

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

EXTRAORDINARY SESSION

April 1987

Minutes
Official Report of Debates
Assembly Documents

WEU

LUXEMBOURG

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BOGAERTS August	SP
DECLERCQ Tijl	CVP
DEJARDIN Claude	PS
PECRIÀUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP

Substitutes

MM. BEYSEN Edward	PVV
CEREXHE Etienne	PSC
CLOSE Robert	PRL
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
du MONCEAU de BERGENDAL Yves	PVV
NOERENS René	PVV

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
de CHAMBRUN Charles	National Front
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GREMETZ Maxime	Communist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF
Mrs. LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist
MM. MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
MERMAZ Louis	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PORTIER Henri	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRE René	RPR
BICHET Jacques	UDF
BOHL André	UCDP
BORDU Gérard	Communist
CHARTRON Jacques	RPR
CHENARD Alain	Socialist

MM. DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUT Xavier	UDF (App.)
LACOUR Pierre	UCDP
MONTASTRUC Pierre	UDF
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
PRAT Henri	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SIRGUE Pierre	National Front
SOUVET Louis	RPR

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MECHTERSHEIMER Alfred	Die Grünen
MULLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
DUVE Freimut	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. GLOTZ Peter	SPD
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
LODIGIANI Oreste	Socialist
MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
GOERENS Charles	Dem.
HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM. KONEN René	Dem.
LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
van den BERGH Harry	Labour
de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr. van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

MM. de BEER Leopold	Liberal
EISMA Doeke	D66
EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM. van der SANDEN Piet van TETS Govert WORRELL Joop	CDA Liberal Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr. Donald COLEMAN	Labour
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Mr. Edward GARRETT	Labour
Sir Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr. Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr. James HILL	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
Lady Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir John PAGE	Conservative
Mr. Stephen ROSS	Liberal
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr. John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. Robert BROWN	Labour
John CORRIE	Conservative
Thomas COX	Labour
Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Reginald FREESON	Labour
Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
MM. Bruce MILLAN	Labour
Michael MORRIS	Conservative
Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. Robert PARRY	Labour
Peter REES	Conservative
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
MM. John STOKES	Conservative
Stefan TERLEZKI	Conservative
John WARD	Conservative
Alec WOODALL	Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 27th April 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the extraordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session (Doc. 1087).
5. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part I: The reactivation of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1089 and amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.40 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the extraordinary session

The President declared open the extraordinary session of the Assembly in accordance with Article III (b) of the Charter and Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Tribute

The President paid tribute to Mr. Berrier who had been a member of the Assembly since 1978 and Chairman of the General Affairs Committee since 1986.

4. Observers

The President welcomed the observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

5. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary

Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes for the extraordinary session had been ratified by the Assembly with the exception of the representatives and substitutes of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany and Mr. Portillon as a substitute in the French Delegation.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of the above.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. Ministerial meeting of the Council

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1094)

The President announced that a motion for a recommendation on the meeting of the Council had been tabled by Mr. Goerens and others with a request for urgent procedure in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure.

The Assembly would decide on the request for urgent procedure after the vote on the draft recommendation of the General Affairs Committee.

**8. Adoption of the draft order of business
for the extraordinary session**

(Doc. 1087)

The draft order of business for the extraordinary session was adopted.

**9. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance
Part I: The reactivation of WEU**

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the
General Affairs Committee and vote on the
draft recommendation, Doc. 1089 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur.

Speakers: Mr. Cuco (*Observer from Spain*), Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*) and Mr. Budtz (*Observer from Denmark*).

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Antoni, Wilkinson, Valleix, Klejdzinski, Murphy, Bassinet, Burger, Freeson, van der Sanden, Martino, Linster, De Decker, Bayülken (*Observer from Turkey*) and Katsaros (*Observer from Greece*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur, and Mr. Close, Acting Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Amendments (Nos. 2 and 1) were tabled by Mr. Bassinet:

2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the proposal

made by the Prime Minister of France on 2nd December 1986 to draw up a European security charter provides" and insert "the proposals by the French Government, and particularly the one to draw up a European security charter, provide".

1. At the end of paragraph 2 (f) of the draft recommendation proper, add:

"(1) for this purpose, by instructing the Secretary-General to play an active part in organising the first course and to promote the formation of an association of former participants of which he would ensure the secretariat; (2) by asking the French institute to invite Spain and Portugal to send participants to this course;"

Speakers: MM. Bassinet and Ahrens.

The amendments were agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 442)¹.

**10. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 2.45 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.

¹. See page 11.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

MM. <i>De Bondt</i> (Adriaensens) Bogaerts Declercq Dejardin <i>Close</i> (Péciaux)	MM. <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Irmer Kittelmann Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> (Mrs. Luuk) MM. <i>Lemmrich</i> (Müller) Niegel Reddemann <i>Zywietz</i> (Rumpf) Scheer Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Schmitz) MM. von Schmude <i>Schmidt</i> (Soell) Unland	Netherlands MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) <i>Worrell</i> (van den Bergh) Stoffelen <i>de Beer</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) <i>van Tets</i> (van der Werff)
France MM. Bassinet de Chambrun Collette <i>Bordu</i> (Gremetz) <i>Lacour</i> (Jeambrun) Jung Mrs. Lalumière MM. <i>Fourré</i> (Matraja) <i>Prat</i> (Mermaz) Oehler Valleix	Italie MM. Amadei Antoni <i>Martino</i> (Cifarelli) Giust Mezzapesa	United Kingdom Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Brown</i> (Coleman) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett <i>Murphy</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) <i>Freeson</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. <i>Terlezki</i> (Jessel) Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Lady Jill Knight Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn MM. <i>Stokes</i> (Sir John Page) Ross Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany MM. Ahrens Antretter Böhm Büchner	Luxembourg MM. Burger Goerens <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France MM. Baumel Croze Galley Koehl Portier Seitlinger	Italy MM. Bianco Cavaliere Ferrari Aggradi Fiandrotti Frasca Gianotti Milani Pecchioli Rauti Rubbi Sarti	MM. Sinesio Vecchietti
Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Mechtersheimer		Netherlands MM. de Kwaadsteniet Tummers

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 442***on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance –
Part I: The reactivation of WEU***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the proposals by the French Government, and particularly the one to draw up a European security charter, provide an opportunity for a fundamental re-examination of the requirements of that security;
- (ii) Considering that the policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance remains the guarantee of that security;
- (iii) Considering that the main threats to international peace now arise in areas not covered by the alliance;
- (iv) Considering that European co-operation in armaments matters has become essential for the security of Europe;
- (v) Considering that the search for disarmament or the limitation of armaments is essential for the maintenance of peace and should continue to be given priority but that this search must not jeopardise the security of Europe;
- (vi) Considering that the recent development of chemical weapons constitutes a particularly serious threat for all mankind;
- (vii) Welcoming recent measures taken by the Council to increase its activities in order to meet the requirements of European security but regretting that information on these activities communicated to the public and to the Assembly is still far from adequate;
- (viii) Considering that it is still essential to bring the requirements of European security to the attention of the public;
- (ix) Deeply regretting the continuous failure of the Council of Ministers to inform the Assembly in a proper way;
- (x) Considering that new governmental activities in WEU must allow the Assembly to exercise to the full its responsibilities under Article IX of the treaty;
- (xi) Noting in particular that the replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions relating to the Council's activities, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Programme Group seriously distort the Council's commitments to the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Study closely the proposals made by the French Government for drawing up a European security charter with a view to:
 - (a) defining Europe's security requirements, acquainting its American allies with them and ensuring that current negotiations on the limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons lead to substantial reductions without compromising Europe's security based on a policy of deterrence;
 - (b) reaffirming member countries' continuing concern not to compromise the cohesion of the alliance and to include the strengthening of the European pillar in the context of the alliance;
 - (c) averting a chemical arms race by calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to seek an agreement ensuring the complete elimination of such arms and promoting the extension of this agreement to all countries;
 - (d) including in the charter a commitment to ensure reciprocal exchanges of information and consultations in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in regard to any threat to international peace;

- (e) also including an expression of the joint will to remove obstacles still obstructing the development of European co-operation in armaments matters;
2. To this end, direct the measures taken to give new work to WEU so as to ensure that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty contributes to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the consolidation of peace by:
- (a) keeping the political committee on European security in the framework of WEU;
 - (b) considering how the treaty should be applied to ensure that it meets present European security requirements and allows WEU to be enlarged to include Western European countries wishing and able to take part;
 - (c) ensuring that these countries are kept informed of the activities of WEU and allowing the countries concerned to take part henceforth in some of these activities, particularly in co-operation in armaments matters;
 - (d) giving the necessary impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters, inter alia by adapting its decision of 7th May 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee to present facts of such co-operation;
 - (e) acting without delay on its document "WEU and public awareness" so as to inform public opinion of all its activities in accordance with the principles set out in the Rome declaration, including the issue of communiqués at the close of meetings of the political committee on European security;
 - (f) ensuring co-ordination of member countries' participation in the course to be organised by the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale in 1988 and of the development of subsequent courses so as to promote public awareness of European security requirements in all member countries; (1) for this purpose by instructing the Secretary-General to play an active part in organising the first course and to promote the formation of an association of former participants of which he would ensure the secretariat; (2) by asking the French institute to invite Spain and Portugal to send participants to this course;
 - (g) developing exchanges of views with the United States authorities so as to enhance the cohesion of the alliance;
 - (h) applying in full Article IX of the treaty under which it has an obligation to report to the Assembly on its activities and on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when pursued in frameworks other than WEU.

SECOND SITTING

Monday, 27th April 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Ministerial meeting of the Council (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1094).
2. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 1090).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 2.55 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

Speaker (points of order): Mr. Hardy.

The President replied to the points of order.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Ministerial meeting of the Council

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure; debate and vote on the motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1094)

In accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on the ministerial meeting of the Council.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy.

The President replied to the point of order.

Speakers: MM. Goerens and Hardy.

The sitting was suspended at 3.20 p.m. and resumed at 3.25 p.m.

In accordance with Rule 43 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to vote by roll-call on the request for urgent procedure.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to unanimously by 52 votes (see Appendix II); 12

representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the motion for a recommendation.

Speaker: Mr. Goerens.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion for a recommendation.

The motion for a recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 443) ¹.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Dr. Miller.

4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations, Doc. 1090 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Antoni and Wilkinson.

Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Valleix, Bordu, Martino, Dr. Miller, MM. Stoffelen and Burger.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

¹. See page 19.

Speakers: Mr. Fourré, Sir John Osborn, MM. Hardy, Close, de Beer, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Reddemann and Scheer.

Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur, and Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the first draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson:

11. In the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (i) and insert:

“(i) Recalling that Europe’s security is based on the deterrence exercised by all the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance thanks to their capacity, in spite of Warsaw Pact superiority in many fields, to prevent any potential adversary undertaking an aggression in the hope that the confrontation will remain at a level chosen by him;”

Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett (point of order), MM. Wilkinson, Amadei and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson:

12. In the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (iv) and insert:

“(iv) Considering that Western Europe may be compelled in the fairly near future to assume more responsibility for the requirements of its security but that in present circumstances this is ensured only thanks to the presence of American forces and armaments in Europe;”

Speakers: MM. Wilkinson, Scheer, Amadei and Kittelmann.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment 12 having been agreed to, Amendment 13 fell.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy.

An amendment (No. 16) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson:

16. In paragraph (v), line 3, of the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave

out “both” and from “deterrence” to end and add:

“whose security should be stabilised by appropriate and verifiable disarmament measures which are subject to agreement;”

Speakers: Mr. Wilkinson, Dr. Miller and Mr. Amadei.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 17) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson:

17. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation and insert:

“(ix) Recalling in this context that the Soviet Union maintains more conventional forces than it requires for its defence and that their offensive force structures optimised to perform aggressive operations must be perceived as a potential threat to the member countries by the member nations of WEU;”

Speakers: MM. Wilkinson, Scheer, Amadei and de Beer (point of order).

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment 17 having been agreed to, Amendment 1 fell.

Amendment 2 was not moved.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by MM. Scheer and Stoffelen.

8. In paragraph 1 (a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from “combined with the simultaneous withdrawal of shorter-range INF” to the end of the paragraph and insert “and combined with the following disarmament of all American and Soviet shorter-range INF in Europe;”.

Speakers: MM. Scheer, Wilkinson and Kittelmann.

The amendment was negated.

Speakers (point of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord Hughes and Mr. Klejdzinski.

Amendment 3 was not moved.

An amendment (No. 18) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson:

18. In paragraph 1 (a), line 5, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out after “fail” to the end of the paragraph and add:

“and make effective progress in the negotiations aiming at greater stability and crisis control in the conventional field (MBFR) and which should take place on the whole of Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural mountains;”

Speakers: MM. Wilkinson, Scheer and Amadei.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment 18 having been agreed to, Amendment 4 fell.

An amendment (No. 15) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson:

15. In paragraph 1 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out subparagraph (c).

Speakers: Mr. Wilkinson, Dr. Miller and Mr. Amadei.

The amendment was agreed to.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Goerens.

Amendments (Nos. 9 and 10) were tabled by Mr. Bassinet and others:

9. Leave out paragraph 2 of the second revised draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Urge governments participating in the informal Vienna consultations to start negotiations as soon as possible in the framework of the CSCE on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals;”

10. In paragraph 3 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from “to accept fully” to the end of the paragraph and insert “to accept the French or British chemical disarmament proposals tabled at the Geneva disarmament conference;”

Speaker: Mr. Fourné.

Amendments 9 and 10 were withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 20) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson:

20. In paragraph 2, line 3, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “reasonable automatic” and insert “regular on-site”.

Speaker: Mr. Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendments 5 and 6 were not moved.

An amendment (No. 19) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson:

19. In paragraph 3, line 4, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out

after “inspection” to the end of the paragraph.

Speakers: MM. Wilkinson and Scheer.

The amendment was agreed to.

Speaker (point of order): Lord Mackie.

Amendment 7 was not moved.

An amendment (No. 14) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson:

14. In paragraph 4 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out subparagraph (b).

Speakers: MM. Wilkinson and Klejdzinski.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

In accordance with Rule 33 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, Mr. Stoffelen asked for a vote by roll-call.

More than five representatives having concurred, the Assembly proceeded to a vote by roll-call.

The amended draft recommendation was negated on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 21 votes to 19 with 14 abstentions; 10 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation replying to the thirty-first annual report of the Council.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 444)¹.

Speakers (explanation of vote): Mr. Irmer, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Dr. Miller.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 28th April, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 7.45 p.m.

¹. See page 20.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

MM. <i>De Bondt</i> (Adriaensens) Bogaerts Declercq <i>du Monceau</i> (Dejardin) <i>Close</i> (Péciaux) Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Steverlynck	MM. Irmer Kittelmann <i>Steiner</i> (Mrs. Luuk) <i>Lemmrich</i> (Müller) Niegel Reddemann <i>Zywietz</i> (Rumpf) Scheer Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Schmitz) MM. von Schmude <i>Schmidt</i> (Soell) Unland	Netherlands MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) <i>Worrell</i> (van den Bergh) Stoffelen <i>de Beer</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) <i>van Tets</i> (van der Werff)
France MM. Bassinet de Chambrun Collette <i>Bordu</i> (Gremetz) <i>Lacour</i> (Jeambrun) Mrs. Lalumière MM. Fourré (Matraja) <i>Prat</i> (Mermaz) Oehler Valleix	Italie MM. Amadei Antoni <i>Martino</i> (Cifarelli) Giust Mezzapasa	United Kingdom Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett <i>Morris</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. <i>Terlezki</i> (Jessel) Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Lady Jill Knight Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Page) Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Ross) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany MM. Ahrens Böhm Büchner <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz)	Luxembourg MM. Burger Goerens <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France MM. Baumel Croze Galley Jung Koehl Portier Seitlinger	Italy MM. Bianco Cavaliere Ferrari Aggradi Fiandrotti Frasca Gianotti Milani Pecchioli Rauti Rubbi Sarti Sinesio Vecchietti	Netherlands MM. de Kwaadsteniet Tummers
Federal Republic of Germany MM. Antretter Mechtersheimer		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on the ministerial meeting of the Council (Doc. 1094)¹:

Ayes	52
Noes	0
Abstentions	0

Ayes:

MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts)	MM. <i>Bordu</i> (Gremetz)	MM. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Page)
<i>De Bondt</i> (Adriaensens)	Hardy	<i>Close</i> (Péciaux)
Amadei	Sir Paul Hawkins	Reddemann
Antoni	MM. <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	Scheer
Bassinat	Hill	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Schmitz)
Sir Frederic Bennett	Lord Hughes	Mr. von Schmude
MM. Bogaerts	MM. Irmer	Sir Dudley Smith
Böhm	<i>Lacour</i> (Jeambrun)	Mr. <i>Schmidt</i> (Soell)
Burger	<i>Terlezki</i> (Jessel)	Mrs. Staels-Dompas
<i>Martino</i> (Cifarelli)	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull)	MM. Steverlynck
Coleman	Mr. Kittelmann	Stoffelen
Collette	Lady Jill Knight	Unland
Declercq	Mrs. Lalumière	Valleix
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	MM. <i>Prat</i> (Mermaz)	<i>de Beer</i> (Mrs. van der
MM. Garrett	Mezzapesa	Werf-Terpstra)
Giust	Dr. Miller	Wilkinson
Goerens	MM. <i>Lemmrich</i> (Müller)	
<i>Morris</i> (Sir Anthony	Niegel	
Grant)	Sir John Osborn	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX III

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the amended draft recommendation on disarmament (Doc. 1090) ¹:

Ayes	19
Noes	21
Abstentions	14

Ayes:

MM. Böhm	MM. Hill	Mrs. Staels-Dompas
Burger	Kittelmann	MM. Steverlynck
Declercq	Mezzapesa	<i>Bühler</i> (Unland)
<i>du Monceau</i>	<i>Lemmrich</i> (Müller)	<i>de Beer</i> (Mrs. van der
(Dejardin)	Niegel	Werf-Terpstra)
Giust	Reddemann	<i>van Tets</i> (van der Werff)
Sir Paul Hawkins	Sir Dudley Smith	Wilkinson

Noes:

MM. Ahrens	MM. <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	Mr. <i>Prat</i> (Mermaz)
Amadei	Klejdzinski	Dr. Miller
<i>Worrell</i> (van den Bergh)	Lord Hughes	MM. Oehler
Bogaerts	Mr. Irmer	Close
Büchner	Mrs. Lalumière	Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Ross)
Coleman	MM. <i>Steiner</i> (Mrs. Luuk)	MM. Scheer
Hardy	<i>Fourré</i> (Matraja)	Stoffelen

Abstentions:

Sir Frederic Bennett	MM. Goerens	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull)
MM. de Chambrun	<i>Morris</i> (Sir Anthony	Lady Jill Knight
<i>Martino</i> (Cifarelli)	Grant)	Sir John Osborn
Collette	<i>Lacour</i> (Jeambrun)	MM. <i>Stokes</i> (Sir John Page)
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	<i>Terlezki</i> (Jessel)	Valleix

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 443***on the ministerial meeting of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the diplomatic/press offensive of Mikhail Gorbachev, who is multiplying proposals for nuclear disarmament, calls for a co-ordinated response from the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Aware that these proposals, which affect first and foremost European security, should lead to European interests being defined in WEU, the only European organisation with responsibilities in this area;
- (iii) Encouraged by the call to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance by George Shultz, United States Secretary of State, following his recent visit to Moscow, requesting their opinion on these proposals,

URGES THE COUNCIL

1. To make known its collegiate point of view on the Gorbachev proposals through the intermediary of its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, in his statement to the Assembly on Tuesday, 28th April 1987;
2. To instruct its Chairman-in-Office to give the Council's point of view on the Soviet proposals at the meetings of the North Atlantic Council to be held on 11th and 12th June 1987.

RECOMMENDATION 444***replying to the thirty-first annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Regretting the serious delay in the communication of the Council's annual report in 1986, the omission of information concerning one important meeting, and considering that the absence of agreement on certain matters should not prevent the Council from presenting the rest of its report on time;
- (ii) Welcoming, however, the communication in October 1986 of the first part of the report for that year,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before the end of February of the following year and that it contain a complete account of activities arranged by the Council;
2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement of WEU.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 28th April 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

Application of Order 65 on the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1095*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

Speaker (point of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

3. Application of Order 65 on the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1987

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1095)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Linster, Sir Paul Hawkins and Mr. Garrett.

Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: Mr. van Tets, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Hill.

The debate was closed.

Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 445)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 67)².

4. The need for action by the Assembly of Western European Union to press western governments for action to channel resources into development needs and away from the arms trade

(Motion for a resolution, Doc. 1096)

In accordance with Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure, a motion for a resolution was tabled by Mr. Freeson.

The motion for a resolution would be referred to the appropriate committee by the Presidential Committee.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 5 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 11.25 a.m.

1. See page 23.

2. See page 24.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium

MM. Bogaerts
Declercq
Dejardin
Steverlynck

France

MM. de Chambrun
Collette
Hunault (Galley)
Lacour (Jeambrun)
Fourré (Matraja)
Prat (Mermaz)
Oehler
Valleix

Federal Republic of Germany

MM. Ahrens
Böhm
Büchner
Klejdzinski (Holtz)
Irmer
Bühler (Müller)
Niegel
Reddemann
Mrs. *Pack (Schmitz)*
Mr. *Lenzer (Unland)*

Italy

MM. Amadei
Gianotti

Luxembourg

MM. Burger
Goerens
Linster (Hengel)

Netherlands

MM. Stoffelen
de Beer (Mrs. van der
Werf-Terpstra)
van Tets (van der Werff)

United Kingdom

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Mr. Garrett
Sir Paul Hawkins
Mr. Hill
Lord *Newall (Earl of Kinnoull)*
Lady Jill Knight
Dr. Miller
Sir Dudley Smith
Mr. Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium

MM. Adriaensens
Péciaux
Mrs. Staels-Dompas

France

MM. Bassinet
Baumel
Croze
Gremetz
Jung
Koehl
Mrs. Lalumière
MM. Portier
Seitlinger

Federal Republic of Germany

MM. Antretter
Kittelman

Mrs. Luuk
MM. Mechttersheimer
Rumpf
Scheer
von Schmude
Soell

Italy

MM. Antoni
Bianco
Cavaliere
Cifarelli
Ferrari Aggradi
Fiandrotti
Frasca
Giust
Mezzapesa
Milani
Pecchioli
Rauti
Rubbi

MM. Sarti
Sinesio
Vecchiatti

Netherlands

MM. Aarts
van den Bergh
de Kwaadsteniet
Tummers

United Kingdom

Sir Frederic Bennett
Mr. Coleman
Sir Anthony Grant
Mr. Hardy
Lord Hughes
Mr. Jessel
Sir John Osborn
Sir John Page
Mr. Ross

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 445***on principles applicable in preparing the budgets
of the WEU ministerial organs and the Assembly***

The Assembly,

Fully endorsing the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end to WEU's budgetary difficulties,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Implement without delay the three principles defined by the Chairman-in-Office:

- application to the operating budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of WEU of the growth rate defined in the European Communities;
- establishment of a separate budget for pensions;
- recognition of the Assembly's freedom to manage its budget within the limits of the appropriations thus calculated.

ORDER 67***on the budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987***

The Assembly,

1. APPROVES the action taken by the Presidential Committee in application of Order 65 and the terms of the memorandum of the President of the Assembly dated 12th March 1987;
2. INVITES the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to take the necessary steps to implement, during the present financial year, the provisions decided upon for improving the structure of the Office of the Clerk.

FOURTH SITTING

Tuesday, 28th April 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and debate.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 5.40 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. The need for action by the Assembly of Western European Union to press western governments for action to channel resources into development needs and away from the arms trade

(Doc. 1096)

The President informed the Assembly that there was an error in the signatures attached to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr. Freeson.

The name of Mr. Baumel should be deleted from the list of signatures and Mr. Bassinet's name should be inserted.

4. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Poos answered questions put by MM. Wilkinson, Valleix, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Gianotti, Freeson and Brown.

Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, and Mr. Poos answered a question put by Mr. Goerens.

Mr. Poos answered questions put by Mr. Terlezki, Sir Frederic Bennett, Sir Dudley Smith and Mr. Stoffelen.

5. Close of the extraordinary session

The President declared the extraordinary session of the Assembly closed.

The sitting was closed at 7.05 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Irmer Kittelmann <i>Lenzer</i> (Müller) von Schmude <i>Schmidt</i> (Soell) <i>Zierer</i> (Unland)	Netherlands
MM. <i>De Bondt</i> (Adriaensens) Bogaerts Declercq <i>Close</i> (Pécriaux) Steverlynck		MM. Stoffelen <i>van Tets</i> (van der Werff)
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. de Chambrun Collette <i>Hunault</i> (Galley) <i>Lacour</i> (Jeambrun) Koehl Mrs. Lalumière MM. <i>Prat</i> (Mermaz) Valleix	MM. Amadei Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) <i>Brown</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins MM. Hill <i>Woodall</i> (Lord Hughes) Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Lady Jill Knight Dr. Miller MM. <i>Terlezki</i> (Sir John Osborn) <i>Ward</i> (Sir John Page) Ross Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz)	MM. Burger Goerens <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Büchner Mrs. Luuk MM. Mechtersheimer Niegel Reddemann Rumpf Scheer Schmitz	MM. Rauti Rubbi Sarti Sinesio Vecchietti
France	Italy	Netherlands
MM. Bassinet Baumel Croze Gremetz Jung Matraja Oehler Portier Seitlinger	MM. Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi Fiandrotti Frasca Milani Pecchioli	MM. Aarts van den Bergh de Kwaadsteniet Tummers Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
Federal Republic of Germany		United Kingdom
MM. Antretter Böhm		MM. Garrett Jessel

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 27th April 1987

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the extraordinary session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Tribute.
4. Observers.
5. Examination of credentials.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Ministerial meeting of the Council (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1094).
8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session (Doc. 1087).
9. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part I: The reactivation of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1089 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ahrens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cuco (*Observer from Spain*), Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Budtz (*Observer from Denmark*), Mr. Antoni, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Burger, Mr. Freeson, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Martino, Mr. Linster, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Bayülken (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Katsaros (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Ahrens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Close (*acting Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Ahrens.
10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.40 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the extraordinary session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (b) of the Charter and Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open this extraordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Tribute

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, ladies and gentlemen, since our last sitting, we have learned with great sorrow of the death of Mr. Berrier, member of the French Senate, and a member of our Assembly since 1978 and Chairman of the General Affairs Committee since 1986. I would like to express the sympathy of the Assembly to his family, his wife and the French Delegation. I believe I can say, ladies and

gentlemen, that the memory of Noël Berrier we shall retain will be that of a man devoted to the cause of Europe, keenly interested in the work of our committee and ready to give of his best to heighten the prestige of our Assembly. In his memory and in token of our friendship, loyalty and respect, let us now observe a few moments of silence.

(The representatives observed one minute's silence)

4. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As is the custom, I have to inform the Assembly of the presence at our proceedings of observers from member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. The observers are from Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. I should particularly like, on your behalf ladies and gentlemen, to welcome full delegations from Portugal and Spain, attending by virtue of the Assembly's decision to grant these countries special observer status, under which from now on they are entitled to attend as a full delegation in accordance with Article IX of the Charter of the Assembly and to take regular part in the work of committees. I extend a most cordial welcome to all our Spanish and Portuguese colleagues attending the Assembly as a delegation for the first time.

1. See page 10.

5. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of credentials of the new representatives and substitutes appointed since the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session, whose names are published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials are attested by the statement of the ratification of credentials communicated by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, with the exception of the representatives and substitutes of the Federal Republic of Germany and Mr. Pontillon, French substitute, who have been nominated since the conclusion of the session of the Assembly.

It is now for the Assembly to ratify these credentials under Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Procedure.

These nominations are in the form prescribed by the rules and no objection has been raised.

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior referral to a credentials committee.

Is there any objection?...

The credentials are ratified, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I welcome our new colleagues.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ministers, your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, as you know two reasons led the Assembly, at its session in December 1986, to decide to hold an extraordinary session in Luxembourg today and tomorrow.

The first was the importance to be attributed to the ministerial meeting of the Council to be held tomorrow at which our governments are to put the final touches to their agreement on the principles to be set out in the European security charter proposed by Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister of France, on 2nd December 1986. We felt it important for the Assembly to express its opinion on the eve of the ministerial meeting. This it will be able to do thanks to the report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by our colleague, Mr. Ahrens.

The same report will also allow us to express our views on a number of specific questions relating to the reactivation of WEU for which the

ministerial meeting should introduce the final stage by taking the necessary decisions for:

- setting up a European security council the principle of which was accepted by the ministers last October;
- restructuring WEU, with a final definition of the respective tasks of the Secretariat-General and the agencies;
- enlarging WEU to include Spain and Portugal, candidate countries for which the Assembly has shown its unreserved support by inviting to this session parliamentary delegations equivalent to those that they would be entitled to have if they were full members of WEU.

Furthermore – and this matter is by no means a secondary one for the Assembly whose continued activities are now at stake – the Assembly is entitled to expect the Council at last to recognise the consequences of the reactivation of WEU for the Assembly budget. That is why plenty of time has been left for consideration of budgetary questions in spite of the adoption of a provisional, but wholly inadequate, budget for 1987. The promises received by the Assembly in 1986 and in recent months have provoked dissatisfaction with customary procedure for the supplementary budget that is essential. The slowness, ineffectiveness and humiliating nature of this procedure for the parliamentary side has made it intolerable.

The Presidential Committee subscribed wholly to the three principles defined by Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council: application in WEU of the growth rates accepted by our governments in the European Communities, establishment of a separate budget for pensions and recognition of the Assembly's freedom to manage its budget within the limits of the appropriations thus calculated. The Assembly therefore now expects the Council to apply, without delay, these new principles accepted by both sides. It cannot be satisfied with deferring for many months consideration of the very detailed requests it has been making for a long time now for reorganising the Office of the Clerk. It cannot continue its normal activities until the end of 1987 if this problem, to which it has constantly drawn the Council's attention, is not settled once and for all. Its operating budget is no longer enough for normal operations.

The second reason for convening this extraordinary session was that the Assembly had valid grounds for expecting that, at its ministerial meeting, the Council would tackle the major problems of the day, including the use of space, security in the Mediterranean and above all disarmament. While it has been able to give its views on the first two problems in recent

The President (continued)

debates, it has had far greater difficulty with the third.

Here, I must first pay a very special tribute to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and in particular its Chairman, Mr. Kittelmann, its Vice-Chairman, Mr. Cifarelli, who presided with great authority over the decisive meeting, and its Rapporteur, Mr. Amadei. They managed in the time available to obtain the adoption of the report on disarmament which is on the agenda for this session in spite of all the difficulties raised by the divisions of European public opinion on this essential question.

Since this report was adopted, two extremely important events have occurred which will give our debates and, I hope, the work of the Council a new dimension.

First, there was the visit by the Bureau of the Assembly to Moscow at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet from 6th to 11th April and its talks with the most senior Soviet leaders. I have had a note circulated so I do not need to dwell unduly on this visit and will refer here to only a few points.

First, it is underlined that, five years after the China of Deng Hsiao Ping, the Soviet Union of Mr. Gorbachev at last decided to establish links with an organised Western Europe and chose our Assembly as its first institutional European parliamentary interlocutor.

Why did it do so? I think several elements of an answer can be given to this question.

It should first be recalled that even and above all during our visit the Soviet press continually attacked WEU and its reactivation, accusing it of representing a new deployment of forces in Europe at a time when the Soviet Union and the United States seemed to be drawing close to a series of agreements on disarmament.

We know only too well that there are no grounds for such accusations and that neither our governments nor the Assembly have contemplated European deployment distinct from NATO. Our comments left no room for ambiguity about the vital importance we all attached to membership of the Atlantic Alliance, i.e. close co-operation with our American allies for everything relating to Europe's defence and security, and I have every reason to believe that on this point we were heard loud and clear and the Soviet side understood us.

I would emphasise that throughout its stay in the Soviet Union our delegation considered itself, because of the mandate it was given by the Presidential Committee, as representing the Assembly as a whole. Over and above the differ-

ences which animate our debates when we are in session, we were able, by speaking to the Soviet authorities with a single voice, to make them hear the voice of Europe, and there was no misunderstanding about this.

The way we were able to present our concern about the security of Europe at a time when the disarmament negotiations were taking a new turn certainly did not remain without response. What the Soviet authorities told us and the probable significance of their accusations against us is that they consider Western Europe to be strong enough to oppose, with some effectiveness, a Soviet-American agreement on disarmament.

A forthright explanation of our security requirements was certainly worth while, and the efforts of several of our governments, and our own, were not without avail. Mr. Gorbachev's speech in Prague gave the answer to several questions we had put in Moscow and which the persons we met could not yet answer.

This gives full meaning to the reactivation of WEU: insofar as our ministers tomorrow, like us today, are capable of expressing the views of Europeans on their security in terms that do not detract from the will of the United States and the Soviet Union to lower considerably the level of their nuclear weapons in Europe, we shall be heard. We already are heard by all concerned because both sides well know that an agreement on disarmament in Europe requires the support of Europeans.

It is just as significant to see the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, consult his NATO allies on the conclusions on disarmament they draw from the recent proposals made by the Soviet Union as it is to see the Soviet authorities invite the WEU Assembly to discuss these matters with it. There is a direct link between these two actions, and this link is acknowledgment of the political weight now carried by Europe in the international concert.

Europe is admittedly not yet a great power and the negotiations are being held without it. But everyone knows that henceforth it will have to be counted in if a disarmament agreement is to be implemented and, on both sides, efforts are being pursued to this end.

This twofold step places both the Assembly and the Council before their respective responsibilities. On the eve of the ministerial meeting, the Assembly would be failing in its vocation and duties if by a clear vote – however difficult this may be – it did not manage to express the view of the European public in face of the Soviet proposals. It should do so even more clearly since its debates during recent sessions have helped to throw light on the positions of all concerned with disarmament at the highest level.

The President (continued)

But no one would understand if tomorrow the Council does not express the views of the seven governments on a matter so vital for our joint security as disarmament. They readily pride themselves on being the hard core of Europe, and use this as a pretext for skating round the candidatures of Portugal and Spain. If they do not adopt a clear position, they will fully justify the recent remarks by the President of the European Commission, who accused WEU of concealing behind its claim to defence responsibilities a lack of government will to take decisions when these responsibilities have to be exercised.

Here we must be clear. The two aspects of this extraordinary session give it very specific significance. It shows that the Assembly has done everything in its power to promote the reactivation of WEU in such a way as at last to give Europe the means of expressing itself in security matters.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the whole world is awaiting the voice of Europe. After China, the Soviet Union is asking to hear it. The United States wanted to hear it in connection with the strategic defence initiative yesterday and, today, it wants to hear it when it is preparing a disarmament agreement. In one way or another, four of our European allies have asked to take part in the activities of WEU because they feel this to be the only way to participate in Europe's consideration of its security.

Tomorrow, it is for the Council to tell us whether this hope is to be vain or whether Europe is really determined to exist in defence questions. The Assembly for its part will have said all it could to the Council; it will have done everything it could. I personally, during the three years in which you have done me the honour of having me as President, have done everything I thought possible to convince public opinion of the need for a European defence policy and I am by no means exaggerating if I say that I have devoted most of my time and efforts to this end. I have also increased contacts with the Council, and in particular with those who have been chairmen-in-office in the last three years, to ensure that the reactivation of WEU moves from kind words to political action.

In this connection, I wish to convey my very special gratitude to the Luxembourg presidency and to Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom the Assembly has in the last ten months had an easy, pleasant relationship. It is thanks to them that we are meeting here today. It is to them, too, that we owe the introduction of a parliamentary practice, new in WEU, of having a minister always present throughout our sessions, empowered to speak in

our debates. And here I take the opportunity of paying a personal tribute to Mr. Goebbels and expressing all my gratitude to him. It is they, too, who, thanks to a procedure which is to be inaugurated tomorrow, have allowed the Assembly to provide the framework for the essential contact between the Council and the press at the close of the ministerial meeting.

I am also gratified to have enjoyed the fullest support and most loyal co-operation from my colleagues of all the political groups without exception. If the Assembly has been divided, which was natural, on major political matters, it has never been divided on the reactivation of WEU.

If tomorrow our hopes are to be dashed, we could no longer expect very much of the WEU Council. The only way out for the Assembly would then be to turn to other authorities, as Mr. Delors recently did, for Europe to exist in an area for which we are responsible. In a letter which he recently wrote to his Prime Minister, our colleague, Mr. De Decker, recalled that WEU could serve as a framework for the meeting of European heads of state or of government on defence questions. The Presidential Committee of the Assembly, informed of this approach, instructed the General Affairs Committee to report on this proposal at the next ordinary session and to examine ways and means of preparing a summit meeting on European security.

It is difficult for me to say more today. Our session, on the one hand, and the ministerial meeting, on the other, will each give an answer to the question we are all wondering about, that is to say, what part Europe intends to play in arrangements for its own defence.

The governments are henceforth inevitably faced with a pressing need: by assuming joint responsibility for defence, they must together attain the political maturity which is now essential for Europe, both for the success of the vast internal market in 1992 and for its place in international affairs.

May the voice of Europe now be heard by our governments, united and interdependent in WEU.

I am happy to congratulate you, ladies and gentlemen, on having allowed our Assembly, constantly and progressively, to make Europe's voice heard in the great East-West debate which directly concerns both European defence and disarmament directly.

We have managed to serve the cause of peace and security by asserting a European identity at world level.

Thank you, Assembly. Thank you all, my dear colleagues; you are all, we are all, Europeans of action.

7. Ministerial meeting of the Council

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1094)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have received a motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure signed by ten representatives concerning the ministerial meeting of the Council. The text is now being distributed to you. The vote on the adoption of urgent procedure will be taken when we have finished considering the report of the General Affairs Committee. Should the request for urgent procedure be approved, the vote by roll-call will be taken at the opening of the afternoon sitting.

8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session

(Doc. 1087)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session, Document 1087.

Are there any objections to the draft order of business?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

The Presidential Committee has asked the political groups for their help in organising our work and it has been suggested to them that they share out speaking time within total allocations proportionate to the numerical size of each political group so that we may allow the necessary time for representatives, the rapporteur and the chairman of the committee not forgetting, of course, that necessary for voting.

I would like to have proposals from the political groups as quickly as possible so that I can allocate speaking time. If it could be done during Mr. Ahrens's speech on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, at least for this morning's sitting, I would be grateful.

9. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part I: The reactivation of WEU

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1089 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part I: The reactivation of WEU and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1089 and amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The report I am now presenting on behalf of the General Affairs Committee is in some respects out of date and in several respects imperfect. Out of date, in particular, as regards the explanatory memorandum and imperfect primarily because it is a partial report only, since the Assembly had not been informed of the Council's activities when it was drawn up. This information was received only three days ago, on 24th April. I shall not be able to present the part of the report dealing with the Council's communication until the June part-session at the earliest and perhaps not before December. But my report is also imperfect because it is confined to aspects of the reactivation of WEU, which, ladies and gentlemen, appear to be little more than a side issue in view of the negotiations now being conducted between the superpowers on European security. We must therefore ask ourselves whether this report will be helpful in the present circumstances, whether it has any point, and whether the Assembly should not be considering quite different issues, such as a European position on the proposals put forward by General Secretary Gorbachev, which have paved the way for a range of negotiations that none of us had dreamt of a year ago.

So the question we must ask ourselves is this: should this parliamentary body, this Assembly, not be announcing here and now its opinion of the negotiations between the superpowers, in which decisions are being taken for us, but not with us, on our security, on the future of our children and our continent?

My question does not arise from any distrust of our American allies. Western Europe's security lies only in the alliance, and only the presence of the United States in Western Europe and its willingness to defend this part of our continent, if need be, as if it were its own territory ensures our freedom, even today. Nor do I see any reason to doubt our American allies' loyalty in the future. But my appeal to Western Europe to contribute more than it has done so far to the negotiations, which specifically concern the future of this part of the world, not only corresponds to Europe's self-image but is also what the Americans expect and want.

We know this from many discussions with our American counterparts, and we constantly read about it in the American press. For example, William Pfaff recently wrote in the *International Herald Tribune* that the West urgently needs more than one country which is prepared to lead, to think and to defend the values of our civilisation and our military security. So the Europeans are still explicitly required to make their own contribution to peace, freedom and the defence of human rights in the world.

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

Ladies and gentlemen, I would go even further. The North Atlantic Alliance will have permanent validity only when Europe becomes a self-confident and equal partner of the United States. We lack neither the opportunities nor the potential. Western Europe, with 320 million people, is a gigantic market which constantly stimulates innovation, and its science and research even now largely determine world development. In terms of potential, Western Europe need not fear comparison either with the United States and Japan, or with the Warsaw Pact and China. We in Europe do not lack opportunities and potential. What we lack is the political will to seize these opportunities in the interests of Europe and the world.

But this, ladies and gentlemen, brings us to the subject of my report. It concerns no more and no less than the improvement of the only instrument designed and suitable for the formulation of Europe's position on its defence and security. As I have already said, the explanatory memorandum in my report has been largely overtaken by events. The General Affairs Committee did not therefore discuss this explanatory memorandum further. It could not be up-dated, if only for technical and procedural reasons, for which I ask your indulgence.

The General Affairs Committee confined itself to discussing the text of the recommendation, concentrating on two aspects in particular: first, the proposal to establish a European security charter, and second, relations between WEU's two organs, the Council and the Assembly. The proposal to establish a European security charter, it seems to me, is the logical extension of French policy in recent years. I do not have the feeling that it has been agreed in detail with the allied governments, although there have been statements by other governments along the same lines.

Common to all these proposals is the demand for a stocktaking of Europe's efforts in the area of security policy so far, and for a reassessment in the light of recent political events in the world arena. The goal of these efforts cannot be to create a European army, for example, or to revive the idea of a European defence community. What is important is to formulate the Europeans' vision of their own security within the alliance. We shall be able to agree very quickly on the objective, which in my opinion is solely to achieve the maximum security with the minimum amount of troops and equipment, for both parts of Europe – I repeat, both parts. This objective must be pursued, the road to its achievement will be stony not only for the super-powers but for us too, and we shall undoubtedly have to discuss it in our Assembly as well.

The General Affairs Committee has been extremely critical of relations between the Council and the Assembly. I am surely not betraying any secrets when I say that the committee considerably intensified the draft report in this respect. Certainly, it is often not easy for the Council to comply with the reporting obligations imposed on it by the treaty. Its activities are long-term, constituting a political process which, by its nature, can lead to a final conclusion only over long periods of time. The Council's reporting obligation is therefore often bound to be restricted to reporting on the state of deliberations. It is rarely able to report on specific events. That is in the nature of things, and gives rise to no criticism. But what we cannot fail to criticise is that, as we see it, the Council very often evades or not infrequently delays an answer, or refuses to give one, on the grounds that the information is classified.

The Council's attitude often leads to the Assembly's fulfilling its own obligations imperfectly, or not at all. Hence the recurrent need for the Council's attitude to be publicly criticised. We shall also have to point out to our governments that they should not be talking about reactivating WEU unless they are prepared to develop relations between the Council and the Assembly and, in my view, to establish them at long last in accordance with the treaty.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the General Affairs Committee approved the report before you with one abstention, and on the committee's behalf I would ask you to approve it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Thirteen representatives have put down their names to speak. The distribution amongst the political groups seems to me fairly even so we shall allow each speaker about seven minutes.

Before calling the first speaker on the list, I call Mr. Cuco from the Spanish Delegation.

Mr. CUCO (*Observer from Spain*) (Translation). – First of all I wish to thank the Assembly of Western European Union for granting our parliamentary delegation this special and privileged opportunity to attend its proceedings. The Spanish Parliament was already represented at the Assembly's thirty-second ordinary session last December when our observers were able to attend a session that was of fundamental importance to Western European Union since it gave fresh impetus, just after the Reykjavik summit, to its revitalisation and enlargement, a development welcomed by the Spanish Government. The European security charter then suggested by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of the French Republic, aroused lively interest in all European members of the Atlantic Alliance and was, in my opinion, very

Mr. Cuco (continued)

favourably received. After attending that session we are very gratified today at the Assembly's decision to increase our delegation to twelve members and to extend its powers, thus enabling Spain to confirm – both as an ally and as a European nation – how interested it is in participating in such an important forum for European security as this Assembly.

At this extraordinary session, the Assembly is looking at the reactivation of WEU with Mr. Ahrens's report and its political analysis of what the European countries in the Atlantic Alliance should be doing. For that reason, the Spanish Parliament and consequently the Spanish Government take a very positive view of our presence here, given Spain's interest in a revitalised WEU.

There is a small coincidence highlighting Spain's interest in WEU and its reactivation. On 23rd October 1984 Mr. Felipe Gonzales, the Spanish Prime Minister, presented a report to the Spanish Cortes on a Spanish policy for peace and security. Item 6 in that report expressed the wish of our country to join Western European Union. On 29th October – a few days later – the Rome declaration on the reactivation of the organisation was signed. Spain is therefore following very closely and with great attention developments in the process on which WEU has embarked, with the intention of assisting in the creation of a real European security forum which, as Mr. Caro has very rightly stressed, must in no way constitute an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance but rather a buttress of the European pillar, which will also further the transatlantic dialogue. This "Europeanist" strengthening of our security policy has the construction of a real Europe as its goal, which explains why our interest in a reactivation of WEU is partly due to the fact that the way through political co-operation, EPC, does not seem possible at least at the moment. A more dynamic and forward-looking WEU, ready to take up the challenges to European security, is one in which I believe we Spaniards, with our firmly Europeanist persuasion, are interested. In that light, the Cahen doctrine applies perfectly to my country since it is a member of the European Communities and the Atlantic Alliance and seriously regards the security dimension as part and parcel of European construction. We satisfy all the required conditions.

The Spanish Government is currently involved in consultations within the alliance which are making good progress, with the object of finalising the details of Spain's contribution especially at military level, outside the integrated military command structure. This latter point will be covered more particularly by

co-ordination agreements between the Spanish high command and the allies and by our participation in allied planning in the Defence Planning Committee, DPC, in a manner similar but not identical to that of the integrated countries.

I would also like to draw attention to our participation in the Independent European Programme Group, IEPG, of which Spain currently holds the chair. Lastly, just as Spain accepts its commitments to its allies within the Atlantic Alliance I would like you to know that, when the time comes, we shall also live up to the future obligations of our participation in a redefined WEU and those set by Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.

To conclude, Mr. President, I would like to stress that the enlargement of WEU to include Spain – although I well understand that this is a subject requiring patience and thought – will be of value to both sides – to both Spain and the present seven members of WEU. In that connection, once again stressing this Assembly's interest in Spain, I feel it would be desirable for this to be repeated in other WEU bodies as well.

Ladies and gentlemen, we believe the reactivation of WEU is urgently necessary for the political and defence reasons given by Mr. Ahrens. We believe in it and hope that it comes to pass. We are in favour of this reactivation of the organisation and I can assure you that you can count on our co-operation in bringing it about.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Cuco. The Assembly very much appreciates your remarks.

I call Mr. Inan.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I simply wanted to inform this great Assembly that the Turkish Government has also applied for membership of Western European Union as mentioned in Part II of Mr. Ahrens's report. Perhaps this could have been said in your introduction. You referred to four countries showing their interest in one way or another: we have done so in the plainest fashion Mr. President. I just wanted to make that point; ours is a formal application.

What is more – and what a coincidence this is, Mr. President – the European Communities are today considering Turkey's application for membership of the EEC. So this will be a twofold commitment to Europe on Turkey's part. What is more, our application with regard to defence, to join WEU that is, went in twenty-four hours before that concerning economic integration, i.e. to join the EEC.

Those of my colleagues present here today are well aware of Turkey's contribution to the

Mr. Inan (continued)

defence of the western world over the last forty years. After the United States, we have the second biggest army for the defence of the West in the Atlantic Alliance – 800 000 strong – and we find it inconceivable for Europe – economic Europe or defence Europe – to be constructed without Turkey. Our geographic situation itself is evidence enough. We share 37% of our frontier line with Warsaw Pact countries and we are in a region that is vital not just for the West but for the world as a whole.

It was in that context that I wished to put these views to the Assembly and I hope that in the future we shall be included among the privileged, not that I infer that we should have preferential privileges: what we want is not a Europe of the privileged but a Europe of Europeans.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Inan, for your loyal support.

I call Mr. Budtz, observer from Denmark.

Mr. BUDTZ (*Observer from Denmark*). – I am very honoured to be given the floor. I would just say that we always like to participate as observers. We have a special problem in Denmark which it might be a good idea to present to you – namely that if Denmark should one day decide to ask for membership of this distinguished organisation, we might be forced to change our constitution, so if only for that reason it is a very difficult problem. There are many other problems linked to the possible – or not possible – membership of my country, but this is not the right time to discuss them of course. We are very happy, however, to be able to follow the deliberations of this organisation and we thank you warmly for your often-repeated invitation for us to send observers. Thank you very much Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Budtz, and also your colleagues from Denmark, for following our debates so assiduously.

The debate is open.

I call the first speaker on the list, Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, you may perhaps allow me a few extra minutes as Mr. Gianotti does not appear to be here, which means that of two speakers on the list one will not be speaking. I shall, however, try to keep within the time-limit so that fellow members do not complain.

Saying first that we can give our support, I wish to add a few points concerning the recommendation drafted by Mr. Ahrens whom I con-

gratulate on his work. I can say at once that we agree that the report he presented this morning needs to be brought up to date, because of subsequent international events of recent date and first among these the new stage in the disarmament negotiations.

It also seems to us however that the overall line taken in the report and the draft recommendation represents an open position calling in particular for comment on a number of fundamental questions. For example, I should like to stress that, independently of the drafting of a European security charter, it is no longer possible to postpone the need for closer co-operation in Europe on security and defence, particularly in the light of the Reykjavik meeting and the subsequent developments in the present negotiations between the United States and the USSR on disarmament.

Europe's security requirements must be affirmed and safeguarded within the alliance and, at the same time, more active participation by the European countries in the negotiations must be sought, especially on the zero option; in our view this is essential in order to promote a fresh concept of security in Europe and throughout the world. By this we mean the concept that security involves a combination of relationships, guarantees, agreements and controls effective for all parties, replacing the old concept of unilateral security guaranteeing oneself only and based therefore on weapons and their power. Our view is that if security is reduced, this is the case for everyone; if it is guaranteed it can and must be so for everyone. We have not found all this in the draft recommendation but it is true that the reactivation of WEU, seen as a problem of the moment, is set in the context of international relations leading up to substantial reductions in nuclear and conventional weapons.

Endorsing the need for an agreement between the United States and the USSR, the position taken on the policy of deterrence is based on the ultimate deterrent and this is very close to our own view. Again, the need for Europe to play a bigger part in security emerges from paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation proper and is correctly linked in paragraph 1(b) to the alliance's obligations regarding the European pillar.

A large part of both the report and the draft recommendation is devoted to the reactivation of WEU. Mr. Ahrens has spoken at length on this subject this morning. The reactivation of WEU is certainly being achieved through our political capacity and the capacity of our member countries, their governments and parliaments but the rôle of Western European Union is undoubtedly very important and is becoming more so with each day that passes. Implementation of the decisions taken in Rome in 1984 involves greater

Mr. Antoni (continued)

co-operation in the joint production of armaments and the enlargement of WEU to include member countries of the alliance and Spain and Portugal in particular. Paragraph 2(a) of the draft recommendation takes this line asking that the political committee on European security be kept in the framework of WEU; paragraph 2(b) refers to enlargement while the remaining clauses deal with important individual points.

In view also of what Mr. Caro said at the beginning of this extraordinary session, we feel that the draft recommendation is still topical. What still remains to be stressed I take from the remarks made by Mr. Ahrens this morning and by the President in his speech. Mr. Ahrens said that what is lacking is the political will. At the end of his speech Mr. Caro said that we must together achieve the political maturity that Europe needs. This in our opinion is the crux of the matter. Europe seems to be too divided, with many uncertainties and just as much insecurity. It is our hope that through our debate this morning on the draft recommendation and on Mr. Amadei's recommendation today, common-sense will prevail and a plan for peace and progress will emerge.

Mr. Ahrens's updated report may therefore point the way in that direction for our work in this Assembly and that is my hope.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, this debate on the excellent report of Mr. Ahrens is extremely timely and I hope it may have historic dimensions. There are just four main subjects which I wish to raise: the possible enlargement of WEU, the collocation of the Council, the Assembly and the specialist agencies, the work of WEU in arms collaboration and possible co-operation with the IEPG, and, last but not least, the potential rôle of our organisation in evolving for Europe a strategy for the military application of space technology.

However, at the outset I think we should realise what we are not. We do not represent all of Europe, all of free Europe, we do not even represent all the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Europe. There are seven others who are very important and some of them have sent delegates here. We should not allocate to ourselves a rôle in the field of arms control and related disarmament questions that are properly the function of NATO. But that said, there is an urgent need for our enlargement and I do most earnestly hope that the Council will now give a favourable response to the official requests to join from such countries as Spain, Portugal and Turkey. It is, I think, vital for the long-term

future of our organisation that the response be favourable.

Secondly, on collocation, it is very necessary for the best use of our resources that all the bodies of WEU be located in the same place. Now, some people would wish that place to be here and Luxembourg has great merit, not least in its facilities and in the hospitality which it has accorded to this special Assembly. Others would wish the place to be Brussels, but were Brussels to be chosen, I am sure that the independence and vigour of our organisation would be subsumed by the proximity to NATO and to the headquarters of the EEC and I think it would be a mistake to be Brussels. No, the place must be either Paris or London, and in my judgment it must be London, because London has a County Hall, the seat of the Greater London Council which could in one building house all the bodies necessary: the specialist agencies, the Assembly – in a very excellent hemicycle – and also of course the Council, and I feel that the United Kingdom which has a maritime dimension could bring to the work of WEU the importance of sea power and of course an Atlantic dimension also which is crucial.

Then, the IEPG should, I think, on a regular basis, report to this Assembly to give this Assembly an account of its work. It should not be an impossible task. A declassified account could be given at each part-session and in that way, I think, a constituency for European collaboration in the arms field could be built up among elected representatives of national parliaments, and that would be a very great step forward.

Finally, Mr. President, in the space field which is the field in which my own Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions is particularly active, it is essential for Europe to co-ordinate an effective military space strategy and for that purpose I would suggest that ministers who attend the Council of the European Space Agency in Paris should ex officio join their defence minister and foreign minister colleagues on the Council of WEU whenever space matters are to be debated. We know that the European Space Agency's charter forbids the European Space Agency itself to have a function for military space technology, but nevertheless it is important, if Europeans' resources in the space field are to be effectively harnessed for our common security, that those ministers who are involved with ESA's work should be at hand to advise WEU whenever space comes up.

If those four questions can be addressed, I think we shall have made progress as a result of this Assembly, but I would urge one final word of caution, Mr. President, and that is that if we do not enlarge WEU, there is a real risk of creating a Europe "à deux vitesses" in the security field. It

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

would be very great shame if WEU as an organisation of seven members were to make progress but that the cost of that progress were to leave further behind the other seven important members of NATO who are not at present members of our organisation and the way to avoid that is to encourage them and welcome them within our fold.

Thank you Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Clearly, after this statement by our colleague and friend, Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions I, as Rapporteur for space, was bound to give my full support to the proposals he has just made regarding the future course of our work and the changes this may require to our structure. I would also like to endorse the wish expressed by all speakers that WEU should be open house to new partners with a natural rôle to play in tackling the security problems of the defence of Europe.

But you will not object, I hope, if I revert to the basic problems formulated by Mr. Ahrens our Rapporteur and join in your satisfaction both at the quality of the report and at the general approval already reached in committee – at which we cannot fail to be pleased – and surely also that of this Assembly that I expect will be forthcoming this morning. I would like to do three things: recall France's attachment to the reactivation of WEU, point out what has already been achieved since then and lastly suggest some lines of action for the future.

Firstly, France has long been hoping for this revitalisation of WEU. France was a prime mover in the reactivation of the organisation that was decided in 1984 and had us all solidly behind it when we met in Italy. Today we are continuing with our efforts to put life into the organisation, as demonstrated by the statement by Mr. Chirac, the French Prime Minister, in Paris last December and the clear commitment to WEU that was manifest in his words. I feel too that public opinion in each of our countries is always very important. There is general approval – I think we can say so in France – going beyond the traditional political frontiers for the commitment to a more dynamic development of WEU and its responsibilities.

Secondly, reactivation has already made considerable progress. As you recalled a moment ago, Mr. President, since October 1984 we have been able to push ahead with a number of concrete projects: adoption of the Rome declaration by the Council of Ministers of the Seven, acti-

vation of the Council of Ministers, its enlargement to include the defence ministers, creation of a real secretariat-general for the organisation with the necessary resources and improved relations between the Council and the Assembly. You have rightly pointed out, Mr. Rapporteur, that this is a field in which much remains to be done and I hope that we may take further steps in that direction at this extraordinary session. There has also been the replacement of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee by three new specialised agencies. There are still many points to be settled but that will be part of our Assembly's new powers to stimulate action.

Lastly there is the attraction that WEU seems to have for other countries. This is no doubt a positive reaction to the efforts that have been made but it is still a pleasure to welcome the interest shown by Portugal, Spain and, more recently, Greece and Turkey in our own efforts. It is through dialogue, I hope, that we shall tighten our links with countries which are interested observers today and may be fully-fledged partners tomorrow. Europe needs them.

Thirdly, the agreement binding the seven member countries of the organisation together today should be formalised by an official act as the French Prime Minister proposed last December. Work is currently proceeding on the text as you know and with your permission I will remind you of some of the main principles on which it could be based.

Nuclear deterrence still remains the only effective means of preventing war in Europe. The threat to Western Europe has to be regarded in its entirety. For the deterrent to be effective in Europe there have to be strategic links between the two sides of the Atlantic which means that American forces have to be maintained on the old continent. European defence forces, too, have to be maintained at a level which matches the threat. On this point, the contribution of the French and British independent nuclear capabilities is essential. The object of disarmament has to be to strengthen security at lower levels of armament by realistic and verifiable agreements.

Ultimately, our discussions this morning and this afternoon are already very closely interrelated.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to make it clear at this point that I feel I can speak on behalf of the representatives of my country on this matter. We cannot be other than pleased that this defence effort is apparently becoming better organised and that all our countries' contributions are better co-ordinated and consequently more effective. In terms of arma-

Mr. Valleix (continued)

ments and the strategic approach, of course, a vast amount remains to be done and we shall need to show once again, this very day, our unity in a world of changing defence problems. This should be an opportunity to strengthen the alliance between us, not the reverse. This is the only responsible way to respond to proposals which should represent a chance of peace for the world provided the way is through the consolidation of Europe and not its disunion.

May I conclude, Mr. President, by expressing two wishes. On the occasion of this basic report on European defence policy my first hope is that we shall interest public opinion increasingly in the recognition – and consequently the acceptance of the responsibility that this implies – of the fact that democracy and freedom have to be defended, if necessary, by force of arms. My second hope is that, ultimately, our action may be conducted in such a way that Europe will become the third world power. That is what it is also trying to become on the economic front but Europe also needs to do so in terms of democracy and freedom, if necessary by mobilising its defence capabilities. So you see the connection between getting the support of public opinion and this climb to the rank of third world power, without prejudice of course to the western entente.

Mr. Rapporteur, Mr. President, I think that this report adds further strength to the basic principles which should enable us to work in that direction so that Europe becomes as determined in its defence policy as in its will for unity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Ahrens has submitted a very balanced and excellent report. Nor need this assessment be amended in view of Mr. Ahrens's self-critical comments on what his report did not or could not achieve. We need a European initiative, and this report is an important contribution, an important step in the right direction.

I agree with Mr. Wilkinson about the importance of such areas as space technology and space research and their possible applications. To bring London into play as the seat is undoubtedly not a bad move when it comes to possible new locations for institutions. But I think we should consider this carefully, since I can imagine that there are many possible locations in Europe, and it might be a good idea to choose somewhere where the sun shines more than it does in London.

Apart from that, we should realise that the European nations must continue resolutely down

the road of détente, which they first took in the 1970s, in order to make a major contribution to defusing the East-West conflict.

What we are discussing here today – and we should admit this to ourselves and others – is our failure to foresee the dramatic nature of developments in the Soviet Union under Mr. Gorbachev. I believe the present Soviet leadership is so keen to modernise the country because it realises that unless it reorganises its own system it will not be able to stay the course, let alone win the contest between the social systems. We must, however, consciously ask ourselves: is the Soviet Union becoming more receptive to co-operation and more predictable as a partner? This applies without reservation, and must be examined against the background of our view that the efforts to achieve disarmament and arms control are essential to the maintenance of peace in Europe and the world. What should not, of course, be overlooked in these efforts is that Europe's security must not be jeopardised. But – and let us also remember this – nuclear deterrence cannot prevent war for ever.

The proposal from our French colleague for a European security charter gives us social democrats the opportunity of considering and defining the conditions for European security once again, and discussing them with our American friends. I do not share the view that the reactivation of WEU we are hoping for might jeopardise the unity of the Atlantic Alliance. The premise we social democrats adopt is that the Federal Republic forms an integral part, politically and militarily, of the European Community and NATO. There is no question about that as far as we are concerned. But we take the view that the reactivation of WEU can achieve something that means a great deal to us: it can ensure that the formulation of objectives in the alliance is more closely geared to the efforts of sovereign contracting parties, and that greater account is taken of the vital interests of individual members and of the security interests of all partners in the alliance's formulation of objectives.

Reactivation with the object of clearly defining European security interests and of allocating to the Western Europeans an independent rôle in the alliance so that their interests in the areas of defence and détente are recognised is an approach that meets with our critical approval.

Let me conclude by saying that no one underestimates the difficulties, no one will underestimate the efforts that will have to be made. But our goal must not be overlooked in the process: it is an established and forward-looking co-operation between East and West which – and I should like to emphasise this once again – enables the two systems to compete peacefully, without the use of force, so that in both alliances

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

demands for reforms are possible, aimed at reaching new agreements on security. We still want Western Europe's political rôle to be strengthened; we want to see it asserting itself as a political force.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, in contributing to this debate on the reactivation of Western European Union, I do so from the point of view of the need for the Council, as the Rapporteur rightly points out, to inform public opinion of all its activities in accordance with the principles set out in the Rome declaration. At the same time, as I have emphasised in the British House of Commons, there is also a need for publicity to be given to the support for this organisation displayed by governments as well as to the achievements of the Assembly in terms of the benefits to European citizens. Throughout the current parliament, I have had the privilege of being a United Kingdom delegate to Western European Union. Since that appointment by the Prime Minister, I have gained an insight into its work and I hope that I have, at least in some small measure, contributed to its progress.

Mr. President, I made clear in my maiden speech to this Assembly and on subsequent occasions my commitment to freedom and democracy. Thus, to be a member of the Assembly of Western European Union has given me an opportunity to broaden that commitment. WEU, with its basis in the Brussels Treaty, aims to preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty and, being concerned with defence and security issues, it has provided substantial benefits in helping to ensure peace and co-operation. But whatever the results of the deliberations of the Assembly of Western European Union, however relevant the reports may be to the lives of ordinary people, whatever the decisions made by the Council of Ministers, the fact remains that little in the way of reference is made to them and consequently little in the way of knowledge is gained by the public. During the period of reactivation of Western European Union, which, it is intended, will ensure that it becomes the European pillar of the NATO alliance, the value of the Council initiating opportunities to draw attention to the activities of Western European Union is manifestly apparent. However, in parallel, the onus must also be upon this Assembly to take similar action.

Mr. President, George Bernard Shaw, who lived in mid-Hertfordshire, once declared he knows nothing and he thinks he knows every-

thing. That points clearly to a political career. As Shaw predates my representation of the area that cannot be said to have been directed at me unless prophecy was intended. However, I now know something about Western European Union, although I realise that I cannot know quite everything. Perhaps I should leave unspoken what that means about a political career.

Mr. President, so that others may know something about Western European Union too, we should support the Rapporteur and the draft recommendation and emphasise the importance of acting without delay on the document entitled WEU and public awareness.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – We have just heard the report so excellently presented by Mr. Ahrens. He referred to the reactivation of WEU; the term previously used was revitalisation but I do not think any semantic dispute is involved. The world changes and every time some major event takes place, public opinion rediscovers the importance of security and defence questions. I believe that the revival of WEU that we have been witnessing for several years now definitely fits into the framework of recent events with their certainties and uncertainties which require forums for wide-ranging discussions. I have already spoken several times about the reactivation or revitalisation of WEU, saying that, though the intentions were boldly announced much less has been achieved by way of results.

After the speech by Mr. Valleix I would nevertheless like to say a word about the French proposals. It might be thought, from a rapid perusal of the report and the draft recommendation, that these French proposals and recommendations only go back to 1986. Like Mr. Valleix, I wish to make it clear that they are in fact part of a continuous process and that it was as early as December 1981 that Mr. Lemoine, then Secretary of State, spoke to this Assembly followed by Ministers Hernu and Cheysson, not forgetting Mr. Mauroy the Prime Minister of course, who gave a reception for all members of the Assembly in order to transmit a message very similar to what the present Prime Minister had to say in December 1986. So they all make a continuous series of initiatives and proposals to which much thought was given after the events that had occurred, in 1979 in particular, and I think that, as far as our common will to strengthen the European dimension of our joint security is concerned, we are all very much agreed.

There was our Rome declaration of 1984. Here, Mr. President, I undertook the useful exercise of re-reading it because everybody keeps referring to it. There are resounding titles of this kind,

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

ready-made words or phrases that keep coming up like the words of a litany. I re-read it to see whether the intentions stated by the Council of Ministers in 1984 and the objectives of the declaration had any relation to things as they really are today. Better use of WEU, harmonisation of views on the specific conditions of security in Europe – who could not have agreed?

In the declaration there was a part devoted to reform of the institutions of WEU, a whole section concerning the activation of the Council, a chapter on relations between the Council and the Assembly in which it was said, among other things, that the Assembly would have the use of contributions from WEU's technical agencies, a complete section on the future of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee with, in particular, a paragraph which stressed that WEU should be in a position to play an active rôle in providing political impetus by supporting all co-operative efforts including those of the Independent European Programme Group and the Conference of National Armaments Directors and lastly a brief but important section dealing with contacts with non-member states. So having re-read this document, Mr. President, and having compared the scale of its ambitions and objectives with the real situation today I think we have to take stock – as Mr. Ahrens's report so excellently invites us to do.

With regard to the originality and specific nature of WEU compared with the other European organisations we are all agreed: in terms of its organisations, Europe is a many-sided entity and I do not think it is any good imagining that security questions can at present be dealt with in depth in the framework of the Community. To my mind, therefore, these issues will for a very long time remain largely excluded from political co-operation among the Twelve – at least in the framework of the EEC.

I therefore welcome the presence of the observers who are present today in greater number than ever before. Whether they come from member states of the Community or elsewhere their presence is a clear indication of what is at stake in the reactivation of WEU, a development which I would like to liken to the new approach to the Community's institutional problems following the European Council's meeting in Milan.

Ultimately, successful reactivation may perhaps make WEU superfluous but for the moment we are all talking about it; there is not a single speech made in this Assembly which does not at some stage or other refer to WEU reactivation. The term is now rooted in our minds. We are all convinced but it must not, in the reality of

things, be reduced to the words of a litany. There are positive aspects however: I would not like to let it be thought that the Rome declaration has been without effect.

The ministers are now in the habit of meeting more regularly and consulting with the representatives of the Assembly. The new agencies have been set up and are beginning, though it has taken a very long time, to function. Even though there have been no big changes to the Assembly because of the diet of budgetary austerity we have had to live on, it has experienced a fresh surge – more vigorous than in previous years – of activity and I would even say has gained in prestige. But, as Mr. Ahrens points out in his report, there have been various difficulties in the way of implementing the principles proclaimed in Rome and I must say, for the ears of the representatives of the ministers and the ministers themselves present here today, that the governments have done everything they could to cover up these difficulties. To my mind such concealment is not a positive factor.

I would also add that, whilst it is clear that an effort has been made in certain fields, no particularly convincing results have been achieved in any of them. I would like to refer more particularly to the work of the agencies because, though something may sometimes happen in them, we are the last to be told, if at all, which is rather regrettable.

Nothing has been done either by the Council or the renovated SAC to promote co-operation on armaments and scientific co-operation. I feel this to be disturbing even though we can understand the reasons for the hold-up. I referred a moment ago to the problem of the Independent European Programme Group because there it has to be recognised that the Council today has gone backwards from the Rome declaration, a point I stress and deplore.

I will close, Mr. President, because you have asked us to be brief. When I last spoke – it was on the same subject – I referred to the Council's "amiable lethargy". The phrase was perhaps cruel but I have no wish to repeat it exactly. The presence of the observers and the applications that have been filed to join WEU are incentives for the Council of Ministers and all of us to make WEU a place that is something more, if I may say so, than a mere forum where the European countries in the Atlantic Alliance can gather or a security appendage of the European Communities but instead a source of political impetus for the defence and security of Europe. It was important, to my mind, to recall this point. The divide separating the Council of Ministers and its activities from our Assembly is still too wide but I would say that there has been some improvement due largely, without a doubt, to the personal efforts of the Chairman-in-Office of the

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

Council of Ministers. Progress has been made in this field. I am gratified that this should be so and I hope that it will continue in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I, as leader of our delegation, thank your President, Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, whose untiring activity and inexhaustible energy have so well defended the cause of WEU in its extended phase of reanimation – I use the term in its medical sense of course.

I trust that the hopes he has placed in the Luxembourg chairmanship will prove warranted. Kindly allow me two comments. First, the advantage of a very small nation is that it is listened to without suspicion – or at least with not as much suspicion – by its more powerful partners who can be in no doubt about the European character of our Grand Duchy, whose name is so intimately linked with all the European institutions. At the last ordinary session in Paris last December the Chairman-in-Office was represented by someone from Luxembourg from beginning to end of the proceedings. In turn, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Defence Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs all addressed the Assembly and replied to representatives' questions. In that way the Chairman-in-Office has demonstrated and is still demonstrating – even though Mr. Goebbels is absent for a few moments – the firm wish of the Council to be in direct dialogue with the Assembly that has, for many years, been asking for closer and more fruitful relations with the Council on whose actions the future of WEU will ultimately depend.

Second, the psychological shock triggered by the Soviet Union's hyperactivity seeking to eliminate missiles in Europe, seriously complicate relations between Europe and America and undermine the foundations of the Atlantic Alliance, has ultimately played into WEU's hands because its political rôle in the security of Western Europe has gained new importance, or so I hope, which should bring about the reactivation we want so much. Given the lack of progress in the integration of European security at Community level – where political and economic co-operation has advanced – it is essential and logical for WEU to put this vital question on its agenda. These two reasons explain why this extraordinary session decided upon in Paris is being held today in Luxembourg.

As regards Mr. Ahrens's report, despite the remarks he made a few moments ago, his very objective study deserves our warmest congratula-

tions. I shall confine myself to a few problems concerned with priorities.

First the budget. The problem of finance, essential for an institution to function properly, has long been on the Assembly's agenda and is regularly the occasion of harsh criticism of the Council. The rule followed by the Chairman-in-Office is to apply to the budget of the WEU Council and Assembly the same norms as those laid down by the budgetary experts of the Twelve for "all estimates of the Community institutions". The annual growth rate of expenditure would thus be kept within the maximum growth in budgetary spending as calculated by the Brussels Commission each year. In addition, under the terms of the agreement negotiated with the Council, the Assembly would itself have the right to decide financial policy for the coming year within that growth rate. I hope that this procedure put forward by the Chairman-in-Office will be applied by the partners.

With regard to structures, the creation of a political committee on European security consisting of the political directors of the foreign affairs ministers of the Seven together with senior officials from the defence ministries is evidence of the will of the Council to promote the reactivation of WEU. This political committee, which is responsible for evaluating the threat and how to respond to it, will meet periodically but emergency meetings could also be held as and when necessary. This would create links with NATO and the Europe of the Twelve, which has no powers with regard to defence. As the Secretary-General of WEU has to attend these meetings, the Assembly is entitled to be informed by the Council about the work done by this committee.

As regards the structures of the agencies and of the Independent European Programme Group for co-operation in weapon systems and for industrial co-operation among Europeans, might it not be useful to set up a study and analysis centre within WEU in order to improve co-operation in technology and research? In certain cases, our partners in the Atlantic Alliance might even be included in sharing the work.

With regard to the European security charter proposed by Mr. Chirac, the first problem – nuclear deterrence – is on our agenda for this afternoon.

The point about the possible participation of countries that are members of the Community and of NATO but not of WEU in the European security charter is, in a way, a first step towards the enlargement of WEU. Would not such enlargement, by stages, and over a reasonable period, act as a kind of supercharger in the reactivation of WEU?

Mr. Burger (continued)

Opinions on that problem differ in the Assembly and in the Council. Those against want the structures and operation of WEU to be modified first and those for think the organisation would gain in credibility and above all be more representative of Europe if it spoke for a larger number of countries.

It must be remembered that the Chairman-in-Office informs allies outside WEU of the results of each ministerial meeting at a briefing in Luxembourg and in a report to the NATO Council. As members of the General Affairs Committee, we have had discussions of value to both sides in several countries. Personally, and the Chairman-in-Office agrees, I consider that we should deal expeditiously with the Portuguese and Spanish applications for membership, convinced as we are of the additional strength these members of the Community and NATO will bring to European security.

In conclusion, let me say, firstly, that the reactivation of WEU ought not to arouse the animosity of our transatlantic allies because its purpose is to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and, secondly, that the security of Europe is guaranteed to the year 2000 by the Atlantic Alliance and the enlarged WEU. I am well aware that a dictatorship which proposes, commands and disposes, is in a position of advantage by comparison with a democratic institution of seven member countries. I nevertheless put my trust in the wisdom of the Council and await with some impatience Mr. Poos's report tomorrow afternoon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – In my remarks I wish to return to the two main points that Karl Ahrens made during the course of his introduction of the report. He made the point that the two main themes to come out of this report were first the question of future relationships between the Council and this Assembly and second, if I understood him correctly, that the objective of the charter which this report calls upon us to study, and calls upon the Council to study, should be – and I quote him – “maximum security with minimum of weaponry and men”. Very important words. In fact so important in my opinion that it would be useful if somehow in a future text they were to be incorporated because they are very relevant to the present situation – more so than ever before.

But I want first of all to comment on one particular aspect of the question of relations between the Council and this Assembly which has arisen in recent times and which some colleagues will

know that I raised this morning. It is an aspect which is of direct relevance to the present political situation that WEU and others have to contend with during the course of the negotiations and the open political discussions taking place on the future of arms control and arms reduction, in particular nuclear arms reduction. I was very concerned – and I make no apologies for raising this very important matter – to read in a leading newspaper in the United Kingdom, on 23rd April, an interview with the Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. Alfred Cahen, who will be addressing us during our session. I was very concerned to read a number of statements which very seriously, if correctly reported as I believe they have been, pre-empt political discussion and decision by this Assembly and indeed by the Council of Ministers. I shall quote some of the statements, just one or two of them. I should say that the report opens as follows – and this is by John Lichfield, West Europe editor of *The Independent*, a highly-respected and, I believe, genuinely independent newspaper. It opens by saying: “Britain and its six partners in the Western European Union will attempt next week to agree a common strategy for resisting the denuclearisation of Europe.”

I leave aside a lot of the text and we go on to see a reference in the report to Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU who “said yesterday” – it does not say to whom he said it, presumably to Mr. John Lichfield – “that he believed the Seven (Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux trio) would reaffirm their commitment to a nuclear aspect in the defence of Western Europe.” He went on to say a number of options would be considered this week by this Assembly presumably and by the ministers. A number of options would be considered including the possibility of keeping a number of short-range missiles on either side of the iron curtain. Further on he said that all, I quote carefully, “all seven members agreed”, not might agree, “agreed that nuclear weapons must continue to play a substantial rôle in the defence of Western Europe. It is accepted that the NATO doctrine of a flexible response to a military threat must be preserved,” and I add that among other things what is referred to as flexible response is the possibility of first nuclear strike should armed conflict break out in Europe.

I will not quote further and you will notice, Mr. President, that I have so far not commented on the merits or demerits of the point of view being expressed. I may come to that later if time permits, but I do want to say this in connection with the relations between the Council and this Assembly. No civil servant, and certainly not the Secretary-General, has the right to go to any section of the media, to anyone, and start making political statements, major political statements of that kind before we have debated the

Mr. Freeson (continued)

issues and before even the ministers have debated the issues.

I put it to you, Mr. President – and I hope that all colleagues, whatever point of view they may have on these matters, will agree – that you make very clear inquiries on our behalf as parliamentarians in this Assembly as to who the Secretary-General was speaking for, on what authority, and who arranged that kind of briefing which I imagine was also given to other senior defence and political correspondents in the media. If we cannot sort out such things, all our talk about constructive relationships being built between our parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Ministers becomes no more than continuing rhetoric.

Now, if I have time, I want to deal briefly with the other theme which Karl Ahrens rightly stressed – the objective of the charter should be maximum security for Western Europe with minimum of weaponry and men. I turn in that connection to only one part of the text. We are all, I believe, going to support this report and its recommendation, but I want to express one reservation or anxiety about the text and then I will sit down. Sub-paragraph 1(a) says quite properly that the study of the French Government's proposals for a charter should be undertaken with a view, and I quote, "to defining Europe's security requirements, acquainting its American allies with them and ensuring that current negotiations on the limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons lead to substantial reductions without compromising Europe's security". Absolutely correct and so far as I am concerned the full stop could go in on that sentence there. But then it concludes with "based on a policy of deterrence". At face value one might argue about the use of the word deterrence literally, but at face value that does not have much political significance but we all know that it could have.

Let me put it this way, Mr. President. If that reference is coded language for maintaining as a long-term strategic objective whatever we may reluctantly have to accept in our time now and maybe had to accept reluctantly over the last forty years, if that is coded language for the indefinite continuation of so-called nuclear deterrence, then there is one delegate here who does not accept that phraseology. And I think there are many others who will agree that if it means nuclear deterrence we do not accept it. We believe our objective must be to move away from what we have hoped to be reluctant acceptance, whether rightly or wrongly, reluctant acceptance of nuclear weapons these last forty years, to move away when the opportunity presents itself, as it appears to be now, to a negotiating position to relieve our continent and

hopefully the world of this most serious of threats to mankind. On that understanding there is no objection to the text. But if it does mean a continuation of nuclear deterrence, then let there be no misunderstanding about it, there will be many others who will continue to campaign and to challenge that concept. Let not Western Europe, or to put it frankly, let not the British and the French Governments become the Molotov of the future. Remember the famous phrase "Niet, niet, niet". Not for us. Let there be "Yes, yes, yes" to an end to this threat to mankind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Sanden.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin by congratulating the Rapporteur, Mr. Ahrens, on this first part of a report that he has called out of date. I think it is a sound, excellent piece of work, but that there should indeed be a follow-up which we can discuss in greater depth. Mr. President, without prejudice to the unity within NATO, which is after all the cornerstone of peace and security in the world and therefore in Europe, one of the main issues in Mr. Ahrens's report is the proposal from the French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, that a European security charter should be drawn up. On 2nd December 1986 Mr. Chirac said in this Assembly, and I quote: "... the time has come for us to agree to give this activity the political inspiration it still lacks." That, Mr. President, was after Reykjavik but before the developments of recent months, the most important of which was the meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shultz. Obviously, we are now asking ourselves what the Council has done with Mr. Chirac's proposal. If a security charter had already existed, what significance would it have had for the consultations that took place in Brussels immediately after the discussions in Moscow?

But perhaps even more pressing is the question: what has the Council of Ministers of Western European Union been doing since Moscow? Or perhaps – I do not know if the Rapporteur has the answer to this – the Council's meeting here in Luxembourg tomorrow, 28th April, will be the first opportunity the ministers have had to consider European security since the discussions in Moscow. There should surely have been consultations within Western European Union, within NATO, before 23rd April, the day on which the negotiations in Geneva were resumed.

Mr. President, during the developments we have witnessed in recent months some very important decisions affecting Europe will clearly have been taken, and I do not need to remind you that considerable emphasis was placed in the European capitals on the importance for Western

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

European Union of the progress made in Moscow. I recall the statements by Mr. Poos, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister and current Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and by Mr. Tindemans. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Minister, has also spoken of this. But I was thinking very specifically of the Soviet Union, where, as you recalled, Mr. President, and you were there, a very unexpected interest was taken in Western European Union. The visit to Moscow by the WEU delegation speaks volumes, I feel, at this stage in relations between East and West. I should like to make special mention of a statement made by one of those I have just mentioned, the statement by Mr. Tindemans at the conference of the European Movement in Paris on 12th or 13th April, I think it was. Mr. Tindemans said on that occasion: "WEU is the only forum available at present to tackle the problems of European defence. Even so I would prefer to be able to include the defence dimension in the Twelve's work". But Mr. Tindemans clearly emphasised that WEU is in fact the only instrument we have at the moment for European defence.

Mr. President, the problem of the zero option for medium-range weapons should, of course, be combined with the problems connected with short-range weapons and also, as Mr. Ahrens's report points out, with the problems relating to chemical weapons. I certainly do not want to go into this in depth now, because the main point I want to make in this Assembly today is that, as stated in Mr. Ahrens's report, disarmament is of the utmost importance because Europe's security, which has now been guaranteed for forty years, must continue to be maintained in terms of the greatest possible security with a minimum of weapons, as Mr. Freeson has just said.

Then there is a second question, Mr. President: how do we now get the Western European Union countries and the other European NATO countries to agree? I realise that the Americans call the tune in consultations within NATO. I also realise that there has to be a consensus there, but the heart of the European security philosophy must surely lie where Europe has its own structure – a parliamentary structure – and that is here in this WEU Assembly.

Mr. President, I should like to put the following question to the Rapporteur today: does he believe that we in Western European Union, and by that I mean both the Council of Ministers and the Assembly, still have time, following the rapid developments of recent months, to study Mr. Chirac's proposals at our leisure, with a view to drawing up a European security charter? Would it not be far better, and perhaps wiser too, to urge Western European Union's Council of Ministers

to look very closely at Mr. Gorbachev's proposals in the coming weeks, and to call on the Council of Ministers itself rather than the Permanent Council in London to safeguard Europe's very considerable interest in security? Do we then, I ask the Rapporteur, need a European charter? I do not think Mr. Ahrens and I disagree that the delay in the reactivation of WEU, the Council's inadequate communication with the Assembly, in short the lack of vigour and pace for which the Council of Ministers is responsible, have had an adverse effect on and even restricted major opportunities for Western European Union in recent international events.

Mr. President, my proposition today – and I should like to hear whether the Rapporteur agrees with me – is that the establishment of a European security charter must not be seen as an excuse for once again postponing the day when Europe speaks with one voice on security matters. In international politics too there are sometimes very important opportunities that do not present themselves every year. When an opportunity of this kind arises, it must be seized with both hands.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall be very brief. Mr. President, you like all of us are aware of the vital importance of the problem of arms limitation and the search for disarmament without endangering European security. Mr. Gorbachev's vigorous and sometimes off-the-cuff policy of making offers does not allow time for necessary thought on the extent and scope of each response by the foreign and defence policies of the WEU countries, all the European countries and all the countries united in western defence policy. This policy of making offers, Mr. President, is surprising seen against many decades when the usual reply was "niet" during a past which we all want to forget and have forgotten. In more and more cases, the United States is responding to this astute policy by equally off-the-cuff moves. This modifies the generally-held ideas which are put into words by one of our permanent committees. This has happened with Mr. Ahrens's report which the speaker, with becoming modesty, says could be improved, not as regards the work which has been put into it which is undoubtedly remarkable but because of the swiftly-changing circumstances which render virtually every assumption out of date overnight.

The need to prevent a chemical armaments race is stressed in the recommendations submitted to the Council of Ministers in the text now before the Assembly. The same text mentions the United States proposal to the USSR that Soviet experts be present to witness the des-

Mr. Martino (continued)

truction of chemical weapons held in United States arsenals. And we should be seeking now to have this invitation extended to our countries because such a move would appear to be a direct preparatory step on the way to any agreement for the elimination of chemical weapons by all civilised nations of the world now that the biotechnological developments of our scientific age are apparently uncontrollable.

My request is a matter of urgency, Mr. President, because, while it is understandably difficult or even impossible for us to be included in the negotiations between the two superpowers, it is on the contrary quite possible that our nations should take part as experts in the application of measures which we hope will, in the fairly near future, remove from the world this threat to the survival of mankind which is second only to the nuclear threat.

Thank you, Mr. President, because I am convinced that through your unflinching understanding and thoughtful efforts it may or will be possible for us to take a direct part in the building of peace on the ruins of our very human fears.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Linster.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – To my mind, Mr. Ahrens's report, which Mr. Wilkinson has described as historic and Mr. Valleix as fundamental, is a perfect illustration of the old French saying to the effect that without the right to criticise there can be no sincere praise. Mr. Ahrens is completely even-handed in his distribution of bad and good marks to the Council. As a Luxembourg representative I obviously welcome the latter, particularly those addressed to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

If, Mr. President, I were to dwell on all the good features I find in this very detailed and impartial report which combines rare heights of political thinking with consistent accuracy in the concrete data on which it is built I am very much afraid that all my speaking time would go in congratulations. Let me just say that both in form and substance, Mr. Ahrens's indictment of the Council is an ideal example of what the rôle, position and importance of the Assembly should be.

It is certainly not without good reason that the General Affairs Committee criticises – with the qualifications that Mr. Ahrens has added in his address – the way the Council clings to its traditional questioning of the Assembly's exercise of the powers it is given by Article IX of the treaty and refuses to apply in our regard all the principles or all the hopes contained in the Rome

declaration. Parliamentary participation in the political reactivation of WEU is undermined by the Council's attitude towards the Assembly that is doubly restrictive, firstly in its information policy and secondly, as President Caro has just pointed out, in its budgetary policy.

All of which hardly enables us to play the part of a second political power, which since 1954 is what the amended Brussels Treaty intended this Assembly to be and that is greatly to be regretted.

I said, Mr. President, that Mr. Ahrens was even-handed in his award of bad and good marks. So you will find it natural for a Luxembourg socialist deputy to note with pleasure certain points made in favour of the Council by the Rapporteur and other speakers, particularly as regards the efforts of the Chairman-in-Office and the Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whose great understanding of the work and importance of our Assembly tribute has already been paid by President Caro and other speakers. In this connection I appreciate in particular the remarks made by Mr. Valleix and Mr. Bassinet.

With regard to the resources that the Assembly should be given, this is something we shall be returning to tomorrow in the debate on the budget but today, in the political context of the problem, I feel it is important to stress straight away, as President Caro did this morning, that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the President of the Assembly and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are in complete agreement on this matter – as expressed, incidentally, in a draft resolution approved by that committee this morning. Here I would express the wish, in the most formal terms and with the utmost vigour, that the ministers will hear our message and accordingly agree, tomorrow, to follow Mr. Poos along the road he proposes towards a workable solution for the Assembly's long-standing budgetary troubles; a permanent solution here would be a vital step towards parliamentary political participation in the reactivation of WEU.

Mr. Ahrens is also perfectly right to my mind to welcome, among other things, the Council decision at its Luxembourg meeting in November 1986 that the meeting of political directors of foreign ministries assisted by senior officials from defence ministries should be of an official, binding and regular nature. This seems to me a tool of the most vital importance particularly since, as the Council's reply to Recommendation 438 and an earlier verbal statement by Mr. Poos make abundantly clear, "the Assembly is to be informed of the results of the meetings".

I would also like to endorse the Rapporteur's oral presentation though I would add that, in my

Mr. Linster (continued)

opinion, Mr. Ahrens's report is not, in substance, invalidated by the two series of proposals Mr. Gorbachev has made regarding what the media call the zero and super zero options. I would just like to add this: in my opinion, certain European governments should bear in mind that, in this connection, insisting on something better could definitely leave us worse off, which is why I am very pleased to hear that an amendment has been tabled to paragraph 2(c) of the recommendation to the effect that disarmament should be added to the subjects of co-operation. This stems logically from paragraph (v) of the preamble to the recommendation we are now considering. I would like to round off what I have just said on a personal note by adding that, being myself unconvinced of the usefulness or even logic of nuclear deterrence, I hope that the whole of the draft recommendation will be revised on the basis of conventional defence rather than deterrence.

To conclude I would like to voice one further concern. With the formation of an unavowed, secret even, but nevertheless real security policy axis linking Paris, Bonn and London, are we small countries not right to nurse the same fear in WEU as WEU itself has with regard to the United States, namely that of being left out of account and not even consulted in any reasonable way in the decisions of the bigger countries? It is in that context, and for that reason among others that I plead very strongly – and I do so as Mr. Bassinet has just done on behalf of the Socialist Group – for the effective and speedy application of paragraph 2(b) of the recommendation, in other words the enlargement of WEU to the countries which have a right to take a full part in our work, which want to do so, and which can produce the necessary democratic guarantees to join our ranks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – You will not be surprised, ladies and gentlemen if, on behalf of the Liberal Group, I join in the congratulations offered to Mr. Ahrens for his excellent report and to the whole General Affairs Committee for its work under the chairmanship of Mr. Close. I really feel, Mr. Ahrens, that your report strikes exactly the right note at the point we have reached today in the history of WEU's development and in the implementation of the concept of the defence of Europe by Europeans themselves. I think you are right to insist on two essential points. In the preamble I would single out paragraph (v) which considers that the search for disarmament or the limitation of armaments is essential for the maintenance of peace and should continue to be given priority; but you

add, and I feel this to be vital, that this search must not jeopardise the security of Europe.

I think that here we are at the heart of the problem. Europe today has its back to the wall under the bombardment of denuclearisation and disarmament proposals from the East after so many years and decades of refusing to talk whilst constantly increasing its military capability. I really believe we cannot accept much longer that meetings attended solely by the United States and the Soviet Union should discuss the security of our continent. The United States and the Soviet Union discuss our security without our being present. Admittedly we are consulted before hand but there ought to be a far deeper involvement on our part. After all, while it is natural for the discussion to be between the Russians and the Americans because it is their arms they are talking about, the question we have to answer is why the weapons that ensure our security are almost exclusively American; fortunately France and the United Kingdom have their own.

So I think, Mr. Ahrens that, in this context, you are right in your criticism of the Council of Ministers. I feel that WEU has greatly changed in three years and that we are ready and waiting to perform a far more important rôle, thanks in particular to our President, Mr. Caro, and to the untiring efforts, since the revitalisation of WEU, of Mr. Cahen, the Secretary-General, whose dynamic activity deserves mention and whose stands on behalf of the organisation, though also in defence of the governments of our countries, must cause us great satisfaction.

But whilst we are ready and waiting, I feel we need – in order to go ahead at this point – to discuss things at a European summit which is why I would like to return to the proposal I made following those of Mr. Delors and which you were kind enough to mention, Mr. President, in your address. I know that my proposal could not be dealt with in this report because it came too late to be included in the work of your committee but I really think that, for a European summit on the concept of security to stand a chance and for the debate, decision-making and creation of awareness at such a summit to be successful, the summit must be attended by the heads of state and government of the seven member countries of WEU, possibly enlarged to include countries that have applied to join WEU.

The truth is that if we were to confine the summit to the framework of the European Economic Community we would be taking an historic risk and making a complete mistake. It would obviously be impossible to arrive at a result or a concrete decision in the presence of our Irish friends who are neutral, Denmark that is not prepared for any discussion of nuclear problems and the Greeks, who, for the moment,

Mr. De Decker (continued)

have a foreign policy which leaves a big question mark about whether they are closer to the Warsaw Pact or to the Atlantic Alliance. Frankly, since they insist on dissociating themselves from the positions of the Atlantic Alliance it would be difficult to arrive at a decision on defence policy in the Twelve, in an organisation which requires unanimous agreement on every issue.

That is why I am glad that, on the suggestion of the President, the General Affairs Committee has agreed to study my proposal and I hope, for the sake of peace, that this proposal I put forward in all modesty on behalf of the Liberal Group will one day materialise and that we shall have some serious thinking about disarmament, though without prejudice to the security of our continent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the last speaker, Mr. Bayülken, observer from Turkey.

Mr. BAYÜLKEN (*Observer from Turkey*). – Mr. President, as I take the floor for the first time in this important body, allow me to say how happy and gratified I am to be in the midst of this important Assembly. My association with the work of Western European Union goes to the days of the 1960s when I had the honour to represent my country as Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Later on, in assuming other responsibilities, I had the honour to expound the use of important words: the rôle of Europe in the defence of the free world. So, Mr. President, it is with special feeling and happiness that I represent the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the Assembly of Western European Union today.

I would like to endorse what my colleague, Mr. Inan, said when he spoke this morning, that the Grand National Assembly and, in fact, all the Turkish political parties as well as Turkish public opinion attach a great importance to the work and the rôle of Western European Union. In fact, Turkish public opinion appreciates what WEU is doing and feels that its rôle should be emphasised and increased and, as you know, Sir, just a few days ago the Turkish Government made an official request to become a full member of Western European Union. I feel that through the work of this Assembly and through the addition of new members, including my country, Turkey, the rôle of this body in defining and emphasising the defence of Western Europe will be much better illustrated.

With these words, Mr. President, I would like to conclude my remarks by saying that I compliment Mr. Ahrens on his excellent report and I shall subscribe to the views that he expressed in it. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Bayülken. Let me say, on behalf of the Assembly, how much I appreciate the participation of observers in our discussions. I am therefore pleased to call Mr. Katsaros once again, our colleague from Greece.

Mr. KATSAROS (*Observer from Greece*). – In connection with Mr. Ahrens's excellent report, I should point out that the need to bring fresh vigour to Western European Union and expand its rôle is uncontested. In the light of this consideration Greece has formally expressed its interest in being a member of Western European Union. Greece is a member of NATO. Its armed forces are assigned to the alliance integrated command. Its defence expenditure, higher than all of the other allies, represents 7% of the country's gross national product. Most important is that it is a member of the European Economic Community and European political co-operation in which the political and economic aspects of security are being discussed. I hope and trust that the Seven will keep this in mind in considering how legitimate and reasonable is the interest of certain countries in acceding to Western European Union. May I add that a renewed Western Europe could and should play a decisive rôle in reviving the talks of arms control and disarmament. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by thanking you for your kind words about the report I have submitted. I should like to pass on much of this appreciation to the secretariat and also express my gratitude for the close co-operation in committee. You will understand, Mr. President, that I cannot take up everything that every speaker has said. I will just comment on a few remarks.

Mr. Antoni suggested that the vote should be deferred and the report revised once again. I do not think we should do this. What the actual operational part of the report says is still topical and should, in my opinion, be voted on by the Assembly today.

The subject of enlargement was generally discussed, and all the speakers who referred to it were in favour. It is surely no surprise that this was also essentially true of the observers, whom I should also like to thank very sincerely for their interest. Their participation in our proceedings, ladies and gentlemen, in fact shows that our organisation's standing in the outside world cannot be so bad. Sometimes we who work in this organisation may suffer more from this than is realised outside. It has been said that this Assembly, this organisation must be an open

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

house, open to other partners, and I share this view and feel that it is high time that a decision was taken in particular on the request Portugal made to join years ago. I see from the report of the Council of Ministers, however, that no more can be said about enlargement today than was said in the last report and the one before that.

Several representatives have referred to the need for the public to be better informed about our work. I would go even further and say that the public should be better informed about Europe's defence and security. It is the way of the world that many of our fellow citizens in Europe have never personally, thank God, had to experience a time when freedom was threatened. But I believe it is all the more important to point out again and again that peace cannot be taken for granted and that it will not be possible to take freedom for granted either.

I also feel we must talk more about the efforts we are making to preserve peace and freedom. We should not be content to say that Europe has been successfully kept free from conflict and the freedom of at least one half of our continent has been ensured: we must provide more information on our contribution in this respect.

Reference was made to the co-operation between the Council and the Assembly, and I am genuinely concerned – viewing the situation from the Assembly's point of view – that, if we continue to be inadequately informed, the Assembly will be unable to do what it is there for, according to the treaty. We are supposed to be a second organ of this organisation, and I feel we should be put in a position to act as such.

One quite frequent question is whether the Communities would not be the place to discuss security policy. There are undoubtedly many connections, and a clear dividing line certainly cannot be drawn. But I believe it is more appropriate for security policy questions to be discussed in WEU, enlarged, if you like, to include the countries which meet the requirements for accession and have applied to join, than in the European Community. For one thing, the Community already has enough problems to solve, and I do not have the impression that it is being particularly successful or making particularly rapid progress in solving these problems. For another, I feel that the tasks of this organisation are such that its existence would be threatened or questioned if co-operation in the area of security policy were also to be handed over to the Community. It has in any case already been said that Ireland, as a neutral country, naturally adopts a different position.

I completely agree with what Mr. Burger and Mr. Linster said about co-operation between the

smaller and the larger member states. I would say the same about the Council of Europe. I am very glad that we have in Europe countries that carry different weight and can represent different positions and that the smaller countries can sometimes afford to reflect on certain things more than the larger countries, where the politicians are called upon to take action straight away. I must stress that at the last part-session in Paris I also welcomed the fact that your minister took part in the whole debate on these issues.

Mr. Freeson referred to the Secretary-General's statement to the press. I cannot say anything about this. The Secretary-General will be here tomorrow afternoon. I would just like to recall one thing in this context. For years this Assembly has been calling for a political Secretary-General, and I feel that if that is what we want, we should not take it amiss if he continues to be a politician. I am not familiar with the interview. We should ask him about it tomorrow. I will do no more than recall the demand the Assembly went on making for years.

The question is, after all, and I will conclude with this, Mr. President, the question is, do we have enough time left? I very often doubt whether we really have any time left to ensure that Europe's voice is heard, and I do not think that the aim at the moment should be to issue statements and declarations which are polished and balanced and thought out down to the last detail. A German politician in the last century once said that the art of politics – I am quoting him rather freely – is not to draw up major programmes and always to have well-founded plans. The art of politics is to know when the cloak of history is swirling through the room and to grasp a corner of it. Mr. President, the cloak of history may also be passing through this chamber.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the acting Chairman of the committee.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President it would be ungracious of me to add anything to what has been said apart from joining the unanimous chorus of praise for Mr. Ahrens's excellent report and I would like to congratulate him personally and on behalf of the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Chairman. I think your remarks express the feeling that is very widely shared by this Assembly.

Two amendments have been tabled by Mr. Bassinet. We shall consider first Amendment 2 and then Amendment 1. They read as follows:

2. In paragraph (*i*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the proposal made by the Prime Minister of France on 2nd

The President (continued)

December 1986 to draw up a European security charter provides" and insert "the proposals by the French Government, and particularly the one to draw up a European security charter, provide".

1. At the end of paragraph 2 (f) of the draft recommendation proper, add:

"(1) for this purpose, by instructing the Secretary-General to play an active part in organising the first course and to promote the formation of an association of former participants of which he would ensure the secretariat; (2) by asking the French institute to invite Spain and Portugal to send participants to this course;"

To save time, Mr. Bassinet, could you speak to your two amendments at the same time?

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – With pleasure, Mr. President. Briefly, on Amendment 2, I recalled a moment ago during my address that there had been several French initiatives. There is no need to single out one more than any other and since, moreover, it would be unreasonable to list them all in the recommendation, I propose this wording which ought, it seems to me, to satisfy everyone.

The second amendment is simply an attempt to refine one of the proposals in the recommendation by stressing the importance that an association of ex-students would have since the courses are organised by the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale as part of the process of co-operation – which we advocate and which, for my part, I had previously recommended several times in this Assembly – between the various institutions of Western European Union. Incidentally, I think it is also important that we should invite Spain and Portugal to send students. To my mind that would be fully in line with their applications to join WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The committee has not, of course, had an opportunity to consider these amendments. I think I can say, with the Chairman's agreement, that the amendments comply with the general tenor of the report and recommend that they be adopted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Ahrens. We shall now vote on Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Bassinet, on which the committee has expressed a favourable opinion.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Does anyone request a vote by roll-call?...

No. We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is agreed to¹.

10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 2.45 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Ministerial meeting of the Council (Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1094).
2. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations, Document 1090 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.)

¹. See page 11.

SECOND SITTING

Monday, 27th April 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
Speaker (points of order): Mr. Hardy, the President.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Ministerial meeting of the Council (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure; debate and vote on the motion for a recommendation*, Doc. 1094).
Speakers: Mr. Hardy (point of order), the President, Mr. Goerens, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Goerens, Dr. Miller (explanation of vote).
4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations*, Doc. 1090 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Amadei (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Antoni, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Bordu, Mr. Martino, Dr. Miller, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Burger, Mr. Fourré, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Close, Mr. De Beer, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Amadei (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman of the committee*), Sir Frederic Bennett (point of order), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Amadei, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Amadei, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Hardy (point of order), Mr. Wilkinson, Dr. Miller, Mr. Amadei, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Amadei, Mr. de Beer (point of order), Mr. Scheer, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Kittelmann; (point of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord Hughes, Mr. Klejdzinski; Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Amadei, Mr. Wilkinson, Dr. Miller, Mr. Amadei, Mr. Goerens (point of order), Mr. Fourré, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Scheer, Lord Mackie (point of order), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Klejdzinski; (explanation of vote): Mr. Irmer, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Dr. Miller.
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 2.55 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – You will recall the last Assembly and that a motion to refer Mr. Amadei's report back to committee was carried. It was then established that that motion should not have been accepted because it was in breach of the rules of the Assembly. The rules make it absolutely clear that reference back can be moved only after the rapporteur has presented the report and the debate has commenced. On that occasion, Mr. Amadei had not even begun to present his report.

Now that was made clear. A number of my colleagues saw you, Mr. President, and that was clearly established as a breach of rule. I was therefore astonished to learn that despite the breach of rule the report was still referred back to the committee. I am not a member of that com-

mittee, otherwise I would have had a fair amount to say about it, because I do think it was a slack interpretation of rules which does not do the Assembly good service because I believe the rules of the Assembly have to be observed. Once the rule had been established and made clear, then it should have been observed in full. I would like your observations on that.

My second point touches upon the reporting of the deliberations of the Assembly. I have spoken to you and to Mr. Moulias about this; I did so with yourself once in Strasbourg and with Mr. Moulias twice in Strasbourg. I listened to the Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, address the Assembly and I was listening to the English interpretation and I and other people heard Mr. Chirac – according to the interpretation – announce that France would increase defence expenditure by 20%. I heard it beyond all doubt and I quoted that remark in a speech I made the following week. Other people may have heard it in other languages; I heard it very clearly in English and I want to say, Mr. President, that I am deeply annoyed and deeply concerned when people tell me that I did not hear what I know I heard and what I know I quoted. There can be no doubt that that figure was used in English.

Now, I would have been happier if people had said the figure had been wrongly interpreted, but I did not know it had been wrongly interpreted. I am prepared to accept that it may have been.

1. See page 16.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

However, I spoke to Mr. Moulias in Strasbourg and, as he will recall, in our first conversation Mr. Moulias said that people are entitled to change their speeches. I then saw you, Mr. President, and Mr. Moulias and said that I was deeply concerned because – whether there was a mistranslation or not – we do need to have rules in this Assembly which ensure that speeches are an accurate report of what is said. There needs to be a system by which this can be checked and it is quite obvious that there is not a system which allows a proper check to be made.

Now, I do not want to be accused of disrupting the Assembly, but I must tell you, Mr. President, bearing in mind the failure to accept that the movement of the reference back was out of order and is contrary to the rules, and bearing in mind that it is impossible to establish what was actually said and what was not said by the speaker, then there do seem to me to be grounds for serious concern about the effectiveness of the operation of this Assembly.

Now those two points of order, Mr. President, are very serious matters. I hope they are going to receive very serious consideration because it is not enough for people to tell me that things I heard were not said. I know that they were said; I am not prepared to accept that they were not and I hope that we can establish the facts of this matter. But more important, I hope we can see that the rules are so established that this sort of absurd situation can never be repeated.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I note your two points of order, Mr. Hardy. On the first, I believe there was no opposition on the part of the Assembly, even if, as you say, the Rapporteur had not yet spoken. I can assure you I shall check carefully what happened. I in no way question what you say, and if the Rules of Procedure have been misapplied I shall make an official statement to that effect. In any event your remarks will be noted to ensure that such a mistake cannot happen again. I can only repeat to you and the Assembly that, casting my mind back to the time in question, the Assembly did not query the propriety of voting on this motion for referral, and the matter seemed to have been dispatched without any procedural problem. That does not mean that the Rules of Procedure can be circumvented, and I promise you a conclusive and public answer on this question.

With regard to the Prime Minister's statements which prompted your request for explanations, the Presidential Committee having taken due note of your letter which was circulated to all members of the Presidential Committee and the relevant information having been obtained by the administration from the Prime Minister's office, you will be aware that the reply confirmed

the figures inserted by the Prime Minister into the text he had circulated to Assembly members. The only way to avoid queries of this kind would be to tape all addresses so that we could, whenever necessary, check points like the one you raised. I shall ask the administration whether the financial resources available to the Assembly would extend to acquiring such means of verification, but, once again, the matter has been dealt with by the means we have to hand. We have no other facilities for conducting the full enquiry you have asked for.

In the light of these replies and the effort I undertake to make to provide Mr. Hardy with as much information as possible, I consider that these two points are for the time being closed.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Ministerial meeting of the Council

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure; debate and vote on the motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1094)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As I informed you, the orders of the day call for examination of the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation concerning the ministerial meeting of the Council, Document 1094. In accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure this request has been tabled by the requisite minimum number of ten representatives or substitutes and the document was distributed at this morning's sitting.

As required by the Rules of Procedure, I shall now ask the Assembly to consider the request for urgent procedure. I shall call one speaker, Mr. Goerens, to support the motion and another, if available, to oppose it.

I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – There is some merit in the motion, but we have certain views about amendments which we regard as necessary. Could you advise us what the procedure is in regard to the possibility of amending that particular document?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – With regard to the amendment procedure, I refer to Rule 29(2) of the Rules of Procedure:

“Amendments tabled in writing and signed by their author shall be distributed without delay. No amendment shall be proposed and put to the vote in the Assembly if it has not been tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting preceding that at which it is considered. In the case of the first sitting, this time-limit shall end with the opening of the sitting.”

I am very sorry, Mr. Hardy, but this article prevents my accepting your amendment as the text of the motion was distributed this morning whereas your amendment should properly have been tabled before the start of this sitting. What you could do, and this is only a suggestion, is to make a statement which will appear in the official report.

I call Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me a few moments. The authors of the motion for a recommendation which you have before you urge the Council to make known its collegiate point of view on Mr. Gorbachev's proposals through the intermediary of its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, in his statement to the Assembly on Tuesday, 28th April 1987. The recommendation further urges the Council to instruct its Chairman-in-Office to give the Council's point of view on the Soviet proposals at the meetings of the North Atlantic Council to be held on 11th and 12th June 1987.

My purpose in speaking is not to go into the substance of the questions posed by the recommendation before you but to prove its urgent nature, so that it can be included in the orders of the day for this session. Consideration of the contents of this text leaves no doubt as to its urgency. The Council's Chairman-in-Office is requested to make known to the Assembly tomorrow at the conclusion of the ministerial meeting the views of our governments on Mr. Gorbachev's disarmament proposals and then to communicate these views to the North Atlantic Council.

Clearly this recommendation would be pointless if not adopted today, as it calls for action which must be taken tomorrow and will even be initiated this evening at the meeting of the defence ministers.

I must also emphasise that this recommendation in no way affects or prejudices the vote to be taken this afternoon on Mr. Amadei's report on disarmament. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has prepared a report which examines the issues in depth and considers the various aspects of disarmament as the

situation now stands. On the other hand, the motion for a recommendation which I am proposing is concerned not with disarmament itself but solely with the orders of the day for tomorrow's ministerial meeting.

In its report the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments naturally makes no reference to the ministerial meeting, at least in this connection, as the event which gave rise to the motion for a recommendation submitted to you by the members of the Presidential Committee is basically the approach made to America's NATO partners by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, on his return from Moscow.

We are aware that in NATO the services concerned are currently studying the contents of the Soviet proposals passed on to them by Mr. Shultz. The present question is whether or not the ministers of defence and foreign affairs should meet in WEU to consider issues which are simultaneously being examined by NATO. This question was raised yesterday by the Assembly's Presidential Committee, and two objections were raised to urgent procedure for this motion for a recommendation.

The first objection was on the point of whether or not consultation within WEU should precede the necessary co-ordination within NATO. It seems to me that the doctrine which our Assembly has defended throughout its existence and which the Council expressed in the Rome declaration bears precisely on this point. If we wish the voice of Europe to be heard and heeded in the political arena, this must occur before NATO's positions are finalised. It is because NATO's ministerial meeting is to take place in June and because NATO is already studying Mr. Gorbachev's proposals that the WEU Council should address itself to the matter this evening.

The second objection arose from the fact that it is Mr. Gorbachev himself who has confronted the West with a kind of ultimatum by demanding that it should reply very quickly to his disarmament proposals.

The truth is that these proposals are naturally going to give rise to long negotiations and do not of themselves demand such a speedy response. There is therefore no reason why the West should comply with Mr. Gorbachev's demands on the subject. Clearly, these proposals demand prolonged thought and in-depth study before a reply is given. It was certainly not the intention of the authors of this motion for a recommendation to ask governments to take immediate and inadequately considered action to satisfy the wishes of Mr. Gorbachev. What is urgent is not the reply but that our seven governments should bend their efforts to working out a European attitude to Mr. Gorbachev's disarmament pro-

Mr. Goerens (continued)

posals. It is not so much disarmament as Europe's involvement which is at issue here. If you vote for urgent procedure we will shortly be able to discuss the contents of the motion for a recommendation, and, if you so wish, its terms may be amended. Anyway, this particular objection is no longer valid in view of the interpretation of the Rules of Procedure just given by the President.

What I now ask is that you vote in favour of urgent procedure, because it is vital if our Assembly is to exert influence on the Council meeting starting this evening. By doing this, you will give proper weight to the Assembly's rôle and justify holding this extraordinary session to coincide with the meeting of the Council of Ministers so as to facilitate an immediate exchange of views between the Council and the Assembly. If you fail to vote for urgent procedure, you nullify the central reason for holding this extraordinary session.

Finally I must point out that, with a single exception, the reservations expressed at the meeting of the Presidential Committee yesterday evening did not imply their authors' refusal to support the request for urgent procedure, and I therefore have great confidence in appealing to you to vote in favour.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy to speak against the request for urgent procedure.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I am speaking against, Mr. President, as a response to your ruling of a few moments ago, since we really did not have time actually to present manuscript amendments and, indeed, I think we can almost say that we have seen a commendable development: the rules of the Assembly being introduced and applied with a speed which has never before been experienced. It is an unparalleled example of progress, so I suppose we should be grateful.

The reason for my seeking to move amendments to this, Mr. President, is simply because the motion as it stands seems to be rather ungracious and somewhat grudging. I do not believe that Europe should be ungracious and grudging in response to the proposals from the United States and the Soviet Union. I believe that Western Europe would be regarded as both hypocritical and irresponsible if it did not welcome that reduction of tension, that possibility of removal of nuclear weapons, that prospect of the disappearance of some categories of nuclear weapons within a short time. I believe that we would be regarded as hypocritical if we were to take that view, not least because reference has already been made in debates today to the report

in one new but important British newspaper, *The Independent*, when the Secretary-General refers to the fact – in fact uses the words: “This is our own zero-zero proposal of six years ago. Why should we change our minds today?” Now, if we find an international agreement which appears to be embodying that which this Assembly called for six years ago, we would and do look rather foolish if we cannot even offer it a welcome.

I think at the same time we are entitled to say that the Americans should understand that Western Europe has its own security needs and for that reason I do not depart from the view that Western Europe must exercise its own independent judgment. But in the exercise of that independent judgment I think it would be remarkably foolish and, as I said, hypocritical if we could not recognise the need to offer a welcome for that which we appear to have been calling for ourselves over a long period. And because there is no reference to a welcome, because Europe appears to be almost frightened of the developments rather than seeking to take such wise political initiatives as will build upon the prospect of peace which these proposals can provide, we wish to make amendments.

The amendments themselves would not have been absolutely dramatic. For example, the revised text would read: “Welcoming proposals by the United States and the Soviet Union for nuclear disarmament, calls for co-ordinated action by the Atlantic Alliance”. And in the fourth paragraph, in the first of the two paragraphs in which we urge the Council to take action, we would merely have inserted three words to the first of those two paragraphs so that it would read: “To make known to this Assembly”. Because, unfortunately, over the recent years this Assembly is not always made fully aware of the views and decisions of the Council of Ministers and on a matter of this kind this Assembly ought to have the information which is, of course, of such enormous importance to the security and to political life in all our member states, and indeed in the rest of the western alliance.

So it is rather unfortunate that this breach of rules, or this failure to observe a rule which we had not previously known about, should have prevented the Assembly from considering words which I believe would have improved and enhanced, strengthened and made more sensible the motion which has been tabled in good faith, but which could have been rather better than it will now appear.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly has listened carefully to your remarks, but under the Rules of Procedure I can now only put to the Assembly the request for urgent procedure on which we shall vote by roll-call.

The President (continued)

Has everybody signed the attendance register?...

The sitting is adjourned for five minutes.

(The sitting was suspended at 3.20 p.m. and resumed at 3.25 p.m.)

In accordance with Rule 43(6) of the Rules of Procedure, we shall now vote by roll-call on the request for urgent procedure.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows:

Number of votes cast	52
Ayes	52
Noes	0
Abstentions	0

The request for urgent procedure is agreed to unanimously.

Ladies and gentlemen, the orders of the day, as amended, now call for a debate on the motion for a recommendation on the ministerial meeting of the Council for which urgent procedure has been adopted. We have heard the speakers. Do they wish to speak again?...

I call Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, you have just voted for urgent procedure to debate the motion for a recommendation which I now propose. However, I wish to say a few words about the contents of the recommendation on which you will shortly be voting.

I must stress first of all that it is addressed directly to the Council as a constituted body. Its purpose is to make clear the specific rôle of the WEU Council, which differs, at least in terms of powers, from that of the ministerial institutions of the Twelve and from that of NATO by virtue of its specifically European character. By its Rome declaration the Council gave notice that it was the forum where Europeans discussed among themselves questions affecting their security. Who would deny that Mr. Gorbachev's proposals fall within the Council's terms of reference? Like it or not, these proposals are now central to the problems of European security, and the responses to them in coming months will decide how European security is assured over the next few decades. The part to be played by

nuclear weapons in the system ensuring our security is now at issue. As a result, the extent of the effort we should make to establish a relative balance in the conventional sphere is a problem still far from solution.

The motion for a recommendation is straightforward, and the first paragraph of the preamble clearly assigns to the Atlantic Alliance the responsibility of replying to Mr. Gorbachev's multiple disarmament proposals. There is not the least intention of substituting WEU for NATO in this or any other field. The purpose is to define what the position of Western European Union can and should be.

Members of the Council and government officials often criticise the Assembly for urging the Council to do more than it can and to take decisions beyond its competence. However, this motion for a recommendation is well inside the limits. What it asks of the Council is that it should not stand aside but should exercise its rights and exchange government views on questions as crucial to European security as those constantly posed by Mr. Gorbachev over the last fifteen months and those the Soviet authorities invited our Presidential Committee to go to discuss in Moscow or those raised twice recently in Mr. Gorbachev's speeches in Prague on 9th April last and in the discussions he had with Mr. Shultz the following week.

I need hardly say that the presence of our delegation in Moscow as these new proposals were made public inevitably fired our interest in these problems.

The third paragraph of the preamble makes clear the not unimportant point that examination of disarmament problems by the Europeans does not call in question our relations with the United States. We all recall how in February 1985 the American Government let our own governments know it did not wish the WEU Council to concern itself with disarmament, which the United States Government proposed to treat, if not entirely exclusively, at least as an area reserved to itself for the duration of the Geneva negotiations.

Now, on the contrary, we have the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, briefing NATO on Mr. Gorbachev's proposals and asking the European allies for their views. This must remove any concern that we might cause serious displeasure to our American allies. It was indeed they who informed the European members of the alliance of the state of their negotiations with the USSR and made it known that they would not pursue these negotiations if their allies did not wish them to do so, at least as far as Euromissiles were concerned.

It is with due regard for these three factors that our motion for a recommendation urges the

1. See page 17.

Mr. Goerens (continued)

Council to take two actions which appear obvious if an initial, unstated premise is assumed: the first essential is, of course, that the Council address itself effectively to the disarmament problem before decisions are taken in NATO, and, if we accept that Western European Union is properly concerned, however limited its competence in the matter, with defence issues, it follows that the Council should direct its attention to the disarmament question before NATO takes any decision.

The meeting of ministers taking place this evening provides both the means and the obligation to do this. This is the basis of the two paragraphs of the recommendation: if the Council addresses itself effectively to the disarmament question, will it brief the Assembly on the outcome of its exchanges of view? Article IX imposes this obligation, and it is moreover difficult to see what the Council's Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Poos, could talk about tomorrow afternoon if not these exchanges of view.

If we want the press representatives to come to our Tuesday sitting and to continue attaching importance to what we do, it is vital that the Council's Chairman-in-Office give the Assembly an account of this aspect of the Council's work. Similarly, as our American allies properly saw fit to consult us in NATO, it is a matter of elementary logic that the Council's Chairman-in-Office should explain to our NATO allies the point of view of the members of Western European Union.

So, there is nothing revolutionary about the motion for a recommendation I am proposing. It is in line with the other reports we have approved or will approve during this session. It is a continuance of what the Assembly has always asked of the Council, but here it is crucial as it associates closely the work of the Assembly with that of the Council on an immediate and most burning issue. I therefore ask you to vote in favour of the recommendation so that it can be transmitted to the Council this evening.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Goerens.

Are there any other speakers?...

There are none.

The Assembly now has to vote on the motion for a recommendation contained in Document 1094.

In accordance with Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Do five members request a vote by roll-call?...

No. We shall therefore take the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion for a recommendation is adopted¹.

I call Dr. Miller to explain his vote.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – May I speak on behalf of my colleagues who abstained and say immediately that we have nothing against the intention of the motion for a recommendation, we think it is a very good idea. But in view of the fact that the possibility of an improving amendment was not permitted by you – and I can understand the reason why it was not, but unfortunately, the text was only produced to us this morning. We did not have very much time to table an amendment – an amendment which, as I indicated, I think from the point of view of the English would have improved it. We did not want to block the motion itself, but we wanted to draw attention to the fact that there are areas in it of which we did not approve. For example, in the English translation, to put “diplomatic/press offensive” I find to be a gratuitous offence, whoever it is to, and this time it is to Mr. Gorbachev, and I do not think it is necessary to be gratuitously offensive and insulting to the proposals which he is making.

Secondly, it is also rather niggardly to criticise the proposals by saying that he is multiplying the proposals. I will agree that a number of proposals have been made and it has been indicated in some newspapers in Britain certainly that there have been a bewildering series of proposals. But it depends upon who is being bewildered by it and in any case it is rather insulting to call it multiplying proposals rather than say a series of proposals which we take seriously.

It is only because of that and because, Mr. President, we have to await also the outcome of the deliberations, the actual recommendations which will take place, that we felt that we could not support the initiative, but, at the same time, not wishing to defeat it we abstained in the vote.

4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations, Doc. 1090 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence

1. See page 19.

The President (continued)

Questions and Armaments on disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council and votes on the draft recommendations, Document 1090 and amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Amadei.

Mr. AMADEI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the draft I am presenting today is, as you know, the second revision of a report already adopted three times by the committee and twice referred back by the Assembly, latterly last December when the Rapporteur was not even able to present his text to the Assembly, as Mr. Hardy has reminded us. Paragraph 1.1 and the following paragraphs of the explanatory memorandum outline the history of the text. This time the report has been adopted by the committee in a spirit of compromise by nine votes to none with eight abstentions.

Two elements in the political situation have changed since the report was referred back to committee for the second time. In the first place, the initial intense debate between European countries and between them and their American ally on the acceptability of certain audacious – and some might say too bold – proposals put forward at the Reykjavik summit has been concluded by the agreement between the sixteen NATO countries establishing an order of priority in the application of the Reykjavik concepts. This agreement between the allies is embodied in the North Atlantic Council communiqué of 12th December 1986, reproduced as Appendix IV to the report, and has since been confirmed in a number of government statements.

In the second place, the Soviet Union has added further appreciable concessions to those implicit in its position at Reykjavik and is continuing to make new proposals. I refer here to General Secretary Gorbachev's speech in Moscow on 28th February, of which the report takes account. However, even after the report was adopted by the committee on 31st March, Mr. Gorbachev made a second important speech in Prague on 10th April, and Mr. Shultz visited Moscow from 13th to 16th April. A second debate among allies is now going on in this city where the WEU Council is meeting, as well as in the various divisions of NATO. With these changes of position the conclusion of an agreement on intermediate missiles in the coming months is now at least a possibility.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in anticipation of the important debate ahead of us – the Assembly's first debate on disarmament in a year – I shall concentrate my presentation of the committee's report on the key subject of disarmament, and in particular the question of intermediate missiles but with due reference to

conventional forces also. Any agreement on intermediate missiles must concentrate attention on conventional forces, in which the Soviets have a great superiority in the central region, and it is this fact which led the committee to Vienna to hear the representatives of various countries at the three conferences currently being held in that city.

As the reply to the Council's thirty-first annual report has been largely overtaken by events – we have this morning received the thirty-second report – and has lost some of its relevance, the committee has divided the recommendation into two. The reply to the Council is dealt with in a separate recommendation, and Chapters II to IV of the explanatory memorandum have been updated.

I now turn to the question of long-range INF missiles or LRINFs. Paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation proper refers on the one hand to NATO's collective position and on the other recommends that the Council “support the United States” in negotiating an agreement under the conditions defined in paragraph 1(a). I wish now to consider the desiderata stated here, together with the questions raised within the alliance and the position adopted by the Soviet Union with regard to each.

As regards verification it is clear that an agreement must be “properly verifiable” as the committee states in the text. On this point I note that Mr. Vorontsov, the chief Soviet negotiator, took the offensive by stating on 6th March in Paris that the Soviet Union would demand in situ inspections even within United States production plants and was ready to grant the same facilities on a reciprocal basis.

Elimination means the destruction of INF missiles, not just placing them in storage from which they could be redeployed, perhaps unknown to an adversary.

With regard to the elimination of missiles within range of Europe, it is not sufficient to eliminate the SS-20s – and the few remaining SS-4s – deployed in Europe. Elimination must cover the European zone, which necessarily includes SS-20s stationed beyond the Urals which are still capable of reaching Western European targets. On several occasions the Soviet Union has accepted that the European zone extends to longitude 80° east, which means eliminating all missiles up to a distance of 1 300 km east of the Urals.

We come now to shorter-range INF missiles or SRINF. Since the deployment of cruise missiles by the NATO countries from 1983 onwards, the Soviet Union has deployed in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic short-range INF missiles, including versions with ranges of 500 to 1 000 km, which are capable of

Mr. Amadei (continued)

reaching the capitals of Western European countries. The constraints to be imposed on such missiles in the INF negotiations will be important. Until 28th February the Soviet Union accepted the withdrawal of SRINF missiles deployed in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic as soon as an intermediate missile agreement was signed, followed by the immediate opening of negotiations on the reduction and possible elimination of such missiles. The recourse for the NATO countries if such negotiations failed would have been, as the committee states in the draft recommendation, "the right for NATO to match Warsaw Pact numbers in such missiles". But on 10th April in Prague Mr. Gorbachev suggested immediate negotiations on the elimination of SRINF without linking the question to that of LRINF missiles. Then, during Mr. Shultz's visit to Moscow the USSR proposed that the commitment to eliminate all SRINF in Europe by a fixed date should be incorporated in an agreement on long-range missiles and that SRINF negotiations should be initiated elsewhere. With regard to SRINF missiles, I would point out that NATO possesses only seventy-two German Pershing IA missiles with a range of 700 km compared with 370 equivalent Soviet missiles, including perhaps 130 in Europe.

Mr. Gorbachev confirmed in Reykjavik that the strictly European British and French nuclear forces would not be affected in any way by an intermediate missile agreement.

With regard to the balance following an intermediate missile agreement, the zero-zero option for intermediate missiles associated with the 1979 decision was proposed by NATO as early as 1981. Only now has it been accepted by the Soviet Union without fresh contrived obstacles. Such an agreement implemented in several stages, each verifiable, will be of great psychological importance, but it must be seen in the context of the current general levels of nuclear weapons. If an agreement of this kind is applied, it will – as stated in paragraph 5.23 of the explanatory memorandum – mean eliminating 316 nuclear warheads on the NATO side against 1 224 warheads on the Soviet side – an excellent deal for NATO. However, this reduction is minimal in relation to the total of some 18 000 nuclear warheads of the American strategic and tactical forces which could be used against the Warsaw Pact. Considering only the American nuclear weapons capable of reaching Soviet territory from Europe or European waters, 1 300 warheads, or more than four times the number of LRINF to be eliminated by NATO, will remain in service after elimination of LRINF without counting the 4 000 warheads of the American tactical air force and the shorter-range delivery systems which will remain in Europe. The agreement will

involve neither decoupling the American strategic deterrent forces nor the denuclearisation of Europe.

The situation with regard to the negotiations on conventional forces is described in paragraph 5.53 and the following paragraphs of the explanatory memorandum, and I draw your attention to section V(c)(iv) concerning the new talks in Vienna on a mandate for negotiations on the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. The meeting the committee had in Vienna produced information which confirms, without change, the conclusions of the draft report. In his Prague speech, Mr. Gorbachev suggested that battlefield nuclear missiles – with a range under 500 km – should be examined in the framework of the new negotiations, and this matches NATO's position that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated as long as the Warsaw Pact has a massive superiority in conventional forces.

As far as the other aspects of disarmament are concerned, the explanatory memorandum of the committee's report examines in detail the work in progress in all the bodies both bilateral and multilateral – and I have counted nine – currently engaged in negotiating on the many issues involved. I shall refer briefly, Mr. President, to those mentioned in the other paragraphs of the draft recommendation proper.

Paragraph 1(c) stresses the importance of respecting existing treaties. This phrase refers particularly to the ABM treaty which is currently operative and ratified by both parties. It also relates to the SALT II agreement, which both parties had observed until the end of last year, though the United States have never ratified it. The governments of our member countries have made quite clear the importance they attach to honouring existing treaties, as is confirmed by the quotations in the explanatory memorandum from paragraph 5.30 onwards.

In paragraph 2 of the recommendation proper the committee stresses the importance of pressing in the MBFR negotiations for an early agreement along the lines at present proposed by NATO. If the Soviet Union is sincere in its new proposals for widening negotiations on conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, the best way of proving it would be the speedy conclusion of the very limited agreement currently proposed in the MBFR framework and described in paragraph 5.53 and subsequent paragraphs of the explanatory memorandum.

With regard to the chemical weapons referred to in paragraph 3, the explanatory memorandum gives an account of the substantial progress made in drafting the treaty of the multilateral negotiations in Geneva. A broad consensus already exists on the aspects of verification which concern the declaration of stocks and their

Mr. Amadei (continued)

destruction, as well as the associated routine inspections. The key issue of additional inspection after prior notification still awaits solution. I draw your attention here to Mr. Gorbachev's declaration in his Prague speech of 10th April according to which the Soviet Union has stopped producing chemical weapons and is constructing the facilities necessary for their destruction – facilities the United States acquired several years ago. Mr. Gorbachev added that there are no Soviet chemical weapons outside the frontiers of the Soviet Union and that the other Warsaw Pact countries had never possessed any. Of course, this has still to be verified, but previously the Soviet Union has never made any statements of this kind and it would be extraordinary if the USSR were to make untrue statements at a time when it is preparing to open its frontiers to inspection and has indeed already opened them in line with the confidence-building measures approved by the Stockholm conference.

In conclusion, I turn to the question of nuclear tests. With regard to paragraph 4(a) of the draft recommendation concerning the United States proposals for calibrating the yield of nuclear tests, we can take satisfaction from press reports that the two superpowers have agreed to undertake a nuclear test for calibration purposes in each other's test area. Lastly, paragraph 4(b) calls for the opening of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, such negotiations having been halted at the Geneva disarmament conference since the suspension in 1980 of the trilateral negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

(The speaker continued in Italian)

Mr. President, after the effort I have made to speak French, may I be allowed a few concluding remarks in Italian to say that the situation is so complex and so difficult and is changing so rapidly that every attempt to deal with the problem of disarmament is liable to be overtaken by events. Time after time we find ourselves with documents which have to be updated because the situation and the proposals have moved forward. I think therefore that, regardless of differing political views and attitudes in this Assembly for which I have the fullest respect, it has to be admitted that the Rapporteur's patience is very often severely tried. I hope I have found a compromise which will be acceptable to everyone. If anyone thinks that I have not done well may I remind the Assembly that even doing something badly involves hard work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Amadei. On behalf of the Assembly, I thank you for your untiring efforts and good will as Rapporteur. You have set an example to many

of us. I hope your work will enable the Assembly to advance in its deliberations and in determining its political positions.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we agree with the statement that disarmament is an issue on which everyone must adopt a clear position and accept definite responsibilities. To this end, we wish to repeat briefly and with fresh emphasis a number of essential points in the line we take.

First of all, we believe that one basic objective which must be maintained is a halt to the arms race and the reduction of armaments. Consequently, we believe that any attempt to achieve military superiority by anyone must be rejected. Disarmament must guarantee the elimination of nuclear weapons and the agreed reduction of conventional weapons to the lowest possible levels. The security of Europe and of the individual European countries cannot be achieved unilaterally. The way is through negotiation.

Together with disarmament, the main instrument is arms control and while the way to total nuclear disarmament is certainly full of complexities, substantial nuclear disarmament in Europe is now a short-term possibility. This calls for a new concept of military strategy and in particular for rejection of the idea that nuclear weapons can be used effectively in war or as instruments of political intimidation. Mr. Klejdzinski said this effectively this morning in the words "military deterrence cannot prevent war". Admittedly nuclear disarmament increases the importance of the rôle of conventional weapons for which a balance at the lowest possible level must be guaranteed. As Mr. Ahrens said this morning, the two sides of Europe must ensure their security with a minimum of equipment and armed forces.

All the negotiations are now open and have most recently been extended to the question of shorter-range missiles and their destruction, for which, as our President, Mr. Caro, quite correctly said this morning, our delegation argued and was given a good hearing at the talks in Moscow. This was confirmed in the remarks made by Mr. Gorbachev in Prague and at the meetings in Moscow with Secretary of State Shultz. According to official reports, the Soviet Union has today tabled in Geneva its proposal for the destruction of the medium-range, so-called Euromissiles. This represents an extension of the zero option to the shorter-range missiles deployed in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.

The opportunities are great therefore. Some people think that this represents a modification of the present balances and imbalances while

Mr. Antoni (continued)

others have doubts concerning the United States and believe that it takes insufficient account of Europe's needs. Anyone like myself who went with the delegation to Moscow will, I think, certainly have recognised that the new attitude and the change from the past is very real in that country. We believe therefore that the worst mistake that could be made in Europe would be to put the brake on this drive towards disarmament. It would be illogical and could only have the worst consequences.

The view can realistically be taken that following the recent positive response from the Soviet Union regarding shorter-range missiles it has now become possible and practicable to conclude an agreement on bases which will contribute to greater security in Europe and provide the impetus for further negotiations and agreements on disarmament, a balance of conventional forces and the destruction of chemical weapons. Europe must not hold back; on the contrary, it must not miss the opportunity of advancing its own interests and must seek to ensure its own security, to influence the negotiations and to safeguard itself. In our view, however, Europe has the vital responsibility of paving the way for this great leap forward in international relations now that the biggest ally, the United States, has declared its willingness to go ahead. Just think, ladies and gentlemen, of the damage which would be caused to East-West relations, world security and European security and sovereignty if Europe itself were to spoil the great and extraordinary opportunity now before us, which, let us not forget, offers us for the first time the possibility of destroying the huge stocks of nuclear weapons and of moving towards real disarmament.

These, ladies and gentlemen, are our firmly held views. They have been developed over the years and have been argued on many occasions in this Assembly where we have always shown understanding for the views of other political parties similar to our own from whom we could learn something in this Assembly and in our own country. And it is on these beliefs that we have based our action during these latest developments in international relations and in Western European Union.

With this approach, we can also appreciate the effort made by our Rapporteur to provide the Assembly with a vast quantity of facts and information on the attitudes and options of both East and West, while at the same time giving due recognition to recent statements from both sides indicating first the intention and then the real possibility of action to bring about disarmament.

The draft recommendation with all its known changes is less positive. The Rapporteur con-

cluded by asking us to be patient and saying that even his own patience had been severely tried. Yet by going back to this the Rapporteur was referring basically to the ups and downs of the draft recommendation. The truth is that attitudes which have so far proved irreconcilable have run up against each other. We believe that the conditions laid down by some members and in particular the British conservatives have been a serious difficulty. Furthermore, as the Rapporteur himself recognised, the most important political section of the text – the question of nuclear disarmament in Europe – has been overtaken by the new corrections – you will remember the expression Mr. President – which the Russians have made to their proposals, in which WEU can claim to have participated in the talks I mentioned earlier.

To conclude, Mr. President, we have tabled a number of amendments which bring the draft recommendation up to date and correct positions which in our view do not respond to the most general requirement, briefly argued here, that nuclear disarmament must be furthered, but that European security must not be threatened but rather strengthened as a result. It seems to us that these amendments are particularly necessary in paragraph 1(a) referring to the disputed question of whether a commitment to the immediate withdrawal and destruction of shorter-range missiles should be excluded from the negotiations or should be entered into. This is the purpose of Amendment 3 signed by Mr. Rubbi, Mr. Antoni and others, but I can say at once that we are quite prepared to withdraw it and to support Amendment 8 tabled by Mr. Scheer and Mr. Stoffelen which deals with the same question and in our view offers at least as good, and possibly a better, solution.

My final word, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, is to express the earnest hope that our Assembly can genuinely express the people's wish for disarmament and co-operation between nations as a guarantee for security, democracy and progress in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I think our alliance has forgotten the origins of the zero-zero option. If we remember, it was Helmut Schmidt, back I think in 1977, who urged the deployment of medium-range theatre nuclear weapons by NATO because he feared that without the presence of such United States weapons on West European soil, West Europe could become decoupled from the United States. His fear was very similar to that of President de Gaulle who thought that the United States nuclear guarantee was never fully credible because in the ultimate analysis, in the event of all-out Soviet aggression against Western Europe, the United States would never actually

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

be prepared to invoke its strategic nuclear deterrent on our behalf. Hence the need for the force de frappe on the one hand and, on the other, the need advocated by Helmut Schmidt for modernised intermediate-range nuclear forces. Politically, of course, his call was very difficult to implement and in 1979 we went for the twin-track decision. We sought to buy off neutralist and critical socialist and labour opinion within Western Europe with the assurance that the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces – modern intermediate-range nuclear forces – by NATO would be accompanied by measures of arms control. And in 1981, two years later, we went for the full zero-zero option hoping, then, that the Soviets would be prepared to dismantle their SS-20s which had been growing in number ever since the end of 1977. If they would do so, we would then be exonerated from the need to modernise our own medium-range nuclear forces.

Of course, in 1983 we had to deploy and that process of deployment has been going on since then, but it is not yet complete. It is not true to say that the Soviets are merely taking up our own NATO zero-zero option, because the situation has greatly changed since 1981. It has changed by the very fact that we have had to deploy and, more significantly, by the deployment on the part of the Soviets themselves of short-range, shorter-range, intermediate-range systems, namely, the SS-22s and SS-23s in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. The Soviets are very, very effectively cashing in on the disunity within our alliance. They are seeking to promote disunity not only between Europeans but between the Europeans and the Americans, cashing in on the fact that the President is coming to the end of his term in Washington with very few significant foreign policy achievements, eager to achieve an arms control agreement almost at any price. We see the disarray among the West Europeans too: within our own ranks in this Assembly, we see it in the ranks of the coalition government in the Federal Republic – between divergent statements on the part of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher, and the Defence Minister, Mr. Wörner, and we see nuances and differences between governments of West European nations within the alliance: the French and the British extremely cautious and sceptical, and others saying we must take the Soviet offer – or offers as they now are – at their face value.

I would say to this Assembly, Mr. President, that, even if the zero-zero option for long-range INF goes ahead, the strategic threat to Europe from the Soviet Union will remain and if there were an attack upon Western Europe we would not so readily, I think, be assured of a strategic

response by the United States, since its own INF on the continent of Europe would no longer be in existence. Of course there would be submarine-launched systems, but that is not the same as having nuclear forces in place.

As for the conventional balance, that is very much in the Soviets' favour still. If we were seeking genuine measures to enhance our security, we would surely have begun the other way round – we would have begun by measures to reduce on a mutual basis, on a verifiable basis, our conventional forces and we would have sought to achieve parity in the balance of conventional forces in Europe. Instead, that has not been possible since the Soviets have been stalling at the MBFR talks in Vienna since 1973.

All this, of course, makes even more important the French and British strategic nuclear deterrents, but even they are not the same – they are not equivalent – to INF deployed on the alliance's behalf by the Americans in Western Europe. I am pleased that Mr. Chirac and our own prime minister have met and that Franco-British military co-operation is improving and I note that the French and British prime ministers have begged the Americans to keep their conventional commitment to Europe at the same level. But we are very much wanting it both ways. First we wanted an effective nuclear deterrent deployed in Europe for NATO because we were unwilling to make the financial sacrifices for an effective conventional defence and, now that those nuclear forces are to be reduced, if not eliminated altogether at intermediate level, now we say: Please, Americans, we know that you are impoverished, that you have a dollar crisis and commitments all around the world, and great difficulties in meeting those commitments, yet we want you to stay at your present level. Instead we should be saying: We will make positive improvements in our own conventional defence. And that I think is urgently necessary as is, of course, a great improvement in the capability of our alliance for chemical defence since the preponderance of the Soviets in chemical warfare is as yet untouched.

To conclude, Mr. President, I think that NATO strategy recalls that of the Grand Old Duke of York who led his troops to the top of the hill and then led them down again. It was very difficult to achieve the modernisation of our INF forces. If we eliminate INF systems – both long-range and short-range – that will pose political problems for the Germans in particular, who of course could see their country turned into a nuclear battlefield if deterrence were ever to break down. Also, I think, we must acknowledge the fact that without reductions in conventional forces and without reductions in chemical forces on the part of the Soviets, we will actually be making ourselves more vulnerable in Western

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

Europe, rather than less, and diminishing the effectiveness of the United States nuclear guarantee. That said, Mr. President, I welcome the fact that we have this debate – it is very timely – but I subscribe very much to the words of warning of President Nixon, Mr. Kissinger, Manfred Wörner and others who know the nuclear strategy business and understand it, and who are not guided in their political thinking largely by wishful thinking.

(Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – With a lengthy debate in prospect, I would like to look at a number of essential points and to congratulate our Rapporteur who, after many ups-and-downs, is today presenting the conclusions arrived at by the committee under admittedly difficult conditions. The subject is indeed a difficult one, and I remind you that the committee voted 9 to 0, but with 8 abstentions if I have read the document correctly.

This report is attended by new and one might say exceptional circumstances. I refer here to Mr. Gorbachev's proposals on arms limitations: the zero option suggested in February for medium-range missiles, Euromissiles, followed by the extension of the negotiations to short-range missiles, chemical weapons and conventional forces in Europe proposed more recently by the Soviet leader. The present situation is also exceptional in that the Europeans are considering more seriously than in the past the establishment of a specifically European defence system. This was I think effectively and very opportunely demonstrated by our debate this morning, supported by a virtually unanimous vote.

With reference to the present negotiations on disarmament and the limitation of arms in Europe, I wish to remind you firstly of France's steadfast position and to make some comments on Mr. Amadei's report.

I can summarise France's position by making three specific points. Firstly, France is deeply concerned for peace, for itself and for the world. Disarmament is a most desirable objective, and France has taken many initiatives in that direction. I would remind you that in 1978 the then President of the Republic, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, expressed to the United Nations his deep commitment and ambitious ideas, with recognition of the need to maintain regional balances. France's position, which has since been restated, is equally categorical in its determination to maintain its own deterrent and its hope for the initiation of disarmament procedures

which are balanced and subject to verification and inspection.

The second point has greater current relevance. The present discussions involve only the Russians and the Americans, and could in no circumstances include either French or British nuclear weapons. I am personally pleased to note the unqualified identity of view on this point between the President of the Republic and the French Government. It is a fact that the French nuclear force differs from intermediate weapons in both character and purpose. It is a central system designed to protect our vital interests and must consequently be excluded from any negotiations between the two superpowers.

On a question where I believe the French position does not differ greatly from that of the British Government – and Mr. Wilkinson has referred to the recent contacts between our two prime ministers – I would remind you that the present debates cannot and do not relate to our arsenals. This is a point which has not been mentioned, but it is one which I think needs to be stated.

My third point is that it is nuclear deterrence alone which guarantees European security. It is impossible to regard the denuclearisation of this part of the world as being without danger. It would have the effect of rendering a future conventional war not only possible but inevitable given the known imbalance between East and West of three to one, perhaps much more, in conventional forces and our geographical circumstances.

I have three main remarks to make on Mr. Amadei's report. In the first place, it is true that we French are opposed to a ban on nuclear tests in Europe. As I have just said, the nuclear deterrent is for us our only effective means of preventing a European war. Maintenance by the Europeans of their nuclear defence efforts at a level compatible with the threats we face is therefore vital, and that is the reason for my willing acceptance of Amendment 14.

My second point, which is addressed particularly to the Rapporteur, is that we must not contemplate the withdrawal of American forces from the European theatre. You, as advocates of a European security charter, know full well that this linkage is of paramount concern. For us all, European deterrence requires the strategic coupling of the two sides of the Atlantic, and this demands the presence in our continent of conventional and nuclear American forces, as the previous speaker said.

My third point is of capital importance. Working together with the Council, we must consider the establishment of a genuine European defence system, and in this, as we said this morning, WEU has a leading rôle to play. Our

Mr. Valleix (continued)

debate is therefore concerned both with the constant principles at issue, which we wish to see strengthened, and with a highly dynamic and mobile current situation largely due, it must be admitted, to the initiative of the Soviet General Secretary.

As far as the principles are concerned, it is obvious that the democracies are in a weak position compared with any totalitarian system, and in the cat and mouse game Mr. Gorbachev is currently pursuing – and I do not mean here to contradict the introductory remarks by our Chairman as presenter and author of the motion for urgent procedure – the democracies are in a weak position against the capacity of a totalitarian system to manoeuvre. We must remember this, and our readiness for possible discussions must be matched by our caution in conducting them.

While noting the words just added by our Rapporteur, I must express my regret that the concept of verification mentioned in the report and, more particularly in the recommendation, makes inadequate reference to the need for inspection as an element of verification. Once again, it is obviously only the genuineness of the checks which gives any substance to possible disarmament. Without it we drift into complete unreality. Ladies and gentlemen, I will conclude by saying that I can on no account vote in favour of the recommendation as it stands at present. Everything therefore depends on the later course of the discussion.

Let us not forget that Europe has been living in peace since 1945. It is an unfortunate fact that this historical truth rests on a balance of forces largely based on deterrence. If history now offers us a chance of peace with fewer weapons and with our means of defence and deterrence rebalanced at a lower level, well and good. But let us not be led by our ambitions or our hopes of peace without weapons to compromise the historical good fortune of the peace in Europe which has lasted forty-two years. This is a responsibility we must shoulder, and it will be interesting to note tomorrow's developments at the ministerial meeting of the Council. We must clearly gear our enthusiasm and flexibility to our historic responsibilities.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bordu.

Mr. BORDU (*France*) (Translation). – I wish first of all to thank Mr. Amadei, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for his patience in producing a report which is a most useful source of information for the Assembly. On the other hand, I regret the succession of changes which the committee has made to the concluding draft recom-

mendation. These changes reflect the unwillingness of some to see Europe committed to a disarmament process from the Atlantic to the Urals. By talking of disaster, they are seeking to impede the disarmament process. To speak of peace in terms of disaster must surely be the limit.

But notwithstanding the efforts of the Rapporteur and the committee, the fact is that events are moving much faster than the parliamentary process, so that many of our assessments and recommendations are overtaken – a point which the Rapporteur fully appreciated when he undertook the impossible task of trying to bring the report up to the minute. It is impossible to disregard the explanations furnished by Mr. Gorbachev in the Prague speech and in his conversations with Mr. Shultz in Moscow. In other words, we must not close our minds and fall in with the majority view of this Assembly based on the hypothesis of possible Soviet aggression.

The explanations I refer to answer the worries expressed in the West about Euromissiles – weapons designed to respond to the deployment of American medium-range missiles and short- and long-range tactical weapons. What is now being suggested is the zero option for all nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, and we may suppose that, had the Americans been prepared to forgo the militarisation of space, this could have been followed by strategic nuclear weapons.

While the question of verification, so often raised by us as a major obstacle to disarmament agreements, may admittedly involve very difficult negotiations, it no longer constitutes a substantial problem. All that is now required is the will to discuss the matter.

It is similarly obvious that conventional weapons must also be reduced in a balanced manner. Once more, the Soviet proposals are clear. The arguments based on disparities in conventional and chemical weapons also cease to apply. The document adopted by the Warsaw Pact contains serious proposals for serious negotiations, and it is to be hoped that the thirty-five CSCE countries negotiating in Vienna will adopt France's proposal opposed to inter-pact negotiations, so that the CDE can meet again in Stockholm, this time to conduct concrete negotiations on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe.

The question of the alleged Soviet superiority in chemical weapons has been raised in recent months. Here, too, the proposal is perfectly clear. The Soviet Union has decided to stop production of these weapons and is fully prepared to conclude an agreement on their reduction and the destruction of existing stocks. Again, the most rigorous verification is envisaged.

Mr. Bordu (continued)

The question for us is not therefore to look for new pretexts for avoiding negotiations while pursuing plans for reinforcing military resources in Western Europe, including the militarisation of space either by supporting SDI or developing a European version. Our Assembly must have a will for disarmament in the same way as it is desired by public opinion. Casting doubts on Mr. Gorbachev's good faith is perhaps no more than a gambit designed to mislead public opinion. With the time ripe for dialogue, it is irresponsible to use arguments of this kind. It is after all the survival or extinction of mankind which is at stake.

And that really is the issue. The accumulation of nuclear weapons is reaching a level which threatens continued human existence on earth. That is the verdict of experts throughout the world, and our common sense tells us it is so. With our present means of destruction there would be neither conquerors nor vanquished in any military confrontation. Nothing would survive! To overarm is to challenge human existence.

The time has come to reconsider seriously the way we view the security of our countries and of Europe as a whole. The choice is simple: either we continue to accumulate sophisticated weapons, nuclear, conventional or whatever, and engineer the means of conducting war in space, so increasing the destabilisation of the continent and further imperilling the security of its inhabitants, or we seek political means of bringing about disarmament and opening the way to effective détente in Europe leading to enduring peace and peaceful co-operation in every area, including space, in the interests of genuine security and the welfare of all. This is the challenge mankind has to face.

We, like others, have made our choice. We want peace, disarmament, and the survival and well-being of the peoples of our planet. Not a Soviet or an American peace, but peace unqualified. We believe that the real security of the European peoples and of Europe as a whole depends on progressive, balanced and verified disarmament, accompanied at every stage by agreements underpinning collective security and the security of each in relation to others.

I therefore suggest that, having regard to the current situation and the events which have occurred since the final formulation of the report and the draft recommendation, our Assembly should submit to the Council relatively short texts:

“ The Assembly,

Considering that in a nuclear world the use of arms would lead to the destruction of mankind;

Considering the need for progressive, balanced and verified disarmament to the lowest possible level;

Considering the Soviet positions on nuclear, conventional and chemical disarmament;

Considering the proposals made by the Warsaw Pact countries on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL urge member governments:

To adopt forthwith a position favourable to the offers of negotiation on medium- and short-range nuclear weapons, conventional forces and armaments and chemical weapons existing or deployed in Europe;

To encourage their American ally to contribute effectively to the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union covering the withdrawal of all long-range nuclear missiles stationed in Europe;

To act in all negotiations in which they are concerned to bring about the denuclearisation of the European continent, the progressive, balanced and verified reduction of conventional forces and armaments, the banning of chemical weapons and the destruction of all existing stocks under rigorous inspection;

To demand that negotiations be opened on the total banning of nuclear tests for military purposes within the framework of the Geneva disarmament conference.”

This obviously means that, while I can support Mr. Amadei's first and second reports, I cannot support the third.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. It is wholly understandable that there are many different national and alliance interests and that on certain questions, which may include security issues, direct relations with Moscow can and should be envisaged. But what should be clear to everyone is that there must be firm and formal political solidarity between the European countries and with the United States. This means that whenever the interests of any party involve the security interests of the allies, any country which has bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union should inform its allies of the nature and progress of those contacts.

Yes, Mr. President, as I did this morning I am referring to information concerning direct contacts between the United States of America and the Soviet Union relating to the destruction of chemical weapons on United States territory in the presence of Soviet experts. This is a sign of

Mr. Martino (continued)

great willingness on one side and is one possible way of forcing the other to destroy its own stocks and so arrive at a total ban on chemical weapons. It is now clear to everyone, at least from the terrible knowledge we have of non-accidental ecological disasters with chemicals as at Seveso, on the Rhine, the pollution from Trazzine and Molinate and the tragedy of Bhopal how terrible chemical deterrents would be, just as there are signs of duly cautious bilateral progress towards reducing first the quantity and then the quality of the nuclear deterrent.

Mr. President, peace built on and supported by deterrence is a sad peace which conceals our people's anxieties and fears through ignorance only. The newspaper article I quoted is perhaps merely a sign of reason.

It is in this belief that I call on the presidency, in approving as we shall today the excellent report drafted by Mr. Amadei and in submitting its recommendation to the Council of Ministers, to stress the subject of chemical weapons and to draw ministers' attention to the United States initiative, urging them to widen its scope and content through a simultaneous reduction of the two forms of deterrence.

Mr. President, I should have finished but I still have the dissatisfaction of having to discuss security problems solely from the standpoint of armed defence. In the past, here in the WEU Assembly, I have raised with Mr. Genscher, Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Spadolini the problem of constructing, forming and perhaps transforming an international security agency for protection against the ecological disasters with which mankind is now threatened by technological progress. I would ask you, Mr. President, to keep this point in mind also in approving this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, despite the length and complexity of this report, it is about a subject which is encompassed in only one word and that is "disarmament". It may not be obvious to people who listen to some of this debate that that was the subject under discussion, the subject to which the Rapporteur directed his attention.

A few weeks ago I might have been satisfied – almost completely satisfied at any rate – with the recommendations of the report. The report itself is a very comprehensive one, full of all kinds of information, important information, but I do believe, Mr. President, that the events of the last few weeks have altered the situation and I am, of course, referring to proposals made by Mr. Gorbachev. In my opinion it opens a completely

new field and, as our American allies would say, it has begun an entirely new ball game. It seems to me that it presents an opportunity of putting to the test the views of some of us – I am talking about those on the western side, among the allies, some of the allies, who say that they are in favour of multilateral but not unilateral disarmament.

Surely Mr. Gorbachev's proposals give an opportunity – an opportunity which should not be missed – of putting the desire for multilateral nuclear disarmament – or reductions to begin with – to the test. I know that there are people who say: That is all very well but we do not trust the Soviet Union. That is the whole problem, the lack of trust. There is a mutual lack of trust – I will accept that – but I think it is exaggerated on both sides and there has to be some kind of perception of what the risks are and how each side sees the situation from its point of view and try to see it from someone else's point of view too.

One of the other arguments is not only from the point of view of trusting of the Soviet Union to keep its word in one respect, but also to keep its word when it comes to the reduction of weapons because some people say this cannot be verified. Verification enters into the argument and I do not disagree with that, I think it has to be verified. But we are in a situation now, technologically, of being able to verify even relatively small nuclear experimentations and explosions and the Soviets – the Russians – have offered to the West the facilities to bring instruments for verification to Soviet soil if they are allowed to do the same thing on the soil of the allies, and I certainly do not see anything wrong in that kind of tit for tat. I do not think that the expressions of worry coming from two Johnny-come-latelies like ex-President Nixon and globe-trotting Kissinger should be allowed to influence how people who want peace, who want disarmament, approach this tremendous problem.

Mr. Wilkinson – for whom I have a very high regard, certainly from the point of view of his knowledge of this subject of weapons, destructive power – mentioned that perhaps we should not be taking the Soviet offers at their face value. Well, I do not think anyone should take any offer at face value; I would accept that kind of admonition, that kind of fear. But we certainly should take them seriously and we should consider them as moves towards multilateral nuclear disarmament. That is of course what most of us think we should be aiming for. I am afraid, Mr. President, that in this very dangerous game, in which it would appear that both sides want the other side to take all the risks, that as far as the West is concerned there are people, unfortunately – I hope there are not many – who have a greater fear of a Soviet Union which uses its enormous natural resources for the economic development of its country than they have of a Soviet Union

Dr. Miller (continued)

which builds up more and more nuclear weapons and spends money on its defence. I am just afraid that there are people on our side who are willing to take the awful risk of a nuclear holocaust, believing that there is a deterrence involved in it, rather than take the risk of seeing a Soviet Union using these natural resources which it no doubt has in order to become an economic competitor with the United States, with Germany, with Japan, with Britain, with Italy, with all the developed nations.

I am not a pacifist, Mr. President. I believe that if there is a risk of our being attacked we should have the means with which to defend ourselves. First, I do not think that we can defend ourselves with nuclear weapons, but, second, the risks should be assessed and we should not see the certitude of attack where that certitude does not exist. It is my opinion that we should be looking for reasons to go ahead with moves towards disarmament and peace and not looking for reasons – although they are there and can be found too easily – for postponing this and continuing with the build-up of nuclear weapons which in themselves constitute an enormous danger not only to the countries of Western Europe but to the whole world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – In this debate, Mr. President, I do not speak as Chairman of the Socialist Group but primarily as a Dutch representative and for that reason I go on in my own language.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – Mr. President, before involving myself in the will-you, won't-you arguments that have broken out in Europe since Mr. Gorbachev put forward his latest proposal, I should like very briefly to refer to some of the premises contained in the report of the commission chaired by Olof Palme, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. Olof Palme made it clear that technology has changed the world. National frontiers are no longer defensible national shields. There is no effective defence against missiles with nuclear warheads. Not now and not in the future. A second problem, according to the Palme commission, is that the more one spends on maintaining a modern war machine to provide security against an external threat, the fewer the resources for solving social problems. Excessive concentration on external security thus threatens internal security, all of which means that there must be major changes in the way in which countries address problems relating to armaments and security. Above all, countries must realise

that in the nuclear age none of them can achieve security at the expense of the others. Every country, Mr. Palme's report goes on, would be involved in the destruction if a nuclear war broke out. Recognition of mutual dependence means that countries must co-operate in formulating and pursuing their security policies.

Mr. President, what does all this add up to? To four, one might say, principles for action: first, there must be a policy of shared security, and international peace must be based on a commitment to joint survival, not on the threat of mutual destruction. Second, complete and total disarmament must be the ultimate objective and remain the yardstick for disarmament talks, as Maurice Miller has just stressed. Third, the economic and social costs of the arms race are the most important arguments for disarmament. And fourth, it is true that to a certain extent arms control and disarmament are connected with the general political climate, although these political links must be avoided as far as possible.

Why, Mr. President, have I reiterated these principles? Principally because there is every reason to feel concern about the reactions from Western Europe to Mr. Gorbachev's various disarmament proposals. I found it really embarrassing to see the consternation and confusion in some countries when an agreement was almost reached in Reykjavik by Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev on medium-range missiles. Imagine, we saw some heads of government thinking, an important step was almost taken towards stopping the insane arms race without asking our opinion! The same people are often surprised that in an increasing number of European countries a majority of the population have more faith in Mr. Gorbachev's disarmament proposals than in the proposals from the President of the United States. I too find this public reaction very worrying, but I do understand it.

The zero option, as Lord Carrington has said, was from the outset the basic premise of NATO's well-known twofold decision in 1979. The deployment of new medium-range missiles was intended as a political means of exerting pressure on the Soviet Union to counteract the deployment of SS-20s. So, according to Lord Carrington, there is absolutely no reason for panic or anger if it should suddenly prove possible to put this zero-zero option into effect now.

Nonetheless, the course of events has been remarkable. In Reykjavik an agreement on medium-range missiles was within reach. This agreement came to nothing because Mr. Gorbachev forged a link between a ban on INF missiles and the SDI project. After Reykjavik the Soviet Union was suddenly prepared to drop this link with SDI and to conclude an agreement on INF missiles without involving other weapons systems. Some Western European countries were

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

then, all at once, extremely worried about superior numbers, not of SS-20s but of nuclear weapons with a range of less than 1 000 km. The Soviet Union reacted by making quite a generous offer concerning weapons with a range between 500 and 1 000 km, of which the Warsaw Pact has far more than NATO, and some Western European countries then, all at once, began to worry about the Warsaw Pact's remaining superiority, not in SS-20s, not in short-range missiles, but in the rest of the nuclear weaponry and conventional military potential.

Mr. President, as my speaking time is limited, I shall now confine myself to a few conclusions: as I said, the Reykjavik meeting almost produced an agreement, which would have resulted in a drastic reduction of strategic systems and the removal of the United States' and the Soviet Union's medium-range missiles from Europe. This agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe based on the zero option is now possible. We really must make an urgent appeal to the United States and the Soviet Union to conclude this agreement now. I am firmly convinced that we should reject all the new conditions which some European countries are now, all at once, trying to impose on any such agreement. The removal of these missiles must certainly not provide an excuse for the deployment of new types of short-range missiles, and as soon as the INF agreement is concluded, the negotiations on short-range missiles, battlefield nuclear weapons and conventional armaments must be resumed. An agreement on these weapons is just as necessary. But this agreement should be based on a realistic assessment of military capability on both sides and not just on the familiar game of comparing mere numbers of people and weapons.

Mr. President, let us not prevaricate: if there was ever a time for real progress in the areas of arms control and disarmament, that time is now. So let us seize this opportunity of taking a bold step towards a world freed from the scourge of violence and war.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a world without weapons is an illusion. After escalation, we are now experiencing a drive for disarmament aimed at a consensus on a simultaneous and verified balance of arms between East and West at the lowest possible level. For the time being, Mr. Gorbachev has the initiative against a weakened America and a Europe which takes its cue from its transatlantic partner. Relations between the Europeans and the Americans are not set fair at the moment, and the Soviet leader

is seeking to profit by this in long-term negotiations, although fortunately for us no commitment has yet been made.

What is the rôle of nuclear deterrence? What is the rôle of conventional deterrence? A majority will say that Europe's forty years of peace are based on the nuclear deterrent, while the two superpowers are engaged in conflict in other parts of the world without the use of nuclear weapons. The destructive force of nuclear arms is such that their use is inconceivable and the price unacceptable.

So, the security of the West is founded less on defence than on the fact that there will be no attack from the East. If the nuclear deterrent ceased to exist tomorrow, East-West tensions would probably increase, and an armed conflict would be possible at any time. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons would perhaps be possible with two adversaries which were pluralist democracies, but the closed system of the East cannot be so described, as the Berlin wall bears witness.

The same is true of bilateral verification, which is certain to prolong all disarmament negotiations. Mr. Gorbachev has much to say on the matter, but in the Vienna negotiations on troop numbers the Soviet delegation rejects all proposals and has not given an inch.

As for the negotiations on chemical weapons, the eastern bloc delegation has at most agreed to inspection and the destruction of existing stocks, but this is not enough if there is a genuine wish for effective agreements.

Apart from the problem of verification, the elimination of nuclear weapons raises other problems. For example, it affects the East-West balance in varying degree, and it is unlikely that France and the United Kingdom will give up their European nuclear arsenals. As regards the problem of a partial reduction of nuclear weapons, and the zero option for intermediate nuclear forces is an example of this, it is vital that simultaneous agreements be reached on short-range intermediate forces, chemical weapons and conventional forces, as in these three areas the Warsaw Pact is reported to have a worrying superiority over Western Europe.

According to a reliable source, a compromise has been reached in the Atlantic Alliance to retain in Europe a number of long-range intermediate nuclear weapons, although nothing official has been said. Long-range intermediate missiles threaten the USSR with attack in the event of conflict with the West, so that the zero option would primarily benefit the East. The Warsaw Pact's advantage of 1 400 against 170 short-range intermediate nuclear missiles, some of which are located in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, plus the eastern bloc's

Mr. Burger (continued)

advantage in conventional forces would therefore be unacceptable to Western Europe.

Instead of inviting the West to establish equality – creating problems in public opinion and defence budgets – the East could demonstrate its desire for peace by destroying its surplus stocks and thereby restoring the balance. While it is possible to reduce nuclear deterrents, it is vital that the United States consult their European allies before summit negotiations, as the aim of the USSR is to uncouple the Atlantic Alliance.

The problem of bilateral verification in the event of an agreement will certainly take time, because the requirements of the Atlantic Alliance are exacting and involve the permanent presence of a hundred inspectors to monitor production, storage and missile assembly units. This is why Pravda stresses that there are still many obstacles in the way of an agreement with the United States, our ally in the Atlantic Alliance whose European pillar should be strengthened by WEU without delay.

With regard to the rôle of conventional deterrence, I repeat that the Warsaw Pact has a considerable superiority in conventional forces. Any request for additional funds for defence budgets would present serious difficulties for the political leaders of the Atlantic Alliance. It is also true that most public opinion is pacifically inclined and wants disarmament. If nuclear weapons were eliminated, conventional deterrents would certainly increase the probability of armed conflict, initially in West Berlin. The best way to prove its desire for peace would be for the eastern bloc to start by accepting a reduction in conventional weapons, where it has a considerable advantage.

However, over thirteen years of MBFR negotiations the West has not succeeded in reducing the Soviet superiority in conventional weapons. Failing a radical and unlikely change on the part of the USSR, conventional deterrence is like partial nuclear deterrence in that it is certain to create more problems instead of providing answers for ensuring the maintenance of peace.

I will conclude by saying that a reduction of nuclear deterrence to a minimum level is feasible. Conventional deterrence alone is inefficient. In the medium term it will increase in importance as nuclear deterrence diminishes. Western European Union, as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, must make efforts to play a greater part in its defence.

Europe must no longer be absent when summit decisions are taken affecting its security. Allies must be consulted in advance, not after the

event, if the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance is not to be eroded.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Amadei's report coincides with a situation which is perhaps unprecedented since the end of the second world war. Following President Reagan's decision on SDI, which evoked varying reactions both on the technological implications of Europe's proper rôle in this important American initiative and on the strategic significance the initiative might have for Europe, we have now heard a series of proposals by Mr. Gorbachev.

The prospect of the elimination and reduction of American and Soviet intermediate nuclear forces in Europe was already envisaged by NATO in 1979, 1981 and 1986. On 4th March last, the President of the French Republic said this served the interests of France and of peace. But we must be clear – the President said that any reduction should be balanced, simultaneous and verified, and it is unquestionably about the last aspect that doubts are still felt. It is true, as Mr. Valleix reminded us just now, that in 1978 France itself suggested the creation of an international monitoring satellite agency capable of verifying directly actual disarmament, crises and outbreaks of tension throughout the world. Mr. President, I have myself several times taken up this initiative in this Assembly and have even proposed instead a European monitoring satellite agency in face of the refusal by the two superpowers to accept a system which seemed to us entirely feasible.

One of the measures proposed by Mr. Gorbachev – calling for an agreement on the short-range SS-20, SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 missiles after or at the same time as a treaty on the SS-20, Pershing II and cruise missiles – would set us a completely different problem. This does not mean we should not all welcome any disarmament. Disarmament is not only our wish but continues to be our basic objective.

But, quite simply, beyond such agreement other problems have to be resolved and these centre on a question which must be the principal concern of our Assembly – what would then become of European security? Again, there is the problem of decoupling, which arose in connection with the SDI decision and is now besetting us again; a decision which awakens us to many rumours, circulating even in the United States, which are occasionally put into concrete terms by some members of the American Congress.

Mr. Fourré (continued)

Some think the denuclearisation of Europe is the right solution, but, in my opinion the idea that the two superpowers should embark on this path without allowing us Europeans any possibility of asserting our individuality, in accordance with the world status we are seeking to establish, is not a satisfactory solution. It would also mean by-passing the issue of conventional forces and disregarding Soviet strength in this area, as has been stated several times. More especially it would hinder progress towards a European defence system, if only because the United Kingdom, and more particularly France, would then be under pressure from other European countries to consider changing their defence doctrine. It seems to me that any such change would at present be unthinkable, so great is our conviction in France of the rightness of the principle of independence, entrenched in public opinion, an independence based on nuclear deterrence which ensures our security and allows us to play our part in confronting world problems. It acts as a central system, and provides a pointer to a possible solution for other European countries.

In this area and perhaps beyond, our European countries must consult each other, must refuse to submit to a timetable imposed from outside and must jointly define a range of policies – as we have been trying to do over several years – covering for example armaments, research, development and, of course, the underlying principles of European defence.

But in speaking of disarmament we must also recall the principles and terms of the Helsinki final act and the measures approved when the thirty-five signatory states met in Madrid. To promote the cause of disarmament is to encourage and develop all kinds of relationships between the member countries of the Warsaw Pact and the countries of the West and, in general, to condemn any actions which can lead to confrontation between the blocs and perpetuate tensions between the countries of Europe. In practical terms, it means demanding that the member states of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should fully implement the provisions of the Helsinki final act and the final document produced in Madrid, and also that they should at once open negotiations on conventional disarmament, without which any debate and any agreement is bound to produce substantial divisions in a Europe which is still in search of itself and which has no need of obstacles in its quest for a European defence system.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I welcome this debate because disarm-

ament is an important subject today and involves the peoples of Europe deeply and, depending on which part of Europe those people live in, in different ways. This report has, however, been superseded by events. After all, it was a report about the annual report of the Council for 1985, which was delayed, and comments on the delay of the 1986 report, but its major theme has been disarmament. There are a number of amendments which we have to consider, some of which I will readily support, others which I will find difficult to support. But at the end of the day my inclination is not to support the report outright, because it has been superseded by events. However, it has given rise to a very topical and valuable debate. These events include not only the Reykjavik conference, the acceptance by Mikhail Gorbachev of the original 1981 NATO proposals supported by President Reagan – Mr. Valleix and others spoke about his initiative; I think those supporting NATO feel the initiative came from them and welcome his support. Now this has been followed up by George Shultz and presents a challenge to Western European governments and its institutions.

Mr. Goerens put forward a useful motion for a recommendation relevant to the short timescale and I had no hesitation in supporting it. Mr. President, the week the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, went to Moscow I summarised my views in a leader in the local paper but they were from the scientific and technological angle and with in mind the challenge the likelihood of disarmament will present to European institutions, whether the European Economic Community, the Council of Europe, but, above all, Western European Union. And this, I think, our ministers must address themselves to tomorrow.

I have said this before, but for some twenty-five years I have been secretary, vice-chairman and, for most of that time, chairman of the British-Soviet parliamentary group. Some five years ago I led a delegation, just after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; it was an all-party British Delegation and protested at the superiority in Soviet conventional and Soviet nuclear arms. That week was a very difficult one, but my bargaining position was undermined by the fact that the leader of the opposition, Michael Foot, and the then shadow foreign secretary, Denis Healey, had given a promise for the next general election, which was to be in 1983, that the socialists would support independent nuclear disarmament – unilateral nuclear disarmament. This is, Mr. President, Neil Kinnock's policy for the British Labour Party today and it has been commented on in the United States of America. I think some of the differences in this Assembly reflect those differences of approach and they were emphasised by John Wilkinson. But in my

Sir John Osborn (continued)

view the strong line of the prime minister and European leaders to support President Reagan and place cruise and Pershing missiles to combat the SS-20 now makes realistic disarmament talks possible in the European theatre and peace through strength has justified itself.

I happened to meet Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev when he came to London in December 1985. So when he became General Secretary I wrote to him and my opposite-number in the British-Soviet group urging recognition of the need to open up a dialogue on economic and industrial matters as well as science and technology with the main European institutions, but especially the Council of Europe, although I was not adverse to the European Parliament. In practice, the Soviet Union had concentrated on bilateral talks with each individual European country. The fact that we can talk together is very important.

Mr. President, now that disarmament is a real issue, I was not surprised to learn of the invitation to the Presidential Committee to visit Moscow. Your report has made interesting reading, particularly the Soviet respect for the European personality.

I would like to end on three points. In the middle of February, the parliamentary and scientific committee of my country visited NATO and SHAPE. This arose because British scientists were conscious that 50% of the research and development budget in Britain was going on defence and also Lord Carrington had, at the December session of the Assembly, suggested co-operation in research and development on defence. Discussions covered defence research and development and the work of the IEPG. This committee met General Rogers but the discussion was more about the technology of verification and disarmament than procurement because it was only a few days after Gorbachev's speech.

The second point: as a member of the British Parliament I have approached ministers and some of their negotiators about the complexity of the very talks that have taken place in Vienna, Geneva and Stockholm. In fact our Secretary-General was at one of those private meetings not so long ago. At one of these meetings I thought the rôle of our defence commanders was surely solely defence and not counting forces of verification. But it was put to me by these professionals that this was not the case. Therefore the Council of Western European Union has to decide the extent to which it will now share with NATO not only defence but the whole question of forces' assessment and verification.

When I was in the Soviet Union I stressed the superiority of all Soviet forces. I got a very

impressive document propounding to me precisely the opposite. But assessment involves high technology as well as political will – I think the will is a function of this Assembly. But in response to John Wilkinson as Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, there are scientific and technological aspects to arms surveillance and arms verification; this involves seismology and satellites and Mr. Fourré has covered this.

But there is a third aspect. The United States has a high level of public expenditure on its own defence and European defence and also an isolationist streak. It wants Western Europe to take a bigger share of its own defence and we in Europe should not forget this. On the other hand, the Soviet economy is virtually in a mess – partly because of its own Marxist economic policies, which I believe Mikhail Gorbachev wishes to change, but mainly because the level of defence expenditure is about double that, in per capita terms, of western countries. I have raised this in IPU debates but I genuinely believe Mikhail Gorbachev wants to meet the apprehensions of Western Europe and therefore we should meet him half way. Therefore arms reductions on a mutual and balanced basis, with adequate verification, are a possibility. What the Western European rôle is has to be determined, but I await the considered response of ministers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Fourré a moment or two ago reminded the Assembly that we are in an almost unprecedented position and that, internationally, developments have been rapid. They certainly have been rapid since the Amadei report surfaced. At that point, it seemed to me that the report was viewed in some circles with animosity, or at least suspicion, though I think to some extent the animosity has to be muted, although the suspicion may still exist in the same quarters. But a few months ago it was possible to argue that we were asking for too much, that the world was not ready for the sort of calls which the report was offering. The report then, as now, presented us with a timely opportunity. Timely, since it provides the chance for members of the Assembly to comment upon the international scene. It is also timely for us to remind Western European countries that they have time and time again voted for multilateral disarmament, multilateral nuclear disarmament and it would be therefore absurdly, perhaps even obscenely, inconsistent if our governments were to appear to be taking a position which was different and in contrast with the international posture which they have adopted for a decade or more.

I had not intended to say very much more than that, in fact, except to point out that the

Mr. Hardy (continued)

report also touches upon the need for reduction in conventional weaponry and it certainly makes a very necessary and relevant reference to the question of chemical warfare and chemical weapon capacity, to which many members have referred and, I think, referred with justification. Those things require very considerable attention.

But I want very briefly to reply to Sir John Osborn, because I think in his valedictory utterance his reference to my own party and its policies does require at least a brief response. I have never been a member of the campaign for nuclear disarmament and Sir John Osborn as a fellow Yorkshire member of parliament will be aware of my position. It is a position shared by many who are prepared to support the Labour Party's policy. It is a policy I support for this reason – a reason that perhaps the Assembly might like to recognise: if we do not have an adequate conventional capacity, then nuclear war is more likely than otherwise. We have taken the view that the British Government, and perhaps other Western European governments, has placed far too high a priority on the nuclear capacity and has neglected the conventional potential. Since my party takes the view that it must at all costs, in order to ensure the survival of humanity, prevent a nuclear war taking place, it has taken the view that a priority should be given to the conventional.

Now the reason for that is very simple. Sir John may rejoice in a decision taken a few days ago in South Yorkshire that a company is going to provide a very large sum of money for a private educational venture. The money is actually coming from a company which purveys the products of Japan and a number of other Far Eastern countries. Those countries have been able to enter our market and make enormous profits and enormous sales in the markets of Western Europe because they have not been investing anything like the same share of their gross national product in and for military purposes. There are lessons to be learned in America and Western Europe about the growth in the economies of countries which do not devote such high priorities to military purposes and it may be that Mr. Gorbachev's initiative is in response to that economic reality. It is an economic reality which should dominate our consideration at the present time and I make no apology for the policies of my party which have been made to appear far more respectable in the last few months than the conservative members of our parliament and our community might like.

But it is not because of party positions, Mr. President, that I make those remarks. It is because I believe that we have, as a result of a Russian initiative, an opportunity to reduce

tension, reduce expenditure and enhance the security of mankind. I am a realist. It will take a lot of time, it will take detailed negotiations, it will take an awful lot of verification and the terms of reference have to be widened. But for us to appear niggardly, for us to appear querulous, for us to appear suspicious and demonstrate that suspicion or seek to put hurdles in front of potential advance will be an act which a future generation, if it has the opportunity, will regard as criminal and irresponsible in the extreme.

I congratulate Mr. Amadei on the opportunity to make those remarks. I believe his report is timely, I certainly hope that it is overwhelmingly endorsed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I must admit to qualified feelings with regard to Mr. Amadei's report. I salute his sustained and worthy efforts in producing for us a remarkable account of all the various moves including especially the strenuous attempt made on the Soviet side to initiate negotiations. All the same, the prolonged and, we might say, almost professional arguments which have dominated the discussion of this report suggest to me that something in the report is not quite right. To me it somehow calls to mind the Echternach procession with its two paces back for every three paces forward – after all we are in Luxembourg! – or a knitting pattern prescribing a series of alternating stitches.

I turn now to some particular points to explain where I depart from the Rapporteur's line of thought. I am very afraid the report is dangerously selective in the quotations made in the draft recommendation. While it reproduces certain phrases used in the North Atlantic Council communiqué of 12th December 1986 – “Ministers welcome the progress at Reykjavik towards agreement on 50% reductions... and pay tribute to the efforts made, etc.”, there is no mention of an essential paragraph which follows this paean of praise by the ministers of the Atlantic Alliance and which reads as follows: “... particularly since reductions in nuclear weapons will increase the importance of removing conventional disparities and eliminating chemical weapons. ... an essential requirement” and I would personally underline those last words, “... for real and enduring stability and security in Europe”. I believe that it is a truly essential requirement.

Let us sum up the situation. In the first place it is a fact that the credibility of nuclear deterrence is wearing thin, whatever the speed of the process. I remind you that the intermediate weapons are American, and if the Americans are determined to reach agreement with the Soviet

Mr. Close (continued)

Union on their elimination they will go ahead despite our protests and our eloquence.

But what does European public opinion expect of us at this crucial session? It expects us to decide our position, and if, as has been foreseeable for some time, the importance of nuclear deterrence is diminishing, public opinion expects us to take measures to co-ordinate our actions, strengthen our conventional forces, possibly conduct discussions about balanced reductions on both sides, but in any case it expects us to guarantee our security. I am afraid we have so far failed to reach a common position, but tomorrow afternoon we shall perhaps have the reply of the Council of Ministers.

Listening – just this once! – to my very right-wing neighbour a moment ago I seemed to be hearing the notes of Munich with Muscovite overtones, and I was reminded of what I lived through at the end of the 1930s when persistent lethargy and laxity led us to Munich, the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, Danzig and the second world war. It is important to remind ourselves of the lessons of history.

My conclusion is brief. I cannot subscribe to the recommendations of a report which, despite the praiseworthy efforts of its author, in my opinion fails entirely to meet the demands of European security and serves even less the search for a European identity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Beer.

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. Amadei's report has had a hard time, for understandable reasons. Firstly, Mr. Amadei had the unfortunate experience of seeing current events constantly overtake the latest version of his report, and secondly, and I say this in the friendliest possible way, we find the report paints a somewhat one-sided picture here and there. The recommendation in its original form would not in fact have been acceptable to many of the members of the Liberal Group. But in the meantime it has undergone two thorough revisions in this Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and I am one of those who are able to endorse the tenor of the recommendation now that these changes have been made, though some minor improvements are still possible here and there.

What the new version of the recommendation must undoubtedly reveal is that we in Western Europe will become more vulnerable if the partial denuclearisation of our part of the world is actually carried out. We shall be more vulnerable militarily, and we shall therefore be more vulnerable politically as well. This will most certainly be true if short-range missiles and/or

chemical weapons are not covered by the negotiations, but even if they are, we shall be far more vulnerable. After all, the Warsaw Pact will still be vastly superior in conventional forces, which, unlike NATO's forces, are offensive. In short, it is we Western Europeans who will be running the risks if this procedure is adopted, not the Russians or the United States.

On the other hand, we must also realise that this is a unique opportunity for doing something about the arms race. Within a broader historical context we must do everything humanly possible to ensure that this opportunity is not wasted. We must therefore be willing to take something of a risk in the short-term, but not with blind faith in the good intentions of the Russians and their allies. Their country, a dictatorship which exposes its own people to the terror of the KGB, treats dissidents as psychiatric patients, regards anyone wanting to leave the country as a traitor and commits the most dreadful crimes in a country like Afghanistan, certainly cannot be trusted. It can be trusted only when the Berlin wall disappears, when believers are allowed to hold prayer meetings without being arrested and when Afghan children can pick up toys without being crippled for life. A country should be trusted only when it has a free press and when its judiciary is genuinely independent. So there must be no blind faith on our part, but we should risk a first step, while watching carefully to see how the Warsaw Pact countries react in the areas of political détente and human rights.

To come back to Mr. Amadei's report, if the recommendation is adopted in its amended form, there will be talk of a discrepancy between the report and the recommendation – the tone of the report will be different from the tone of the recommendation. But we are not voting on the report in this Assembly, we are voting on the recommendation in its final form. We think it necessary, Mr. President, to point this out and to say that how we vote on the recommendation must certainly not be construed as a complete endorsement of everything in the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I would endorse the last speaker's words when he talked about trust and mentioned the Soviet Union that invades places like Afghanistan. I think perhaps it is a little humbling for all of us, or ought to be, that while we are talking in this way about ensuring peace and security for ourselves, there is a country that invades countries like Afghanistan. They are, at this very minute while we are sitting here, bombing and killing the population of a non-aligned country in Asia. It is not just a matter of people who behave like this, they are behaving like this at the present time, and I make no

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

apology in asking all colleagues please to remember that we are talking about a country which is conducting at this very moment an aggressive war of a particularly brutal sort against a small non-aligned country.

Secondly, in regard to his final remark about the way we are voting, of course, particularly if the amendments are carried, it will be a very different consequence of the explanatory memorandum. In the past it has always been difficult because, although technically we are voting for the recommendation, we have to bear in mind the material as a whole, all the thinking in it, not just the points that have been gained by committee discussion, but the thinking behind the whole report. And that certainly causes a number of my colleagues and myself considerable anxiety.

The Rapporteur began today by saying, quite truthfully, that he had been very patient and had had a difficult time. He and I have done our best, I think, to collaborate and I thank him for what he did. He was good enough also to express gratitude to myself and those who think like I do. But I think we must put it on the record that in this kind of Assembly, where there are no absolute majorities and no whips, if rapporteurs are to get reports through easily they have to get a consensus that is acceptable to a substantial majority. Otherwise, if they do not, they are going to have to go through the experience that Mr. Amadei has had to go through and this is the background to it. There is always the danger that the longer a contested report takes for discussion, the more often it is referred back to committee. Of course, it is more likely – as has happened today – to become increasingly overtaken by events, irrespective of what the original motivation was. There is no politics in that because obviously the longer a discussion goes on the more situations can develop which make the situation different and that has happened today. I say quite quickly that I now think that this document, without political considerations from either side, is very largely irrelevant in the context of the situation as we see it today, whether on the left, the right or the centre.

Europe, disarmament, the relationship with the United States, with the Soviet Union is not what it was when Mr. Amadei first planned his report and he knows that, and I know that; we are living in a very different atmosphere to when he first took on this task.

The main theme of what I want to say refers back to my colleague, Mr. Hardy. I think I quote him rightly – I must be very careful on this – I think he said we pay too much attention at the moment to nuclear defence and too little to con-

ventional. This I think is symptomatic, if I may say so, of the confusion in ministers' and others' minds throughout Europe, America for all I know, and the Soviet Union too. There is no indication in history that merely getting a bigger and bigger defence capacity comparable with that of your potential enemies produces peace. I have done a little research before I came here. We had the war in 1914, not when there was an enormous majority in favour of the central powers of Germany, Austria and Hungary. In fact, France, Britain and Russia fighting at that time had more conventional forces than our opponents at that time, and we still had a war. In 1939, if we actually look at the armaments that we all possessed at that time, Nazi Germany – greater Germany – had at that time rather fewer forces than the allies that went against it: Britain and France. Yet, we had a war. So trying to match up conventional weapons and say that this will bring peace – and this is what distresses me so much about actually saying that what we have to do in Europe is to spend a lot more money and build up our conventional forces until we get nearer to the level of the Russian forces – may do all sorts of things, but it has not brought peace in the past, when we did have parity. So why we have got bemused into thinking that, because we undertake this action, we make war unlikely is quite beyond my perception.

Mr. President, there is only one consideration that we should be thinking of and that is deterrence, not defence. Deterrence is the name of the game and ought to be. We ought not to be thinking in terms of whether we could fight a successful defence war – if one takes place – we all ought to be thinking of how we should prevent that war ever taking place and the only lesson we have is deterrence, and the example we have is poison gas in the last war. When there was an element of deterrence, poison gas was not used. It was not a matter of some people had a little more poison gas or a little less poison gas, it was an element of deterrence. That is what is guiding people like myself into thinking that we do not want to denuclearise Europe if it simply means another conventional arms race to try to get to a situation which failed dismally to prevent war in 1939 and, unless we are careful, will prove dismally useless in the future.

Under these circumstances, since this debate is taking place about a paper which, with all courtesy to the Rapporteur, is outdated, I want to listen to the further amendments that are going to be moved today from both sides and then come, with my colleagues, to a decision. But I say now, irrespective of the outcome of these amendments, I myself shall find it very hard to give my support to a document which I regard – with the best wishes of all to the Rapporteur and thanks for what he has been trying to do – as

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

being irrelevant and outdated in the context of today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we are today debating the report which is intended as the Assembly's reply to the Council's thirty-first annual report. It rather sounds as if on this fine sunny day we are discussing the New Year's Day weather report and trying to draw conclusions from it. This problem has been created not by our excellent Rapporteur but by our working methods, and we should perhaps take this opportunity to consider how we can adapt our working methods more quickly to the practical situation.

We have, ladies and gentlemen, witnessed an interesting development in recent weeks. After decades of seeing the Soviet Union not only holding back but usually opposing any disarmament proposal, the news we are now receiving from the Soviet Union is favourable, and I feel that the first thing we should do is to welcome this. For us in this Assembly it is all-important to remember that before the West's arms build-up there was considerable controversy as to whether any disarmament negotiations at all with the Soviet Union would be possible after this build-up, or whether it would in fact result in the Soviet Union's moving back to the negotiating table of its own accord.

In my opinion, the fact that the Soviet Government and the Soviet party leaders have been making very positive signals in favour of disarmament in recent weeks and months has shown how important it was for the democratic countries of Europe and our allies across the Atlantic to carry on jointly with the arms build-up, because all of us must now be certain that without it the Soviet Union would have continued to arm, without offering to negotiate. The joint approach adopted by the democratic countries in the arms race should lead on to a joint approach in the talks with the Soviet Union. In other words, we should continue in future negotiations what we have begun together, so proving Henry Kissinger wrong in his recent comment on disarmament that the democrats run the risk of falling victim to blackmail they have talked themselves into.

Ladies and gentlemen, we all want disarmament. But we know equally well that weapons alone are neither the crucial nor the dangerous factor; the question is one of intent: whether weapons are kept for purposes of defence or attack. So what is crucial in the first instance is a basically peaceful outlook, and no country can

prove it has peace in mind, ladies and gentlemen, unless it not only puts forward proposals on disarmament but also and above all backs them up by approving the verification of disarmament. And on this, to be quite frank, I completely disagree with some representatives, particularly members of the British Labour Party, who felt we should not be so sceptical. I believe scepticism has its place at the beginning of the deliberations, and thereafter, not simply when some control station or other has been set up but when it is actually possible to check up on one's suspicions on the spot – only then can we accept the existence of the peaceful attitude that is undoubtedly necessary if we want to make any progress, not only towards disarmament in the technical sense but also in the disarmament of the various concepts of society.

Ladies and gentlemen, though I say this with conscious scepticism after seventy years of Soviet imperialism, I am pleased that for the first time the Soviet Government has talked about the zero option for long-range intermediate missiles. But here again we must realise that it has not yet been possible to scrutinise the offers made so far, because the Soviet Government has not yet given all the necessary details.

I must say that, for example, Dr. Jörg Kastl, German Ambassador to Moscow for many years and an expert on the Soviet Union, told us once again only last weekend, and I quote: "So far, Gorbachev's declarations of intent are more dramatic than the reality." I feel we must bear this in mind when we discuss the overall situation. Nevertheless, I hope we will very soon have a solution, particularly in the case of long-range intermediate missiles, because this was, of course, a problem where the arms race was concerned, and it would be a good thing if we had the opportunity of actually bringing peace a little bit closer with fewer weapons.

But, ladies and gentlemen, we also know that there is a twofold problem, in that the Soviet armies with their conventional weapons are far stronger than the NATO countries, the countries of WEU. And to behave as if we could dispense with the nuclear shield without a single doubt, at the same time ignoring the Soviet Union's conventional weapons, would, I believe, be excessively naive, so if we are to discuss joint disarmament, we must also discuss conventional disarmament, which is just as crucial.

Ladies and gentlemen, as a child I experienced the horrors of conventional war. I saw the incendiary bombs raining down on us, and yet I know that by comparison that represented, I will not say child's play, but a great deal less in fire power and destructive power than conventional weapons produce today. Hence my urgent appeal that nothing should be overlooked in the disarmament talks we want to hold – that these

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

powerful, these lethal, these murderous weapons should be included in the negotiations.

Mr. President, I should like to introduce a final item into the debate. Such wide-ranging negotiations on disarmament as have now been announced can only be conducted with a government which we know to be secure in office and capable of sustaining proposals which represent a complete departure from statements and practices stretching back over many years. And here again I should like to quote Ambassador Kastl. He writes: "However much of a dove Mikhail Gorbachev may seem to us, his closest advisers are very hawk-like in their definition of the general line to be taken vis-à-vis the international class enemy." I am not saying that this statement should be accepted by everyone, but I do think we should regard it as the statement of an expert, an admittedly sceptical expert, and take it into account in our deliberations.

It would be nice if Mikhail Gorbachev and the present majority of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were to take a step towards giving communism a more human face. But I feel we should not just take such statements, however striking, at face value. We should, if you will allow me such a comment, amend the old proverb "One swallow does not make a summer" and say that while we rejoice in opportunities for disarmament, "One Gorbachev does not make peace."

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Amadei's report is in fact being used for a political controversy under which it has, I am sorry to say, so far suffered badly. I will therefore consider the controversy, not the fact that much of the report is out of date, for which, as the previous speaker said, the Rapporteur is in no way to blame. The more serious problem is that a report is now in dispute although it goes no further than past reports adopted by the Assembly. This dispute is, in my opinion, partly due to the fact that there are now greater opportunities for disarmament than ever before. Never since 1917 has there been a Soviet leadership so willing to disarm and now that we suddenly have these practical opportunities, we in the West must also stand by our own former initiatives. But some people no longer want this, because they did not mean their earlier proposals seriously. In other words, we are slowly approaching the moment of truth, when we must show just how serious we are about disarmament.

That is the issue here. The West - as I will show with a few examples - has constantly imposed a number of preconditions. In 1981 it imposed the condition of the zero-zero option. The NATO twofold decision had a far more restricted condition attached. It says that the West might refrain from an arms build-up if the Soviet Union kept the number of SS-20s down to the 1979 level. Then came the zero-zero option, which, strictly speaking, goes beyond the NATO twofold decision. Then, all of a sudden, triggered off by a fundamental change of course, the Soviet Union accepted the zero-zero option. Then came the West's next reservation: short-range missiles. Now the Soviet Union is willing to dismantle the short-range missiles, this having been previously agreed by Mr. Shultz and the Soviet Foreign Minister in Moscow in recent weeks. And suddenly the word goes round that Europe would be denuclearised, deprived of its protective nuclear shield.

The American Foreign Secretary himself has denied this. There would still be over 4 000 nuclear weapons left in Western Europe if both medium- and short-range missiles were withdrawn. There would still be aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, and there would still be the Poseidon launchers. There would still be tactical nuclear weapons. There would still be the British and French systems, which will have a larger number of missiles by the end of the decade than the present number of Soviet SS-20s - and those are modern weapons. All that would still be there. Then there was the point that, if Europe were to be denuclearised, it would face the Soviet Union's allegedly enormous conventional superiority. Quite apart from the fact that conventional disarmament takes much longer because it is far more complicated, if everything were to be postponed until a conventional treaty was signed, what, I ask myself, would the next reservation be, when it came to finding practical solutions?

I am not now referring to everyone who may have been sceptical, but the nucleus of resistance is clearly discernible and far more obviously evinced here. And then there are the political arguments: for instance General Close's reference to a new Munich. When is an agreement with the Soviet Union likely to be concluded, if not under this changed leadership? Will it only be possible when the Soviet system has been abandoned? That seems to be the only logical conclusion. That means disarmament is absolutely impossible until something has changed.

If the present proposals were implemented, the Soviet Union would be giving up more missiles than the West, because it has more medium- and short-range missiles. If it gives up more than the West, how can the West be weakened? I find this argument completely incomprehensible. How can the West be more vulnerable? That is

Mr. Scheer (continued)

impossible. On the contrary, the British and French systems, which the British and French Governments also declared, after the last but one world summit in Williamsburg, to be part of the western deterrence, would actually be the only long-range systems left in Europe. The West would become stronger. In other words, it is quite conceivable that, where nuclear missiles alone are concerned, the Soviet Union would be taking a greater risk than the West.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has dropped one precondition after another. To make it easier for us in Western Europe to include the British and French systems in some form, it has dropped the SDI package. We really will make no progress if one side imposes more and more conditions after the previous conditions have been met, until the other side feels that nothing will come of its efforts, no matter what it may offer. The essential problem cannot be solved, Mr. Reddemann, by saying that we all want disarmament. The essential problem lies elsewhere.

In my opinion, Sir Frederic Bennett highlighted the focal point far more clearly and, I would say, more honestly. The essence of the problem is this: are we or are we not intent on retaining every form of nuclear deterrence? I do not believe that Sir Frederic Bennett is on the whole questioning the willingness of the Soviet leadership. He is afraid that too much nuclear deterrence would be lost. That is the main problem, and the NATO twofold decision was indeed a cover for two different positions. One was the arms control position, as officially presented, the other the gap in deterrence that was to have been filled with medium-range missiles. In the latter case it is absolutely immaterial whether there are Soviet medium-range missiles or not.

The proponents of the deterrence gap theory hid behind those who wanted arms control, hoping that their demands could never be met by the Soviet Union. They could not imagine the Soviet Union dismantling all its SS-20 missiles, the latest and most modern missiles it has at present. Now, all at once, the idea is becoming feasible, and the real background to the opposition in the West is coming to light. They cling to the logic of deterrence, which has increasingly resulted in the West taking an irrational view, but justifying it with mathematical logic. And somehow or other the fragile structure of deterrence must match up theoretically, with so many short-range and medium-range missiles, even long-range missiles, whatever the cost, not least in money terms, or in terms of missed opportunities for disarmament.

I am firmly convinced that those who are now opposed to the zero-zero option for short-range missiles were in fact opposed to a reduction in medium-range missiles, but were unable to prevent it because the West had been demanding it for too long. They were against it because they stood by the deterrence gap theory. Now that they are no longer able to prevent this, they are absolutely determined to solve the same problem with short-range missiles, even if it means increasing the number of these missiles. This school of thought, which is also represented here, prefers an increase in western short-range missiles, even if this means eastern short-range missiles remaining in place, to the reduction of short-range missiles to zero in both East and West. Anything else bypasses the problem to some extent, insofar as other suggestions have been made here. And some people here, thank God, have been honest enough to say so.

So the "right to match" Warsaw Pact numbers of short-range missiles, called for in the recommendation, which was the committee's compromise formula, is in the final analysis the opposite of the zero-zero option, judging at least by what has emerged in the last two weeks. The situation here has therefore changed very considerably, because all those who are opposed to the zero-zero option for short-range missiles and quote the "right to match" really mean an increase in the number of short-range missiles.

Secretary of State George Shultz has put this in so many words. He advocates, rightly, in my opinion – it is in our own interests too – the zero-zero option for short-range missiles as well, warning the European governments who may not want to join in that if they do not agree to the zero-zero option for short-range missiles as well, they must now agree to an arms build-up. That is the dilemma. I believe it is in our own interests to support the zero-zero option for medium-range and short-range missiles, because these are weapons that could destroy the European continent, and we must do the same for zero-zero options relating to other weapons where this arises. At the moment, these are the two things we are concerned with, and that is the dilemma I wanted to underline.

Sir Frederic, there is one point I think you should consider. How long do we intend to subscribe to a theory of deterrence that is our economic ruination, because the weapons are becoming increasingly complex and increasingly expensive? How much longer? Might the fact that we have had peace in Europe for so long be due not only to nuclear weapons but also to the existence of two blocs of roughly equal strength, which no longer pose the serious problem of balance in Europe, as was the case in the last century, when four or five European superpowers faced each other, unable to agree? The existence of these two blocs has a more

Mr. Scheer (continued)

stabilising effect than individual weapons systems.

(Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?...

Mr. AMADEI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I will be very brief, as I do not wish to try your patience. I simply wish to thank everyone who has taken part in the debate whether they have spoken in favour or have accepted the report less enthusiastically. As I said at the outset, this has been a very troublesome report and has had to be looked at every day because of the events which have followed in such quick succession that the Rapporteur could not even follow them. As I said to begin with, even the present text can be regarded as partly out of date because of what has happened. I think that we must accept this however. I am neither a sceptic nor an optimist; I wish to be pragmatic and realistic. I am not greatly interested in what is being said by those who believe everything that Mr. Gorbachev says is true or by others who doubt his every word. What is important is to make progress.

This report is not accepted with enthusiasm by anybody but on average is acceptable and satisfactory to almost everybody and this is the purpose of the report. As I said several times in committee, I preferred the first report which was more my personal report and I stated formally in committee that I was not the Rapporteur for a group but for the whole committee and as such had to resign myself to the amendments in order to reach a compromise acceptable to the very great majority of the committee and therefore of the Assembly. I hope, therefore, that I succeeded in doing this. I think that the present text could be further improved later but that we should now put a full stop to it.

I wish to thank the Christian Democrat Group, because early this morning they asked me to wait again before approving the report because, as was argued with good reason, it could be overtaken by events. I wish to thank the christian democrat members for not persisting in this attitude because in my view it would have been scandalous to refer it back again after a first, second and third time. This was a bit like making fun of the Rapporteur. I think, therefore, that the first task can now be regarded as completed, with the approval of the very great majority; this will not be the last task and we shall see another report in another year. I wish the next rapporteur more luck than I have had.

I am at the disposal of all members who have tabled amendments. I shall reply to them in turn and I do not wish to waste any more of the Assembly's time except to thank all members for their support and interest and for what they have done to help in having my report approved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Rapporteur. Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak on Mr. Amadei's report?

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The reason why this report has been discussed at such length and given rise to so many misunderstandings and so much rejection is probably that while it was being drawn up a series of political changes was taking place, due to the Soviet Union's constantly renewed efforts either to cause uncertainty in the West by being more precise about past proposals or putting forward new ones, or to introduce new ideas, possibly based on better knowledge. The fact that the Rapporteur has suffered as a result of these developments should be a lesson to us all, because it shows how some uncertainty – as the last few speeches have revealed – has been introduced into the whole of the western camp by proposals from the Soviet Union.

We of WEU's parliamentary Assembly must be more critical of both sides, both of the Soviet Union and in relation to the Council, which awaits our proposals, our recommendations and our advice. And if, as Mr. Scheer says, this debate represents the moment of truth, he has himself contributed something to that moment of truth by saying, as regards certain compromises that have been reached, how he would like to see the resulting consensus interpreted and understood.

In other words, the point at issue is mutual distrust, the exacerbation of the conflicts within the western camp following Mr. Gorbachev's proposals, which we do not expect to be put forward and discussed in depth until the Geneva negotiations. So far the Soviet Union has been highly successful in testing the western camp by making these proposals, and we are discussing them among ourselves, emotionally may be, but always sustained by the common will to do the best we can for our security.

Consequently, the amendments before us are probably controversial in themselves, but this too we must deal with among ourselves. On the committee's behalf I should like to thank the Rapporteur for his efforts. The committee has endeavoured – as the debate has shown – to do justice to its theme. The absence of agreement in the committee on every issue is simply due to the fact that the two political camps represented here in Western European Union showed their

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

colours most clearly during this contribution to the disarmament debate.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We shall now take the vote on the draft recommendation on disarmament, Document 1090. Twenty amendments have been tabled to this text and they will be considered in the following order: Amendments 11, 12, 13, 16 and 17 by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson, 1 by Mr. Antoni, 2 by Mr. Gianotti, 8 by Mr. Scheer, 3 by Mr. Rubbi, 18 by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson, 4 by Mr. Rubbi, 15 by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson, 9 by Mr. Bassinet, 20 by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson, 5 by Mr. Antoni, 6 by Mr. Gianotti, 10 by Mr. Bassinet, 19 by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson, 7 by Mr. Antoni and 14 by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson.

At the same time, I ask you to take note of the following information on procedure: if Amendment 12 is agreed to, Amendment 13 falls; if Amendment 17 is agreed to, Amendment 1 falls; if Amendment 8 is agreed to, Amendments 3, 18 and 4 fall; if Amendment 9 is agreed to, Amendments 20 and 5 fall; if Amendment 6 is agreed to, Amendments 10 and 19 fall; if Amendment 10 is agreed to, Amendment 19 falls.

We shall start with Amendment 11 tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson which reads:

11. In the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave out paragraph *(i)* and insert:

“(i) Recalling that Europe’s security is based on the deterrence exercised by all the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance thanks to their capacity, in spite of Warsaw Pact superiority in many fields, to prevent any potential adversary undertaking an aggression in the hope that the confrontation will remain at a level chosen by him;”.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order. All these amendments under my name are, of course, not just a personal production, they represent joint efforts to get a consensus within the Federated Group and this morning we decided within the group that Mr. Wilkinson should be entrusted with the task of moving all the amendments, I having done it the other day in committee. He is now entrusted on behalf of the Federated Group as a whole to move the amendments that would otherwise be

in my name, so perhaps in future you would call Mr. Wilkinson rather than myself and I now ask you to call him for this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson to move Amendment 11.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, Amendment 11 tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and others is perfectly straightforward. It would, in the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph *(i)* and insert the words on the order paper which members have. Exactly the same amendment was tabled at the Defence Committee meeting and unfortunately was not carried because the vote was tied. I feel that the wording of the existing paragraph *(i)* is exceptionally weak and inadequate to begin a report of this importance. The amendment outlines the fact that the Atlantic Alliance’s deterrent is a spectrum of capabilities and that our deterrence is based on the principle of flexible, graduated response. And those simple, clear, strategic facts need to be enunciated in an unambiguous way and in a more adequate fashion than in the existing wording. For those reasons, Mr. President, I would put this amendment to the Assembly for its approval.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee’s opinion?...

Mr. AMADEI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I would like to point out, Mr. President, that the opinions I will be giving on these amendments will be solely my own because the committee has not had a chance to discuss them. I thought it was right and proper to say that and to leave the Assembly free to decide. However, paragraph *(i)* in the preamble to the draft recommendation, as it happens, reflects the wording proposed by Sir Frederic Bennett for the first part and approved by the committee. As to the second part, I asked Sir Frederic to withdraw it and he agreed. I make the same request today and ask the Assembly to keep the first text as it was approved and Sir Frederic and Mr. Wilkinson to withdraw their amendment as they did in committee. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I made it quite clear to the Rapporteur at the meeting that I would not withdraw and we all abstained in the vote at the end. I was asked by Mr. Amadei whether I would withdraw and I say the answer is no, because we all said that what we did in committee would have no effect at all on how we would act in the plenary Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It was my impression that Sir Frederic wished to speak to

The President (continued)

withdraw his amendment, as he did use the word "withdraw". In those circumstances I was entitled to call him, but the result is not what I anticipated. I maintain that in good faith I was right in my interpretation of the Rules of Procedure, but so that the debates on the amendments may be conducted properly, I repeat that I shall now call only the speaker supporting the amendment, the speaker against and the committee Chairman or Rapporteur. If, after hearing the committee's opinion, the author wishes to withdraw his amendment, he is to raise his hand and say "I withdraw".

I shall now put Amendment 11 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 11 is agreed to.

Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have tabled Amendment 12 which reads:

12. In the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (iv) and insert:

"(iv) Considering that Western Europe may be compelled in the fairly near future to assume more responsibility for the requirements of its security but that in present circumstances this is ensured only thanks to the presence of American forces and armaments in Europe;"

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I speak to Amendment 12, which is another amendment which was put to the committee and, most unfortunately, was not carried because the vote was tied.

I regard this amendment as particularly important. It raises the fact that Western Europe may be compelled in the fairly near future to assume more responsibility for the requirements of its security. I believe that factor is fundamental to our deliberations; we would not be having this special Assembly were that fact not to be true. And also it draws attention to the necessity of maintaining American forces and armaments in Europe. In view of the problems which our American friends have – financial, political and otherwise – I think this is especially important as well. It is, of course, or was, the subject of the talks between Prime Minister Thatcher and Prime Minister Chirac in London. So I think this particular amendment which would leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble and insert a new wording is timely, apposite and fully deserves the support of the Assembly. I beg to move.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer to speak against the amendment.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The paragraph (iv) we are concerned with here is intended to reflect a common position and responsibility as regards disarmament policy. Although the text that is now to be replaced is well worth reading, the crucial point is what is to be omitted, namely joint responsibility for disarmament policy. This amendment therefore represents an attempt to turn a recommendation on disarmament into a recommendation on deterrence, with as little reference to disarmament policy as possible. It must therefore be opposed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?...

Mr. AMADEI (*Italy*) (Translation). – This wording, to my mind, is in open contradiction with the recommendation and for that reason I am against.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – As there was a more or less tied vote in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and we cannot now discuss the various amendments in committee, I can only give my personal opinion. I do not personally agree with Mr. Scheer's dramatic view and would consider this amendment to be a clarification.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I now put the amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 12 is agreed to.

Amendment 12 having been agreed to, Amendment 13 falls.

I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – How many votes were actually cast in each case?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As you know, Mr. Hardy, I am always prepared to do what is asked of me, but you are a dedicated defender of the Rules of Procedure, and it is my belief that, unless expressly decided otherwise, the numbers of votes on amendments taken by show of hands are not communicated. However, as it is your wish, I shall do so next time.

Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have tabled Amendment 16 which reads:

16. In paragraph (v), line 3, of the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave

The President (continued)

out "both" and from "deterrence" to end and add:

"whose security should be stabilised by appropriate and verifiable disarmament measures which are subject to agreement;"

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Amendment 16, Mr. President, is a relatively straightforward one and I hope that the Assembly will not regard it as controversial. In paragraph (v), line 3, of the preamble, leave out the word "both" after "reiterates" in the English text and then after "deterrence", line 3, leave out from "based" to the end of the paragraph, and add the words on the order paper.

The existing words in the final three lines of paragraph (v) I think are convoluted, long-winded and unnecessarily complicated. I find the wording that we propose more succinct, the meaning and objects are the same and I would hope that for general reasons of convenience and good drafting the Assembly will accept this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller to speak against the amendment.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I am against this amendment. I do not think the text is convoluted. I think that the wording of the paragraph itself includes aspects of the problem which it is quite right that we should emphasise. It adds to the attempts at solution which we are making and in addition to that I think that the amendment itself uses a concept which I think is at least doubtful, because I do not think you can stabilise security by appropriate and verified disarmament measures which are subject to agreement. I think that the paragraph itself adequately emphasises, adequately portrays and conveys what it is that the Rapporteur is trying to do.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?...

Mr. AMADEI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I find that the present text, that in the recommendation, is the same as the wording in the NATO communiqué. I copied that communiqué word for word and I would therefore ask the members to accept the text as it is.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put Amendment 16 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 16 is agreed to by 30 votes to 21.

Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have tabled Amendment 17 which reads:

17. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation and insert:

"(ix) Recalling in this context that the Soviet Union maintains more conventional forces than it requires for its defence and that their offensive force structures optimised to perform aggressive operations must be perceived as a potential threat to the member countries by the member nations of WEU;"

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I think the important factor, Mr. President, in moving this amendment, which would replace existing paragraph (ix) in the preamble with new (ix) whose words are on the order paper, is to bring home to the Assembly the fact that the Soviet Union maintains far more conventional forces than it requires for its defence and that their exercise manoeuvres, their planning and their strategy are geared specifically to aggressive operations that could be a potential threat to the member countries of this organisation. We could, Mr. President, become so preoccupied with our understandable desire to achieve a measure of mutual balanced nuclear disarmament that we forget this overriding fact that there is a massive conventional threat that will still have to be counted. So great is that threat and so dominant should it be in our thinking that it is our belief that the wording on the order paper in this amendment deserves to be accepted by the Assembly. Thank you, Sir.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The main point is always to check what is to be omitted in favour of the proposed new text, and this proposal suggests in practice that the statement on a ban on all chemical weapons should be replaced. What I said just now about another amendment applies equally to this one. I am opposed to it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?...

Mr. AMADEI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this paragraph (ix) in the preamble, which is in the text, is word for word the amendment tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett in committee where I accepted it. Now I am asked to change what was done in committee and my answer is no.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Beer on a point of order.

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am not entirely sure that this is a point of order. The vote poses a problem as the text of the amendment relates to a subject different from that of the text which it replaces, that is to say the two are not incompatible. I wish to propose that a vote be taken on the amendment and that it then be decided whether it replaces the existing text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As you know, we cannot consider verbal amendments to amendments. They have to be tabled. We are obliged to follow the Rules of Procedure, and I think that the only solution for those like yourself who have some difficulty is to choose one of the three voting alternatives. This is one of the questions which should be considered by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to give added flexibility to debates. I personally would be in favour.

I shall now put Amendment 17 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 17 is agreed to by 31 votes to 23.

Amendment 17 having been agreed to, Amendment 1 falls.

Mr. Gianotti and others have tabled Amendment 2 which reads:

2. In paragraph 1, lines 2 and 3, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “to support the United States” and insert “to support active participation by European countries”.

Is there no one to move Mr. Gianotti's amendment?...

The amendment is not moved.

Mr. Scheer and Mr. Stoffelen have tabled Amendment 8 which reads:

8. In paragraph 1 (a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from “combined with the simultaneous withdrawal of shorter-range INF” to the end of the paragraph and insert “and combined with the following disarmament of all American and Soviet shorter-range INF in Europe;”.

I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The purpose of this amendment is to refer to the political debate within NATO and between East and West since the meeting of the Soviet Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of State in Moscow and the preliminary agreements on the possibility of dismantling short-range as well as other missiles. We propose that the passage which refers to a “right to match” in the case of short-range missiles should be replaced by a clear statement

endorsing a follow-on agreement on the zero-zero option for short-range missiles with a range of over 500 km as well as for other missiles.

I would add to what I said just now in my contribution to the debate: this amendment reflects the avowed position not only of the Soviet Union but above all of the American Secretary of State. It is also the avowed position of the Federal German Government from today. It was in any case the avowed position of the Federal German Foreign Minister and of my party in the Federal Republic of Germany, to name but a few in this context. I name them because the debate stems from the only country in which short-range missiles are deployed and would be dismantled. I would point out that anyone who opposes this amendment will almost certainly also be opposing the government in this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I wish as strongly as I am able to urge the Assembly to reject this amendment which I believe to be fundamentally extremely dangerous. The wording in the existing text “the right for NATO to match Warsaw Pact numbers in such missiles if those negotiations fail;” are in fact the words of my own prime minister, the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher. If we were to see these negotiations end up with a disparity, perpetuated, with us unable to match a preponderance on the other side, we would be more vulnerable, less secure, weaker, and our peoples would be more at risk at the end of this process than at the beginning.

For these reasons, I think it would be extremely dangerous to accept Mr. Scheer's amendment and I am sure the Assembly will note that there is a much more responsible amendment, No. 18, which I think is commendable if, as we all hope, No. 8 is defeated. I urge that this amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?...

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – This amendment, Mr. President, is undoubtedly a central element of the question of faith that finds expression here. I personally recommend that this amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put Amendment 8 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The President (continued)

Amendment 8 is negated by 33 votes to 15 with 5 abstentions.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – It should be made clear that the President does not have to give the number of votes. You gave in to Mr. Hardy; there are other members in the Assembly and I do suggest that we now ask you to go back to the normal procedure of announcing the result and not giving the figures.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In these circumstances the final decision rests with the Assembly, as it is the good intentions of the chair which have been democratically challenged. I therefore ask the Assembly whether or not I should announce the numbers of votes by show of hands on the amendments.

(The President continued in English)

I know I can give a ruling myself without having a vote by the Assembly on this point, but apparently it is a question on political grounds and I want to have clearly the view of the Assembly. It is my duty as President.

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – When you replied to Mr. Hardy's request, you said the rules did not require the numbers to be given unless a request was made. A request was made and you followed that. It does not say that it has to be a request from the Assembly as a whole. It is as you put it. It was a request from a member. Now, if in fact it is not a request from a member but has to be followed up by a vote, then of course the point made by Sir Geoffrey is valid.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I understand Mr. Hardy's motion to refer to the amendment on which he intervened, and I am similarly prepared to accede to Sir Geoffrey's request to stop giving the numbers unless someone else asks for them.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In view of the importance of these amendments, I believe the results of the voting should continue to be announced.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Opinions are divided. You do no more than acknowledge a fact of which all, including your President, are well aware. In the circumstances I maintain my position.

Mr. Rubbi and others have tabled Amendment 3 which reads:

3. In paragraph 1(a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out "combined with the simultaneous withdrawal of shorter-range INF from Czechoslovakia and East Germany; the right for NATO to match Warsaw Pact numbers in such missiles if those negotiations fail" and insert "in the context of an undertaking to withdraw immediately the shorter-range INF missiles stationed in Czechoslovakia and East Germany".

Is there no one to move the amendment?...

The amendment is not moved.

Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have tabled Amendment 18 which reads:

18. In paragraph 1(a), line 5, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out after "fail" to the end of the paragraph and add:

"and make effective progress in the negotiations aiming at greater stability and crisis control in the conventional field (MBFR) and which should take place on the whole of Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural mountains;".

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The Assembly having rejected the Scheer-Stoffelen amendment, I think it is important that it now pass Amendment 18, leaving out after "fail", that is, the concluding phrase of sub-paragraph (a) to paragraph 1 in the draft recommendation proper, because the important thing is to achieve stability and crisis control in the conventional field so that the negotiations at a nuclear level do not precipitate any instability or tendency for outbreaks of conflict in our continent. I think this amendment would enhance the sub-paragraph and should be adopted by the Assembly. I beg to move.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – As the amendments that have been adopted have now completely distorted the report on disarmament, there is absolutely no point in making any further attempt to improve it in some way. The destruction of the report has already been achieved. I am therefore opposed to this and the other amendments tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?...

Mr. AMADEI (*Italy*) (Translation). – NATO is not asking for links with conventional negotia-

Mr. Amadei (continued)

tions and therefore there is no point in putting them in here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 18 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 18 is agreed to.

Amendment 18 having been agreed to, Amendment 4 falls.

Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have tabled Amendment 15 which reads:

15. In paragraph 1 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (c).

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I seek to move Amendment 15 in the name of Sir Frederic Bennett and myself to leave out sub-paragraph (c) to paragraph 1 in the draft recommendation proper. This is, I think, an extremely important one. I do not believe that wording as sloppy as this should be contained in a recommendation to a Council as important as this one is: “existing treaties” – well, which “existing treaties”? It is totally open-ended and of course it is the parties to those treaties, the signatories to them, who must decide what their future is. I do not think we as an Assembly can urge our governments themselves to urge the United States to take a particular line of action with regard to particular treaties. Do they mean the unratified SALT II treaty, do they mean the ABM treaty on which there are different interpretations? Interpretations with differentiation can only lead to confusion and uncertainty within our own alliance. So, for all these reasons, I think it would be much wiser if we simply deleted this little sub-paragraph which otherwise could cause us unnecessary trouble. I beg to move.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I think we ought to hear the view of the Rapporteur on this, because he has a reason for including it. As far as I am concerned, I think Mr. Wilkinson is quibbling a little here. The object surely that we are trying to attain is contained in the words “respecting treaties which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to them”. Surely that is something that we ought to be striving for and the fact that it encompasses or does not mention treaties that Mr. Wilkinson perhaps would like it to mention does not make it a paragraph which has no value. The paragraph does have value because, in my opinion,

that is what negotiations try to achieve. In other words, if agreement has been made, if a treaty is made, it should not be possible for it to be abrogated by one side.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee’s opinion?...

Mr. AMADEI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The position in sub-paragraph (c) is that of all WEU governments and includes the stance taken by Mrs. Thatcher. May I refer you, ladies and gentlemen to paragraph 5.46 which gives what Mrs. Thatcher said word for word: “the anti-ballistic missile treaty... required negotiation before testing and deployment in accordance with the terms of the treaty”.

I have nothing further to add.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 15 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 15 is agreed to.

I call Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I wish to know the voting figures.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ayes 30, noes 21, abstentions 1.

I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRE (*France*) (Translation). – It was our belief in considering this report that, in view of the difficulties encountered, the different views expressed and the necessary approaches which suggested that we might reach a measure of consensus in this Assembly, some amendments to this text might be tabled. That was the purpose of Amendments 9 and 10 tabled and signed by a number of my French colleagues. Considering the amendments which have been approved, we feel that our Rapporteur’s text has been turned upside down. A short time ago he himself expressed his opposition to all the amendments, and yet, by a large majority, this Assembly is altering the text without regard for the work of the committee.

We now have a text which seems to us both ridiculous and biased, and I apologise for these terms. So, on behalf of my colleagues, I wish to announce that we withdraw Amendments 9 and 10.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Fourré. I take due note of the withdrawal of Amendments 9 and 10.

Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have tabled Amendment 20 which reads:

20. In paragraph 2, line 3, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “rea-

The President (continued)

sonable automatic" and insert "regular on-site".

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I agree that those amendments were not appropriate in present circumstances, but also I express appreciation of the stand he and his French colleagues have taken on a number of nuclear matters, not least certain aspects of this report. I hope we will now be able to accept Amendment 20 which, of course, insists on an important right: in paragraph 2, line 3, leave out "reasonable automatic" and insist upon "regular on-site" inspections. This is crucial if we are to make quite certain that the provisions of any arms control agreement are actually kept and it is for that reason that those two words must be removed and regular on-site inspections insisted upon. For those reasons I hope that Amendment 20 will be carried. Thank you, Sir, I beg to move.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's opinion?...

I now put Amendment 20 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 20 is agreed to.

Mr. Antoni and others have tabled Amendment 5 which reads:

5. At the end of paragraph 2 of the second revised draft recommendation proper add "thus promoting a new concept of balanced and verified European security linked to the noblest values of a policy of peace and co-operation in the world".

Is there no one to move this amendment?...

The amendment is not moved.

Mr. Gianotti and others have tabled Amendment 6 which reads:

6. In paragraph 3 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out "to press the Soviet Union to accept fully the United Kingdom compromise proposal" and insert "to combine their efforts to seek an agreement acceptable to all the parties".

Is there no one to move this amendment?...

The amendment is not moved.

Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have tabled Amendment 19 which reads:

19. In paragraph 3, line 4, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out after "inspection" to the end of the paragraph.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In paragraph 3, line 4, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out after "inspection" to the end of the paragraph. That is, I think, important because what is necessary now is for NATO to be able to take whatever appropriate measures are necessary and putting stipulations of the kind that are in the existing wording I do not think would give us the flexibility we could ultimately need. The important thing is for the British Government's compromise proposals on those aspects to be accepted, and we should press the Soviet Union to do so. In the interests of speed, I hope the amendment will quickly be carried. Thank you, Sir.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – As the amendment seeks the deletion of the reference to 1987 as the time-limit for a ban on chemical weapons, it is obvious that what is wanted is not the destruction of chemical weapons but, on the contrary, the earliest possible increase in stockpiles of chemical weapons. That is the only conclusion to be drawn from this amendment, otherwise it would not have been tabled. Those who keep voting for these amendments should now know which way the wind is blowing.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?...

I shall now put Amendment 19 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 19 is agreed to.

I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – May we have the figures, please?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Certainly, Lord Mackie: ayes 30, noes 21, abstentions 0.

Mr. Antoni and others have tabled Amendment 7 which reads:

7. In paragraph 4(a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out "Urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States' proposal" and insert "Promote the conclusion of an agreement acceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union".

Is there no one to move this amendment?...

The amendment is not moved.

The President (continued)

Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson have tabled Amendment 14 which reads:

14. In paragraph 4 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b).

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Amendment 14 is one of the more important ones. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b). The important thing is that the NATO alliance should be able to know that its weapons – nuclear weapons – will operate effectively, that they are secure, and if there is a need for their modernisation – and this is very likely with the advent of a British Trident D-5 system shortly to come into service and with the French modernisation plans that are envisaged – it is important that our nuclear forces be secure and work, and can be seen to have effective warheads that can be guaranteed to operate entirely as predicted. For these very sound and sensible reasons, I do not think it would be wise to do any other than to accept this amendment to delete sub-paragraph (b) to paragraph 4. I beg to move.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – All I want to say about this amendment is that it represents a complete departure from all the WEU recommendations we have adopted on this subject in the past, and I would also say, Mr. Wilkinson, that those who seek to justify this amendment with an argument of this kind do not in fact want nuclear weapons removed from Europe. They continue to favour a sharp rise in nuclear stock-piles, which means the presence of large numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?...

I now put Amendment 14 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 14 is agreed to.

The figures are ayes 28, noes 22, abstentions 0.

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation.

In accordance with Rule 33(2), the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Mr. President, I have been a member of this Assembly for about twelve years. I have never seen such a complete change in a report and recommendation. The recommendation on disarmament has become a plea for further armament, for an increase in armaments, for the production of chemical weapons. It is, at the same time, an attack on the position of, for instance, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany; it is an attack on the President of the United States. I want to see who wants to be responsible for accepting such a scandalous document. For that reason we ask for a vote by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Are there five members who request a vote by roll-call?...

There are.

We shall therefore vote by roll-call.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	54
Ayes	19
Noes	21
Abstentions	14

The amended draft recommendation is negatived.

The Assembly now has to vote on the draft recommendation replying to the thirty-first annual report of the Council.

In accordance with Rule 33(2), the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members who request a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall therefore take the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously.

I call Mr. Irmer for an explanation of vote.

Mr. IRMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and

1. See page 18.

Mr. Irmer (continued)

gentlemen, this is the first time I have attended a sitting of this august Assembly, and it is no doubt due to my lack of experience that I do not now know whether I have spent the last two hours witnessing a tragedy or a farce. I have certainly seen how a report that was no longer completely up-to-date because time has passed, has not been up-dated here to make good the time-lapse, but has in fact been turned into precisely the opposite of its original intention. Far from bringing it up-to-date, I would say this has actually catapulted it back several years into the past. My impression – and this is why I voted against the recommendation – is quite simply that this Assembly has this afternoon withdrawn from the current debate in Europe and the world. In the light of this, I wonder if I was wise to vote this morning for the report seeking to extend this Assembly's rights. I did so with great conviction. I hope that what happened today was an exception, that in future this Assembly too will take up the subjects and proposals that are being discussed by the public and by governments, the forward-looking topics, and that we shall stop living in the past.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for an explanation of vote.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – That was an example of how you lose with no good grace. Can I say, Mr. President, that basically I abstained for the very simple reason that I am not prepared to be party to a farce, which was to go along with a series of recommendations prefaced by a most biased and outdated preface. That is the point. Had it been possible to remove all the introductory remarks, then I would have happily voted for the recommendations. But you know, and I know, that people will read the explanatory report and say to themselves: Ah! That is really what was meant; the recommendations do not actually count. That is the problem and it may well be that one of the things the Committee on Rules of Procedure should do is to see whether an opportunity should be given

for people to vote against the explanatory memorandum as well as the recommendations. That is why I abstained and in my view we have been participating in a system showing that the left wing do not like any disarmament proposals and they showed it in their way.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I voted against the report and I have been asked to express the views of some of my colleagues who also voted against it because the amendments which were passed indicate to us quite clearly that there are people in this Assembly who do not want disarmament. There are people who are interested only in continuing a situation which is dangerous, as I said in my speech, not only for the people of Europe but for the people of the world. And I would say that in this Assembly there are members of parliament who are attached to the continuation of an almost warlike situation.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 28th April, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

Application of Order 65 on the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1095).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 7.45 p.m.)

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 28th April 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Application of Order 65 on the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order*, Doc. 1095).
Speakers: The President, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Linster, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Garrett, Mr. van Tets, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Hill, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
4. The need for action by the Assembly of Western European Union to press western governments for action to channel resources into development needs and away from the arms trade (*Motion for a resolution*, Doc. 1096).
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

Before taking the first item, I would remind you that the sitting this afternoon will start at about 5 p.m. This will be a very special sitting since, with the Council as a whole, Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, will report to the Assembly. The press will be here; there will not be a press conference at the close of the Council meeting.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Am I right in assuming that on this occasion there will be no requirement to put questions in writing beforehand?

The PRESIDENT. – You are quite correct. There is no requirement to put questions beforehand.

Questions may be put freely.

3. Application of Order 65 on the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1987

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1095)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the application of Order 65 on the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1095.

I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, this is the last time I shall be addressing the Assembly as Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration because I have now done, surprisingly I find, four years – three is the normal, four by the grant of the committee – and therefore under the rules I shall have to make way for somebody else at the next meeting of the committee.

Be that as it may, I would like today, before presenting the motions that I intend to propose to say that in the time I have been Chairman I have enjoyed very much the co-operation of the

1. See page 22.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

staff and of you, Sir, and indeed of members of all political parties. We have, I think, been united in our feeling of unjustness that we have always been dogged by lack of money in our task in trying to reactivate our side of Western European Union, namely the Assembly. Indeed, the position is somewhat farcical inasmuch as we have been charged to reinvigorate our activities and to play a responsible rôle along with the other arms of WEU in reactivation and yet we have been starved of funds. There are many activities, there is much administration which could be more efficient, more relevant and more positive with a little extra funding which in global terms, in state terms, is minuscule compared with the budgets of so many other organisations and so many other activities of government. Matters are now rapidly reaching a crisis point in my view and while, in some ways thankfully, I shall no longer have the responsibility as Chairman of the committee, Mr. President, I shall of course as a member of the Assembly, if I am fortunate enough to be re-elected as a member of my national parliament in the not too distant future, and indeed fortunate enough to be reappointed as a member of the British Delegation – all of these hurdles have to be taken in their course – I shall of course continue to do what I can to support the very real case that the Western European Union Assembly has and I am sure that in that view I am strongly supported by many other members who hope and believe that perhaps they will be able to continue here to try and obtain justice for the Assembly.

I wish, Sir, to move the two motions which I think have been circulated and which arise from the meetings of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs a week ago and yesterday. They are printed on the order paper and therefore I do not propose to read them out. The first one recommends to the Council three very salient points that need to be taken into consideration by the Council if they are to assist us. In the second one, the Assembly invites the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs to take the necessary steps to implement the reorganisation and improvement of the structure of the Office of the Clerk. There is an explanatory memorandum at the end of this particular document and I shall be only too pleased to amplify any points in the discussion which takes place later on.

Can I therefore, in formally moving those particular motions, Mr. President, just give a little background detail to members about the situation we are now in.

As the Assembly knows, the draft budget of the Assembly which was submitted to the Council showed an overall growth rate, including pen-

sions, of 6.85% over the previous budget. The growth rate of the operating budget if you take away the pensions element alone was 4.9%. We made, I thought, an excellent case from the Presidential Committee downwards for that particular budget, but in fact the Council turned down all the proposals regarding the operating budget. The total net operating budget from the Council's point of view was to be 0.49% and the total net budget overall including pensions 2.79%. And therefore we have to note as an Assembly that our operating budget, and I mean the operating budget leaving aside pensions, to which we are totally committed and have no option one way or the other, was thus reduced in real terms to the foreseeable inflation rate for France which I understand is 2% and I think that is optimistic. I would imagine that the inflation rate in France might well be, at the end of the day, higher than 2%. But we did not just get a zero growth rate, Mr. President, we had a cut. We were told "you will have less money in effect if you take away the particular pensions issue".

As the Assembly knows, this has not gone down at all well with members in all quarters of the Assembly and it has, I think, been a bone of contention in the discussions in the Presidential Committee, in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and indeed in political groups of the Assembly, again questioning, reiterating the thought, are we really a relevant organisation, should we be in existence, do our national governments want to cut us down and cut us off or do they really support us, but are going through difficult financial times and perhaps have not explained themselves as properly and as helpfully as they should have done. But we suggested that one of the best ways of meeting the situation would be to examine the whole of the organisation of WEU with reformations, with changes, with the right kind of assistance so that we could all share perhaps in the restructuring and the reorganisation of the various arms of the union. But the Council again deferred any decision in effect on this particular point until the end of the year.

There is a promise that there will be this reorganisation. Indeed already some of the arms of the union seem to have benefited. We have not. And any benefit that is going to come to us will not come until the end of the year. In those circumstances therefore it is pointless for us to introduce a supplementary budget for 1987 in accordance with the Assembly's Order 65 because it would be meaningless. It would be rejected immediately and there is no possibility whatever of the right kind of consideration for that until the reorganisation has properly taken place. Knowing how these things go, I would think that it would be later rather than sooner, even though at the most optimistic it would not be until the end of the year.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

Now I come to the second point. The first point in the motion which has been put is the suggestion, which I think is a very sound one and indeed many others would feel accordingly, that we should organise ourselves along the lines of the EEC: application to the operating budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of WEU of the growth rate defined in the European Communities. This is the idea of Mr. Poos who has been an exceptionally helpful Chairman of the Council of Ministers – he is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, our hosts for this particular session. This was very much his idea and we have incorporated this although I must say, Mr. President, I cannot imagine the governments responding favourably to it, but that should not stop us putting forward something which we think is right and useful.

We come on to the question of pensions, which I shall deal with in a moment, but the next thing is the question of the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk. Now, you Sir, and indeed the Presidential Committee and every other member that I have talked to on this subject, irrespective of his political background, believes that this should be an internal matter for the Clerk as our chief executive, for the President of the Assembly, whoever he is, and indeed for the official side of our Assembly, that the restructuring should be an internal matter.

But what do we have today? We have to submit our budgets. They go in, we get our global amounts, but then they are gone through, as I always understand it, by the officials on behalf of the Council and there is a kind of approval or rejection like the smallest little business where every particular item is scrutinised and there is the attitude of you may have this but you may not have that. Now, in an organisation with highly-paid officials, with government money backing this, with democratically-elected members of parliament who in fact help to run the organisation on a democratic basis, surely in this age an Assembly could be trusted, given a total amount of money to spend in what it considers to be the wisest possible way. Surely, it should not be treated like small children being governed and supervised at every turn. There are checks and balances in the situation and in the absurd and totally unlikely event of some madness developing and someone being profligate with the funds, it could be stopped very quickly indeed, but we all know that it would be done sensibly and responsibly by both the officials and by the politicians.

I think it is very degrading and demeaning that this Assembly with its budget should not have its own internal autonomy and it is something I believe this Assembly is beginning to press very strongly now and should go on pressing until it

actually achieves success because, unless it does, I see a very poor future indeed for the Assembly.

You, Mr. President, explained the Assembly's position to Mr. Poos at the meeting you had in Luxembourg last March and your views and his, as I understand them, fully converged. He was very appreciative and understanding of our situation and you emphasised to him the need to find a solution without further delay and you were very strongly of the opinion that this internal reorganisation should be allowed to proceed as an internal matter. But the Council, when it finally met, and despite the advocacy of their Chairman, merely took note of this. No decision has yet been communicated to this Assembly. I am sorry to tell you, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, that as far as I know, certainly up until the beginning of this Assembly this morning, no communication has come from the Council on this particular issue.

Then we come to the very vexed question of pensions which we have debated before. No person, no fair person, would believe other than that it is unfair for any assembly, any organisation to be burdened with a pensions commitment which will grow and which will continue to grow and which has to be paid for out of the global funds handed over each year – particularly in a zero growth situation. We are committed to former members of the staff, whose numbers will be added to substantially at the end of this year and in years to come, because they have served the Assembly well and deserve their pensions. We all hope that they will live to a ripe old age, but the longer they live, and the greater their number, the actual burden grows.

As I explained to one of the foreign ministers in my own parliament just recently, the day will come – we shall all probably be gone and no longer associated with WEU – but the day will actually come, if zero growth rates persist, when this Assembly will do nothing else but pay the pensions of former employees of the Assembly. The whole of the budget will be devoted to the payment of pensions which of course is a ludicrous situation and one which ought not really to be tolerated. We have been into this many times. We have sought the various ways in which we could get the agreement of the Council to extract pensions from this situation.

Mr. Linster, who I see here this morning, did an admirable report on this not so long ago in which he said that the Council appeared to begin to understand the problems of the pensions and that they shared some of our anxiety although of course they were not prepared to act. He came up with three possible solutions and I shall just read them out briefly. He said that the governments might assume full responsibility for financing pensions outside the operating budget or an

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

independently-managed pension fund might be set up in WEU into which the contributions of staff and the organisation would be paid, or the management of the fund might be handed over to a private insurance company. All excellent suggestions, all relevant, all of which deserve the fullest and most detailed consideration by experts, and I emphasise this, by experts, and I am sure we could get that expert advice which would tell us. But no, my latest information, and indeed talking to my own government and elsewhere, leads me to believe that the Council of Ministers remains stony-faced even though under the surface sympathetic about the pensions issue. At the moment, as far as I know, there is no proposition whatever to do anything about the pensions except to leave them where they are as a constant drain on the budget of the Assembly.

I would say, Mr. Chairman, in moving this today, and I have been gloomy deliberately because I think these points need to be underlined, we need straight speaking, we need frank speaking, the time has gone for the niceties of these exchanges. We now must very rapidly ask the Council of Ministers exactly where we are going to stand on the premise that if a job is worth doing, it is worth doing well. And I think we ought to say, Sir, to the Council of Ministers and our own relevant governments, and some of us have already said it, if you do not want us, be frank enough to say so. Do not go on paying lip service to us about how you believe in the Assembly and, oh yes, we do support you, if you do not want us, be frank about it. We would appreciate this so much more. But if you feel that we do have a place, that we do have a relevance in WEU, then pay us properly and treat us properly. I beg to move.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank both Sir Dudley as Rapporteur and, through him, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for the report and for their excellent work. This report is indeed vital not only for the Assembly but also for WEU as a whole. I hope that all those who believe in WEU realise that our political debates would serve no purpose if the budget issue were not dealt with at the very highest level and our means of existence thus secured.

On behalf of all the members of the Assembly, thank you Sir Dudley for your efforts which may attract less notice than the great political debates but whose importance, I am sure, is obvious to everyone.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Linster.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, budgets and figures are of course a boring subject in what is essentially a political assembly. As a Luxembourger, I should perhaps be pleased that the chamber is almost empty today because the coach tour of our capital would seem to be competing successfully with this morning's order of business. However that may be, I am not going to repeat the figures and arguments that Sir Dudley has just given you with the skill and eloquence we know to be his.

Actually Mr. President, as Sir Dudley Smith has so forcefully argued and proved, the issue of the budget – imposed on our Assembly by the Council organs – is really political and the debate upon it in this chamber is a political debate.

I would like to take this opportunity, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, to congratulate Sir Dudley Smith on his clear-sighted and determined leadership of our Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration over which he has presided with skill and fairness and on his political impartiality on which all members of the committee, regardless of their political divisions, are agreed.

Yesterday, in his report on the reactivation of WEU, our colleague Mr. Ahrens cogently argued that to withhold basic financial resources is to refuse the Assembly the tools of its political trade because the very exercise of its political responsibilities under Article IX of the treaty is seriously imperilled. If anyone had the deliberate intention of emasculating this Assembly politically there would be no better way than to continue to deny the Assembly the budgetary resources it needs for the effective performance of the political rôle that the treaty explicitly confers upon it. That is exactly what the Council has so far done.

Up to now the Council has rejected every proposal we have made for an improvement in our operating budget. The result is a reduction in real terms in the Assembly's resources as compared with possible expenditure for the preceding year.

Let me explain. Following the Council decision the Assembly's budget, pensions included, is to be increased by only 2.79% but when we look at the operating budget on its own, which is all we have for our work, the unfortunate fact is that net growth there is only 0.49% as Sir Dudley has just told us.

The Assembly's purchases of goods and services are made in France where – according to what has been called a very optimistic estimate – the rate of inflation will be at least 2%. Sir Dudley has just said that there is every reason to be more than sceptical about this figure. So there is no need to be a mathematician to see that the Assembly's purchasing power is in fact being

Mr. Linster (continued)

reduced by an amount equivalent to the French rate of inflation. The economic reasons that were, a few years ago, still lending a semblance of plausibility to the retention of a zero growth rate – really a euphemism for negative growth – no longer apply in most of our countries: there is no longer any serious economic crisis nor galloping inflation and the fact is that the governments in most of our countries have, for some years now, dropped zero growth as a national objective. So why maintain it for the WEU parliamentary Assembly when the zero growth rate is in practice no longer maintained for the ministerial organs?

I do not propose to give so categorical an answer to this question this morning as the Rapporteur for the General Affairs Committee did yesterday mainly because of the number of statements that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council has made at various times in support of the Assembly and its real needs. I shall just note the facts while asking myself a number of questions.

Is it the deliberate decision of the ministers to deny in this underhand way, the rights that are ours under the Brussels Treaty and the Rome declaration? Or is it not simply a mistake on the part of the experts who sometimes seem to me to discuss the internal affairs of our Assembly as capably as a blind man could discuss colour? Or is it both at once? It is true that the sorry spectacle we gave of ourselves yesterday afternoon is not calculated to refute the criticisms that can be levelled at the Assembly. However, I would like to point out here that, in my view and in that of many of the representatives on this bench, the farce – to give it the name used yesterday evening by a German colleague – was not the result of a badly working Assembly but of the failure and extreme conservatism of the majority in this Assembly which only parliamentary courtesy prevents me from qualifying, always supposing that a term including the notion of quality can rightly be used in their regard.

However this may be, the facts are clear. For one thing, the Council has up to now been steadily reducing the Assembly's purchasing power and therefore the extent and impact of its activities. For another, the Council has so far avoided taking any decision about restructuring the Office of the Clerk. What is more, by refusing to take a decision on the position of pensions in the WEU budget the Council is making it impossible to present a supplementary budget for 1987 whereas Order 65 of the Assembly formally called for such a budget.

This being so I feel it is natural for our Assembly to register, in the plainest and most formal terms, its full endorsement of the two documents put before us by the Committee on

Budgetary Affairs and Administration and more particularly the recommendation to the Council. Sir Dudley has explained them and since the texts were distributed yesterday there is no point in going over them in detail.

Suffice it to add this. Yesterday I expressed formally and vigorously the hope that the Council would support the Chairman-in-Office in his proposals regarding the Assembly's budget. In that connection, I would remind you of the memorandum he wrote on the subject as early as 12th March 1987, fully endorsing the views of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, namely: a growth rate in step with that worked out each year for the organs of the European Communities, a budget divided into categories in which expenditure on pensions would be separate and not covered by the growth rate – and I do not propose to go over the various ways in which pension costs could be met since Sir Dudley has just done so – and lastly the budgetary independence of the Assembly once the total budget figure is decided, on the model of the gentlemen's agreement governing relations between the Council of the European Community and the European Parliament in this field. Within the scope of this independence I would definitely include our right to deal with restructuring the Office of the Clerk ourselves.

Those, Mr. President, are the three decisions that we elected parliamentarians are hoping for from the WEU Council. It is in the light of how positively and promptly the Council responds on these three points that we shall judge the rôle that the Council intends to assign to our Assembly in the future. It is in this way that we will know whether the Council really intends to reduce us to the rôle of an echo chamber or whether it is prepared to restore to us elected representatives our full political rôle under the modified Brussels Treaty. Yesterday, Mr. President, at the dinner given by the Luxembourg authorities, you said you hoped that the speech that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was to give this afternoon would, provided the results of this morning's Council meeting so allow, be a Luxembourg declaration of equivalent importance to the Rome declaration and open a fresh and decisive chapter in the reactivation of WEU. May I express the hope that, after due consideration, Mr. Poos will receive a mandate from his colleagues this morning in terms enabling his speech, as far as the budget is concerned, to become also a Luxembourg declaration on the future operation of the Assembly and to represent for us, a clearcut and favourable decision on the political rôle of our parliamentary Assembly?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, after listening to Sir Dudley Smith, I wondered whether it was worth while getting up and saying anything at all because we all believe and have been fighting for these principles which he has set out today for so long and they are so clear to us and must be so clear to the Council of Ministers that it hardly seems worth while reiterating. Yet I believe that we have all got a job to do to put over to the Council of Ministers, not only here but also in our own countries, as we have tried to do, the stupidity of keeping in being the Assembly of Western European Union if they do not intend it to work.

I would like here, if I might, just to say to Mr. Linster how wonderful it has been to be in his country and to receive the hospitality that we have received. I am sure it was not the hospitality we received last night which has emptied this chamber but, as he said, the beautiful weather outside which Luxembourg has given us and also the entertainments put on for people today. But even if we are small in numbers we are in fact representing the whole of the Assembly in what they feel very strongly about. We do not want to do a job which is not wanted to be done. We want to know that we are wanted and I hope that the Council of Ministers will begin to wake up to the fact that it is no use keeping us in being if they are going to cut everything that we want to do or they want us to do or should want us to do.

I would like to congratulate our Chairman on the tremendous hard work, not just on his report today, but on the tremendous hard work which he has put in over many years. I think I was on the Budgetary Affairs Committee before that and he was too before he became Chairman. I would also like to congratulate our President on the way in which he has put this forward time and time again to the Council of Ministers. I believe that we have got to go on in the way of dripping water on a stone until we wear through to the heart of the Council of Ministers and make them wake up to the fact that they are really cutting their own throats if they allow us to continue in this way.

I think I must mention the three points that are really the key points; they have been and will be extremely well put by everybody else far better than I. It does seem to be extraordinary that the EEC, which is a very rich organisation, is allowed a growth rate and we who are a poor organisation are not allowed any at all or in fact we are cut back on our expenditure altogether. It looks like one law for the rich and one for the poor. Over the question of pensions it really is absolute nonsense, and we must go on saying this time and time again, to have pensions, which are growing yearly, included in our total budget for which we are given zero growth. Secondly, this pension matter really does make the work of the

Assembly almost impossible to carry on because we want to see fair pensions for those people who have served us, but when we employ fresh people, if we are being cut back somehow or another, the pensions will have to be cut back as well and that is something no one would wish to do. Finally, I must support Sir Dudley Smith when he says that to treat the organisation as if it is a child and cannot manage its own affairs, that you cannot go out and buy a typewriter when one is wanted without referring back to London or to the Council of Ministers, does seem absolutely ridiculous.

If I am lucky and we do not have an election called before the time we should meet in Paris, I may meet my friends here again and I do not mean just my friends on the political side, but many friends which I have made over the years and across the boundaries of party. This will be my last year with Western European Union and the Council of Europe because I am retiring at this parliament. And so, I would like to say what tremendous interest this Assembly has given to me. I want to see this Assembly worthwhile. I want to see it grow in influence and, strangely enough, I was told by the leader of the delegation who went to America how much emphasis they are putting on our importance. So I wish you, Mr. Caro, and whoever succeeds you, and the whole of the Assembly my very best wishes for the future and for the future of this Assembly which I believe is going to play a very important part in the world in the future and the sooner we make the Council of Ministers realise this the better for the whole, I believe, of Western Europe. Thank you Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Paul. You have told us of a coming event that we shall all keenly regret but I hope that today's will not be your last speech and that we can still look forward to having you with us. Please let me say how much the Assembly has appreciated your faithful attendance at its meetings and in particular the pains you have always taken to defend the interests of our organisation. Please accept my grateful thanks, Sir Paul.

I call Mr. Garrett.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I have been on the delegation to Western European Union now for seven years and budgetary problems have been recurring with monotonous regularity and each budgetary problem emphasises the inherent dangers of this organisation going bankrupt. The point is that we could go into overdraft if we had any fixed assets, but we do not even have a building. All we have is human resources and the human resources we have are of good quality. We pay good salaries, we expect good reports and good service and we get it. And it seems a shame to me that the quality of the reports that are issued and

Mr. Garrett (continued)

debated here from time to time should be possibly placed in jeopardy, for other people to read, placed in jeopardy by the fact that the staff may have to be reduced; staff would have to be reallocated and the whole anxiety of organisation in the long run must affect the quality, morale and general well-being of all associated with this important institution.

I am a committed believer in Western European Union and anybody of my generation who has been in the armed forces and seen the horrors of conflict will realise that when you are talking about the defence of Europe, you are talking about not merely the political defence of Europe, but the defence of all the citizens in Europe and, regrettably, the seven nations which form this organisation shoulder the burdens for other nations which are in Europe and the other nations which are in Europe should be making their contribution to Western European Union. They are actually living on the backs of the nations that form Western European Union and regard it as part of the defence equipment.

Now budgetary matters seem to have been with me all my life and I know how difficult it is, and we all do because we are all politicians in our own different countries, we all know how difficult it is to move finance ministers into reallocation of the resources available. But I take up the point made by Sir Paul Hawkins, my colleague in the United Kingdom Parliament. He is absolutely right. The EEC, the European Economic Community, is awash with money and one of the reasons why they can get funds so easily, not so easily now as it used to be, but still they can get their budgets made and adjusted to increases, percentage increases per annum, the reason they get it is quite simple. A powerful civil service lobby operates in Brussels and because it is powerful it is self-protecting. If there are any civil servants in here this morning, I hope that they will not think that I am getting at them personally, I am getting at the system. It is so easy that when they are in power they will protect their own interests and unfortunately there are politicians here in this Assembly this morning who are so besotted with the principles of the European Economic Community that they lack the guts and the resolution to say enough is enough to their national parliaments. They will still not face up to the fact that they are handing money over to the European Economic Community and, if some of that money was not handed over to the European Economic Community by our national parliaments, that money could be reallocated to an important organisation like this. That is where the problem has to be tackled from the start, within our national parliaments.

Mr. President, a new generation of politicians will come up within our national assemblies and they will not be as kind and generous to the EEC as our generation has been. They will be looking at the EEC much more critically than we have done hitherto and when they have done that they will come to the conclusion that money raised by taxes within our national parliaments should be reallocated and it is possible that they will look with favour upon Western European Union. They will look with favour upon Western European Union because, as I said earlier, we are an organisation built up to defend democracy in Europe, to keep peace through strength and if we keep peace through strength then we can get good allies within the parliaments of Europe.

Now, on pensions, I think that whether we are here as parliamentarians or ministers on the Council, we have a moral responsibility to pay pensions. In my lifetime, masses of people in our own countries never received pensions. Two-thirds of the people working in the United Kingdom did not have a pension. Some would say that the pensions they have now are not adequate. But then we are moving forward and the public servants – that is what our staff are – are expected, and we expect them, to set an example in responsibility and the level of reward should be pensions which are paid so that people in the retiring years of their life should be free from financial anxiety. That is what it is about. It is not getting money so that you can pass it on to relatives, it is getting money so that you enjoy a reasonable standard of living in your retirement and that is what we are seeking to achieve through a sensible policy on pensions.

I conclude by saying that when we met in Rome we decided we would reactivate Western European Union. There are cynics who say the word reactivate does not mean too much, but those of us who were here yesterday afternoon saw a good animated debate with a lot of cross political banter, but the point was that the Assembly here yesterday afternoon looked alive. It looked as if it was doing its job. And my conclusion was, it was doing its job. So therefore, given the opportunity, given the finances, given the resources that we need, I see no reason why WEU should not go from strength to strength and I hope that when the ministers read my speech – I hope one or two of them read it anyhow, I doubt if they will all read it – I hope they will realise that there are people in this Assembly like myself who have great belief in its future.

(Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van Tets.

Mr. van TETS (*Netherlands*). – Mr. President, my remarks will be addressed solely to the

Mr. van Tets (continued)

matter of pensions which is a subject I happen to know something about. On the matter of pensions, a choice has been made for this organisation, a choice which faces all government institutions in the matter of pensions, and that is whether to equalise the cost over the years or to take the costs as they arise. Now for governmental organisations, both systems have their merits. But once a choice has been made its consequences should be accepted. If the choice had been to pay annual premiums to build up a capital from which pensions can be paid, these costs would be part and parcel of our normal operating budget. There would have been no special problem in extending to them all the rules of the game pertaining to the budget including the zero growth concept if that was in force.

However, now that the choice has been the other way we are in an entirely different ball game. A small organisation such as ours could face disruption of its work by the retirement or death of just a few members of its staff, especially at a time when a zero real growth policy is being pursued. This is not the case where some governments are faced with a similar choice and have made a similar choice, where hundreds of thousands or even millions of civil servants are incorporated in such a system. It would not even be much of a problem if we were dealing with ten thousand employees. A difference in system would, in that case, be ironed out by the large numbers involved, whereas that is not the case in a small organisation such as we have. I know that what I have described does happen in national administrations but I have the impression that those who advise the Council in this matter overlook the fact that the consequences of this choice in a small organisation are so different. In fact, those who wish to maintain the zero real growth doctrine should be the last to want to apply it in such a way that it becomes nonsense. Pensions are a preferential obligation. To have such an obligation weigh on our operating budget means gradually but increasingly curtailing the activities of WEU at a time when we have just discussed the desire to reactivate it, a desire which has recently developed into a necessity.

Mr. President, I have been involved in pension management for nearly thirty years. I have seen systems ranging from very good to very poor, but I have never before seen a system being applied in such a way that it is inconsistent with and frustrating to the stated aims of the organisation that has set it up. And that is what we are now doing in WEU, and that is what we should put a stop to. Thank you Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – We just heard a very valuable intervention from Mr. van Tets and if I may go back to what Mr. Garrett said, no the ministers will not read all the speeches, let us be very clear about that. They will be given a very small selection that their officials think they ought to see. Now that is understandable, I am not being critical of their civil servants, but ministers have a vast number of documents to read, so unless they are very lucky they will not read Mr. Garrett's excellent speech and I know he will forgive me if I say my worry is they are even less likely to read Mr. van Tets's speech because he actually hits at the system and it is those who control the system that decide what the ministers are going to read.

So let us just reflect upon that for a moment and I am not, I make the point again, I am not being critical, I am merely being factual. Having been a minister, I know exactly how it works and unless you say you are going to read everything, and Sir Dudley knows this as well, you get only a selection and if you say you are going to read everything, my God, you will get everything and you will work twenty-four hours a day just reading. So the system has to be looked at in that way. But I think we need to take what Mr. van Tets has said and between us just bring this home in our own countries.

There are four or five points I would like to make, Mr. President. The first is that I had a couple of years on the Budget Committee under Sir Dudley and at one stage I was hoping to persuade the Budget Committee to say very simply that if the means were not willed then the Assembly should suspend itself and that would be an interesting point because under the treaty there has to be an Assembly and it would be interesting to know how the legal advisers to the governments would have dealt with a suspended Assembly. But we did not go that far because there were signs and pointers and one kept on hoping. I think that what Sir Dudley has said today was interesting because we seem to have the commitment of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers and we may know today, when we question him, whether he has been able to deliver what he feels and what he understands.

Sir Dudley made a comment that he and I may not be here but as the years go on more and more of our staff will quite rightly be drawing pensions. I just ask that you reflect for a moment that if all our staff were women they would be getting their pensions for even longer because women live that much longer and so perhaps we ought to be thankful that, at present anyhow, most of our staff drawing pensions and who will be drawing pensions are male. That is not in any way sex discrimination, it is merely being factual again.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

Can I say that what does concern me is the unwillingness of those who have any responsibility for our pension system to take advice. I am, amongst other things, one of the trustees of the pension fund of the House of Commons and we have a very substantial sum of money to invest. We do not believe that we know the best way of doing it. We certainly do not believe civil servants know the best way and we have given it to an outside organisation, expert in pensions. This makes an enormous difference to the proper management of a pension fund and I hope that perhaps more and more pressure will be put upon those responsible to get the right to have proper outside actuarial advice from sources other than treasuries or civil service.

Mr. Linster made the point – which I thought was a very important point – that perhaps ministers do not actually consider some of these points, that again the slowness in response comes in fact from the ambassadors and the officials who are too over-awed by the fact that much of their future depends upon the attitude of the civil servants in their home treasuries. They do not want to upset those treasury officials too much. Again one has to accept that that is not being critical, it is a fact of life – if you want, for your own department, an increase in your budget provision, it does not always help you to go around attacking the treasury and therefore you might decide that you will be fairly quiet and not push the matter too far. It comes back, I think, to the need to influence the ministers, not their deputies. That is what I think we have to do.

Might I just give a brief quotation, Mr. President, from the excellent information report that we had last November from Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges and on page 35 there is a quotation from the late and great Mr. Spaak who said this: “We (the Council of WEU) have been determined to leave you the greatest possible freedom” (that is the Assembly), “relying upon your experience and your wisdom... We consider that the organisation and working methods of the Assembly... are matters for its own decision...”. Why do we not ask the Council of Ministers why they have reneged upon what Mr. Spaak said. Why do we have to get their permission to make internal changes in our staff organisation? Why is our experience and wisdom, as Mr. van Tets has proved on pensions, not looked at properly? Why is it that I have to go to the expense of flying over to Paris to discuss proposed changes in rules because there is no such thing available to Mr. Moulias as a telex? That is the situation and I say bluntly to every ambassador who should be here and who is not, probably at the Council of Ministers, to every representative of the Seven who are here and to every minister, would they or would their

civil servants at that level exist without a telex machine? The answer is no. So why should we? That, I think, is the point we need to make very strongly indeed.

The last thing that I want to say is quite simply this. I yield to nobody, and I hope my friends on the left will not be too offended, I yield to nobody in my very strong belief in a tough monetary policy, but if governments who follow monetary policies – and in the United Kingdom both the last labour government and the conservative government followed monetary policies, the first because of the IMF, the second by choice – but where this is followed if you decide that there is an organisation or policy you are going to support, you do not slowly starve it of funds. You either wipe it out or you fund it to do the job you want. And so I am not being in any way wet in my application of monetarism, but I am saying if the governments believe they want the Brussels Treaty and the Assembly to do its work then they should fund it to a sensible amount and I believe that the proposals Sir Dudley has put to us fit that bill adequately.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – It is a great pleasure this morning to be able to congratulate my colleague and friend, Sir Dudley Smith, on that excellent address he gave at the beginning of the budget debate. He has laboured long and probably if he was a farmer he would have starved to death by now because of course the people who can give us the rewards so that we can continue to work a very efficient, but nevertheless a reactivated institution, have not seen it quite the same as we here this morning.

In fact, there is a question being answered. I received it on 15th April, a reply from the Council which I think answers all the naive questions that have been put by some of my colleagues this morning. The reactivation of WEU – and this is Recommendation 438 for those who love figures – also involves the strengthening of its structures, the improvement of its working methods and the Permanent Council will continue to co-ordinate all the organisation's activities. It goes on to a lot more waffle from the Council because there are going to be additional meetings of political directors, the Council of Ministers are beefing up the number of times they are going to meet, they now think that, in their work programme, the maximum they can do is two meetings a year, but nevertheless that was an improvement on one meeting a year.

When we talk of these ministers and how the secretariats put before them a briefing of meetings, has anyone not suggested this morning, these are the same people all the time, the same ministers, ministers of the Council of

Mr. Hill (continued)

Ministers, are exactly the same people as would meet on EEC problems, on Council of Europe problems, on WEU problems. Of course the whole emphasis I get is that there is not at the moment a real purpose in the Council of Ministers declaring that there will be a fundamental reactivation of WEU.

I think the circumstances over the last few months, and certainly the Gorbachev public relations campaign which has proved very successful, have meant that the Western European countries are beginning to worry about conventional warfare. They are being very worried about no nuclear umbrella of any kind and WEU is obviously the forum in which conventional warfare and procurement could be discussed. Until the Council of Ministers really make up their minds that WEU has a real purpose, we are in this Catch 22 situation. There will be little or no money available. They do not want this institution to die off so they send them the odd canister of oxygen to breathe some sort of new life, in most cases it is not oxygen it is hot air because the odd minister will make a reactivation speech once again.

We were all enthused in Rome some considerable time ago when the German Foreign Minister made a very forthright speech on reactivation and since then we have had numerous speeches from the copycat ministers who make exactly the same speech but at the end of the day those self-same ministers, when they meet in another room on their own, cannot seem to bring themselves to the position of spending a little more on an institution that they and the press have called moribund and which is now in need of reactivation.

I certainly think there is a good case here for following up some of the points that Mr. Linster made and certainly the privatisation, if that is not a dirty word, of the pension fund would be a very good way to start. Get some people from the outside to put forward a formula to present to the Council of Ministers to see whether the pension burden could not be lifted from the institution itself without the fear that many of our old employees – we are all grateful to say most of us are living longer and indeed have greater expectations healthwise than, say thirty or forty years ago – for our old employees to be well and truly covered during the lifetime of their retirement. Is there not another way that we can point out to the Council of Ministers the problem of its 2% inflation growth in France? The franc is a weak currency. I say that with all humility at the moment. Perhaps one of the basic means of securing stability would be to link it with a strong currency. The pension fund in particular should be linked to a strong currency such

as the German mark or the Swiss franc. These are points that only a detail committee could work out and if they are taking no notice of our Budget Committee then it has to be a working party set up by the Council of Ministers and I hope they will think carefully and long on that.

The difficulty of talking about budgets is that invariably you are either for spending more money or you are for spending less money. We have heard how the EEC budget is inflated. But of course they have a great burden, a far greater burden than any pension fund. They have their common agricultural policy and that is the real fulcrum of the expenditure of the EEC. The Council of Ministers would defend their budget to the EEC on the fact that circumstances have got really out of control and they would of course not think twice about making an advantageous budget linked to the national VATs of every participating country and be fully justified inasmuch as they cannot evade what are treaty obligations.

Now, from my point of view, are there any treaty obligations to Western European Union? Are we going to survive? Are we going to be able to continue to be the second layer to NATO? Are we going to be almost the emergency defensive system that is protecting the conventional forces and indeed the short-range nuclear umbrella in Europe? Or are we just going to meet here once in a while getting written questions from the Council of Ministers which disprove that they are thinking along the same lines as ourselves? In the end, will Sir Dudley Smith have felt that his four years' labour have been lost? The tragedy of a politician's life is that you work long and hard, you are actually vital in your own sphere, but your words fall on deaf ears or are put before blind eyes.

I think, Mr. Chairman, this is the great problem. Is the Council of Ministers alert enough to be able to see that this institution is in a desperate situation? If they were a room of bank managers they would be able to see it, but they are a room of politicians aided and advised by their secretariat. We are in desperate straits. For goodness' sake, Council of Ministers, open up your eyes, listen with your ears and see that one of the most worthwhile institutions of Europe is beginning to flag and die for lack of finance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Does Sir Dudley, in his twofold capacity of Rapporteur and Chairman of the committee, wish to speak?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – At the conclusion of this debate, and listening to Mr. Hill and his rather cynical view about reactivation, which I must say is shared by many people, I realise just how wide and how deep the

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

feelings of members go. We have had a good cross-section of members speaking this morning and I think it is a great pity that the ambassadors and a number of the officials are not here. There may be good and adequate reasons why not, but I do hope that in fact the ministers, particularly for this debate, will look at it, that the ambassadors and the ministers will read the report of this comparatively short debate because there are many many views which have been put across which need to be noted and even acted upon and which again show an extraordinary unanimity. Very rarely in any political assembly is there such unanimity and this shows that this Assembly has a really excellent case.

I am grateful for the kind remarks of many of the members who have spoken and one or two points need to be emphasised. Mr. Linster said that it is right to stress that in Europe we are no longer in the state of economic crisis that prevailed four or five years ago. As he said, zero growth does not operate in other areas of government. Why specifically should it be so where Western European Union is concerned? As Sir Paul Hawkins, who is an old friend and an effective advocate of sensible reform over the years, said, it is no use keeping this organisation in being if our funds are to be cut and he is absolutely right. That is a view that I think is shared by many others including Mr. Garrett who says that we have a right to say where our resources should be used and we have no assets of our own but we have human resources and these are of high quality if given the opportunity to function well.

Then there was, I thought, a devastating comment from Mr. van Tets. We all know that he was a very high expert in his own country, the Netherlands, where pensions were concerned, during his professional life and he made a very serious condemnation of the position, one which I think the Council of Ministers ought seriously to take on board. It was something which was reiterated by my colleague, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, and he said that we need expertise in this sphere. I can tell my colleague that the present pension system is very convenient for governments but it is falling down. It needs expertise and they are letting down the democratic countries they represent if they do not obtain the best possible deal. Sir Geoffrey brought back a theme that he did raise. He reminded us in the committee some time ago that there was always this option of suspending the activities of the Assembly if we did not obtain the assistance that we deserve. I think it certainly remains an option. At the time I did not advocate it because it was fairly drastic but I think it appealed to quite a lot of members and it was something that was held in abeyance. I really

think, Mr. President, that if we do not obtain assistance fairly quickly it is an option that we should re-examine very seriously.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur. The Assembly now has to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1095.

In accordance with Rule 33(2), the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members who request a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

The Assembly now has to vote on the draft order contained in Document 1095.

In accordance with Rule 33(2), the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members who request a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft order is adopted unanimously².

4. The need for action by the Assembly of Western European Union to press western governments for action to channel resources into development needs and away from the arms trade

(Motion for a resolution, Doc. 1096)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure, I have received from Mr. Freeson a motion for a resolution on the need for action by the Assembly of Western European Union to press western governments for action to channel resources into development needs and away from the arms trade.

1. See page 23.

2. See page 24.

The President (continued)

It will be referred to the appropriate committee by the Presidential Committee.

**5. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 5 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and debate.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 11.25 a.m.)

FOURTH SITTING

Tuesday, 28th April 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. The need for action by the Assembly of Western European Union to press western governments for action to channel resources into development needs and away from the arms trade (Doc. 1096).
4. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Poos, Mr. Fischbach (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Valleix, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Freeson, Mr. Brown, Mr. Goerens, Mr. Cahen (*Secretary-General of WEU*), Mr. Terlezki, Sir Frederic Bennett, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Stoffelen.
5. Close of the extraordinary session.

The sitting was opened at 5.40 p.m., with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. The need for action by the Assembly of Western European Union to press western governments for action to channel resources into development needs and away from the arms trade

(Doc. 1096)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have been told there is an error in the signatories of Document 1096 containing Mr. Freeson's motion for a resolution.

1. See page 26.

The name of Mr. Bassinet should be inserted instead of Mr. Baumel.

4. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Chairman, Ministers, Your Excellencies, in welcoming you here on behalf of the Assembly I take this opportunity of expressing once more the Assembly's gratitude to the Luxembourg chairmanship and repeating what I said yesterday evening to the Chairman of the Council, to Mr. Fischbach and to all your government colleagues. Our gratitude also goes to the Chamber of Deputies, its President, Colonel Hengel, Vice-President, and to the Lady Burgomaster of Luxembourg, who have provided the Assembly with the facilities for this extraordinary session.

The Assembly is particularly aware of the significance of simultaneous sessions of the Council and the Assembly at such an important time for European construction and for Europe's status in international affairs, including the great East-West debate. The Council's advice is necessary to us, and the Assembly would welcome the political guidance the WEU Council of Ministers is required to provide on such important subjects as security and disarmament and at least on alignments between member states so that the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to which we are all deeply committed can be built.

The President (continued)

Mr. Chairman, we await your address with great interest, and we are aware that, with the agreement of your ministerial colleagues on the Council, you have allowed us something completely new. This is the first time that, after a meeting of the Council of Ministers, the Chairman of the Council accompanied by representatives of the other member states is to address the Assembly in person to give details of the communiqué and to bring to the attention of the press not only your statements but also your contact with the parliamentary organ instituted by the modified Brussels Treaty.

Mr. Chairman, after your address I hope you will be kind enough to reply to the questions some delegates will no doubt want to ask.

I thank you and now ask you to take the floor.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, ministers and colleagues, allow me first to say how happy I am that this extraordinary session of your Assembly coincides with the ordinary meeting of our Council of Ministers, the second to be held during the present Luxembourg presidency.

This coincidence allows me to inform you all together of the results of the ministerial discussions immediately after they have been concluded. I am happy about this because I attach vital interest to the continuous development of the meaningful dialogue that must exist between the representatives of the executives and those of the legislative bodies of our member states. Only through this democratic, and hence public, debate will public opinion become aware of what the security of our Europe means in both the European and Atlantic context.

Even more significant is the fact that your extraordinary session and the ordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers are both being held at a time which is of particular importance for Europe and our organisation.

For several months, East-West and transatlantic relations have been evolving at a steadily-accelerating rate. Today, we can discern the possibility of major changes whose foreseeable impact is likely to change considerably the strategic environment of our continent. The delicate balances on which peace has depended for more than forty years are to be considered in this new light.

In such circumstances, the need for our states to reflect together and to concert their approach to their security problems in the framework of active Atlantic solidarity, without which there can be no credible defence of the West and hence of Western Europe, is for ever essential.

Under the chairmanship of Mr. Fischbach and myself, our foreign affairs and defence colleagues have just been devoting their efforts to this process of reflection and consultation. We did this at two levels, which are in fact inseparable: the assessment of the situation facing us today and the progressive definition of our essential security interests, i.e. the criteria on which our joint consideration of the situation can be based.

I am happy to say that this twofold exercise was conducted in the Council in the most open, detailed and constructive manner. It allowed us to identify significant convergences, the broad lines of which I shall communicate to you.

In regard to the present situation, we were unanimous in noting with satisfaction the improvement in East-West relations and the positive consequences for arms control and disarmament.

It was in this context that we discussed the talks held by the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, in Moscow from 13th to 15th April with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Shevardnadze. Following talks with the same authorities by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Sir Geoffrey Howe, and preceding those I myself have just had, they take their place in a movement of dialogue to which all our governments are highly favourable.

The cohesion of the alliance and the coherence of the positions of certain members probably encouraged this positive trend. We all wish this cohesion and coherence to be maintained or even strengthened and in this connection we welcome the determination of the United States to pursue its in-depth consultations with its allies with a view to defining joint positions taking real account of joint interests.

Our member states have always expressed the wish for intermediate nuclear forces to be withdrawn from the European theatre. They therefore approved the zero-zero option when it was tabled by their American ally at the Geneva negotiations in 1981. It is therefore with positive interest and satisfaction that they now note the possibility of reaching agreement to this end. As is normal, they wish such progress to be a factor to strengthen their security, and not the reverse.

The ministers recalled their serious concern at the existing Soviet superiority in shorter-range intermediate nuclear missiles and the requirement not to neglect this in any intermediate nuclear force agreement. In this context, they noted that the Soviet Union had, in response to earlier proposals tabled by the United States, recently made statements on these missiles, the content of

Mr. Poos (continued)

which should be carefully studied as soon as they are clarified in writing. They welcomed the consultations now being held in the alliance.

Earlier, I referred to the delicate balance which has ensured the peace that we have enjoyed for forty years. So far, this balance has been based on nuclear and conventional elements which together ensure the credibility of the strategy of flexible response. We remain faithful to this strategy and we intend its credibility to be maintained in the future and hence the two components, nuclear and conventional, to be retained. For each element of our defence potential, this requires a real East-West balance of forces at a level that we obviously wish to be as low as possible. *Inter alia*, this is particularly true for chemical weapons and conventional capabilities.

These proposals may be considered to be those of all the WEU member states. Moreover, they correspond to a series of guidelines that are essential for Europe's security.

What are these guidelines? We think the first aim of European security policy is to prevent, by means of adequate deterrence and defence, any form or threat of military conflict. Now and in the foreseeable future, Western Europe's security cannot be ensured without a defence structure including both conventional and nuclear means which visibly and indivisibly combine to exercise credible deterrence. In this connection, a strong conventional component is the primordial condition for Western Europe's forward defence strategy.

Furthermore, we consider that there can be no concept of Western European security outside the Atlantic Alliance: the maintenance of the necessary American forces in Europe, guaranteeing the coupling between European and American security, is essential.

The French and United Kingdom nuclear forces make a major contribution to European security. They are not concerned by the current negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It goes without saying that each European state must enjoy equal security. In return, each European state must make a contribution to the joint defence commensurate with its own capability. In this context, greater effectiveness in the European countries' defence efforts depends on improving co-operation in arms procurement.

The security of Europe cannot be considered separately from that of the rest of the world. Thus, in assessing risks, European states must take into account tension and conflicts outside Europe insofar as such developments affect their security.

Our security depends as much on the dialogue and reduction of tension as it does on our defence effort. These are not two conflicting factors; on the contrary, they are wholly complementary and were linked in the famous Harmel report.

The WEU Council of Ministers therefore agreed to play an energetic part in a policy of co-operation and dialogue based on a credible defence capability. The will to promote the control of armaments and disarmament to ensure a stable balance of forces at a lower level is an essential aspect of such a security policy. Agreements on these matters must increase our security and strengthen stability while being verifiable.

In any event, the ministers expressed their wish to see Western Europe, at the present international juncture, play a part in the development of any dialogue in full exercise of its responsibilities. *Inter alia*, they examined how to avoid any risk of Europe being side-lined in the present strategic debate.

It was in accordance with the guidelines that I have just described that the Council of Ministers took note of a report on European security interests in the present strategic context. This report was prepared in accordance with the mandate set out at the informal ministerial meeting of the WEU Council on 13th and 14th November 1986. On the instructions of the Council, this document will be studied further and extended by the relevant bodies of the organisation.

From what I have just told you, I think it is clear that the reactivation of WEU is now well under way: it may be considered to have reached cruising speed. The ministers therefore decided to consider at the present Council meeting the rôle, tasks and final structures of the organisation. The close association of ministers for foreign affairs and defence with all the organisation's work is now an accomplished fact. The political directors of the ministries for foreign affairs of our seven states and their counterparts in the ministries of defence now meet regularly. In the first four months of 1987, they have already met twice. Senior officials – assistant political directors or politico-military directors from the ministries for foreign affairs and their counterparts from the ministries of defence – do likewise in the framework of a special working group, but even more frequently, *i.e.* once a month, which is even more often than meetings in the framework of European political co-operation. These two bodies are responsible for examining any matter relating to European security that may arise in the context of Atlantic solidarity.

Finally, experts from the capitals meet in the same dual context to examine matters entrusted

Mr. Poos (continued)

to them such as problems raised by the evolution of the strategic defence initiative or Western Europe's security interests. The frequency of their meetings depends on the requirements of their work. New structures have therefore emerged alongside those which already existed such as the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council, which co-ordinates all the organisation's activities. They make it possible to pursue reflection and consultation on the security matters that reactivated WEU was mandated to handle by the Rome declaration and provide it with the means of becoming what it was intended to be: political co-operation on security matters.

The ministerial organs, the Secretariat-General and the agencies for security questions are at the service of these old and new structures to which I have just referred. The Secretariat-General assists them with their everyday work, particularly through its political division. The agencies, in close contact with the secretariat, are to constitute a medium- and long-term study centre whose effectiveness will be enhanced by being under the authority of a single director and organised and composed in such a way as to offer the intergovernmental structures the best of their expert knowledge. The Permanent Council has been instructed by the ministers to implement in a detailed manner the guidelines adopted by the ministers.

The Council of Ministers gave preliminary consideration to an outline study of security interests in the Mediterranean, prepared jointly by Italy and France. They instructed the appropriate bodies of the organisation to go further into the matter. The Council also took note of a report on the SDI prepared by the experts in which the politico-strategic implications of the current research programmes on strategic defensive systems are analysed. The ministers wished the experts to continue to examine these implications at regular intervals in the context of the necessary reflection on all matters affecting Western European security interests.

My foreign affairs and defence colleagues also examined the problem of the enlargement of WEU. Interest in our organisation is growing. After Portugal and Spain, Greece and Turkey are now showing, by their respective approaches, the importance they attach to WEU. We all obviously consider these demonstrations of interest in what our organisation is in the process of becoming to be a positive factor.

However, it would be premature for the WEU Council of Ministers to take a decision at this stage. The ministers tackled the problem on an informal basis only, waiting for matters to become clearer both for WEU member states

and for states interested in becoming members. On the one hand, final decisions still have to be taken on the rôle, tasks and structures of WEU before 31st December of this year, and on the other hand the joint definition of the fundamental guidelines of European security on which a consensus can be found is being pursued.

This, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, is what was done at the meeting of the Council of Ministers. It is not without some satisfaction that I review this work since, as I am sure you will agree, it was far from negligible.

You will probably appreciate that what we were mainly concerned with in our ministerial discussions tallies exactly with your own concerns, as testified by the talks between your President and several of his colleagues from the Presidential Committee in Moscow, on the one hand, and the debates at the extraordinary session you have just held, on the other, as shown in particular in Recommendation 443. As you can see from what I have just told you, the ministers took and will continue to take the utmost account of all this in the future.

A European security policy and its underlying defence effort require as wide a consensus as possible of the European nations in regard to the essential aims of that policy. Such a consensus necessarily implies a dialogue between us.

The ministers were aware of this reality when they discussed the problem of the Assembly's budget. I know how concerned you are about this question and we have discussed it at length and in depth, particularly during the talks that I have had with your President and Presidential Committee. This important matter is still on the agenda of the Council of Ministers.

However, the latter has just agreed to improve the situation by accepting a separate budget from the ordinary budget to meet the growing financial implications of pensions. It has also agreed to meet your wishes in regard to independent budgetary management, within the limits of agreed appropriations. In regard to an increase in the ordinary budget, it wishes to have more time to consider this matter on the basis of specific data. As you can see, two of your three wishes have now been given a constructive answer and I personally am happy to be able to announce this.

Furthermore, the ministers agree with the Assembly on intensifying the dialogue to allow better political means to be found for increased co-operation between the legislative and executive bodies of our organisation. They therefore held an exchange of views on relations with the Assembly. In accordance with a suggestion by the latter, they instructed the Secretary-General to make proposals at the next ministerial meeting.

Mr. Poos (continued)

With all my colleagues, ministers from the seven member states, I welcome the results thus obtained and trust that it will thus be possible for our meetings to be held in such good conditions as today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have listened closely to your most important statement and may I say that in my view it contains political guidance meriting close consideration by the committees of the Assembly.

I am not of course in a position here to make any value judgment, but perhaps I may be allowed to say that your words and the political and administrative ideas you have outlined seem to prove that you and the Minister of Defence have been most effective chairmen. I am glad of this on your behalf as you have spared no effort in responding unflinchingly to the views of the Assembly and in the patience you have shown to it and, more particularly, its President, who has invariably been demanding towards the Council and especially its Chairman. Thank you, Minister.

I call Mr. Fischbach.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I have asked for the floor to say once more that the joint council structure is a sound arrangement which works well. This was shown again yesterday evening by the informal exchange of views held by the ministers of defence. This exchange was arranged in the spirit of co-operation which guides WEU defence ministers, and yesterday's discussion was basically concerned with the problem just mentioned by the Chairman of the Council, the INF disarmament proposals. I can tell you that the talk was frank and of real substance and that those responsible for defence made clear their expectations as well as their concerns and personal areas of responsibility.

The ministers again stressed that INF did not constitute the sole nuclear threat to Western Europe. The total elimination of intermediate-range systems would not fundamentally reduce the threat to Europe in absolute quantitative terms. Europe must retain a balancing deterrent force. We need a weapons system which can threaten the potential aggressor without menacing our own countries or peoples. We therefore need deterrent weapons of sufficient range. Furthermore, INF disarmament measures must not be separated from parallel efforts for disarmament in strategic and conventional weapons, and such measures must not upset existing balances. The imbalance in conventional forces was the main concern of the defence ministers, who

insisted on the need to restore the balance. Everything must be done to safeguard the flexible response, and this requires a deterrent capacity at every level.

Some ministers wondered about the chances and timeliness of a zero-zero option, involving the total elimination of intermediate nuclear systems and not just in Europe. In this connection, mention was made of the need to maintain fundamental European solidarity.

The means of verification which will have to accompany any agreement on the reduction of nuclear weapons were considered to be essential but also extremely difficult, or even impossible in certain respects.

As far as the general approach to the INF negotiations is concerned, it is important that these should not be conducted under pressure. Not only do we Europeans have a unique chance of influencing the American negotiating position, but it is the Americans themselves who have provided us with this opportunity.

The ministers of defence are fully conscious of their responsibilities here and are quite prepared to shoulder them. The discussion yesterday evening again showed that the problems raised by the proposals for nuclear disarmament in Europe are complex, and it is a fact that the current debate touches the very core of European security. The discussion also showed just how useful a forum like WEU is for co-ordinating and harmonising views on political and strategic problems of crucial importance to Europe. The present debate on nuclear disarmament in Europe carries some risks for the Europeans, but it also gives them an opportunity to define in clearer terms their essential security concerns in both the short and the long term.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. I am very glad you were also able to address our Assembly. The brevity and conciseness of your remarks bear no relation to the effort involved, as I can personally attest. I welcome your efforts to strengthen the contacts between the defence ministers of our member countries and to associate them as closely as possible with the work of the ministers for foreign affairs. By your actions you have fulfilled one of the most urgent wishes of our Assembly, which, even before reactivation, considered that the WEU Council of Ministers was of necessity the appropriate forum for the competent government representatives in these two important areas. Thank you again, Minister, for all your work.

I call Mr. Wilkinson to put the first question.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, may I first express my appreciation to

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

Foreign Minister Poos and Defence Minister Fischbach for their candour and the openness with which they have addressed this Assembly and shared with us some of their reflections on European security policy. We greatly appreciate that and we appreciate the generosity of spirit and practical generosity too of the Luxembourg Government throughout the period of the Luxembourg presidency, which has been I think a positive period in our Assembly's development.

Can I ask the ministers why they did not say more, or were not able to agree more in the course of their discussions on European military space policy, on collocation of the various institutions and organs of WEU – namely the Council, agencies and Assembly? Whether they are hopeful to be able to do more in the longer term for the budgetary needs of our Assembly? We greatly welcome the fact that the pensions are to be taken out of the main working budget and treated separately. This is a thoroughly positive development. But could I remind the ministers that we are a very cost-effective organisation. We are not a sort of travelling circus like the European Parliament. We have a staff of twenty-six instead of 2 600 and we produce really very good reports and excellent value for money and we deserve, we believe, to be supported financially so we can continue to do worthwhile work.

In that regard, can I say that we still hope that it will ultimately be possible for the fourteen European members of our NATO alliance all ultimately to be members of WEU. Then, surely, would there not be the appropriate institutional framework to make Eurogroup fully representative and have all the agencies and support services necessary to concert a more effective European security policy?

In short, Sirs, can I ask you to tell us what needs to be done immediately to make WEU, in your judgment, from the time you have been working on the Council, in the presidency, a more effective organisation than it is today, because in that we share a common purpose?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson, for your very kind appraisal of the Luxembourg chairmanship. The results we have achieved over the last ten or eleven months were made possible by the small back-up team of our two ministers and by the willing collaboration of the WEU secretariat. When the chair is held by a small country the work invariably has to be done by

the secretariat, and its contribution has been greatly appreciated.

Why did I not say more about SDI? Because I think you will be receiving the interim report prepared by our experts on the subject, and that you will have the opportunity to address this subject later. I can however reveal to you some of the general ideas embodied in this report. It makes the first point that research into space defence is not confined to the United States but is also conducted by the Soviet Union. Secondly, it considers that the deployment of SDI will take a very long time and that the system will not be effectively in place before the end of this millenium or only after the year 2000.

The report draws the third conclusion that, while it is still too early to make final judgments, it is highly likely that the deployment of SDI will restart a race in both defensive and offensive armaments with each side trying to increase its offensive weapons to penetrate the shield erected by its adversary. That is a first important conclusion of the report. But I stress that it is an interim report, and we have instructed our experts to continue their analysis in the context of world strategic developments.

The relocation of WEU organs was the subject of an in-depth exchange of views between ministers in very restricted session, and we found that opinions on this were divided. You all know that our organs are at present located in the two cities of London and Paris, and that moving elsewhere would cause additional expenditure. We are continuing to think about the issue, but it seems that the Council of Ministers does not ascribe high priority to the question. We are also continuing to consider the agencies but are already agreed that these should be combined under a single directorate. This action will result in rationalisation and budgetary savings.

To conclude on the question of the budget, I am sure that this is a matter of prime importance to you, and I have been insistent with my colleagues that the problem must be finally solved. You are aware that the chair suggested a method, but it seems there are some reservations. Nevertheless, I gained the impression that the various attitudes expressed were moving towards a better understanding of your concern. The ministers are agreed that means should be sought of allowing WEU generally and hence the Assembly a budget growth rate compatible with our political decisions on the reactivation of WEU. I stressed that the figures in question were derisory when compared with the funds made available to other international organisations. I hope that deliberations will continue in national cabinets, and that the Council will be able to address this problem again at its next meeting under Netherlands chairmanship.

Mr. Poos (continued)

The decision taken to separate the pensions budget from the operating budget is a step forward which will enable WEU to honour its commitments to former employees whether of the secretariat or of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly.

The last question asks: what is your opinion of the reactivation of WEU? I think I replied to this when I spoke on behalf of the Council. My colleagues consider that the reactivation of WEU is an accomplished fact and that it will now be sufficient to finalise the relevant document prepared under the Luxembourg chairmanship. The WEU organs and the substance of the debates conducted at various levels from ministerial councils to the groups of experts prove that the Rome decision has been translated into fact.

I am therefore highly satisfied with what has been accomplished, and I leave it to my successor, Mr. van den Broek, Chairman for next year – to whom I express my regards here today – to put the final touch to the reactivation and to meet the target date of 31st December 1987 set by the ministers in Rome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I shall not add to the compliments already paid to the Chairman-in-Office. All of us appreciate the value of what he had to say. Mr. Chairman, you have reminded us of many points relating to what was said in this Assembly last December about the idea of a European security charter, launched at that time by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac. Do you think that action could be taken to interest the public in this idea and to focus attention on the major security principles involved? I think this would be a useful tool for our Assembly and Council, and would at the same time provide a means of increasing public awareness and a proper understanding in our countries. I think that could give important support to our work.

My second question concerns the relations between the Assembly and the Council. You have referred to the task entrusted to the Secretary-General, and, without wishing to presume on a mission which will be wholly his responsibility, I consider that this evening's arrangements are both exceptional and noteworthy. May we look forward to repetitions?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I was expecting an intervention on this subject, as the charter or joint principles

of European security were separate items on the agenda of the ministerial session, and I am pleased to tell you that progress has been made. We have instructed the Permanent Council to prepare a report and to define on that basis a common platform identifying European security interests for examination and adoption at the next ministerial meeting, which will be in The Hague.

It has therefore been accepted that the principles should be defined, though we have not yet decided on the title to be used. This will be done when we have defined the security issues on which we can all agree. We have already instructed the Permanent Council to examine in what form these principles should be put for presentation to European and world public opinion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I thank the Minister for what he said and could I ask him three simple direct questions?

First of all, as there has been this advance on the matter of pensions, will he allow the Assembly to look into the way the pension fund money is invested and see if they are in a position to do better than governments and government officials, which is the experience we have certainly had in the United Kingdom?

Secondly, could I ask whether the separate budget means that the normal increases in pensions will be added to that budget without reflecting upon any other increases that may be required for growth?

Thirdly, on the question of collocation, may I ask the Minister whether he realises that it may be that the cost of putting organisations from two cities into one may cost more the first year – I know of few examples in commerce where it does not then save a lot of money – and does he appreciate that too much thought on a subject paralyses action?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I am not aware of present WEU practice, and I do not know whether the money allocated to future disbursements is banked to earn interest or whether the pensions are paid from each year's operating budget. I think it is the Secretary-General who should answer this technical question, but at any rate the decision taken today is that the rate of increase of pension payments will be determined by actual needs. The ministers are agreed that the rate of increase for this item should be different from that

Mr. Poos (continued)

applied to the rest of the budget. I can say nothing more regarding the relocation of WEU organs, as the Council has not yet reached agreement on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, for many years Europe has been witnessing a faster and more intense arms race and both governments and peoples in Western Europe have come to look upon both the race and the fears which it has brought as being inevitable. Now we have the near prospect of agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on a reduction of nuclear armaments, which affects Europe.

My question to you is: as you said in your speech today the governments are concerned about security; there are no proposals from them but only understandable concern. Do you not think that this attitude involves a double risk, firstly, of obstructing an agreement on disarmament and secondly of confirming the impotence of the European governments? Thank you for your reply.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I must tell the speaker that I see no contradiction in the position of the WEU Council. I have just made it clear that the WEU doctrine continues to be that set out in the Harmel report: concern for defence combined with readiness to discuss and conclude controlled and verifiable disarmament agreements. I think it is wrong to say that Europe or the West in general does no more than react to Soviet proposals, as exactly the contrary has been the case in recent years. It was the alliance which in 1981 made a major proposal on the zero option in Europe, and it is the Soviet Union which took five years to accept. It is therefore totally incorrect to regard the Soviet proposals now on the table as genuinely original initiatives to which Europe is merely reacting without having its own ideas on disarmament.

Again, it was Europe which demanded that shorter-range missile systems be included in the framework of an agreement on long-range missiles, and we are still waiting for a reply from the Warsaw Pact countries to the Brussels appeal for conventional disarmament. I also remind you that MBFR negotiations have been in progress in Vienna for the last fourteen years without the other side accepting any of the western proposals on disarmament in conventional weapons where, as you know, there are large imbalances. I

therefore believe that public opinion should be given a more positive image of the western position on disarmament, and we have tried to do this in the Council communiqué, which will, I think, be distributed to you this evening.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – Still on the same theme, Mr. Chairman, Mr. President, in the opening part of the Minister's address to us he expressed satisfaction on behalf of the Council of Ministers at the progress – limited as it may be so far – that is being made with regard to nuclear disarmament at intermediate-range level. He went on, if I heard him correctly, to state that the ministers took seriously the statements that the Soviet Union has been making more recently covering a variety of other levels of disarmament – medium-range, short-range and, indeed, conventional weaponry and personnel. All these have been statements and he said that what the Council of Ministers wanted was to consider these matters seriously when they had been put in writing and had been tabled. I think I quote the Minister correctly.

He then went on to state, as I understood him, and this is where my question arises, what the Council of Ministers' position was on security matters, what the policy was: that Europe had to maintain a nuclear deterrent. Now if I have got that wrong I shall be interested to hear the answer. If I got it right, I would like to know how one can make compatible a statement which expresses serious interest in discussing and negotiating the statements that are being made by the Soviet Union once they are put into writing, which cover all levels of nuclear arms, and at the same time declare a position where Western Europe is going to maintain the nuclear deterrent.

I finish with this, if I may, in the form of a question. Until recently nuclear weapons were officially a regrettable necessity. That was our position. Something we only did because the East had them as well. When they got rid of theirs we would too, with relief. That was our position. Now that it seems Moscow is moving in our direction, are we to believe that Western Europe still has to have nuclear weapons, even if the Russians do not have them? Is denuclearising Europe something to hope and work for or to fear and obstruct? Does the Minister appreciate that, if this is the line, we will be – some of us, some of our countries – in abrogation of the non-proliferation treaty? What does he think will be the effect of that on existing non-nuclear powers who have the capacity to become nuclear powers?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think I replied to the first part of the question a moment ago by saying that the members of our union will be ready to discuss the Soviet proposals on SRINF when they are put in writing. The only text on the Soviet proposal is General Secretary Gorbachev's Prague speech. In our view this is not a sufficiently detailed proposal to enable us to react at the moment by suggesting, say, a limit to which we would be prepared to dismantle short-range systems. We have not given any definitive response but have said we will examine the proposals in detail when they become known.

As far as alliance strategy is concerned, I repeat that the flexible response is the only strategy we advocate. It is a strategy which comprises both a conventional and a nuclear element. I have been very clear on this point in the draft statement which has been formulated and which will, I hope, be adopted at our next ministerial Council. In present circumstances the nuclear component of European security is clearly included, and I do not need to remind you that the reason for this is the conventional superiority of the other side.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Chairman, in your most interesting speech you referred quite specifically to the continued defence of Europe by both conventional and nuclear weapons. Could I ask you: how does this square with the publicly-stated intention of the President of the United States to achieve the removal of all nuclear weapons – I repeat, all nuclear weapons – from Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I have no knowledge of any such statement by the United States President. I know that when he first presented his strategic defence initiative he did say that, by deploying the anti-missile ballistic defence system in space, the United States could acquire a facility which would render atomic weapons obsolete. Such a statement does indeed exist, but I have yet to see any statement by the United States President announcing his intention of eliminating all nuclear weapons in Europe. I do not know of any such statement, but I am aware of many in the opposite sense, including especially those of the American Secretary of State.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, you will be aware that a very large majority of our Assembly yesterday voted in favour of a motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure which urged the Council “to make known its collegiate point of view on the Gorbachev proposals through the intermediary of its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, in his statement to the Assembly on Tuesday, 28th April 1987” and that in paragraph 2 of the recommendation proper the Assembly urged the Council “to instruct its Chairman-in-Office to give the Council's point of view on the Soviet proposals at the meetings of the North Atlantic Council to be held on 11th and 12th June 1987”.

My first question after this brief introduction is whether this recommendation caused any change to be made to the Council's agenda and what action, if any, was taken in response to the Assembly's recommendation adopted under urgent procedure.

I would then like to ask whether the Council Chairman can tell me when we shall have the report on SDI.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. The SDI report referred to by the Minister is still under study and will be examined by the Permanent Council before being finalised as quickly as possible for transmission to the Assembly. The report is, of course, part of an on-going study, as the SDI is still evolving, and we shall also have to mould our ideas to various hypotheses relating especially to the strategic impact of SDI.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-office of the Council*) (Translation). – In answer to the first part of Mr. Goerens's question, I can inform the Assembly that its recommendation under urgent procedure was passed to Council members in writing. It was not added to the agenda but was, I believe, taken into account in drafting the final communiqué, which refers to Mr. Gorbachev's proposals on short-range missiles, details of which we are still awaiting.

We were informed during the meeting that the Soviet Union has today tabled a draft INF agreement in Geneva, but that no reference is made to SRINF in any section of the text. In these circumstances the Council was not in a position today to respond to the proposals made by the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. I am not being evasive. The

Mr. Poos (continued)

Council is at all times alert to the news from Geneva and is ready for consultation to decide a common position as soon as the proposals are known.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Terlezki.

Mr. TERLEZKI (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. I too wish to congratulate the Minister for an excellent speech about the defence of Europe, about disarmament – nuclear, conventional and, indeed, chemical weapons.

What I would like to ask the Minister is: Is there room for discussion and debate – irrespective of what platform, WEU, Council of Europe, at the defence level, NATO level – about human rights, about the Helsinki agreement, about the European people who are suffering under the tyranny in the Soviet Union, in the satellite states? Should we not sometimes include also the debate about the millions of people who are not so fortunate as us; where we enjoy freedom and democracy and they, for about seventy years, have suffered under tyranny and oppression?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The Council of Ministers has rightly underlined the global nature of détente. Détente is not limited to disarmament agreements, however important they may be. Détente must also extend to human rights and to reducing tension points throughout the world, where the true behaviour of the Soviet Union will be tested by its actions.

We were agreed in stressing this point, which I think responds to the concern which has been expressed. Every western minister who has had an opportunity of meeting his Soviet counterpart has emphasised western insistence that greater efforts should be made in the Soviet Union. Although there have been some releases of refuseniks and dissidents, hundreds of people are still confined in internment camps and prisons, and when I was in Moscow I personally insisted that additional efforts should be made in this area.

We must never lose sight of the fact that the military arsenal which we are endeavouring to control and restrain is the product of distrust, and the Soviet Union must understand that certain causes of this distrust must be removed if the chances of a general disarmament agreement are to improve.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. I was particularly delighted to hear the Minister's last remarks in which he said what I think is in the hearts of many of us, that any assessment of the threat with which we are possibly having to cope cannot be judged just on weaponry alone but in a wider context of observance of the CSCE, which some of us feel very strongly when we are seeking to assess just what threat it is that we are trying to face.

The Minister in his opening remarks, again entirely comprehensibly, mentioned the fact that it was very difficult for ministers today to give a joint collective response, or indeed any response, to what were merely declarations but were not in fact written proposals on which we could comment. I thought that was the only possible answer he could have given.

Could he say – because at least he has sources of information and we parliamentarians merely have to rely only on the media – whether some of these declarations, which may or may not come in the form of proposals, does he know of any that are in the pipeline, which would indicate that a precondition of any settlement would be the abandonment by France and/or Britain of their own sovereign nuclear deterrents?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – At this stage it is impossible to play the prophet and predict what Mr. Gorbachev may still have in his pipeline, which seems to me to be quite long and amply filled. However, the Soviet Union has not in the current negotiations so far insisted that the French and British nuclear forces be dismantled. On the contrary, a Soviet demand to this effect, which had been maintained since 1981, was lifted at Reykjavik, and since then the existence of these forces, which are not integrated in NATO, has ceased to be a subject for pressure in the Soviet-American negotiations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, could I, as Chairman of the Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs, thank the Chairman for his thoroughly enlightened and helpful approach during the time he has held office in our very intense and difficult deliberations about the budget and its future. Perhaps I could go as far as saying that I do not believe we would have achieved what we

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

have so far without his advocacy and his determination to back up our very legitimate claims and I am sure all of us, irrespective of our parties, would thank him for his efforts on our behalf.

Can I just ask, Sir, whether you could say when the pensions element is likely to be severed from the main operating budget? Will it be in the current financial year?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The reply is “Yes”. We will try to do this as quickly as possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Mr. President, I too want to thank the Minister for his rather clear and encouraging statements. Nevertheless, I was a bit puzzled by a more or less cryptic statement on the relationship between an agreement on INF and the short-range missiles. If I try to understand the statements, at least I heard something like: in an essential agreement on INF, the problem of short-range missiles should not be neglected. If I heard that correctly. Does that mean that, in a separate agreement on INF missiles, a passage should be included something like: further following negotiations will start after the separate agreement on short-range missiles, or does it mean that an agreement on short-range missiles is a precondition for an agreement on INF missiles?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The sixteen members of the alliance have considered the links between an INF agreement and short-range missiles. They adopted the position set out in the Brussels communiqué, which says that an agreement on INF must be followed by negotiations on shorter-range missiles. That is the official position of the sixteen members. The ministers of the WEU countries have said nothing different today. They are in complete agreement with this

NATO position and reaffirm that the problem of shorter-range missiles should not be neglected when negotiating an agreement on INF, though no preconditions are implied.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. On behalf of the Assembly I should like to thank you for your presence here and for your detailed comments and replies. Before ending, I wish to express again the Assembly's gratitude and the conviction that relations between the Council and the Assembly have steadily improved in recent times and are largely responsible for improved efficiency, markedly better understanding and the unquestionably closer co-ordination of our efforts and work.

As President of the Assembly and speaking on behalf of all my colleagues I wish to express appreciation of your actions and of the Council's work today in bringing this about. Thanks to you, we have plenty to do. It has been a successful occasion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5. Close of the extraordinary session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I wish to thank our committee rapporteurs for all the work they have done. My thanks go also to the members of the Assembly for their attendance and their participation in our debates; I have at various times expressed my gratitude to ministers, ambassadors and representatives of member states who have attended.

My warmest thanks also go to all staff made available to us here in Luxembourg to help with the work of committees, political groups and the Assembly itself; this includes all messengers, security guards and other hard-working staff who have helped us until now and I am sure will continue to do so until we leave.

I wish also to thank the press and everyone who has followed our deliberations, the staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly who have served us unstintingly as usual. Finally, Mr. Secretary-General, thank you for your attendance and your work which I trust will produce further results.

The extraordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union in Luxembourg is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 7.05 p.m.)

III
ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

AGENDA
of the extraordinary session
Luxembourg, 27th and 28th April 1987

I. Political questions

The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part I: The reactivation of WEU

Report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee

II. Defence questions

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

Report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

III. Budgetary and administrative questions

Application of Order 65 on the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1987

Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Presidential Committee

ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the extraordinary session
Luxembourg, 27th and 28th April 1987

MONDAY, 27th APRIL

Morning 8.30 a.m.

Meeting of the Socialist Group.

9 a.m.

Meeting of the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats.

Time to be fixed

Meeting of the Liberal Group.

10 a.m.

1. Opening of the extraordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part I: The reactivation of WEU:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.

TUESDAY, 28th APRIL

Morning 10 a.m.

Application of Order 65 on the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1987:
Debate.

Afternoon at the close of the meeting of the Council of Ministers

Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Debate.

CLOSE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION

The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance
Part I: The reactivation of WEU

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – Part I: The reactivation of WEU

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Reactivation of WEU
- III. A charter of principles for the security of Western Europe
- IV. The activities of WEU
- V. Conclusions

1. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Close (Acting Chairman); Mr. Martino (Vice-Chairman); MM. Ahrens, Baumel, Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: Murphy), MM. Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Hardy, Mrs. Herfkens, Mr. Hill, Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Koehl (Alternate: Portier), Lord Mackie, MM. Masciadri, Mermaz, Müller, Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Vecchietti, van der Werff, N... (vacant seat) (Alternate: Chénard), N... (vacant seat).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
*on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance –
 Part I: The reactivation of WEU*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the proposal made by the Prime Minister of France on 2nd December 1986 to draw up a European security charter provides an opportunity for a fundamental re-examination of the requirements of that security;
- (ii) Considering that the policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance remains the guarantee of that security;
- (iii) Considering that the main threats to international peace now arise in areas not covered by the alliance;
- (iv) Considering that European co-operation in armaments matters has become essential for the security of Europe;
- (v) Considering that the search for disarmament or the limitation of armaments is essential for the maintenance of peace and should continue to be given priority but that this search must not jeopardise the security of Europe;
- (vi) Considering that the recent development of chemical weapons constitutes a particularly serious threat for all mankind;
- (vii) Welcoming recent measures taken by the Council to increase its activities in order to meet the requirements of European security but regretting that information on these activities communicated to the public and to the Assembly is still far from adequate;
- (viii) Considering that it is still essential to bring the requirements of European security to the attention of the public;
- (ix) Deeply regretting the continuous failure of the Council to inform the Assembly in a proper way;
- (x) Considering that new governmental activities in WEU must allow the Assembly to exercise to the full its responsibilities under Article IX of the treaty;
- (xi) Noting in particular that the replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions relating to the Council's activities, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Programme Group seriously distort the Council's commitments to the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Study closely the proposals made by the French Government for drawing up a European security charter with a view to:
 - (a) defining Europe's security requirements, acquainting its American allies with them and ensuring that current negotiations on the limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons lead to substantial reductions without compromising Europe's security based on a policy of deterrence;
 - (b) reaffirming member countries' continuing concern not to compromise the cohesion of the alliance and to include the strengthening of the European pillar in the context of the alliance;
 - (c) averting a chemical arms race by calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to seek an agreement ensuring the complete elimination of such arms and promoting the extension of this agreement to all countries;
 - (d) including in the charter a commitment to ensure reciprocal exchanges of information and consultations in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in regard to any threat to international peace;
 - (e) also including an expression of the joint will to remove obstacles still obstructing the development of European co-operation in armaments matters;

2. To this end, direct the measures taken to give new work to WEU so as to ensure that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty contributes to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the consolidation of peace by:

- (a) keeping the political committee on European security in the framework of WEU;
- (b) considering how the treaty should be applied to ensure that it meets present European security requirements and allows WEU to be enlarged to include Western European countries wishing and able to take part;
- (c) ensuring that these countries are kept informed of the activities of WEU and allowing the countries concerned to take part henceforth in some of these activities, particularly in co-operation in armaments matters;
- (d) giving the necessary impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters, inter alia by adapting its decision of 7th May 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee to present facts of such co-operation;
- (e) acting without delay on its document "WEU and public awareness" so as to inform public opinion of all its activities in accordance with the principles set out in the Rome declaration, including the issue of communiqués at the close of meetings of the political committee on European security;
- (f) ensuring co-ordination of member countries' participation in the course to be organised by the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale in 1988 and of the development of subsequent courses so as to promote public awareness of European security requirements in all member countries;
- (g) developing exchanges of views with the United States authorities so as to enhance the cohesion of the alliance;
- (h) applying in full Article IX of the treaty under which it has an obligation to report to the Assembly on its activities and on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when pursued in frameworks other than WEU.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. When the General Affairs Committee asked your Rapporteur to study what might constitute a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, its wish was not to limit its deliberations to the Council's report on its activities in 1986 but to examine to what extent past or future decisions on the activities and structure of WEU corresponded to the Council's intention, voiced in the Rome declaration, to set up this second pillar.

2. Since the committee took this initiative, two events have given shape to your Rapporteur's mandate. First, speaking to the Assembly on 2nd December 1986, Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France, proposed that the WEU countries together draw up a European security charter. Second, on 4th December the Presidential Committee of the Assembly decided to hold an extraordinary session in Luxembourg in April 1987 at which, in addition to disarmament, consideration would be given to the reactivation of WEU, covering the action to be taken on Mr. Chirac's proposals and the political committee on European security which the Council decided to set up in Luxembourg on 14th November 1986. The latter question was referred to the General Affairs Committee and therefore quite naturally took its place in the study of the European pillar of the alliance.

3. However, it is difficult for a report to be presented to the Assembly in April, which consequently should be adopted by the General Affairs Committee on 16th March, to include a reply to the annual report of the Council. This report was very late in reaching the Assembly in 1986 and, even if there are hopes that the Council will try to speed things up, there is little chance of the committee being able to give its opinion on the thirty-second annual report of the Council in time. Moreover, the ministerial meeting of the Council, normally followed by joint meetings with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee, should give parliamentarians useful pointers to the guidelines adopted by the Council and the decisions taken. These joint meetings are at the moment expected to be held at the end of April, i. e. after the Assembly's extraordinary session. It is therefore hardly desirable for the General Affairs Committee to give its views on the Council's activities before the ministerial meeting and the joint meetings are held.

4. This being so, your Rapporteur felt he should divide his draft report into two parts. The first part, dealing with Mr. Chirac's proposals

and the creation of a political committee on European security, might thus be adopted by the committee in March and included in the agenda of the extraordinary session. The second part might be adopted subsequently and included only in the agenda of the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session, as is customary.

II. Reactivation of WEU

5. It is of little concern to the WEU Assembly to know what internal political reasons led the Prime Minister of France to address it on 2nd December 1986 and make the remarks which your Rapporteur will try to analyse. It should merely be noted that the presence of a prime minister, even from a country where the President of the Republic is also head of the executive, is sufficiently exceptional to be underlined. In the last ten years, only Mr. Mauroy, also Prime Minister of France, addressed members of the Assembly, not during a sitting but in the course of a dinner on 29th November 1982, thus limiting the official nature of his remarks. Nevertheless, on that occasion Mr. Mauroy heralded his government's intention to propose to France's partners that Western European Union be given new impetus and his address was a major event in the steps leading to the Seven's decision to reactivate WEU.

6. At that time, the situation was marked by the difficulties the Western European countries were experiencing in implementing the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 which implied, on the one hand, reviving disarmament negotiations to obtain the complete withdrawal of Soviet SS-20 missiles and, on the other, deploying Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe in the event of these negotiations not being successful. The number and scale of demonstrations against deployment raised the question of whether the people of the countries concerned were not going to force their governments to oppose the application of the NATO decision on their territory. Mr. Mauroy recalled the danger of a disarmed Europe in face of Soviet missiles and drew the public's attention to its security requirements. He was probably encouraged by the relative unanimity in France towards the policy of nuclear deterrence pursued by successive governments and by the conviction that greater awareness of the threats to Western Europe would help all the European nations to accept the cost and implicit risks of an effective policy of deterrence.

7. An important aspect of the Prime Minister of France's address was the rôle he attributed to the WEU Assembly in this effort to inform and appeal to public opinion. He believed a public debate on security requirements to be the best means of coping with fears and putting over what he considered to be reasonable views.

8. It now seems that this address, which was followed by more specific proposals in the framework of WEU, led to significant results since, together with Belgian proposals submitted to the Council in 1983 but not published, it was at the origin of the reactivation of WEU which included the elimination of out-of-date discrimination, reaffirmation of the rôle of NATO and of existing national deterrent forces as instruments of Europe's defence and, finally, the Council adopting a new approach to its rôle thanks inter alia to the participation of defence ministers in its work: the purpose was to give the alliance's defence policy political guidance to take account of Europe's specific interests. The governments of the other WEU countries all accepted the French proposals, on the one hand because they probably feared that France might otherwise move away from its partners to try to guarantee its security by other means and, on the other, because they shared France's views about the need to enhance the European dimension of joint security, provided this did not jeopardise the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance; nor should it induce the Americans to make concessions to the fraction of their public opinion which wanted American troops to be withdrawn from Europe since these forces make a decisive contribution to the protection of Western European territory by the American nuclear deterrent. The Rome declaration of 27th October 1984 expressed the Seven's agreement to remodel the work of WEU.

9. However, implementation of the principles agreed upon in Rome seems to have run up against various obstacles which are difficult to define since the governments have done their utmost to conceal them. In any event, in 1985 and the first half of 1986 one has to record a succession of hesitations, delays, uncertainties and evasions in the Council's work, which has fallen well short of the intentions expressed in Rome.

10. The wish to maintain the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and not to provoke negative reactions in the United States to the reactivation of WEU and differences of opinion in certain European countries have already imposed strict limits on the intentions expressed by the governments. There is absolutely no question of reviving the idea of a European army or a European defence community with its own armed forces. A European pillar of the alliance is not to be set up in military terms. This is not the aim of countries assigning forces to NATO inte-

grated military commands or of those with forces remaining under national command, i. e. mainly French forces. From the very outset the former clearly had no intention of doing anything that could be taken for a withdrawal of forces from the alliance and France was not prepared to place its forces, particularly its nuclear forces, under a command over which it did not have sovereignty.

11. There thus remain the areas to which the modified Brussels Treaty applies but which are outside NATO integrated activities or are not covered by consultations in other European institutions such as economic, social and cultural matters. First and foremost comes the security policy of member countries, particularly in regions outside the North Atlantic Treaty area.

12. Then there are all matters relating to disarmament which oblige Europe to follow closely the relevant Soviet-American talks or multi-lateral negotiations so that its security is not jeopardised by the terms of any agreement on the limitation of armaments or disarmament. Europe is even less able to impose its views in such matters because it takes no part in the most important negotiations and can hardly play a leading rôle in a matter which is being conducted by the two great powers. It therefore has to limit its action to a continuing study of the progress of negotiations and to approaching its American allies when the need is felt.

13. The third major task WEU took on concerns the production of armaments. It has to ensure that European technology does not fall too far behind in this sector, that it plays a fair part in trade between countries of the alliance and that intra-European co-operation allows its industries to produce at reasonable cost.

14. Finally, one of WEU's main rôles as redefined in the Rome declaration is to make public opinion understand the European dimension of security problems so that it accepts the sacrifices of all kinds which are essential for maintaining its security, i. e. military service, an adequate armaments budget, respect for allies in every area and acceptance of certain risks, including those implied by the deployment of nuclear weapons to ward off the even greater risks that an inadequately-defended Europe would run. It should be emphasised that this essential rôle can be played effectively with the means available to WEU only if Europe makes convincing progress in other areas. There would be no point in claiming to uphold the morale of European nations if the difficulties confronting economic Europe were too serious, if political rivalry developed, if Europe's real interests in disarmament or armaments were not effectively defended or if the defence of Europe was not ensured.

15. Hence, if WEU is to be effective as an instrument for acting on public opinion, the Community and European political consultations must be conducted efficiently, the deterrent exercised by NATO must be maintained at an adequate level and all the aims set for WEU itself in the Rome declaration must be attained.

16. Yet the convergence of all these factors has not been achieved, or only very imperfectly, since October 1984, with the result that outside observers, the press and WEU parliamentarians have increasing doubts about the seriousness of the intentions expressed in Rome.

17. (a) In the European Communities, there was no major operational crisis in 1985 and 1986. On the contrary, the adoption and subsequent ratification by most member countries of the single European act showed the continuing will of the Twelve to develop Community Europe, although there is still much discussion about the merits of the common agricultural policy. Monetary policy has encountered serious difficulties but this affects only some of the members of the Community. From the WEU standpoint, the single act is particularly noteworthy in that it recognises our organisation's specific rôle in exercising its responsibilities, considered as a contribution by the Seven to the solidarity of the Twelve. But it can hardly be claimed that Community activity in recent years has given much impetus to European feelings. The single act also testifies to the meagre progress achieved by twelve-power Europe.

18. (b) In political co-operation, the development of consultations has not allowed meaningful decisions to be taken in times of crisis, particularly for responding to the terrorist threat which affected Europe several times in 1985 and 1986. There are three very different reasons for this. First, European countries have very unequal means of acting outside the NATO area. Although some of them took action in the Falklands, Lebanon and Chad, they could not rely on serious assistance from partners which, for various reasons, did not have the means of taking such action. The most they could hope for was relative solidarity from their partners. Second, the involvement of several of them in external conflicts and their consequences, particularly when they were victims of terrorist actions or hostage-taking, left them no possibility of respecting collective discipline which failed to take account of the facts. This was one of the reasons for the Franco-British differences over Syria in autumn 1986: the United Kingdom saw this country as being behind an operation which had been judged in a British court, whereas Mr. Chirac, in an interview in the Washington Times on 7th November 1986, recalled that for the sake of its solidarity with the United Kingdom France could not sacrifice its negotiations to obtain the release of certain hostages or a policy aimed at

strengthening the Arab states best able to counter subversion by Islamic fundamentalism. Third, a meeting of the ambassadors of member countries in London is probably not the best forum for receiving information or a fortiori for taking decisions in matters of this kind. However, the development of meetings between political directors from ministries for foreign affairs and representatives of ministries of defence of WEU member countries may remedy this situation.

19. (c) There have been no substantial changes where NATO is concerned. However, differences have emerged several times between its members, first about matters not concerning the North Atlantic Treaty area, particularly in Latin America, or about American reprisals against Libya in April 1986, and subsequently about disarmament, because the Reykjavik meeting revealed that consultations between European and American members of the alliance had been inadequate and led to fears lest Europe's security be jeopardised.

20. (d) Attainment of the aims set by the Seven in the Rome declaration is still far from certain. There is no doubt that the Seven have started to implement them in several areas, but in none of them have they yet achieved really convincing results.

21. (i) In regard to disarmament, everyone knows, although the Council has never admitted it – hiding behind the pretext of secrecy in order not to answer Written Question 270 put by Mr. van der Sanden on 30th June 1986 – that in February 1985 the American authorities with the most responsibility for such matters informed the governments of the Seven that they did not wish a European position to be expressed at the time the Geneva negotiations were being started. Everything indicates that this intervention led to the Council's disarmament activities being shelved for several months. However, the Council has since informed the Assembly that in 1986 it resumed the consultations on this subject which had been interrupted in February 1985 and that Agency I has been instructed to report on several major aspects of the question. Neither the Assembly nor the public has been officially informed of results obtained in this matter. In spite of its promises, the Council has not communicated its agencies' reports to the Assembly.

22. However, the Belgian information bulletin *De defensa Europe*, generally very well informed about matters relating to WEU, gave a number of indications on this point in its issue of 10th December 1986. Noting that the Assembly's main reproach to the ministers following their meeting in Luxembourg was that they had not agreed on a joint text reflecting the position of WEU which the Chairman-in-Office of the Council could have put forward in the Council,

the bulletin said the United Kingdom had vetoed the principle of a joint statement. Conversely, the bulletin said the ministers would have been able, without great difficulty, to agree on a text defining a joint overall position on the aftermath of Reykjavik. It is to be hoped that the thirty-second annual report of the Council, albeit much later than the press, will give the information to which the Assembly is entitled on this matter.

23. (ii) On the SDI, the thirty-first annual report of the Council mentioned generally-agreed principles. It was announced in turn that the working group on the SDI had been instructed to prepare a study on air defence in Europe and then, in November 1986, that the task assigned to the working group on the SDI had been extended to cover all matters relating to Europe's security. This latter decision makes one wonder about the nature of this working group, its responsibilities and what the Council expects of it. Specialising in the SDI, it could conduct a serious study into a question on which Europe will inevitably have to give its views and take major decisions in the next few years. It might have been logical and desirable to extend the range of its activities to the air defence of Europe. By extending it still further, is it not being turned into a replica of the Council itself? Does it not also reduce the impact and seriousness of its work?

24. (iii) On more general consultations on foreign policy matters related to security, in regard to which the single European act clearly shows WEU's place, the Council has started to hold meetings of political directors from ministries for foreign affairs. At its meeting in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986, it decided to make these meetings more official and binding, in particular by having them meet at least as frequently as after all the meetings of the Twelve. In answer to a question on this subject, Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, told Assembly representatives that these meetings were part of the WEU Council's activities. This is not unimportant since the Council consequently has to report on them in its annual report to the Assembly, in accordance with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.

25. (iv) In regard to the meetings attended by ministers of defence or members of their staff, whose discussions include European co-operation in armaments matters, the Assembly is even less well informed of what happens in the Council, assuming that something actually does happen. On 15th July 1986, our colleague, Mr. van der Werff, put Written Question 271 to the Council on the rôle the Council intended to play in this field and on the mandate and activities of the Standing Armaments Committee. The Council answered this question only on 17th November, merely recalling the rôle the Rome

declaration had assigned to the Council for providing political impetus in this field and asserting that its "effort will be continued". The Council said it had "decided to undertake a process of reflection on ways of enhancing collaboration between the SAC and Agency III" – whereas it had already instructed Agency III to ensure the secretariat of the SAC – to "help to identify areas of research relevant to WEU... in the current context of the transitional period" which is to end in 1987, after which it would draw "final conclusions". Finally, the Council gave an assurance that "the SAC will meet in the not too distant future". One may well wonder what the Council means by "not too distant future" since, as far as your Rapporteur knows, no date has yet been fixed for the next meeting of the SAC which, it should be recalled, did not meet at all in 1986. It might as well be said clearly that neither the Council nor the SAC has done anything to promote co-operation in armaments matters. In this case, even the press has given no indication of the origins of and reasons for an evident blockage.

26. Furthermore, the Council is now taking refuge behind a pretext which fools no one in order to refuse to give any information about the present or planned activities of the Independent European Programme Group, i. e. that it cannot do so on the grounds that this information also concerns non-member countries of WEU. This situation did not prevent the Council undertaking to report to the Assembly on all matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when exercised in a framework other than WEU. This is the undertaking on which the Council is now going back, which is serious for the Assembly and its future work, because it thus calls in question the exercise of the responsibility assigned to the Assembly in Article IX of the treaty. Moreover, if it is acting in this way it is most probably in order to conceal, or at least to avoid admitting, that the governments have not managed to achieve better co-operation in the IEPG than in WEU.

27. (v) Relations between the Council and the Assembly depend on the way the Council applies the treaty and the Rome declaration and on the various means it gives the Assembly for fulfilling its tasks. Its half-hearted implementation of the principles defined in Rome impels it to withhold information from the Assembly and restrict its instruments of work so that its weaknesses are not exposed to the public view. So far, the Council had at least attempted to coat the pill of its attitude towards the Assembly with fine words and had not restricted the Assembly's possibilities of expression. In December 1986, the abundance of ministerial pronouncements for the first time seriously perturbed parliamentary work because the Council had limited the

Assembly's budgetary resources to such an extent that it was unable to prolong its session to take account of the time taken up with ministerial addresses. If the *De defensa* bulletin already mentioned is to be believed, government representatives went still further since, according to the bulletin, there was criticism of the Assembly's impulsive and irresponsible character. As far as your Rapporteur knows, this criticism did not come from the press, which reported on the Assembly's work with great objectivity. The only other source might be government representatives trying to discredit the Assembly when they were unable to keep it quiet. Your Rapporteur has learned with satisfaction that the President of the Assembly did not let these anonymous allegations go unanswered. Could an unbiased observer compare an impulsive, irresponsible Assembly with an active, responsible Council? The question needs only to be put to find an answer.

28. As the bulletin abundantly quoted by your Rapporteur most rightly points out, in conclusion to its long article on the WEU Assembly session, "the general impression given at the Luxembourg summit meeting has been confirmed: by the force of circumstances, the Council is tending to take the leading rôle because it has the power to take decisions and is responsible for the budget: both the Assembly and the secretariat have to manoeuvre to strengthen their immediate presence in the current process, which might in the long run diminish their place and influence in the union". The Assembly's aim has admittedly never been to achieve pre-eminence over the Council, but on the other hand it cannot allow the Council to abuse its strength, particularly in budgetary matters, to make it become its purveyor of propaganda for the press and public opinion or to reduce it to silence in order to strip the modified Brussels Treaty of its parliamentary aspect which was why it was so novel in 1954 and is still its hallmark.

29. (vi) Similar reasons probably led the Council not to follow up the excellent document on WEU and public awareness appended to its thirty-first annual report and to maintain a thick smokescreen around all intergovernmental meetings held in WEU, with the exception of the spring ministerial meeting, unless the anonymous remarks reported in *De defensa* are to be considered as Council communications.

30. In answer to the following question put by our colleague, Mr. Antretter:

"Is the Federal Government aware that, contrary to its answer of 6th June 1986 to my Question 83, the new public relations unit created in the Secretariat-General of WEU in London has not yet started work since the corresponding post has still not been filled?"

What steps does the Federal Government intend to take to ensure that this public relations unit, created on its initiative, is staffed without delay so that it may start work?"

Mr. Müllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, said on 22nd December 1986:

"The new public relations unit of the Secretariat-General of WEU in London was created on 1st January 1986. However, the corresponding post of Head of the Press Service has not yet been filled. An official from another section of the Secretariat-General is at present carrying out the work. The Secretary-General has given an assurance that he will ensure that this post is filled as soon as possible and in the prescribed manner.

The Federal Government has asked its representative to the WEU Permanent Council to ensure that this post is filled without delay."

The Assembly would be most interested to know what is holding up implementation of this measure, which stems directly from the Rome declaration.

31. Thus, more than two years after the Rome declaration, the least that can be said is that implementation of the principles it enunciates is advancing extremely slowly and in several important areas it has not even been started. This is the context in which the proposals made by the Prime Minister of France to the Assembly on 2nd December 1986 should be placed.

III. A charter of principles for the security of Western Europe

32. The proposal made to the Assembly on 2nd December 1986 that the seven governments draw up a European security charter is obviously not likely to cause any immediate upheaval in WEU's activities. The most the Council has done is to set up a working group to go into the proposal and examine the text France has been asked to prepare. Your Rapporteur knows nothing of the working conditions of this group or the deadlines set for it after a first meeting in January.

33. Mr. Chirac's suggestions contained nothing very new about the actual content of this charter, since they mainly listed the principles on which he considered the Seven were already in agreement. In his own words, the list of principles given by Mr. Chirac were moreover "simply indicative" and most of the items correspond to tasks WEU is already handling: assessing the threat to Europe and encouraging

maintenance of the defence effort of member countries at a level commensurate with the threat, while promoting disarmament with the aim of increasing security at the lowest possible level of armament and enhancing the strategic linkage between Europe and the United States.

34. The only terms which might apparently give rise to reservations by some of France's partners are those at the top of the list, i.e. "Nuclear deterrence is still the only effective way of preventing war in Europe". Mr. Chirac's very words about the need to face the overall threat imply that deterrence does not depend only on nuclear weapons but forms a whole and that the aim of disarmament should be to lower the level of armament, particularly nuclear, as far as possible, while maintaining deterrence. In the Ottawa declaration of April 1974, the partners of France and the United Kingdom certainly recognised that the contribution made by the nuclear forces of those two countries was a major factor in European security. But in view of the reactions of a section of public opinion towards anything nuclear, it is probably not in Europe's interests to give undue priority to the nuclear element of a policy of deterrence. This was, for example, the view expressed by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, when answering oral questions in the Second Chamber of the States-General on 10th December 1986.

35. This reservation is a secondary one and probably relates more to the form – obviously open to negotiation – of Mr. Chirac's suggestions than to their content, and when he said that "any developments which may occur as a result of technical progress must aim to reinforce deterrence not to question it" he was voicing the evident concern aroused in Europe by some American statements about President Reagan's strategic defence initiative. Europe has no interest in the two great powers developing the idea that a war can be waged without the risk of nuclear devastation on their territory. Here too Mr. Chirac endorsed an action already started by the WEU Council when it set up a working group on the air defence of Europe and published the principles on which the Seven had reached agreement in regard to the SDI.

36. One may even wonder whether it is not possible to find a consensus among the Seven on points Mr. Chirac did not mention but which have already been the subject of agreements of principle, including the need to develop European co-operation in armaments matters and to examine any threats to Europe stemming from events outside the North Atlantic Treaty area and measures of all kinds which Europe can take to counter them.

37. Co-operation in armaments matters is specifically included among the aims the Rome declaration assigned to the WEU Council but whose

implementation is suffering from the uncertainty and delays mentioned in the previous chapter. The Prime Minister of France confirmed the interest his country attaches to developing such co-operation. The drafting of a European security charter might be an opportunity to define priority aims in this area and, above all, ways and means of achieving them and the principles which have so far been lacking for effective, continuous action. Here, your Rapporteur is referring in particular to the studies conducted by the SAC into economic and juridical obstacles to co-operation. Are the Seven therefore unable to agree to removing these obstacles?

38. Answering a question put by our colleague, Mr. Valleix, on 2nd December 1986, the Prime Minister of France nevertheless said that France would be in favour of representatives of the arms industries being associated in some way with the work of WEU in order to reflect upon and define methods of European co-operation in armaments matters, provided it was the Assembly that made the necessary proposals to the governments. It is naturally difficult for the Assembly to make firm, realistic proposals, but it would seem very wise to make Agency III responsible for doing so since this is quite clearly its rôle. The Assembly can but recommend that the Council move in this direction when preparing the European security charter.

39. Consultations on events outside the NATO area obviously raise more delicate questions since it would seem difficult for states to reach agreement beforehand on their reactions to possible threats. Nevertheless, Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty makes the Council responsible for organising any exchanges of views which may be necessary because of threats to international peace, wherever they may occur. A European security charter might recall this principle and express the governments' firm intention to apply it effectively, which the Council has never done. The development of the political committee on European security, set up in Luxembourg, would allow this.

40. However, the crux of the initiative by the Prime Minister of France is probably not to be found in the suggestions relating to the contents of this charter but rather in the revelation it represented. It would be both risky and pointless to bring it down to an act of internal policy, particularly since President Mitterrand, in an address to the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London on 15th January 1987, insisted on the need to strengthen co-ordination and discussion of defence matters. He added that he wanted more exchanges, meetings and agreements in military matters and, if all European forces were co-ordinated, an accurate and not merely verbal idea would be obtained of a sort of European defence, all this in conjunction with WEU which

would be most useful from this point of view. This is indeed the same proposal as the one developed by Mr. Chirac.

41. It may however be wondered why France, which throughout the years has made so many general proposals for breathing new life into WEU, has proved to be infinitely more reserved from the moment there is question of taking definite measures in the framework of WEU. Not only did its proposals then become rare but it was no more eager than others when it had to give shape to contractual commitments. Here your Rapporteur wishes to suggest three explanatory points but he has absolutely no knowledge of the extent to which they have effectively been taken into account by French leaders:

42. (a) France has often stated that it did not intend, by integrating its forces with those of its WEU partners, all of which have a place in the NATO integrated military structure, to return to the system of integration in NATO that it rejected in 1967. There can be no doubt that there is quite a large consensus on this point in France and it is certain that many of France's allies would like to see it resume its place in NATO. It has therefore shown no more desire to be committed, through WEU, to collective decisions which it might have found disagreeable than its allies, which feared that WEU's activities might weaken NATO.

43. (b) Ever since General de Gaulle decided, following the explosion of the first French atomic bomb, to withdraw French nuclear weapons unilaterally from the controls, the principle of which it had accepted in the 1954 Paris Agreements, France seems to have experienced difficulties in its relations with WEU. The annexes to the treaty which are not effectively applied or which have been overtaken by the trend of international events should probably be re-examined to avoid these texts, which were drafted thirty-two years ago, being an obstacle to the most important aspect of the treaty: the unreserved application of Article V.

44. (c) On 2nd December our colleague, Mr. Stoffelen, asked Mr. Chirac whether France, whose new defence planning act made provision for the manufacture of chemical weapons, intended to respect its undertakings under Articles III and IV of Protocol No. III of the Paris Agreements. While insisting on the need for France to have "a chemical deterrent" in spite of its "earnest wish... for the complete and total disappearance and destruction of all chemical weapons", Mr. Chirac failed to answer the question, thus giving rise to fears that France might apply the same method in this matter as for nuclear weapons.

45. Your Rapporteur is afraid that exchanges between France and its WEU partners have

never been clear enough on these three questions. It is indeed evident that at present no one is thinking of integrating forces in the framework of WEU, although some do not wish the possibility to be permanently excluded. It should be easy to find an approach satisfactory to everyone in this connection. The question of the control of French nuclear weapons is in fact settled according to France's own wishes and, if a legal solution were sought, it should be found without too much difficulty. The question of chemical weapons has not yet arisen but it would be regrettable – and this could probably be avoided – if it were to arise in such a way that France failed to follow through its proposals on the reactivation of WEU.

46. Conversely, there are three points which Mr. Chirac clarified in answering questions put to him by several members of the Assembly and this should facilitate the definition of the principles of European defence, first in regard to the application of Article V of the treaty, second, the participation of other European members of the Atlantic Alliance in the European security charter and, third, relations with the United States.

47. Answering further questions, Mr. Chirac indicated very clearly that France intended to fulfil its obligations under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and that the defence of France began not at its own frontiers but at those of its neighbours. He also said France intended to share with no one decisions relating to the stage of hostilities at which it would bring in its nuclear weapons, the highly deterrent nature of which Mr. Chirac emphasised, which precluded any prior declaration concerning their possible use. This was France's unswerving approach and the only way for its allies to derive the maximum benefit from this deterrent was to develop as far as possible their relations with France in defence matters, both bilaterally and multilaterally, not to obtain specific commitments which it cannot give but a regular process of consultation and co-operation.

48. Apparently the French initiative in WEU was not an isolated one. It was preceded, accompanied and followed by talks between France and several of its allies, particularly the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. There were indications that Mr. Chirac's initiative had been the subject of prior consultations between France and its partners, for instance at the Franco-German summit meeting in Frankfurt on 28th October 1986 and during Mr. Chirac's visit to London on 20th November. It was noted in particular that on the same day it was decided that Mr. Chirac would address the WEU Assembly. From this it may be deduced that the Prime Minister's proposals on 2nd December were a well-prepared initiative undertaken with the certainty that it

would be welcomed. Hence it would be absurd to reduce it to the level of a French internal policy operation.

49. However, the fact is that other governments do not seem to have been notified of Mr. Chirac's intentions. This was made clear on 6th December 1986 by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium, when answering a question put to him by our colleague, Mr. Beysen. He added, moreover, that:

“ If the French – since they are there as full members – make proposals in that forum in order to be able to discuss security and draw up a European charter, we must – and right from the start – adopt a very positive attitude.”

50. Your Rapporteur does not know the results of the Franco-German talks, but Chancellor Kohl's statement to the federal press on 13th January 1987 indicates that there was fairly broad agreement between the two countries. The Chancellor said:

“ Close agreement and a joint European approach in the various areas of security policy are becoming increasingly urgent. We have laid the foundations together with our French friends. Truly European interests, which are called in question by the dialogue between the great powers, also require co-ordination anchored in an institution.

The Federal Government is convinced that WEU might be an appropriate instrument for this purpose. In this connection, I formally approve the conclusions and proposals of Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France.

- We must give WEU the means to fulfil this task from an organisational point of view. First steps have been taken in this sense.
- We must also give WEU political impetus to ensure that it can speak authoritatively about Europe's interests in security policy.

Such an evolution in WEU would strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It is directed against no one.”

51. The Netherlands Government, for its part, while not subscribing so explicitly to Mr. Chirac's proposals, expressed itself through its Prime Minister, Mr. Lubbers, in an interview granted to the German newspaper *Die Welt* on 2nd February 1987, as follows:

“ *Question.* – What do you think of a more independent European security policy in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance?

Helmut Schmidt has not been the only one to propose it for a long time. He even wishes it to be attained under French leadership.

Mr. Lubbers. – I do not believe very strongly in a leading rôle for Paris, but I believe the European pillar must be strengthened. I think there is sufficient room to develop this European pillar. This is the trend of thoughts in the Netherlands. According to its geographical position, each country has its own means and special commitments within the alliance. It must also have a specifically European commitment there.

There is already a broad consensus among Europeans on disarmament policy and towards the United States. Furthermore, France and Germany have taken the first, albeit limited, steps towards co-operation in defence matters. European co-operation in defence matters will certainly increase, but there are still obstacles. France and the United Kingdom have a tendency to be rather autarkical. We would welcome a European security and defence policy if it made a contribution to the alliance, and we are working to this end.

Question. – Would Western European Union (WEU) be an appropriate instrument for building and strengthening this pillar?

Mr. Lubbers. – One of the instruments, but the result should not be a WEU armed force. No new situation in terms of forces should be created. I think we must first concern ourselves with improving internal co-ordination, mainly in armaments matters. Only thus would de facto co-operation also be able to work. The Hague will help to ensure that the European component – the second pillar in NATO – is further enhanced and strengthened.”

52. Your Rapporteur is not aware of any formal statements by other governments on the action they intend to take on Mr. Chirac's proposal, but he has heard it said that the WEU Council had set up a working group to prepare their implementation, which means the Seven have reached agreement on taking part in the group. In other words, they have at least accepted the proposal in principle.

53. Should Mr. Chirac's statement be connected with the announcement in certain British newspapers on 23rd January 1987 of agreement between France and the United Kingdom to hold talks on the possible use of the two countries' nuclear weapons? The main purpose of these talks would be to discuss co-operation for targeting, which would obviously considerably

enhance the deterrent effect of the two countries' weapons and also Europe's military and political cohesion. This matter has been raised often in the last twenty years but it has always been impossible to make the slightest progress. Admittedly, an agreement of this kind, if confirmed, would remain bilateral, but it would nevertheless help to make forces hitherto planned as purely national political instruments more European.

54. However, the prospect of WEU adopting a European security charter may perhaps provoke reservations outside the organisation which will possibly be echoed in certain governments. Franco-British nuclear agreement would certainly not be enough to remove them.

55. Indeed, the Assembly knows that several European members of the Atlantic Alliance do not wish WEU to play an important rôle in organising western defence; they claim to represent the European element of the alliance to which they rightfully consider they too belong. Here we are touching on the problem of the enlargement of WEU to which, in spite of the Assembly's recommendations, the Council has not yet been able to give a clear answer. In the Rome declaration, it recommended that the Assembly increase contacts with the parliaments of those countries; this was done by inviting observers to sessions and, since 1986, to committee meetings and by the visit of the General Affairs Committee to Portugal in 1985 and to Norway and Denmark in 1986. The General Affairs Committee has also asked to visit Spain, but has not yet received an answer from that country.

56. All the European member countries of the alliance have, to varying degrees and in various ways, shown their interest in the reactivation of WEU and their concern not to be excluded from whatever may develop. They cannot be wholly satisfied by being parliamentary observers to the Assembly. It is clear that the aim, proclaimed or not, of several of them is accession to WEU, for others participation in some of its activities and for all to be kept fully informed of what the Council is doing.

57. Mr. Chirac's proposal does not forcibly link endorsement of the European security charter with participation in WEU, although it is favourable to the enlargement of WEU itself:

"By celebrating in this way the deep-rooted agreement which unites them on such vital issues, the seven members of WEU would be adopting an approach in which other countries could join if they so wished: I am thinking in particular of our neighbours on the Iberian peninsula, Spain and Portugal.

WEU – and to my mind this is its true *raison d'être* – is destined to become,

sooner or later, one of the keystones in the building of Europe. Its expansion would thus be perfectly in keeping with the 1984 decision to revitalise it.

France is aware of the legal and political problems which will need to be overcome in order to achieve this goal. The consolidation of what has been achieved through reactivation does not call for precipitate action, but our political stance must be perfectly clear, and we must do everything in our power to make the reality of Western European Union live up to its name.

As I have already assured you, France is determined to contribute to the emergence of a common European awareness on defence matters, which would also draw more substance from the responsibilities of some of our members outside Europe, and from our other obligations within the Atlantic Alliance."

58. This too is a matter on which a decision will have to be taken in the negotiations on the European security charter: which countries will be invited to accede to it? Will these countries at any stage take part in the preparation of the charter? Will their accession imply active participation in some or all of WEU's activities? Your Rapporteur can but repeat the views already expressed by the Assembly that WEU should be open to all countries which are members of both the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance. Possibly a given country which is not yet a member of the Community might join WEU, but it would be an aberration for non-member countries of the alliance to take part in view of the rôle played by NATO in European security, WEU's main concern.

59. The question of the United States' reactions to the reactivation of WEU and the preparation of a European security charter is quite different. It is evident that Europe's security cannot be ensured without the deterrent exercised by American nuclear weapons and the presence of American forces on the European continent. As Mr. Chirac confirmed on behalf of France, no country is contemplating replacing the Atlantic Alliance by a European defence system. Moreover, the United States Government has never shown any opposition of principle to Europe's participation in NATO being organised. For instance, it approved the Rome declaration.

60. It is clear, however, that the development of this organisation has given rise to reservations or even opposition in certain American circles and this obviously carries weight because of persistent opposition in Congress to the maintenance of American forces in Europe. Any sign of

Europe asserting itself in security matters has both advantages and disadvantages for the United States. On the one hand, it has every interest in Europe being more sure of itself and assuming a greater share of the burden of its own defence. Agitation against the deployment of Euromissiles after 1979 worried the American authorities and the reactivation of WEU, seen as a means of making Europeans more interested in their security, was welcomed. Again, if European co-operation in armaments matters allows the European members of the alliance to use their military budgets to better avail the joint military system would thus be strengthened.

61. Conversely, the American authorities may fear that the expression of a European political will in certain areas may hinder their diplomacy and give the Soviet Union the impression that it could break up the alliance, particularly by opposing Europe to the United States in disarmament questions. This was expressed in the American approach to the WEU countries in February 1985, asking them to avoid adopting a European position on the matter. Similarly, the Americans may fear they will encounter stronger opposition to some of their views on strategy, general policy and the management of forces in NATO. European reservations concerning certain revisions of alliance strategy, the SDI and the bombing of Tripoli engendered apprehension about such an evolution. Finally, the Americans may fear that the development of European co-operation in the armaments industry may cut off certain markets in Europe and elsewhere just when their trade balance is already heavily in deficit.

62. Indubitably certain American reactions have prompted several of the seven governments to be cautious about reactivating WEU. However, anxiety caused by what Europe has learned of events at the Reykjavik summit meeting, coming after the announcement of the SDI programme, led a large section of European public opinion to admit the need to strengthen Europe's participation in the Atlantic Alliance. Mr. Chirac, for his part, did not conceal the fact that this event was one of the main reasons for his initiative, and it is clear that he contributed largely to making the other members of WEU admit this.

63. The rôle Europeans can play in American security and defence decisions should probably not be overestimated. Europe has played very little part in President Reagan's main decisions in these matters, be it the SDI, Reykjavik or the bombing of Tripoli. However good or otherwise Europe's organisation of defence becomes, it will probably have little effect on American decisions on strategy, armaments or external policy. Conversely, it should help the European members of the alliance to promote their own security interests vis-à-vis the United States and com-

pensate for any weakening of the American presence in Europe.

64. Furthermore, Europe must be most careful to make its views known and understood, not only by the United States Government but also by Congress and public opinion. The Assembly is gratified that the Secretary-General was able to tour the United States in October 1986 to good account. The Assembly for its part should make better use than in the past of the transatlantic visits of its committees to present and defend its views on this matter. But no one can hope for decisive results if the seven governments do not also take strenuous action to make the United States understand the requirements of European security.

IV. The activities of WEU

65. It is obviously desirable for Western Europe to define the principles on which its security is based. But it is no less important for any European security charter to be applied immediately and effectively, failing which it would be nothing more than yet another example of European rhetoric. In this connection, Mr. Chirac's proposals came at the right moment, i.e. just after the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986, at which the seven governments agreed to give new impetus to the reactivation of WEU, after a year of marking time, and following the failure of the Reykjavik summit meeting.

66. The Assembly has already had an opportunity of discussing the decisions taken in Luxembourg during the debate on the report by our colleague, Mr. Bianco, at the December 1986 session. Since the session, your Rapporteur has received no official information about the action taken on these decisions and he can but mention a few questions raised by the most recent events.

67. The ministers' main decision was to set up a political committee on European security formed of political directors from the ministries for foreign affairs and possibly representatives of the ministries of defence. A first meeting of this committee was planned to be held in January 1987 and a second in March.

68. In fact, the press reported that, at the invitation of Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, the country having the chairmanship-in-office of the Council, representatives of defence ministries met at the Château of Senningen (Luxembourg) on 23rd January 1987 for an informal meeting, the first of this kind. The Secretary-General of WEU was present. The aim was to exchange ideas and information for strengthening WEU and the

voice of European countries in NATO. Participants referred to the security situation in the Mediterranean, the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe, European defence against nuclear weapons, the production of armaments, the strategic situation in Europe and security problems outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. As far as your Rapporteur knows, this information, given to the press by the Luxembourg presidency, was not the subject of a communiqué. However, it is important to know at what level these talks were held and what kind of results were achieved: were they, for instance, intended to prepare the ministerial meeting in April?

69. The political committee on European security should meet periodically, *inter alia* on the occasion of meetings of the Twelve, and hold emergency meetings as and when necessary. By doing this, it would take on the political duties of the WEU Council under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, i.e. it would become a third element of the WEU Council alongside ministerial meetings and meetings of ambassadors in London. It would obviously be far better adapted than the ambassadorial Council to hold the political consultations provided for in the treaty, while the ambassadors and their directly dependent working group would be more concerned with the administrative continuity of the Council. Hence it is particularly important for meetings of the political committee on European security to be effectively assisted by the Secretariat-General of WEU and for the annual report of the Council to give details of them accordingly to the Assembly even though a communiqué may already have been issued. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, assured the Assembly that this committee would actually be the WEU Council. The full consequences should be drawn from this, one being that meetings of the political directors of the ministries for foreign affairs of the Seven should in no event be confused with meetings of the Twelve, even if they immediately precede or follow them.

70. Moreover, the fact that WEU does not yet include all members of the European Community, i.e. all countries taking part in twelve-power political consultations, nor all the European members of the Atlantic Alliance creates a situation which is particularly embarrassing or irritating for countries which are not yet members of WEU since WEU's activities are increasing. This limits WEU's possibilities of claiming to speak on behalf of Europe and is a source of division among Europeans.

71. According to Mr. Tindemans' answer to the question put by Mr. Beysen on 4th December 1986, already referred to above, the Belgian Gov-

ernment seems interested in maintaining and developing specifically WEU structures:

“ At present, we are studying its internal organisation and how the existing agencies can be given more activities. We propose that there should also be contacts at the level of political directors, as is the case in the European Community and between NATO ambassadors. Similarly, we propose that regular contacts also be held at the level of military and diplomatic experts and that correspondents be appointed as is the case in the European Community. In this way, new life could effectively be given to WEU. ”

72. The real remedy for this situation would obviously be to enlarge WEU. The question arose with Portugal's application for membership in October 1984 which has not yet elicited any answer from the Council. This is most inconsiderate and consequently other countries which might think of joining WEU will be more reserved and cautious. The reasons given by the Council for postponing its decision are questionable and give the impression that it secretly wishes to refuse. The Assembly itself which, in accordance with the Council's recommendations, has developed its relations with the parliaments of non-member countries, is now in an embarrassing situation where they are concerned.

73. However, for reasons of which everyone is aware, it is not possible at present to consider the accession of all the European members of NATO to the modified Brussels Treaty. Yet they must not be left out of what is being done in WEU: they must be kept regularly informed, they must be allowed to take part in whatever WEU activities are possible without raising problems, *inter alia* in co-operation in armaments matters, and finally there must be co-ordination between WEU on the one hand and the European Council and NATO bodies on the other. Co-ordination has so far been ensured by member countries and in particular by the country having the chairmanship-in-office of the Council. The development of intergovernmental activities in WEU and increased participation by representatives of defence ministries would henceforth mean co-ordination being established on a permanent basis pending the effective enlargement of WEU.

74. Another decision taken by the Council in Luxembourg which no doubt has a more limited immediate impact but which conforms to the concern shown by the Council in 1984 to convince Europeans of the need for an effective defence policy was to set up a European institute for defence studies. This was a French proposal and France has invited member countries to take part in a first course it is organising in autumn

1988. Belgium and the United Kingdom are to organise similar courses in subsequent years.

75. In making this proposal, the French Government was responding to wishes already expressed in the Assembly in December 1984 by Mr. Genscher, the German Minister, then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and regularly recalled ever since by successive rapporteurs of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Berrier and Mr. Bianco. It doubtless also had in mind the success in France itself of the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale, which has just celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. Set up by the Front populaire government, the aim of the institute was to arouse a spirit of defence in France by associating civil servants, persons holding influential posts in the private sector and the military in long-term courses on defence matters. An association of former trainees allows interest in these matters to be maintained among those who have attended the courses. In this way, they have made a major contribution to making known France's defence policy and eventually having it accepted by a very large section of public opinion in the country.

76. It is significant therefore that in the last few years France has been considering the extension of this experience to European defence. It made its proposals to the WEU Council and has taken the necessary steps to ensure that its ideas are implemented. For this undertaking to succeed, however, it must not be linked unduly with the views of a single country. The way the Council's decision is implemented must be the subject of true consultations between members of WEU: how to recruit delegations from member countries for the courses already planned, the subjects to be studied, methods of work and the choice of speakers should be examined in WEU. There has so far been some ambiguity about the link between the French proposal for a study institute and Mr. Genscher's proposal which, on the contrary, related to co-operation between existing research institutes in each country. This ambiguity must be cleared up entirely since these are two different initiatives with separate aims and they can be followed up only by means specific to each one.

77. Mr. Genscher's proposal concerned university-type establishments on which government institutes cannot expect to impose their views. Your Rapporteur knows nothing about the results of the first steps taken in this matter but thinks WEU's rôle will inevitably be fairly limited. It would mainly be to supply institutes concerned with documentation on European research in defence matters to help them to make useful outside contacts so that they may work efficiently. A first contribution might be for a WEU agency to prepare and circulate a list of

European establishments conducting research in defence matters.

78. The French proposal requires more initiative and continuity of action by WEU bodies if WEU's contribution is not to be reduced to sending invitations to nationals of other countries to take part sporadically in studies conducted in each of the member countries. It would probably be vain to hope that it would require no financial effort by WEU, but the judicious use of a WEU agency to guide the work, circulate information on a reciprocal basis, allocate tasks and co-ordinate procedure seems necessary. Your Rapporteur wishes each government to examine the French proposals seriously and to agree not to abandon responsibility for these activities to each member country in turn. The Council's answers to the Assembly so far on this matter seem rather short.

V. Conclusions

79. There is no doubt that the Reykjavik meeting, following the launching of the SDI programme, created circumstances favourable to Western Europe assuming greater responsibility for its own security, as is proved by the decisions taken by the Council in Luxembourg, Mr. Chirac's address and the favourable response to it in certain member countries.

80. The main thing for the Assembly is that in this situation the reactivation of WEU is developed so as not to be merely a surge of European dynamism, which might soon be called in question by the trend of special interests and events, but is carried into effect by the establishment of new structures which alone can give permanency to the outcome of political decisions taken today.

81. The governments are certainly breaking new ground in WEU. The danger today is that the WEU framework may as a result break up: the Standing Armaments Committee does not meet, arms controls are reduced to very little, the Secretary-General alone attends meetings of political directors or representatives of defence ministries and most of these meetings are unofficial.

82. In such a situation, your Rapporteur considers the rôle of the Assembly must be to recall the constraints of contractual undertakings. It is empowered to do so by Article IX of the treaty which makes it responsible for answering the annual report of the Council. If this report and, more generally, information transmitted by the Council to the Assembly does not allow it to exercise this power to scrutinise WEU's true activities, the Assembly would lose its raison

d'être and its credibility in the eyes of public opinion. The Council too would lose what had ensured its stability and strength in times when it was not very active and, finally, any change in circumstances which led it to slow down its activities once again would reduce it to nothing, or almost nothing. This is why the Assembly, while welcoming the Council's new activity, has to ask for Mr. Chirac's proposals to lead to a

detailed definition of the tasks and responsibilities of all the WEU organs embodied in a new contract, extended to include those European members of the Atlantic Alliance now able to take part. On this condition only will WEU's activities be able to help to advance European union in areas for which it is responsible in accordance with the wish constantly expressed by the Assembly ever since it has existed.

The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance
Part I: The reactivation of WEU

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹

tabled by Mr. Bassinet

1. At the end of paragraph 2 (f) of the draft recommendation proper, add:
“ (1) for this purpose, by instructing the Secretary-General to play an active part in organising the first course and to promote the formation of an association of former participants of which he would ensure the secretariat; (2) by asking the French institute to invite Spain and Portugal to send participants to this course; ”.
2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ the proposal made by the Prime Minister of France on 2nd December 1986 to draw up a European security charter provides ” and insert “ the proposals by the French Government, and particularly the one to draw up a European security charter, provide ”.

Signed: Bassinet

1. See 1st sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendments adopted).

*Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*SECOND REVISED REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 0 with 8 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); Mr. Cifarelli, Dr. Miller (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: Jeambrun), Amadei, de Beer, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. van den Bergh (Alternate: Stoffelen), De Decker (Alternate: Close), De Jardin (Alternate: Pécriaux), Edwards (Alternate: Brown), Ertl, Galley (Alternate: Baumel), Gerstl, Giust, Jung, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Mrs. Lalumière, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja, Pecchioli (Alternate: Antoni), Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith (Alternate: Lord Newall), MM. Steverlynck, Stokes (Alternate: Corrie).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

(d) The conference on disarmament in Europe

- Refraining from the threat or use of force
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Introductory Note

In preparing this report *the Rapporteur* arranged for the following representatives to the MBFR talks in Vienna to be interviewed on his behalf on 7th and 8th March 1986:

Mr. Jozef Sestak, Deputy Head, Delegation of Czechoslovakia, and Dr. Lenka Novotna;
 H.E. Mr. J.H.L. van de Mortel, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation, and Mr. Pieter Jan Wolthers;
 Mr. Kent Brown, Adviser, US Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. Michael Alexander, Ambassador, Head of the UK Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. Valerian Mikhailov, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the USSR;
 Dr. Jurgen Pöhlmann, Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany;
 Mr. Krzysztof Stronczynski, member of the Polish Delegation.

The committee as a whole adopted the first version of this report at its meeting in Venice on 29th April 1986. It subsequently met in Washington DC and Norfolk, Virginia, from 16th to 20th June 1986, when it was addressed by or met with:

16th June 1986

State Department, Washington DC

Ms. Rozanne Ridgway, Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs;

Mr. Charles Thomas, Ambassador, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs;

Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political Military Affairs;

Mr. Edward Rowny, Ambassador, Special Representative for Strategic Arms Negotiations;

Congressional Research Service, Washington DC

Mr. Stanley Sloan, Specialist in US Alliance Relations;
 Mr. Paul Gallis, Analyst in West European Affairs;
 Mr. Charles Gellner, Senior Specialist, International Affairs;
 Mr. Stuart Goldman, Analyst in Soviet Affairs;
 Mr. Steven Hildreth, Analyst in National Defence;
 Mr. Francis Miko, Specialist in International Relations;
 Ms. Charlotte Preece, Specialist in West European Affairs;
 Mr. Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, Foreign Affairs Analyst;
 Ms. Jeanette Voas, Arms Control Analyst;
 Mr. Paul Zinsmeister, Specialist in National Defence.

Brookings Institution, Washington DC

Mr. Joshua Epstein, Research Associate in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Programme.

17th June 1986

Department of Defence, Washington DC

Mr. Fred Iklé, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy;
 Dr. Winfred Joshua and Colonel Don Scott, Defence Intelligence Agency;
 Mr. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defence;
 Mr. Frank Gaffney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy;
 Mr. Douglas Feith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Negotiations Policy;
 Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director NATO Affairs, Defence Research and Engineering;
 Mr. Robert Mullen, Assistant Deputy Under-Secretary for Trade Security Policy.

18th June 1986

United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services

Mr. Samuel Stratton, Representative of New York, and members of the committee:

Democrats

Mr. Melvin Price;
Mr. Charles E. Bennett;
Mr. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery;
Mr. Earl Hutto;
Mr. Ike Skelton;
Mr. Thomas M. Foglietta;
Mr. Richard Ray;
Mr. Solomon P. Ortiz;
Mr. Albert G. Bustamante;

Republicans

Mr. G. William Whitehurst;
Mr. Robert E. Badham.

19th June 1986

Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia

Admiral Lee Baggett, US Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and staff;
Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dolton, RN, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic;
Vice-Admiral Bernard Cauderer, US Navy, Commander Submarine Force US Atlantic Fleet;
Rear-Admiral Jerry Tuttle, US Navy, Deputy and Chief-of-Staff for the Commander-in-Chief US Atlantic Fleet, and staff.

20th June 1986

Arms Control Association, Washington DC

Mr. Paul Warnke, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, President of the Arms Control Association.

It met subsequently in Geneva on 24th and 25th July 1986, when it was addressed by the following representatives to the Conference on Disarmament:

H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Representative of the Soviet Union;
H.E. Mr. Robert van Schaik, Ambassador, Representative of the Netherlands;
H.E. Mr. Donald Lowitz, Ambassador, Representative of the United States;
H.E. Mr. Rolf Ekeus, Ambassador, Head of the Swedish Delegation;
H.E. Mr. Ian Cromartie, Ambassador, Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation and Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Chemical Weapons Ban;
H.E. Dr. Henning Wegener, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany;
H.E. Mr. Mansur Ahmad, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Pakistan.

The committee subsequently discussed and adopted a revised version of the report at its meeting at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 3rd November 1986.

The committee as a whole met at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 24th February 1987, where it was addressed by:

The Rt. Hon. the Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO;
The Hon. Stephen Ledogar, United States Chargé d'affaires, acting permanent representative to NATO;
General Wolfgang Altenburg, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

The committee as a whole was addressed in Vienna on 16th and 17th March 1987 by the following representatives to the MBFR talks and to the CSCE conference:

H.E. Dr. K.P. Ernst, Ambassador, Leader of the GDR Delegation to the MBFR talks;
Professor Werner Hänisch, GDR Delegation to the CSCE conference;
H.E. Mr. Robert Blackwill, Ambassador, United States Representative to the MBFR talks;

H.E. Mr. Warren Zimmermann, Leader of the United States Delegation to the CSCE conference;
H.E. Mr. V.V. Mikhailov, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Soviet Union to the MBFR talks;

Maj. General Viktor Tatarnikov, Delegation of the Soviet Union to the CSCE conference;
H.E. Dr. Klaus Citron, Ambassador, Representative of the FRG in the Mandate Talks on Conventional Arms Control;

H.E. Dr. Günter Joetze, Ambassador, Representative of the FRG to the MBFR talks;
H.E. Mr. Edouard Molitor, Ambassador, Leader of the Luxembourg Delegation to the MBFR talks and to the CSCE conference;

Mr. Hubert Wurth, Luxembourg Representative to the NATO High-Level Task Force on Conventional Force Reductions;

H.E. Mr. Hans Meesman, Ambassador, Leader of the Netherlands Delegation to the CSCE conference;

H.E. Mr. J.H.L. van de Mortel, Ambassador, Netherlands Representative to the MBFR talks.

The committee subsequently discussed and adopted the present second revised report at its meeting in Paris on 31st March 1987.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, members of Congress, officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions. In particular the Rapporteur thanks those members of the staff of the WEU agency for the study of arms control and disarmament who assisted in the preparation of the report.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Second revised draft Recommendation
on disarmament

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that Europe's security is based on the deterrence exercised by all the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Noting therefore that no partial agreement on limiting armaments must come into force without all the problems raised by Europe's security having been examined;
- (iii) Stressing that since December 1979 the Soviet Union has deployed a large number of "shorter-range INF" weapons in Eastern Europe;
- (iv) Believing that it is more than ever necessary for the Council to discuss and harmonise the views of member governments on disarmament and arms control matters, with a view to facilitating agreement on a common policy within the alliance as a whole, and welcoming therefore the position adopted by the Council in its thirty-first report on the whole range of arms control negotiations, in particular the importance ministers attach "to respect for existing treaty obligations";
- (v) Endorsing the common position on nuclear and conventional arms control and disarmament after the Reykjavik summit reached by all sixteen allied governments in the North Atlantic Council communiqué of 12th December 1986, which reiterates both the alliance strategy of deterrence, based on adequate conventional and nuclear defences, and the commitment to verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements to enhance stability at lower levels of forces and armaments;
- (vi) Noting that in that communiqué ministers inter alia "welcome the progress at Reykjavik toward agreement on 50% reductions in United States and Soviet strategic offensive forces..." , the allies concerned "fully support the envisaged elimination of American and Soviet land-based LRINF in Europe..." ; and ministers strongly support "the United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on defence and space systems which aim to prevent an arms race in space and strengthen strategic stability" ;
- (vii) Welcoming the improvement in confidence-building measures included in the document of the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe;
- (viii) Welcoming also General Secretary Gorbachev's statement of 18th April 1986 expressing readiness to pursue conventional force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals, and its positive reflection in 1986 in the NATO Halifax statement and Brussels declaration, and in the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact countries, but believing that agreement on initial reductions in the MBFR framework can be reached immediately the Soviet Union accepts the necessary verification measures;
- (ix) Recalling that the stockpiling of large quantities of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union may well force the alliance to retain or acquire retaliatory capability in this field, while hoping that negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva will lead to a ban on all chemical weapons with adequate verification safeguards and the destruction of all existing stockpiles;
- (x) Aware that the overwhelming majority of United Nations member countries, including a majority of the members of NATO and WEU, have repeatedly called for multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban;
- (xi) Convinced that the enhancement of well-balanced security and deterrence should be the primary criterion of any process of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member governments, in their consultations concerning the bilateral nuclear and space talks in Geneva, to bear in mind the impact of these talks on European security, and to support the United States:

- (a) in negotiating a properly verifiable agreement to secure, within five years, the elimination of all long-range INF missiles within range of Europe, their limitation to 100 warheads in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and in the United States, combined with the simultaneous withdrawal of shorter-range INF from Czechoslovakia and East Germany; the right for NATO

to match Warsaw Pact numbers in such missiles if those negotiations fail; and follow-on negotiations on the reduction of all shorter-range missiles;

- (b) in negotiating a properly verifiable agreement to secure a 50% reduction within five years in the numbers of strategic nuclear warheads;
- (c) in respecting existing treaties which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to them;

2. Urge governments participating in the MBFR negotiations to press for the earliest agreement on initial reductions of United States and Soviet forces proportional to the relative numerical strength of their forces, including the right of reasonable automatic inspections and the obligation for all troops entering or leaving the reductions zone to pass at all times through recognised entry-exit points with permanent observers;

3. Urge participating governments to pursue actively the improved prospects for a complete chemical weapons ban, including the destruction of all existing stocks, in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, to press the Soviet Union to accept fully the United Kingdom compromise proposal for challenge inspection and, pending the outcome of these negotiations in 1987, not to approve the deployment of further chemical weapons in Europe;

4. (a) Urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States' proposal for the mutual exchange of official technical teams for calibrating the yield of nuclear tests;

(b) Call for the opening of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Second revised draft Recommendation
replying to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

- (i) Regretting the serious delay in the communication of the Council's annual report in 1986, the omission of information concerning one important meeting, and considering that the absence of agreement on certain matters should not prevent the Council from presenting the rest of its report on time;
- (ii) Welcoming, however, the communication in October 1986 of the first part of the report for that year,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before the end of February of the following year and that it contain a complete account of activities arranged by the Council;
2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement of WEU.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The first version of this report¹, adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 7 abstentions on 29th April 1986, was referred back to the committee on 5th June that year after the Assembly had failed to complete discussion of the report in the light of the 13 amendments tabled.

1.2. The first revised version of the report² was drafted in the immediate aftermath of the Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, at a time of some ferment in Europe and the NATO alliance concerning the wisdom of some of the hastily-drafted yet far-reaching proposals discussed by the two leaders. That first revised version, adopted by the committee by 8 votes to 7 with no abstentions on 3rd November 1986, was again referred back by the Assembly on 2nd December, after 21 amendments had been tabled, but before the Rapporteur had been allowed to introduce it.

1.3. This second revised version of the report is drafted in a calmer atmosphere, at a time when some at least of the intra-alliance arguments of last December concerning both priorities for some of the disarmament objectives formulated at Reykjavik and procedural aspects of negotiations on conventional force reductions have been ironed out at least for the time being in the North Atlantic Council communiqué of 12th December 1986, the accompanying Brussels declaration on conventional arms control and some subsequent work in the corresponding high-level group in NATO. At the same time, a new transatlantic argument has developed over the obvious desire of the White House and the United States Secretary of Defence to adopt a new, "broad" interpretation of the ABM treaty in order to proceed with early space-testing and then deployment of some strategic defence systems; but on this issue the European allies are in much closer agreement in calling for existing treaties to be respected.

1.4. This second revised report has been prepared by the Rapporteur for the extraordinary session of the Assembly convened especially, as the President announced on 4th December, to discuss disarmament as well as the reactivation of WEU. It is a particularly interesting time to deal with the subject because although it may yet

be difficult to identify substantive progress in the many bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations that are currently proceeding, nevertheless in the words of Lord Carrington "the log jam has broken" and there is motion on all fronts.

1.5. In the original terms of reference given to the Rapporteur for his report in December 1985, the committee noted that "as the internal WEU conventional arms control functions are terminated at the end of 1985, while three new agencies are created, including the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions, the report replying to the annual report of the Council can conveniently be combined with a follow-up report on disarmament which, in view of the impulse given by the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, will follow negotiations on the most topical or urgent disarmament problems, without however covering all the topics dealt with in the information report of 4th November (Document 1040) or the report of 22nd November (Document 1043)". In this second revision of the report the sections dealing with the disarmament negotiations have been brought up to date.

1.6. At the time of drafting the first report in spring 1986, the Rapporteur had in his possession only Chapters III and IV of the annual report of the Council. The complete report did not reach the Assembly until after 20th May that year. Moreover, on 24th October the Council communicated to the Assembly the first part of its report for 1986. In preparing the first revision of this report, the Rapporteur therefore took advantage of the intervening period to comment both on the complete annual report of the Council covering the year 1985 as well as the first part of 1986. This second revision is revised in the light of events, but the draft recommendation has been separated into two parts dealing respectively with disarmament and with the reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, because the first is very topical whereas the second is historical record now that the Council's thirty-second report is already overdue.

II. Activities of the Council

2.1. The annual report of the Council for the year 1985, which should normally reach the Assembly towards the end of February, was dated 20th May, although Chapters III and IV on the last activities up to 31st December 1985 of the former international secretariat of the

1. Document 1059.

2. Document 1075.

Standing Armaments Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments reached the Office of the Clerk in March. It would in fact appear that the Council had the greatest difficulty in reaching agreement on a simple account of its own activities in 1985. The committee welcomes however the communication on 24th October of the first part of the Council's report for 1986, covering the first half of the year, and the Council's intention announced therein to "present its report in two half-yearly parts and transmit, if appropriate, written information concerning certain of its activities" (Chapter III, 1).

2.2. Where these activities of the Council are concerned, the committee is gratified to see the large section devoted to disarmament negotiations and the fact that the Council discussed these negotiations at both permanent and ministerial level. An important passage from Chapter I is worth quoting:

"The ministers expressed the hope that the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union would make possible radical reductions in their strategic and medium-range nuclear armaments and agreements aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing an arms race in space. They underlined in this regard the importance they attached to respect for existing treaty obligations."

This was an important statement that the committee will refer to below.

2.3. However, the committee notes a curious gap in the Council's report – there is no reference to the important meeting organised by the German Government, which had the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council at the time, of experts on disarmament questions from the seven ministries for foreign affairs and held in Bonn on 11th February 1985 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ruth. At the time the press reported that Mr. Richard Burt, then American Assistant Secretary of State, had sent a letter to certain ministries for foreign affairs of WEU countries according to which this meeting of experts was thought to be inappropriate.

2.4. The committee considers it important for the WEU countries to harmonise their positions on major disarmament questions. It is therefore regrettable that the Council makes no reference to one of its most successful initiatives in this sense.

2.5. It is not surprising that the Council was unable to reach agreement on two specific points on which the positions of the seven governments still seem to differ. These are Portugal's application for membership of WEU made in October 1984 and the attempt to co-ordinate the reac-

tions of WEU countries to the United States invitation to take part in research for strategic defence purposes.

2.6. In regard to the accession of new states to the Brussels Treaty, Article XI of the treaty provides that "the high contracting parties may, by agreement, invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited". The Seven seem to have been unprepared for Portugal's application in 1984 which in a way anticipated their invitation. In this connection, another letter from the WEU Secretary-General on 26th February 1986 informing the President of the Assembly of his visit to Spain on 28th and 29th January reports in regard to Spain that:

"On relations between Spain and Western European Union, those to whom I spoke confirmed Spain's interest in acceding to WEU. How do they view such accession? They are aware that accession to WEU is at the invitation of the WEU Council. They will therefore await this invitation in due course, i.e. after the major debate on the problem of security raised by the referendum on 12th March has come to a conclusion."

The Secretary-General concluded:

"Still in my personal capacity, I concluded that it was politically desirable, if a state wished to join WEU, for it:

- to be a member of the Communities and of political co-operation;
- to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance; and
- to have a real desire to promote a European security dimension."

2.7. The Council's report for the first part of 1986 now makes it clear that the accession of Portugal will not now be considered until 1988, after the "transitional period" up to the end of 1987 when the new structures of WEU resulting from the 1984 reactivation are to be reviewed, and after "the applicability to new members of all the provisions of the modified Brussel Treaty and its additional protocols" have been examined in depth. (The application of Protocols Nos. II and III is discussed below in paragraphs 2.10 et seq. and 3.1 et seq.). While it is certain that the accession of Portugal and Spain would be very warmly welcomed from a purely political standpoint, certain WEU countries consider that at the same time it is essential not to isolate the European allied countries on the two flanks which are of vital strategic importance for European security. Should not a simultaneous invitation therefore also be made to all the allied

European countries members of NATO to join WEU?

2.8. In regard to the American invitation to European firms to take part in research for strategic defence purposes, the bilateral negotiations held by the United States with each of the European allied countries are making slow progress. Memoranda of understanding have been signed by the United Kingdom, Germany and, on 19th September 1986, by Italy but with the reservation that signature did not imply that government's political or military support for the SDI³. Exceptionally for this type of document, their content has not been published, which is arousing concern about the extent of the American technical know-how to which European industries taking part in the research would have access. Government reservations about the SDI were referred to very recently by Baroness Young, British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, when she addressed the Assembly on 3rd June 1986:

"We shall in particular look from a European perspective at certain aspects of European participation in the SDI research programme, and at the politico/strategic implications of SDI for Europe itself. Many of these questions, as Geoffrey Howe made clear in his speech in March 1985 to the Royal United Services Institute, are unanswerable, and will be so for a long time to come. And differences in perception and perspective between our member governments have already limited the possible extent of co-ordination or participation in the SDI research programme."

The many questions and reservations referred to by Sir Geoffrey Howe in this speech of 15th March 1985 were quoted in an earlier report by the committee⁴.

2.9. Where the future activities of the three new Council agencies are concerned, a letter⁵ from the Secretary-General dated 17th March 1986 gives some information. Inter alia, it reports that:

"Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-à-vis the countries of Western Europe in regard to questions of the control of armaments and disarmament. In the future it will also have to take an interest in the control of conventional armaments and the essential problem of verification."

3. The Times, 20th September 1986.

4. Document 1033, WEU and the strategic defence initiative, 4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. van den Bergh - explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.2.

5. Text at Appendix I.

Application of Protocol No. II on forces of Western European Union

2.10. In 1985, the Council duly carried out the formalities provided for in Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty to ensure that the forces maintained by member countries on the mainland of Europe did not exceed the agreed levels.

2.11. In regard to the forces which the United Kingdom has undertaken to station on the mainland of Europe in accordance with Article VI of Protocol No. II, fixed by the Council at 55 000 men plus a tactical air force, the committee notes with satisfaction that, according to the Council's report, in 1985 the number of British forces concerned was 56 005, of which 814 were redeployed in Northern Ireland for short tours of duty. These figures compare with 56 467 on the mainland of Europe of which 972 in Northern Ireland in 1984, according to the Council's previous report. The British tactical air force stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1985 was the same as in the previous year, i.e.:

Rôle	Aircraft/ Equipment	Squadrons
Strike/Attack	Jaguar	1
	Tornado	4
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguar	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	1
Air transport	Puma	1
	Chinook	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1

III. Agency for the Control of Armaments

(a) Conventional weapons

3.1. In its 1984 report⁶ the committee examined the history of the rather incomplete application of controls of member countries' weapons provided for in the Brussels Treaty as modified in 1954. There is no need to return to controls of conventional weapons - and the gaps in their application - since the Council, in accordance with several Assembly recommendations, decided to abolish them completely as from 1st January 1986. In 1985, in accordance with the decision of principle taken by the Council in Rome in October 1984, supplemented by its resolution of 23rd January 1985, controls were applied to only about half the conventional weapons subject to control under the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols Nos. III and

6. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 973, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker.

IV. By pursuing documentary controls – which represented most of the Agency's work in the past – in 1985 and carrying out thirty-four field control measures in the same year, the Agency

for the Control of Armaments duly carried out its duties until the last day of its existence with a full staff. The table hereafter gives a breakdown of field control measures:

Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments – 1961-85

	Quantitative control measures				Non-production control measures		Total control measures (all categories)
	at depots	at units under national command	at production plants	Sub-total	at production plants	(of which non-production of chemical weapons)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1961	29	15	12	66	7	(2)	63
2	26	20	11	57	7	(2)	65
3	35	13	13	61	10	(4)	74
4	39	19	13	71	9	(4)	80
5	26	16	11	53	7	n.a.	60
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	78
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	79
9	*	*	*	*	*	(3)	77
1970	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	n.a.	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>
1	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
2	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
3	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 66
4	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 66
5	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 71
						n.a.	— 72
6	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 71
7	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 70
8	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 68
9	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 70
1980	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 70
1	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 70
2	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 69
3	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 72
4	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 66
5	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	— 34

Notes *a*, *b*: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style – *a* and *b*) for the years 1970 and 1971.

n.a.: Information not available.

Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the variable categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the committee. Those for 1970 to 1985 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

* Confidential information available to the committee deleted from the published report.

3.2. The Council's decision to control in 1985 only half the number of conventional weapons formerly controlled, pending the complete abolition of such controls as from 1st July 1986, seems curious, not to say aberrant.

(b) ABC weapons

3.3. The situation is different in regard to atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The Rome declaration adopted by the Council on

27th October 1984 asserted that "the commitments and controls concerning ABC weapons would be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures agreed up to the present time". But, as in previous years, the annual report of the Council for 1985 states that "since the situation has remained the same as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic weapons" and the list of biological weapons subject to control accepted by the Council in 1981 having been renewed by the latter for 1985 "as in previous years... the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological weapons".

3.4. There remain chemical weapons. As for atomic and biological weapons, there are two aspects to controls of chemical weapons provided for in the Brussels Treaty:

- (i) control of any production in countries not having renounced the right to produce chemical weapons;
- (ii) verification of undertakings made by the country which renounced the right to produce such weapons.

3.5. As in past years, in 1985 the Council first renewed the list of chemical weapons subject to control which it had previously approved. Then, according to the annual report, the questionnaire which the Agency sends the six countries which have not renounced the right to produce such chemical weapons asked:

"... whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage. As in the past, all these states replied in the negative.

In addition, the Agency asked all the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold. Since all the member states replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1985."

3.6. The committee notes that this situation will change if France starts the effective production of chemical weapons as Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, foresaw in his address to the Geneva disarmament conference on 19th February 1987. According to Article III of Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels Treaty: "When the development of atomic, biological and chemical weapons in the territory on the mainland of Europe of the high contracting parties who have not given up the right to produce them has passed the experimental stage and effective production of them has started there, the level of stocks that the high contracting parties concerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of

the Council of Western European Union" and, according to Article IV, these weapons "will be controlled to the extent and in the manner laid down in Protocol No. IV".

3.7. In the case of the seventh country, which has renounced the right to produce chemical weapons on its territory, the annual report states that:

"The competent authorities of the country concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, precise and complete reply to the request for information – aimed at facilitating the control of non-production of chemical weapons – which was sent to them by the Agency in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Council in 1959 and with the directive received from the Council in 1960. In addition, the procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used."

3.8. In regard to field control measures, the Agency each year conducts agreed verification of non-production in plants. But reports of the Council prior to 1983 contained the following reservation:

"As the convention for the due process of law⁷ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1982, as in previous years, to take the form of agreed control measures.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. Since this agreement has never been withheld, the 1982 programme of control measures at privately-owned plants was therefore drawn up with full confidence that it could be implemented as in previous years."

3.9. In future, therefore, WEU's activities in regard to the internal control of armaments will be limited in fact to this procedure for controlling chemical weapons which could be extended to control of the production of French chemical weapons if this becomes effective. The Agency for the Control of Armaments has not been disbanded altogether, but its staff has been reduced to one person, an expert in chemical weapons.

7. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but so far ratified by only six countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

IV. Standing Armaments Committee

4.1. In the chapter of the annual report on the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee in 1985, it is stated that the committee:

“having noted the ministerial decisions taken in regard to it and in regard to the establishment of the ‘agencies for security questions’, addressed the problem of co-operation in the field of armaments and research, and that of its own future.”

Delegates’ opinions appear to have been divided as to the expediency of convening the committee in the future. The new Agency III which is replacing the former international secretariat of the SAC is now working directly for the Council and, according to the letter of the Secretary-General of 17th March 1986:

“will study certain aspects of competitiveness in the armaments industry in Europe and the implications of the evolution of the world arms market, together with the problems of technological transfers between European allies.”

V. International negotiations on the control of armaments

(a) General

5.1. The committee welcomed the fact that the Council decided in the Rome declaration of October 1984:

“... to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular:

.....

– arms control and disarmament.”

5.2. In 1985, the committee, for its part, studied in detail the progress of negotiations on the control of armaments in four international forums: the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons, the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations in Vienna, the conference on disarmament in Europe in Stockholm and the Geneva disarmament conference⁸.

5.3. At the close of the first summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva from 19th to 21st November 1985, the committee was able inter

8. Disarmament, information report, Document 1040, 4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw; Disarmament, Document 1043, 22nd November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

alia to welcome “the positive fresh start to bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union... and the constructive references to most arms control issues in the agreed statement including the principle of a 50% reduction in nuclear arms, the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons, and the idea of an interim INF agreement, while noting the absence of specific agreement”⁹. The very positive impetus given to the negotiations was enhanced shortly afterwards by the long statement on disarmament made by General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow on 15th January 1986 which contained six proposals, including a fifteen-year programme leading in three stages to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world before the end of the century and a three-month prolongation of the moratorium on nuclear tests initially declared by the Soviet Union as from 6th August 1985 immediately after it had carried out a programme of nuclear test explosions.

5.4. In 1986, several mainly positive events occurred which change the prospects for almost all the various negotiations on arms control. The impromptu summit meeting in Reykjavik was the most recent to attract worldwide attention and gave rise to varied reactions on the part of the European allies leading up to the alliance’s collective conclusions which were set out in the North Atlantic Council communiqué of 12th December 1986. Then, in his statement of 28th February 1987, Mr. Gorbachev announced major concessions relating to INF missiles. Consideration should also be given to the consequences of President Reagan’s speech on 27th May 1986 about SALT II, the NATO declarations in Halifax and Brussels and the appeal of the member states of the Warsaw Pact of 11th June 1986 relating to the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe, certain concessions announced by the Soviet Union on 22nd April 1986 and again on 17th February 1987 concerning verification in the context of a ban on chemical weapons and the new British proposals of 15th July 1986 and, finally, the document of the Stockholm conference adopted on 19th September 1986 relating to confidence-building measures. The committee examines these developments under the following heads.

(b) Bilateral negotiations

(i) Intermediate-range nuclear forces

5.5. In the bilateral negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range

9. Recommendation 425, adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1985, the draft version of which is given in Document 1043.

nuclear forces and space weapons, particular attention was paid to intermediate-range weapons last year because of the new proposals put forward by Mr. Gorbachev in his statement of 15th January 1986 and the terms of the West's answer. Details of the proposals made by each side's negotiators in Geneva are obviously not known. But since the Soviet Union in particular has developed the habit of negotiating more publicly than in the past, the public is most probably aware of the major elements of the proposals exchanged.

5.6. The rather spectacular language used by Mr. Gorbachev in his address on 15th January 1986 was certainly intended to impress world public opinion:

“The Soviet Union is proposing a step-by-step and consistent process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons, to be implemented and completed within the next fifteen years, before the end of this century.”

Nevertheless, for intermediate-range weapons, this address contains at least the outline of certain tangible proposals. The first stage would last from five to eight years:

“The first stage will include the adoption and implementation of the decision on the complete elimination of intermediate-range missiles of the USSR and the United States in the European zone, both ballistic and cruise missiles, as a first step towards ridding the European continent of nuclear weapons.

At the same time the United States should undertake not to transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries, while Britain and France should pledge not to build up their respective nuclear arms.”

During the second stage, starting in 1990 and spread over a period of five to seven years:

“... the other nuclear powers will begin to engage in nuclear disarmament. To begin with, they would pledge to freeze all their nuclear arms and not to have them in the territories of other countries.

In this period the USSR and the United States will go on with the reductions agreed upon during the first stage and also carry out further measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear systems.”

5.7. Further details were given on 12th February 1986 during an interview granted to West German television by General Nikolai Chervov, Soviet spokesman on disarmament. He defined

the “European zone” as being the area extending as far as longitude 80° east, *i.e. a line some 1 300 km to the east of the Urals, beyond which SS-20 missiles are out of range of Europe.* SS-20 missiles west of that line would be destroyed:

“We do not propose to move these SS-20 missiles somewhere else. They will be destroyed under painstaking and reliable national and international control, including inspections on site and on the spot.”

5.8. The detailed Soviet proposals tabled at the Geneva negotiations on 16th January 1986 were supplemented by letters to the British and French Governments, not represented at the negotiations.

5.9. At this stage, there were two new and positive elements in these Soviet proposals. British and French nuclear forces would no longer be taken into account in the negotiations; they would be frozen, however, at their present level. Secondly, the Soviet Union at that time no longer seemed to be seeking a link with space weapons, a ban on which was previously to have formed part of any agreement on other weapons systems. This point was confirmed publicly by Mr. Gorbachev in an interview which he granted to United States Senator Edward Kennedy in Moscow on 6th February 1986 when Mr. Gorbachev said that his proposal to withdraw SS-20s from Europe if the Americans did the same with their Pershing IIs depended solely on the United Kingdom and France refraining from increasing their corresponding nuclear weapons and the United States not supplying such weapons to other countries.

5.10. While the United States was holding consultations with its allies, particularly during Mr. Paul Nitze's visit to Europe in February, the press on 8th February 1986 reported an American counter-proposal approved by Mr. Reagan subject to consultations with the allies. It is believed this plan accepted the elimination of all intermediate-range American and Soviet missiles stationed in Europe but also insisted on a 50% reduction in Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia. However, no ceiling was said to be placed on British or French forces, nor were there to be limitations on the supply of American missiles to the allies.

5.11. The European allies had reservations about the first American proposals, considering that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe would leave western forces at the mercy of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces, particularly in Central Europe. The American answer finally communicated to the Soviet Union on 23rd February 1986 returned rather to the “global zero-zero” position already defined in

1981. The United States therefore proposed as a target the elimination of SS-20 and cruise missiles in both Europe and Asia, but as a first stage the reduction to 140 of the SS-20 launchers in Europe, with a proportional reduction in Asia; only in the second and third stages would the United States agree to a reduction of its own missiles parallel with Soviet reductions; short-range missiles were also to be taken into account. Soviet proposals relating to the freezing of British and French forces were rejected since the Geneva negotiations are purely bilateral. French and British answers to Mr. Gorbachev also rejected his proposal, France recalling its well-known position that it is in favour of all reductions in nuclear weapons, but the arsenals of the superpowers must be reduced significantly before reductions in the relatively small French forces can be considered; in any event, priority was to be given to reducing conventional weapons.

5.12. In previous reports, the committee recalled that the existence of British and French forces had in fact been taken into account already in the SALT I and SALT II bilateral agreements. In the first case, the Soviet unilateral declaration accompanying the agreement stated that the Soviet Union could increase the number of its strategic missile launching submarines in the event of the United States' allies doing likewise. In the case of SALT II, it has been known for a long time that the concession which allowed the Soviet Union to retain 308 heavy ICBMs (SS-9s and SS-18s) was made in compensation for British and French nuclear forces and the deployment of American nuclear systems in Europe.

5.13. While the committee has always rejected any proposal to reduce British and French nuclear forces at a time when the superpowers have thousands of nuclear warheads, it has nevertheless drawn attention to the problems which would arise for the negotiations on the control of armaments if European forces were equipped with multiple-warhead missiles. The Trident missile, intended to come into service with the British force in the nineties, is designed to carry up to eight warheads. The possibility of a British force eight times its present size obviously raises a problem for the Soviet Union in the current negotiations.

5.14. During summer 1986 there was a fairly intensive bilateral dialogue with exchanges of letters between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in June, July and September, followed shortly afterwards by the announcement of a meeting between the two leaders in Reykjavik on 11th and 12th October. The initiative for this meeting came from the Soviet Union; it was to be a preparatory meeting for a true summit meeting and was not to lead to the signing of a final agreement.

5.15. Before the Reykjavik summit meeting, the press was already reporting new American proposals for reducing INF in Europe to 100 warheads on each side (and hence only 33 SS-20 missiles for the Soviet Union): 100 warheads in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, which would be offset by 100 cruise missiles based in the United States.

5.16. The Soviet Union made significant concessions in Reykjavik relating to intermediate-range missiles¹⁰. First, the agreement would aim at "the complete elimination of Soviet and United States medium-range missiles in Europe" and, second, "without taking the nuclear potentials of Britain and France into account", meaning that these forces would no longer be frozen. "Negotiations will be started on the missiles with a range of under 1 000 kilometres deployed by the sides in Europe" (SRINF). At the close of the summit meeting, the press reported that intermediate-range missiles remaining in Soviet Asia and the United States following their elimination in Europe would be limited to 100 warheads on each side, i.e. 33 SS-20 missiles on the Soviet side. At the same time, the Soviet Union back-tracked by again making any agreement on intermediate missiles depend on the conclusion of an agreement on anti-ballistic weapons.

5.17. A fairly heated discussion started in Europe on the expediency of accepting this new Soviet proposal, which, on the NATO side, would lead to the removal of cruise and Pershing II missiles whose deployment following NATO's 1979 decision led to opposition from a section of the public. However, the elimination of these missiles was already implicit in the 1979 decision in the event of the SS-20 being withdrawn, and explicit in the famous zero-zero option proposed by NATO in 1981. Since then, each communiqué issued by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group has confirmed "our willingness to reverse, halt, or modify the deployment – including the removal or dismantling of missiles already deployed – upon achievement of a... equitable agreement"¹¹. Finally, the consensus of the sixteen NATO countries on negotiations on intermediate-range missiles after Reykjavik was expressed in the North Atlantic Council communiqué of 12th December 1986¹², as follows:

"Opportunity for progress in some areas, notably in the LRINF negotiations, must not be held hostage to agreements in other unrelated ones. Soviet insistence on doing so would contradict assurances given at the highest level.

10. See Appendix V, section 2.

11. Nuclear Planning Group communiqué, 22nd October 1986.

12. See Appendix IV.

On the basis of the December 1979 NATO decision on LRINF modernisation and arms control, the allies concerned fully support the envisaged elimination of American and Soviet land-based LRINF in Europe and the limitation to 100 warheads in Asia and the United States while their ultimate objective remains the total elimination of all such LRINF. They stress that an INF agreement must not neglect the existing imbalances in shorter-range United States and Soviet INF missiles and must provide for a commitment to follow-on negotiations on these missiles."

5.18. Finally, on 28th February 1987 Mr. Gorbachev made a statement, referring to "the Soviet leadership and the country's Defence Council, which I am responsible for presiding..."¹³ probably in order clearly to involve the Soviet military authorities – and reverting to his position prior to Reykjavik:

"The Soviet Union suggests that the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe be singled out from the package of issues, and that a separate agreement on it be concluded, and without delay... It was agreed in Reykjavik that the Soviet Union and the United States would eliminate all their medium-range missiles (MRM) in Europe within the next five years. Within the same period the number of Soviet MRMs in the Asian part of our territory would be cut down to a hundred warheads on the understanding that the United States could leave the same number of MRM warheads in its national territory.

As soon as an agreement on eliminating Soviet and United States medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, the Soviet Union will withdraw from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, by agreement with the governments of those countries, the longer-range theatre missiles which had been deployed there as measures in reply to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. As far as other theatre missiles are concerned, we are prepared to begin talks immediately with a view to reducing and fully eliminating them..."

5.19. In Moscow on 2nd March it was the Soviet Chief-of-Staff, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, who confirmed that, as foreseen in the Soviet document tabled in Reykjavik, the Soviet Union was making no link between British and French nuclear forces and the proposed agreement on intermediate forces, which the Soviet Union hoped would be concluded

within six months. However, at some as yet non-determined stage in the process of reducing nuclear weapons, Britain and France would have to join in. Marshal Akhromeyev made it clear that missiles to be eliminated would be "destroyed" or "dismantled" under the "most effective control" including "on-site reciprocal inspection of the action of the parties"¹⁴. The chief Soviet negotiator, Mr. Vorontsov, in a press conference in Paris on 6th March, went on the offensive on verification: "We demand total access to all bases, all depots, to all places where these missiles are..." in Europe and in the United States, including "private production plants" if necessary with special legislation to provide this right¹⁵. The extensive nature of expected inspection provisions is shown by the special conference of foreign ministry officials from the five NATO countries in which INF missiles are based held in Washington on 10th March prior to the tabling of inspection proposals by the United States in the Geneva talks on 12th March. In Belgium at least domestic legislation is expected to be required.

5.20. These latest Soviet concessions make it highly desirable for NATO to accept the agreement on INF now envisaged. Certain consequences should be examined.

Possible decoupling of American deterrent forces

5.21. The elimination of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe would obviously reduce the number of American nuclear weapons based in Europe and within range of Soviet territory. Some have thought the elimination of this category of weapons might reduce the essential coupling between American strategic nuclear weapons and the defence of Europe. Others considered this argument too philosophical to be of real military significance. In any event, the argument takes no account of the many other American nuclear weapons which would remain in Europe or in European waters and which are still within range of Soviet territory, i.e. 150 F-111 aircraft based in the United Kingdom, 20 A-6E and 48 A-7 carrier-based aircraft (assuming that two of the fourteen American aircraft-carriers are in European waters) and, finally, many of the 166 TLAM/N nuclear cruise missiles with a range of 1 350 nautical miles already deployed on board American surface ships and five submarines, and which will number 758 when their production has been completed.

Shorter-range INF missiles

5.22. Until the seventies, NATO had some 7 000 American nuclear warheads earmarked for

13. Text at Appendix VII.

14. Tass, 2nd March 1987.

15. Figaro, 7th March 1987.

tactical weapons in Europe, including tactical aviation, Lance short-range missiles and the artillery. The Soviet Union was then believed to have only 3 500. However, in the meantime NATO has unilaterally reduced the number of its tactical warheads, on the one hand to offset the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles and, on the other hand, because of the obsolescence of certain weapons systems with the result that the number of warheads now earmarked for the abovementioned tactical equipment is only just over 4 000. Since the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles by NATO in 1983, the Soviet Union "in compensation" has deployed shorter-range INF missiles, including the SS-23 with a range of 500 km and the modified version of the SS-12 (SS-22) with a range of 900 km, in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany, visibly threatening the European capitals. NATO tactical aviation cannot reach Soviet territory although the capitals of the other Warsaw Pact countries are within range. The constraints imposed on shorter-range weapons in an agreement on LRINF will therefore be of importance, and seem to have been foreseen in the statement of 28th February 1987.

Number of warheads to be eliminated

5.23. The most positive aspect of the planned INF agreement is the number of warheads to be eliminated on each side; for NATO, it would be a matter of 108 Pershing II and 208 cruise missiles effectively deployed at the end of 1986 out of a total of 464 whose deployment is planned, i.e. a total of only 316 warheads eliminated. Conversely, the Soviet Union would eliminate 408 SS-20s with 3 warheads each, i.e. a total of 1 224 warheads, 729¹⁶ of which cover Europe, leaving only 33 SS-20s in Soviet Asia (100 warheads foreseen in the draft agreement) which would be offset by 100 missiles in the United States.

Comparison with the situation before 1979

5.24. When NATO took its 1979 decision, the Soviet Union had already deployed 120 SS-20s in addition to other intermediate-range missiles, 500 SS-4s and 90 SS-5s. At that time, NATO had no missiles of comparable range. The proposal to reduce to zero on each side the number of intermediate-range missiles in Europe therefore can but be a definite advantage for NATO compared with the situation before 1979.

The European zone

5.25. It is essential for the "European zone" which would henceforth be free of such missiles to be the one defined in paragraph 5.7 above, i.e. from a line some 1 300 km to the east of the

Urals, beyond which SS-20 missiles are out of range of Europe.

Conclusion concerning INF

5.26. On the adjournment of the Geneva INF talks on 26th March, Mr. Maynard Glitman, the United States Representative, described the session as "useful and constructive" but added "difficult issues remain...". He recalled the United States "long-standing position that there must be equal global constraints on shorter-range INF missile systems as an integral part of this INF treaty to ensure its viability and effectiveness"¹⁷. It was hoped that the meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze in Moscow from 13th to 16th April would help the Geneva negotiations to progress on their resumption on 23rd April.

5.27. In the draft recommendation, the committee therefore proposes the conclusion of a separate agreement for "the elimination of all long-range INF missiles within range of Europe". It will obviously be important for the details of the treaty that the two delegations will have to draft in Geneva to provide for adequate verification measures and a programme of reductions in stages spread over the planned five-year period, allowing passage to a subsequent stage of reductions only when the other side's implementation of the previous stage has been verified.

(ii) Strategic nuclear weapons

5.28. Referring to strategic weapons in his major statement of 15th January 1986 on the elimination of nuclear weapons before the end of the century, Mr. Gorbachev said:

"Stage one. Within the next five to eight years the USSR and the United States will reduce by one half the nuclear arms that can reach each other's territory. On the remaining delivery vehicles of this kind each side will retain no more than 6 000 warheads.

It stands to reason that such a reduction is possible only if the USSR and the United States mutually renounce the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons."

In stage two, as from 1990 and for a period of five to seven years, the United States and the Soviet Union would have completed the 50% reduction in their strategic weapons; at the same stage, the prohibition of space strike weapons would have to become multilateral, with the participation of major industrial powers. There would be a ban on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, with a destructive power close to that of

16. Marshal Akhromeyev on 2nd March 1987 referred to 243 SS-20s in Europe.

17. International Herald Tribune, 27th March 1987.

nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction. Finally, in stage three as from 1995 the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons would be completed. Mr. Gorbachev then made a few comments about verification:

“ We have in mind that special procedures will be worked out for the destruction of nuclear weapons as well as the dismantling, re-equipment or destruction of delivery vehicles. In the process, agreement will be reached on the numbers of weapons to be destroyed at each stage, the sites of their destruction and so on.

Verification with regard to the weapons that are destroyed or limited would be carried out both by national technical means and through on-site inspections. The USSR is ready to reach agreement on any other additional verification measures.”

5.29. In his answer communicated to the Soviet Union on 23rd February 1986, President Reagan reconfirmed the American proposal to reduce strategic nuclear weapons by half. In an address on 24th February 1986 on the eve of the opening of the twenty-seventh congress of the Soviet Communist Party, President Reagan expressed reservations about the rather publicity-seeking aspects of Mr. Gorbachev's proposals:

“ On the other hand, many of the specific details proposed in the subsequent phases of the Soviet 'plan' are clearly not appropriate for consideration at this time. In our view, the total elimination of nuclear weapons will require, at the same time, the correction of the conventional and other force imbalances, full compliance with existing and future treaty obligations, peaceful resolution of regional conflicts... Unfortunately, the details of the Soviet 'plan' do not address these equally vital requirements.”

5.30. Towards 20th May, the United States had to face the problem of respecting the SALT II treaty when the strategic submarine Nevada started sea-trials with a load of 24 missiles. To respect the treaty limits, the United States then had to dismantle two old Poseidon submarines (with 16 launchers each) or reduce the number of its Minuteman ICBMs. On 14th April, 52 of the 100 senators wrote to President Reagan asking him to take the necessary steps to respect the treaty.

5.31. On 27th May 1986 President Reagan made a major speech on his intention to consider himself no longer bound by the SALT II treaty, the key passage of which reads as follows:

“ ... I have determined that, in the future, the United States must base decisions

regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet non-compliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two Poseidon submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II treaty until the United States equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend at that time to continue deployment of US B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional US systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II treaty. Of course, since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II treaty for some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account.”

5.32. The 131st B-52 with 12 cruise missiles duly came into service on 28th November 1986, the United States having thus exceeded the ceiling of 1 320 strategic launchers imposed by SALT II. The following 5th December, the Soviet deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bessmertnykh, said the Soviet Union would continue to respect SALT II limits “ for the time being”. At the same press conference, General Chervov added that the 131st bomber was not a threat in itself but that in view of the steady increase in American forces the Soviet Union could not respect SALT II much longer.

5.33. President Reagan's speech of 27th May 1986 was much commented on in divergent statements by various members of the American administration and the public. On 19th June the United States House of Representatives passed by 256 votes to 145 a non-binding resolution calling on the President to “ continue to adhere to the provisions of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise”. At its meeting in Washington from 16th to 20th June, the committee also heard diverging opinions about the themes of this speech. As far as the actual terms of the speech are concerned, it is clear that the President did not say, as some members of his administration would have liked, that SALT II is dead.

5.34. Reactions by the governments of the WEU countries to the speech of 27th May 1986 were also negative. In the House of Commons on 18th November 1986, Mrs. Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, returning from talks with President Reagan at Camp David, said: "We did not discuss the provisions of the SALT II treaty on this occasion. They remain as before. They must be observed by both sides, and I hope that they will be..."

5.35. A key argument relates to possible violations of the SALT II treaty by the Soviet Union. As the committee has already underlined, the only case of violation of the SALT II treaty specifically endorsed by the NATO countries was the introduction of two "new" missiles – the SS-X24 and SS-25 – by the Soviet Union¹⁸ when under the treaty it is allowed only one. It should be stressed that, until 28th November 1986, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had violated the numerical ceilings imposed by SALT II and that the United States is not accusing the Soviet Union of doing so. Although it has deployed improved models of strategic missiles, the Soviet Union, like the United States, simultaneously destroyed or withdrew from service other missiles so as to respect the ceilings. According to the definitions used the number of warheads thus destroyed or withdrawn by the Soviet Union is believed to be between 600 and 1 300, plus 14 nuclear-propelled submarines. Recent figures given by the Soviet Union of numbers of total "strategic delivery vehicles" dismantled by the Soviet Union and the United States in compliance with SALT I and SALT II claim 616 and 290 respectively¹⁹.

5.36. The question whether or not the SS-25 is a new missile within the meaning of SALT II (i.e. whether its diameter, launch weight or throw weight exceed those of its predecessor by more than 5%) is highly complex and depends inter alia on the components to be included in the expression "throw weight". If the violation is proved, as the NATO countries seem to believe, an appropriate response would be to deploy "new" missiles such as the Midgetman envisaged by the United States, but not to exceed ceilings hitherto respected by both super-powers.

5.37. Nevertheless, the 27th May speech and 28th November 1986 deployment do not seem to have held up bilateral negotiations on strategic weapons too much. At Reykjavik, the Soviet Union proposed a 50% reduction in offensive strategic weapons on both sides covering all

types of such weapons, "taking into account the historically established specificities of the structures of each side's strategic forces"²⁰... "A solution will also be found to the problem of... sea-based... cruise missiles" (referred to in paragraph 5.21 above). At the close of the summit meeting, the press reported on proposals for the total elimination of strategic ballistic missiles within ten years, with a reduction of 50% during an initial five-year period in the number of nuclear warheads in each of the three categories: ICBMs, missiles on submarines, and the nuclear payloads of strategic bombers. President Reagan in his televised press conference of 14th October said:

"For the first time on the highest level we and the Soviets came close to an agreement on real reductions of both strategic and intermediate-range weapons... For the first time we began to hammer out details of a 50% cut in strategic forces over five years..."

...And maybe most important, we were just in sight of an historic agreement on completely eliminating the threat of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996."

5.38. The United States position on eliminating strategic missiles in ten years is limited to "ballistic missiles" – ICBMs and SLBMs – but would not cover cruise missiles or other weapons carried by bombers – a point on which the Soviet spokesman after the summit appeared to disagree, claiming that the elimination of "all strategic nuclear weapons" had been discussed at the summit, but the United States has denied that this was formally proposed, although tacitly accepting that the elimination of "all strategic nuclear weapons" may have been discussed in conversation²¹. At Reykjavik once again the Soviet Union abandoned its request to offset the medium-range American systems based outside American territory, nor did it ask to offset British and French forces. But again the Soviet Union made agreement on strategic weapons depend on an agreement limiting the SDI programme to research. In his statement on 28th February 1987, Mr. Gorbachev spoke, however, of "the prevention of deployment of weapons in outer space".

(iii) Space weapons

5.39. In his references to space weapons in his address on 15th January 1986, Mr. Gorbachev maintained his total opposition: "We are against weapons in space." But for the first time he seemed to consider the possibility of space

18. See Document 1040, Disarmament, information report, 4th November 1985. Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw – paragraphs 4.25 to 4.27.

19. Pravda, 17th March 1987; quoted from Soviet News, 18th March 1987.

20. See draft Soviet directives at Appendix V.

21. International Herald Tribune, 28th October 1986, "US denies Pact account", and 29th October 1986, "New US orders for arms talks..."

research not leading to the deployment of offensive weapons in space:

“Space must remain peaceful, strike weapons should not be deployed there. Neither should they be developed. And let there also be a most rigorous control, including opening the relevant laboratories for inspection.”

5.40. If there has been a specific answer from the United States to this request to open laboratories engaged in space research for inspection, it has not been made public. In his 24th February 1986 address, President Reagan merely welcomed the Soviet Union's acceptance of the principle of verification:

“We intend to pursue in specific terms at the negotiating table General Secretary Gorbachev's public offer to resolve any necessary verification issues.”

5.41. At his press conference in Reykjavik at the close of the summit meeting on 12th October, General Secretary Gorbachev, having first confirmed the Soviet concessions in regard to intermediate-range and strategic nuclear weapons referred to above, reaffirmed the Soviet Union's request that the ABM treaty be of indefinite duration and that the two parties undertake not to abrogate it for at least ten years. “Simultaneously, we suggested that all the ABM requirements be strictly observed within these ten years, that the development and testing of space weapons be banned and only research and testing in laboratories be allowed.” Mr. Gorbachev continued: “We are aware of the commitment of the American administration and the President to SDI. Apparently, our consent to its continuation and to laboratory tests offers the President an opportunity to go through with research and eventually to get clear what SDI is, what it is about. Although it is already clear to many people, ourselves included.” (See also the Soviet draft tabled in Reykjavik²².)

5.42. President Reagan did not hold a press conference until 14th October on returning to Washington, when he expressed his determination to proceed to actual testing of SDI, and appeared to belittle the ABM treaty:

“I offered to delay deployment of advanced strategic defence for ten years while both sides eliminated all ballistic missiles, but General Secretary Gorbachev said that his demand that we give up all but laboratory research on SDI – in effect kill the programme – was non-negotiable...”

Now the ABM treaty, which he kept referring to as if it was the Holy Grail, I

asked him once what was so great about a treaty that had our governments saying to our people, we won't protect you from a nuclear attack? That's basically what the ABM treaty says...

I told him that what we were proposing with SDI was that once we reached the testing stage we would – well, before that, that right now we were ready and willing to sign a treaty – a binding treaty that said when we reached the testing stage that both sides would proceed, because we told him frankly that we knew they were researching also on defence, nor was that ever denied. And we said we both will go forward with what we are doing. When we reach the testing stage, if it's us, we'll invite you to participate and see the test... and I said or if you have perfected a system that can be this kind of defence that we're talking about, then we share, so that there won't be one side having this plus offensive weapons, but that we eliminate the offensive weapons and then we make available to all who feel a need for it or want it this defence system so that safety is guaranteed for the future.”

On 15th October, in approving a defence budget of \$292 billion for FY 1987, the US Congress reduced the Administration's request of \$5.3 billion for SDI to only \$3.5 billion.

5.43. In contrast to President Reagan's commitment to testing and, apparently, deployment of SDI, allied support for the United States position on SDI has been limited to support for “research”, and has specifically stressed the importance of maintaining the ABM treaty. Thus Baroness Young, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking of the Reykjavik summit in the House of Lords on 15th October 1986, said:

“Perhaps I can confirm... as President Reagan has repeatedly confirmed, that SDI research is consistent with the present treaty obligations, including the ABM treaty. He recently reaffirmed that SDI will be conducted in conformity with a strict interpretation of the treaty. The government have repeatedly made it clear that we regard the treaty as an important element in preserving international peace and stability and want to see it reaffirmed and strengthened. Any suspicion of violations should be pursued according to the mechanisms provided in the treaty.”

5.44. The reservations of WEU governments concerning SDI are referred to in paragraph 2.8 above. The communiqué of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Gleneagles on 21st and 22nd October similarly said “We strongly

22. See Appendix V, section 3.

support the United States exploration of space and defence systems, as is permitted by the ABM treaty”.

5.45. Early this year, a keen public discussion began between the United States and its European allies relating to the interpretation of the ABM treaty when Mr. Weinberger, the Secretary of Defence, seemed to be wishing to impose a new “broad” interpretation which would have allowed strategic defence systems to be tested in space and a commitment, before the end of President Reagan’s administration, to deploy at least some parts of such a system. The White House, weakened by the Irangate affair, no longer seemed able to impose its own policy, the only one which might have put an end to a discussion now dividing the Departments of State and Defence.

5.46. Mrs. Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, had made her position very clear on 19th March 1985 when she told the House of Commons that “research is permitted and constraints on deployment are those contained in the anti-ballistic missile treaty signed in 1972 both by the Soviet Union and the United States, which permitted research but required negotiation before testing and deployment in accordance with the terms of the treaty”. With Mr. Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister, by her side in London on 11th February 1987, Mrs. Thatcher said: “We both expressed the hope that the United States would continue to consult its allies closely on issues connected with the strategic defence initiative” and added: “Our message to the United States is ‘please consult your allies on this matter of vital interest to us all’.”²³ Mr. Younger, British Secretary of State for Defence, then visited Washington where he was reported by the press to have said on 18th February²⁴: “If the part of the programme we are involved in went, in our view, outside the treaty, we would not want to be involved. That is why we have very carefully stated that British participation is most definitely confined to the research part of SDI. We are not committed to anything beyond that.”

5.47. Speaking to the Geneva disarmament conference the following day, Mr. Raimond, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, referring to the discussion about the interpretation of the ABM treaty, said:

“...the ABM treaty is essentially bilateral... So, it is up to the two signatory countries to determine for themselves what today is in keeping with the provisions laid down in 1972, taking account of new technological developments; what goes beyond the agreed provisions of the treaty; and what modalities can or cannot be used to

make changes in the treaty. Whatever solution may be found, I add that it would have to be agreed upon bilaterally. We are attached to maintaining the ABM treaty... We therefore hope to see it respected by both parties, including with respect to research activities. These are clearly permitted by the treaty.”

The minister expressed no opinion on the question of tests.

5.48. During the week of 24th February, Mr. Nitze, President Reagan’s special adviser on disarmament, and Mr. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defence, visited the European countries in which cruise missiles are based, winding up on 28th February with a meeting with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels at the close of which the NATO spokesman said that consultations would be continued and that no decision relating to the interpretation of the ABM treaty would be taken by the United States in the immediate future. The European allies for their part have made their opinions clearly known, in particular that any interpretation of the ABM treaty required consultations between the two parties.

(iv) The limitation of nuclear tests

5.49. Still on the bilateral level, talks to establish negotiations on nuclear tests have been under way in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union since July 1986. (The multi-lateral aspect of this question at the Geneva disarmament conference is referred to in paragraph 5.91 below.) The Soviet Union considers the purpose of these bilateral negotiations to be a complete ban on nuclear tests. The United States considers the Soviet Union must be persuaded to accept methods of calibrating the yield of nuclear tests by the on-site Cortex method proposed by President Reagan on 14th March 1986 with a view to improving the possibilities of verifying two bilateral treaties, i.e. the threshold test ban treaty signed by President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev on 3rd July 1974 and the treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions signed by President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev on 28th May 1976. These two treaties have never been ratified by the United States. On the adjournment of the fourth session of the talks on 20th March, Mr. Robert Barker, the United States Representative, stated:

“Immediately following the successful conclusion of such negotiations (on verification protocols to the two treaties) and the subsequent ratification of these treaties, and in association with a programme to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons, the United States would propose that the United States and the USSR immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a

23. The Times, 12th February 1987.

24. Daily Telegraph, 19th February 1987.

step-by-step parallel programme of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.”

5.50. While it is widely recognised in scientific circles that a ban on underground nuclear tests can now be verified at a distance by seismic means, it is conversely difficult by such means to make an accurate assessment of the yield of tests carried out. The threshold test ban treaty fixed a ceiling of 150 kt. According to the United States, the calibration of the geological structure of the two superpowers' nuclear test sites by the Corrtex system would subsequently allow a more accurate assessment to be made of the yield of tests by seismic stations far from the sites.

5.51. In the text tabled in Reykjavik, the Soviet Union called for bilateral talks on a complete end to nuclear tests, adding that: “The subject of these talks could include questions concerning verification, the lowering of the ceiling on the yield of explosions and a reduction in their number, and the 1974 and 1976 treaties.” Although the United States has still not agreed to resume the trilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on the complete suspension of nuclear tests which were broken off in 1980, it has recently announced that if the two treaties of 1974 and 1976 could be accompanied by a protocol providing for additional verification measures of the type proposed by the United States, consideration might then be given to progressively lowering the threshold for authorised tests below 150 kt and to negotiating an agreement to reduce progressively the number of tests authorised each year.

5.52. In a somewhat publicity-minded gesture, President Reagan sent the two treaties in question to the Senate on 13th January 1987 for ratification, still subject to the conclusion of an additional protocol requiring separate ratification by the Senate before the principal treaties could come into force.

(c) Mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe

(i) The western initiative of 5th December 1985

5.53. On 5th December 1985, western participants²⁵ in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna put forward new proposals which they said were intended to allow a first, albeit modest, agreement to be reached quickly. To this end, they accepted the general framework and main provisions of the Warsaw Pact proposal of 14th

February 1985, but proposed making only half the initial reductions set out in that proposal. On 30th January 1986, the western proposals were supplemented by an outline text accompanied by a table of associated measures.

5.54. The western initiative provided for an initial cutback of 5 000 American and 11 500 Soviet troops in the reduction zone. It provided for a no-increase commitment relating to NATO, the Warsaw Pact and American and Soviet troops stationed in that zone which was to come into force immediately after the reductions. The agreement and its various provisions were to be valid for a period of three years following the completion of the initial reductions. This period was to be used to pursue negotiations and prepare for further reductions.

5.55. Since the new proposals no longer insisted on prior agreement on levels of troops now present in the reduction zone (the data problem), they were intended, in the mind of the West, to allow speedy progress to be made. It was also believed that acceptance, during the period of the agreement, of the first stage of transitional force ceilings relating, on the one hand, to each alliance and, on the other hand, to the United States and the Soviet Union separately was also a favourable factor for advancing the negotiations.

5.56. Nevertheless, NATO maintained and to a certain extent strengthened the verification system hitherto envisaged.

5.57. The associated measures included:

- setting up permanent entry and exit points with observers through which all personnel of land and air forces of participating countries would leave or enter the reduction zone;
- notification and observation of withdrawals;
- notification of out-of-garrison activities;
- exchange of observers on the occasion of such activities;
- notification of ground force movements in the reduction zone;
- the right for each side to conduct thirty inspections each year to verify the no-increase undertaking;
- exchange of information up to battalion level;
- the free use of national technical means.

5.58. The only position adopted in the western proposal on what was to happen to the weapons of units withdrawn was to say that it was for each

25. On the western side, “direct” participants are countries whose territory forms the “reduction zone” (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) plus the other countries having troops in the zone (Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States).

side to decide on the destination of the equipment concerned. However, the proposal increased from 18 to 30, as compared with previous proposals, the number of annual inspections required, and made the provisions relating to out-of-garrison activities apply also to the western part of Soviet territory, outside the reduction zone.

(ii) Immediate Warsaw Pact reactions and its written answer of 20th February 1986

5.59. The first Warsaw Pact reactions were rather encouraging. At a press conference in Moscow on 17th December 1986, Mr. Mikhailov, Soviet Ambassador to the MBFR talks, said that the western proposals were in line with the spirit of Geneva but were still very divergent. He criticised however the associated measures, which he considered to be deliberately excessive, and also the fact that the reduction figures proposed by NATO were not significant and the 5th December proposal did not include the equipment of troops withdrawn.

5.60. Even Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 15th January gave an encouraging impression; he said he was prepared for "reasonable verification" of troop reductions, including the establishment of permanent verification posts at the points of passage of troops withdrawn.

5.61. The Warsaw Pact counter-proposal of 20th February 1986 entitled "draft agreement on the initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of ground forces and armaments and on the subsequent no-increase of forces and armaments of the sides and associated measures in Central Europe" could not therefore fail to be very disappointing to the western allies.

5.62. Although it accepts the principle of permanent verification posts at points where troops enter or leave the reduction zone, this proposal is negative in several respects:

- while the reductions proposed by NATO were not militarily significant, the Pact would nevertheless agree to similar figures: 6 500 American and 11 500 Soviet troops, which, for the West, did not correspond to the disparity between American and Soviet troops stationed in the reduction zone;
- the verification measures proposed were termed excessive and a kind of legalised spying. It was unacceptable to extend the area of verification to cover part of Soviet territory as NATO had requested for out-of-garrison activities.

5.63. Furthermore, the question of the destination of the weapons of troops withdrawn

remained at the heart of the East-West controversy.

5.64. In greater detail, the seventeen articles in the document, which the Warsaw Pact describes as intended to guide the negotiations towards a favourable outcome, may be summarised as follows:

- in the course of one year, the USSR and the United States will withdraw behind their national boundaries 11 500 and 6 500 men respectively from their ground forces stationed in Central Europe, together with their *armaments* and combat equipment;
- information on the military units reduced will be exchanged prior to the beginning of the withdrawals;
- the eleven direct participants in the negotiations will undertake not to increase the levels of their ground and air forces in the reduction zone for a period of three years after the completion of the Soviet-American reductions;
- as from the same date, updated figures on forces remaining in the reduction zone will be exchanged each year;
- when the agreement comes into force, three or four observation posts will be established on each side;
- units and subunits of the ground forces of all signatories of the agreement must enter or leave the reduction zone via these posts;
- observation posts will be manned by representatives of both sides;
- military activities (movements, exercises, call-up of reservists) involving more than 20 000 men must be notified beforehand;
- in addition to the obligation not to interfere with implementation of national technical means, requests for on-site verification may be made if well-founded. As a rule, such requests should be granted. A refusal must be accompanied by a sufficiently convincing explanation;
- a consultative commission will be established to settle disputes which may arise when the agreement is implemented.

Finally, on the basis of these proposals, the East offered to join in the drafting of a joint agreement, in the course of which the utmost should be done to overcome remaining difficulties.

(iii) The situation towards the end of 1986

5.65. Since the Warsaw Pact proposals of 14th February 1985 and the western answer of 5th December 1985, the negotiations seem to have made little progress in spite of the concessions made by both sides.

5.66. The East has mainly kept to its earlier proposals, i.e. withdrawal in combat or combat support units, establishment of permanent entry and exit points, immediate freeze of troop levels in the reduction zone on a collective basis and without national sub-ceilings for a period of three years after the completion of initial withdrawals under the control of observers from both sides. The NATO countries for their part have agreed to abandon their data requirements and, as a whole, have linked their proposals with the plan proposed by the Warsaw Pact. There are still major points of disagreement, however, and these explain the disappointment felt on both sides.

5.67. Differences between East and West have crystallised around verification. While the Pact has now agreed to the permanent presence of observers at entry and exit posts, during and after the reductions, it has not accepted western requirements concerning larger-scale inspections in the reduction zone, which, for the Pact, can take place only after a well-founded and justified request and with the prior consent of the country concerned. The NATO partners are calling for thirty inspections each year for both sides, at short prior notice.

5.68. The other point at issue is the destination of equipment of units withdrawn. The West wishes to have a free hand in stockpiling such equipment as the country concerned sees fit, but the East on the contrary insists on it being destroyed or returned to the country of origin. The geographical asymmetry between the parties to the negotiations prevents NATO from accepting this position.

5.69. In its previous report, the committee suggested with regard to the unresolved problem of equipment that "NATO could however accept the withdrawal, to a depot in some rear area in Europe to be designated, of the equipment of American units to be withdrawn from the zone".

5.70. Still to be settled is the fate of rotations of individuals relieving troops in the reduction zone which the Soviet Union refuses to have pass through the official entry and exit points. As for the strengths to be notified before their withdrawal, the West is calling for them to be reported down to battalion level whereas the East does not wish to go lower than divisional level. Finally, the delicate problem of notification of exercises and possible inspections in the two western districts of the Soviet Union,

measures which the West considers essential for the security of the countries on the alliance's flanks, has not been solved.

5.71. Nevertheless, by proposing far smaller reductions than before (half), at the same time increasing from eighteen to thirty the number of annual inspections called for, NATO has gone against the conventional Soviet position that any verification must be commensurate with the magnitude of the reductions involved.

5.72. In 1986, attention was paid to new proposals for conventional reductions in the wider area extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, but NATO's position in the MBFR negotiations remains unchanged. According to the North Atlantic Council communiqué issued on 12th December 1986²⁶: "Those of us participating in MBFR reaffirm our determination to reach early, substantial and verifiable agreement..."

(iv) The new talks in Vienna on a mandate for negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe

5.73. Some confusion arose over Mr. Gorbachev's speech in East Berlin on 18th April 1986 when he said:

"The USSR proposes substantial reduction of all components of land forces and tactical aircraft based in Europe, including the relevant parts of American and Canadian forces deployed there.

The military units should be dissolved and their armaments either destroyed or put into storage on their national territories. The scope of the reductions must obviously cover the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals,"²⁷.

5.74. On 11th June, the theme of Mr. Gorbachev's speech was taken further in the Budapest appeal by the Warsaw Pact member states to the NATO member states and all European countries for a programme to reduce armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe²⁸. As a first stage, this appeal proposes, in an area extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, a reduction of 100 000 to 150 000 in the forces of the two alliances followed by other reductions so that in the early nineties the land and tactical air forces of the two alliances would be reduced by 25% as compared with present levels. Conventional weapons and nuclear missiles with a range of less than 1 000 km would be included in the reductions; equipment withdrawn would either be destroyed or stockpiled on national territory. Verification measures are

26. See Appendix IV.

27. International Herald Tribune, 22nd April 1986.

28. See Appendix II.

envisaged in the third part of the appeal while the fourth part states that negotiations on implementing the proposals might be held either in a first stage of the conference on disarmament in Europe (Stockholm) or in a special forum with the participation of the European states, the United States and Canada, or in the context of the Vienna MBFR negotiations enlarged to include other European states.

5.75. In the meantime, meeting in Halifax, Canada, on 29th and 30th May 1986, the North Atlantic Council in ministerial session had issued a statement on conventional arms control²⁹ which referred inter alia to the setting up of a high-level task force on conventional arms control designed to build on the western proposals already presented at the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe and the Vienna MBFR negotiations and to take account of Mr. Gorbachev's statement on 18th April. This task force is also studying the Budapest appeal.

5.76. The "bold new steps... required in the field of conventional arms control" advocated by NATO in this Halifax statement have proved more difficult to agree upon than was thought when the statement was adopted. The subsequent Brussels declaration on conventional arms control adopted on 12th December 1986³⁰ summarises only the first results of the task force. While the latter declaration provides for "distinct negotiations", a major difference persisted between France, which wanted these new negotiations to be held in the framework of the CSCE with the presence of neutral European countries, and the other NATO countries, which considered that only the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact whose conventional forces would be subject to reductions in the negotiations should participate directly. This difference was shown publicly at the Vienna follow-up meeting to the conference on security and co-operation in Europe where the United States Delegate, Mr. Zimmermann, said on 26th February 1986 that the NATO countries would propose to the Warsaw Pact countries discussions on the reduction of conventional forces. The French Delegate to the conference, Mr. Renard, answered on 30th January that "France would not agree to take part in enlarged MBFR talks... it refuses a process having no link with the CSCE... France has proposed a wording aimed at allowing all participants in the CSCE process to continue to be involved in the discussion on security and then to allow the twenty-three countries belonging to alliances to hold informal talks, parallel with the work of the thirty-five on confidence-building measures, with a view to preparing a mandate for negotia-

tions more directly concerning conventional stability". In fact, the idea of negotiations on conventional reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals dates back to the proposals made by Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, then French President, to the special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1978. Such negotiations would have formed a second stage of the conference on disarmament in Europe held in Stockholm.

5.77. The informal talks between representatives of the twenty-three Warsaw Pact and NATO countries opened at the French Embassy in Vienna on 17th February 1987.

5.78. While various proposals relating to the new negotiations seem interesting, the committee is for the time being sceptical about the possibility of concluding an agreement on reducing conventional forces with adequate verification measures in a wider framework when, after thirteen years of negotiations in Vienna in a more restricted framework, the Soviet Union has still not accepted the necessary verification measures. If the Soviet Union accepted the commitment of a number of annual inspections and the obligation for all troops entering or leaving the reduction zone to pass through entry and exit checkpoints, a first agreement could be reached in Vienna immediately. With the experience acquired in the more restricted framework, consideration might then be given to wider negotiations.

(d) The conference on disarmament in Europe

5.79. At the last session of the conference on disarmament in Europe held in Stockholm in 1986, only in August were major concessions made by both sides which on 19th September finally allowed publication of the "Document of the Stockholm conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe...". Comprising 104 paragraphs with four annexes, this document is clearly different from the Helsinki final act of 1975, on the one hand because "the measures adopted in this document are politically binding..." (whereas application of the confidence-building measures in the final act were always optional) and on the other because the confidence-building measures accepted in Stockholm:

"will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area"

* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe."

In other words, the new area of application extends from the Atlantic to the Urals while the Helsinki measures applied in the Soviet Union

29. See Appendix III.

30. See Appendix IV.

only to a 250 km wide strip of territory along its western frontier.

5.80. The Stockholm document has six sections and four annexes.

Refraining from the threat or use of force

5.81. Paragraphs 9 to 28 recall the obligation of participating states to refrain "from the threat or use of force" on which the Soviet Union insisted, but in exchange participating states also "reconfirm their commitment to the basic principle of the sovereign equality of states and stress that all states have equal rights and duties within the framework of international law" and "the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms..." - principles dear to the West.

Prior notification of certain military activities

5.82. Paragraphs 29 to 37 govern notification of military activities which must be given at least 42 days in advance if they involve at least 13 000 troops or 300 tanks (or at least 3 000 troops in the case of amphibious or parachute exercises), and notification must include air forces if the exercise involves 200 or more sorties. Activities carried out without advance notice will be notified at the time the troops involved commence such activities. (See constraining provisions below.) Notification must include details of the principal weapons systems involved, by category.

Observation of certain military activities

5.83. Paragraphs 38 to 54 contain an obligation to invite observers to all exercises involving more than 17 000 troops (or more than 5 000 in the case of amphibious or parachute exercises). It is generally estimated that some ten exercises by each military alliance will exceed this ceiling each year. Each state has the right to send two observers who may use their own maps, photographic equipment, binoculars, etc.

Annual calendars

5.84. Paragraphs 55 to 58 provide for the exchange by each state with all other states, not later than 15th November each year, of a calendar of all exercises notifiable under the document for the following year.

Constraining provisions

5.85. Paragraphs 59 to 62, enhancing the provisions for prior notification, provide for notification two years in advance of any activity involving more than 40 000 troops and an absolute ban on military activities involving more than 75 000 troops which have not been notified two years in advance or more than

40 000 troops not notified one year in advance.

Compliance and verification

5.86. The thirty-six paragraphs numbered 63 to 98 contain key provisions relating to verification rights. Each state is entitled to ask for one inspection per year and each state is bound to accept up to three requests for inspection per year in the case of notifiable activities being suspected of having taken place without being notified in accordance with the provisions of the document. The inspected state has no right to refuse such inspections "except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted, military and other defence installations, as well as naval vessels, military vehicles and aircraft". In contrast, the Soviet Union has never accepted automatic verification obligations in the framework of the MBFR talks.

5.87. The inspected state must answer the request within twenty-four hours, and the state requesting an inspection may send four observers who must arrive on the territory within thirty-six hours of the request. Inspection may be conducted using a land vehicle, helicopter or aircraft according to the wishes of the state requesting the inspection, but the two states must choose by mutual agreement which of them will provide the vehicles, i.e. the inspected state may insist on its own vehicles being used, but the inspectors may oversee navigation, etc.

5.88. The request for inspection must specify the area within which the inspection will be conducted which must not exceed that required for an army-level military activity. The inspection must be terminated within forty-eight hours of the arrival of the inspection team.

Annexes

5.89. The four annexes relate to:

- I. the zone of application;
- II. the date of notification (15th December 1986 for the first year of application);
- III. the right to raise any matter relating to confidence-building measures at the Vienna meeting;
- IV. the obligation not to take advantage of the alliances to circumvent the inspection system, i.e. a state belonging to one of the alliances must not exercise its right of inspection on the territory of a state belonging to the same alliance in order to exhaust the quota of three annual inspections.

The document entered into force on 1st January 1987.

5.90. Although in the negotiations the NATO member countries asked that notification relate to exercises involving more than 6 000 troops and confer on inspectors the right to overfly territory in their own aircraft, the provisions of the Stockholm document show real improvement in confidence-building measures. The committee has reported several times on the application of confidence-building measures in the context of the Helsinki final act³¹. The table at Appendix VI summarises their application. The effectiveness of the new measures will be established only after several years of application. It will certainly have to be seen how the Soviet Union interprets the expression "areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted" within which any state is entitled to refuse inspection. Prospects are good, however. Already on 15th December 1986 the annual calendars of exercises planned in 1987 had been exchanged. NATO plans eighteen exercises to nine of which observers are invited and the Warsaw Pact twenty-five to nine of which observers are invited. Five are planned by neutral and non-aligned countries. The committee will not fail to follow the application of this important document very closely.

(e) Comprehensive nuclear test ban

5.91. At the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly which ended in December 1986, very particular attention was once again paid to a ban on all nuclear tests. Three separate resolutions³² were devoted to the matter, the first of which inter alia urged the three depositary powers of the partial test ban treaty to promote, at the Geneva disarmament conference, the creation of a special committee to negotiate a treaty on a complete halt to nuclear test explosions. The second, calling for negotiations to be held at the conference on disarmament for a complete ban on nuclear tests, was adopted by 137 votes to 1 (France) with 15 abstentions (including the United Kingdom and the United States), the five remaining member countries of WEU and the eight other NATO countries having voted in favour.

5.92. In his speech on 15th January 1986, Mr. Gorbachev prolonged by three months, until 31st March 1986, the unilateral moratorium declared by the Soviet Union in August 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the attack on Hiroshima. The United States maintained the position held by the Reagan administration for the past two years according to which nuclear tests had become necessary to guarantee the effectiveness of nuclear weapons in storage. For the first time

since the Soviet moratorium was declared, the United States carried out a test on 22nd March 1986 and there have been several more since. At Easter 1986 Mr. Gorbachev proposed an emergency meeting in a European city to discuss a moratorium on nuclear tests and, in spite of the statement by Marshal Akhromeyev, Chief-of-Staff of the Soviet armed forces, at a press conference in Moscow on 14th April 1986, that the Soviet moratorium had been terminated as from 11th April, it was only on 26th February 1987 that the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test since the unilateral moratorium, the United States having already conducted three in 1987. General Botnenin said at the time that the test was an isolated one, that the Soviet Union had no intention of competing with the United States space programme and that it was prepared to resume the moratorium as soon as the United States did likewise, but the second Soviet test after the moratorium was conducted on 12th March. (The bilateral talks on nuclear tests are referred to in paragraph 5.49 et seq. above.)

5.93. A team of United States seismologists from a private institution who had effectively monitored the moratorium with instruments in the vicinity of the testing range were required to switch off their equipment and leave the area – apparently to preclude "calibration" measurements called for by the United States (paragraph 5.50). On 26th March the (private) British Seismic Verification Research Group announced it had also signed an agreement with Mr. Gorbachev's Chief Scientific Adviser to establish a permanently manned seismic station 640 km south of the main Soviet test site³³.

5.94. At the Geneva disarmament conference it has still not been possible to set up a special committee to negotiate a treaty on banning nuclear tests as called for in United Nations General Assembly resolutions and proposed in Geneva by the non-aligned and Warsaw Pact countries. As in previous years, the western powers have maintained their opposition to terms of reference which would allow a treaty to be negotiated, considering that the terms of reference of a special committee should be limited to examining problems.

5.95. In a letter addressed to the conference on 20th February 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev said:

"The Soviet Union, for its part, has been doing all it can to help achieve this goal. In particular, it is agreeable to the strictest control over a ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspections and the use of all the latest developments in seismology."

31. See the committee's information report, Disarmament, Document 1040, 4th November 1985, Appendix IV. Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

32. 41/46A; 41/47; 41/54.

33. Guardian, 27th March 1987.

The Soviet Union had also announced that it would agree to the establishment of regional seismological networks on its territory to verify that a treaty banning nuclear tests was respected.

5.96. Finally, at the disarmament conference the ad hoc group of experts on seismic measuring systems submitted a report on its technical tests in 1984 in the framework of international co-operation for recording and analysing seismic phenomena with a view to verifying an agreement banning nuclear tests.

5.97. The western countries' position, which is well known, has not changed. The United States has asserted several times that it intended to pursue a nuclear test programme designed above all to ensure the reliability of American nuclear weapons. This was a break from the earlier policy of pursuing trilateral negotiations on a complete suspension, these negotiations having been suspended in 1980. It is known that the present test programme also covers research on a possible X-ray laser for strategic defence systems and on new nuclear warheads for the Midgetman missile. The press has now quoted scientists at the United States Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratories as saying that new generations of nuclear weapons under development, understood to be part of the SDI programme, would require at least 100 test explosions per weapon compared with six for earlier weapons³⁴. The United Kingdom for its part continues to assert that it is prepared to accede to a treaty banning tests if the verification problem is solved. On this latter point, the United Kingdom and the United States seem to be the only countries to consider that existing seismic networks, particularly if supplemented by regional systems on the territory of nuclear weapon countries, are not enough to verify such a treaty. At the Geneva disarmament conference on 19th February 1987, Mr. Raimond, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, said without ambiguity:

“France does not consider today, any more than yesterday, that stopping tests is a precondition for progress towards nuclear disarmament. It maintains that, on the contrary, the stopping of tests could become significant at the end of a long-term process resulting in real and effective nuclear disarmament.”

5.98. The Prime Minister of China, Mr. Zhao, in his address of 20th March 1986 marking international peace year, announced that China was henceforth renouncing tests in the atmosphere; it had not conducted any since 1980. At the Geneva disarmament conference, China has declared that it is prepared to play an active part in negotiations to draft a total test ban treaty.

5.99. The other European allied countries represented at the disarmament conference at the moment are supporting United States opposition to the creation of a special committee in Geneva to draft a test ban treaty. However, in their public statements and in their affirmative votes on United Nations resolutions on the suspension of nuclear tests, they have shown they were in favour of a test ban treaty. For instance, the communiqué issued by the Federal German Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 2nd April 1986 at the close of Mr. Papandreou's visit to Bonn indicated that there was a chance of starting negotiations intended first to limit and then to stop nuclear tests.

5.100. The committee referred in its previous report to scientific evidence that underground nuclear explosions could be adequately monitored down to the smallest yields. As in its last report, the committee calls for the opening of negotiations on a complete nuclear test ban treaty and that the Soviet Union be urged to accept the United States' invitation to participate in the testing of the new calibration system at the United States test site.

(f) Chemical weapons

5.101. The state of negotiations at the end of 1985 on a chemical weapons ban was described in earlier reports by the committee³⁵. The emphasis on the need for such an agreement in the Reagan-Gorbachev summit communiqué of 21st November 1985 led to the belief that progress was possible in the negotiations being held on this subject at the Geneva disarmament conference. The communiqué also announced the start of a bilateral dialogue on measures to be taken to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. In his statement on 15th January 1986, Mr. Gorbachev referred to chemical weapons as follows:

“We are prepared for a timely declaration of the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons and for the cessation of their production, and are ready to start developing procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base and to proceed, soon after the convention enters into force, to eliminating the stockpiles of chemical weapons. All these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections.”

Referring to certain interim measures, he said:

“For example, agreement could be achieved on a multilateral basis not to

34. The Times, 19th April 1986.

35. Disarmament, Documents 1040 of 4th November 1985 and 1043 of 22nd November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

transfer chemical weapons to anyone and not to deploy them in the territories of other states.”

5.102. At the Geneva disarmament conference on 11th March 1986, the United States representative, Mr. Lowitz, while affirming the priority his country gave to a comprehensive treaty eliminating chemical weapons, said:

“ However, the United States is opposed to a formal treaty – as some have suggested – such as one that would mirror the nuclear non-proliferation treaty for nuclear weapons.”

At the session of the conference in spring 1986, the United States also made it clear, in regard to the American draft treaty banning chemical weapons tabled in 1984, that the inspections called for would apply to all establishments capable of manufacturing chemical products, and not solely to state enterprises, as the wording of the draft had initially indicated.

5.103. The special ad hoc committee and its three subgroups set up by the conference on disarmament continued their work in 1986 and 1987. On 22nd April 1986 the representative of the Soviet Union introduced some significant new proposals which in particular moved further towards the western position on some aspects of destruction of chemical weapon facilities and verification:

- destruction of chemical weapon stocks would begin within six months and be completed within 10 years of entry into force of a convention;
- within 30 days of entry into force the number, capability and precise location of all plants capable of producing chemical weapons would be declared;
- destruction or dismantling of such production facilities would begin within one year of entry into force;
- all production activities would cease immediately on entry into force and measures to ensure their close-down, including disconnection from any non-military chemical production facilities the operation of which would be authorised under a convention, would be completed within three months;
- fairly detailed provisions were described for destruction of production equipment, or the dismantling of equipment which could be used for authorised civilian chemical production;
- verification measures were provided for: “including systematic on-site inspections, such as the verification of

the accuracy of declarations, the sealing by inspectors of the facility to be closed, the periodic checking of preservation of seals up to the moment the seals are removed and the destruction or the dismantling of the facility is initiated...the final international verification would be carried out upon the full termination of the process of the elimination or the dismantling of the entire facility”.

5.104. The detailed nature of the Soviet proposals, which are obviously based on the design of existing chemical production plants where no doubt legitimate civilian chemical processes are also carried out, makes these proposals a convincing attempt at progress. The proposals do not however go into detail about subsequent verification measures after destruction of existing and declared chemical weapon production plants has been completed, merely asserting that “the convention should envisage measures ensuring its strict observance... first of all the prevention of the use of the commercial chemical industry for the development and production of chemical weapons”. Nevertheless they seem to offer a solid basis for active negotiation of a treaty leading to a complete and verified ban on chemical weapons.

5.105. In the light of the important Soviet statement, a wide consensus could be seen in the negotiations on the *routine verification* system which would be applied for the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons, the dismantling of production plants and declared installations of the legal civil chemical industry whose products could be used for the production of chemical weapons. A point still at issue is the concept of *challenge inspections* which would allow inspection of an undeclared chemical installation suspected of manufacturing forbidden products. Until now the Soviet Union has insisted on the right of any state to refuse requests for challenge inspections if they were considered abusive – if, for instance, they sought to inspect other secret military installations on the pretext of alleged chemical production. The United States proposals concerning challenge inspection, contained in the draft treaty it tabled in 1984, were considered too intrusive by the Soviet Union and also by certain western allied countries with large-scale chemical industries.

5.106. On 15th July 1986, the United Kingdom tabled a document containing new proposals for challenge inspections³⁶. This text provides that each state party to the convention would have the right directly to request an inspection of another party. This inspection would be carried out impartially by members of the international technical secretariat that would be set up by the convention. They would be required to reach the

36. Document CD/715, 15th July 1986.

location not later than seventy-two hours from the issue of a challenge. Normally, any state receiving a request for inspection would authorise the team to conduct a detailed inquiry in order to establish the facts. But if in exceptional circumstances the state considered that its security would be threatened by the inspection requested, it would have the right to propose alternative measures to provide sufficient information for the matter under consideration to be resolved. The time-limit for this process would be a maximum of seven days and during that time the requested state would be obliged to take sufficient steps to enable its compliance to be demonstrated.

5.107. If, following an inspection or refusal of an inspection, the requesting state was not satisfied that the requested state was respecting the convention, the Executive Council set up under the convention would take collective measures which might include withdrawal of rights and privileges under the convention. Such measures would be without prejudice to the right of the other states to take unilateral action up to and including withdrawal from the convention – the ultimate sanction.

5.108. The report by the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons dated 21st August 1986 contains the text of those articles of a convention on which agreement has been reached, consisting largely of the technical aspects of chemical product definition which would be covered by the convention, by category: supertoxic lethal products, other lethal chemical products and other harmful chemical products, and the restrictions applying to each product.

5.109. Sessions of the disarmament conference are normally suspended at the end of August to allow delegates to take part in debates on disarmament in the United Nations General Assembly in New York during the autumn. They are resumed only in February of the following year. In view of the urgency of drafting the convention on chemical weapons, however, informal consultations were continued in Geneva during autumn 1986 and the ad hoc committee resumed its work in January 1987.

5.110. In autumn 1986, the representative of the Soviet Union had, in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, shown some interest in the British proposals on challenge verification. At the Geneva disarmament conference on 17th February 1987, the Soviet representative said his country was henceforth prepared to accept the obligation to declare, within thirty days of the entry into force of a convention, the site of stocks of chemical weapons and their automatic inspection on site. However, the Soviet Union continued to limit acceptance of challenge inspection to declared plants and depots and certain still to be defined cases such

as that of a state suspected of actually using chemical weapons.

5.111. At the disarmament conference on 19th February, Mr. Raimond, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, asked whether progress should not be step by step. He said:

“My country wishes to achieve results, even if they prove to be limited, in an initial stage, for example, to the progressive destruction of stocks and production facilities during a period to be determined. This same stage-by-stage approach could be used with respect to the solution to be found for the problem of the lists of supertoxic agents.”

The minister added:

“Nevertheless, it is in the light of these uncertainties in the negotiations that France does not rule out the possibility of acquiring a limited and purely deterrent capability in this area....this would only be used for retaliation and not for a first attack. In any case, the current negotiations, to which we continue to attach very high priority, could not constitute a moratorium for France, nor for that matter for any other country.”

The minister announced that France would subsequently be tabling specific proposals.

5.112. There are still many points on which agreement was not reached in the text of the convention being drafted by the conference's ad hoc committee. If this convention is to be completed in 1987, it is essential for the Soviet Union in particular to clarify *inter alia* its position on challenge inspections.

5.113. In parallel with these multilateral negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union have, since the 1985 Geneva summit meeting, been holding bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons whose results have not been made public. But at its meeting in Geneva in July 1986, when it was addressed by representatives of several delegations to the conference, the committee noted that the general opinion was that it would be possible to conclude a convention in 1987 if the main stumbling-block, i.e. challenge verification, could be overcome. This agreement could thus be reached before the production of binary chemical weapons began in the United States as planned at the end of 1987.

5.114. Once again there is reason to deplore the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran in February 1986. For the first time, the United Nations group of experts investigating the incident mentioned Iraq by name: “The agent used has mainly been mustard gas although on some occasions nerve gas was also employed... On many occasions, Iraqi forces have used

chemical weapons against Iranian forces." This shows the importance of a multilateral convention – which must be a worldwide one – banning chemical weapons.

5.115. On 18th February 1986 the NATO Supreme Commander, General Rogers, made an important statement to the French Institute for International Relations in Paris about stocks of chemical weapons. For the first time since 1969, he was expecting NATO to approve American plans concerning the production of chemical weapons. He outlined a plan providing for the transfer of chemical weapons to Europe in the event of crisis and after consultation with the European allies. He considered the stockpiling of chemical weapons should be approved as a force goal by the Defence Planning Committee at ministerial level. When voting funds in 1985 for the production of chemical weapons for the first time since 1969, the United States Congress had made production subject to the prior acceptance by the European allies of plans providing for the stockpiling of chemical weapons in Europe.

5.116. The communiqué of the NATO Defence Planning Committee dated 22nd May 1986 refers to "the 1987-1992 force goals which reflect the priorities we have identified for improving conventional defence" without making it clear that, for the United States, the force goals include production of the new generation of so-called "binary" chemical weapons. Three countries – Greece, Norway and Denmark – appended a reservation concerning the text of the communiqué. At the same time the representatives of Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands made it known that they did not approve of the American decision. At all events, the ministerial meeting merely noted, without approving, a force goal affecting only the United States. Since then, Germany and the United Kingdom have indicated that the new chemical weapons would not be deployed in Europe in peacetime and that each country would have the right to veto their possible deployment on its territory in times of crisis. This possible deployment seems to have been discussed bilaterally with Germany and the United Kingdom and Germany has obtained a compensatory assurance that the stocks of American chemical weapons now stationed on its territory will be withdrawn by 1990.

5.117. The committee repeats the conclusions it reached in its last report, considering that chemical weapons now stockpiled in Germany were sufficiently effective to deter an enemy from using such weapons. It consequently recommends making all necessary efforts to ensure the conclusion in 1987 of a treaty banning such weapons, including the destruction of all stocks. While underlining the importance of realistic verification measures, the committee asks that the situation be re-examined at the end of 1987. In the meantime, it considers there is no need to

approve the deployment of further chemical weapons in Europe.

(g) Space weapons

5.118. In 1986, the Geneva disarmament conference was late in reconstituting the ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Soviet Union proposed that an international agreement be prepared guaranteeing the immunity of artificial earth satellites, banning the creation, testing and deployment of new anti-satellite systems and making it compulsory to destroy old ones. It proposed that partial measures be taken urgently to enhance confidence between states in space activities pending a solution to the problem of preventing an arms race in space with all that implies.

5.119. In his address to the conference on 19th February 1987, Mr. Raimond, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, recalled French proposals at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament in 1978 for the creation of an international satellite agency to monitor disarmament measures, which proposal, as the committee noted at the time, took up two of the committee's own proposals³⁷. Noting that present space arrangements were inadequate for the immunity of satellites of third countries, and the difficulties of international provisions for banning anti-satellite systems, the minister proposed the registration and notification of space objects and proposed making the international satellite monitoring agency responsible for ensuring the application of measures of transparency and the code of conduct of space activities.

VI. Conclusions

6.1. The committee's conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation, the substantive paragraphs of which relate to this explanatory memorandum as follows:

<i>Recommendation on disarmament</i>	<i>Explanatory memorandum</i>
Paragraphs	Paragraphs
1	5.1 et seq.
1(a)	5.5 to 5.27
1(b)	5.28 to 5.38
1(c)	5.36 to 5.48 and 2.8
2	5.53 to 5.78
3	5.101 to 5.117
4(a) and (b)	5.49 to 5.52 and 5.91 to 5.100

Recommendation replying to the 31st annual report of the Council

Paragraphs	Paragraphs
1	2.1 to 2.5
2	2.5 to 2.7

37. East-West relations and defence, Document 587, 8th November 1972, Rapporteur: Mr. Destremau, and Security and the Mediterranean, Document 637, 21st May 1974, Rapporteur: Mr. Jung.

APPENDIX I

*Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly**17th March 1986**(Extract)*

.....

The Council has instructed me to give you the following information concerning the staff and activities of the new agencies responsible for security questions.

Since 1st January, each of these agencies has a director: General E. Rambaldi directs the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions (Agency I) and the restructured ACA. The former head of the international secretariat of the SAC, Mr. E. Hintermann, is responsible for the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments (Agency III). Appointed by the ministers at their meeting in Rome on 14th November 1985, a senior United Kingdom official, Mr. I. Dawson, has taken charge of the agency for the study of security and defence problems (Agency II).

A full table of establishment will be sent to you as soon as all the posts have been filled.

As indicated in the Bonn communiqué, the rôle of these new agencies is to carry out the studies requested by the Council.

Certain studies have already been planned, all or part of which will be the subject of interim reports which might be presented to the ministers at their meeting in Venice.

Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-à-vis the countries of Western Europe in regard to questions of the control of armaments and disarmament. In the future it will also have to take an interest in the control of conventional armaments and the essential problem of verification.

In connection and close co-ordination with the tasks of Agency I, Agency II will have to study the assessment of the threat, and the contribution of the WEU countries to the response to this threat, and the question of management resources.

Agency III will study certain aspects of competitiveness in the armaments industry in Europe and the implications of the evolution of the world arms market, together with the problems of technological transfers between European allies.

Other tasks have been planned and will have to be undertaken during the transitional period up to the end of 1987.

All these studies constitute internal working papers for the Council intended to contribute to its process of reflection on the subjects dealt with.

In order to guarantee the availability of the information necessary for them, the agencies shall establish links with the appropriate international bodies and with national administrations. In this respect it must be noted that the latter must be assured that the classified information they transmit to the ministerial organs of WEU is handled in accordance with their security regulations and limited to the exclusive use of these organs.

The suggestion to place at the disposal of the ministerial organs a computerised documentation centre will have to be assessed in the light of budgetary priorities and will have to be examined subsequently by the Council.

(signed) A. CAHEN

APPENDIX II

***Appeal by the Warsaw Treaty member states to the member states of NATO
and to all European countries for a programme to reduce armed forces
and conventional armaments in Europe***

Budapest, 10th-11th June 1986

The Warsaw Treaty member states, being aware of their responsibility to their respective peoples and to mankind for the peace of Europe and the world at large and seeking a radical change for the better in the current complicated international situation, are of the view that now, more than ever, there is a need for taking resolute action and concrete measures aimed at ending the arms race, proceeding to effective disarmament and averting the danger of war.

They support the programme proposed by the Soviet Union for the complete and comprehensive liquidation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century. They are convinced that the cessation of nuclear testing, the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the extension of the arms race to outer space, a ban on and the liquidation of chemical weapons and other disarmament measures would be conducive to bringing about a more secure world for the peoples of Europe and the entire globe.

The allied states profess a complex approach to disarmament problems and that the liquidation of weapons of mass destruction be supported by significant cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments. Along with making Europe free of nuclear weapons, the problem of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments is acquiring an ever greater significance for the present and future of the European continent. It is on this continent that the two largest groupings of armed forces equipped with the most up-to-date armaments face each other and the destructive power of some systems of conventional armaments is growing equal to that of mass-destruction weapons. The allied states seek to ensure that concrete nuclear disarmament measures and cuts in conventional armaments and armed forces are followed by appropriate reductions in the military spending of the states.

Guided by these considerations, the Warsaw Treaty member states present these concrete proposals to all the other European states, to the United States of America and Canada. These proposals constitute a significant supplement to the programme for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, but at the same time bear an independent character, and their realisation would substantially reduce the danger of war in Europe.

I.

The Warsaw Treaty member states propose a substantial reduction in the land and tactical air forces of European states and in the corresponding forces of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe. Simultaneously with conventional armaments, tactical nuclear weapons with a range of up to 1 000 km should also be reduced.

The geographical zone of reduction includes the whole territory of Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals.

They propose that the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe be carried out gradually at agreed times, with the military balance maintained at ever lower levels and without jeopardising the security of any of the parties. In addition, parallel to the troops under reduction their armaments and equipment inclusive of nuclear means would also be dismantled.

As a first step, a one-time mutual reduction is proposed to be carried out in such a way that the troop strength of the countries belonging to the opposing military-political alliances be cut by 100 000-150 000 troops on each side within a year or two. Cuts in tactical air forces as part of these measures would be of great significance. Immediately afterwards, given the willingness of the NATO countries to act likewise, the Warsaw Treaty member states are ready to carry out further significant reductions, as a result of which, the land forces and tactical air forces of both military alliances in Europe would, by the early 1990s, be reduced by some 25% as compared with present levels. Such reductions would affect more than half a million troops on each side, thus the opposing armed forces in Europe would be reduced by over one million troops.

The allied socialist states stand for continuing the process of reductions in the armed forces and armaments of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. Significant reductions in the armed forces and armaments of the two alliances would make it possible for all the other European countries to join this process.

They propose that the components of armed forces to be reduced be demobilised in the

form of equivalent larger units, units and subunits, together with their troop arms and equipment. Troops would be discharged in accordance with established procedures in the given state.

Armaments and equipment subject to reduction could be destroyed or stored on national territories in accordance with agreed procedures. Nuclear warheads should be destroyed. Certain types of military equipment could, subject to agreement, be transferred for peaceful purposes.

Funds becoming available as a result of appropriate reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments cannot be allocated to the creation of new types of weapons or to other military purposes, they should be used for the needs of economic and social development.

All the states party to an agreement on armed forces and armaments reduction would assume the commitment to keep from increasing their land forces and tactical strike aviation beyond the limits of the cut-back area.

II.

The Warsaw Treaty member states propose to work out such a system of reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments under which the process of reduction would result in a lessening of the danger of surprise attack and would contribute to the consolidation of strategic stability on the European continent. With this end in view, they propose to come to agreement at the very beginning of the process on a significant reduction in the tactical air forces of the two military-political alliances in Europe and on lowering the level of the concentration of troops along the lines of contact between the two alliances.

For the same purpose, supplementary measures would be elaborated and implemented which were suitable for strengthening the conviction of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and the other states of Europe that surprise offensive operations would not be launched against them.

They plan to reach agreement on limiting the number and size of larger military exercises and on exchanging more detailed information about the size of forces and equipment regrouped to Europe from other regions for the period of military exercises, and on other measures facilitating the increase of mutual trust.

The implementation of measures like the establishment of nuclear and chemical weapon-free zones on the European continent, gradual reduction in the military activity of the two mili-

tary alliances, the establishment of co-operation among their member states on questions of arms reduction and disarmament would facilitate the strengthening of confidence, the creation of more favourable conditions for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

III.

The reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments would take place accompanied by reliable and effective verification through national technical means and international procedures including on-site inspection.

They propose to organise, together with measures of verification for the process of reduction, the observation of the military activities of troops remaining after reductions.

Appropriate forms of verification would be applied concerning measures strengthening mutual confidence and implemented in harmony with the agreements.

For purposes of verification the parties will exchange, at an agreed date, data on the total troop strengths of their land forces and tactical strike air forces stationed in the zone of reduction and separately on their components to be reduced and on those not affected by the reduction. They will exchange information concerning the designation of the formations to be dismantled, their troops' strength, location, and the quantity of their main types of weapons agreed upon. The parties would notify each other of the beginning and completion of the reduction.

For purposes of verification, an international consultative committee will be formed with the participation of representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as well as of interested neutral and non-aligned and other countries of Europe.

On-site inspection of the reduction of armed forces and the destruction or stockpiling of armaments could be carried out, if necessary, with the involvement of representatives of the international consultative committee. For purposes of such supervision posts of control, composed of representatives of the international consultative committee, would be set up at major railway centres, airports and harbours.

IV.

The present proposals for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe could be the subject of concrete discussion in the second stage of the conference on con-

fidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

At the same time, keeping in mind the pressing urgency of taking measures to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe, the Warsaw Treaty member states would consider it possible to proceed without delay to explore the proposals presented here. To this end, they deem it possible to convene a special forum with the participation of the European states as well as the United States and Canada.

They are also prepared to widen the framework of the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe through the inclusion of other European states and the corresponding modification of the terms of reference of those negotiations.

While expressing their readiness to make use of all possible channels and for mutually lowering the level of military confrontation on an all-European scale, they reaffirm their interest in reducing armaments and armed forces in Central Europe and come out once again for a successful conclusion of the first stage of the Stockholm Conference.

V.

In terms of the assessment of the real intentions of military-political groupings and individual states the question of military doctrines is no less important. The mutual suspicion and distrust accumulated over many years must be dispelled, the two sides must be thoroughly acquainted with each other's problems in

this regard, too. For the sake of European and world security the military concepts and doctrines of military alliances must be of a defensive character.

The Warsaw Treaty member states declare with full responsibility that they will never, under any circumstances, initiate military actions against any state, whether in Europe or in another region of the world, if they themselves are not victims of aggression. Their proposals stem from their consistent policy aimed at the elimination of the military threat, the creation of a stable and secure world, from the defensive character of their military doctrine which presupposes the maintenance of armed forces at the lowest possible level and the reduction of military capabilities to a level indispensable for defence.

The member states of the Warsaw Treaty were guided by the same peaceful intentions when they presented their proposal for the simultaneous dissolution of the two military alliances.

The member states of NATO also profess the defensive nature of their alliance. Consequently there can be no obstacle to the mutual and significant reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

In presenting this appeal, the Warsaw Treaty member states set no preliminary conditions for starting the objective discussion of the proposals contained therein. They are ready to consider, in a creative spirit, other relevant proposals formulated either by the NATO member states, by the neutral and non-aligned or the other states of Europe.

APPENDIX III

*North Atlantic Council statement on conventional arms control**Halifax, 29th-30th May 1986*

Within the alliance, we cherish the ideal that all the peoples of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, should live in peace, freedom and security. To achieve that ideal, bold new steps are required in the field of conventional arms control.

Our objective is the strengthening of stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels.

To work urgently towards the achievement of this objective, we have decided to set up a high level task force on conventional arms control.

It will build on the western proposals at the CDE conference in Stockholm and at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, in both of which participating allied countries are determined to achieve early agreement.

It will take account of Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 18th April expressing, in particular, Soviet readiness to pursue conventional force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals.

An interim report will be presented to the Council in October, and a final report will be discussed at our next meeting in December.

Our aim is a radical improvement in East-West relations in which more confidence, greater openness, and increased security will benefit all.

APPENDIX IV

*North Atlantic Council communiqué**12th December 1986**(Extract concerning arms control and disarmament)*

1. The North Atlantic Council met in ministerial session in Brussels on 11th and 12th December 1986. Ministers agreed as follows:

.....

2. We shall continue to explore all opportunities for a broad and constructive dialogue which addresses the concerns of the peoples of East and West. We reconfirm our commitment to a more co-operative East-West relationship including political dialogue, commercial relations, and cultural exchanges, in which all states participate on equal terms. Respect for human rights and encouragement of human contacts remain essential.

Recent high-level meetings, notably that between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, constitute important milestones in East-West relations.

3. The alliance strategy of deterrence, based on adequate conventional and nuclear defences, has proved its value in safeguarding peace and enabling us to resist intimidation. It remains fully valid. The continuing build-up of Soviet forces underscores that maintaining this effective range of deterrence capabilities must remain a key alliance priority.

4. Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of our security policy. We remain committed to reaching equitable agreements aimed at enhancing stability at lower levels of forces and armaments. They must strengthen security in Europe and must not weaken the link between the European and North American members of the alliance. Effective verification is an essential condition for all such agreements. Real progress on arms control can only be made if a stable overall balance is assured at all times.

5. Following Reykjavik, we support the United States in seeking balanced, equitable and effectively verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. We agree that instead of simply codifying the existing levels of arsenals, agreements in Geneva should seek to achieve substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces in ways that will enhance peace and stability. We therefore welcome the progress at Reykjavik towards agreement on 50% reductions in United States and Soviet strategic offensive forces and towards an agreement on longer-range intermediate nuclear missiles. We fully endorse the

United States' determination to negotiate detailed agreements on this basis as a matter of priority and urge the Soviet Union to join in this effort in Geneva.

Opportunity for progress in some areas, notably in the LRINF negotiations, must not be held hostage to agreements in other unrelated ones. Soviet insistence on doing so would contradict assurances given at the highest level.

On the basis of the December 1979 NATO decision on LRINF modernisation and arms control, the allies concerned fully support the envisaged elimination of American and Soviet land-based LRINF in Europe and the limitation to 100 warheads in Asia and the United States, while their ultimate objective remains the total elimination of all such LRINF. They stress that an INF agreement must not neglect the existing imbalances in shorter-range United States and Soviet INF missiles and must provide for a commitment to follow-on negotiations on these missiles.

We also reviewed the United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on defence and space systems which aim to prevent an arms race in space and strengthen strategic stability. We strongly support these efforts.

In all cases, effective verification would be an essential condition. We will continue to assess and to consult closely on all these issues in the appropriate alliance fora¹.

6. Nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with in isolation. We also look for progress in other areas of arms control, particularly since reductions in nuclear weapons will increase the importance of removing conventional disparities and eliminating chemical weapons. An effective resolution of these issues is an essential requirement for real and enduring stability and security in Europe.

7. At our last session in Halifax we stressed the importance which we attach to conventional arms control and decided to consider all the issues involved in a high-level group. We have approved the first report of this group and have also adopted the Brussels declaration on conventional arms control.

1. Greece recalls its position on nuclear matters and space system issues as expressed during previous NATO ministerial meetings.

8. Those of us participating in MBFR reaffirm our determination to reach early, substantial and verifiable agreement and call upon the East to respond constructively to the western initiative of 5th December 1985. This would, in our view, significantly contribute to the launching of other negotiations, this time extended to Europe as a whole².

9. The continued Soviet build-up of chemical weapons is a matter of great concern, as is the proliferation and use of such weapons. At the Geneva conference on disarmament, we seek a convention which meets our objective, the general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of all existing stock-piles. If the Soviet Union is prepared to take a constructive attitude on all aspects of an effective verification régime, such an agreement is within reach. We appeal to the USSR to join us in overcoming the outstanding obstacles.

10. The Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting is of major importance for the promotion of stable and constructive East-West relations and for the sustained long-term improvement of relations

between all the participating states. We deplore the deficiencies of Warsaw Pact countries in honouring their commitments, particularly in the field of human rights and human contacts. We shall continue to insist on the full implementation of all agreements reached in the CSCE process.

We welcome the results of the Stockholm CDE. The confidence- and security-building measures agreed upon, if fully implemented, will create more transparency and contribute to greater confidence and predictability of military activities in the whole of Europe. The measures thus represent progress in regard to the Helsinki final act and demonstrate the validity of the step-by-step approach defined in the Madrid mandate.

We shall press for a balanced and constructive outcome at Vienna and a strengthening of the CSCE process through improved compliance by the East and progress in all three baskets.

.....

***Brussels declaration on conventional arms control
by ministers at North Atlantic Council session***

12th December 1986

1. At Halifax we agreed on the objective of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. In pursuit of this objective we set up a high-level task force; we have today reviewed its first report. We have instructed it to continue in being and to provide further regular reports to the Council.

2. Arms control should enhance, and not diminish, security in Europe. We reiterate our commitment to the maintenance of an effective and credible deterrent posture. Therefore our approach to arms control will remain consistent with the need, at each step of the negotiating process, to retain the means to implement alliance and national strategies.

3. While maintaining effective deterrence involving both nuclear and conventional forces, we seek to establish a stable relationship of conventional forces in Europe. Reductions in nuclear weapons which are the subject of discussions between the United States and the USSR in Geneva would increase the importance of eliminating conventional disparities.

4. We are therefore ready to open East/West discussions with a view to the establishment of a new mandate for negotiating on conventional arms control covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

5. For such negotiations to succeed, there must be recognition of the facts about the current situation, and a common understanding on philosophy, objectives and methods.

The facts

6. Statements by eastern spokesmen sometimes imply that the present military situation in Europe is stable and balanced. It is not. On the contrary, it is marked by asymmetries and disparities which vary from region to region but which are detrimental to western security and which are a source of potential instability. The relevant factors include:

- the armaments, equipment types, deployments, numbers, mobility and readiness of the armed forces involved;
- the information, predictability and confidence about them;
- considerations of geography.

² Recalling its position on the MBFR negotiations, France has made a reservation on this sentence.

The philosophy

7. Military forces should exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defence, not for the purpose of initiating aggression and not for purposes of political or military intimidation.

The objectives

8. These should be:

- the establishment of a stable and secure level of forces, geared to the elimination of disparities;
- a negotiating process which proceeds step by step, and which guarantees the undiminished security of all concerned at each stage;
- focus on the elimination of the capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of large-scale offensive action;
- further measures to build confidence and to improve openness and calculability about military behaviour;
- the application of the measures involved to the whole of Europe but in a way which takes account of and seeks to redress regional imbalances and to exclude circumvention;

- an effective verification régime (in which detailed exchanges of information and on-site inspection will play a vital part) to ensure compliance with the provisions of any agreement, to guarantee that limitations on force capabilities are not exceeded.

The methods

9. We propose that distinct negotiations take place:

- to build upon and expand the results of the Stockholm conference on confidence- and security-building measures;
- to eliminate existing disparities, from the Atlantic to the Urals, and establish conventional stability at lower levels, between the countries whose forces bear most immediately upon the essential security relationship in Europe, namely those belonging to the alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

10. In the light of the foregoing therefore, we are ready to initiate discussion on enhancing conventional stability in the whole of Europe.

APPENDIX V

Draft directives to the foreign ministers of the USSR and the United States concerning the drafting of agreements on nuclear disarmament

Draft handed to President Reagan by General Secretary Gorbachev at the Reykjavik summit on 11th October 1986 and published subsequently by the Soviet Union

Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and United States President Ronald Reagan, having considered the situation in the field of nuclear arms and having brought the position of the two countries considerably closer together at their working meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, agreed to issue directives to their countries' foreign ministers to prepare the texts of accords and agreements to be signed in Washington during the General Secretary's official visit to the United States on...(date of the visit), which are to be based on the following key provisions:

1. *In the field of strategic arms.* An agreement on a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States, taking into account the historically established specificities of the structures of each side's strategic forces. All types of strategic offensive weapons, including heavy missiles, will be subject to reduction within specified limits. A solution will also be found to the problem of limiting the deployment of sea-based, long-range cruise missiles.

In the course of their negotiations the sides will take into consideration each other's interests and concerns and display the political will to reach agreement on all questions pertaining to the problem of strategic offensive arms.

2. *In the field of medium-range missiles.* An agreement on the complete elimination of Soviet and United States medium-range missiles in Europe, without taking the nuclear potentials of Britain and France into account. Negotiations will be started on the missiles with a range of under 1 000 km deployed by the sides in Europe.

As soon as is practically possible, separate talks will be started on Soviet and American medium-range systems in Asia.

3. *Regarding the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and a ban on nuclear testing.* In order to strengthen the régime

of the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, signed in 1972 for no set limit of time, the Soviet Union and the United States will reach agreement pledging not to use their right to withdraw from this treaty for ten years and to strictly abide by all of its provisions throughout that period. The testing of all space-based elements of anti-ballistic missile defences in space will be prohibited. This would not apply to laboratory research or testing in this field, nor entail a ban on the testing of stationary land-based systems or components thereof allowed by the ABM treaty. In the next few years the sides will seek and find through negotiations further mutually-acceptable solutions in this sphere.

The sides consider it expedient to apply extra efforts to reach mutually-acceptable accords on banning anti-satellite systems.

The bilateral talks (between the Soviet Union and the United States) on the total prohibition of nuclear tests will be resumed as early as is practically possible. The subject of these talks could include questions concerning verification, the lowering of the ceiling on the yield of explosions and a reduction in their number, and the 1974 and 1976 treaties.

The commencement of talks on the issue of banning nuclear explosions will be a condition for the elaboration of an agreement on strategic arms.

*
* *

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President of the United States believe that these accords are a matter of fundamental importance and a turning point in the work to implement the tasks they set themselves in Geneva in 1985, which are: to limit and reduce nuclear arms, to prevent an arms race in space and stop the arms race on earth, and to strengthen strategic stability and universal security.

APPENDIX VI

*Implementation of confidence-building measures**1. Notification of military manœuvres under the CSCE régime by NATO countries*

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manœuvre	Size of manœuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
<i>1975</i>					
September	FRG	Grosse Rochade	68 000	23	-
October	USA	Certain Trek	57 000	34	Yes
Oct/Nov	USA	Reforger 75	53 000	21	-
September	Turkey	Deep Express	18 000	21	-
October	Norway	Batten Bolt	8 000	24	-
Oct/Nov	Netherlands	Pantsersprong	10 000	14	-
<i>1976</i>					
September	FRG	Grosser Bär	50 000	21	Yes
September	USA	Gordian Shield	30 000	21	-
September	USA	Lares Team	44 000	21	Yes
Feb/Mar	Norway	Atlas Express	17 000	21	-
September	Norway	Teamwork	13 500	21	Yes
October	Denmark/FRG	Bonded Item	11 000	21	-
November	Britain	Spearpoint	18 000	23	Yes
<i>1977</i>					
September	USA	Cardon Edge	58 700	21	Yes
September	FRG	Standhafte Schatten	38 000	21	Yes
May	USA	Certain Fighter	24 000	23	-
September	Denmark	Arrow Express	16 000	21	Yes
September	Belgium	Blue Fox	24 500	21	-
Sep/Oct	Netherlands	Interaction	12 000	21	Yes
October	Turkey	Tayfun 77	15 000	30	Yes
<i>1978</i>					
September	FRG	Blaue Donau	46 000	24	Yes
September	USA	Certain Shield	56 000	24	Yes
September	Netherlands	Saxon Drive	32 500	24	Yes
September	FRG	Bold Guard	65 000	24	-
March	Norway	Arctic Express	15 300	30	Yes
September	Norway	Black Bear	8 200	30	-
<i>1979</i>					
Jan/Feb	USA	Certain Sentinal	66 000	25	Yes
September	USA	Constant Enforcer	29 000	21	Yes
September	FRG	Harte Faust	60 000	21	Yes
March	Norway	Cold Winter 79	10 000	30	-
Sep/Oct	Turkey	Display Determination 79	18 000	32	-
October	France	Saone 79	16 000	21	Yes
October	Britain	Keystone	18 000	21	-
<i>1980</i>					
September	FRG	St. Georg	44 000	24	Yes
September	USA	Certain Rampart	40 000	21	Yes
September	Britain	Spearpoint	90 000	24	Yes

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manœuvre	Size of manœuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
March	Norway	Anorak Express 80	18 200	31	-
September	Norway	Teamwork 80	16 800	28	Yes
October	France	Marne 80	17 000	10	-
<i>1981</i>					
September	USA/FRG	Certain Encounter	45 600	24	Yes
September	FRG	Scharfe Klinge	48 000	21	Yes
October	Britain	Red Claymore	23 000	21	-
March	Norway	Cold Winter	11 000	21	-
September	Norway	Barfrost	9 000	21	-
Sep/Oct	Denmark	Amber Express	15 000	21	Yes
October	Belgium/FRG	Cross Fire	21 000	21	-
October	France	Farfadet	4 000*	14	-
<i>1982</i>					
March	Norway	Alloy Express	14 200	30	-
Sep/Oct	Denmark/FRG	Bold Guard 82	47 200	24	Yes
September	USA/FRG	Carbine Fortress 82	73 000	24	Yes
September	FRG	Starke Wehr	35 000	21	Yes
September	France	Langres 82	17 000	4	-
<i>1983</i>					
	Norway	Cold Winter 83	10 000		-
	USA/FRG	Confident Express	> 25 000		Yes
	FRG	Wehrhafte Loewen	> 25 000		Yes
September	FRG/Neth.	Atlantic Lion	> 25 000		Yes
	Britain	Eternal Triangle	> 25 000		-
September	Denmark	Ample Express	> 25 000		-
	France	Moselle 83			-
<i>1984</i>					
<i>A. Major manœuvres</i>					
March	Norway	Avalanche Express	25 000	29	Yes
September	Britain FRG	Lion Heart 84 (Full Flow)	132 000	24	Yes
		<i>plus</i>			
		Spear Point 84			
September	FRG	Flinker Igel	55 000	22	Yes
September	USA/FRG	Certain Fury	50 000	21	Yes
<i>B. Smaller-scale manœuvres</i>					
September	France	Doubs 84	20 000	32	Yes
September	Denmark	Bold Gannet 84	21 000	22	No
<i>1985</i>					
<i>A. Major manœuvres</i>					
January	USA	Central Guardian	72 000	21	Yes
September	Britain	Brave Defender	65 000	28	Yes
September	FRG	Trutzige Sachsen	60 000	21	Yes
<i>B. Smaller-scale manœuvres</i>					
March	Norway	Cold Winter 85	10 000	21	-
June	France	Jourdan	5 000	-	Yes

* To Mediterranean CSCE countries only.

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manoeuvre	Size of manoeuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
<i>1986</i>					
<i>A. Major manoeuvres</i>					
January	USA	Certain Sentinel	73 000	21 (FRG) 28 (USA)	Yes
September	FRG	Fränkischer Schild	58 000	21	Yes
September	NATO	Bold Guard 86	65 000	21	Yes
<i>B. Smaller-scale manoeuvres</i>					
March	NATO	Anchor Express 86	20 000	28	Yes
September	Norway	Blue Fox 86	24 000	21	Yes
September	Norway	Barfrost 86	11 000	45	-

2. Notification of military manœuvres under the CSCE régime by Warsaw Pact countries

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manœuvre	Size of manœuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
<i>1975</i>					
None					
<i>1976</i>					
Jan/Feb	USSR	Kavkaz	25 000	21	Yes
June	USSR	Sever	25 000	21	Yes
April	Hungary	-	10 000	1	-
October	Hungary	-	15 000	0	-
September	Poland	Tarcza 76	35 000	21	Yes
<i>1977</i>					
Mar/Apr	USSR	-	25 000	21	-
July	USSR	Karpatia	27 000	21	Yes
<i>1978</i>					
February	USSR	Berezhina	25 000	21	Yes
July	USSR	Tarcza78	30 000	21	-
September	USSR	Kavkaz II	25 000	21	-
<i>1979</i>					
February	USSR/CSSR	Druzhba	26 000	21	-
April	USSR	-	25 000	21	-
July	USSR	Neman	25 000	21	Yes
mid-May	Hungary	Shield 79	25 000	*	Yes
<i>1980</i>					
July	USSR	-	30 000	21	-
September	GDR	Brotherhood in Arms	40 000	21	-
August	Hungary	Dyna 80	18 000	1	-
<i>1981</i>					
September	USSR	Zapad 81	100 000**	21	Yes***
<i>1982</i>					
January	USSR/CSSR	Druzhba 82	25 000	21	-
September	Bulgaria	Shield 82	60 000	21	-
<i>1983</i>					
January	Hungary	Danube 83	over 20 000	few days	-
June	Hungary	Kunsag 83	14 000	6	-
July	USSR		50 000	21	-
July	USSR		26 000	21	-
September	USSR		23 000	21	Yes
<i>1984</i>					
<i>A. Major manœuvres</i>					
June/July	USSR	-	60 000	22	No
September	CSSR	Shield 84	60 000	21	No
<i>1985</i>					
<i>A. Major manœuvres</i>					
May	-	-	25 000	25 (CSSR) 28 (USSR)	-
July	-	-	25 000	23 (GDR) 22 (USSR)	-
July	USSR	Kavkaz 85 (Caucasus 85)	25 000	21	Yes

* Verbal notifications on 3rd May 1979.

** According to TASS on 5th September 1981.

*** Only from Warsaw Pact countries.

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manoeuvre	Size of manoeuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
<i>1986</i>					
<i>A. Major manoeuvres</i>					
February	USSR	-	50 000	24	-
February	USSR	-	25 000	21	-
September	CSSR	Druzhiba 86 (Friendship 86)	25 000	28	Yes
September	USSR	-	25 000	21	-

3. Notification of military manœuvres under the CSCE régime by neutral and non-aligned countries

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manœuvre	Size of manœuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
<i>1975</i>					
October	Yugoslavia	-	18 000	25	-
November	Switzerland	-	40 000	31	-
<i>1976</i>					
October	Yugoslavia	Golilja	24 000	24	Yes
November	Sweden	Poseidon	12 000	30	-
<i>1977</i>					
March	Sweden	Vönn 77	10 000	21	Yes
October	Spain	Podenco	8 000	53	Yes
November	Austria	Herbstübung	12 000	37	-
<i>1978</i>					
November	Austria	(Command Post Exercise)	5 000	20	-
<i>1979</i>					
March	Switzerland	Nussknacker	34 000	28	Yes
October	Switzerland	Forte	27 000	33	Yes
November	Austria	Area Defence Exercise 79	27 500	45	Yes
<i>1980</i>					
None					
<i>1981</i>					
Oct/Nov	Spain	Crisex 81	32 200	25	Yes
October	Switzerland	Cresta	25 000	33	-
<i>1982</i>					
March	Sweden	Norrskan	23 000	30	Yes
September	Sweden	Sydfront	25 000	30	-
<i>1983</i>					
<i>B. Smaller-scale manœuvres</i>					
September	Yugoslavia	Unity 83	22 000	35	Yes
Sept/Oct	Sweden	Ostkust	20 000	31	No
<i>1984</i>					
			None		
<i>1985</i>					
<i>A. Major manœuvres</i>					
October	Switzerland	Tornado	25 000	42	-
<i>B. Smaller-scale manœuvres</i>					
February/March	Sweden	Västgräns	22 000	42	Yes
<i>1986</i>					
<i>A. Major manœuvres</i>					
October	Austria	Baumverteidigung Herbstübung 1986	30 000	41	Yes
November	Switzerland	Dreizack 1986	40 000	48	Yes

APPENDIX VII

*Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary
of the Central Committee of the CPSU**Moscow, 28th February 1987*

On 15th January 1986, the Soviet Union put forward a historic programme, that of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons. When suggesting it we proceeded from the firm conviction that future security would be a nuclear-free one. The Soviet leadership and the country's defence council, which I am responsible for presiding, constantly keep the problems of the security of the country, that of our allies, and of universal security at the centre of attention. We do not have the slightest doubt that the security of the world and the survival of humanity should be ensured by joint efforts and political means and not by weapons.

..... (7 preliminary paragraphs)

Today, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, I am announcing our decision which is as follows:

The Soviet Union suggests that the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe be singled out from the package of issues, and that a separate agreement on it be concluded, and without delay.

There is actually not just a basis, but an accord ready for such a step. It was agreed in Reykjavik that the Soviet Union and the United States would eliminate all their medium-range missiles (MRM) in Europe within the next five years. Within the same period the number of Soviet MRMs in the Asian part of our territory would be cut down to 100 warheads on the understanding that the United States could leave the same number of MRM warheads in its national territory.

As soon as an agreement on eliminating Soviet and United States medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, the Soviet Union will withdraw from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, by agreement with the governments of those countries, the longer-range theatre missiles which had been deployed there as measures in reply to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

As far as other theatre missiles are concerned, we are prepared to begin talks immediately with a view to reducing and fully eliminating them.

So, there is a real opportunity to free our common European home from a considerable portion of the nuclear burden within the shortest possible time. That would be a real and big step towards completely freeing Europe of nuclear arms. We are putting our proposals on the negotiating table with the United States in Geneva.

We were assured more than once that if the USSR singled out the issue of medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package, there would be no difficulty to agree to their elimination in Europe. A good opportunity is now being offered to prove that in practice. This is being awaited by the Europeans and by the peoples of other continents. This is required by the interests of the present and the future.

By singling out the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe now, the Soviet Government still considers it highly important to reach agreement on substantial limitation and then elimination of strategic arms.

Of course, the conclusion of such an agreement, as has been repeatedly emphasised, should be conditioned by a decision on the prevention of deployment of weapons in outer space, in view of the organic interconnection of these issues.

Despite all the difficulties and artificial obstructions, the Soviet Union is again showing its will to resolve the nuclear disarmament issue.

The new way of thinking means an ability to listen to the voice of the public, the European and world one, to understand the concerns and interests of other peoples, and not to separate one's own security from the security of neighbours in our interconnected world.

The historic chance should not be missed! We are awaiting a speedy and positive reply.

Source: Novosti, London (slightly edited).

*Disarmament –
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Antoni and others

1. At the beginning of paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave out from “Recalling that” to “in this field” and insert: “Emphasising the need to conclude mutually verifiable agreements with a view to eliminating chemical weapons in Europe”.

Signed: Antoni, Gianotti, Rubbi, Francese

1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment fell).

*Disarmament –
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 2 ¹

tabled by Mr. Gianotti and others

2. In paragraph 1, lines 2 and 3, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “ to support the United States ” and insert “ to support active participation by European countries ”.

Signed: Gianotti, Antoni, Rubbi, Francese, Colajanni

1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment not moved).

*Disarmament –
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENTS 3 and 4¹

tabled by Mr. Rubbi and others

3. In paragraph 1 (a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “ combined with the simultaneous withdrawal of shorter-range INF from Czechoslovakia and East Germany; the right for NATO to match Warsaw Pact numbers in such missiles if those negotiations fail ” and insert “ in the context of an undertaking to withdraw immediately the shorter-range INF missiles stationed in Czechoslovakia and East Germany ”.

4. In the last line of paragraph 1 (a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “ reduction of all shorter-range missiles ” and insert “ balanced, verifiable and verified reduction of the other missiles ”.

Signed: Rubbi, Antoni, Giannotti, Colajanni, Francese

1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment 3 not moved; amendment 4 fell).

*Disarmament –
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 5¹

tabled by Mr. Antoni and others

5. At the end of paragraph 2 of the second revised draft recommendation proper add “ thus promoting a new concept of balanced and verified European security linked to the noblest values of a policy of peace and co-operation in the world ”.

Signed: Antoni, Giannotti, Rubbi, Colajanni, Francese

1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment not moved).

*Disarmament –
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 6¹

tabled by Mr. Giannotti and others

6. In paragraph 3 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “ to press the Soviet Union to accept fully the United Kingdom compromise proposal ” and insert “ to combine their efforts to seek an agreement acceptable to all the parties ”.

Signed: Giannotti, Rubbi, Antoni, Francese, Colajanni

1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment not moved).

*Disarmament –
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 7 ¹

tabled by Mr. Antoni and others

7. In paragraph 4 (a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “ Urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States’ proposal ” and insert “ Promote the conclusion of an agreement acceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union ”.

Signed: Antoni, Colajanni, Rubbi, Giannotti, Amadei

1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment not moved).

*Disarmament –
reply to the thirty first annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 8¹

tabled by Mr. Scheer and Mr. Stoffelen

8. In paragraph 1 (a) of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ combined with the simultaneous withdrawal of shorter-range INF ” to the end of the paragraph and insert “ and combined with the following disarmament of all American and Soviet shorter-range INF in Europe; ”

Signed: Scheer, Stoffelen

1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendment negatived).

*Disarmament –
reply to the thirty first annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENTS 9 and 10¹

tabled by Mr. Bassinet and others

9. Leave out paragraph 2 of the second revised draft recommendation proper and insert:
“ Urge governments participating in the informal Vienna consultations to start negotiations as soon as possible in the framework of the CSCE on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals; ”
10. In paragraph 3 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ to accept fully ” to the end of the paragraph and insert “ to accept the French or British chemical disarmament proposals tabled at the Geneva disarmament conference; ”

Signed: Bassinet, Oehler, Lahumière

1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendments withdrawn).

*Disarmament –
reply to the thirty first annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENTS 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20¹

tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson

11. In the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (i) and insert:
“ (i) Recalling that Europe’s security is based on the deterrence exercised by all the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance thanks to their capacity, in spite of Warsaw Pact superiority in many fields, to prevent any potential adversary undertaking an aggression in the hope that the confrontation will remain at a level chosen by him; ”
12. In the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (iv) and insert:
“ (iv) Considering that Western Europe may be compelled in the fairly near future to assume more responsibility for the requirements of its security but that in present circumstances this is ensured only thanks to the presence of American forces and armaments in Europe; ”
13. In paragraph (iv), line 2, of the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, insert after “ matters ”:
“ to elaborate valid concepts for the most urgent disarmament steps and their mutual interdependence which are in the interests of common security ”.
14. In paragraph 4 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b).
15. In paragraph 1 of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (c).
16. In paragraph (v), line 3, of the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation, leave out “ both ” and from “ deterrence ” to end and add:
“ whose security should be stabilised by appropriate and verifiable disarmament measures which are subject to agreement; ”
17. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the second revised draft recommendation and insert:
“ (ix) Recalling in this context that the Soviet Union maintains more conventional forces than it requires for its defence and that their offensive force structures optimised to perform aggressive operations must be perceived as a potential threat to the member countries by the member nations of WEU; ”
18. In paragraph 1 (a), line 5, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out after “ fail ” to the end of the paragraph and add:
“ and make effective progress in the negotiations aiming at greater stability and crisis control in the conventional field (MBFR) and which should take place on the whole of Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural mountains; ”
19. In paragraph 3, line 4, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out after “ inspection ” to the end of the paragraph.
20. In paragraph 2, line 3, of the second revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “ reasonable automatic ” and insert “ regular on-site ”.

Signed: Bennett, Wilkinson

1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (amendments 11 and 12 adopted; amendment 13 fell; amendments 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 adopted).

*Memorandum on the budget of the Assembly
from Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, President of the Assembly,
to Mr. Jacques Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

1. You know the difficulties the Assembly is encountering in fulfilling its tasks with the means now available to it.
2. Following your suggestions at the Assembly's last plenary session, you proposed the implementation of three principles to help to overcome these difficulties:
 - (i) The annual growth rate applicable to the WEU budget as a whole would be that calculated each year by the Commission of the Communities for the European Communities.
 - (ii) Within the limits of the overall budget defined in application of this rate, the Council would recognise the Assembly's budgetary independence.
 - (iii) The annual growth rate would be calculated after deduction of the implications of pensions, these being the subject of a separate budget.
3. I confirm my agreement with these proposals which seem likely in future to avoid the friction regularly caused in recent years when the Assembly's budget was drawn up.
4. It is therefore with the utmost interest that I await the Council's answer so that the Assembly may know as soon as possible the amount of the overall budget, calculated on these new bases, which will be available to it in 1987 to pursue the tasks it has set itself.
5. You can count on my fullest support for the efforts you are making with so much conviction for the greatest benefit of WEU as a whole.

Ministerial meeting of the Council

MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION ¹

*tabled by Mr. Goerens and others
with a request for urgent procedure*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the diplomatic/press offensive of Mikhail Gorbachev, who is multiplying proposals for nuclear disarmament, calls for a co-ordinated response from the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Aware that these proposals, which affect first and foremost European security, should lead to European interests being defined in WEU, the only European organisation with responsibilities in this area;
- (iii) Encouraged by the call to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance by George Shultz, United States Secretary of State, following his recent visit to Moscow, requesting their opinion on these proposals,

URGES THE COUNCIL

1. To make known its collegiate point of view on the Gorbachev proposals through the intermediary of its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, in his statement to the Assembly on Tuesday, 28th April 1987;
2. To instruct its Chairman-in-Office to give the Council's point of view on the Soviet proposals at the meetings of the North Atlantic Council to be held on 11th and 12th June 1987.

Signed: Goerens, Stoffelen, De Decker, Close, Pécriaux, Knight, Schulte, Kittelmann, Antoni, Martino

1. See 2nd sitting, 27th April 1987 (urgent procedure agreed to).

*Application of Order 65 on the draft budget
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987*

REPORT ¹

*tabled on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur*

Draft Recommendation

*on principles applicable in preparing the budgets
of the WEU ministerial organs and the Assembly*

The Assembly,

Fully endorsing the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end to WEU's budgetary difficulties,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Implement without delay the three principles defined by the Chairman-in-Office:

- application to the operating budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of WEU of the growth rate defined in the European Communities;
- establishment of a separate budget for pensions;
- recognition of the Assembly's freedom to manage its budget within the limits of the appropriations thus calculated.

Draft Order

*on the budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987*

The Assembly,

1. APPROVES the action taken by the Presidential Committee in application of Order 65 and the terms of the memorandum of the President of the Assembly dated 12th March 1987;
2. INVITES the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to take the necessary steps to implement, during the present financial year, the provisions decided upon for improving the structure of the Office of the Clerk.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Sinesio (Alternate: Giust), Bohl (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Beysen, Chartron, Declercq, Dhaille (Alternate: Mrs. Lalumière), Enders, Ferrari Aggradi, Freeson (Alternate: Sir Paul Hawkins), Haase, Mrs. Herfkens, MM. Linster, Morris (Alternate: Lord Mackie), Oehler, Mrs. Pack, MM. Pollidoro, Rauti, Stokes, van Tets, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur)

Following the Presidential Committee, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration fully endorsed the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end to the budgetary difficulties standing in the way of the reactivation of WEU as a whole.

The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration considered the Assembly should, in a further order, express its satisfaction with the action taken by the Presidential Committee in application of Order 65 and urge it to pursue its effort jointly with our committee to ensure that this action can be completed during the present financial year.

The committee also considered that the Assembly should, in a recommendation, give its full support to the action taken by Mr. Poos to ensure that WEU has the means to fulfil its mission.

It was in this spirit that the committee unanimously adopted the present report.

*The need for action by the Assembly of Western European Union
to press western governments for action to channel resources
into development needs and away from the arms trade*

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION ¹

tabled by Mr. Freeson and others under Rule 28

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that millions of men, women and children die from starvation and are malnourished throughout the third world, a condition which makes for instability and insecurity;
 - (ii) Noting the links between the arms race, the arms trade and poverty and injustice and their contribution to the conditions of war which threaten Western Europe, whose member states largely provide the armaments in question;
 - (iii) Believing that the WEU parliamentary Assembly has a special responsibility to challenge what our democratically-elected governments and our industries are doing in our names and to press for resources to go into development needs and away from death and destruction;
 - (iv) Noting that military expenditure contributes to the failure to meet social needs both in Europe and in the poor countries of the world; noting that the arms trade is one of the major causes of poverty which also fuels the arms race, making international conflict more likely;
 - (v) Believing that arms production and trading cannot be isolated from but is central to the question of development, both North and South;
 - (vi) Further believing that European countries bear an increasingly important responsibility as they seek to increase their sales of arms worldwide to the detriment of their own people, the third world developing countries and world peace itself,
1. RESOLVES that action must be taken to reverse this trend and to channel resources into the social needs of European countries and worldwide development;
 2. FURTHER RESOLVES to press its member states and others to change their policies in this direction, and
 3. THEREFORE CALLS on its member governments to take urgent steps:
 - (a) drastically to reduce their countries' arms trading, particularly in Africa, South America, the Middle and Far East;
 - (b) to reduce the level of arms production; and
 - (c) to transfer scientific, technical, research and productive resources to development needs in these areas of the world.

Signed: Freeson, Stoffelen, Ahrens, Linster, Büchner, Scheer, Fourré, Bassinet, Miller, Bogaerts, Coleman, Garrett, Hughes, Edwards, Cox, Ross, Brown, Woodall, Hardy, Klejdzinski

1. See 3rd sitting, 28th April 1987 (motion to be referred to the appropriate committee by the Presidential Committee).

*Communiqué issued at the close of the ministerial meeting
of the Council of Western European Union*

Luxembourg, 27th-28th April 1987

1. WEU foreign and defence ministers met in Luxembourg on 28th April 1987. Their discussions continued the process of joint reflection on security matters initiated in 1984. They recalled the importance of the Rome declaration and the communiqués of Bonn in 1985 and Venice in 1986.

2. Ministers stressed the important rôle WEU can play in the development of a European union, an important stage in which was the signature of the single European act. They emphasised the importance of further strengthening the European component of the North Atlantic Alliance. The alliance needs a strong and united Europe which jointly analyses and defines more clearly its security interests. They intend to develop WEU further as a suitable forum to this end. Such a development will also serve the interests of all the allies. The defence of a free Europe is also the defence of North America.

3. Their overriding objective remains to strengthen peace in freedom and to prevent any kind of war or intimidation by military means. They reaffirmed that there is for the foreseeable future no alternative to the western concept for the prevention of war, which must continue to be based on an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces which together provide a credible deterrent against all forms of aggression. They stressed the need to maintain the effectiveness of this strategy through the linkage of Europe's security to that of North America. Recalling the indivisible nature of security in the North Atlantic Treaty area, ministers re-emphasised the essential character of the commitment of the United States and Canada to the defence of Europe. The presence of United States nuclear forces and the presence of United States troops in Europe remain indispensable for the security of the whole alliance.

4. In this context, ministers recalled the importance of the contribution made by the seven member countries of WEU to alliance defence capabilities. They stressed that a strong conventional component is a fundamental prerequisite for an effective defence of Western European territory.

They recalled that five member states provide delivery systems and the facilities for nuclear weapons which remain under United States control. They acknowledged the contribution made by France's and Britain's independent nuclear forces to the western deterrent by increasing the uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor.

5. The considerations stated above remain fully valid in the context of the current evolution in East-West relations.

All aspects of the East-West dialogue affect the security interests of Europe. WEU ministers reiterated their wish to see Western Europe continue to participate actively in the development of this dialogue and to shoulder its responsibilities fully. The member governments of WEU will continue, while retaining strong defences, to strive to develop co-operation and dialogue with Eastern European countries.

6. Ministers underlined their determination to make full use of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna for progress in all fields. In this context, they reaffirmed their commitment to all the provisions of the Helsinki final act and the Madrid concluding document. The balanced application of these provisions is the prerequisite for a more constructive development of East-West relations in all fields, political and military as well as economic and technological, and in the field of human rights and contacts. Each step towards the free movement of individuals and ideas allows progress towards overcoming the division which continues to affect Europe and towards building a stable framework of peace and security in Europe.

7. Arms control and disarmament efforts aimed at effectively verifiable agreements leading to a stable balance of forces at lower levels are an integral part of western security policy. A successful outcome of the current East-West negotiations depends on the continued solidarity between Europe and the United States.

Ministers noted with satisfaction that conditions and prospects for dialogue between East and West on arms control had improved. A recent expression of this improvement was the intensification of the negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the visit of Secretary of State Shultz to Moscow. Ministers expressed the hope that the prospects for progress would be confirmed and would materialise in agreements which would ultimately reduce the hitherto undiminished threat represented by the Soviet military capability.

8. Ministers wished to recall that the basic proposal in the field of land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles was formally presented by the United States as long ago as 1981. If the achievement of an agreement proves possible, this will be as a result of the constructive approach and the steadfastness of the western countries concerned. They underlined that any arms control agreement should meet the fundamental security requirements of the West.

Ministers examined with interest the growing possibility of an agreement aimed at the total elimination of American and Soviet longer-range intermediate land-based nuclear missiles, which should be effectively verifiable. They fully support the United States efforts for its conclusion.

Ministers recalled their serious concern at the existing Soviet superiority in shorter-range intermediate nuclear missiles and the requirement not to neglect this in any INF agreement. In this context, they noted that the Soviet Union had, in response to earlier proposals tabled by the United States, recently made statements on these missiles, the content of which should be carefully studied as soon as they are clarified in writing. They underlined the importance of ongoing consultations with the alliance.

9. Underlining the great importance which they attach to progress also being made in the field of strategic weapons, ministers reiterated their support for United States proposals for a 50% reduction of Soviet and American strategic offensive forces as a matter of priority. As for negotiations on space and defence systems, every effort must be made in Geneva to arrive at agreement on the relationship between United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons and defensive systems with the aim of strengthening strategic stability.

10. Ministers reiterated that reductions in nuclear weapons would increase the importance of removing the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact and eliminating chemical weapons, given the need for a stable balance at all times.

They underlined the need to focus on the problems arising from geostrategic asymmetry and the Warsaw Pact's capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of a large-scale offensive action.

11. Ministers stressed their determination to intensify their efforts to strengthen stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. They recalled the Brussels declaration of 11th December 1986. They expressed their hope that the informal discussions taking place in Vienna in a constructive atmosphere would, within a reasonable time, lead to an agreement allowing the opening of new negotiations on conventional arms control in Europe aimed at eliminating existing disparities.

They recalled at the same time their determination to strive for the continuation of the conference on confidence and security-building measures in Europe.

Only a stable East-West balance of forces at each stage of the arms control process can ensure security in Western Europe.

12. Ministers also underlined their commitment to the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable, global ban on chemical weapons.

13. Ministers stated their resolve to continue their efforts towards the establishment in Europe of the technological and industrial base necessary to ensure the development of a strong and competitive European armaments industry, this being an important aspect of Europe's contribution to defence. In this connection, they reaffirmed the importance they attach to the generation of more, and more systematic, collaboration in the field of conventional armaments.

14. Ministers took note of an interim report on European security interests in the present strategic context. This report was prepared in accordance with the mandate set out at the informal ministerial meeting of the WEU Council in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986.

They mandated the Permanent Council to finalise this report and, on this basis, to establish a common platform for identifying the principles of European security with a view to its examination, possible adoption and publication.

15. Ministers took note of the report prepared by the special working group analysing the politico-strategic implications of the current research programmes on strategic defensive systems. They instructed the special working group to continue to examine the implications of ballistic missile defence within the framework of its reflections on the problems affecting security interests in Western Europe.

16. With regard to the problems of security in the Mediterranean, ministers took note of the draft outline study prepared jointly by France and Italy which, in conformity with their decision of

November 1986, would provide a basis for reflection by a group of experts acting under the authority of the Council.

17. Ministers noted with satisfaction that the reactivation of the organisation, which allowed for a close association of the foreign and defence ministers, had become a reality. They heard a report by the presidency on the reorganisation of the intergovernmental structures of WEU.

They pointed out that the measures still to be taken should be specified by 31st December 1987 and that the possible collocation of the ministerial organs in one capital should also be contemplated. They therefore instructed the Permanent Council to present them with definitive proposals at their autumn meeting

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