th February, Mr. Eggar also said:

"It is important that we bring to public attention the work done by both those organisations (Council of Europe and WEU)."

94. One may wonder why, in spite of all these assertions of good intentions, most governments do so little to pursue a true information policy. It is interesting to note the figures given by the United Kingdom Government on 14th January 1987 in answer to a question put on the amount spent by the NATO information service in 1986 and 1976 and on the British contribution:

	1986	1976
Total budget	BF 143 million (£2.42 million)	BF 65 million (£823 000)
United Kingdom contribution	BF 26.9 million (£456 000 or 18.82%)	BF 12.6 million (£160 000 or 19.95%)

This table shows that the amount has more than doubled in ten years.

95. What about the figures for WEU? First of all, it must be borne in mind that there is no comparable information service in WEU.

96. In regard to another aspect of public relations, new and interesting initiatives have been taken. Answering Mr. Antretter, who had asked in the Bundestag:

"Can the Federal Government give details of the initiative taken by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, for organising European seminars on defence matters under the auspices of WEU? Should seminars of this kind also be held in the Federal Republic of Germany and, if so, how?"

Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, said on 20th March 1987:

"Particularly since it was reactivated in 1984, Western European Union has been considering organising conferences and setting up research bodies to deal with security and defence matters. This comes within the context of the reform of the WEU organs, now under way, with a view to adapting them to the tasks resulting from reactivation. In October 1984, when he was Chairman of the WEU Council of Ministers, the Minister for Foreign Affairs already proposed the creation of a European institute to conduct research into security policy.

The Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. Cahen, is also in favour of these ideas being followed up. He recently suggested to the French Government, on behalf of WEU, that participants from all WEU countries be allowed to attend European seminars on defence matters, to be organised in France. For the coming years, he also considered other seminars should be organised in the WEU member countries in turn, if necessary under the aegis of WEU."

97. In this context, it should also be noted that the European Institute of Public Administration in Maastricht has invited members of the WEU Assembly to take part in a round table on "West European security in a changing world" that it is organising on 11th May 1987 in co-operation with the Secretary-General of WEU.

*(iii) Institutional reforms and enlargement
(Recommendations 432 and 438)*

98. Several members stressed the question of the enlargement of the organisation and put questions to their governments. Answering Mr. Beysen, Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, said on 4th December 1986 that "the problem of enlargement, and hence of the admission of new members, is a delicate problem that is now being studied".

99. Members of the French Government made the most positive remarks in this respect, including Mr. Bosson, Minister Delegate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible for European affairs, after a speech by Mr. Caro (see paragraph 40 above) on 20th November 1986 and Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking about Spain on 18th December 1986 (see paragraph 45 above).

100. The Italian Government's answer to a question put by Mr. Masciadri on Recommendation 438 on 21st January 1987 is not yet known. Mr. Masciadri asked inter alia for the govern-

ment's position on whether a positive answer should be given to Portugal's application for membership.

101. Conversely, the United Kingdom Government was generally speaking more reserved when Mr. Eggar, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, described its position in the House of Commons on 13th February 1987:

"Ministers have agreed that the WEU institutional changes resulting from reactivation should run unhindered until the end of this year. They will then undertake a review of the performance of the new arrangements, which will help to signpost the way ahead. Our aim is to get WEU established as the focal point of the European defence identity and to ensure that its working methods are soundly based for this purpose. Once the review is complete, we shall be able to turn our full attention to the question of the possible future enlargement of the organisation. In doing so, we shall have to reflect carefully on the serious treaty obligations to which potential new members must commit themselves and to ask whether these could be undertaken. But that is for the future – we must first be certain that WEU is heading in the right direction and is sure of its future rôle. Until then, it would be premature to examine the important question of enlargement in detail."

In his speech to the Royal Institute for International Affairs in Brussels on 16th March 1987, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said:

"The advantages of broadening WEU's membership need to be balanced against the importance of maintaining its sense of cohesion and purpose. The present membership is homogeneous. We, you, your Benelux neighbours, France, Germany and Italy all see broadly eye to eye on both the nuclear and the conventional aspects of defence. The test of membership must be readiness to accept and implement in full the commitments of the treaty and to make – all of us – the practical military dispositions to give effect to this."

102. In regard to the pursuit of institutional reforms, Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, said on 4th December 1986 in answer to a question put by Mr. Beysen:

"At present, we are studying its internal organisation and how the existing agencies can be given more activities. We propose that there should also be contacts at the level of political directors, as is the case in the European Community and between

NATO ambassadors. Similarly, we propose that regular contacts also be held at the level of military and diplomatic experts and that correspondents be appointed as is the case in the European Community. In this way, new life could effectively be given to WEU."

103. Answering a question put by Mr. Hardy in the House of Commons, Mr. Eggar said on 22nd January 1987 that other institutional reforms would be implemented at the beginning of the year. On 26th November 1986, Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, said:

"The political directors are to meet four times a year and whenever circumstances require.

Ministers of defence will have to play a more active part in work so as to make the discussion of European security problems more detailed and factual.

The rôle of the Secretariat-General should be enhanced.

Both NATO and the Twelve must be kept regularly informed of the activities of the Seven.

A system of communications on the lines of Coreu should facilitate exchanges of views between capitals and the secretariat."

104. In regard to the rôle of ministers of defence in WEU, in the House of Commons on 25th February 1987 Mr. Terlezki asked the Secretary of State for Defence what was his policy on the rôle to be played by defence ministers within Western European Union and if he would make a statement. Mr. Stanley, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, answered:

"Western European Union provides a forum for foreign and defence ministers of the seven member states to meet jointly to discuss issues related to European security. Defence and foreign ministers play full and complementary parts in these discussions."

On 24th February 1987, Mr. Stanley said that because of other commitments the Secretary of State for Defence regretted that he was unable to attend the next ministerial meeting of WEU scheduled for 27th and 28th April in Luxembourg and had asked Mr. Stanley to represent him.

105. Several members put questions on the composition of the WEU Permanent Council. Answering a question put by Mr. Terlezki on this subject, the United Kingdom Government specified on 20th February 1987 that it had no plans to change the composition of the Permanent

Council. Conversely, it was reported in the Luxembourg press on 5th March 1987 that:

“ Answering a question put by Mr. Linster, who had asked whether the Permanent Council consisting of ambassadors from the seven member countries to the Court of St. James was an appropriate framework for reactivating WEU, Mr. Poos said this matter was crucial in the context of the current reactivation process.

The Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs added that the problem was the ability of these ambassadors in a reactivated WEU to give the necessary impetus or take the necessary political initiatives insofar as they did not have the adequate infrastructure in terms of staff.

While reserving for the Permanent Council a central rôle in co-ordinating all the work of the organisation, the Luxembourg presidency had just proposed a closer association of political directors with the activities of WEU.

These political directors had now met twice along with the ambassadors, Mr. Poos underlined, and he pointed out that they had just, for the first time moreover, held a separate meeting on the occasion of a twelve-power political committee meeting. This real innovation would be followed up, he said.

The minister ended his written answer to Mr. Linster by announcing that a further joint meeting in the form of an enlarged Permanent Council would be held at the beginning of April to prepare for the ministerial meeting of the Council. ”

106. On 23rd February 1987, Mr. De Bondt and Mr. Noerens put a number of questions in the Belgian Senate on the basis of Recommendation 438. These questions related inter alia to the rôle of the Permanent Council and of the ministers of defence:

“ The Assembly of WEU has asked several times whether the Permanent Council of WEU as now composed of the ambassadors in London is best suited for giving WEU the political impetus it needs and applying in full the decisions set out in the Rome declaration.

Does the government share the view that the composition of the Permanent Council does not allow it to take the necessary political initiatives and does the government intend to propose that it be reorganised in the framework of the impending re-examination of WEU's new structures?

In his address to the Assembly of WEU on 3rd December 1986, the Minister of Defence of Luxembourg stressed inter alia the importance of assigning a greater rôle to the defence ministers within WEU.

What is the position of the government in this context and in which areas has it taken special initiatives in order to strengthen the rôle of defence ministers within the Council? ”

107. In his answer on 17th March, Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations, emphasised the following points:

“ 1. The Council has been implementing the Rome declaration for more than two years. The ministerial meeting in Luxembourg in November 1986 confirmed member states' firm intention to carry through the reactivation process.

2. The reactivation of WEU includes a strengthening of its working structures. The Permanent Council ensures co-ordination of the organisation's activities and settles its specific statutory and technical matters.

The political directors of member states, who meet more frequently in WEU, give political impetus to the process of consultation.

In close co-operation with representatives of the ministries of defence, they play an active part in the preparation of ministerial meetings and the application of decisions taken there.

A special working group of senior officials from ministries for foreign affairs and ministries of defence is responsible for studying all matters relating to European security interests.

3. The ministers of defence, who meet twice a year in the Council with their foreign affairs colleagues, play an active part in the co-operation which is being developed in the framework of WEU.

4. According to the Rome declaration, the ministers decided to hold in-depth discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of European security, including the development of European armaments co-operation to which WEU can give political impetus. ”

(iv) *Joint production of armaments*
(Recommendations 437, 438 and 440)

108. On 27th February 1987, Mr. Terlezki asked in the House of Commons what tasks were

assigned to the Standing Armaments Committee and the IEPG. Mr. Hamilton, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, answered:

“Following the revitalisation of both Western European Union and the Independent European Programme Group towards the end of 1984, the Standing Armaments Committee has helped to provide political impetus towards increased European armaments co-operation, assisting the IEPG in translating this into practical achievement; it also advises the WEU Council on these matters. The IEPG is directly responsible for the harmonisation of operational requirements and research goals, and for promoting the establishment of collaborative projects to meet these needs.

The effectiveness of these arrangements will be reviewed from time to time.”

109. The same subject was raised in a question put by Mr. De Bondt and Mr. Noerens in Belgium on 23rd February:

“Can the government describe in detail which tasks are assigned to the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) on the one hand and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) on the other in the light of each group’s specific characteristics?”

The answer was as follows:

“The WEU Council follows with the greatest attention the progress of work in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), which includes eleven European countries members of the Atlantic Alliance and is responsible for strengthening armaments co-operation.

Inter alia, this co-operation is intended:

- to allow more effective use of financial resources earmarked for the production and procurement of armaments;
- to increase standardisation;
- to ensure the maintenance in Europe of an industrial and technological base in defence matters;
- to ensure that Europe carries weight in its relations with the United States and Canada.

The aim of the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) is to develop, in close liaison with NATO, consultations and co-operation in armaments ‘with a view to finding joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in meeting their

equipment requirements. To that end it shall encourage, on a case by case basis, agreements or arrangements on such subjects as the development, standardisation, production and procurement of armaments... concluded between all the countries of Western European Union or between some of them. They would remain open to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’.

The Council studies what it considers to be the most appropriate ways of enhancing WEU’s contribution to co-operation.”

110. Two members, Mr. Terlezki and Mr. Antretter, tackled a specific standardisation problem, i.e. the British-German-Italian armoured howitzer programme. Mr. Hamilton, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, answering Mr. Terlezki on 25th February, said he saw no reason to raise the matter in WEU. On 13th January, he had already summed up the matter in the House of Commons:

“In 1973 the Governments of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom signed a memorandum of understanding to develop and produce collaboratively 155 mm self-propelled howitzers to meet their requirements as then foreseen. That followed the successful introduction into service of the collaborative FH-70 towed howitzer.

The programme has encountered many problems in development and the house is well aware of them. That has resulted in slippages in the original timescale. At the same time, there have been changes to long-term operational requirements. To take account of the new operating characteristics of self-propelled artillery to be able to operate effectively against threat in the next century would need further extensive development and design modifications of the existing development prototypes. That would inevitably lead to further slippage of the programme.

In view of those uncertainties, the defence ministers of the three partners have met to discuss the way ahead of this important collaborative programme. It was acknowledged that because of the various difficulties encountered in the project to date it was no longer possible to develop and produce a collaborative howitzer in time to meet the earlier requirements of the nations. Accordingly, it was agreed that to meet their most pressing requirements nations should seek their own solutions on a national basis as judged necessary.

However, ministers reiterated their support for the objective of achieving, if possible, a collaborative solution to meet their long-term requirements in this area. Therefore, they instructed their national armament directors to continue to explore the possibilities of continued collaboration for a longer-term procurement, taking into account the decisions that were taken meanwhile on national purchases so that ministers could decide on the best way forward in due course."

111. On 16th February, he added:

"A request for quotations has been issued to three United Kingdom and one United States firms to seek a replacement for the 105 mm Abbot gun. National armament directors will continue to explore the possibilities of continued collaboration for requirements in the longer term."

112. Answering a question put by Mr. Antretter on the same subject in the Bundestag on 13th March 1987, Mr. Würzbach, Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence, said:

"Joint development of the howitzer 70 by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy has had no result which meets tactical requirements. By joint agreement, the partners have consequently terminated the form of co-operation hitherto practised. In this respect, the press reports to which you referred are accurate.

However, all the participating countries have already said they were maintaining their requirements for a new howitzer and intended to harmonise their plans for the future model.

Work has started in this sense.

During the year, a definition is to be made of tactical requirements, taking full account of future conditions of use and bearing in mind experience acquired during previous development work.

Independently of this, provisional national solutions are now being studied in order to cover the most urgent immediate requirements.

There are no plans for giving impetus to the project in WEU since that organisation is not responsible for this type of task."

The last paragraph of this answer is remarkable and might be the subject of further questions relating to WEU's arms production duties.

113. On 21st January 1987, Mr. Masciadri put a question to the Italian Government on

European helicopters for the 1990s (Recommendation 440). No answer has yet been received.

*(v) Scientific, technological and aerospace questions
(Recommendations 436 and 437)*

114. On 31st July 1986, Mr. Masciadri put questions on Recommendations 436 and 437. On 30th December 1986 and 20th January 1987, the Italian Minister of Defence gave identical answers to the two questions:

"WEU Assembly recommendations are addressed to the WEU Council of Ministers rather than to member countries.

The Minister of Defence is consequently unable to give a detailed answer to this question."

It is to be hoped that this kind of answer will be the exception. It would indeed be a pity to revert to the situation which prevailed in the mid-seventies when the governments seemed to have agreed to limit their answers to questions put in national parliaments on Assembly recommendations. At that time, the Assembly had already underlined that there was no real justification for a government refusing to answer a question on the pretext that the matter was being dealt with by the WEU Council (Document 768 of 3rd April 1978). The committee should therefore be informed if there is any increase in such practices.

*(vi) Financial questions
(Recommendations 433 and 438)*

115. Several members emphasised these questions, which are crucial for the Assembly's work. On 7th February 1987, Mr. Cattanei, Italian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, answered a question put by Mr. Masciadri on 31st July 1986 on Recommendation 433 as follows:

"Recommendations of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU are addressed to the Council of the organisation which is consequently responsible for taking decisions on following up Recommendation 433 on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1985 (revised) and 1986.

The government for its part recalls that under Italian chairmanship-in-office of the organisation the aim was to remove what proved to be the most difficult obstacle to agreement between the Council and the Assembly, i.e. the 1986 budget.

The government took vigorous action to have the Assembly's requests for 1986 accepted as far as possible, while applying strictly the principle of zero growth, thus taking into consideration not only the

inflation rate expected in France but also compensation for reductions in earlier years and the transfer to the Assembly of savings resulting from the abolition of certain posts in the Paris establishment. These measures allowed an increase of about 8.6% in the Assembly's budget.

Although the increase in the budget on which a consensus was reached did not fully respond to the Assembly's expectations, the government underlined the political value of this decision, which was an exception to the principle of zero growth, and was also made in order to take account of the drop in purchasing power recorded in recent years.

On several occasions, members of the WEU Assembly expressed their gratitude at the action carried out under Italian chairmanship for improving the Assembly's participation in the work of the organisation and, by this compromise step, overcoming budgetary differences.

On the Italian side, this policy will have to be pursued coherently in view of the value of the parliamentary organ which is a feature of the structure of WEU. It should be noted that the Luxembourg chairmanship, which has distinguished itself by its great availability, will pursue the action started under Italian chairmanship.

In spite of progress accomplished during the year, the Assembly continues to deplore the policy of budgetary restrictions practised by member states. But it is not realistic to think it possible to go beyond the strict application of the principle of zero growth, a principle which is stringently applied by the large majority of member countries, in parallel with similar practice on which national budget management is based. Moreover, the ministerial organs too abide strictly by this principle and if the Secretariat-General appears to have enjoyed a larger increase in 1986 it is merely because a symmetrical reduction was applied to sums made available to the Paris agencies, whose staff has been reduced.

As for the more technical questions raised by the honourable member, I feel it appropriate to refer to the answer given by member countries to Recommendation 433 of the Assembly. "

116. In a speech in the House of Commons on 13th February 1987 answering a speech by Mr. Murphy, Mr. Eggar, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said on financial matters:

" The government attach significance to the provision to both the Assembly and other WEU bodies of adequate resources to carry out their work. It has not been easy to establish the appropriate level of financing in view of the great changes which WEU has undergone in the past two years and in which my hon. Friend has been involved, but the organisation has experienced real budgetary growth in both 1985 and 1986 and is likely also to do so for 1987. When set against the government's policy of restricting the budgets of international organisations to zero real growth, this indicates that WEU has in recent years benefited beyond the norm, partly as a tribute from governments to WEU during its reactivation. British ministers have supported the need to ensure adequate financing of WEU and will continue to do so. "

117. On 24th February 1987, Mr. Eggar answered a question put by Mr. Terlezki, saying that together with its partners on the WEU Council the government sought to provide the Assembly with adequate resources to conduct its work. The Council had authorised real budgetary growth for the Assembly against forecast inflation in each of the last three years.

118. Financial matters were also raised in Belgium in the question on Recommendation 438 put by Mr. De Bondt and Mr. Noerens on 23rd February 1987:

" Is the government aware that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the North Atlantic Assembly have been able to use telexes for working purposes for a long time but the Assembly of WEU, the only international parliamentary assembly with responsibilities in defence and security matters, is still without such facilities although they are essential for the effective pursuit of its duties?

Is the government prepared to take strong action in the Council of WEU for the WEU Assembly to be granted the necessary credits for a telex? "

On 17th March 1987, the Belgian Government answered as follows:

" The Council is aware of the fact that the Assembly must have adequate material means for pursuing its work.

It also has to take account of budgetary constraints in the seven member countries which made adoption of the principle of zero growth necessary.

In the light of the decisions it has to take at the end of the present transitional period,

the Council will endeavour to examine within the framework of the existing WEU budget how it might better meet the Assembly's future requirements. "

IV. Conclusions

119. It emerges from all the interventions studied in the parliaments of the seven WEU member countries that the trend of East-West relations and, in particular, the prospects of disarmament offered by the Reykjavik meeting seem to have considerably increased the number of those urging that Western Europe unite its security policy interests in order to make its voice heard more clearly in the Atlantic concert and in negotiations between the world powers. But it is still more significant that the conviction that WEU is the appropriate framework for attaining this aim has become widespread in most member governments.

120. For many years, it had to be noted that too often debates in national parliaments on defence and security matters and on the activities of WEU were held without any link or cohesion. Today, a major aspect of European security has been linked directly with the reactivation of WEU. Without forgetting the firm undertaking entered into by many parliamentarians in this sense, it is above all the governments that have expressed a determination rarely seen before.

121. The diversity of proposals and ideas put forward by parliamentarians since Reykjavik for enhancing European unity in security matters is encouraging but also shows that many Europeans are still far from having a joint concept in this

connection. The work of the WEU Assembly, the national delegations and their individual members and also of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to spread and make better known the concepts recommended by the WEU Assembly is therefore crucial.

122. It is highly gratifying to note the initiative taken by the Chairman of the French Delegation to the Assembly of submitting an information report on the activities of the WEU Assembly to the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee on 18th December 1986 which contains political conclusions that are encouraging for the future work of WEU and its Assembly. It is recommended that other delegations which regularly prepare information reports after Assembly sessions enhance them with political conclusions to make them more interesting for other members of their parliaments.

123. It is encouraging to see that many representatives, including several members of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, were very active during the period covered by the present report and put questions and spoke in plenary sitting or committee on various aspects of WEU's work, as shown in Chapter III. This was perhaps also an indirect effect of the post-Reykjavik situation. Many parliamentarians used recommendations selected by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and, with one exception that your Rapporteur trusts will remain an isolated case, the governments made an effort to give useful answers. However, on governments' activities to keep the public informed, the answers to many questions are still not satisfactory. A future committee report should perhaps study means of keeping the public informed and their application in member countries.

European space policy until 2000

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur*

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on European space policy until 2000

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submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Wilkinson (Chairman); Mr. Bassinet (Vice-Chairman); MM. Aarts, Adriaensens, Böhm, Colajanni (Alternate: Gianotti), Fiandrotti, Fourré, Garrett (Alternate: Parry), Sir Paul Hawkins, MM. Hengel (Alternate: Linster), Lenzer, McGuire (Alternate: Ward), Mechtersheimer, Mezzapesa, Schmidt, Sinesio, Souvet (Alternate: Prat); Mrs. Staels-Dompas (Alternate: De Bondt), MM. Valleix, Worrell.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation**on European space policy until 2000**

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that a resolute space policy helps the development of pioneering technology by fostering progress in advanced industrial sectors and intellectual, cultural and human resources in Western Europe;
- (ii) Convinced that such a space policy can, in the long run, provide solutions to problems of energy and raw material supplies, the pollution of the biosphere and also famine, poverty and illiteracy in the third world, while fostering day-to-day progress and a better standard of living for the populations of our own countries;
- (iii) Determined that Western Europe, through ESA, should be fully independent in space matters before the end of the twentieth century;
- (iv) Considering that to enhance scientific capability and make optimum use of relatively limited intellectual and financial resources every possibility of European co-operation in both civil and military space research must be exploited;
- (v) Anxious to back up the already considerable results achieved by ESA's Ariane programme and confirmed by Arianespace in the commercial market;
- (vi) Stressing the urgency of establishing space co-operation for the security of the Western European countries, particularly in activities recognised to be stabilising, such as monitoring and communications,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Support the aim of the European Space Agency (ESA) to make Europe independent in space before the end of the century by ensuring that it has all the means necessary, which may mean doubling the present budget in the next decade;
2. Encourage the establishment of liaison between ESA and the authorities responsible for space policy in each country of the agency to ensure that all European bodies handling space research are kept mutually informed of current or planned civil and military programmes in order to avoid any pointless waste of intellectual and financial resources and better prepare for the difficult choices which will inevitably have to be made in the future;
3. Facilitate as far as possible operations by the European Ariane launcher to ensure that it has at least a half share of the market for commercial launches, inter alia by:
 - concluding without delay an agreement with the United States Government defining principles according to which the cost of commercial launches should take account of the costs borne by governments, particularly those relating to launching sites;
 - making arrangements to avoid having western satellites placed in orbit by Soviet launchers proposed on the world market if such offers continue to be made without reciprocity and at a cost which does not respect commercial principles;
4. Endeavour to conclude as early as possible an intergovernmental agreement with the United States on the space station in order to bring it into being more quickly while consolidating western co-operation, this being an opportunity for Europe, with its partners, to take part in technological progress linked with this programme and to advance towards independence;
5. With the assistance of the WEU agencies for security questions, examine the repercussions of establishing a European military programme for communications, navigation, observation and reconnaissance satellites;
6. Systematically strengthen European space co-operation which has already made Europe the third space power in the world and encourage the space dialogue with the United States each time it may lead to balanced solutions for the future.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The committee held a colloquy on the space challenge for Europe as recently as September 1985, followed by a report by Mr. Lenzer in November 1985. Since then so many developments have taken place that a report on European space policy inevitably has to re-examine the whole situation. There is ever-increasing competitiveness in the market for space activities. Recognising that earlier programmes including, for instance, the Giotto mission have been very successful, Europe cannot afford to rest on its laurels. There are many reasons for increasing European space efforts if Europe is to keep pace with developments elsewhere.

2. It should however also be noted that space is part of the common heritage of mankind from the very roots of civilisation. This means that in the framework of space programmes due attention should be paid to the preservation of this heritage.

3. No one can appropriate it for their exclusive use because present generations have the duty to hand it down to future generations.

4. In the 1967 treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, notions like the interest of mankind and common heritage of mankind have been introduced, following the use of these notions in maritime law. Nevertheless at that time it was already too late to prevent the military use of space, which even now can be considered as enhancing security. Nor has it been possible to prohibit formally the development or deployment of anti-satellite weapons or even to agree on an international treaty on earth observation and satellite television.

5. It should be recognised that any human activity, however unimportant it may be, affects the environment. Increasing progress in science and technology has even produced a situation where mankind, through sheer numbers, is becoming a threat to its very existence. If, under these circumstances, space programmes might well contribute to answering a number of fundamental questions that humanity is now facing, there is reason enough to support them strongly. All the more so if the positive impact of human activities in space far outweighs the negative effects.

II. Reasons for civilian space efforts

6. For many years now, considerable sums have been spent on space programmes and, in the years to come, these will not diminish. Are these programmes a pure luxury, providing decent employment for many and an unheard of intellectual pastime for others, a modern version of the Roman *panem et circenses*? Or are they an absolute necessity, providing the last straw for the preservation of the human species? It is not easy to answer these questions. But it will certainly be impossible to stop the eternal human search for more knowledge and new discoveries.

7. Nevertheless the development of activities in space is of such importance that it should force those responsible for funding the budgets to consider the achievements and long-term objectives of these activities. They should realise that without any exaggeration the decisions to be taken may be a turning point in the history of mankind.

8. They should also bear in mind that in the foreseeable future space programmes, because of the amount of money involved and their unusual time-span, will assume a strategic aspect which will make government funding indispensable.

9. The basic questions involved seem to be obscured by questions of a less philosophical and more down-to-earth character such as the imminent shift of emphasis from international to national programmes, increasing competition on the commercial launch market or tipping the balance from civil to military programmes.

10. Through advances in space technology during the last few decades, mankind has discovered completely new phenomena. Our understanding of the evolution of the universe has been radically modified, which also has a deep impact on philosophy yet to be fully understood.

11. Space science plays an important rôle in the development of science. Its impact today extends well beyond the frontiers of astronomy and the solar system into the domains of fundamental physics and earth sciences. The importance of space programmes for the intellectual progress of mankind cannot be overestimated.

12. But the public has always been most deeply impressed by the spectacular achievements in what may rightly be called the space race. Sputnik I, the first manned space flight, the first walk in space, the first man on the moon, all

inspired awe. Such may rightly be called tangible symbols of technological excellence and national power, and they are of utmost importance for generating financial support for particular programmes. For some time they were and will continue to be necessary for maintaining the interest of the general public, which will help to make political decisions in favour of other expensive space programmes more acceptable. If only for that reason, manned space flights will continue to be a central activity in any of the more extensive national or international programmes. For modern nations, manned space programmes have become what cathedrals were for mediaeval cities.

13. Recent technological innovations and experience in space now seem to have demonstrated more or less sufficiently that the basic tools have been created to extend human influence and technical achievements into space. A most generally-accepted fundamental reason for doing so is that in the long run activities in space might help mankind to escape the limitations of existing technology within the biosphere, where it is disturbing the chemical and thermodynamic balance through the use of resources. Expansion into the solar system could offer solutions for energy procurement, raw materials and biospheric pollution attributable to the existing technical system. It should be noted that an acceptable solution of the abovementioned problems may help mankind to survive provided other problems such as the control of demography and ideological controversies are solved.

14. If we accept the need to extend our technical infrastructure into space, the next important question is how this will have to be achieved. Much attention has already been paid to the technical feasibility of different missions to be accomplished by future space systems, such as supplying the earth with energy through solar power and the digging and processing of lunar material.

15. Programmatical feasibility is without any doubt a far more difficult problem. Here, the question is when, on the basis of present space technology, space systems will take the place of systems on earth which at the moment give access to energy and raw materials. The size and weight of stations to be placed for this purpose in space or on celestial bodies will be far greater than anything now known. Transportation capabilities between earth and space and the amount of human labour required for the installation and maintenance of these stations will be of incomparable scale.

16. For transporting man and materials it is quite clear that gravity is a limiting factor which must not be neglected. Only the absolute minimum necessary should be launched into space. Stations of real importance to meet the

abovementioned goals should be built mainly with materials that are at hand and can be processed in space. It is difficult to assess the degree of automation that can be achieved in the distant future, but in the near future there is no doubt that human labour and permanent human occupation will be indispensable for building, operating and maintaining space stations. At the moment, we are still a long way from the mass transportation of people from earth into space. To put one man into low earth orbit costs F 150 million, while a return ticket to the moon can be estimated at around F 4.5 billion. To put human beings on the moon or Mars for more than a very short stay would cost at least F 10 billion per person. This situation might change considerably for low-orbit flights when, by the beginning of the next century, alternative launchers with air-breathing engines for the first phase of flight might come into service.

III. Distinction between civilian and military programmes

17. In its reports on the military use of space (Documents 976 and 993) and on WEU and the strategic defence initiative – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Document 1036) the committee paid close attention to military programmes. Since then, the overall situation has not changed to the advantage of civilian programmes.

18. Recent accurate figures on military spending are not easily available and, if so, they do not always give a reliable picture of the real outlay, which is estimated to be higher, but recent more or less reliable figures are revealing. In 1983, the latest year for which reliable data were available, the world space budget amounted to \$35 billion, which could be divided as follows:

		\$ billion
United States	military programmes	8.5
	civilian programmes	6.5
Soviet Union	military programmes	13.5
	civilian programmes	4.5
Europe	ESA	0.75
	national programmes	0.32
Japan		0.45
India		0.09

19. This means that at least \$22 billion or more than 62% of the total budget was spent on military programmes, a share which has increased considerably since then.

20. There can be no doubt that the greatest part by far of the Soviet space budget is spent on military space activities. Pentagon officials have recently said that 80% of the Soviet space programme is associated with military purposes. Recently United States space command officers indicated that the Soviet Union is maintaining a

growth rate of 15% in annual space expenditure and that it has doubled its expenditure for space programmes compared to 1980.

21. A report of the United States general accounting office, released in March 1987, said that for the fiscal year 1987 the United States military space expenditures amounted to \$17 billion, while the NASA space budget, excluding the Challenger replacement funding, only amounted to \$8 billion. In 1981 the figures were \$4.8 billion for military space and \$5 billion for NASA. Annual increases for the defence space budget were between 19 and 36%, while NASA had only annual increases between 4 and 14%.

22. In the framework of this report the question is how far military programmes can influence civilian programmes. Will civilian space programmes be boosted by the results of military or slowed down for political, psychological or economic reasons? Should there not at least be an exchange of basic information on research and development projects so that redundancy in this area could be prevented?

23. In the past, programmes of a military nature have certainly had a positive impact on civilian uses of space. Military technological research and development especially has led to improvement of civil technology where the market has not been ready to pay for independent research and development.

24. Nowadays, many of the key military applications have similar civilian applications; meteorology and communications lean to a considerable extent on satellites. Earth observation satellites help to find natural resources, manage the environment and combat disasters; the rôles of geodetic satellites include mapping and mineral exploration. The economic importance of satellite technology for the socio-economic development in the third world too is considerable, and this contributes to international stability and thus greater security.

25. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the outcome of certain civilian projects may be profitable for the military side, as for instance in the case in microgravity experiments.

26. Finally, there is also the possibility of joint military and civilian research and development. To mention only one example, since March 1986 a joint NASA defence/SDI team has been conducting an extensive study of the type of spacecraft refuelling and servicing that will be possible both from manned vehicles, such as the shuttle, and unmanned robot spacecraft. Satellite refurbishment capabilities will be essential for the operational deployment of large, long-term SDI spacecraft and could save costs on smaller military and civilian spacecraft, such as reconnaissance and communications satellites for which orbital refuelling could provide significant opera-

tional benefits. NASA is contributing 20% of the funding, while the Department of Defence and the SDI organisation each contribute 40%.

27. As matters now stand, military space programmes and the military use of space should not be banned. Military satellites can provide exact and objective knowledge of the mutual threat balance and so help to limit the growth rate of arsenals. By improving command, control and communications, they contribute to making military forces more reliable and effective. In this way, they have a stabilising effect, promote peace and improve security.

28. Far more human, material and financial effort is put into military research, development and applications of space technology than in civilian areas, even if there can be no doubt about the latter's socio-economic usefulness. It is also known that scarce specialised manpower and financial means needed for research and development for scientific purposes and socio-economic applications are diverted to military programmes and, contradictory as it may seem, for want of room there is a limit on the use of orbital space. At the moment, there is no formal or official way for ESA to be kept up to date with the progress of military space programmes in Europe.

29. In view of this, it would seem useful to establish, at European level, an official link between ESA and national space policy authorities to keep each other informed of all current or planned programmes, military as well as civilian, in order to co-ordinate national and multilateral programmes and to prevent waste of human and financial resources.

IV. Developments outside Europe

30. It is essential to give a brief outline of main developments expected outside Europe in the next twenty years. The United States and Soviet Union are working towards fairly large space stations. They tend to lay greater emphasis on their military programmes, but also seem to have understood the importance of the commercial market in space. In the Far East, Japan and China are working vigorously on their national space programmes. It is interesting to mention India's activities in this area. It is one of very few countries to have a dedicated long-term space policy with significant continuity. Its aim is to use this advanced technology to control hunger, poverty and illiteracy. Attention should be paid to the budgets available for space programmes in these countries compared to European expenditure on space programmes.

China

31. Although until two years ago China was considered by western countries as an important potential market for the space industry and hardly possible as a competitor, this situation has now completely changed. It is third in the list of space spending nations and already offering a range of commercial space services such as launch vehicles, satellite communications and ground stations.

32. In 1956, China started a development programme for military rockets to deliver its nuclear weapons which was given highest priority after Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the early 1960s. This launch infrastructure enabled China to put its first satellite in orbit in April 1970 with a Long March 1 booster. Since then it has launched nineteen successful spacecraft. In recent years such rapid progress has been made in the development and manufacturing of modern missiles that China is now able to offer the world a satellite launching service.

33. It is estimated that China is spending F 20 billion a year on space research and development. The first Chinese astronaut could be launched in the next few years and a small reusable space shuttle is expected to fly by the mid-1990s. The Chinese are offering to accommodate two to four astronauts and a two tonne payload in their Long March 2 for low-altitude payloads and Long March 3 for small geosynchronous payloads.

34. Inter alia, the Chinese have launched and are operating a number of earth-imaging satellites and communications satellites. New satellite programmes include a 700 kg polar orbit weather spacecraft to be launched in 1987, a geosynchronous orbit weather spacecraft and a remote-sensing satellite with specifications similar to the first generation French Spot satellites which will be launched between 1988 and 1990.

35. Advanced new computer systems, some built by China and others imported from the United States and Europe, coupled with the growing number of Chinese co-operative arrangements with the United States and Europe in the field of space and aircraft technology will accelerate Chinese space programme developments. On the other hand, this progress will be slowed down by the lack of Chinese expertise in managing and integrating large aerospace programmes.

36. Communications, weather, earth resources and military observation satellites are now technical priorities necessary for both national prestige and service to the population. For this reason, in June 1985, the Chinese joined the board of Intelsat, the international telecommunications satellite organisation.

37. The second geosynchronous communications payload was launched successfully in 1986 and the launch of a second generation communications satellite is planned for 1987.

India

38. In 1972, India established the Indian Space Commission, an advisory body to the prime minister, to promote the development and application of space technology and space science for the economic and social benefit of India. This body formulates space policy and proposes the budget for the country's space activities.

39. The Indian Department of Space, also created in 1972, is the executive agency for carrying out the space programme itself. Its operating agencies are the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Indian National Satellite Space Segment Project Office.

40. For the first fifteen years of the space department's activities, the total appropriation was less than \$1 billion, but funding has now been increased to some \$200 million per year.

41. From the beginning, India has been determined to develop a satellite programme tailored for the special needs of the country. In this framework India designed and built the Insat 1 series, a concept of a multi-purpose satellite to fit the needs of a developing nation which covers a large geographical expanse and lacks ground-based television facilities in many remote areas. This basic concept could be widely used in developing countries. The first of this series, Insat 1A, was launched in 1983. Insat 1C was scheduled for launch on a shuttle flight in September 1986 but meanwhile India has booked the Insat 1C on Ariane for launch in early 1988.

42. To design the Insat 1 series, India used its experience with the earlier advanced technology satellite (ATS), which provided television to rural communities and Bhaskara 1 and 2, remote-sensing satellites which provided much useful information about surface and forestry conditions, floods and other important sources for the development of the country.

43. The Insat 2, now being designed as an updated version, will have about one and a half times the capacity of the Insat 1 series and is scheduled for initial launch in the early 1990s.

44. The system for predicting meteorological conditions developed for Insat is among the most efficient in the world, particularly for providing early warning of tornadoes.

45. For the use of remote-sensing data, India has set up a unique system with a specialised central institute, a decentralised distribution network and regional centres for user instruction and data processing.

46. The Indian Space Research Organisation Satellite Centre (ISAC) is currently producing the second of the four planned, stretched Rohini series (SRS) 150 kg (330 lb) satellites with a variety of payloads, the first of which was lost in a launch failure in March 1987, and the Indian resources satellite (IRS) 950 kg (2 090 lb), while it is anticipating designing and manufacturing the Insat 2. IRS is to be launched in mid-1987 by a Soviet space booster and will be used to provide earth resources data. Fuel will be sufficient to stabilise the satellite for about three years. SRS is to perform gamma ray experiments and several other scientific experiments.

47. India has also set up a national programme for launch vehicles, which resulted in a first successful launch of an SLV (satellite launch vehicle) in 1980. Its improved version, the ASLV, capable of placing 150 kg in low orbit, malfunctioned during its first launch in March 1987. The GSLV, to enter into service in 1992, will have a geostationary capability.

Japan

48. Japan started its space activities relatively late. The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) was established in 1969. The other but, in terms of budget, much less important organisation in these matters is the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS).

49. In the first phase of its space activities, Japan co-operated very closely with the United States. This led to the development of the N-1, N-2 and H-1 launch vehicles on the basis of the Delta design and to the building of satellites in conjunction with United States companies.

50. In 1983 a new long-term space programme was introduced, marking the beginning of the second phase, which seeks to make Japan an autonomous space nation. In this framework, the 1986 space budget in Japan was 131 billion yen. This programme includes the development of the H-2 launch vehicle, capable of lifting 4 400 lb (1 980 kg) into geostationary orbit. The first launch is scheduled for 1992.

51. On 18th February 1987, NASDA successfully launched its first remote-sensing spacecraft, entirely Japanese built, the Marine observation satellite MOS-1 on an N-2 launch vehicle. The engineering test satellite, ETS-5 (set for launch in mid-1987) with a three-axis stabilised geosynchronous orbit for navigation, search and rescue and aircraft communications relay is also scheduled for launch in 1987. They are both meant to be forerunners of operational satellites which could be serious competitors for Europe and the United States in space applications as from about 1995.

52. On 5th February 1987, the Astro-C satellite was launched. It was designed and built

together with British scientists in order to study X-ray sources in the universe.

53. Japan is planning to launch a spacecraft for a lunar mission in 1990 which will make it possible to practise swing-by techniques that could be used for future flights to the moon and planets.

54. Japan has responded positively to the United States offer to take part in the space station programme and has said it will spend some 300 billion yen for its part of the programme.

Soviet Union

55. It is very difficult to say what kind of long-term goals the Soviets have in mind, because they surround them with the greatest possible secrecy. Notwithstanding this difficulty, their achievements so far are known and it is more or less possible to assess their aims.

56. As regards civil and military applications such as meteorology, telecommunications, navigation, reconnaissance and remote sensing, the Soviets have developed the technical means, but on a modest level with relatively heavy satellites of limited reliability.

57. Because the Soviets use low-performance satellites with a short life-cycle, they have to multiply their launches to ensure the required services. This explains their enormous activity with about a hundred launches each year and 600 ton payloads put into orbit (three to four times as much as the United States). In 1986 the Soviets launched 91 boosters to place 114 satellites in orbit, while the United States launched six, Europe two and Japan two.

58. The Russians owe a great deal of their successful achievements in space during recent years to their caution and tenacity. Well-tried designs for their space vehicles and launchers have a very long lifespan. Soyuz, the main launch vehicle now in service, was also used for Sputnik I and, later, for the flight manned by Yuri Gagarin. The cosmonaut transport vehicle, operating until last year, was designed in 1962.

59. Vostok, Gagarin's space vehicle, was the first of a whole family of reusable spacecraft which at the moment is still in use for reconnaissance, biological research, remote-sensing and microgravity experiments. Important advantages of this policy are long production runs and cost-saving for many items. The fact that, for instance, in the Venus study programme only the eighteenth attempt succeeded illustrates Russian tenacity.

60. It should be acknowledged that space technology in the Soviet Union is progressing rapidly, as was clearly indicated by the success of the Vega mission in 1986 to study the Halley comet.

61. After launching their first Salyut station in 1971, the Russians have increased their activities to prepare for a permanent space station. With their last station in the Salyut series, the Salyut 7 launched in 1982, they had problems, most of which they were apparently able to solve. They have used it as a manned space station, performed a transfer between Salyut 7 and Mir, a new space station, and subsequently moved it into a higher orbit, for use as a laboratory for several more years.

62. In February 1986, the Russians launched their Mir space station which is far superior to the Salyut stations. Mir is provided with much more technical equipment and more powerful solar cells. Attached to the main station, which can accommodate five or six cosmonauts, is a docking compartment with four docking parts for modules which will be equipped for scientific or technical experiments. After a first inspection by the cosmonauts Kisim and Soloviev in summer 1986 however, the station was left unmanned until this year. On 5th February 1987, cosmonauts Romanenko and Laveikin were launched on board a new type of space vehicle, the Soyuz TM-2 and docked with the space station Mir, following the entirely new guidance system Kurs. It is expected that they will stay in the station for at least ten months. Before the end of this decade, four modules are to be added to Mir to make it similar in size and importance to the space station being planned by the United States for the mid-1990s.

63. A first growth module, the 12.1 ton Kvant laboratory, which carries X-ray experiments from agencies in West Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and ESA was launched on 31st March 1987 and docked with the Mir station on 11th April 1987. It is not yet certain how long the Kvant module will remain operational, but the preliminary observation programme is based on a one-year lifetime, which could be extended to two years or more.

64. The Soviets also developed a shuttle orbiter provided with jet engines for more flexible landing capability than the United States orbiters. According to United States officials, a first launch might be conducted in 1988. This Soviet shuttle, to be launched by the new SL-W heavy-lift booster, is expected to be able to place up to 66 000 lb of cargo in orbit – about the same as the United States shuttle. The flexibility of the Soviet design allows the substitution of a cargo pool in place of the manned orbiter to launch much heavier unmanned cargo, altogether able to place a 220 000 lb payload in orbit, as much as the Saturn V moon rocket capability abandoned by the United States in 1973. At the United States space command it has even been said that the Soviet Union is evaluating a three-stage version of the heavy-lift launcher, capable of placing 330 000 lb in orbit. Using this and the

shuttle's capability, the Soviet Union would be able to build a heavy space station in the mid-1990s for one hundred cosmonauts. The launch of Soviet military cosmonauts into geostationary orbit could take place within fifteen years. These may be mere allegations, but it is true that the Soviet Union is determined to use space intensively for both active and passive military purposes.

65. The Soviets developed an interplanetary spacecraft for a mission to Mars and its moon Phobos in 1988. This spacecraft can be adapted for future missions to planets, asteroids and comets.

United States

66. The United States Government is in the process of readjusting its space policy for the next decades.

67. At the moment, the United States has started to increase the NASA budget significantly in order to give new impetus to its civil space programmes. Figures quoted here are the agreed budgets for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 and the budget requested by NASA for fiscal year 1988. The budget for 1987 includes an extraordinary appropriation of \$2.1 billion to provide full funding for manufacturing a new space shuttle to replace Challenger. Figures are given in millions of United States dollars.

1986	1987	1988
7 764	10 508 (including 2 100 for a new shuttle)	9 481

68. In 1987, NASA will present a new long-range strategic plan, Space 1995, with directions for the United States national space programme for the years beyond 1994 to be discussed and adopted by the government later. The director of this planning effort is Sally Ride, a former astronaut.

69. In the meantime, President Reagan reaffirmed in August 1986 the plan to build and operate a space station, which has been opened for international co-operation and for which the main contractors should be chosen in 1987. This space station and ESA's co-operation programme in the framework of Columbus will be mentioned in Chapter VIII of this report.

70. An indication of what the new national programme Space 1995 will contain may be obtained from published reports by two of the more than a dozen organisations that will contribute to their drafting.

71. In mid-1986, the National Commission on Space presented to the White House a phased development programme, covering the period from 1995 to 2020 with total expenditures amounting to \$700 billion. Expenditure is based

on a growth rate of the gross national product of about 2.4% annually and a proportionally and steadily growing NASA budget, but in the meantime the commission is assuming that there will be continuing international and commercial contributions to the programme. In its report, the commission presupposes there will be an operational manned space station by 1995.

72. Among the more striking proposals in the report can be mentioned the development of high-performance electric propulsion systems such as ion propulsion engines and mass-drive reaction engines run by propellants derived from raw materials mined from asteroids, the moon and Martian moons. Ion engines, using electric fields to accelerate ions, are considered to be well suited to missions requiring low thrust sustained for long periods. Mass drivers accelerating by magnetic fields are thought suitable for launching payloads of any material extremely efficiently.

73. A first manned outpost on Mars is scheduled for 2015 in the commission's report. A continuing programme should be undertaken to develop engineering methods for separating materials found in space into pure elements suitable as raw materials for propellants and manufacturing. Research should also be carried out in constructional and manufacturing space materials not requiring energy-intensive chemical separation.

74. The construction is proposed of closed ecological systems, independent of earth, using on-site planetary materials.

75. The commission also stressed the need to develop intelligent autonomous systems. Basic technology spending should be tripled. It considers artificial intelligence indispensable for cargo trips beyond the moon, roving the surface of Mars and operating unattended propellant processing plants that take raw materials from asteroids, Phobos or Mars.

76. A precondition for real progress in space exploration is the availability of launch services and a drastic reduction in transportation costs within the inner solar system. The commission recommends putting a new cargo vehicle in operation by the year 2000, which will be able to deliver payloads into orbit at a cost of \$200 per pound. It should be noted that launch costs of payloads by the space shuttle are estimated at \$4 000 per pound, excluding research and development costs. For a wide range of missions such as intercontinental passenger transport, low-cost orbital transport and defence missions, an air-breathing hypersonic aerospace plane is advocated which should be available soon after the year 2000.

77. For the next century there are great opportunities for extra-terrestrial prospecting and

mining of mineral resources from asteroids, the moon and Mars and its moons and industrial development in space by way of space-based "self-replicating" factories to circumvent the cargo limitations of rockets and the high costs of space transport. The factories would provide the industrial capacity to transport, process and manufacture finished products derived from thousands of tons of material.

78. It should be noted, however, that the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences in its recently issued "Major directions" study, which provides scientific advice to NASA on space science planning for 1995-2015, directs NASA towards goals different to those endorsed by the National Commission on Space.

79. According to this study, although it is not opposed to exploration as an objective, the main aim of the civilian space programme should be to advance knowledge of science and its applications for human welfare. It does not support the establishment of manned bases on the moon or Mars but advocates keeping manned space activity in near-earth orbit and leaving scientific research beyond that region to automated probes and observatories.

80. Microgravity scientists should accomplish extensive basic science work to determine if orbital factories for profitable manufacturing of exotic but valuable materials are feasible. The effects of long-term weightlessness on humans should be studied in much greater detail before the United States can mount a manned Mars mission.

81. The study stresses the importance of continuous observations of the entire earth, recommends completing the exploration of the solar system and studying Mars intensively. In solar and space physics it recommends a programme to image the sun's magnetosphere, explore the interstellar medium and conduct high-resolution solar imaging.

V. Developments in the international commercial launch market

Introduction

82. It should be noted that there are vast opportunities for the commercial use of space which until now have been largely unused. The best known branches of commercial use at the moment are communications, broadcast and earth observation satellites in different configurations. There are however also great opportunities in the field of microgravity experiments, not only for the metallurgical industry, but also for chemical, pharmaceutical and other companies, which so far have not generally responded very actively.

83. There are good prospects for semi-conductors, which could be manufactured in exceptionally clean conditions, new materials, difficult to obtain under circumstances of normal gravity, and separation techniques in organic chemistry, especially the crystallisation of proteins, with far-reaching implications for pharmaceutical companies.

84. According to some specialists, production in microgravity could well be the only sector which may justify, for civil purposes, the development of a new generation of launchers and a space infrastructure.

85. Due to the accidents with a European and several United States launchers, including the space shuttle Challenger in 1986, the whole market for commercial launchers was thrown into confusion, space operations have suffered set-backs and the image of routine has been jeopardised. Insurance rates will certainly be raised and could even reach 35% of the value of a launch package.

United States

86. The United States will not be able to start new shuttle launches, even at a reduced pace of five per year at the most, before September 1988 or later that year. Commercial launching capabilities in the United States will therefore be virtually inexistent until 1989. Many people, even those closely connected with satellite exploitation, had not seriously taken into account the possibility of long delays in launch schedules. Satellite programmes had to be postponed and operators realised that it might not be wise to put all their money on the same horse.

87. In August 1986, President Reagan decided to remove the space shuttle and NASA from the commercial satellite launch market, intending to boost the United States commercial expendable launch vehicle (ELV) industry. After this decision, United States private companies started to develop vehicles for a market which some experts estimate at \$10 billion by the end of the 1990s.

88. Three companies, General Dynamics, Martin Marietta and McDonnell Douglas, especially responded to a call of the United States air force to develop an ELV which should in the first place be able to deploy the Navstar GPS (global positioning system) satellites, a task originally assigned to the space shuttle. In the meantime, the United States Government considered this an excellent opportunity to give a boost to the development of ELVs for the commercial market.

89. In this framework, in January 1987, the air force selected McDonnell Douglas to build seven Delta II boosters to launch Navstar satellites with options for thirteen additional ELVs. The

first ELV is scheduled for launch in 1988, while the first of twenty-eight Navstar satellites should be launched in January 1989. This ELV programme should furthermore provide launch capacity for other Defence Department payloads and for commercial spacecraft. Air force officials have stated publicly that the ability of the McDonnell Douglas Delta vehicle to attract commercial launches was a key factor in the award of this contract. In fact, it was quite clear to everybody concerned that the Delta II was selected because it was the cheapest launcher available for the specific needs of the air force. The air force purchased the Delta IIs at an average price of \$33 millions. In terms of performance, the commercial version of the Delta II does not seem very well suited for the market, but thanks to its selection by the air force it may well be a strong competitor for medium-sized communications satellites.

90. The launch capability of Delta II into geostationary transfer orbit will gradually increase from 3 190 lb for the first nine launches to 4 010 lb for the final version with stretched solid strap-on boosters. This upgraded version will not be available before mid-1990. Commercial launch prices will be set after agreement is reached with the air force on the fees it will charge for using its launch facilities and on a number of other issues. One of these issues is whether McDonnell Douglas will be allowed to purchase surplus Thor engines to convert them into Delta engines, in which case several commercial launches would be possible already in 1989-90. At the moment commercial satellite owners are said to have placed four orders for launches with a Delta vehicle. It is important to note, however, that McDonnell Douglas will not be able to guarantee that commercial satellite users will not be "bumped" by military payloads if a launch failure disrupts the schedule.

91. Martin Marietta is competing on the market with the Titan III, capable of putting a 10 000 lb (4 500 kg) payload into geostationary transfer orbit for a price between \$90 and 100 million, depending on the service provided. The Titan III will be commercially operational in 1989. Up to now, Martin Marietta has received ten paying launch reservations for the years 1989-1990 and recently was selected by the Intelsat consortium for two Intelsat VI launches in 1989. The company has ordered six payload fairings of the Ariane 4-type and options for another twelve from the Swiss company Contraves AG.

92. It should be noted that the United States air force is a permanent customer for Titan vehicles. It has signed contracts for refurbishments of eight Titan IIs with options for five more vehicles through 1993. This vehicle has a low-level polar orbit performance capability of 4 200 lb (1 890 kg). It has also ordered twenty-

three Titan IV vehicles, with a low earth orbit performance capability of 39 000 lb (17 550 kg) and a geosynchronous orbit performance capability of 10 000 lb (4 500 kg).

93. General Dynamics is currently modifying eleven Atlas ICBM vehicles into Atlas E vehicles, the last to be completed in February 1988 for use by the United States air force from Vandenberg air force base, and has said that other contracts with the air force for launch vehicles are still under discussion.

94. For commercial launches, General Dynamics is offering two versions of the Atlas G-Centaur, one with a 10-foot-wide standard payload fairing, the other with a longer 13-foot-wide payload fairing. These vehicles have a geosynchronous transfer orbit performance capability of 5 200 lb (2 250 kg) which could increase to 7 000 lb (3 150 kg) in the future. Until now however there have been no new government contracts for launch vehicles to keep the production going.

Heavy-lift launch vehicles

95. The United States air force, which is preparing a heavy-lift launch vehicle (HLLV) procurement programme has set a payload capability of 100 000 to 150 000 lbs (45 to 68 tons) into low earth orbit as a goal for the new HLLV, primarily to launch SDI payloads. It is essential for the HLLV launch costs to be reduced to no more than one-third of today's launch costs, with an ultimate goal of one-tenth. Key technologies to be involved are a liquid oxygen hydrocarbon engine, high temperature and high strength materials, automation of ground-processing, launch and recovery-post processing and state-of-the-art avionics. The air force would like to begin HLLV operations in about 1993.

96. Boeing and Hughes Aircraft Company are preparing the development of an HLLV, Jarvis, which should be able to put a 77 000 lb (35 ton) payload into a 220 nautical mile orbit. If a first customer can be found, actual development could start in 1987 and the first Jarvis launch could take place in 1990. Boeing foresees a market of at least six and possibly ten HLLVs per year in this category for SDI, military, NASA and commercial purposes. Launch fees are estimated at more than \$150 million.

97. Rockwell International has proposed an HLLV design with an unmanned reusable glide vehicle which would be capable of placing a maximum payload of 139 000 lb (63 tons) in a 150 nautical mile orbit with a launch rate of twelve to fifteen a year from 1994-95. According to Rockwell, this HLLV could reduce launch costs by more than two-thirds compared with the price of the space shuttle.

98. NASA also wanted to be involved in the HLLV development and is investigating internally at the moment at which stage of the space station build-up or maintenance this vehicle could be used.

99. Many NASA officials are advocating a heavy-lift launcher to meet national space transportation needs during the space station era, but the NASA administrator announced recently that for launch and construction of the space station, no HLLVs will be used, only the shuttle.

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100. In the United States, commercialisation of ELVs and HLLVs is closely tied to winning United States Government contracts. Nevertheless, since President Reagan's decision to remove the shuttle from the commercial satellite launch business in order to boost the United States commercial ELV industry, less progress has been seen than was expected by some officials.

101. The United States Congress will no doubt consider alternatives for United States involvement in the commercial launch industry if satisfactory results of the new policy fail to appear in the first half of 1987.

Soviet Union

102. The Soviet Union announced recently that it has four different vehicles available for commercial launches: Vertical, a sounding rocket which can lift 650 kg to an altitude of 900 km; Cosmos, which can place 1.2 tons in a low earth orbit; Soyuz capable of placing 7 tons in a 350 km orbit and Proton which can launch about 20 tons into a 200 km low earth orbit or 2.2 tons in geostationary orbit. The cost of the last-mentioned launch is estimated at \$40-45 million, representing half the actual price of Ariane 4, for 80% of its payload. It has to be added that this price in no way represents the real costs involved for the Soviet Union which, due to the geographical position of the Soviet launch centre, Baikonur, at latitude 45.6° North, needs much heavier launchers for the same payload than is the case for the United States with the Kennedy space centre at latitude 28.22° North or Arianespace with Kourou at latitude 5.08° North.

103. The Soviet Union is trying very actively to sell its commercial services, especially the orbiting of satellite payloads on its Proton launchers, at extremely competitive prices. Ariane is considered by the Soviets as their main competitor. The Soviets have called on the United States to end restrictions that prevent most western satellites from being launched on

Soviet vehicles. They have said that spacecraft booked for commercial launches can be supervised continuously by the customer prior to launch to ensure that there is no unauthorised technology transfer. Meanwhile the Soviets have also declared that they are ready to co-operate with all countries, which might mean that foreign modules will be allowed to dock with their space station. In a further stage, one could even imagine that foreign scientists and astronauts will be transported by the Soviet Union to their own modules on a commercial basis.

104. The consequences of these developments will certainly have to be assessed with considerable caution. The Soviet Union is offering capable and reliable launchers in the immediate future at prices below the real market value. It will only favour a one-way traffic and under no circumstances allow western launch companies to bid for the launch of Soviet or other eastern bloc satellites according to rules of fair competition, thus making use of free trade principles in other countries without exposing its own economy to these principles. In this way, the Soviet Union is posing a serious threat to the competitiveness of Europe's Ariane and other commercial launchers in the western world. Moreover, it would be impossible for any launch vehicle authority to launch a modern satellite without detailed knowledge of the technical properties of this spacecraft. With this in mind, it will be very hard to believe in any assurance by Soviet authorities that there will be no unauthorised technology transfer.

Japan

105. Japan, which is developing its H-2 launch vehicle, scheduled for first launch in 1992, will not be bidding on the international launch market until 1994, when the H-2 is due for its first commercial launch. The H-2 is expected to be capable of lifting 4 400 lb (1 980 kg) into geostationary transfer orbit. According to an agreement with fishermen's organisations, launches in Japan are limited to two periods of forty-five days each a year which means that even under the most favourable circumstances only four H-2 launches could take place each year, two of which are reserved for Japanese satellites.

China

106. Since last year, China has been actually promoting its launch vehicles on the international market through the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). At the moment, only the Long March 2 and the Long March 3 with a medium cryogenic propulsion system are available. The Long March 2 was first launched in November 1974 and has failed once in a total of nine launches. A more capable version of the Long March 2, the Long March 2/4L, is now

under development and will come into service in the year 1990.

107. The payload capability of these different launch vehicles is as follows:

	LM-2	LM-3	LM-2/4L
Low earth orbit (200 km)	2.5 tonnes	na*	9 tonnes
Geostationary transfer orbit	1.7 tonnes	1.4 tonnes	na*
Geostationary orbit	na*	na*	1.6 - 3 tonnes

108. The development of a Long March 4 booster that could place about 4 500 lb in geosynchronous transfer orbit with a lift-off thrust double that of LM-2 and LM-3 has almost been finished. This vehicle will be used for launching Chinese satellites, probably from the end of 1987 or beginning of 1988.

109. In the first months of 1987 the CGWIC signed its first fixed commercial launch contracts with the American companies Teresat Inc. for launch of the Westar 6 satellite and Pan American Pacific Satellite Corporation for launch of the Pacific Star 1, both to take place in 1988. These companies have mentioned that they paid less than \$30 million for a launch, at least 10% to 15% below current prices in Europe or the United States. It has also been made clear that launch insurance fees at the People's Insurance Company are below international rates. The CGWIC has also indicated that recently some thirty customers from twenty countries have made initial launch reservations. The Chinese authorities have guaranteed their overseas customers that Chinese customs will admit spacecraft hardware without inspection and that owners of the hardware may convey their own satellites to the launch site.

110. To accommodate commercial and scientific spacecraft that normally would have difficulty in finding cost-effective and available launch slots, China is developing a multiple payload arrangement for the LM-2 to carry four spacecraft into orbit.

111. Notwithstanding all these activities, western commercial launch organisations do not consider China to be a real competitor for the near future, but developments should be watched closely. Until now, it has not made more than one or two launches each year, a rhythm which may be increased to three or four launches in the next few years. The Chinese, however have said they will be able very soon to produce and launch ten to twelve vehicles a year.

Europe

112. Europe with Arianespace as its commercial launch contractor is offering the Ariane

* not available.

launcher in several versions. Until now Ariane 2 with a capability of 5 000 kg in low earth orbit and 2 175 kg in geostationary transfer orbit and Ariane 3 which can place 5 800 kg in low earth orbit and twice 1 195 kg in geostationary transfer orbit were both available.

113. Ariane 4, which is scheduled for first launch in 1987 and entry into service in 1988, will be able to place 8 000 kg in low earth orbit and 4 200 kg in geostationary transfer orbit.

114. The Ariane 5, now under development and scheduled to be ready by 1995, will be capable of lifting two 2 500 kg payloads simultaneously into geostationary transfer orbit with an enhanced reliability of 98% in both manned and unmanned vehicle launches.

115. The Ariane programme was seriously delayed after the failure of the V-18 mission on 30th May 1986, when an Ariane 3 vehicle had to be destroyed due to problems with the third stage engine ignition.

116. In 1986, Arianespace concluded eighteen firm launch contracts of which ten were signed after the V-18 failure and five had made earlier reservations on the United States space shuttle. Altogether since its establishment in March 1980 Arianespace has concluded fifty-nine satellite launch contracts with twenty-two different customers for a total of F 16.4 billion. It is expected that some eight to twelve new contracts will be signed in 1987. Production and launch capacity of Arianespace is now fully booked until 1990. Ariane launches at Kourou should start again in June 1987. For this year six launches are scheduled, among which is the first launch of Ariane 4 with a payload consisting of the European meteorological satellite Meteosat 3 and the United States telecommunications satellite Panamsat. Next year, there should be eight launches and nine in 1989.

117. Arianespace hopes to keep half of the western commercial launch market which it estimates at around twenty satellites each year until the end of this century.

Launch prices

118. For commercial launches, Ariane has been the price reference until now. Arianespace however does not have a fixed scale, its price being dependent on the method of payment, required performances, etc. It is not unlikely that prices of all future launchers will be influenced by increasing competition on the market.

119. Under the United States air force's direct cost-pricing policy, commercial users of air force launch facilities save substantially since recoupment of research and development money for facilities, depreciation and overheads are not charged for launches. Military labour, military

leave and retirement, military operations and maintenance and contractor overheads are not charged against launches.

120. It is exactly this launch fare policy which bothers Europeans the most. They reproach the United States that government launch facilities are put at marginal costs at the disposal of United States companies for commercial launches. Shortly, a new agreement will be concluded between the United States air force and commercial launch companies regarding the facility use fees, which will be essential for the setting of launch prices. The United States, in turn, have accused Europe of subsidising launching costs. ESA retorts that in the case of Arianespace, the cost of launches is proportionally shared between governments and commercial customers, including the cost of launch facilities. Already in 1985, Europe asked the United States to start negotiations for defining new rules for commercial launch competition. No official answer has yet been given but the United States is now willing to start negotiations.

A preliminary appreciation of the market

121. Even though the overall situation on the commercial launch market is quite confused, some conclusions may be drawn.

122. In recent years, expectations of the size of the commercial launch market have been greatly exaggerated. Many of the commercial opportunities mentioned in the introduction to this chapter are still more speculative and unlikely to become reality before the beginning of the next century. For the foreseeable future, the government sector will continue to be the primary user of space. A determined and steady government policy must be maintained if commercial space projects of any importance are ever to succeed.

123. Serious world market studies in Europe and the United States have demonstrated that in the near future the market for commercial launches, primarily of communications satellites, is rather limited. A modest backlog due to recent launch failures and the ensuing technical reappraisal of the space shuttle and Ariane, will brighten the market until around 1990. After that, the demand will stabilise on a lower level until the year 2000. Between now and the year 2000 there will be an average demand of 15 to 20 satellite launches each year in the western world.

124. There is a tendency to build satellites in the 2 500 kg class for which only the Ariane 4 and the Titan III have a capability. Most companies want to make sure that there is a second choice of launcher at hand when their first choice is not operational at a given moment.

125. Under these circumstances it is most likely that Ariane 4 and Titan III, both with comparable performance capability, will be the strongest competitors, with Ariane determined to keep its 50% share of the market and fair chances for Titan IV to take one-third. The commercial Delta II will certainly be competitive for smaller payloads, but the limited demand leaves no room for more than three competitors. It should be noted that the prospects for commercial launchers could deteriorate even more when NASA is allowed once more to offer its space shuttles for commercial launches. This could happen if NASA decided to rely more on cheaper HLLVs for building and maintaining the space station, thus making three or four space shuttles partly available for other services.

126. At European and United States Government level, agreement should be reached defining principles according to which the cost of commercial launches should take account of the costs borne by governments, particularly those relating to launching sites. Other nations might be invited to join this agreement.

127. European governments should take all necessary measures to prevent unfair competition from Soviet launchers. They should carefully observe the Cocom list to ensure that no unauthorised technology transfer is possible during a commercial launch of a western satellite by a Soviet launch vehicle.

VI. Developments within Europe at a national level

128. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and, soon, Italy have each established a national space organisation to co-ordinate all activities in this area at national and international level. Some of the smaller European countries have done likewise. It should be emphasised that all countries participating in ESA programmes should establish such a national space organisation lest valuable research and financial resources be lost.

129. Attention is drawn to important national programmes, with equal regard to budgetary implications. Comparison of figures in recent years might lead to the conclusion that larger countries tend to increase their contributions to national programmes more rapidly than to ESA programmes.

130. It should be stressed that squandering European space efforts in national, or even nationalistic, programmes leads to waste of money and intellectual energy. In so doing, Europe will fall back in a race where its competitors do their best to unite forces on the widest possible scale.

France

131. In France, the budget for the national space agency, the Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), has been increased from F 4.74 billion in 1985 to F 5.84 billion in 1986. The policy for CNES is to continue its lead rôle in development and expansion of the Ariane launcher family, play a key rôle in the development of the Hermes manned mini-spaceplane, continue the expansion of the Spot earth resources satellite programme and maintain a dominant position in ESA.

132. In the 1986 budget F 2.2 billion francs were earmarked for France's contribution to ESA programmes (37.99% of the CNES budget), making it the largest category of expenditure.

133. The sum of F 1.23 billion has been allocated to national programmes, a 20.06% increase from last year. Here the development programme for the Spot 4 and 5 improved earth observation satellites as a follow-on to the initial Spot 1, 2 and 3 spacecraft will receive the largest share, F 839.29 million. Spot 4 and 5 are to be launched in 1990 and late 1994, providing continuity for the commercial Spot programme.

134. In the national programme funding, F 191.3 million is allocated to research and development activities. A development plan for 1986-89 is concerned particularly with emerging technologies such as advanced propulsion systems, manned space stations and future in-orbit infrastructure to support activities such as materials production and the use of electronuclear generators.

135. A significant part of the budget, F 674.16 million, is spent on launch and operational utility systems, of which F 461.4 million go to the Kourou launch facility, where Ariane is launched.

136. Another important part of the CNES budget, 12.69%, is allocated to bilateral co-operation.

Italy

137. According to a draft national space plan, Italy should increase national space spending by 16% and shift the emphasis from small satellite programmes to large infrastructure projects such as Columbus and Ariane 5.

138. A five-year plan for government spending on space for the years 1988-92 should increase current expenditure of about \$395 million per year to \$460 million per year, a large part of this increase being meant for Italy's share of Ariane 5 and Columbus.

139. At the moment the major Italian space programmes are Italsat, IRIS, SAX and the tethered satellite. Italsat is a telecommunications

satellite to be launched in 1988; Italian research interim stage (IRIS), of which the first flight is expected in the late 1980s, is a vehicle for moving satellites weighing less than 2 000 lb from the space shuttle's low earth orbit to geostationary orbit; satellite astronomica X (SAX), now under development, will study stellar radiation sources; the tethered satellite, an Italian initiative, now being jointly developed by Aeritalia and Martin Marietta, will be deployed from the space shuttle at the end of a tether up to 100 km long to conduct atmospheric, ionospheric or electrodynamic experiments away from the environment of the shuttle. The first deployment of this satellite is scheduled for 1990. All these programmes are to be continued, but new programmes will emphasise development of a long-term space infrastructure. Italian policy-makers are convinced that investment in long-term programmes such as Columbus and Ariane 5 will provide a better return than spending on smaller projects with quick return.

140. Spending will be equally divided between ESA projects (Columbus and Ariane 5) and national projects, such as research and telecommunications satellites. Gradually, however, the national projects will become more concerned with Columbus, where microgravity studies are considered to be of the greatest interest.

141. The Italian Government is also intending to establish a national space agency, the initial proposal for which was submitted to the Italian Parliament more than a year ago.

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142. The German and British national space programmes are being redefined at the moment.

European military space programmes

143. Although fairly recently reports by Mr. Wilkinson on the military use of space (Documents 976 and 993) have paid attention to various European initiatives in the field of military space programmes and opportunities for further European involvement, it seems appropriate to mention some new developments and to recall old initiatives that are still worth considering.

France

144. In spring 1987, France decided to spend F 15 billion on a ten-year programme to develop the military satellite systems Helios and Syracuse II.

145. The Helios project envisages three or four remote-sensing satellites of which the first should be operational in 1993. Based on the principles

of the civilian Spot satellites, but with enhanced capabilities, the Helios satellites should provide France with an autonomous source of detailed visual information. It has been announced now that Italy and Spain will participate in this programme for 15% and 5% respectively. Syracuse II, a network of satellites of which the first is scheduled for launch in 1991, should in connection with the future Telecom II network provide the French armed forces, including airborne and submarine forces, with an advanced and well protected communications system. This will be a considerable step forward, compared with the existing Syracuse I network which provides communications only with land forces and surface ships of the naval forces.

United Kingdom

146. The British Skynet military satellite communications system was dealt with in Document 976, but since then a third satellite has been ordered for the Skynet IV series in May 1985. According to the Defence Ministry, this Skynet IVC is needed "to meet increased requirements and to improve reliability over an extended period" and will be placed in a geosynchronous orbit on longitude 53° East above the Indian Ocean.

147. In recent months there has been some commotion about a new intelligence-gathering space project called Zircon, a geosynchronous satellite equipped with a large dish aerial to provide information on all types of defence-related radio transmissions over a large part of Europe and the Middle East. There were rumours that the total cost of this project might be around £500 million. According to the Ministry of Defence, which neither confirmed nor denied the programme costs mentioned here, this project is still in a preliminary phase.

European co-operation in military space programmes

148. In Recommendation 410 on the military use of space, adopted on 21st June 1984, several paragraphs were devoted to possible European involvement in military space programmes. In the reply of the Council to this recommendation, communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1984, it was said "the Council has taken note with interest of the Assembly's recommendation and the proposals therein. However, it is not in a position, at this stage, to give precise and detailed replies."

149. More than two years have elapsed since then but the Council does not seem to have been at all active in this important area. Meanwhile, however, there have been a number of international developments with possible far-reaching consequences for Europe's defence policy, for instance, the arms control proposals made in

Reykjavik, a possible agreement to remove intermediate-range nuclear forces from European soil and the ever-increasing United States pressure on Europe to do more for its own defence.

150. In this light, it seems all the more appropriate for the WEU member states to consider the establishment of a European programme for close military space co-operation to enhance their security. As has been mentioned earlier, the primary aims of this programme should be a telecommunications satellite network, a military observation satellite system and a navigational satellite system. It is widely recognised that these systems have a stabilising effect. They will provide European governments with autonomous and independent means of assessing the international situation. Moreover, they will reinforce Europe's identity and demonstrate its determination to accept responsibility for its own defence.

151. As negotiations to establish this programme will take some time whereas international developments in security matters appear to be moving rapidly towards an entirely new situation, it would seem appropriate for the Council to begin to study it seriously in the very near future.

VII. International co-operation on a multi- or bilateral level

152. Elsewhere in this report it has been stressed that the vast and complicated space programmes that are being planned for the next century cannot be tackled without international co-operation to put all available efforts together.

153. In this chapter some programmes of multi- and bilateral co-operation will be mentioned, especially regarding ESA and individual European countries. These programmes demonstrate an irreversible trend towards increasing scientific and technological co-operation at international level. In some or even many cases they may have been inspired partly by political reasons. On the other hand this kind of co-operation is compulsory for programmes to rendezvous with Halley's comet, or the solar-terrestrial science project mentioned hereafter which are of a scale and complexity which surpass the capabilities of one nation, certainly if it wishes to expand activities in more than one aspect of space.

Inter-Agency Consultative Group

154. In 1981, the Inter-Agency Consultative Group (IACG) was established to co-ordinate encounters with Halley's comet. Member agencies of the IACG now are NASA, Japan's

Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), the Soviet Union's Intercosmos and ESA.

155. Solar-terrestrial science has been chosen as the next IACG collaborative effort with twelve separate missions now being planned from 1989 to 1994. The first mission in this framework should be Ulysses, an ESA mission to explore for the first time the third dimension of the solar system by flying high over the poles of the sun. However, the launch date for this spacecraft is far from sure after earlier delays caused by cancellation of a NASA solar-polar spacecraft that should have complemented Ulysses and by the cancelling of all shuttle launches after the Challenger accident. Another mission of the greatest importance for the solar-terrestrial programme will be Cluster, a co-operative ESA/NASA project where four spacecraft will be launched in 1994 to explore the boundary regions of the earth's magnetosphere. The Soviet Union's Intercosmos has offered to supply two Soviet spacecraft to the Cluster programme to increase data-gathering capabilities.

United States-Europe-Canada-Japan

(i) Earth observation system

156. Space officials from NASA, ESA, Canada and Japan have started negotiations on a co-operative programme to design a series of spacecraft, the earth observation system (EOS). This programme envisages three or possibly four spacecraft equipped with advanced sensor systems in a polar orbit which should monitor damage to the earth caused by natural forces and human enterprise and at the same time perform more traditional meteorological and scientific functions.

(ii) International space station

157. Since 1984, NASA, ESA, Canada and Japan have been partners in the development programme for a manned space station which should be operational around 1995. In this report, Chapter VIII is devoted to this co-operative programme, while the ESA contribution will be discussed in Chapter IX on European space programmes.

Soviet Union-Europe

(i) Mars-Phobos project

158. The Soviet Union is preparing a complicated mission to Mars and its moon Phobos. In July 1988, two spacecraft will be launched which, after entering orbit around Mars, will be directed for a close and slow fly-by of Phobos during which small landers will be released. The main spacecraft will continue operating in Martian orbit to conduct further observations of the moon, Mars and the sun.

159. A number of European countries and ESA have agreed to participate in this programme, contributing a wide range of high technological scientific instruments to execute experiments covering a wide range from remote laser mass-spectrometric analysis of soil to a long-term automated lander.

(ii) Kvant astrophysics module

160. As has been mentioned in paragraph 63 of this report, West Germany, the Netherlands, Great-Britain and ESA have contributed several X-ray experiments to the Kvant astrophysics module, which was docked to the Soviet Mir space station on 11th April 1987. European scientists have said that this co-operative programme will allow them to obtain a large return quickly at a relatively low cost. The indications are that the next ESA X-ray satellite will not be in orbit until the 1990s.

161. The Soviet Union will have access to all basic information from the European experiments, but it has only generally agreed to share data from its experiments with European scientists, without guarantee of access to its basic data. The Soviet Union has failed to respond to western requests for detailed mission plans.

Soviet Union-France

162. French-Soviet bilateral co-operation in space has already been practised for the last twenty years. Several interesting programmes are now in progress, among which should be mentioned Alissa, a mission which for the first time will make use of a lidar, a laser radar, that will be placed on the Mir space station in 1991-92 to study the global distribution and variation of aerosols in the troposphere and stratosphere in order to determine their influence on the climate.

163. Another Soviet/French mission is Vesta, scheduled for 1992-94 and designed for the exploration of Mars and to provide data on at least five different asteroids/comets during a five-year flight. ESA has been asked by France's CNES to participate technically and financially in the construction of two small spacecraft intended for this mission which should encounter at least two comets and six asteroids.

164. In October 1988, a French astronaut will be launched on board a Soyuz TM-2 together with two Soviet colleagues to spend a month in the Mir space station. The programme on board Mir will include technological and biomedical experiments, while it has also an important rôle to play in the preparations for Hermes, the European mini-spaceplane.

Soviet Union-United Kingdom

165. In March 1987, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union signed a space science co-operation agreement, which among other things aims at integrating British scientists into Soviet science teams in preparation for the 1988 mission to Mars and its moon Phobos. A co-operative X-ray astronomy spacecraft mission is under consideration, as well as co-operation in ultra-violet astronomy, life sciences and space processing in zero-gravity.

Soviet Union-United States

166. In November 1986, following the agreement in Reykjavik between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to initiate full-scale co-operative civil space programme negotiations, United States and Soviet negotiators agreed on a new space pact between both countries which was signed by the ministers for foreign affairs of both countries in April 1987.

167. Agreement was reached on sixteen project areas, including significant Mars mission co-operation for joint selection of potential landing sites for future landings as well as co-ordination of missions such as the Soviet Mars-Phobos and the United States Mars observer flights. Both countries will co-operate in the selection of lunar landing sites and in programmes regarding life sciences, astronomy, astrophysics, earth sciences and solar-terrestrial research.

168. The new agreement will renew co-operation, originally established in the 1972 agreement which the United States allowed to lapse in 1982 as a sign of its disapproval of the use of Soviet troops to support martial law in Poland.

VIII. International co-operation in the United States space station

169. In January 1984, President Reagan directed NASA to begin development of a permanently-manned space station. In its initial phase, the station should provide work space, docking ports and living quarters for a crew of six to eight. The space station should be used for:

- commercial and government scientific research and technology development;
- commercial manufacturing of critical materials and pharmaceuticals not available on earth;
- assembly, service and repair of satellites and other large structures in space;
- research focused on extending the time man can stay in space as a first step towards an even more ambitious manned space programme.

170. At the same time, the President invited friends and allies of the United States to participate in the space station programme. This invitation has been accepted by Canada, ESA and Japan. ESA has proposed the Columbus programme, including a pressurised module and two platforms. Japan also proposed a pressurised module, while Canada is contributing the mobile service centre.

171. Recently, the United States space station programme has been under severe criticism after revelations of new cost estimates, according to which, in 1984 dollars, the programme will cost \$14.5 billion (or \$21 billion in 1987 dollars) instead of the originally planned \$8 billion.

172. In January 1987, the Congressional budget office even proposed cancelling the programme because of a lack of compelling arguments in favour of the programme. It said that the station does not adequately support the traditional United States space policy objectives, will fulfil no significant Defence Department purpose and is far behind the Soviet Union's station time-schedule. The office furthermore has expressed its doubts about NASA's ability to conclude agreements with its three abovementioned partners on the division of facilities and operating costs in such a way as to serve United States interests adequately. As an alternative to cancellation, the Congressional budget office has proposed a reduced programme, intermittently using manned and unmanned facilities.

173. According to an agreement on a two-phase programme, reached in March 1987 with the United States administration, NASA is allowed to proceed with a phase-one scaled-back space station at a cost of \$12.2 billion in 1984 dollars. This agreement provides only temporary approval to allow station contracting, final approval by the President having been postponed until the autumn of this year. The administration will review station costs again before hardware contracts are awarded this autumn.

174. A phase-one space station is meant to comprise the four pressurised modules of the United States, Japan and ESA.

175. According to the latest station plan, the first element should be launched in mid-1994, while permanently manned capability should be achieved in the beginning of 1996.

176. A new series of meetings with European partners was scheduled for the second week of May 1987.

177. The four partners in the space station programme are meanwhile continuing their negotiations on an intergovernmental agreement concerning the control and use of space station facilities. The most recent meeting of delegations from the United States, Canada, ESA and Japan

was held in Washington on 12th February 1987, where all partners reaffirmed their intention to co-operate, but also remained far from agreement in several key areas.

178. At this last meeting, a new draft intergovernmental agreement approved by the United States Department of Defence and other agencies was discussed with the other partners. While in earlier discussions the United States Delegation had expressed the view that all station elements must be open to all partners, the new draft agreement granted this right to only the United States and Canada. ESA and Japan would be allocated 50% use of their own respective hardware contributions and no use of United States or Canadian hardware unless special arrangements were made.

179. Control of the station modules is another important and very contentious issue. NASA has proposed a multilateral management board for the station to plan and co-ordinate operations.

180. If no consensus can be reached, NASA as chairman of the board would make the decision. The partners do not object to the idea of a management board and agree that NASA should have ultimate authority in emergencies, but they want to retain final authority for control of their own elements. ESA has insisted on retaining control of its Columbus pressurised module and the two European platforms.

181. Another contentious issue was the confessed interest of the United States Department of Defence to use the station for national security purposes. Recently, however, the Department of Defence, NASA and the State Department agreed to remove all mention of possible use of the station for national security purposes from the draft intergovernmental agreement and only refer to it in an attached paper called the "Agreed Minutes".

182. In a new draft intergovernmental agreement, which the United States sent to its partners at the end of April 1987, mention of several other difficult issues was deleted with the intention of deferring them to memoranda of understanding to be negotiated later. Among these are the multilateral management board, the mechanism for deciding disputes among the co-operating agencies and details about station operations.

183. Although negotiations on an agreement may be difficult, at this particular time co-operation with the United States in the space station programme should be regarded as essential. This is the only practical way to promote a balanced partnership. Moreover the Columbus programme is the only direct way for ESA to obtain extensive experience of the complicated techniques required for manned operations in space.

184. During its recent visit to the United States, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was informed by Pentagon officials of their surprise and even distress over European inconsistency in co-operation programmes. On the one hand, the European partners and allies are very reluctant to sign any co-operation agreement regarding the United States international space station because it might be used for national security purposes, but on the other hand, it was said, many European countries have agreed to participate individually or within the framework of ESA in the Soviet Kvant astrophysics module or Mars-Phobos mission, while it is widely known that the results of all experiments in Soviet space missions may be used for military applications. Europeans agreed to participate in the Kvant module even when there was no clear agreement on sharing data from experiments and no knowledge of detailed mission plans. According to the same Pentagon officials, results from European experiments in the Mars-Phobos mission may also have security implications yet to be assessed.

185. Concluding this chapter it should be noted that the most malicious comments on the United States offer of international participation in the space station have been that this programme could be a way of diverting European and Japanese money to the station which otherwise could have been used to develop competitive threats to the United States. In the European space business a feeling certainly prevails that the United States likes to co-operate as long as it is convenient and does not pose a threat to United States programmes, yet another reason to seek European autonomy.

IX. European programmes up to 2000

186. It is quite clear that the entire European space programme reflects a strong quest for autonomy in space. In these circumstances, one may wonder whether it is really necessary to spend so much money on becoming independent and autonomous in space operations, now that Europe can also rely on all kinds of space infrastructure available elsewhere.

187. When trying to answer this question it should be recalled that in recent years Europe has experienced, and to a certain extent still is experiencing, the consequences of fragmented co-operation. It may be sufficient to mention the negotiations for participating in the space station and the many delays in the Ulysses programme. Ulysses is a European solar-polar spacecraft, which was to be launched in an ESA-NASA co-operative programme. Earlier delays were caused by autonomous changes in NASA planning for the upper stage to be used for deployment from the space shuttle and by United States cancellation of NASA's own solar observation spacecraft which should have been

sent to the sun with Ulysses in a co-ordinated mission. Ulysses had to be stored two years for these reasons and was scheduled for launch in May 1986 on the Challenger. NASA and ESA recently announced their decision to launch Ulysses in October 1990 with the American space shuttle.

188. The United States, the only partner of real importance for Europe in space programmes, will not easily relinquish its ability to proceed alone. One can well imagine that its unswerving concern for defence, technological leadership and the maintenance of future commercial interests are reasons enough to cherish and protect its leadership in space. Europe will achieve a position of equality in the negotiations only if it manages to reduce the United States' lead in space capabilities. Evolution towards co-operation based on mutual dependence will be achieved only through a change in relationship and not through political and legal negotiations.

189. Europe is certainly in a rather ambiguous position. On the one hand it is virtually obliged to have access to the economic and technological benefits of industrial and economic space activities and so to develop and maintain a space capability sufficient to meet requirements in all areas and to take its own decisions. On the other hand, the growing dimensions of space systems force everybody concerned to pool their available forces.

190. Even if the final goal is global co-operation between space nations based on interdependence, Europe should do everything possible to retain its competitive ability in the commercial market, reduce the capability gap with the United States and impose itself as a fully-fledged partner, not as a group of assistant countries from which the stronger member expects only support and cheers.

191. A fully-developed space transportation system is clearly the key to gaining independence. A space system is credible only if a corresponding transport system is available. The Ariane 5 launch vehicle and Hermes mini-spaceplane will meet these needs.

192. On 1st January 1987, Norway and Austria joined ESA, which now has thirteen member countries. By approving the long-term plan for the years 1985-95 at their meeting in Rome in January 1985, the European ministers confirmed the member countries' intention gradually to increase the ESA budget. Hereafter are the main figures for the years 1986 and 1987 in millions of units of account:

	1986	1987
Ariane/Hermes	305	362
Telecommunications	180	288
Spacelab/Columbus	139	195
Earth observation	165	180
Scientific and general	251	347
Total budget	1 040	1 372

193. In view of a new updated programme, to be decided upon at a ministerial meeting in November 1987, a much more detailed and considerably higher cost estimate has been made for the long-term plan covering the years 1987-2000. This estimate takes into account operational costs of the launchers and other infrastructure mentioned in paragraphs 201 to 211 of this chapter and even costs having regard to the

autonomous space station and reusable launcher with advanced air-breathing engines which will be developed to ensure European independence in space in the beginning of the next century.

194. In terms of 1985 prices and millions of accounting units a comparison of costs of both long-term plans reads as follows:

Breakdown of estimates in the new ESA 1987-2000 long term plan
(in millions of Ecus - 1985 rates)

Programmes	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Total
General budget (GB)	110.2	114.3	121.1	132.9	144.1	155.7	161.9	164.1	164.3	164.5	164.5	164.5	164.5	164.5	2 091.1
Programmes associated with GB	56.6	52.6	54.8	55.4	60.4	64.3	64.2	65.2	65.5	66.7	67.7	68.7	69.7	70.7	882.5
Science	163.0	171.0	179.0	190.0	199.0	209.0	220.0	224.0	224.0	224.0	224.0	224.0	224.0	224.0	2 899.0
Technology	6.2	9.7	11.7	17.8	23.9	27.3	30.4	32.4	32.4	32.4	32.4	32.4	32.4	32.4	353.6
Earth observation	173.6	185.3	219.2	196.8	222.8	234.0	229.0	229.0	237.0	244.0	249.0	244.0	254.0	260.0	3 177.7
Microgravity	20.3	52.0	77.0	96.0	116.0	129.0	131.0	131.0	135.0	137.0	135.0	135.0	135.0	135.0	1 564.3
Telecommunications	293.0	273.0	229.0	251.0	260.0	274.0	263.0	261.0	242.0	230.0	230.0	215.0	210.0	255.0	3 486.0
Space station	175.4	243.5	307.2	340.4	431.8	480.4	485.0	495.0	582.0	527.0	452.0	552.0	552.0	552.0	6 176.7
Space transportation	396.9	487.3	599.0	719.0	770.0	812.0	811.0	779.0	641.0	652.0	683.0	609.0	600.0	600.0	9 159.2
Plan 1987-2000															
Total	1 396.1	1 588.7	1 798.0	1 999.3	2 228.0	2 385.7	2 395.5	2 380.7	2 323.2	2 277.6	2 237.6	2 244.6	2 241.6	2 293.6	29 790.1
Plan 1985-1995															
Total	1 363	1 576	1 783	1 783	1 873	1 873	1 791	1 787	1 671	-	-	-	-	-	-

195. France has stressed already that more money may be needed in the coming years, so that it would be unrealistic to limit ESA's annual budget. Such a limit would also be contrary to the ESA convention establishing the principle of optional programmes. Indeed, more expenditure may be expected over the years to come, especially regarding the Columbus programmes where much still depends on the outcome of negotiations with the other partners in the space station.

196. As it is impossible to review the whole European space programme in detail, only the most important subjects are mentioned in this chapter.

A. The space science programme

197. To achieve a quantum jump of scientific significance and to offer the European Community a front-line research capability, ESA has started work on a long-term space science programme.

198. At present, more than 2 000 scientists in Europe are making use of the results of space investigations. Europe should not fail to give this group reasonably frequent flight opportunities to develop its line of research lest scientists prefer to work on other topics.

199. The same is true for industry, where highly skilled teams ensure technological development. Scientific space programmes constitute a "tech-

nological pull" - another reason to provide enough programmes to keep this advanced industry in the lead. To provide continuity of effort to scientific institutes and industry in Europe, a total of some twelve to fifteen missions is required over the next fifteen years.

200. The ESA space science programme should be feasible within a twenty-year period with a time schedule extending to 2004. A budget of about 200 million units of account a year is envisaged.

201. The programme is based on four cornerstones, i.e.:

- (i) The solar-terrestrial programme, to investigate solar, heliospheric and space plasma physics. It envisages among others the operation of an observatory in space and the launch of a multi-spacecraft space plasma physics mission;
- (ii) Planetary exploration, envisaging a mission to primordial bodies such as asteroids and comets to return material from these bodies. Thus an asteroidal sample could be compared with meteoric material for elemental and isotopic composition enabling the material to be classified. A cometary sample might contain not only unaltered pristine solar system material, but possibly also interstellar

and stellar material, giving essential insight into the physics and chemistry of the star formation region;

- (iii) X-ray spectroscopy. This programme aims at placing an observatory into orbit with multiple telescopes, providing the required sensitivity to perform detailed spectral diagnostics of many classes of objects with low surface brightness. It will allow the evolution of the large- and small-scale structures of the universe to be studied. Simultaneous observation of several characteristics of astronomical objects will be possible, thus achieving a much better understanding of ongoing physical processes;
- (iv) Heterodyne spectroscopy. A heterodyne spectroscopy mission is envisaged to explore the sub-micrometer domain which is the last remaining gap in the electromagnetic spectrum. This range contains not only the continuum radiation from dust, but also a large number of very important atomic and molecular transitions which provide a direct probe for studying the physics and chemistry of the cool universe in the range of 3-1 000 km.

Apart from these cornerstones in the scientific programme, there are a number of conventional medium-sized projects, each costing about 200 million units of account, which will also be realised before 2004, such as Giotto, Ulysses and Hipparcos.

B. Launchers and other infrastructure

202. ESA is developing a programme in order to have at its disposal a complete infrastructure for all kinds of space missions by the year 2000. This programme is integrated in a package deal to be presented for approval by the member states at a ministerial meeting in November 1987 and covers authorisation for development of several parts of a full infrastructure, a condition for autonomy in space. Its elements are:

(a) Ariane 5

203. This is a further development of the Ariane launcher series to launch unmanned payloads similar to those orbited by the United States shuttle and the Hermes mini-spaceplane. The Ariane 5 will have a payload capacity of 15 tons (33 000 lb) in a 400 km circular orbit and of 5-8 tons (11 000 – 17 600 lb) in a geostationary transfer orbit, depending on the version used. The central core's propulsion system is a Vulcan HM-60 cryogenic engine with liquid hydrogen/

liquid oxygen propellant. The Ariane 5 is scheduled to become operational in the mid-1990s. Costs of this project are estimated at 3.35 billion units of account (at 1985 prices).

(b) Hermes

204. This is a manned mini-spaceplane to provide the transfer of crew and supplies to and from the space station, as well as to perform a range of in-orbit servicing tasks with satellites, platforms and other systems. Hermes, equipped with an ejectable crew cabin, should be able to carry a crew of three persons and a payload of 6 600 lb (3 000 kg) in a pressurised cargo compartment. This spaceplane should be operational around 1995. Costs are estimated at 3.11 billion units of account (at 1985 prices).

205. In October 1986, France decided to contribute 45% of the \$35 million preparatory development programme for Hermes, while the Federal Republic of Germany will contribute 30%. Later, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland committed themselves to participation; Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are expected to do the same.

206. The preparatory programme should define Hermes' use and mission rôles and should enable ESA to prepare for a decision in 1987 on full-scale development.

207. Aérospatiale and Dassault-Bréguet have been selected as the industrial prime contractors, other contractors being MBB, Dornier, Aeritalia, Fokker and Matra.

(c) Columbus

208. This a programme for a manned space module and three other spacecraft functioning as part of or in co-operation with the United States space station. Costs of this programme are estimated at 4.85 billion units of account (at 1985 prices).

209. Following President Reagan's invitation to participate in the United States space station programme, Europe, relying on its experience with Spacelab, proposed Columbus. At the moment, ESA has proposed the following elements to NASA for further evaluation:

- (i) A pressurised module for permanent attachment to the NASA space station. This manned module should primarily be used for materials and fluid physics research and as a laboratory for life sciences. Launching by the space shuttle is envisaged;
- (ii) A man-tended free-flyer. This free-flying pressurised module would not be manned permanently, but could be visited by a crew for routine maintenance.

nance, resupply of consumables, repairs and experiment exchange or set-up. It should be used for material sciences, fluid physics and life sciences. The design is planned for launch by the Ariane 5;

- (iii) A polar platform. This unmanned spacecraft should operate in a sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of about 800 km and be launched by Ariane 5. Its main function should be earth observation but it might also be used for astronomical observation and for any discipline that can make use of the pressureless microgravity environment. It complements the space station's capability and human intervention could take place via the space shuttle or Hermes;
- (iv) An enhanced Eureka spacecraft dedicated to a wide range of missions, in particular microgravity and space sciences. This platform is envisaged as flying alongside the space station. Unlike the other elements of the Columbus programme that are scheduled to be operational by 1995, the enhanced Eureka should be deployed in 1991 to allow experiments and tests of operational concepts to be conducted before the space station is available. The existing Eureka will be used for space station technology support and help Europeans to master techniques such as rendezvous docking and fluid transfer in orbit. With possible European autonomy in mind, the compatibility of Eureka with Ariane and Hermes is being studied.

210. Of these four modules, only the pressurised module (i), the man-tended free-flyer (ii) and the polar platform (iii) have been agreed to by NASA at the moment.

(d) *DRS (data-relay satellite)*

211. This satellite is for autonomous permanent communications with and between shuttles, space stations and platforms. DRS 1 and 2 will be launched from 1994-95 and DRS 3 at the end of 1995. The cost of this project is estimated at 0.88 billion units of account (at 1985 prices).

(e) *Future European launcher*

212. In the long-term plan for the years 1987-2000, a budget has been allocated for a study programme to develop a future European launcher (FEL), known as FESTIP (Future European Space Transportation Infrastructure Pro-

gramme). According to ESA, the FEL should be considered as a means for delivering frequently and easily payloads between 5 and 10 tons into low orbit. This is different from Ariane 5's task, which is to deliver heavier payloads of up to 20 tons into the same orbit at a lower frequency. FESTIP will preferably study one- or two-stage fully reusable launchers with an air-breathing propulsion system and horizontal take-off and landing. All these characteristics can be found in the Hotol and Sanger projects now being carried out on a national level. Hotol is a British development project, funded on a 50/50 basis by industry and government with a hybrid air-breathing and rocket propulsion system which uses atmospheric air as the oxidant up to Mach 5 at 85 000 ft (\pm 25 000 m) and then switches to rocket propulsion. The German national aerospace research establishment DFVLR is studying Sanger, a reusable two-stage horizontal launcher consisting of a winged booster on which a shuttle orbiter-type vehicle is mounted. The booster would be separated at Mach 6 for its return to the launch site, while the orbiter would continue into a 400 km circular orbit. Both rocket and ramjet propulsion versions are under study. On the other hand, FESTIP will also include more traditional launchers, fully or partly recoverable and making use of advanced rocket propulsion systems. ESA estimates that a decision for the FEL could be taken between 1992 and 1995, followed by operational availability around 2005 and 2010.

*
* *

213. Notwithstanding these tremendous efforts, Europe should realise that it is not sufficient to spend vast sums of money on space infrastructure only. As soon as the infrastructure is ready, money should also be available to support users of the space station and other dependent spacecraft since it seems likely that the private sector will be most reluctant to become involved in the substantial long-term investments that will be required for taking part in space station research projects.

C. Earth observation, space telecommunications and microgravity

(a) *Earth observation*

214. This is centred on the ERS-1 project and follow-on missions. The first ERS-1 launch is scheduled for December 1989-February 1990. The ERS-1 is a microwave remote-sensing satellite, expected to become the forerunner of a series of European remote-sensing satellites that could become operational in the 1990s. This satellite is being developed by a multinational consortium headed by Dornier Systems (Federal Republic of Germany) and will be used to

provide data on oceans, coastal regions and polar ice areas to help in weather forecasting, assist shipping and fishing and improve understanding of ocean-related phenomena. A second ERS could provide users with five to six years of continuous data before an operational multisatellite global monitoring system is established. The Meteosat weather satellite programme is another aspect of earth observation satellites. Two pre-operational spacecraft were launched in 1977 and 1981. Three operational Meteosats could be launched as from 1987.

(b) Space telecommunications

215. This will be a continuation of present programmes centred on the development and in-orbit testing of advanced payload systems.

216. In 1986 the second largest portion of the ESA budget (180 million units of account, or 17.3% of the total budget) was spent on telecommunications programmes. The main element is the payload and spacecraft experimentation programme (PSEP), expected to run from 1986 through 1995 with overall funding at 765 million units of account. Its main objectives are to improve the competitiveness of European industry in the communication markets of the 1990s and to counter advances elsewhere in the world. It should demonstrate new services to enlarge the scope of satellite applications and introduce and experiment with new techniques for designing satellite systems that are more competitive with expanding ground communications networks and identify with advanced techniques.

(c) Microgravity

217. This aspect is centred on an enhanced utilisation programme for Spacelab and Eureka leading to the use of Columbus and the international space station for microgravity research and development.

X. Conclusions

218. By the end of this century, Europe must be fully autonomous in space in order to be a serious partner in future international space programmes and to keep pace with developments in advanced technology in other parts of the world.

219. International co-operation in space programmes will be indispensable to accomplish the technologically and financially demanding space operations that are ahead in the coming years.

220. To be able to accomplish European autonomy, the ESA budget will have to be

increased at least up to a total of 30 billion units of account and probably more between the years 1987 and 2000 which will mean doubling the budget in the next decade.

221. Establishment of an official link between ESA and national space policy authorities should be considered to keep all European space research authorities informed on current and planned programmes with a view to preventing unnecessary waste of human and financial resources.

222. Until now, the European Ariane has been operating very successfully on the commercial launch market. With more competitors from other countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, entering a market which will most likely not expand in the foreseeable future, Ariane will have to go to great lengths to keep its 50% market share. As space industry is one of the essential high technology industries, European governments should watch carefully Ariane's development and do everything possible to facilitate its operations. They cannot afford to lag behind when governments of other countries are doing their best to promote their own commercial launch vehicles.

223. In this framework, an agreement between the United States and European governments containing rules for commercial launch activities should be reached as soon as possible.

224. In the years to come, ESA participation in the United States international space station will be essential for rapid progress in the development of European space capability. All available European ingenuity should be used to reach an intergovernmental agreement concerning the control and use of space station facilities as soon as possible.

225. If ESA and its individual member states are trying to conduct a balanced and unbiased international space co-operation policy, they should assess carefully the possible security implications of their co-operation in Soviet programmes.

226. Bearing in mind recent international developments, and recalling the committee's report by Mr. Wilkinson on the military use of space (Document 976), it seems appropriate for WEU to examine the establishment of a European programme for military space co-operation, including satellite systems for telecommunication, earth observation and navigation. Such a programme could provide Europe with autonomous means of assessing the international situation, reinforcing its identity, and demonstrating its determination to accept responsibility for its own defence.

The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance
Part II: Political activities of the Council

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur

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on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Activities of the Council
- III. Organisation of European security
- IV. Conclusions

1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Close (Acting Chairman); Mr. Martino (Vice-Chairman); MM. Ahrens, Baumel, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Hardy (Alternate: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg), Mrs. Herfkens (Alternate: Stoffelen), MM. Hill, Koehl, Lord Mackie (Alternate: Murphy), MM. Masciadri, Mechttersheimer, Mermaz (Alternate: Bassinet), du Monceau de Bergendal (Alternate: De Bondt), Reddemann (Alternate: Lenzer), Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden (Alternate: Aarts), Spitella (Alternate: Amadei), Vecchietti, van der Werff, N...

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance –
Part II: Political activities of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Protesting against the fact that the thirty-second annual report of the Council reached it only on 27th April 1987;
- (ii) Noting that at the ministerial meeting on 28th April no action was taken on the proposal to draw up a European security charter;
- (iii) Noting and regretting that no effective decision has yet been taken on the Assembly's budgetary requests and that the words used by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council need clarification;
- (iv) Noting that the Council has taken no practical action on its intentions to reorganise the WEU services;
- (v) Noting and regretting that the Council has given no answer to the countries which have applied for membership of WEU and Portugal in particular;
- (vi) Noting that the absence of effective and adequate information given to the public on the Council's activities leaves considerable doubt about its intention to set up a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Convene as swiftly as practicable a conference of heads of state and of government of the signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty and of countries effectively determined to take part in a European security organisation in the context of the Atlantic Alliance in order to define jointly security requirements for the next ten years and the rôle to be attributed to WEU to this end;
2. Respond favourably to Portugal's application before the end of the year.

Draft Order

***on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance –
Part II: Political activities of the Council***

The Assembly,

Anxious to play a useful part in preparing a conference of European heads of state and of government on security,

INSTRUCTS ITS GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE to organise as early as possible, and not later than spring 1988, a colloquy which would be open to the public and bring together a number of prominent Europeans not at present exercising governmental duties to draw up specific proposals:

- (a) for defining the matters that the conference of heads of state and of government on security should include in its agenda;
- (b) for directing the reactivation of WEU.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The thirty-second annual report of the Council reached the Office of the Clerk on 24th April 1987, thus, for the second year running, preventing the drafting of a reply by the General Affairs Committee in time for examination at its meeting on 29th April. According to Rule 41, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly: "All reports on the agenda of a part-session shall be adopted by committees at least three weeks before the opening of the relevant part-session. A report not adopted in time shall be withdrawn from the agenda." The date limit for adopting the present report is therefore Monday, 11th May.

2. At its meeting on 29th April, the committee therefore considered that it was not possible, in view of the time required for reflection, drafting and distribution, to submit a reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council at the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session. As in 1986, it is therefore obliged to wait until the second part-session in order to submit a serious, detailed study.

3. Your Rapporteur again has to emphasise how harmful such delays, for which the Council bears sole responsibility, are for an effective dialogue with the Assembly. The latter will probably not be able to give its views on the Council's activities in 1986 before the end of 1987, when this will no longer have much significance in view of the decisions that the Council is to take in 1987 which will probably make the remarks about 1986 pointless.

4. As the General Affairs Committee has always said, informal meetings at which no minutes are taken such as those held between the Presidential Committee or the Committee for Relations with the Council, on the one hand, and members of the Council, on the other, generally allow useful and friendly remarks to be made, but they do not really commit the Council. Thus, the words of three successive chairmen-in-office of the Council, Mr. Genscher, Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Poos about matters relating to the Assembly's budget have so far led to no effective results but have helped to raise false hopes in the Assembly. The same is true of certain political information provided at such meetings, admittedly subject to the necessary reservations – for instance concerning the creation of a European security council – and which the Council has never confirmed. It should be recalled, moreover, that, contrary to the claim in paragraph 5 of the reply to Recommendation 438, the presidency does not meet the Assembly but

only committees at the close of ministerial meetings.

5. The extraordinary session in Luxembourg on 28th April 1987 was the first experience of a meeting concerning the Assembly as a whole on such an occasion and this innovation is to be welcomed. As it is hardly possible to hold extraordinary sessions each year, consideration might be given, in conjunction with the Council, to arranging for ordinary spring sessions to coincide with ministerial meetings. This would mean both sides making a considerable effort to reach agreement on dates very early in the year. In any event, the annual report of the Council is and must remain the basis for all exchanges between the Council and the Assembly in accordance with Article IX of the treaty and the policy pursued by the Council in delaying its publication and reducing the substance of its replies to recommendations and written questions is part of an overall attitude whose results are already being felt: the Assembly is increasingly unable to exercise any supervision whatsoever of the Council's activities.

6. The thirty-second annual report certainly makes no revelations about the Council's activities in 1986. The various meetings between WEU bodies and representatives of the Council held in 1986 and at the beginning of 1987 and the half-yearly report relating to the first part of 1986 already gave some indication, albeit not very specific. Conversely, it is interesting to note that, in referring to WEU's statutory activities, the annual report reveals that the latter are no longer of great importance and now have very little place in the Council's work. The Council did not in fact carry out the arms control for which it is still responsible. What did it do in the joint production of armaments? Apparently nothing. Consideration will also have to be given to how it covers the meetings of political directors from the ministries for foreign affairs since this information throws little light on a question that the Assembly cannot fail to raise: are such meetings, like those of senior officials from ministries of defence, really WEU activities, as the Council claims? If they are, the Council is bound to report on them to the Assembly. In paragraph 4 of its reply to Recommendation 438, it says that it will "continue to keep the Assembly informed about its activities". If it did not do so, would it be possible to speak of the reactivation of WEU? Would it even be possible to speak of respecting the treaty? Your Rapporteur can but reserve his conclusions until he and the committee have been able to analyse the annual report more thoroughly.

7. In the present report, your Rapporteur will therefore have to confine himself to commenting on certain recent activities of the Council of which he has learned by various official or unofficial means, and, in accordance with the request made by the Presidential Committee on 30th March 1987, he will give his views on the proposal to call for a European summit meeting on security.

II. Activities of the Council

8. Certain government representatives have told your Rapporteur how disappointed they were with what they considered to be the excessive severity with which the first part of the present report described the Council's activities. Here, your Rapporteur can say that most committee members criticised the first part of this report not for excessive severity but for being too compliant towards the Council's practices. This was again so when the General Affairs Committee considered this second part of the report on 29th April. This means that there is now a deep-rooted misunderstanding, not to say real incomprehension, between the two WEU bodies. This would probably not be very serious if the misunderstanding were limited to our organisation, but press reports and various reactions by the public recorded by your Rapporteur indicate that Europeans as a whole have not much faith in the reactivation of WEU.

9. Proof of this general scepticism is to be found in the remarks made by Mr. Delors, President of the Commission of the European Community, on Europe I radio station on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Rome Treaty on 15th March 1987. Quoting two paragraphs of the Rome Treaty, Mr. Delors said he considered the treaty gave the Community defence responsibilities. He added that the Community leaders not only could but should handle security matters and that there was no point in hiding behind WEU and repeating that it was the only organisation with defence responsibilities. He called on the Community to consider the prospects for nuclear disarmament and the cost of the conventional armaments that would be necessary if such disarmament became effective and to adopt a European position on Mr. Gorbachev's proposals on the subject. It therefore appears that such an authorised observer as the President of the European Commission himself does not take the reactivation of WEU very seriously and considers it to be a subterfuge designed to conceal the absence of government will to handle security matters. In these circumstances, how could these governments hope that the public will adopt a positive attitude towards a reactivation which, insofar as it exists, remains so discreet, not to say clandestine?

10. It can admittedly be seen that our countries' governments are starting what the Assembly has always asked, i.e. they are holding meetings of senior officials to consider matters relating to Europe's security, associating ministers of defence with WEU's activities, setting up groups to study essential matters to provide grist for their work. But the Assembly, the press and the public know nothing of these meetings and studies and no one is in a position to assess the results. Paragraphs 5, 6 and 15 of the reply to Recommendation 438 claim that the media receive appropriate information about the Council's various activities. This is precisely a point on which your Rapporteur finds some difficulty in following the Council's assessment. He in no way wishes to contradict its statements, but he has to note that parliamentarians from all member countries are complaining about the ignorance in which the public is kept by the media about WEU's activities although, in recent months, considerable progress has been recorded. This lack of information is probably due to the nature of WEU and the intergovernmental character of all its activities, which means the Council is subject to the principle of unanimous agreement before communicating anything whatsoever about what is done in its name. But if the governments are not careful, the reactivation of WEU will very soon lose all credibility and sink into indifference and oblivion. It should be recalled that the main reason for reactivation in 1984 was to ensure that public opinion played a larger part in efforts for Europe's security. The Council's information policy does little in this sense. *Inter alia*, it should be recalled that on 28th April Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, answering a question by our colleague, Mr. Wilkinson, undertook to communicate to the Assembly an interim report by the Council on matters relating to space defence, but he was unable to say when.

11. Your Rapporteur wishes to recall here some of the questions that members of the Assembly have to put because the Council does not provide them with the information they are entitled to receive in accordance with the treaty and undertakings entered into by the Council in recent years.

(a) Does the Council still consider itself bound by paragraph 2 of its own reply to Recommendation 319 in which it said in 1978 that:

“ In this context, the duty which belongs to the Council alone of informing the Assembly on all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty forms a major aspect of their political activities.

The Council therefore intend to meet the Assembly's request for fuller information on consultations between member countries on matters relating to the application

of the modified Brussels Treaty. They aim to expand and develop the information supplied in their replies to recommendations and questions, which cover a wide range of matters relating to European policy, in the annual report, which, as the Assembly was able to note, is now becoming fuller and more complete, and in speeches made by the Chairman-in-Office and ministers at plenary sessions of the Assembly and informal joint meetings."

Replies it has given in recent years to recommendations or to written questions put by members of the Assembly, particularly on the IEPG, indicate that this is not so. This is confirmed by the replies to Recommendations 437 and 438 (paragraph 12).

(b) Does the Council still consider itself bound by the protocols to the 1954 Paris Agreements? The annual report for 1986 shows that it does. But in that case how does it intend to apply them in the new structures it is in the process of setting up?

(c) Does the Council still consider itself bound by its own decision of 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee? If so, why did that committee not meet in 1986 or so far in 1987?

In this connection, the reply to Recommendation 438 (paragraph 11) is in contradiction with the reply to Written Question 271 to which it refers since that reply specified that: "The SAC will meet in the not too distant future", whereas the Council now seems to have made this meeting subject to the results of a hypothetical reflection to which it referred in its reply to Written Question 271 but which has not yet taken place.

(d) Does the Council consider that effective action might be taken on its document on WEU and public awareness? What kind of action?

(e) Does the Council still consider itself bound by Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty authorising member countries to "invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited"? If so, can it explain why it has still not acted upon the interest shown by Spain and Portugal in taking part in the activities of WEU? Can it explain why it would be necessary to wait for the outcome of "reactivation" which has already been under way for three years before inviting these countries to take part in the reactivation? Does it not think this shillyshallying might put these two countries off taking part in reflection on Europe's security that the WEU countries moreover declare to be desirable?

Already in May 1985, the Assembly for its part voted quite clearly in Recommendation 420

for the admission of Portugal which had applied for membership in October 1984. It has now decided to invite a delegation of Portuguese parliamentary observers equivalent to the one to which Portugal would be entitled if it were a member of WEU so as to demonstrate publicly the firmness of its decision. It is still waiting for the Council to reach a decision.

The Financial Times of 6th April 1987 published an interview with Mr. Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece, in which he said that his country too had applied to join WEU, specifying that this was not a formal application but a wish conveyed through diplomatic channels. It is clear that Mr. Papandreou's action in making this wish public made it an effective candidature. Yet your Rapporteur feels that Greece's candidature raises a number of problems which cannot be solved in the near future:

- (i) Greece's relations with NATO and the United States are at present at a difficult stage and it does not seem very desirable for WEU to appear as an alternative solution to NATO if current negotiations between Greece and the United States are not successful in the fairly near future.
- (ii) Relations between Greece and Turkey have recently been fairly tense. In March 1987, a clash was feared between the two countries over matters relating to the exploitation of the Aegean seabed. In these conditions, it seems difficult for the WEU member countries to agree to the accession of Greece or Turkey to the modified Brussels Treaty whose Article V provides for the intervention of all signatory countries on behalf of any of them which may be the subject of an armed attack in Europe. Whatever those concerned may feel about the interests defended by Greece and Turkey – and it is well known that they are not unanimous – these are matters over which an organisation responsible for Europe's security, and already having difficulty in taking action, cannot take the risk of becoming seriously divided or even involved in armed conflict.

However, the Turkish observers at the meeting on 29th April 1987 said they considered the simultaneous accession of Greece and Turkey might help to reduce tension between the two countries, which obviously meets the Assembly's wishes. They thought, not without reason, that the two countries' membership of NATO had already allowed the worst to be

avoided and that their accession to WEU might improve their relations.

- (iii) The policy pursued by Greece in the Middle East differs considerably from that of most WEU member countries in that area. It was a major factor in weakening the joint positions adopted by the Twelve towards terrorism in 1986. It seems hardly desirable for WEU to expose itself to such difficulties.

Because of its dilatory attitude towards the applications of Spain and Portugal, the Council has had to deal at one and the same time with the cases of these two countries, whose accession to WEU might enhance its reactivation, and the case of Greece, to which has already been added that of Turkey which, not being a member of the European Community, raises a particular question of principle. On 13th April 1987, the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs announced that its government was asking to join WEU because of the importance Turkey attached to the defence of Europe in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and its interest in the unification of Europe. At the same time, Turkey applied for membership of the EEC. The absence of a decision by the Council on the applications of Portugal and Spain singularly complicated the problem raised by the possible enlargement of WEU.

12. The doctrine according to which membership of the Economic Community and of WEU are a priori linked perhaps does not correspond with present European facts. There is no doubt that it is strongly felt that European security must be reconsidered and, in spite of Mr. Chirac's proposals in December 1986, the Seven still seem incapable of responding to this feeling. They showed this again on 28th April 1987.

13. Yet the shape of the reactivation of WEU will depend on the Council's answer to these questions. If the Council intends to reactivate an existing institution on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty by developing exchanges of views between governments on security-related matters after having reduced its arms control functions to almost naught, it is clear that it must consider itself bound by the treaty and by its subsequent decisions and commitments. If, on the contrary, it intends to establish a new form of intergovernmental co-operation in security matters without the backing of commitments as specific as those contained in the modified Brussels Treaty, it must make its intentions known and explain its views, particularly in regard to the rôle of the Assembly, enlargement and co-operation in armaments matters.

14. So far, the Council has never raised the question of revising the treaty and, moreover, it

is difficult to see which articles of the treaty proper could be revised since the deletion of the lists annexed to Protocol No. III restored the balance of member countries' commitments. However, certain observers have considered such a revision, including the Federalist Inter-group for European Union of the European Parliament at its meeting in Strasbourg on 10th April 1987 at which it instructed a working group to report on European defence and tackle this matter. It has yet to be determined what kind of revision would at present be possible and desirable. Should Protocol No. III be completely deleted, together with the complementary Protocol No. IV? Should Protocol No. II be revised, since only its Article VII still corresponds to the present requirements of European security? Your Rapporteur is tempted to think so because he considers the non-application of certain provisions of a contract might give rise to doubt about the signatories' intention to apply the other provisions of the contract. In this connection, the main point is still that Article V, which is the principal foundation of European security, must retain its full scope, particularly its deterrent value. The fact that anyone, like Mr. Delors, can wonder about the will of the governments to take action in the framework of WEU casts doubt on their intention to apply Article V.

III. Organisation of European security

15. At its meeting on 30th March, the Presidential Committee was informed by the President of the Assembly of a letter written by a member of the Belgian Delegation, Mr. De Decker, Chairman of the Liberal Group of the Assembly, to Mr. Martens, Prime Minister of Belgium, which read as follows:

"In view of the proposals by Mr. Gorbachev on disarmament, Mr. Delors, President of the Commission of the European Communities, launched the idea of a twelve-power summit meeting to work out a joint European answer.

This proposal was welcomed by President François Mitterrand, and you yourself said the juridical limits to the responsibilities laid down in the Rome Treaty could not in themselves constitute a limit to political will if this were common.

As you know, only Western European Union, based on the Brussels Treaty, has responsibility for handling security matters at European level.

Following the discussion aroused by the problem of the deployment of Euro-missiles, France and Belgium initiated an effort to revitalise the organisation, which

had been working in low gear for a number of years.

WEU has the great advantage of being composed of states which are all members of both the Atlantic Alliance and the EEC.

Moreover, these states form the hard core of Europe and all have relatively similar views about European security problems. In particular, they have all shown their agreement with Article V of the Brussels Treaty which provides for total military solidarity as an expression of a will for collective and reciprocal legitimate defence.

The revitalisation of WEU has been progressing steadily since 1984 and, in the last two years, the ministers of defence and foreign affairs of the seven states have met together on five occasions.

However, I feel that the heads of state and government of our states do not yet perceive very clearly the political importance of WEU although it alone can advance harmonisation of Western European security policy and, in so doing, accelerate the process of European political integration.

This is the spirit in which, in addressing the Chairman-in-Office of the European Communities, I wish, in all modesty, to make the suggestion that you propose to the Prime Minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, whose Minister for Foreign Affairs is at present Chairman-in-Office of WEU, to send jointly to your five other colleagues heads of state or government of WEU member countries an invitation to a special meeting, which might be held in Brussels, to consider Mr. Gorbachev's proposals and endeavour to lay the foundations of a joint policy on defence, security and disarmament matters for our continent.

Thank you for the attention with which I hope you will consider my proposal, which is intended to advance the building of Europe and the cause of peace."

16. The Presidential Committee decided to refer this letter to the General Affairs Committee for consideration, with the request to report on it at the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly. The matter raised by Mr. De Decker appeared to be within your Rapporteur's mandate. He has not yet been informed of the Belgian Prime Minister's answer. However, the newspaper *Le Monde* dated 7th April 1987 gave the following information about Mr. Tindemans's position:

"Contrary to the wish of Mr. Jacques Delors, President of the Brussels Com-

mission, Mr. Tindemans, Chairman-in-Office of the Twelve, said that NATO and Western European Union (WEU) were the appropriate forums for studying matters relating to European security, not the Council of the Community."

17. It therefore seems clear that, where the responsibilities of WEU are concerned, the Belgian Government's opinion is no different from that of Mr. De Decker. The first part of the present report quoted statements by Chancellor Kohl (paragraph 50), confirmed by Mr. Genscher, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 27th March 1987, and by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France (paragraph 57), expressing similar positions. Finally, Sir Geoffrey Howe, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in a speech on European security to the Royal Institute of International Relations in Brussels on 16th March 1987, stressed the need for a "European defence identity" and referred to the reactivation of WEU. He said:

"A better European defence effort, galvanised perhaps through WEU, can lead to a more substantial European pillar of the alliance. It can help the United States to justify to sceptics the maintenance of its own contribution to European defence."

Finally, Sir Geoffrey added:

"If we want our particular European concerns to be clearly perceived and taken into account in negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, then we must argue them out clearly among ourselves and come wherever possible to a common view. That is what we have been attempting, increasingly, to do within WEU... The NATO Alliance itself must remain the decision-making forum for defence matters."

18. Whereas the positions adopted by Mr. Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, quoted in paragraph 51 of Part I of this report, make WEU only one of the appropriate instruments for building the European pillar of the alliance, Italy and Luxembourg, who held the chairmanship-in-office of the WEU Council successively in 1985-86 and 1986-87, left not the slightest doubt that they shared the point of view expressed by Mr. Tindemans on the responsibilities of WEU. Mr. De Decker's proposals should therefore not run into any opposition based on such a consideration.

19. However, it is evident that the governments of member countries will not wish to take steps towards a formal demonstration aimed at

“laying the foundations of a joint policy on defence, security and disarmament matters for our continent” if they are afraid the United States will consider this to be a reason for reducing its military presence in Europe. In this connection, in the absence of an official statement by the American authorities, your Rapporteur has been able to record two testimonies made at almost the same time and yet very different. On the one hand, Mr. Owen, Leader of the British Social Democrat Party, speaking to Social Democrats in Brussels on 22nd March 1987, recalled that in April 1985 the United States administration had informed members of WEU “in blunt and direct terms that the United States saw no need to revitalise Western European Union and that any larger European rôle in defence should take place within NATO”. Your Rapporteur must emphasise that the Assembly was never informed of this step and that in December 1986 the Council refused to confirm another American approach, dating back to February 1985, asking that matters relating to disarmament not be studied in WEU, although the General Affairs Committee was informed of this by the State Department after learning about the matter in press reports.

20. Moreover, on 31st March Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France, told Mr. Reagan of efforts to strengthen the coherence of Europe's defence policy, particularly in the framework of Western European Union. On 1st April, he made the following statements on Europe I radio station:

“*Question.*— Does President Reagan accept the idea of European defence?”

Mr. Chirac.— The words European defence are perhaps a little ambitious and premature. But what is sure is that Europe's security, while depending largely on the existence of nuclear deterrence, on the link and on the soundness of the link, also depends on the defence effort of the European nations and on the coherence of that effort, i.e. a better concerted effort on the part of the European nations. This is what led me, when addressing the parliamentary Assembly of WEU on 2nd December 1986, to propose a European defence charter, which has already been approved by several countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany. Today, I was very happy to hear the President of the United States express a very positive opinion on this initiative. I say happy because, for a long time, the United States had rather mixed feelings about WEU initiatives. President Reagan told me quite clearly that he was in favour of the initiative I had taken.

Question.— With an American guarantee, can Europeans go forward in creating their own defence?

Mr. Chirac.— Europeans are seeking neither the guarantee nor the blessing of anyone, not even of an ally and friend; Europeans are adult and capable of having their own policy. It is nevertheless interesting to see that the United States approves of this step for, after all, it might have been a little suspicious about this initiative which concerns only Europeans, moreover members of the Atlantic Alliance; but the President approved of it.”

21. Finally, while it was possible until recently to wonder whether the reactivation of WEU would not lead to a pointless revival of East-West tension, the invitation to a delegation from the WEU Assembly to hold talks in Moscow on East-West relations and disarmament with representatives of the Supreme Soviet and the way the Soviet authorities received this delegation from 6th to 11th April 1987 are likely to calm fears in this connection although, at the very moment the visit was taking place, the Soviet press apparently resumed its earlier attacks on the reactivation of WEU and at the same time on any other attempt to organise Europe's participation in the defence of our continent. It should be recalled that, reactivated or not, WEU involves no military deployment and no one has proposed creating WEU forces or commands. It is evident that in the aftermath of Reykjavik the Soviet Union had the impression that certain European countries had brought pressure to bear in the alliance to put over their views on security matters. France in particular was blamed for its particularly negative attitude towards Mr. Gorbachev's proposals.

22. However, this should not prevent Europeans from speaking together on matters which concern them and, just as the United States seems to have been convinced in 1986 that exchanges of views between Europeans in WEU would in the long run enhance the cohesion of the alliance, the Soviet Union for its part should understand that these exchanges do not necessarily run counter to its disarmament proposals if it agrees to disarmament being effectively verified and if it does not set itself the aim of weakening the security of Western Europe. Remarks made by Soviet leaders to members of the Bureau of the Assembly in Moscow from 7th to 10th April 1987 show that they were not insensitive to the reactions of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance.

23. All these considerations indicate that Mr. De Decker's proposal should encounter no major obstacle. Moreover, there is no doubt that it is

being made at a very suitable moment, because the need for a solemn proclamation of the principles on which European security is based is making itself felt very keenly, particularly because the negotiations on the limitation of armaments are arousing strong hopes in Europe that there will be a significant reduction in the level of armaments of all kinds on European territory and certain fears about the possible weakening of Europe's security because of these negotiations. The visit by the Bureau of the Assembly to Moscow, like the Assembly's recent difficult debates on disarmament, confirm the reality and urgency of the problem. Proof is also to be found in the statement by the Action Committee for Europe of 24th March 1987 whose members, with the exception of the Irish, underlined the need to establish a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to allow our nations to remain masters of their destiny.

24. The proposal to hold a summit meeting on security matters meets several kinds of requirement since it would appear to be a logical follow-up to the proposal made by Mr. Chirac on 2nd December 1986 on drawing up a European security charter. It might formalise the adoption of this charter which is particularly necessary if European public opinion is to be convinced that Europe must assume responsibility for its own security since, as your Rapporteur has underlined, the WEU Council has done nothing to advance in this direction.

25. It should be mentioned on the one hand that Mr. De Decker's initiative is being taken at a time when many voices are being raised throughout Europe calling for a summit meeting to consider matters of European security. Conversely, like Mr. Delors, some favour holding such a summit meeting in the framework of the Twelve, although others endorse Mr. De Decker's wish that it be held in the framework of WEU or speak of a meeting of heads of state and of government of all the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. Now does not seem to be the time for juridical wrangling and the decision to hold a summit meeting merely requires the agreement of those who will take part in it. To risk failure in making the shape of the Europe to be represented correspond to one or other specific view of the future of the European institutions would probably not be wise. It is political will that should bring together the participating countries and Mr. Chirac's proposal now seems the best basis for defining this political will, particularly if the terms proposed by the Assembly in Document 1089 are followed.

26. However, your Rapporteur wishes to add to Mr. De Decker's proposal another, i.e. to invite, as well as the heads of state or of government of the seven WEU member countries, those of the countries which have applied

for membership of WEU which unreservedly express their endorsement of the principle of organising European participation in the Atlantic Alliance and the modified Brussels Treaty and whose admission to WEU the Council considers would not encounter major obstacles. Speaking of the possible enlargement of WEU, Sir Geoffrey Howe said in his Brussels speech that he considered "the test of membership must be readiness to accept and implement in full the commitments of the treaty". This might be applied to a summit meeting which, as Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman-in-Office of the European Council, said in a press conference on 19th March cannot be held on a twelve-power basis because Ireland considered it impossible to discuss military questions. Your Rapporteur's proposal to hold this summit meeting in the framework of WEU, but a WEU dedicated to enlargement, in accordance with a method practised by the European Community on several occasions since 1970, seems to meet the concerns of those who, like Sir Geoffrey Howe, consider WEU must retain the benefits it derives from the fact that "the present membership is homogeneous" as well as of those who think the WEU framework is a little narrow for crystallising European thinking on security matters, as Mr. Mitterrand, President of the French Republic, told the President of the Assembly when he received him on 2nd April 1987, and others who, like Mr. Tindemans, conclude that responsibilities should not be mixed. The General Affairs Committee, in particular, expressed the wish that Portugal be invited to take part.

27. On the other hand, the agenda proposed by Mr. De Decker corresponds very well to the aims assigned by the Seven in the Rome declaration to a reactivated WEU, since it does not include truly military questions as such, left to NATO or the military commands, but does include Mr. Gorbachev's proposals on disarmament and "the foundations of a joint policy on defence, security and disarmament matters". This might be completed by following Sir Geoffrey Howe's suggestion on making "real headway in the standardisation of equipment, the elimination of waste and the rationalisation of infrastructure and support services".

28. Your Rapporteur therefore asks the Assembly to give its full support to Mr. De Decker's proposal and recommend that the Council implement it.

IV. Conclusions

29. Thus it would appear that the reactivation of WEU, in spite of the growth in the number of intergovernmental meetings held in the framework of the Seven, is still not in focus and that many questions that the governments

intended to solve before the end of 1987 are still unsolved, whether it be a matter of the future of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the SAC and the three new agencies, the possible enlargement of WEU or the very nature of the various seven-power meetings. The inadmissible delay in transmitting the annual report of the Council to the Assembly is probably caused by this lack of focus and indecision, also demonstrated in the vagueness of replies to recommendations and written questions or even in their contradictions. This also helps to prevent the public being kept seriously informed about what is actually happening in the Council and explains the general scepticism, expressed by Mr. Delors on 15th March, about the reality of reactivation, which is shared even by those who stress the need for it.

30. Henceforth the public must be kept informed of the governments' true intentions. Mr. Chirac's proposal on 2nd December 1986 was intended to allow them to be expressed. Mr. De Decker's proposal should lead to their adoption being made official by countries which will take part in a meeting of heads of state and of government.

31. If the Assembly wishes to play an effective part in this twofold undertaking, it too should take steps to convince public opinion of the need now felt to give accurate, official expression to the requirements of European security. This seems to have been the aim of the Presidential Committee when it referred to the General Affairs Committee the proposal made to it on organising a public colloquy, bringing together

eminent persons who have demonstrated in the recent past their competence, authority and personal commitment to the cause of Europe. Several names have been mentioned. Your Rapporteur feels he should not reveal them until they have given their agreement.

32. The colloquy would therefore be of a new type, different from those already organised by the other Assembly committees. The list of persons to be invited should not exceed twenty. All WEU member countries should be represented, as should any countries which have applied for membership and which have the Assembly's backing. A European capital will certainly wish to host such a colloquy, which might be held in autumn 1987 and, in one day, allow each participant to say what should be the content of a European security charter. A simple agenda will set out the chapters, ensuring that institutional matters are raised but not given priority over the questions facing a European security organisation: development of new defence systems, disarmament, cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, security in the Mediterranean, joint production of armaments.

33. This is the purpose of the draft order in the present report. The General Affairs Committee agreed on 29th April to meet as soon as this draft order has been adopted by the Assembly to fix the place, date and duration of the colloquy and the topics to be discussed, to draw up a list of those to be invited and countries to be represented and to decide what measures should be taken to inform the media and public opinion of the aim of the colloquy.

*Letter from Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, President of the Assembly,
on the mandates of the agencies*

London, 24th March 1987

The purpose of my letter of 17th March 1986 (see Document 1061, Appendix III) was to inform you about the staff and activities of the agencies for security questions. During the second half of 1986, the Council reconsidered the agencies' mandates and instructed me to give you the following details:

- *Agency I* will focus its work on two main areas:
 - the first relates to the proposals concerning verification put forward in the context of current arms control negotiations;
 - the second relates to Soviet tactics towards Western European countries concerning arms control and disarmament issues.

The Permanent Council has also requested that the agency follow changes in the Soviet positions on disarmament and arms control.

- *Agency II* has been tasked to continue its reflections on resource management – by analysing national defence budgets – and on the non-military aspects of the threat, as well as to examine how public opinion in the member countries of WEU perceives the strategic balance.

With particular regard to resource management, the agency is studying methods of achieving genuine comparability of criteria between the western countries, and the rational management of defence budgets. The analysis of these budgets is under way.

- *Agency III* has been tasked to study defence technology from specific viewpoints such as the impact of SDI and the influence of various factors on transfers of technology involving the Seven.

Furthermore, Agency III will draw up inventories of the various policies on co-operative equipment programmes and defence technology.

A process of reflection is also under way on the rôle and future tasks of the Standing Armaments Committee.

The mandates given to the agencies may be revised once the governments have reached an agreement on their final structure.

Action by the Presidential Committee

REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee by
Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur*

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I. Introduction

1. During the first half of this year, the Presidential Committee carried out two specific tasks, i.e. the organisation of an extraordinary session and budgetary negotiations with the Council, which had been assigned to it by the President of the Assembly and the Assembly respectively. Furthermore, in the framework of its terms of reference, it took the action it considered necessary, such as taking up the invitation from the Supreme Soviet to visit Moscow for talks with leading Soviet authorities.

2. By organising an extraordinary session of the Assembly in Luxembourg and arranging a visit by the Bureau to Moscow, the Presidential Committee endeavoured to solve specific political problems and, through its budgetary reorganisation, it sought to provide the Assembly with means of working commensurate with its task.

***II. Political activities
of the Presidential Committee
between sessions***

3. At its session in December 1986, the Presidential Committee was set the task of organising an extraordinary session in Luxembourg. This mandate originated in a decision by the President of the Assembly to convene the Assembly again before the June ordinary session to allow it to give its views, before the meeting of the Council of Ministers, on disarmament matters that had been referred back to committee, on the reactivation of WEU and on the promotion of the European security charter proposed by the Prime Minister of France at the last session. This extraordinary session was to be held in the

capital of the country having the chairmanship-in-office of the Council, i.e. Luxembourg, on a date as close as possible to that of the ministerial meeting.

4. Because of the reductions made by the Council in the budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1987, very strict economy measures were adopted to keep expenditure relating to this session to a minimum.

5. However, an entirely new event arose before the extraordinary session could be held. This was the invitation from the Supreme Soviet to a delegation from the Presidential Committee to visit the Soviet Union in order to discuss, inter alia, East-West relations, disarmament and peace.

6. The Presidential Committee first noted that this invitation departed from the traditional line of the Soviet Union which strongly criticises WEU and is against establishing relations with a European forum in which the conditions for security and maintaining peace in Europe are examined with a view to better harmonisation. After a vote, it was decided by a very large majority to accept the principle of this invitation.

7. The Presidential Committee then considered that only the Bureau would constitute an appropriate delegation, with the addition of one other member to ensure that all the political groups were represented.

8. As the Presidential Committee wished the Assembly to be fully informed at its extraordinary session, the conditions in which this visit took place were described in a memorandum by the President of the Assembly. Your Rapporteur will not therefore dwell on the way the Bureau was received during its visit or on the interest of

its talks. He will merely recall that the Bureau had no intention of embarking upon negotiations for which it was not responsible or adopting positions of a technical nature. Its aim, in accordance with the position always upheld by the Assembly, was to assert Western Europe's right to define and express its own interests in security matters. This message seems to have been heard since the speech by Mr. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, in Prague on 9th April, i.e. the day before the Bureau returned to Paris, responded to remarks during the Moscow talks on the too limited nature of the zero option for medium-range missiles, which could be evaded by developing shorter-range missiles.

9. Still in order to allow the Assembly to remain faithful to its vocation of ensuring that Europe has a say in matters which concern it, the Presidential Committee wished the Assembly at its extraordinary session to examine a motion for a recommendation under urgent procedure to ask the Council to give its collegiate view on Mr. Gorbachev's proposals and to ask the Chairman-in-Office to present the Council's views on this matter at the meetings to be held by the North Atlantic Council on 11th and 12th June.

10. The adoption of this recommendation by the Assembly marks its support for the Council in its reactivation work which must be completed.

11. For the Assembly to carry out its task, which is to stimulate rather than supervise, it must have the wherewithal to conduct a dialogue with the Council. The Presidential Committee therefore attached great importance to the success of the budgetary negotiations it had been instructed to conduct with the Council.

III. Budgetary activities of the Presidential Committee

12. In the budgetary negotiations last autumn, the Council asked the Assembly to make a number of reductions in the budget it had submitted in accordance with traditional procedure.

13. However, the Council specified that it was continuing to study in detail the problem of the place of pensions in the budget of the organisation and would study in detail the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk as soon as possible.

14. The position adopted by the Council did not therefore seem final. There was a possibility of improvement. At the second part of its thirty-second ordinary session, the Assembly therefore addressed an order to the Presidential Com-

mittee instructing it to negotiate with the Council to obtain a favourable opinion on a supplementary budget taking into consideration the requirements of the Assembly as set out in the memorandum on the structure of the Office of the Clerk and the initial draft budget for 1987 which applied most of the provisions of that memorandum.

15. The President of the Assembly met the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Poos, in Luxembourg on 10th March. During these very cordial talks, the Deputy Prime Minister of Luxembourg repeated the proposals he had made to the Assembly last December, i.e. to separate the pensions budget from the operational budget of the WEU organs, to apply for WEU a growth rate identical to the one applied in the European Communities and, finally, to recognise the Assembly's budgetary independence, it being understood that it would be entitled to manage its budget freely within the limits of agreed appropriations.

16. It should be recalled that a separate budget for pensions and the Assembly's budgetary independence had been called for in many recommendations.

17. The President of the Assembly therefore expressed his agreement with these proposals and trusted that they might be applied as from the current financial year in order to allow him to meet the wish expressed by the Assembly in Order 65.

18. The application of the three principles defined by Mr. Poos allowed the Assembly to play its part in the reactivation process, to recruit staff considered essential for the efficient pursuit of the Assembly's work and to regrade certain posts to improve the structure of the Office of the Clerk.

19. The Presidential Committee met the Chairman-in-Office of the Council in Paris on 31st March. It unanimously endorsed the three principles defined by Mr. Poos relating to the budget of WEU and its Assembly. At the extraordinary session, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was therefore able, in agreement with the Presidential Committee, to adopt unanimously a draft recommendation asking the Council to implement without delay the three principles of an identical growth rate for WEU and the Communities, a separate pensions budget and the Assembly's budgetary independence.

20. This draft recommendation was adopted, also unanimously, by the Assembly and transmitted immediately to the Council which was meeting at the same time.

21. A few hours later, Mr. Poos, reporting to the Assembly on the results of the Council's

work, said the Council had just agreed to improve the situation of the Assembly "by accepting a separate budget from the ordinary budget to meet the growing financial implications of pensions". It had also agreed "to independent budgetary management, within the limits of agreed appropriations".

22. Finally, the Council was to examine in greater detail the method of calculating inflation rates applicable to the ordinary budget.

23. The Presidential Committee is gratified that the Council, thanks to the efforts of the presidency, has recognised the validity of the Assembly's requests, and thus allowed it to carry out the mandate set out in Order 65.

24. The Assembly's steering body is now endeavouring to implement Order 67, also adopted unanimously by the Assembly at its extraordinary session in Luxembourg. In this text, the Assembly invites the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration "to take the necessary steps to implement, during the present financial year, the provisions decided upon for improving the structure of the Office of the Clerk".

25. The Presidential Committee in no way intends to depart from its habitual policy of budgetary rigour, but in implementing these provisions it is endeavouring to adapt the Assembly to the new situation so that it may improve its contribution to the reactivation of WEU.

*Written Questions 273 and 274 and reply of the Council
to Written Question 273*

QUESTION 273

*put by Mr. Close
on 26th November 1986*

In the discussions between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik, consideration was given to eliminating intermediate-range missiles (cruise and Pershing II missiles on one side, SS-20s on the other), with the exception of a hundred SS-20s based in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and a hundred missiles of an equivalent type *based in the United States*.

This preagreement said nothing about the SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s deployed by the Soviet Union in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

Can the Council answer the following questions:

1. Since the SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s remain in place and the hundred SS-20s deployed in Asia are mobile and can be brought back to Europe at very short notice, what is left of deterrence at European level and the coupling between the United States and Europe so widely evoked to justify undeniably the deployment of Euromissiles in five European countries?

2. Even if these agreements take no tangible form in view of the impossibility of agreeing on the question of the strategic defence initiative, it can be seen that the Soviet Union is conducting a vast psychological offensive to bring European and American points of view into conflict, which is their major strategic goal.

What is Europe's answer to this point in NATO and above all in Western European Union?

3. Why did the Council not define a joint European position taking account of the requirements of a strategy based on nuclear deterrence and the security of Europe before the Reykjavik talks started?

4. In what I consider to be the unlikely event of a five- and ten-year timetable leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, can it reasonably be expected that the United States space system would be set up and operational in such a short lapse of time? If not, does the Council not consider that Europe would be in the position of a hostage in view of the considerable Soviet superiority in conventional forces and chemical weapons?

5. In view of the lessons to be learned from the "truncated summit meeting", does the Council not consider that the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance in WEU should be effected urgently in a spirit of political and military co-operation which is lacking at present? What steps does it intend to take to bring about this strengthening?

6. Is it not therefore essential to conduct a vast information campaign among public opinion and to make it aware of the conditions necessary for guaranteeing Europe's security and warding off the risks of a third world war? Is the Council prepared to grant the Assembly the means necessary for taking part in this information campaign? Is it determined to take part in the campaign itself and by what means?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 21st May 1987*

1. Deterrence and the coupling of the United States and Europe are assured through the alliance and the commitment of the United States to Europe. Accordingly, the communiqué of the ministerial meeting of WEU, held on 28th April 1987 in Luxembourg, recalled the indivisible nature of security in the North Atlantic Treaty area, and re-emphasised the essential commitment of the United States and Canada to the defence of Europe. The presence of United States nuclear forces and the presence of United States troops in Europe remain indispensable for the security of the whole alliance.

At this same meeting, ministers examined with interest the growing possibility of an agreement aimed at the total elimination of American and Soviet longer-range intermediate land-based nuclear missiles, which should be effectively verifiable. They fully support the United States efforts for its conclusion.

Ministers recalled their serious concern at the existing Soviet superiority in shorter-range intermediate nuclear missiles and the requirement not to neglect this in any INF agreement. In this context, they noted that the Soviet Union had, in response to earlier proposals tabled by the United States, recently made statements on these missiles, the content of which should be carefully studied as soon as they are clarified in writing. They underlined the

importance of ongoing consultations within the alliance.

2. WEU member states welcomed on different occasions the fact that Mr. Gorbachev has dropped the artificial linkage between an INF agreement and SDI.

3. WEU ministers also stated that their overriding objective remains to strengthen peace in freedom and to prevent any kind of war or intimidation by military means. They reaffirmed that there is, for the foreseeable future, no alternative to the western concept for the prevention of war, which must continue to be based on an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces which together provide a credible deterrent against all forms of aggression.

4. In the same Luxembourg communiqué, ministers underlined the great importance which they attach to progress also being made in the field of strategic weapons and reiterated their support for United States proposals for a 50% reduction of Soviet and American strategic offensive forces as a matter of priority. As for negotiations on space and defence systems, every effort must be made in Geneva to arrive at agreement on the relationship between United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons and defensive systems with the aim of strengthening strategic stability.

Ministers reiterated that reductions in nuclear weapons would increase the importance of removing the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact and eliminating chemical weapons, given the need for a stable balance at all times.

Ministers stressed their determination to intensify their efforts to strengthen stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. They recalled the Brussels declaration of 11th December 1986. They expressed their hope that the informal discussions taking place in Vienna in a constructive atmosphere would, within a reasonable time, lead to an agreement allowing the opening of new negotiations on conventional arms control in Europe aimed at eliminating existing disparities.

They recalled at the same time their determination to strive for the continuation of the conference on confidence and security-building measures in Europe.

Only a stable East-West balance of forces at each stage of the arms control process can ensure security in Western Europe.

Ministers also underlined their commitment to the conclusion of a comprehensive

and effectively verifiable, global ban on chemical weapons.

5. The reactivation of WEU, decided at the ministerial meeting in Rome in October 1984, has been actively pursued and is now a reality. The practice of holding regular meetings of political directors will significantly strengthen the process of consultation within WEU, as will the participation of representatives of defence ministries. In Luxembourg, in April 1987, ministers took note of an interim report on European security interests in the present strategic context which had been drawn up by a special working group, consisting of representatives of both foreign affairs and defence ministries. This report was prepared in accordance with the mandate set out at the informal ministerial meeting of the WEU Council in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986.

6. The Council shares the view of the honourable member that public awareness on defence issues is important. The Council and the Assembly both have an important rôle to play in this respect, making best use of the resources available to the organisation.

QUESTION 274

*put by Mr. Fourré
on 8th April 1987*

At the end of 1986, the group of wise men which the IEPG asked to give an opinion on the competitiveness of the European industrial network in the armaments sector published its report. Inter alia, it concluded that it was necessary to make a permanent administrative structure available to the IEPG ministers of defence.

Considering that:

1. paragraphs 4 and 10 of the 1955 decisions setting up a Standing Armaments Committee make it possible to associate any member country of the Atlantic Alliance with the work of and agreements and arrangements drawn up in that body. The economic and juridical study of the armaments sector of WEU member countries' industry benefited at the start from co-operation between the IEPG and the SAC, as did the study on the armaments industry in Japan by the former international secretariat, thus showing the possibility of conducting such studies in this framework where NATO observers can follow the operation directly;
2. such co-operation might give Spain, which now has the chairmanship-in-

office of the IEPG, an opportunity of co-operation leading towards accession to WEU;

3. it would be for the Council to make the necessary arrangements for the participation of interested non-WEU member countries in such activities;
4. the Assembly, through the intermediary of its liaison subcommittee on the joint production of armaments, would thereby have a means of making a direct contribution to a debate to which the growing need to develop conventional weapons and the breakthrough of

emerging technology should give a new dimension,

would the Council be prepared to propose that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance save setting up a new European administrative structure by making the SAC, which has a secretariat in Agency III, responsible for co-ordinating and conducting studies which would be useful for the work of the IEPG?

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No reply has yet been received from the Council.

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 438 to 441;
extraordinary session Recommendations 442 to 445*

RECOMMENDATION 438 ¹

*on the political activities of the Council –
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Emphasising that the explanatory memorandum to the present report is an essential factor that cannot be separated from the recommendation;
- (ii) Noting that the Council's replies to Recommendations 432, 433 and 435 reached the Assembly in time to allow a true dialogue with the Council;
- (iii) Welcoming the intention expressed by the Council henceforth to report on its activities twice a year;
- (iv) Noting that the thirty-first annual report of the Council reports on the definition of a European position towards the United States strategic defence initiative;
- (v) Regretting however that the report makes no mention of decisions on other important matters;
- (vi) Considering that the harmonisation of European positions on disarmament and the limitation of armaments has assumed new importance since the Reykjavik meeting;
- (vii) Recalling that, if Europe is to speak with one voice, it is essential for all member countries of WEU to take part on an equal footing in defining a European position on disarmament and the limitation of armaments;
- (viii) Recalling the importance of official procedure in regard to the Council's own activities and also exchanges between the Council and the Assembly;
- (ix) Still unaware of the action the Council has taken on its document on WEU and public awareness;
- (x) Noting that the Council has not yet followed up its promise to communicate to the Assembly, insofar as the needs of secrecy allow, the reports the new agencies submit to it;
- (xi) Considering that the Council gives no information about the rôle it assigns to the Standing Armaments Committee or the activities of that body;
- (xii) Noting that the Council makes no mention of any action taken on studies by the SAC, its international secretariat or the three agencies set up in 1985;
- (xiii) Noting that the Council recognises that the WEU agencies as well as other bodies " must also take account of terrorism when analysing the different threats facing Europe " but that the Council itself has not followed up this recognition;
- (xiv) Emphasising that these failings are making the press, public opinion and the WEU countries' partners in the Atlantic Alliance express ever stronger doubts about the governments' will to follow up the Rome declaration;
- (xv) Recalling that any lapse by WEU in areas for which it is responsible will jeopardise the present and future of Western Europe as a whole and that no institution is able to take over the place the modified Brussels Treaty reserves for WEU;
- (xvi) Considering that the principle of zero growth as interpreted and practised is progressively preventing the Assembly from taking part in the reactivation of WEU,

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1986 during the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session (11th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1078).

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Confirm its intention to apply in full the decisions in the Rome declaration;
2. Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to submit, at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held in Brussels on 11th December 1986, the joint views of the Council on the implications of the Reykjavik meeting;
3. Say whether the composition of the Permanent Council allows it to apply these decisions and indicate what steps it intends to take to this end;
4. Make official all the information it transmits to the Assembly, even if such information has previously been given in informal communications to some of its organs;
5. Inform the Assembly about the purpose and methods of ministers of defence attending its meetings at ministerial level and the results thus obtained;
6. Inform the Assembly about its activities at its meetings at the level of political directors;
7. Communicate to the Assembly the conclusions it has drawn from its work on disarmament, account being taken of the studies submitted to it by Agency I;
8. Integrate in WEU the working group on security in Europe set up by France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, in order to ensure the participation of all member countries;
9. Explain the action it intends to take on the observation in its reply to Recommendation 435 that the terrorist threat forms part of the matters for which it is responsible and whose study can be assigned to the agencies;
10. Ensure that the WEU agencies receive the information they need to carry out their mandates effectively;
11. Inform the Assembly in detail of the tasks assigned to the SAC on the one hand and the IEPG on the other in the light of each group's specific characteristics;
12. Specify in particular what conclusions the IEPG reached on the economic inquiry into the European armaments industries which, according to the note from the Council transmitted to the Assembly on 23rd February 1978 (Document 769), it was asked to prepare in 1977;
13. Tell the Assembly how it intends to follow up the studies on the European armaments industries carried out by the SAC;
14. Provide the Assembly with detailed information on the steps it has taken to strengthen "co-operation between existing European institutes for security studies";
15. Explain to the Assembly how it intends to keep the press informed of each of its activities;
16. Give a positive answer without further delay to Portugal's application to join WEU;
17. Stop depriving the Assembly of the material means essential for the exercise and development of its work.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 438***

1. At its meeting at ministerial level in November 1986 in Luxembourg, the Council confirmed its firm intention to pursue actively the implementation of the Rome declaration and to accomplish successfully the reactivation of WEU.

2. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, reported to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 11th December last on the results of the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg.

3. The reactivation of WEU also involves the strengthening of its structures and the improvement of its working methods. The Permanent Council will continue to co-ordinate all the organisation's activities. The practice of holding regular meetings of political directors will significantly strengthen the process of consultation within WEU, as will the participation of representatives of defence ministries. A special working group, consisting of representatives of both foreign affairs and defence ministries, is in the process of studying questions relating to European security interests.

4. The Council will, in its report, continue to keep the Assembly informed about its activities. With the aim of improving the dialogue with the Assembly, the Council now presents this report in two six-monthly parts.

5. Information on the participation of defence ministers in the ministerial meetings is given to the Assembly when the presidency meets the latter after the ministerial meetings, addresses it during its sessions and in the Council's reports.

6. The political directors make an important contribution to the new activities of WEU, in particular to the preparation of ministerial meetings. The Assembly is informed of the results of these meetings, as indicated in the foregoing paragraph.

7. The Permanent Council has discussed the reports prepared by Agency I and, as the Assembly has already been informed, has drawn up new guidelines for the further work of this agency.

8. There is no working group set up by France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom on security in Europe.

9. The Council would again underline that many collective efforts are being made to combat terrorism by WEU member countries in other international, and in particular European, bodies. As stated in its reply to Recommendation 435, WEU does not wish to duplicate the work of these other bodies.

10. The Permanent Council is aware of the importance of the agencies having adequate technical data for carrying out their work and has made a number of démarches to this end; in particular, the national administrations have now been asked to assist the agencies in this respect.

11. As indicated in its reply to Written Question 271, the Council has decided to undertake a process of reflection on the rôle of the SAC. Final conclusions could be drawn only at the end of the transitional period.

12. As stated in the reply to Recommendation 437, the Council cannot provide detailed information on current or planned activities of the IEPG as this information involves a number of non-WEU member countries. Accordingly, the honourable members wishing to receive more detailed information should approach their national administrations directly.

The Council can, however, inform the Assembly that the IEPG did not draw specific conclusions from the economic survey of the European armaments industry and that it tasked the European defence industries studies team to formulate recommendations.

13. When the review of the rôle and future tasks of the SAC has been completed, as referred to in paragraph 11 above, the Council will be better placed to indicate further action to the Assembly.

14. It was agreed at the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg last November that European seminars on defence should be organised with the aid of European educational institutes. For their part, research

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 31st March 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 8th April 1987.

institutes of the member countries are examining the possibility of strengthening their co-operation in those areas coming within the purview of WEU.

15. The Chairman-in-Office informs the press about WEU activities after each ministerial meeting. The Secretary-General has given numerous public talks about WEU in both Europe and the United States, which are often attended by media representatives. He has also published articles about WEU in a number of different journals. The Secretariat-General has arranged press briefing sessions and media discussions between ministerial meetings and maintains regular contact with the press to provide it with appropriate information.

16. At their meeting in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986, ministers confirmed the position on the question of enlargement which has already been set out in the Council's reply to Written Question 265 and in the first part of its thirty-second annual report.

17. The Council is aware of the fact that the Assembly should have adequate resources in order to carry out its work.

The Council must also take account of the budgetary constraints existing in the seven member states.

It is in this context that the Council will examine the Assembly's concern.

RECOMMENDATION 439 ¹*on European security and the Mediterranean* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced that the long-term political objective of the Soviet Union towards the Middle East region and the Mediterranean area has not changed;
- (ii) Believing however that the military threat from Warsaw Pact forces in the Mediterranean area has not increased since the committee's last report;
- (iii) Condemning the continued Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the perpetration of atrocities against the Afghan resistance forces and population;
- (iv) Concerned at the latent dangers arising from conflicts and crises particularly in the eastern and southern parts of the Mediterranean area which exert direct or indirect influence upon the interests and positions of allied countries;
- (v) Drawing particular attention to the political and military instability in the Middle East region caused by the unsolved Arab-Israeli dispute, Arab disunity, Libyan and Syrian involvement in world terrorism and, last but not least, by Islamic belligerent fundamentalism in some countries of the region;
- (vi) Welcoming Spain's decision to remain a member of NATO;
- (vii) Believing that European security and security in the Mediterranean area depend also on appropriate diplomatic efforts to reach agreed and verifiable arms control measures,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Establish common adequate and convincing policies, which it should implement and publicise, when and where appropriate, and which should be defined and intended:

1. To demonstrate more publicly the collective responsibility of the western alliances for defence in the Mediterranean area:
 - (i) by supporting joint NATO forces and their exercises in the region and co-ordinating maritime surveillance under COMMARAIRMED;
 - (ii) by recommending that peacetime actions of forces of NATO countries in the areas covered by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty should be oriented towards NATO policies;
 - (iii) by making all efforts to secure and maintain the operational freedom of forces of NATO countries in the Mediterranean area, in full accordance with international law and the principle of the freedom of the seas;
 - (iv) by emphasising the need for the continued presence of United States forces in the area thus helping to improve European defence capability in this particular part of the continent.
2. To stress the absolute need to maintain proper military stability in the region, particularly by providing military aid for the modernisation of the equipment of the Portuguese, Greek and Turkish armed forces;
3. To persuade Spain to co-operate to the fullest possible extent with ACE mobile force, the naval on-call force Mediterranean, Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, and by contributing a mobile force for reinforcement of allied contingents in the Mediterranean, as well as by reporting defence data to NATO as customary with all other NATO members;
4. To pay proper attention and give due consideration to Turkey's key political and strategic position on the Middle East land bridge and to its important defence assignments in NATO's south-eastern flank;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1986 during the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session (11th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1073).

5. To persuade Greece and Turkey to resume bilateral negotiations to solve their Aegean issues, inter alia with a view to permitting normal co-operation of Greek forces with NATO plans and to completing the NATO command structure in the area;
6. To persuade all relevant parties in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and especially in the disturbing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to find a final and lasting solution, thereby removing the inspiration and causes of terrorism, and reducing one peripheral threat to the region;
7. To continue to support the United Nations peace-keeping forces in Lebanon and Cyprus;
8. To encourage the two communities in Cyprus to resume direct contacts to discuss all issues which will assist in finding an agreed solution to the political problem through the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General;
9. To recall Egypt's commitment to pursue the search for a peace settlement between the Arab world and Israel and, by political support, economic assistance and due consideration for its security problems, to encourage that country to continue relevant efforts in that direction;
10. To encourage appropriate measures to improve the economic and social situation of the peoples of the less-developed countries in order to create more stability in the region.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 439***

1. The Council is aware of the great importance of the Mediterranean region for European security. It can assure the Assembly that the governments of the western countries consult one another regularly on developments in the region. However, it would remind the Assembly that the operational responsibility for NATO forces lies with the Atlantic Alliance. At their meeting in Venice in April 1986, the ministers of the WEU Council exchanged views on the risks of destabilisation in the Mediterranean region and underlined the rôle which the countries of Western Europe can continue to play to reduce tension in that area. As announced at the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg in November 1986, France and Italy are to submit to the Council a preliminary study on questions raised by security in this region.

WEU member states emphasise the importance of maintaining the presence of American forces in this region as part of the defence effort of the alliance.

2. Ministers of the alliance have frequently emphasised the need to contribute towards the strengthening of the defences of Greece, Portugal and Turkey to enable them to play their part even more effectively in the collective defence of the alliance.

3. WEU member states welcome the decision of the Spanish people in favour of the Atlantic Alliance and consider that this should make it possible to work out arrangements for Spanish participation which would be satisfactory to Spain and the other allies.

4. The member countries of WEU are aware of the crucial geopolitical position of Turkey and of the other Mediterranean countries of the Atlantic Alliance and fully appreciate the contribution which these countries make to the common defence.

5. The Seven share the Assembly's hope that Greece and Turkey may, through bilateral negotiations, resolve their differences, including the Aegean issue. This would have beneficial effects on the situation of the alliance on the southern flank.

6. As underlined in the declaration on the Middle East adopted by ministers of the Twelve in Luxembourg on 23rd February 1987, the member countries of WEU reaffirm their willingness to help find a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In order to bring an end to this situation which has for long posed a serious threat to both regional and global stability, concerted political action is required on the part of all those seeking a peaceful settlement. In this context, the Twelve stated that they are in favour of, and would endeavour to make an active contribution to, an international peace conference to be held under the auspices of the United Nations with the participation of the parties concerned and of any party able to make a direct and positive contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace. They also stated that this conference should provide a suitable framework for the necessary negotiations between the parties directly concerned.

7. WEU member states have reaffirmed their support for the mandate of the United Nations interim force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). They have expressed the hope that UNIFIL's mandate, as laid down in relevant Security Council resolutions, can be carried out to the full. They deplore the recent attacks against this force and the resulting loss of life.

WEU member states wish to reiterate their support for the United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). They are convinced that this force is still playing an important rôle.

8. The member states of WEU have also expressed their support for the establishment of direct contacts between the two communities in Cyprus with a view to finding a solution to the political problem through the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General. They believe that this approach offers the best prospects for a peaceful, fair and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

9. As already stated in paragraph 6, the member states of WEU support all efforts made to promote peace between the Arab states and Israel. They are following with interest the efforts made by Egypt and Israel to consolidate their relations.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th April 1987.

They note the endeavours being made by Egypt to overcome its current economic difficulties and support the government's efforts to reach an agreement with the IMF on a realistic recovery programme. They would draw the Assembly's attention to the financial assistance which WEU member states are giving to Egypt bilaterally or through international organisations.

10. WEU member states encourage all appropriate measures, notably those of an economic and social nature, which may help to create greater stability in the Mediterranean region.

RECOMMENDATION 440¹
*on European helicopters for the 1990s*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the failure of West European armies to exploit fully the military potential of the helicopter, especially compared to the emphasis placed upon helicopter operations by the armies of the United States and the Soviet Union;
- (ii) Aware of the need to harmonise more closely operational doctrines for the utilisation of helicopters in Western Europe and to meet more effectively the challenge posed by the helicopter preponderance of the Warsaw Pact forces;
- (iii) Stressing the need for harmonising the requirements and re-equipment timescales for helicopters by NATO;
- (iv) Conscious of the commercial difficulties of helicopter manufacturers in Western Europe and the negligible market for civil helicopters in Europe compared to the United States;
- (v) Concerned at the relative industrial and technical advantages enjoyed by the United States helicopter industry owing to the economies of scale of the large military market for helicopters within the United States;
- (vi) Regretting that European co-operation in the helicopter field has not been more successful,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Concert a strategy for the future of the helicopter industry in the member states of WEU based on transnational co-operation;
2. Impress forcefully upon the western alliance the benefits of firepower against armour, mobility, surprise and flexibility of operation inherent in the helicopter;
3. Tackle vigorously the problems of overcapacity, short production runs for military helicopters and poor profitability which characterise the West European helicopter industry;
4. Secure a co-ordinated programme through the IEPG, but reporting progress to this Assembly, to harmonise helicopter doctrines and operational requirements with a view to ensuring the joint procurement within the alliance of more helicopters, but of fewer types;
5. Meet the industrial and technical challenge to European helicopter manufacturers posed by the United States, not by a policy of exclusion of American rotorcraft or investment, but by encouraging the governments of WEU member countries to give the European helicopter industry adequate support in terms of orders;
6. Work with the Assembly to create a political will within the member states favourable to international and especially European collaboration and against the protectionist and parochial nationalistic pressures in the helicopter field as in other key areas of high technology and industry of strategic importance.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1986 during the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session (12th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 1077).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 440***

1. The Council shares the Assembly's conviction that helicopters have considerable military potential. The armed forces of the member countries of WEU are aware of the advantages referred to by the Assembly. Any decision about the size of future military helicopter procurement programmes will be taken by defence ministers in accordance with the missions to be accomplished by their forces and the resources available.

2. Through their participation in bodies such as the IEPG the member countries of WEU are actively pursuing a policy of co-operation in the field of armaments procurement. This policy offers military benefits in that it leads to greater standardisation and/or greater interoperability. From the industrial angle it allows longer production runs.

The Council would like to draw attention to their positive experience in Europe in connection with joint helicopter procurement which has led to programmes such as the Lynx/Puma/Gazelle package and to joint projects designed to meet European requirements well into the next century in all categories of helicopter, including both transport and attack versions, but at present with the exception of the heavy-lift type. This applies in particular to the EH-101, between Italy and the United Kingdom, the Tonal light attack helicopter – derived from the A129-LAH – between Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain, as well as the PAH2-HAC/PAC between France and Germany. Furthermore, the European countries are engaged in engine development for these projects.

European helicopter co-operation between France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom (Netherlands and Spain are considering accession) provides a forum for harmonisation of European helicopter programmes and collaboration in development and production. Participants in this forum launched successful collaborative work on the definition of the NATO helicopter programme (NH-90) in which these countries have tried to fulfil the requirements of their armed forces for the nineties. It is expected that 600 NH-90 helicopters will be produced.

Part of the work undertaken by the IEPG in its aeronautical sector study concerns the identification of key technologies required for future generations of aircraft. This identification should make it possible to maintain and strengthen Europe's position by improving its capability to co-operate and compete on an equal footing with NATO's transatlantic members.

3. It is clear from the collaborative helicopter programmes in which WEU member states are already involved that they have the necessary political will to co-operate in this field. Ministers in Luxembourg restated their resolve to continue their efforts towards the establishment in Europe of the technological and industrial base necessary to ensure the development of a strong and competitive European armaments industry, this being an important aspect of Europe's contribution to defence. In this connection, they reaffirmed the importance they attach to the generation of more, and more systematic, collaboration in the field of conventional armaments.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th May 1987.

RECOMMENDATION 441¹*on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that for forty years the Soviet Union has constantly pursued a degree of military deployment not justified by the requirements of its security;
- (ii) Considering that, in spite of the Helsinki final act, the measures taken in the name of détente have led to no true alleviation of the internal dictatorship in the USSR nor to an improvement in the situation in the peoples' democracies;
- (iii) Noting that the size of the amounts the Soviet Union allocates to defence is one of the fundamental reasons for the persistence of economic difficulties and that any true transformation in the Soviet Union requires a reduction in its military effort;
- (iv) Considering that the new Soviet authorities seem aware of the need to make this reduction;
- (v) Considering in particular that the progress the latter have made in informing the Soviet and foreign public in 1986 may be the start of an important new turn in Soviet internal policy and in that country's external relations;
- (vi) Considering that the determination shown by the Soviet Government to improve the standard of living of the population should lead it to seek agreements allowing it to reduce its military expenditure;
- (vii) Noting in fact that since 15th January 1986 the highest Soviet authorities have presented many proposals which could allow meaningful negotiations to be started on the limitation of armaments;
- (viii) Welcoming in particular the results obtained at the Stockholm conference on the verification of confidence-building measures;
- (ix) Regretting however that the speeches of Soviet leaders have not always resulted in effective concessions in international negotiations;
- (x) Regretting that the Reykjavik meeting did not allow the bases for these negotiations to be fixed, but trusting that it nevertheless allowed a substantial rapprochement of views likely to lead, in the near future, to agreement between the United States and Soviet Union on the goal of true negotiations which would take account of the strategy now in force and of which deterrence is the keystone at every level;
- (xi) Recalling that western security is ensured by a relative balance in forces – which should be brought to the lowest possible level – in all areas and that at the present time this balance has not been achieved in Europe in the conventional field and particularly in that of chemical weapons where the Soviet Union has a near monopoly in Europe;
- (xii) Considering it is essential for the countries of Western Europe to harmonise their views on questions concerning the limitation of armaments and to make them known to their American partners;
- (xiii) Considering that the WEU Council has a decisive rôle to play in this matter and gratified that it has instructed one of the new agencies to study Soviet proposals;
- (xiv) Considering that the requirements of European security must also guide relations of all kinds between the West and the Soviet Union,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Develop as a matter of urgency its consultations and work with a view to defining European positions on armaments and the limitation of armaments as it has done for the strategic defence initiative;
2. Convey these positions to the United States before negotiations on the limitation of armaments are started;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1987 during the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session (14th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Close on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1079).

3. Proceed in like manner to study the Soviet Union's attempts to transfer to the countries of the third world the struggle it calls "anti-imperialist";
4. Seek an agreement between all the western countries to avoid undue competition continuing to allow the Soviet Union to have the West contribute, even indirectly, to the development of its military effort;
5. Ask the member countries to increase their effort to ensure a balance of conventional forces in Europe in order to facilitate an agreement on the reduction of the number of Euromissiles without jeopardising the security of Europe as it now is by the deployment of Soviet short-range Euromissiles, including SS-21s, SS-23s and SS-24s;
6. Make every effort to ensure that the current negotiations in Geneva result without delay in an agreement on a verified worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 441***

1. The Council devoted the major part of its November ministerial session in Luxembourg to evaluating East-West relations in the light of the Reykjavik meeting. There was convergence of views on many aspects of its implications for European security interests. Further consideration of these matters is now taking place with the participation of the political directors and senior representatives of defence ministries. A major contribution to these reflections will also be made by the special working group.
2. The WEU member states consult closely with the United States on arms control and other security questions both bilaterally and within the alliance. These consultations form part of the fabric of the alliance and help to ensure the maintenance of its cohesion.
3. The Council and agencies examine problems which directly affect European security interests. They may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.
4. All WEU member states have emphasised – notably during the CSCE negotiations – their support for an improvement in the economic links between the countries of East and West. The Council would emphasise that appropriate procedures exist among western countries to ensure that no contribution is made – even indirectly – to the development of the Soviet Union's military effort.
5. The Council recalls the North Atlantic Council communiqué of 12th December 1986 which stated that reductions in nuclear weapons will increase the importance of removing conventional disparities between East and West, and of eliminating chemical weapons, and that an effective resolution of these issues is an essential requirement for real and enduring stability and security in Europe. The WEU Council continues to follow closely developments in this field.
6. The member countries of WEU have on many occasions stated their desire for a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all existing stockpiles. On 12th December 1986 in Brussels, the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Atlantic Alliance again expressed their willingness to seek at the Geneva conference on disarmament a convention which meets this objective.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th April 1987.

Extraordinary session

RECOMMENDATION 442¹

***on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance –
Part I: The reactivation of WEU²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the proposals by the French Government, and particularly the one to draw up a European security charter, provide an opportunity for a fundamental re-examination of the requirements of that security;
- (ii) Considering that the policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance remains the guarantee of that security;
- (iii) Considering that the main threats to international peace now arise in areas not covered by the alliance;
- (iv) Considering that European co-operation in armaments matters has become essential for the security of Europe;
- (v) Considering that the search for disarmament or the limitation of armaments is essential for the maintenance of peace and should continue to be given priority but that this search must not jeopardise the security of Europe;
- (vi) Considering that the recent development of chemical weapons constitutes a particularly serious threat for all mankind;
- (vii) Welcoming recent measures taken by the Council to increase its activities in order to meet the requirements of European security but regretting that information on these activities communicated to the public and to the Assembly is still far from adequate;
- (viii) Considering that it is still essential to bring the requirements of European security to the attention of the public;
- (ix) Deeply regretting the continuous failure of the Council of Ministers to inform the Assembly in a proper way;
- (x) Considering that new governmental activities in WEU must allow the Assembly to exercise to the full its responsibilities under Article IX of the treaty;
- (xi) Noting in particular that the replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions relating to the Council's activities, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Programme Group seriously distort the Council's commitments to the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Study closely the proposals made by the French Government for drawing up a European security charter with a view to:
 - (a) defining Europe's security requirements, acquainting its American allies with them and ensuring that current negotiations on the limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons lead to substantial reductions without compromising Europe's security based on a policy of deterrence;
 - (b) reaffirming member countries' continuing concern not to compromise the cohesion of the alliance and to include the strengthening of the European pillar in the context of the alliance;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (1st sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1089).

- (c) averting a chemical arms race by calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to seek an agreement ensuring the complete elimination of such arms and promoting the extension of this agreement to all countries;
- (d) including in the charter a commitment to ensure reciprocal exchanges of information and consultations in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in regard to any threat to international peace;
- (e) also including an expression of the joint will to remove obstacles still obstructing the development of European co-operation in armaments matters;

2. To this end, direct the measures taken to give new work to WEU so as to ensure that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty contributes to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the consolidation of peace by:

- (a) keeping the political committee on European security in the framework of WEU;
- (b) considering how the treaty should be applied to ensure that it meets present European security requirements and allows WEU to be enlarged to include Western European countries wishing and able to take part;
- (c) ensuring that these countries are kept informed of the activities of WEU and allowing the countries concerned to take part henceforth in some of these activities, particularly in co-operation in armaments matters;
- (d) giving the necessary impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters, inter alia by adapting its decision of 7th May 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee to present facts of such co-operation;
- (e) acting without delay on its document "WEU and public awareness" so as to inform public opinion of all its activities in accordance with the principles set out in the Rome declaration, including the issue of communiqués at the close of meetings of the political committee on European security;
- (f) ensuring co-ordination of member countries' participation in the course to be organised by the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale in 1988 and of the development of subsequent courses so as to promote public awareness of European security requirements in all member countries; (1) for this purpose by instructing the Secretary-General to play an active part in organising the first course and to promote the formation of an association of former participants of which he would ensure the secretariat; (2) by asking the French institute to invite Spain and Portugal to send participants to this course;
- (g) developing exchanges of views with the United States authorities so as to enhance the cohesion of the alliance;
- (h) applying in full Article IX of the treaty under which it has an obligation to report to the Assembly on its activities and on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when pursued in frameworks other than WEU.

RECOMMENDATION 443¹
*on the ministerial meeting of the Council*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the diplomatic/press offensive of Mikhail Gorbachev, who is multiplying proposals for nuclear disarmament, calls for a co-ordinated response from the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Aware that these proposals, which affect first and foremost European security, should lead to European interests being defined in WEU, the only European organisation with responsibilities in this area;
- (iii) Encouraged by the call to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance by George Shultz, United States Secretary of State, following his recent visit to Moscow, requesting their opinion on these proposals,

URGES THE COUNCIL

1. To make known its collegiate point of view on the Gorbachev proposals through the intermediary of its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, in his statement to the Assembly on Tuesday, 28th April 1987;
2. To instruct its Chairman-in-Office to give the Council's point of view on the Soviet proposals at the meetings of the North Atlantic Council to be held on 11th and 12th June 1987.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (2nd sitting).

2. Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure tabled by Mr. Goerens and others (Document 1094).

RECOMMENDATION 444¹

*replying to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*²

The Assembly,

(i) Regretting the serious delay in the communication of the Council's annual report in 1986, the omission of information concerning one important meeting, and considering that the absence of agreement on certain matters should not prevent the Council from presenting the rest of its report on time;

(ii) Welcoming, however, the communication in October 1986 of the first part of the report for that year,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before the end of February of the following year and that it contain a complete account of activities arranged by the Council;

2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement of WEU.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1090).

RECOMMENDATION 445 ¹

***on principles applicable in preparing the budgets
of the WEU ministerial organs and the Assembly ²***

The Assembly,

Fully endorsing the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end to WEU's budgetary difficulties,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Implement without delay the three principles defined by the Chairman-in-Office:

- application to the operating budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of WEU of the growth rate defined in the European Communities;
- establishment of a separate budget for pensions;
- recognition of the Assembly's freedom to manage its budget within the limits of the appropriations thus calculated.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1095).

**OPINION ON THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEARS 1986 (REVISED)
AND 1987¹**

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Linster, Rapporteur*

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submitted by Mr. Linster, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mr. Sinesio, Mrs. Pack (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Beysen (Alternate: Bogaerts), Mrs. Blunck, MM. Bohl, Chartron (Alternate: Jeambrun), Declercq, Dhaille, Ferrari Aggradi (Alternate: Giust), Freeson, Mrs. Herfkens, MM. Klejdzinski (Alternate: Soell), Morris (Alternate: Woodall), Oehler, Pollidoro (Alternate: Colajanni), Rauti (Alternate: Mitterdorfer), Sir Dudley Smith (Alternate: Rees), MM. Stokes (Alternate: Sir Paul Hawkins), van Tets, Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Revised Draft Recommendation
*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987*

The Assembly,

(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1986 (revised) and 1987, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;

(ii) Considering that:

- (a) the presentation of the budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 has been simplified by reducing the number of sub-heads and grouping all social charges under one sub-head and all expenditure on staff under one head but that ordinary expenditure has not been separated from extraordinary expenditure as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendation 433;
- (b) consequently, because of the effect of extraordinary expenditure, the growth rate of these budgets cannot be accurately compared with the rate of inflation fixed for applying the zero growth criterion;
- (c) furthermore, the evolution of budgets since 1985 shows an increase above the zero growth rate since the requirements of reactivating WEU – including the restructuring of the ministerial organs – have been taken into account in this budget;
- (d) in addition, the payment of pensions to newly-retired officials could no longer be included in the operating budget without jeopardising the activities of the various organs;
- (e) the zero growth rate obviously no longer being of any value, the Council should establish a more objective and effective criterion for preparing WEU budgets;
- (f) analysis of the various categories of expenditure in the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU shows that expenditure on staff alone represents about 90% of total operating expenditure;
- (g) this percentage could be improved considerably and amounts under Head I “Permanent staff” could be used for other operating expenditure if the two seats in London and Paris were combined to allow their now separate services to be merged;

(iii) Regretting that:

- (a) three posts assigned to the Secretariat-General remained vacant throughout 1986 whereas the Council refused the creation of new posts in the WEU Assembly;
- (b) the Council has given a new interpretation of criteria for dual grading which entirely ignores the wishes of the staff to achieve career prospects subject to certain conditions of seniority;

(iv) Welcoming the fact that at the close of the ministerial meeting on 28th April 1987 Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, informed the Assembly that the Council of Ministers had decided to agree to a separate budget for pensions and to recognise the Assembly’s budgetary independence within the limits of agreed appropriations, this decision to take effect immediately,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apply the same criterion for increasing WEU budgets as is applied by the EEC in establishing its budget;
2. Apply to the operating budget of the Assembly for 1987 the growth rate of 2.79% agreed upon for its budget as a whole, including pensions, i.e. an increase of F 379 983;
3. Examine the possibility of:
 - (a) uniting the ministerial organs of WEU in a single seat and preparing one table of establishment integrating the services now divided between the two seats;
 - (b) establishing dual grading at every level of the hierarchy to improve the staff’s career possibilities.

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. Linster, Rapporteur)*

1. The report giving an opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987 and the relevant draft recommendation were agreed to by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration at its meeting on 27th February 1987. They are on the agenda of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session.

2. In these texts, your Rapporteur stressed the following three fundamental problems, i.e.:

- (a) abandoning the zero growth criterion applied to all WEU budgets, including pensions;
- (b) adopting instead a more realistic criterion allowing a maximum growth rate equal to that calculated each year by the Commission of the European Communities to be applied to the operating budgets alone;
- (c) recognising the Assembly's full independence in the management of its operating budget within the limits of appropriations agreed by the Council in application of the abovementioned criterion.

3. Since 27th February 1987, the committee has met twice (in Paris on 22nd April and in Luxembourg on 27th April) to examine further the Assembly's budgetary problems. Having noted that the negotiations with the Council conducted by the Presidential Committee on the basis of Assembly Order 65 had still not produced results although Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, had made proposals which could put an end to WEU's budgetary difficulties, the committee agreed unanimously to submit to the Assembly at its extraordinary session in Luxembourg on 27th and 28th April 1987 a proposal that the Council be recommended to implement without delay the principles set out in the proposals by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

4. During the morning sitting on 28th April 1987, the Assembly adopted this draft recommendation unanimously (see Recommendation 445 at Appendix I).

During the afternoon sitting on the same day, at the close of the Council meeting, Mr. Poos told the Assembly that:

"The Council of Ministers has just agreed to improve the situation by allowing a separate budget - in relation to the ordinary budget - to meet the growing

financial requirements in respect of pensions. It has also agreed to meet your views in regard to independent budgetary management within the limits of agreed appropriations. On increases in the ordinary budget, it wishes to have more time to consider how this might be implemented on the basis of specific data."

5. After his statement, Mr. Poos added in answer to a question put by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, that the Council's decisions were applicable immediately.

6. Your Rapporteur can but express his greatest satisfaction that two of the most important problems of principle for which the Assembly has been fighting with conviction, steadfastness and firmness in recent years, have finally been settled in a suitable manner.

The third problem is still outstanding, i.e. the annual growth rate of operating budgets, but there is reason to believe that a solution will soon be found since the Council is aware of the need to give the various WEU bodies the means which are essential for exercising their activities in the context of reactivation, allowing WEU to play a part in matters vital for the defence of Europe.

7. The budgetary decisions taken by the Council are so important that it has proved necessary to revise the report already adopted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

In regard to the Assembly's budgetary independence, your Rapporteur can but refer to the analysis of this problem made by Mr. Sinesio in his report dated 28th April 1986 (Document 1054, paragraphs 36, 37 and 38) and the definition given by the Assembly itself in Recommendation 429:

"Guarantee the Assembly full independence in all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its overall budget between the various heads while respecting the regulations governing the staff of the co-ordinated organisations."

8. As to separating the pensions budget from the operating budget with immediate effect, your Rapporteur considers that, pending the Council's decisions on the growth rate applicable to WEU operating budgets, it should here and now apply the growth rate of 2.79% fixed by the Council for the net total budget of the Assembly for 1987 (including pensions) to the operating budget

alone, which would immediately make available to the Assembly a further sum of F 379 983, thus bringing the operating budget for 1987 up to F 17 034 358.

9. Your Rapporteur believes that in accordance with the budgetary independence granted to the Assembly and within the limits of this new total operating budget the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration will be able, in implementation of Order 67 of the Assembly (see Appendix II), to start applying the provisions agreed upon for improving the structure of the Office of the Clerk.

10. On another section of the report relating to the refusal to allow a telex to be installed in the Office of the Clerk, your Rapporteur has noted that the Office of the Clerk has recently been authorised to use the telefax installed for the

Paris agencies. This equipment can be used within the limits of a still relatively small network of subscribers and first experience indicates that it is very expensive to use. However, it is certainly an improvement in means of communication and the Office of the Clerk has recently used it to good effect. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that a longer period of use (at least one year) is needed before valid conclusions can be drawn from the experiment. In the meantime, the Assembly must study its need for a telex next year in the context of its budgetary independence.

11. For the reasons set out above, your Rapporteur proposes that the draft recommendation in Document 1088 be amended accordingly. All the proposed amendments are given at Appendix III. The new text of the draft recommendation incorporating these amendments is given at the beginning of the present report.

APPENDIX I

RECOMMENDATION 445***on principles applicable in preparing the budgets
of the WEU ministerial organs and the Assembly***

The Assembly,

Fully endorsing the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end to WEU's budgetary difficulties,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Implement without delay the three principles defined by the Chairman-in-Office:

- application to the operating budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of WEU of the growth rate defined in the European Communities;
- establishment of a separate budget for pensions;
- recognition of the Assembly's freedom to manage its budget within the limits of the appropriations thus calculated.

APPENDIX II

ORDER 67

*on the budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987*


The Assembly,

1. APPROVES the action taken by the Presidential Committee in application of Order 65 and the terms of the memorandum of the President of the Assembly dated 12th March 1987;
2. INVITES the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to take the necessary steps to implement, during the present financial year, the provisions decided upon for improving the structure of the Office of the Clerk.

APPENDIX III

***Proposed amendments to the draft recommendation
in Document 1088 of 27th February 1987***

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out sub-paragraph (a).
2. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out sub-paragraph (d).
3. At the end of the preamble, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Welcoming the fact that at the close of the ministerial meeting on 28th April 1987 Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, informed the Assembly that the Council of Ministers had decided to agree to a separate budget for pensions and to recognise the Assembly’s budgetary independence within the limits of agreed appropriations, this decision to take effect immediately, ”
4. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“ Apply as soon as possible the same criterion for increasing WEU budgets as is applied by the EEC in establishing its budget; ”
5. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Apply to the operating budget of the Assembly for 1987 the growth rate of 2.79% agreed upon for its budget as a whole, including pensions, i.e. an increase of F 379 983; ”
6. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (a).
7. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b).
8. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (d).
9. In sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ studying the problem of ” and insert “ establishing ”.

IMPRIMERIE  ALENÇONNAISE
Rue Édouard-Belin : 3^e trimestre 1987
N^o d'ordre : 9138

PRINTED IN FRANCE

