

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1987

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSSENS Hugo	SP
DECLERCQ Tiji	CVP
DEJARDIN Claude	PS
PECRIAUX Nestor	PS
RAMAEKERS Jef	SP
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP

Substitutes

MM. BEYSEN Edward	PVV
CEREXHE Etienne	PSC
CLOSE Robert	PRL
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
du MONCEAU	
de BERGENDAL Yves	PSC
NOERENS René	PVV

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
de CHAMBRUN Charles	National Front
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GREMETZ Maxime	Communist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF
Mrs. LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist
MM. MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PORTIER Henri	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BICHET Jacques	UDF
BOHL André	UCDP
BORDU Gérard	Communist
CHARTRON Jacques	RPR
CHENARD Alain	Socialist

MM. DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
LACOUR Pierre	UCDP
MONTASTRUC Pierre	UDF
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
PRAT Henri	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SIRGUE Pierre	National Front
SOUVET Louis	RPR
Mrs. TRAUTMANN Catherine	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MECHTERSHEIMER Alfred	Die Grünen
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
DUVE Freimut	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FPD
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. GLOTZ Peter	SPD
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. CACCIA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
INTINI Ugo	Socialist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Guido	Republican
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SALVI Franco	Chr. Dem.
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
TARAMELLI Antonio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CANNATA Giuseppe	Communist
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	Communist
MANZOLINI Giovanni	PSDI
PANNELLA Marco	Radical
PASQUINO Gianfranco	Ind. Left
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBNER Hans	SVP
SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TRIGLIA Ricardo	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
GOERENS Charles	Dem.
LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mr. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
Mr. KONEN René	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
de JONG Frans	CDA
de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
MM. de BEER Leopold	Liberal
DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob	CDA
EISMA Doeke	D66
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM. MARIS Pieter	CDA
van der SANDEN Piet	CDA

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. COLEMAN Donald	Labour
COX Thomas	Labour
Dame Peggy FENNER	Conservative
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
MM. GARRETT Edward	Labour
HARDY Peter	Labour
HILL James	Conservative
JESSEL Toby	Conservative
Sir Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
Lady Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
MM. MORRIS Michael	Conservative
PARRY Robert	Labour
SHELTON William	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
MM. SPEED Keith	Conservative
STOKES John	Conservative
WILKINSON John	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David	Conservative
BOWDEN Andrew	Conservative
EWING Harry	Labour
FAULDS Andrew	Labour
GALE Roger	Conservative
HOWELL Ralph	Conservative
Lord KIRKHILL	Labour
MM. LAMBIE David	Labour
LITHERLAND Robert	Labour
LORD Michael	Conservative
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. RATHBONE Tim	Conservative
REDMOND Martin	Labour
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
Ms. RUDDOCK Joan	Labour
MM. STEWART Allan	Conservative
THOMPSON John	Labour

AGENDA

**of the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session
Paris, 30th November-3rd December 1987**

I. Political questions

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. Recent developments in Soviet external policy | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Pécriaux on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

II. Defence questions

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. Threat assessment | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

III. Technical and scientific questions

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. European armaments co-operation – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. Military use of computers – towards a joint European defence research programme | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Fourné on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

IV. Budget and administrative questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |

V. Rules of procedure and privileges

- | | |
|---|---|
| Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure | <i>Report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges</i> |
|---|---|

VI. Parliamentary and Public Relations

- | | |
|---|--|
| Public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Burger on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations</i> |
|---|--|

**DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1987 ¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur

APPENDICES

- I. Revised estimates under Head I of the operating budget of the Assembly for 1987
- II. Revised estimates in the pensions budget for 1987
- III. Revised budget estimates of the Assembly for the financial year 1987

1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee*: Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mr. Sinesio, Mrs. Pack (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Beysen, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Bohl (Alternate: *Hunault*), Chartron, *Declercq*, Dhaille, *Ferrari Aggradi*, Freeson (Alternate: *Woodall*), Mrs. Herfkens, MM. *Klejdzinski*, Morris, Oehler, Pollidoro, Rauti, *Sir Dudley Smith*, MM. Stokes, van Tets (Alternate: *van der Werff*), Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. According to Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly:
 " 1. Each year, following a report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration drawn up in collaboration with the Presidential Committee, the Assembly shall approve a provisional statement of its expenditure, divided into heads and sub-heads.
 2. The Assembly may, if necessary, approve supplementary estimates of expenditure. "
2. In accordance with this provision, the present report sets out the Assembly's additional requirements, resulting mainly from the application of the 223rd report of the Co-ordinating Committee.
3. The salary scales given in that report are higher than the estimates made in summer 1986 when the 1987 budget was prepared, so that a supplementary budget is necessary in order to have enough money available in Head I of the operating and pensions budgets to cover expenditure until the end of the year.
4. Appendix I gives details of the new estimates under Head I, including the financial implications of the 223rd report for the salaries of permanent staff for 1987 and the second half of 1986 (back-dated increase).

These estimates also take account of:

- foreseeable increases as at 1st July 1987 which it has been agreed with the ministerial organs of WEU to estimate at 5%, i.e. 2.5% of total annual salaries;
 - the installation allowance and reimbursement of travelling and removal expenses paid to two officials who resigned before reaching the age limit for retirement;
 - the reimbursement of travelling expenses paid to a candidate who was interviewed for a vacant post.
5. Appendix II gives details of the new estimates in the pensions budget based on the scales laid down in the 223rd report. It also includes:
 - an estimate of the increase in pensions as from 1st July 1987 effected in accordance with the criteria in paragraph 4 above;
 - the cost of two new pensions payable as from 1st July 1987 and 1st September 1987 respectively.
 6. As a result of the abovementioned additional amounts, the budgets of the Assembly for 1987 will be modified as follows:

	Operating budget (F)	Pensions budget (F)
Initial	16 964 375	1 351 000
Supplementary	466 600	135 050
	17 430 975	1 486 050

7. Appendix III gives a breakdown by heads and sub-heads of the Assembly budgets resulting from the new estimates set out above. For the pensions budget, the increase in income corresponding to the increase in contributions by permanent staff is also shown.

APPENDIX I

Revised estimates under Head I of the operating budget of the Assembly for 1987

Sub-heads	Revised estimates on the basis of the 223rd report	Back-dated increase for 1986	Increase for 1987	Total	1987 budget	Difference
1. Basic salaries	6 965 000	41 000	174 000	7 180 000	6 830 000	350 000
2. Allowances	1 292 000	7 900	30 000	1 329 900	1 300 000	29 900
3. Social charges	1 345 000	1 100	33 600	1 379 700	1 318 000	61 700
4. Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	25 000 ¹			25 000		25 000
5. Medical examination	8 000			8 000	8 000	
	9 635 000	50 000	237 600	9 922 600	9 456 000	466 600

1. Installation allowance for a new official.
 Reimbursement of travelling expenses of a candidate for a vacant post.
 Reimbursement of travelling and removal expenses of an official leaving the Office of the Clerk.

APPENDIX II

Revised estimates in the pensions budget for 1987

Sub-heads	Revised estimates on the basis of the 223rd report	Back-dated increase for 1986	Increase for 1987	New pensions	Total	1987 budget	Difference
1. Pensions and leaving allowances	1 278 000	8 000	31 000	56 000	1 373 000	1 249 000	124 000
2. Family allowances	75 000	250	1 900	3 500	80 650	74 000	6 650
3. Supplementary insurance .	31 000	—	—	1 400	32 400	28 000	4 400
	1 384 000	8 250	32 900	60 900	1 486 050	1 351 000	135 050

APPENDIX III

Revised budget estimates of the Assembly for the financial year 1987

Heads and sub-heads	Budget for 1987 (initial)	Supplementary budget	Budget for 1987 (revised)
<i>Head I – Permanent staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
1 – Basic salaries	6 830 000	350 000	7 180 000
2 – Allowances	1 300 000	29 900	1 329 900
3 – Social charges	1 318 000	61 700	1 379 700
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	–	25 000	25 000
5 – Medical examination	8 000	–	8 000
Total	9 456 000	466 600	9 922 600
<i>Head II – Temporary staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions	2 111 875	–	2 111 875
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	456 000	–	456 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk .	50 000	–	50 000
9 – Social charges	87 000	–	87 000
Total	2 704 875	–	2 704 875
<i>Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	450 000	–	450 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms	15 000	–	15 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	345 000	–	345 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	45 000	–	45 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	18 000	–	18 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	28 000	–	28 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	32 300	–	32 300
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	366 700	–	366 700
Total	1 300 000	–	1 300 000

Heads and sub-heads	Budget for 1987 (initial)	Supplementary budget	Budget for 1987 (revised)
<i>Head IV – General administrative costs</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480 000	–	480 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	258 000	–	258 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents ...	1 190 000	–	1 190 000
21 – Purchase of documents	60 000	–	60 000
22 – Official cars	115 000	–	115 000
23 – Bank charges	500	–	500
Total	2 103 500	–	2 103 500
<i>Head V – Other expenditure</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs ..	130 000	–	130 000
25 – Expenses for representation	200 000	–	200 000
26 – Committee study missions	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	350 000	–	350 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	–	70 000
29 – Expenditure on information	311 000	–	311 000
30 – Expenses for political groups	311 000	–	311 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	–	20 000
Total	1 400 000	–	1 400 000
OPERATING BUDGET	16 964 375	466 600	17 430 975
RECEIPTS	310 000	–	310 000
	16 654 375	466 600	17 120 975
PENSIONS	1 351 000	135 050	1 486 050
RECEIPTS	409 000	20 000	429 000
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET	942 000	115 050	1 057 050
NET TOTAL BUDGET	17 596 375	581 650	18 178 025

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1986*

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

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REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1986 – 16th June 1987.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1986 – CERTIFICATE OF THE AUDITOR – 16th June 1987.

APPENDICES

- I. Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1986.
Financial position as at 31st December 1986.
- II. Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1986.
- III. Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1986.
- IV. Provident fund – Account for the financial year ended 31st December 1986.

*Letter from the President of the Assembly
to the Auditor submitting the accounts
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986*

3rd April 1987

Sir,

In accordance with Article 13 of the Financial Regulations of the WEU Assembly, I have the honour to submit to you the accounts for the financial year 1986 in accordance with the statements attached hereto which refer to:

1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure – financial position as at 31st December 1986 (Appendix I);

(b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II);

(c) Contributions (Appendix III);

(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

As is customary, after being audited these tables will be signed by the President of the Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration before being submitted to the Assembly.

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a saving of F 241 257, whereas the final statement of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 20 731. The difference between

these two figures, i.e. F 220 526, represents the deficit of receipts over estimates:

	F	F
- Bank interest	129 456	
- Sundry receipts	3 055	
- Sale of publications	30 512	
- Levy on the salaries of grade A staff	32 912	
- Contributions 7%	<u>407 839</u>	
		603 774
- Receipts for 1986 estimated in the budget		<u>824 300</u>
		<u>- 220 526</u>

3. Excess expenditure under Heads II and IV of the operating budget and under Head I of the pensions budget amounting to F 163 629 has been met by transfers from other heads of the budget.

4. All contributions for the financial year 1986 (1986 revised budget) have been received from the Secretary-General of WEU London.

5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident fund are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the joint fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

On 31st December 1986, these amounts totalled F 3 826 415 as shown in Appendix IV. On that date there remained two loans to two staff members amounting to F 365 808.

The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of these funds. On 31st December 1986, the fund was held by Montagu Investment Management Limited in London.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
J.-M. CARO
President of the Assembly

Mr. J. VAN DE VELDE
Premier Président de la Cour des Comptes
Rue de la Régence 2
B - 100 BRUXELLES - Belgique

**Letter from the external Auditor
to the President of the Assembly
submitting the accounts of the Assembly
for the financial year 1986**

16th June 1987

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the accounts of the Assembly of Western European Union for the financial year 1986 together with my opinion and report thereon.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
JEROOM VAN DE VELDE

The President of the Assembly
of Western European Union,
43, Avenue du Président Wilson
75775 PARIS Cedex 16

**Report of the external Auditor to the
Assembly of Western European Union on the
accounts for the financial year 1986**

16th June 1987

I have audited the accounts of Western European Union for the financial year 1986 in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the correct management of the budget and book-keeping.

The final statement of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 20 731 whereas the statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a saving of F 241 257. The difference, i.e. F 220 526, stems from a deficit in sundry receipts (F 603 774 instead of the estimated F 824 300).

The total saving in the budget may be summarised as follows:

	F
Head I	
Permanent staff	+ 170 505
Head II	
Temporary staff	- 76 282
Head III	
Expenditure on premises and equipment	+ 114 803
Head IV	
General administrative costs	- 73 956

Head V		
Other expenditure	+ 119 578	
Head I		
Pensions, allowances and social charges	- 13 391	
Total	<u>+ 241 257</u>	

As my predecessor mentioned in his report on the accounts for the financial year 1985, I would point out that the Financial Regulations do not provide for transfers between heads of expenditure.

However, I have also noted that the Council of Western European Union, which approves the budget of the Assembly, was notified of these transfers in April 1987 in accordance with the usual procedure.

I thank the President and staff of the Assembly for the willingness with which all requests for explanations were met and for their co-operation and assistance in the exercise of my duties as auditor.

J. VAN DE VELDE
*(Premier Président de la
 Cour des comptes de Belgique)
 Commissaire aux Comptes*

*Financial statements of the Assembly of
 Western European Union for the financial year
 1986*

Certificate of the Auditor

16th June 1987

In application of Article 15 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of Western European Union, I have examined the appended financial statements (Appendix I) of the Assembly of Western European Union comprising the summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities for the financial year 1986. My examination included verification of the books and other relevant documents that I deemed necessary. As a result of this examination, my opinion is that these statements are a correct record of the financial operations conducted during the 1986 financial year, that these operations were in conformity with the budget estimates, the Financial Regulations, the financial instructions and other decisions of the legislative authority, and that they are a correct record of the financial situation for the year ended 31st December 1986.

J. VAN DE VELDE
*(Premier Président de la
 Cour des comptes de Belgique)
 Commissaire aux Comptes*

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1986

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)	17 118 700
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Miscellaneous

(A) Sundry receipts

Bank interest	129 456
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Sundry receipts	3 055
-----------------------	-------

Sale of publications	30 512
----------------------------	--------

Levy on salaries of grade A officials	32 912
---	--------

(B) Pensions

Contributions (7%)	<u>407 839</u>
--------------------------	----------------

603 774

17 722 474

Expenditure under budget authorisation	17 538 114
--	------------

Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads II, IV and I of the pensions budget	<u>163 629</u>
---	----------------

Total expenditure (see Appendix II)	<u>17 701 743</u>
---	-------------------

Excess of income over expenditure	F <u><u>20 731</u></u>
---	------------------------

*Financial position as at 31st December 1986**Assets*

Cash at bank	26 600
--------------------	--------

Sundry advances	298 554
-----------------------	---------

Accounts receivable	<u>351 044</u>
---------------------------	----------------

F 676 198*Liabilities*

Accounts payable	655 467
------------------------	---------

Excess of income over expenditure	<u>20 731</u>
---	---------------

F 676 198*Certified correct:*

Jean-Marie CARO
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Dudley SMITH
*Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration*

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE

(in French francs)

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1986 ¹
HEAD I – PERMANENT STAFF		
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Basic salaries	6 877 800
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Allowances	
2.1.	Expatriation allowance	605 000
2.2.	Household allowance	280 000
2.3.	Allowance for children and other dependent persons	227 900
2.4.	Rent allowance	42 000
2.5.	Education allowance	90 000
2.6.	Allowance for language courses	2 000
2.7.	Overtime	50 000
2.8.	Home leave	35 000
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Social charges	
3.1.	Social security	919 000
3.2.	Supplementary insurance	261 400
3.3.	Provident fund	130 000
<i>Sub-Head 4</i>	Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	
4.1.	Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts	15 000
4.2.	Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	15 000
4.3.	Removal expenses	80 000
4.4.	Installation allowance	70 000
<i>Sub-Head 5</i>	Medical examination	8 000
Total of Head I		9 708 100

1. Documents 1030, 1071 and 1071 Addendum.

IX II

ND UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1986

ncs)

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		10 753	6 867 047	6 863 397	3 650
			605 000	581 797	23 203
			280 000	257 461	22 539
			227 900	218 586	9 314
			42 000	29 628	12 372
			90 000	83 535	6 465
	532		2 532	2 532	-
	10 221		60 221	60 221	-
			35 000	20 847	14 153
		4 023	914 977	886 838	28 139
	1 217		262 617	262 617	-
	2 806		132 806	132 806	-
			15 000	821	14 179
			15 000	1 669	13 331
			80 000	74 298	5 702
			70 000	54 402	15 598
			8 000	6 140	1 860
	14 776	14 776	9 708 100	9 537 595	170 505

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1986	
HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF			
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly		
6.1.	Sittings service	950 000	
6.2.	Interpretation service	340 000	
6.3.	Translation service	620 000	
6.4.	Other services	40 000	
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	400 000	
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	80 000	
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Social charges		
9.1.	Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	3 000	
9.2.	Provident fund for interpreters	75 000	
9.3.	Insurance for interpreters	3 000	
Total of Head II		2 511 000	
HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT			
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	430 000	
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Hire of committee rooms	15 000	
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	340 000	
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Various services for the organisation of sessions	45 000	
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	15 000	
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Purchase or repair of office furniture	25 500	
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	94 800	
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	390 800	
Total of Head III		1 356 100	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	23 755		973 755	973 755	-
		17 302	322 698	322 698	-
		22 315	597 685	597 685	-
		5 547	34 453	34 453	-
	5 360		405 360	481 642	76 282
	9 448		89 448	89 448	-
	535		3 535	3 535	-
	6 363		81 363	81 363	-
		297	2 703	2 703	-
	45 461	45 461	2 511 000	2 587 282	76 282
		35 128	394 872	389 788	5 084
			15 000	-	15 000
	10 397		350 397	350 397	-
			45 000	43 514	1 486
			15 000	1 242	13 758
	5 860		31 360	31 360	-
	18 871		113 671	113 671	-
			390 800	311 325	79 475
	35 128	35 128	1 356 100	1 241 297	114 803

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1986	
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480 000	
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	250 000	
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Printing and publication of documents	1 150 000	
<i>Sub-Head 21</i>	Purchase of documents	50 000	
<i>Sub-Head 22</i>	Official cars	100 000	
<i>Sub-Head 23</i>	Bank charges	500	
Total of Head IV		2 030 500	
HEAD VI – OTHER EXPENDITURE			
<i>Sub-Head 24</i>	Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	150 000	
<i>Sub-Head 25</i>	Expenses for representation	170 000	
<i>Sub-Head 26</i>	Committee study missions	3 300	
<i>Sub-Head 27</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk	350 000	
<i>Sub-Head 28</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	
<i>Sub-Head 29</i>	Expenditure on information	300 000	
<i>Sub-Head 30</i>	Expenses for political groups	300 000	
<i>Sub-Head 31</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	
<i>Sub-Head 32</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	
Total of Head V		1 366 300	
Total		16 972 000	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	25 836		505 836	505 836	-
	324		250 324	252 899	2 575
		25 872	1 124 128	1 124 128	-
			50 000	51 320	1 320
			100 000	170 061	70 061
		288	212	212	-
	26 160	26 160	2 030 500	2 104 456	73 956
		20 740	129 260	81 797	47 463
	15 823		185 823	185 823	-
	4 108		7 408	7 408	-
			350 000	315 378	34 622
			70 000	56 403	13 597
			300 000	278 126	21 874
			300 000	300 000	-
			3 000	978	2 022
	809		20 809	20 809	-
	20 740	20 740	1 366 300	1 246 722	119 578
	142 265	142 265	16 972 000	16 717 352	254 648

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET		Total budget for 1986	
HEAD I – PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES			
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Pensions and leaving allowances		
1.1.	Retirement pensions	645 700	
1.2.	Invalidity pensions	198 000	
1.3.	Survivors' pensions	45 500	
1.4.	Orphans' or dependants' pensions		
1.5.	Leaving allowances		
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Family allowances		
2.1.	Household allowances	27 900	
2.2.	Children's and dependants' allowances	24 100	
2.3.	Education allowances	10 400	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Supplementary insurance	19 400	
Total of Head I		971 000	
Total		17 943 000	

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1986, and paid for up to 31st Ma

Jean-Marie CARO
President of the Assembly

Georg
Clerk of t

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	1 431		647 131	660 522	13 391
	5		198 005	198 005	-
		306	45 194	45 194	-
	44		27 944	27 944	-
	176		24 276	24 276	-
		3 378	7 022	7 022	-
	2 028		21 428	21 428	-
	3 684	3 684	971 000	984 391	13 391
	145 949	145 949	17 943 000	17 701 743	241 257

87, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

Dudley SMITH
*Chairman of the Committee on
 Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

IOULIAS

APPENDIX III

**STATEMENT OF SUMS RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY
BUDGET FOR 1986**

Member states	600ths	Contributions overpaid in 1985	Budget deficit 1985	Budget for 1986	Budget for 1986 (Revised)	Net contributions required
		F	F	F	F	F
Belgium	59	(-) 16 539	14 894	1 652 973	30 365	1 681 693
France	120	(-) 33 638	30 293	3 361 980	61 760	3 420 395
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(-) 33 638	30 293	3 361 980	61 760	3 420 395
Italy	120	(-) 33 638	30 293	3 361 980	61 760	3 420 395
Luxembourg	2	(-) 560	504	56 034	1 030	57 008
Netherlands	59	(-) 16 539	14 894	1 652 973	30 365	1 681 693
United Kingdom	120	(-) 33 638	30 293	3 361 980	61 760	3 420 395
	600	(-) 168 190	151 464	16 809 900	308 800	17 101 974

APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1986

in French francs

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward:</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1986	3 222 858	Withdrawals	8 500
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	207 262	Management fee	14 487
Repayments of loans by staff members	87 336		
Interest received during the year	220 984		
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1986	110 962	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1986	3 826 415
	3 849 402		3 849 402
	3 849 402		3 849 402

Jean-Marie CARO
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Dudley SMITH
*Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing account. In my opinion the account presents fairly the financial position of the provident fund at 31st December 1986.

JEROOM VAN DE VELDE
*Premier Président de
la Cour des Comptes de Belgique,
Commissaire aux Comptes*

16th June 1987

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1986*

**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1986¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1986, together with the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mr. Sinesio, Mrs. Pack (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Beysen, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Bohl (Alternate: Hunault), Chartron, Declercq, Dhaille, Ferrari Aggradi, Freeson (Alternate: Woodall), Mrs. Herfkens, MM. Klejdzinski, Morris, Oehler, Pollidoro, Rauti, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Stokes, van Tets (Alternate: van der Werff), Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Communications from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council
concerning the meetings of senior officials from
the ministries for foreign affairs and defence
of WEU member states on the situation in the Gulf
held in The Hague on 20th August and 15th September 1987*

The Hague, 31st August 1987

Sir,

In view of the interest often expressed by the Assembly in the implications that crises occurring in other regions may have for Europe and bearing in mind our discussions in The Hague on 7th July 1987, I wish to inform you personally as follows.

On 20th August, the presidency convened a group of senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the member states of WEU to consider the situation in the Gulf. The presidency acted in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and the decision taken in Rome in October 1984 to hold consultations whenever necessary on the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. To my knowledge, this is the first time such a meeting has been held. We agreed to consider these matters in more depth in order to bring about greater co-operation.

For your information and that of the Assembly, I enclose the guidelines for the press agreed upon at the close of the meeting on 20th August.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Hans van den Broek

Mr. Charles Goerens,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union

Guidelines for the press

1. At the invitation of the Netherlands, which chairs the Western European Union, high officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the member states met in The Hague on 20th August 1987 to consider the different aspects of the situation in the Gulf area in the context of the current efforts of the United Nations to bring an end to the Iraq-Iran conflict. This meeting was held pursuant to Article VIII of the WEU treaty and, more recently, to the decision taken by ministers in Rome in October 1984 to consider whenever appropriate the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.
2. We had a thorough and useful exchange that contributed to a harmonisation of views. It was agreed to continue this process of concertation.
3. It was stressed that Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully implemented forthwith so as to bring the conflict between Iraq and Iran to an end. Member countries of WEU will continue to support all efforts aimed at achieving this. In this context they reiterated their support for the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
4. Europe's vital interests require that the freedom of navigation in the Gulf be assured at all times. The member states strongly condemned all actions contrary to that principle.
5. Participants took note of the measures already undertaken or envisaged by individual member countries. They agreed to continue to consult each other and exchange information in order to further develop their co-operation.

*
* *

The Hague, 18th September 1987

Sir,

By letter of 31st August, I drew your attention to the fact that a group of senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence had met for the first time in The Hague on 20th August to discuss the situation in the Gulf region. In accordance with the decision taken at that meeting and on the initiative of the presidency, a further meeting of members of WEU was held in The Hague on 15th September.

The exchange of views proved very useful and will be continued. I think that in this way a process of consultation on problems relating to crises in other regions will gradually emerge.

I enclose the guidelines for the information of the press issued by the presidency on 15th September.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Hans van den Broek

Mr. Charles Goerens,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union

Guidelines for the press

At the invitation of the Netherlands, which chairs Western European Union, and pursuant to the decision they took at their meeting of 20th August 1987 to continue to consult each other and exchange information in order to further develop their co-operation, high officials of the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the member states met in The Hague on 15th September 1987.

They had a thorough exchange of views on recent developments in the Gulf and the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations to bring to an end the conflict between Iraq and Iran. They again stressed that Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully implemented forthwith. They will continue to support the efforts of the Secretary-General and of the Security Council.

They underlined the importance they attach to the principle of freedom of navigation. They noted the decisions taken by some member countries since the last meeting to commit naval forces to the Gulf region.

Participants reiterated their decision to continue the process of concertation. It was agreed that representatives of the member countries of WEU will continue to meet to exchange information and to discuss related issues.

*Revision and interpretation of the
Rules of Procedure*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges ²
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT DECISION

on the revision of Rules 7, 8, 12 and 48 of the Rules of Procedure

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur

1. Adopted unanimously in committee.

2. Members of the committee: *Sir Geoffrey Finsberg* (Chairman); MM. *van der Werff*, *Lacour* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *André* (Alternate: *Bohl*), *Antoni*, *Antretter*, *Bordu*, *Cerexhe*, *Coleman* (Alternate: *Parry*), *Corrie* (Alternate: *Jessel*), *Eysink*, *Gorla*, *Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges* (Alternate: *Goerens*), MM. *Marchio*, *Péciaux*, *Rodota*, *Scheer*, *von Schmude*, *Sirgue*, *Unland*, *Woodall*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Decision

on the revision of Rules 7, 8, 12 and 48 of the Rules of Procedure

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To amend Rules 7, 8, 12 and 48 as follows:

1. *Rule 7*

Add the following sentence at the end of paragraph 3:

“ An alternate must be of the same nationality as the titular member he may be asked to replace. ”

Replace paragraph 4 by the following text:

“ Any titular member of a committee who is prevented from attending a meeting shall arrange to be replaced by a representative or substitute appointed for the purpose. If the latter is unable to attend, the chairman of the committee must be informed of the name of the other member of his national delegation who is authorised to take his place. ”

2. *Rule 8*

Replace paragraph 1 by the following text:

“ The term of office of representatives and substitutes shall take effect from the date of the communication of the statement of the ratification of the credentials by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or, if the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been unable to ratify the credentials, from the date of the ratification of their credentials by the WEU Assembly in accordance with Rule 6, paragraph 2. ”

3. *Rule 12*

Add the following sentence at the end of paragraph 1:

“ A Vice-President may not replace the President during a debate in which he has taken part nor speak in a debate over which he has already presided. ”

4. *Rule 48*

Replace paragraph 2 by the following text:

“ The Assembly or, in between sessions or part-sessions, the Presidential Committee, in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, may, if necessary, approve supplementary estimates of expenditure, but if the latter so acts it shall submit its decision to the next sitting of the Assembly for ratification. ”

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur)

Interpretation of Rule 7

1. Like the appointment of substitutes in the Assembly, the appointment of alternates in committees is designed to assist in obtaining a quorum in spite of the many commitments of parliamentarians.

2. The status of Assembly substitutes and committee alternates is similar. Just as a substitute exercises his duties only if he signs the register of attendance in the place of a representative, so an alternate exercises his duties only if he replaces a titular member who is absent. It should be added that substitutes may attend Assembly debates even if they are not replacing a representative but then they do not have the right to vote and consequently will not be given a voting card. Similarly, the alternate of a titular member present may attend a committee meeting but is not entitled to vote, but both a substitute and an alternate may speak, the former in the Assembly and the latter in committee.

3. It must be borne in mind that under Rule 38(6), proposals for the composition of committees, taking into account the representation of political tendencies, are submitted to the Assembly which "shall decide by secret vote disputed nominations for one or more seats in a committee". Thus, the composition of a committee is determined in the last resort by the Assembly; in practice candidatures have always been submitted by national delegations, and there appears to be no precedent for a disputed candidature being settled by the plenary Assembly. Rule 38 makes no provision for the appointment of alternates to committees. The practice of delegations submitting and the Assembly ratifying an alternate member as well as a titular member for each national seat on a committee appears to be a matter of usage, designed to facilitate the application of Rule 7 which alone makes specific reference to alternate members.

4. When a titular member is replaced by an alternate therefore the presumption, in the light of Rule 38(6), is that the replacement should respect the principles underlying the composition of the committee as approved by the Assembly.

5. A titular member unable to attend a meeting arranges to be replaced by the alternate appointed for this purpose. The names of alternates are therefore listed opposite the titular

committee members they are required to replace. The priority of the alternate appointed over any other alternates should be specified in the Rules of Procedure of the WEU Assembly as it is in the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

6. Nevertheless, some flexibility is customary in designating alternates. When his titular member is present, an alternate may replace another titular member who is absent if that member's alternate is also absent.

7. In this connection, the committee chairman merely ensures that replacements conform with the Rules of Procedure and, in particular, that the alternate is of the same nationality as the titular member.

8. So that the notification of alternates is always clear, it is proposed that the replacement be notified to the chairman and the committee by being entered on the list of committee members kept by the secretariat at the entrance to the committee room, the name of the titular member replaced being shown. It goes without saying that if the titular member concerned arrives later his alternate will stand down at least as long as the latter is present.

9. A special case exists when an alternate is taken from outside the committee. Obviously, the alternate must be of the same nationality. The political aspects of choosing alternates, should be settled within each national delegation. Whilst it is for the titular member to inform the chairman which other member of his national delegation is authorised to take his place, he may do so through the medium of the member of the Assembly who is to take his place. The chairman will take note of this after ensuring that it conforms with the Rules of Procedure.

10. To sum up, the wording of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure might be made clearer and more precise if it followed closely the wording of Rule 45, paragraph 13, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Council of Europe. This is proposed in the amendment included in the preliminary draft decision above.

Rule 8

11. The term of office of a representative or substitute implies the right to sit and exercise all responsibilities in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. The exercise of this right depends on the ratification of credentials.

12. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has not been able to effect this ratification, it is for the WEU Assembly to ratify them in accordance with Rule 6, paragraph 2, "on the basis of the official documents supplied... by the parliaments or governments of member states subject to conformity with the subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe". The term of office of representatives and substitutes cannot therefore take effect from the date of their nomination by the member states but only from the date of ratification of credentials attested by this act. For that reason it is proposed to draft Rule 8, paragraph 1, as follows:

"The term of office of representatives and substitutes shall take effect from the date of the communication of the statement of the ratification of the credentials by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or, if the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been unable to ratify the credentials, from the date of the ratification of their credentials by the WEU Assembly in accordance with Rule 6, paragraph 2."

Rule 12

13. The purpose of the proposed amendment is to extend to Vice-Presidents the restrictions imposed on the President of the Assembly by the new provisions of Rule 11, paragraph 2, regarding participation in a debate. It would be wholly improper to preside over one's own case, i.e. to be the impartial chairman of a debate or part of a debate and take part in it oneself.

14. The amendment proposed is therefore to add the following sentence at the end of Rule 12, paragraph 1:

"A Vice-President may not replace the President during a debate in which he has taken part nor speak in a debate over which he has already presided."

Mandate of the Presidential Committee for approving provisional statements of expenditure (Rule 48, paragraph 2)

15. The conditions for drawing up the budget are set out in Article VIII of the Charter and Rule 48, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure. The Assembly's responsibility is necessarily engaged in this process and is expressed in its approval of a "provisional statement of expenditure" or "draft budget" set out in a report by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration prepared in co-operation with the Presidential Committee. Rule 48, paragraph 2, states

that it may also approve supplementary estimates of expenditure.

16. However, it should be stipulated that, in this specific case, it is possible to apply the procedure set out in Rule 14, paragraph 2, on the action the Presidential Committee is authorised to take in between sessions or part-sessions to allow the Assembly's work to be properly carried on. It may on occasion be necessary to adopt a draft supplementary budget as a matter of urgency. This happened at the beginning of 1986 after a decision by the Council in December 1985 to increase certain salaries to take account of inflation. The resulting supplementary expenditure could no longer be included in the draft budget as it had already been adopted by the Assembly at its session which had just been concluded. The revised draft budget adopted by the Assembly for the financial year 1986 therefore included an amount to offset part of the backdated salary increases which could not be met from the budget for the financial year 1985 and consequently had to be charged to the budget for the financial year 1986. The Council had agreed to this procedure.

17. However, comments were made about the procedure by the Auditor who, after auditing the accounts for the financial year 1985, considered it was not entirely in accordance with good accounting practice.

18. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration examined this matter and felt the Rules of Procedure should be made more flexible so as to allow the Presidential Committee, subject to subsequent ratification by the Assembly, to adopt a draft supplementary budget in the context of its responsibilities under Rule 14, paragraph 2, for ensuring that the Assembly's activities between sessions are properly carried on.

19. It is therefore proposed to amend Rule 48, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure by replacing Rule 48, paragraph 2, by the following text:

"The Assembly or, in between sessions or part-sessions, the Presidential Committee, in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, may, if necessary, approve supplementary estimates of expenditure, but if the latter so acts it shall submit its decision to the next sitting of the Assembly for ratification."

Procedure applicable in plenary sitting to amendments withdrawn by their authors (Rule 29)

20. The problem has arisen several times as to whether an amendment withdrawn by its author could be moved by another representative.

Although the Rules of Procedure say nothing about this possibility, the presidency has always considered that any member of the Assembly was entitled to take over an amendment thus withdrawn.

21. It should be pointed out that an amendment withdrawn by its author has been tabled within the time limit prescribed in the Rules of Procedure. Having been distributed to all members of the Assembly, it is not therefore a new text which could be opposed for not having been tabled in time and there should be nothing to prevent a member of the Assembly taking

over such an amendment which has been tabled and then withdrawn.

22. It should be made clear that the original member who tabled the amendment is either absent or, if present, is seeking leave from the Assembly to withdraw it and what actually happens in the case under consideration is that another member is refusing to permit such leave to be granted or the item to be lost through the absence of the original mover.

23. It might therefore be specified in the future handbook on procedure that an amendment withdrawn by its author may be taken over and moved by another representative.

Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Pannella

1. Add the following new text at the beginning of paragraph 4 of the draft decision proper:
“ Replace paragraph 1 by the following text:
The draft budget of the Assembly shall be drawn up by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in consultation with the Presidential Committee.
This draft budget shall be submitted to the Council which may make comments in the form of amendments thereto.
Thus amended, the draft budget shall be re-examined by the Assembly in accordance with the following procedure:
 - if the Council has not amended the draft budget, it shall be agreed to by the Assembly by simple majority;
 - if the Council has amended the draft budget, the Assembly may ratify it by simple majority or itself amend the draft budget as amended by the Council. Any amendment to the Council’s amendments to the draft budget must be approved by an absolute majority.The budget thus adopted shall be proclaimed adopted by the President, who shall communicate it to the Council. ”

Signed: Pannella

1. See 6th sitting, 30th November 1987 (amendment ruled out of order).

Recent developments in Soviet external policy

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Pécriaux, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Close, Burger (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Bassinet, Baumel (Alternate: Seitlinger), Bianco, Dejardin, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Hardy, Hill, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martino, Masciadri, Mechttersheimer, du Monceau de Bergendal (Alternate: Pécriaux), Muller, Pontillon, Reddemann, Ruet (Alternate: Chénard), Rumpf, van der Sanden, Shelton, Spitella (Alternate: Amadei), Stoffelen, Vecchietti (Alternate: Antoni).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation***on recent developments in Soviet external policy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that, if confirmed and pursued, the policy of reform and openness undertaken by the Soviet Union opens the way for a far-reaching change in relations between Eastern and Western Europe, important disarmament measures and a consolidation of international peace;
- (ii) Noting that the prospects for “reality and guarantees for a secure world” expressed by Mr. Gorbachev on 17th September 1987 very largely respond to Western Europe’s aspirations, but considering that Soviet practice should correspond more to these words;
- (iii) Considering that the CSCE is the framework in which the conditions for new relations between the two parts of Europe can be worked out, provided adequate progress is accomplished in each of the three baskets;
- (iv) Welcoming the progress achieved in the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons but noting that Western Europe’s security also requires agreements on the verified limitation of strategic weapons, on a balance of conventional weapons and on banning the use of chemical weapons with the progressive destruction of existing stocks;
- (v) Noting that the principal threats to international peace now originate in regions outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (vi) Stressing that a concern of the WEU Council should be to concert the action of member countries to restore peace by the application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 and to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf;
- (vii) Welcoming the fact that the Assembly has been able to start a dialogue with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on the conditions of European security and hoping that it will be possible to continue these exchanges of views,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly the evolution of relations between Eastern and Western Europe;
2. Urge both the United States and the Soviet Union to implement any Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons, while assuring Europe that there will be a determined and vigorous effort to achieve an early, satisfactory outcome to negotiations on other categories of weapons;
3. Through close consultations, seek to uphold joint positions in all meetings held in the framework of the CSCE in order to obtain substantial, balanced results in negotiations held in the context of each of the three baskets, including:
 - (a) the early conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of conventional weapons restoring the balance of forces in Europe and including a satisfactory system of verification;
 - (b) the liberalisation of exchanges of ideas and the free movement of persons between Eastern and Western Europe;
 - (c) the definition of the obligations of each country taking part in the conference, particularly in regard to human rights and the environment;
 - (d) the development of economic, scientific and cultural relations between the two parts of Europe;
 - (e) respect for the sovereignty and independence of all states.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Pécriaux, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Whereas until 1984 a feature of Soviet external policy had been its remarkable continuity, or, one might even say, extreme caution and slow development, the arrival of Mr. Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party was followed by many initiatives in particularly fast succession which forced the western countries, and probably other countries including members of the Warsaw Pact, to embark upon unaccustomed intellectual and diplomatic exercises in order to respond to them. Two years later, the purpose of the present report is first to consider to what extent changes in the style of Soviet diplomacy also relate to its aims and methods and second to study how WEU, and the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance in general, can and must react to the new Soviet external policy.

2. The Assembly has a particular obligation to do this since it was the subject of a special approach by the Soviet Union, which invited a delegation of parliamentarians to visit Moscow in April 1987. This was something quite new since the Soviet Union had hitherto condemned the very existence of WEU, which, as the Brussels newspaper *Le Soir* recalled, the Soviet press considered to be a mainstay of NATO and had, from the very outset, accused of supporting a warmongering policy. As certain Soviet authorities made clear to your Rapporteur, there is no doubt that the reactivation of WEU led the Soviet Union to take a second look at the present and future of the organisation. They made no secret of the fact that, while considering it was for the Western European countries to consult each other as they thought fit on economic matters that concerned them, and that political co-operation was natural, provided it was not directed against the Soviet Union, they felt the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to the creation of any new military grouping because this would affect its security. Consequently, should it seem that WEU was about to have its own armed forces, the Soviet Union would reserve the right to express a critical opinion.

3. Experience derived from exchanges of views by certain members of the Assembly with Soviet authorities exercising considerable responsibility in foreign policy matters could but lead to the presentation of reports and it is the task of the General Affairs Committee to present to the Assembly the political conclusions drawn from these exchanges. However, these conclusions cannot be limited to purely diplomatic considerations and it is essential to place the Soviet

Union's external action in a wider context. The seriousness and permanency of Soviet initiatives can be assessed only by examining the reasoning behind them. Your Rapporteur will therefore pay particular attention to recent ideological and economic developments in the Soviet Union and will not confine himself to examining undertakings that directly concern Europe or the western world but will assess the country's overall external policy. Conversely, in accordance with the decision taken by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on 27th July 1987, he will leave it to the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to study in depth the question of disarmament, which is the responsibility of that committee.

4. The forty-two years which have elapsed since the end of the European aspect of the second world war have been marked by the discovery and development of nuclear weapons and the start of man's mastery of space. At the same time, the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have taken on new dimensions giving them a considerable lead in these two areas and thus a prime position in terms of military power. For the first time in history, therefore, hostilities between the two great powers could lead to worldwide disaster. Nuclear fire-power has a decisive impact as a factor of balance and consequently of peace between the powers. However, to quote the French political economist, Jacques Vernant, "nuclear potentials do not cancel each other out like two terms in an equation that equal zero: even if they are never to be used, which is the aim, they nevertheless exist. Conventional warfare below the nuclear threshold is difficult to imagine, if not impossible, for those who have nuclear fire-power".

5. Yet the caution imposed by the enormous risks involved and fear of the unknown establishes only a fragile form of peace. Only the dialogue and the agreements to which it must lead can avert the danger of a war which is still a threat, less because of direct clashes between the two great powers or European matters than because of the innumerable crises throughout the rest of the world where the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is not so strong.

6. Present military and strategic parity remains the decisive factor in war not being started, but the question is whether raising the level of parity enhances or, on the contrary, threatens world security. According to Mr. Gorbachev, disarmament is of historic importance and, today, the eastern and western countries have no choice other than to reach

agreement on a radical reduction in the levels of military confrontation. He links the consolidation of peace closely with the reduction of these levels, particularly those of nuclear weapons, but it is evident that reductions have to be a consequence of a more global development of détente and must concern all armaments, including conventional and above all chemical weapons whose early, total and verified elimination is an important aim for the West.

7. However, until 1984 negotiations to determine the conditions for a parity of forces on each side produced only very limited results, whether in nuclear or conventional weapons. In the conventional area, it was on 14th February 1985 that the Soviet Union proposed basic provisions for an agreement of three years' duration on initial reductions by the Soviet Union and the United States of forces and weapons in the central region of Europe and on a subsequent no-increase commitment to be applied to the levels of armed forces.

8. On 5th December 1985, NATO accepted these basic provisions as a starting point for negotiations. But for the West confidence is a prior condition for progress in any subsequent negotiations towards the agreed goal of parity and, to ensure this, verification is the key factor in any agreement on the control of armaments. But on 20th February 1986 the Soviet Union, while maintaining its proposal for agreement on armaments, recalled its reservations on the question of verification.

9. On 28th and 29th May 1987, the member countries of the Warsaw Pact met in the German Democratic Republic at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. This meeting started by analysing the situation in the world and in Europe. Noting an evolution in the international situation, the existence of growing interdependence of states and technical and scientific progress leading towards particularly powerful weapons of destruction, these countries concluded that there would be no victor in a nuclear war and proposed denouncing the concept of nuclear deterrence and seeking a new political line of thought and a new approach to the problems of war and peace. In the words of the conference, the fundamental goal is to prevent war and hence to promote disarmament. For this purpose, there must be a climate and relationship of confidence between states, particularly those with different social systems. The member states of the Warsaw Pact thus stressed the defensive nature of their military doctrine. The points of view of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance are certainly not very different, which opens the door to agreements between the two great powers on the reduction of nuclear weapons and wider negotiations on other aspects of disarmament.

10. The measures proposed by the Warsaw Pact countries for attaining this aim are:

- an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on medium-range missiles;
- a reduction in strategic weapons;
- a total ban on nuclear tests;
- strengthening the ABM treaty provisions;
- eliminating chemical weapons.

On the basis of bi- or multilateral negotiations, agreements would be concluded on disarmament, ranging from the process of reducing armed forces and armaments to appropriate reductions in military expenditure by states and the creation of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons in Central Europe. But the question of verification has never led to firm proposals.

11. The stated aim of the Warsaw Pact countries was improved confidence and the development of relations between states parties to the conference on security and co-operation in Europe on political, economic and humanitarian matters, excluding any activities deemed to be anti-communist. This would therefore imply determination to set up a global system of international peace and security and to promote economic, scientific and technical co-operation beneficial to all states. This initiative, aimed inter alia at bringing about an atmosphere of confidence and openness, would in the long run lead to a worldwide security system guaranteed by the United Nations if the international community managed to define and have adopted a system of verification and implementing measures accepted by all. In a particularly remarkable article published in Pravda and Izvestia on the occasion of the forty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly on 17th September 1987, Mr. Gorbachev reviewed all these ideas, associating closely, in the context of this worldwide security system, disarmament, the promotion of human rights, the development of ecological security, the transformation of the third world and strengthening the authority of the United Nations.

12. This attitude on the part of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, and more specifically the Soviet Union, expressed among others by the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, raises a whole series of questions that Europe must answer if it wishes to guarantee its democracy, preserve its security and protect its culture.

13. In particular, it must ask itself whether the Soviet Union is sincere in its proposals, whether aims other than disarmament, especially in

political, economic and ideological matters, are hiding behind these proposals, whether the Soviet Union has the wherewithal to follow up this new course, whether Europe can count on a substantial, lasting change in the Soviet Union and whether disarmament is really the key to greater security in the world or whether it might not aggravate other problems, such as that of the underdeveloped countries, since the East-West dialogue does not necessarily solve North-South problems.

14. To understand the scope of these proposals, the present situation in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries must first be analysed in order to determine all the pros and cons of this new course. Consideration will then be given to the extent to which the policy effectively pursued by the Soviet Union in the last two years has conformed to this proclaimed course and facilitated an agreement on disarmament.

II. The ideological dimensions of the problem

15. While, when the Third International was founded, the Soviet Union considered itself to be the country whose main vocation, having succeeded a revolution, i.e. power having been taken over by the Communist Party, was to spread this revolution throughout the world, the question today is whether worldwide revolution is still its aim, at least in the reasonably long term. During the seventy years which have elapsed since the Bolshevik revolution Soviet ideology has indeed evolved, taken shape and changed so that it has often been wondered whether the underlying Marxist philosophy was still its real basis or whether history had not imposed a new ideology for which Marxism proper was no more than a label giving only a very approximate definition of the contents.

16. To keep to questions of foreign policy, it is clear that until the death of Stalin in 1953 the Soviet Union considered its relations with the capitalist world had to be warlike because the relationship between middle classes and proletariat and hence between socialist and capitalist states was based on an irreconcilable struggle. Admittedly, in this struggle every kind of tactic was allowed: the other side could be divided, the so-called socialist side materially strengthened and the capitalist world's grasp on the "colonial or semi-colonial countries" broken. An armed confrontation seemed inevitable but it was to be delayed until the Soviet Union could launch it with every chance of success. This made the Soviet Union develop a very pacifist way of speaking, while devoting all its efforts to building up military power which was to become the strongest in the world. At home, it also pursued a policy of constraint and repression to make the population accept the sacrifices necessary for the

salvation of the motherland of revolution and abroad it pursued a policy of isolation to spare the Soviet public any contamination by capitalism and also any possibility of comparing its standard of living with that of the western democratic nations.

17. The period dominated by the personality of Nikita Khrushchev marked the first step in the evolution of this ideology: there was certainly no question of abolishing the dogma according to which the class struggle was inevitable and led only to the victory of the proletariat, i.e. the Soviet Communist Party and its allies taking power throughout the world. However, the Soviet leaders then admitted that this struggle did not have to be military: it could also take the form of peaceful competition between the capitalist and communist worlds. The expression "peaceful coexistence" covered this new concept of international relations; it meant that war would continue but by means other than force. In fact, it was a tacit tribute to the policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance since 1949 whose aim was to convince the Soviet Union that any attack on Europe would result in its vital forces being destroyed by nuclear fire-power.

18. The competition between the two great powers was to be pursued in other ways, including a comparison between the economic and social achievements of the Soviet Union and those of the capitalist countries, and particularly the United States. The coming of "socialism" was therefore no longer postponed to the distant future when communism would have triumphed over capitalism but became a short-term objective that could be attained even before the communist parties had taken power throughout the world. Communism was to become a means of economic development allowing faster progress than capitalism could offer and satisfying the requirements of the individual in his everyday life. The negotiated limitation of armaments then became foreseeable and desirable because it was a means of making the investment necessary for redirecting agricultural and industrial production for the benefit of Soviet society as a whole.

19. However, it soon became clear that, in spite of the opening of the first United States-Soviet negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments, the Soviet Union was, on the one hand, making no serious cuts in its military expenditure and, on the other, not managing, economically, to catch up with the United States or even, in many fields, with Western Europe. The policy of opening and liberalisation pursued by Mr. Khrushchev encountered various difficulties and aroused internal opposition which considerably limited its impact and finally led to the fall of the General Secretary and the abandonment of most of his initiatives.

20. It becomes far more difficult to discern the trend of Soviet ideology in foreign policy during the years between the fall of Mr. Khrushchev and the advent of Mr. Gorbachev. The policy pursued by Mr. Andropov in particular gave rise to very different interpretations, some observers considering it to be a second step towards liberalisation of the régime while others held that continuity then constantly triumphed over the desire for reform. There is no doubt, however, that the Soviet Union spent two decades building up a first-class military force, both nuclear and conventional, which meant that it still felt threatened by the capitalist countries. The major effort it made to build up a powerful naval force that could operate on all the oceans of the world with nuclear-missile submarines, attack submarines, aircraft-carriers and land or sea-going naval bases on all the oceans is probably the most significant aspect of this policy. But it requires serious analysis.

21. Was the Soviet Union's aim to extend the boundaries of its domination in Asia, Africa and Latin America at a time when expansion in Europe had become risky and dangerous? Not without reason, the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 has been quoted in support of this possibility, as well as the deployment of Soviet forces or forces of some of its allies, particularly Cuba, and above all the development of national armed forces with Soviet support in North Africa, the Middle East, Southern and Eastern Africa and several Central American countries. Conversely, other observers stress the meagre Soviet economic commitment in these areas, its ill-adapted attempts to encourage their development and the cautious part it played in internal conflicts, except in the case of Afghanistan which, it is true, is a particularly sensitive matter for the Soviet Union because of the links between certain Soviet Asian peoples and those of Afghanistan.

22. What makes it particularly difficult to assess the ideological reasons for Soviet external policy during that period is the fact that the country's leaders probably did not hold identical views on this point. The Soviet political system has never allowed those who are not in command to express their views freely, as can be done in the western democracies, where periodical changes in the teams in power allow those who have exercised responsibilities to explain their reasons for acting as they did. What Soviet leaders say is always linked with political action, with all the constraints that this implies.

23. It is also difficult to discern to what extent the policy then pursued by the Soviet Union stemmed from ideological considerations or from purely national concerns. Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the pressure brought to bear on Poland to make its government repress unrest among the trade union

opposition and the very expression "Brezhnev doctrine", according to which the Soviet Union would accept no infringement of communist domination in Eastern Europe, can just as easily be explained in ideological terms, according to which there can be no going back on the taking of power by the proletariat, as in entirely traditional strategic terms in view of the situation of Poland and Czechoslovakia at the heart of Europe on lines of communication that open up Western Europe to Soviet armies and Soviet territory to western armies.

24. Mr. Gorbachev has certainly removed none of these ambiguities. It must not be forgotten that he did not come to power because he had beaten his political opponents in a battle of ideas but because he seemed to be the man of the new generation who was the closest to power at the right time. This situation should logically lead him to lay greater stress on continuity than on the novelty of his policy as compared with that of his predecessors. However, as the Finnish Ambassador, Max Jakobson, pointed out in two articles in the *International Herald Tribune* of 17th and 18th September 1987, conflicts between generations have played a vital rôle throughout Russian history and, after the twenty years of conservatism which marked Mr. Brezhnev's government, the advent of a new generation may lead to speedy and far-reaching changes. Insofar as this analysis is accurate, it leaves little doubt about the future of the present conflicting forces. A British writer and journalist, Mr. Brian May, drew attention in an article in *Le Monde Diplomatique* of June 1987 to an important section of Mr. Gorbachev's speech to the twenty-seventh congress of the Soviet Communist Party:

"The course of history, of social progress, requires ever more insistently that there should be constructive and creative interaction between states and peoples on the scale of the whole world. Not only does it so require, but it also creates the requisite political, social and material premises for it.

Such interaction is essential in order to prevent nuclear catastrophe, in order that civilisation could survive. It is essential in order that other worldwide problems that are growing more acute should also be resolved jointly in the interests of all concerned. The prevailing dialectics of present-day development consists in a combination of competition and confrontation between the two systems and in a growing tendency towards interdependence of the countries of the world community. This is precisely the way, through the struggle of opposites, through arduous effort, groping in the dark to some extent, as it were, that the controversial but interdependent and

in many ways integral world is taking shape.”

25. This is indeed an entirely new concept of relations between capitalist and communist countries: hitherto the only solution considered for the inevitable opposition between countries representing fundamentally antagonistic social classes was the assumption of universal power by the proletarian state. To admit that “social progress requires ever more insistently that there should be constructive and creative interaction” between all concerned and that “the prevailing dialectics of present-day developments consists in a combination of competition and confrontation between the two systems and in a growing tendency towards interdependence of the countries of the world community” gives an entirely new dimension to Soviet foreign policy. In these conditions, peaceful coexistence would in effect stop being a transitional stage in the conquest of world power by the proletarian power and become an aim in itself through recognition of the “interdependent and in many ways integral” nature of the “contradictory” world that is being formed.

26. This obviously does not mean that the Soviet Union is renouncing its positions of force, its domination of the people’s democracies, its action on the world stage or even its propaganda operations against the capitalist world. On the one hand, its security concerns are not thereby changed. Second, its will to play a rôle as world power, backed up by its nuclear and conventional military force, is not in question. Again, even assuming that Mr. Gorbachev cherishes profoundly different views on this subject from those of his predecessors, he cannot, if he wishes to remain in power, allow his policy to result in a reduction of Soviet power, of its direct or indirect influence in Eastern Europe and the world or an increase in what the Soviet Union considers to be threats to its security.

27. Finally, in view of the influence the administration must inevitably exert on Mr. Gorbachev, particularly in areas in which his personal experience is short, his undeniable Russian patriotism and his attachment to Marxism-Leninism, it is very unlikely that he will be able to escape from the suspicion of the West’s aims and methods that has predominated among Soviet leaders since 1917. How could he not think that the aim of the capitalist world is to ruin communism and his homeland? This may moreover lead him to seek a true balance of forces, meeting the wishes of the West which cannot agree either to place its fate in the hands of the Soviet Union, however pacifist the words of its leaders may be. This mutual mistrust makes negotiations arduous but helps to make them serious, since each side knows how necessary it is to reach a compromise acceptable to all.

28. Thus, the new course laid down for Soviet foreign policy by Mr. Gorbachev must not be neglected, but its impact must not be exaggerated either. It merely expresses a reality that the Soviet Union has been facing for many years without having hitherto been able to draw the consequences, i.e. the failure of a plan to conquer the world by the country which wishes to be the privileged representative of the world proletariat. However, it opens up very significant prospects for peace when it proclaims not only that the opposition between capitalism and communism cannot be solved by recourse to force but also that this opposition is in itself beneficial and must be preserved. With this in mind, disarmament, the call for human rights and exchanges of all kinds between countries with different régimes take on a very new meaning: the purpose would no longer be to use peaceful coexistence to prepare for war but to use it to organise peace. At a time when the West is trying to develop its relations with the Soviet Union and its allies, these very relations are becoming, at least according to the principal Soviet leader, a factor of peace and no longer of confrontation.

29. These are the reasons why your Rapporteur considers the ideological factor makes a major contribution to explaining Mr. Gorbachev’s initiatives, to placing international peace on sounder bases and to opening the door to disarmament. Naturally, the West cannot base its own security policy solely on what the Soviet leaders say. It must consider the underlying realities if it is not to be the dupe of propaganda or fall victim to a change in the leadership of the Soviet state.

III. Internal reforms

30. In an interesting article published in the February 1987 issue of the NATO Review, Mr. Mackintosh, consultant on Soviet affairs to the IISS in London, points out that on taking up his post as General Secretary of the party Mr. Gorbachev had little experience of foreign affairs and only fragmentary experience of economic affairs, apart from agricultural matters for which he had already exercised major responsibilities. This probably explains some of the fluctuations in the impetus he gave during his first two years of government to what he himself called perestroika, i.e. restructuring. This inexperience may also explain certain differences between the words, admittedly logical and coherent, of the General Secretary and the practice of Soviet diplomacy which on the one hand refers constantly to his speeches but on the other hand often clings to traditional practice and the defence of past positions. Mr. Gorbachev’s advisers in this field had necessarily held posts of responsibility before he came to power and can

hardly betray themselves in the opinions they give him or the actions they direct.

31. A German expert in Soviet questions, Boris Meissner, pointed out in the issue of *Aussenpolitik* for the third quarter of 1987 that the extent of the planned reforms emerged only in his 27th January 1987 address at the start of the Party Central Committee plenum. Previously, he had spoken only of the "acceleration of the country's socio-economic development on the basis of scientific and technical progress" (at the plenum in April 1985) and of a "strategy of acceleration" in Leningrad on 15th May 1985. The word *perestroika* appears only in a proposal relating to limited reforms made at the twenty-seventh party congress in February 1986.

32. There are two possible explanations for the progressive nature of this definition of the extent of the planned reforms and, far from being contradictory, they can well complement each other. The first is that Mr. Gorbachev initially considered that the economic policy pursued by his predecessors was right and that they had just not been energetic enough in applying it. It was simply difficulties encountered in the sought-for acceleration which made him realise the magnitude of the obstacles and the radical nature of the measures that must be taken to overcome them. The other explanation is that Mr. Gorbachev, aware from the outset of the magnitude of the task to be accomplished, but just as aware of the opposition that would be raised by any serious policy of reform, wished to spare the party aristocracy and the conservative elements of Soviet society by divulging his intentions only progressively to an administration which was already being purged. Whichever interpretation is chosen, it raises the question whether he has completed an evolution in his campaign or whether he will further direct his language towards a fuller revision of the Soviet system than has so far been the case.

33. The fact is that for several years the Soviet economy had been showing signs of deficiency, but it was particularly difficult to interpret them since the most prosperous western economies showed similar symptoms. Moreover, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power at a time when the team of leaders and the élite of the country were running out of breath because of their age and above all their concepts of economic and social facts: there was a huge gap between their perception of problems and the general trend of society, and the team had to be renewed.

34. The Soviet Union was burdened by a stagnant economy, cumbersome party and government administration and deep-rooted corruption and apathy in most branches of the country's economy. Workers' productivity was scandalously low. Generalised corruption was making itself felt and there was a considerable

growth in delinquency, drunkenness, drug-taking and a return to individualism. The gap was growing between public authorities and society. The sense of social interest was giving way to attachment to individual interests. Demographic statistics in particular were affected by this.

35. The death rate, particularly for children, was relatively high. The population, unequally spread over the country, showed a downward trend mainly noticeable among the European elements of the population. From an economic point of view, growth was declining, there were energy problems and investment for consumption was lagging behind – marked inflationary phenomena since production was not managing to follow wage increases granted in principle to raise the standard of living of the workers. The unduly high level of military expenditure was putting a brake on growth and the priority given to heavy industry was too great. Planning was too centralised and authoritarian and the economy was suffering from a lack of autonomy and stimulus at the level of production units. The country's economic self-sufficiency was an obstacle to performance and the share of trade in its economy was very low.

36. Aware of these facts, Mr. Gorbachev presented a programme at the twenty-seventh communist party congress and a first glimpse of the party's tasks in restructuring the economy. While showing his deep-rooted Marxist-Leninist convictions, the General Secretary expressed the feeling that the party and government administrations should be cut back, rationalised and modernised and advocated economic "yield". The main lines of his economic views were the need to adopt dynamic methods, concentrate efforts on technology and resource and energy economy, speed up the rate of scientific and technological progress, improve the quality of products, increase investment in equipment and give priority to the production of machinery. He approved the self-financing experiments under way and reaffirmed the need to reorganise the system of prices in order to give them an active rôle in economic stimulation. He also stressed the interest of authorising certain firms to adjust their own supplies and sales thanks to the creation of horizontal links between them. But the principle of planning and central controls remained a political necessity and it may be wondered to what extent this can be reconciled with recipes for economic reforms.

37. However, while affirming the absolute need for fundamental modernisation, Mr. Gorbachev seemed to be aiming above all at short-term results in order to enhance his authority. He showed himself to be a firm, determined, modern and original leader who understood the wishes and problems of the Soviet people, but while the rhetoric was new the content was less so. The influence of the personal

factor did not affect the logic of the system, to which Mr. Gorbachev proposed no remedy. This logic, which justifies the system and the powers of the leadership, remains political.

38. In fact, it was in his speech to the Central Committee plenum on 27th January 1987 that Mr. Gorbachev revealed the true extent of the reforms he was proposing to carry out, underlining the "revolutionary" character that he intended to give them. On that occasion, he made it quite clear that the measures already taken were but a beginning because "changes for the better occur only slowly". He even noted that "restructuring is proving more difficult and the reasons for the problems which have accumulated in society more deeply rooted than we initially assumed". Since then, Mr. Gorbachev has said in several speeches that his reform programme would not relate only to the economy but to the entire policy for transforming life in society, the expression "strategy of acceleration" has given way to that of "strategy of renewal" and the goal of democratisation has been clearly stated.

39. In fact, on 30th June 1987 the Supreme Soviet adopted unanimously, on a report by Mr. Andrei Gromyko, who can hardly be said to represent the new generation, the texts of three particularly significant laws. The first sought to free firms from the authority of the central planning services. The second made it possible for citizens to appeal against decisions taken by police authorities or tribunals. The third laid down methods for discussions on major aspects of the state's activities, i.e. made possible a true political debate on large-scale industrial or urbanisation projects, legislation relating to everyday life, and respect for the rights, freedoms and duties of the citizen. Of course, the maintenance of a single party still seriously limits democracy and habits and fears stemming from seventy years of dictatorship do not make it easy to apply the new legal provisions, but these laws nevertheless show intentions which go much further than the mere rectification of economic practices.

40. This evolution in official statements and the scale of the planned reforms may of course reflect the simple observation that after two years' experience touching up the economic organisation of the country was not enough to give the new impetus to the economy that the new generation of Soviet leaders seems, not without reason, to consider indispensable. In this case, it would be purely technical considerations that led Mr. Gorbachev to embark upon far more radical, extensive reforms than those he envisaged in 1984 in order to solve problems viewed initially from an economic standpoint. However, Mr. Gorbachev's statements leave room for quite another interpretation, i.e. that he was

always determined to carry out these deep-rooted reforms but was prevented from doing so by the existence and maintenance in leading posts of representatives of the previous generation, radically hostile to any serious reform relating to political or social matters, i.e. to their power and privileges. Thus, the incomplete, limited nature of the initiatives taken in 1985 and 1986 was a sign of political caution, to which less attention can henceforth be paid because of the widespread purge of state and party officials in the last two years.

41. Your Rapporteur obviously has no means of giving a verdict in this debate and even less of determining whether the Soviet administration is now prepared to follow loyally the orders of Mr. Gorbachev and his friends. Nor can he know how far Mr. Gorbachev can go in implementing a policy of liberalisation over a very broad spectrum without running the risk of giving opponents of his policy arguments and means to bring about his own fall, as was the case for Mr. Khrushchev. The fact that the new Soviet leadership is trying to situate its action in direct line with Lenin's 1921-24 NEP is extremely ambiguous since Lenin himself often indicated that recourse to capitalist methods, which he then advocated, was a provisional measure and should not prevent the state retaining real control over the economy. No one can say what Lenin's true intentions were nor a fortiori what Mr. Gorbachev's are. Mr. Gorbachev told the trade union congress in February 1987, which was not very much in favour of the reform policy, that Lenin had said it was absolutely necessary to make a clear distinction between the vital interests and the immediate interests of the working class. Restructuring harmed immediate interests but met the vital long-term interests of the working class. This gives a fairly clear indication of the scope he attributes to the reforms undertaken.

42. Real developments in the Soviet Union can be assessed not on the basis of what is said but on continuing political action, not limited to doctrinal, constitutional or legislative texts, that evolves over a long enough period for it to become irreversible, and there is no doubt that many westerners, whose work consists of observing what is happening in the Soviet Union or who have everyday contacts with representatives of that country, for instance in the framework of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, are, to say the least, cautious, if not sceptical, about the extent of liberalisation in the Soviet Union. They willingly recall the failure of the reforms undertaken by Khrushchev between 1956 and 1965. They also note that the words of the General Secretary are not quickly translated into a policy effectively applied by many services. Finally, they stress that the Central Committee negated or diluted

many proposals submitted by Mr. Gorbachev at the plenum in January 1987. Yet the meeting of the plenum, initially planned for October 1985, had had to be postponed three times to avoid a more obvious setback.

43. Boris Meissner, in the abovementioned article in *Aussenpolitik*, points out that when Mr. Gorbachev came to power he had no team or following in the machinery of government. While he has managed to find allies, they are not unconditional. The promotions made at the twenty-seventh congress concern only one-third of the members of the Central Committee and far from all the new members are in favour of reforms. This would largely explain the difficulties and delays encountered in working out and implementing the policy advocated by the new General Secretary.

44. In order to overcome this opposition and, in particular, that clearly expressed by the trade unions, Mr. Gorbachev appealed to society as a whole and first and foremost intellectuals, who can exercise an influence on it. He therefore considers democratisation of the Soviet system to be a means of imposing his policy. He expressed himself most clearly on this point on 26th February 1987, as follows:

“To make restructuring an irreversible process and to ensure that what happened in the past does not happen again, everything must be placed under the control of the people. There is only one voice, that of a broad democratisation of Soviet society. We need strong, biting democratic forms, openness, criticism and self-criticism in order at last to bring about radical transformations throughout the sphere of social life.” (Quoted by Ignacio Ramonet in *Le Monde Diplomatique* of July 1987)

45. Even the notion of glasnost, constantly put forward by Mr. Gorbachev's supporters, is not without ambiguity: is it a principle which should lead to real democratisation of society, or only a means of fighting the administration's open or masked opposition to the policy of reform? The word appears to have been used to designate two distinct practices. One is an authorisation to speak accorded by the party and concerning internal affairs alone, to criticise the administration and social practices in order to justify steps taken to remove opponents or promote greater efficiency. The desire for openness seemed very real in matters where administrative routine was at stake, particularly during the Chernobyl affair and other accidents which were more technical than political, even though the verdict of the trial of the Chernobyl officials does not appear to have been announced in the Soviet press. It was a means of overcoming administrative sluggishness and removing certain opponents of reforms. It does not seem to

play the same rôle in more sensitive matters such as those relating to nationalities. For instance, no real information was given to the public about the bitter disturbances in Kazakhstan in December 1986 and no one was able to assess the magnitude of the problems raised by the Tatars in the Crimea, known only because of quickly quelled public demonstrations in Moscow in August 1987. The same was true of certain nationalist demonstrations in the Baltic republics this summer. However, the deportation of the local inhabitants and the immigration of Russians now seems to have brought the latter into the majority in the former Baltic states. These developments were recognised quite late, the Soviet press said nothing about them and the absence of western journalists in these areas prevented the public being properly informed. There was little respect for “openness” in this matter.

46. The other concept covered by the word glasnost is believed to correspond more to the notion of openness, i.e. to give the impression, above all to foreigners, that the régime has become less secretive and less intolerant. Thus, many literary, cinematographic or artistic works, hitherto banned, have been circulated among the Soviet and foreign public. The rehabilitation of fifteen scientists who had been victims of Stalinist purges was agreed by the Soviet Supreme Court on 16th July 1987. They included Nikolai Kondratiev, author of the theory of economic cycles, Alexander Chainov, organiser of the co-operative movement in the Soviet Union, Alexander Chelnitsev, theoretician of the division of agricultural production, and Leonid Iuroski, monetary expert. All had worked out and propagated theories considered dangerous for the dogma of the communist economy and their rehabilitation seems particularly characteristic.

47. Similarly, on 13th February 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev accomplished a revolutionary act by calling on intellectuals “to see history as it is”. In a country where ideology led to history being considered from the sole point of view of the struggle of the proletariat, where falsification of the past had forged the greater part of a dogma that no one could call in question, such a statement was of very special importance. The history of the Soviet Union, as written, is too marked by justification of the worst excesses for its revision not to be explosive. Moreover, the search for historical truth affects the Soviet Union's relations with the people's democracies. Thus, in August 1986 General Jaruzelski seems to have convinced Mr. Gorbachev to re-examine the Katyn file. A joint Soviet-Polish committee of historians was set up in April 1987 to examine this subject, which has embittered relations between the two countries since 1941.

48. However, although criticism of the administration's excesses is now commonplace and it is

evident that Mr. Gorbachev is seeking the backing of the intellectuals, freedom is nevertheless not complete. Even if Mr. Gorbachev is proving responsive to the demands of the press, much information, particularly from abroad, is still carefully censored.

49. Whatever uncertainty there may still be about the true nature of the new Soviet policy, however fragile the reform team led by Mr. Gorbachev, it is probable that several elements of these reforms will remain: it is not possible – unless there is a return to Stalin-type terror – to go back on a certain degree of liberalisation of the economy, for fear of stagnation or recession. Nor is it possible to deprive the people of advantages they have gained in their standard of living or freedom without risk of serious disturbances. It is no less difficult to consider as established a policy which cannot be expressed clearly and whose implementation seems to be encountering so many difficulties.

50. These considerations are far from negligible for the West, not only because cohabitation in Europe with countries whose régime is still dictatorial and where freedoms of all kinds are not guaranteed has drawbacks that we have experienced since the iron curtain was lowered and the Berlin wall built, but also because, as long as the Soviet Union does not base the stability of its régime and hence of its external policy on the will of the people, guaranteed by democratic practices, changes that are as quick as they are unforeseeable will remain possible. Some observers, for instance, are wondering whether Mr. Gorbachev is not liable to find himself forced to provoke an outbreak of Russian nationalism in order to mobilise public opinion, and in particular that of the younger generations, in support of his reforms so as to overcome his opponents. This would obviously jeopardise the course, on the whole moderate and favourable to détente and disarmament, along which he has so far guided Soviet external policy. It is certainly not in the West's interest to counter Mr. Gorbachev's attempts or to weaken his position in the Soviet Union. But nor is it in its interest to sacrifice the guarantees of its security and international peace in response to appeals by the new Soviet leaders.

IV. European questions

51. It is in relation to European matters that Soviet diplomacy has been most active in recent years. One of its aims is obviously to avert any risk of conflict in an area that is particularly sensitive and essential for its security while it traverses a period of economic and political change. A halt to the arms race, or even real disarmament, is probably necessary if investments are to be redirected in the Soviet Union. Moreover,

if it wishes to develop its external trade, Europe – Eastern but also Western – is an essential partner for it. This is particularly so if it needs credits or foreign investment. However, it is not out of the question that in order to attain these results it may try on the one hand to separate Western Europe from the United States in order to weaken it and make it easier to impose its views and, on the other, through propaganda to promote the spread of pacifist, neutralist or even nationalist movements capable of weakening the will of the European nations to resist. It must not be forgotten that the Soviet leaders – and probably the whole population – are still convinced that the capitalist West is trying to squash the homeland of socialism. There can be no doubt that even if the Soviet disarmament proposals are perfectly sincere they are also an instrument of propaganda intended to weaken western cohesion.

(a) Soviet policy in regard to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)

52. Eastern Europe plays an essential rôle for the Soviet Union. Its domination brings obvious strategic advantages, sheltering the Soviet Union from any attack in Europe and providing it with a ramp, largely occupied by the Red Army, from which it could rapidly reach the vital centres of Western Europe. Secondly, annexing these countries to form part of the Soviet economic area has allowed their economies to be turned towards production useful to the Soviet Union and they form a protected market since their currencies are linked to the rouble and, not being convertible, the countries concerned are closed to free trade. It should be added that a not very firmly established Soviet régime would find it difficult to give up this domination because public opinion would not accept it.

53. In April 1986, NATO organised a colloquium on "The economies of Eastern Europe and their foreign economic relations" the texts of which have been published and allow the position of CMEA when Mr. Gorbachev came to power to be reviewed. Since that date, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which groups all the countries with communist régimes allied with the Soviet Union, has been unusually active, holding four sessions – of which two extraordinary – between June 1984 and December 1985.

54. In a paper submitted to the NATO colloquium, Mrs. Anita Tiraspolsky pointed out that there had been a CMEA summit meeting each time the Soviet Union was confronted with uncontrolled movements in Eastern Europe because this gave it an opportunity to reassert its authority, while Robert Wielemans considered that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe constitute an averagely-developed economic entity

with an autarkical vocation and rather mediocre performances. He said this entity was out of date and applied imperialist strategy because the socialist countries seem to conduct their economies by doing the reverse of what would seem rational on the basis of experience accumulated by the West.

55. The most frequently-quoted problems are:

- the lack of modern technology;
- the lack of adaptation of co-operation and specialisation among the CMEA member countries in relation to the requirements of modern economic management;
- the fact that industries are not managing to limit their consumption of raw materials and energy;
- a simultaneous deterioration of the energy situation in all the eastern countries since the 1973 oil crisis and the considerable increase in the price they pay for the oil they import from the Soviet Union;
- an agricultural situation which causes shortages of foodstuffs;
- the flagrant inefficiency of industrial production due to inadequate organisation;
- the absence of co-ordination in external economic relations.

56. These shortcomings have led to tension in CMEA in various areas: tension due to the lack of resources needed for growth, tension in supplies and prices, operational tension, differences of views on the theory and ideology of economic co-operation, financial tension. In fact, such tension is due to the fact that Eastern Europe is paying for a political course imposed on it by the Soviet Union. To escape from this situation, the eastern countries as a whole are trying to speed up their entry to the world economic and monetary system. In recent years, these countries have therefore become far more vulnerable to the ups and downs of the international economy, while remaining less well-equipped than the Soviet Union to face up to the consequences of the world recession, mainly because they lack oil.

57. Everyone is aware of the serious crisis now facing Poland and Romania. The situation seems little better in Bulgaria and the rapid progress made by the Hungarian economy in the previous decade, thanks to the development of co-operatives with fairly wide freedom to invest, direct their work and fix prices and profits, has been slowing down since 1980. Czechoslovakia, where the situation is better, has been forced to

increase its trade with the Soviet Union beyond reason, thus running heavily into debt and becoming extremely dependent. Finally, the GDR, which was heavily indebted to the West and had a large trade deficit with the Soviet Union, made considerable savings in energy and raw materials in 1986, with very little loss of economic growth. These results were obtained thanks to major reorganisational changes in industry, the imposition of binding obligations on production units, financial incentives and enhanced control mechanisms. All these reforms were called "perfecting the existing order". But there is grave anxiety for the future: the GDR has only a narrow range of products exportable to the West and its investment rates are falling. Furthermore, to be able to pay its debt in strong currencies it has replaced its imports from the West by goods from the East and its external trade has stopped being a growth sector, just when fulfilment of its obligations to the Soviet Union had to be postponed.

58. To examine the situation of CMEA as a whole, it was designed originally as an instrument of harmonisation and political and economic integration. Forty years later, it has become an institutional mechanism for tightening the close special relationship between each of its members and the Soviet Union. This evolution was accompanied by a constant increase in structural difficulties in the economies of the countries concerned to such an extent that the question now is whether the reforms undertaken will be successful or even whether it will be possible to make real reforms. In the foreseeable future, economic integration and specialisation in CMEA will continue at the level of countries rather than industries, and the Soviet Union will remain the cornerstone of the system. Eastern Europe has never been so dependent on the Soviet Union for its trade as it is today, particularly as it has to meet increasingly tough competition from the Far East and it largely lacks the will to reform itself. These are, at least, the conclusions of the NATO colloquium.

59. It was in the framework of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, meeting on 28th and 29th May 1987, that the solution to these problems was envisaged by Mr. Gorbachev, who proposed a more dynamic approach to co-operation in economic policy matters within CMEA and perfecting the system thanks to a true price mechanism, considered henceforth to be a vital instrument of economic and social policy.

60. But the CMEA summit meeting in June 1984 had already been the result of a new way of thinking which had been pursued since 1980, and hence prior to the election of Mr. Gorbachev, about intra-CMEA co-operation. The new leadership has merely continued and spelled out this re-examination. Its main

intention is obviously to maintain unity in the bloc by restricting margins for deviation and interlinking the socialist economies more closely. The determination of the Soviet authorities may give the impression that the revival of activity in CMEA will be a turning point in community life. This is expressed mainly in a text entitled "Complex programme for scientific and technical progress" adopted in December 1985.

61. Although following up a first programme of co-operation and integration dating back to 1971, the complex programme really came into being on 29th December 1981, the date of the American embargo on transport and energy transformation equipment for the Soviet Union following the introduction of martial law in Poland on 13th December 1981. Mr. Brezhnev was its initiator and according to the Soviet leaders this programme was a riposte to the West's scientific programmes. It consists of an industrial policy relating to five priority areas: data-processing, nuclear energy, robotics, biotechnology and composite materials. It seemed to be basically a formal document confirming tasks previously assigned by the Soviet Union to its partners for future years. Economic integration thus took a resolutely structural turn with the Soviet Union more than ever at the heart of the system. The cohesion of the community should emerge strengthened in the nineties. The feasibility of the programme nevertheless raises a problem, particularly in view of lower oil prices which hinder Soviet exports and consequently the earning of hard currency, essential for the acquisition of new technologies.

62. In any event, there is no reason to expect that the complex programme will lead to the harmonisation of national positions and the specific interests of each participant with those of the Soviet Union. The only alternative seems to be between the introduction of true prices and currencies, still far from existing in the Soviet Union itself, leading to integration through the market which, as in the Soviet Union, raises the question of whether it is possible to change behaviour and management methods without jeopardising the whole system, or the maintenance of forced co-operation with no real joint industrial policy or reconciliation of the interests of each party. In other words, it is hardly possible to consider a noticeable change in the system of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe as long as the Soviet Union has not itself completed a deep-rooted reform that Mr. Gorbachev has so far merely announced and set in motion.

(b) Security and co-operation in Europe

63. Since the Helsinki conference in 1975, the conference on security and co-operation in Europe has been extended considerably, at least in regard to the number of meetings and confer-

ences held under its aegis, although it is to be deplored that application of the measures in the Helsinki final act is still fragmentary and very insufficient. It will be remembered that it was a Soviet initiative that gave rise to the CSCE: an all-European conference was to be convened to organise peace and to develop exchanges in Europe and, under this pretext, the Soviet Union sought to have all the European countries recognise the states and frontiers resulting from the second world war. The Western European countries agreed to take part only subject to a number of conditions, i.e. that their United States and Canadian partners could take part, that exchanges of information and persons would be considered and above all that the question of human rights would be included in the agenda of the conference. In these conditions, the final act represented a balanced set of mutual concessions. However, application of the decisions relating to human rights and the exchange of goods and persons was a long-term process and the Helsinki conference was to be followed by so-called verification conferences to ascertain what action had been taken by each participant on the final act, to go into the provisions in greater detail and to extend them.

64. While in the field of confidence-building measures, i.e. mainly the observation of military manoeuvres of some magnitude, the Helsinki final act was fairly satisfactorily applied, the provisions relating to individual rights and exchanges of all kinds have raised considerable difficulties, particularly as in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries opponents of the prevailing régimes were able to invoke the commitments entered into by their countries to call for freedoms denied to them, including, in many cases, the right to emigrate. When Mr. Gorbachev came to power, it was to be wondered whether the process started in Helsinki would be pursued. As recently as 1985 and 1986, meetings of experts held in Ottawa and Bern on human rights, as well as the Budapest cultural forum, were a failure.

65. However, it very soon became clear that the new Soviet leaders would give new impetus to the CSCE. They were bound to do so for several reasons. The disarmament undertaking on which they were relying in order to develop their economic programme seemed to have little chance of succeeding if not accompanied by a true policy of détente, linked in western eyes with the application of all the principles defined in Helsinki. Secondly, Mr. Gorbachev could count on the commitments entered into by his predecessors to promote, in the Soviet Union itself, the policy of liberalisation that he considered essential.

66. The Stockholm conference held from 17th January 1984 to 22nd September 1986 led to the adoption of a major text on confidence- and

security-building measures which lists ten principles showing a commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force and recognising the sovereign rights of each state. In accordance with these principles, the participating states adopted a series of measures which may be grouped under three heads:

(a) First, the undertaking to give prior notification of military activities above a certain level. This was to be done in two ways;

(i) by publishing an annual calendar of planned exercises exceeding certain levels (13 000 troops or 300 tanks or a parachute drop of 3 000 troops). Exercises involving more than 40 000 troops must be notified at least two years in advance;

(ii) by communicating details of these exercises to all the other signatory states at least forty-two days before the start of military activities.

(b) The second series of provisions includes the obligation to invite observers from the other signatory states to attend these manoeuvres when certain thresholds are exceeded (17 000 troops or the amphibious landing or parachute drop of 5 000 troops). This measure was to allow it to be observed that such large-scale exercises were not a threat to other states and that their aim was really limited to training.

(c) The third series concerns on-the-spot inspection in the event of a state having doubts whether another state is complying with the measures. A state asking for an inspection must state the reasons for such a request and should receive an answer – in principle positive – within twenty-four hours. It may start thirty-six hours later and the inspection may not last more than forty-eight hours. Refusal is permitted only in the event of the state in question having already been the subject of an inspection by the same state or at least three inspections in the same year by signatory states.

67. In fact, this Stockholm document has been applied satisfactorily. Calendars of exercises were communicated for the first time at the end of 1986. Since then, prior notifications (forty-two days) of such exercises have become routine. On each side, both the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries as well as non-aligned countries have invited the other states to send observers to large manoeuvres. The most recent were the Reformer exercises and NATO autumn manoeuvres in the Federal Republic of Germany. So far, observation is still considered to be in the trial stage. Very open or very restrictive application is indeed possible. The practice of observation should lead to a general consensus on the interpretation of certain provisions. Finally, inspections are still in a very early stage since to

date only the United States and the United Kingdom have asked the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic respectively to carry out inspections on their territory as provided for in the Stockholm document. It is still too early to draw conclusions.

68. A general verification conference has been under way in Vienna since 4th November 1986. It should have been concluded on 31st July 1987, but the slowness of its work made it necessary to arrange a further session from September to December. This slowness was due to the particularly large number of proposals tabled at the conference – about 140 – which was an encouraging factor. Another reason was the fact that NATO members had to agree on conditions for negotiations on conventional disarmament and they managed to do this only at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Reykjavik in June 1987. It was indeed essential for the West to be able to make serious concessions on this question if it wished to obtain concessions on human rights from the other side and achieve balanced progress in the three different baskets defining the scope of the CSCE, this being the very principle of the negotiations.

69. For the first basket, NATO's proposal for a conference of the twenty-three members of the two alliances on the reduction of conventional forces in connection with the CSCE, which would have to fix the mandate, should give new breadth to negotiations which had hitherto been limited to the application and extension of confidence-building measures agreed upon in Stockholm. Conventional stability must be sought through equal ceilings achieved by the progressive elimination of present disparities. In view of the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional forces, the balance will have to be sought through asymmetrical reductions. In Vienna, the eastern countries have continuously raised the question of nuclear disarmament, although the West holds that this is not on the agenda of the CSCE. It is clear that the success of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva is a prior condition for discussion of this aspect of disarmament in the context of the CSCE.

70. The second basket is probably the one where there are the least difficulties. Everyone seems to recognise the importance of ecological questions in Europe and considerable progress seems possible in this field. Moreover, the Italian proposal to hold a conference of scientists in Erice in the framework of the CSCE at which diplomats would no longer have the lead seems likely to be followed up with the result that the CSCE would give its direct patronage to non-governmental exchanges, i.e. it would practise the openness that it preaches. Conversely, the Spanish proposals for a conference on specifically Mediterranean problems raises objections

from those who consider these matters should not be brought into East-West discussions. Finally, the East's proposals relating to economic co-operation are arousing many objections in the West, both from those who think states should not intervene too much in this field and those who fear the growth of eastern countries' exports resulting from their co-production with western firms, or even those who are mainly afraid of the transfer of technology to a competitor at military level.

71. The third basket concerning information, contacts between persons, cultural exchanges and education is the one in which there are the greatest difficulties. It continues to embarrass the Soviet Union. In a pre-electoral period, it is mobilising the Americans, very sensitive to the problem of refuzniks, i.e. Soviet Jews who, for various reasons, are refused the right to emigrate to the state of Israel. It concerns the Federal Republic very directly, as it wishes inter alia to ensure respect for the right to have contacts between families and to obtain favourable measures for the many Germans who still live in the East, without necessarily seeking their repatriation to the Federal Republic. It is the main point for all who see in the CSCE a chance of returning to a Europe based on respect for freedom.

72. In fact, the organised groups of participating countries have been somewhat overtaken by the reality of the interests of all concerned. Those who have bilateral problems to settle in regard to persons see the conference as an opportunity to tackle them discreetly on a bilateral level. The threat of exposing them in public if they are not settled in this way is in many cases enough to ensure their success. It is impossible to list all the bilateral problems solved in this way, but they seem to be numerous. There are also certain differences of views between the Western European delegations and an American policy of trying to obtain authorisations to emigrate for the largest possible number of refuzniks but which does not seem to believe very strongly in a serious transformation of the living conditions of Europeans nor is it very much in favour of developing East-West exchanges. The United States delegation is under constant pressure from American circles concerned by the question of refuzniks and, in the view of its partners, it measures its successes too much in terms of statistics.

73. Most western and neutral countries are trying above all to obtain the effective recognition of human rights for all the peoples of Europe, which they consider implies radical changes in the practices of the Soviet Union and its allies. They wish to be satisfied neither with individual concessions nor with legislative measures whose application is not verified. They are anxious to avoid any formula which would

jeopardise what seemed to have been gained in the Helsinki final act. They are trying to confirm rights already recognised, obtain undertakings on how to respect them and organise verification of this by various means, including further meetings of verification conferences, in short the pursuit and extension of the process set in motion since Helsinki, although the Soviet Union says this is too cumbersome.

74. A most delicate question is that of religious freedom, and the proposal by the Holy See on this matter seems to be encountering many objections in the East, particularly in regard to the right of communities to give religious teaching, the freedom they might be given to set up ecclesiastical authorities or structures and their right to address states, to circulate printed matter and to have free relations with the outside world. The Soviet Union does not seem prepared to make major concessions in regard to religious freedom so as not to lay itself open to internal opposition which first has to be made to accept other aspects of Mr. Gorbachev's policy, particularly the economic parts. Nor can it overlook the resistance to Soviet domination of certain religious forces, especially the Catholic Church in Poland.

75. Proposals relating to economic and social human rights emanating from eastern countries (right to work, housing, health, food) are understood by the other participants to be attempts to weaken western positions on human rights and seem to have little chance of being considered. This is a fortiori the case of the proposal to create a right to immigrate which seems to be merely a challenge designed to offset the West's claims to the right to emigrate, although there is no possible parallel between the obligation to allow anyone who wants to leave to do so and the obligation, unacceptable for any state, particularly in a time of economic recession, to allow free entrance.

76. A senior Soviet official told your Rapporteur that the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss human rights on condition all rights were discussed, i.e. civil and political rights but also economic, social and cultural rights. It would be prepared to consider two separate negotiations, one on civil and political rights and the other on economic and cultural rights, but certain western countries seemed to be refusing negotiations on the two aspects and wished them to be limited to political and civil rights. He believed the Soviet Union preferred to have serious discussions not only on the economic and social aspect of human rights but on all rights, since a human being should enjoy all rights, although this did not prevent the matter being divided between two working groups. It had made a step forward by accepting the western concept of human rights.

77. It is essential for the West to be quite clear about what it expects of the CSCE. When a delegation from the Assembly's Presidential Committee visited Moscow, the people it met underlined the European nature of the Soviet Union, using expressions such as "we all live in the same house". If such remarks were aimed at separating Western Europe from its American allies, they would be dangerous if they were not in vain. If, on the contrary, they indicate that the Soviet Government wishes to find support among the Western Europeans for a policy of far-reaching reforms, which concern the Eastern European countries as much as the Soviet Union itself, they are worthy of consideration. It would be particularly absurd to reject without thorough study proposals relating to the economic and social rights of human beings since in all probability the Western European countries generally have little to envy the communist states where medical or family assistance are concerned, or even unemployment assistance. Admittedly, the proclamation of the right to work – of which the West had an experience with the French constitution of 1848 and the unfortunate attempt at national workshops – should not hold sway over economic efficiency and the Soviet Union should take account of this in its own reform policy. But if the CSCE could bring about an improvement in certain aspects of social welfare throughout Europe, who could complain?

78. Finally, the impressive number of proposals for further specialised conferences in the framework of the CSCE, from both East and West, and which often seem to be well-received, indicate that the process will develop and break up into a large number of separate, limited negotiations which will perhaps prove to be more effective than large-scale conferences. It is perhaps in this way that, very progressively and slowly, the most tragic aspects of the division of Europe might find a solution. If it seems that the Vienna conference is to have clearly positive results, it would seem that they should be situated in such a context. Thus, it may be hoped that a Europe will be progressively built up which, from the Atlantic to the Urals, will benefit from the renaissance of the solidarities that were broken in 1945.

79. Some Western Europeans thought they held a lever when the Soviet Union proposed holding the next conference on the third basket in Moscow. Anxious not to give the Soviet Union any sign of satisfaction without real concessions on its part, they decided to insist that in any event the conditions prevailing at previous conferences, including their being open to the public and the media, must also apply at the Moscow meeting. They also wish to avoid the principal aspects of human rights being left on one side to make way for less essential questions covered by the term humanitarian co-operation,

such as education, information, culture and contacts between persons which would unduly limit the impact of the question of human rights and indicate the abandonment of the seventh Helsinki principle relating to freedoms. The solution might be to hold the conference on human rights elsewhere and one on less sensitive subjects in Moscow (information, education and culture, for instance).

80. At the centre of European concerns, after security, is the reconstitution of a Europe that respects and propagates to the world a number of universal values such as human rights, democracy or freedom, which implies freedom of movement of persons and circulation of information and ideas that the Soviet Union is still far from putting into practice. Nevertheless, the West has no interest in giving the Soviet Union the impossible choice between denying its own history or renouncing a policy of reforms. The values the West upholds can be introduced through Mr. Gorbachev's reforms. The CSCE should therefore encourage them, even if they seem insufficient, provided Western Europe's security is not thereby jeopardised.

(c) Economic relations

81. Mr. Gorbachev's manifest desire to give priority to the requirements of economic transformation in the Soviet Union, the adoption of the complex programme by CMEA in December 1985, laying down five areas whose development was to be given priority, and also the realisation that the Soviet Union was lagging behind the western countries in regard to defence-applied technology can but encourage the Soviet Union to develop not only its trade but also, as far as possible, economic co-operation with the more developed countries, mainly the United States, Japan and Western Europe. Thus, the Soviet Union has made it clear that it wished to develop East-West co-operation in science, technology, transport, energy and agriculture and has shown its interest in the Eureka programme.

82. In addition to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe which, for more than forty years, has been conducting work that is effective but not widely known in defining technical standards allowing such co-operation to be promoted, the CSCE provides a framework in which more general problems can be usefully raised. Furthermore, the Secretary-General of CMEA, Mr. Sytchev, has started to negotiate the establishment of official relations between CMEA and the EEC in order to move towards the definition of areas in which co-operation might be envisaged, while Romania and Hungary are increasing their activities in Brussels and Luxembourg and support the idea that there is some degree of economic complementarity between Eastern and Western Europe, suggesting to the

West that Eastern Europe could form a vast market for EEC investors, which at least would be very probable if the necessary guarantees for their investments were granted by the CMEA member countries.

83. More and more, the Soviet authorities are now seeking to increase the number of joint ventures to ensure the participation of western capital in the development of their economy and probably also to promote their own exports to the West. Their appeals are not addressed only to Europeans: on 24th August 1987 they published six pages of publicity in the New York Wall Street Journal inviting American investors to help to finance joint ventures. Furthermore, action by the Soviet Union and its allies at the CSCE is aimed at encouraging sales of licences and exchanges of technology, an increase in which would help to promote détente. In 1986, the Soviet Government set up a State Committee for External Trade whose Director, Mr. Kamentsev, is Deputy Prime Minister, thus showing the importance the Soviet Union now attaches to the promotion of trade with capitalist countries. Soviet legislation will, however, have to be modified to allow the development of joint ventures and the proposal to introduce a convertible rouble seems to be the subject of serious study.

84. However desirable it may be, there are two obstacles to the development of such co-operation. One is the extra-legal methods systematically used by the Soviet Union and its allies over a long period to gain knowledge of foreign technology, in other words economic espionage, which is an important part of the activities of the KGB and the GRU. The Soviet Union cannot hope to play the game of loyal economic co-operation and at the same time resort systematically to such methods. Europe must insist that it radically change its habits, which cause mistrust and tension and are absolutely contrary to the aims of détente called for by the Soviet Union, before starting a true policy of co-operation with it. Furthermore, as long as military-related activities continue to play a major rôle in the Soviet economy, it is inevitable that NATO should be careful to do nothing to contribute to the growth of Soviet power. The Soviet Union is complaining with increasing frequency about Cocom obstacles to the development of trade relations between the two parts of Europe. The activities of that body and the length of the list of products that Atlantic Alliance countries may not export to the East depend very largely on internal developments in the Soviet Union.

85. Mr. Honecker's visit to the Federal Republic as from 7th September 1987 is of some interest. The reasons for it admittedly remain ambiguous: economic and commercial rapprochement, which is of the utmost interest to

the GDR and the eastern countries, certainly, and probably also true détente in relations between the two German states. If it is recalled that until now it was the Soviet Union that opposed such an approach, the fact that it is now taking place is an encouraging sign of a real will to restore confidence and develop East-West co-operation. However, it is also likely that the visit is intended to convince the West Germans that they should support Soviet views on disarmament matters and Mr. Honecker's fairly vague allusions to a more permeable demarcation line between the two German states reveals this concern rather than that of a rapprochement between Germans.

V. Outside Europe

86. For geographical reasons, the Soviet Union has to have an Asian as well as a European policy. Communist ideology has given this policy a world dimension which is enhanced by the very strength acquired by the Soviet Union, which was acknowledged when the United Nations was set up by its being immediately made a permanent member of the Security Council. It was therefore logical for it, once it had nuclear weapons, to start developing means of intervening in any point whatsoever of the globe by building up a large naval force which in turn required bases and means of defending them and for it to use these means to exercise and extend its influence throughout the world.

87. Conversely, becoming involved in international affairs increased the vulnerability of the Soviet Union: although nuclear weapons guaranteed the security of its own territory, they no more guaranteed the maintenance of its influence than those of certain western powers saved their empires from decolonisation or protected their interests in large areas of the world. However, the Soviet Union has constantly managed to avoid becoming irreversibly involved in regions where it had no means of controlling local developments. The crisis which compelled it to withdraw its nuclear missiles from Cuba in 1962 made it measure the limits of its power and, although it has been active in Africa and Latin America, it has always ensured that it was in a position to avoid a show of force. It should be added that since Mr. Gorbachev came to power it has taken practically no new initiatives in these regions whereas, in Asia, certain facts allow a better understanding of the nature of Soviet action. This action has not been of the same type in Central and Eastern Asia as in the Middle East.

(a) The Middle East

88. Soviet interests in the Middle East are quite different from those of the West. Being a large-scale oil exporter, not only does the Soviet

Union have no need to draw upon reserves in that area but on the contrary has every advantage in ensuring that there is not over-production and that oil prices remain high. Furthermore, it is well aware that almost a third of its population is Moslem and feels some solidarity with the peoples of the Middle East, especially since certain ethnic groups are to be found both in the Soviet Union and in Afghanistan, Iran or Turkey. The Soviet Union can derive considerable advantage from this, particularly because some of its leaders are very sensitive to the reactions of communities in the region and can save it making the kinds of blunder that are frequent in the policies of western countries.

89. Conversely, the Afghanistan affair has shown that this solidarity can lead to the Soviet Union becoming dangerously involved. Furthermore, its freedom of action is limited by the possible reactions of the Moslem section of Soviet society among whom certain western observers have in recent years noted a considerable growth in Islamic fundamentalism and secret societies designed to spread it. It is impossible to give an exact idea of these influences in the light of current information but there is no doubt that Soviet policy has to take account of them.

90. Since the Red Army invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the Soviet Union's influence in the Middle East, which reached its height at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 and again at the time of the break with the state of Israel in 1967, has been singularly diminished and threatened. Millions of Afghan refugees, principally in Pakistan and Iran, are denouncing the methods used against the resistance movement and the civilian population in their country. The Soviet air force has been known to bomb Pakistani or Iranian territory where fighting on the ground has also occurred on several occasions. Since President Sadat broke off military co-operation between Egypt and the Soviet Union, only Iraq, Syria and South Yemen have had close relations with the Soviet Union, which supplies most of their armaments. This helped to prevent any great improvement in Soviet positions in Iran after the fall of the Shah and the outbreak of the Gulf war. The Tudeh Communist Party failed to share power with the Shiite fundamentalists and was severely repressed. For all these reasons, by the time Mr. Gorbachev came to power the Soviet Union was, to all intents and purposes, excluded from Middle East affairs.

91. Without wishing to break with the policy of his predecessors, Mr. Gorbachev made a number of changes one obvious aim of which was to take advantage of all steps to restore peace in both Palestine and the Gulf area in order to re-establish Soviet influence. He well realised, however, that such efforts could not progress sig-

nificantly as long as the Afghanistan war continued and he is clearly looking for an honourable way out by attempting to negotiate with at least some of the resistance movements in order to include them in a government coalition at the side of the two Afghan Communist Parties and announcing the withdrawal – far from complete – of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan. In August 1987, the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party had to admit that in these areas he had encountered far greater difficulties than he had expected: on the one hand, the Afghan communists were showing little enthusiasm for such a compromise and, on the other, a large fraction of the resistance movements rejected it and were pursuing their struggle with renewed energy, particularly in the region near the Soviet frontier.

92. It now seems that the Soviet Union has renounced the political and strategic objectives which led to the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and because it is finding the continuing war with that country too costly in men, equipment and political influence. The aim pursued seems to be limited to the search for a compromise freeing it from the hornets' nest of Afghanistan at least expense to Mr. Gorbachev's prestige and personal authority. However, some committee members stressed that the fine words of Mr. Vorontsov had led Pakistan to change its attitude towards the Afghan Government although they had not been carried into effect. They interpreted these statements, therefore, as a tactical means of weakening the adversary and not as the expression of a true will to restore peace. Even if such a will does effectively dominate Mr. Gorbachev's policy in Afghanistan, this goal is still far from having been achieved, however, and the Soviet Union's freedom of action in the Middle East and, to some extent also, the Far East, will probably be shackled for a long time to come.

93. In regard to other current affairs in the region, the Soviet Union's approach seems to have been to move away from its privileged customers – Iraq and Syria in particular – in order to take advantage of the difficulties of the western powers in Iran and the Gulf and give the impression that it is a power interested but not committed in the region. Thus, without halting arms supplies to Iraq, the Soviet Union, in summer 1987, appears to have resumed deliveries to Iran and, above all, negotiated with the latter for converting into an oil pipeline the gas pipeline which carries part of Iran's production to Batumi on the Black Sea. By thus allowing Iran to transport its oil outside the dangerous war zone, the Soviet Union's action is not entirely to its own advantage since it is helping to keep the price of oil down by encouraging one of its oil-exporting rivals. On the other hand, it is thus gaining considerable means of economic, and hence political, pressure on Iran.

94. However, it is not possible to speak in this connection of a reversal of alliances, the Soviet Union having associated itself with all the members of the Security Council in adopting, on 20th July 1987, Resolution 598 on the re-establishment of peace in the Gulf which it is known met the wishes of Iraq in particular and has not been accepted by Iran, which continues to refuse any peace that does not include the overthrow of the government in Baghdad. But the Soviet Union, by playing no part in any military measures to ensure the security of navigation in the Gulf and not agreeing to impose sanctions on Iran if it refuses to apply Resolution 598, is leaving itself a free hand to play a major rôle in settling the conflict.

95. The Soviet Union was even more cautious in the Palestinian affair. However, it seems to have made a major contribution to bringing about the reunification of the various Palestinian movements around Mr. Yasser Arafat at the meeting in Algiers in April 1987, which hardly pleased his Syrian ally. It is also being less hostile towards Israel with which it has admittedly not re-established the diplomatic relations broken off in 1967 but to which it sent a consular mission in July 1987 to settle a few problems of limited scope. In October 1985, Mr. Gorbachev, during his visit to Paris, recalled that the Soviet Union had taken part in the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and affirmed his wish for a normalisation of the situation in the Middle East. The Soviet Union has since proved more flexible than in the past over matters relating to the emigration of Soviet refuzniks. It has in any event been very favourable to holding a large-scale conference with a view to finding a settlement to the Palestinian question on the basis of United Nations Resolution 242 which would be attended by Israel, the PLO, Palestine's neighbouring countries, the United States and the Soviet Union. This is not a new proposal since it was opposed by Mr. Brezhnev in 1981 at the Camp David negotiations that established separate peace between Egypt and the state of Israel. But in 1987 it has been well received by the majority of the international community. In April 1987, the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council took part in a preparatory meeting, in spite of Israeli opposition, and the Soviet Union is making the holding of this conference a condition for resuming its diplomatic relations with Israel.

96. It is therefore through a moderate, peaceful and balanced policy that the Soviet Union is trying to re-establish its influence, or at least to regain a foothold, in Middle East affairs, even before reaching a settlement in Afghanistan. This seems to be causing some uncertainty and controversy in the West and your Rapporteur had the feeling that the meeting of political directors of the WEU member countries in The Hague on

20th August 1987 was not alien to these concerns. The question seems to be whether it is in the interest of the western allies to help the Soviet Union to return to Middle East affairs or to avoid this as far as possible.

97. In the immediate future, the intervention of the Soviet Union will not help the western powers to make their interests and views prevail, particularly in regard to freedom of navigation in the Gulf or measures to be taken to combat terrorism. However, consideration of longer-term interests may suggest that the participation of the Soviet Union in the settlement of the Gulf war and the Palestinian conflict is essential if those who might feel injured by such a settlement are not to find, in the Soviet Union, encouragement and assistance in opposing the achievement and application of these settlements.

98. Soviet interest in slowing down the spread of Moslem fundamentalism and calming passions unleashed in the Middle East is clear enough for it to be considered that beyond any tactical advantages it may derive from its return to Middle East affairs the Soviet Union can provide powerful assistance to the restoration of peace in the area. Again, its participation in this is an essential condition for its maintenance.

(b) The Far East

99. Throughout its existence, the Soviet Union has been interested in the Far East, like the Tsars before it. The purpose was to find outlets on the Pacific Ocean and to ensure the security of very sparsely-populated Soviet Asia vis-à-vis China and Japan. In spite of efforts to attract people to the region, willingly or by force, the Soviet Far East still has only about ten million inhabitants, while Chinese Manchuria alone has almost 120 million. In other words, whatever the policy of the Chinese Government, the Soviet Union will be concerned about the region. Moreover, at the end of the second world war, the Soviet Union seized the Japanese part of the island of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands and these annexations have not yet been recognised by Japan in a peace treaty or by any other means. This issue has been embittering Soviet-Japanese relations since that time, just as the division of Korea into two states, one of which is protected by the Soviet Union, is a constant threat to stability in the area.

100. However, since 1960 Soviet policy in the Far East has been dominated by the consequences of the split between the Soviet Union and China. There have since been many crises in relations between the two countries. Although at present the relationship seems calmer, the crises caused deep-rooted mutual mistrust which makes settlement of the problems and definition of conditions for disarmament difficult and slow.

It is clear, however, that since 1980 the two countries have been trying to reduce tension and restore normal relations. The coming to power of Mr. Gorbachev and his disarmament proposals have also encouraged the restoration of some degree of confidence and the holding of negotiations between the two countries on specific, limited subjects.

101. Addressing the twenty-seventh party congress in February 1986, Mr. Gorbachev said he considered that – together with Europe – Asia and the Pacific were his main external policy concerns because of the growing importance of the region. But it was in July 1986, in his Vladivostok speech, that he defined his policy for Asia and the Pacific region, announcing his intention to give new dynamism to the Soviet Union's relations with all countries of the region "without exception". The purpose was to take advantage of the extremely fast economic expansion of these countries in order to improve Soviet trade and develop the Soviet Far East, hoping to attract Japanese capital for co-operative ventures in the region and also to avoid excessive Japanese and United States domination of the countries concerned. In November 1986, the Soviet Union took part for the first time in the conference on Pacific economic co-operation in Vancouver as an observer. It has since asked to play a full part in this conference and proposed that its 1990 meeting be held in Vladivostok. Finally, Mr. Gorbachev proposed increasing economic and technical assistance to the Soviet Far East by 45% during the five-year period 1986-90, compared with an increase of only 25% between 1981 and 1985.

102. On 7th June 1969, Mr. Brezhnev had proposed setting up a collective security system in Asia, aimed primarily at isolating China and secondarily at keeping American influence out of Asia. But he had no success, even among countries favourable to the Soviet Union such as India, North Korea, Vietnam and Laos. In 1985, Mr. Gorbachev abandoned this concept and proposed the creation of an all-Asian forum, including China on this occasion, but this too gave rise to many reservations, thus leading Mr. Gorbachev, particularly in Vladivostok, to stress the development of bilateral relations. He also proposed holding a Pacific conference on the lines of the CSCE and a conference on confidence-building measures and renunciation of force in the Pacific, dealing inter alia with the security of sea lanes. These proposals were again given a fairly cold reception by many countries in the region and rejected by China and Japan, which meant they had no chance of success.

103. China has constantly laid down three principal conditions for normalising relations with the Soviet Union: the reduction of Soviet forces

deployed next to its territory, the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Afghanistan and the restoration of independence in Cambodia. So far, none of these conditions has been met. However, China must consider encouraging the Soviet attempt to find a solution to the Afghan affair and Mr. Gorbachev's acceptance of the principle that all Soviet nuclear weapons, and not only those stationed in Europe, would be taken into account in the Soviet-American negotiations on medium-range weapons.

104. In fact, there have been periodic talks between the two countries on the development of their bilateral trade, which increased eightfold between 1981 and 1985, without reaching any great volume since in 1985, at \$1,900 million, it was still only 3.2% of China's trade and 1.1% of that of the Soviet Union. Moreover, negotiations were started on settling the vast problem of the alignment of frontiers. A compromise therefore seems to have been found between the Chinese claim for recognition of the "unequal" nature of the treaties which laid down these frontiers at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries and the Soviet Union's wish to consider these treaties as the legal basis for its presence in Central and Eastern Asia. Recent information indicates that in August 1987 the Soviet Union accepted, for the eastern part of the immense common frontier, the principle upheld by the Chinese that the thalweg of the Amur and the Ussuri formed the frontier in a region where armed clashes have been particularly serious in the last twenty years. A commission is at present studying a plan for the joint exploitation of the hydroelectric resources of the Amur, and the Soviet press has reported demonstrations of fraternisation along the frontier. However, your Rapporteur has been told by some Chinese that they thought it would be particularly difficult to fix frontiers in Mongolia and Turkestan and that the negotiations would be very lengthy. The WEU Assembly delegation which visited Sin Kiang in October 1985 was indeed able to note that the frontier dispute related to a length of thousands of kilometres and considerable depths and caused frequent, often bloody, incidents.

105. It is more difficult to understand why Soviet diplomacy, which is now fairly flexible in other respects, is doing little to encourage Vietnam to evacuate Cambodia as it has more-over undertaken to do. Yet it has considerable means of bringing pressure to bear on that country, to which it supplies much financial assistance. In December 1986, it promised to double this by supplying between \$12 000 and \$13 000 million during the period 1986-90. China on the one hand and the ASEAN countries on the other support the four-party coalition opposition to the régime installed and supported by the Vietnamese. Even if there still seem to be differences between them on the respective

importance of these parties within the coalition, China upholding the Khmer rouge, whom it arms and who exercise the strongest military action, the ASEAN countries giving more support to the other coalition parties, in view of the murderous tyranny exercised by the Khmer rouge prior to the Vietnamese intervention. Moreover, China was very reserved about the Indonesian proposal defended in Beijing in August 1987 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand on the so-called cocktail procedure, which was to bring the four coalition parties together to define the fate of Cambodia and then, at the last moment, to introduce Vietnam into the negotiations already started.

106. In this affair, the Soviet Union's aim, for which the Cambodian question is probably not essential, is perhaps the maintenance of its relations with Vietnam, where it has obtained the use of naval bases at Da Nang and Cam Ranh, the only bases it has in South-East Asia. The growing importance of the Far East and the Pacific in international life, from an economic standpoint and also in political and military terms, can but encourage the Soviet Union to do its utmost to retain Vietnam's support which is essential for the maintenance of its presence in the South Pacific, close to the Strait of Malacca through which passes most of the external trade of Japan and the Far East.

107. Considered as a whole, Soviet policy in the Far East does not seem to have changed radically since Mr. Gorbachev came to power but it has been diverted in a more moderate direction, the real aim of which may be to bring about generalised détente as well as to improve Soviet positions which have been threatened since the split with China. It faces serious difficulties as long as Mr. Gorbachev cannot allow himself to break away from the initiatives or positions of his predecessors, particularly in regard to Japan, Cambodia and Afghanistan. If he manages to obtain a freer hand, this policy might cause an upheaval in international relations in the Far East. It is already noticeable that trade with China, and above all with Japan, which is more than ever anxious to diversify its outlets, has increased considerably. The accession of the Soviet Union, the first nuclear power to do so, to the Pacific denuclearisation treaty has considerably increased the Soviet Union's prestige in the area.

VI. Conclusions

108. The interpretation of Mr. Gorbachev's policy of reforms, on the one hand, and the guidelines he has laid down for Soviet external policy, on the other, are still the subject of keen discussion among western experts on the Soviet Union. The method that consists of separating

the problems in order to study the evolution of each one generally leads to scepticism and emphasises the differences between words and deeds. The very nature of diplomatic work means that many of those who have to deal with each of these problems, for instance in the framework of specialised conferences, see above all the continuity of Soviet positions and are far from convinced of the extent of their evolution. Those who, on the contrary, attach more importance to an overall picture of Soviet history are generally – with notable exceptions – far more convinced of the existence of a radical desire for change within the country, which necessarily implies considerable reorientation of foreign policy. Conversely, they see some political fragility among the reform team that has been in power for two years. They believe this fragility explains the progressive or meandering course of the government approach in several areas and the gap between Mr. Gorbachev's words and the practice of an administration that changes only slowly.

109. It is obviously still impossible to take stock of what Mr. Gorbachev has achieved in such a short period, but it already seems from his words alone that he has released a desire for far-reaching changes which had existed for a long time in Soviet society and that he has made it impossible for himself or his successors to revert to the situation as it was before. The priority they must give to reforms should logically lead them to pursue the search for peace and disarmament. However, it is well known that logic does not always prevail in politics and it is always possible that internal disappointments will lead to the search for success abroad, i.e. the use of international tension to mobilise energy – practices very different to what the Soviet leaders proclaim today. The history of the Soviet Union provides many examples of this.

110. It is clear that at the present stage Mr. Gorbachev is trying to rely on outside successes to assert his internal position, but that the successes he is aiming at are in disarmament, the development of co-operation in Europe and settlement of Asian problems. A priori, the West has no interest in denying him satisfaction or in backing those who, in the Soviet Union, are opposed to the policy of reforms. But it must not forget that in acting in this way it is taking certain risks, for instance that the success of Mr. Gorbachev's policy may, in future, allow a stronger Soviet Union, more sure of itself, to modernise its military power and use it to increase its influence or even as a threat.

111. For these various reasons, therefore, the new Soviet policy should not be accorded blind confidence. In each sector, Western Europe must energetically defend its own interests and in particular ensure that the negotiations on disarm-

ament do not lead to its security being diminished, that the development of economic and trade relations does not foster a policy of further improvements in armaments and that détente sought through the CSCE is based on a true balance between confidence-building measures and disarmament, the development of co-operation and progress in regard to freedom. It must also attach the greatest importance to ensuring that Soviet participation in the settlement of the problems splitting the Middle East does not lead to a heightening of tension or to the internationalisation of conflicts. The caution and moderation shown by the Soviet Union in these matters offer reasonable hope of this. Whatever importance is attached to Mr. Gorbachev's new policy, each question must be tackled on its own merits and a satisfactory solution found.

112. Current changes in the Soviet Union offer hope of a far-reaching transformation of East-West relations, a major development in disarmament, more exchanges between the two parts of Europe, a noticeable evolution in the régimes in the people's democracies and a much greater rôle for the United Nations in promoting peace. In his article in Pravda on 17th September 1987, Mr. Gorbachev brings out most pertinently the link between these various aspects of his policy. However, this logic is not enough to assure the West that the economic transformation of the Soviet Union will lead to these changes. The West must therefore continue to seek balanced concessions in every field and not lower its guard until agreements have been concluded on the limitation of armaments subject to the necessary verification guarantees.

Recent developments in Soviet external policy

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Rubbi

1. In the draft recommendation proper, redraft paragraph 2 as follows:
“ Urge the United States, after the Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of medium- and short-range nuclear weapons, to bring negotiations on other categories of weapons to an early, satisfactory conclusion, always bearing in mind Europe’s security interests; ”

Signed: Rubbi

1. See 10th sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendment withdrawn).

Recent developments in Soviet external policy

DRAFT ORDER ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Péciaux, Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that the goal of the reactivation of Western European Union is to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Considering that the close association of Western Europe and the United States in the Atlantic Alliance is the essential basis of Europe's security;
- (iii) Considering that any Soviet-American agreement on the limitation of armaments must give Western Europe the guarantees necessary for its security;
- (iv) Noting with interest the initiative taken by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to invite a delegation from the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly to visit Moscow in April 1987 for an exchange of views on the requirements of European security,

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. In order to avoid the reactivation of WEU adding to "transatlantic misunderstandings", to promote a regular dialogue between the Assembly and the United States Congress covering inter alia the consequences for Europe's security of any American-Soviet agreements on the limitation of armaments, on the aims to be pursued in the CSCE and on threats to international peace which may arise outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
2. To invite members of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to pursue the exchange of views started in April 1987 on the limitation of armaments with a view to achieving a balance of conventional forces acceptable to both parties and on the three baskets of the CSCE in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace.

1. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Close, Burger (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: van der Werff), Bassinet, Baumel, Bianco, Dejardin (Alternate: Péciaux), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Hardy, Hill, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martino, Masciadri, Mechttersheimer, du Monceau de Bergendal, Müller, Pontillon, Reddemann, Ruet (Alternate: Chénard), Rumpf, van der Sanden, Shelton, Spitella (Alternate: Amadei), Stoffelen (Alternate: Eisma), Vecchiatti (Alternate: Pollidoro).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Public information activities on security and defence matters
in WEU member countries***

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Mr. Burger, Rapporteur***

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APPENDIX

Questionnaire for preparing the report on public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries

1. Adopted unanimously in committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Lady Jill Knight (Chairman); Mr. Tummers, Mr. Giust (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Büchner, Burger, Cavaliere (Alternate: Antoni), de Chambrun, De Bondt, De Hoop Scheffer, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Frasca, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Dr. Miller (Alternate: Parry), MM. Noerens (Alternate: Pécriaux), Seitlinger (Alternate: Chénard)*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution

***on public information activities on security and defence matters
in WEU member countries***

The Assembly,

- (i) Anxious to make public and parliamentary opinion more aware of the European dimension of security and the specific aims of WEU in this context;
- (ii) Stressing that it is of the utmost importance for more members of the Assembly to intervene in their national parliaments on the basis of texts adopted in order to draw the attention of government authorities and public opinion to the work of the WEU Assembly;
- (iii) Welcoming the initiative taken by the Netherlands Government in communicating to the Second Chamber of the States-General its position on the future prospects of WEU under Netherlands presidency;
- (iv) Regretting nevertheless that the remarkable efforts made by certain member governments to keep the public – and in particular the younger generation – in their countries informed of security and defence problems only exceptionally give adequate information on the rôle of WEU,

INVITES NATIONAL DELEGATIONS

1. To ensure that debates on defence and security in parliaments, in the political groups and with governments and the public are organised so as to bring the greatest possible attention to the work of the WEU Assembly;
2. To urge governments to improve the co-ordination, with the appropriate WEU bodies, of their national activities in keeping the public informed, and in particular the younger generation.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Burger, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Indubitably the problem of making Western European public opinion aware of the state of security and western defence must remain high on the list of concerns of political leaders.

2. All the organs of Western European Union have responsibilities in this connection. Members of the *Assembly*, as representatives of the people, must report to their member countries on the work and actions of the Assembly. Chapter II below will therefore cover parliamentary activities.

3. Furthermore, the WEU Assembly has continuously recalled that it is incumbent upon the *Council* to inform public opinion of its own activities (Recommendation 442). Consequently, the report will then examine the section of the annual report of the Council on informing the press and public.

4. Finally, as suggested in the last report, your Rapporteur will consider practice adopted by *governments* of member countries for keeping the public informed. In order to make a comparative study, a questionnaire was sent to the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of WEU member countries. Your Rapporteur attaches particular importance to this study since the governments have absolute sovereignty in regard to security policy and the way they explain it to the public. Their responsibilities in this connection are therefore of special importance.

II. Parliamentary activities

(i) Interparliamentary meetings

5. The last information meeting organised by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was held in Luxembourg on 28th April 1987. It was attended by members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies and Luxembourg members of the North Atlantic Assembly.

6. The briefings by Mr. de Bondt on reactivated Western European Union, Mr. Terlezki on the duties of the WEU Assembly and Lady Jill Knight, Chairman of the committee, on the rôle of WEU in its relations with NATO and the other Western European organisations and countries aroused keen interest among the Luxembourg parliamentarians and led to a lively discussion at the close of the briefings.

7. The meeting brought out the following points in particular:

- The public and political circles too are apparently generally unaware of the specific aims of WEU and its reactivation. Furthermore, there is still not enough basic information on the existence of this organisation.
- It is essential to intensify efforts to inform the younger generation of security and defence matters.
- Views converge on the fact that any reactivation of WEU must enhance the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.
- Rules now governing the membership of the WEU Assembly do not seem satisfactory. The search for a solution which would make the Assembly's work more effective must remain on the agenda.

8. At its meeting in Luxembourg, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations discussed how the abovementioned impressions might be communicated to the relevant bodies of the organisation and member countries but no definite decision was taken. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes to assess the results of the Luxembourg information meeting in his report since most of them fit perfectly into the context of his principal subject.

9. The question of the membership of the Assembly is outside the responsibilities of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. However, it is in its interest to convey the message to the relevant Assembly bodies. To date, at least three main proposals have been made:

- the proposal by Mr. Ahrens to appoint two substitutes in national delegations, one of whom would be available only for the WEU Assembly;
- the proposal by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges to link the mandate of the WEU Assembly with that of the North Atlantic Assembly;
- the proposal made in the European Parliament on 24th June 1987 for the WEU Assembly to be composed of representatives of the WEU member states to the European Parliament as from 1989.

10. Since there has recently been animated discussion on this matter and the solutions pro-

posed would have very different consequences for the future development of the organisation as a whole, it is time for it to be raised in the Assembly's steering body, i.e. the Presidential Committee.

11. In regard to other meetings with national parliaments, it should be noted that on 22nd June 1987 a delegation from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Second Chamber of the Netherlands States-General, led by its Chairman, was received by Mr. Goerens, President of the WEU Assembly, for an exchange of views and to be given information on the current work of the Assembly and the reactivation of WEU. It would be desirable for such meetings to be organised with other committees of national parliaments.

(ii) Action taken in national parliaments on texts adopted by the Assembly

12. At its meeting at the close of the extraordinary session held in Luxembourg on 27th and 28th April 1987, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations selected from among the texts adopted Recommendation 442 on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part I: The reactivation of WEU, for transmission to and discussion in national parliaments.

13. During the first part of the thirty-third session of the Assembly, the committee met at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 3rd June 1987 and selected the following texts for transmission to the parliaments of member countries:

- Recommendation 446 on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part II: Political activities of the Council;
- Recommendation 448 on European space policy until 2000.

14. Except for written questions put in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies on 16th July 1987 by Mr. Goerens and Mr. Hengel on Recommendations 442 and 446, your Rapporteur has received no information on the use made by committee members of the draft questions relating to subjects dealt with in these recommendations which were sent to them on 2nd July 1987. However this may be, it is evident from parliamentary texts received by the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly that a number of matters debated during the Assembly's spring session have been raised in the parliaments of several member countries.

15. In the Belgian Senate, during the debate on the budgets of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence on 5th and 17th June 1987, several parliamentarians raised matters relating to European security. Mr. du Monceau de Bergendal endorsed Mr. Jacques Delors's proposal to convene a meeting of the European

Council in the framework of the European Community to discuss current defence problems, while Mr. De Decker said he was disappointed that the government had taken no action on his suggestion to convene a summit meeting of heads of state or of government of the seven WEU member countries.

16. Answering speakers, Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations, said:

“ The ground has been explored by asking the other six partners whether they agreed to convene a meeting of heads of government to draft a joint answer to Mr. Gorbachev. To date, there have been four answers from states which refuse to take part in such a meeting. ”

17. Speaking on the same subject on 16th June 1987 during the debate in the French National Assembly on the government foreign policy statement, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, said:

“ The first European reaction to future Soviet initiatives should be to announce that they are concerting their approach and the natural framework for this might be the WEU Council of Ministers. ”

He continued:

“ It is essential for Europe to examine strategy since it has specifically European aspects.... I consider the natural framework for this to be not that of the Twelve, who have no psychological or political unity on such a subject, but that of the states participating in Western European Union. ”

18. On the preparation of a European security charter, Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said in answer to a statement by Mr. Baumel in the same debate that:

“ Striking progress has been recorded on the basis of this initiative. On the one hand, the experts have prepared a report on Europe's strategy which includes many of our ideas and therefore deals with all the problems raised by Mr. Gorbachev's initiatives. This report was submitted too recently for the ministers to be able to approve it, but it was agreed that at the next WEU meeting it would be finalised and that the ministers would try to prepare a text on the principles of European security. ”

19. However encouraging this information may be, it leaves open the question of how much parliamentarians and the public will learn about the contents of such a document.

20. Speaking in the Belgian Senate on 17th June 1987, Mr. Péciaux deplored “ the little

information Belgian representatives agreed to circulate in WEU on the results of their meetings". He also affirmed that the WEU Assembly, through its specialised committees, continuously produced work of a high standard on European defence which might be used regularly or considered attentively by government authorities. This remark should be repeated in the parliaments of all member countries.

21. Where the information of the public is concerned, the Assembly again asked the Council in Recommendation 442 to act without delay on its document "WEU and public awareness" so as to inform public opinion of all its activities. In the House of Commons on 14th May 1987, Mr. Murphy took the opportunity of asking the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to "make a statement regarding the level of support in the United Kingdom for the work of Western European Union in terms of publicity".

22. In his answer, Mr. Eggar, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said: "The WEU Secretary-General has responsibility for publicising Western European Union activities. British Ministers keep parliament and the public informed on a regular basis." He then referred to the answer given by Mrs. Chalker, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, on 30th April 1987 to a question put by Mr. Hanley on the meeting of the WEU Council held in Luxembourg on 27th April³.

23. It emerged from the previous report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on the voice of Europe after Reykjavik – debates in national parliaments, that certain governments still consider that the vital rôle of keeping the public informed is incumbent upon the WEU Assembly. For instance, Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, said on 26th March 1986 in answer to a question put by Mr. Hengel that:

"Inter alia, governments inform the public through the dialogue with the Assembly, which plays a particularly important rôle in this connection."

24. Similarly, the Netherlands Government confirmed in the memorandum of 18th June 1987 that one of WEU's future aims was: "encouraging public support for joint security requirements. The WEU Assembly plays a major rôle in this area which the government will willingly encourage during its chairmanship-in-office."

25. These examples show that the sharing of responsibility for information requires greater

thought and Chapters III and IV below deal with this matter.

26. In regard to initiatives to set up a European centre for strategic studies, note should be taken of an answer by Mr. Giraud, French Minister of Defence, on 24th August 1987 to a question put by Mr. Bernard-Reymond. The Minister said initiatives in the form of joint deliberations by European military authorities had recently been taken:

"In particular, a first Franco-German seminar bringing together officers from the three armed forces and the police force of the two countries was held in Paris from 6th to 10th July 1987, when the Minister of Defence specified that this step came within the same context as the important decision taken at the ministerial meeting of Western European Union in November 1986 that will be implemented in 1988 with a European meeting of the Institut des hautes études de la défense nationale, the nucleus of a European defence institute".

27. The discussion on the rôle of WEU in European security matters was intensified during the year in both chambers of the States-General with the participation of several members of the Assembly: Mr. van der Werff and Mr. Eysink in particular, during a debate in the First Chamber on 19th May 1987, referred inter alia to the question of a single seat for WEU and the accession of Portugal and Spain.

28. In response to an initiative by Mr. de Boer and Mr. Engwirda, the Netherlands Government sent a detailed memorandum to the President of the Second Chamber of the States-General on 18th June 1987 on the Netherlands chairmanship of Western European Union from mid-1987 to mid-1988. The interesting point about this memorandum is that it gives a very useful summary of the positions of the new chairmanship on relations between WEU and NATO, the aims and principles of WEU, structural aspects and problems of enlargement. It is a kind of programme of work for the WEU Council for the duration of the Netherlands chairmanship. The Netherlands Government is to be heartily congratulated on this useful initiative.

29. In regard to parliamentary activities as a whole, your Rapporteur has the impression that there were fewer interventions either because of parliamentary recesses or because of elections in Italy and the United Kingdom. However, it would be desirable for representatives to make greater use of the texts adopted by the WEU Assembly in their dialogues with governments in national parliaments.

3. See Collected Texts 45, page 45.

III. Public relations activities of the WEU Council and its ministerial organs

30. On 4th June 1987, the Presidential Committee instructed the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to study the section of the annual report concerning information given to the press and public. The first part of the thirty-second annual report contains no information on this subject but in the second part there are a few indications under the heading "Press and information".

31. The Council first recalls "the contribution that WEU could make to achieve a wider consensus among public opinion on the defence effort being made by the European countries". But it says nothing about basic measures to attain this aim or action to be taken on its document "WEU and public awareness". Its answer to Recommendation 442, which stressed the need for early action in this connection, is not mentioned in this part of the annual report.

32. It is gratifying that a unit responsible for relations with the press and information was set up in the *political* division of the Secretariat-General in September 1986. However, this information does not answer the question of the fate of the public relations unit which was specially set up - outside the political division - and which is included in the organogram of the Secretariat-General appended to the first part of the thirty-second annual report.

33. The half-yearly report of the Federal German Government on the activities of WEU during the period 1st October 1986 to 31st March 1987, prepared for the information of members of the Bundestag, gives further information on this subject, specifying that the post of counsellor for press and public relations has not yet been filled, that his work is being carried out partly by the Secretary-General himself and that an official from the political and analysis section has been made responsible for relations with the press. Moreover, on 22nd December 1986, in answer to a question put in the Bundestag by Mr. Antretter, the German Government stated that the Secretary-General had given an assurance that he would ensure that this post was filled as soon as possible and in the prescribed form.

34. However, the post is still vacant and one may wonder about the Council's real intentions in this connection since the transitional period for the restructuring of the ministerial organs is to be concluded at the end of 1987.

35. While, according to the annual report, the unit responsible for relations with the press has a secondary rôle of providing information and documentation for the permanent representatives in London, what are its principal activities?

It is satisfying to learn that the Secretariat-General answers many requests for information from the public about the activities of WEU as a whole and that the number of requests has increased considerably in recent months.

36. This information is very interesting and raises a number of questions. Which persons or institutions are asking for information? How are they informed? What practical lessons have the Council and the Secretary-General learned from this trend in regard to information policy in general? There is no denying that the Secretary-General himself is very active where public relations are concerned, but this can nevertheless not replace the definition and implementation of an information policy emanating from the Council. The memorandum from the Netherlands Government to the President of the Second Chamber of the States-General on 18th June 1987 is a good example in this connection. However, it is a purely national text and in no way commits the Council.

37. The new Netherlands chairmanship made a further firm, positive gesture by issuing guidelines to the press at the close of the meetings held in The Hague on 20th August and 15th September 1987 of a group of senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the WEU member states to consider the situation in the Gulf. This was the first time the Council had informed the press immediately of a non-ministerial meeting and it would be desirable for this to become normal practice.

38. Tribute should also be paid to the initiative taken by Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, who reviewed the Luxembourg chairmanship-in-office of the Council in 1986-87 in an article entitled "The prospects for the WEU" in the August 1987 issue of the NATO Review, thus ensuring its distribution throughout the countries of the Atlantic Alliance.

39. However, these are isolated acts. Information in the annual report that efforts made to strengthen co-operation "between existing European academic and research institutions in the field of security and defence... forms part of the process of increasing public awareness of European security requirements" is too vague to throw light on the Council's intentions in this connection. Admittedly, it would be useful for these institutions to be made aware of WEU problems but they cannot replace the organisation in propagating its aims or explaining its action to the public.

40. Nothing is learned about the rôle of the agencies in regard to information. However, in the document entitled "WEU and public awareness" the duties of the agencies in this area were described as follows:

“ The Council may commission the Paris agencies of WEU to contribute to information activity in the following ways:

- (i) preparing material specifically for public relations use; such material could be distributed as directed by the Permanent Council through the secretariat unit in London. If budgetary resources permitted, the Council might request preparation of small publications about the work of WEU in pamphlet or brochure form for distribution;
- (ii) preparing material of topical interest for publication and dissemination to the press. A list of press contacts should be drawn up and kept with the new unit in the Secretariat-General in London. ”

41. Why has none of these intentions been followed up, although the Council has noted that the number of requests for information from the public has increased considerably? What rôle does the Council assign to national governments in this connection? In the abovementioned document, the Council stressed that the European governments “ should focus the attention of their publics on the central importance of deterrence in maintaining peace and security ”. After stressing the importance of public statements by politicians and ministers, the Council considered “ other national information channels should also be used more effectively to generate greater public awareness of policies which the alliance and WEU members follow ”.

42. Furthermore, in its reply to Recommendation 441, communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1985, the Council considered that the effort to keep the public informed about security and defence policy was “ essentially the responsibility of each member state which provides regular information using the methods that it considers the most appropriate ”. Furthermore, the Council had also announced in its document on “ WEU and public awareness ” that it would be possible to ensure that national information activities were co-ordinated in order to give them greater impact. In this context, the committee’s decision to consider in greater detail the practice followed by the governments of the seven WEU member countries in keeping the public informed can provide the Council with useful indications.

IV. How the governments of the WEU member countries keep the public informed

43. In order to make a comparative study, on 21st July 1987 your Rapporteur sent a questionnaire to the ministries for foreign affairs and

defence of the seven WEU member countries (see appendix). Although only five governments have as yet answered, this has allowed interesting conclusions to be drawn.

(i) Technical instruments set up by governments

44. It is worth noting that several member governments have set up large structures and bodies to develop contacts with the public on security policy matters.

45. This has been done, for instance, in one of the smaller member countries, *Belgium*, where the 1985 defence white paper issued by the private office of the Minister of Defence devotes a chapter to information policy. It is learned from this white paper that in May 1984 the Ministry of Defence issued an order defining structures designed to allow the pursuit of an information policy “ better suited to basic information and improving its propagation, while taking account of the limits which, for security reasons, stand in the way of the disclosure of military information ”.

46. The Ministry of Defence set up an information service which is the main executive body for information on the armed forces. It has several specialised departments for contacts with the press and broadcasting special television programmes. There is also a defence study centre dependent on the Institut royal supérieur de défense, which pays close attention to defence information policy and is above all responsible for giving clarification and details on defence matters. It organises discussions, seminars and colloquies which are open to all who are interested in security questions. According to the white paper, “ it can rely on the regular participation of members of parliament and representatives of political research bodies, political parties and university, trade union and religious circles ”.

47. In the *Federal Republic of Germany*, the 1985 white paper on the situation of and developments in the federal armed forces also devotes a chapter to public relations. Responsibility for information is shared between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Federal Government Press and Information Office. When planned public relations measures relating to security policy concern several ministries, co-ordination of the relevant action is ensured by the Press Office in close co-operation with the ministries concerned.

48. The Ministry of Defence itself has a press and information office and a public relations office responsible for supervising and guiding youth officers and non-commissioned officers and all other officers and officials responsible solely for public relations work. It is responsible

for informing the population by publishing documents, advising publishers of works on security policy and assisting producers or actors in the preparation of films, television programmes or plays dealing with problems relating to security policy.

49. In the *United Kingdom*, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has set up a special Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit responsible inter alia for informing the public about matters relating to the limitation of armaments and disarmament. There is also the Central Office of Information which produces booklets for the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

50. In *France*, the Ministry of Defence has set up an armed forces information and public relations service which has a vast rôle to play in ensuring real-time information for the defence authorities and those responsible for relaying information to the public, keeping the general public informed and helping to train those responsible for relaying information to the public.

51. In *Italy*, it appears from the 1985 white paper on defence that in 1947 a single press office for the Ministry of Defence was set up which has been known since 1967 as the Servizio Pubblica Informazione della difesa (public defence information service). It is responsible for:

- issuing communiqués and information relating to the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces;
- supplying continuous information on institutional military activities;
- co-ordinating information on compulsory military service and voluntary service;
- maintaining contacts with the media and corresponding services of the Presidency of the Republic, the private office of the Prime Minister, parliament, other ministries, public institutions and international organisations of which Italy is a member.

Inter alia, the white paper advocates wider circulation of news and improved co-ordination.

52. It is interesting to study how the governments use the means available to them. Since the attitude of the younger generation in Europe towards the security problems of our continent is a crucial factor for the fate of our nations, the Rapporteur proposes to consider first of all how governments maintain contacts with the younger generation.

(ii) *Contacts with the younger generation*

53. The governments of five countries – Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom – have given useful information on this subject.

54. In *Belgium*, 2 200 copies of a document entitled “Initiation to defence problems” were published in 1985 and circulated in 1986 by the education authorities to all teaching establishments at every level. It was intended for secondary schools and published on the initiative of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Defence on a proposal by the Army-Youth Committee. A similar publication is now being prepared in co-operation with the Flemish-speaking department of the Ministry of Education.

55. The 177-page publication, accompanied by separate documentation, is quite remarkable in that it gives basic information on the historical evolution of the rôle of the armed forces in society right up to the present position of Belgium in East-West relations and the Atlantic Alliance.

56. It is therefore particularly regrettable that this publication says absolutely nothing about Western European Union either in its historical section or in its description of the present situation. It would perhaps be useful for our Belgian colleagues to use their contacts with their government to ensure that any future edition takes account of the rôle of WEU in European security policy. In any event, the Belgian Government’s initiative in publishing this text should be encouraged.

57. In the *United Kingdom*, schools receive information on defence and security matters, usually on request. Moreover, the British Atlantic Committee, a non-governmental organisation that works in co-operation with the government and NATO, arranges vast educational programmes on which it concentrates most of its activities.

58. In February 1987, the Ministry of Defence, with the assistance of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, produced a film entitled “Keeping the peace” intended specially for school children. Your Rapporteur does not know whether information thus given to young people in the United Kingdom includes the rôle of WEU. Where booklets are concerned, the Ministry of Defence has said that WEU was mentioned in a number of publications, but only briefly. According to an answer given on 9th April 1987 to a question by Mr. Terlezki the United Kingdom Government has no plans to take steps to ensure that school children have access to information on the rôle played by the United Kingdom in WEU. It hopes, however, “that where opportunity to do so arises in the

school curriculum, pupils' understanding of the United Kingdom's relationships with its European neighbours including the functions and work of... Western European Union will be developed as part of the process of learning about political processes... ”.

59. Although in the *Federal Republic of Germany* education is the responsibility of the Länder, the Federal Government plays a small part in drafting school textbooks. It distributes information to primary and secondary school teachers. In January 1987, for instance, the Ministry of Defence published a booklet entitled “Elements for civic education” (*Materialien für den Staatsbürgerlichen Unterricht*) containing texts on peace and security policy. There was only one sentence on WEU which unfortunately gave no basic information.

60. Special action has been taken in Germany with the presentation throughout the country of plays on security-related subjects. This initiative is intended specially for school children and other young people.

61. The 1985 white paper on the situation of and developments in the federal armed forces, issued by the Federal Ministry of Defence, paid special attention to relations with the younger generation. It considered that the scholastic communication of information on security policy must become an international political reality and allow future conscripts to form opinions on the need to safeguard peace. In this context, the white paper asserted that “schools, as public institutions designed to ensure that the younger generation is educated and instructed, play an important rôle ”.

62. Moreover, the white paper said that “for relations with young people, the Bundeswehr has 665 ‘youth officers’ 65 of them working full-time and 600 part-time for this purpose. There are also more or less the same number of non-commissioned youth officers. At the invitation of teaching establishments and youth associations they discuss with adolescents matters relating to security policy and inform them about military service, thus making a major contribution to civic education.

63. In *France*, the Société d'études et de réalisations techniques pour l'image et le son (society for audiovisual technical studies and projects) prepared in March 1984 under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence a very detailed document entitled “Thoughts on defence” aimed at assisting history and geography teachers wishing to make their classes think about the subject of defence. A section on alliances and negotiations describes historical developments from the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty on 17th March 1948 to the creation of WEU and concludes that “WEU is the only European institution responsible for

debating defence matters, but its vocation goes beyond that of a military alliance alone: it has to promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe ”.

64. On the rôle of schools, the situation is different in *Luxembourg*, where there is no provision for schools to be given information from the government on security and defence questions in the context of the school curriculum. However, it must be borne in mind that the Luxembourg public in general benefits from a broad spectrum of information on various security and defence questions simply because it usually has access to all the media of neighbouring and more remote countries, particularly the press, radio and television of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium.

(iii) *Free publications and their circulation to the general public*

65. When answering the questionnaire, four countries – Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom – appended their recent publications and booklets to show their efforts to keep the public informed.

66. In *Luxembourg*, security and defence matters and problems linked with the operation of WEU are dealt with at length in the memorandum prepared by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the beginning of each year on government activities in the previous year. This memorandum is transmitted to the Chamber of Deputies and made public, so that it is available to anyone interested in the government's foreign policy.

67. In *Belgium*, the booklet on “Initiation to defence problems” intended for teaching establishments was described in the previous section. 15 000 copies of the 1985 white paper on defence were distributed as follows: to the Flemish executive, the executive of the French community, the Walloon executive, the executive of the German-speaking community, members of both houses of parliament, the bureaux of the various Belgian political parties, study centres, public libraries, scientific foundations, communal and provincial administrations and the media. It included a relatively short paragraph on efforts to reactivate WEU but no basic information on the organisation.

68. Also in 1985, the information service of the Ministry of Defence published 15 000 copies of a “Defence manual”. This vast document gives 207 pages of very detailed, useful information on all the political and military aspects of defence and Belgian policy in this area. Western European Union is mentioned in the historical part of the document but the basic description

consists of one small paragraph indicating that "WEU is the only collective Western European security system having an adequate legal basis which might therefore allow future developments. This can be seen from recent efforts to reactivate WEU". This manual was distributed to members of the defence committees but not to public libraries.

69. In 1983, the Ministry for External Relations and the Ministry of Defence produced a pamphlet entitled "Peace with freedom" showing how the partners of the Atlantic Alliance had safeguarded peace in freedom and describing their future rôle. It is not known whether this pamphlet is to be reissued.

70. In the *United Kingdom*, the Ministry of Defence distributes a number of publications, mainly on request. Among the most recent, mention should be made of the booklet "British defence policy 1987" (85 000 copies), the pamphlet "Britain in NATO" (30 000 copies) and the booklet "Keeping the peace", published in 1987, the number of copies of which your Rapporteur does not know. Another pamphlet published in 1987 contains twenty questions and answers on defence matters. In none of these publications is there any information on WEU.

71. Under the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit is responsible for issuing a number of booklets and pamphlets giving information on problems of and negotiations on the limitation of armaments and disarmament.

72. A quarterly review prepared by this unit reports regularly on parliamentary debates, statements by ministers and the progress of negotiations. About 5 000 copies are printed of this review. No. 5 for this year gives extracts from a speech by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to the Royal Institute of International Relations, Brussels, on 16th March 1987. Alas, all the parts of the speech calling for a stronger rôle for WEU have been omitted. To sum up, your Rapporteur found no trace of WEU in the free British publications. Only the defence estimates for 1987 presented to parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence include a special chapter on WEU giving useful information.

73. Where *France* is concerned, the armed forces information and public relations service circulates many publications on the subject, including "Weapons in France", No. 83, August 1986, which mentions WEU in the chapter on international meetings in the context of co-operation in armaments matters and "France's defence policy", an information document published in October 1984 and containing extracts from speeches by members of the French

Government which mentions WEU in the context of an interview granted to the newspaper *La Croix* by the Minister for External Relations on 11th July 1984.

74. Another document entitled "The programme law relating to military equipment for the years 1987-91", published in April 1987, contains inter alia the full text of the address by Mr. Giraud, French Minister of Defence, to the National Assembly and extracts from the address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister, to the WEU Assembly on 2nd December 1986 concerning the European security charter.

75. Where free publications are concerned, the *Federal German Government* has an impressive record. The German authorities have transmitted for information no less than forty recent booklets and other publications of which between 50 000 and one million copies have been printed (white paper: 150 000 copies, pamphlets: 100 000 to 500 000 copies) designed to inform the public. A few examples are given hereafter.

76. The German Government is the only government of a WEU member country to publish a half-yearly report on the activities of the organisation for the information of parliamentarians. It is to be noted that the standard of these reports has further improved in recent years and the most recent, covering the period 1st October 1986 to 31st March 1987, contains much useful information. Nevertheless, these reports, which are printed solely by the Bundestag services, do not go much further than parliament itself.

77. Another useful document is the annual report by the Federal Government on progress with disarmament and the control of armaments and the trend of the balance of forces. This text, also designed primarily for the information of parliamentarians, is reissued in another booklet by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government so as to reach a wider public.

78. In September 1984, this office published a roneoed version of a document entitled "The reactivation of WEU" which contained basic information on the WEU organs and the Assembly. Although this text preceded the Rome declaration and has not been updated, it should be stressed that it is the only basic national publication on WEU that your Rapporteur has seen.

79. In regard to the activities of the Ministry of Defence, the white paper on the situation of and developments in the federal armed forces, last issued in 1985, when it had 434 pages, gives the fullest information on every aspect of defence policy. There are a few paragraphs on the reactivation of WEU in the chapters entitled "The

bases of security” and “The transatlantic partnership and the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance”.

80. Useful basic information is also given in this white paper. It quotes commitments stemming from Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and decisions taken in the Rome declaration. It also contains a table showing the structure of the organisation. It then sums up the German Government's position as follows:

“The Federal Government considers that the reactivation of WEU constitutes a considerable progress in European co-operation which has already proved itself in the Eurogroup and the IEPG. Co-operation at WEU level must strengthen the European pillar of the alliance, open up a new dimension in the process of European unification and contribute to the harmonisation of positions in every area in which Europe should speak with a single voice. The member countries of the alliance which do not belong to WEU are informed in detail of the activities of the organisation in security policy matters.

A single European will is now more important than ever if Europe is to remain a respected partner of the United States of America.”

81. It is therefore gratifying that the white paper gives the necessary information about WEU. It is merely to be regretted that this is rather “drowned” in the text and that WEU does not appear in the table of contents.

82. The Ministry of Defence has recently published a number of booklets designed primarily to inform the man in the street. Thus, the booklet entitled “What does the enemy look like? – Facts and arguments about the East-West conflict”, 150 000 copies of which were published in 1987, aims to give younger readers a better grasp of the origins and consequences of the East-West conflict and make them more aware of the facts. The alliance systems are explained at length, but WEU is mentioned only very briefly in the description of post-war events and only in regard to the arms restrictions imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany. Developments since 1984 are not mentioned.

83. Among the other publications, mention may be made of the booklet entitled “Strategy versus arms control” published in 1986 and intended to give the reader basic knowledge of security policy and arguments for discussions on security and peace questions (WEU is referred to only very briefly), the booklet entitled “An alliance, defence and arms control so that we may live in peace”, published in March 1986, and the pamphlet entitled “Two unequal alliances”, published in October 1986, in which

WEU is mentioned in one sentence on the very last page.

84. “The army in the alliance”, a booklet published in October 1986, gives information on the security policy of the Federal Republic in an international context, on the German army and on the place of the army in society.

85. The present state of security in the international context, threat assessment, the alliances and German security policy are analysed in a booklet entitled “Being a soldier today”, published in January 1987.

86. The thirtieth anniversary of the Bundeswehr in 1985 provided an opportunity to publish a booklet summing up the evolution of German rearmament. None of these latter publications refers to WEU.

87. In addition, the Ministry of Defence publishes each month in a magazine entitled “Arguments relating to security policy” statements and positions adopted by politicians on current events in this connection and the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government distributes each month a document entitled “Notes on security policy” which reports on all the most recent events and statements. Furthermore, booklets from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs give information on developments in East-West relations and the CSCE process.

88. Your Rapporteur has received no publications from *Italy*, but the 1985 white paper shows that the Ministry of Defence publishes many periodicals including “Quadrante”, “Informazioni della difesa”, “Il carabiniere” and “Notiziari” (chronicles).

89. In the *Netherlands*, the government attaches special importance to a study published in June 1987 by the provisional consultative council on peace and security entitled “Western European co-operation in security matters – an Atlantic necessity”, which gives an important place to the future rôle of WEU.

(iv) Other means of information

90. It is clear that all the governments use the media in one way or another to put their policies over to the general public. The media for their part often take the initiative of questioning governments.

91. In *Luxembourg*, for instance, the media, and particularly the radio, frequently question the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence on their views on security and defence questions.

92. In *Belgium*, the principal means of distribution used by the government is through the press, television or radio. At the beginning of

May 1987, the Belgian Minister of Defence launched a campaign in several newspapers under the heading "In peacetime, too, our army fights every day", aimed at explaining defence problems. According to the answer given on 5th June 1987 to a question put by Mr. Daras in the Chamber of Representatives, the interest of this special action was to make public opinion more aware of the various tasks Belgium gives its army which it carries out competently and with devotion.

93. There is no particular production of special films in Belgium. However, there is co-operation between the information service of the armed forces and the television channels for producing programmes on the armed forces. To date, these merely concern the operational aspect. At a later stage, it is hoped to tackle defence policy in these programmes.

94. In the *United Kingdom*, the Ministry of Defence, in co-operation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, produced a film in February 1987 on "Keeping the peace". This production was intended mainly for schools and other institutions concerned.

95. In the *Federal Republic of Germany*, there is inter alia a film entitled "Security for peace in freedom", produced in 1985, which explains the aims of security policy. Over the years, the Ministry of Defence has also produced a considerable number of films including one entitled "Defence plus détente equals security" and another entitled "NATO today", which gives information on security policy. These information films are loaned free of charge to institutions, organisations, groups and associations for the information of their members.

96. In regard to the organisation of conferences and debates in special frameworks, in *Luxembourg* the Ministry for Foreign Affairs encourages the organisation of conferences on security and defence matters. Thus, it promoted a lecture by Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, to the Luxembourg Society for International Affairs. There are regular relations with representatives of various organisations in the field of action of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. If necessary, they are given financial assistance. In this context, special mention should be made of the "Jeunesse atlantique luxembourgeoise".

97. In *Belgium*, the Ministry of Defence organises various kinds of lectures and discussions:

- seminars organised by the defence study centre;
- a pool of military lecturers speaking on request to various audiences.

98. In the *United Kingdom*, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office finances seminars on spe-

cific subjects in co-operation with non-governmental organisations. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs holds regular meetings with non-governmental organisations, universities and those responsible for information. On request, officials receive various groups, research workers and visitors to the Central Office of Information.

99. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office corresponds with the public and keeps non-governmental organisations informed of current developments in arms control matters. The counsellor responsible for disarmament questions makes information tours throughout the United Kingdom and attends all public meetings at which a government spokesman is required.

100. At the Ministry of Defence, press correspondents are informed once a month of current events at a high level. Every two or three months, information meetings on defence and disarmament are organised for groups of undergraduates. Exhibitions and information visits are also organised in the country.

101. In the *Federal Republic of Germany*, the government organises seminars for the press, including the foreign press, and military information courses for managerial staff in industry, the public administration and the press.

102. The Press and Information Office and the Ministry of Defence receives about 70 000 visitors each year. They organise information visits to NATO headquarters in Brussels and seminars for allied military forces stationed in Germany.

(v) *Principal topics of information*

103. It would be premature to give a final opinion on the essential elements of information in the member countries solely on the basis of the answers by the four governments which have given information on this subject.

104. While *Luxembourg* refers to "security and defence matters" in general and to "problems linked with the operation of WEU", the main subjects to which the Belgian Ministry of Defence pays attention are Belgium's defence effort, military service, East-West relations and disarmament problems.

105. In the *United Kingdom*, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office concentrates on information on matters relating to the control of armaments and disarmament. The Ministry of Defence endeavours to circulate information on its policy as a whole, on the rôle of NATO and on the United Kingdom's contribution to the Atlantic Alliance and, in this context, on the necessary defence measures, East-West relations and disarmament problems.

106. In the *Federal Republic of Germany*, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs gives information on security policy, East-West relations and disarmament problems. The Ministry of Defence gives information on everything relating to the armed forces and the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government is responsible for explaining the government's basic positions in three ways:

- in the long term, by circulating basic information on the meaning and aims of the government's security policy;
- in the medium term, by preparing the public for decisions and measures to be taken (e.g. extending military service, introducing new weapons systems, etc.);
- in the short term, by giving information on current events.

107. Most of the information documents studied by your Rapporteur show that the fundamental rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in European security is explained in great detail and all governments have confirmed that they have more or less close contacts with the NATO information service. This is in close keeping with the Rome declaration and the Council's document on WEU and public awareness, which underlines the need to inform the public of "the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty as the foundation of our security".

108. However, this represents only part of the necessary information. Where WEU is concerned, the initiative of explaining its rôle and the aim of its reactivation is apparently left mainly to ministers, heads of government and other politicians. But in view of the fact that their speeches concentrate on topical questions, the public receives very little basic information. Among the many documents and publications from governments consulted by your Rapporteur, only the German 1985 white paper on the situation of and developments in the federal armed forces and the statement to parliament by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence on the defence estimates for 1987 explain the importance of Article V, the cornerstone of the modified Brussels Treaty, which obliges WEU member countries to afford automatic aid and assistance by all the means in their power in the event of an armed attack.

109. For the rest, it must be noted that the great majority of publications available to the public do not give enough information on the aims of our organisation and there may be many reasons for this. Perhaps some governments, fearing that they may give the impression of no longer considering the Atlantic Alliance to be decisive for Europe's security, hesitate to give too many details about WEU. However, there seem no

grounds for such fears provided they follow the guidelines given by the Council in its document on WEU and public awareness.

110. Another reason might be uncertainty or even ignorance about the precise aims of WEU and its reactivation in the offices responsible for public information in the ministries concerned. Difficulties may also stem from possible uncertainty about the sharing of responsibilities between the ministries concerned and, even more serious, from misunderstanding between the national authorities and WEU organs about task-sharing.

V. Conclusions

111. Assuming that all the WEU organs wish the public to be better informed about the European dimension of security, the above study shows there are encouraging signs but also serious shortcomings in the implementation of this aim. One can be particularly grateful to the Netherlands Government for having sent the Second Chamber of the States-General a memorandum on the Netherlands chairmanship-in-office of the Council from mid-1987 to mid-1988. The text of this memorandum is particularly useful because it meets the concerns expressed by parliamentarians at the information meeting organised by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in Luxembourg on 28th April 1987 about ignorance and uncertainty about the precise aims of WEU and its reactivation.

112. In regard to the Council's relations with the press, it is gratifying that guidelines were distributed to the press at the close of the meetings in The Hague on 20th August and 15th September 1987 of a group of senior officials from WEU member countries to examine the situation in the Gulf. Conversely, the section of the thirty-second annual report concerning information given to the press and public is hardly likely to give any hope that the active, permanent information of the public will become one of the Council's primary concerns.

113. As for government public relations activities, the comparative study, although incomplete, allows it to be concluded that efforts made by some governments to attract the attention of the younger generation and the public in general are noteworthy. However, national publications are still very far from assigning due importance to the rôle and tasks of WEU. Moreover, there seems to be no co-ordination between member countries.

114. To improve this situation, action seems necessary at several levels:

115. At the level of parliaments, members of the Assembly must be urged to speak more often on the basis of texts adopted by the WEU Assembly. In this way, they can draw the attention of governments and the public to the work of the Assembly. In drawing up the order of business of plenary sessions of the Assembly, greater importance should be accorded to relations with parliaments and the public. Indeed, it is difficult to arouse interest in these problems if the debates on the relevant reports are always held on the last day of the session.

116. At the level of governments, it would be useful for them to concert their public relations work and – even more important – ensure co-ordination with the public relations office in the Secretariat-General in London. A regular exchange of publications and booklets, as is the

practice of most governments with the NATO information service for instance, would already be a useful first step.

117. At the level of the Council and Secretariat-General, it would be important to work out an active information policy taking account of the growing number of requests for information on the activities of WEU as a whole. If the budgetary situation does not allow booklets to be produced under the responsibility of the Council or the Secretariat-General, advantage must be taken of instruments and means available in member governments. The Council must really ensure that national information activities are co-ordinated and make appropriate suggestions and recommendations for including WEU in the subjects on which information is given. For this purpose, it is essential for an efficient unit in the Secretariat-General to concentrate on this area.

APPENDIX

***Questionnaire for preparing the report on public information activities
on security and defence matters in WEU member countries***

*(sent to the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the WEU member countries
by Mr. Burger, Rapporteur, on 21st July 1987)*

1. What are the principal means used by your government for informing the public about defence and security?
 - (a) Are publications (booklets, periodicals, leaflets, etc.) issued free of charge by the ministry?
If so, please send us the latest relevant publications.
 - (b) How many copies of these publications are printed and how are they circulated to the public?
 - (c) How does the government use the information media to propagate its security and defence policy?
 - (d) Does the ministry arrange for specialised films to be produced?
If so, please quote titles and describe the way in which they are used.
 - (e) Does the ministry organise conferences and discussions in special forums?
If so, please give details.
 - (f) Are groups of visitors received and briefed at the ministry and/or headquarters?
If so, how often and how are such groups formed?
 - (g) What other methods of informing the public are used?
2. What are the main subjects on which the government informs the public?
(for instance: the government's security and defence policy; threat assessment; necessary defence measures; the system of alliances in the East and West; Europe's identity in security matters; East-West relations and disarmament problems; co-operation in armaments; military service, etc.)
3. In what way does your government participate in NATO's information service?
4. How does the government inform the public of the activities of Western European Union?
5. Is governmental information directed mainly towards:
 - (a) special groups, for instance young people?
If so, what approach is adopted?
 - (b) schools – to what extent do schools receive government information – possibly in the framework of educational programmes from the ministry for national education – and how do schools make use of it?
 - (c) the media?
 - (d) parliamentarians?
 - (e) political parties?
 - (f) the population in general?
 - (g) other groups?
6. Is there a special authority responsible for co-ordinating the information policy of your government in these matters?
If so, please give the name and address.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

**of the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session
Paris, 30th November-3rd December 1987**

MONDAY, 30th NOVEMBER

Morning

Meetings of political groups

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session.
5. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly.
6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
Vote on the draft decision.
8. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.

TUESDAY 1st DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council:
Resumed debate.

11 a.m.

2. Presentation of the first part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council.
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft budget.
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts.
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.
4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.

4 p.m.

5. Address by Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.

WEDNESDAY 2nd DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council:
Resumed debate.

11.30 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
3. European armaments co-operation – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. European armaments co-operation – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council:
Resumed debate.

3.15 p.m.

2. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.
3. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council.
European armaments co-operation – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council.
Votes on the draft recommendations.

3. Recent developments in Soviet external policy:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Péciaux on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.

THURSDAY, 3rd DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Recent developments in Soviet external policy:
Resumed debate.
Votes on the draft recommendation and draft order.
2. Threat assessment:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Burger on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolution.
2. Military use of computers – towards a joint European defence research programme.
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Fourré on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
Votes on the draft recommendation and draft order.

CLOSE OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 442 to 448*RECOMMENDATION 442¹*on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance –
Part I: The reactivation of WEU²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the proposals by the French Government, and particularly the one to draw up a European security charter, provide an opportunity for a fundamental re-examination of the requirements of that security;
- (ii) Considering that the policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance remains the guarantee of that security;
- (iii) Considering that the main threats to international peace now arise in areas not covered by the alliance;
- (iv) Considering that European co-operation in armaments matters has become essential for the security of Europe;
- (v) Considering that the search for disarmament or the limitation of armaments is essential for the maintenance of peace and should continue to be given priority but that this search must not jeopardise the security of Europe;
- (vi) Considering that the recent development of chemical weapons constitutes a particularly serious threat for all mankind;
- (vii) Welcoming recent measures taken by the Council to increase its activities in order to meet the requirements of European security but regretting that information on these activities communicated to the public and to the Assembly is still far from adequate;
- (viii) Considering that it is still essential to bring the requirements of European security to the attention of the public;
- (ix) Deeply regretting the continuous failure of the Council of Ministers to inform the Assembly in a proper way;
- (x) Considering that new governmental activities in WEU must allow the Assembly to exercise to the full its responsibilities under Article IX of the treaty;
- (xi) Noting in particular that the replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions relating to the Council's activities, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Programme Group seriously distort the Council's commitments to the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Study closely the proposals made by the French Government for drawing up a European security charter with a view to:
 - (a) defining Europe's security requirements, acquainting its American allies with them and ensuring that current negotiations on the limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons lead to substantial reductions without compromising Europe's security based on a policy of deterrence;
 - (b) reaffirming member countries' continuing concern not to compromise the cohesion of the alliance and to include the strengthening of the European pillar in the context of the alliance;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (1st sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1089).

- (c) averting a chemical arms race by calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to seek an agreement ensuring the complete elimination of such arms and promoting the extension of this agreement to all countries;
 - (d) including in the charter a commitment to ensure reciprocal exchanges of information and consultations in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in regard to any threat to international peace;
 - (e) also including an expression of the joint will to remove obstacles still obstructing the development of European co-operation in armaments matters;
2. To this end, direct the measures taken to give new work to WEU so as to ensure that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty contributes to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the consolidation of peace by:
- (a) keeping the political committee on European security in the framework of WEU;
 - (b) considering how the treaty should be applied to ensure that it meets present European security requirements and allows WEU to be enlarged to include Western European countries wishing and able to take part;
 - (c) ensuring that these countries are kept informed of the activities of WEU and allowing the countries concerned to take part henceforth in some of these activities, particularly in co-operation in armaments matters;
 - (d) giving the necessary impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters, inter alia by adapting its decision of 7th May 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee to present facts of such co-operation;
 - (e) acting without delay on its document "WEU and public awareness" so as to inform public opinion of all its activities in accordance with the principles set out in the Rome declaration, including the issue of communiqués at the close of meetings of the political committee on European security;
 - (f) ensuring co-ordination of member countries' participation in the course to be organised by the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale in 1988 and of the development of subsequent courses so as to promote public awareness of European security requirements in all member countries; (1) for this purpose by instructing the Secretary-General to play an active part in organising the first course and to promote the formation of an association of former participants of which he would ensure the secretariat; (2) by asking the French institute to invite Spain and Portugal to send participants to this course;
 - (g) developing exchanges of views with the United States authorities so as to enhance the cohesion of the alliance;
 - (h) applying in full Article IX of the treaty under which it has an obligation to report to the Assembly on its activities and on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when pursued in frameworks other than WEU.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 442***

1. The proposals put forward by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in his address to the WEU Assembly in December 1986 have been the subject of detailed examination by the Council and the special working group. An interim report on European security interests was presented to ministers at their meeting on 28th April 1987. On the basis of this interim report, a common document is to be drawn up with a view to its examination, possible adoption and publication, at the ministerial meeting in The Hague.
2. At their April meeting, ministers examined the latest proposals tabled at the Geneva negotiations on nuclear arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union. In particular, they affirmed their support for the efforts being made by the United States to reach an agreement. On the same occasion, they reiterated that reductions in nuclear weapons would increase the importance of removing the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact and eliminating chemical weapons, given the need for a stable balance at all times.
3. The Council recognises that improved European arms co-operation can increase the effectiveness of the European defence effort, promote a better balance within the Atlantic Alliance and thus contribute to an all-round strengthening of the western security system.
4. In their exchanges of views, WEU member states take account of tensions and conflicts outside Europe insofar as they may affect their security. In this context, the political directors of the Seven met on 20th August 1987, at the invitation of the Netherlands presidency, to consider the situation in the Gulf. There was a further high-level meeting on 15th September.
5. There is no political committee on European security as such. It is the responsibility of the Permanent Council to co-ordinate all the organisation's activities. In the context of improved co-operation between the seven capitals, meetings of the enlarged Council take place with the participation of the political directors and representatives from the defence ministries. In particular, these councils prepare for the ministerial meetings. The political directors of the Seven also have opportunities to meet, for example, in the margins of meetings of the political committee of the Twelve. In the special working group, representatives of both the foreign and defence ministries, meeting either jointly or separately, study subjects as directed by the Council such as European security interests, security in the Mediterranean, SDI and resources management.
6. On the question of enlargement, the Council would reiterate the position it adopted in its replies to Written Questions 265 and 272.
7. At their meeting of 21st May in London, representatives of the national armaments directors of the Seven agreed that their work should be on an ad hoc basis. The Council would also like to point out that WEU has a conceptual and not an operational rôle and that all duplication with the IEPG and the CNAD should be avoided. Responsibility for promoting and monitoring specific European co-operation projects lies with the IEPG.
8. The Council is prepared to offer the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale, and any bodies which may follow its example, every encouragement in organising courses on European security. The precise organisational arrangements for such courses will of course depend on the experience gained.
9. Prior to the ministerial meeting of April 1987, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Jacques Poos, and the United States Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, exchanged letters. This exchange confirmed that the United States supported the revitalisation of WEU in the broader framework of the Atlantic Alliance and that they were convinced that WEU could provide a means of strengthening Europe's contribution to the common defence.
10. As in the past, the Council will endeavour to report fully on its activities to the Assembly not only through the six-monthly reports and the meetings with official representatives of the Assembly but also via addresses to and discussions with the parliamentarians during Assembly sessions.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 22nd September 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 25th September 1987.

RECOMMENDATION 443¹

on the ministerial meeting of the Council²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the diplomatic/press offensive of Mikhail Gorbachev, who is multiplying proposals for nuclear disarmament, calls for a co-ordinated response from the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Aware that these proposals, which affect first and foremost European security, should lead to European interests being defined in WEU, the only European organisation with responsibilities in this area;
- (iii) Encouraged by the call to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance by George Shultz, United States Secretary of State, following his recent visit to Moscow, requesting their opinion on these proposals,

URGES THE COUNCIL

1. To make known its collegiate point of view on the Gorbachev proposals through the intermediary of its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, in his statement to the Assembly on Tuesday, 28th April 1987;
2. To instruct its Chairman-in-Office to give the Council's point of view on the Soviet proposals at the meetings of the North Atlantic Council to be held on 11th and 12th June 1987.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (2nd sitting).

2. Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure tabled by Mr. Goerens and others (Document 1094).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 443***

1. Addressing the Assembly at the end of the Council meeting on 28th April 1987, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Jacques F. Poos, reviewed the discussions which had focused on the various proposals on arms reduction in Europe.
2. On 6th May 1987, the Political Director from the presidency paid a visit to the NATO Permanent Council to appraise the alliance of the Council's discussions on 28th April.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 2nd September 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 7th September 1987.

RECOMMENDATION 444¹

*replying to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Regretting the serious delay in the communication of the Council's annual report in 1986, the omission of information concerning one important meeting, and considering that the absence of agreement on certain matters should not prevent the Council from presenting the rest of its report on time;
- (ii) Welcoming, however, the communication in October 1986 of the first part of the report for that year,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before the end of February of the following year and that it contain a complete account of activities arranged by the Council;
2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement of WEU.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1090).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 444***

1. The Council will send the report on its activities as soon as possible to the Assembly. It should, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the drafting of this report and its approval by the seven member states require a certain amount of time.
2. In its reflections on possible enlargement the Council, aware of the fundamental implications of this issue, will take into account all relevant aspects as it has indicated in its reply to Written Question 265.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st September 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 25th September 1987.

RECOMMENDATION 445¹

*on principles applicable in preparing the budgets
of the WEU ministerial organs and the Assembly*²

The Assembly,

Fully endorsing the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end to WEU's budgetary difficulties,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Implement without delay the three principles defined by the Chairman-in-Office:

- application to the operating budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of WEU of the growth rate defined in the European Communities;
- establishment of a separate budget for pensions;
- recognition of the Assembly's freedom to manage its budget within the limits of the appropriations thus calculated.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1095).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 445***

1. The Council considers that, when all the budgets of WEU are prepared, the growth rate applicable should remain at zero in real terms, based on the rates of inflation in France and the United Kingdom, as officially forecast.
2. On the issue of pensions and budgetary autonomy, the Council would like to draw the Assembly's attention to the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly dated 15th July 1987 (see annex).

ANNEX

The Secretary-General

15th July 1987

Dear President,

Thank you for your letter of 22nd June 1987 enclosing a note on the application of the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy. The Council notes that the funds available to WEU come from contributions by member countries. It has to take account of the fact that in attributing financial means to international organisations, the governments of member countries have a degree of responsibility regarding supervision of the management of resources.

Bound by this principle, the Council read with the closest attention this note which very usefully clarifies a number of questions. It was taken especially into account in the deliberations of the Council on the implementation of the conclusions reached by the Ministers on 28th April last on separating the pensions budget from the operating budget of the Assembly as well as the latter's budgetary autonomy.

On this question, the Council agrees that, for the management of its future budgets, the Assembly may transfer funds between Heads II, III, IV and V without the prior agreement of the Council being necessary. Such agreement will be necessary, however, for any transfer concerning Head I. All the other procedure relating to the establishment of the budget and its management remain unchanged.

The overall budget of the Assembly, without pensions, will of course have to take account of the growth rate accepted by the seven member countries.

In this light, the presentation by the Assembly of detailed draft budgets remains as before and it is consequently more than desirable for a representative of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to be able to continue to take part in meetings of the Budget and Organisation Committee when these drafts are examined.

Supplementary budgets are necessarily subjected to the same procedures as ordinary budgets.

Mr. C. Goerens
President
Assembly of Western
European Union
43, avenue du Président Wilson
75775 Paris Cedex 16
France

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd October 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 30th October 1987

The calculations made by the Council allow it to note that the separation of the pensions budget from the operating budget would release an amount which, for 1987, might allow it to consider agreeing to a supplementary budget of not more than F 250 000.

The restructuring of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly – which had already been set out in a letter and a memorandum from your predecessor – falls within the context of Head I of the budget. Having examined these documents, the Council decided “ that the proposals contained in the document (memorandum) need to be considered as part of the review, during the transitional period, of the structure of the whole organisation, and cannot therefore be tackled separately ”. I had the honour to inform Mr. Jean-Marie Caro of this in a letter dated 23rd February and to specify, in another dated 28th May, that “ this decision remains fully valid for all the governments and was in no way modified at the lunch of the Ministers on 28th April ”.

In these conditions, the possible creation of new posts can be contemplated only in the framework of the structure of the whole organisation. Likewise, pending a decision on the new table of establishment, all the promotions made must be considered as measures taken in a personal capacity.

The Council keenly hopes that these clarifications will allow a harmonious application of the conclusions reached by the Ministers on 28th April, and this to the satisfaction of the Assembly, and will allow the positive nature of its relations with the latter to be strengthened.

Yours sincerely,
Alfred CAHEN

RECOMMENDATION 446¹*on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance –
Part II: Political activities of the Council*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Protesting against the fact that the thirty-second annual report of the Council reached it only on 27th April 1987;
- (ii) Noting that at the ministerial meeting on 28th April no action was taken on the proposal to draw up a European security charter;
- (iii) Noting and regretting that no effective decision has yet been taken on the Assembly's budgetary requests and that the words used by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council need clarification;
- (iv) Noting that the Council has taken no practical action on its intentions to reorganise the WEU services;
- (v) Noting and regretting that the Council has given no answer to the countries which have applied for membership of WEU and Portugal in particular;
- (vi) Noting that the absence of effective and adequate information given to the public on the Council's activities leaves considerable doubt about its intention to set up a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Convene as swiftly as practicable a conference of heads of state and of government of the signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty and of countries effectively determined to take part in a European security organisation in the context of the Atlantic Alliance in order to define jointly security requirements for the next ten years and the rôle to be attributed to WEU to this end;
2. Respond favourably to Portugal's application before the end of the year.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1987 during the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1099).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 446

1. The convening of a conference of heads of state and/or of government is at present not under consideration. The Council considers that the joint ministerial meetings held twice a year since 1984 provide the necessary political impetus for the organisation's work. As indicated in the Luxembourg communiqué, the Council is currently finalising its report on European security interests in the present strategic context which will serve as a basis to draw up a common document identifying the principles of European security with a view to its examination, possible adoption and publication, at the next ministerial meeting in The Hague.
2. In considering Portugal's application to join WEU, the Council will have to take account of the interest expressed by other European countries. On the general issue of enlargement, the Council's position has been stated on several occasions, most recently in its replies to Recommendations 442 and 444.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th September 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 29th September 1987.

RECOMMENDATION 447¹

***on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1986 (revised) and 1987, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
- (a) the presentation of the budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 has been simplified by reducing the number of sub-heads and grouping all social charges under one sub-head and all expenditure on staff under one head but that ordinary expenditure has not been separated from extraordinary expenditure as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendation 433;
 - (b) consequently, because of the effect of extraordinary expenditure, the growth rate of these budgets cannot be accurately compared with the rate of inflation fixed for applying the zero growth criterion;
 - (c) furthermore, the evolution of budgets since 1985 shows an increase above the zero growth rate since the requirements of reactivating WEU – including the restructuring of the ministerial organs – have been taken into account in this budget;
 - (d) in addition, the payment of pensions to newly-retired officials could no longer be included in the operating budget without jeopardising the activities of the various organs;
 - (e) the zero growth rate obviously no longer being of any value, the Council should establish a more objective and effective criterion for preparing WEU budgets;
 - (f) analysis of the various categories of expenditure in the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU shows that expenditure on staff alone represents about 90% of total operating expenditure;
 - (g) this percentage could be improved considerably and amounts under Head I “Permanent staff” could be used for other operating expenditure if the two seats in London and Paris were combined to allow their now separate services to be merged;
- (iii) Regretting that:
- (a) three posts assigned to the Secretariat-General remained vacant throughout 1986 whereas the Council refused the creation of new posts in the WEU Assembly;
 - (b) the Council has given a new interpretation of criteria for dual grading which entirely ignores the wishes of the staff to achieve career prospects subject to certain conditions of seniority;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that at the close of the ministerial meeting on 28th April 1987 Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, informed the Assembly that the Council of Ministers had decided to agree to a separate budget for pensions and to recognise the Assembly’s budgetary independence within the limits of agreed appropriations, this decision to take effect immediately,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apply the same criterion for increasing WEU budgets as is applied by the EEC in establishing its budget;
2. Apply to the operating budget of the Assembly for 1987 the growth rate of 2.79 % agreed upon for its budget as a whole, including pensions, i.e. an increase of F 379 983;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1987 during the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the reports tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Documents 1088 and 1105).

3. Examine the possibility of:
 - (a) uniting the ministerial organs of WEU in a single seat and preparing one table of establishment integrating the services now divided between the two seats;
 - (b) establishing dual grading at every level of the hierarchy to improve the staff's career possibilities.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 447***

1. After due consideration, the Council has concluded that the criteria for determining the budgets of the European Communities should not be applicable to WEU.

2. When the Council agreed to a growth rate of 2.79% for the 1987 Assembly budget, which was above the anticipated rate of inflation of 2% for France, it did so in order to compensate partially for the high pension budget (Part II of the budget). Because of this high pension expenditure, the increase of the operating budget (Part I of the budget) was only 0.49%.

When the Council of Ministers decided on 28th April 1987 that the pension budget of the Assembly should, with immediate effect, be separated from the operating budget, the result was that:

- the pension budget would be determined in accordance with the legal obligations resulting from the application of the pension scheme rules;
- the operating budget would be determined according to the zero real growth principle.

In the light of this decision, the Council would refer the Assembly to the Secretary-General's letter dated 15th July 1987, a copy of which is annexed hereto. (See annex to reply of the Council to Recommendation 445).

3. (a) The possibility of collocating the ministerial organs is part of the current deliberations on the reorganisation of WEU.

In examining collocation, the Council is mindful, amongst other considerations, of the overall increase in efficiency which could result.

(b) As stated in its reply to Recommendation 433, the Council recalls that the general principle of dual grading is that the higher of the two grades represents the approved position in the establishment table. The lower of the two grades is added to enable the organisation to recruit staff who are judged to possess the basic qualifications called for but may not have had previous experience.

Dual grading, therefore, is not intended to create promotion possibilities over and above the approved establishment table, but to facilitate recruitment.

The Council also recalls that the marked difference of 30 to 33% between the minimum and maximum salaries in a grade (seniority steps) exists, amongst other things, to compensate financially for limited career possibilities in international organisations. The Council also takes the view that the common grading and salary system, as well as the common pension scheme, for the co-ordinated organisations encourage job mobility.

RECOMMENDATION 448¹***on European space policy until 2000***²

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that a resolute space policy helps the development of pioneering technology by fostering progress in advanced industrial sectors and intellectual, cultural and human resources in Western Europe;
- (ii) Convinced that such a space policy can, in the long run, provide solutions to problems of energy and raw material supplies, the pollution of the biosphere and also famine, poverty and illiteracy in the third world, while fostering day-to-day progress and a better standard of living for the populations of our own countries;
- (iii) Determined that Western Europe, through ESA, should be fully independent in space matters before the end of the twentieth century;
- (iv) Considering that to enhance scientific capability and make optimum use of relatively limited intellectual and financial resources every possibility of European co-operation in both civil and military space research must be exploited;
- (v) Anxious to back up the already considerable results achieved by ESA's Ariane programme and confirmed by Arianespace in the commercial market;
- (vi) Stressing the urgency of establishing space co-operation for the security of the Western European countries, particularly in activities recognised to be stabilising, such as monitoring and communications,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Support the aim of the European Space Agency (ESA) to make Europe independent in space before the end of the century by ensuring that it has all the means necessary, which may mean doubling the present budget in the next decade;
2. Encourage the establishment of liaison between ESA and the authorities responsible for space policy in each country of the agency to ensure that all European bodies handling space research are kept mutually informed of current or planned civil and military programmes in order to avoid any pointless waste of intellectual and financial resources and better prepare for the difficult choices which will inevitably have to be made in the future;
3. Facilitate as far as possible operations by the European Ariane launcher to ensure that it has at least a half share of the market for commercial launches, inter alia by:
 - concluding without delay an agreement with the United States Government defining principles according to which the cost of commercial launches should take account of the costs borne by governments, particularly those relating to launching sites;
 - making arrangements to avoid having western satellites placed in orbit by Soviet launchers proposed in the world market if such offers continue to be made without reciprocity and at a cost which does not respect commercial principles;
4. Endeavour to conclude as early as possible an intergovernmental agreement with the United States on the space station in order to bring it into being more quickly while consolidating western co-operation, this being an opportunity for Europe, with its partners, to take part in technological progress linked with this programme and to advance towards independence;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1987 during the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 1098).

5. With the assistance of the WEU agencies for security questions, examine the repercussions of establishing a European military programme for communications, navigation, observation and reconnaissance satellites;

6. Systematically strengthen European space co-operation which has already made Europe the third space power in the world and encourage the space dialogue with the United States each time it may lead to balanced solutions for the future.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 448

1. The Council has noted with interest the Assembly's report entitled "European space policy until 2000" and considers that it represents a useful contribution to the member states' reflection on this subject. The Council points out that WEU has no rôle in the organisation and development of civil or military programmes. However, those WEU member states which are members of the European Space Agency have extended co-operation within the framework of Europe's present and future space programmes such as the Ariane launcher programme.

They are continuing to strengthen European co-operation in this sphere.

2. As far as activities of the agencies for security questions are concerned, the Council would like to point out that the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions has been asked to study possibilities for verification measures with regard to different arms control forums.

In this context, space technology, satellites for example, may offer possible means of verification that merit careful examination.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th October 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 16th October 1987.

Threat assessment

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Kuttelmann (Chairman); MM. Cifarelli, Fourré (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: Jeambrun), Amadei, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. de Beer, De Decker (Alternate: Close), Edwards (Alternate: Cox), Giust, Irmer, Jung, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet (Alternate: De Hoop Scheffer), Mrs. Lalumière, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja (Alternate: Bichet), Dr. Miller, MM. Pecchioli (Alternate: Pollidoro), Ramaekers, Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steiner, Steverlyncq (Alternate: Declercq), Stokes.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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Introductory Note

In preparing this report *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows:

IISS, London, 26th August 1986

Mr. Robert Elliot, Information Officer.

Ministry of Defence, London, 26th August 1986

Mr. David Nicholls, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Policy and Programmes;
Brigadier the Hon. T.P.J. Boyd-Carpenter, Director of Defence Policy;
Miss G.L. Franklin, Head of Secretariat (Policy Studies).

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 12th September 1986

Mr. David Ratford, Assistant Under-Secretary of State;
Mr. John Barrass, Defence Department;
Mr. Martin Nicholson, Research Department.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 29th September 1986

Dr. von Plotz, Political Director for European, North American and Atlantic Alliance Affairs;
Dr. von Kitlitz, NATO Affairs.

Ministry of Defence, Bonn, 29th September 1986

Colonel Pohlmann, German Army, Intelligence Division;
Colonel Farwick, German Army, Public Information, Planning Staff;
Captain Günther, German Navy, Military Relations NATO/WEU;
Lt. Col. Meyer, German Air Force, Military Relations NATO/WEU;
Lt. Col. Keller, German Air Force, Military Policy, Eurogroup and European Affairs;
Mr. Ysker, National Defence Staff, Economic Affairs.

NATO, Brussels, 30th September 1986

Maj. Gen. Christie, UK Army, Assistant Director, Plans and Policy Division, International Military Staff;
Rear Admiral van Idsinga, RNLN, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division;
Colonel Malcolm Hunt, Royal Marines, Plans and Policy Division;
Colonel Harry Sloan, UK Army, Public Information Adviser;
Dr. Murray Feshbach, Sovietologist-in-residence, International Staff;
Mr. Simon Lunn, Head of Plans and Policy Section, Defence Planning and Policy Division of International Staff;
Mr. Jean-Claude Renaud, Director, Economic Directorate;
Mr. Brian Field, Assistant Director, Political Affairs Division, International Staff.

The committee as a whole met in Washington DC and Norfolk, Virginia, from 16th to 20th June 1986, when it was addressed by or met with:

16th June 1986

State Department, Washington DC

Ms. Rozanne Ridgway, Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs;
Mr. Charles Thomas, Ambassador, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs;
Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political Military Affairs;
Mr. Edward Rowny, Ambassador, Special Representative for Strategic Arms Negotiations;

Congressional Research Service, Washington DC

Mr. Stanley Sloan, Specialist in US Alliance Relations;
Mr. Paul Gallis, Analyst in West European Affairs;
Mr. Charles Gellner, Senior Specialist, International Affairs;
Mr. Stuart Goldman, Analyst in Soviet Affairs;
Mr. Steven Hildreth, Analyst in National Defence;
Mr. Francis Miko, Specialist in International Relations;
Mrs. Charlotte Preece, Specialist in West European Affairs;
Mr. Dagnija Sterne-Perkins, Foreign Affairs Analyst;
Mrs. Jeanette Voas, Arms Control Analyst;
Mr. Paul Zinsmeister, Specialist in National Defence.

Brookings Institution, Washington DC

Mr. Joshua Epstein, Research Associate in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Programme.

17th June 1986

Department of Defence, Washington DC

Mr. Fred Iklé, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy;
Dr. Winfred Joshua and Colonel Don Scott, Defence Intelligence Agency;
Mr. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defence;
Mr. Frank Gaffney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy;
Mr. Douglas Feith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Negotiations Policy;
Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director NATO Affairs, Defence Research and Engineering;
Mr. Robert Mullen, Assistant Deputy Undersecretary for Trade Security Policy.

18th June 1986

United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services

Mr. Samuel Stratton, Representative of New York, and members of the committee:

Democrats

Mr. Melvin Price;
Mr. Charles E. Bennett;
Mr. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery;
Mr. Earl Hutto;
Mr. Ike Skelton;
Mr. Thomas M. Foglietta;
Mr. Richard Ray;
Mr. Solomon P. Ortiz;
Mr. Albert G. Bustamante;

Republicans

Mr. G. William Whitehurst;
Mr. Robert E. Badham.

19th June 1986

Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia

Admiral Lee Baggett, US Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and staff;
Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dolton, RN, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic;
Vice-Admiral Bernard Cauderer, US Navy, Commander Submarine Force US Atlantic Fleet;
Rear-Admiral Jerry Tuttle, US Navy, Deputy and Chief-of-Staff for the Commander-in-Chief US Atlantic Fleet, and staff.

20th June 1986

Arms Control Association, Washington DC

Mr. Paul Warnke, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Association;

Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, President of the Arms Control Association.

It subsequently met in the United Kingdom on 13th and 14th October 1986.

13th October 1986

The committee made an underway visit to *HMS Ark Royal, Portsmouth*, when it was addressed by:

Captain J.L. Weatherall, RN, Commanding Officer;
Commander Fraser Hutchison, Commander (Air).

14th October 1986

The committee met at *Headquarters Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel, Northwood*, when it was addressed by:

Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt, RN, Commander-in-Chief Channel;
Rear-Admiral R. den Boeft, RNLN, Chief of Allied Staff;
Air-Vice Marshal Derek Hann, RAF, Chief-of-Staff Maritime Air Forces, Eastern Atlantic;
Commander Nillesen, RNLN;
Captain Whitfield, US Navy, representative of Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic.

At a meeting in London that day the committee discussed a first draft of the preliminary report.

It met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 3rd November 1986 when it adopted the preliminary report (Document 1076).

The committee held a meeting at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 24th February 1987 where it was addressed by:

The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO;
The Hon. Stephen Ledogar, United States Chargé d'Affaires, Acting Permanent Representative to NATO;
General Wolfgang Altenburg, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

The committee met at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 8th April when a preliminary discussion of the report took place. On 9th April the committee held a joint meeting with the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and the two committees were addressed by:

Mr. Benoît d'Aboville, Deputy Director, Political Affairs, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs;
Admiral Lacoste, Director of the 'Fondation pour les études de défense nationale'.

Revised versions of the report were discussed at meetings of the committee held in Luxembourg on 28th April during the extraordinary session of the Assembly and at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 12th October. The report was adopted at a further meeting at the seat of the Assembly on 2nd November, when Mr. Ian Dawson, Director of Agencies for security questions I and II, addressed the committee.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, members of Congress, officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions.

The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft recommendation

on threat assessment

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising that any assessment of the threat which the Atlantic Alliance faces from the Soviet Union requires first a political assessment of the Soviet Union's external policy and behaviour, and its presumed intentions, as well as rigorous comparison of the military capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (ii) Aware that friendly relations cannot develop while the Soviet Union pursues directly or by proxy a policy of military repression in many countries, including Afghanistan and the Baltic states, and continues to deny the free movement of people across its borders;
- (iii) Reiterating the importance of public support for the necessary allied defence effort, which must be seen to be based on a credible comparison of the forces of a potential adversary with those of the alliance;
- (iv) Deeply concerned about the large numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces in the northern and central European region dating from the immediate post-war period, noting that qualitatively these forces have been continuously improved since then and that geography here favours the Soviet Union;
- (v) Noting also the unremitting growth in Soviet nuclear, chemical and maritime forces in the last twenty-five years, and noting in particular the submarine threat to the vital transatlantic sea routes;
- (vi) Believing that the sometimes divergent, even contradictory, estimates of Soviet forces or equipment used in some public statements by different allied national authorities can only detract from the credibility of the estimates;
- (vii) Aware that the agreed NATO force comparisons on which consistent official statements can be based could be more comprehensive, and aware that an internal political dispute is still preventing their further publication;
- (viii) Believing that a joint European programme for technical sources of defence intelligence would be cost effective, which the three independent national programmes in WEU countries cannot be,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Impress on governments the need for defence policy to be based on a credible, objective and consistent assessment of the threat as a whole, economic, political and military:
 - (a) which takes account of both allied and Soviet perceptions of security requirements;
 - (b) which takes account of both qualitative and numerical factors and the reinforcement capabilities of each alliance;
 - (c) which compares the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies with comparable allied forces;
2. Urge allied governments:
 - (a) to draw as far as possible on the agreed NATO force comparisons in their public statements, so as to present a more consistent picture of the size and capabilities of Soviet forces compared with those of the alliance;
 - (b) to press for further improvements in the comprehensiveness of the agreed force comparisons published by NATO, and for an urgent resolution of the dispute currently preventing their further publication;
 - (c) to encourage the Soviet Government to follow up its newly-declared attitudes towards openness and the reduction in international tension by matching words with further deeds;
3. Co-ordinate the present disparate programmes of three member countries by initiating a joint European programme for technical sources of information such as observation and signals intelligence satellites and electronic listening posts.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. A preliminary version of the present report was adopted by the committee on 3rd November 1986, but was not discussed at the second part of the thirty-second session of the Assembly in December 1986. The present report is the completed version of the preliminary report.

1.2. When the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was first set up thirty years ago to examine the security requirements of Europe and the alliance, the first problem it faced was the acquisition of information to provide a basis for its discussions. Perhaps coincidentally, the years that followed saw growing interest in informed public discussion of defence issues and the establishment of many more independent academic institutions devoted to defence studies. In addition to a number of national institutes and specialised departments within universities, two international institutes were set up which have since acquired a considerable reputation in their particular fields: the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in London, founded in 1958 and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute founded in 1966, financed by the Swedish Government. Since 1959, the first of these has published each year its now substantial and authoritative Military Balance, and the second, since 1968, its well-known yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament.

1.3. Especially in the early 1980s there was a marked increase also in the public information effort devoted by certain countries to publicising the military capabilities of potential adversaries. In September 1981 the United States Department of Defence published for the first time in English, and through United States Embassies in other languages, its illustrated brochure Soviet Military Power which provided considerable information about Soviet military forces, their equipment, and the Soviet defence production effort. The Soviet Union responded remarkably promptly with two editions the following year of its publication *Whence the threat to peace?*, in English and French as well as the original Russian, a skilful rejoinder to the United States publication, which described United States military capability, but also drew one or two comparisons with the Soviet Union's own military capability. Later the same year the NATO international staff produced for the first time its own publication *NATO and the Warsaw Pact – force comparisons* which made objective comparisons between the collective forces of the two military

pacts, representing an agreed view of the NATO countries. These publications have appeared in revised form at varying intervals since.

1.4. As far as the United States was concerned, this public relations exercise of the early 1980s sought to bring to the notice of a wider public, in more popular, indeed dramatic, form information much of which had been available for many years in official governmental publications such as the annual report to Congress of the United States Secretary of Defence, the chiefs-of-staff military posture statement, as well as the voluminous congressional hearings. But it was supplemented by some newly declassified information on Soviet weapons systems. For the Soviet Union, the glossy publication *Whence the threat to peace?* was an innovation in public relations – it drew on many western sources, at least for its illustrations, as it duly acknowledged, but some of the themes were not new. In 1987, for the first time apparently a Soviet publication¹ gave broad Soviet estimates of the conventional force balance in central Europe, and the institute concerned is understood to be refining its estimates, with the intention of publishing them annually in future – a welcome example of military glasnost.

1.5. Other notable official sources which nowadays provide a comparison of forces include the annual United Kingdom white paper, *Statement on the Defence Estimates*, and the less frequent white papers published by the Federal Republic of Germany in English and French, as well as German, the most recent (June 1985) entitled “The situation and the development of the federal armed forces”. Thus, the committee's information problem today is one of selection rather than acquisition.

1.6. In 1979 the committee prepared a first report on the balance of force, dealing with much the same subject as the present report². On that report, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 336. The preamble began:

“Aware that different political assumptions used in interpreting information can lead to widely differing assessments of adversary capabilities and of the balance of force;”

1. Disarmament and Security 1986, Volume I, Table 11, page 208. Yearbook of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, published by Novosti, 1987.

2. Document 809, 22nd May 1979, Rapporteur: Mr. Pawelczyk.

and recommended that the Council:

“ Urge member governments:

1. To take account of both Soviet and western perceptions of objectives, military capabilities and resulting threats, and to reject worst-case analysis as the only basis of assessment;”

1.7. The present report eschews the word “ balance ” because it implies judgment in comparing many unlike quantities in the asymmetrical forces concerned. The purpose of the report is to examine some of the difficulties of force comparisons and to draw attention to the need in the alliance for objective and consistent official information. The importance of the subject cannot be overstated because the attitudes of both sides to arms control and disarmament negotiations, on which the committee reports elsewhere³, are of course intimately bound up with their respective assessments of the threat.

II. Objectives and intentions

(a) Behaviour

2.1. As the British Prime Minister pointed out after her visit to Moscow in March-April 1987, the political and military problems are inseparable. That is why she put so much emphasis on human rights. We must also not forget the invasion of Afghanistan, the continued occupation of the Baltic states, the support for Cuban mercenaries in numerous parts of the world and the denial of the free movement of peoples between the USSR and its satellites across the iron curtain.

(b) Military intentions

2.2. Most threat assessment is concerned with attempts at the quantitative assessment of military capability, compared with which any attempt to guess the underlying intentions of a potential adversary is fraught with uncertainty. Intentions can change overnight; military capability only slowly over five, ten or twenty years. The intentions of the leaders who took the decisions that led to the acquisition of certain equipment may not be those of the leaders in power when that equipment enters service. Individual members of a collective leadership, whether democratic or not, will often have different reasons for supporting particular executive decisions.

2.3. Nevertheless, despite the inherent uncertainties, the Rapporteur has attempted to

3. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council, Document 1116, 2nd November 1987, Rapporteur: Mr. Scheer.

assemble a range of official opinion on Soviet intentions, first by drawing on the official sources mentioned in paragraph 1.4., and secondly, by addressing the following specific questions to the national and allied authorities with whom he discussed the report, asking for replies on a non-attributable basis:

- (a) What intentions lie, or lay, behind the acquisition of the present forces and armaments of the Soviet Union:
 - (i) territorial expansion?
 - (ii) global power/influence projection?
 - (iii) defence of its own and Warsaw Pact territory?
- (b) What opportunities does the Soviet Union believe its military capability gives it today:
 - (i) in Europe?
 - (ii) vis-à-vis the United States?
 - (iii) globally for power/influence projection?

2.4. As far as the general objectives of the new leadership of the Soviet Union under General Secretary Gorbachev are concerned, the Rapporteur found remarkable unanimity among persons he interviewed, most of whom considered that the primary objective at home is the modernisation and strengthening of the Soviet economy, while externally the primary objective is to be seen to be able to deal with the United States on a basis of equality and not to allow the United States to dictate to the Soviet Union from a position of strength. At home, the Soviet leadership is deeply conscious that the Soviet Union is a world power only on the basis of its defence effort and resulting military capability, while its economy in many ways suffers from the shortcomings of those of the third world countries. Thus, the first objective of defence (and arms control) planning in the Soviet Union today, after ensuring the integrity of its own territory, and dominance in Eastern Europe, is to achieve or retain a semblance of parity with the United States.

2.5. While no responsible western authorities today believe that the Soviet Union is actively planning aggression against any NATO country, that does not mean that the Soviet Union will cease to be opportunist in its attempts around the world to bolster or install régimes friendly to the Soviet Union in third world countries, nor would it be wise to assume that circumstances may not again arise in which the Soviet Union will resort to the open use of force in territory contiguous to the Soviet Union, where it is best placed to apply its considerable military force, and as it did in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and most recently in Afghanistan in 1979.

2.6. In the words of recent United Kingdom white papers on defence:

“ The challenge for NATO is not simply a military one. Soviet leaders have never renounced the ‘ideological struggle’ and have used every means available to propagate their own brand of Marxism, taking full advantage of the freedoms that exist in western societies to further Soviet aims. These activities are designed to weaken the cohesion of NATO... ”⁴

and again:

“ The Soviet Union inherited the product of many centuries of Russian expansion; it is a country obsessed with its own security but insensitive to the security concerns of others. These traditions, and the great importance given to military power that goes with them, have been combined with an ideology dedicated to the ultimate victory of communism. The evidence suggests that these ideological goals will be pursued with caution and discretion, but that opportunities will be grasped if the price is limited and acceptable. Given the present scale of NATO’s defences, we have no reason to believe that Soviet leaders have any immediate intention of attacking NATO countries; but we cannot ignore the fact that those same leaders continue to improve the Soviet capability for such an attack. Moreover, the size and reach of the Warsaw Pact’s forces make them a potent political weapon. If they were not counter-balanced by an adequate military capability, they could be exploited to bring unwelcome influence to bear on the domestic and foreign policies of other countries. ”⁵

2.7. The most recent German white paper published in June 1985, only very shortly after Mr. Gorbachev became General Secretary, contrasts the readiness of the Soviet Union to use force to maintain the limitation of sovereignty of Warsaw Pact countries – the Brezhnev doctrine – with its policy of peaceful coexistence:

“ 83...Vis-à-vis western countries, the Soviet Union pursues her policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’. This policy is aimed at attenuating the conflict between the eastern and western systems in international relations while continuing it at the societal and political levels in a manner which favours the Soviet Union unilaterally. Extension of Soviet influence to western and third world societies through

communist parties and other revolutionary movements is to be tolerated by the West as legitimate, while reversely the Soviet Union reserves to herself the right of preventing intrusion of western influences into her sphere of power by all means, including violence. This continuation of class warfare under unequal conditions against the free social order of the West is to pave the way towards a victory of ‘socialism on a global scale’ without war. ”

The excessive military power acquired by the Soviet Union results from deliberate political decisions, to be used as a substitute for economic power in international relations:

“ 86. Forces for the defence of one’s own country are legitimised under legal, political, and moral criteria. The Soviet Union and her allies, however, have built up a military posture that goes far beyond what would be required for defence. This is also true if one accords to these countries an excessive want of security.

In the ‘correlation of forces’ – a key term of Marxist-Leninist ideology – military power has steadily gained in importance as other instruments of political power, such as ideology and economic power, have lost in effectiveness in competition with the West. The Soviet Union is convinced that the political balance of forces is essentially governed by military power. This philosophy attaches particular importance to the political-psychological effect of military power, especially as a threat potential in situations of crisis. Today, the Soviet Union owes her position as a world power primarily to her military strength.

87. The existence of nuclear weapons has reduced the use of military power as an instrument of warfare. Nonetheless, great weight attaches to military power as a political factor. The military superiority of the Warsaw Pact is a deliberate result of political decisions and priorities. In peace and crisis, this superiority is the threat potential with which the Soviet leaders seek to force the West to behave well and to yield to intimidation and blackmail. ”⁶

2.8. The corresponding United States assessment of Soviet objectives is noticeably harsher:

“ The Soviet Union has long relied on military power as its primary instrument for expanding control and influence throughout the world. Consequently, its

4. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence statement on the defence estimates 1986, paragraph 109.

5. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence statement on the defence estimates 1985, paragraph 105.

6. Federal German Ministry of Defence white paper, 1985.

military forces are structured and designed as offensive forces, ever growing in size and sophistication, meant to intimidate and, if necessary, to impose the will of the Soviet Union on other nations...

While Soviet leaders regard military power as their primary strength, they view the struggle with the West as multidimensional, combining political, economic, scientific, ideological, and military factors into what they characterise as the correlation of forces. The Soviets constantly work to modify and exploit this correlation to their benefit through subversion, propaganda, covert activities, the use of proxies, and the threat of intervention. Brezhnev declared in 1973: A decisive shift in the correlation of forces will be such that by 1985 we will be able to exert our will whenever we need to. Although the efforts of the western world prevented the Soviets from reaching their 1985 goal, we must continue our efforts to ensure that they never reach it.

Soviet ambitions are global. Lenin wrote: We aim at the firm union and full fusion of the workers and peasants of all nations of the world into a single, worldwide Soviet Republic. This goal remains unchanged.”

but sees also the inherent weaknesses of the system especially in the longer term:

“ But in the longer run, Soviet weaknesses become even more impressive. The heart of their long-term weakness is the source of their short-term strength: their political system’s command and control of every area of Soviet life. Such control risks sclerosis. An economy co-ordinated by politicised command rather than market forces has seen its rate of growth steadily decline. Such control inhibits adaptive experimentation especially in an era of rapid technological change led by independent centres of initiative. The revolution spearheaded by microelectronics and computers depends on widespread access to information and communication, and thus poses for the Soviet systems a threat of terminal decline. Geography bequeaths them no warm water ports, thereby limiting ocean access. Short-term advantages of empire are falling victim to the inevitable strains inherent in an attempt to dominate nations with the histories and traditions of the Eastern Europeans. Geopolitically, it has been quipped that the Soviet Union is the only nation to be entirely surrounded by hostile communist countries. They face the threat of adversaries on two fronts, NATO to the

west and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan to the east. Trends in demography, health statistics (especially alcoholism), and the growth of non-Russian nationalities challenge the Soviet leaderships’ conception of their régime. The political and cultural values enshrined in Soviet communism are falling behind the march of history.”⁷

2.9. In response to the Rapporteur’s specific questions in paragraph 2.3 above, some authorities drew attention to some of the foregoing quotations, two others provided custom-made replies. In response to question (a) concerning Soviet intentions in acquiring its present military capability, first:

“(a) The Soviet Union has, as part of its national psyche, a mortal fear of invasion and dismemberment. Its lengthy history of occupation by foreign powers is a basis for this fear. Its primary motivation for a large armed force is, therefore, national defence.

At the same time (it justifies) its history of expansion... by the assessment... that a weak or unstable neighbour represents a potential prize for another, probably unfriendly, power. Such border states must therefore be brought under Russian control lest they fall to another. Afghanistan is one such scenario, and the absence of any credible threat by any of the Soviet Union’s neighbours is either irrelevant or encouragement.

From this it follows that Soviet power confers a measure of support for influence exercised against the border areas, or against countries not immediately contiguous who might as themselves, or by proxy, represent a possible adversary.

In short all three of these sub-questions are relevant, each in its own way. The term ‘aggressive defence’ might well apply to the concept outlined.”

In general agreement with the second reply to the same question:

“(a) The Soviet Union’s armed forces and armaments exist primarily to defend the Fatherland and sustain the Soviet system. Historical experience has however made the Russians deter-

7. Annual Report to Congress by United States Secretary of Defence, 5th February 1986, pages 55 et seq.

mined that a future war should not be fought on Soviet territory and that in the event of war they should seek to gain or regain the initiative as soon as possible. A second but increasingly important rationale for the size and shape of the Soviet armed forces is its determination to maintain at least parity with the United States, together with a capability to counter perceived threats from other quarters. The Soviet armed forces are not intended for territorial expansion *per se*, but have been and are used to maintain Soviet control in a number of socialist countries, mainly on the Soviet Union's borders."

2.10. As to the opportunities the Soviet Union may believe its military capability may give it (question (b)) the replies are less convergent; first:

"(b) ...The Soviet Union, despite its radical Marxist ideology, is extremely cautious and conservative when it comes to confrontation with a more powerful, and hence more potentially dangerous, adversary... the Soviet leadership (has no) intention of risking outright hostilities... they would far rather gain political ends by subverting possible target countries, swinging the leadership of those countries into political alliance with them through 'democratic' means.

(i) Countries in Europe?... theoretically possible but not yet!

(ii) ...A long-term intent would be to isolate (the United States) from both its European and Asiatic allies... an unlikely eventuality. Shorter-range goals would be to divide the United States from its allies, and to make it politically unacceptable to as much of the non-aligned world as possible.

The Soviet Union labours under a major disadvantage in this activity, from the fact that the United States enjoys economic superiority... (but the latter) does not best use its advantages.

(iii) ...The Soviet Union does have an advantage with its propaganda about 'freedom', liberty, and the rights of the workers... whereas the Americans have become identified with the sup-

porters of the status quo... The Soviets can supply arms. But they cannot supply economic facilities... Nor can they provide markets... Here the United States has a great advantage, and the third world manufacturers an even greater one."

Whereas the second respondent claims simply:

"(b) The Soviet Union believes that its military capability gives it the opportunity to deal with the United States and be dealt with, as an equal. By the same token it expects to be treated as overwhelmingly the strongest European power. It is increasingly using its military and especially naval, capability to project its superpower status and influence globally, particularly in Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East and some parts of Africa, in the absence of a commensurate political or economic capability."

2.11. As a conclusion to the chapter on intentions it has to be borne in mind that reassuring assessments that the Soviet Union has no immediate intention of attacking NATO countries are no basis for allied defence planning which must take account of the Soviet military capabilities discussed in Chapter IV. As already stated, intentions can change overnight. Not only must allied military capability be sufficient to deter attack, there must be a willingness to take precautionary measures when needed to prevent surprise attack. Outside observers have always been notoriously bad at assessing the intentions of potential adversaries in times of tension – bluff, intimidation or bent on aggression? The externally observable signs are the same. Two recent examples are the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and, in a quite different context, that of the Falklands in 1982. In the case of Czechoslovakia, military intelligence accurately reported concentrations of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces on the frontiers of Czechoslovakia, but the majority of western political assessment was that the Soviet Union at that time, in a period of improving relations with the West, would not resort to the use of force against an ally as it had done in Hungary twelve years earlier. As the committee has reported⁸, the equally valid but different example of the invasion of the Falklands by Argentina in April 1982 left London with less than four days clear military warning, despite many earlier signs of belligerent intent. Openly belligerent language had been used by Argentine leaders for many

8. The Falklands crisis, Document 935, 8th November 1982, Rapporteur; Mr. Cavaliere. See explanatory memorandum Chapter V, Warning and alert.

years, but always dismissed as bluff in diplomatic assessments.

2.12. Thus to say merely that Soviet defence planning aims at defence of the homeland and maintaining parity with the United States does not provide any useful indication of the way the Soviet Union might employ its armed forces in particular circumstances. Permanent vigilance and an adequate defence effort are the only guarantees of allied security.

III. What comparison – what viewpoint?

3.1. Significantly different conclusions can be drawn from a comparison of the United States with the Soviet Union on the one hand or of the whole of NATO with the Warsaw Pact on the other. The fifteen NATO allies of the United States make a much larger contribution in manpower, economic strength and military forces and equipment than do the six Warsaw Pact allies of the Soviet Union. Again the viewpoint will affect the countries to be taken into account in a force comparison. Viewed from Washington or any European country, the Soviet Union is the major, if not the only, potential adversary. Viewed from Moscow, the Soviet Union with its long land and sea frontiers must take account of China, other neighbours, and also Japan as well as the NATO countries in its force comparisons. The Soviet Union also sees itself confronted by four independent nuclear weapon powers.

3.2. At Appendix II are tabular comparisons of some main strategic indicators considered in the next chapter. It is seen that depending on the groups of potential adversaries compared, very different ratios of advantage or inferiority could be adduced. Thus, in population terms, the Soviet Union is larger than the United States in the ratio 1 to 0.9 whereas the Warsaw Pact as a whole is inferior to the whole of NATO in the ratio of 1 to 1.5, and when the remaining potential adversaries of the Soviet Union are added to the NATO total, the Warsaw Pact is inferior in the ratio of nearly 1 to 5. Using the same comparisons for GNP expressed in dollars (with the reservations involved in the conversion process) the Soviet Union is inferior to the United States in the ratio of 1 to 1.8; the Warsaw Pact is inferior to NATO as a whole in the ratio of 1 to 2.4, and inferior to NATO and all other potential adversaries of the Soviet Union in the ratio of 1 to 3.1.

3.3. When the defence efforts are compared in the same way, the Soviet Union has a superiority over the United States in the ratio of 1 to 0.5 for armed forces and 1 to 0.8 for defence expenditure. But the same ratios for the Warsaw Pact as a whole to NATO show the Warsaw Pact equal or inferior in the ratios 1 to 1 and 1 to 1.1 respectively, and inferior to all potential

adversaries of the Soviet Union in the ratio of 1 to 1.9 and 1 to 1.3.

3.4. These comparisons are for 1983 and are based solely on official United States figures published annually in World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers with the reservations inherent in the dollar assessments of GNP and defence expenditure of the various countries concerned, discussed in the next chapter.

3.5. While Soviet perceptions of security requirements must be borne in mind, "equal security" for the Soviet Union cannot be allowed to mean force levels comparable to the sum of those of all possible adversaries as the Soviet Union has at times claimed. It has been pointed out that the military structure of the Soviet Union resembles that of ancient Rome, with far-flung legions, composed of many different peoples, manning the distant frontiers of empire, protecting its civilisation from the barbarian hordes beyond. This indeed may be a Soviet perception of its defence posture today on parts of its frontier.

3.6. But this view cannot be true of the central region in Europe. Here the Soviet Union has overwhelming numerical superiority in men and most major weapons which (except for tanks) it is reluctant to admit. There is however a recognition, as the committee has heard, that force levels in Europe are too high and that an attempt should be made to reduce them through negotiation, with inspection procedures "from the Atlantic to the Urals", as the committee has reported elsewhere⁹.

IV. What to measure?

4.1. Resources (manpower and gross domestic product) can be measured as can defence input (the resources devoted to defence) and defence output (numbers of men and weapons systems). Although there are difficulties in comparing the essentially capitalist economies of the West with the centrally directed economies of the Warsaw Pact, especially as the official statistics of the latter may be suspect, nevertheless an attempt can be made to measure these quantities objectively. There remain other important factors such as geography, demography, and the quality of equipment which are more difficult to quantify, but are still important in making a comparison of military capability. This report looks first at available resources on which they can be based (manpower and gross domestic product).

9. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council, Document 1116, 2nd November 1987, Rapporteur: Mr. Scheer. See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 4.34 to 4.38.

(a) Resources - population

4.2. The population column in the table of strategic indicators at Appendix II reveals only the aggregate picture as far as population comparisons between the two alliances are concerned (using United States data for 1983). With populations of 234 million and 272 million respectively, the United States and the Soviet Union both have large manpower resources but the even larger total populations of the rest of NATO redress the total population balance between all Warsaw Pact countries and all NATO countries to 1:1.5 in favour of NATO.

4.3. As far as the NATO-Warsaw Pact comparison is concerned, aggregate population figures are an insufficient indication of available military manpower resources. Compared with the Soviet Union, the NATO countries have relatively homogenous, largely urbanised and industrialised populations in which certain basic technical skills such as the ability to drive motor vehicles are widespread, and where literacy is universal. Turkey is perhaps an exception to this general description where literacy for example is still only 62%, and to a lesser extent Portugal assessed to have 70% literacy.

4.4. In terms of population resources the 110 million population of the European Warsaw Pact countries, other than the Soviet Union, correspond broadly in character with the 332 million population of the European NATO countries, but the same is not true of the population of the Soviet Union itself. Composed of 15 constituent republics with some 40 different nationalities and as many principal languages, the population of the Soviet Union is very far from being homogenous and is less urbanised than the populations of European countries. Of the 127 recorded languages of the Soviet Union 45 were in use for instruction in Soviet schools in 1977.

4.5. According to Soviet statistics the urban population of the Soviet Union as a whole increased from only 48% in 1959 to 65% by 1985, but the proportion differs widely among the different republics, being only 34% in the Tadzhikistan republic. Great efforts have been made to teach Russian throughout the country, but in the republics where it is not an indigenous language Russian is understood mainly by the urban population, and is still being taught as a "foreign" language to more than one third of all elementary and high school students in the Soviet Union¹⁰. Official Soviet reports of "fluency" in Russian have varied, ranging from 62% (urban) and 28% (rural) in Moldavia, through 42% in

Kazakhstan, 28% in Estonia, to 14-19% in the Central Asian republics.

4.6. Because the birth rate is declining in the European part of the Soviet Union while at the same time it is increasing in the eight republics of predominantly Muslim origins along the southern border of the Soviet Union with Iran, Afghanistan and China, the proportion of 18 year olds available for conscription into the Soviet forces is shifting rapidly. These eight republics (four in Central Asia plus Kazakhstan and three trans-Caucasian republics) accounted for less than 19% of the 18 year old population in 1970, but now account for 30% and will account for 35% in the year 2000. Soviet military writings have referred to the "yellowing" of the armed forces. The basic technical skills of European populations are less widespread among these still very rural and culturally different peoples of the Soviet Union.

4.7. Reports differ on the importance of the Muslim religion in the Soviet Union today. While the 1972 edition of the great Soviet encyclopedia claims, in accordance with official doctrine, that "Islam, like other religions, is becoming more and more a vestige of the past", leaders of the Muslim religion in the Soviet Union have made quite different claims such as that by the Mufti Babakhan for Central Asia in a broadcast on 1st April 1979 claiming "over 40 million Muslims in the Soviet Union"¹¹ - a figure corresponding to the total population of the various nationalities of Muslim origin in the Soviet Union. Assimilation appears to have been dropped as a policy slogan in the Soviet Union in favour of "rapprochement" and even "flourishing" of the different nationalities. Muslim fundamentalism in Iran and other neighbouring countries is a cause of concern to the Soviet Union.

4.8. Thus, while total manpower resources available in the Soviet Union are not declining, the proportion of that population that is technically competent and fluent in Russian is declining both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the whole. The burden of training in the Soviet armed forces will be that much greater, especially with the introduction of ever more advanced technical equipment.

4.9. In the NATO countries in contrast, population growth over the last five years has been limited largely to the United States and Turkey, being largely static in other countries, reflecting in fact a decrease in the number of 18 year olds available for military service, which in the case of Germany has led to an extension of service from 15 to 18 months in 1989.

10. See Prospects for out-migration from Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the next decade, by Murray Feshbach in US Congress Joint Economic Committee Soviet economy in a time of change, Volume 1, 1979.

11. Quoted by Feshbach op. cit.

(b) Resources – economy

4.10. There is a wealth of statistical data available on the economies of the western industrialised countries, published in comparable form by the various international organisations including the European Community and the OECD. Western experts on the Soviet economy warn both on the absence of important official Soviet economic statistics, and on the unreliability of those that are published.

4.11. The non-availability of much important information about the Soviet Union reflects in part a defensive secrecy, an unwillingness to disclose weaknesses to the outside world. But it is a consequence also of the natural secretiveness of the highly compartmentalised, bureaucratic communist system which lacks the extensive lateral communication between different branches of an administration, partly structurally organised and partly informal, that characterises most western societies. The unreliability of some of the officially published Soviet statistics, according to Soviet writers themselves, reflects a tendency to inflate production figures to meet the planning targets that are a feature of the state planning system.

4.12. Mr. Gorbachev's call for glasnost or openness is quite likely to be motivated as much, or more, by the urgent need to inform the central authorities of the Soviet Union of the true state of affairs throughout its own sprawling, backward empire, than by a desire to present a more favourable image to the West.

4.13. A more fundamental problem arises in comparing prices in a centrally-planned economy with those of the comparatively free-market economies of the West where market forces result in prices reflecting the value of a product in terms of labour and other resources devoted to their manufacture. However, several western estimates of the Soviet economy as a whole are available, without too much disagreement between them.

4.14. The United States Central Intelligence Agency however publishes its own estimate of Soviet economic performance and that of the other Warsaw Pact countries, calculating gross national product in United States dollars on a purchasing power equivalent basis¹². This basis of comparison is understood to be the mean between estimates of Soviet GNP, as valued and compared with United States at both dollar and rouble prices. More detailed statistics are published by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency¹³ which, for the Soviet Union, again draws on the CIA figure.

12. Handbook of economic statistics, 1985.

13. World military expenditure and arms transfers, 1985.

4.15. The CIA figures for the year 1984 show Soviet gross national product of \$1 958 billion compared with \$3 663 billion for the United States. In terms of GNP per capita, the same source shows \$7 120 for the Soviet Union compared with \$15 470 for the United States. The more detailed ACDA figures for the previous year permit comparisons with a number of individual countries. They show a Soviet GNP per capita of \$6 490 – lower than that of any NATO country except Greece, Portugal and Turkey. The same source shows total GNP for all NATO countries of \$5 942 billion compared with \$2 460 billion for the Warsaw Pact countries. The GNP per capita figures from the same source show \$10 045 for NATO compared with \$6 417 for the Warsaw Pact.

4.16. While the United States remains outstandingly the most powerful economy among the NATO countries, in proportion to its population that of the Soviet Union is not outstanding compared to the more developed Warsaw Pact countries. The CIA figures for 1984 for GNP per capita show \$8 250 for Czechoslovakia; \$9 800 for East Germany; and \$7 200 for Hungary (compared with \$7 120 for the Soviet Union).

4.17. Although the Soviet economy expanded considerably in the aftermath of World War II, increasing by as much as 8% per annum according to some estimates, the growth was achieved by a progressive increase in the labour force and in capital investment. The growth slowed during the 1960s, and during the 1970s the Soviet Union had to look to increased labour productivity to maintain its economic growth but with less success than the industrialised western countries. Significantly, the twelfth five-year plan for the period 1986-90 calls for an increase in labour productivity of between 20 and 23%, and calls for 80 to 95% of industrial production to meet international quality standards – an admission that the quality of many civilian goods produced by the centrally-planned system cannot match the quality of those produced in the West.

(c) Defence inputs – expenditure

4.18. Even among the NATO countries, there has been debate in the past about the proper comparison of national defence expenditure, turning on items such as pensions to ex-service personnel (which some countries in their budgets show as social affairs expenditure, others as defence expenditure) or frontier police (countries with long and remote frontiers may employ armed paramilitary units in a multi-purpose defence/customs/immigration rôle, whereas similar functions in other countries are per-

formed by purely civilian officials). NATO now has its agreed common definition of defence expenditure and publishes its own comparative defence statistics – see Appendix III.

4.19. Estimating Soviet defence expenditure in terms comparable with that of allied countries encounters first the same difficulties as western estimates of the Soviet economy, mentioned in the foregoing section, further complicated by the much greater secrecy that surrounds defence information in the Soviet Union. Many properly military items are obviously excluded from that country's published defence budget. But whereas there is not much discrepancy between different western academic estimates of the Soviet economy as a whole, there is some disagreement between western estimates about the proper methodology to apply when comparing Soviet defence expenditure with that of allied countries.

4.20. The United States CIA regularly estimates Soviet defence expenditure at dollar cost using the "building block" method, whereby the different items which comprise the Soviet armed forces – personnel, equipment, operating costs – are identified and the cost of procuring the same items in the United States is then estimated using United States prices for goods and labour. This dollar cost estimate of Soviet defence expenditure is published each year in the United States ACDA publication, "World military expenditure and arms transfers". This figure for Soviet defence expenditure is then used, in conjunction with the averaged dollar-rouble cost estimate of Soviet GNP, to calculate the percentage of GNP devoted to defence.

4.21. Rouble cost-estimates of Soviet defence expenditure, using the same building blocks as for dollar estimates, are also calculated but do not appear to have been published more recently than for the years 1970 to 1975. It is widely recognised both by critics of the method and in the official United States and NATO publications concerned, that estimates of this type generally overstate the relative size of Soviet military expenditure: "... data on Soviet military expenditure are based upon Central Intelligence Agency estimates of what it would cost in the United States in dollars to develop, procure, staff and operate a military force similar to that of the Soviet Union. Estimates of this type... generally overstate the relative size of the second country's expenditures in inter-country comparisons."¹⁴ And again: "... familiar reasoning would indicate that comparisons of Soviet and United States military spending should be carried out regularly not only in dollars, but in roubles too. When crude comparisons have been carried out in

roubles, then the Soviet advantage in terms of expenditures on military activities has been shown to be less than a dollar comparison indicates."¹⁵

4.22. Appendix IV shows the United States ACDA figures for military expenditure of the United States and the Soviet Union, of NATO and the Warsaw Pact collectively, for the years 1973 to 1983 – the latest published. On the CIA dollar basis for Soviet expenditure, this shows Soviet expenditure exceeding that of the United States by some 25% during much of the period, but also shows total NATO expenditure exceeding that of the Warsaw Pact for the first two and last three of the years covered. The contribution by the "rest of NATO" is more than double that of the "rest of the Warsaw Pact" during the period.

4.23. Prior to 1983, the CIA estimated that Soviet military expenditure over the previous five years had been increasing by 3% per annum (constant dollars) or 4 to 5% (constant roubles). This estimate made a large contribution to the NATO objective in the late 1970s to secure a 3% annual increase in real terms in defence expenditure by all NATO countries. In a significant revision of its estimates in 1983 the CIA concluded that in the post-1976 period, there had been a reduction in the rate of increase of Soviet military expenditure to 2% a year or slightly less up to the year 1982. In particular, expenditure on military equipment was estimated not to have increased in the post-1976 period, although expenditure on research and development probably increased by more than 2 to 3% per annum.

4.24. In maintaining its large concentration of men, tanks and aircraft in Europe, whilst striving for parity with the United States in strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union inevitably has devoted a far larger proportion of its relatively modest economic base to military purposes than any of the NATO countries. The earlier CIA estimate showed that the Soviet Union had devoted from 12 to 13% of its GNP to military expenditure in the period 1970 to 1978 and that the percentage had increased to 13 or 14% in the period 1979 to 1981. After 1983 the view was that the percentage had remained at 13 to 14% during the whole of the period 1970 to 1981. The 1983 revision by the CIA apparently resulted from accumulating evidence from 1976 onwards that Soviet expenditure on mil-

14. United States ACDA World military expenditure and arms transfers, 1985, page 140.

15. Soviet military expenditure estimates: meaning and measurement, Brian Field, Assistant Director, NATO Economics Directorate, in NATO Review for August 1986. A footnote at this point in the article states: "The CIA found that Soviet military expenditures in 1974 were 20% higher than in the United States in dollar terms and 10% higher in rouble terms".

itary equipment had levelled off from 1976 onwards¹⁶.

4.25. A sharper critic of the dollar cost methodology of assessing Soviet military expenditure has pointed out that whereas the CIA uses an average of its dollar cost and rouble cost estimates in assessing Soviet GNP, it does not publish such an averaged evaluation for Soviet military expenditure¹⁷. On the basis of these criticisms, rouble estimates of Soviet defence expenditure, with some adjustments for distorted Soviet prices, provide the best estimate of resources devoted to defence as perceived by the Soviet Union. The dollar estimate of defence expenditure is more properly seen as a measure of defence output by United States standards.

(d) Defence inputs – manpower

4.26. Generating armed forces of 4.4 million men compared with some 2.2 for the United States, from a population only slightly larger than that of the United States, the Soviet Union inevitably draws on a large proportion of its population. It also has longer periods of conscription than any NATO country except Greece – three years in the navy, two years in all other services. Figures for NATO countries are at Appendix III B; for Warsaw Pact at III C. Canada, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and (since the end of the Vietnam war) the United States have no compulsory military service; that of other NATO countries ranges from 9 to 24 months. Compulsory service in other Warsaw Pact countries ranges from 16 to 36 months. The following table compares numbers in armed forces per thousand population.

*United States and Soviet Union;
NATO and Warsaw Pact
Numbers in armed forces per thousand
population – 1983*

United States	9.5
NATO	9.4
Warsaw Pact	15.2
Soviet Union	16.1

4.27. Another factor relevant to the raising of armed forces is the extent of pre-military edu-

16. For an analysis of the CIA decision to revise its estimates, see Causes of the slow-down in Soviet defence, Richard F. Kaufman, Assistant Director, United States Congress Joint Economic Committee, published in Soviet Economy, January to March 1985 (reprinted in Survival, July/August 1985).

17. Franklyn Holzman, Professor of Economics at Tufts University, quoted in United States Congressional Research Service, Estimates of Soviet defence expenditures: methodological issues and policy implications, Robert E. Foelber and others, 5th July 1985.

cation and training in schools. This is understood to be institutionalised in the Soviet Union, both in schools and in the young pioneers. There are far fewer cadet forces in schools in NATO countries.

(e) Defence output

4.28. Defence output – the final product of the defence effort – is represented by the armed forces and military equipment which are maintained by the defence effort. These are described in the next chapter.

V. Force comparisons

5.1. Potentially, the most useful official source of comparative information of the forces of the two military blocs is the NATO publication: NATO and the Warsaw Pact: force comparisons, because it represents a view agreed within NATO rather than the view of any one government. First published in 1982, an updated edition was issued in 1984.

5.2. It suffers from the serious defect of excluding French and Spanish forces from the comparison, at the insistence of those two countries, because they do not participate in the integrated military structure of the alliance. Moreover, it has not been updated since 1984 because of a Greek-Turkish dispute over the declaration of Greek forces on an island in the Aegean. This is a curious exclusion when it is remembered that France has always notified NATO of its defence expenditure and is included in the relevant NATO publications (Appendix III A). The most widely-quoted publication is the annual IISS Military Balance, which has won international recognition since its first publication in 1959.

(a) Nuclear weapons¹⁸

(i) Strategic nuclear weapons

5.3. The following tabulation of nuclear forces follows the categories defined by the arms control process. This has the advantage of relatively clear definition of each category, but will not correspond to the forces taken into account in assessing a particular military threat, which is a far more complex process.

5.4. The SALT I and SALT II agreements in effect cover all nuclear weapon delivery systems stationed on the territory of one superpower that are capable of reaching the territory of the other and all submarine-launched ballistic missiles. These weapons are: intercontinental ballistic

18. Notes: Chief source: IISS Military Balance 1986-87. Figures valid for mid-1986 except where otherwise shown. "Range" means range of missiles, combat-radius of aircraft which can only be a rough estimate.

missiles, defined in SALT II as those having a range in excess of 5 500 km; heavy bombers, defined in SALT II as the following aircraft, or any aircraft with comparable performance: United States B-52 and B-1; Soviet Tu-95 (Bear); and Mya-4 (Bison), or any aircraft equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 km; and lastly, all submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

5.5. Table I shows the numbers of these weapons. While the Soviet Union has more ICBMs and SLBMs, because of the larger number of multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on United States SLBMs, and the larger bomb and ALCM load of United States heavy bombers, the United States force comprises more warheads than that of the Soviet Union.

TABLE I
Strategic nuclear weapons

	United States			Soviet Union		
	Range (km) ¹	No.	No. of warheads	No. of warheads	No.	Range (km) ¹
ICBMs	11 300– 14 800	1 010	2 110	6 420	1 398 ²	9 600– 13 000
SLBMs	4 000– 7 400	640	6 656	3 216	944	2 400– 9 100
Heavy bombers	5 000– 6 000	260	4 080	1 080	160	4 500– 6 400
Totals		1 910	12 846	10 716	2 502	

1. Throughout this paper "range" means range of missiles; combat-radius of aircraft.

2. Some of the SS-11 and SS-19 missiles in this total are designed for use either against Europe or the United States.

(ii) Grey area nuclear weapons falling between the present SALT and INF arms control categories

5.6. During the SALT negotiations, both the Soviet Union and the United States raised objections concerning other categories of nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of either superpower, but which were finally excluded from the SALT agreements. These are essentially the British and French strategic forces; what the Soviet Union terms the forward based weapons of the United States; the Soviet Backfire bomber which could reach the United States with in-flight refuelling, and possibly the obsolescent SLBMs in the Baltic and submarine-launched cruise missiles. Table II lists all such weapon systems which are also understood to be excluded from the current INF negotiations.

(iii) Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)

LRINF

5.7. The current bilateral INF negotiations in Geneva are concerned primarily with missiles that have acquired the cumbersome term in NATO communiqués "long-range intermediate nuclear forces" (LRINF). These are taken to be

the current Soviet SS-20 and presumably its surviving predecessors, the SS-4 (the SS-5 having been withdrawn from service) and the NATO cruise and Pershing II missiles, the ranges of which are shown in Table III.

SRINF

5.8. The deployment by the Soviet Union after the NATO 1979 INF decision of SS-22 (otherwise referred to as a modified SS-12) and SS-23 missiles, with ranges of 900 and 500 km respectively, led to the definition of a further missile category "shorter-range intermediate nuclear forces" (SRINF), not to be confused with short-range missiles *tout court* with ranges from tens of kilometres up to 150 km (tactical nuclear weapons below). NATO seeks constraints on SRINF in the INF negotiations. It is uncertain how many of the reported SRINF are deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, but those that are in range of large areas of European NATO countries. NATO has Pershing IA missiles with 700 km range in Germany, otherwise no corresponding missile system but its nuclear-capable tactical aircraft fulfil a comparable military rôle.

TABLE II

*Grey area nuclear weapons excluded from SALT and INF negotiations,
capable of reaching territory of adversary superpower*

<i>Allied</i>					<i>Soviet Union</i>			
Weapon	Range (km)	Country deploying	No.	No. of warheads	No. of warheads	No.	Range (km)	Weapon
<i>Missiles</i>					<i>Missiles</i>			
IRBM	3 500	France	18	18	39	39	1 400	SLBM ¹
SLBM	3 000–4 400	France	96	176				
SLBM	4 600	UK	64	64	(356)	356	450–550	SLCM ³
SLCM ²	2 500	US	164	164				
<i>Aircraft</i>					<i>Aircraft</i>			
<i>Land-based</i>					<i>Land-based</i>			
FB-111A	2 000	US	55	300	420 ⁴	140 ⁴	5 000	Tu-22M Backfire ⁵
F-111	2 000	US	150	450				
Mirage IV ⁵	1 400	France	30	30				
<i>Carrier-based</i>					<i>Carrier-based</i>			
A-6	1 500	US	30 ⁶	90 ⁶				
A-7	1 200	US	72 ⁶	288 ⁶				
<i>Totals</i>			679	1 580	815	535		<i>Totals</i>

1. Believed deployed in Baltic.

2. Sea- (submarine or surface) launched cruise missile.

3. Anti-ship missiles that *may* have land target capability.

4. A further 120 of these aircraft belong to naval aviation. If in nuclear rôle they might add 360 warheads.

5. Require in-flight refuelling to reach US/Soviet territory.

6. Assumes 3 only of United States 15 aircraft carriers in Atlantic/Norwegian Sea or Mediterranean. Pacific coast threat to Soviet Union ignored.

TABLE III

<i>NATO</i>				<i>Soviet Union</i>			
Weapon	Range (km)	No.	No. of warheads	No. of warheads	No.	Range (km)	Weapon
<i>In Europe</i>				<i>In range of Europe</i>			
GLCM	2 500	208 ¹	208 ¹	810	270	5 000	SS-20
Pershing II	1 800	108	108	112	112	2 000	SS-4
				513	171	5 000	<i>In Asia</i> SS-20
<i>Total</i>		316	316	1 435	553		<i>Total</i>

1. Figure for end-1986. Deployment continuing to planned 464 GLCM.

(iv) *Short-range nuclear forces (SNF) and tactical nuclear weapons*

5.9. There is a variety of other nuclear weapon systems usually thought of as tactical or battle-

field weapons, most of which are dual-capable – capable of delivering nuclear or conventional weapons. These include most tactical aircraft and much artillery. Only short-range missiles in this category are likely to be reserved to a nuclear

NATO			Soviet Union		
Missile	Range (km)	No. of launchers	No. of launchers	Range (km)	Missile
Pershing IA	700	72	60-80	900	SS-22 (or modified SS-12) SS-23
			20	500	
<i>Totals</i>		72	90		

TABLE IV

Shorter-range nuclear-capable delivery systems in European area

(Except for the missiles with one nuclear warhead each, all these systems are dual-capable. The size of the *nuclear* threat depends on the size of the nuclear stockpile rather than the number of delivery systems.)

NATO			Warsaw Pact			
Weapon	Range (km)	No. of launchers	No. of launchers	Range (km)	Weapon	
<i>Missiles</i>			140	120	<i>Missiles</i>	
Lance	110	163	500	70	SS-21	
Pluton	120	44	600	300	Frog Scud	
<i>Artillery</i>					<i>Artillery</i>	
Reminder: calibres 150 mm and over are nuclear-capable. See conventional forces below for numbers.						
<i>Tactical aircraft</i>					<i>Tactical aircraft</i> (and Soviet Union medium bombers)	
F-104	1 000	271	180	} 2 100	<i>Soviet Union</i>	
F-4	950	263			Tu-16 Badger	
F-16	1 600	387	1 190	} 2 800	Tu-22 Blinder	
Mirage III	1 000	30			600	Su-7 Fitter A
Jaguar	650	45			450	MiG-21 Fishbed L
Tornado	1 200	358			600	MiG-27 Flogger D/3
					550	Su-17 Fitter D/H
(Carrier-based)	700	38		1 600	Su-24 Fencer	
			90	600	<i>Warsaw Pact</i>	
			40	550	Su-7	
			109	1 100	Su-20	
					MiG-23	
<i>Totals</i>		1 392	1 609		<i>Totals</i>	
			235		Soviet naval aviation Tu-16, Tu-22, Tu-22M	

Excluded from both alliances: ASW aircraft which may carry nuclear depth charges.

rôle. A measure of the nuclear forces on each side in this category depends therefore on the number of nuclear warheads available for the dual-capable systems, rather than on the number of delivery vehicles. Reliable figures are not published.

5.10. NATO in the 1970s was understood to have 7 000 United States nuclear warheads for tactical systems deployed in Europe (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) plus those of France. The Soviet Union was then reported to have 3 500. Following the Montebello decision of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group on the modernisation of tactical weapons and the 1979 INF decision (to withdraw one warhead for every one deployed on INF), NATO is understood to have reduced the number of tactical warheads in Europe to 4 000. No recently quoted comparable figure for the Soviet Union is to hand.

5.11. Possible reductions in such tactical weapon systems are implicitly covered in discussions of armaments and air forces in the MBFR negotiations, but any limited initial agreement would be unlikely to affect them.

(b) *Conventional forces*

5.12. The strategic indicators at Appendix II show the total numbers of armed forces for the two alliances. Of more interest in threat assessment is a comparison of the conventional forces and equipment in Europe. Such a comparison raises difficult problems of definition including the degree of readiness and peacetime location of forces, and the operational capability of different items of military equipment, which should be included (or not) in an objective comparison.

5.13 The publication issued by NATO in 1982 and revised in 1984, NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force comparisons, is used here. It gives definitions of the criteria used in including or excluding forces and equipment in the different categories compared. The publication is the work of the international military and civilian staffs in NATO headquarters based on information reported by member governments and is moreover collectively approved by the NATO countries. It represents a more objective approach than some purely national sources. The publication suffers however from the major defect that it excludes French and Spanish forces on the legalistic grounds that they are not part of the integrated military structure of NATO.

5.14 The comparisons of conventional forces in Europe at Appendix III A-D are therefore based on the NATO publication, corrected by the

inclusion of French and Spanish forces where appropriate with information drawn chiefly from the IISS Military Balance.

(i) *Ground and air forces*

5.15. These comparisons confirm the well-known picture of large numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional *ground and air* forces in Europe, particularly in tanks and artillery (more than 2 to 1) and in total numbers of combat aircraft (2.5 to 1). The only significant item in which NATO is numerically superior is transport and support helicopters.

5.16. Warsaw Pact spokesmen claim that the relationship of conventional forces in Europe is asymmetrical; in recent years they have recognised Warsaw Pact superiority in numbers of tanks and air defence fighters, but have claimed that NATO is superior in anti-tank weapons and strike and attack aircraft. The figures at appendix do not support this claim of NATO numerical superiority, but do show that Warsaw Pact superiority in tactical aircraft is largely confined to those in the air defence fighter rôle. NATO figures for anti-tank weapons (which exclude short-range shoulder-launched weapons) show a 1 to 1.5 Warsaw Pact numerical superiority.

5.17. When certain qualitative factors considered in the next chapter are taken into account, however, the overall picture is a little less unfavourable for NATO than the foregoing numerical comparisons would suggest.

(ii) *Naval forces*

5.18. As far as *naval forces* are concerned NATO is in a far stronger position with a monopoly of aircraft carriers for conventional fixed-wing aircraft, and clear superiority in ocean-going surface forces. The Warsaw Pact has larger numbers of submarines and of smaller coastal craft.

5.19. NATO navies, however, enjoy considerable geographical advantages with ready access to the seas and oceans. The Soviet navy is of necessity divided into four separate fleets largely isolated from each other with the Baltic and Black Sea fleets having to transit the NATO-controlled Danish and Turkish straits respectively to reach the seas beyond. The width of the ice-free passage for the Soviet Northern Fleet from Murmansk to the Norwegian Sea may be reduced to 100 miles in winter. The Pacific fleet from its main base at Vladivostok has to transit Japanese straits to reach the Pacific. At all of these choke-points NATO countries have surface and submarine surveillance devices. Only the secondary base of the Pacific Fleet at Petropavlovsk on the remote Kamchatka peninsula provides direct access to the Pacific Ocean.

(c) Qualitative factors

5.20. Numbers of conventional forces discussed in the foregoing section are obviously an important factor, but the capabilities of the military equipment can significantly affect the assessment of the threat. Qualitative factors are however more difficult to measure.

5.21. As far as the basic technologies available to weapons designers are concerned, the NATO force comparisons publication notes that "NATO nations until recently enjoyed clear leadership in most areas of technology although,... this lead is being eroded". The US Secretary of Defence provides each year a general comparison of US and Soviet technology. The report for FY 1987 does not recognise Soviet superiority in any of the selected fields:

*Relative US/USSR standing
in the twenty most important basic technology areas*

Basic technologies	US superior	US/USSR equal	USSR superior
1. Aerodynamics/Fluid dynamics		X	
2. Computers and software	← X		
3. Conventional warheads (including all chemical explosives) ..		X	
4. Directed energy (laser)		X	
5. Electro-optical sensor (including infrared)	X		
6. Guidance and navigation	X		
7. Life sciences (human factors/biotechnology)	X		
8. Materials (lightweight, high strength, high temperature)	X →		
9. Microelectronic materials and integrated circuit manufacturing	X		
10. Nuclear warheads		X	
11. Optics		X	
12. Power sources (mobile) (includes energy storage)		X	
13. Production/Manufacturing (includes automated control)	X		
14. Propulsion (aerospace and ground vehicles)	X →		
15. Radar sensor	X →		
16. Robotics and machine intelligence	X		
17. Signal processing	X		
18. Signature reduction	X		
19. Submarine detection	X →		
20. Telecommunications (includes fiber optics)	X		

Notes:

- The list is limited to 20 technologies, which were selected with the objective of providing a valid base for comparing overall US and USSR basic technology. The list is in alphabetical order. These technologies are "on the shelf" and available for application. (The technologies are not intended to compare technology level in currently DEPLOYED military systems.)
- The technologies selected have the potential for significantly CHANGING the military capability in the next 10 to 20 years. The technologies are not static; they are improving or have the potential for significant improvements; new technologies may appear on future lists.
- The arrows denote that the relative technology level is CHANGING significantly in the direction indicated.
- The judgments represent overall consensus for each basic technology area. The USSR may be superior in some of the subtechnologies making up each basic technology. The average assessment can incorporate a significant variance when individual components of a technology are considered.

Source: Annual report to Congress, FY 1987, US Secretary of Defence

5.22. The Soviet Union excels in heavy engineering, a fact reflected in its huge defence investment in tanks and artillery, but lags in sophisticated electronics-based technologies that make for increased accuracy with higher first-round hit probabilities for modern guided weapons. Some qualitative comparisons of specific equipment have been attempted in the following paragraphs.

(i) Tanks

5.23. An examination of the models of tanks in service in the two alliances shows at once that the 2.5 to 1 Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in Europe hides considerable differences in the ages and sophistication of tanks in service. The following table lists dates of first entry-into-service of tanks currently in service with certain indicators for tank equipment, together with numbers in service in the forces of the countries concerned:

Description of tanks in service with NATO and Warsaw Pact forces

Country of manufacture	Model	Date entry into service	Range/km	Max road speed/kph	Weight/tons	Gun/mm	Fire control devices				Armour		Nos in service in producing country	
							Ballistic computer	Thermal imager	Gun stabiliser	Laser range-finder	Type	Frontal thickness/mm		
France	AMX 30	1966	500-600	65	36	105 rifled	N	N	N	N	rolled steel	79	1 050	
	AMX 30 B2	1982	500-600	65		105 rifled	Y	Y	Y	Y	rolled steel	79	248	

1 300														
FRG	Leopard 1	1965	600	65	40	105 rifled	N	N	Y	Y	steel plate multilayer spaced	70	2 437	
	Leopard 2	1980	550	72		120 smooth	Y	Y	Y	Y		-	1 513	

3 950														
UK	Chieftain 5 Challenger	1961	400-500	48	55	120 rifled	Y	N	Y	Y	cast steel Chobham	(22)	900	
		1982	500	60		120 rifled	Y	Y	Y	Y		-	250	

1 150														
US	M47	1951	130	48	46	90 mm rifled	N	N	N	N	cast steel cast steel cast steel cast steel cast steel and steel ceramic Chobham Chobham	76/101	0	
	M48	1952	110	42		90 mm rifled	N	N	N	N		100/120	0	
	M48 A3	1964	460	48		47	90 mm rifled	Y	N	N		N	101/120	1 478
	M60 A1	1960	500	48		53	105 rifled	Y	N	Y		N	32	668
	M60 A3	1979	500	74		56	105 rifled	Y	Y	Y		Y	406	7 352
	M1 Abrams	1980	500	72		55	105 rifled	Y	Y	Y		Y	-	4 798

14 296														
USSR	T54/55	1947	400-500	48	36	100 rifled	N	N	(elevation)	-	welded steel	97	19 900	
	T62 A	1961	450	50		40	115 smooth	N	N	Y	-	cast steel	102	13 700
	T64	1966	450	70		38	125 smooth	Y	N	Y	-	cast steel	-	9 300
	T72-M	1971	480	60		41	125 smooth	Y	N	Y	Y	cast steel laminated glacis	200	8 500
	T80	1986	?	?		?	?	?	?	?	?	?	-	1 400

52 800														

Sources: RUSI/Brassey's Defence Yearbook, 1987
Jane's Armour and Artillery 1986-87
IISS Military Balance 1986-87

5.24. The table shows that 34% of all United States main battle tanks are the 1980s model M-1 with some 4 800 in service. There are only 1 400 comparable Soviet T-80 tanks in the Soviet forces, representing 2.5% of all Soviet tanks. Only 15% of US tanks are the 1960s models M-48 and M-60 A1 and the United States has no older tanks in service. About 23 000 Soviet tanks, *half of the total*, are the 1947 models T-54/55. While the annual Soviet tank production has been more than twice that of the United States, the large Soviet superiority reflects the retention in service of older models for much longer periods.

5.25. The more modern tanks are mostly deployed in the European area. In the case of the Warsaw Pact, T-80s are in service only with Soviet troops; the vast majority of the tanks in service with all the other Warsaw Pact countries are T-54/55 dating from 1947, with the T-72 in any substantial numbers in service only with GDR and Czechoslovakia. NATO has old tanks of the 1950s in service only in Italy, Greece and Turkey. The following estimates have been made of tanks in service in Europe by type and date, based on the NATO force comparison figure of 46 230 Warsaw Pact tanks and 19 720 NATO tanks.

NATO			Warsaw Pact			
Period of entry into service	Models	Numbers in Europe	Numbers in Europe	Models	Period of entry into service	
1979-1985	M-1 Challenger Leopard 2 AMX-30 B-2 M-60 A-3	4 800 250 1 958 248 888	8 142	10 900	1 400 T-80 9 500 T-72-M	1971-1986
1960-1966	AMX-30 Leopard 1 M-48 A-3 Chieftain 5	1 300 4 901 2 172 900	9 273	12 300	8 500 T-64 3 800 T-62 A	1961-1966
1950s	M-48 M-47	585 1 720	2 305	23 000	T-54/55	1947
<i>Totals</i>		<u>19 720</u>	<u>46 200</u>			

The foregoing estimates are made on the assumption that all of the most recent tanks of each alliance are deployed in Europe, the balance of the totals being made up of older tanks. The table shows Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in tanks of all age groups – but one which ranges from 1:1.3 in modern tanks and those of the 1960s, to 1:10 in tanks of the 1940s and 50s. NATO scraps its old tanks, or sells them to third countries; the Warsaw Pact keeps its in service.

5.26. In recent months there has been some speculation in the press about the ability of anti-tank guided missiles with high explosive warheads to penetrate certain advanced types of armour which, it is claimed, only the solid high velocity penetrator rounds fired by smooth bore tank gun can penetrate. Israel developed a “reactive armour” called “Blazer”, used in the Lebanon in 1982. It comprises small explosive charges hung outside the main tank armour. These charges are detonated by high explosive warheads of anti-tank missiles, distorting the blast pattern which then fails to penetrate the main armour. In July, Major General Robert

Sunell, Director of a US Army team studying the problem, was quoted as saying: “Blazer subsequently fell into Soviet hands and now Moscow’s T-72 and T-80 main battle tanks are protected by it. Only the high velocity metal penetrator rods fired by our latest tank cannons can get through it”¹⁹. This conclusion was refuted by a Pentagon spokesman on 20th July, who said the latest version TOW 2A missile could destroy existing Soviet tanks²⁰.

5.27. It is far from clear whether reactive armour has been widely adopted by the Soviet Union, or whether it is as advantageous as claimed – the United States would certainly have adopted it if it were. Hearings before the informal Congressional Military Reform Caucus on 29th July highlighted the different views of competing equipment manufacturers.

5.28. The most objective evidence of Soviet tank vulnerability comes from the 1982 clash between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Lebanon

19. International Herald Tribune, 13th July 1987.

20. International Herald Tribune, 22nd July 1987.

in the course of which Israeli forces destroyed several hundred tanks supplied by the Soviet Union, including some T-72s. Israel is equipped with TOW anti-tank missiles, but an Israeli general is quoted as saying the (quite old) 105 mm tank gun had largely been responsible for destroying T-72s²¹.

(ii) *Anti-tank guided weapons*

5.29. Anti-tank guided weapons are notoriously difficult to count – data for the Warsaw Pact in particular are uncertain. The NATO force comparisons publication shows 38 800 crew-served or helicopter- and vehicle-mounted anti-tank guided weapons for the Warsaw Pact compared with 19 170 for NATO. Such missiles in wire-guided version such as the French SS-10 and SS-11 first came into service in NATO in the 1950s. The first generation required well-trained operators who, in battle conditions, were required to “fly” the missile to the target, keeping both in sight the whole time. Second-generation NATO missiles appeared in the 1970s; computerised, they required the operator merely to keep telescope cross-wires on the target while the missile was automatically guided to it. There is a 10-year lag in the deployment of comparable missiles by the Soviet Union.

5.30. Published figures have not been found for the respective numbers of such first- and second-generation missiles in service with Warsaw Pact forces, but second-generation missiles (mostly US TOW and the Franco-German Milan) form the bulk of ATGW in service with most NATO countries whereas the first Soviet second-generation missile AT-4 (Spigot) has only recently reached four Warsaw Pact allies, the bulk of whose missiles remain first generation.

5.31. Soviet spokesmen have consistently claimed that NATO has considerable superiority in ATGW. To substantiate such a claim the Soviet Union would have to publish its own reliable figures of Warsaw Pact ATGW; as noted above²² such detailed information is not as yet available from Soviet sources. From the following comparison of ATGW by generation and date of entry into service, it seems likely that NATO has considerable superiority in sophisticated ATGW with high-kill probability.

5.32. As far as tank/anti-tank comparisons are concerned the important article quoted below points out that: “The Atlantic Alliance, because it sought a defensive image, and more particularly because it had greatly superior technology, therefore limited the rôle and numbers of its tanks, turning rather to anti-tank weapons, born from the recent explosion in electronics and

information technology... Today there are more than ten (such NATO missiles) for each existing Soviet tank, and this number grows each year.”²³

(iii) *Combat aircraft*

5.33. As shown in Appendix III B, the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact in aircraft in Europe is confined to air defence aircraft. The numbers of fighter bomber/ground attack aircraft in place in Europe – 2 160 for NATO including France and 2 250 for the Warsaw Pact – are not greatly different, but some Warsaw Pact air defence aircraft have ground attack capability. Warsaw Pact spokesmen, and some western experts including Mr. Les Aspin, Chairman of the United States House Armed Services Committee, have claimed that on qualitative grounds the NATO ground attack capability is superior in terms of the ordnance load and combat radius over which it can be delivered.

5.34. The corresponding table compares these criteria for the NATO and Warsaw Pact aircraft concerned, but the data for combat radius must be treated with caution because the effective combat radius of modern aircraft can vary by a factor of more than two, depending on many factors: whether external fuel tanks are carried (thus reducing advance load), and especially the flight profile whether low-level all the way out and back (lo-lo-lo) to escape radar detection, or a combination of partly high- and low-level (e.g. lo-lo-hi).

5.35. With some 700 Su-24 Fencer in service (of which 250 with tactical aviation) the Soviet Union has an aircraft that matches recent NATO models, but older Soviet aircraft in general have shorter combat radius than NATO aircraft. Another study²⁴ comparing the offensive load capacity of three air forces based in Europe projected for 1985 a figure of 4.5 million ton miles for the United States air force, compared with 1.8 for the Soviet air force, and 1.5 for the German air force.

(iv) *Morale and the occupying forces*

5.36. An unquantifiable factor in a qualitative comparison of forces in Europe is the relationship between the Soviet forces and the Warsaw Pact countries in which they are stationed. As has been demonstrated at various times since World War II in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in particular, Soviet forces in these countries help to maintain in power governments compliant to

21. See *The Threat*, Andrew Cockburn, publ. Hutchinson 1983, pages 273-274.

22. See paragraph 1.3.

23. Vice Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, retired, in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1987.

24. *Soviet Air Power in Transition*, Robert P. Berman, Brookings Institution 1978.

Anti-tank guided missiles in service (crew-served or vehicle-mounted)

NATO					Warsaw Pact			
Entry into service	Model	Range (m)	Producing country	In service with	In service with	Range (m)	Model	Entry into service
↑ Early 80s 1975 1974 1970 ↓ Second generation	Hellfire	7 000	US	US	USSR	?	AT-8 KOBRA	1988?
	HOT	4 000	France FRG	FRG France Spain	USSR	8 000	AT-6 Spiral	1980 ?
	MILAN	2 000	France FRG	Belgium FRG France Greece Italy Portugal Spain Turkey UK	USSR Czecho- slovakia	4 000	AT-5 Spandrel	1980 ?
	TOW	3 700	US	Canada Denmark FRG Greece Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Turkey UK US	USSR Czecho- slovakia GDR Hungary Poland	2 000	AT-4 Spigot	1980
↑ 1969 1960 ↓ First generation	Swingfire	4 000	UK	UK Belgium	USSR Bulgaria Czecho- slovakia GDR Hungary Poland Romania	3 000	AT-3 Sagger	1965
	SS-11	3 000	France	France Greece Portugal Turkey	USSR	2 500	AT-2 Swatter	1960s

Soviet policies. In the event of a conflict the resentment of local populations could hamper the operational efficiency of Soviet forces. The same factor undoubtedly affects the morale and reliability of the armed forces of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.

VI. Sources of information

6.1. With the development of surveillance technology involving both satellites and ground-

or ship-based radio interception, what is known as "national means of verification" in the arms control context, coupled with such official publications as are available, have become by far the most important sources of information for measuring the military capability of an adversary. But the raw information derived from technological sources remains as closely guarded a national secret as that derived from traditional espionage. Overwhelmingly, the United States with its huge investment in satellite sensors of all types and a worldwide network of electronic lis-

Fighter/bomber ground attack

NATO			Warsaw Pact		
Aircraft	Combat ¹ radius (km)	Weapons load (kg)	Weapons load (kg)	Combat radius (km)	Aircraft
Alpha Jet	500 l.l.l.	3 000	2 500– 3 000	950 l.l.h. 322 l.l.l.	Fencer Su 24
Buccaneer	850	7 000	2 500	300 l.l.l.	Fitter Su-7
Corsair II A-7	750	6 800	4 000	450 l.l.l.	Fitter Su-17/22
Fighting Falcon	920				
	550 h.l.h.	7 000	4 000	390 l.l.l.	Flogger MiG-27
Freedom Fighter F-5	220 l.l.l.	3 000	4 500	550 l.l.l.	Frogfoot Su-25
Harrier	400 l.l.l.	2 500			
Jaguar	720				
	550 l.l.l.	4 500			
Mirage IIIE	800-1 200	4 000			
Mirage 5F	500 l.l.l.	4 000			
Phantom F-4	1 060				
	800	7 000			
Starfighter F-104	450	2 000			
Thunderbolt II A-10	900	7 500			
Tornado	650 l.l.l.	9 000			
F-111	2 400	14 000			

Source: RUSI/Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1987
Jane's All the World's Aircraft.

1. Flight profile indicated (h = high, l = low) where given by source consulted.

tening posts, has privileged access to raw information, but some other NATO countries are in a position to make significant contributions of their own.

6.2. Such raw technological intelligence data is not distributed throughout the alliance, but there is some selective exchange of information on a bilateral basis between a few of the NATO countries. The United Kingdom in particular has a long-standing agreement with the United States for the exchange of data to which the United Kingdom contributes signals intelligence from listening posts on British territory in several parts of the world. A multilateral agreement involving also Canada and Australia has operated since World War II.

6.3. The interpretation of raw data is a separate process, an inexact science that can offer different conclusions from the same data. Some interpreted intelligence data from several countries is pooled in NATO, but the dominance of one country in particular in access to the basic raw data occasionally raises problems concerning the reliability of interpreted intelligence information disseminated by one country which other countries are unable to confirm independently.

6.4. In addition to being a vital source of intelligence, satellite images are used for targeting nuclear weapons, while terrain data from satellites is needed for the on-board navigational system of cruise missiles. For all these reasons

the committee has stressed on a number of occasions the need for the European allies to possess better technological resources of their own for collecting raw information concerning military capabilities of an adversary, especially through observation satellites, so as to be able to make their own interpretations of the data collected. It has also proposed the establishment of international satellite observation agencies both for the verification of arms control agreements²⁵ and to support United Nations peacekeeping functions²⁶.

6.5. But the growing use of observation satellites, both commercially and by some European allies, would now make it highly desirable for a collective European satellite observation capability to be established. Such a capability can contribute to European security and to the stability of defensive arrangements. Early warning of preparation for hostilities is essential to NATO for the implementation of defence plans and satellites can provide it. At the same time they can enhance stability by revealing the absence of offensive preparations by a potential adversary at times when they might otherwise be suspected.

25. East-West relations and defence, Document 587, 8th November 1972, Rapporteur: Mr. Destremau; Recommendation 227, paragraph 8, 6th December 1972.

26. Security and the Mediterranean, Document 637, 21st May 1974, Rapporteur: Mr. Jung; Recommendation 254, paragraph 1, 20th June 1974.

6.6. Both the United States and the Soviet Union operate a wide variety of observation and intelligence-gathering satellites in orbits of various heights. The current generation of United States observation satellites proper comprises the Big Bird series which entered service in 1971. In orbit some 150 km high, these big satellites, weighing over 11 tonnes, provide resolution of objects on the ground of less than 1 m. They have used photographic film in the past, which can be ejected in a number of pods for recovery on the ground, but the latest versions develop film on board the satellite and then transmit the data to ground terminals via a television-type link. The larger and more recent Key Hole series, weighing 13.5 tonnes, are said to provide resolution of objects down to 20 or 30 cm. These low-orbit satellites would normally have a short life because of residual atmospheric drag and therefore use on-board booster rockets to maintain the orbit from time to time.

6.7. The United States and the Soviet Union also operate a worldwide network of ground-based or ship-based electronic and other intelligence-gathering stations. The Soviet Union makes extensive use of ships for this purpose. The United States has many stations in allied countries, particularly those bordering the Soviet Union. The United States post in Iran used to monitor Soviet missile tests was lost on the fall of the Shah, but the press in 1981 reported that a corresponding United States monitoring post had been installed in China. It has now been reported that the United States also has seismic devices in China for monitoring Soviet nuclear tests²⁷.

6.8. France in 1986 launched a civilian earth-resources observation satellite, Spot, which can provide resolution of objects of 7 to 10 m in size. The American press has reported that the United States Department of Defence is negotiating with the Spot corporation for the regular supply of Spot photographs²⁸. In December 1985 France then started a programme to construct a military observation satellite, Helios, due to be launched in summer 1993, to be derived from Spot technology, and which should be able to provide resolution of objects smaller than 1 m from a 400 km-high orbit – a sufficient height for the satellite to remain in orbit for several years. A report of the Finance Committee of the French National Assembly has stated that Italian participation in the programme could amount to 15% of the cost, and that Spain had expressed interest in assuming a share not exceeding 5%²⁹.

6.9. Prior to the French decision to develop its military observation satellite programme inde-

pendently, the press had reported discussions with Germany over a possible joint programme, which foundered on technical disagreement. Germany was reported to be interested in developing an observation satellite taking images at radar frequencies which, although it would provide much lower resolution, possibly of objects of some 15 m on the surface of the earth, would be fully operational by night and day and in all weather conditions. Observation satellites working at optical frequencies can of course obtain images only in daylight and when the sky is clear.

6.10. Earlier in 1987 it was reported that the United Kingdom simultaneously had a Zircon programme to develop an intelligence-gathering satellite which reportedly would operate in the very much higher geostationary orbit some 35 500 km above the earth. It would be designed for the interception of radio communications and possibly other transmission of radio or radar wavelength, which would be retransmitted to ground receiving stations. The total cost was reported at between £400 million and £500 million. On 6th August however it was unofficially reported that the programme had been abandoned after £70 million had been spent on a feasibility study, possibly in the hope of acquiring the necessary technology more cheaply from the United States³⁰.

6.11. In July the western press carried part of an Izvestia report that the country's chief cartographer, V. Yashchenko, had said that the Soviet Union also was offering satellite photographs with a resolution of six metres. They were available commercially through a government trade organisation, Soyvzkarta, and a number of countries, including Australia and the German Democratic Republic, were listed as potential customers³¹.

6.12. Another very interesting development was the publication by the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute in 1986 of its study of Soviet military installations in the Kola Peninsula using commercially available satellite photographs³². The Norwegian institute, using Landsat photographs, provided independent confirmation of the very extensive Soviet military installations in the Kola Peninsula which had been reported in the past largely from United States sources, but it also scored a first in reporting a new airfield, and the precise location of the new large Gremikha naval base. The United States Landsat series of satellites, beginning with Landsat-1 in 1972 with a resolution of some 80 m, has continued in the 1980s with the launching of Landsat-4 and

27. International Herald Tribune, 6th April 1987.

28. Le Monde, 5th-6th April 1987.

29. Le Monde, 10th April 1987.

30. Guardian, 7th August 1987.

31. International Herald Tribune, 16th July 1987.

32. Investigating Kola – a study of military bases using satellite photos, Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute studies, No. 57, Norsk Utenkspolitisk Institutt, Oslo 1986 (in English).

Landsat-5 providing resolution of 25 to 30 m, and photographs from the latter were used by the Norwegian Institute. As the United States military observation satellites provide far higher resolution (20 to 30 cm) the existence of these newly-reported installations was undoubtedly known to the United States, but had not been publicly reported. Similar deductions could undoubtedly be made from the French Spot satellite photographs also available commercially, providing resolution of 7 to 10 m as mentioned above. Curiously, the United States military authorities are reported to have been concerned at finding that details of Soviet military installations are becoming available to the general public through the relatively high-resolution photographs from commercial satellites such as Spot. The Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, Craig Alderman, was reported to have asked for the security aspects of the situation to be reviewed³³.

6.13. The existence of all these costly and independent national programmes referred to above clearly points to the need for a co-ordinated European allied programme for an observation and intelligence-gathering satellite system. The committee's previous recommendations on the subject of observation satellites are referred to in paragraph 6.4.

VII. Chemical weapons – A specific case

7.1. The committee could not fail to notice over the years the way in which official allied statements concerning levels of some weapons systems held by the Soviet Union have lacked consistency, and in some cases have ranged so widely that their credibility is jeopardised. The size of the Soviet Union's chemical weapons stockpile is a case in point.

7.2. In an earlier report the committee has chronicled United States statements concerning Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons in the years preceding President Nixon's decision in November 1969 to cease any further production of chemical weapons. Prior to that decision, United States estimates of the corresponding Soviet stockpile had ranged from one-fifth or one-sixth of the total Soviet ammunition stocks, but such claims were abandoned after the 1969 decision, press reports then revealing that aerial photographs of storage sheds in the Soviet Union had been wrongly interpreted as chemical weapons stores³⁴. In that earlier report the

33. Guardian, 13th March 1987.

34. Nuclear, chemical and biological protection, report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Banks, Rapporteur, Document 838, 29th April 1980. See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 2.50 et seq.

Rapporteur noted simply that "in a recent briefing in the United States Department of Defence, the Rapporteur was given to understand that the United States today claims simply that Soviet stocks of chemical weapons are 'sufficient for their requirements'..."³⁵.

7.3. Similarly the present Rapporteur in the course of the discussions he held in preparing the report was informed by one authority that the country concerned did not know the levels of Soviet chemical stockpiles and accordingly did not make any public statement concerning those levels. This attitude corresponds to that of the United States in official statements. The Chemical Warfare Review Commission appointed by President Reagan reported on 11th June 1985 that:

"The Soviets have fourteen known chemical weapon production facilities, and may have more. Soviet production rates of chemical weapons are not adequately known..."

Exact deployments and quantities of Soviet chemical munitions are not precisely known... It is well established, however, that the Soviets have major resources devoted to research, development, testing, production and storage of chemical weapons at a number of sites throughout the Soviet Union. There are indications that such activities also exist in several of the Eastern European countries of the Warsaw Pact, including Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania. By the most conservative informed estimates, the Soviet stockpile of chemical munitions is several times as large as the usable portion of the United States inventory."³⁶

The foregoing careful distinction between the "well-established" existence of chemical weapon sites throughout the Soviet Union, and "indications" of such activities in four other Warsaw Pact countries is not made in the United States popularised Soviet Military Power which provides a map showing without qualification "stored Warsaw Pact chemical munitions in forward areas" at 32 sites in six Warsaw Pact countries, allies of the Soviet Union³⁷. Mr. Gorbachev in his Prague speech on 10th April 1987 said:

"...I can inform you that the Soviet Union has ceased production of chemical weapons. It is known that the other Warsaw Pact countries have never pro-

35. Idem. explanatory memorandum paragraph 2.50.

36. Report of the Chemical Warfare Review Commission, 11th June 1985, pages 26 and 27 (United States Government Printing Office).

37. 1986 edition, page 75.

duced such weapons and have never had them on their territory. The Soviet Union does not have chemical weapons outside its territory... ”

7.4. The same conservative conclusion of President Reagan's Chemical Warfare Review Commission that the levels of Soviet chemical weapons stockpiles are uncertain is found in the evidence given by Mr. David Abshire, United States Permanent Representative to NATO, to the Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Forces Committee on 10th April 1986:

“ The size of the Soviet chemical weapons stockpile is a point on which intelligence experts do not agree. That disagreement, however, should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that even the most conservative estimates indicate Soviet stocks are several times greater than the *usable portion* of the United States inventory. ” (emphasis added)

7.5. This comparison of the whole of the Soviet stockpile with the “ usable portion ” of that of the United States leaves open the question as to whether the Soviet stockpile exceeds the total United States stockpile. The Chemical Warfare Review Commission's report states of United States stocks that “ The Department of Defence calculates that only 28% of the total tonnage of chemical agent on hand could be put to any use at all. And only 7% of the agent... (in)... munitions substantially meets current Department of Defence requirements ”. Moreover, although the whole of the United States stockpile pre-dates 1969 when production stopped, and, according to the report, the Soviet chemical programmes did not apparently have high priority until the early 1970s, nevertheless Soviet production of nerve agent weapons began after World War II with captured German facilities, so it is hardly likely that the whole of the Soviet stockpile is serviceable, if only 28%, or only 7%, of the United States is ³⁸.

7.6. Despite this official caution in putting a figure to the size of the Soviet chemical weapons stockpile, in the past year the committee itself has heard from different officials estimates which have ranged from 100 000 tonnes (an unattributable remark in closed hearing) through the higher levels claimed in British public statements of 300 000 tonnes of chemical weapons ³⁹ to an almost certainly exaggerated claim made in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

38. See paragraphs 7.12 to 7.14 below for an estimate of usable parts of the United States stockpile.

39. See for example Mr. Luce, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in his address to the Assembly on 4th December 1984, official report, page 117.

according to which the Soviet stockpile could possibly approach the total production of all nations since chemical warfare began.

7.7. Estimates of chemical weapons stockpiles are complicated by the distinction that must be drawn between the weight of chemical agent and the weight of filled ammunition which will range from 6.7 times (aircraft bombs) to 20 times (artillery shells) the weight of chemical agent contained in them ⁴⁰. The figure of 300 000 tonnes most frequently quoted in recent years originally applied to filled ammunition and would correspond to something like 30 000 tonnes of contained agent, but this distinction is not always made, perhaps not always understood, by ministers in their public statements. Even official reports, updated presumably by civil servants, reveal this confusion because British defence white papers, which in 1983 referred to Soviet “ *chemical weapons... already assessed to be over 300 000 tonnes...* ”, have from 1984 to 1986 referred to “ 300 000 tonnes of *nerve agent...* ” ⁴¹. This latter figure could correspond to something like 3 million tonnes or more of filled ammunition equivalent.

7.8. The foregoing observations were made in the committee's preliminary report ⁴². The committee is encouraged to note that, perhaps as a consequence, more careful statements have since appeared. Thus, the 1987 British white paper states more credibly that “ The Warsaw Pact has the capability to conduct chemical warfare against NATO forces on a very large scale, and produces and stockpiles a range of lethal agents and incapacitants ” ⁴³. Similarly, Mr. David Mellor, British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, addressing the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 14th July 1987, referred to “ a truly massive Soviet stockpile ” of chemical weapons ⁴⁴. Neither of these statements attempted to quantify the Soviet stockpile.

7.9. Of course, the Soviet Union has provided no public information of its own on the levels of its chemical stockpiles. Prior to Mr. Gorbachev's speech of 10th April quoted in paragraph 7.4 above, it had admitted possessing them only tacitly in accepting proposals for the declaration and destruction of its existing stockpiles in the course of negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. For the first time, however, Mr.

40. See for example Red God of War, Soviet Artillery and Rocket Forces, Chris Bellamy, Publ. Brassey's 1986, pages 172-3.

41. Statement on the defence estimates 1986, Volume I, Annex A, paragraph 14 (Cmnd. 9763-1). Compare with 1983 edition, paragraph 408 (Cmnd. 8951-1).

42. Threat assessment, Document 1076, 3rd November 1986, Rapporteur: Mr. Stokes.

43. Statement on the defence estimates 1987, Volume I, Cm 101-I, page 10, boxed paragraph 1.

44. Final record for 14th July 1987, CD/PV 421, page 8.

Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, in addressing the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 6th August 1987, invited the 40 participants to inspect specimens of Soviet chemical weapons in a military facility at Shikhany – United States representatives visited the plant on 7th and 8th October – and, in undertaking to issue similar invitations to observe the plant for the destruction of chemical weapons, once construction was complete, revealed that it was located at Chapayevsk.

7.10. Unlike strategic nuclear missiles, chemical weapons do not lend themselves to identification by observation satellite. It is therefore very difficult to assess levels of Soviet chemical weapons, but it appears that several different approaches have been used to produce the divergent figures of the previous paragraphs. One approach is through assumptions concerning the proportion of chemical weapons held in the total Soviet ammunition stockpiles. The other approach is to assess assumed Soviet requirements for offensive operations based on

available literature on Soviet artillery applications which discusses quantities of chemical weapons which would be required to attack particular targets. Yet another is to try to assess the likely production capacity of known chemical weapon production plants and then to calculate the maximum amount of chemical agent that could have been produced if the plants had been run at full capacity from the date of their construction to the present time. This last approach is presumably the basis of the last statement mentioned in paragraph 7.5 above.

7.11. Official allied statements about Soviet stockpiles would be more credible if they were more consistent, if they made some reference to the assumptions on which the assessment was based and probably if they were expressed as a possible range between a high and a low limit.

7.12. In contrast to the speculation about Soviet stockpiles, the level of existing United States chemical weapons has not recently been publicised in terms of total stockpile, but over the years considerable information has been

American chemical weapons: estimates from open sources

Item	Number held	Tons of agent fill
<i>GB nerve gas munitions for in-service weapons</i>		
105 mm howitzer rounds	900 000	750
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds	200 000	850
500 lb and 70 lb aircraft bombs	13 000	1 300
<i>VX nerve gas munitions for in-service weapons</i>		
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds	300 000	950
2 000 lb aircraft spraytanks	900	630
<i>Mustard gas munitions for in-service weapons</i>		
4.2 in mortar rounds	470 000	1 400
105 mm howitzer rounds	480 000	700
155 mm howitzer rounds	300 000	1 700
<i>Munitions deteriorated beyond repair, obsoleted, or for weapons no longer in service</i>		
115 mm rockets	480 000	2 500
Leakers, land-mines and 155 mm gun rounds	320 000	1 400
<i>Unweaponised agent held in bulk storage</i>		
1 ton drums of GB nerve gas	5 700	4 300
1 ton drums of VX nerve gas	2 300	1 800
1 ton drums of mustard gas	14 000	12 600
<i>Planned binary-munition acquisition quantities</i>		
155 mm howitzer rounds, binary GB	410 000	1 700
500 lb aircraft spraybombs, binary VX	44 000	4 100
227 mm MLRS rocket warheads, binary GD (?)	?	?

Note: Of the total tonnage held of mustard and nerve gases, 93.3% is in the United States, 1.4% in West Germany, and 5.3% on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. The holdings in Germany constitute some 17% by agent weight of all of the available nerve gas howitzer ammunition.

Source: Julian Perry Robinson in Sussex University ADIU report, September-October 1985.

made public officially, in particular in congressional hearings. The committee has previously drawn attention to the academic estimate, shown in the above table, of United States stockpiles based on such public information.

7.13. The table shows a total of 30 880 tonnes of chemical agent in existence (not counting the planned binary production). If the multiplier referred to in paragraph 7.7 above concerning the amount of chemical agent contained respectively in artillery shells, aircraft bombs, etc., is applied to that figure an estimate of the United States stockpile is then 342 000 tonnes of filled ammunition equivalent, inclusive of the weight of ammunition that could be filled from the chemical agent in bulk storage.

7.14. Some of this stockpile is known to be obsolete at the present time, not so much because of deterioration of the chemical agent, but because the weapons systems for which it was designed have largely been withdrawn from service – this applies particularly to 105 mm howitzer rounds. Thus adjusted for obsolete and deteriorated ammunition shown in the above table, and deducting all 105 mm rounds, the operationally usable United States stockpile is probably 282 000 tonnes of filled ammunition equivalent.

7.15. Unless and until all chemical weapon stocks are declared and inspected under the terms of a treaty banning such weapons, it cannot be known with certainty whether Soviet stocks exceed United States stocks, but the presumption must be that they do if only because Soviet production has continued unabated since the 1970s whereas United States production ceased in 1969, and the militarily usable stockpile decreased thereafter, largely through obsolescence of weapons systems. However, the report of President Reagan's Chemical Warfare Review Commission portrays the Soviet chemical warfare programme essentially as a reaction to the earlier United States programme:

“...the Soviet Union apparently did not give chemical programmes high priority until the early 1970s – just after the United States abandoned its own chemical weapons production... during the 1960s, Soviet military leaders apparently became concerned about the seeming United States technological lead in this and other military areas and recommended stepped-up efforts to develop and produce more chemical weapons.”

7.16. In the foregoing paragraphs attention is drawn to the conflicting and at times clearly exaggerated official statements that have been made about Soviet chemical stockpiles. The result is to undermine the credibility of state-

ments about what is certainly a serious military threat. The lessons from this case-study of chemical weapons are of general application to threat assessment as a whole. It should be a sober process. Deliberate or subconscious exaggeration of one part of an adversary's military capacity can lead to incorrect allocation of resources in allied defence plans, or at worse, trigger an arms race.

VIII. Conclusions

8.1. In conclusion, the committee draws attention to the statement included in the platform on European security interests which the Council adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987:

“ 3. We have not yet witnessed any lessening of the military build-up which the Soviet Union has sustained over so many years. The geostrategic situation of Western Europe makes it particularly vulnerable to the superior conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. This is the fundamental problem for European security. The Warsaw Pact's superior conventional forces and its capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are of special concern in this context.”

8.2. The committee notes that many governmental and NATO publications provide a sound basis of force comparison, but that on some particular points, such as that examined in Chapter VI, statements by national authorities can be inconsistent if not contradictory. The alliance needs an agreed consistent policy on threat assessment and in particular on the public presentation of it. There is much information available for those who seek it on the levels of allied forces and equipment, but the inherent secrecy of the Soviet Union about all aspects of government, but more particularly about its military forces, means that the alliance must devote effort to publicising the levels of Soviet forces and equipment. NATO itself does not possess any intelligence sources of its own, being dependent solely on national inputs.

8.3. The committee stresses the need for public presentation of the Soviet defence effort to be consistent and objective. Without concealing the large numerical superiority of certain Soviet forces which pose a real military threat to the alliance, it must take account of Soviet perceptions both of the threat the Soviet Union believes it faces and of the capabilities it believes its own forces to possess in the face of those of potential adversaries. It must take account of the historical and other reasons which led to the present accumulation of Soviet forces and armaments.

8.4. It is particularly important that estimates of Warsaw Pact military capabilities should not be exaggerated for political purposes. In a warning reminiscent of President Eisenhower's in his last days in office, a distinguished military commentator has written:

"It remains to ask why the legend of the East's enormous conventional superiority is carefully cultivated in Europe, especially in France. Certainly the maintenance of fear is an avowed means of ensuring the cohesion of the alliance. But that no doubt would be insufficient if the special financial and other categories of interests were not added, of two influential pressure groups for whom détente is never profitable: the industrialists and the military. The reverse of the coin is that sound policy cannot be built on bad data. Apart from the waste of money, always harmful, the systematic overestimation of the capabilities of the Soviet Union serves its interests in building up its prestige image in a third world fascinated by power. And no doubt it is there, and not in Europe, that the future will be played out." ⁴⁵

8.5. Although the committee does not believe that the Soviet Union is bent on aggression today, it notes that from the end of World War II the Soviet Union has built up, maintained and continuously improved its conventional forces in the central European region. Today, in many areas, these forces are greatly superior in numbers to those of NATO which historically have been built up only as a defensive reaction to the Soviet threat. As a consequence the concentration of military force on both sides in the central region today is greater than anywhere else in the world. While this Soviet build-up in the late 1940s may have been intended to ensure Soviet domination of the occupied Eastern European countries, and as an insurance against any renewed aggression by its recent adversary, the levels of these forces today cannot be justified by any legitimate defence requirement. They provide a capability to advance into NATO-held territory and to seize at least key objectives. Similarly, the numerical superiority of the Soviet submarine fleet provides a significant capability to disrupt allied shipping in the event of hostilities.

8.6. On the other hand, the unremitting growth in Soviet strategic nuclear forces, surface naval forces and chemical weapons, appears to result

from Soviet reaction to historically larger western forces, themselves a response to Soviet conventional superiority in Europe. The first two are unlikely to be seen by the Soviet Union as giving it more than an ability on the one hand to deter an initial first strike by western nuclear forces and on the other to demonstrate the right of the Soviet Union to be present in the oceans of the world.

8.7. Within NATO there are agreed procedures for presenting a reasonably objective picture of force comparisons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But a Greek-Turkish dispute involving the declaration of Greek forces on one Aegean island has prevented any revision of the NATO publication since 1984. Moreover the exclusion of French and Spanish forces, at the insistence of these two countries, detracts from the objectivity of the publication. While those forces are not now in the integrated military structure of NATO, both governments maintain they would be available to the alliance in the event of Soviet aggression. Objectivity thus requires their inclusion in NATO force comparisons.

8.8. In the draft recommendation the committee urges that the Assembly recommend that allied governments in their public presentation of the threat should draw on the agreed NATO force comparisons to give a more consistent presentation of the levels of Soviet forces compared objectively with corresponding allied forces. At the same time every effort must be made through discussion within NATO to overcome the present political obstacle to the regular updating and publication of the NATO force comparisons and to improve the objectiveness and scope of this publication, in particular through the inclusion of data for French and Spanish forces which those countries have so far insisted should be excluded.

8.9. The committee finds a clear political case for independent European technical data sources such as observation satellites and other electronic intelligence installations. It draws attention to the existence of three costly independent intelligence satellite projects in France, Germany and the United Kingdom and notes that their different nature makes them potentially complementary. It recommends therefore that the Council give active consideration to fulfilling the need for a collective European capability and to co-ordinating existing national projects.

45. Vice Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, retired, in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1987.

APPENDIX I

*A. United States and Soviet Union
historical levels of strategic nuclear weapons*

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1973	1975	1977	1979	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
<i>United States</i>																					
ICBMs . . .	18	63	294	424	834	854	904	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 052	1 049	1 040	1 030	1 026
SLBMs	32	96	144	224	416	496	592	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	512	520	568	592	616
Heavy bombers . .	450	550	600	630	630	630	600	540	545	450	465	435	397	330	316	316	316	299	241	241	241
Total vehicles	500	709	1 038	1 278	1 880	1 980	2 096	2 250	2 255	2 160	2 175	2 145	2 107	2 040	2 026	2 026	1 880	1 868	1 849	1 863	1 883
Warheads:																					
on ICBMs	18	63	294	424	834	854	904	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 074	1 274	1 754	2 154	2 154	2 154	2 152	2 149	2 140	2 130	2 126
on SLBMs	32	96	144	224	416	496	592	656	656	656	800	1 664	3 824	4 688	5 120	5 120	4 752	4 800	5 152	5 344	5 536
on bombers	1 800	2 200	2 400	2 520	2 520	2 520	2 400	2 160	2 180	1 800	1 860	1 740	2 088	2 220	2 414	2 414	3 372	3 304	3 200	3 744	3 792
Total weapons	1 850	2 359	2 838	3 168	3 770	3 870	3 896	3 870	3 890	3 510	3 734	4 678	7 666	9 062	9 688	9 688	10 276	10 253	10 492	11 218	11 454
<i>Soviet Union</i>																					
ICBMs	35	50	75	100	200	270	300	460	800	1 050	1 427	1 489	1 547	1 607	1 477	1 398	1 398	1 398	1 398	1 398	1 398
SLBMs	0	(20)*	(50)*	100	120	120	125	130	130	160	289	401	589	741	970	989	1 017	969	961	946	979
Heavy bombers . .	175	190	190	190	190	190	200	210	150	150	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	173	170
Total vehicles	210	260	315	390	510	580	625	800	1 080	1 360	1 861	2 035	2 281	2 493	2 592	2 532	2 560	2 512	2 504	2 517	2 547
Warheads:																					
on ICBMs	35	50	75	100	200	270	300	460	800	1 050	1 427	1 489	1 547	1 937	2 407	4 187	5 302	5 862	6 420	6 420	6 420
on SLBMs	0	(20)*	(50)*	100	120	120	125	130	130	160	289	401	589	741	1 130	1 309	1 849	1 865	1 957	2 122	2 787
on bombers	175	190	190	190	190	190	200	210	150	150	145	145	145	145	145	145	580	580	580	792	780
Total weapons	210	260	315	390	510	580	625	800	1 080	1 360	1 861	2 035	2 281	2 823	3 682	5 641	7 731	8 307	8 957	9 334	9 987
Related events										(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)			(8)	(9)

* Figures in brackets are approximate interpolations.

Related events

- (1) SALT negotiations begin 17th November 1969
- (2) Initial United States deployment MIRVs on ICBMs and SLBMs
- (3) Initial United States deployment SRAM on bombers
- (4) SALT I and ABM treaty signed 26th May 1972
- (5) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on ICBMs
- (6) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on SLBMs
- (7) SALT II signed 18th June 1979
- (8) Initial United States deployment ALCMs on bombers
- (9) Initial Soviet deployment ALCMs on bombers

Sources.

- 1960-1969, 1985 - various editions of IISS Military Balance
 1970-1979 - US-Soviet Military Balance 1970-1981, John M. Collins, United States Congressional Research Service, October 1981
 1981-1984 - US-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985, John M. Collins, United States Congressional Research Service, March 1985

Notes on counting rules

Only weapons counted in the SALT treaties are included: ICBMs; SLBMs; United States B-52 and Soviet Tu-95 and Mya-4 bombers. All such bombers in service are counted as carrying nuclear weapons, even if operationally assigned to a non-nuclear rôle (as 61 B-52s are), because they are counted as nuclear-capable for the purposes of the treaties.

Data from the different sources are fairly consistent for numbers of missiles and their warheads. The numbers of nuclear weapons carried on a bomber can vary widely however, and have increased with the introduction of the United States SRAM and ALCM, and the Soviet equivalent. Weapon-counting rules applied to all data for bombers are as follows:


Aircraft	Total number of nuclear weapons per aircraft		
	1960-1971	1972-1982	1983-1985
B-52 (all other)	4	4	—
B-52G with SRAM	—	12	12
B-52G with ALCM	—	—	20
B-52H with SRAM	—	14	14
Tu-95	1	4	4
Tu-95 (Bear H) with ALCM	—	—	8
Mya-4	1	4	4

These counting rules are those used by Collins in the sources quoted, except for 1983 to 1985 for which IISS Military Balance 1985-86 is the source for United States ALCMs.

The effect of these rules is to overstate the numbers of nuclear weapons that could be delivered operationally, but they derive implicitly from the SALT treaties and provide an objective basis of comparison.

B. United States and Soviet Union
historical trend of total numbers of strategic nuclear weapons 1960-1985

Numbers of weapons



Related events

- (1) SALT negotiations begin 17th November 1969
- (2) Initial United States deployment MIRVs on ICBMs and SLBMs
- (3) Initial United States deployment SRAM on bombers
- (4) SALT I and ABM treaty signed 26th May 1972
- (5) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on ICBMs
- (6) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on SLBMs
- (7) SALT II signed 18th June 1979
- (8) Initial United States deployment ALCMs on bombers
- (9) Initial Soviet deployment ALCMs on bombers

APPENDIX II


Ratio of strategic indicators for different assumptions - 1983

	Resources		Defence effort	
	Population m.	GNP \$b.	Armed forces thousands	Defence expenditure \$b.
United States	234.5	3 298	2 222	217.2
WEU	253.7	2 357.4	2 119	92.0
Rest of NATO	103.4	538.6	1 246	15.9
Total NATO	591.6	6 194	5 587	325.1
Other potential adversaries of USSR				
Iran	42.5	110.1	470	5.5
Pakistan	94.1	36.6	584	2.0
China	1 020.9	401.0	4 100	34.5
Japan	119.3	1 137.8	241	11.5
Total other potential adversaries	1 276.8	1 685.5	5 395	53.5
Total NATO and other potential adversaries	1 868.4	7 879.5	10 982	378.6
USSR	272.5	1 843.4	4 400	258.0
Rest of Warsaw Pact	110.9	720.6	1 410	41.8
Total Warsaw Pact	383.4	2 564	5 810	299.8
Mongolia	1.8	1.9	38	0.2
Total Warsaw Pact + Mongolia	385.2	2 566	5 848	300.0
<i>Ratios:</i>				
USSR: United States	1:0.9	1:1.8	1:0.5	1:0.8
Warsaw Pact: NATO	1:1.5	1:2.4	1:1.0	1:1.1
Warsaw Pact + Mongolia:				
NATO + other potential adversaries	1:4.9	1:3.1	1:1.9	1:1.3

Source: Absolute data from World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1985, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (except defence expenditure and GNP for Mongolia from IISS Military Balance 1986).

APPENDIX III

A. NATO - Warsaw Pact force comparison



1. Estimate of French and Spanish forces in metropolitan territory (and French forces in Germany) taken from IISS Military Balance 1986-87. These forces are excluded from the above table, but are logically comparable with Soviet forces included in the table.

Notes: Warsaw Pact divisions normally consist of fewer personnel than many NATO divisions but contain more tanks and artillery, thereby obtaining similar combat power.


(*) Rapidly deployable forces - include those United States forces whose equipment is stored in Europe and high-readiness Soviet forces located in the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa, Kiev and North Caucasus military districts.

(**) Fully reinforced forces - include North American reinforcements and all Warsaw Pact forces located west of the Ural mountains.

Source: Table adapted from NATO and the Warsaw Pact: force comparisons, fig. 2, publ. NATO 1984.

**B. NATO – Warsaw Pact combat aircraft
Quantitative comparisons**

*Selected types of aircraft in place in Europe
(excluding Moscow air defence district and Spain)*



1. Estimates of French aircraft in metropolitan France and Germany, excluded from above table, are taken from IISS Military Balance (excluding Mirage IV strategic bombers).

N.B. A large proportion of interceptor aircraft can be used in ground/attack rôles. The figures mentioned above refer to combat aircraft in operational units only.

Source: Table adapted from NATO and the Warsaw Pact: force comparisons, fig. 4., publ. NATO 1984.

C. NATO and Warsaw Pact: Force comparisons 1984 – Regional comparisons in Europe

	Land forces						Tactical air forces					
	Divisional equivalents		Main battle tanks		Artillery and mortars		Fighter/bomber ground attack		Interceptors		Reconnaissance	
	N	WP	N	WP	N	WP	N	WP	N	WP	N	WP
NORTH AND CENTRAL REGIONS												
- In place and rapidly deployable ¹	43	61	8 165	16 620	4 920	10 270	1 345	1 555	500	2 635	145	390
- Active and mobilisable reserves (in US or more distant parts, SU up to Urals)	28 ²	43	4 100	10 760	3 670	10 530						
Total fully-reinforced	71	104	12 265	27 380	8 590	20 800						
Note: French excluded from above ³ . . .	5		1 260		1 260		200		180		60	
SOUTHERN REGION							615	695	295	1 560	90	195
<i>N.E. Italy</i>												
- In place and rapidly deployable	8	10	1 250	2 340	1 400	1 560						
- Active and mobilisable reserves	1/3	7		2 000		1 300						
Total fully-reinforced	8 1/3	17	1 250	4 340	1 400	2 860						
<i>Greek and Turkish Thrace</i>												
- In place and rapidly deployable	25	12	4 000	6 570	4 600	6 400						
- Active and mobilisable reserves												
Total fully-reinforced		34										
<i>East Turkey</i>												
- In place and rapidly deployable	8	12		2 435		2 735						
- Active and mobilisable reserves	4			1 865		2 065						
Total fully-reinforced	12	20		4 300		4 800						
Note: Spanish forces ⁴ excluded from above	6		880		2 400		30		107		20	

1. Includes 4 US divisions with equipment stored in Europe but 2/3 of their manpower in US. They are air-transportable to Europe.

2. Some might be assigned to southern region.

3. Source for French forces: FRG Ministry of Defence White Paper 1985 quoting "appendix to NATO force comparisons 1984".

4. Source for Spanish forces: IISS Military Balance 1986-87. These forces are not assigned for NATO purposes and the ground forces could not be rapidly transported to the three isolated areas of the southern region.

D. NATO and Warsaw Pact maritime forces:(a) *In North Atlantic and seas bordering Europe.*(b) *Total including US, Canadian and Soviet Pacific fleets*

<i>Category</i>	<i>NATO</i>	<i>Warsaw Pact</i>	<i>NATO</i>	<i>Warsaw Pact</i>
Aircraft carriers: VSTOL carriers	10	—	16	—
Kiev-class ships	—	2	—	3
Helicopter carriers	—	2	—	2
Cruisers	14	23	29	36
Destroyers and frigates	277	187	350	74
Coastal escorts and fast patrol boats	192	515	n.a.	n.a.
Amphibious ships				
— ocean-going	44	19	75	
— independent coastal craft	69	174	n.a.	n.a.
Mine warfare ships	273	378	277	474
— Long-range attack submarines ¹	67	142	109	185
— Other types	95	55	95	77
— % submarines nuclear-powered	50 %	64 %	n.a.	n.a.
Sea-based tactical ASW and support aircraft including helicopters	685	181	1 372	} 1 549
Land-based tactical and support aircraft including helicopters	366 ²	700 ³	1 600 ²	
Land-based anti-submarine warfare fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters	454	228	738	

Note: n.a. = not available
coastal craft not included in worldwide totals

Source: Adapted from "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force comparisons 1984", page 16, with additional data from IISS Military Balance.

1. Excluding ballistic missile submarines.

2. For 1983, includes US Marine Corps aircraft and helicopters.

3. About 300 of these are bombers.

APPENDIX IV

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1982-1986

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency, current prices) <i>d</i>					Defence expenditure (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a</i>					GDP in purchaser' values (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a</i>					Population (thousand)					Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values					Defence expenditure per head (current prices - US \$) <i>a</i>					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 ^e	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 ^e	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 ^e	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 ^e	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 ^e	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 ^e	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 ^{e 1}
(0)	(1)	(- 5)	(- 4)	(- 3)	(- 2)	(- 1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	132 127	136 615	139 113	141 582	-	2 892	2 672	2 407	2 384	-	84 879	80 408	76 187	79 076	99 448	9 856	9 855	9 855	9 857	9 857	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.0	-	293	271	244	242	-	3.31	3.17	3.03	2.96	-
France (c)	Million F. Frs.	148 021	165 029	176 638	186 715	196 465	22 523	21 654	20 212	20 780	25 955	542 746	516 317	490 078	510 321	647 692	54 480	54 729	54 946	55 162	55 400	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.0	413	396	368	377	468	25.77	25.70	25.42	25.81	26.50
Germany	Million DM	54 234	56 496	57 274	58 650	60 378	22 350	22 127	20 125	19 922	24 717	658 502	653 883	614 252	621 739	794 989	61 638	61 423	61 175	61 015	60 832	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.1	363	360	329	327	406	25.57	26.26	25.31	24.74	25.20
Italy	Milliard Lire	12 294	14 400	16 433	18 584	20 332	9 090	9 481	9 353	9 733	12 252	347 862	355 441	350 096	358 669	452 710	56 639	56 825	56 983	57 128	57 299	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	160	167	164	170	214	10.40	11.25	11.76	12.09	12.50
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	1 893	2 104	2 234	2 265	2 533	41	41	39	38	51	3 497	3 476	3 446	3 573	4 579	366	366	366	366	367	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	113	112	106	104	139	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Netherlands	Million Guilders	11 921	12 149	12 765	12 901	13 244	4 464	4 257	3 978	3 884	4 811	138 139	133 499	124 184	124 968	154 310	14 313	14 367	14 424	14 484	14 542	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	312	296	276	268	331	5.11	5.05	5.00	4.82	4.90
United Kingdom	Million £ Sterling	14 870	15 830	17 511	18 352	19 213	26 030	24 014	23 400	23 789	27 886	483 864	455 443	424 679	450 721	539 921	56 335	56 377	56 488	56 642	56 810	5.4	5.3	5.5	5.3	5.2	462	426	414	420	491	29.79	28.50	29.43	29.54	28.40
TOTAL WEU							87 390	84 245	79 515	80 527	98 072*	2 259 490	2 198 467	2 082 923	2 149 069	2 693 649	253 627	253 942	254 237	254 654	255 107	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.6*	345	332	313	316	384*	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada	Million C. \$	7 802	8 815	9 754	10 329	11 115	6 324	7 153	7 531	7 564	8 030	299 061	323 600	334 105	341 736	356 783	24 657	24 905	25 146	25 379	25 607	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.3	256	287	299	298	314	7.24	8.49	9.47	9.40	8.20
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	11 669	12 574	13 045	13 344	13 750	1 400	1 375	1 260	1 259	1 536	55 742	56 024	54 060	57 840	73 617	5 119	5 114	5 111	5 113	5 114	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.1	274	269	246	246	300	1.60	1.63	1.58	1.56	1.60
Greece	Million Drachmas	176 270	193 340	271 922	321 981	366 632	2 639	2 195	2 412	2 331	2 573	38 206	34 657	33 444	32 777	38 700	9 790	9 847	9 900	9 950	9 997	6.9	6.3	7.2	7.1	6.6	270	223	244	234	257	3.02	2.61	3.03	2.89	2.60
Norway	Million N. Kr.	10 956	12 395	12 688	15 446	15 788	1 698	1 699	1 555	1 797	2 069	56 277	55 064	54 736	54 681	65 882	4 116	4 128	4 141	4 148	4 165	3.0	3.1	2.8	3.3	3.1	412	412	375	433	497	1.94	2.02	1.96	2.23	2.10
Portugal	Million Escudos	63 817	76 765	92 009	111 375	138 479	803	693	629	654	884	23 295	20 672	19 309	20 770	27 404	9 969	10 050	10 129	10 230	10 332	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.2	81	69	62	64	86	0.92	0.82	0.79	0.81	0.90
Turkey	Millions L.	447 790	556 738	803 044	1 234 547	1 867 990	2 755	2 469	2 190	2 365	3 082	53 738	51 225	49 667	52 701	65 469	46 780	47 804	48 825	49 840	50 850	5.1	4.8	4.4	4.5	4.7	59	52	45	47	61	3.15	2.93	2.75	2.94	3.10
United States	Million US \$	189 971	213 626	231 459	258 164	272 499	189 971	213 626	231 459	258 164	272 499	3 045 279	3 275 728	3 634 582	3 840 845	4 064 881	232 520	234 799	237 019	239 283	241 676	6.2	6.5	6.4	6.7	6.7	817	910	977	1 079	1 128	217.38	253.58	291.09	320.59	277.90
TOTAL NON-WEU							205 590	229 210	247 035	274 134	290 674	3 571 598	3 816 969	4 179 904	4 401 350	4 692 736	332 951	336 647	340 271	343 943	347 741	5.8	6.0	5.9	6.2	6.2	617	681	726	797	836	235.26	272.08	310.68	340.43	296.40
TOTAL NATO (d)							292 980	313 455	326 550	354 663	388 740*	5 831 088	6 015 436	6 262 827	6 550 418	7 386 385	586 578	590 589	594 508	598 597	602 848	5.0	5.2	5.2	5.4	5.3*	499	531	549	592	645*	335.26	372.08	410.68	440.43	396.40

Note a : GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States \$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

For the period 1982-1986, the following rates of exchange have been applied:

		Units per US \$				
Country	National currency unit	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 ^b
(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	45 69100	51 13200	57 78400	59 37800	49 76400
France	Million F. Frs.	6 57210	7 62130	8 73910	8 98520	7 56950
Germany	Million DM	2 42660	2 55330	2 84590	2 94400	2 44280
Italy	Milliard Lire	1 35250	1 51880	1 75700	1 90940	1 65950
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	45 69100	51 13200	57 78400	59 37800	49 76400
Netherlands	Million Guilders	2 67020	2 85410	3 20870	3 32140	2 75290
United Kingdom	Million Pound Sterling	0 57127	0 65920	0 74833	0 77143	0 68899
Canada	Million C. \$	1 23370	1 23240	1 29510	1 36550	1 38410
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	8 33240	9 14500	10 35660	10 59600	8 94900
Greece	Million Drachmas	66 80300	88 06400	112 72000	138 12000	142 48000
Norway	Million N. Kr.	6 45400	7 29640	8 16150	8 59720	7 63110
Portugal	Million Escudos	79 47300	110 78000	146 39000	170 39000	156 62000
Turkey	Million Turkish Lira	162 55000	225 46000	366 68000	521 98000	606 13000
United States	Million US \$	1 00000	1 00000	1 00000	1 00000	1 00000

Note b : Average August 1985/July 1986.

Note c : France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure ; the relevant figures for defence expenditures are indicative only.

Note d : The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available.

^e = Estimate.

* = WEU secretariat estimate.

Source : Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2 (86) 39.

B. Manpower effort – 1986

	Period of compulsory ¹ military service (months)			Total in armed forces ² military personnel (thousands) (e)	Total armed forces ² (military and civilian) as percentage of active population *	Total armed forces as percentage of population aged 18-45
	Army	Navy	Air force			
Belgium	10 ³	10 ³	10 ³	108	2.9	2.7
France	12	12	12	558	3.0	2.5
Germany	15 ⁴	15 ⁴	15 ⁴	495	2.4	2.0
Italy	12	18	12	529	2.5	2.4
Luxembourg ..	voluntary			1	0.9	1.0
Netherlands ...	14-16	14-17	14-17	106	2.3	1.6
United Kingdom ...	voluntary			331	2.0	1.5
TOTAL WEU ..				2 128	2.5	2.1
Canada	voluntary			84	1.0	0.7
Denmark	9-12	9-12	9-12	29	1.4	1.4
Greece	21	25	23	205	6.1	5.5
Norway	12	15	15	36	2.5	2.1
Portugal	16	24	21-24	102	2.8	2.5
Spain	12	12	12	320	..	2.1
Turkey	18	18	18	853	4.6	4.2
United States .	voluntary			2 294	2.9	2.1
TOTAL NON-WEU .				3 923	3.1	2.4
TOTAL NATO				6 051	2.8	2.2

Sources :

1. IISS, Military Balance 1986-87.
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (86) 39 of 4th December 1986. Spain as for 1.
3. Eight months if served in Germany.
4. To be eighteen months from 1989.

e: Estimate.

*: 1985 figures taken from NATO press release quoted above.

C. Warsaw Pact manpower effort

	Period of compulsory military service			Total in armed forces (thousands)	Armed forces as percent of population aged 18-45
	Army	Navy	Air force		
Bulgaria	24	36	24	149	4.3
Czechoslovakia	24	—	36	201	3.2
GDR	18	36 ¹	18	179	2.6
Hungary	18	—	24	105	2.5
Poland	24	36 ¹	24	402	2.6
Romania	16	24	16	190	2.2
Soviet Union	24	36	24	5 130	4.5
Warsaw Pact Total				6 356	4.0

1. Sea-going.

APPENDIX V

*United States and Soviet Union; NATO and Warsaw Pact
Military expenditures 1973 to 1983**(\$ b at constant 1982 \$)*

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
United States	154	155	150	142	149	150	155	168	181	196	208
Rest of NATO	81	85	86	84	89	92	93	96	98	101	104
<i>Total NATO</i>	235	240	236	230	238	242	248	264	279	297	312
<i>Total Warsaw Pact</i>	223	234	243	253	255	259	264	270	274	284	288
Rest of Warsaw Pact	34	35	36	36	36	36	37	37	37	40	40
Soviet Union	189	199	207	217	219	223	227	233	237	244	248

Source :

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers", 1985.
(Soviet Union expenditure from US CIA dollar cost estimate - paragraph 4.18 et seq. of explanatory memorandum.)

Threat assessment

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others

1. At the beginning of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Considering that independently of the assessment of the political intentions of the leaders of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact, the military potential of those countries is in itself a major factor in the threat assessment, particularly when – as is the case of the Warsaw Pact – their technico-military doctrine has led them to establish a structure better suited to offensive purposes than to defence;”

Signed: Reddemann, Valleix, Finsberg, Fioret, Wilkinson, Kinnoull, Dudley Smith, Hill

1. See 11th sitting, 3rd December 1987 (amendment withdrawn).

*Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council*REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur*

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- (b) The thrust of Soviet policy
- (c) Strategic and space talks
- (d) Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)
- (e) Chemical weapons
- (f) Nuclear test ban

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. Cifarelli, Fourré (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: Jeambrun), Amadei, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlamann, MM. de Beer, De Decker (Alternate: Close), Edwards, Giust, Irmer, Jung, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet (Alternate: De Hoop Scheffer), Mrs. Lalumière, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja, Dr. Miller, MM. Pecchioli, Ramaekers, Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steiner, Steverlynck (Alternate: Declercq), Stokes.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- (g) Negotiations on conventional forces and confidence-building measures
- (h) Other Warsaw Pact proposals
- (i) Conclusions

APPENDICES

- I. WEU platform on European security interests, adopted by the Council in The Hague, 27th October 1987 (Extracts)
- II. Statement on the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Reykjavik, 11th-12th June 1987 (Extracts)
- III. Document on military doctrine adopted by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Berlin on 29th May 1987 (Extracts)

Introductory Note

In preparing this report the committee as a whole met in Geneva on 30th and 31st July 1987, when it was addressed by the following representatives to the Conference on Disarmament:

H.E. Mr. Robert van Schaik, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation;
Dr. Walter Krutzsch, Minister Plenipotentiary, Delegation of the German Democratic Republic;
Mr. Sergei Batsanov, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the USSR;
Mr. Thomas Barthelemy, Minister Plenipotentiary, Alternate Representative of the United States Delegation;
H.E. Mr. Pierre Morel, Ambassador, Representative of France;
H.E. Mr. Rolf Ekéus, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Sweden;
H.E. Mr. Fan Guoxiang, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of China.

The Rapporteur arranged for the following officials to be interviewed on his behalf in Moscow from 19th to 21st October 1987:

Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation

Mr. Yevgeniy K. Silin, Vice Chairman.

Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada

Mr. Fedorenko, Senior Research Associate;
Mr. Lev Semeiko, Military Expert.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Victor V. Smolin, Minister, Deputy Director Evaluations and Planning Department;
Mr. Alexander V. Yakovenko, Assistant to the Director of Department;
Mr. Vladimir Bashkirov, Counsellor, Disarmament Department.

Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)

Dr. Bugrov, Head of Department;
Dr. Blagovolin, Head of Department;
Dr. Nikolai Kishilov, Head of Section, Defence Expert;
Dr. Rassadin, Senior Research Fellow;
Mr. Usachev, Research Fellow.

Soviet General Staff

General Makelov, Disarmament Department.

The committee as a whole met in Paris on Monday 2nd November 1987, when it discussed and adopted the present report and was addressed by Mr. Ian Dawson, Director of WEU Agencies for security questions I and II.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to all the officials and senior officers who provided information for the report in one way or another. In particular thanks are due to the staff of the Agency for the study of arms control and disarmament who have assisted the committee.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft recommendation*replying to the thirty-second annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the Council's continued close consultation on European security and disarmament questions and its determination not to allow Europe to be sidelined in the present strategic debate;
- (ii) Welcoming the commitment in the platform on European security interests adopted by the Council on 27th October 1987 to build a European union;
- (iii) Welcoming in particular the active rôle of the presidency of the Council in initiating consultation, including the first consultation on a threat to peace arising outside Europe;
- (iv) Welcoming also the establishment of the Council's high-level special working group to improve co-operation between Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence in all member countries;
- (v) Stressing the need for a decision in 1988 on the co-location and restructuring of all Council organs and WEU institutions;
- (vi) Calling for an early decision thereafter on the accession of the countries which have expressed a wish to join WEU;
- (vii) Recalling the continued importance of the long-standing institutional responsibilities of the Council concerning troop levels and the remaining internal arms control,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue its discussions on all aspects of European security and disarmament and ensure that European interests are safeguarded in the present strategic debate;
2. Decide to co-locate all Council bodies and WEU institutions and to define the new tasks of the agencies for security questions;
3. Reinstate in its annual reports the information previously given on the number of control measures carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Draft recommendation

on disarmament

The Assembly,

- (i) Calling for the collective defence effort to be maintained at all times at the level necessary to ensure the security of all countries of the alliance, while negotiations are actively pursued on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments to the lowest levels compatible with that essential security, in full accordance with the long-standing policy of the alliance;
- (ii) Welcoming progress on a properly verifiable INF agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union based on zero-zero proposals agreed by the alliance as a whole which it believes should be in the long-term security interests of countries both of the alliance and the Warsaw Pact, and noting that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will report fully on all aspects of the anticipated agreement when the text is published;
- (iii) Welcoming also the approach to a bilateral agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons;
- (iv) Stressing the importance of respect for the existing ABM treaty and notional limitations of the SALT accords which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to them, and recalling in this connection the reply of the Council to Recommendation 413;
- (v) Noting with satisfaction the improved prospects for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty to ban all chemical weapons and a bilateral agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons tests;
- (vi) Noting both the similarities and the differences between the security policy declared by NATO most recently in Reykjavik and the military strategy enunciated by the Warsaw Pact in Berlin, and welcoming the positive aspects of the Berlin proposals for consultations between the two alliances to discuss military doctrine and a search for ways of removing imbalances and asymmetries in different armaments and forces;
- (vii) Calling in general for the councils of both alliances to give careful consideration to all arms control proposals of the other,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability mandated to discuss asymmetrical reductions of conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals so as to establish a stable and non-threatening military balance in Europe at the lowest possible levels, with priority to negotiations on the Central European region;
2. Express full support for a verifiable bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the strategic warheads of each party to 6 000, and continue to ensure that any such bilateral agreement imposes no restrictions on the forces of European countries, who are not parties to it;
3. Urge on the two parties the importance of fully respecting the existing ABM treaty and notional limitations of the SALT accords, which can be modified only by agreement between them;
4. Call on the North Atlantic Council to consider positively the Berlin proposal of the Warsaw Pact for consultations between the two alliances to compare military strategy, and to find ways of removing asymmetries in types of armaments and forces through reductions to the lower level in each case, and in general to give proper consideration to all arms control proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries with a view to identifying those elements which may provide a fruitful basis for mutually-advantageous negotiations.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The terms of reference of the present statutory report under the terms of the Charter and Rules of Procedure provide for it to reply to those parts of the annual report of the Council which the Presidential Committee refers to the committee. As for the last eighteen months, the terms of reference further provide that: "In view of the importance of disarmament in the Council's discussions since reactivation, the report will examine also developments in all present forums for negotiations on the control of armaments and disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral, on nuclear weapons and on other aspects of armaments control."

1.2. The committee's previous report on this subject¹ already took account of the first part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council covering the first half of 1986, which was communicated to the Assembly on 24th October 1986. The present report therefore replies to the second part of the thirty-second annual report received on 24th April 1987, shortly after the committee's previous report was adopted. (The first part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council, covering the first half of 1987, had not been received when the committee adopted the present report on 2nd November.) This report also takes account of course of miscellaneous subsequent communications from the Council or the Chairman-in-Office; in particular the address to the Assembly by Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, on 28th April, conveying the conclusions of the Council at its ministerial meeting the previous day.

1.3. At its meeting on 3rd June 1987 the Presidential Committee referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments the sections of the Council's annual report concerning:

- “ – the Council's activities relating to security in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the control of armaments and disarmament;
- the application of Protocol No. II on WEU forces;
- the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and Agencies I and II.”

¹ Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, 31st March 1987, Document 1090, Rapporteur: Mr. Amadei.

II. Activities of the Council

(a) General

2.1. The committee welcomes the new Council arrangements since reactivation whereby, at enlarged meetings of the Council, political directors and representatives of the Ministers of Defence attend meetings of the permanent Council in London, thereby involving Defence Ministries more closely in European consultation on security matters.

2.2. The committee particularly welcomes the initiative of the Netherlands presidency of the Council which convened senior officials from the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the WEU countries in The Hague on 20th August and again on 15th September 1987 to discuss developments in the Gulf. The meeting expressed the full support of WEU countries to secure implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 and their support for the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to secure a ceasefire in the Iraq-Iran conflict. After the first meeting the WEU Secretary-General stressed to the press that the despatch of mine-sweepers to the Gulf by various WEU countries had not been discussed at the meeting.

2.3. The important consensus reached by the five permanent members of the Security Council in adopting Resolution 598 on the Gulf conflict, and subsequently in supporting the mission of the UN Secretary-General, is a historical achievement, marking the first time that the Soviet Union has been so publicly associated with the western members in a United Nations peacekeeping effort. The committee particularly welcomes the WEU Council's support for the United Nations' rôle in this area. The Hague meetings mark two important precedents for the use of WEU in security matters – the first time since the signature of the original Brussels Treaty in 1948 that the present Article VIII, paragraph 3 has been invoked whereby the Council may be convened for consultation: “with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise,...” – such discussion covers threats arising outside the *casus belli* area of Article V which provides for automatic military assistance in the case of an armed attack “in Europe” on a WEU country.

2.4. Secondly, the Hague meetings show the important rôle that the presidency of the Council can play in accordance with the provisions of the 1984 Rome agreement on the reactivation of WEU. The committee welcomes this vigorous

demonstration of the right of initiative of the presidency but suggests that, in order to ensure proper liaison with the Secretary-General of the Council in London, the latter should second a member of his staff as liaison officer to the Foreign Ministry of the country exercising the presidency-in-office of the Council at any time. There could then be a "WEU cell" within that Foreign Ministry which could greatly facilitate the proper functioning of the presidency.

2.5. Bilateral consultations among WEU countries with appropriate resources have subsequently resulted in the deployment of mine-sweepers by Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in the Gulf.

2.6. The committee does not pursue this first demonstration of the "outside area" responsibility of the WEU Council, as the subject was referred to the General Affairs Committee.

(b) Arms control and disarmament questions

2.7. The Council describes its discussions on arms control and disarmament questions under the heading "East-West relations", not wishing perhaps to give too much prominence to a subject which the United States has let it be known it considers should be discussed in the NATO framework, and which the committee discusses in Chapter IV of this report.

2.8. The Council has regularly discussed disarmament since reactivation, dealing in particular with the INF negotiations and their relationship with the problem of shorter-range missiles; the multilateral negotiations to ban chemical weapons; the importance of removing conventional disparities, and the United States strategic defence initiative. The section of the Council's report is prefaced with the assertion that: "Maintaining peace in freedom is a prime objective of the security and defence policies of WEU member states within the alliance: their aim is to prevent any type of war - nuclear and conventional. The maintenance of deterrence, based on adequate conventional and nuclear defences, is an essential element of these policies..."

2.9. At the time of drafting the present report, the Rapporteur is not yet in possession of any comments by the Council on the latest progress of the INF negotiations, but on reporting to the Assembly in Luxembourg on 28th April this year, Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-Office of the Council at that time, pointed out that the member states: "approved the zero-zero option when it was tabled by their American ally at the Geneva negotiations in 1981. It is therefore with positive interest and satisfaction that they now note the possibility of reaching agreement to this

end... the Ministers recalled their serious concern at the existing Soviet superiority in shorter-range intermediate nuclear missiles and the requirement not to neglect this in any intermediate nuclear force agreement...". The very good prospects now for a "double zero" INF agreement that would eliminate both longer-range and shorter-range intermediate nuclear missiles can only meet with the Council's approval.

2.10. During the period reviewed the Council's working group on the United States strategic defence initiative continued to work since November 1986 within the new high-level special working group comprising representatives from Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries which is considering European security interests. At the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg in April 1987 the Council was able to take note of a report analysing the politico-strategic implications of current SDI research programmes and this study will be continued.

2.11. A little more information about the work of the Council's special working group comes from the report to the Netherlands Second Chamber by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defence on 18th June 1987 concerning the study on the possible consequences of the introduction of various forms of strategic defence. The Ministers' report points out that various factors would come into play, such as the time of introduction and possible retaliatory measures; whether defence systems would be for point defence or the protection of the territory; and whether such systems would be introduced on one side only, or on both sides in the framework of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is recalled that, as far as participation in the United States research programme is concerned, among the WEU countries governmental agreements have been signed with the United States only by Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

2.12. The committee notes with satisfaction the priority now given by the Council to discussions of all aspects of arms control negotiations and welcomes Mr. Poos's statement to the Assembly in Luxembourg in which he said: "...the Ministers expressed their wish to see Western Europe, at the present international juncture, play a part in the development of any dialogue in full exercise of its responsibility. Inter alia, they examined how to avoid any risk of Europe being sidelined in the present strategic debate."

(c) Restructuring and co-location

2.13. Among the more domestic WEU subjects still under discussion in the Council is the final structure which the various bodies of the WEU

secretariat, including the agencies for security questions described below, should take and the question of their location. Certainly the separation of the Council secretariat in London from the main WEU bodies in Paris comprising the agencies for security questions and the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly considerably hampers the efficient conduct of business. It is unlikely that the agencies in particular are able to afford the permanent Council the close and continuous support which the latter has a right to expect.

2.14. Addressing the Belgian Royal Institute of International Relations in Brussels on 16th March this year, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, devoted part of his speech to WEU and said: "If the organisation can be made more effective by concentrating its activities in one place – close to NATO here in Brussels – then we should consider that, provided that this is not an excuse for creating a new bureaucracy." It is understood that the Netherlands Government similarly sees the advantage of co-locating all the WEU organs in Brussels where the permanent representatives of the WEU countries to NATO – who deal with defence problems on a day-to-day basis – could then represent their countries more effectively in the permanent Council of WEU than the present Ambassadors to the United Kingdom who must necessarily concern themselves primarily with the bilateral relations of their countries with the United Kingdom.

2.15. The historical reasons for the present locations of WEU organs should be recalled. The Council secretariat has been in London since the signature of the original Brussels Treaty in 1948 when the Brussels Treaty Organisation was established – the precursor of WEU. That body transferred its defence functions to NATO in 1950 when the latter's military structure had been established, and ceased thereafter to deal with defence questions on a day-to-day basis. The NATO secretariat which in 1950 had been divided between London and Paris was concentrated in the latter city in 1952 in a temporary annex to the Palais de Chaillot. With the establishment of WEU through the modification of the Brussels Treaty in 1954, the new WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee were established at the outset alongside NATO in the Palais de Chaillot – indeed they were formed from the existing staffs of the Preparatory Committee for the European Defence Community already working with NATO in anticipation of the entry into force of that ill-fated treaty.

2.16. As far as the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly was concerned, it originated as a tiny staff of some two persons in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg at a time when it was

envisaged that the WEU Assembly would meet but rarely, perhaps for half a day at the end of the session of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly. The Charter of the Assembly, as originally adopted, provided similarly that the seat of the Assembly was in Strasbourg. As soon, however, as the Assembly had established itself as an authoritative political forum for debating the problems of European security, it became obvious that the Office of the Clerk should be co-located with NATO and the WEU secretariats in Paris. It was accordingly decided in 1956 to move the Office of the Clerk to the NATO building in Paris and arrangements were made for the Assembly to meet in the nearby chamber of the then Assembly of the French Union – the premises subsequently occupied by the French Economic and Social Council under the Fifth Republic.

2.17. The requirement for this close collaboration with NATO was indeed foreseen in the modified Brussels Treaty which provides in Article IV that "...the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.", while the decision of the Council of 7th May 1955 setting up the Standing Armaments Committee provides in paragraph 1: "In order that the closest contact may be maintained with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the Standing Armaments Committee's seat shall be in Paris." Unfortunately this close effective collaboration between the WEU organs and NATO co-located in the same building in Paris was disrupted in 1966 when the NATO secretariat moved to Brussels while the WEU organs were left in Paris. At that time, however, WEU was to some extent a moribund organisation. Since the reactivation of WEU and the establishment of its new agencies for security questions there is again a need for the closest collaboration both with NATO and with the European political co-operation secretariat; logically that should lead to the transfer of all WEU organs from London and Paris to Brussels. The committee considers however that it would be premature to make a specific recommendation concerning the site for co-location.

(d) European security charter

2.18. Following the proposal of the French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, in the WEU Assembly in December 1986, for a European security charter, the Council meeting at the level of foreign and defence ministers on 27th October adopted the platform on European security interests, a document which reaffirms well-known principles of allied defence policy in a useful up-to-date statement to which all seven governments have now subscribed². The com-

2. Extracts at Appendix I.

mittee particularly welcomes the introductory paragraph:

“ 2. We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act...We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.”

and the subsequently expressed intention:

“ 4. We intend therefore to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we are committed through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties.”

2.19. Other fundamental features of the platform include:

- the assertion that the continuing division of Europe remains unacceptable, and that full use should be made of the CSCE process to open more possibilities in the fields of economy, technology and science, and to achieve the free movement of peoples and the exchange of opinions and information in the whole of Europe;
- “...the security of the Western European countries can only be ensured in close association with our North American allies”;
- “...the balanced policy of the Harmel report remains valid. Political solidarity and adequate military strength within the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament and the search for genuine détente continue to be integral parts of this policy...They should lead to a stable balance of forces at the lowest level compatible with our security”;
- “In the present circumstances and as far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the western strategy for the prevention of war...”;
- “We remain determined to pursue European integration including security and defence and make a more effective contribution to the common defence of the West.

To this end we shall:

- ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its borders is made clearly manifest by means of appropriate arrangements”;

(this is a clear endorsement of NATO's forward defence policy, to which France had not hitherto so clearly subscribed).

2.20. On arms control and disarmament the platform endorses the most recent NATO Reykjavik statement of 12th June 1987 on these issues, and declares that “An agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the global elimination of land-based INF missiles with a range between 500 and 5 500 km will constitute an important element of...” WEU's comprehensive approach. These issues are discussed in the next chapter.

(e) *Enlargement*

2.21. The problem of the possible enlargement of WEU has now been hanging fire for three years. Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty provides clearly that the parties to the treaty: “...may, by agreement, invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited...”. Portugal announced publicly at the time of the reactivation of WEU in 1984 that it wished to join WEU. In adopting Recommendation 420 in May 1985, the Assembly took a clear position in favour of Portugal's accession.

2.22. Subsequently, however, Spain in 1986 announced its interest in joining WEU and two more candidates declared themselves in 1987 – on 6th April the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, announced his country's candidature in an interview with the Financial Times, and on 13th April a statement by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Ankara announced Turkey's candidature, one day before that country deposited its formal application for full membership of the European Community. It is understood that all four countries have made bilateral diplomatic approaches to the seven WEU countries expressing their wish to join WEU, and indeed in his address to the Assembly in April the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Poos, referred collectively to the four candidate countries. It should also be noted that the Norwegian Government's report to the Storting on “Norway, the European Community and European co-operation” of 22nd May 1987, devotes two pages to “reviving WEU”. It notes that: “Together with Portugal, Turkey and Denmark, Norway has regularly sent observers to the meetings in Paris of the WEU's parliamentary Assembly. Norway is favourable to the efforts to reactivate WEU. Depending on further clarification within WEU of how the French initiative will be followed up, the government will consider Norway's future relationship to the organisation”. Then Mr. Ellemann-Jensen, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, was quoted as saying to a European Community periodical E.S. Avisen, that “Denmark should seek to be admitted to WEU if it is in that forum that a real

policy of European security co-operation is initiated”³.

2.23. The Council has made it clear in a number of replies to recommendations and in its annual report that it has shelved the question of enlargement for the time being, until the transitional phase of the reactivation of WEU is completed. This involves decisions on the new structures of the agencies on security questions and the London secretariat of the Council and the question of the co-location of all WEU organs. While the transitional period was scheduled to be completed by the end of 1987, it is not yet clear whether the Council will succeed in taking the necessary decisions in time. In the view of the committee, enlargement is not an issue that should be indefinitely shelved.

2.24. The criteria to be applied by the Council in considering invitations for countries to join WEU are becoming clear. Obviously countries must subscribe to the Brussels Treaty which provides in particular in Article IV for close co-operation with NATO on which the WEU Council and its Agency are required to rely for information and advice on military matters. It follows automatically therefore that any applicant for membership of WEU must be a member of NATO. Under Article V, if a party is the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other parties must afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power. This is of course a more far-reaching commitment than that in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Additionally, however, any new applicants must be required to subscribe to the platform on European security interests approved by the Council on 27th October 1987, and indeed to the whole corpus of Council decisions which apply at the date of joining.

2.25. The platform includes a statement to the effect that European defence policy is based *inter alia* on nuclear deterrence and candidate countries would be expected to accept that principle, which is already accepted by all NATO countries. A quite different issue appears to have been raised in the domestic debate in Spain concerning its relationship with NATO and the renegotiation of its bilateral defence agreement with the United States – the stationing of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory. Spain has not allowed nuclear weapons to be stored on its territory since a United States nuclear bomb, accidentally released, broke up on impact and caused considerable radioactive contamination although not exploding. The January 1976 version of the bilateral defence treaty, concluded after the death of General Franco, provided further for United States strategic nuclear submarines to be withdrawn from the Rota base by 1st July 1979.

Norway and Denmark similarly have always had a policy of not allowing the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime. Although nuclear weapons are stored on the territory of six WEU countries, there are none in Luxembourg, so the acceptance of such storage cannot be a condition for membership of WEU. It should be a matter to be decided by each member country in full exercise of its sovereignty in the light of NATO collective defence plans, as the optional wording in the WEU platform on European security interests implies: “...In the nuclear field also, we shall continue to carry our share: *some* of us by pursuing appropriate co-operative arrangements with the United States...” (emphasis added). Another criteria raised in the case of Spain has been the integration of military forces into the NATO military structure which the Spanish referendum on its membership of NATO ruled against. As French forces were withdrawn from the integrated military structure in 1966, however, it would be difficult to make integration a requirement for membership of WEU, although it is regarded as an essential feature of collective NATO defence by all other NATO countries.

2.26. The Secretary-General of WEU has expressed the opinion that candidates should also be members of the European Community as are all existing members. Norway and Turkey at present are not – but Turkey has applied for full membership, and Norway which once did, is expected in some quarters to apply again some time after the next parliamentary elections in that country. So Community membership alone need not be a criterion for WEU membership.

2.27. When the time comes for active consideration of the enlargement of WEU, the committee believes that acceptance of all obligations of the Brussels Treaty, the WEU platform on European security interests and the corpus of Council decisions and membership of NATO should be sufficient criteria for accession.

2.28. Alternatively, the Council may come to feel that the enlargement of WEU by the admission of four further members, with the possibility of yet other European NATO countries applying, might change the nature of WEU too fundamentally. In which case, it might be felt that the historical and geographical reasons that led to the present membership would be a strong reason for not enlarging WEU. In any case, it would not seem possible to discriminate against one or other European NATO country that satisfied the agreed criteria for membership of WEU by accepting some candidates but not others.

2.29. Meanwhile, the committee notes that in Recommendation 420 and Order 61 adopted in May 1985, the Assembly recorded its support for Portuguese accession and extended special

3. Le Monde, 28th October 1987.

arrangements for Portuguese parliamentary observers in the Assembly and Assembly committees. As there are now four applicant countries, consideration should be given to placing their relationship with the Assembly on an equal footing. As far as the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is concerned, it has acceded to requests from the Norwegian and Turkish parliaments in admitting two observers from each to its meetings, and has implemented Order 61 of the Assembly in inviting three observers from Portugal. It has also exchanged observers with the Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament of the Political Committee of the European Parliament. No request for observer status in the committee appears to have been received from Spain, Greece or Denmark.

(f) Agencies for security questions

2.30. The Secretary-General informed the Assembly by letter on 24th March 1987 of the revised terms of reference of the Paris-based agencies for security questions. Agency I for the study of arms control and disarmament questions is to work on two studies:

- “ – the first relating to verification proposals in the context of current negotiations on arms control;
- “ – the second relating to Soviet tactics vis à vis western European countries in regard to arms control and disarmament matters.”

The agency is also to “ follow changes in Soviet positions in regard to disarmament and armaments control ”.

2.31. Agency II for the study of security and defence questions was “ to continue its consideration of resource management – on the basis of an analysis of national defence budgets – and of the non-military aspects of the threat, and to study how the public in WEU member states views the strategic balance ”. In connection with resource management, “ the agency is to study means of achieving true comparability of criteria in western countries and rationalisation of defence budget management ”.

2.32. The activities of Agency III for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments, and which is also to act if required as the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, have been referred to the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. It should be noted that the Standing Armaments Committee has not met for the last two years and some of the discussion of armaments production problems appears to have taken place in meetings of a group of experts organised by the Council in London.

2.33. While Council communiqués have stated that the Council has taken note of the state of studies undertaken by Agencies I and II, the committee wonders to what extent their work can be central to consultations in the framework of the Council while the agencies continue to be based in Paris and apparently still lack secure electronic communication facilities with the Council secretariat. In section (c) above, the committee finds that the reactivation of WEU, if it is to be effective, should lead to the transfer of all WEU organs from London and Paris to be co-located near NATO in Brussels.

(g) Institutional defence tasks of the Council

(i) Level of forces of member states

2.34. In implementation of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council has to find each year that the levels of ground, air and naval forces which WEU countries place under NATO command do not exceed the limits fixed in Articles I and II of that protocol. The Council examines levels of these forces in the light of the NATO annual review. As this no longer covers the French forces concerned, the Council has to take note also of a declaration on French forces made independently by the representative of France.

2.35. The Council further controls “ forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe and remaining under national command – internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories and common defence forces ” specified in the implementing agreement concluded by the WEU countries on 14th December 1957.

2.36. The committee notes that the Council’s report for the second part of 1986 states that these procedures were duly carried out for that year.

(ii) United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe

2.37. Under the terms of Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, the United Kingdom undertook to maintain on the mainland of Europe the effective strength of: “ four divisions and the second tactical air force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity ”. The United Kingdom undertook: “ not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties...this undertaking shall not, however, bind her in the event of an acute overseas emergency... ”. In accordance with the procedure provided for in that article, the Council subsequently “ acquiesced ” in the United Kingdom’s request to reduce the levels of forces it maintains

on the mainland of Europe, and the level now agreed by the Council is 55 000 men plus a tactical air force. At the insistence of the Assembly, acting on reports from the committee, the United Kingdom has latterly agreed to include a statement in the Council's annual report setting forth the precise levels of the forces affected by this undertaking.

2.38. The Council's annual report states that the "average" number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1986 in accordance with this commitment was 54 371, but "...in 1986 there were on average 836 men redeployed...to Northern Ireland". This means that the underlying average number of men on the mainland of Europe was 53 535 – a shortfall of 1 465 below the current level of the United Kingdom's obligation. Moreover, as the figure quoted is an average level, it must be concluded that there were periods in 1986 when the actual level was lower still.

2.39. The committee regrets that for the first time in a number of years the United Kingdom fell short of its WEU commitment by an average of some 2.7% in 1986.

2.40. As far as the United Kingdom's contribution to the second allied tactical air force in 1986 is concerned, the Council's report provides the following information:

*United Kingdom contribution
to NATO second tactical air force*

Rôle	Aircraft Equipment	Squadrons
Strike/Attack	Tornado	6
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguar	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
	Chinook	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1

2.41. The committee notes with satisfaction that compared with 1985 there has been an increase of two in the number of British Tornado squadrons in Germany as greater numbers of this relatively new aircraft have entered service, against which one squadron of Jaguars in the strike/attack rôle has been withdrawn – a net increase of one in the number of British aircraft squadrons based in Germany. At the same time the number of Rapier air defence surface-to-air missile squadrons has increased from one to four. The committee welcomes this increase in the United Kingdom's commitment to second tactical air force.

(h) Agency for the Control of Armaments

2.42. In 1986 for the first time the Agency for the Control of Armaments applied no controls to conventional weapons in WEU countries, in accordance with the Council's decision to abolish these controls – a decision which the Assembly, on the recommendation of the committee, had been calling for repeatedly for a number of years. The Agency for the Control of Armaments has itself been largely disbanded and comprises today a single staff member who is an expert on chemical weapons. According to the Council's Rome declaration of 26th October 1984, which announced the reactivation of WEU, while the conventional arms controls were to be abolished from 1st January 1986, "the commitments and controls concerning ABC weapons would be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures agreed up to the present time". The second part of the annual report for 1986 records that: "The Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic weapons". While the list of biological weapons subject to control, as accepted by the Council in 1981, was renewed for 1986, "...the agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological weapons". The committee notes that the situation concerning nuclear and biological weapons remains unchanged – the controls on these weapons provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty have never been applied.

2.43. The situation concerning chemical weapons is quite different, as the Agency for the Control of Armaments has duly applied the controls provided for in Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Agency for the Control of Armaments circulates a questionnaire to all member countries which have not renounced the right to produce chemical weapons; two specific questions are asked: whether production of chemical weapons has passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage; and the levels of stocks of any chemical weapons that the member country might hold. The annual report states, as in the past, that all member states replied in the negative to both questions, and that accordingly, the agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1986.

2.44. The committee notes in this connection the proposal put forward by France in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 11th June 1987, whereby under a treaty to ban all chemical weapons, countries not possessing such weapons should be entitled to procure security stocks of 2 000 tonnes to be held during the interim period during which stocks of chemical weapons of all parties to the treaty would be progressively reduced. If a WEU country ever acquired chemical weapons under such a system, the controls provided for in Protocol No. III of

the modified Brussels Treaty would of course take full effect, and under Article III of that protocol: "...the level of stocks that the high contracting parties concerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of the Council of Western European Union.". Such levels would then be verified by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments.

2.45. As far as Germany is concerned, it has of course renounced the right to produce chemical weapons on its territory under the terms of a unilateral declaration annexed to the modified Brussels Treaty, and the Agency for the Control of Armaments applies an agreed procedure to verify the non-production of chemical weapons in that country. At the present time, visits carried out under the agreed procedure remain the only inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments which previously numbered some 70 each year when controls were applied also to conventional weapons. The annual report of the Council up to 1965 gave details of all inspections carried out by the agency, including the numbers of non-control measures applying to the non-production of chemical weapons. From 1966 onwards, annual reports of the Council provided data only for total numbers of control measures carried out by the agency, but under a subsequent agreement with the Council, the committee was informed each year on a confidential basis of the breakdown of this number of inspections by quantitative controls and non-production controls, etc. The Council's report for 1986 omits any reference to the numbers of inspections carried out under the residual functions of the Agency for the Control of Armaments; the committee calls for this information to be reinstated.

*(i) European defence co-operation
outside the WEU framework*

2.46. The report would be incomplete if it did not mention in passing various proposals, made outside the WEU framework in 1987, to increase European co-operation on defence questions. The year saw the proposal for the constitution of a Franco-German brigade with which other countries such as the Netherlands and Spain have expressed a wish to be associated, and a proposal for the constitution of a Franco-German defence council. These proposals were characterised by statements in Bonn as a means for linking France more closely to the integrated military structure of NATO, through the intermediary of Germany. The French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, in his interview with *Le Point* of 6th October 1987, warned in this connection that "Symbolic measures, however spectacular they may be, should not disappoint those who

expect more of them, or serve as a pretext for those who might be tempted, in this way, to put in question our original position in the Atlantic Alliance".

2.47. Then during the Paris meeting between Mr. George Younger, British Minister of Defence, and Mr. André Giraud, French Minister of Defence, on 1st October 1987, the press reported that the possibility of co-operation on nuclear strategy was discussed. It was suggested that at least the patrol programmes of the French and British strategic nuclear submarines could be better co-ordinated – a proposal originally put forward by the committee in 1978⁴.

III. Other texts referred to the committee

3.1. The Rapporteur records his thanks to Mr. Reg Freeson, a representative to the Assembly, for an interesting paper entitled "Arms trade obstructs world disarmament and development" which he communicated to the Chairman of the committee on 12th January 1987. The Rapporteur suggests that this is a subject to which the committee might well turn its attention in a future report. The Rapporteur also notes the communication by Mr. Antoni, a member of the committee, of a resolution adopted by the Direction of the Italian Communist Party on the security and defence of Italy and Europe. This was communicated to the President of the Assembly on 1st December 1986 and communicated by him to the committee for information.

3.2. The texts of these two communications are held in the committee files and copies can be made available to any representative on request.

*IV. International negotiations
on the control of armaments*

(a) General

4.1. Since the committee last reported on 31st March 1987⁵, there have been several important developments affecting current arms control negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral. An INF agreement has now moved nearer to completion following Mr. Gorbachev's decision announced on 22nd July to accept the original

4. The limitation of strategic arms, Document 787, 31st October 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Baumel. See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 109-110; SALT and the British and French nuclear forces, Document 859, 17th November 1980, Rapporteur: Mr. Mommersteeg. See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 6.1 to 6.14.

5. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, Document 1090, 31st March 1987, Rapporteur: Mr. Amadei.

NATO position that *all* longer-range intermediate nuclear force (LRINF) missiles should be eliminated, but adding shorter-range INF (SRINF) as well; on 26th August, Chancellor Kohl announced that the Federal Republic of Germany was prepared to eliminate its SRINF – Pershing 1A missiles – thus removing the last substantive obstacle to the conclusion of the treaty. Chancellor Kohl stressed this point in his announcement at a special session of the Bundestag on 2nd September 1987. This was confirmed at the meetings between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze in Washington on 16th and 17th September, in Moscow on 22nd and 23rd October and again in Washington on 30th and 31st October. It is now expected that the treaty will be signed at a summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Washington in December. The same Shultz-Shevardnadze meetings gave further impetus to the negotiations on strategic and space weapons.

4.2. On chemical weapons, Mr. Shevardnadze's address to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 6th August heralded Soviet acceptance of challenge on-site inspection and invitations to all participants to inspect specimens of Soviet chemical weapons. On test ban, a statement by General Cherevov in Washington on 31st August announced Soviet acceptance of United States proposals to improve seismic methods of verification and was followed on 17th September by a joint United States-Soviet agreement to begin full-stage negotiations before 1st December on limiting and eventually ending nuclear testing.

4.3. Glasnost in arms control was further emphasised on 5th September with the visit by three members of the United States Congress to inspect the Krasnoyarsk radar which the United States had alleged violated the ABM treaty.

4.4. On 17th September, an article under the name of General Secretary Gorbachev in Pravda and Izvestia dealt with the Soviet idea of a world system of international security, and Mr. Gorbachev in the flesh made a speech in Murmansk on 1st October calling inter alia on countries bordering the Arctic to discuss making it a "zone of peace".

4.5. Coming events such as Mr. Gorbachev's expected speech on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution and the now expected Reagan-Gorbachev summit perhaps in December can further change the situation as described in this report.

(b) The thrust of Soviet policy

4.6. While Mr. Gorbachev's reforming zeal may not as yet have improved the material lot of the man in the Russian street, it has already

widened the Russian's means of information and stimulated Soviet intelligentsia among which must be included the Soviet diplomatic service. This has produced a remarkable expansion of Soviet diplomatic and political contacts in hitherto taboo areas including in particular the European Community as well as Western European Union and attempts, believed so far to have been unsuccessful, to make direct contacts with NATO. At the same time, quite extensive military verification measures are now either being applied on Soviet and NATO territory – chiefly the confidence- and security-building measures of the Stockholm agreement – or are now offered in negotiations such as those on INF, chemical weapons or a nuclear test ban.

4.7. There has resulted an apparent profusion of Soviet proposals in all areas of arms control and disarmament, which at times have appeared confusingly contradictory. The fact that nearly all the concrete progress in actual negotiations has come about merely through the tardy Soviet acceptance of western proposals which have been on the table for some years passes unnoticed in the blaze of publicity attracted by Soviet glasnost and "new thinking".

4.8. It is the relative speed with which the dynamic Soviet leadership now takes high-level decisions that contrasts most strikingly with the sluggish last years of the Brezhnev era. This faces the West with quite a new challenge. On the one hand, it will require greater resources devoted to analysis of arms control issues and an ability to consult permanently and reach consensus in the alliance and WEU far more rapidly than has hitherto been possible.

4.9. The West can afford to welcome Soviet concessions in accepting western proposals that have now made possible the conclusion of an INF agreement, which for the first time will lead to the elimination of some hundreds of nuclear weapons.

(c) Strategic and space talks

4.10. In the bilateral negotiations in Geneva, the Soviet Union has continued to insist on the linkage between space talks which would impose agreed limits on the United States strategic defence initiative, probably through a reconfirmation of the ABM treaty, and progress on the goal towards reducing strategic nuclear weapons by 50%, as agreed in principle at the Reykjavik summit. The Soviet Union has pointed out that to maintain the credibility of its strategic forces in the event of United States deployment of an operational SDI, it would need to *increase* the numbers of its strategic warheads – although it has been thought that it might also develop an anti-SDI system. Negotiations up to the first quarter of the year are reviewed in the last

report⁶. Early in 1987 a joint working document had agreed on a ceiling of 6 000 warheads and 1 600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) for each side and on counting rules for bombs and cruise missiles carried on bombers. The subject was discussed at the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting on 17th September when the Soviet Union for the first time is understood to have accepted the principle that not more than 60% of the agreed 6 000 warheads should be carried on any of the three strategic systems (strategic submarines, ICBMs, bombers) and that not more than a total of 1 540 warheads should be carried on "heavy" missiles - i.e. those with more than 6 independent re-entry vehicles. At the 22nd to 23rd October Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting the Soviet Union proposed further sub-ceilings of 3 000 to 3 300 warheads on ICBMs, 1 800 to 2 000 on SLBMs and 800 to 900 on ALCMs.

4.11. The strategic arms talks are linked however to United States testing of the new Trident-2 submarine-launched missile which in early September was tested with 10 warheads instead of the original 8. The United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, was reported⁷ as pressing for it to be tested with 12 in November against the advice of the Chiefs of Staff and State Department. The United States has so far refused to include in the new strategic treaty the SALT II principle whereby all missiles are counted as if fitted with the maximum number of warheads for which they have been tested. This issue may well have consequences for the future British Trident force.

4.12. The United States administration still appears to consider an agreement on strategic weapons possible during the Reagan administration, but the ABM treaty and its conflict with the strategic defence initiative has so far been a major stumbling-block. At the September Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting it is understood that the Soviet Union proposed clarification of the ABM treaty in submitting a list of objects which it should be forbidden to launch into space and inviting the United States to propose criteria concerning the physical parameters for such objects. The bilateral review conference of the ABM treaty, held every 5 years since its signature in 1972, is due in October 1987 and the Soviet Union is expected to press for a non-withdrawal agreement to last 10, or possibly 7 years.

4.13. On 5th September, three United States Congressmen, accompanied by four military experts, inspected the large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk, which the United States has alleged violates the ABM

treaty. The building was photographed inside and out. The visitors reported the radar not yet operational. The visit did not resolve the question as to whether the radar was for space tracking (permitted) or ABM defence; it was probably capable of performing either rôle to a limited extent. The fact that it was not protected against nuclear attack and was dependent on outside sources of electrical power implied that its primary function was for peacetime operation. At the 22nd to 23rd October Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting the Soviet Union offered to suspend construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar if the United States would forego the modernisation of its Fylingdales radar in the United Kingdom, which the Soviet Union contends would violate the ABM treaty because the radar is not on United States territory as the treaty requires. The Soviet Union further offered to open to inspection other radars at Gomel, south-west of Moscow.

4.14. WEU governments individually have made it clear from the outset that their support for the United States SDI proposals was limited to laboratory research and that under the ABM treaty any tests or deployment would be a matter for negotiation. The WEU Council stated this position clearly on 11th April 1985 in its reply to Recommendation 413 of the Assembly:

"The Council notes that the strategic defence initiative (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a scientific research programme and hence does not contravene the provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. The Council also takes the view that laboratory research does not lend itself to arms control measures. On the other hand, relevant tests or deployments will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion."

4.15. The restraints that the Reagan administration will accept on SDI, through continued respect for the ABM treaty as negotiated, may determine the outcome of the strategic arms negotiations. The United States administration itself remains divided on the issue; a press report from Washington in February revealed that Mr. Shultz, with the support of the governments of Belgium, Canada, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom, and of the Secretary-General of NATO, as well as congressional circles, had successfully opposed Mr. Weinberger's proposal that the United States proceed with the early deployment of some simple version of SDI, while unilaterally announcing a new "broad" interpretation of the ABM treaty. President Reagan had ruled against Mr. Weinberger. Since then the Pentagon has revealed that allied countries had been awarded only 2% of the \$4.25

6. Document 1090, explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 5.28 to 5.48.

7. International Herald Tribune, 8th October 1987.

billion total of SDI contracts in the last two years: Germany has 19 contracts worth \$45 million; the United Kingdom 24 worth \$30 million; Italy \$5 million; France \$3 million; and Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands together \$1.5 million.

(d) Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)

4.16. When the committee last reported⁸ on 31st March an INF agreement as then envisaged would have allowed each side to have retained 100 warheads on longer-range INF (LRINF, 1 000 to 5 500 km), and dealt with shorter-range INF systems (500 to 1 000 km) only through restraints and follow-on negotiations. On 22nd July, Mr. Gorbachev proposed the elimination of all INF missiles as NATO had urged, as well as the total elimination of SRINF – of which the Soviet Union has deployed some 100 SS-23s and SS-12s in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The proposal was conditional upon the elimination of 72 warheads for the German Pershing 1As and destruction of INF missiles, precluding their conversion to other types of missile.

4.17. The United States had accepted the no-conversion requirement but made it clear that third country weapons, such as the German Pershing 1A missiles, were not the subject of the bilateral negotiations. Chancellor Kohl announced on 26th August that Germany was prepared to eliminate its Pershing 1A missiles at the latest by 1992 which would have marked a 5-year period during which INF missiles were expected to be eliminated. The United States and the Soviet Union have now solved the problem with a supplementary agreement which deals with warheads.

4.18. The United States tabled a new draft INF treaty on 14th September, reportedly proposing the elimination of all LRINF missiles and launchers within 3 years and all SRINF within 1 year, and banning the production or testing of any INF missile systems. For the first time, the United States tabled a separate protocol on verification, said to run to some 40 or 50 pages. It is understood that, as in the case of the SALT II treaty, there would be an exchange of data on numbers and locations of existing INF weapons systems of all sorts prior to entry into force of a treaty and provisions to verify the validity of the data. Verification of the process of elimination of missiles would be stringent, but progressively reduced as production facilities were closed and missiles destroyed. With agreement to eliminate all INF systems, the United States had been able

to drop its original proposal for a strictly-controlled perimeter around any missiles retained by either side.

4.19. The implication of “elimination” for warheads appears to have been agreed with both parties retaining the right to remove and retain for their own purposes fissile nuclear material and guidance mechanisms prior to the destruction of the remainder of the re-entry vehicles.

4.20. At the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow on 22nd and 23rd October, agreement was reached on the timetable for SRINF to be eliminated in 18 months, and LRINF in three years, with the United States agreeing to *begin* reductions in its 348 cruise and Pershing II missiles at the same time that the Soviet Union begins reductions in the 1 500 warheads on its SS-20 and remaining SS-4 missiles. German Pershing 1A missiles would be removed only after three years in accordance with Chancellor Kohl’s unilateral declaration and the United States warheads for them would be eliminated at the same time. Both sides stated in Moscow that only minor details of verification arrangements remained to be agreed, and final drafting of a treaty was expected to be completed by the delegations in Geneva within three weeks.

4.21. With the recent reported⁹ deployment of 16 United States cruise missiles to the Molesworth site in the United Kingdom (due to reach its total of 64 by the end of 1987) the number of cruise missiles in Europe was 240 out of a planned total of 464. With the 108 Pershing II missiles deployed in Germany the total of LRINF was thus 348. Further deployments were due in Belgium and initial deployments in the Netherlands in 1988. At the 22nd to 23rd October Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting the Soviet Union proposed a moratorium on further INF deployment pending the entry into force of the treaty. This proposal was not accepted by the United States, but a NATO working group is now re-examining the programmes for future deployment in the expectation that there would now be no need for any deployment in the Netherlands. The United States Senate on 27th October deleted from a military appropriations bill funds for further cruise missile sites in Germany and the Netherlands.

4.22. The INF agreement appears likely to be published on signature at a summit meeting in Washington before the end of December and the committee will wish to report on it in detail at the next session. Meanwhile the committee welcomes the INF treaty as at present proposed, as a worthwhile contribution in itself to lowering the level of confrontation between East and West

8. Document 1090, explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 5.5 to 5.27.

9. Sunday Times, 25th October 1987.

without in any way reducing western security – indeed the foreshadowed agreement will include a number of significant Soviet concessions to the original NATO proposals as the committee pointed out in its previous report. While significantly reducing the number of Soviet nuclear warheads of less than strategic range, it will not greatly reduce the more than 4 000 warheads for NATO tactical aircraft and other weapons systems currently stored in Europe, or the corresponding Soviet nuclear weapons, nor will it affect at all the some 1 500 warheads on “grey area” nuclear weapons on forward-based systems of NATO countries that are in reach of Soviet territory, but which fall outside either an INF agreement or SALT – the committee draws attention to these in another report¹⁰. The Soviet Union will in fact have to eliminate some 1 600 warheads on its SS-20s and remaining SS-4 compared with some 348 warheads eliminated by NATO in the LRINF bracket. In the SRINF range, against the 72 Pershing 1As which Germany will unilaterally withdraw, outside the framework of the bilateral United States-Soviet Union treaty, the Soviet Union will be removing some 100 SS-23 and SS-12 targeted on western Europe.

4.23. The committee can therefore endorse the verdict of Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO, in his speech to the Royal United Services Institute in London on 5th October 1987 when he said:

“...I do not believe that the INF agreement which has been reached in principle is a bad one. Having worked hard and consistently to that end since 1979 and 1981 and finally brought the Soviet side round, we should take *yes* for an answer – and also take credit for the major achievement that is in sight.

The alliance is now in a good position to do some constructive thinking on future disarmament negotiations... an INF agreement is I hope well on the way; 50% reductions in US and Soviet strategic arms should be the next step in the nuclear field; and we are also committed to work for an effective global ban on chemical warfare, and for a stable East-West balance in conventional weapons at lower levels. None of this need – or should – be put into question. But we do need from now on to have a better overall picture of the route we want to take, and of the influence which progress – or the lack of it – in one field, whether nuclear or conventional, should have on what we do in another.”

10. Threat assessment, Document 1115, 2nd November 1987, Rapporteur: Mr. Stokes. See explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.6.

(e) *Chemical weapons*

4.24. The committee surveyed progress on chemical weapons negotiations in the first quarter of the year in its previous report¹¹. In July it was addressed by representatives to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

4.25. On 6th August, shortly after that meeting, Mr. Shevardnadze addressed the conference announcing that the Soviet Union would accept mandatory challenge inspection of any site in the Soviet Union suspected of holding chemical weapons without right of refusal. Details spelled out by the Permanent Representative, Mr. Nazarkin, on 11th August, provided for inspectors to arrive on site within 48 hours, but, to guard state secrets unrelated to chemical weapons production, provided that an inspected state would also have the right to offer “alternative measures” sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the state requesting the inspection. Alternative measures could include observation of a facility from outside; photography; analysis of chemical samples; partial access and remote-control devices. This proviso was in line with a British proposal of July 1986. Mr. Nazarkin added further Soviet proposals for a preparatory commission to be established and technical inspectors recruited, on signature, but prior to entry into force, of a treaty, and proposed further that entry into force should require only 30 to 40 ratifications. He further proposed that decisions by the organs established under the treaty should be taken by two-thirds majority vote on substantive issues and by simple majority on others. This represents a significant Soviet departure from its traditional insistence on the right of veto in international organisations.

4.26. The Soviet Union also invited all participants at the conference to observe specimens of Soviet chemical weapons at a military facility at Shikhany on 7th and 8th October. The demonstration was attended in the event by delegates from 45 countries who were shown 19 types of Soviet chemical weapon including 250 kg bombs containing the nerve agent Sarin, and other weapons containing mustard gas. Some expert western observers claimed that weapons filled with the nerve agent Tabun had not been disclosed by the Soviet Union.

4.27. The Soviet Union has consistently refused however to reveal publicly the present level of its stocks which seem to be estimated most reliably in the West at 300 000 tonnes. The committee reviews the evidence in another report¹². The

11. Document 1090, explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 5.101 to 5.117.

12. Threat assessment, Document 1115, 2nd November 1987, Rapporteur: Mr. Stokes. See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 7.1 et. seq.

Soviet Union has however agreed that data on chemical weapons held by parties to the treaty should be exchanged between the signature of the treaty and its entry into force.

4.28. It is now clear that the major East-West obstacles to the conclusion of a fully verifiable treaty to ban all chemical weapons have been largely overcome with the latest decisions in principle by the Soviet Union. However, the drafting of the document in the ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is a lengthy and detailed process involving 40 countries, some of which are only belatedly examining the detailed implications of inspection for their own chemical industries. Despite the new sense of urgency which has led the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons to fix special sessions in the first half of December and in the first two weeks of January 1988, most experts believe that at least another 12 months of highly detailed and technical negotiation and drafting lie ahead before a multilateral treaty can be opened for signature.

4.29. Obviously the great incentive for the Soviet Union in making its latest concessions at this time is the imminent opening of the new United States production plant for binary chemical weapons, which is scheduled to start production in early December – the first time since 1969 that the United States will have produced any chemical weapons. As the committee has reported, the Soviet Union is believed, by President Reagan's special committee on chemical weapons, to have begun large-scale production of chemical weapons only after United States production had ceased. On 10th April 1987, in his Prague speech, Mr. Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union had ceased the production of chemical weapons and was building installations for their destruction. He added that the Soviet Union had not stockpiled chemical weapons beyond its frontiers, and that no other Warsaw Pact country possessed any. For the time being this statement remains unverified, but has not been seriously challenged by allied governments.

(f) Nuclear test ban

4.30. The United States and the Soviet Union had been at loggerheads over the issue of banning or restricting nuclear tests ever since 1980 when the United States withdrew from the trilateral test-ban talks which had also involved the United Kingdom. The bilateral threshold test-ban treaty of July 1974 signed by President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, which limits nuclear tests to a maximum yield of 150 kt, and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty of May 1976 signed by President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev, laying down conditions under which peaceful

explosions might be conducted, have both gone unratified as subsequent United States administrations have called for additional measures of verification beyond those provided for in the treaties. Bilateral "talks about talks" in Geneva since July 1986, designed to find a basis for formal negotiations on nuclear testing, had made little progress with the Soviet Union considering that the aim of negotiations should be the same as those of the previous trilateral negotiations – a complete ban on all nuclear tests. The United States was prepared to negotiate only on a programme of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear tests, and called for verification procedures which would involve each side carrying out a calibration experiment on the nuclear testing site of the other in order to establish close correlation between the true yield of a nuclear test and the seismic signals generated at a distance from it.

4.31. While the United States has maintained that remote seismic monitoring could not provide certainty that a test ban was being respected, the weight of world scientific opinion has held that it would be extremely unlikely that any programme of nuclear tests could escape detection, even if a single test conducted in exceptional circumstances might theoretically not be distinguished from other seismic signals. The accurate determination of the actual yield of a test from remote seismic signals is however recognised to be a less certain procedure; there would thus appear to be a case for on-site calibration of seismic propagation conditions on the test site of each party if some nuclear tests are to be permitted.

4.32. The Soviet Union had been very active in calling for a complete test ban, maintaining in the process a unilateral moratorium on all Soviet tests from August 1985 to February 1987 in the course of which the United States conducted some 23 tests. The Soviet Union resumed testing thereafter. Total nuclear tests of all sorts conducted to the end of 1986 are 815 by the United States and 597 by the Soviet Union¹³.

4.33. A number of Soviet concessions to meet the United States attitude to nuclear testing were confirmed at the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting of 17th September at which a special joint statement was issued expressing agreement to begin "full-scale stage by stage negotiations" before 1st December 1987:

"In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the US-USSR threshold test ban treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and peaceful nuclear explosions treaty (PNET) of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further inter-

13. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1987.

mediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapon tests and, ultimately, their elimination. For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the US-USSR treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached."

(g) Negotiations on conventional forces and confidence-building measures

4.34. The committee's previous report¹⁴ has chronicled the state of the deadlocked MBFR negotiations up to March of this year when the committee was addressed by a number of the negotiators in Vienna. In this specific field, there is no progress to report. The follow-up conference of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is meanwhile continuing in Vienna and may now be extended beyond the end of November, even into the beginning of 1988. The informal mandate talks between the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries attending the conference are continuing in Vienna with a view to drawing up a mandate on negotiations between those countries on conventional stability in Europe. The mandate is to be appended to the concluding document of the present follow-up conference. This approach marked NATO's response to Mr. Gorbachev's speech in East Berlin on 18th April 1986, proposing: "substantial reduction of all components of land forces and tactical aircraft based in Europe, including the relevant parts of American and Canadian forces deployed there...the scope of the reductions must obviously cover the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" – a proposal subsequently elaborated in the Budapest appeal issued collectively by the Warsaw Pact countries on 11th June 1986¹⁵.

4.35. The committee stresses that, following the conclusion of the expected INF agreement, the reduction of conventional forces and armaments on both sides to lower levels to provide equal security, and negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons, will become the most important arms control objective. At the same time it is likely to

14. Document 1090, explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 5.53 to 5.78.

15. Text of the Budapest appeal is at Appendix II to Document 1090.

prove the most difficult to achieve because of the large number of different factors involved – numerous conventional weapons systems; different types of forces; the number of different countries involved; the large geographical disparity which leaves NATO forces almost with their backs to the sea while the Soviet Union enjoys a continuous hinterland in Europe.

4.36. Nevertheless, some of the new attitudes of the Soviet Union appear encouraging, while others are ambiguous. Soviet military leaders have recognised publicly Soviet superiority in numbers of tanks. At the same time they have challenged the NATO view of Soviet superiority in combat aircraft, claiming that NATO is superior in attack aircraft while the Soviet Union's numerical superiority is in air defence aircraft. The Soviet Union has claimed that NATO is superior in anti-tank guided missiles – a claim that is not borne out in the agreed NATO comparisons as the committee reports elsewhere¹⁶. For the first time it appears that the Soviet Union has published its own estimates of the military balance in Europe¹⁷ and spokesmen have referred to the need to remove "asymmetries" in force comparisons, and to seek "sufficiency" in defence capability. Mr. Gorbachev's published article of 17th September, the main thrust of which was to reiterate a Soviet proposal for a global system of security in the United Nations framework, contains some of these ambiguities:

"If there is imbalance, if disproportions exist, we have but to eliminate them...the comparison of defence budgets?...I think...in two or three years we could compare the figures which concern us and our partners, figures which would reflect symmetrically the expenditure of the parties.

An agreement on strategic defence and on military sufficiency would give a strong impulse in the right direction. These notions presuppose a structure of the armed forces of a state sufficient to repulse any aggression but not great enough to launch an offensive. The first step to achieve this aim would be the withdrawal in depth from the national territory of nuclear weapons and other offensive weapons under adequate control so as to create along the frontiers under-armed strips and demilitarised zones between, so to speak, the potential adversaries."

4.37. The concept of "military sufficiency" is a welcome basis for negotiation, and the concept

16. Threat assessment, Document 1115, 2nd November 1987, Rapporteur: Mr. Stokes. See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 5.29 to 5.32.

17. Disarmament and Security IMEMO Yearbook 1986, published by Novosti, Moscow, 1987.

of partly disarmed zones in Europe should be carefully studied by NATO, although difficulties might be found because of NATO's inherently weak geographical position, with its lack of depth and reliance on United States support to offset the numerically superior conventional forces of the Soviet Union. But when Mr. Gorbachev continues, as he did in his article of 17th September, to talk about the liquidation of the two blocs, he is harking back to the policy of his predecessors which continually sought to secure the removal of United States forces from Europe:

“ In principle though it should lead to the dissolving of the military blocs and the liquidation of bases on the territory of foreign countries, to the repatriation of all forces stationed beyond their national frontiers. ”

It is far from clear that the Soviet Union could afford to withdraw all Soviet forces from the other Warsaw Pact countries; in any case NATO could not afford to accept the total withdrawal of United States forces from Europe.

4.38. In the framework of the Stockholm document of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, the confidence- and security-building measures provided for appear to have been applied satisfactorily so far in 1987, the first year of application. A United States State Department report on 22nd September confirmed that a team of four United States officers had been able to observe Soviet manoeuvres at the end of August and beginning of September. They travelled to Minsk in their own aircraft accompanied by Soviet officers and then were provided with two Soviet helicopters, two land vehicles and a communications van to carry out inspections of Soviet military manoeuvres. They were not denied any access on the grounds of “ sensitive points ” or “ restricted zones ” being involved, which the Stockholm document would have permitted the Soviet Union to invoke in certain circumstances. The State Department report welcomed the spirit of co-operation shown by the Soviet military authorities which permitted inspections of manoeuvres by a tank division and a motorised rifle division with a total of 16 000 men and 425 tanks. Inspections have similarly been carried out by the United Kingdom in the Soviet Union and Soviet observers are due to inspect an exercise in Scotland in the autumn.

(h) Other Warsaw Pact proposals

4.39. The important statement of the North Atlantic Council adopted in Reykjavik on 12th June 1987, which dealt in particular with arms control negotiations, made no reference to the Warsaw Pact document on military doctrine

adopted in Berlin on 29th May 1987¹⁸, no doubt because the 16 NATO countries had not had enough time to consult on a reasoned reply. Soviet spokesmen have stressed that the Warsaw Pact document contains material that is new in Warsaw Pact statements – in particular the assertion that:

“ The combat-readiness of the armed forces of the allied states is maintained at a *sufficient* level so as not to be caught unawares... ”

The Warsaw Treaty member states never had nor have an aspiration to possess armed forces and armaments in excess of what is necessary for these purposes. Thus, they strictly comply with the limits of *sufficiency* for defence and for repelling possible aggression. ” (emphasis added)

Military spokesmen have asserted that Soviet defence forces are henceforth to be structured on this basis of sufficiency. The NATO countries will of course remain sceptical of these claims while the large Soviet superiority in tanks and guns in particular persists. Remembering the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, the allied countries will be particularly sceptical of the further assertion:

“ The Warsaw Treaty member states declare that they firmly base their international relations on the respect for the principles of independence and national sovereignty, non-use of force or threat of force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, resolution of conflicts in a peaceful way, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and other principles and goals envisaged by the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act and generally-recognised standards of international relations ”,

until such time as the Soviet Union matches words with deeds – as for example by withdrawing all its forces from Afghanistan.

4.40. Nevertheless the new Soviet leadership under Mr. Gorbachev has undoubtedly made several concessions to the western position in different areas of disarmament negotiations and full opportunity should be provided for the Warsaw Pact to demonstrate in practice the sincerity of its many proposals. In the view of the committee therefore NATO should now respond positively to the proposal in the Warsaw Pact Berlin document on military doctrine:

...

“ The Warsaw Treaty member states propose to the North Atlantic Alliance

18. Texts at Appendices II and III.

member states to hold consultations with the aim of comparing the military doctrines of both alliances, analysing their character and jointly studying the directions of their further evolution with a view to removing the mutual suspiciousness and mistrust that have accumulated for years, attaining a better understanding of each other's intentions and ensuring that the military concepts and doctrines of the military blocs and their members be based on defensive principles.

The existing imbalances and asymmetries in separate types of armaments and services of armed forces and the search for ways of removing them on the basis of reductions by the side that is ahead, on the understanding that such reductions will lead to the establishment of ever lower levels, could also be a subject of consultations.

The socialist member states of the treaty propose to hold such consultations at an authoritative expert level with the participation of military specialists of countries of both sides. They are prepared for holding such consultations already in 1987. The consultations could be held in Warsaw or Brussels, or in each of these cities alternately."

Soviet spokesmen portray such consultations as a constructive preparatory measure for the future negotiations on conventional stability in Europe, the mandate for which is now being discussed between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in Vienna. It is possible to note a few points of similarity between the Warsaw Pact military doctrine, the WEU platform on European security interests, and the NATO Reykjavik statement if only in the general concept of the non-use of force except in defence. There are equally wide divergencies in the Warsaw Pact's renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, while the WEU platform stresses the importance of preventing "any kind of war", through a strategy of "deterrence and defence...based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces". Most positively however the six goals of arms control negotiations enumerated in the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine parallel quite closely those of the WEU platform and the NATO Reykjavik statement.

4.41. Other recent Warsaw Pact proposals deserve to be noted, and duly replied to, even if they prove on examination to be unacceptable to NATO. They have included the Jaruzelski plan of 8th May 1987 for nuclear and conventional disengagement in the Central European area – defined as the territories of countries which comprise the reductions area of the MBFR negotiations, plus Denmark and Hungary. Other

proposals by the GDR and Czechoslovakia for a 300 km wide nuclear-free corridor separating the two sides in Europe, and by Bulgaria and Romania for a nuclear- and chemical-free zone in the Balkans are noted in the Warsaw Pact Berlin communiqué. Such proposals have not been favoured by the West in the past because of the range and mobility of such weapons based outside the proposed zones.

(i) Conclusions

4.42. Apart from the specific arms control topics discussed under separate headings above, there is a plethora of other ideas coming mostly from Moscow. Mr. Gorbachev has also announced that the Soviet Union will publish its military budget in terms that may be compared with those of other countries, when price restructuring permits procurement costs to be estimated realistically – a process expected to take three years – meanwhile it is recognised that such costs have always been excluded from the published budget.

4.43. For some months, the new Soviet Defence Minister, General Dmitry Yazov has been proposing a meeting with his United States counterpart, Mr. Weinberger – originally asking for a meeting in the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, the bilateral commission established in the framework of the ABM and SALT treaties to discuss any points of disagreement over their application. General Yazov's object was to discuss at the highest level various United States allegations concerning breaches of these treaties; the SCC would normally meet in Geneva. Mr. Weinberger has proposed a meeting in Washington or alternatively in New York, but according to a Pentagon spokesman on 6th October the meeting place had not been agreed. So far the two men have never met.

4.44. Then in his speech in Murmansk on 1st October 1986, Mr. Gorbachev caused some confusion in calling for the countries bordering on the Arctic to discuss the demilitarisation of the area, in particular the creation of a nuclear-free zone. In this context Mr. Gorbachev said the Soviet Union had already removed unilaterally its medium-range missile launchers in the Kola peninsula and reduced many shorter-range missiles there. He offered to remove ballistic missile submarines from the Soviet Baltic Fleet. At the same time, he criticised the United States and NATO for intensifying military activities in the polar region and for constructing a new "star wars" radar in Greenland which he claimed was in violation of the ABM treaty. The fact that these proposals came even before a mandate had been agreed in Vienna for the talks on conventional disarmament in Europe, caused some

scepticism in NATO circles; Soviet spokesmen were later at pains to say that the proposals were not alternatives, that talks on reducing conventional forces in Europe were still desired.

4.45. NATO meanwhile is being left far behind in the new competition of ideas. It took more than six months for the NATO countries to agree among themselves even on their position concerning the proper mandate for negotiations on conventional stability in Europe, and this was not because of transatlantic disagreements, but largely because of differences between France and the other NATO countries. NATO is still far from agreeing an actual negotiating position for such negotiations if and when they open, and another related point of disagreement again between some of the European countries concerned, is the proper place for short-range nuclear missiles in future negotiations (less than 500 km range), whether negotiations on them should open immediately after conclusion of an INF treaty, or whether any reductions in such missiles should only follow an agreement to reduce conventional disparities.

4.46. The problem is not a lack of consultation in NATO – there is plenty both in the Council, in the high-level group, and special consultative group dealing with the INF negotiations and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. France, apparently for historical reasons, does not participate in these groups although Spain always has done. Consultation would be improved if France were to join them, without prejudice to its status in the integrated military structure.

4.47. The immediate timetable is that of possible agreements that may be concluded during the lifetime of the Reagan administration. In addition to an INF treaty, these are quite possibly: an agreement to limit strategic nuclear forces by 50%; the possible ratification by the United States of the two nuclear test treaties – that on the 150 kt threshold and that on peaceful nuclear explosions. Beyond that there could be some further agreement on limiting the number and lowering the yield of nuclear tests. As noted above the substantive problems of verification have been very largely agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the negotiations on a total chemical weapons ban are very complex, involving many countries with a chemical industry. Although a full multilateral treaty to ban chemical weapons may not be concluded before the end of 1988, it is also suggested that there could be a preliminary bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the mutual declaration of the present levels of their chemical weapons, with bilateral verification of those declarations.

4.48. The committee stresses the important rôle which the WEU Council must now play in harmonising the views of the WEU countries on all important issues affecting European security and arms control, while at the same time urging on their NATO partners the importance of rapid response to Soviet initiatives, many of which contain very positive concessions to long-standing NATO proposals, while others remain a rehash of unacceptable proposals for dividing the alliance.

APPENDIX I

*WEU platform on European security interests**adopted by the Council in The Hague, 27th October 1987**(Extracts)*

.....

II. European security should be based on the following criteria:

1. It remains our primary objective to prevent any kind of war. It is our purpose to preserve our security by maintaining defence readiness and military capabilities adequate to deter aggression and intimidation without seeking military superiority.

2. In the present circumstances and as far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the western strategy for the prevention of war, which has ensured peace in freedom for an unprecedented period of European history. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk.

3. The substantial presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe. They embody the American commitment to the defence of Europe and provide the indispensable linkage with the United States strategic deterrent.

4. European forces play an essential rôle: the overall credibility of the western strategy of deterrence and defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution not least because the conventional imbalance affects the security of Western Europe in a very direct way.

The Europeans have a major responsibility both in the field of conventional and nuclear defence. In the conventional field, the forces of the WEU member states represent an essential part of the alliance. As regards nuclear forces, all of which form a part of deterrence, the co-operative arrangements that certain member states maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of Europe. The independent forces of France and the United Kingdom contribute to overall deterrence and security.

5. Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy and not an alternative to it. They should lead to a stable balance of forces at the lowest level compatible with our security. Arms control policy should, like our defence policy, take into account the specific European security interests in an evolving situation. It must be consistent with the maintenance of the strategic unity of the alliance and should not preclude closer European defence co-operation. Arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time. East and West have a common interest in achieving this.

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III. The member states of WEU intend to assume fully their responsibilities:

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(b) In the field of arms control and disarmament

1. We shall pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy aimed at influencing future developments in such a way as to enhance security and to foster stability and co-operation in the whole of Europe. The steadfastness and cohesion of the alliance and close consultations among all the allies remain essential if concrete results are to be brought about.

2. We are committed to elaborate further our comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament in accordance with the alliance's declaration of 12th June 1987 and we will work within the framework of this concept as envisaged particularly in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this declaration. An agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the global elimination of land-based INF missiles with a range between 500 and 5 500 km will constitute an important element of such an approach.

3. In pursuing such an approach we shall exploit all opportunities to make further progress towards arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities, taking into account the fact that work in this area raises complex and inter-related issues. We shall evaluate them together, bearing in mind the political and military requirements of our security and progress in the different negotiations.

(c) In the field of East-West dialogue and co-operation

1. The common responsibility of all Europeans is not to preserve the peace but to shape it constructively. The Helsinki final act continues to serve as our guide to the fulfilment of the objective of gradually overcoming the division of Europe. We shall therefore continue to make full use of the CSCE process in order to promote comprehensive co-operation among all participating states.

2. The possibilities contained in the final act should be fully exploited. We therefore intend:

- to seek to increase the transparency of military potentials and activities and the calculability of behaviour in accordance with the Stockholm document of 1986 by further confidence-building measures;
- vigorously to pursue our efforts to provide for the full respect of human rights without which no genuine peace is possible;
- to open new mutually beneficial possibilities in the fields of economy, technology, science and the protection of the environment;
- to achieve more opportunities for the people in the whole of Europe to move freely and to exchange opinions and information and to intensify cultural exchanges,

and thus to promote concrete improvements for the benefit of all people in Europe.

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APPENDIX II

*Statement on the ministerial meeting
of the North Atlantic Council at Reykjavik**(11th-12th June 1987)**(Extracts)*

.....

We reaffirm the validity of the complementary principles enunciated in the Harmel report of 1967. The maintenance of adequate military strength and alliance cohesion and solidarity remains an essential basis for our policy of dialogue and co-operation – a policy which aims to achieve a progressively more stable and constructive East-West relationship.

2. Serious imbalances in the conventional, chemical and nuclear field, and the persisting build-up of Soviet military power, continue to preoccupy us. We reaffirm that there is no alternative, as far as we can foresee, to the alliance concept for the prevention of war – the strategy of deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces, each element being indispensable. This strategy will continue to rest on the linkage of free Europe's security to that of North America since their destinies are inextricably coupled. Thus the United States nuclear commitment, the presence of United States nuclear forces in Europe¹ and the deployment of Canadian and United States forces there remain essential.

3. Arms control and disarmament are integral parts of our security policy; we seek effectively verifiable arms control agreements which can lead to a more stable and secure balance of forces at lower levels.

4. We reiterate the prime importance we attach to rapid progress towards reductions in the field of strategic nuclear weapons. We thus welcome the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union now share the objective of achieving 50% reductions in their strategic arsenals. We strongly endorse the presentation of a United States proposal in Geneva to that effect and urge the Soviet Union to respond positively.

We reviewed the current phase of the United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on defence and space systems which aim to prevent an arms race in space and to strengthen strategic stability. We continue to endorse these efforts.

5. We note the recent progress achieved at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament towards a total ban on chemical weapons. We remain committed to achieving an early agreement on a comprehensive, worldwide and effectively verifiable treaty embracing the total destruction of existing stockpiles within an agreed timeframe and preventing the future production of such weapons.

6. Recognising the increasing importance of conventional stability, particularly at a time when significant nuclear reductions appear possible, we reaffirm the initiatives taken in our Halifax statement and Brussels declaration aimed at achieving a comprehensive, stable and verifiable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. We recall that negotiations on conventional stability should be accompanied by negotiations between the 35 countries participating in the CSCE, building upon and expanding the confidence- and security-building measures contained in the Helsinki final act and the Stockholm agreement. We agreed that the two future security negotiations should take place within the framework of the CSCE process, with the conventional stability negotiations retaining autonomy as regards subject matter, participation and procedures. Building on these agreements we took the decisions necessary to enable the High Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control, which we established at the Halifax ministerial, to press ahead with its work on the draft mandates to be tabled in the CSCE meeting and in the conventional stability mandate talks currently taking place in Vienna.

7. Having reviewed progress in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on an INF agreement the allies concerned call on the Soviet Union to drop its demand to retain a portion of its SS-20 capability and reiterate their wish to see all long-range land-based missiles eliminated in accordance with NATO's long-standing objective.

1. Greece recalls its position on nuclear matters.

They support the global and effectively verifiable elimination of all United States and Soviet land-based SRINF missiles with a range between 500 and 1 000 km as an integral part of an INF agreement.

They consider that an INF agreement on this basis would be an important element in a coherent and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament which, while consistent with NATO's doctrine of flexible response, would include:

- a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union to be achieved during current Geneva negotiations;
- the global elimination of chemical weapons;
- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;
- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

8. We² have directed the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, working in conjunction with the appropriate military authorities, to consider the further development of a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament. The arms control problems faced by the alliance raise complex and inter-related issues which must be evaluated together, bearing in mind overall progress in the arms control negotiations enumerated above as well as the requirements of alliance security and of its strategy of deterrence.

9. In our endeavour to explore all opportunities for an increasingly broad and constructive dialogue which addresses the concerns of people in both East and West, and in the firm conviction that a stable order of peace and security in Europe cannot be built by military means alone, we attach particular importance to the CSCE process. We are therefore determined to make full use of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna.

The full implementation of all provisions agreed in the CSCE process by the 35 participating states, in particular in the field of human rights and contacts, remains the fundamental objective of the alliance and is essential for the fruitful development of East-West relations in all fields.

Recalling our constructive proposals, we shall persist in our efforts to persuade the eastern countries to live up to their commitments.

We will continue to work for a substantive and timely result of the conference.

10. Those of us participating in the MBFR talks reiterate our desire to achieve a meaningful agreement which provides for reductions, limitations and effective verification, and call upon the Warsaw Pact participants in these talks to respond positively to the very important proposals made by the West in December 1985 and to adopt a more constructive posture in the negotiations.

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2. In this connection France recalled that it had not been a party to the double-track decision of 1979 and that it was not therefore bound by its consequences or implications.

APPENDIX III

Document on military doctrine

*adopted by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee
in Berlin on 29th May 1987*

(Extracts)

.....

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty, just as of each of its member countries, is subjugated to the task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional. Out of the very nature of the socialist social system these states have never linked and do not link their future to the military solution of international problems. They declare for the solution of all disputable international problems peacefully, by political means.

In the nuclear space age, the world has become too fragile for war and power politics. Humanity is faced with the problem of survival in conditions when huge volumes of the deadliest armaments have been stockpiled. A world war, the more so nuclear war, would have catastrophic consequences not only for the countries directly involved in the conflict, but also for the very life on Earth.

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member states is strictly a defensive one. It proceeds from the view that the use of the military road for resolving any disputed question is intolerable in the present conditions. Its essence is that:

The Warsaw Treaty member states will never, under any circumstances, start hostilities against any country or an alliance of countries, unless they become the target of a military attack themselves.

They will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

They have no territorial claims to any state either in Europe or outside it.

They do not view any state, any people as their enemy. Quite the contrary, they are prepared to build relations with all countries without exception on the basis of mutually taking into account the interests of security and peaceful coexistence.

The Warsaw Treaty member states declare that they firmly base their international relations on the respect for the principles of independence and national sovereignty, non-use of force or threat of force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, resolution of conflicts in a peaceful way, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and other principles and goals envisaged by the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki final act and generally recognised standards of international relations.

While favouring the implementation of disarmament measures, the Warsaw Treaty member states are compelled to maintain their armed forces in a composition and at a level that would enable them to repulse any attack from outside against any treaty member state.

The combat readiness of the armed forces of the allied states is maintained at a sufficient level so as not to be caught unawares. In the event of an attack, they will give a devastating rebuff to the aggressor.

The Warsaw Treaty member states never had nor have an aspiration to possess armed forces and armaments in excess of what is necessary for these purposes. Thus, they strictly comply with the limits of sufficiency for defence and for repelling possible aggression.

The Warsaw Treaty member states regard ensuring the reliable security of their peoples as their prime duty to them. The allied socialist states do not claim greater security than other countries, but they will not agree to lesser security either.

The existing military-strategic parity remains the decisive factor of preventing war. Further raising the level of parity does not yield, as experience shows, greater security. That is why they will continue applying efforts to maintain the balance of military force at an ever lower level.

Under these conditions, ending the arms race and carrying out measures of real disarmament are acquiring truly historic significance. The states nowadays have no other path but reaching accords on the drastic lowering of the level of military confrontation.

The Warsaw Treaty member states come out resolutely from these positions. In full compliance with the defensive essence of their military doctrine, they are consistently pressing for the following principal goals:

First. The earliest comprehensive ban on nuclear testing as a top-priority measure to end the development, production and perfection of nuclear arms, their stage-by-stage reduction and total elimination, and prevention of the spread of the arms race into outer space.

Second. Prohibition and elimination of chemical and other types of weapons of mass annihilation.

Third. Reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe down to the level at which neither side, in ensuring its defence, would have means for a sudden attack on the other side or for starting offensive operations in general.

Fourth. Strict verification of all disarmament measures, based on the combination of national technical means and international procedures, including the establishment of corresponding international bodies, exchange of military information and holding on-site inspections.

Fifth. The creation in various regions of Europe and in other parts of the world of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons and also zones of reduced concentration of armaments and increased trust, the implementation of military confidence-building measures in Europe on a mutual basis and the attainment of accords on such measures in other areas of the world and also on seas and oceans. The mutual renunciation by Warsaw Treaty member states of the use of armed force and the adoption of commitments to maintain relations of peace, the liquidation of military bases on the territory of other states; the withdrawal of troops within the confines of national borders, the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive types of armaments from the zone of direct contact of the two military alliances and also the lowering of the concentration in that zone of armed forces and armaments to the minimum agreed-upon level.

Sixth. Regarding Europe's continuing split into opposing military blocs as abnormal, the Warsaw Treaty member states come out for the simultaneous dissolution of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty and, as the first step, for the liquidation of their military organisations and ultimately for an all-embracing system of international security.

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* *

The Warsaw Treaty member states propose to the North Atlantic Alliance member states to hold consultations with the aim of comparing the military doctrines of both alliances, analysing their character and jointly studying the directions of their further evolution with a view to removing the mutual suspiciousness and mistrust that have accumulated for years, attaining a better understanding of each other's intentions and ensuring that the military concepts and doctrines of the military blocs and their members be based on defensive principles.

The existing imbalances and asymmetries in separate types of armaments and services of armed forces and the search for ways of removing them on the basis of reductions by the side that is ahead, on the understanding that such reductions will lead to the establishment of ever lower levels, could also be a subject of consultations.

The socialist member states of the treaty propose to hold such consultations at an authoritative expert level with the participation of military specialists of countries of both sides. They are prepared for holding such consultations already in 1987. The consultations could be held in Warsaw or Brussels, or in each of these cities alternately.

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3¹

tabled by Mr. Eisma

1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Urging the United States Senate to advise and consent as a matter of urgency to the ratification of the INF agreement; ”
2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, after “ ABM treaty ” insert “ in its traditional interpretation ”.
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after “ ABM treaty ”, insert “ in its traditional interpretation ”.

Signed: Eisma

1. See 10th sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendments not moved).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

AMENDMENT 4¹

tabled by Mr. Soell

4. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, leave out “ with priority to negotiations on the Central European region ”.

Signed: Soell

1. See 10th sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendment agreed to).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 5, 6 and 7¹

tabled by Mr. Pieralli

5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, place paragraph (i) after paragraph (vi).
6. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out “progress on a properly verifiable INF agreement” and insert “the agreement”.
7. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out “should” and insert “must”.

Signed: Pieralli

1. See 10th sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendment 5 withdrawn; amendments 6 and 7 agreed to).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12¹

tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others

8. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out “ in different armaments and forces ”.

9. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Noting in this connection that in Prague on 10th April 1987 General Secretary Gorbachev confirmed the existence of such imbalances and asymmetries for historical and other reasons; ”

10. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after “ in Europe ” insert “ and the various regions concerned ”.

11. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after “ military strategy ” insert “ and doctrine ” and leave out the words to the end of the paragraph.

12. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, add two new paragraphs:

“ Call on the Warsaw Pact to renounce its offensive military and technical doctrine and give its armed forces a structure clearly designed for defensive purposes and which does not allow it to undertake an offensive against other countries;

In the framework of disarmament, ensure that in each case both sides make reductions to the lowest level. ”

Signed: Reddemann, Wilkinson, Finsberg, Lenzer, Müller, Valleix

1. See 10th sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendments 8 and 11 negatived; amendments 9 and 10 agreed to; amendment 12 amended and agreed to).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

AMENDMENT TO AMENDMENT 12 ¹

tabled by MM. Scheer and Stoffelen

In amendment 12 to the draft recommendation on disarmament, after “ countries; ”, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Call on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to renounce offensive technical capacities in favour of the creation of mutual non-provocative, confidence-building defence structures; ”

Signed: Scheer, Stoffelen

1. See 10th sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendment to amendment agreed to).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ¹
by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur*

Draft resolution on the INF treaty

The Assembly,

Endorsing the view of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments expressed in Document 1116 that the INF agreement now to be signed by the United States and the Soviet Union should be in the long-term security interests of countries both of the alliance and the Warsaw Pact,

To give its advice and consent to the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces as expeditiously as possible;

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT

To transmit the text of the present resolution and the corresponding report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the President of the United States Senate for the information of all its members.

Explanatory Memorandum

The draft resolution is the text of the motion for a resolution on the INF treaty tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and several of his colleagues and referred to the committee by the Assembly on 30th November 1987 (Document 1127). The committee adopted the text without amendment at its meeting on 1st December.

As the subject is dealt with in its report on disarmament already before the Assembly (Document 1116) the committee instructs the Rapporteur to present it to the Assembly.

There is a precedent for such a text in Resolution 64 adopted by the Assembly on 6th December 1979 which called on the United States Senate to ratify the SALT II treaty.

1. Adopted in committee by 14 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. Fourré, *de Beer* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Cariglia, Cox, De Decker (Alternate: *Close*), Fiandrotti, *Fioret*, *Hardy*, Irmer, Jung, Konen, *de Kwaadsteniet*, Mrs. *Lalumière*, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja, Pecchioli, *Ramaekers*, *Scheer*, Sinesio, Sir *Dudley Smith*, MM. *Speed*, *Steiner*, *Steverlynck* (Alternate: *Declercq*), Stokes (Alternate: *Wilkinson*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Political activities of the Council –
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur*

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APPENDIX

Dates of transmission of annual reports of the Council, replies to Assembly recommendations and answers to written questions put by parliamentarians in the last three years

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Close, Burger (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: van der Werff), Bassinet, Baumel, Bianco, Dejardin (Alternate: Pécriaux), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Hardy, Hill, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martino, Masciadri, Mechttersheimer, du Monceau de Bergendal, Müller, Pontillon, Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Shelton, Spitella (Alternate: Amadei), Stoffelen (Alternate: Eisma), Vecchietti (Alternate: Pollidoro).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on the political activities of the Council –
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that developments in the Atlantic Alliance make it essential to strengthen its European pillar and that at the present juncture WEU is still the only organisation capable of forming this pillar;
- (ii) Considering that the way to achieve this result is through the early implementation of the Rome declaration and welcoming the fact that the adoption of the platform on European security interests marks the starting point in the effective reactivation of WEU;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction that the platform on European security interests adopted by the Council on 27th October 1987 responds, in the main, to Assembly Recommendations 420, 429, 432, 438, 441, 442 and 446;
- (iv) Welcoming the development of consultations between member countries in the framework of WEU and expressing its satisfaction that the Council implemented, although tardily, Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty for the first time in summer 1987 in the context of the Gulf crisis;
- (v) Regretting, however, that co-ordination of the action taken by member countries in that region was inadequate;
- (vi) Noting that the thirty-second annual report of the Council gives only a very inadequate account of the Council's activities in 1986;
- (vii) Regretting the Council's slowness in answering the Assembly, the ever-later dates on which it transmits its reports and the very inadequate information it gives;
- (viii) Noting that the informal procedure increasingly practised by the Council is not likely to alleviate this shortcoming;
- (ix) Stressing that the Assembly's own needs are wholly independent of those of the ministerial organs and that restructuring must not affect the independence of either the Assembly or the Office of the Clerk vis-à-vis the ministerial organs,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Speed up its procedure to allow quicker transmission to the Assembly of the substantial information it needs in order to exercise its responsibility of supervising the Council's activities under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, respect a time-limit, under normal circumstances, of eight weeks for answering questions and adopt a normal schedule of dates so that the Assembly might receive its half-yearly reports in time for preparing useful replies;
2. Ensure the immediate implementation of the intentions expressed in paragraph III (a) 4 of the platform which it adopted on 27th October 1987;
3. While respecting the time-limit of 31st December 1987, take the measures to restructure the organs of WEU allowing these new requirements to be met and, in pursuance of this, invite the Assembly to comment on the draft organogram being prepared by the Secretary-General before its submission to the Council for approval;
4. Pursue the full implementation of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular its paragraph 3;
5. Examine carefully the development of bilateral co-operation between its members on security matters with a view to extending this co-operation to all member countries without thereby diluting the results of bilateral co-operation;
6. In consultation with the Presidential Committee, ensure satisfactory co-ordination of the presence of ministers at Assembly sessions, and in particular the participation of the presidency in all debates on the Council's reports;

7. Continue to give and improve information to the Assembly and the public on meetings of the WEU Council at the level of the enlarged Council;
8. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of meetings and the results of the work of the special working group and its sub-groups;
9. Accord the Assembly without delay the funds and staff necessary for restructuring the Office of the Clerk;
10. Ensure that the Secretariat-General is in a position to assist the Council in all its activities.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur)

I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

1. The second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council having reached the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly only on 24th April 1987, it was impossible for the General Affairs Committee to present its reply at the first part of the thirty-third session and your Rapporteur was therefore asked to present it at the second part of this session. In fact, he should have been replying to the first part of the thirty-third annual report, but on 1st November this had not yet been received by the Assembly. In these conditions, it is impossible to prepare a reply for a session starting on 30th November.

2. Your Rapporteur can but refer to the General Affairs Committee's replies to earlier annual reports and recall that these delays make it difficult to hold the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly of which these reports and replies are a statutory part and should, with the answers to written questions by parliamentarians and ad hoc written communications, form the major part of it. Recent experience has again shown how fragile is the information given by highly-qualified persons at "informal" meetings, which are on the increase, and even in more public speeches. Such exchanges are certainly useful but must be additional to the official communication of the annual report adopted by the seven governments and the replies to recommendations duly adopted by an Assembly which cannot delegate its powers.

3. He notes that the annual report refers to "efforts to improve the formal procedure for exchanges with the Assembly" made by the Council to "expedite the replies to recommendations and written questions". Similarly, in regard to the annual report, the Council gives an assurance that it wishes "to provide the Assembly with the most up-to-date and complete information". However, these efforts do not yet seem to have been crowned with success since each year the answers to written questions are sent later and later and the time-limit of one month provided for in Rule 45, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, which the Council has several times said it would try to respect, is now never met. Replies to recommendations adopted since the December 1986 session were on the contrary, with two exceptions, received in time, for which tribute should be paid to the Council, but your Rapporteur finds it very hard to understand why it took several months to draft and adopt such a short

text containing so little political information as the thirty-second annual report of the Council. At the committee's request, a table showing the dates on which these various texts were sent is appended to the present report.

4. Conversely, whatever reservations one may have about increasing recourse to non-statutory procedures, they have been far more satisfactory. The number of ministers present at the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly was particularly high. The Assembly would have welcomed their presence had its normal work not been seriously jeopardised thereby. For budgetary reasons, it cannot prolong its sessions or organise night sittings. In some cases, this also prevented a real exchange of views with the representatives of governments. However, fewer ministers were present at the ordinary and extraordinary sessions in spring 1987. Your Rapporteur believes the Assembly should note:

5. (i) The almost continuous presence of ministers from the country having the chairmanship-in-office of the Council – in this case Luxembourg – at its sessions and their interventions during the debates. This is an innovation which tends to give greater interest and weight to the Assembly's deliberations and it is to be hoped that it will be continued.

6. (ii) The attendance of a prime minister – Mr. Jacques Chirac – who used the tribune of the Assembly to present proposals on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, which is entirely in conformity with the statute of WEU and a clear indication of the complementarity of governmental and parliamentary activities.

7. (iii) The growing number of ministers or secretaries of state for defence taking part in Assembly sessions, which is a satisfactory reflection of their growing participation in the work of the Council.

8. (iv) The unforeseeability of the presence of ministers or secretaries of state. Your Rapporteur suggests that, as far as possible, the Presidential Committee of the Assembly should co-ordinate, in consultation with the Chairman-in-Office, via the Permanent Council, the presence and interventions of ministers, in order to ensure that an adequate number of them attend each session. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers has special responsibility for relations between the Council and the Assembly.

9. (v) The rôle assumed by the Secretary-General, who makes a substantial contribution to keeping the Assembly informed about the work of the Council. This corresponds to the wish often expressed by the Assembly to have a "political secretary-general" at the head of the ministerial organs of WEU, one of whose rôles would be to ensure, at the side of the chairmanship-in-office, the representation of the Council vis-à-vis the Assembly. The fact that the Secretary-General is the only person who takes part in the work not only of the Permanent Council, but also of the enlarged Council, meetings of political directors, the Council of Ministers and the main working groups gives him full competence for this rôle. He brings out clearly the specific nature of WEU, quite different from that of the Council of Europe, since the Secretary-General, appointed by the governments, Chairman of the Permanent Council, has a very special political rôle at the side of the executive, whereas the Assembly, to which Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty assigned powers which are above all supervisory, must therefore benefit from full political independence, which would not be implied if its work were above all consultative. This political independence is necessarily expressed in the breakdown of the operating budget of the Assembly and in the status of the Office of the Clerk.

10. (vi) The new and important rôle played by the chairmanship-in-office of the Council in the dialogue with the Assembly, since meetings and exchanges of letters with the presidency of the Assembly have increased, meetings with the Presidential Committee before and after ministerial meetings have been confirmed and exchanges with the Assembly through the intermediary of its committees or directly in public on the occasion of the extraordinary session in Luxembourg have assumed new regularity and scope. This is perfectly normal in view of the rôle now played by the chairmanship-in-office. Your Rapporteur wishes to emphasise that the Assembly is interested in the policy of the Council of Ministers as such and is only indirectly concerned by the views of each member government. This places special responsibility on the shoulders of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council. For this reason, your Rapporteur considers it very desirable for the Chairman-in-Office to participate in the Assembly's debates on the annual reports of the Council.

11. (vii) The innovation introduced by the Netherlands chairmanship-in-office which, at the close of the meeting in The Hague on 20th August 1987, of a "group of senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and of defence of the member states of WEU to consider the situation in the Gulf", held in accordance with Article VIII of the treaty, sent the President of

the Assembly, on 31st August, the "guidelines for the press agreed upon at the close of the meeting". One may certainly wonder why it took eleven days to send this communiqué to the Assembly. But, while it was "the first time such a meeting has been held", it was also the first time the Council has informed the press – immediately – and the Assembly – fairly quickly – of the discussions at a non-ministerial meeting. Your Rapporteur can only hope that this practice will be continued and extended and this was indeed confirmed following the meeting of senior officials on 15th September.

12. (viii) A degree of dissonance between ministerial decisions as reported by the chairmanship-in-office and their interpretation at the level of the Permanent Council. Thus, in his statements to the Assembly meeting in extraordinary session on 28th April 1987, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council referred to the Council's agreement to two of the Assembly's principal budgetary claims: separation of the pensions budget from the general WEU budget and the granting of autonomy to the Assembly in the use of the overall budget granted to it by the Council. Mr. Poos said:

"... [the Council of Ministers] has also agreed to meet your wishes in regard to independent budgetary management, within the limits of agreed appropriations. In regard to an increase in the ordinary budget, it wishes to have more time to consider this matter on the basis of specific data. As you can see, two of your three wishes have now been given a constructive answer and I personally am happy to be able to announce this."

However, the Permanent Council subsequently interpreted this second decision of the Council of Ministers in such a restrictive way as to deprive it of substance.

13. This was not the first time chairmen-in-office of the Council have made soothing remarks to representatives of the Assembly that were not to be confirmed by the Permanent Council. It has happened several times over matters relating to information given to the Assembly, and the thirty-second annual report incidentally states that the promise to transmit to the Assembly a declassified version of reports submitted to it by the agencies will not be respected. This promise having been made at an "informal" meeting at which no minutes were taken, the Assembly is defenceless when it wishes to insist on its application. Such practices can but make the Assembly ask the Council to ensure that its commitments are respected and cause the Assembly to approach with caution the "informal" procedure for dialogue which the Council has an increasing tendency to substitute for official procedure.

14. Your Rapporteur has heard from several sources that the Council is complaining that the Assembly is not giving it credit for its work of reactivating WEU or its efforts to promote a dialogue with the Assembly. Your Rapporteur will return to what should be thought of the reactivation of WEU, but he wishes here to point to a problem for which he can propose no fully satisfactory solution but whose dimensions he wishes the Council to consider with a view to finding a satisfactory outcome.

15. WEU, as moulded by the modified Brussels Treaty, remained fairly inactive at political level but carried out technical duties mainly in the control of armaments. The Assembly, assigned supervisory duties under Article IX of the treaty, had a relationship with the Council in which the formal aspect was dominant. The annual report of the Council was the keystone. It was drafted with great care and studied by the Assembly in the same spirit. The reactivation of WEU, without wholly abolishing these statutory activities, reduced them to very little and instead developed intergovernmental consultations on foreign policy and defence matters. The Assembly welcomed this evolution which it had always sought in conformity with Article VIII of the treaty.

16. However, the new line followed in the work of the Council and all its dependent organs such as the agencies and at the various meetings held in the context of WEU has led to a burst of ill-structured activity. Hardly any joint decisions were forthcoming. Generally, there have been no communiqués, with the result that the Assembly has serious difficulty in grasping the true nature of the Council's activities, and the thirty-second annual report is far too brief about most of them to improve the situation. The character of exchanges between the Council and the Assembly has therefore been transformed without any specific agreement having been defined by the two WEU bodies during a period of trial and error and search for new procedures. The Council has taken refuge in informal practices and made excessive use of them, as testified by the preceding paragraphs. It must now be seen how the Assembly, while exercising all its prerogatives as a parliamentary assembly, can effectively accomplish its duties of supervision and stimulus. The dialogue between the Council and the Assembly in the last two years has not yet allowed a satisfactory solution to be found to this point. Your Rapporteur considers this to be the principal cause of the uneasiness that several members of the Council have stressed. In this connection, he would refer to the very many questions put by the Assembly in the reports by Mr. Ahrens and Mr. Bianco (Documents 1078, 1089 and 1099) which are still far from having been answered.

II. The reactivation of WEU

17. Since 1984, the governments have been trying to redirect the activities of WEU without touching the modified Brussels Treaty. They were not anxious to embark upon the long and difficult task of revising the treaty which would have made it impossible, for several years, to achieve what seemed necessary, i.e. to give some degree of political consistency to Europe's participation in the organisation of its security. It was probably a similar consideration that led the same governments to defer examination of the possible enlargement of WEU until the day reactivation was complete, a decision which is further confirmed by the thirty-second annual report. However, the governments have had to note that institutions designed for activities of a different kind are now ill-adapted.

18. Implementation of reactivation therefore encountered further difficulties about which the Council has always been discreet, but which are evident. On the one hand, posts in the Secretariat-General and the agencies were attributed on a very carefully studied nationality basis, particularly for the more senior posts. Any restructuring necessarily affected the proportion, thus giving rise to negative reactions on the part of countries which, rightly or wrongly, felt injured. On the other hand, many agency officials were highly-qualified experts, particularly for the control of armaments, which did not necessarily prepare them for work of another kind. The fact that many of them were former officers and almost at their second retirement age certainly allowed the progressive recruitment of staff suited to the new requirements. However, these requirements do not yet seem to have been clearly defined, nor has provision been made for them after the transitional period that finishes at the end of 1987, and the annual report informs us that staff recruited for the agencies were given only very short-term contracts, contrary to the policy long pursued by the co-ordinated organisations and the European Community. The purpose was to create a permanent European civil service independent of national authorities, which could not be expected of officials recruited for limited periods. Finally, the annual report refers to the high cost of suppressing a grade A post whose holder had to be paid an indemnity for loss of job in accordance with the Staff Rules. It does not conceal the fact that it has endeavoured to limit the burden for governments of suppressing other posts.

19. However legitimate these various considerations may be, they made the Council avoid facing up to the real question, that of adapting WEU structures to the organisation's true activities. The result has been some confusion which your Rapporteur wishes to sort out, taking as a basis the thirty-second annual report of the

Council and subsequent communications from the Council. He submitted the following text to the Secretary-General of WEU before drafting the final version of his draft report so as to avoid mistakes. Your Rapporteur wishes to thank the Secretary-General, who has enabled him to be accurate in the following paragraphs, whereas the Council's communications to the Assembly had left room for much uncertainty about the nature and description of the WEU organs.

20. (a) Created by Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, the WEU Council may take the following forms:

(i) *Council of Ministers*, consisting of ministers for foreign affairs and, since October 1984, ministers of defence, under the chairmanship of the minister for foreign affairs exercising the chairmanship and assisted by the Secretariat-General. It holds at least one formal and, in general, one informal meeting each year.

(ii) *Enlarged Council*, with the participation of political directors and representatives of the ministries of defence. It meets in London under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. The phrase in the annual report indicating that two meetings of the enlarged Council were held in London on the same day, 24th October 1986, referred to two meetings which did not have the same participants. The morning meeting was held with representatives of the ministries of defence. It was the first of its kind and was specifically intended to prepare for the participation of ministers in the ministerial meeting of the Council in Luxembourg by spelling out their rôle in the new WEU and the matters they were to consider. At the afternoon meeting, these representatives of the ministries of defence were joined by the political directors of the ministries for foreign affairs to prepare the agenda of the ministerial meeting.

It is also in the context of the enlarged Council that *meetings of political directors are held whenever necessary*. The meetings held on 20th August and 14th September on the situation in the Gulf, in the presence of the Secretary-General, come within this context in application of Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the treaty. The meeting on 20th August 1987 was the first of this kind.

(iii) *Permanent Council*, consisting of the ambassadors to London and an official from the United Kingdom Foreign Office, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, assisted by the Secretariat-General and responsible for co-ordinating all the activities of WEU.

Your Rapporteur would like the Council to confirm that it does in fact consider all these meetings to be meetings of the Council or, otherwise, to explain their status and whether some of them should be considered "subsidiary bodies" as provided for in Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the treaty.

21. (b) Furthermore, government representatives are invited to take part in:

(i) *the high-level special working group*, consisting of experts from the two ministries and responsible for studying matters relating to European security interests. This was an offshoot of the *SDI working group* whose task was subsequently "to develop a possible framework for a long-term analysis of the politico-strategic implications of conceivable developments in ballistic missile defence" and was then modified and extended on 28th April 1987. It now has three sub-groups:

- the *group of deputies*;
- the *SDI group*;
- the *Mediterranean group*, which held its first meeting on 16th July 1987;

(ii) *the ordinary working group of the Council*, composed of representatives of the embassies in London, responsible for preparing the decisions of the Permanent Council;

(iii) *the Standing Armaments Committee* responsible for co-operation in armaments matters whose secretariat is ensured by Agency III. It exists by virtue of a decision of the Council of 1955 but did not meet in 1986 or 1987. Some members of the Council consider that it not having met is tantamount to the abolition of the SAC. The Council is certainly entitled to annul its 1955 decision, but it should do so clearly;

(iv) *two working groups dependent on the SAC*, which continue to meet, thus suggesting that the SAC does still exist.

22. (c) The institutions specific to WEU are, apart from the Council and the Assembly:

- (i) the *Secretariat-General*;
- (ii) three *agencies* for security questions. Their programme of work, now being implemented, was drawn up by the Council in the light of the wishes of the governments, for whom their studies are really intended. The Council takes note of them and comments on them as necessary. No information has been given on any action taken by a government to follow up the studies so far transmitted to them. According to information given by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to the Presidential Committee at the close of the meeting of the Council of Ministers in The Hague on 27th October 1987, it had been decided to reduce the number of agencies to one. Your Rapporteur knows nothing of the tasks given to this single agency for which he believes all the problems raised for the three agencies still exist;
- (iii) the *Agency for the Control of Armaments* whose staff are part of Agency I and which in fact verifies only the non-production and non-stockpiling of chemical weapons by the country which has undertaken not to produce ABC weapons on its territory. Your Rapporteur has no idea what is to become of the statute of this agency in the framework of the single agency which it was decided to set up on 27th October 1987;
- (iv) the *international secretariat of the SAC*, hitherto ensured by Agency III, but your Rapporteur does not know how it will be ensured by the single agency, particularly where the working groups are concerned.

23. Your Rapporteur can but welcome the present scale of exchanges of views between governments in the framework of WEU. However, compared with the number and importance of decisions taken by WEU, this list makes him wonder whether the Council has really found the simplest, most effective and least expensive means of organising these exchanges. He notes that many aspects of the operation of these bodies have never been communicated to the Assembly and the complication of the system allows the Council to evade all supervision by the Assembly and public opinion, which is contrary to the spirit and the letter of the modified Brussels Treaty, whose Article IX aimed specifi-

cally at concerning public opinion with European consultations on security matters.

24. The thirty-second annual report recalls usefully that the Council continues to consider this interest to be of prime importance if a moral crisis is to be mitigated, as this would be disastrous for Europe's security. One of the principal reasons for the reactivation of WEU had been the need, noted at that time, to give a European dimension to the spirit of defence. All the governments agreed that in this connection the rôle of the Assembly was to be essential, and the then French Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre Mauroy, stressed this forcefully in his address to members of the Assembly in December 1983. The Assembly accepted this rôle but emphasised that it could only carry it out on two conditions: first that its full independence be respected and second that the Council, by giving it substantial information about its activities, become a true partner for it. While at the present juncture the first condition has been almost fulfilled, this is far from being the case of the second.

25. The thirty-second annual report refers to the activities of the Council in informing the public by announcing "the setting up of a unit within the Political Division of the Secretariat-General to be responsible for relations with the press and for providing information", also "responsible for answering the many requests by the public for information about the activities of WEU". This is fully in line with a request by the Assembly but, in view of the fact that it is unlikely that the Council will keep the public better informed than the Assembly about its activities, your Rapporteur has every reason to fear that this "unit responsible for relations with the press" will have little to offer. What does it know of meetings other than ministerial meetings? No communiqués are issued after them apart, it is true, from the meetings of high-level experts held in The Hague on 20th August and 14th September 1987, when a document was adopted and transmitted to the press by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council. This practice should be pursued and generalised.

26. Your Rapporteur associates himself with the Council in congratulating the Secretary-General on the considerable amount of work he does to make WEU known and make its reactivation understood in both a European and Atlantic context. However, he notes that, for reasons probably due to the excessive secrecy with which the Council insists on surrounding itself and not to the Secretary-General himself, these communications reveal little about the content of the work of the Council and its dependent bodies. But the press and public will be really interested in general considerations only if they can be shown the full implications for handling topical questions. The Assembly has

enough experience of this to assert this view strongly.

27. The Council has set its autumn 1987 ministerial meeting as the conclusion of the transitional period for setting up new structures. On the one hand, it has used this as an argument for refusing to consider the question of enlarging WEU, which arose two years ago with the candidature of Portugal, and on the other for refusing to examine the Assembly's proposal for restructuring the Office of the Clerk submitted in spring 1987. The Assembly has already stated that it considers it would have been better to take an immediate decision on the possible enlargement of WEU so as to allow applicant countries whose accession was considered desirable to take part in reflection and decisions on reactivation. As it did not adopt this procedure, the Council, once the establishment of the new structures has been completed, will have to examine quite quickly how to adapt them to the requirements of an enlarged WEU, which means that the first transitional period will be followed by a second no less transitional period. There is no point in stressing the consequences these delays have already had and will continue to have, in particular for the staff, who cannot rely on stable employment.

28. It was even more absurd to link decisions relating to a reorganisation of the Office of the Clerk, which has a very limited impact, with a restructuring of the ministerial organs of WEU, since the latter has no implications for the Assembly itself. It was the announcement of reactivation that led to an increase in the burden on the Assembly services because of the new interest shown by the press and public in the activities of WEU – the thirty-second annual report refers to this – whereas, until now, the Council has done nothing of substance to respond to this interest. Your Rapporteur fears that the position adopted by the Council may be interpreted as a pretext concealing ill will either because of the budgetary implications, which are in reality minimum, of the Assembly's requests or because it does not really wish to provide the Assembly with means of action that would give it greater weight and a wider audience.

29. According to statements made by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to the Presidential Committee on 27th October, the main decisions concerning the restructuring of WEU were taken at the October ministerial meeting. The principle of the collocation of the ministerial organs having been established, it apparently remains on the one hand to decide in which city this collocation should take place – which is apparently no easy task – and on the other hand to work out the new organogram of the ministerial organs of WEU, which must be agreed upon by the Council before the end of the year on a report by the Secretary-General. If this is really the case, the way is now open for an early

decision on how to respond to the various applications by other countries to join WEU and an immediate decision on the Assembly's requests relating to the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk.

III. Political activities of the Council

30. The thirty-second annual report of the Council makes no distinction between political and defence questions, which does not facilitate the division of its chapters between the two committees concerned. On 3rd June 1987, the Presidential Committee decided to refer to the General Affairs Committee the sections of the report on "the Council's activities relating to political consultations in WEU, threats outside the North Atlantic Treaty area and international terrorism". But the report has little to say on these three points.

31. (a) The question of *East-West relations* is considered solely from the point of view of disarmament, which concerns the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. As the General Affairs Committee for its part is to submit a report to the Assembly on recent developments in Soviet external policy, your Rapporteur will not dwell on this subject.

32. (b) *The Council's activities relating to political consultations in WEU* are dealt with in Chapter II of the present report.

33. (c) On *international terrorism*, the thirty-second annual report is laconic. It includes only six lines on the subject, saying that the ministers attached importance to the fight against terrorism but that "collective efforts are being made by WEU member countries in other international bodies". Without wishing to challenge a decision which seeks to associate with this fight as many countries as possible, your Rapporteur reminds the Council that it undertook to report to the Assembly on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even if this was done in institutions other than WEU. The Council should therefore say what has been done and in which framework.

34. (d) On *threats outside the North Atlantic Treaty area*, the thirty-second annual report says nothing at all, since the Mediterranean is part of the North Atlantic Treaty area. However, your Rapporteur wishes to draw attention to the guidelines for the press agreed upon at the close of the meetings held in The Hague on 20th August and 14th September 1987, which were communicated to the Assembly by Mr. van den Broek, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and the Minister's letter accompanying the first of these texts.

35. The two texts dated 31st August, reporting on the meeting of 20th August, give several val-

uable pointers to the way the presidency viewed the steps it took:

36. (i) The letter from the Chairman-in-Office places the communication of the guidelines to the Assembly clearly in the context of a dialogue: it is based on the interest shown by the Assembly and expressed again by its President to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council during their talks on 7th July on the implications for European security of crises occurring in other regions. This interest was expressed *inter alia* in Recommendation 412, adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1984, on a report by Mr. Blaauw which recommended that the Council:

“Afford its full support to any initiative by the United Nations, by Middle Eastern countries or by other countries to restore peace between Iran and Iraq and instruct its Chairman-in-Office to do all in his power to foster such an initiative.”

Your Rapporteur feels that a further basis is Article IX of the treaty, which instructs the Council to report to the Assembly on its activities.

37. (ii) The two texts specify that it was the presidency that took the initiative of convening the meeting on 20th August on the basis of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and on the decisions taken in Rome in October 1984. Since Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty concerns solely the activities of the Council, it should be deduced that the meeting in The Hague was a meeting of the Council, even if attended by senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence who were perhaps not those who usually take part in Council meetings. Your Rapporteur has learned that the Secretary-General was indeed present at the meeting. He assumes that it was paragraph 3 of Article VIII that the Council intended to apply on this occasion, i.e. the one which obliges the Council to be convened immediately at the request of any of its members in order to discuss “any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability”. Events in the Gulf obviously constitute such a threat and the press had announced that Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany had called for a meeting of the WEU Council on this matter. This is the first time the WEU Council has applied this paragraph of Article VIII, although the Assembly has often asked that it be taken more fully into account, for instance during the Falklands war.

38. (iii) The Council’s decision to consider matters more closely in order to achieve greater co-operation is obviously not wholly satisfactory since it might have been hoped that it was already engaged in such co-operation. It is nevertheless a very positive factor in view of the quite

divergent attitudes adopted beforehand by the members of WEU towards security in the Gulf, the participation of their navies in minesweeping operations and protection of merchant shipping, their diplomatic relations or even their trade and sales of arms to one or other of the belligerents. These divergent attitudes probably explain why the Council has not managed to start effective co-operation.

39. (iv) The adoption of guidelines for the press at the close of the meeting is also a novelty since this procedure had hitherto been followed only for ministerial meetings.

40. The guidelines give a few indications about the points on which the seven governments were able to reach agreement:

41. (a) There was no doubt about their endorsement of Security Council Resolution 598 calling upon the belligerents to put an immediate end to their military operations and to return to the status quo ante bellum. Their decision to support all efforts, particularly by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to put an end to the war was less foreseeable since the United States has proposed a boycott on Iran if the latter fails to comply with this resolution. It is known that, while Iraq has agreed to it, Iran has still given no answer, so in all probability the question of applying sanctions will arise very soon. The decision “to support all efforts aimed at bringing the conflict to an end” apparently heralds the participation of all the countries in the boycott.

42. (b) The statement that “Europe’s vital interests require that freedom of navigation in the Gulf be assured at all times” justifies the measures taken or agreed upon under certain conditions by the United Kingdom and France for sweeping the mines laid by one of the belligerents in the waters of the Gulf and those taken by France to ensure some degree of armed protection of its merchant ships in the region. It announces that the participants “took note” of these measures. It does not commit the other countries to act in parallel since they merely “strongly condemned all actions contrary to that principle”, which implies no effective action.

43. The 10th September 1987 issue of *De defensa* gives useful information about the meeting on 20th August. While setting aside the proposals for the formation of a European minesweeping force, it is reported to have allowed better co-ordination of action in the Gulf and to have enabled positions to evolve, *inter alia* by inducing Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands to take part in minesweeping operations in which France and the United Kingdom had already decided to take part. While confirming that it would not take part, the Federal Republic proposed to assume responsibility in the Mediter-

anean for tasks which its partners could no longer fulfil because their forces had been sent to the Gulf. Finally, the United Kingdom has agreed to provide air cover for Netherlands and Belgian minesweepers. Italy, however, has laid down a number of special conditions relating mainly to the length of time its warships will take part in minesweeping operations in the Gulf.

44. Finally, members of the Presidential Committee were told at their meeting with the Council on 27th October that a third meeting on the situation in the Gulf was held on 14th October when Luxembourg, which has no means of taking part in naval operations, took the opportunity of stating that it intended to make a financial contribution to the minesweeping operations which now therefore associate in various ways all seven WEU countries. No details were given to the Presidential Committee about the means or extent of co-operation on the spot for reasons which can easily be understood. The Assembly has received no written communication on this last meeting.

45. Obviously the Council cannot expect to overcome many of the differences between the member countries. Their geography, history and specific interests and the means at their disposal inevitably make them react in different ways to international crises. The rôle of the Council is first to prevent these differences endangering the application of the alliance based on Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and then to ascertain the convergences that exist to allow Europe, speaking through WEU, to place its full influence at the service of international peace. What is known about the meetings shows that for the first time in the history of WEU significant results were achieved in application of Article VIII, paragraph 3, in The Hague on 20th August 1987.

46. At its meeting on 21st September 1987, the General Affairs Committee was divided in its views on European co-operation in the Gulf. Some members strongly deplored the fact that it was not WEU that was intervening in the Gulf but five separate countries, each acting on its own behalf, and that the co-ordination of their forces was limited to bilateral agreements, following a British proposal, between the United Kingdom and Belgium on the one hand and between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands on the other for ensuring British air cover for Belgian and Netherlands minesweepers. Others, on the contrary, noted, with your Rapporteur, that while there were no WEU operations or forces in the Gulf WEU was nevertheless the framework in which the Seven had examined the situation in the Gulf. Each country's possibilities of action had been discussed and measures had been taken, admittedly national but nevertheless concerted, for

harmonised action by all WEU countries to help maintain freedom of navigation in international waters of the Gulf and neighbouring seas. The consultations seemed particularly positive since it was the first time, thirty-three years after the signing of the Paris Agreements, that Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty had been applied.

47. Henceforth, co-operation on European security will be at the centre of political interest. Setting aside all other factors, your Rapporteur links this fact with a widespread feeling that the process of European integration should not stop at security questions.

IV. WEU and European security

48. Four initiatives designed to foster detailed consideration of the future of Western European security marked the end of 1986 and the beginning of 1987. First, there was the proposal by the Prime Minister of France, Jacques Chirac, to the Assembly on 2nd December 1986 to draw up a European security charter. On this proposal, the Council prepared a "Platform on European security interests" which was adopted and issued at the ministerial meeting in The Hague on 27th October 1987.

49. Second, on 3rd June 1987, on a report submitted by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee the Assembly adopted unanimously Recommendation 446 asking that the Council:

"Convene as swiftly as practicable a conference of heads of state and of government of the signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty and of countries effectively determined to take part in a European security organisation in the context of the Atlantic Alliance in order to define jointly security requirements for the next ten years and the rôle to be attributed to WEU to this end."

Then, in a speech on 19th June 1987, Mr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic, proposed the creation of a joint Franco-German brigade. Finally, at the close of joint Franco-German manoeuvres in Germany in September 1987, the President of the French Republic, Mr. Mitterrand, mentioned a plan which had apparently been under consideration by the two countries' governments since the early summer to set up a Franco-German defence council. No details were given on the aim of this council, but the French President said firm proposals would be agreed upon in the coming months. The Spanish Government immediately announced its wish to be associated with current Franco-German consideration of defence matters. These four proposals directly concern

WEU although so far neither Chancellor Kohl's proposal nor the plan for a Franco-German defence council seem to have been submitted to it officially.

50. The Assembly had an opportunity of giving its opinion on Mr. Chirac's proposal in Recommendation 442, which it adopted in Luxembourg on 27th April 1987, also on a report submitted by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, and it is clear that the two questions are closely linked since it is a matter of determining both the terms and the conditions for adopting a declaration of principles of European security.

51. When he visited The Hague in June 1987, Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, suggested that the summit conference proposed by the Assembly be held in March 1988 on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the Brussels Treaty. According to the Europe Bulletin of 17th June 1987, he said on that occasion that changes in relations between the United States and its NATO allies made it necessary to define a European identity in security matters, in the context of course of Atlantic solidarity, which would thereby be enhanced.

52. This statement provokes several comments. First, the Secretary-General should be congratulated on the speed with which he replied – albeit indirectly – to Recommendation 446, particularly since the reply is a positive one. He was certainly not claiming to give the Council's reply to the Assembly, but it may be thought that he would not have been so forthright if he had not been aware of positive reactions on the part of some at least of the governments concerned.

53. Secondly, emphasis should be laid on the reason he gave for this European summit meeting, i.e. to try to define a European identity in security matters because this had become necessary. It may be noted here that this aim corresponds almost exactly with that defined by Mr. Chirac on 2nd December 1986 and the concern expressed by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, on 3rd June 1987, in his speech to the Assembly. In accordance with Recommendation 442, most of the seven governments have therefore apparently shown that they are prepared, if not to adopt the European security charter proposed by Mr. Chirac, at least to agree on the principles of that security in a joint public document. On 10th September, De defensa announced that the Secretariat-General had handed the Council a report on Europe's strategic interests to serve as a basis for this document, but it pointed out that one country, Italy, was opposed to the publication of this text, which would have deprived Mr. Chirac's proposal of much of its impact. It was apparently

only on the eve of the ministerial meeting on 27th October that the last obstacles to the adoption of a joint platform were removed.

54. Then, while it must be quite clear to everyone that the aim of this definition of principles of European security is not to weaken but to strengthen Atlantic solidarity, everything indicates that the governments are well aware that there have been changes in relations between the United States and its allies. In determining the nature of this evolution, your Rapporteur notes several reasons for it:

55. (a) It is clear that the concerns of American public opinion and, to a lesser degree, the priorities of United States external policy have evolved, particularly in the last six years. Greater importance is attributed to an overall view of American-Soviet relations, the Pacific and Far East questions, the search for peaceful solutions to Middle East conflicts, keeping Latin America out of East-West debates, the space defence of the United States and the nuclear disarmament of the two great powers. This reduces considerably Europe's place in the way Americans view their security requirements.

56. (b) When he addressed the Assembly on 2nd June 1987, the Secretary-General of WEU threw useful light on the approach made in February 1985 by the then Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Burt, on the examination of disarmament matters in WEU. While this clarification shows that the Assembly was insufficiently informed on the subject, it is the Council that is to be blamed because it had until then, against all the evidence, denied that there had been any approach. This being so, the change in the American attitude is worth stressing since in April 1987 the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, asked Europeans officially for their opinion on the zero-zero option, whereas in February 1985 American diplomacy was trying to avoid Europeans adopting any public position on the current American-Soviet negotiations. The United States even awaited the formal agreement of the Federal Republic in August 1987 before accepting the Soviet request for the dismantling of the Pershing missiles deployed in the Federal Republic. This evolution may be interpreted as an expression of the wish that Europeans assume greater responsibility in matters which are of more special concern to them, particularly the conventional defence of their territory.

57. (c) Current prospects for the American-Soviet disarmament negotiations have raised questions about the evolution of the American military presence in Europe in future years. It is known that this question carries enough weight for it to have led to the resignation of General Rogers from the post of SACEUR, which became effective at the end of June 1987.

58. These various factors seem to justify fully a search for new dimensions of European security that do not stop at the mere reactivation of WEU now taking shape but which includes a redefinition of the principles and requirements of that security which are now becoming evident thirty-three years after the Paris Agreements defined the bases for this security on practices which are now obsolete. In adopting Recommendation 446, the Assembly's aim was probably not so much to fix once and for all the way to achieve this as to make governments start work on this redefinition. The address by the then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Poos, on 3rd June, showed that the Council has understood this perfectly.

59. But then one may wonder why the Secretary-General has tried to link the holding of a European summit meeting with the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the Brussels Treaty. To lay too much emphasis on celebrating anniversaries might give the impression that WEU, instead of looking to the future of European security, is mainly looking to the past to justify its existence. It would be weakening the political impact of a European summit meeting to say that it was being held to commemorate an event and not to achieve something. This is particularly true when the purpose is to celebrate the Brussels Treaty, since WEU today has little in common with the Western Union of 1948. It shares neither the objectives nor the means. In particular, it involves no military deployment of its own and, up to now, the reactivation of WEU has in no way taken such a turn. It was the Paris Agreements of 1954, not the Brussels Treaty of 1948, that founded WEU and this is not without practical importance since the answer to the question of the date – 1998 or 2004 – with effect from which member states are authorised to announce a possible denunciation of the modified Brussels Treaty depends on this. The reactivation of WEU obviously has meaning only if the organisation has the assurance that the member countries will remain in it for enough years. Thus, the end of the transitional period the Council fixed for reorganising WEU, the importance of the problems now raised by Europe's security and the changes in relations between the United States and its allies seem to be far more valid reasons for a European summit meeting than the celebration of a treaty which left little mark on history.

60. Finally, Chancellor Kohl's proposal on 19th June to set up a Franco-German brigade most probably responds to concerns not far removed from those expressed by Mr. Chirac and the WEU Assembly. Although a brigade is only a small military unit, this proposal in fact raises all the fundamental questions of European security.

61. (a) This is the responsibility of WEU under Protocol No. II to the Paris Agreements on the forces of Western European Union. This protocol fixes the maximum level of forces to be deployed on the mainland of Europe by member countries under the command of SACEUR and makes subject to "agreements within the organisation of Western European Union, having regard to their proper functions and needs and to their existing levels" the strength and armaments of "the internal defence and police forces" of these countries on the mainland of Europe.

62. The question indirectly put by Mr. Kohl's proposal was whether the future Franco-German brigade was to be placed under the command of SACEUR, which would have been a major step towards the return of French forces to NATO command, or whether, on the contrary, it was to be placed under another command. It was in fact difficult to propose that a multinational force should be considered an "internal defence and police force". An answer to this question was given on 24th August 1987 by Mr. Giraud, French Minister of Defence, in reply to a written question put by our colleague, Mr. Koehl. The Minister specified that "such a unit, which it is agreed would be interoperable with other units of the Atlantic Alliance, but which would not be placed under NATO integrated military command, can represent a step forward in marking Franco-German solidarity vis-à-vis defence questions". Hence, it would be a force coming under a new category not foreseen in the modified Brussels Treaty and whose status would still have to be defined.

63. (b) In the same answer, the French Minister referred to another aspect of the problem when he added: "We must now discuss the concept for the use of this unit. The French Government has pointed out that it considers it should not be involved in conventional-type hostilities without the cover of a unit of nuclear deterrence." This wording may be found surprising since it is the first time, as far as your Rapporteur knows, that France has officially given its nuclear forces a rôle of covering conventional forces and no longer a pre-strategic rôle. It may also be wondered how the words cover and deterrence can be associated. In any event, this text raises a vital question: will Franco-German defence be nuclear?

64. (c) Naturally, the question of the command of this brigade arises. It might rotate between the two countries, but this would mean, if the principle of nuclear cover were accepted, that a German general might have French nuclear weapons at his disposal at tactical level.

65. (d) In July, the Netherlands Government announced its intention of participating in this

brigade. The Italian Government has announced a similar position. It is not out of the question that other WEU member countries may do likewise. This further complicates the matter, not only because problems of command and language, already difficult to solve for two countries, would become almost insoluble, but also because of the various attitudes adopted by the WEU member countries towards the defence of Europe by nuclear means. If this brigade is to exist and be enlarged, it would, one way or another, be practically the start of a WEU deployment.

66. These considerations lead your Rapporteur to express the keen hope that this matter will be placed before the WEU Council very soon since in any event this responsibility cannot be evaded. We should be grateful to Chancellor Kohl for having, by his proposal, made all the governments ask themselves firm, practical questions that are linked with the very concept of European defence.

67. Events have left your Rapporteur just enough time to analyse only too briefly the platform adopted by the Council on 27th October 1987. However, he can pick out a number of points of interest not because they are new but because the text adopted by the ministers gives coherence to a European approach to security matters which had not hitherto seemed very continuous in developing "a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we are committed through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties."

68. The motives for this undertaking stem from three quite separate considerations. One relates to the threat:

"We have not yet witnessed any lessening of the military build-up which the Soviet Union has sustained over so many years. The geostrategic situation of Western Europe makes it particularly vulnerable to the superior conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. This is the fundamental problem for European security. The Warsaw Pact's superior conventional forces and its capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are of special concern in this context."

The second relates to the need for a certain balance within the Atlantic Alliance:

"It is our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the alliance, to the benefit of western security as a whole. This will enhance the European rôle in the alliance and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across

the Atlantic. We are resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance."

The third relates to the governments' concept of European union:

"We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.

.....

We see the revitalisation of WEU as an important contribution to the broader process of European unification."

69. The instrument the governments gave themselves to meet this goal is the modified Brussels Treaty and in particular its Article V. This is repeated several times, *inter alia* in paragraph III (a) 1, which specifies that:

"... This pledge, which reflects our common destiny, reinforces our commitments under the Atlantic Alliance, to which we all belong, and which we are resolved to preserve."

This means that it is through the accession of new states to the treaty which "also envisages the progressive association of other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination" that the enlargement of WEU can be envisaged, with all the constraints this implies for both present members of WEU and the applicant countries. Although the Presidential Committee has been given no text on this subject, it would appear that the Council has effectively spelled out its conditions for accession: membership of the European Community, clear relations with NATO and absence of disputes with other member countries of the alliance. This corresponds very largely with the views expressed by the Assembly since 1985, as does the following provision:

"Emphasising the vital contribution of the non-WEU members of the alliance to the common security and defence, we will continue to keep them informed of our activities."

70. The content of the security policy pursued by the Seven is also specified. Its aims are first:

"... to prevent any kind of war. It is our purpose to preserve our security by maintaining defence readiness and military capabilities adequate to deter aggression and intimidation without seeking military superiority",

then "to foster stability and co-operation in the whole of Europe" and, finally, "to promote comprehensive co-operation among all participating states" so as "to do all in our power to achieve our ultimate goal of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe". In order to do this:

"... there is no alternative to the western strategy for the prevention of war, which has ensured peace in freedom for an unprecedented period of European history. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk.

.....

In the conventional field, the forces of the WEU member states represent an essential part of the alliance. As regards nuclear forces, all of which form a part of deterrence, the co-operative arrangements that certain member states maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of Europe. The independent forces of France and the United Kingdom contribute to overall deterrence and security."

This implies:

- (i) the maintenance of American forces in Europe while "maintaining coupling with the United States and ensuring conditions of equal security in the alliance as a whole". This last statement seems to stem from the decision to develop close consultations with the United States on the pursuit, technical results and strategic consequences of President Reagan's SDI;
- (ii) the development of conventional weapons by all member countries and of nuclear weapons by France and the United Kingdom;
- (iii) "arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy and not an alternative to it. They should lead to a stable balance of forces at the lowest level compatible with our security. Arms control policy should, like our defence policy, take into account the specific European security interests in an evolving situation. It must be consistent with the maintenance of the strategic unity of the alliance and should not preclude closer European defence co-operation. Arms control

agreements have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time. East and West have a common interest in achieving this";

- (iv) "the possibilities contained in the (Helsinki) final act should be fully exploited" thanks to continuing action in all negotiations deriving from the CSCE.

71. These parts of the platform include some ambiguities, particularly in the juxtaposition of the words defence and deterrence and the statement that a full part must be played in disarmament while at the same time making an effort in armaments matters in order to achieve a balance with the Warsaw Pact, although it is not stated clearly whether it is a balance in Europe that is meant or a worldwide balance. It will probably be one of WEU's main tasks in future to examine these matters in depth and explain them satisfactorily. Paragraph III (a) 4 of the platform contains a real programme for the Council, i.e. to:

- ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its borders is made clearly manifest by means of appropriate arrangements,
- improve our consultations and extend our co-ordination in defence and security matters and examine all practical steps to this end,
- make the best possible use of the existing institutional mechanisms to involve the defence ministers and their representatives in the work of WEU,
- see to it that the level of each country's contribution to the common defence adequately reflects its capabilities,
- aim at a more effective use of existing resources, inter alia by expanding bilateral and regional military co-operation, pursue our efforts to maintain in Europe a technologically advanced industrial base and intensify armaments co-operation,
- concert our policies on crises outside Europe insofar as they may affect our security interests."

72. In this connection, your Rapporteur wishes to underline certain phrases which he believes offer useful pointers to the Seven's intentions. The first, where it is specified that Article V of the treaty implies the defence of any member country attacked "at its borders", probably removes some uncertainty about the nature of France's commitment since its with-

drawal from the NATO integrated commands. The words "the level of each country's contribution" imply a commitment which must be respected by each one. The reference to "bilateral and regional military co-operation" situates, in the framework of WEU, the development of relevant Franco-German relations and mention of "crises outside Europe" implies an undertaking henceforth to apply Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty, as the Seven are now finally doing in the Gulf. Finally, the will to "make the best possible use of the existing institutional mechanisms" defines the context for the restructuring of WEU.

73. In spite of the few ambiguities reported above, the Assembly can but welcome the adoption of this platform. Immediately after the adoption of the Rome declaration, the committee's Rapporteur, Mr. Masciadri, prepared a list of points in the declaration which the Council had drawn from Assembly recommendations. The list was a long one. Your Rapporteur has not had time to do the same for the Hague platform, but he feels that the contents show even clearer signs of what the Assembly has been recommending to the Council since 1985. In spite of all the shortcomings noted in its relations with the Council, the Assembly must therefore clearly voice its satisfaction that, for the first time, the seven governments have published such a coherent declaration on European security. It now firmly hopes that these principles will be applied in practice in WEU.

74. The adoption of the platform on European security interests together with Chancellor Kohl's proposal and the governments' reactions to it therefore constitute an important item on the agenda of the European defence debate. It is most desirable for our Assembly to take account of this in preparing the consultations advocated in Order 68.

75. Your Rapporteur has also heard reports of two criticisms of this order in government circles. The first relates to the very principle of a meeting of persons outside governments to make proposals for the organisation of European security, whereas it should be for the governments to draw up a political programme of this kind. This consideration seems somewhat unfounded since the colloquy provided for in Order 68 seeks to meet the Assembly's concern "to play a useful part in preparing a conference of European heads of state and of government on security" and it is hard to see why the Assembly, whose useful rôle in making proposals and giving impetus has been stressed by the Council on several occasions and whose exclusive responsibility was recalled in the platform of 27th October, should refrain from consulting in turn a number of persons who have concentrated their thoughts on the subject in question. The

Assembly sees this as an opportunity to pursue its own work in greater depth and believes this initiative is in no way detrimental to the governments whose political responsibilities necessarily limit their freedom of expression but which, on 27th October, provided a basis for reflection which is extremely important for the Assembly.

76. The second concerns the date of the colloquy. Now that the governments have agreed on the text of a joint platform on European security and taken the necessary decisions for reorganising WEU, it may seem pointless to convene a colloquy followed by a summit meeting in the next few months. This argument is not unfounded and may lead the Assembly to defer the date of the colloquy that it asked the General Affairs Committee to organise. The Assembly's Presidential Committee took a decision in this sense on 13th October 1987.

77. However, it is still quite clear that the platform of 27th October is far from exhausting the questions raised by Europe's security. The forthcoming signing of a Soviet-American agreement on INF - which the Assembly welcomes as much as the Council - will inevitably oblige Europe to determine the strategy of deterrence and defence it intends to pursue. Holding a conference on conventional disarmament in the framework defined by the CSCE will oblige it to review the means it intends to place at the service of this strategy. The enlargement of WEU will bring it face to face with structural problems and make it consider certain questions - in particular the Mediterranean - in new terms. The Council gives itself the duty of having each member country make an adequate effort for joint defence: the degree of effort is yet to be specified. This leaves the Assembly a free hand to organise the colloquy at an appropriate time, account being taken of the Council's reply to Recommendation 446.

V. Conclusions

78. The Assembly must obviously regard the thirty-second annual report of the Council as unsatisfactory because of the date on which it was transmitted, its contents and the meagre information it gives in regard to the Council's political activities. From information received unofficially, it would appear that since the Reykjavik meeting the Council may have realised that there is an urgent need for European consultations and that at last it may have embarked upon more promising and perhaps more apparently intelligent activity. The reasons for this somewhat more encouraging impression should be stressed:

- (a) the declaration made in the States-General by the Netherlands Gov-

ernment at the time it took over the chairmanship-in-office of the Council on 1st July 1987. Inter alia, it undertook to meet a number of the Assembly's wishes and, in fact, the latter was informed of proceedings at the meeting on the Gulf held on 20th August. It should be recalled that the Assembly's principal claims, after the maintenance of its independence, relate to the information it is given and its budget. This declaration was confirmed by Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands in her speech from the throne on 15th September 1987. For the first time in history, she referred to the reactivation of WEU as follows:

“ WEU has an important rôle to play in defining the specific interests of European security within the Atlantic Alliance and in harmonising the standpoints on that issue. The Netherlands, being Chairman-in-Office, will give it full support ” ;

- (b) the meeting held in The Hague on 20th August constituted the first application in thirty-three years of Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty. It was followed by communications to the press to which, your Rapporteur has noted, there was a worldwide response, also for the first time. This meeting was followed by two others, in September and October, and corresponds to what the French Minister of Defence, Mr. Giraud, said on 16th October 1987:

“ More generally, it is in Europeans' interests to consult each other on how to handle crises outside Europe. In view of worsening tension in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, there would probably be only advantages for the Europeans if they compared their analyses, exchanged information and harmonised their attitudes more and better than they manage to do at present. WEU seems the obvious framework for this ” ;

- (c) the most important decisions taken on 27th October on the restructuring of WEU to reduce the number of agencies to one under the closer authority of the Secretary-General and for it to meet

in the same place as the Secretariat-General, and on the adoption, before the end of the year, of a new organogram for the WEU ministerial organs, demonstrate that the restructuring has been achieved. This commits the governments to taking action on the Assembly's requests for the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk;

- (d) the adoption of the platform on European security, also on 27th October, provides a framework for subsequent work by the Council and a basis for the enlargement of WEU. Your Rapporteur wishes to stress the urgency of considering the more or less official applications for membership submitted so far.

79. The absence of a Council decision was particularly scandalous in the case of Portugal, which applied for membership first. No reasons have been given for shelving this candidature although it is hard to see what inconvenience this might involve. Spain's intention of taking part in a “ hard core ” of European security is no less evident and its request to be associated with Franco-German co-operation was announced by Mr. Gonzales in September and October after his visits to France and Germany. This attitude was no doubt brought about by the ill will shown by the WEU Council towards Spanish overtures. The French Minister of Defence, Mr. Giraud, said in his speech on 16th October 1987 that “ WEU is destined to become a cornerstone of European defence. Taking into account the defence of Europe's southern flank suggests that it should soon be enlarged to include Spain and Portugal ” and it is hard to see why a country should continue to oppose enlargement, even if the accession of Greece and Turkey still seems impossible in present circumstances, as mentioned in the report by Mr. Ahrens already quoted. The Council's adoption on 27th October of principles of enlargement should allow this matter to be solved. On that occasion, the press reported that the Danish Government did not wish to remain outside WEU if the latter were to become the organisation for European security. There would certainly be no reason to keep that country out if it were prepared to subscribe to the Hague platform, including the commitment to make an adequate effort for joint defence.

80. It is therefore in the light of what has been undertaken and largely achieved in 1987 rather than on the basis of the annual report for 1986 that your Rapporteur proposes to accept the thirty-second annual report of the Council.

APPENDIX

*Dates of transmission of annual reports of the Council,
replies to Assembly recommendations
and answers to written questions put by parliamentarians
in the last three years*

(a) Dates on which annual reports reached the Assembly

Annual report for the year	Reached the Office of the Clerk on
1983	2nd March 1984
1984	1st March 1985
1985	20 May 1986
1986 – First half	24 octobre 1986
1986 – Second half	24 april 1987
1987 – First half	Not yet received on 2nd november 1987

(b) Recommendations

Recommendation	Adopted	Reply received on
417	21st May 1985	23rd October 1985
418	21st May 1985	11th October 1985
419	22nd May 1985	23rd October 1985
420	22nd May 1985	18th September 1985
421	22nd May 1985	8th October 1985
422	22nd May 1985	26th July 1985
423	23rd May 1985	12th November 1985
424	24th September 1985	11th October 1985
425	2nd December 1985	28th May 1986
426	4th December 1985	17th March 1986
427	3rd December 1985	16th May 1986
428	4th December 1985	28th May 1986
429	4th December 1985	13th May 1986
430	4th December 1985	28th May 1986
431	5th December 1985	27th May 1986
432	3rd June 1986	30th October 1986
433	4th June 1986	20th October 1986
434	4th June 1986	27th October 1986
435	5th June 1986	20th October 1986
436	5th June 1986	20th November 1986
437	5th June 1986	13th November 1986
438	2nd December 1986	8th April 1987
439	2nd December 1986	27th April 1987
440	3rd December 1986	26th May 1987
441	4th December 1986	27th April 1987
442	27th April 1987	22nd September 1987
443	27th April 1987	21st September 1987
444	27th April 1987	21st September 1987
445	28th April 1987	30th October 1987
446	4th June 1987	24th September 1987
447	4th June 1987	30th October 1987
448	4th June 1987	12th October 1987

(c) Written questions

Question	Date of question	Date of answer
254	14th January 1985	14th May 1985
255	5th February 1985	28th March 1985
256	14th March 1985	Reply refused on 26th November 1985
257	26th July 1985	27th September 1985
258	26th July 1985	27th September 1985
259	26th July 1985	11th October 1985
260	26th July 1985	11th October 1985
261	26th July 1985	28th October 1985
262	12th December 1985	20th March 1986
263	8th January 1986	22nd May 1986
264	26th February 1986	25th April 1986
265	8th April 1986	30th July 1986
266	30th April 1986	30th May 1986
267	30th April 1986	22nd November 1986
268	30th April 1986	19th June 1986
269	30th April 1986	30th July 1986
270	30th June 1986	26th November 1986
271	15th July 1986	17th November 1986
272	3rd November 1986	1st December 1986
273	26th November 1986	21st May 1987
274	8th April 1987	Not yet received on 2nd November 1987
275	27th July 1987	Not yet received on 2nd November 1987
276	19th August 1987	22nd October 1987
277	21st September 1987	Not yet received on 2nd November 1987
278	21st September 1987	Not yet received on 2nd November 1987
279	30th September 1987	Not yet received on 2nd November 1987

*Political activities of the Council –
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Burger and others

1. Add the following new text at the beginning of paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper:
“ Ensure that the permanent structure of the ministerial organs allows the establishment of a unit responsible solely for implementing an active policy for informing the public and the press and ”
Signed: Burger, Knight, Chénard, Goerens, Péciaux, Shelton, Parry, Büchner

1. See 8th sitting, 1st December 1987 (amendment agreed to).

*The military use of computers –
towards a joint European defence research programme*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific,
Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Wilkinson (Chairman); MM. Bassinet, Beysen (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Bohm, Colajanni (Alternate: *Gianotti*), Fiandrotti, *Fourré*, Garrett (Alternate: *Parry*), *Hengel*, Hill (Alternate: *Sir Dudley Smith*), *Lenzer*, McGuire, Mechttersheimer, *Mezzapesa*, Schmidt (Alternate: *Klejdzinski*), Sinesio, Souvet (Alternate: *Bohl*), Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. *Valleix*, van der Werff, Worrell (Alternate: Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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Draft Recommendation
on the military use of computers –
towards a joint European defence research programme

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the converging views observed at European level on more active participation in the East-West dialogue and any disarmament initiatives;
- (ii) Considering the results of work conducted in the IEPG recalling the interest of a European defence market;
- (iii) Considering that an essential prerequisite for a modern and competitive European defence industry is Europe's mastery of the whole range of microelectronics;
- (iv) Considering the conclusions drawn in the report "Towards a stronger Europe", indicating Europe's relatively weak position as compared with its main competitors in certain areas of defence electronics and specifically microelectronics;
- (v) Considering the close relationship in research and development between military and civilian microelectronics;
- (vi) Noting the striking contrast between the repeated public announcements of the WEU member countries' determination to take the necessary steps in the European Community to strengthen Europe's own technological capability and achieve the creation of a technological community on the one hand and the endless bickering leading to an unsatisfactory agreement on a European framework programme for 1987-91 on the other hand;
- (vii) Considering that the early harmonisation of national operational requirements and the interoperability of the military computer systems are of primordial importance,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Stop making solemn statements on the determination of the WEU member countries to create a technological community for as long as their action is turned in the opposite direction, and instead:
 - (a) attach higher priority to IEPG co-operative technology projects than has been the case hitherto;
 - (b) convince member countries of the need to increase the budget for the European framework programme and for Esprit in particular;
 - (c) pay attention to the risks stemming from the protection of American and Japanese markets which calls in question the rules of international trade and threatens Europe's legitimate interests;
 - (d) make a major effort to harmonise national operational requirements for military computer systems;
2. Initiate a joint European defence research programme associating round the WEU member countries all the Western European countries wishing to take part.

Draft Order

*on the military use of computers –
towards a joint European defence research programme*

The Assembly,

Convinced that the importance of a well-developed data-processing industry cannot be overestimated,

INSTRUCTS the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions

To examine in greater detail ways of protecting markets and civil and military interchange in key sectors of technology:

- by comparing the United States, Japan and the WEU member countries;
- by proposing suitable solutions for developing a competitive European industry, particularly in areas of high technology such as microelectronics.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In May 1985, the Assembly adopted a recommendation on the military use of computers (Recommendation 419). In the accompanying report (Document 1007), it was pointed out that military computers have been prime movers for the development of civil computer industries. Western Europe was lagging behind its main competitors, the United States and Japan. For that reason the Assembly strongly recommended a number of measures to stimulate and improve Europe's competitiveness in the field of microelectronics for military applications.

2. The Council, in its reply to Recommendation 419 (communicated on 23rd October 1985), showed sincere interest in the questions raised by the Assembly. Your Rapporteur has also ascertained with satisfaction that in the Western European countries there is a growing awareness of the importance of microelectronics as a key element in economic success. Nor can it be denied that some co-operative efforts are being attempted.

3. But these efforts are no more than modest. Grumbling and almost a year later, in September 1987 the European Council adopted a framework programme for research for the five-year period 1987-91 with a budget of about 6.48 billion ECU, slightly more than the 5.9 billion ECU it was willing to spend in 1987 to finance the overproduction of milk. This five-year 6.48 billion ECU, or annual 1.3 billion ECU, budget pales into insignificance compared with the annual 50 billion ECU budget which member states are spending for national research programmes. Technology programmes in the IEPG framework obtain even less funding. The efforts of Europe's competitors are increasing and are far more effective, while Europe itself continues to be split up into separate national markets, its individual countries often preferring to promote national champions.

4. At the moment, much is being said about restructuring and rationalising European armaments production. In the IEPG, ministers of defence "expressed their determination to develop an action plan for a step by step approach towards an open European market for defence equipment", as recently as June 1987 at their Seville meeting. It is your Rapporteur's firm conviction that ministers are not prepared to act immediately and firmly to improve Europe's semiconductor industry, give a boost to the IEPG co-operative technology projects, broaden them and establish a common defence tech-

nology research programme with common funding. They would be better advised to descend from their heights, cut out much of their fine talk, and devote some energy to actively developing at least the basic necessities of a truly European defence industry. Semiconductors are rightly called the crude oil of the twenty-first century. Electronics technology will be decisive for future defence equipment.

5. In particular, the WEU member countries are well placed to promote a reappraisal of Europe's activity in military computing and microelectronics. In this report, a brief review will be made of the situation in this field, leading to a recommendation tailored to WEU's responsibilities.

II. Developments in military research

6. In this chapter, some important developments will be mentioned, but your Rapporteur lays no claim to presenting an exhaustive survey. Recalling that:

"The economy of the country of origin has a competitive advantage if it can forestall its competitors in the use of more sophisticated tools with a better performance. Because of the rapid evolution of data-processing and performances, this advantage may be decisive, for instance in the speeds of progression relating to the most advanced scientific research: if Europe lags a few months behind the United States in introducing new generations of supercomputers, this may lead to a serious shortfall in the ability of European research teams to carry out certain work¹,

his intention is rather to make the reader aware of the fact that in research gigantic leaps forward are being made, particularly in electronics, where the United States is very much in the lead, as the following examples will show.

Very-high-speed integrated circuits (VHSIC)

7. In Document 1007, mention was made of the VHSIC programme (paragraphs 79-83), initiated in 1978 by the United States Department of Defence. This initiative started with the will to take advantage of trends in the powerful com-

¹ Francis Lorentz, Director-General of the Bull Group: *L'enjeu informatique*.

mercial semiconductor industry. On the other hand, the Pentagon was firmly convinced that the system development community tended to use older proven technology in military devices, which in fact required state-of-the art, advanced technology. This situation was made particularly acute because of the increased efficiency of the Soviets to transfer technology to their semiconductor industry and into Soviet military systems. Furthermore, there was a reduced interest in industry to address specific military requirements due to the diminishing rôle of the military on the market place at that time.

8. Phase 1 was initiated in 1981 and centred on reducing the minimum transistor size to 1.25 micron, 25 MHz clock speeds and a processing throughput of 5×10^{11} Gate-Hertz/cm², which means 10^8 operations per second. Phase 2, started in October 1984, was aimed at minimum feature size of 0.5 micron, 100 MHz clock speeds and a throughput of 10^{13} Gate-Hertz/cm², or 10^9 operations per second. This phase is scheduled for completion in 1989. Phase 3, running parallel with the other two, is a collection of research and development efforts in support of the main programme.

9. Of the 28 different types of Phase 1 microcircuits proposed, 24 have been successfully produced. In 1983, the Pentagon launched its VHSIC technology insertion programme to encourage military services to seek applications where the new devices might be retrofitted into existing hardware to achieve higher performance, greater reliability and reduced size, weight or power consumption. Since then, more than 40 of these programmes have been funded in areas such as guidance and control, communications, radar and electronic warfare. The contractors have also been encouraged to prepare specification sheets that are sufficiently detailed for use by systems designers.

10. It should be mentioned that the companies which took part in Phase 1 and were not selected for Phase 2 nevertheless continued their research and development in VHSIC without government funding because they did not want to lag behind their competitors.

11. It is estimated that the United States Government has funded about \$500 million in the VHSIC programme so far.

12. To give one example of the situation in Europe, mention should be made here of France, which has said it is spearheading research in this field with its CITGV (circuits intégrés à très grande vitesse) programme, set up by the defence ministry's procurement office (DGA). Here the three leading companies Thomson-CSF, Electronique Serge Dassault and Matra Harris Semiconductors have developed or, in the case of Matra, produced a chip with 2 micron devices. They are working currently on chips with 1.25,

1.2 or 1 micron devices. Matra is hoping to bring out its 1 micron device chip in 1989² when the Americans will complete their VHSIC Phase 2 programme with a 0.5 micron device chip. This means that even a highly-advanced European programme is lagging at least two years behind.

Microwave/millimetre-wave monolithic integrated circuits (MIMIC)

13. This programme was launched by the United States Department of Defence in 1986.

14. The MIMIC programme was set up when it was realised that, with advances in signal-processing speeds made possible by VHSIC technology, the major bottleneck had become the performance, cost and reliability of analogue microwave subsystems used in electronic warfare and radar systems.

15. One promising potential advantage of MIMIC technology is that it could significantly reduce the cost of the analogue portion such as the multifunction active-aperture phased-array antennas of EW and radar systems by eliminating the expensive, time-consuming adjustments and "tweaking" required when subsystems are built using individual components.

16. This could also lead to reducing the cost of the so-called "smart munitions" that use millimetre-wave guidance systems. The SDI organisation has also shown interest in using MIMIC in its spaceborne radar equipment.

17. The MIMIC programme will focus on the use of gallium arsenide (GaAs) integrated circuits. GaAs technology has been around for more than twenty years but it lagged behind silicon devices because of the difficulties of working with this material. GaAs only made the transition from discrete devices to ICs during the past ten years, something silicon did thirty years ago.

18. GaAs is inherently about six times faster than silicon and offers the potential of reduced power requirements and lower thermal dissipation. Furthermore it has a higher maximum operating temperature and is said to be resistant to radiation.

19. At the moment GaAs wafers are still between 70 and 250 times more expensive than the same size silicon wafers, which causes their current application exclusively in military equipment and in the competition between the United States and Japan for the next generation of supercomputers, which explains the interest of the Pentagon and especially the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

2. Air and Cosmos monthly, May 1987.

The goals of the MIMIC effort is to have GaAs integrated circuits ready for technology insertion during the early 1990s. Among the applications currently planned are:

- (1) ultra-reliable radar for the United States Air Force's advanced tactical fighter (ATF);
- (2) airborne shared aperture radar for the United States Navy's ATF;
- (3) communications terminals for the Milstar satellite network;
- (4) sensor-fused munitions such as the Sadarm anti-armour system;
- (5) wideband jammers such as the airborne self-protection jammer (ASPJ);
- (6) anti-radiation missiles, including Harm and Sidarm;
- (7) precision-guided munitions, such as the terminally-guided warhead for the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS).

DARPA's strategic computing programme (United States)

20. Work on the strategic computing programme of the defence advanced research projects agency (DARPA) (Document 1007, paragraph 78) is steadily advancing. Initially, DARPA had chosen three specific applications, which were autonomous systems, a pilot's associate and a navy battle management system.

21. The autonomous land vehicle project is making progress. Future efforts of this project will focus on the reduction of the number of crew members on the M-1 main battle tank along with increased attention for other tasks such as mission planning and doubling the probability of a first round hit through a gunner's assistant.

22. The navy's battle management programme using a natural language interface has performed its first demonstrations but admittedly is scarcely out of the egg. In addition to this original programme, which started in 1983, DARPA recently mentioned three new applications in its second strategic computing programme plan, which are:

- an autonomous smart weapons programme;
- an army air/land battle management system;
- a radar and photo imagery analysis programme.

23. The air/land battle envisages new operational concepts which emphasise deep strikes into enemy territory. These would require com-

manders to take very rapid decisions on the basis of very large amounts of information coming from airborne and ground-based sensors which report electronics, signals and imagery intelligence. Here again, more and more important elements of command and control functions are likely to be taken over by automated procedures or expert systems (see also paragraphs 43-50).

24. SDI is clearly thought to be another field of application for results of this DARPA research programme. The SDI system must react so rapidly that it will have to rely almost completely on automated systems.

25. The United States strategic computing programme has an annual budget of about \$150 million.

Supercomputers

26. In April this year, the first ETA-10 supercomputer, made by ETA Systems Inc., a subsidiary of Control Data Corp., was installed at Florida State University. In full operation it will theoretically be able to perform 10 billion calculations per second, 10 times the current limit. In building the ETA-10, extensive use has been made of large-scale integration, the even more dense packing of circuits on each chip's wafer of silicon.

27. At present, about 200 supercomputers are installed in the world, but analysts expect the number to increase to about 1 000 in the early 1990s.

28. Very powerful supercomputers are used for such military purposes as cracking codes and designing weapons systems. For this reason many United States officials consider them to be the most important tool of the future, with implications for United States national security. It is no wonder, therefore, that the same officials are very worried about the progress of Japan in the supercomputer market. While Japan had no part in the world market for supercomputers in 1980, it had 40% in 1986. Europe has not yet produced any supercomputers.

29. Among the most advanced supercomputers produced in the United States are those manufactured by Cray Research Inc., such as the Cray X-MP/416 and the Cray II. Today, 100% of the memory capacity of these machines is derived from Japanese-manufactured semiconductors, and 10% of the logic elements are of corresponding origin. As Japanese firms evolve from the rôle of merchant semiconductor manufacturers into computer/telecommunications system builders, it would not be an illogical strategic business policy to delay release of the most advanced chips to competitors in the systems market, including those residing in the United States. Even if foreign manufactured chips are to be available to United States manufacturers, it

would appear likely that these chips will be a generation behind those which foreign semiconductor manufacturers elect to incorporate in their own system-level products³.

30. Currently, Cray Research Inc. is developing its next generation supercomputer, Cray III, which is expected to be available on the market in 1990. This supercomputer will be based on digital gallium arsenide integrated circuits.

31. In September 1987, Cray announced that it had stopped its MP project, saying that it grew beyond the original vision, both in terms of technological risk and budget. The MP supercomputer scheduled to be introduced in 1990 was designed to be four times as powerful as Cray's next generation Cray III. The MP is a parallel processor, which splits up a problem into many parts and uses a number of processors working simultaneously to come up with a solution.

32. Parallel machines are expected to be extremely important in the future, especially because they promise much greater performance than the classical sequentially operating computers. Actually, DARPA is supporting partially the development of the RP 3 parallel processor by IBM and New York University which will serve as a testbed for various kinds of parallel architectures. At the moment, however it is too early to predict which kind of parallel architecture will be dominant or what performance levels are likely to be found in future years. So far, parallel hardware has always fallen short of performance expectations. Here, it should be kept in mind that mere processing speed, which currently attains astonishingly high figures, is not the sole determinant of a computer's performance capabilities. Computer performance is also dependent on memory size and the speed with which data flow from the computer's memory to the computational units inside the

machine. Moreover, the development of software applicable to the parallel machines will require a major effort, if one bears in mind that it has taken more than thirty years to build up today's base of sequential software.


Software and standard common computer language

33. In Document 1007, a section was devoted to software and the Ada and LTR computer languages. It need not therefore be explained in detail that the ability of military computers to function in a coherent and timely fashion is largely a function of software. In fact, experts agree that the rate at which software can be developed and deployed will ultimately determine the speed with which computer systems penetrate and transform warfare. An ever-larger share of total information system cost has to be spent on computer programmes. According to the United States Department of Defence, half of the purchase cost of an average on-board computer for military aircraft is for software, while software costs are responsible for about 80% of the life-cycle cost of the system.

34. The United States Department of Defence spent \$10 billion on software for fiscal year 1985 alone. In 1990, this sum will already amount to \$30 billion, which is \$90 million a day.

35. Ada, the software language of French origin which became American national standard through the Department of Defence, has since been extended to other United States Government agencies such as the Federal Aviation Agency and NASA space station project. Sales of programmes written in Ada were at about \$200 000 in 1985, but are expected to rise to \$1.6 billion in 1988 and to \$15 billion in 1991.

36. Table 1 hereafter⁴ provides a clear illustration of the expected growth of Ada applications in the United States.



Forecast growth in military (left) and civil (right) Ada applications

37. Japan, in an effort led by NTT and Mitsubishi, is at present engaged in a major

software production automation effort, also based on Ada.

3. Report of the United States Defence Science Board Task Force on Defence Semiconductor Dependency, page 66.

4. "Air and Cosmos monthly", September 1987.

38. Recently, the European Space Agency (ESA) chose Ada for all its big future projects.

39. Even if Europe was previously well-placed in this sector, this situation has changed radically. The United States is now holding 50% of the world market, with a two-thirds share of the European market.

Susceptibility to nuclear explosions

40. With the increasing high dependency of western defence systems on electronics it is not without interest to note that within 3 to 5 nanoseconds a single high-altitude nuclear explosion could disable virtually every kind of unprotected electronic circuit. Without effective countermeasures, the nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP) resulting from an explosion of 10 to 50 megatons at 400 kilometres above the ground could render useless every electronic device within an over 300 kilometres radius. Computer and telecommunications switching circuits and volatile semiconductor memories would be most vulnerable. Damage to crucial weapons control systems could be irreversible within the limited time available to respond.

41. The abovementioned explosion is "clean" and creates no shock wave or fallout. For this reason, some military strategists regard a NEMP attack as non-nuclear, not necessarily inviting nuclear retaliation, which further increases its probability.

42. All contracts of the United States and Western European departments of defence already include specifications for NEMP protection in all weapons, avionics and communications systems.

III. Applications of advanced microelectronics technology in defence systems

43. Advanced microelectronics are at present used in very many areas. Information technology has a place in all defence systems and now offers unlimited possibilities. Your Rapporteur wishes to present a few significant examples.

Command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I)

44. With the present electronic means of data-processing, military commanders are able to lead a battle in real time, without any significant delay between discovery of information, assembly, transmission, assessment, taking the provoked decision and the transmission and reception of the ensuing order. This whole new complex of events, taking place at practically the same time, is designated C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence).

45. According to an extensive manoeuvre control system (MCS) designed by the United

States Department of Defence for the European theatre, this real time battle management would be performed with the help of many integrated systems, among which are mentioned:

- the 18 Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft, which are able to direct the battle from the air within a radius of several hundreds of kilometres with automatic data-transmission between aircraft and ground through the joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) which interconnects the American ground and air forces in Europe;
- the 42 Boeing JSTARS (joint surveillance and target attack radar system) aircraft of the United States army which will be the equivalent of AWACS for detecting ground movements and will also ensure real-time data-transmission. Smaller versions of this system will be used for interventions in restricted areas;
- the NATO identification system (NIS) will automatically distinguish between friend and foe aircraft. In 1985, agreement was reached within NATO to develop this system. This is one of the programmes actually funded by the 1985 Nunn amendment;
- the position location reporting system (PLRS) which should allow each vehicle or aircraft equipped with it to be located with a precision of 15 to 25 metres;
- the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), being introduced in 1987, which gives the United States army mobile integrated communication at army corps level, similar to the Franco-Belgian RITA system.

46. It will however not be easy to fulfil this C3I system completely, because of the lack of software to allow the integration of all these military communication systems on a European scale.

47. Meanwhile, a number of Western European nations have started to introduce or to develop their own C3I system. According to a long-standing and much cherished European tradition, all these systems are different. Among others there are Heros for West German forces, Wavell/Ptarmigan for the British, Catrin and its subsystems for the Italian and Sacra for the French.

48. In 1989, French, West German, United Kingdom and United States army staff cells will make an attempt to interoperate their C3I systems, of which only one will by then be fully fielded at the tactical level. Success in this interoperation attempt might be a first step to

achieve a NATO battlefield information collection and exploitation system (BICES), which aims at improvements in the collection, fusion and dissemination of intelligence information by the interconnection of all national and NATO systems already fielded, under development or planned.

49. BICES was accepted in June 1986 by the NATO tri-service group as an outline NATO staff target and now is a programme under the provisions of the 1985 Nunn amendment.

50. The goals set for BICES are initial operational capability by 1992 and full operational capability by the year 2000.

51. The budget involved in C3I is rising sharply over the years and should not be underestimated. The United States Department of Defence is planning to spend approximately \$150 billion during the five-year period 1986-90, an 80% increase compared to the \$83 billion it spent during the years 1981-85.

Guidance of weapons systems

52. An excellent example of the use of computers and other advanced technology is a highly-sophisticated guidance system for stand-off tactical missiles which should allow pilots to attack a ground target without having it in sight. This new system combining holography and optical computing is currently being developed by the United States Air Force armament division together with private companies. In an operational system, a holographic or three-dimensional image will be stored in the missile and the seeker will use an optical computer to compare the image with what it is receiving from the missile's active sensors. Holograms are three-dimensional images created by using a laser to split the original image and recombine it.

53. In an optical computer, light is used instead of wires to transmit the information. Because light can cross itself without shorting out, the optical computer can process the entire image in a very small space, which means it can fit into a missile.

54. The holographic images in this case are created from infrared images, using standard images and backgrounds which are selected from a data base and extensively processed by computer.

55. A final day and night operational system could be ready for deployment around 1995.

Automatic target recognition

56. Image-processing technology, which combines microchips resulting from the VHSIC programme with a computer architecture called parallel-processing, is now being used to develop

important new tactical capabilities for pinpointing and destroying targets. This system is called automatic target recognition (ATR).

57. Martin Marietta, one of the companies involved in the ATR development, is making use of geometric arithmetic parallel processors (GAPP) to analyse images provided by electro-optical sensors. Because GAPPs can be interconnected and are able to process data in parallel – unlike conventional computers which process data serially – there is an unprecedented progress in speed. Martin Marietta is developing a miniature computer of a 10 × 10 × 6 inch size which will be able to perform more than 400 billion operations per second when equipped with GAPPs. It is said that while a human pilot takes 12 seconds for target recognition under favourable conditions, an ATR system could do it in 0.03 to 0.1 seconds under any conditions.

Logistics, supply, planning and maintenance of weapons systems

58. In this field again, a Pentagon initiative, the computer-aided logistic support project, is a framework for a series of innovative programmes where computers are the main tool to help the armed forces meet their requirements for the future. Among these programmes should be cited here: the integrated maintenance information system (IMIS). In wartime, several types of aircraft may be operating from one forward air base, while not enough manpower is available to provide a specialist for each type of aircraft. The same ground crew should therefore be capable to repair different types of aircraft. With IMIS it should be possible to condense diagnostic and repair instruction manuals into a mobile, automated computer display about the size of a briefcase which can be used by maintenance personnel working on the flight line at austere airfields. The mechanic will be able to plug the computer into the aircraft to diagnose the problem, learn the best way to repair it and receive a list of the necessary parts involved. By feeding directly off the aircraft's databus network, the computer can use the aircraft's own sensors and computer as well as its own diagnostic capabilities to locate problems.

59. Another programme is aiming at the creation of a data base of the logistics experience gained from previous wars and experience in simulated wartime situations. By putting these facts together, the armed service involved should be able to predict what might occur and then have the right thing in the right place at the right time.

60. The last of these programmes to be mentioned here is project crew chief, in which computer specialists are working with field technicians to help engineers design equipment with maintenance features in mind.

61. The way so-called artificial intelligence can be used to help improve battle management is clearly demonstrated in the following example: For its air/land battle management doctrine, the United States Army would like to have a system which can automate planning of the manoeuvre control functions at corps and division levels, and do the same for artillery fire control planning at the corps level.

62. Eventually, it is hoped to see artificial intelligence applied to planning all the army's air/land battle functions on all staff levels. This will enable commanders to act far more quickly by slashing the time necessary for preparing and distributing operations orders. This would encompass the corps, division, brigade and battalion levels, all of which have staffs to do advance planning and the five functions that the army considers crucial to air/land battle management doctrine:

- manoeuvre control;
- artillery fire control;
- air defence;
- intelligence electronic warfare and combat service or logistical support.

63. At present, it can take twelve hours to plan an engagement at the corps level and six at a division, while a company or battery may have only forty-five minutes to prepare. One reason it takes so long is that information arteries are clogged. More than 500 messages and sensor reports per hour flood into each command staff section during intense engagement and fewer than 20% can be fully processed. An artificial intelligence system could be developed to process this information.

Integrated electronic warfare system

64. A very important field of application for both VHSIC and MIMIC technology will be the integrated electronic warfare system (INEWS).

65. The United States Air Force and Navy have both started developing new tactical fighters, known respectively as the advanced tactical fighter (ATF) and the advanced tactical aircraft (ATA). At the moment, Lockheed and Northrop are competing for the ATF order, while Northrop/Grumman and McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics teams are competing for the ATA order.

66. With a view to providing an efficient electronic warfare system for these future tactical fighters, both services have started the INEWS programme.

67. INEWS should include several functions previously performed by separate systems or not performed at all:

- radar/threat warning (also locating and identifying enemy aircraft);

- missile detection and warning;
- jamming of enemy communications and data links;
- laser radiation detection and warning;
- jamming against anti-aircraft missiles;
- navigation and identification communications;
- infrared signals searching and tracking.

68. MIMIC technology is expected to yield very significant cost reductions in the technology needed for expendable or semi-expendable active decoys, the latter being towed behind an aircraft to attract radar-guided anti-aircraft missiles.

69. MIMIC should accelerate the development of active aperture phased array radars for EW applications. Application of VHSIC technology has already shown that it can provide significant volumetric savings in jamming pods, thus making room to add capabilities to such systems to meet new threats. Moreover it offers significantly greater reliability for the system.

70. At present it is not yet quite clear whether the INEWS programme will meet its goal of production by mid-1993. In the short term, however, experts foresee great opportunities in using the results of VHSIC and MIMIC programmes in the INEWS development to upgrade existing EW systems.

71. In June 1986, two teams were selected from the five contenders in Phase 1A of the programme. These teams, Sanders Associates/General Electric and TRW/Westinghouse, each received a contract of \$48.3 million for Phase 1B. It is thought that each of these teams is investing another \$48.3 million in the programme. Phase 1B should end by late 1989 when the winner should begin full-scale development.

IV. Europe's defence electronics industry, a sector under threat

72. Given the often publicly confessed determination of governments and politicians at all levels to stimulate arms co-operation, restructure the market and maybe even the industry for defence equipment, it is not surprising that this subject is often examined in the media.

73. There is one outstanding report, however, which provides a fairly accurate and reliable, sometimes even ruthless, assessment of the capabilities of the European defence industry. This report, "Towards a stronger Europe", was written by the European Defence Industry Study Team (hence the name EDIS report) by order of the Defence Ministers of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and pre-

sented to them in December 1986. An assessment of the technological threat facing Europe's defence industry is made in enclosure 3 of volume 2 of the EDIS report, a special study by General Technology Systems Ltd.. In paragraphs 73 to 91, your Rapporteur will rely on the findings of this study.

74. The EDIS report has made it clear that Europe's defence industry is performing very well in practically all sectors of equipment except in electronics, guided missiles and materials. Unfortunately enough, these are key sectors for many if not all future developments of defence equipment.

Electronics

75. There is a European lag in microelectronics, particularly in high-speed very large-scale integration (VLSI) systems, in some aspects of advanced optoelectronics and in the harnessing of computer software and hardware to systems.

76. This is a fast-developing and intensely competitive sector of both civil and military industries with the same basic technology but different applications. There is a major threat to European electronics industries given the rapid pace of development and the speed with which the United States and Japan can move from development to marketable systems. Even the survival of this sector of European industry could be at stake if no appropriate measures are taken.

77. Electronics is an essential enabling technology which pervades all modern defence weapon and operational systems. Its prime manifestation is in the collection, transfer and processing of information. Advances in electronics technology and its closely-related field of information technology (IT) have had the greatest impact of all technological advances on the nature of warfare in modern times. Countermeasures to the transfer of information give rise to the rapidly-growing field of electronic warfare. The integration of the gathering of information, its processing, the formulation of required action and its communication to field units, etc., all through electronics based means, give rise to the C 3I (command, control, communication, intelligence) concepts of the prosecution of warfare.

Microelectronics

78. This underlying circuit and component technology provides the capability for handling large quantities of information and the prosecution of electronic processes within a very small physical space and with the consumption of very small quantities of electrical energy per operation. The inherent small-scale geometry of such multi-circuit components also allows speeds of

operation not possible with previous discrete component assemblies. Microelectronics has not only reduced size, weight and power requirements but also made possible advances in all aspects of electronics applications not previously feasible. Though microelectronics is largely concerned with multiple circuits on single "chips" (of silicon or GaAs for example) for digital or analogue processing operations, the topic is allied to optoelectronic devices such as lasers for launching signals along fibre-optic transmission lines, detector arrays, phase splitters, etc. and millimetric circuits.

Digital computers

79. These are a ubiquitous element of most modern electronic-based military systems, including navigation, weapon aiming, missile guidance, communications, for data-processing on all weapon platforms, in semi-autonomous or autonomous weapons, image-processing and recognition, expert systems, artificial intelligence applications, robotics, etc.

Systems integration

80. To perform their military functions, electronic (and other) equipments have to be linked together as overall, fully-integrated systems. The construction of a system occurs at several different levels. For example, in an aircraft, the avionics including navigation, weapon aiming, weapon management, flight instruments, autopilot, A-I radar, optoelectronic sensors, radar warning receiver displays, communications, etc., may all be linked together by a digital databus. Similar systems, but of greater complexity because of the wider range of weapons and sensors, are integrated as A-10 systems on surface warships and submarines. At a higher level, an area air defence system requires the linking of surveillance radars, ground-based missile systems, air interceptors and central control stations. Systems architecture design and the reliability of the resulting software are critically important to the successful operation of such systems at all levels of complexity.

81. The EDIS report concludes that even if the IEPG member states, both individually and collectively, are aware of the importance of electronics as a key element in economic success and both national and industrial research and development investment in Europe in this field is high, many still consider it to be inadequate to meet the challenge of its competitors.

82. It further identified some areas in the electronics field where Europe has a particularly weak performance. Europe is lagging in the development of advanced high-speed multi-current chips and application specific integrated circuits (ASIC) for military use.

83. Europe is said to be ahead of its competitors in battlefield communications systems but there is doubt whether it can match United States competence in large-scale strategic systems of the class of the joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) as deployed with the Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft.

84. In software and systems architecture, though Europe has developed considerable expertise, there is a need to build up a sounder base in large scale systematisation and adoption of common standards.

85. In general, there still remains a dependence upon United States sources for certain electronic components required for incorporation in indigenous European designs which can inhibit their sales to third countries.

86. The digital computation field is also identified as an important European weakness. Otherwise competitive equipments and systems design are not always adequately supported by their dedicated computational capability.

87. For the future, the competitive threat from the United States in the field may be expected to increase, as advances in information technology, high-speed digital devices (the United States VHSIC programmes, for example, and GaAs technology) have an impact on new products and systems.

Guided weapons

88. For obvious reasons, the development of guided weapons is largely dependant on new developments in microelectronics, radar, optoelectronics, millimetric wave techniques and image and signal processing. Especially the new generation of smart weapons, a fire and forget category will, among other things, require complex computational capability in a very small space. As a result of its greater funding, the United States certainly has a technological lead, particularly in sensors and computation capability for the new generation of smart guided weapons.

89. The EDIS report concluded that, though Europe has a good technology base in practically all techniques required, the massive United States effort on these topics could have severe implications for the future competitiveness of European technology in weapon system guidance – the key to weapon effectiveness. The present and future European position is weakened not only by the impact of new technological advances in the electronics-based fields but also by the fragmentation of effort arising from the development and production of internally, directly competitive weapon systems.

90. The ability of the United States, as a nationally-integrated defence entity, to concen-

trate on a relatively limited number of types, compared with the competitive diversity of types produced by individual European countries, is a significant advantage enjoyed by the United States.

91. At this moment, there are some examples of successful European co-operation in this field, such as the HOT anti-tank missile and the Roland surface-to-air missile, both by the Franco-German firm Euromissile. On the other hand, it remains to be seen if the complementary United States-European development of the AMRAAM (advanced medium-range air-to-air missile) and ASRAAM (advanced short-range air-to-air missile) missiles will fulfil expectations. At present, the ASRAAM, being developed as a European joint venture, is said to be about five years behind the United States AMRAAM timetable.

Materials technology

92. Materials technology finds application across all defence equipment sectors. It should be noted that the present wave of advances in electronics is almost wholly dependent on materials technology, primarily in the area of semiconductor materials such as silicon, gallium arsenide, III-V alloys, etc. In Europe, several successful research programmes in this field have been conducted, which made it approach the United States lead. On the other hand, Europe is lagging in much of the manufacturing technology associated with the exploitation of the properties of these materials.

V. The semiconductor industry

93. In the introduction to this report, semiconductors have already been referred to as the crude oil of the twenty-first century. A rapid examination of technical developments in recent years is convincing proof of this:

- 1947: Transistor effect – starting point of a gigantic technological revolution;
- 1950-60: Industrialisation of this invention and start of the industrial informatics era;
- 1960-70: Industrialisation of integrated circuits. Intelligence reserved for large systems;
- 1970-80: Birth of large-scale integration (LSI). Microprocessors. Each transistor is measured in microns;
- Today: Very-large-scale integration (VLSI) and very-high-scale integrated circuits (VHSIC);
- Tomorrow: Volumetric integration. Bioelectronics.

Indeed they are the crude oil of modern industry, providing the building blocks for developments in new electronic components, the replacement of out-of-date devices and at the same time inducing the growth of new electronic-based industries. Semiconductors are the main generators of product innovation and development. This has been the main reason for many governments to have stressed the need to assist in the development of a local industry, based in particular on the premise that technical ability in semiconductor production and innovation ability in the industry are necessary in order to be at the leading edge of potential downstream growth industries which are semiconductor intensive. Unfortunately enough, European governments have been very late in realising this.

94. The following table⁵ provides a revealing picture of the development of the relative position of Western Europe in comparison with the United States and Japan regarding the world production of integrated circuits:

*Shares in world production
of integrated circuits
(percentages)*

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
US	68.2	68.8	73.3	71.6	69.5	67.8	66.9	66.8
Western Europe	6.7	6.2	5.8	6.3	5.9	5.6	5.4	5.1
Japan	17.8	18.0	19.8	20.7	23.4	25.4	26.4	26.7
TOTAL	92.7	93.0	98.9	98.6	98.8	98.8	98.7	98.6

95. Figures in this table are calculated on the concept of the home base of the producing firms. The trends shown in this table, where the 1983 to 1985 figures are estimates, have not improved for Europe since then. According to the February 1987 report of the United States Defence Science Board Task Force on defence semiconductor dependency, figures are much worse for the United States share in the worldwide semiconductor market. The report says that the United States share dropped from 67% in 1975 to 50% in 1986 while Japan went from 25% in 1975 to 39% in 1986. The Japanese gain was at the expense of both European and United States semiconductor-chip-only producers. With a share of 5.9% of world integrated circuit production in 1982, Western Europe's share in world integrated circuits consumption was 20%. The share of Western Europe in the world's semiconductor production was 12.3% in 1978 and 8.5% in 1982.

96. The next table⁶ gives a development of the world top list of semiconductor industries (by

5. Source: The semiconductor industry, trade-related issues, OECD 1985.

6. Source: Report of the United States Defence Science Board Task Force on Defence Semiconductor Dependency.

sales volume), with the figure for 1986 based upon industry estimates.

World top list of semiconductor producers

1975		1980		1986 (est.)	
Texas		Texas		NEC	J
Instruments	USA	Instruments	USA	Hitachi	J
Fairchild	USA	Motorola	USA	Toshiba	J
National	USA	Philips	NL	Texas	
Motorola	USA	NEC	J	Instruments	USA
Philips	NL	National	USA	Motorola	USA
Intel	USA	Toshiba	J	Fujitsu	J
		Hitachi	J	Philips	NL
		Intel	USA	Intel	USA
		Fairchild	USA	Matsushita	J
		Siemens	FRG	National	USA

97. The situation in the European semiconductor industry is paradoxical, because, as so often, parochial considerations yet again are stronger than the urge for integration.

98. Instead of offering the industry a large and unified market to achieve the scale needed for high-volume production which is considered a key to leadership in this sector, the market has in practice become regionalised. This was mainly a consequence of national policy efforts, concerned to build up a broadly-based semiconductor industry. In the meantime, high common external tariffs at European Community level and national policies to foster domestic industries and reduce the technological gap between European producers and the United States and Japan led to the installation in Europe of foreign, mainly United States, producers or joint ventures.

99. European producers have extensive ties with United States and Japanese semiconductor producers mainly to obtain access to their output and process technology and to widen their product base. For too long there has been an evident lack of close inter-firm co-operation between European firms which will likely retard the growth of a locally-based European semiconductor industry.

100. Agreements between European firms and their United States and Japanese partners to allow European firms to remain or become serious competitors can only be considered a stopgap and one of many factors in helping the reinforcement of international competitiveness. The European industry has a weak record for the exploitation of innovations, particularly in standard products.

101. Europe as a whole, admittedly, has not given up. The European Community has set up the Esprit programme and a number of related programmes. These programmes will be discussed in Chapters VI and VII.

102. In the meantime, the European semiconductor industry has not been idle. In April 1987, Thomson-CSF of France and STET, the Italian state telecommunications enterprise, announced that they would form a joint venture between their civilian semiconductor divisions Thomson Semi-conducteurs and SGS Microelettronica. This joint venture would be the second largest Western European manufacturer of semiconductors with expected sales of more than \$800 million and 3.2% of the world market. First in Western Europe is Philips-Signetics with a sale of \$1.36 billion in 1986.

103. Siemens AG of West Germany recently unveiled samples of a four-million-bit memory chip which it is developing together with Philips NV of the Netherlands.

104. Even so, these efforts have not been enough by far to ensure a comfortable position for the European semi-conductor industry well into the next century. In September 1987, the EECA (European Electronic Component Manufacturers' Association) published a white paper calling for action by the European Communities with "well-directed policies, in the creation of unified European home markets and in the starting of projects that lead to new manufacturing technologies and products".

105. Among other things it asked more specifically for a concentrated research and development effort that is selectively deployed and effectively subsidised, quoting Esprit, Eureka and Race as examples. It thought rigorous measures were needed not only because the market for integrated circuits is growing and has a promising future but also because the market position of the major competitors is not yet established. Furthermore, it pointed out that the Far East is clearly aiming at the conquest of overseas markets with huge new production facilities which could lead to world-wide overcapacity, while the United States is gradually leaning towards protectionism.

106. The EECA recognised that the European integrated circuit industry receives substantial government support, but says that this support is much less effective than in the United States or Japan for two main reasons. The first is that "too many small sums are spread over too many small projects and over too many countries. And they are, further, unevenly distributed. For example, support in the United Kingdom is less than one third of that in Germany and France". The other is that "it is mainly research projects that are subsidised and only recently has the need for support that leads to manufacturing technologies and manufacturable products been recognised".

107. On two recent occasions, events in the United States semiconductor business have

caused the greatest concern in the Pentagon. The first time was when in 1986 the Japanese computer giant Fujitsu Ltd. announced that it was planning to take over Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. in California. Fairchild, a pioneer in the chip industry, is particularly known for emitter-coupled logic chips, a special type of semiconductor which is widely used in large mainframes and supercomputers. The Reagan administration at that time also expressed its determination to ensure that the United States electronics industry, particularly makers of leading-edge technology, vital for the military world, would not become dependent on Japanese-owned semiconductor manufacturers⁷. At the same time, it showed annoyance with the outcome of an agreement between the United States and Japan in July 1986 regarding trade in semiconductors. This five-year accord called for both governments to set up a price-monitoring system to prevent Japanese manufacturers from dumping their chips on the United States market. It also required the Japanese Government to make efforts to give United States microchips wider access to the Japanese market. In February 1987, American manufacturers charged that their Japanese counterparts were wilfully subverting the agreement. In retaliation, the United States imposed 100% tariffs on some Japanese electronics, which incidentally after a few months were cancelled again.

108. Great concern was also expressed on the second occasion by big computer manufacturers in the United States, while the Pentagon and the CIA warned against threats to national security when, at the end of 1968, GCA Corp. was in heavy financial trouble. GCA Corp. is among the last American makers of "wafer steppers", which are essential machines for a semiconductor production line. These machines are optical devices which expose the pattern of circuitry on silicon chips, aligning each layer of gates and transistors within a hundred thousandth of an inch.

109. Many of its customers said that GCA had lost tremendous ground to Nikon Inc., Canon Inc., and the ASM division of Philips NV, implying that the centre of development of state-of-the-art technology for making semiconductors is no longer in the United States.

110. In a recent CIA report it was concluded that without such technology, United States companies could face extraordinary difficulty in designing submicron circuits - those in which the lines of circuitry are less than 25 thousandths of an inch wide. Achieving such submicron scales is considered critical to the design of 4 and

7. As a result of government and private industry efforts, Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. was sold by its owner Schlumberger Ltd. to National Semiconductor in October 1987.

16-megabit memory chips and complex micro-processors.

111. In February 1987, the United States Defence Science Board Task Force on semiconductor dependency released a report which concluded that the United States was rapidly losing manufacturing capability in integrated circuits. It viewed the growing dependence on foreign sources of semiconductors as a national problem of concern to both the Defence Department and the economy of the whole nation.

112. The report also provided a comparison of American and Japanese chip technologies. Japan was found ahead in all types of memory chips, which store and retrieve data, and gaining quickly in the American strongholds of micro-processors and other logic chips, which perform calculations and execute programmes. Furthermore it found that Japan held a lead in gallium arsenide technology, increasingly used by the defence industry instead of silicon chips for optical sensors and high-speed semiconductors.

113. The report established slim American leads in several processing technologies and computer-aided engineering, critical to chip design, although the Japanese led in packaging and testing of semiconductors. In general, the report stated that the United States chip technology was steadily deteriorating relative to the technology in Japan.

114. The Defence Science Board Task Force called the difference in industrial practices and structure between the United States and Japan the major reason for the relative inadequacy of technology development in both countries. From 1970 through 1985, Japanese companies invested 35% of sales in plant and equipment compared with 20% for United States companies. In research and development the ratio was 13% to 10%.

115. According to the Japan Electronics Industry Association, Japan's semiconductor imports from the United States in 1985 totalled \$63 million against exports of \$169.3 million. Japan has captured more than one-third of the world market for semiconductors. Capital investment by the top nine Japanese semiconductor manufacturers totalled \$2.5 billion in 1984.

116. For the development of basic technology, Japan organised co-operative arrangements avoiding duplication, many of them under the co-ordinating leadership of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) or Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT). In the application of the resulting technology to products, the companies compete again. It should be noted that this Japanese system is not unlike the European Esprit system. Japan, however, unlike

Europe, does not have to count with the cherished but expensive European hobbies such as nationalistic rivalries, a segregated international market and duplication or even multiplication of research.

117. The Defence Science Board called for the creation of a government-industry consortium to focus on advanced manufacturing techniques in order to restore the United States edge in semiconductor technology. This consortium should be formed by private semiconductor companies, capitalised with about \$250 million and supported by \$200 million per year in Defence Department contracts.

118. Also in February 1987, the largest United States manufacturers of computer chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment agreed to create a company, Sematech, aimed at improving domestic competitiveness to overturn Japanese domination in this key industry.

119. Sematech (Semiconductor manufacturing technology consortium) has three specific tasks: to conduct research and development on advanced semiconductor manufacturing techniques, to test and demonstrate these techniques on a pilot production line and to adapt those techniques to the manufacturing of a wide variety of products. At this time, a six-year programme is envisaged starting in late 1987 and ultimately aimed at developing manufacturing technology for feature sizes of 0.35 micron with a total budget of \$1.5 billion. For the \$250 million annual budget, funding is sought from the federal, state and local governments and from the participating private companies. The United States Senate has already voted \$125 million representing the Federal Government share for 1988 and 1989.

VI. National and regional policies

Europe

120. Well aware of the technological threat, Europe has started a wide variety of programmes on virtually all levels of co-operation to face it. In this section of the report, an attempt will be made to provide a survey of these programmes.

The European Community

121. To meet the technological challenge on the world market, the European Community has established a "framework programme" for pre-competitive research in a number of important areas. Of special interest for the subject under consideration are Esprit (European strategic programmes for research in information technologies) and Race (Research and development in advanced communications technologies in

Europe), even if they are both of a purely civilian nature.

Esprit

122. On 28th February 1984, the European Council adopted the first phase of the Esprit programme, a strategic programme designed to give the Community a fundamental technological basis. The programme was conceived for a ten-year period with three main objectives:

- to provide the European information technology industry with the basic technologies it needs to meet the competitive requirements of the nineties;
- to promote European industrial co-operation in information technology;
- to contribute to the development of internationally-accepted standards.

For the first five-year phase of the programme an overall effort of 1 500 million ECU was foreseen, 50% of which was to be borne by the research budget of the Community. The programme is implemented by means of a public call for proposals, which is based upon an annual up-dated work programme adopted by the Council.

123. Esprit offers an opportunity for European countries and laboratories to launch international co-operative research and development activities in order to maximise the effective management of similar research. The programme is focused on microelectronics, software technology, advanced information-processing, office systems and computer integrated manufacturing. The European Community as one of the co-financers is able to co-direct the nature of research. Participating private companies share costs, while results of research must be shared with due regard for rights of the investors proper. An important feature of Esprit is the creation of an advanced electronic network to enable exchange of information between all participants in the programme, which in the long term should be part of a network spread over the whole Community with a permanent interest for all researchers in the European Community. In Esprit, the development of advanced chips to keep up with the United States and Japan is estimated to be of the greatest importance.

124. It is hoped that in November 1987 the European Council will finally adopt Phase 2 of the Esprit programme within the new research framework programme for the years 1987-91. The total European Community budget for this second five-year phase, which will actually start in spring 1988, should amount to 1.6 billion ECU, while another 1.6 billion ECU should be contributed by the participating industry. The purpose will be to double research and devel-

opment capacity thanks to a number of research workers carrying out joint work, who may number 5 500 by 1990.

*Resource estimates
(Community contribution in million ECU)⁸*

	1984/86	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993 +	Total
Activities second phase (1987-1991)	-	-	263.5	465	404	137.5	330	-	1 600
Activities first phase (1984-1988)	560	173.5	16.5	-	-	-	-	-	750
Grand total	560 ⁹	173.5	280	465	404	147.5	330		2 350
Payment credits									
Grand total	263.6 ⁹	187.4	174.5	373	430	311.5	310	300	2 350

125. In December 1986, the European Commission presented a report to the Council with an assessment of the progress and the result of the first phase of Esprit so far. It was said in the report that Esprit had succeeded in promoting trans-European co-operation between information technology organisations. Apart from universities and research institutes, 240 different industrial companies are participating in 201 projects, with an estimated 2 900 researchers involved. More ambitious research projects of broader scope had been instituted and their execution was accelerated. Specific results with major industrial impact had already been achieved. One of these results was a demonstrator of a 10 k array bipolar chip, comparable with the best available in the world, for which Siemens was building a new 100 million ECU production line. In another project, six major European computer companies (Bull, GEC, ICL, Nixdorf, Olivetti and Siemens) are co-operating with the goal of producing software faster, safer and more efficiently than the current state of the art.

126. In the microelectronics subprogramme, activities are concentrated on two main themes, vital for a competitive position of Europe to supply its information technology industry. These themes are:

- computer-aided design (CAD) to provide fast, easy-to-use tools to design integrated circuits (ICs) tailored to specific needs;
- processing technology to provide the technological capability of manufacturing ICs notably in the more promising sectors of digital signal-processing, very-high-speed applications and optical transmission.

8. Calculated on the basis of a 50% contribution to research and development projects. The resources for accompanying measures and personnel are allocated proportionally to the research and development sectors.

9. Including commitment and payment appropriations carried over.

127. In the research programme for complementary metal oxide semiconductors (CMOS) technology running parallel with the CAD programme dedicated goals should result in production use of 1.25 micron device chips early in 1988 and of 1 micron device chips early in 1990.

128. Other areas of specific interest covered by Esprit programmes are to be found in the advanced information-processing (AIP) sub-programme, which includes projects for digital image-processing, speech-processing and optical processing. In this framework, parallel processing should also be mentioned, as this subject is also the focus of main efforts in the United States (DARPA) and Japan (fifth-generation programme) in order to design new computer architectures. In Esprit, most work on parallel architectures is carried out in a project with Philips, AEG, Bull, CSELT and Nixdorf. The Commission concluded that the AIP projects in Esprit currently play an important part in international discussions, but in the meantime called for closer co-operation among projects and quick exploitation of results.

129. Note should also be taken of the inevitable spin-off from Esprit in respect of normalisation, a particularly important area where, in spite of the amount of work done, much ground remains to be covered.

Race

130. Race, the programme for research and development in advanced telecommunications technologies, deals with advanced research into optical fibres and optoelectronic technology. Among other things it will pave the way to video-telephones. One of its most important aims is the setting up of networks of compatible equipment throughout Europe.

131. In its proposal to the Council to establish the Race programme the Commission stated that telecommunications is a very important sector with in 1985 a world-wide turnover of 40 billion ECU with revenues in the service sector of around 200 billion ECU. Moreover the Commission made it clear that the availability of telecommunications infrastructure will in a very high degree be determining for the location of future activities with a high added value.

132. It is estimated that, in the European Community alone, in the next ten years around 500 billion ECU will be invested in telecommunications infrastructure, services and terminal equipment. In the next twenty years the investment is estimated at 1 500 billion ECU.

133. In the period 1987-91, the European Community will finance a maximum of 500 million ECU in this Race programme – instead of the 850 million ECU proposed by the Commission –

as contributions in the financing of activities of a precommercial and standardising nature.

Delta

134. The programme Delta (developing European learning through technological advance) will receive 20 million ECU from the Communities (50% of the estimated cost) for its eighteen-month developing phase. Delta should be the link between education and learning programmes in technology in Esprit and Race.

Brain

135. Another programme, Brain (basic research in adaptive research and neurocomputing), is in the process of being set up. At the beginning of 1987, the European Commission invited prominent European scientists to prepare a research programme on artificial intelligence and more specifically on so-called "adaptive" intelligence. In fact, it is aimed at developing computers which will not only – as normally is the case – act in sequences, but will use parallel channels and call on their memory to deal with new situations. It is proposed that Brain be financed in the framework of the European research stimulation programme ("Europe for researchers", adopted in 1984 for the years 1985-88) and be granted 20 million ECU to start it in 1987-88.

Outside the European Community

Eureka

136. A programme of a different nature is Eureka, involving projects close to producing marketable products or concepts. Eureka was launched in 1985 on a French initiative, in which are now participating all member countries of the European Community plus Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. Eureka programmes are clearly industry-led with the companies themselves judging the market opportunities to be aimed at. In the long term it is hoped to reduce subsidies to a minimum and other public aid to Eureka, which still provide 39% of the financial resources of the programme. Computer technology, research in new materials and communication technology are still among the sectors represented, but the last meeting of participating countries at ministerial level in September 1987 clearly indicated a shift away from the emphasis given to telecommunications and information technology when Eureka started.

137. Acceptance of Eureka projects by ministers in their half-yearly meeting does not mean that a budget is assured. Each national government after official approval has to assess if and how it will subsidise the projects from its own national budget.

138. After the last meeting of ministers of the nineteen participating countries in Madrid in September 1987, approval was given to a total of 165 projects. All in all, a total number of 600 industries, universities and research institutes are now engaged in the Eureka framework, with an investment budget of nearly 4 billion ECU.

IEPG – co-operative technology projects

139. In 1985 the ministers of defence of the IEPG countries (i.e. all the European members of NATO) identified several crucial technology fields for co-operative technology projects (CTPs). They agreed in principle on government funding for these projects. According to the EDIS report the fields identified are:

- high-speed microcircuits and associated materials;
- application of specific integrated circuits;
- sensors;
- data-processing;
- robotics;
- intelligent knowledge-based systems;
- systems engineering and integration (including software);
- smart weapons;
- advanced design and processing systems: computer guided design (CAD); computer-integrated manufacturing systems (CIM); flexible manufacturing systems (FMS); computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) and computer-aided testing (CAT);
- advanced materials.

Agreements between co-operating countries are established in a memorandum of understanding. Within the framework of such an agreement each country is responsible for the accomplishment of its own task. To date, most research and development projects under the responsibility of the IEPG Panel III, such as image-processing and the development of integrated software programme support, are in a pre-development phase. Some, such as microwave integrated circuits and GaAs analogue monolithic integrated circuits are in the development phase.

Bi- or multilateral co-operation agreements

140. Apart from the abovementioned co-operative projects or programmes in an institutionalised framework, there are in Europe a large number of co-operative ventures between two or more countries, or between private companies in different countries, in civilian as well as

in military information technology or specifically microelectronics.

141. A recent example which should be mentioned here is Franco-German co-operation to develop an avionics system for the PAH/HAP helicopter.

National programmes

142. It is not exaggerated to say that virtually each country in Western Europe is sustaining one or more research programmes in information technology. Among the big programmes, there is not one of an entirely military nature.

143. Although all European nations well realise that the size of their national markets will not allow them to meet the massive cost of research, development and marketing required to create and maintain a strong position in the international market for information technology, they still allocate most of their money to national programmes. The natural bias to maintain a national industry at whatever cost is not the only reason. Another key reason is that they want to sell their country and its industry as an effective and desirable partner in Europe, without which they would be unable to secure a fair return from programmes such as Esprit¹⁰.

United Kingdom

144. Curiously enough, in the 1950s it was the United States company Texas Instruments that established a plant in the United Kingdom to meet the British military requirements in integrated circuits. Later, many efforts were made to develop a British capability in this area. There are now several programmes including MISP and Alvey. MISP (microelectronics industry support programme) is aimed at stimulating the microelectronics industry in a commercial environment. Its objectives include the expansion of production of standard types of integrated circuits and the development of design and manufacturing capability for the design and manufacture of integrated circuits for specific uses. Over the years 1978-90 a total budget of £175 million has been allocated to this programme. The Alvey programme is much more ambitious. It is a five-year programme (1983-88) with a £300 million contribution by the government, £40 million of which is being contributed by the Ministry of Defence, while the other £260 million is contributed by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Science and Engineering Research Council. Industry should contribute the other £250 million of the total budget proposal for the programme. The five main key sectors covered by Alvey are: very large-scale integration, software

10. See: Information Technology – a plan for concerted action, pages 43-44.

engineering, intelligence knowledge-based systems, systems architecture and man/machine interface.

145. Even if Alvey is a programme of pre-competitive research, many products and processes resulting from it are already on sale or in commercial use. The programme consists of some 200 industry-led co-operative projects. Of these projects, mention is made here of the 1-micron CMOS-SOS whole process, which provides radiation chips, in demand for the space and defence market throughout Europe and the United States. In another project, 1.25 micron technology recently came into full production. Ella, a behavioural language improved with Alvey support, will now be adopted and standardised for all United Kingdom computer-aided design (CAD) systems. Among the speech- and image-processing projects, there is one for object identification from 2D images, with the aim to develop methods of automatically finding and identifying objects in images of complicated scenes, which has apparent applications in surveillance for security and defence.

Federal Republic of Germany

146. In recent years, the Federal Republic has increased its efforts to strengthen its position in semiconductor production through enhancing research and development. In a three-year (1982-84) special programme for microelectronic applications, the development of marketable products incorporating microelectronics was financed with DM 450 million. For the period 1984-88 a further DM 500 million was allocated to develop the microelectronic industry's capability in submicron technology for integrated circuits. It should be mentioned that, especially in the Federal Republic, there is great reluctance to label research and development projects as defence-oriented. In 1981, only 9% of government expenditure on research and development was openly defence-related.

147. In Germany, a working group composed of representatives of industry and the scientific world recently published its report on the directives for information technology policy until 2000. This working group concluded that the completion of a European internal market is of primordial importance.

148. Moreover, it emphasised that the government has an important rôle to play in supporting industry to allow it to find its place in the important strategic markets of the future in information technology. To this end, it estimates that the German Government should spend at least DM 1 billion annually.

149. The working group considered that the many programmes and public discussions, which have been dragging on for years, have not managed to convince parliaments, governments,

economists and public opinion of the real dimension of the problem, the extent of the efforts necessary and information technology's vast potential for innovation.

150. On European research programmes such as Esprit, it stated that at the moment these projects very often involve time-consuming administrative procedures, although in such projects time is a decisive factor for success.

France

151. France has chosen to encourage its electronics industry along the "filière" approach, pertaining to all economic activities in this area, integrated on the basis of markets, technology and capital structure. The overall programme, with a total funding effort of F 140 billion over a five-year (1983-87) period is called Mission Filière Electronique. Some 46% was to be provided by the government (including research grants by the armed forces and the telecommunications administration), almost 40% by French firms and only 14% by foreign firms. In practically each sub-sector the government set out to create one or two national champions, which absorbed the bulk of government funds, incorporating the activities of the other French electronic firms. The major French industrial groups in the electronics field were nationalised, which facilitated the whole process.

152. The purpose of this effort is to reinforce areas in electronics where it is believed France is relatively strong, such as telecommunications and software, and to catch up in areas where French industry is weak. Included is a programme to encourage the use of microelectronics (PUCE).

153. There is also the CITGV (circuits intégrés à très grande vitesse) programme, set up by the Defence Ministry's procurement office (DGA), in which a 2 micron device chip has already been produced, while production of a 1 micron chip should be started in 1989. In 1987, the French Government budget for research and development was estimated at F 80.2 billion, of which F 30.7 billion or 38.3% was spent by the Ministry of Defence.

154. At a recent colloquy organised by the General Secretariat for National Defence (SGDN) in France, it became clear that the French Délégation nationale pour l'armement is trying to work out a Eureka programme for military research. This programme might be based on Articles 24 and 30 of the single European act.

Italy

155. In Italy, a development programme for electronics for the years 1982-87 included an allocation for the integrated circuits industry. At

the outset a budget of \$157 million was foreseen.

A small country: the Netherlands

156. In September 1987, the Dutch Government published its annual policy review for technology which mentioned several programmes in the information technology field. The innovation-oriented research programme for integrated circuit technology (1985-92) for strategic research in universities has a Fl 27.2 million budget. The promotion programme for research and education in universities (1986-90) has an allocation of Fl 132.2 million. A five-year (1984-88) information technology promotion plan with a government funded budget of Fl 1.7 billion covers a vast range of activities from education to product innovation. Of the annual total budget for 1987 for technology programmes of Fl 2.2 billion, including Fl 112 million for defence-oriented research, about Fl 370 million is being spent on information technology policy.

Japan

157. There is no doubt that in technology Japan is an important competitor for Europe. In 1985, it spent \$35 billion on research and development, virtually all in the civilian sector (99%), while 71% of this amount came from private funds. Nevertheless, there is an extremely close relationship between the private sector and the state, in particular the Ministry of International Trade and industry (MITI), which co-ordinates policy and has a long-established tradition of preventing foreign penetration.

158. It should be noted here that the Japanese electronics industry recently had to cope with a very serious setback caused by the rising value of the yen. Following the decision of the Group of Five in September 1985 to lower the value of the United States dollar, the yen rose from 240 yen to the dollar at that time to about 140 yen to the dollar in May 1987. Most of Japan's trade contracts in this sector are drawn up in dollars. In 1986 the majority of electronics companies consequently had to face a 50% drop in sales results compared to 1985.

159. A United States-Japan semiconductor arrangement was concluded in September 1986, with Japanese business interests making substantial concessions. Despite the fact that certain sectors initially objected to this arrangement, Japanese semiconductor companies strove to respect its provisions. On 4th March 1987, the international semiconductor co-operation centre (INSEC) was established to promote greater co-operation in developing semiconductors and in marketing foreign-made semiconductors in Japan. Funded by Japanese semiconductor companies, several foreign companies and the Jap-

anese Government, this centre encourages smoother relations among various national semiconductor industries and provides easier access for foreign companies wishing to market electronic devices and components in Japan.

160. The main feature of Japanese strategy in developing new electronics technology is the establishment of flexible co-operative projects associating many firms while at the same time encouraging the exchange of research staff between private laboratories. Among recent research and development programmes are the supercomputer project (1982-90), the optoelectronics project (1980-91) and the new function elements project (1982-89) with a proposed government funding of 66 billion yen in total. Basic research in the application of sophisticated integrated circuits is included in these projects. Fortified integrated circuits for extreme conditions and composite semiconductors using alternate layers of gallium arsenide and aluminium arsenide are among the projects. It needs no explanation that all these projects seem to be extremely well adapted for advanced military applications. The leading Japanese microelectronics companies are heavily involved in the abovementioned projects.

161. At the moment a number of companies are jointly studying an entirely new computer architecture which might become a new world standard. This project, "Tron", is aimed at devising interchangeable modular systems that could serve as basic units for ultra high-speed computers.

162. In 1987, Japan made the first decision to start its Human Frontier programme, which is still in a very early stage. Human Frontier is concentrated on study of the human machine and biological systems: molecular biology and the transformation of energy, thought and the transmission of information and associated technologies at the cellular and molecular level. The budget for this programme totals 200 000 million yen for ten years (approximately 1 100 million ECU). In 1987, the sum of 197 million yen (approximately 1.1 million ECU) was earmarked for the project's feasibility study. It is thought that such research can lead to industrial applications in the fields of new materials, artificial intelligence and pharmaceuticals, among others.

163. In the meantime, since the end of January 1987, Japanese officials have been presenting their programme to members of the international scientific community whom they are inviting to participate. Scientists from European institutions have shown their interest in these proposals. Some experts in Europe have expressed their fear that Japan, through an international programme, could easily benefit from

the results of European and United States basic research.

164. Even if these are all civilian-oriented activities, its influence in advanced defence technology should not be neglected. Through its increasing dominance of civil markets in microelectronics Japan is gradually depriving Europe of its capability in this field. Japanese strength in, for instance, high-speed multicircuit chips and optoelectronics could give them a lead in a wide range of military equipment. Japan also started a programme of intelligent knowledge base systems (IKBS) which will bring it level with the United States and Europe in systems research and development. Even now, United States and European defence manufacturers rely heavily on Japanese components and are starting to purchase subsystems.

United States

165. During the 1950s and 1960s demand in electronics and later microelectronics resulting from procurement by the Department of Defence and NASA was an important factor in the development of this sector of industry because they were willing to pay high prices and it helped companies to attain a sufficient level of production. This demand certainly accelerated the introduction of some innovations. The relative importance of military and space procurement declined as new commercial areas emerged and product prices began to fall.

166. In the United States semiconductor market for example, in the early 1960s 70% of demand was military as opposed to 30% commercial, while in the late 1980s only 10% is military and 90% commercial. However, the size of the United States military market is still considerable compared to Europe or Japan: in 1982, the 10% share of military consumption in semiconductor end-use in the United States was equivalent to about 28% of European and 10% of Japanese consumption.

167. After a decade of low-level United States Government activity in the microelectronics industry in the 1970s, it became active again in the early 1980s to meet its own requirements and those of the industry.

168. A change in the antitrust policy covering all sectors of the economy encouraged microelectronics companies to co-operate in increasingly-expensive research and development. Through international action, the government tried to influence foreign government policies towards their industries through a combination of bilateral discussions and multilateral actions.

169. It need not be explained here that one of the main goals of the strategic defence initiative programme started in 1983 was to give massive new impetus to developments in advanced elec-

tronics. Furthermore, the Department of Defence, continuing its expenditure through procurement, started several comprehensive research and development programmes, in particular VHSIC (phases I and II), MIMIC and the strategic computing programme, each of which has been mentioned earlier in this report. Early in 1987 it was estimated that since its modest start in 1979, the Pentagon had invested approximately \$500 million in the VHSIC programme but a few hundred million dollars more will be spent up to 1990. The annual expenditure of VHSIC is approximately equivalent to between 7-10% of total semiconductor industry research and development expenditure (excluding contract research and development for government agencies)¹¹. For the first five years of the MIMIC programme, the government budget will be about \$137 million, while government funding for the first five years of the strategic computing programme, launched in 1983, was estimated at another \$500 million. In paragraphs 114 and 115 of this report, mention has been made of the establishment of the Sematech company, which is not only defence-oriented and which now seems to be well under way with government support.

170. In a detailed analysis of the impact of the VHSIC programme on industry research and development by the United States National Research Council it was said that even when VHSIC was directed towards military goals, "it appears that the activity stimulated by the VHSIC programme will... actually strengthen the United States non-military very large-scale integration component and equipment industry".

171. Of a total Department of Defence budget for 1987 of \$281.7 billion, \$36.9 billion was allocated for research, development, test and evaluation.

VII. Conclusions

172. In the early 1980s Europe had finally understood that in information technology it was threatened seriously enough by its main competitors, the United States and Japan, to justify specific concerted action. It was realised that the sum of European efforts would amount to more than the aggregate of individual national or company efforts.

173. Today, the European electronics industry is lagging still further behind the United States and Japan, as can be seen from the trend of the trade balance (deficit of \$1.5 billion in 1979 and \$12 billion in 1984). Similarly, 30% of the data-processing industry's market is in Europe and

11. See report: The Semiconductor Industry, OECD, Paris 1985, page 64.

European industry accounts for 7 to 8% of production.

174. European industry has little place in the larger markets. As they control only a third of their own market, the principal firms seem very small and unassuming compared with their American and Japanese competitors (the leading European firm is twelfth on the world scale). This is in spite of some degree of national protectionism which, contrary to a widespread view, is rife in all countries, particularly the United States.

175. The American effort, made mainly by manufacturers, receives considerable assistance from the Federal Government (subsidies of \$4 billion between 1980 and 1984, of which 95% went to four firms) and, in particular, more discreet assistance from Defence Department markets and military research efforts (+80% between 1980 and 1985).

176. Europe's weakness in this area stems from the fact that the European market is a mosaic of national markets. It is difficult for European firms to accede to the homogenous American market but the European market is not really accessible either because of different standards and certain still strong protectionist practices.

177. Currently, as a result of many considerations there are two main programmes of a different nature which are expected to stimulate the competitiveness of Europe's information technology industry.

178. The first is "Esprit" a European Community programme involving projects of a precompetitive or technological standard-setting character, entirely dedicated to information technology.

179. The second is "Eureka", embracing the European Community member countries and five other Western European countries and involving projects close to producing marketable products or concepts.

180. Both these programmes officially are said to be purely civilian, but it is thought that a number of the projects approved or under development will also have possible military applications. In Eureka, an estimated 30% of the first hundred projects approved could be used in military applications.

181. Apart from these two civilian programmes, the IEPG has established the co-operative technology project (CTP) scheme which should address many defence information technology questions. The CTPs are intended to operate in the precompetitive phase, with participation and funding comparable to the system used for Eureka, on an à la carte basis. At the moment it is virtually impossible to judge the

effectiveness of these projects as they are all in a very early stage of development.

182. It is your Rapporteur's opinion that Western European nations are still spending too much on purely national programmes. This policy has resulted in disasters like the British GEC Avionics Nimrod AEW Mk-3 airborne early-warning programme on which more than \$1.3 billion was spent over a nine-year period before the government decided to select its main competitor, the Boeing E-3A AWACS. Likewise France, which has gone to great lengths to maintain an independent national military aircraft industry, is now facing difficulties following the lack of orders for the Mirage 2000 which may also have repercussions on its defence electronics industry.

183. Certainly, more should be spent on collaborative information technology programmes, but there is not one widely-accepted model for such programmes. In Europe, leading companies and countries in this field are ever more reluctant to follow the European Esprit solution. They prefer national programmes, bi- or multilateral co-operation on a more informal basis or in the loose Eureka framework.

184. As lessons may be drawn from this Esprit-Eureka controversy, it may be useful to list the main complaints, advantages and drawbacks of both programme structures and then make a choice regarding the best course to be followed for improving the competitiveness of Europe's defence information technology industry.

Comparison between the Esprit and Eureka structures

Esprit

185. Each year, the allocation of subsidies to specific programmes is subject to political whims and the parochial wish of member countries to get a fair share.

186. According to some leading industries, too much money is spent in countries with a less-developed electronics industry.

187. Precompetitive and basic research to which Esprit is limited is not the main weakness of Europe.

188. Participation in Esprit implies an obligation to publish the results of research, which is an advantage for the scientific world to some extent but also means that leading companies do not participate in Esprit with their strategic research programmes.

189. Decisions are made at a snail's pace because of friction between the European Commission and the Council. The budget is far from sufficient to meet the goals set.

190. Since the beginning, in 1984, many other programmes related to information technology have been established within the European Community. As a consequence, too many parties are involved in shaping policy.

191. Among the advantages of the Esprit model, it should certainly be mentioned that companies will more readily tackle technologies that are too advanced for commercial application or too expensive for the research to be done at company expense.

192. Esprit may also have reduced duplication in research: it certainly has stimulated international co-operation between companies and it helps to create an open internal European market.

Eureka

193. In the much less compulsory structure of Eureka, there is no working programme established by industry and governments, nor is there an extensive bureaucracy. Because funding is on a project-by-project basis, no participant, country or industry takes the risk that its money will be used for other than its own programme. Another advantage of the Eureka structure is that the constraint of government calculations to determine fair returns, which may slow down considerably the implementation of projects, is avoided.

194. Participants may choose their own partners for each project, thus ensuring that results will be shared exclusively between them.

195. In view of this, it is not difficult to see the disadvantages: countries with a less-developed technology industry do not benefit from the majority of the programmes; there is no technology transfer to smaller companies; universities and research institutes are less involved and programmes are more market-oriented.

196. One could conclude that the Eureka structure has nothing to do with a European approach but that it is rather a public marketplace fostering bi- or multilateral co-operation.

197. It seems quite clear that Eureka could be the easiest way to achieving quick results, especially for countries and companies which still think they can catch up while protecting their national and private interests. But then it should be kept in mind that Eureka does next to nothing to change the old-fashioned and completely out-of-date structures of separate markets, relations between national governments and their favourite industries and other nationalistic hobby-horses. Eureka does not recognise that the key problem for a modern technology policy is not that of generating new ideas, of which there has never been a lack in Europe, but rather of

facilitating their rapid diffusion and widespread use. Long-term growth of any modern economy depends mainly on the capacity to deploy technological capabilities across a broad spectrum of economic activities.

198. These key problems are far better addressed in the framework programme of the European Community, with Esprit in the forefront. The framework programme should certainly secure more support from member countries, as it should be the indispensable main thrust for Europe's future industrial capacity. This programme recognises the need for widespread dissemination of technological capabilities throughout industry and addresses the key issues of such a policy: a strong institutional mechanism for technology transfer; an education and training system; a call for industrial standardisation; a network of co-operative research. Finally, it fits in with the concept of an open internal market in Europe by 1992. It is, however, clearly a drawback that for political reasons Esprit was limited to precompetitive research. More market-oriented research and development projects should be tackled in Phase II of Esprit, but that has not been decided yet.

199. Moreover, no sufficiently satisfying results can be expected from the Esprit programme if European countries continue to refuse to allow it a substantial budget. A budget of 1.6 billion ECU for Esprit Phase II, a five year programme, is quite inadequate for forcing a breakthrough for Europe's competitiveness in the world market.

Aims

200. Priority must continue to be given to strengthening European industry and capability. This means that various kinds of alliance must be formed and co-operation developed based on complementarity which will allow our industries to co-operate with American or Japanese industries at the same technological level. There must also be official assistance from several sectors to encourage predominantly intra-European co-operation and the opening of national European armaments markets.

201. It should be noted, however, that if Europe abides by its confessed determination to have a modern and competitive defence industry, it will also have to set up more ambitious research and development programmes for defence electronics. The co-operative technology projects are certainly a step in the right direction and should be continued. As progress so far seems to have been rather slow, their base should be broadened and given new impetus, as has been recommended in the "Towards a stronger Europe" report. To a great extent, these CTPs have the same advantages as Eureka, but they also suffer from the same disadvantages which in the long run may be counterproductive to the estab-

lishment of a strong European defence industry. A proportion of existing national defence research funds should therefore be diverted to establish a common budget for a common defence technology research programme, initially limited to precompetitive general research and

enabling technologies, but gradually also tackling more market-oriented research. Thus a first step would be taken towards a joint *European defence research programme* associating around the WEU member countries any other European countries wishing to take part.

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- (a) on the second report on Europe's response to the modern technological challenge. Rapporteur: Mr. M. Poniatoski. 13th April 1987, series A, Document A 2-14/86/B;
- (b) on the proposal for the Commission of the European Communities to the Council (COM(86)547 final – Document C2-152/86/I) for a regulation on a community action in the field of telecommunications technologies (RACE) R & D in advanced communications technologies in Europe. Rapporteur: Mr. Amédée Turner. 8th July 1987, series A, Document A 2-119/87;
- (c) on the proposal for the Commission of the European Communities to the Council (COM(86)430 final – Document C 2-82/86) for a regulation concerning the framework programme of Community activities in the field of research and technological development (1987-1991). Rapporteur: Mr. B. Sälzer. 25th November 1986, series A, Document A 2-155/86.

APPENDIX I

The twenty-five largest computer manufacturers

Manufacturer	Country	Turnover 1985 \$ billion
IBM	(USA)	48 554.0
Digital Equipment	(USA)	7 029.4
Sperry	(USA)	4 755.1
Burroughs	(USA)	4 685.3
Fujitsu	(J)	4 309.5
NCR	(USA)	3 885.5
NEC	(J)	3 761.8
Control Data	(USA)	3 679.7
Hewlett-Packard	(USA)	3 675.0
Siemens	(FRG)	3 265.0
Hitachi	(J)	2 885.4
Olivetti	(I)	2 518.2
Wang Laboratories	(USA)	2 428.3
Xeros	(USA)	1 959.0
Honeywell	(USA)	1 951.9
Groupe Bull	(F)	1 794.5
Apple Computer	(USA)	1 753.8
AT and T	(USA)	1 500.0
TRW	(USA)	1 450.0
Matsushita	(J)	1 447.6
Toshiba	(J)	1 409.0
Philips	(NL)	1 365.6
Nixdorf	(FRG)	1 339.9
ICL	(GB)	1 330.8
Northern Telecom	(CND)	1 240.8

\$1 = DM 2.94

Source : Datamation.

APPENDIX II

*Public funding of research and development
by socio-economic objective**Total defence**Million dollars – current prices*

	1982	1983	1984
Germany	744.8	840.3 (a)	900.4
France	2 946.1	3 046.7	3 384.9
United Kingdom	3 501.0	3 912.2	4 261.5
Italy	156.9	215.8	362.0
Spain	49.7	50.7	59.9
Netherlands	51.1	46.1	51.3 (a)
Turkey	NA	NA	NA
Belgium	3.6	1.9 (a)	1.6 (b)
Denmark	0.7	0.8 (a)	2.7
Norway	33.1	44.9	47.7
Greece	NA	0.5 (a)	5.1 (a)
Portugal	NA	NA	NA
	7 487.0	8 159.9	9 077.1
US	22 070.0	24 936.0	29 287.0
European figure as % of US	34%	33%	31%

Source : OCDE/STIID Data Bank – July 1986

Notes :

(a) Change in definition : Figures not strictly comparable with preceding year.


(b) Provisional.

NA – Not available.

APPENDIX III

World computer market in 1985

(Expenditure and offer)



World expenditure : \$130 billion

World offer : \$130 billion

Source : IDC 1986

*European armaments co-operation –
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific,
Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 10 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Wilkinson (Chairman); MM. Bassinet, Beysen (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Böhm, Colajanni (Alternate: *Gianotti*), Fiandrotti, Fourré, Garrett (Alternate: *Parry*), Hengel, Hill (Alternate: *Sir Dudley Smith*), Lenzer, McGuire, Mechtersheimer, Mezzapesa, Schmidt (Alternate: *Klejdzinski*), Sinesio, Souvet, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Valleix, van der Werff, Worrell (Alternate: *Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on European armaments co-operation –
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that ever since the Rome declaration in October 1984 the Council as a whole and its members individually have stated that WEU should provide political impetus to the development of European co-operation in armaments matters;
- (ii) Dissatisfied that during the three years that have elapsed since October 1984 the Council has failed to provide proof of this much-vaunted political impetus, notwithstanding the primordial rôle of the WEU countries in the IEPG, their geographical and military position and the size of their defence industry;
- (iii) Recalling the final communiqué of the IEPG ministers' meeting held in Seville on 22nd June 1987, in which the ministers endorsed the long-term objectives of the European defence industry study (EDIS) report and expressed their determination to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach towards an open European market for defence equipment;
- (iv) Considering that neither the division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee and the IEPG, dating from 1978, nor the agreement regarding co-operation between the presidency of the IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU, dating from 1986, are being observed;
- (v) Considering that the IEPG ministers have declined to establish an international secretariat for the IEPG,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take the lead in implementing the action plan for an open European market for defence equipment as recommended by the EDIS report by committing its members to reach agreement on common operational requirements for each major piece of defence equipment they will need from now on;
2. Conclude its three-year reflections and deliberations on the reorganisation, future rôle and tasks of the SAC and Agency III and instruct the new ministerial organs to conduct studies connected with the IEPG ministers' decision to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach towards an open European market for defence equipment;
3. Increase its efforts to guarantee that appropriate international bodies and national administrations provide all the information needed by the body which takes over to conduct its studies;
4. Ensure that the division of work between the SAC and the IEPG dating from 1978, if considered obsolete, is replaced by an up-to-date agreement and that the 1986 co-operation agreement between the presidency of the IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU is observed;
5. Arrange for the presidency of the IEPG to address the Assembly once a year to inform it about developments in European armaments co-operation.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The need for armaments co-operation in a European framework is so well-known, so rarely opposed and so frequently endorsed in public by politicians that one might even wonder why a report is again being devoted to the subject.

2. However, for several reasons your Rapporteur takes the view that it is necessary to follow developments on this issue closely.

3. First and foremost, encouraging lip service as an expression of sincere intentions and maybe even of political will is frequently paid to the cause of armaments co-operation while the practical outcome of all this verbosity is still rather disappointing.

4. Secondly, the WEU Council and its individual members are continually talking about the important rôle WEU can play or the political impetus it can give to the process of armaments co-operation while in practice carefully refraining from giving these statements any substance or follow-up.

5. Thirdly, the Assembly wishes to show its deep interest in this matter, thus hoping to help the Council to persevere with attaining the ultimate goal.

6. This report will not describe directly the problems of co-operation because this has been done with great skill and relentless sophistication by the European defence industry study (EDIS) team in its report "Towards a stronger Europe"¹ written by order of the IEPG and presented to it in December 1986.

7. Neither will it dwell on all too widely-known reasons for Europe to rationalise its defence efforts through closer co-operation in arms procurement. A recent study by the United States National Academy of Science estimates that the waste devolving from duplication of efforts through Europe's failure to co-operate for government procurement amounts to some \$35 billion a year. There is no need to explain that significant reductions in nuclear weapons deployed in Europe or the elimination of certain categories of nuclear weapons will only produce new arguments for the same cause of co-operation.

8. The main purpose of this report is to try to compare and assess recent official statements, to point out certain developments and finally to

make some modest and feasible suggestions for useful work in this area that could be done by WEU without duplicating the work of other existing bodies.

II. Activities of WEU

(a) The Council

9. In its Rome declaration of 27th October 1984, the Council called attention to WEU's ability to give political impetus to the development of European co-operation in armaments questions (paragraphs 7 and 8).

10. Ever since, the Council as such and its members have been unable to stop talking about the political impetus of WEU in this area.

11. In Bonn, the Council instructed the Permanent Council to present proposals in time for the next meeting to help provide the necessary political impetus for, and practical contributions to, the various efforts undertaken in this field, including those carried out by bodies such as the IEPG and the CNAD (Conference of National Armaments Directors) (final communiqué of the meeting in Bonn, 22nd and 23rd April 1985, paragraph 9).

12. Apparently, the Permanent Council failed to make proposals that could rise to the daring expectations of the Council, because in the communiqué issued after the Venice meeting the ministers only "underlined the importance of co-operative efforts designed to help strengthen their defence capabilities". They "welcomed the progress which had been made in the IEPG". Furthermore, probably to make things sound slightly more positive, they requested that studies be undertaken on the management of resources and the implications of rising defence costs (final communiqué of the meeting in Venice, 29th-30th April 1986).

13. An indication of the meaning of these studies may be found in the reply of the Council to Recommendation 436 (18th November 1986). In paragraph 2 of this reply, the Council drew attention to the activities of the IEPG and the CNAD. It said that Agency III should maintain contact with these groups and "thus contribute to the rôle recognised for WEU by the ministers, namely to provide political impetus to bodies concerned with arms co-operation such as the IEPG and the CNAD". A refined and subtle variation of the same theme was provided in the reply of the Council to Written Question 271 (17th November 1986).

¹ Henceforth referred to as the EDIS report.

14. In its reply to Recommendation 432 (17th October 1986) the Council again mentioned that "in the field of arms co-operation WEU's objective is to help maintain the political impetus for the work of the IEPG and to contribute substantively in support of it, wherever possible".

15. In an effort to be more definite on this subject the ministers, after their Luxembourg meeting, "stated their resolve to continue their efforts towards the establishment in Europe of the technological and industrial base necessary to ensure the development of a strong and competitive European armaments industry, this being an important aspect of Europe's contribution to defence. In this connection, they reaffirmed the importance they attach to the generation of more and more systematic collaboration in the field of conventional armaments" (final communiqué of the meeting in Luxembourg on 27th-28th April 1987). This statement was quoted in paragraph 3 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 440 (26th May 1987).

16. But even if for a less favourable observer the enthusiasm and unambiguousness in the written statements of the Council seem to be slackening, its individual members and other ministers in member states have apparently increased their promising statements.

17. At the December 1986 session of the Assembly Mr. Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister of France, stated that in arms co-operation, WEU had special political potential and a specific and important part to play alongside the IEPG. Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom, said that WEU should be a ginger group – a catalyst for decisions – even if some of those by their nature had to be taken elsewhere. Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy, was even more specific, urging that WEU: "should commit itself actively in three directions: first, concerted efforts by our defence ministers to improve conventional defences by means of long-term programmes based on the use of advanced technology; second, the creation of European research and development agencies in the key sector of defence production; third, the pursuit of an industrial defence policy based on common European rules and practices for purchases and supplies". He was convinced that "in all these three directions WEU can do a great deal by establishing procedures aimed at co-ordination and agreement on financial, legal and technological matters".

18. Mr. Fischbach, the Luxembourg Defence Minister, gave a detailed explanation of the future rôle of defence ministers in WEU. According to Mr. Fischbach, one of the topics these ministers want WEU to consider is that of European co-operation in arms production, rela-

tions with the IEPG, the allocation of resources to defence and the exchange of information on long-term defence programmes and defence strategies.

19. At the June 1987 session of the Assembly, Mr. Fischbach gave the most recent information on consultations between defence ministers. The representatives of the WEU defence ministers met several times in 1987 to discuss co-operation in arms procurement and the management of defence resources. Quite logically, they agreed that WEU should not duplicate work being done elsewhere, for example in the IEPG and the CNAD. Its work should be directed to concepts rather than to operational matters. They also agreed that the defence ministers were concerned with political as well as technical matters. Having stated this, Mr. Fischbach once more emphasised the political rôle which the defence ministers must play in WEU concerning the management of resources in particular.

20. Mr. Fischbach then pointed out that he and all his colleagues shared the view that it was WEU's business to provide the necessary political stimulus for the partners in the IEPG to discuss concrete projects placed before the Council of Ministers.

21. It is far from easy to draw clear conclusions from all these declarations. It seems sometimes as if the Council has been moving up and down on the waves of the IEPG tide. The Council may have mentioned the need for political impetus by WEU when it was disappointed by negative developments in the IEPG and may have tried to diminish WEU's rôle when the IEPG was making enough progress.

22. Taking into account the most recent statements of several ministers, including Mr. Fischbach's explanation at the June 1987 session, the prevailing opinion at the moment may well be that WEU can provide political stimulus for arms co-operation in the IEPG. This conclusion is in line with the state of affairs in the IEPG which, as will be demonstrated elsewhere in this report, is not altogether satisfactory.

23. What should WEU do in arms co-operation to give it the long-awaited political impetus? On the political level, at least two suggestions can be made.

24. The first suggestion requires concerted action by both the Council and the Assembly of WEU. It is to make it standard procedure for the Chairman of the IEPG to address either the plenary Assembly or a meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of WEU once a year, to present a progress report on armaments co-operation in the IEPG. The Assembly would not object if the Chairman were a minister from

a non-member country of WEU. On the contrary, that might even be a twofold advantage. It would on the one hand be an opportunity for a non-WEU minister to become acquainted with WEU and its institutions, while on the other hand the Assembly, showing its deep interest in European armaments co-operation, would thus be able to encourage the minister concerned. Moreover, it could enhance public awareness of the useful activities of the IEPG. For implementation of this suggestion, all that is needed is an invitation to the IEPG Chairman from the Assembly and eventually a unanimous recommendation of WEU defence ministers to convince a non-WEU Chairman of the IEPG to present a report to the Assembly.

25. The second suggestion is more complicated and requires action by the Council only. It is that WEU member countries really take the lead in implementing the action plan for an open European market for defence equipment as recommended by the EDIS report.

26. WEU is indeed the organisation pre-eminently suitable for providing such far-reaching political impetus because its members include all the European countries which maintain forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and the two European nuclear powers. Furthermore, WEU countries have always been at the source of any major European arms project as their defence industries are the most developed of the IEPG. They are a relatively small, homogenous group of countries which makes it generally easier to reach an agreement on drastic measures. In fact, drastic measures are required to restructure the European defence market.

27. The very loose structure of the IEPG allows its member countries to move at exactly their own speed because co-operation takes place on a case-by-case basis, each member country being completely free to participate or to abstain.

28. However unbelievable it may seem, after nearly forty years of allied efforts, it would be a tremendous first step forward if the WEU member countries of the IEPG could commit themselves to reach agreement on common operational requirements for each major item of military equipment they may need from now on. If only this and no more could be achieved, it would set an excellent example for the other IEPG nations.

29. Few objections could be raised to any measures taken in this direction since, in principle, it does not affect any of the so dearly cherished national defence industries, unless certain member states argue that so far they have been tuning their operational requirements to the needs and possibilities of the national industries before adapting them to the threat assessment.

30. Recent examples where the needs of a branch of the national armaments industry have played a major part in government decisions to favour national or less-international solutions are France's decision to develop and produce its own combat aircraft based on the Rafale and the British decision to favour the utility version of the EH-101 instead of the NH-90.

31. Nor would this step affect the long-standing objective of the IEPG to support the development of the industrial and technological basis of member countries with less-developed defence industries, which was reaffirmed in the recent Seville communiqué of the IEPG ministers.

*(b) The Standing Armaments Committee (SAC)
and Agency III*

32. In his address to the Assembly on 1st June 1987, the Secretary-General of WEU mentioned that well-proven and successful practices of other European organisations are now also being adopted in Western European Union. Those responsible in the WEU capitals, he continued, whether they be ministers, political directors or experts, are meeting for regular, in-depth consultations. These structures provide a focal point where views on security are coming close together and reflect common, longer-term basic positions. The Assembly recognises that these meetings on an intergovernmental level are essential. It also recognises that the administrative services in London and Paris – according to the Secretary-General – are there to service these meetings so that they can be as effective as possible.

33. But the Assembly is surprised that during the three years that have elapsed since the Rome declaration the Council has failed to make any effective use of its administrative services in Paris, i.e. the agencies. Even at this moment, following the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 27th October in The Hague and with the transitional period practically at an end, not all the decisions required to implement the envisaged reorganisation have been taken.

34. Also through a multitude of developments in international security policy, WEU is playing a new rôle among other organisations. No wonder the Secretary-General mentioned that WEU has adopted policies of consultation which have been well-proven and successful in other European organisations. WEU has, however, clearly forgotten to adopt one feature of the utmost importance, that of a well-organised, sufficiently-manned and properly equipped administration. It is quite natural that the WEU ministers do not favour a large, top-heavy administration. High-level officials in national administrations for obvious reasons do not like

international staff unless they are very discreet, low-level, obedient and powerless. But in their fervour to prevent the setting up of any administration large enough to do more than routine preparation of meetings and to prevent the agencies from doing useful work they have missed an opportunity.

35. The record of the Council's dealings with the agencies since the Rome declaration is easily described. In April 1985 it was decided that, in the framework of a comprehensive reorganisation of the existing ministerial institutions in Paris, new structures would be established under the collective title "Agencies for security questions". Meanwhile, the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) was retained, while the duties of its abolished International Secretariat were assigned to Agency III. This Agency III was to assist the Council and to conduct studies at its request on co-operation in armaments questions. The new agencies have been operational since the beginning of 1986 and they have conducted a number of studies, including studies on several issues connected with arms co-operation.

36. According to the second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council, Agency III has been tasked to study defence technology from specific viewpoints such as the impact of SDI or the constraints at national level on technology transfers between the Seven. Furthermore, it will have to draw up inventories of the various policies on co-operative equipment programmes and defence technology.

37. The SAC did not meet in 1986. In its annual report, the Council mentions dryly that the SAC's future rôle in the reactivated WEU will be determined by the outcome of the Council's deliberations on how WEU could provide political impetus in armaments co-operation, in accordance with the Rome declaration and the Bonn communiqué.

38. Agency III has continued the routine activities of the SAC and its subsidiary working groups. Furthermore, it attended the annual meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee and was represented at meetings of the Conference of National Armaments Directors at NATO Headquarters in Brussels in February, April and October.

39. In a surprisingly lucid statement as part of its reply to Recommendation 436 (18th November 1986), the Council said that Agency III should maintain contact with the IEPG and the CNAD in order to be able to draw on their analyses and conclusions in its own studies, and to avoid unnecessarily duplicating their work. The agency should thus contribute to the rôle recognised for WEU by the ministers, namely, to provide political impetus to bodies concerned

with arms co-operation such as the IEPG and the CNAD.

40. Consideration of three years' reflection by the Council with a view to avoiding WEU's activities overlapping with those of the IEPG and the CNAD and to devising a useful rôle for Agency III and the SAC shows that the results can only be called extremely feeble. The Assembly does understand that it is a difficult exercise, as the Council pointed out in its reply to Written Question 271 (17th November 1986), but, with positive political will, more could have been done.

41. Officially, a note from the Council regarding the division of work between the SAC and the IEPG, communicated to the Assembly on 23rd February 1978 (Document 769), is still valid today. It seems however that the arrangements which were made on that occasion to ensure efficient liaison between WEU and the IEPG are no longer respected.

42. In December 1985 and January 1986, Mr. Cahen, the Secretary-General, discussed co-operation between the IEPG and WEU in regard to European armaments co-operation with the outgoing and incoming presidency of the IEPG, respectively the Dutch Minister of Defence and Secretary of State for Armaments and the Spanish Minister of Defence. At the December 1985 discussion, the Director of Agency III was also present.

43. In a letter to the President of the Assembly dated 26th February 1986 (Document 1063, Appendix III) the Secretary-General mentioned the results of these talks. He wrote that: "Both the Spanish Minister of Defence and his Netherlands colleague showed their interest in the driving rôle which Western European Union and its member countries can play in the Independent European Programme Group. The Spanish minister agreed that it was important to maintain the necessary contacts in order to avoid duplication and to promote worthwhile co-operation. In this spirit he said that, as the Netherlands presidency had already done, he would be happy for the Chairman of the IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU to meet periodically and for the Director of WEU's Agency III for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments to hold regular meetings with the Chairman of the IEPG national armaments directors and the Chairmen of the IEPG panels, particularly Panel III, whose responsibilities would make such contacts especially useful.

44. However, even after this agreement had been confirmed by the national armaments directors at their IEPG meeting in spring 1986, it has as yet come to nothing. The Assembly thinks that now that more than a year has elapsed the agreed procedures should be carried into effect without further ado. To complete this network of

contacts, the Council, in agreement with the IEPG, should also arrange for Agency III to be represented at IEPG meetings at national armaments director level in the same way as is already the case at FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee and CNAD meetings.

45. As regards the studies conducted by Agency III, also in its capacity as international secretariat of the SAC, the Council's attitude is ambiguous. On 20th March 1986, in its reply to Written Question 262, the Council said that the SAC and Agency III were "preparing concrete proposals in order to provide the necessary political impetus for, and practical contribution to, the various efforts undertaken in the field of armaments co-operation, including those carried out by the IEPG". In the thirty-second annual report, their work on these proposals is no longer mentioned. Has it been interrupted after the further examination of the mandates in the latter half of 1986?

46. On 17th November 1986 the Council, answering Written Question 271, said that it was to undertake a process of reflection on ways of enhancing collaboration between the SAC and Agency III so that the SAC can help to identify areas of research relevant to WEU. Only at the end of the transitional period, i.e. 31st December 1987, could any final conclusions be drawn. In the same reply, it was stated that the SAC would meet in the not too distant future. The thirty-second annual report mentions in rather ominous words that "a process of reflection is also under way on the rôle and future tasks of the SAC".

47. At the time of writing, the SAC has not met since 25th October 1985 and it seems that nobody in the Council wants to speak openly about its rôle and future tasks. If the Council does want to abolish the Standing Armaments Committee, it is of course entitled to do so, but then it should take the necessary steps to make it clear to everybody concerned, including the Assembly.

48. The Assembly can but think that the Council has only limited interest in the progress and final results of studies conducted by Agency III. Mandates are continuously under review or threatened with review. Very often it turns out that the Agency has no access to data of primordial importance for these studies while requests to governmental organisations on a national or international level are answered reluctantly or negatively.

49. It is true that Mr. Cahen, the Secretary-General, in a letter to the President of the Assembly on 17th March 1986, promised that the agencies would establish links with the appropriate international bodies and with national administrations in order to guarantee the

availability of the information necessary for them. But until now there have been only few positive results stemming from this initiative. Typical of the current situation is Lord Carrington's answer to a question put by Mr. De Decker at the December 1986 session of the Assembly. Mr. De Decker had asked why the ministerial organs, especially the technical agencies of WEU, sometimes appeared to be unable to obtain the information they needed to discharge their functions either from the NATO Secretariat-General or from NATO and SHAPE Headquarters. Lord Carrington answered that he did not know of anything ever having been refused that was asked of him by the Secretary-General of WEU, but if one of the sixteen member countries of NATO objected to a piece of information being passed on to WEU it would be impossible to pass it on. In practice, this is often so when information is asked of other, and also national, administrations. It seems that notwithstanding the persistent efforts of the Secretary-General of WEU to achieve increased effectiveness and the endeavours of the Council to ensure that the agencies have greater access to the sources of confidential information which are essential for the proper execution of their mandates, Agency III is encountering persistent problems in this field.

50. According to the Chairman-in-Office, the Council at its meeting in The Hague on 27th October 1987 reached a consensus on the principle that the three existing agencies should be merged into one under the closer authority of the Secretary-General and located in the same place as the Secretariat-General. The actual location is to be decided later, but a new organogram of the merged agencies is to be adopted before the end of 1987.

51. The Assembly is firmly convinced that the new single agency can play a useful rôle in armaments co-operation and standardisation at the present juncture. According to the Secretary-General, this was affirmed by the national armaments directors when they had a meeting with him last May in particular on this subject. When they were asked however what exactly this rôle should be, they said they preferred to decide on a case-by-case basis.

52. Here again, the usual reluctance of all established administrations to lose control of any subject they want to keep in their own hands can be clearly felt. They skilfully fend off every attempt to undermine their interests. But it is the view of the Assembly that European arms co-operation is precisely an issue where dedicated attention and profound study by persons with fewer national ties could result in proposals to the Council which would launch the necessary measures.

53. At their Seville meeting, the IEPG ministers of defence decided not to establish a permanent secretariat. The final communiqué issued after this meeting, however, makes it clear that a considerable amount of work will have to be done as a consequence of the EDIS report. The Assembly is convinced that much of this work could very well be done by the new agency along the lines set out by Mr. Fourré in a question he put to the Council on 8th April 1987 (Written Question 274). The same subject was pursued in a question put by Mr. van der Werff on 27th July 1987 (Written Question 275) on the results of the Seville meeting in particular.

III. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)

54. The defence ministers of the thirteen member countries met in Seville on 22nd June 1987 under the chairmanship of the Spanish Defence Minister, Narcis Serra. In this chapter, several of the ministers' decisions will be quoted and commented upon¹.

(a) The European defence industry study

55. At that meeting they discussed among other things the report "Towards a stronger Europe" of the independent study team which they had established to make proposals to improve the competitiveness of the European defence industry. This study, called the EDIS report, argues that Europe's international competitiveness can best be secured at international level by opening up Europe's internal armaments market to a much greater degree of cross-boundary trading and by increasing co-operative activity between European industries and European governments, particularly in defence research.

56. In their final communiqué, the ministers endorsed the long-term objectives of the EDIS report and expressed their determination to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach towards an open European market for defence equipment.

57. While this decision in itself raises confidence and a step by step approach cannot be considered unreasonable in view of its ensuing consequences for the European defence industry, there is a lurking danger. The fact is that the ministers instructed their national armaments directors to draw up an action plan for the ministers to consider at their next meeting. Meanwhile however, the ministers stressed the importance of wide consultation, especially with

European industry, in developing such an action plan.

58. It is precisely this last phrase which raises doubts as to the serious determination of the ministers to go ahead as quickly as possible with improving the structure of Europe's defence industry. The commitment of the national armaments directors to wide consultation means that all organisations, administrations and industries will be involved. There can be no doubt that new recommendations and alternative proposals will be suggested by those who were not consulted or by those whose suggestions were not adopted by the EDIS team. It seems quite natural that such a duplication of the work of an independent study team by the national armaments directors, who are national representatives bound by their office, will considerably weaken the recommendations of the EDIS team and that much precious time will again be lost. Elsewhere in this report (see paragraph 52) it is suggested that the WEU ministerial organs should be instructed to conduct studies connected with the IEPG ministers' decision to develop the abovementioned open European market for defence equipment.

59. Here it should be mentioned that at the Délégation générale pour l'armement (DGA) in France consideration is being given to the possible creation of a military Eureka. The idea is to have a military version of the civil model by obtaining Community financing for certain upstream programmes initiated by laboratories and industry. A military Eureka would be based on the creation of specialised European consortia which would be the prime contractors for each new programme on the lines of economic interest groups such as Airbus industrie or Arianespace. The reason given is that the introduction of the single market in Europe in 1992 will disturb the national structure of the armaments industry by allowing all suppliers access to public markets and even to national military markets which are now protected. In France, it is stressed that the cost of armaments research and development is high; furthermore, very rapid technological developments lead to a steady, significant rise in these costs. Consequently, in all probability co-operation agreements will be increasingly inevitable for the development of major items of equipment. Co-operation programmes are also a means of offering more outlets for equipment while limiting competition.

(b) Research and technology

60. There was another interesting paragraph in the Seville communiqué, concerning research and technology, which reads as follows:

"Ministers underlined the importance of a greater co-ordination of national research

1. Appendix II shows the tasks of the different IEPG bodies under the responsibility of national armaments directors.

and technology efforts in Europe. They directed that efforts should be made to increase the number of co-operative technology projects (CTPs), including wherever possible technology demonstrators and agreed that research co-operation needed to be developed on a systematic basis, concentrating upon areas of technological priority. Ministers also welcomed a report on the second Conference of Directors of Research and Test Establishments, whose work could form a basis for increased co-operation in the use of existing facilities and in the planning of new investments."

61. As this subject has been partly dealt with in an earlier report and recommendation of the committee (Document 963 and Recommendation 400, adopted by the Assembly in November 1983) your Rapporteur would like to pay closer attention to it.

62. The EDIS report stressed that for military research and development, Europe is investing only about one-third of the United States figure. It recommended that Europe maintain a research programme which provides for a fully comprehensive technology base and that it address as a matter of priority the areas of weakness, identified in the same report. The report recognised the co-operative technology projects (CTPs) initiative as a useful step, but recommended that it be broadened and given new impetus. In the EDIS team's view the most important step to be taken to secure a significant improvement in the value obtained from research budgets would be to establish a common European research programme, as this would be the only possible way to achieve a high degree of co-ordination of research activities. This common research programme should be limited to general research and allow new technologies. Such a programme should be supported by a common budget, starting at, for example, 100 million ECUs per year and gradually rising to a maximum of 500 million ECUs per year. Moreover, your Rapporteur believes that for the research-development-test sector member states must adopt a selective approach to the technological courses to be explored. An exhaustive approach would be conceivable only in the framework of research specialising in a small number of areas, which is possible only if there is true European armaments co-operation.

63. It should be noted here that in his December 1986 address to the Assembly, Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO, on the same lines stressed the need for European research and development establishments, multinationally paid for and multinationally manned, in the key equipment sectors.

64. The most detailed statement by the Council of WEU on this issue can be found in the final communiqué of its meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985, where the ministers, noting the increasing importance of technology, also affirmed the member states' determination to take the necessary measures within the European Communities to strengthen Europe's own technological capacity and thus achieve the creation of a technological community.

65. On this subject, the Council, at its Luxembourg meeting on 27th and 28th April 1987, briefly stated the ministers' "resolve to continue their efforts towards the establishment in Europe of the technological and industrial base necessary to ensure the development of a strong and competitive European armaments industry".

66. A comparison between the Bonn statement and the recent Luxembourg statement clearly shows that the ministers' determination to achieve the creation of a technological community has diminished considerably. This reflects the alarmingly negative developments taking place in the European Community programmes for research and development in the civilian technological sector.

67. The European Commission has had to surmount unparalleled difficulties in having its framework programme 1987-91 for research approved by the Council. For this five-year programme, the Commission had proposed a budget of 7.7 billion ECUs. There were rumours that the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom in particular preferred to spend their money on national research programmes. France, in principle not unwilling to agree to the Commission's proposals, initially opted for solidarity with the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom, but later agreed to a compromise, negotiated by the Belgian presidency, and was soon followed by the Federal Republic.

68. The compromise, reached in March 1987, to which eleven member states but not the United Kingdom agreed, involved a dotation of 5.4 billion ECUs for the years 1987-91. The United Kingdom Government wanted a sum of about 400 million ECUs less. On 23rd July 1987, however, the United Kingdom lifted its veto and the Council accepted the earlier compromise without discussion. There will now be a dotation of 5.396 billion ECUs for the five-year programme plus 1.084 billion ECUs for programmes already agreed upon or under way.

69. The only conclusion the Assembly would like to draw here is that in the IEPG as well as in the European Community there is obviously still a lack of political will and courage to develop the common European technological programmes which are so badly needed to prevent Europe

soon becoming increasingly dependent on the United States and Japan in this area.

70. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, concerned about these negative developments, is planning to hold a colloquy in London in spring 1988 on European co-operation in armaments research and development. At this colloquy, the committee will try to emphasise strongly the need for common programmes.

(c) Support for countries with less-developed defence industries

71. The defence ministers in Seville repeated that it was a long-standing objective of the IEPG to support the development of the industrial and technological bases of member countries with less-developed defence industries (LDDI) in order that they may be able to participate as partners in co-operative projects and contribute more effectively to the defence capability of the alliance.

72. The ministers agreed to a number of measures to improve this support in practice. One of these measures mentioned in the final communiqué was: "in order to encourage the development of competitive industries and to make the best use of the resources available to the IEPG countries as a whole, conditions will be created to allow appropriate industries from the LDDI countries to compete more successfully in the national procurement projects of other nations and for orders under collaborative programmes. The participation of industries from LDDI countries in joint ventures will also be encouraged."

73. It will be very interesting to hear from the Council the exact nature of the conditions referred to in this decision. It looks, however, as if here the conditions which are going to be introduced are precisely those which have been the main cause of the serious disease of Europe's defence industry which the IEPG now is trying to control.

74. The Assembly welcomes one of the other decisions taken within the same framework, i.e.: "Arrangements will be made to stimulate the participation of the LDDI countries in co-operative research and technology projects in order to give them access to the latest defence technology."

(d) Equipment co-operation

75. The ministers stated that since their last meeting in April 1986 staff targets had been agreed upon: a medium surface-to-air missile (MSAM), an active dipping sonar, light support weapons, a coastal minesweeper and microwave landing systems.

(e) General conclusion

76. It cannot be denied that the IEPG is a very useful forum where ministers show their will to achieve positive developments in armaments co-operation. Nevertheless, many high-level persons in closely-connected organisations and industries willingly recognise that not enough progress is being made by far. The Assembly is well aware that in these matters the ministers concerned are divided between conflicting interests. But more painful and politically unpopular measures have to be taken in the fairly near future if ministers really wish to attain the goal they say they are aiming at.

IV. The 1985 Nunn amendment

77. In the autumn of 1985, the United States Congress adopted an amendment to the National Defence Authorisation Act for fiscal year 1986, sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn, William Roth and John Warner, setting aside \$200 million, specifically and exclusively to be used for co-operative research and development projects for defence equipment with other members of the North Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, an amount of \$50 million was made available for co-operative testing of allied defence equipment. This initiative certainly is an unequivocal Atlantic endorsement of armaments co-operation as a vehicle for achieving the modernisation of NATO conventional forces through equitable burden-sharing among members of the alliance. Furthermore, it is completely in accordance with the conventional defence improvement (CDI) effort, adopted by the North Atlantic Council to restore the conventional force balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

78. Projects under this initiative are to be joint efforts, established by formal agreement between the United States and one or more of the other NATO nations, while United States funds for such projects are to be spent in the United States. Candidate projects may be bi- or multilateral. Understandably enough, bilateral projects tend to be favoured, as they are easier to negotiate and to manage. In practice, however, the majority of the projects are multilateral.

79. The most appealing and innovative feature of this Nunn initiative is the deliberate objective of having participating industries and countries involved at the research and development stage at the very outset so that any project could grow up on a co-operative basis from the beginning.

80. Also, in European arms co-operation programmes, there has been the specific and widely-recognised complaint that they begin too late in

the process, when various defence contractors have already made large investments in the same kind of project and too many people in both politics and administration have become closely involved.

81. The IEPG nations proposed six candidates for co-operation, out of which four eventually received Nunn funding in 1986: the 155mm autonomous precision-guided munition, the NATO frigate replacement, the NATO identification system and surveillance and target acquisition which is embodied in the American, British and French airborne radar demonstrator system.

82. There should certainly be no doubts about the positive intentions behind this Nunn initiative, but the success of it should also give European governments a warning. In this case a realistic programme, backed by enough money and also made attractive by early involvement in the research and development stage, attracted many European countries and funds right from the beginning. If IEPG does not want to be outstripped by appealing transatlantic initiatives, it should really act quickly and courageously. WEU member countries, with their hard core of Europe's defence industry, should take the lead without delay if they do not wish to be the losers in arms co-operation.

83. Even within NATO there is some concern that the member states are focusing too much attention on the Nunn projects, while there are a lot of other co-operative projects that are just as important but not visible. A drawback of the Nunn projects was to focus attention exclusively to the detriment of other, European, projects.

V. European helicopter programmes

84. This subject was dealt with extensively in a recent report by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of this committee (Document 1077, November 1986). Here, it should be enough to mention only the current position or latest developments in these programmes.

(a) Franco-German PAH/HAP battlefield helicopter

85. On 16th July 1987, the French and West-German Ministers of Defence announced that in November 1987 their countries would sign a final agreement concerning the production of a common battlefield helicopter for both armies, to come into service after 1997. This will be a helicopter with 5.4 tonnes start weight, twin-engined with a crew of two people in tandem seats. The helicopter will be equipped with European-made visionics and optronics for

in-flight shooting in all weather and day and night conditions. Visionics will be mast-mounted in the anti-tank version, which will be equipped with air-to-air missiles derived from the Matra Mistral. The anti-tank version will initially be equipped with Hot anti-tank missiles. Later, it will be equipped with a new-generation fire-and-forget anti-tank missile, called Trigat. This Trigat missile will be developed by France, the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom. An intergovernmental agreement on this subject will be signed in October 1987. The Federal Republic is planning to order 212 anti-tank helicopters (PAH). France will order 140 anti-tank helicopters and 75 anti-helicopter-helicopters (HAP), a one-man machine.

(b) Anglo-Italian EH-101

86. The first EH-101 had its roll-out at Yeovil on 7th April 1987, while the first flight took place on 9th October 1987. Full-climate certification of the civil/military utility aircraft is planned for September 1991.

87. Canada is likely to be the first foreign customer, with an order of about 50 EH-101 helicopters in the naval version, following the results of the Canadian navy's new shipborne aircraft competition. It is expected that the British Royal Navy will order 50 and the Italian navy 42 EH-101 in the naval version. The British general staff have made a reappraisal of their future tactical troop transporter helicopter requirements and as a result settled for the utility version of the EH-101 instead of the NH-90. Consequently, the British Ministry of Defence ordered 25 utility EH-101s for the army in April 1987. It is said that even this additional order is not sufficient for Westland to bridge the gap until the EH-101 production line starts up in the early 1990s. Westland and Agusta, the manufacturers, expect eventual sales to be at least 1000 military and civil EH-101s.

(c) NH-90

88. A feasibility and predefinition study was conducted by the five initial participating nations, France (Aérospatiale), the Federal Republic (MBB), Italy (Agusta), the Netherlands (Fokker) and the United Kingdom (Westland), from September 1985 to November 1986. As a result of this study, a choice was made for a fly-by-wire helicopter with mission weights of 7.5 to 9 metric tons, depending on whether the NH-90 is used for the tactical transport helicopter mission or the NATO frigate helicopter rôle. The helicopter will be powered by two Rolls-Royce Turbomeca RTM-322 or General Electric CT-7-6 turboshaft engines. In December 1986,

these five nations gave approval for the definition phase to be launched on 1st May 1987. The start of the definition phase was delayed in April 1987 after the announcement by the United Kingdom Government that it had decided to withdraw officially from the programme. In June 1987, however, the four remaining partners reached an agreement on a new division of tasks. This was followed by the launching of the definition phase on 5th June 1987. The development phase will be launched at the end of 1988 with the first flight expected to take place at the end of 1991 and first deliveries in 1995. NATO requirements are estimated at 700 NH-90 helicopters. Export and civilian versions included, the producers hope to sell more than 1000 helicopters by the year 2005.

(d) Tonal A-129 Mk 2 light attack helicopter

89. The four partners – Westland (38%), Agusta (38%), Fokker (19%) and Casa (5%) – are continuing the feasibility and cost studies, which should be concluded by the end of 1988, and will then proceed to the definition phase. The programme is managed by the Joint European Helicopter Company, established in Rome. However little has been settled about the Tonal configuration, it will certainly have to be able to carry a full day- and night-sighting system, an adequate number of Trigat anti-tank missiles and other operational systems, including electronic countermeasures. The requirements of the participating nations are now estimated at 125 for the United Kingdom, 90 for Italy and 70 each for the Netherlands and Spain. According to the present schedule, the first flight should take place in 1991, and the helicopter will come into service in 1995.

IV. Future European fighter aircraft

90. A full report by Mr. Wilkinson (Document 1037, November 1985) was submitted to the Assembly two years ago. Since then, there have been new developments which will be mentioned below. It should be noted, however, that the current situation is still far from clear.

(a) European fighter aircraft (EFA)

91. At the Farnborough air show in September 1986, British Aerospace presented its experimental aircraft programme (EAP) fighter, a demonstrator which is being used as an airborne testbed in the development programme for the EFA.

92. Meanwhile, the companies participating in the EFA programme, British Aerospace, MBB, Dornier, Aeritalia and Casa, had established Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH in Munich. At the time of writing (August 1987) officials of Eurofighter and Panavia (the producer of Tornado) are exploring a possible restructuring of the EFA programme under the existing Panavia management organisation in order to eliminate redundant staff and to take advantage of Panavia's co-operative project experience. Since February 1987, representatives of the four participating governments have been grouped in the NATO European Fighter Management Agency (NEFMA).

93. With a view to developing the EJ-200 engine for the EFA, Rolls-Royce (United Kingdom), Motoren- und Turbinen Union (Federal Republic), Fiat Aviazione (Italy) and Sener (Spain) have formed the Eurojet consortium.

94. At this moment two consortia are competing for the radar equipment. A Ferranti-led consortium is developing the entirely European ECR-90 radar, while the other consortium with AEG and Hughes is developing a special version of the Hughes APG-65 radar.

95. Each country is participating in the EFA development programme proportionally according to the number of aircraft it is expecting to buy, i.e. Federal Republic and United Kingdom 33% each (250 aircraft), Italy 21% (between 150 and 200 aircraft) and Spain 13% (between 75 and 100 aircraft).

96. It should be noted that some partners have expressed their concern over rising costs in the programme. In the United Kingdom, budget constraints might force the RAF to halve its initial requirement of about 260 aircraft, while the ground attack version of the EFA could be abandoned in favour of the McDonnell Douglas/British Aerospace Harrier GR Mk 5. In the Federal Republic many questions are being put about the rising costs of the programme. Just when the budget is becoming tighter, the EFA programme needs more funding and is having to compete for it with other programmes.

97. Originally, the deadline for beginning full-scale development had been fixed at spring 1986, but in the meantime there have been important delays. The definition phase has been extended into a definition refinement and risk reduction phase, which will continue until January 1988 and perhaps longer.

98. At the time of writing, the EFA is expected to enter into service in early 1998, three years later than initially planned.

(b) Rafale future combat aircraft

99. After long hesitation, the French Government in June 1987 ordered the development of a future combat aircraft for the French forces, to be derived from the Dassault-Breguet Rafale demonstrator. This future combat aircraft, also called avion de combat européen (ACE), with an empty weight of 8.5 tons, will be powered by two SNECMA M-88 engines now being developed. The French Government is said to attach the greatest importance to the use of stealth techniques, which make its detection by enemy radar difficult. The ACE should make its first flight in 1990 and enter into service in 1996.

100. It is hoped in France that it will be possible to produce the ACE in co-operation with other countries, especially Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, which will have to replace their F-16As and did not join the EFA programme. Export to other countries is also envisaged. For this purpose, Dassault-Breguet, Thomson, SNECMA, and Electronique Serge Dassault set up ACE International, a company

which is actively seeking international partners.

101. There are problems, however, concerning the replacement of the French carrier-based fighters Etendard, Super-Etendard and Crusader. Dassault-Breguet is developing a naval version of the ACE, the avion de combat marine (ACM), which will not be ready until 1996, while the expected service life of the Crusaders will expire in 1993. French defence officials now say that a decision to upgrade the Crusaders or to buy the American F/A-18 Hornet must be made by 1988.

102. Dassault-Breguet will meet heavy competition from the United States since General Dynamics has proposed an upgraded version of the F-16, called Agile Falcon, which could be produced jointly with other allied users, among which the four abovementioned European nations. At the same time, McDonnell Douglas is actively seeking buyers for the Super Hornet, an improved and more manoeuvrable version of the F/A-18. Both these initiatives are strongly supported by the United States Defence Department.

APPENDIX I

Programmes under the Nunn initiative

Ada project support environment: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Italy.

Airborne stand-off radar demonstrator system (ARDS): United States, United Kingdom, France.

Multi-functional information distribution system (MIDS): United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Norway, Italy.

155 mm autonomous precision guided munition: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Turkey.

NATO identification system (NIS): United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Norway, Italy, Greece, Turkey.

Modular stand-off weapon: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Spain, Italy.

Advanced sea mine: United States, United Kingdom.

Enhanced fighter manoeuvrability: United States, West Germany.

Advanced short take-off and vertical landing technology: United States, United Kingdom.

Battlefield information collection and exploitation system (BICES): United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain.

HAWK mobility enhancement: United States, Netherlands.

NATO frigate replacement – 1990s (NFR 90): United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Italy.

APPENDIX II

*Tasks of the different IEPG bodies under the responsibility of national armaments directors**Panel I*

Identifies opportunities for co-operation. Once an opportunity is identified, an explanatory group is set up to try to draw up an outline European staff target (OEST).

Panel II

Its main task is to oversee the project groups which are responsible for launching concrete projects and steering them through the stages of feasibility, development and production. Some projects are developed from OESTs agreed in Panel I, others are introduced into the IEPG at a later stage.

Panel III

Responsible for the procedures which govern co-operation within the IEPG. In recent years, Panel III, through one of its sub-groups, has also taken on responsibility for co-operation in defence research and technology, by establishing the co-operative technology projects (CTPs). Also, as a result of the last IEPG ministerial meeting in Seville, Panel III has seen its activities enlarged with the creation this year of a new sub-group to monitor the implementation, as well as to identify new measures to allow those nations with less-developed defence industries (LDDI) to participate more fully in the European armament activities, and with the creation of three ad hoc groups to draft an action plan on EDIS (European defence industry study).

Staff group

Based in Brussels, it provides a forum for co-ordination among IEPG nations between meetings of ministers and NADs, particularly with regard to the transatlantic dialogue, and it has an important rôle in making preparations for high-level meetings.

European defence industry group (EDIG)

Constituted by industrialists, it is an advisory body which collaborates with the IEPG giving advice on industrial subjects.

Task force C3

This non-permanent group has been established to study the possibility of developing a "European data distribution system" (EDDS) to cope with the existing needs in the field of command, control and communications (C3).

*European armaments co-operation –
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 ¹

tabled by MM. Bassinet and Fourré

1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Welcoming the organisation in 1988 of a first European defence study session to advance knowledge of the European dimensions of security matters; ”
2. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Instruct the Secretariat-General to ensure periodical meetings of European defence study sessions and to co-ordinate national initiatives in this connection with a view to setting up a European defence research institute as soon as possible. ”

Signed: Bassinet, Fourré

1. See 12th sitting, 3rd December 1987 (amendments agreed to).

**DRAFT SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1987¹**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur

APPENDICES

- I. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly, 15th July 1987
- II. Letter from the President of the Assembly to the Secretary-General, 27th July 1987

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee*: Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mr. Sinesio (Alternate: *Gianotti*), Mrs. Pack (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Beysen (Alternate: *Ramaekers*), Mrs. Blunck (Alternate: *Ahrens*), MM. Bohl, Chartron, Declercq, Dhaille, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Ferrari Aggradi, Freeson (Alternate: *Woodall*), de Jong, Klejdzinski, Morris, Oehler, Pollidoro, Rathbone, Rauti, Worrell (Alternate: *Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman*), Mr. Zierer.

N.B.: *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. In his letter dated 15th July 1987 (reference VII.37, see Appendix I) the Secretary-General of WEU informed the President of the Assembly of the Council's discussions on the implementation of the decision taken by the ministers in Luxembourg on 28th April 1987. He said the Council has noted "that the separation of the pensions budget from the operating budget would release an amount which, for 1987, might allow it to consider agreeing to a supplementary budget of not more than F 250 000".
2. This second supplementary budget for the financial year 1987 has been prepared for the specific purpose of meeting this decision by the Council. It takes account of the Assembly's needs that could not be covered in the ordinary budget although they had priority in the framework of the Assembly's activities for 1987. This supplementary budget amounts to F 178 230 and does not use the entire sum of F 250 000 made available to the Assembly by the Council. The fact is that at this stage of the financial year it is difficult to implement programmes held over for financial reasons or new programmes requiring lengthy preparation and many contacts. This is the case, for instance, of the visit to Iceland and Canada by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. When the Presidential Committee authorised this visit, planned some time earlier subject to the possibility of financing it, only the visit to Canada proved feasible, the visit to Iceland having been cancelled by the Icelandic authorities because of unforeseeable circumstances that had occurred in the meantime.
3. The sums requested relate to three heads in the budget, i.e. Heads I, II and V.
4. A sum of F 35 000 has been included under Sub-Heads 1, 2 and 3 of Head I for the creation, as from 15th October 1987, of a grade B3 post of bookkeeper. In his letter to the Secretary-General dated 27th July 1987 (see Appendix II), the President of the Assembly stressed that the protracted absence for health reasons of the Assembly's only accountant had brought about a crisis which, in spite of the efforts made by the staff of the Office of the Clerk, could but jeopardise the running of the administrative service. The creation of the Grade B3 post of bookkeeper therefore seems a vital necessity.
5. Supplementary credits have been requested under Head II, as follows:
 - in Sub-Head 7 (F 60 000) and Sub-Head 9 (F 15 000) for interpretation expenses for carrying out the programme of work of the various committees, approved by the Presidential Committee. This includes the visit by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to Canada which was held over;
 - in Sub-Head 8 (F 30 000) to allow the Office of the Clerk to recruit between now and the end of the year the temporary staff needed to operate the administrative service in view of the problems set out above, to assist in the private office of the President and to meet the requirements of the committee service (including the organisation of a colloquy to be held in London early next year).
6. Finally, a sum of F 40 000 has been requested under Sub-Head 24 of Head V to meet expenditure relating to journeys and visits by the President in the exercise of his duties and the protocol visits he is to make to the authorities of the WEU member countries following his election.
7. The total supplementary budget amounts to F 180 000 which, in view of an increase in receipts of F 1 770 (contribution of the new grade B3 official to the pension scheme), represents an increase in contributions by member countries of F 178 230.
8. As a result of the proposed new credits set out in the present supplementary budget, the Assembly's financial position for 1987 is modified as follows:

	Operating budget	Pensions budget	TOTAL
Estimates for 1987 (1st revision)	17 120 975	1 057 050	18 178 025
Supplementary estimates	180 000	- 1 770	178 230
New total for 1987	17 300 975	1 055 280	18 356 255
Budget for 1986	16 572 000	546 700	17 118 700
Modified increase in the 1987 budget compared with 1986 ..	4.39%	93.02%	7.22%

**Budget estimates of the Assembly
for the financial year 1987 (second revision)**

Heads and sub-heads	Budget for 1987 – (1st revision)	Supplementary budget	Budget for 1987 – (2nd revision)
<i>Head I – Permanent staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
1 – Basic salaries	7 180 000	26 000	7 206 000
2 – Allowances	1 329 900	4 000	1 333 900
3 – Social charges	1 379 700	5 000	1 384 700
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	25 000	–	25 000
5 – Medical examination	8 000	–	8 000
Total	9 922 600	35 000	9 957 600
<i>Head II – Temporary staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions	2 111 875	–	2 111 875
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	456 000	60 000	516 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	50 000	30 000	80 000
9 – Social charges	87 000	15 000	102 000
Total	2 704 875	105 000	2 809 875
<i>Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	450 000	–	450 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms	15 000	–	15 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	345 000	–	345 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	45 000	–	45 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	18 000	–	18 000
15 – Purchase or repair of Office furniture ...	28 000	–	28 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	32 300	–	32 300
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	366 700	–	366 700
Total	1 300 000	–	1 300 000

Heads and sub-heads	Budget for 1987 – (1st revision)	Supplementary budget	Budget for 1987 – (2nd revision)
<i>Head IV – General administrative costs</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480 000	–	480 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	258 000	–	258 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents ..	1 190 000	–	1 190 000
21 – Purchase of documents	60 000	–	60 000
22 – Official cars	115 000	–	115 000
23 – Bank charges	500	–	500
Total	2 103 500	–	2 103 500
<i>Head V – Other expenditure</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	130 000	40 000	170 000
25 – Expenses for representation	200 000	–	200 000
26 – Committee study missions	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	350 000	–	350 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	–	70 000
29 – Expenditure on information	311 000	–	311 000
30 – Expenses for political groups	311 000	–	311 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	–	20 000
Total	1 400 000	40 000	1 440 000
OPERATING BUDGET	17 430 975	180 000	17 610 975
RECEIPTS	310 000	–	310 000
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET	17 120 975	180 000	17 300 975
PENSIONS	1 486 050	–	1 486 050
RECEIPTS	429 000	1 770	430 770
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET	1 057 050	– 1 770	1 055 280
NET TOTAL BUDGET	18 178 025	178 230	18 356 255

APPENDIX I

*Letter from the Secretary-General to
the President of the Assembly, 15th July 1987*

Dear President,

Thank you for your letter of 22nd June 1987 enclosing a note on the application of the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy. The Council notes that the funds available to WEU come from contributions by member countries. It has to take account of the fact that in attributing financial means to international organisations, the governments of member countries have a degree of responsibility regarding supervision of the management of resources.

Bound by this principle, the Council read with the closest attention this note which very usefully clarifies a number of questions. It was taken especially into account in the deliberations of the Council on the implementation of the conclusions reached by the Ministers on 28th April last on separating the pensions budget from the operating budget of the Assembly as well as the latter's budgetary autonomy.

On this question, the Council agrees that, for the management of its future budgets, the Assembly may transfer funds between Heads II, III, IV and V without the prior agreement of the Council being necessary. Such agreement will be necessary, however, for any transfer concerning Head I. All the other procedures relating to the establishment of the budget and its management remain unchanged.

The overall budget of the Assembly, without pensions, will of course have to take account of the growth rate accepted by the seven member countries.

In this light, the presentation by the Assembly of detailed draft budgets remains as before and it is consequently more than desirable for a representative of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to be able to continue to take part in meetings of the Budget and Organisation Committee when these drafts are examined.

Supplementary budgets are necessarily subjected to the same procedures as ordinary budgets.

The calculations made by the Council allow it to note that the separation of the pensions budget from the operating budget would release an amount which, for 1987, might allow it to consider agreeing to a supplementary budget of not more than F 250 000.

The restructuring of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly – which had already been set out in a letter and a memorandum from your predecessor – falls within the context of Head I of the budget. Having examined these documents, the Council decided “ that the proposals contained in the document (memorandum) need to be considered as part of the review, during the transitional period, of the structure of the whole organisation, and cannot therefore be tackled separately ”. I had the honour to inform Mr. Jean-Marie Caro of this in a letter dated 23rd February and to specify, in another dated 28th May, that “ this decision remains fully valid for all the governments and was in no way modified at the lunch of the Ministers on 28th April ”.

In these conditions, the possible creation of new posts can be contemplated only in the framework of the structure of the whole organisation. Likewise, pending a decision on the new table of establishment, all the promotions made must be considered as measures taken in a personal capacity.

The Council keenly hopes that these clarifications will allow a harmonious application of the conclusions reached by the Ministers on 28th April, and this to the satisfaction of the Assembly, and will allow the positive nature of its relations with the latter to be strengthened.

Mr. C. GOERENS,
President,
Assembly of Western European Union

Yours sincerely,
Alfred CAHEN

APPENDIX II

*Letter from the President of the Assembly to
the Secretary-General, 27th July 1987*

Sir,

Thank you for your letter of 15th July 1987 further to my letter of 3rd June and the notes on the Assembly's budgetary autonomy that I sent you on 5th and 22nd June. It has been examined attentively by the Presidential Committee, which agreed unanimously to make the following remarks.

The Assembly's steering body can but agree on the need for government supervision of the management, in international organisations, of funds voted by parliaments. It considers, however, that application of this principle should be reconciled with the fact that the establishment, by the modified Brussels Treaty, of a parliamentary body in WEU would lose its justification and meaning if the Assembly did not have political independence, the implications of which at the level of budgetary management were set out in the memorandum of 22nd June.

The Assembly therefore expresses its satisfaction at the recognition, in the framework of its budgetary autonomy, of the possibility of transferring funds between Heads II to V of its budget without the prior agreement of the Council. In regard to Head I, it should be pointed out that since these amounts are attributed to permanent staff they cannot in principle be increased or reduced during the financial year.

Unlike the ministerial organs of WEU, the Assembly cannot allow posts to remain vacant, thereby increasing the amounts available for its work, since such a practice would be contrary to the rules governing the establishment of its budget. For the same reasons, it cannot reduce its work in order to create a post not included in the budget. Hence no transfer of funds should be considered between heads relating to the activities of the Assembly and those relating to the remuneration of its permanent staff except for technical adjustments involving minor amounts.

The urgent issue now facing the Assembly is that of the shortcomings in the present structure of the Office of the Clerk. The Assembly considers that the specific problems still to be solved cannot remain outstanding pending "the review, during the transitional period, of the structure of the whole organisation". Indeed, the Assembly is at present without an accountancy service due to the protracted absence for health reasons of its only accountant. The inadequate number of staff in the administrative service has already been amply emphasised. The crisis that was to be feared has occurred. In spite of the efforts made by the staff of the Office of the Clerk, the absence of an accountant is now jeopardising the running of this service. The creation of the grade B3 post of bookkeeper that the Assembly hoped to be able to fill on 1st September of this year therefore seems a vital necessity.

By underlining the urgency of finding a solution to this problem, the Presidential Committee is not renouncing the creation of other posts. This matter will be dealt with as a whole when the budget for the financial year 1988 is prepared. Head I of that budget will be based on the note relating to the structure of the Office of the Clerk.

The Presidential Committee wishes to stress again the importance of one aspect of this structure. This is the sharing out of the duties of assistant to the Clerk between an assistant responsible for political matters and the committees and an assistant responsible for administrative and financial matters, both at grade A6. The Council agreed to the appointment of two assistants to the Clerk with this grade in 1981. When the present holder of the post of assistant responsible for political matters retires at the end of this year, the Secretary of the General Affairs Committee, who will replace him in that capacity, should be given the same grade.

The Assembly also wishes to raise again the question of methods of calculating the overall amount of its budget. There is too often a considerable difference between the theoretical growth rate of the overall budget which should in principle compensate for the effects of expected inflation and the real growth rate in the cost of services and equipment paid for by the Assembly. If such a difference occurs several years running, as has already happened in the past, it results in a substantial reduction in the overall budget in real terms.

The case this year is that a 2% growth rate was fixed for calculating the Assembly's operating budget following the separation of the pensions budget, although it is apparent that price increases in France will be far higher than this rate.

The Assembly therefore considers that the problem of fixing the nominal growth rate of its overall budget without pensions remains and should be studied in depth.

H.E. Mr. Alfred CAHEN,
Secretary-General,
Western European Union

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
Charles GOERENS

*Draft second supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987*

Opinion of the Council

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Opinion of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee
(Document C-B (87) 16)

Opinion of the Council (Letter from the Deputy Secretary-
General of WEU dated 20th November 1987)

Table showing modifications approved by the Council

*Secretary-General's note*¹

WEU Assembly second supplementary budget for 1987

1. The WEU Assembly second supplementary budget for 1987 (Assembly document A/WEU/BA (87) 12) was distributed under reference B (87) 24 and was examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee at its meeting on 11th, 12th and 13th November 1987 (BR (87) 3, II – to be circulated).

2. It is recalled that the first supplementary budget was the subject of document C-B (87) 12 forwarded to the Council for approval on 7th October 1987. The following figures summarise the effect of both budgets:

	Operating budget (F)	Pensions budget (F)	Total (F)
1987 approved estimates	16 654 375	942 000	17 596 375
First supplementary budget	466 600	115 050	581 650
Sub-total	17 120 975	1 057 050	18 178 025
Second supplementary budget	180 000	(-) 1 770	178 230
New total for 1987	17 300 975	1 055 280	18 356 255
Totals for 1986	16 572 700	546 000	17 118 700
Increase for 1987 over 1986	4.39%	93.02%	7.22%

3. The second supplementary budget's explanatory memorandum recalled that the Council had agreed to grant the Assembly additional funds of not more than F 250 000 as a result of the ministerial decision to allow the separation of the pensions budget for the purpose of zero-growth considerations. The memorandum gave reasons for the fact that the Assembly was not asking for the full amount but only F 178 230.

4. Members of the Budget and Organisation Committee could not contest the Assembly's justification for this budget, but observed that the Council's willingness to grant the additional F 250 000 had to be considered in the light of the amount of F 581 650 sought in the first supplementary budget. The combined increase of F 759 880 had certainly not been anticipated and was substantially in excess of the increase intended by the Council. The committee felt obliged, therefore, to seek some reductions in this second supplementary budget.

1. Document C-B (87) 16, 16th November 1987.

5. The committee's recommendations were as follows:

Head I – Permanent staff

Delegates could not support the proposal to increase the permanent establishment by one B3 (book-keeper) as from 15th October and recommended the withdrawal of the total of F 35 000 in Head I foreseen for this post. The Assembly's representative observed that a consequence would be the elimination of the sum of F 1 770 by which pension income would otherwise be increased in the pension section of the budget.

The committee agreed to re-examine this proposal in the context of the 1988 budget (see C-B (87) 15).

Head II – Temporary staff

The committee proposed to reduce the amounts sought as shown below:

Sub-Head 7 – Interpretation staff

Reduce by F 10 000 from F 60 000 to F 50 000.

Sub-Head 8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk

Reduce by F 20 000 from F 30 000 to F 10 000.

Sub-Head 9 – Social charges

Reduce by F 5 000 from F 15 000 to F 10 000.

The total reductions in Head II amounted to F 35 000.

Head V – Other expenditure

Sub-Head 24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances for the President, chairmen of committees, etc.

The committee proposed a reduction of F 10 000 from F 40 000 to F 30 000.

The total of these reductions in Heads I to V came to F 80 000, amending the total requested therein from F 180 000 to F 100 000. That figure, after taking out the additional pension income foreseen (F 1 770) that was associated with the new B3 post, also represented the amended total of the Assembly's second supplementary budget as recommended by the Budget and Organisation Committee.

6. The effect of the foregoing amendments proposed by the committee on the Assembly's 1987 budget is as follows:

	Operating budget (F)	Pensions budget (F)	Total (F)
Total after first supplementary budget	17 120 975	1 057 050	18 178 025
Amended second supplementary budget	100 000	–	100 000
Amended total for 1987	17 220 975	1 057 050	18 278 025
Increase 1987/1986	3.91%	93.60%	6.77%

7. The following figures summarise the 1987 increases for *all* of the WEU budgets :

	Sections A (%)	Section B (%)	A + B (%)	Assembly (%)	Combined total (%)
With pensions	2.30	8.21	6.23	6.77	6.37
Without pensions	(-) 0.26	4.86	3.10	3.91	3.34

Note: The London percentages *exclude* the effect of sums that were brought forward in the 1987 revised budget from 1986 when they were unspent (cf. C-B (87) 10).

8. Subject to a United Kingdom reserve that applies to both of the Assembly's supplementary budgets, the committee could recommend the Council to approve the second supplementary budget as amended to F 100 000.

9. The Council's approval will be sought at its next meeting on 19th November 1987.

*
* *

London, 20th November 1987

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Council has approved the revised budgets of the Assembly for 1987 given in documents C-B (87) 12 and 16.

I enclose copies of these documents.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
H. HOLZHEIMER
Deputy Secretary-General

Mr. G. MOULIAS,
Clerk of the Assembly of
Western European Union

*Draft second supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987*

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft budget for 1987 (second revision)	Reductions in accordance with the Council's opinion	Draft second budget for 1987 (reduced)
<i>Head I – Permanent staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
1 – Basic salaries	7 026 000	– 26 000	7 180 000
2 – Allowances	1 333 900	– 4 000	1 329 900
3 – Social charges	1 384 700	– 5 000	1 379 700
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	25 000	–	25 000
5 – Medical examination	8 000	–	8 000
Total	9 957 600	– 35 000	9 922 600
<i>Head II – Temporary staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions	2 111 875	–	2 111 875
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	516 000	– 10 000	506 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk .	80 000	– 20 000	60 000
9 – Social charges	102 000	– 5 000	97 000
Total	2 809 875	– 35 000	2 774 875
<i>Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	450 000	–	450 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms	15 000	–	15 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	345 000	–	345 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of ses- sions	45 000	–	45 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	18 000	–	18 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	28 000	–	28 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	32 300	–	32 300
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	366 700	–	366 700
Total	1 300 000	–	1 300 000

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft budget for 1987 (second revision)	Reductions in accordance with the Council's opinion	Draft second budget for 1987 (reduced)
<i>Head IV – General administrative costs</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480 000	–	480 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	258 000	–	258 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents	1 190 000	–	1 190 000
21 – Purchase of documents	60 000	–	60 000
22 – Official cars	115 000	–	115 000
23 – Bank charges	500	–	500
Total	2 103 500	–	2 103 500
<i>Head V – Other expenditure</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs ..	170 000	–10 000	160 000
25 – Expenses for representation	200 000	–	200 000
26 – Committee study missions	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	350 000	–	350 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	–	70 000
29 – Expenditure on information	311 000	–	311 000
30 – Expenses for political groups	311 000	–	311 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	–	20 000
Total	1 440 000	–10 000	1 430 000
OPERATING BUDGET	17 610 975	– 80 000	17 530 975
RECEIPTS	310 000	–	310 000
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET	17 300 975	– 80 000	17 220 975
PENSIONS	1 486 050	–	1 486 050
RECEIPTS	430 770	– 1 770	429 000
GRAND TOTAL	1 055 280	+ 1 770	1 057 050
NET TOTAL BUDGET	18 356 255	– 78 230	18 278 025

**DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1988 ¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mr. Sinesio (Alternate: *Gianotti*), Mrs. Pack (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Beysen (Alternate: *Ramaekers*), Mrs. Blunck (Alternate: *Ahrens*), MM. *Bohl*, Chartron, Declercq, Dhaille, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Ferrari Aggradi, Freeson (Alternate: *Woodall*), de Jong, *Klejdzinski*, *Morris*, Oehler, MM. *Pollidoro*, Rathbone, Rauti, Worrell (Alternate: Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman*), Mr. Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. General and political considerations

1. In Luxembourg on 28th April 1987, following recommendations by the Assembly, the Council of Ministers gave a favourable opinion on the Assembly's budgetary autonomy and decided to separate the pensions budget from the operating budget.
2. The Council subsequently reverted to the first point and specified that in managing its budgets the Assembly was entitled to transfer sums between Heads II, III, IV and V without prior agreement but that even in that case budgets would have to be set out in a detailed manner in accordance with the procedure in force.
3. According to the Council, this autonomy may not be extended to Head I ("Permanent staff") which is the context for the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk. The latter should be considered in the context of WEU as a whole on the occasion of the reassessment study of which the ministerial organs were the subject.
4. In view of the Council's decisions, the Presidential Committee pointed out that:
 - Assembly budgets would continue to be presented as in the past following the usual criteria, which correspond perfectly to the need for clarity and accuracy in budget management;
 - autonomy in the management of Head I was in fact a false problem since, once the Office of the Clerk had been restructured, the amount and management of credits under this head would depend solely on Council decisions relating to salary scales to be applied to permanent staff. Indeed, the Assembly could neither leave posts vacant to increase sums available for its activities nor reduce its activities in order to create a post not included in the budget since such a practice would be contrary to its own rules concerning the preparation and management of its budget;
 - the only question therefore was one of weaknesses in the present structure of the Office of the Clerk and the problems thus raised could not remain unsolved for long.
5. In accordance with the abovementioned remarks – which have been brought to the attention of the Council – the Presidential Committee decided to include in the draft budget for 1988 all the proposals necessary for completing the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk as set out in the document of 9th October 1986, approved on 4th November 1986 (see Appendix I).
6. The creation of new posts, which is the subject of these proposals, largely justifies the increase in the budget for 1988 compared with the budget approved for 1987, as will be specified in the next chapter. But your Rapporteur wishes here and now to stress that in the present situation – marked by a growth in the activities of WEU which have taken a turn in a new direction, the interest shown by a growing number of foreign governments in its work, the concern shown by the parliaments of various Western European countries not to be left out of the Assembly's debates and the ever-larger amount of space that WEU is being given in the press – the Assembly intends to continue to play the political rôle of supervision, advice and stimulus assigned to it by Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. It is this determination that underlies the present draft budget.
7. In the operating budget (the pensions budget will be considered subsequently), compared with the revised budget for 1987 (see Appendix VI), there is an increase of:
 - 9.02% if total expenditure is considered;
 - 9.47% if the net totals are compared (expenditure less receipts).
8. This increase is higher than the foreseeable inflation rate in 1988. It should be pointed out that the creation of new posts alone represents an increase of 5.7% in expenditure. This confirms that, disregarding exceptional expenditure connected with the creation of new posts and the repercussions of the three-yearly adjustment in staff salaries, the utmost rigour has been applied to budget estimates for 1988 and that the greatest possible cost-effectiveness has been sought.
9. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the question of the growth rates applicable to Assembly budgets and to the budgets of the ministerial organs is still open, the Council not yet having taken a decision on the proposal by Mr. Poos, former Chairman-in-Office of the Council. The Assembly has

raised the matter, which is not without importance, on many occasions because it is liable to have a considerable effect on the activities of the organs concerned. Experience in 1987 shows the validity of all the arguments put forward: with the rate of 2% agreed upon by the Council as the zero growth rate, it is now generally felt that the inflation rate in France will reach 3.5% by the end of the year while certain categories of Assembly expenditure (e.g. the cost of servicing equipment) have already, following the freeing of prices, risen by about 30%.

10. It seems that it will be even more difficult to estimate the zero growth rate for 1988 because of the complexity of the present economic and political situation. Your Rapporteur is therefore unable to calculate the disparity between the growth rate in the Assembly's budget for 1988 and the zero growth rate. He can but repeat what Sir Dudley Smith wrote in the explanatory memorandum for 1987, i.e. once the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk has been completed and once the budget has been adjusted on the basis of true requirements, the evolution of Assembly budgets will become normal again and thus remain within the limits of the growth rate fixed by the Council for all the WEU organs. Your Rapporteur adds the wish that following the Presidential Committee's firm approach to the Council the latter will be able to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of the growth rate as soon as possible and that the Assembly's budgetary debates will thus be able to return to their normal purpose, i.e. to financial matters rather than to relations with the Council.

2. Restructuring of the Office of the Clerk

11. The restructuring of the Office of the Clerk started in 1986 with the regrading, approved by the Council, of the post of head of the research service and Secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations from grade A3 to A4.

12. It was continued in 1987 with the adoption of the following provisions immediately after the extraordinary session in Luxembourg on the basis of statements by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to the Assembly:

- regrading of the post of assistant to the Clerk for political affairs from grade A5 to A6;
- regrading of the post of assistant to the Clerk for administrative and financial affairs from grade A5 to A6;
- promotion on a personal basis of the head of the press and external relations service from grade A5 to A6;
- regrading of the post of head of the translation and publications service from grade A4 to A5;
- regrading of two posts of bilingual shorthand-typist from grade B3 to B3/B4 and promotion of their respective holders.

13. In spite of the extremely small financial implications of these provisions since all but one of the officials concerned were already at the ceiling of their grades, the Council considered the regrading of the abovementioned posts to be a measure that consisted solely of promotions on a personal basis pending a decision on a new organogram. The Assembly can but confirm that the structure of the Office of the Clerk corresponds to its organisation and methods of work and that it cannot possibly await the revision of the structure of the ministerial organs. Decisions on this subject have become a matter of priority, particularly in the administrative and accounting service in which a crisis arose because of the protracted absence of its only accountant. The creation of a new grade B3 post of bookkeeper was therefore included in the draft second supplementary budget for 1987 as being a vital necessity (cost in 1988: F 175 000).

14. The process of restructuring the Office of the Clerk reaches completion in the present draft budget, which contains the following proposals for the creation of posts:

Grade	Duties	Financial implications (salaries, allowances and employer's social contributions) (F)
A2	Head of the private office of the President	290 000
A2	Controller – deputy to the head of the administrative and financial service	340 000
B3	Assistant to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations	200 000
		830 000

The relevant justification is given in the note on the structure of the Office of the Clerk at Appendix I.

3. Operational expenditure

15. There is an increase of 4.77% under Head II (“ Temporary staff ”) compared with the revised 1987 budget. The salaries of staff recruited for the various services during sessions, the scales of which are subject to the same increases as those of permanent staff, are charged to this head.

16. Estimates under Sub-Head 7 (“ Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions ”) are slightly lower than in the revised budget for 1987. It is considered, in fact, that the possibility of drawing up in advance a complete programme of work for both parts of the year on the basis of known credits will allow implementation of a very stringent policy for recruiting interpreters meeting the concern to reduce to the minimum the cost of organising interpretation teams.

17. Estimates under Sub-Head 8 (“ Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk ”) are F 50 000 lower than in the previous budget since account has been taken of the fact that the creation of new posts will allow the recruitment of temporary staff from outside to be limited.

18. There is an increase of 1.90% compared with 1987 in the total for Head IV “ General administrative costs ” due to application of the principle of renewing the credits for this year, subject to a very small increase in the light of inflation.

19. Conversely, there is an increase of 5% in estimates under Head V “ Other expenditure ”. The sub-heads under this head are strictly linked with the Assembly’s activities, e.g. travelling expenses of the President of the Assembly and rapporteurs (Sub-Head 20), travelling expenses of members of the Office of the Clerk (Sub-Head 27), expenditure on information (Sub-Head 29) and expenses for political groups (Sub-Head 30). This increase takes account of the financial implications of the intensification in the Assembly’s activities.

4. Expenditure on premises and equipment

20. Maintenance of the premises assigned to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly comes under the general programme for the seat of WEU in Paris drawn up by the WEU agencies. Estimates of expenditure are therefore calculated in agreement with the agencies.

21. The five-year programme for modernising equipment is given at Appendix V. Apart from the purchase of electronic scales, which will allow postal charges to be calculated more accurately, in 1988 this programme merely renews current hire and maintenance contracts and makes provision for the replacement of office furniture.

22. In 1987 the Assembly was faced with a considerable rise in the cost of contracts for maintaining reproduction machines due to the policy of higher rates applied by the firm concerned. Negotiations on this subject allowed the Assembly to obtain lower rates than those initially charged. Estimates for 1988 are based on these rates.

23. It should be pointed out that the programme for modernising equipment was completed in 1987. It has allowed large savings in other sectors of expenditure, an improvement in the working conditions of the staff and increased efficiency. The establishment of a new modernisation programme will depend on the possibility of obtaining additional premises. As Sir Dudley Smith wrote in his report last year, priority should be given to this problem.

5. Summary of operating budget estimates

24. A summary of operating budget estimates for 1988 (expenditure and receipts) is given at Appendix VII. The implications of each head for total expenditure and the total net budget (expenditure less receipts) are shown. For the purposes of comparison, data relating to the revised budget for 1987 are given in the same table.

6. Pensions

25. The problem of pensions was finally solved by the Council's decision to separate the pensions budget from the operating budget. Your Rapporteur can but welcome this decision, taken at a time when the Assembly's pensions budget is increasing steadily, as shown at Appendix VIII. It would have been impossible for the Assembly to meet this increase in 1988 from savings in the operating budget without its activities being jeopardised.

Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts for the financial year 1988

Details	Expenditure	Receipts
PART I Operating budget		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Permanent staff	11 313 000	
<i>Head II:</i> Temporary staff	2 944 000	
<i>Head III:</i> Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 287 000	
<i>Head IV:</i> General administrative costs	2 143 500	
<i>Head V:</i> Other expenditure	1 512 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		260 000
	19 199 500	260 000
NET TOTAL		18 939 500
	19 199 500	19 199 500
PART II: Pensions budget		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Pensions, allowances and social charges	2 396 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		478 000
	2 396 000	478 000
NET TOTAL		1 918 000
	2 396 000	2 396 000
NET TOTAL BUDGET		20 857 500

Budget estimates
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

Section A – Expenditure

Head I – Permanent staff

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1988	Revised budget for 1987	Expected expenditure in 1987	Actual expenditure in 1986
Sub-Head 1 – Basic salaries	7 895 000	7 206 000	7 206 000	6 863 397
Sub-Head 2 – Allowances:				
2.1. Expatriation allowance	740 000			
2.2. Household allowance	325 000			
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons	365 000			
2.4. Rent allowance	40 000			
2.5. Education allowance	65 000			
2.6. Allowance for language courses	2 000			
2.7. Overtime	50 000			
2.8. Home leave	<u>20 000</u>			
	1 607 000	1 333 900	1 333 900	1 254 607
Sub-Head 3 – Social charges:				
3.1. Social security	1 070 000			
3.2. Supplementary insurance	325 000			
3.3. Provident fund	<u>151 000</u>			
	1 546 000	1 384 700	1 384 700	1 282 261
Sub-Head 4 – Expenses relating to the recruit- ment and departure of permanent officials				
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi- dates for vacant posts	5 000			
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	15 000			
4.3. Removal expenses	120 000			
4.4. Installation allowance	<u>117 000</u>			
	257 000	25 000	25 000	131 190
Sub-Head 5 – Medical examination	8 000	8 000	8 000	6 140
TOTAL OF HEAD I	11 313 000	9 957 600	9 957 600	9 537 595

Explanations

Sub-Heads 1 and 2

Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to permanent staff in accordance with Chapter III of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 1st July 1986¹, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 5% as from 1st July 1987 and 4% as from 1st July 1988. Adjustments taken into account amount to F 724 000.

1. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU Council and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA). In accordance with the committee's report, salaries are adjusted with effect from 1st July of each year. Furthermore, should the cost of living between 1st July and 31st December rise by more than 3% a corresponding percentage adjustment is made. (This threshold, initially 2%, was raised to 3% in the 191st report).

The organogram of the Office of the Clerk is given at Appendix II. A list of officials, showing their grades and duties, is given at Appendix III. This appendix also shows proposed changes compared with the financial year 1987. Justification for these changes is given in the explanatory memorandum.

Sub-Head 3

Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from:

- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)²;
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)³;
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).

Sub-Head 4

Estimates under this sub-head take account of the retirement of a grade A non-French official, the recruitment of his replacement of the same nationality and the recruitment of two other officials, who will probably also not be French nationals.

Sub-Head 5

The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.

Head II – Temporary staff

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1988	Revised budget for 1987	Expected expenditure in 1987	Actual expenditure in 1986
Sub-Head 6 – Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly				
6.1. Sitings service	1 072 000			
6.2. Interpretation service	401 000			
6.3. Translation service	772 000			
6.4. Other services	40 000			
	2 285 000	2 111 875	2 150 000	1 928 591
Sub-Head 7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	500 000	516 000	516 000	481 642
Sub-Head 8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	30 000	80 000	80 000	89 448
Sub-Head 9 – Social charges				
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	4 000			
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters	120 000			
9.3. Insurance for interpreters	5 000			
	129 000	102 000	102 000	87 601
TOTAL OF HEAD II	2 944 000	2 809 875	2 848 000	2 587 282

2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-age pensions.

3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the beneficiaries he has named.

Explanations

Sub-Head 6

Estimates under this sub-head relate to:

(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at Appendix IV.

Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1986 in the co-ordinated organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, the rate of increase being 7.1%. These adjustments amount to F 134 000.

In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, plus 6%.

(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post office technician, typewriter mechanic, etc.).

Sub-Head 7

This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances, travelling time and travelling expenses).

Estimates are based on a total of 150 working days (of which 100 in Paris and 50 elsewhere). Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. Sub-Head 6). Their salary adjustment for 1988 amounts to F 28 000.

Sub-Head 8

Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the Office of the Clerk may have to recruit in 1988. They include an overall sum for salaries, possible travelling expenses and insurance. The sum requested is far lower than in 1987 since it is expected that fewer staff will have to be recruited from outside due to the creation of two new grade B3 posts proposed in the budget.

Sub-Head 9

Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:

Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters

Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 40% by staff.

Provident fund for interpreters

In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters.

Insurance for interpreters

A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk (0.7%) and the interpreters (0.4%).

Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1988	Revised budget for 1987	Expected expenditure in 1987	Actual expenditure in 1986
Sub-Head 10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	418 000	450 000	430 000	389 788
Sub-Head 11 – Hire of committee rooms	15 000	15 000	–	–
Sub-Head 12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	365 000	345 000	360 000	350 397
Sub-Head 13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	45 000	45 000	45 000	43 514
Sub-Head 14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	18 000	18 000	8 000	1 242
Sub-Head 15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	43 000	28 000	40 000	31 360
Sub-Head 16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	11 000	32 300	25 000	113 671
Sub-Head 17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	372 000	366 700	380 000	311 325
TOTAL OF HEAD III	1 287 000	1 300 000	1 288 000	1 241 297

*Explanations**Sub-Head 10*

Sums requested under this sub-head cover the Assembly's share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises. They are lower than in 1987 because the cost of replacing the telephone switchboard was paid in full in 1987.

The director responsible for co-ordinating the Paris agencies manages the programme for such expenditure, to which the Assembly contributes 30%, 70% being met by the agencies.

Sub-Head 11

For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for the hire of a room or the cost of installing portable interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the Assembly to cover such expenditure if necessary.

Sub-Head 12

As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment, telephone booths, telex, two metal-detecting doors necessary for improving security measures, screens, etc., in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions.

Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise in the cost of services.

Sub-Head 13

Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises loaned by the Economic and Social Council, etc.).

The estimate remains unchanged compared with the previous financial year.

Sub-Head 14

The same sum is requested as for the previous financial year to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk.

Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17

Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for equipment given at Appendix V to this budget. Criteria governing the preparation of this programme are shown in the explanatory memorandum.

Head IV – General administrative costs

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1988	Revised budget for 1987	Expected expenditure in 1987	Actual expenditure in 1986
Sub-Head 18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	490 000	480 000	480 000	505 836
Sub-Head 19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	264 000	258 000	258 000	252 899
Sub-Head 20 – Printing and publication of documents	1 214 000	1 190 000	1 150 000	1 124 128
Sub-Head 21 – Purchase of documents	60 000	60 000	60 000	51 320
Sub-Head 22 – Official cars	115 000	115 000	140 000	170 061
Sub-Head 23 – Bank charges	500	500	500	212
TOTAL OF HEAD IV	2 143 500	2 103 500	2 088 500	2 104 456

*Explanations**Sub-Head 18*

The increase of F 10 000 as compared with 1987 is calculated on the basis of an average inflation rate of 2%, this being the minimum foreseeable, and takes account of the fact that the increase in the Assembly's work will involve a considerable increase in the cost of the various means of communication. Expenditure relating to the use of the telefax installed by the ministerial organs in Paris are charged to this article.

Sub-Head 19

In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work, the increase in the estimate as compared with 1987 is slight and is mainly due to the variation of prices in this sector.

Sub-Head 20

Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in costs (2%).

Sub-Head 21

Estimates under this sub-head remain unchanged compared with the previous financial year.

Sub-Head 22

Expenditure relating to the hire of a chauffeur-driven car when the President is in Paris and the cost of servicing, repairs and insurance in respect of the official car are charged to this sub-head. With the years, these expenses are constantly growing, the official car having been registered in 1981. Its replacement will be proposed in 1989.

Estimates for 1988 remain unchanged compared with 1987 as it is expected that there will be less need to hire a car for the President of the Assembly.

Sub-Head 23

The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.

Head V – Other expenditure

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1988	Revised budget for 1987	Expected expenditure in 1987	Actual expenditure in 1986
Sub-Head 24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	170 000	170 000	170 000	81 797
Sub-Head 25 – Expenses for representation	210 000	200 000	200 000	185 823
Sub-Head 26 – Committee study missions	5 000	5 000	–	7 408
Sub-Head 27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	380 000	350 000	350 000	315 378
Sub-Head 28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	70 000	40 000	56 403
Sub-Head 29 – Expenditure on information	327 000	311 000	311 000	278 126
Sub-Head 30 – Expenses for political groups	327 000	311 000	311 000	300 000
Sub-Head 31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	3 000	–	978
Sub-Head 32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	20 000	20 000	20 809
TOTAL OF HEAD V	1 512 000	1 440 000	1 402 000	1 246 722

*Explanations**Sub-Head 24*

The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly is borne by governments as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee.

The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for the President of the Assembly on official visits and of rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen insofar as these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the running of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.

Estimates take account of the expected increase in the Assembly's work in 1988 (see explanatory memorandum) and of the foreseeable rise in per diem allowances and travelling expenses.

Sub-Head 25

The increase of 5% compared with the 1987 budget, based on experience, is due mainly to the foreseeable rise in the cost of meals in different types of restaurant in the Paris area.

Sub-Head 26

Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure linked with committee study missions.

On the basis of experience, the same amount has been requested as last year.

Sub-Head 27

The 8.57% increase in sums requested for 1988 compared with last year is justified by:

- the increase in per diem allowances approved by the Council with effect from 1st July 1987 (224th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts);
- the increased activities of the Assembly which require more frequent travel by members of the Office of the Clerk for organising and holding meetings and visits of the various Assembly committees.

Sub-Head 28

The same amount has been requested as for 1987.

Sub-Head 29

An increase of 5% over sums granted for 1987 has been included to take account of the increase in representation and travelling expenses.

Sub-Head 30

The estimate under this sub-head is divided between the political groups. By decision of the Presidential Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the number of members listed.

Sub-Head 31

There is no change in the estimate for this sub-head as compared with 1987.

Sub-Head 32

The same amount is requested as for 1987.

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

Section B – Receipts

	Estimates for 1988	Revised budget for 1987	Expected receipts in 1987	Actual receipts in 1986
Sales of publications	50 000	50 000	40 000	30 512
Bank interest	200 000	250 000	100 000	129 456
Social security reimbursements	10 000	10 000	20 000	3 055
Levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials	–			32 912
TOTAL RECEIPTS	260 000	310 000	160 000	195 935

Explanations

Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are calculated on the basis of experience. It is expected that there will be a decrease in bank interest due to a fall in interest rates applying to deposits.

In accordance with the decisions of the Council, no levies are planned on the basic salaries of grade A officials.

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

*Section A – Expenditure**Head I – Pensions, allowances and social charges*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1988	Revised budget for 1987	Expected expenditure in 1987	Actual expenditure in 1986
Sub-Head 1 – Pensions and leaving allowances				
1.1. Retirement pensions	1 885 000			
1.2. Invalidity pensions	218 000			
1.3. Survivors' pensions	50 000			
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions	–			
1.5. Leaving allowances	–			
	2 153 000	1 373 000	1 373 000	903 721
Sub-Head 2 – Family allowances				
2.1. Household allowances	90 000			
2.2. Children's and other dependants' allowances	53 000			
2.3. Education allowances	42 000			
	185 000	80 650	80 650	59 242
Sub-Head 3 – Supplementary insurance	58 000	32 400	32 400	21 428
TOTAL OF HEAD I	2 396 000	1 486 050	1 486 050	984 391

*Explanations**Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

In 1988, the Assembly will be paying ten pensions, as follows:

- eight old-age pensions;
- one invalidity pension;
- one survivor's pension.

Estimates for expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provisions of the pension scheme rules.

Sub-Head 3

Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19*bis* of the collective convention in force.

Estimates for expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid by the Assembly.

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

Section B – Receipts

	Estimates for 1988	Revised budget for 1987	Expected receipts in 1987	Actual receipts in 1986
Contributions by permanent officials	478 000	430 770	430 770	407 839
	478 000	430 770	430 770	407 839

Explanations

Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) affiliated to the pension scheme.

APPENDIX I

*Note on the structure of the Office of the Clerk**(adopted by the Presidential Committee on 4th November 1986)*

In Rome in 1984, the Council agreed upon a number of measures to be taken to enhance the rôle played by WEU in Europe. Apart from activating the Council, it planned to intensify contacts between the Council and the Assembly and expressed the wish that the Assembly develop its dialogue with other parliaments and parliamentary institutions and with the public. Meetings between the Council and various Assembly bodies have in fact developed. The media's interest in the Assembly has increased considerably. The participation of the President and members of the Assembly and even of members of the Office of the Clerk in colloquies, meetings and lectures of all kinds has likewise increased. The Assembly's relations with a number of non-member countries have been extended significantly.

Consequently, the President of the Assembly said the will to give new life to WEU should lead to an improvement in the Assembly's methods of work. The Assembly is backed by a secretariat of twenty-seven permanent officials who provide assistance for the presidency, the committee secretariat, external relations, the translation and publication of the Assembly's Official Proceedings, committee reports and various other documents and, finally, the administrative organisation and financing of the work of the Assembly and its committees, including setting up the sittings service and recruiting temporary staff. Since the number of this staff was considered clearly insufficient, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and then the Presidential Committee adopted a draft budget providing for the creation of a grade A2 post of deputy to the Head of the Administration Service, a grade B3 post of book-keeper and a grade B3 post of assistant.

The purpose of the present memorandum is to define, in a spirit of stringent economy, the structure the Office of the Clerk should have if it is to be better able to carry out the tasks assigned to it.

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* *

In accordance with the Charter, the Clerk provides the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

The Office of the Clerk, which was set up for this purpose, consists of five services:

- the committee service, to which the research service is attached;
- the administration and finance service;
- the press and external relations service;
- the translation and publications service;
- the sittings service.

Emphasis should be laid on the extent to which economical solutions have been sought in organising the Office of the Clerk.

The Clerk is directly responsible for the sittings service and ensures personally the secretariat of the Bureau, the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

In the exercise of his duties, he is assisted, when necessary, by two deputies.

The abolition of the hors cadre post of Clerk Assistant at the end of 1980 made it necessary to organise the Office of the Clerk so as to allow the smooth running of the Assembly secretariat and continuity in the exercise of the duties carried out by the Clerk. It was therefore decided in 1981 to share the duties of deputy to the Clerk between two officials, the head of the committee service for the Clerk's responsibilities relating to the committee secretariats and the head of the administration and finance service for those relating to administrative assistance to the Assembly and its committees.

To take account of the increased responsibilities of these two officials, the Bureau decided to regrade their posts from grade A5 to grade A6.

However, the Council granted these two regradings in a personal capacity only and has not yet agreed to their being granted to other officials since the departure of those concerned.

Administratively speaking, it would nevertheless be logical for each grade to be linked to duties and, when an official leaves, for the relevant grade to be passed on to his successor.

*
* *

Maintenance of the two grade A6 posts originally granted by the Council to offset the loss of an hors cadre post and to take account of the new breakdown of the duties of deputy would therefore put an end to a deterioration in the structure of the Office of the Clerk which is particularly unjustifiable when, for reasons of economy, each deputy fulfils several duties.

The deputy in charge of the committee service is at present secretary to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. He co-ordinates the activities of the committee secretaries and supervises the research service. His responsibility for the harmonious running of the work of the committees is vital in the absence of the Clerk.

The deputy in charge of the administration and finance service ensures the secretariat of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and assumes responsibility for protocol and security matters. The diversity of the tasks assigned to him is set out in the enclosed note on the organisation of the Office of the Clerk. The inadequate number of staff in this service in view of the considerable growth in the volume of work imperils the smooth running of the work of the Assembly and its committees. Two of the three posts requested in the 1987 budget are therefore intended to remedy this situation.

Two other heads of service play a major rôle in the Office of the Clerk. The responsibilities of the head of the information service were extended to external relations because of the growth in the Assembly's relations not only with the media but also with the authorities of member countries and a number of organisations. However, it is not proposed to regrade this post to A6.

It was in fact in a personal capacity that in 1984 a promotion to grade A6 was requested by the Bureau for Mr. Borcier, head of the press and external relations service. This is an exceptional case. The promotion of Mr. Borcier would be recognition of his acknowledged position in the press and media world. His successor would obviously be recruited at grade A5.

The head of the translation and publications service, apart from his linguistic duties as a reviser, is responsible for a considerable amount of administrative work including running a team of temporary translators working from the five official languages of member states into English and French and the organisation of printing work. It should be noted that the head of the translation service in the Secretariat-General of the Council has a grade L5, although he does not appear to have the same administrative responsibilities.

This post is the only grade A post for which a regrading is requested, the Bureau having considered that this post should be regraded from A4 to A5.

Finally, the sittings service being the direct responsibility of the Clerk, it is referred to here only as a reminder. However, stress should be laid on the importance of the rôle played by the head of the administration service in the recruitment of temporary staff and in the administrative organisation of the sittings service and the rôle of the head of the translation service after the session in revising the work of the offices which prepare the minutes, verbatim report and amendments and in editing the final version of the Official Proceedings.

The President of the Assembly notes that there is a gap in the structure of the Office of the Clerk thus defined. Unlike his colleagues in the other European assemblies, he is not assisted in the exercise of his mandate by a private office. Yet he is endeavouring to develop the activities of the Assembly and to extend its audience. He has therefore had to increase and intensify his relations with the authorities of member countries, international organisations, associations and the media. As he is unable, in the Office of the Clerk, even by calling upon the devotion of its officials, to obtain the intensive, continuing co-operation required by the exercise of the presidential mandate, he considers there are grounds for the Assembly asking again for the creation of a post of head of the private office, which had already been proposed but which the Council had refused. In a spirit of economy, this post might be given a grade A2.

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* *

In Recommendation 433, the Assembly asked the Council to arrange for dual grading at all levels of the hierarchy.

The organogram of the Secretariat-General and the agencies shows that the ministerial organs have started to apply this principle. There is no reason why this should not also be done in the Assembly secretariat.

Priority should be given to applying it to all grade B staff.

Note has to be taken of the change in the qualifications required of assistants in the committee service, the press service and the translation and publications service. They were formerly bilingual shorthand-typists but have now had to master word-processing techniques which allow Assembly documents to be printed directly from texts which have been recorded on disks and prepared for printing with an appropriate coding system. The substantial savings made in the cost of printing are due to the assistants having mastered these word-processing techniques. The services rendered should be recognised by regrading their posts to B3/B4 which would allow promotions to be granted to the most experienced assistants who have been at the ceiling of their grades for a long time.


The dual-grading principle should also be applied to grade B4 staff (B4/5/6) to take account of the changes in the extension of the tasks assigned to assistants who are both the most experienced and capable.

Staff policy is to adapt the Office of the Clerk to the tasks assigned to it by the Assembly. It seeks to compensate for the small number of posts available in relation to the tasks to be carried out by recruiting officials of a high standard and assigning a wide range of duties to each of them, particularly the duties of colleagues of the same or a higher grade when they are absent. For instance, when the grade B official responsible for the mail and archives service is absent grade C staff replace her for some of her duties.

Such a policy means recruiting officials of a high standard and being able constantly to rely on their devotion in order to allow the Assembly to carry out the tasks it has set itself in the best possible conditions in order to meet the requirements of European security.

APPENDIX II

Organigram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
(corresponding to the draft budget for 1988)



* Ad hoc service/staff recruited for sessions.
** Recruited twice yearly for the preparation of the Assembly proceedings.

1. New post.
2. Replaces Mr. Borcier A6 on 1st February 1988.

APPENDIX III

*Recapitulation of changes in the staff of the Office of the Clerk
proposed in the 1988 budget*

Grade	Duties	1988 budget	Revised budget for 1987	+ or -
H.C.	Clerk	1	1	-
A6	Assistants to the Clerk	2	2	-
A5	Counsellors	4	4 ¹	-
A4	First secretaries	2	2	-
A2	Controller ; Head of private office	2	-	+ 2
A2	Translators ; Documentalist	3	3	-
B6	Chief accountant	1	1	-
B4	Qualified assistants	7	7	-
B3	Accountant	1	1	-
B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typists	4	3	+ 1
B3	Switchboard operator	1	1	-
C6	Head of reproduction department	1	1	-
C4	Assistants in reproduction department	2	2	-
		31	28	+ 3

1. One of these posts has been given a grade A6 on a personal basis until the retirement of its holder on 31st January 1988.

APPENDIX IV

*Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions**1. Sitings service*

Duties	Number	No. of days	Daily remuneration F*	Total F	Total F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly	1 a	16	870	13 920	40 614
	1 b	18	1 483	26 694	
Heads of sections	1 a	8	875	7 000	44 008
	2 b	10	1 356	27 120	
	1 a	8	1 236	9 888	
Sergeant-at-arms	1 b	16	1 215	19 440	19 440
Parliamentary secretaries	2 a	8	751	12 016	36 316
	2 b	10	1 215	24 300	
Précis writers	3 a	8	751	18 024	54 474
	3 b	10	1 215	36 450	
Verbatim reporters	7 a	8	1 101	61 656	231 756
	14 b	10	1 215	170 100	
Assistants	10 a	8	361	28 880	273 374
	2 a	16	361	11 552	
	1 a	22	361	7 942	
	1 b	18	693	12 474	
	1 b	12	693	8 316	
	23 b	10	693	159 390	
	6 b	10	747	44 820	
Head ushers	1 a	10	339	3 390	8 136
	1 a	24	339	8 136	
Ushers:					
Security control	5 a	8	308	12 320	
Sittings office	4 a	8	308	9 856	
	4 b	10	640	25 600	
Messengers	3 a	10	308	9 240	
Cloakroom attendant	1 a	8	308	2 464	
Offset-assemblers	13 a	10	308	40 040	
mechanic	1 a	8	308	2 464	113 510
	115				813 492
Adjustment for 1988 (+ 7.1%)					58 000
					871 492
Travelling expenses					200 000
					1 071 492
				Rounded up to	1 072 000

* In accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1986.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

2. Interpretation service

Duties	Number	No. of days	Total F
Interpreters	8 a	8	360 000
	6 b	10	
	14		
Adjustment for 1988			25 560
			385 560
Travelling expenses			15 000
			400 560
		Rounded up to	401 000

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

N.B.: On 1st July 1986, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2 460. In addition, interpreters recruited outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (half a day each way F 769), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.

3. Translation service

Duties	Number	Daily remuneration F	Estimate ¹	Total F
Revisers	3 a	971	78 225	236 625
	4 b	1 584	158 400	
Translators	3 a	761	57 075	228 225
	5 b	1 374	171 150	
Assistants	5 a	361	63 175	241 535
	2 a	415	29 050	
	4 b	693	97 020	
	2 b	747	52 290	
	28			706 385
Adjustment for 1988				50 153
				756 538
Travelling expenses				15 000
				771 538
			Rounded up to	772 000

1. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 35 days for assistants.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

APPENDIX V

Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk*(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)*

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets					
			1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	
	<i>A. Reproduction equipment</i>							
1	1 RX 1045 photocopier	Hire (rate blocked until April 1989): F 1 713 per month Maintenance (indexed rate) F 1 690 per month Total: F 3 403 per month Hire and maintenance of a new photocopier (type RX 1065), with improved performance, as from May 1989	40 836	13 612				
2	RX 3107 photocopier	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance (blocked rate): F 210 per month.		47 100	70 600	70 600	70 600	
3	3 Gestetner offset machines	1 type 311 (1984). Maintenance (indexed rate). 1 type 329 (1985). Maintenance (indexed rate). 1 type 339 (1986). Maintenance (indexed rate).	7 560	7 560	7 560	7 560	7 560	
			5 125	5 125	5 125	5 125	5 125	
			6 060	6 060	6 060	6 060	6 060	
4	3 Gestetner electrostatic stereotypers	1 Gestetner PM/9 (1980). Maintenance (annual indexed rate). 1 Gestetner DT 1 (1985). Maintenance (annual indexed rate). 1 Gestetner 100 PM. Maintenance (annual indexed rate).	1 200	1 200	1 200	1 200	1 200	
			1 300	1 300	1 300	1 300	1 300	
			2 700	2 700	2 700	2 700	2 700	
5	1 Gestetner 100 binding machine	Purchased in 1978, this machine is in good condition. Maintenance (annual indexed rate).	1 200	1 200	1 200	1 200	1 200	
6	1 Logabas-Ordina 7630 assembling machine with stapling machine	Purchased in 1977, this machine is serviced when required, since the cost of a maintenance contract is exorbitant. The estimate is based on experience.	5 000	5 000	5 000	5 000	5 000	
7	1 AM International addressograph 5000	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance (indexed rate).	3 623	3 623	3 623	3 623	3 623	
8	1 Fortematic 655 paper-cutting machine	This machine is serviced when required. A single annual service is enough to keep it in good working order.	700	700	700	700	700	
9	1 Orpo-Planax binding machine	Property of the Assembly. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.						
10	1 Orpo-Planax binding machine	Property of the Assembly. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.						

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets					
			1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	
	<i>B. Typewriters and calculators</i>							
	<i>(a) Office of the Clerk</i>							
11	7 Olivetti ET 121 electronic typewriters	Purchased between 1981 and 1983, these typewriters are in very good condition.						
12	1 Olivetti ET 221 electronic typewriter	Purchased in 1983, this typewriter is in very good condition.						
13	1 Olympia SGE 51 long-carriage electric typewriter (French keyboard)	This machine is are of the old stock and will remain in service as long as possible.						
14	1 IBM electric typewriter with (French keyboard)	This machine is part of the old stock and will remain in service as long as possible.						
15	3 Olivetti calculating machines	These machines are in good working order.						
	<i>(b) For use during sessions</i>							
16	6 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters (2 English keyboards 4 French keyboards)	These machines are part of the old stock and are assigned to national delegations.						
17	4 RX 6015 electronic typewriters (English keyboards)	These machines were purchased in 1986 and are assigned to session services.						
18	3 Olivetti electronic typewriters - 1 ET 121 (English keyboard) - 2 ET 109 (Italian keyboards)	Assigned to the sittings office. Assigned to the Italian Delegation and the Italian summary reporters in replacement of two other Olivetti electric typewriters no longer in stock.						
19	21 Olympia mechanical typewriters (19 with English keyboards, 2 with French keyboards)	Purchased between 1966 and 1979, these typewriters are used only occasionally because they are old models and the staff are no longer used to working on such machines. It is planned to keep the best of them in reserve in case of electricity cuts.						
20	Electronic typewriters	To meet the requirements of the various services during Assembly sessions, and subject to the possible purchase of other typewriters, the following hire programme is envisaged for each session: - 13 machines with English keyboards - 15 machines with French keyboards.						
			14 200	14 200	14 200	14 200	14 200	14 200
			13 780	13 780	13 780	13 780	13 780	13 780

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets				
			1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
21	(c) <i>Maintenance and repairs</i>	All typewriters and calculators are serviced twice a year, before each session, by a mechanic recruited for the purpose. However, a lump sum should be earmarked for possible repairs at other times.	7 000	7 000	7 000	7 000	7 000
	<i>B. Miscellaneous equipment</i>						
22	2 UHER 5000 dictaphones 1 Sony BM 80	Purchased in 1971 and 1987, these dictaphones are in good condition. It is not planned to replace them in the period 1988-1992.					
23	11 Grundig Stenorette dictaphones	Purchased between 1963 and 1987, these dictaphones are in good condition. It is not planned to replace them in the period 1988-1989.					
24	1 Grandjean stenotyping machine	Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good working order.					
25		Provision for an overall sum in the budget for possible repairs to equipment in this category.	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000
25 bis	Alcatel CT2 electronic scales	These scales will replace the very old Testut-Dayton scales, which are inaccurate, and will allow postal charges to be calculated very accurately.	11 000				
	<i>D. Word processors and computers</i>						
26	8 word processors/computers	These have been hired on a five year leasing basis. The two contracts expire in December 1989 and September 1991 respectively.					
	7 Olivetti ETS 2010	Cost of hire.	206 000	206 000	82 000	61 000	
	1 Olivetti M 24	Maintenance contract (indexed).	48 600	48 600	48 600	48 600	48 600
	<i>E. Office furniture</i>						
27	Various offices	Purchase of computer desks for staff using word processors.	18 000				
28	Various offices	Replacement of various items of furniture	25 000	20 000	20 000	20 000	20 000

Breakdown by budget classification

Budget classification		Ref. No. in programme	Budgets					
Head	Sub-Head		1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	
III	15. Purchase or repair of office furniture	27	18 000					
		28	25 000	20 000	20 000	20 000	20 000	
			43 000	20 000	20 000	20 000	20 000	
III	16. Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	25 bis	11 000	11 000	11 000	11 000	11 000	
III	17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	1	40 836	60 712	70 600	70 600	70 600	
		2	2 520	2 520	2 520	2 520	2 520	
		3	18 745	18 745	18 745	18 745	18 745	
		4	5 200	5 200	5 200	5 200	5 200	
		5	1 200	1 200	1 200	1 200	1 200	
		6	5 000	5 000	5 000	5 000	5 000	
		7	3 623	3 623	3 623	3 623	3 623	
		8	700	700	700	700	700	
		20	27 980	27 980	27 980	27 980	27 980	
		21	7 000	7 000	7 000	7 000	7 000	
		25	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	
		26	254 600	254 600	130 600	109 600	48 600	
				371 404	391 280	277 168	256 168	195 168
			Rounded up	372 000	392 000	278 000	257 000	196 000

APPENDIX VI

Trend of the Assembly budget from 1987 to 1988

	1987 a	1987 (1st and 2nd revision) b	% $\frac{b-a}{a}$	1988 c	% $\frac{c-b}{b}$
A. Operating budget					
Head I. Permanent staff	9 456 000	9 957 600	+ 5.30	11 313 000	+ 13.61
Head II. Temporary staff	2 704 875	2 809 875	+ 3.88	2 944 000	+ 4.77
Head III. Expenditure premises and equipment	1 300 000	1 300 000	-	1 287 000	- 1.00
Head IV. General administrative costs	2 103 500	2 103 500	-	2 143 500	+ 1.90
Head V. Other expenditure	1 400 000	1 440 000	+ 2.85	1 512 000	+ 5.00
Total expenditure	16 964 375	17 610 975	+ 3.81	19 199 500	+ 9.02
Receipts	310 000	310 000	-	260 000	- 16.12
Net Total	16 654 375	17 300 975	+ 3.88	18 939 500	+ 9.47
B. Pensions budget					
Pensions and leaving allowances	1 351 000	1 486 050	+ 9.99	2 396 000	+ 61.23
Receipts	409 000	430 770	+ 5.32	478 000	+ 10.96
Net Total	942 000	1 055 280	+ 12.02	1 918 000	+ 81.75
GRAND NET TOTAL (A + B)	17 596 375	18 356 255	+ 4.31	20 857 500	+ 13.62

APPENDIX VII

Percentage of credits under the various heads of the operating budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 compared with the total of these budgets

	Revised budget for 1987			1988		
	Amount	% of		Amount	% of	
		A	B		A	B
A. Operating budget						
Head I. - Permanent staff	9 957 600	56.54	57.55	11 313 000	58.92	59.73
Head II. - Temporary staff	2 809 875	15.96	16.24	2 944 000	15.33	15.54
Head III. - Premises and equipment	1 300 000	7.38	7.52	1 287 000	6.70	6.80
Head IV. - General administrative costs	2 103 500	11.94	12.16	2 143 500	11.17	11.32
Head V. - Other expenditure	1 440 000	8.18	8.32	1 512 000	7.88	7.98
TOTAL A (expenditure)	17 610 975	100.00	101.79	19 199 500	100.00	101.37
Receipts	310 000		1.79	260 000		1.37
TOTAL B (net)	17 300 975		100.00	18 939 500		100.00

APPENDIX VIII

Trend of the pensions budget

(1984 = 100)

Year	Net total	Index
1984	336 000	100
1985	300 500	89
1986	546 000	162
1987	942 700	280
1988	1 918 000	574

N.B. Until 1983, receipts exceeded expenditure.

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1988*

Opinion of the Council

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Opinion of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee
(Document C-B (87) 16)

Opinion of the Council (Letter from the Deputy Secretary-
General of WEU dated 20th November 1987)

Table showing modifications approved by the Council

*Secretary-General's note*¹

WEU Assembly budget for 1988

1. The WEU Assembly budget for 1988 (Assembly document A/WEU/BA (87) 13) was circulated to the Budget and Organisation Committee on 22nd October 1987 under reference B (87) 25 and was examined during the committee's meeting on 11th, 12th and 13th November 1987 (BR (87) 3, II – to be circulated).

2. As presented, the 1988 estimates were as follows:

Operating budget	F 18 939 500
Pensions budget	1 918 000
Total	<u>F 20 857 500</u>

These figures resulted in increases over the total for 1987 (from the Assembly's second supplementary budget for 1987) of 9.47% for the operating budget and 13.6% for the total.

3. The Budget and Organisation Committee's conclusions and recommendations are summarised below:

General observations

All delegations reaffirmed their commitment to the "zero-growth" principle to be applied to all of the budgets of WEU. One delegation stressed that this consideration was of particular importance this year, in the case of the Assembly, because agreement to separate the pensions budget in this context had been conditional upon the Assembly adhering to zero growth for its operating budgets in the future.

Staffing proposals

Delegates observed that the creation of three new posts was proposed and that these had earlier been included in the Assembly's restructuring suggestions. It was recalled that the Council had informed the Assembly that the question of restructuring the Office of the Clerk could only be considered in the wider context of staffing changes that would affect the whole of WEU as a part of the reactivation process. The Council had not yet completed the necessary studies, contrary to what appeared to be the Assembly's impression, and, in consequence, delegations could not agree to the inclusion of these posts in the 1988 budget.

It was also noted that the budget included estimates for an additional post in grade B3 (bookkeeper) which had been rejected in the study of the Assembly's second supplementary budget for 1987.

1. Document C-B (87) 15, 13th November 1987.

The committee concluded that the credits foreseen for all four posts should be withdrawn without prejudice to eventual decisions that may be taken when the Council is able to conclude its wider study of the future staffing needs of WEU.

The Assembly's representative said that the total net cost of these four posts was F 1 108 000, but there would be a loss of income in the pensions budget of F 38 000.

Other expenditure

In their discussions on other expenditure chapters, delegations made the following recommendations:

Head II – Temporary staff

The Assembly's representative sought to re-establish the credit under Sub-Head 8 to its 1987 level of F 80 000. In the budget it was shown to have been reduced by F 50 000 to F 30 000. He pointed out, however, that this reduction in the item for temporary staff had been made on the assumption that the Assembly would be given the extra posts requested for the permanent establishment. They had been refused so there would still be a need for temporary staff.

Only one delegation was opposed to restoring the amount of F 50 000 under this heading.

Head V – Other expenditure

After a long debate, the committee agreed to recommend that the total of this head be reduced by F 42 000. The Assembly could decide which sub-heads should be modified.

4. As a result of the foregoing proposals, it was noted that the estimates would be amended as follows:

Head I	- F 1 108 000
Head II	+ 50 000
Head V	- 42 000
	- F 1 100 000
Pensions	+ 38 000
Total	- F 1 062 000

The budget totals would then be:

Operating budget	F 18 939 500	-	1 100 000	=	17 839 500
Pensions	1 918 000	+	38 000	=	1 956 000
Total	<u>F 20 857 500</u>	-	<u>1 062 000</u>	=	<u>19 795 500</u>

The increases over 1987 would be:

Operating budget	3.59%
Pensions budget	85.35%
Total budget	8.31%

5. One delegation pointed out that inflation in France in 1988 was, on a generous estimate, expected to be around 2.5%. The above reductions had brought the Assembly's operating budget increase down to 3.59% (from 9.47%) but that still did not meet the zero-growth requirement. Attempts to obtain a further reduction were abandoned when it became evident that there could be no unanimous agreement on this issue.

6. The committee could finally recommend the Council to give a favourable opinion on the Assembly's budget for 1988, as amended above, but subject to a United Kingdom reserve.

7. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting to be held on 19th November. It is recalled that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next part-session opens on 30th November.

*
* *

London, 20th November 1987

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Council has examined the budget of the WEU Assembly for 1988 and, in accordance with the procedure for approval in force, expressed a favourable opinion on this amended budget as given in document C-B (87) 15.

I enclose copies of this document.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
H. HOLZHEIMER
Deputy Secretary-General

Mr. G. MOULIAS,
Clerk of the Assembly of
Western European Union

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1988*

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft budget for 1988 (initial)	Modifications in accordance with the Council's opinion	Draft budget for 1988 (reduced)
<i>Head I – Permanent staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
1 – Basic salaries	7 895 000	– 695 000	7 200 000
2 – Allowances	1 607 000	– 185 000	1 422 000
3 – Social charges	1 546 000	– 125 000	1 421 000
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	257 000	– 103 000	154 000
5 – Medical examination	8 000	–	8 000
Total	11 313 000	– 1 108 000	10 205 000
<i>Head II – Temporary staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions	2 285 000	–	2 285 000
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	500 000	–	500 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk .	30 000	+ 50 000	80 000
9 – Social charges	129 000	–	129 000
Total	2 944 000	+ 50 000	2 994 000
<i>Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	418 000	–	418 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms	15 000	–	15 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	365 000	–	365 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of ses- sions	45 000	–	45 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	18 000	–	18 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	43 000	–	43 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	11 000	–	11 000
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	372 000	–	372 000
Total	1 287 000	–	1 287 000

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft budget for 1988 (initial)	Modifications in accordance with the Council's opinion	Draft budget for 1988 (reduced)
<i>Head IV – General administrative costs</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	490 000	–	490 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	264 000	–	264 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents	1 214 000	–	1 214 000
21 – Purchase of documents	60 000	–	60 000
22 – Official cars	115 000	–	115 000
23 – Bank charges	500	–	500
Total	2 143 500	–	2 143 500
<i>Head V – Other expenditure</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs ..	170 000	– 15 000	155 000
25 – Expenses for representation	210 000	–	210 000
26 – Committee study missions	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	380 000	– 10 000	370 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	– 10 000	60 000
29 – Expenditure on information	327 000	– 7 000	320 000
30 – Expenses for political groups	327 000	–	327 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	–	20 000
Total	1 512 000	– 42 000	1 470 000
OPERATING BUDGET	19 199 500	– 1 100 000	18 099 500
RECEIPTS	260 000	–	260 000
GRAND TOTAL	18 939 500	– 1 100 000	17 839 500
PENSIONS	2 396 000	–	2 396 000
RECEIPTS	478 000	– 38 000	440 000
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET	1 918 000	+ 38 000	1 956 000
NET TOTAL BUDGET	20 857 500	– 1 062 000	19 795 500

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

*Platform on European security interests**The Hague, 27th October 1987*

1. Stressing the dedication of our countries to the principles upon which our democracies are based and resolved to preserve peace in freedom, we, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the member states of WEU, reaffirm the common destiny which binds our countries.
2. We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.
3. An important means to this end is the modified Brussels Treaty. This treaty, with its far-reaching obligations to collective defence, marked one of the early steps on the road to European unification. It also envisages the progressive association of other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination. We see the revitalisation of WEU as an important contribution to the broader process of European unification.
4. We intend therefore to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we are committed through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties.
5. We highly value the continued involvement in this endeavour of the WEU Assembly which is the only European parliamentary body mandated by treaty to discuss all aspects of security including defence.

*
* *

I. Our starting point is the present conditions of European security.

1. Europe remains at the centre of East-West relations and, forty years after the end of the second world war, a divided continent. The human consequences of this division remain unacceptable, although certain concrete improvements have been made on a bilateral level and on the basis of the Helsinki final act. We owe it to our people to overcome this situation and to exploit in the interest of all Europeans the opportunities for further improvements which may present themselves.
2. New developments in East-West relations, particularly in arms control and disarmament, and also other developments, for example in the sphere of technology, could have far-reaching implications for European security.
3. We have not yet witnessed any lessening of the military build-up which the Soviet Union has sustained over so many years. The geostrategic situation of Western Europe makes it particularly vulnerable to the superior conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. This is the fundamental problem for European security. The Warsaw Pact's superior conventional forces and its capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are of special concern in this context.
4. Under these conditions the security of the Western European countries can only be ensured in close association with our North American allies. The security of the alliance is indivisible. The partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic rests on the twin foundations of shared values and interests. Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, independent and increasingly more united Western Europe is vital to the security of North America.
5. It is our conviction that the balanced policy of the Harmel report remains valid. Political solidarity and adequate military strength within the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament and the

search for genuine détente continue to be integral parts of this policy. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.

*
* *

II. European security should be based on the following criteria:

1. It remains our primary objective to prevent any kind of war. It is our purpose to preserve our security by maintaining defence readiness and military capabilities adequate to deter aggression and intimidation without seeking military superiority.
2. In the present circumstances and as far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the western strategy for the prevention of war, which has ensured peace in freedom for an unprecedented period of European history. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk.
3. The substantial presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe. They embody the American commitment to the defence of Europe and provide the indispensable linkage with the United States strategic deterrent.
4. European forces play an essential rôle: the overall credibility of the western strategy of deterrence and defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution not least because the conventional imbalance affects the security of Western Europe in a very direct way.

The Europeans have a major responsibility both in the field of conventional and nuclear defence. In the conventional field, the forces of the WEU member states represent an essential part of the alliance. As regards nuclear forces, all of which form a part of deterrence, the co-operative arrangements that certain member states maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of Europe. The independent forces of France and the United Kingdom contribute to overall deterrence and security.

5. Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy and not an alternative to it. They should lead to a stable balance of forces at the lowest level compatible with our security. Arms control policy should, like our defence policy, take into account the specific European security interests in an evolving situation. It must be consistent with the maintenance of the strategic unity of the alliance and should not preclude closer European defence co-operation. Arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time. East and West have a common interest in achieving this.

*
* *

III. The member states of WEU intend to assume fully their responsibilities:

(a) In the field of western defence

1. We recall the fundamental obligation of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty to provide all the military and other aid and assistance in our power in the event of armed attack on any one of us. This pledge, which reflects our common destiny, reinforces our commitments under the Atlantic Alliance, to which we all belong, and which we are resolved to preserve.
2. It is our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the alliance, to the benefit of western security as a whole. This will enhance the European rôle in the alliance and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic. We are resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance.
3. We are each determined to carry our share of the common defence in both the conventional and nuclear field, in accordance with the principles of risk- and burden-sharing which are fundamental to allied cohesion:
 - in the conventional field, all of us will continue to play our part in the on-going efforts to improve our defences;
 - in the nuclear field also, we shall continue to carry our share: some of us by pursuing appropriate co-operative arrangements with the United States; the United Kingdom and France by continuing to maintain independent nuclear forces, the credibility of which they are determined to preserve.

4. We remain determined to pursue European integration including security and defence and make a more effective contribution to the common defence of the West.

To this end we shall:

- ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its borders is made clearly manifest by means of appropriate arrangements,
- improve our consultations and extend our co-ordination in defence and security matters and examine all practical steps to this end,
- make the best possible use of the existing institutional mechanisms to involve the defence ministers and their representatives in the work of WEU,
- see to it that the level of each country's contribution to the common defence adequately reflects its capabilities,
- aim at a more effective use of existing resources, inter alia by expanding bilateral and regional military co-operation, pursue our efforts to maintain in Europe a technologically advanced industrial base and intensify armaments co-operation,
- concert our policies on crises outside Europe in so far as they may affect our security interests.

5. Emphasising the vital contribution of the non-WEU members of the alliance to the common security and defence, we will continue to keep them informed of our activities.

(b) In the field of arms control and disarmament

1. We shall pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy aimed at influencing future developments in such a way as to enhance security and to foster stability and co-operation in the whole of Europe. The steadfastness and cohesion of the alliance and close consultations among all the allies remain essential if concrete results are to be brought about.

2. We are committed to elaborate further our comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament in accordance with the alliance's declaration of 12th June 1987 and we will work within the framework of this concept as envisaged particularly in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this declaration. An agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the global elimination of land-based INF missiles with a range between 500 and 5 500 km will constitute an important element of such an approach.

3. In pursuing such an approach we shall exploit all opportunities to make further progress towards arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities, taking into account the fact that work in this area raises complex and inter-related issues. We shall evaluate them together, bearing in mind the political and military requirements of our security and progress in the different negotiations.

(c) In the field of East-West dialogue and co-operation

1. The common responsibility of all Europeans is not to preserve the peace but to shape it constructively. The Helsinki final act continues to serve as our guide to the fulfilment of the objective of gradually overcoming the division of Europe. We shall therefore continue to make full use of the CSCE process in order to promote comprehensive co-operation among all participating states.

2. The possibilities contained in the final act should be fully exploited. We therefore intend:
- to seek to increase the transparency of military potentials and activities and the calculability of behaviour in accordance with the Stockholm document of 1986 by further confidence-building measures;
 - vigorously to pursue our efforts to provide for the full respect of human rights without which no genuine peace is possible;
 - to open new mutually beneficial possibilities in the fields of economy, technology, science and the protection of the environment;
 - to achieve more opportunities for the people in the whole of Europe to move freely and to exchange opinions and information and to intensify cultural exchanges,

and thus to promote concrete improvements for the benefit of all people in Europe.

It is our objective to further European integration. In this perspective we will continue our efforts towards closer security co-operation, maintaining coupling with the United States and ensuring conditions of equal security in the alliance as a whole.

We are conscious of the common heritage of our divided continent, all the people of which have an equal right to live in peace and freedom. That is why we are determined to do all in our power to achieve our ultimate goal of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

*First part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council
to the Assembly of Western European Union*

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I. Activities of the Council and its Secretariat-General in London

(Period covered: first half of 1987)

1. Organisation

(i) In the period under review, the Council met in ministerial session on 27th and 28th April in Luxembourg, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Jacques F. Poos and Mr. Marc Fischbach, the Luxembourg Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Armed Forces respectively.

In their communiqué, ministers stressed the important rôle of WEU in the development of a European union, an important stage in which was the signature of the single European act. They emphasised the importance of further strengthening the European component of the North Atlantic Alliance: the alliance needs a strong and united Europe which jointly analyses and defines more clearly its security interests.

(ii) The Permanent Council met fourteen times during this period. The meeting on 6th April was an "enlarged" session with the participation of political directors of ministries for foreign affairs and senior representatives of defence ministries. It focused on discussion of topical questions, and preparation of the ministerial meeting.

The Permanent Council has devoted an increasing proportion of its work to co-ordinating the activities of the various working groups. This results mainly from new initiatives in WEU reactivation, aimed at widening consultation within the organisation on matters affecting European security.

As part of this consultation process, political directors of the Seven met twice in the first half of this year in the margins of meetings of the political committee of the Twelve.

(iii) In the same context, the special working group, comprising representatives of foreign and defence ministries responsible for security affairs, met eight times in London and twice in Luxembourg (on the occasion of the Ministerial Council) during the reporting period. Deputies to these representatives met seven times, discussing inter alia SDI and the drafting of the report on European security interests.

(iv) Representatives of both foreign and defence ministries normally attend these meetings, thus implementing the concept of complementarity and sustaining WEU as the only European forum for such joint consideration of security matters. This ensures the full and continuing involvement of defence ministers in the work of the organisation. But a number of meetings have been of more specific interest to the defence side:

- on 21st May, representatives of national armaments directors met to discuss European armaments co-operation and WEU;
- other defence ministry representatives met on 23rd January in Luxembourg and on 29th May in London to exchange views both on the optimisation of defence ministers' participation and, more specifically, on the subject of management of defence resources.

The results of their work have been submitted to the Council.

(v) The Council's ordinary working group met nineteen times to prepare Council replies to recommendations and written questions from the Assembly and also the second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council to the Assembly. Other ad hoc tasks were given to it by the Council to enable the latter to give an opinion on documents on which the widest possible consensus had already been reached.

(vi) The Secretary-General has, in addition to its other activities, continued to play a vital part in the reactivation process by supporting and serving the Permanent Council and the above groups on a daily basis.

(vii) The agencies, in close contact with the secretariat, have provided the Council with studies and work which they have been mandated to carry out. The Assembly was informed of this work in a letter from the Secretary-General dated 24th March 1987¹.

(viii) At their meeting in Luxembourg on 28th April 1987, ministers heard a report by the presidency on the reorganisation of the intergovernmental structures of WEU. They pointed out that the measures still to be taken should be specified by 31st December 1987 and that the possible collocation of the ministerial organs in one capital should also be contemplated. They therefore instructed the Permanent Council to present them with definitive proposals at their autumn meeting.

2. WEU and European security

(i) Ministers at Luxembourg in April emphasised the rôle of WEU as a forum in which European security interests could be analysed

¹ See Annex II.

and more clearly defined. In this way, it contributes to the process of European construction and to strengthening the European component of the Atlantic Alliance. This is particularly important in view of current developments in East/West relations and their implications for European security.

(ii) Ministers took note of an interim report on European security interests, which had been prepared in accordance with the mandate given by the Ministerial Council at its informal session in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986.

They mandated the Permanent Council to finalise this report and, on this basis, to draw up a common document identifying the principles of European security with a view to its examination, possible adoption and publication, at their next ministerial meeting in The Hague.

(iii) Developments in the United States-USSR negotiations on strategic and intermediate nuclear forces were followed closely in the Council's discussions on topical questions – in particular, those developments relating to a possible effectively verifiable agreement to eliminate on a global basis United States and Soviet land-based INF above the 500 km range. Ministers fully supported United States efforts to conclude such an agreement.

In this context, they recalled that the zero option in the field of land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles had been formally presented by the United States as long ago as 1981. They added that if the achievement of an agreement proved possible, this would be as a result of the constructive approach and the steadfastness of the western allies concerned and underlined that any arms control agreement should meet the fundamental security requirements of the West.

(iv) Ministers at Luxembourg recalled their serious concern at the existing Soviet superiority in shorter-range intermediate nuclear missiles and the requirement not to neglect this in any INF agreement. In this context, they noted that the Soviet Union had, in response to earlier proposals tabled by the United States, recently made statements on these missiles, the content of which should be carefully studied as soon as they were clarified in writing. They underlined the importance of ongoing consultations with the alliance.

The acceptance by Mr. Gorbachev on 28th February 1987 of the zero option as formulated in November 1981 by Mr. Reagan was extended the following July to missiles with a range of 500 to 1 000 km and to the SS-20s sited in Asia. The Council's discussions of this "double-zero option" will be referred to in the second part of the Council's thirty-third report.

(v) On that occasion, ministers reaffirmed that there is for the foreseeable future no alternative to the western concept for the prevention of war, which must continue to be based on an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces which together provide a credible deterrent against all forms of aggression. They stressed the need to maintain the effectiveness of this strategy through the linkage of Europe's security to that of North America. Ministers re-emphasised the essential character of the commitment of the United States and Canada. The presence of United States nuclear forces and the North American conventional troops in Europe remains indispensable for the security of the whole alliance.

(vi) Ministers also stressed their determination to intensify their efforts to strengthen stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. They recalled the Brussels declaration of 11th December 1986.

During the first six months of the year, discussions within the alliance came to fruition in the form of the decisions reached by the North Atlantic Council at its ministerial meeting on 12th June 1987. The allies at Reykjavik agreed to develop further their comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament and to work within the framework of this concept as envisaged in particular in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the alliance's declaration of 12th June 1987.

3. SDI

During the period covered, the special working group completed its task of preparing a report analysing the politico-strategic implications of the current research programmes into strategic defence systems. This report was presented to ministers at Luxembourg. They took note of it and instructed the special working group to continue to examine the implications of ballistic missile defence within the framework of its reflections on the problems affecting security interests in Western Europe.

4. European armaments co-operation and WEU

On 21st May, the representatives of the national armaments directors met to discuss European armaments co-operation. They agreed that their work in this connection should be done on an ad hoc basis. The Council will draw conclusions from the institutional point of view, notably with respect to the SAC and Agency III.

5. Security in the Mediterranean

Following the ministers' decision taken in Luxembourg in November 1986 to pursue their reflections in WEU on security in the Mediterranean, the French and Italian delegations drew up a preliminary study which was submitted to the ministers at their meeting in April. The ministers took note of the study and instructed the Permanent Council to set up, under its authority, a group of experts for which the preliminary work would provide a basis for reflection.

This group held two meetings in the second half of 1987, which will be mentioned in the second part of the Council's thirty-third annual report.

6. Information of the press and public

Both media and public have shown a growing interest in WEU in the first part of this year, particularly during ministerial meetings and Assembly sessions.

The Secretary-General played a full part in the dissemination of public information through his participation in public seminars, and by delivering speeches and publishing articles.

He was assisted in this by a press and information unit in the secretariat set up to promote contacts with the media. It provided information and documentation for the Secretariat-General and the permanent representatives in London and also met requests for information about WEU.

II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

The Council, concerned to promote informed debate of relevant defence and security issues and public awareness, attaches particular importance to its dialogue with the Assembly.

This was demonstrated during the Luxembourg presidency by the participation of the Foreign Minister and Minister for the Armed Forces in the extraordinary and ordinary sessions of the Assembly on 28th April and from 1st to 4th June 1987.

Various aspects of the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly in the first half of 1987

1. *The following documents were transmitted to the Assembly:*

- (i) Second part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council to the Assembly on its activities, covering the period 1st July to 31st December 1986.
- (ii) The Council's replies to Recommendations 438 to 441 which the Assembly adopted

during the second part of its thirty-second ordinary session.

(iii) The Council's reply to Written Question 273.

2. *Meetings between representatives of the Council and the Assembly bodies*

(i) 10th March in Luxembourg: meeting between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, Mr. Poos and the President of the Assembly, Mr. Caro.

(ii) 31st March in Paris: meeting between the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Poos, and the Assembly Presidential Committee.

(iii) 28th April in Luxembourg: Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council and Luxembourg Foreign Minister and Mr. Fischbach, Luxembourg Minister for the Armed Forces met the Assembly at its extraordinary session.

(iv) 1st to 4th June in Paris: first part of the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly. Speeches by MM. Poos and Fischbach and discussion.

ANNEX I

*Communiqué issued at the close of the ministerial meeting
of the Council of Western European Union**Luxembourg, 27th-28th April 1987*

1. WEU foreign and defence ministers met in Luxembourg on 28th April 1987. Their discussions continued the process of joint reflection on security matters initiated in 1984. They recalled the importance of the Rome declaration and the communiqués of Bonn in 1985 and Venice in 1986.

2. Ministers stressed the important rôle WEU can play in the development of a European union, an important stage in which was the signature of the single European act. They emphasised the importance of further strengthening the European component of the North Atlantic Alliance. The alliance needs a strong and united Europe which jointly analyses and defines more clearly its security interests. They intend to develop WEU further as a suitable forum to this end. Such a development will also serve the interests of all the allies. The defence of a free Europe is also the defence of North America.

3. Their overriding objective remains to strengthen peace in freedom and to prevent any kind of war or intimidation by military means. They reaffirmed that there is for the foreseeable future no alternative to the western concept for the prevention of war, which must continue to be based on an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces which together provide a credible deterrent against all forms of aggression. They stressed the need to maintain the effectiveness of this strategy through the linkage of Europe's security to that of North America. Recalling the indivisible nature of security in the North Atlantic Treaty area, ministers re-emphasised the essential character of the commitment of the United States and Canada to the defence of Europe. The presence of United States nuclear forces and the presence of United States troops in Europe remain indispensable for the security of the whole alliance.

4. In this context, ministers recalled the importance of the contribution made by the seven member countries of WEU to alliance defence capabilities. They stressed that a strong conventional component is a fundamental prerequisite for an effective defence of Western European territory.

They recalled that five member states provide delivery systems and the facilities for nuclear weapons which remain under United States control. They acknowledged the contribution made by France's and Britain's independent nuclear forces to the western deterrent by increasing the uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor.

5. The considerations stated above remain fully valid in the context of the current evolution in East-West relations.

All aspects of the East-West dialogue affect the security interests of Europe. WEU ministers reiterated their wish to see Western Europe continue to participate actively in the development of this dialogue and to shoulder its responsibilities fully. The member governments of WEU will continue, while retaining strong defences, to strive to develop co-operation and dialogue with Eastern European countries.

6. Ministers underlined their determination to make full use of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna for progress in all fields. In this context, they reaffirmed their commitment to all the provisions of the Helsinki final act and the Madrid concluding document. The balanced application of these provisions is the prerequisite for a more constructive development of East-West relations in all fields, political and military as well as economic and technological, and in the field of human rights and contacts. Each step towards the free movement of individuals and ideas allows progress towards overcoming the division which continues to affect Europe and towards building a stable framework of peace and security in Europe.

7. Arms control and disarmament efforts aimed at effectively verifiable agreements leading to a stable balance of forces at lower levels are an integral part of western security policy. A successful outcome of the current East-West negotiations depends on the continued solidarity between Europe and the United States.

Ministers noted with satisfaction that conditions and prospects for dialogue between East and West on arms control had improved. A recent expression of this improvement was the intensification of the negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the visit of Secretary of State Shultz to Moscow. Ministers expressed the hope that the prospects for progress would be confirmed and would materialise in agreements which would ultimately reduce the hitherto undiminished threat represented by the Soviet military capability.

8. Ministers wished to recall that the basic proposal in the field of land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles was formally presented by the United States as long ago as 1981. If the achievement of an agreement proves possible, this will be as a result of the constructive approach and the steadfastness of the western countries concerned. They underlined that any arms control agreement should meet the fundamental security requirements of the West.

Ministers examined with interest the growing possibility of an agreement aimed at the total elimination of American and Soviet longer-range intermediate land-based nuclear missiles, which should be effectively verifiable. They fully support the United States efforts for its conclusion.

Ministers recalled their serious concern at the existing Soviet superiority in shorter-range intermediate nuclear missiles and the requirement not to neglect this in any INF agreement. In this context, they noted that the Soviet Union had, in response to earlier proposals tabled by the United States, recently made statements on these missiles, the content of which should be carefully studied as soon as they are clarified in writing. They underlined the importance of ongoing consultations with the alliance.

9. Underlining the great importance which they attach to progress also being made in the field of strategic weapons, ministers reiterated their support for United States proposals for a 50% reduction of Soviet and American strategic offensive forces as a matter of priority. As for negotiations on space and defence systems, every effort must be made in Geneva to arrive at agreement on the relationship between United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons and defensive systems with the aim of strengthening strategic stability.

10. Ministers reiterated that reductions in nuclear weapons would increase the importance of removing the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact and eliminating chemical weapons, given the need for a stable balance at all times.

They underlined the need to focus on the problems arising from geostrategic asymmetry and the Warsaw Pact's capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of a large-scale offensive action.

11. Ministers stressed their determination to intensify their efforts to strengthen stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. They recalled the Brussels declaration of 11th December 1986. They expressed their hope that the informal discussions taking place in Vienna in a constructive atmosphere would, within a reasonable time, lead to an agreement allowing the opening of new negotiations on conventional arms control in Europe aimed at eliminating existing disparities.

They recalled at the same time their determination to strive for the continuation of the conference on confidence and security-building measures in Europe.

Only a stable East-West balance of forces at each stage of the arms control process can ensure security in Western Europe.

12. Ministers also underlined their commitment to the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable, global ban on chemical weapons.

13. Ministers stated their resolve to continue their efforts towards the establishment in Europe of the technological and industrial base necessary to ensure the development of a strong and competitive European armaments industry, this being an important aspect of Europe's contribution to defence. In this connection, they reaffirmed the importance they attach to the generation of more, and more systematic, collaboration in the field of conventional armaments.

14. Ministers took note of an interim report on European security interests in the present strategic context. This report was prepared in accordance with the mandate set out at the informal ministerial meeting of the WEU Council in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986.

They mandated the Permanent Council to finalise this report and, on this basis, to establish a common platform for identifying the principles of European security with a view to its examination, possible adoption and publication.

15. Ministers took note of the report prepared by the special working group analysing the politico-strategic implications of the current research programmes on strategic defensive systems. They instructed the special working group to continue to examine the implications of ballistic missile defence within the framework of its reflections on the problems affecting security interests in Western Europe.

16. With regard to the problems of security in the Mediterranean, ministers took note of the draft outline study prepared jointly by France and Italy which, in conformity with their decision of

November 1986, would provide a basis for reflection by a group of experts acting under the authority of the Council.

17. Ministers noted with satisfaction that the reactivation of the organisation, which allowed for a close association of the foreign and defence ministers, had become a reality. They heard a report by the presidency on the reorganisation of the intergovernmental structures of WEU.

They pointed out that the measures still to be taken should be specified by 31st December 1987 and that the possible collocation of the ministerial organs in one capital should also be contemplated. They therefore instructed the Permanent Council to present them with definitive proposals at their autumn meeting.

ANNEX II

*Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly
concerning the agencies*

24th March 1987

Dear President,

The purpose of my letter dated 17th March 1986 was to inform you about the staff and activities of the agencies for security questions. During the latter half of 1986, the Council undertook a fresh examination of their mandates and has instructed me to notify you of the following clarifications:

Agency I will focus its activities on two main areas:

- the first relates to the proposals concerning verification put forward in the context of current arms control negotiations;
- the second relates to Soviet tactics towards Western European countries concerning arms control and disarmament issues.

The Permanent Council has also requested that the agency follow changes in the Soviet positions on disarmament and arms control.

Agency II has been tasked to continue its reflections on resource management – by analysing national defence budgets – and on the non-military aspects of the threat, as well as to examine how public opinion in the member countries of WEU perceives the strategic balance.

With particular regard to resource management, the agency is studying methods of achieving genuine comparability of criteria between the western countries, and the rational management of defence budgets. The analysis of these budgets is under way.

Agency III has been tasked to study defence technology from specific viewpoints such as the impact of SDI and the influence of various factors on transfers of technology involving the Seven.

Furthermore, Agency III will draw up inventories of the various policies on co-operative equipment programmes and defence technology.

A process of reflection is also under way on the rôle and future tasks of the Standing Armaments Committee.

The mandates given to the agencies may be revised once the governments have reached an agreement on their final structure.

Revision of the Rules of Procedure

MOTION FOR A DECISION¹

tabled by Mr. Pannella and others

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To add a new Rule 37 *bis* as follows:

Joint Group

Representatives and substitutes who are not members of a political group shall form a single Joint Group.

The Joint Group shall appoint, from among its members, two representatives to the Presidential Committee without the right to vote.

Explanatory Memorandum

Our Rules of Procedure make no provision for the position of representatives and substitutes who are not members of the political groups provided for in Rule 37. In accordance with the solution adopted by several national parliaments, the undersigned representatives and substitutes propose that our Assembly make provision for the automatic creation of a Joint Group. We specify (as is the case in the Rules of Procedure of the Italian Parliament) that this is a "single" Joint Group to exclude all possibility of several such groups.

The existence of a Joint Group is in the *institutional* interests of the Assembly to allow it to work better and to allow representatives and substitutes who are not members of a political group to make their full contribution.

Finally, to take account of the political differences existing in the Joint Group, we propose that two of them be appointed to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee, but without the right to vote.

Signed: Pannella, Malfatti, Pieralli, Natali, Sarti, Fassino, Filetti, Stegagnini, Greco, Parisi, Martino, Fioret

1. See 6th sitting, 30th November 1987 (motion referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges).

*Written Questions 274 to 279 and replies of the Council***QUESTION 274**

*put by Mr. Fourné
on 8th April 1987*

At the end of 1986, the group of wise men which the IEPG asked to give an opinion on the competitiveness of the European industrial network in the armaments sector published its report. Inter alia, it concluded that it was necessary to make a permanent administrative structure available to the IEPG ministers of defence.

Considering that:

1. paragraphs 4 and 10 of the 1955 decision setting up a Standing Armaments Committee make it possible to associate any member country of the Atlantic Alliance with the work of and agreements and arrangements drawn up in that body. The economic and juridical study of the armaments sector of WEU member countries' industry benefited at the start from co-operation between the IEPG and the SAC, as did the study on the armaments industry in Japan by the former international secretariat, thus showing the possibility of conducting such studies in this framework where NATO observers can follow the operation directly;
2. such co-operation might give Spain, which now has the chairmanship-in-office of the IEPG, an opportunity of co-operation leading towards accession to WEU;
3. it would be for the Council to make the necessary arrangements for the participation of interested non-WEU member countries in such activities;
4. the Assembly, through the intermediary of its liaison subcommittee on the joint production of armaments, would thereby have a means of making a direct contribution to a debate to which the growing need to develop conventional weapons and the breakthrough of emerging technology should give a new dimension,

would the Council be prepared to propose that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance save setting up a new European administrative structure by making the SAC, which has a secre-

tariat in Agency III, responsible for co-ordinating and conducting studies which would be useful for the work of the IEPG?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 9th November 1987
and received at the Office of the Clerk
on 13th November 1987*

The Council shares the interest shown by the honourable member in the IEPG and, in this connection, would recall the Rome declaration of October 1984 in which ministers affirmed, as regards armaments co-operation, that WEU should play an active rôle in providing political impetus by supporting all co-operative efforts, including those of the IEPG and the CNAD.

As indicated in its reply to Recommendation 438, the Council has decided to undertake a process of reflection on how best to perform this rôle. However, final conclusions could be drawn only at the end of the transitional period. The representatives of the national armaments directors took the same view when they agreed, during their exchange of views on 21st May last, that WEU's rôle and tasks in this area (European arms co-operation) had to be specified before the question of structures could be broached.

They also noted that the IEPG – and not WEU – was competent for specific co-operation projects and that any duplication of effort between these two bodies had to be avoided.

The possibility of WEU conducting studies for the IEPG could be examined by the Council if the IEPG makes such a request.

The specific shape and modalities of co-operation between the two organisations depend upon the future rôle, structure and tasks of the agencies and the SAC, which are now under consideration.

QUESTION 275

*put by Mr. van der Werff
on 27th July 1987*

According to press reports, on 22nd June 1987 the IEPG adopted an action plan for setting up a European market for defence equipment in order to improve co-operation between its

members by establishing greater interoperability between military equipment and making intra-European armaments co-operation more competitive.

Can the Council say:

1. whether, in application of paragraph 9 of the communiqué it issued in Bonn on 23rd April 1985, the SAC will be asked to co-operate in a practical manner in this plan;
2. whether it is at last in a position to answer written question 274 on the activities of the SAC put to it by Mr. Fourré on 8th April 1987;
3. whether, in application of paragraph 10 of the decision of 1955 setting up the SAC, the agency providing the secretariat of the SAC will be asked to pursue on behalf of the SAC its work on the armaments sector of European industry;
4. what action has been taken on its reply to Written Question 271 in which, on 17th November 1986, it announced that "the SAC will meet in the not too distant future";
5. whether the SAC has submitted a half-yearly progress report on its activities since 31st May 1986 in accordance with paragraph 9 of the Council decision of 1955?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 9th November 1987
and received at the Office of the Clerk
on 13th November 1987*

1. In the preparation of the report "Towards a stronger Europe", the IEPG Independent Study Team were in touch with WEU, in particular Agency III. IEPG ministers discussed the report at their June 1987 meeting and decided to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach towards an open European market for defence equipment. If the IEPG, which has a wider composition than WEU makes a request for WEU to play a rôle in such a process, the Council will of course consider it.
2. The reply to question 274 has been forwarded to the Assembly.
3. Representatives of national armaments directors of the Seven met in May 1987 to discuss WEU's rôle in the field of armaments co-operation and agreed that WEU could provide the necessary political impetus.

A clearer picture of the tasks of the agencies for security questions, including the

question of any possible future rôle of the SAC, will appear on completion of the reorganisation process.

Given this situation, the SAC itself has not been convened since its meeting of October 1985. However, a half-yearly report on the activities of its sub-groups has been submitted in accordance with Article 11 of the Council's decision of 7th May 1955.

QUESTION 276

*put by Mr. Wilkinson
on 19th August 1987*

What steps is the Council taking to concert the policies of the member countries of WEU with a view to maintaining their joint security interests in the Arab/Iranian Gulf?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 22nd September 1987
and received at the Office of the Clerk
on 25th September 1987*

In view of the developments in the Gulf, senior officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the member states of WEU met in The Hague on 20th August 1987 at the invitation of the Netherlands, which currently holds the WEU presidency. The Chairman-in-Office informed the President of the Assembly about this meeting in a personal communication.

The meeting was called in order to discuss the different aspects of the situation in the Gulf area.

Member countries of WEU agreed that Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully implemented forthwith so as to bring the conflict between Iraq and Iran to an end, and stated that they would continue to support all efforts aimed at achieving this. In this context, they reiterated their support for the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Furthermore, they agreed that Europe's vital interests required that freedom of navigation in the Gulf be assured at all times. The member states strongly condemned all actions contrary to that principle.

The thorough and useful discussions contributed to a harmonisation of views. It was decided to continue to consult each other and exchange information in order to develop further their co-operation. To this end a further meeting was held in The Hague on 15th September.

QUESTION 277

*put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
on 21st September 1987*

When did the Standing Armaments Committee last meet? Has its report of that meeting yet been made public? When is it next scheduled to meet?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 9th November 1987
and received at the Office of the Clerk
on 13th November 1987*

The Standing Armaments Committee last met on 25th October 1985.

In view of their restricted nature, the half-yearly reports submitted by the Standing Armaments Committee to the Council are not made public.

No date has been set for a next meeting since, as has been stated in earlier replies to Written Questions 270, 271, 274 and 275, the rôle of the SAC and armaments co-operation in the framework of WEU is currently under review.

QUESTION 278

*put by Mr. Pécriaux
on 21st September 1987*

The Council informed the President of the Assembly of proceedings at the intergovernmental consultations held in The Hague on 20th August 1987 on matters relating to security in the Gulf.

Was this meeting followed by other consultations? Where and when?

Did the agenda include consideration of factors other than the use of military means in the Gulf? If so, what were they?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 13th November 1987
and received at the Office of the Clerk
on 16th November 1987*

The 20th August meeting concerning matters relating to security in the Gulf was followed by a similar meeting on 15th September

and by a third on 14th October 1987. Ministers also had discussions on this subject at their meeting on 26th-27th October. All these meetings took place in The Hague.

On 15th September, officials exchanged views on recent developments and noted the decisions taken by some member countries to commit naval forces to the Gulf region. They decided to continue to meet, to exchange information and to discuss related issues. On 14th October, they discussed in particular how to improve their contacts in order to enhance co-ordination at the practical/technical level. Ministers on 27th October agreed that close consultation between the capitals of those countries with forces in the Gulf should continue on both a political and technical level. Daily contact between locally deployed forces was essential.

The Assembly has in all cases been informed of the outcome of these meetings, the last occasion of which was at the end of the ministerial meeting in The Hague when the presidency formally briefed the Presidential Committee of the Assembly.

QUESTION 279

*put by Mr. De Decker
on 30th September 1987*

Now that the United States and the Soviet Union are about to conclude a treaty banning INF (intermediate nuclear forces), is the Council considering including in the draft declaration on the principles of European security now being studied a provision reserving the rights and interests of the WEU member countries in regard to the possibility of equipping themselves with this category of armaments themselves in the future?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 1st December 1987*

If the specific point raised by the Honorable Parliamentarian was not dealt with as such in the platform on European security interests which was adopted after his question by the Ministerial Council of WEU on 27th October at The Hague, he will find certain reference elements in this text regarding the determination of WEU member states to carry out their share of the common defence in both the conventional and nuclear fields, in accordance with the principles of risk and burden-sharing which are fundamental to allied cohesion (see, in particular, Sections II, 4 and II a, 3).

*Action by the Presidential Committee***REPORT**

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly*

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1. Like the Council, the Assembly must always be able to take the measures necessary to ensure the continuity of its action. In application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, it gives the Presidential Committee the task of acting on its behalf in the period between sessions.

2. Because of the reactivation of the Council and the WEU ministerial organs, the Presidential Committee's rôle of permanent Assembly body has been exercised regularly and no longer exceptionally since the Rome declaration.

3. Meetings of representatives of the seven governments in the context of WEU are now more numerous and more varied. To ensure continuity of the dialogue between the two sides of WEU between sessions, the Assembly, which usually holds only two part-sessions a year, has therefore had to authorise the Presidential Committee to keep itself informed of the Council's activities and to comment or give encouragement on its behalf.

4. The Presidential Committee has therefore tightened its links with the Council and above all with the Chairman-in-Office whose rôle has been strengthened considerably since the Rome declaration. The now regular meetings between the presidency of the Council and the Presidential Committee, first before meetings of the Council at ministerial level and then at the close of those meetings, henceforth form part of the permanent attributions of the Presidential Committee.

5. To report on the exercise of these attributions, the Presidential Committee has to submit a progress report to the Assembly at each part-session. This is no longer a reflection of positions it has had to adopt in handling new and highly topical matters but rather an expression of the concern to show that its action between sessions corresponds to the guidelines laid down by Assembly votes.

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* *

6. In the Presidential Committee's action, it is customary to distinguish between the exercise of its administrative responsibilities and the political dialogue that it conducts with the Council on behalf of the Assembly. The distinction is less marked when it is seen that the Presidential Committee's administrative, and above all budgetary, action translates political views which have been held by the Assembly since the outset with praiseworthy perseverance.

7. The period of reorganisation we have just been through has allowed the Presidential Committee to reaffirm two principles which are fundamental to the concept the Assembly has always had of its rôle. The first principle is that of the political independence underlying the

Charter of the Assembly which was acknowledged in the message from the Council quoted in the preamble to the Charter.

8. The Assembly cannot, however, play its twofold rôle of political stimulation and supervision if it cannot rely on the material bases for its political independence. As the President of the Assembly said a few months ago in a letter to the Secretary-General, autonomous budgetary management is, for the Assembly, the corollary of the principle of political independence insofar as this autonomy makes it possible for the Assembly to organise its activities in the light of its aims within the framework of the budget granted to it by the governments.

9. When the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy, announced by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, had to be interpreted, the President of the Assembly, in notes to the Secretary-General which were approved unanimously by the Presidential Committee, did his utmost, while upholding the Assembly's prerogatives, to avoid disputes and eliminate false problems.

10. He showed specifically that a distinction must be drawn between two categories of financial means that the Assembly needs in order to fulfil its tasks.

11. A first category concerns the permanent staff of its secretariat whose organogram was set out in a note on the structure of the Office of the Clerk adopted by the Presidential Committee at the end of last year. Appropriations for staff are determined by statutory provisions and are carried over from year to year. There is therefore no question of making transfers between these heads and those relating to the work of the Assembly, either in one direction or in the other. For that reason, when the Council decided to apply to WEU staff the measures taken in the framework of the co-ordinated international organisations to adapt staff salaries to the inflation rate recorded, the Presidential Committee submitted a supplementary budget with the consent of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and in the context of the mandate to negotiate with the Council under Assembly Order 65.

12. In this budgetary category, the Council accepted on a personal basis only the promotions linked with the regrading of posts in the framework of the organogram approved by the Presidential Committee and refused to take into account in the draft budget for 1988, which it has nevertheless adopted, the creation of four posts that would have completed this organogram.

13. The Council persists in deferring consideration of the Assembly's organogram until it is able to take a decision on the structures of the organisation as a whole.

14. Here it should be made clear that it is for the Assembly to organise its secretariat in the light of its activities. This is a corollary of its political independence. The Presidential Committee defined the duties of members of the Office of the Clerk and the organisation of its services so as to make the most rational use of the very reduced resources at the Assembly's disposal for its growing tasks. Thus, it drew up the organogram which, apart from the four posts to be filled, has already been implemented. A feature of this organogram is that, following the abolition of the post of Clerk Assistant, the duties of assistant to the Clerk have been shared between two grade A6 officials, one responsible for political questions, the other for administrative questions. Therefore, on the departure of Mr. Whyte, who now carries out the duties of assistant for political questions and head of the committee service, Mr. Burgelin is to take over his duties and grade, as the President of the Assembly stressed.

15. The Presidential Committee obviously recognises that the four posts needed to allow the Assembly secretariat to work in normal conditions can be created only when the Assembly obtains the necessary funds. It hopes an early decision will be taken on this matter and that it will no longer be necessary to raise budgetary matters which might lead to controversy detrimental to the organisation.

16. The second budgetary category covers the appropriations directly earmarked for the Assembly's activities. Since the Council has recognised the Assembly's right to make transfers between the relevant heads of the budget, the Presidential Committee noted with satisfaction that the Assembly has therefore obtained recognition of its autonomy in the management of its administrative expenditure which is the condition for the free exercise of its supervisory rôle.

17. These amounts, included in Heads II to V of the budget, were the subject of a second supplementary budget adopted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee in order to complete certain operations that had had to be suspended for lack of funds. The Council had announced that it was prepared to approve a supplementary budget of not more than F 250 000 to take account of the fact that the pensions budget has now been separated from the Assembly's operating budget.

18. The Presidential Committee regrets that of this amount the Council finally granted the Assembly only a supplementary F 100 000.

19. Since the Presidential Committee, in agreement with the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, submitted two sup-

plementary budgets this year, it is gratifying that Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has tabled an amendment to the Assembly's Rules of Procedure with a view to specifying the legal framework for arrangements made by the Presidential Committee on behalf of the Assembly. The preparation of supplementary provisional statements of expenditure is an urgent measure that the Presidential Committee, even without a mandate from the Assembly, must be able to take in the period between sessions to ensure the smooth running of the administration. It is correct for the Rules of Procedure to stipulate unambiguously that there is a legal basis for this technical measure which reserves the Assembly's rights since the latter has to ratify it.

20. Finally, it should be recalled that the President of the Assembly again raised the question of the total Assembly budget, stressing that the principle of zero growth constantly reaffirmed by the Council seems particularly incompatible with the reactivation of WEU and the Assembly's growing activities since there is often a large gap between estimated and actual inflation rates, i.e. the increase in the cost of goods and services paid for by the Assembly. The recurrence of this gap for several years results in a progressive reduction in the Assembly's budget in constant terms. This problem therefore remains.

II. Political activities of the Presidential Committee during the intersession

21. Fortunately, the dialogue between the Presidential Committee and the Council did not deal only with budgetary matters.

22. The political dialogue with the Council was in fact the Presidential Committee's main concern during the period between the part-sessions this year.

23. Following now well-established procedure, shortly after his election the President of the Assembly had talks with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, and the Minister of Defence of the same country, Mr. van Eekelen. The two ministers then received the Presidential Committee twice for exchanges of views on matters on the agenda of the ministerial meeting.

24. The first exchange of views, held before the ministerial meeting, allowed the Presidential Committee to recall the Assembly's views on the preparation of the European security charter, to which the Assembly attaches the greatest importance, the restructuring of WEU and the reorganisation of the agencies. The Assembly considers this should help to improve their efficiency and strengthen the organisation.

25. In the discussions on enlargement, the Presidential Committee reminded the Council of the importance the Assembly attaches to Portugal, which applied formally for membership a long time ago, being admitted to the organisation as soon as possible and to the case of Spain being considered without delay.

26. Here it should be recalled that it was decided to invite the Portuguese Assembly and the Spanish Cortès to be represented in the WEU Assembly by a delegation of observers consisting of their delegation to the Assembly of the Council of Europe. At its request, Portugal has been provisionally authorised to appoint a different delegation of observers but of the same number as its delegation to the Council of Europe.

27. The other member countries of the Atlantic Alliance had already been authorised to be represented by two observers. The WEU Assembly therefore grants Portugal and Spain a status that constitutes a step towards accession.

28. On the Gulf question and member countries' naval task forces in the area, the Presidential Committee expressed satisfaction at the way the Assembly was kept informed of the matter. It stressed that the Assembly wished to continue to receive information from the Council allowing it to follow developments so as to be able, as it hopes, to give its support.

29. Finally, the Presidential Committee stressed the importance of examining recent developments in Soviet policy, which is often difficult to interpret, so that Europe may be better able to assess their implications for its security.

30. The Presidential Committee considered that the talks with the presidency allowed a frank and detailed discussion but revealed the difficulty the Council was having in agreeing on sufficiently forceful measures.

31. The meeting of the Presidential Committee with the presidency following the ministerial meeting in The Hague on 27th October allowed it to confirm the progress made and to assess how much ground still had to be covered. The results of the ministerial meeting will be analysed by the rapporteurs presenting their committee's replies to the annual report of the Council.

32. I shall therefore confine myself to recording the Presidential Committee's immediate reactions. It first considered that the talks which had just been held were very useful and showed how much progress the Council had made towards the reactivation of WEU.

33. The platform published by the Council has the merit of being the first attempt to define

Western Europe's security interests. The principles thus defined now have to be implemented. I feel an encouraging sign is the application, for the first time since WEU was formed, of the provisions of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty concerning threats to peace. In the Gulf, Europe has to face up to a situation which constitutes a particular threat to its vital economic interests. It is to be hoped that in disarmament matters, now the hub of East-West negotiations, Europe will manage to speak with a single voice to express the solidarity imposed by its geographical situation.

34. To act, WEU must be efficient. The Presidential Committee therefore expressed the wish

that the Council's decisions on the structure and seat of the ministerial organs of WEU be applied swiftly, since the Council must be able to give greater cohesion to the security policies of the European countries which have taken on particularly constraining defence commitments and particularly important military responsibilities. This is the price at which the European component of the Atlantic Alliance can make its voice heard.

35. The Presidential Committee for its part will continue, outside sessions, to act as spokesman for the European assembly with defence responsibilities and thus ensure continuous parliamentary support for all efforts to give Europe more body and more soul.

APPENDIX I

*Note by the President of the Assembly
on the Assembly's budgetary autonomy*

16th June 1987

1. The nature of the WEU Assembly's budgetary autonomy can be deduced from the political autonomy that is an essential condition of its action.

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2. The Assembly's mandate is indirectly defined in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty which makes it compulsory for the Council to present a report on its activities. It is in the spirit of these provisions that the Council answers recommendations and written questions addressed to it by the Assembly.

3. It cannot therefore be considered that the Council has no commitments to fulfil vis-à-vis the Assembly. The Council probably does not have to conform to the recommendations addressed to it but it has the duty to take them into account, if only to express its opinion on them.

4. The various changes that have occurred in the nature of the Council's activities have not reduced the Assembly's task. On the contrary, the Rome declaration of October 1984 recalls the importance of the WEU Assembly "which, as the only European parliamentary body mandated by treaty to discuss defence matters, is called upon to play a growing rôle".

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5. In carrying out its task, the WEU Assembly autonomously determines its methods of work, draws up its agenda and organises its plenary sessions, committee meetings, meetings with the Council and colloquies.

It is assisted by a secretariat which, unlike that of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, is self-dependent and has staff rules separate from those of the ministerial organs. It shares its work out among the members of the Office of the

Clerk and recruits staff on the basis of criteria of competence and nationality that it alone determines.

6. To finance its activities, the Assembly has the following resources:

- sums granted in its budget in the light of the Assembly's proposals and after discussion in the Council;
- expenditure borne by the parliaments of member countries: travelling expenses of members of the Assembly on the occasion of plenary sessions and committee meetings, whether held at the seat of the Assembly or elsewhere, expenditure involved in the organisation of colloquies, meetings, etc.;
- the proceeds of the sale of Assembly publications.

7. The Assembly's autonomy of action requires autonomy in the management of its resources. It was in this spirit that the Charter and Rules of Procedure made the President of the Assembly responsible for budgetary management. This is also why the Assembly has its own auditor verify that the budget is managed correctly and the approval of the Assembly is sought each year.

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8. Recognition of the Assembly's autonomy to manage its budget within the limit of resources available being implied by the very nature of its mandate, the Assembly had for many years been insisting that it should be responsible for allocating appropriations to the various heads of its budget. It is therefore particularly satisfied that the principle of its autonomy in budgetary management has been recognised and wishes the methods of applying this principle to be specified, due account being taken of its specific driving and supervisory rôle.

APPENDIX II

*Note by the President of the Assembly
on the application of the principle
of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy*

22nd June 1987

The decision taken in Luxembourg meets a long-standing claim by the Assembly in recognising the principle of its right to autonomous budgetary management. The total amount of the Assembly budget can be determined only as a result of discussions between the Council and the Assembly.

The question of autonomous budgetary management for the Assembly originated in the contradiction between the Assembly's freedom of action under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty and the constraints of the provisions applied to procedure for adopting its budget.

Its freedom of action was recognised by the then Chairman-in-Office of the Council during the first session of the Assembly. Mr. Spaak said: "The Council of the union has not wished to force its views upon you. On the contrary, we have been determined to leave you the greatest possible freedom... We consider that the organisation and working methods of the Assembly and the nature of its relations with other assemblies are matters for its own decision, within the framework of the agreements setting up the Western European Union."

Conversely, the procedure imposed on the Assembly for adopting its budget includes a detailed study by government financial experts of the reasons for a specific estimate being included in a specific sub-head of its draft budget.

The decision taken in Luxembourg meets the need to remove this contradiction.

To study the effects, a distinction must be drawn in the Assembly budget between, on the one hand, a fixed proportion corresponding to the financial implications of the structure of the Office of the Clerk and, on the other, appropriations for activities defined in an annual programme of work.

The present structure of the Office of the Clerk was established in accordance with decisions taken by the Presidential Committee in 1981 and 1986. An essential feature is the division of the duties of assistant to the Clerk between two grade A6 officials. The four remaining posts will be filled when the Assembly obtains the necessary sums.

This fixed part of the budget, to be renewed from year to year, is subject to application of decisions taken in the framework of the co-ordinated international organisations and the provisions of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk.

Conversely, some flexibility is essential in managing the parts of the budget corresponding to the financing of the Assembly's work. By allocating to the various heads and sub-heads expenditure implied by its programme, the Assembly makes estimates designed to make its action possible, not to place constraints upon it.

According to the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, the budget is above all an estimate of expenditure. It is subject to modification in the course of implementation due to unforeseeable events such as the rise in the cost of certain services or the impossibility of carrying out certain plans. If no offset were possible between over-spending and savings, the Assembly would, because of the inadequacy of sums under certain sub-heads becoming apparent during the financial year, have to cancel part of its programme of work which, because of the close correlation of expenditure, would involve non-use of sums under other sub-heads.

It thus appears that freedom to manage its own budget is, for the Assembly, a condition for the rational organisation of its work.

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APPENDIX III

*Letter from the Secretary-General
to the President of the Assembly*

London, 23rd November 1987

Dear Mr. President,

In your letter dated 27th July 1987¹, you have made some interesting remarks and given explanations of matters which have been and still are of considerable importance for the Assembly and have received the repeated attention of the Council.

I would think that on the matter of budgetary autonomy and of the pensions budget, the Assembly has, this year, made considerable and remarkable progress, bearing in mind that these subjects are almost as old as the organisation and the pension scheme themselves. Consolidation and the gaining of experience with the new situation would now seem to be the next step.

The restructuring of the Office of the Clerk is still a matter on which the Council has not yet been able to come to a conclusion. As was explained in my letters of 23rd February 1987 and 29th May 1987, the proposals for new posts and the regrading of posts in order to arrive at a new organogram were to be considered during the review of the whole of the organisation. This has, however, not yet been concluded and since these questions are, in the eyes of the Council, intimately linked, a decision on the Assembly's proposals will only be possible somewhat later.

The problem of the growth rate to be applied to the operational budgets is also long-standing, and has been raised in meetings of the Budget and Organisation Committee repeatedly. The Council in its reply to Recommendation 445 considers that, when all the budgets of WEU are prepared, the growth rate applicable should remain at zero in real terms, based on the rates of inflation in France and the United Kingdom, as officially forecast.

Yours sincerely,
Alfred CAHEN

Mr. C. GOERENS,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union

1. Reproduced at Appendix II to the draft second supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (Document 1120).

The INF treaty

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION ¹

tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others

The Assembly,

Endorsing the view of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments expressed in Document 1116 that the INF agreement now to be signed by the United States and the Soviet Union should be in the long-term security interests of countries both of the alliance and the Warsaw Pact,

URGES THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

To give its advice and consent to the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces as expeditiously as possible.

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT

To transmit the text of the present resolution and the corresponding report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the President of the United States Senate for the information of all its members.

Signed: Stoffelen, van der Sanden, Hardy, Malfatti, de Beer, Ahrens, Linster, Pack, Hennicot-Schoepges, Staels-Dompas, Cox, Pieralli

1. See 6th sitting, 30th November 1987 (motion referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments).

Amendment of the Charter of the Assembly

MOTION TO AMEND THE CHARTER ¹

tabled by Mr. Pannella and others

The Assembly resolves to amend Article VIII as follows:

Leave out paragraph (a), and insert:

“ The draft budget of the Assembly shall be drawn up by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in consultation with the Presidential Committee.

This draft budget shall be submitted to the Council which may make comments in the form of amendments thereto.


Thus amended, the draft budget shall be re-examined by the Assembly in accordance with the following procedure:

- if the Council has not amended the draft budget, it shall be agreed to by the Assembly by simple majority;
- if the Council has amended the draft budget, the Assembly may ratify it by simple majority or itself amend the draft budget as amended by the Council. Any amendment to the Council's amendments to the draft budget must be approved by an absolute majority.

The budget thus adopted shall be proclaimed adopted by the President, who shall communicate it to the Council.”

Signed: Pannella, Fioret, Stegagnini, Parisi, Salvi, Sarti, Malfatti, Pack, Tummers, Natali, Fourré, Steiner, Fiandrotti, Pieralli, Greco, Cannata, Taramelli, Gabbuggiani, Martino, Close, Fassino, Irmer, Hitschler

1. See 8th sitting, 1st December 1987 (motion referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges).

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