



Assembly of Western European Union

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1992

IV

**Minutes
Official Report of Debates**

WEU

PARIS

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Assembly of Western European Union

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THIRTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

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IV

**Minutes
Official Report of Debates**

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The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
CHEVALIER Pierre	SP
KELCHTERMANS Lambert	CVP
KEMPINAIRE André	VLD
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
SARENS Freddy	CVP
SEEUWS Willy	SP

Substitutes

MM. DE DECKER Armand	PRL
GHEQUIÈRE Ferdinand	CVP
LAVERGE Jacques	PVV
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
OTTENBOURGH Yvan	CVP
THISSEN René	PSC
WINTGENS Pierre	PSC

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PUECH Jean	Ind. Rep.
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	PC

Substitutes

MM. ANDRÉ René	RPR
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
DUMONT Jean	Ind. Rep.
Mrs. DURRIEU Josette	Socialist
MM. GAITS Claude	Socialist
de GAULLE Jean	RPR
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LE JEUNE Edouard	UCDP
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
d'ORNANO Paul	RPR
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
ROGER Jean	RDE
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

GERMANY

Representatives

Mr. ANTRETTER Robert	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU

MM. BÜCHLER Hans	SPD
BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MENZEL Bruno	FDP
MEYER zu BENTRUP Reinhard	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TERBORG Margitta	SPD
Mr. VOGEL Friedrich	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

MM. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. JUNGHANNS Ulrich	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
LUMMER Heinrich	CDU/CSU
MAASS Erich	CDU/CSU
MARTEN Günter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. MASCHER Ulrike	SPD
MM. MATSCHIE Christoph	SPD
MICHELS Meinolf	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
PROBST Albert	CDU/CSU
REIMANN Manfred	SPD
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHLUCKEBIER Günter	SPD
Mrs. von TEICHMAN Cornelia	FDP
Mr. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGNELLI Arduino	Socialist
ANDREOTTI Giulio	Chr. Dem.
BENVENUTI Roberto	PDS
BOSCO Rinaldo	Northern League
COLOMBO Vittorio	Chr. Dem.
DE CAROLIS Stelio	PRI
FERRARINI Giulio	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
LECCISI Pino	Chr. Dem.
MANISCO Lucio	Ref. Com.
MANNINO Calogero	Chr. Dem.
MARONI Roberto	Northern League
PAIRE Giacomo	PLI
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLO Ugo	PDS
PIZZO Pietro	Socialist
RODOTA Stefano	PDS
TATARELLA Giuseppe	PDS

Substitutes

MM. BATTISTUZZI Paolo	PLI
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
CALDORO Stefano	Socialist
CICCIOMESSERE Roberto	Radical
COVI Giorgio	PRI
DE PAOLI Paolo	PSDI
FAVA Claudio	Rete
FERRARI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
GOTTARDO Settimo	Chr. Dem.
GUZZETTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
LECCESE Vito	Verdi

MM. LIBERATORI Vittorio MESORACA Maurizio POZZO Cesare RUBNER Hans SPERONI Francesco TRABACCHINI Quarto VINCI Luigi	Socialist PDS MSI SVP Northern League PDS Ref. Com.	SPAIN Representatives	
LUXEMBOURG Representatives		MM. ALVAREZ Francisco BORDERAS Augusto CUCO Alfons DIAZ Lorenzo FABRA Juan Manuel HOMS I FERRET Francesc LOPEZ HENARES José Luis MARTINEZ Miguel Angel MOYA Pedro PERINAT Luis Guillermo de PUIG Lluis Maria ROMAN Rafael	People's Party Socialist Socialist Soc. and Dem. Centre People's Party C.i.U. People's Party Socialist Socialist People's Party Socialist Socialist
Mrs. ERR Lydie Mr. GOERENS Charles Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle	Soc. Workers Dem. Soc. Chr.	 Substitutes	
Substitutes		MM. BARRIONUEVO José BOLINAGA Imanol DIAZ DE MERA Agustin Mrs. FRIAS Milagros MM. GARCIA SANCHEZ Daniel GONZALEZ-LAXE Fernando Mrs. GUIRADO Ana MM. LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO Santiago NÚÑEZ Manuel PALACIOS Marcelo RODRIGUEZ GOMEZ Jaime VAZQUEZ Narcis	Socialist Basque Nat. People's Party Socialist Socialist Socialist Socialist People's Party Socialist Socialist People's Party United Left
MM. DIMMER Camille KONEN René REGENWETTER Jean	Soc. Chr. Dem. Soc. Workers	UNITED KINGDOM Representatives	
NETHERLANDS Representatives		MM. ATKINSON David BANKS Tony COX Thomas Earl of DUNDEE Dame Peggy FENNER Lord FINSBERG MM. HARDY Peter JESSEL Toby Sir Russell JOHNSTON Lord KIRKHILL MM. LITHERLAND Robert RATHBONE Tim REDMOND Martin Sir Dudley SMITH Sir Keith SPEED Sir Donald THOMPSON MM. THOMPSON John WARD John	Conservative Labour Labour Conservative Conservative Conservative Labour Conservative SLD Labour Labour Conservative Labour Labour Conservative Conservative Conservative Labour Conservative
MM. AARTS Harry Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob EISMA Doeke STOFFELEN Pieter van VELZEN Wim VERBEEK Jan Willem	CDA Labour CDA D66 Labour CDA VVD	 Substitutes	
Substitutes		MM. ALEXANDER Richard BOWDEN Andrew CUMMINGS John CUNLIFFE Lawrence DAVIS Terry DUNNACHIE Jimmy Sir Anthony DURANT Mr. FRY Peter Dr. GODMAN Norman Baroness HOOPER MM. HOWELL Ralph HUGHES Roy Sir John HUNT Baroness LOCKWOOD Lord MACKIE of BENSHE Mr. MARSHALL Jim Lord NEWALL Mr. TOWNEND John	Conservative Conservative Labour Labour Labour Labour Conservative Conservative SLD Labour Conservative Labour Labour Conservative Conservative
MM. DEES Dick EVERSDIJK Huib JURGENS E.C.M. van der LINDEN René Mrs. SOUTENDIJK van APPELDOORN Marian H.J. Mr. TUMMERS Nicolas Mrs. VERSPAGET Josephine	VVD CDA Labour CDA CDA Labour Labour		
PORTUGAL Representatives			
MM. AMARAL Fernando BRITO Raul Fernando CANDAL Carlos FERNANDES MARQUES Joaquim MACHETTE Rui Manuel PINTO Carlos ROSETA Pedro	Soc. Dem. Socialist Socialist Soc. Dem. Soc. Dem. Soc. Dem. Soc. Dem.		
Substitutes			
Mrs. AGUIAR Maria Manuela MM. ALEGRE Manuel CURTO Abilio Aleixo MARTINS Alberto de Sousa ROÇAS SANTOS João Alvaro REIS LEITE José Guilherme RODRIGUES Miguel Urbano	Soc. Dem. Socialist Socialist Socialist Soc. Dem. Soc. Dem. PCP		

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 30th November 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (*Presentation of the first part of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council*, Doc. 1343); Address by Mr. Colombo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
5. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (Doc. 1321).
6. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1346).
7. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council: Part One: European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1342, Part One).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The President declared the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Tribute to a former President of the Assembly

The President notified the Assembly of the death of Lord Muirshiel, the first President of the Assembly.

The Assembly paid tribute to his memory in observing a minute's silence.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 8 had been ratified by that Assembly.

5. Observers

The President welcomed the observers from Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Greece,

Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council

(Presentation of the first part of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1343)

Address by Mr. Colombo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

Mr. Colombo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Colombo answered questions put by MM. Stoffelen, Hardy, Lord Finsberg, MM. Fry, Ward, van Velzen and Marten.

8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 1321)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business.

On the proposal of Mr. Stoffelen, on behalf of the Political Committee, the Assembly agreed to remove from the draft order of business the

report of the Political Committee on the enlargement of WEU, Document 1340.

The President proposed a consequential change in the draft order of business, namely that, for the morning sitting on 1st December 1992, the debate on the report of the Political Committee on Turkey begin immediately after the election of the Clerk of the Assembly and be interrupted at 11.30 a.m. for the address by Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.

The proposal was agreed to.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Goerens.

The draft order of business for the second part of the session, as amended, was adopted.

9. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 40 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

Standing Committee

France

- Mr. Puech as a titular member.

Defence Committee

Italy

- MM. De Carolis, Ferrarini, Leccisi and Mannino as titular members; MM. Caccia, Cicciolessere, Fava and Paire as alternate members;

United Kingdom

- Mr. Hardy as a titular member; MM. Dunnachie and Thompson as alternate members.

Political Committee

France

- Mr. d'Ornano as a titular member;

Italy

- MM. Agnelli, Andreotti, Benvenuti and Maroni as titular members; MM. Caldoro, Ferrari, Gottardo and Leccese as alternate members;

Spain

- Mr. Rodriguez Gomez as an alternate member;

United Kingdom

- Mr. Bowden as a titular member; Sir Anthony Durant, Dr. Godman, Mr. Marshall and Sir Keith Speed as alternate members.

Technological and Aerospace Committee

France

- Mr. Dumont as an alternate member;

Italy

- MM. Bosco, Gottardo, Guzzetti and De Paoli as titular members; MM. Caccia, Leccisi and Liberatori as alternate members;

United Kingdom

- Mr. Davis as a titular member; MM. Alexander and Cunliffe as alternate members.

Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

France

- Mrs. Durrieu as a titular member; Mr. Puech as an alternate member;

Italy

- MM. Covi, Manisco, Pizzo and Tatarella as titular members; MM. Maroni and Vinci as alternate members;

United Kingdom

- Mr. Howell as a titular member; MM. Cummings and Dunnachie as alternate members.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

France

- MM. Dumont and Le Jeune as titular members;

Italy

- MM. Battistuzzi, Leccese, Pozzo and Trabacchini as titular members; MM. Ferrarini, Foschi, Speroni and Vinci as alternate members;

Spain

- Mr. Rodriguez Gomez as an alternate member;

United Kingdom

- Mr. Hughes as a titular member; Mr. Dunnachie, Dr. Godman and Mr. Townend as alternate members.

*Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations*

France

- Mr. Le Jeune as an alternate member;

Italy

- MM. Caldoro, Colombo, Rodotà and Speroni as titular members; MM. Paire, Pizzo, Pozzo and Trabacchini as alternate members;

United Kingdom

- Dr. Godman as a titular member; MM. Cummings, Fry and Baroness Lockwood as alternate members.

10. Action by the Presidential Committee

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1346)*

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Caro and Liapis (*Observer from Greece*).

The debate was closed.

The Assembly ratified the action of the Presidential Committee.

11. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:

***Part One: European Union, WEU
and the consequences of Maastricht***

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Political Committee
and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1342, Part One)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Marshall, Müller, Antretter, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Soysal (*Observer from Turkey*), de Puig, Vazquez, Colombo, Caro and Liapis (*Observer from Greece*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 526)¹.

12. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 1st December 1992, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.50 p.m.

¹. See page 16.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Bosco Colombo De Carolis Ferrarini Foschi Leccisi <i>Liberatori</i> (Manisco) Mannino <i>Ferrari</i> (Maroni) Paire Parisi <i>Mesoraca</i> (Pecchioli) Pizzo Tatarella <i>Trabacchini</i> (Rodotà)	MM. <i>Poças Santos</i> (Machete) <i>Rodrigues</i> (Pinto) Roseta
MM. Biefnot <i>De Decker</i> (Chevalier) Kelchtermans Pécriaux <i>Wintgens</i> (Sarens) Seeuws		Spain
France		MM. Borderas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
MM. Caro Jeambrun Valleix		
Germany	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
MM. Antretter <i>Lummer</i> (Böhm) <i>Feldmann</i> (Holtz) Irmer <i>Junghanns</i> (Meyer zu Bentrup) Müller Reddemann <i>Marten</i> (von Schmude) Sprung Steiner Vogel	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	MM. Atkinson <i>Davis</i> (Banks) <i>Cunliffe</i> (Cox) <i>Fry</i> (Earl of Dundee) Dame Peggy Fenner Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Jessel) Sir Russell Johnston Lord Kirkhill MM. Litherland <i>Marshall</i> (Redmond) Sir Dudley Smith Sir Keith Speed Sir <i>Anthony Durant</i> (Sir Donald Thompson) MM. <i>Dunnachie</i> (Thompson) Ward
	Netherlands	
	Mr. Aarts Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. Stoffelen van Velzen Verbeek	
	Portugal	
Italy	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Amaral) MM. Brito <i>Curto</i> (Candal) Fernandes Marques	
MM. Agnelli Andreotti Benvenuti		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Oehler Puech Seitlinger Vial-Massat	Netherlands
Mr. Kempinaire		MM. De Hoop Scheffer Eisma
France	Germany	Spain
MM. Alloncle Bassinot Baumel Beix Durand Forni Fourré Galley Gouteyron Jung Masseret	Mrs. Blunck MM. Büchler Bühler Kittelmann Menzel Mrs. Terborg	MM. Alvarez Homs I Ferret
	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
	Mrs. Err	Mr. Rathbone

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 526

*on European security policy –
reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:
European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht*

I

The Assembly,

1. Is resolutely in favour of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by all signatory countries;
2. Considers the modified Brussels Treaty to be the only treaty providing the foundations for truly European solidarity in defence matters and, as such, the inevitable basis of a European Union in this area;
3. Recalls its Recommendations 490 and 504 urging the Council to revise the treaty to adapt it to the new situation in Europe without weakening the commitments it includes;
4. Notes that the Maastricht Treaty recognises this fact and specifies that WEU is part of the process of European Union;
5. Believes that, for WEU to assume the rôle attributed to it by Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty and by the Maastricht Treaty, it is essential for the modified Brussels Treaty to continue to be strictly applied;
6. Notes that the Council is apparently using various means to diminish the importance and juridical significance of the treaty, to circumvent its provisions and to weaken its political significance, e.g. by:
 - (i) feigning to ignore the way the responsibilities of WEU under Articles I, II and III of the modified Brussels Treaty, the exercise of which has been entrusted to other organisations, are effectively carried out, as can be seen from paragraph 4 of the reply to Recommendation 517, while paragraph 3 of the answer to Written Questions 302 and 303 recognises the Assembly's responsibility for "any matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty";
 - (ii) not reaching agreement with NATO to avoid duplication of work, as required by Article IV, as it emerges from the parallel decisions taken by NATO and WEU on the naval deployment to enforce the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro decided by the Security Council and on the deployment of armed forces from member countries to escort humanitarian assistance for Bosnia-Herzegovina;
 - (iii) introducing in the Petersberg Declaration a reservation that seems to be of general significance relating to the application of Article V;
 - (iv) wrongly taking Article VII as a basis for justifying this reservation, as it does in its answer to Written Question 301;
 - (v) making no reference, in the second part of its thirty-seventh annual report, to the Agency for the Control of Armaments, a subsidiary body of the Council in accordance with Article VIII;
 - (vi) thereby violating Article IX;
 - (vii) limiting the significance of this article by:
 - (a) not communicating to the Assembly important documents on its activities;
 - (b) providing for the implementation of the Petersberg Declaration in regard to the enlargement of WEU and the creation of the status of associate member and of observer without the Assembly having been able to discuss the matter;
 - (viii) not applying the provisions of Article XI to states that it is inviting to become associate members of WEU;
 - (ix) insisting on an arbitrary interpretation of Article XII and not following up paragraph 21 of Recommendation 517 which states that the Assembly considers that the period of fifty years ran from 1954 and where the Assembly invites the Council of Ministers to submit this issue to independent arbitration;

7. Considers that, by acting in this way, the Council, far from preparing the establishment of a European Union with clearly specified competences and responsibilities, is apparently weakening such a prospect.

IT RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Report effectively to the Assembly on every aspect of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even in cases where the responsibilities attributed to it by the treaty are exercised in other fora as it has undertaken to do on several occasions;
2. Seek an understanding with NATO to avoid duplication, while leaving WEU the possibility of exercising fully the responsibilities assigned to it by Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;
3. Proceed to no modification in the scope of the modified Brussels Treaty by any process other than international agreements subject to ratification;
4. Report in its annual report on the application of Protocols Nos. II, III and IV;
5. Provide the Assembly in time with all the information it needs to exercise the mandate assigned to it by Article IX, inter alia by:
 - answering without delay Written Question 305 asking the Council to communicate its organogram to the Assembly;
 - reversing its refusal to answer Written Question 304 asking for details of the results of the operations of the naval force co-ordinated by WEU in the Adriatic;
 - communicating:
 - the report on practical measures necessary for the development of close working relationships with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;
 - the proposals of the Permanent Council for promoting co-operation between the respective secretariats of those organisations;
 - its report on the mandate of the WEU planning cell;
 - its report on the possible tasks of WEU forces;
 - its report on co-operation in armaments matters;
 - its report on current WEU activities in space matters;
 - its report on current WEU activities in regard to the verification of arms control agreements and implementation of the Open Skies Treaty;
 - its report on the activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group;
6. Follow up paragraph 21 of Recommendation 517 according to which:

“Noting that the Assembly believes that the period of fifty years laid down in Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty starts from the ratification of the 1954 Agreements while the Council considers the starting date is 1948,

THE ASSEMBLY STRONGLY URGES

That the issue be referred to a group of independent European legal experts for arbitration.”

II

The Assembly,

- (i) Considers that the European Union has a vocation to associate all Central European countries;
- (ii) Welcomes the fact that the Council, after the Assembly, has started to examine with those countries the conditions for a collective security organisation in Europe;
- (iii) Notes that the information it has received concerning requests from some of those countries about their approaches to the Council do not correspond to the information it receives from the Council;

(iv) Considers that the rapprochement between the Central European countries and the European Union means that they must henceforth base their relations on the principles governing relations between the member countries of WEU.

IT RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Develop its exchanges with the CSCE with a view to making a more effective contribution to maintaining peace in Europe;
2. Offer the Central European countries any technical assistance they may request, in particular to allow them to play a better part in operations to verify all the disarmament or arms limitation agreements they may have signed;
3. Respond favourably to the requests some of those countries have made so as to improve the restoration of confidence and maintenance of peace in Central Europe;
4. Arrange for requests sent to the Chairmanship-in-Office to reach the Council and be the subject of real consultations;
5. Urge the Governments of Hungary and Slovakia to submit the dispute between them to conciliation procedure similar to that provided for in Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty.

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 1st December 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Election of the Clerk (Doc. 1347).
2. Turkey (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.
4. Turkey (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Change in the order of business

The President proposed a change in the order of business for Wednesday, 2nd December 1992.

The proposal was agreed to.

4. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly

(Doc. 1347)

The President informed the Assembly that the Presidential Committee proposed, in alphabetical order, the names of Mr. Burgelin and Mr. Cameron as candidates for the post of Clerk of the Assembly, and that a majority of the committee had expressed a preference for the election of Mr. Burgelin.

MM. Péciaux and Litherland were chosen by lot to be tellers.

The Assembly proceeded to the election of the Clerk of the Assembly by secret ballot by roll-call at the tribune.

5. Turkey

(*Presentation of the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments*)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Moya, Rapporteur.

6. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly

(Doc. 1347)

The result of the ballot was declared as follows:

Number of representatives voting: 96
Number of blank or spoiled ballot papers: 1
Number of valid votes cast: 95
Absolute majority required: 48

Mr. Burgelin: 50
Mr. Cameron: 45

Mr. Burgelin, having the majority of the votes cast, was declared elected.

7. Solemn declaration of the Clerk-elect before the Assembly

The President asked the Clerk-elect to make his solemn declaration before the Assembly.

The Clerk-elect made his solemn declaration before the Assembly.

8. Turkey

(*Debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments*)

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Müller, Cuco, Barrionuevo, de Puig, Borderas, Zierer and Miss Özver (*Observer from Turkey*).

The debate was adjourned.

9. Address by Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom

Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Rifkind answered questions put by Mr. Cox, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Hardy, Lopez Henares, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. van Velzen, Lord Finsberg, Mr. De Carolis, Sir Keith Speed and Mr. Andreotti.

10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal) Fernandes Marques <i>Poças Santos</i> (Machete) Pinto Roseta
MM. Biefnot <i>Laverge</i> (Chevalier) Kelchtermans Kempinaire Péciaux <i>De Decker</i> (Sarens) Seeuws	MM. Agnelli Andreotti Benvenuti Bosco Colombo De Carolis Ferrarini Foschi Leccisi <i>Vinci</i> (Manisco) Mannino <i>Guzzetti</i> (Maroni) Paire Parisi <i>Mesoraca</i> (Pecchioli) Pizzo <i>Gottardo</i> (Rodotà) <i>Pozzo</i> (Tatarella)	Spain MM. <i>Gonzalez-Laxe</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Cuco <i>Nuñez</i> (Diaz) Fabra <i>Bolinaga</i> (Homs I Ferret) Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
France		
MM. Alloncle <i>Le Jeune</i> (Beix) Caro Durand <i>Worms</i> (Forni) Fourré <i>d'Ornano</i> (Galley) Jeambrun Jung Masseret <i>Dumont</i> (Puech) Valleix <i>Lagorce</i> (Vial-Massat)	Luxembourg Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	United Kingdom Lord <i>Newall</i> (Atkinson) MM. <i>Davis</i> (Banks) Cox Earl of Dundee Baroness <i>Hooper</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Jessel) Sir Russell Johnston MM. <i>Dunnachie</i> (Lord Kirkhill) Litherland <i>Fry</i> (Rathbone) <i>Marshall</i> (Redmond) Sir Dudley Smith Sir Keith Speed Sir <i>Anthony Durant</i> (Sir Donald Thompson) MM. Thompson Ward
Germany	Netherlands	
MM. Antretter <i>Zierer</i> (Böhm) Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler) MM. <i>Pfuhl</i> (Holtz) <i>Feldmann</i> (Irmer) <i>Maass</i> (Kittelmann) <i>Junghanns</i> (Meyer zu Bentrup) Müller Reddemann <i>Marten</i> (von Schmude) Sprung Steiner <i>Lenzer</i> (Vogel)	Mr. Aarts Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. <i>van der Linden</i> (De Hoop Scheffer) <i>Dees</i> (Eisma) Stoffelen van Velzen Verbeek	
	Portugal	
	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Amaral) Mr. Brito	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Germany
MM. Bassinet Baumel Gouteyron Oehler Seitlinger	Mrs. Blunck MM. Büchler Menzel Mrs. Terborg

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 1st December 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Melescanu, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania. *debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1336 and amendment).*
2. Turkey (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments).*
3. Defence: Central Europe in evolution (*Presentation of and*
4. Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1333).*

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.25 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Melescanu, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania

Mr. Melescanu, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Melescanu answered questions put by MM. Cox, Hardy, Perinat, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Pécriaux, Reddemann, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Agnelli and Mrs. Verspaget.

4. Turkey

(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: Sir Dudley Smith and Mr. Liapis (*Observer from Greece*).

Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Pahtas (*Observer from Greece*), Agnelli, Bosco and Slatinski (*Observer from Bulgaria*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Moya, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Amendments 1 and 3 were tabled by Mr. Speroni and Mr. Bosco:

1. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Concerned about the repression of the Kurdish people living in Turkey;”

3. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Establish as a condition for the accession of Turkey recognition of the Kurdish people’s right to self-determination in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki declaration.”

Speaker: Mr. Bosco.

The amendments were withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Speroni and Mr. Bosco:

2. After paragraph (x) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Wishing the rights of the Kurdish people to be recognised by peaceful, democratic means;”

Speakers: MM. Bosco and Moya.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 527) ¹.

5. Defence: Central Europe in evolution

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1336 and amendment)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Caro, Hardy, Vacaru (*Observer from Romania*), Rockenbauer (*Observer from Hungary*), Iwinski (*Observer from Poland*), and Philipov (*Observer from Bulgaria*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Cox, Rapporteur, and Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy and others:

1. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Ensure that both WEU member states and Central European states develop effective arrangements to prevent the export of military equipment to those countries and groups which pursue policies of militant nationalism or of aggressive intention.”

Speakers: MM. Péciaux and Cox.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 528) ².

Speakers (points of order): MM. Hardy, Goerens, Tummers and Hardy.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 2nd December 1992, at 9.15 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.

1. See page 25.

2. See page 26.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Caccia</i> (Maroni) Paire Parisi <i>Mesoraca</i> (Pecchioli) Pizzo <i>Trabacchini</i> (Rodotà) Tatarella	MM. Fernandes Marques <i>Rodrigues</i> (Machete) Pinto
MM. Biefnot Pécriaux		Spain
France	Luxembourg	MM. Borderas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
MM. Caro <i>Koehl</i> (Durand) Mrs. <i>Durrieu</i> (Masseret) Mr. Puech	MM. <i>Regenwetter</i> (Mrs. Err) Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	
Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
MM. Antretter <i>Zierer</i> (Böhm) Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler) MM. Müller Reddemann	Mr. Aarts Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman Mr. De Hoop Scheffer Mrs. <i>Verspaget</i> (Eisma) MM. Stoffelen van Velzen <i>Tummers</i> (Verbeek)	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Atkinson) MM. <i>Hughes</i> (Banks) Cox Earl of Dundee Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Jessel) Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Mr. <i>Fry</i> (Rathbone) Dr. <i>Godman</i> (Redmond) Sir Dudley Smith Sir Keith Speed Baroness <i>Hooper</i> (Ward)
Italy	Portugal	
MM. Agnelli Andreotti Benvenuti Bosco Colombo De Carolis Ferrarini Leccisi <i>Liberatori</i> (Manisco)	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Amaral) MM. Brito <i>Curto</i> (Candal)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Oehler Seitlinger Valleix Vial-Massat	Italy
MM. Chevalier Kelchtermans Kempinaire Sarens Seeuws		MM. Foschi Mannino
France	Germany	Portugal
MM. Alloncle Bassinot Baumel Beix Forni Fourré Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung	Mrs. Blunck MM. Büchler Holtz Irmer Kittelmann Menzel Meyer zu Bentrup von Schmude Sprung Steiner Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	Mr. Roseta
		Spain
		MM. Alvarez Homs I Ferret
		United Kingdom
		Dame Peggy Fenner Lord Kirkhill Mr. Litherland Sir Donald Thompson Mr. Thompson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 527**on Turkey**

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming Turkey's associate membership of WEU, while looking forward to close co-operation in the framework of the association document;
- (ii) Recalling Turkey's most loyal membership of NATO and its vital contribution to security in Europe during the many years of East-West confrontation;
- (iii) Aware of Turkey's important geostrategic position which has changed to some extent but whose interest has remained undiminished since the end of the cold war;
- (iv) Stressing the importance of Turkey's participation in debates on Europe's future security in the framework of WEU;
- (v) Concerned about the volatile situation in the newly independent republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia where political instability and ethnic strife seem to dominate the agenda;
- (vi) Noting that Turkey, which has historic, cultural, linguistic and religious affinities with the populations of many of these new republics, can serve as a model for their gradual development into modern states based on democratic government and a market economy;
- (vii) Aware of the specific contribution which Turkey can make in concerted efforts to bring about stable inter-ethnic and international relations in the Balkans;
- (viii) Recalling the report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the situation of human rights in Turkey (Document 6553) and Resolution 985 of that Assembly;
- (ix) Concerned about the mounting violence in south-eastern Anatolia which stands in the way of a balanced policy towards the Kurdish population in that area as announced by the Turkish Government;
- (x) Condemning all forms of terrorism, even if it is used as a means of attaining political objectives;
- (xi) Recalling paragraph 10 of the Council of WEU's Venice communiqué on 30th April 1986, which stated that " They gave special attention to the threat to security posed by international terrorism and underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries of Western Europe have agreed upon to combat this scourge. " ;
- (xii) Convinced that Greece and Turkey, which both wish to be well-respected members of the community of civilised European states and to participate in WEU, cannot afford to continue to harbour differences over many issues which could be solved if approached in a positive manner,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Afford active encouragement to Turkey in the establishment of close relations with the newly independent republics in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, in particular in activities which may help to prevent or solve conflicts in those regions;
2. Be certain to involve Turkey in all its consultations and initiatives regarding the Balkan crisis;
3. Establish close co-operation with Turkey in containing the threat to security posed by international terrorism;
4. Make every effort to promote a solution to existing differences between Greece and Turkey in order to prevent such differences being a strain on security discussions in WEU, particularly taking into account Section A of Part III of the Petersberg Declaration which refers to the settlement of mutual differences by peaceful means, among others in accordance with Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty;
5. Endeavour, as matters now stand, to give Turkey guarantees allowing it to participate at the highest possible level in the tasks and missions of WEU, account being taken of its status of associate member as contained in the document on associate membership signed in Rome on 20th November 1992.

RECOMMENDATION 528***on defence: Central Europe in evolution***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming progress made in establishing a formal relationship between WEU and the states of Central Europe;
- (ii) Welcoming the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers together with the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Central European states on 19th June 1992;
- (iii) Welcoming the declaration agreed at the same meeting and aiming "to strengthen existing relations between WEU and the Central European states by structuring the dialogue, consultations and co-operation";
- (iv) Welcoming the Council's largely positive replies on those aspects of relations with the Central European states stressed in Recommendations 518 and 524;
- (v) Welcoming the various initiatives taken under the aegis of the WEU Institute for Security Studies to deepen the discussion with the Central European states;
- (vi) Determined to maintain the momentum of its own relationship with the governments and parliaments concerned;
- (vii) Recalling Recommendation 510 on "Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland" and extending the recommendations to include reference also to Bulgaria and Romania,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Fulfil the expectations of the Central European states by regular and relevant dialogue and timely discussion of current issues;
2. Follow closely possible moves in the European Community to create the new status of "affiliate member" which could have implications for the formal relationship between the Central European states and WEU;
3. Include the Central European states in appropriate seminars to provide an opportunity for debate on subjects of mutual interest, such as national service and conscription;
4. Invite the Central European states to observe the exercises to be co-ordinated by the WEU planning cell;
5. Encourage member states as appropriate to develop relations with the Central European states in the realms of:
 - higher staff training;
 - budgetary management;
 - procurement (especially for air defence);
 - personnel exchanges;
 - language training;
 - military survey and mapping;
 - command and control (C²) and identification friend or foe (IFF) systems;
6. Explore ways in which the Central European states might be associated with the development of a European armaments agency;
7. Seek the opinions of the Central European states on matters scheduled for discussion in the CSCE and NACC and wherever possible co-ordinate positions;
8. Institute regular meetings of the "Seventeen" in the context of the Vienna Forum for Security Co-operation;
9. Ensure that accounts of consultations with the Central European states at ministerial and WEU Permanent Council/Ambassador level and meetings of senior officials or seminars organised by the Institute for Security Studies are included in the annual report to the Assembly;
10. Establish information points in the capitals of the Central European states, by using the good offices of the embassies of WEU members;
11. Ensure that both WEU member states and Central European states develop effective arrangements to prevent the export of military equipment to those countries and groups which pursue policies of militant nationalism or of aggressive intention.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 2nd December 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1333*).
2. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council: Part Two: Europe and the

crises in former Yugoslavia; WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1342 Part Two, 1337, and 1337 supplementary draft recommendation and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.20 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Organisation of debates

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy.

4. Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1333)

The report of the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Nuñez, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Antretter, Mrs. Frias, MM. Godman, Hughes and Paasio (*Observer from Finland*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Nuñez, Rapporteur, and Mr. Tummers, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to. (This resolution will be published as No. 85) ¹.

5. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:

Part Two: Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia

WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1342 Part Two, 1337, and 1337 supplementary draft recommendation and amendments).

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur.

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. Marten, Rapporteur.

The joint debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Steiner, Lord Mackie of Benshie (point of order), MM. Rodrigues, Pini (*Observer from Switzerland*) and de Puig.

Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Vazquez, Andreotti, Verivakis (*Observer from Greece*), Lord Finsberg, Mr. Iwinski (*Observer from Poland*), Sir Keith Speed, MM. Pahtas (*Observer from Greece*), Fry, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. De Hoop Scheffer, Ferrari, Mrs. Fischer, MM. Agnelli, König (*Observer from Austria*), Mrs. Err and Mr. Slatinski (*Observer from Bulgaria*).

¹. See page 30.

The joint debate was closed.

Mr. Marten, Rapporteur of the Defence Committee, Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Political Committee, and Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Defence Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1342, Part Two.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 529)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1337.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 530)².

The Assembly proceeded to consider the supplementary draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. De Decker, Lord Mackie of Benshie and others:

2. After paragraph 4 of the supplementary draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Take measures for and announce sanctions to be taken by member states against shipping companies and airlines guilty of violating the embargo decreed by the United Nations. ”

Speakers: MM. De Decker and Andreotti.

An amendment to Amendment 2 was moved by Mr. Pécriaux to leave out “ shipping companies and airlines ” and insert “ all sea or air transport operators ” .

Speakers: Mr. Pécriaux and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The amended amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. De Decker, Lord Mackie of Benshie and others:

1. After paragraph 4 of the supplementary draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Study plans for a European military operation to relieve the region of Sarajevo, liberate the prison camps and put an end to the policy of occupation and ethnic cleansing pursued by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. ”

Speakers: Mr. De Decker and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 531)³.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day, at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.

1. See page 31.

2. See page 32.

3. See page 34.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Vinci</i> (Manisco)	Spain
MM. Kempinaire	Mannino	MM. Alvarez
Péciaux	<i>Caccia</i> (Maroni)	Borderas
<i>De Decker</i> (Sarens)	Paire	Cuco
	Parisi	Diaz
	<i>Mesoraca</i> (Pecchioli)	Fabra
France	Pizzo	<i>Bolinaga</i> (Homs I Ferret)
MM. Baumel	<i>Gottardo</i> (Rodotà)	Lopez Henares
<i>Pistre</i> (Beix)	<i>Trabacchini</i> (Tatarella)	Martinez
Durand		Moya
<i>Gaits</i> (Forni)	Luxembourg	Perinat
Masseret	Mrs. Err	de Puig
Mrs. <i>Durrieu</i> (Oehler)	Mr. Goerens	Roman
	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	
Germany		
MM. Antretter		United Kingdom
<i>Zierer</i> (Böhm)		MM. <i>Hughes</i> (Banks)
Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler)	Netherlands	Cox
MM. <i>Pfuhl</i> (Holtz)	Mr. Aarts	Earl of Dundee
Müller	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman	Baroness <i>Hooper</i>
<i>Marten</i> (von Schmude)	MM. De Hoop Scheffer	(Dame Peggy Fenner)
Steiner	Stoffelen	Lord Finsberg
	Verbeek	Mr. Hardy
Italy		Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Jessel)
MM. Agnelli	Portugal	Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i>
Andreotti	MM. <i>Rodrigues</i> (Amaral)	(Sir Russell Johnston)
Benvenuti	Brito	Mr. <i>Dunnachie</i> (Lord Kirkhill)
Bosco	<i>Curto</i> (Candal)	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Rathbone)
Colombo	Fernandes Marques	Dr. <i>Godman</i> (Redmond)
De Carolis	<i>Poças Santos</i> (Machete)	Sir Dudley Smith
Ferrarini	Pinto	Sir Keith Speed
Foschi	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Roseta)	MM. Thompson
Leccisi		<i>Fry</i> (Ward)

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Jung	Mr. Sprung
MM. Biefnot	Puech	Mrs. Terborg
Chevalier	Seitlinger	Mr. Vogel
Kelchtermans	Valleix	
Seeuws	Vial-Massat	Netherlands
		MM. Eisma
France	Germany	van Velzen
MM. Alloncle	Mrs. Blunck	
Bassinat	MM. Büchler	United Kingdom
Caro	Irmer	MM. Atkinson
Fourré	Kittelmann	Litherland
Galley	Menzel	Sir Donald Thompson
Gouteyron	Meyer zu Bentrup	
Jeambrun	Reddemann	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RESOLUTION 85***on parliamentary debates on security policy
under the Maastricht Treaty***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the significant progress in the process of European political integration due to the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty concerning the definition and implementation of a common foreign and security policy;
- (ii) Aware of the importance of the rôle the Maastricht Treaty attributes to WEU, which will be required to work out and implement the union's decisions and action in the defence area;
- (iii) Bearing in mind the need to ensure that there is a new consensus on the one hand between the political and social forces and public opinion in the member countries of Western European Union and, on the other hand, between those countries on questions connected with security and defence policy;
- (iv) Aware that the definition and implementation of a common foreign and security policy is one of the most difficult challenges to be met by the European Union;
- (v) Regretting that, in certain countries, the public was not kept sufficiently informed of the progress of negotiations on the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht;
- (vi) Noting also the absence of an in-depth debate on the rôle of WEU and on its relations with the institutions of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, a debate that ought to have been required by the declaration on WEU appended to the treaty,

INVITES THE GOVERNMENTS OF WEU MEMBER COUNTRIES

To instigate a parliamentary debate on the common foreign and security policy provided for in the Maastricht Treaty and on the rôle of and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;

INVITES THE PARLIAMENTS OF WEU MEMBER COUNTRIES

1. To arouse public interest in the common foreign and security policy provided for in the Maastricht Treaty, the rôle of WEU and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;
2. To strengthen their co-operation with the WEU Assembly in particular by increasing exchanges of information with it;
3. To debate in full the common foreign and security policy provided for in Maastricht, its evolution and the rôle of WEU as specified in the treaty, as well as relations between our organisation and the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance.

RECOMMENDATION 529***on European security policy –
reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:
Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendation 525;
- (ii) Noting with satisfaction that, in a number of respects, this recommendation has been followed up;
- (iii) Noting, however, that the decisions taken in WEU and NATO to protect humanitarian assistance to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina are being implemented very slowly;
- (iv) Considering that the approach of winter makes the conditions for the survival of these people a matter of supreme concern;
- (v) Noting that the measures decided by the Security Council to ensure a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina still fall short of achieving such a result;
- (vi) Noting the slowness with which Security Council decisions are applied in the parts of Croatia that are outside the authority of that republic;
- (vii) Insisting that a statute must be created for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by qualified representatives of the three principal components of the population of that republic;
- (viii) Fearing a spread of hostilities to regions of former Yugoslavia which have remained safe from them, particularly in the region of Kosovo,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Speed up intervention by forces of member countries to protect the transport of humanitarian relief to Bosnia-Herzegovina;
2. Approach the Security Council to ensure that it makes effective the coercive measures it has taken to make the parties to the conflict put an end to military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
3. Offer the United Nations a larger contribution to the peace-keeping operations it has undertaken;
4. Consider the possibility of extending the UNPROFOR mission to Kosovo;
5. Agree to its members urgently recognising the independence of the Republic of Macedonia with a name acceptable to the population of that republic.

RECOMMENDATION 530***on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Recommendations 506, 512, 519 and 525 which have all sought to prompt precise action by WEU to help solve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia;
- (ii) Fully endorsing United Nations Resolutions 713, 757, 770, 771 and 781 and the efforts being made by Lord Owen and Mr. Vance to resolve the crisis;
- (iii) Dismayed that so little apparent progress has been made in finding a political solution to the crisis and that the suffering of the peoples concerned is likely to be intensified still further with the onset of winter;
- (iv) Urging the Council to multiply efforts within the United Nations, the CSCE, the EC and the new WEU Forum for Consultation with the Central European states, to seek greater co-operation at all levels in a further attempt to convince the various belligerents to stop fighting;
- (v) Disappointed that the United Nations Security Council has not heeded WEU's call for reinforcement of the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and that consequently the fighting is being prolonged;
- (vi) Congratulating the Council for promptly following up a number of the Assembly's recommendations and applauding the Italian presidency for its pragmatic and positive initiatives over WEU co-ordination and liaison with the United Nations, CSCE and NATO;
- (vii) Pleased that all WEU countries have offered to contribute either forces, logistic support or facilities, or a combination of such assets, but insisting on the need for an equitable sharing of costs;
- (viii) Convinced that an air defence capability plus associated intelligence-gathering measures to help protect United Nations forces are essential;
- (ix) Considering that similar WEU and NATO naval and maritime air assets might well be combined to form composite forces to stress complementarity and in a demonstration of cost-effectiveness rather than duplication;
- (x) Believing that when WEU forces are operating as such they should be readily identifiable,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Intensify efforts within the United Nations, the CSCE, the EC and the new WEU Forum for Consultation to support Lord Owen and Mr. Vance's endeavours in Geneva and to sponsor a possible fresh initiative to convince the belligerents in all parts of the former Yugoslavia to stop fighting and seek a political solution to their grievances;
2. Prepare a resolution to be tabled by WEU members of the United Nations Security Council to reinforce the present embargo at least to the level of that enforced against Iraq in 1990/91 and in particular to take account of the problem of cargo in transit and also of the complications of the Danube Convention and to publish evidence at an early stage of any significant breach of the embargo;
3. Fulfil its pledge for WEU member states to "offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757" and in particular respond to Romania's request for assistance;
4. Ensure that all WEU nations which have offered forces, logistic support or facilities are permitted to participate in operations, although not necessarily those organised exclusively under the direct aegis of the United Nations. Both the CSCE and the EC, for example, require considerable support for observer missions;

5. Prepare a special supplementary budget for 1992 to take account of operations concerning the former Yugoslavia and also to enable the WEU planning cell to function correctly;
6. Make contingency arrangements to provide an adequate air defence capability to help protect United Nations forces engaged in the former Yugoslavia;
7. In conjunction with the NATO authorities, rationalise naval and maritime air operations in the Adriatic area to form composite and cost-effective forces;
8. Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to use it to distinguish their military forces – ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel – taking part in WEU operations. Personnel serving in the planning cell should be among the first recipients of such a badge.

RECOMMENDATION 531***on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming United Nations Security Council Resolutions 786 (on an air exclusion zone) and 787 (reinforcing the present embargo to the level of a blockade) which respond directly to the Assembly's recommendations;
- (ii) Welcoming the United Nations Security Council's decision to set up a peace-keeping force for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and wishing to see the initiative extended to Kosovo and elsewhere;
- (iii) Welcoming the WEU Council's prompt responses to the Assembly's Recommendation 525 adopted on 3rd September 1992 and also the Council's " Declaration on former Yugoslavia " issued on 20th November 1992,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge all member nations to review and improve their participation in at least the humanitarian aspects of operations concerning the Yugoslav crisis;
2. Actively promote the idea of establishing safe areas for refugees and displaced persons throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia;
3. Transform the Ad Hoc Group into a standing advisory group to manage WEU's response to the Yugoslav crisis for as long as the crisis lasts;
4. Publish the evidence of any known breach of sanctions and particularly of cases where arms or other military equipment were exported to the Serbs and other warring factions in the former Yugoslavia;
5. Take measures for and announce sanctions to be taken by member states against all sea or air transport operators guilty of violating the embargo decreed by the United Nations;
6. Study plans for a European military operation to relieve the region of Sarajevo, liberate the prison camps and put an end to the policy of occupation and ethnic cleansing pursued by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 2nd December 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy.
2. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget*, Doc. 1325 and addendum).
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to* approve the final accounts, Doc. 1328 and addendum).
5. Composition of the political groups – Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision*, Doc. 1331).
6. European armaments co-operation after Maastricht (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1332 and amendments).
7. Anti-ballistic missile defence (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order*, Doc. 1339 and amendment).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. The situation in East Timor

(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1353)

The President announced that Mr. Brito and others had tabled a motion for a resolution on the situation in East Timor with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 44 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided to examine this request for urgent procedure after the vote on the motion to approve the final accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991.

4. Address by Mr. Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy

Mr. Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Andò answered questions put by Mr. Ferrarini, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Lopez Henares, Fry, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Fourré, Covi, Péciaux, De Hoop Scheffer and Mrs. Fischer.

5. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by Mr. Stoffelen, Lord Finsberg, MM. Thompson, Lopez Henares and Eser (*Observer from Turkey*).

6. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1325 and addendum)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Lagorce, in place of Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Lord Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft budget.

The draft budget was agreed to.

7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1328 and addendum)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Lagorce, in place of Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.

The motion was agreed to.

8. The situation in East Timor

(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1353)

In accordance with Rule 44 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a resolution on the situation in East Timor.

Speakers: MM. Brito, De Hoop Scheffer, Stoffelen, de Puig (point of order) and Brito.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

The debate would take place on Thursday, 3rd December, as the final item of business.

Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Stoffelen.

9. Composition of the political groups – Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1331)

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Thompson, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft decision.

The draft decision was agreed to. (This decision will be published as No. 7) ¹.

1. See page 39.

10. European armaments co-operation after Maastricht

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1332 and amendments)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Borderas and the Earl of Dundee.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Amendments 1 and 2 were tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Socialist Group:

1. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "not too burdensome".
2. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add "and retain records of such exports".

The amendments were not moved.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares:

3. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add "and promote the notification of such exports to the United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers".

Speaker: Mr. Lopez Henares.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 532) ².

11. Anti-ballistic missile defence

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1339 and amendment)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Lopez Henares.

2. See page 40.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Atkinson and others:

1. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Promote the participation of the largest possible number of countries and competent international and national institutions to share the burden of the establishment of a global protection system;”

Speaker: Mr. Lenzer.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 533)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 83)².

12. Acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia

(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1354)

The President announced that Mr. Pécriaux and others had tabled a motion for a resolution on acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 44 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided to examine the request for urgent procedure at the beginning of the next sitting.

13. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 3rd December 1992 at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.

1. See page 41.

2. See page 42.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Leccisi <i>Vinci (Manisco)</i> <i>Caccia (Maroni)</i> <i>Ferrari (Paire)</i> <i>Mesoraca (Pecchioli)</i> <i>Pizzo</i> <i>Rodotà</i> <i>Pozzo (Tatarella)</i>	MM. <i>Curto (Candal)</i> Fernandes Marques Mrs. <i>Aguiar (Machete)</i> Mr. Roseta
Mr. Pécriaux		
France	Luxembourg	Spain
MM. Durand Fourré <i>Dumont (Puech)</i> <i>Lagorce (Vial-Massat)</i>	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	MM. Alvarez Borderas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares de Puig Roman
Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Mr. Antretter Mrs. <i>Fischer (Bühler)</i> <i>Lenzer (Kittelmann)</i> <i>Marten (von Schmude)</i>	Mr. Aarts Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. De Hoop Scheffer Stoffelen Verbeek	Earl of Dundee Lord Finsberg Sir <i>John Hunt (Jessel)</i> Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Lord <i>Newall (Rathbone)</i> MM. Thompson <i>Fry (Ward)</i>
Italy	Portugal	
MM. Agnelli Benvenuti <i>Covi (Bosco)</i> De Carolis Ferrarini Foschi	MM. <i>Rodrigues (Amaral)</i> Brito	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	Netherlands
MM. Biefnot Chevalier Kelchtermans Kempinaire Sarens Seeuus	Mrs. Blunck MM. Böhm Büchler Holtz Irmer Menzel Meyer zu Bentrup Müller Reddemann Sprung Steiner Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	MM. Eisma van Velzen
France	Italy	Portugal
MM. Alloncle Bassinot Baumel Beix Caro Forni Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Masseret Oehler Seitlinger Valleix	MM. Andreotti Colombo Mannino Parisi	Mr. Pinto
	Luxembourg	Spain
	Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens	MM. Homs I Ferret Martinez Moya Perinat
		United Kingdom
		MM. Atkinson Banks Cox Dame Peggy Fenner Mr. Hardy Lord Kirkhill MM. Litherland Redmond Sir Dudley Smith Sir Keith Speed Sir Donald Thompson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

DECISION 7***on amending Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure***

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To amend Rule 39, paragraph 4, to read as follows:

“The number of members of a political group, representatives or substitutes, may not be less than one-tenth of the number of representatives to the Assembly.”

RECOMMENDATION 532***on European armaments co-operation after Maastricht***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that the new tasks attributed to allied forces in Europe make essential an in-depth re-examination of defence equipment and technology requirements, taking account inter alia of:
- the disappearance of the threat of a mass attack against Europe;
 - uncertainty about the risk of conflicts and tension that exist or may emerge in several regions of the world;
 - reductions in defence budgets in the majority of WEU member countries;
 - the rapid evolution of advanced technology in the defence area;
- (ii) Stressing that the creation of multinational forces in the framework of NATO and WEU shows how urgent it is to make more effort to enhance the standardisation and interoperability of their equipment;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction the increased activities of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in joint research on and development of defence equipment;
- (iv) Noting nevertheless with concern the existence of a number of bi- and multilateral equipment co-operation programmes which are not certain to be either developed or completed;
- (v) Welcoming, on the one hand, WEU's Maastricht and Petersberg declarations, in which it is suggested that a deeper study be made of strengthening European armaments co-operation with a view to setting up a European armaments agency, and, on the other, the Council's proposal to instruct WEU and IEPG experts to study this problem together so that it may be settled without delay;
- (vi) Astonished nevertheless that, more than seven months after the IEPG defined its positions relating to the conditions for possible association of the IEPG and WEU, the Council has still done nothing to implement these proposals;
- (vii) Convinced that it is the duty of the public authorities, as defence industries' principal customers, to try to help them to find means of facilitating their conversion and adapting themselves to the new conditions;
- (viii) Convinced that defence industries should not be excluded from the European market but noting that the Twelve did not reach agreement in Maastricht on abolishing Article 223 of the Rome Treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Speed up its work in order to work out a concept of the rôle and operation of a European armaments agency;
2. Appoint representatives immediately to contact without delay the team made responsible by the IEPG for the dialogue with WEU with a view to studying together the conditions for a merger between the IEPG and WEU;
3. Ensure that the future agency has adequate authority and powers to enable it to facilitate the process of harmonisation, by member countries, of their armed forces' defence equipment in a sensible, not too burdensome manner;
4. Ensure that all the IEPG member countries participate fully in the agency;
5. Reach agreement on its policy towards exports of military equipment and end-destination controls on exports of jointly-produced equipment and promote the notification of such exports to the United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers;
6. Draw up an inventory and a financing plan for all medium- and long-term plans and studies launched by WEU and the IEPG for equipment, and draw up a list of priorities;
7. Inform the Assembly of the results of its study on Europe's strategic mobility needs;
8. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions it drew from the first stage of the feasibility study for the creation of a European space-based observation system.

RECOMMENDATION 533***on anti-ballistic missile defence***

The Assembly,

- (i) Gratified that Europe is no longer threatened by a ballistic missile attack from the territory of the former Soviet Union;
- (ii) Recalling nevertheless that the danger of proliferation of ballistic technology and nuclear, biological and chemical warheads stockpiled on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States has not yet been averted;
- (iii) Noting that several third world countries, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East, are making considerable efforts to procure ballistic systems capable of reaching European countries;
- (iv) Noting further that a number of countries that have not joined the missile technology control régime (MTCR) are endeavouring to develop ballistic technology and to export it to third world countries;
- (v) Disturbed at the growing number of countries endeavouring to develop nuclear, biological and chemical weapons;
- (vi) Recalling the uncertainty that still remains about the completion of the United States programme for establishing a system of global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) and its consequences for Europe;
- (vii) Considering that such a system of protection will mean renegotiating the anti-ballistic missile treaty of 26th May 1972;
- (viii) Stressing the importance of the evolution of Russian-American co-operation in this matter in the framework of which the possible creation of an early warning centre to avert the risks of ballistic attacks is being studied;
- (ix) Recalling that the technical difficulties encountered during the Gulf war in intercepting with Patriot systems Iraqi missiles launched against Tel Aviv and Riyadh showed that protection against this new type of threat was still far from perfect;
- (x) Convinced, therefore, that it is high time for the Western European countries to adopt a joint position, on the one hand on the assessment of the possible risks for Europe of the development of ballistic technology throughout the world and, on the other, on the corresponding response;
- (xi) Also convinced of the need to ensure that efforts to afford protection against ballistic missiles do not lead to an arms race in space,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Assess without delay the risks to Europe stemming from:
 - (a) the development of strategic and theatre ballistic capability and nuclear capability in several countries of the world;
 - (b) the proliferation of ballistic technology in countries close to Europe's southern and south-eastern flanks;
2. Identify without delay Europe's needs and the means available to it to counter the ballistic missile threat;
3. Adopt without delay a joint European position towards the American programme for global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) ;
4. Promote the participation of the largest possible number of countries and competent international and national institutions to share the burden of the establishment of a global protection system;
5. Submit its conclusions to the Assembly.

ORDER 83***on anti-ballistic missile defence***

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that the rapid development of advanced ballistic missile technology and its proliferation in the third world represents new challenges to Europe and to the whole world whose consequences have not yet been fully defined;

(ii) Convinced of the need to hold a public debate on the repercussions of these challenges and on the appropriate response,

INSTRUCTS its Technological and Aerospace Committee to pursue its work on anti-ballistic missile defence problems and to organise a symposium in 1993 on this subject, to be attended by technical, industrial and legal experts as well as parliamentarians and representatives of governments and the public.

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 3rd December 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1354).
2. European security – reserve forces and national service (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations*, Docs. 1338 and 1338 supplementary draft recommendation).
3. Address by Mr. Fasslabend, Minister of Defence of Austria.
4. Western European Union – Information report (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order*, Doc. 1334).
5. Situation in East Timor (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the motion for a resolution*, Doc. 1353).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia

(*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1354)

In accordance with Rule 44 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a resolution on acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia.

Speakers: Mr. Pécriaux, Mrs. Fischer, MM. Stoffelen and Caro.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

The debate would take place on Thursday, 3rd December 1992, as the final item of business.

4. Change in the orders of the day

The President proposed that the motion for a resolution on the situation in East Timor, Doc-

ument 1353, be removed from the orders of the day.

The proposal was agreed to.

The sitting was suspended at 10.20 a.m. and resumed at 11.05 a.m.

5. Address by Mr. Fasslabend, Minister of Defence of Austria

Mr. Fasslabend, Minister of Defence of Austria, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Fasslabend answered questions put by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Ferrarini, De Decker and Lopez Henares.

Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

6. European security – reserve forces and national service

(*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations*, Docs. 1338 and 1338 supplementary draft recommendation)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Lord Newall, Mr. Moya, Sir Keith Speed, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and the Earl of Dundee.

The debate was closed.

Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur, and Mrs.

Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1338.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 534) ¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the supplementary draft recommendation.

The supplementary draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 535) ².

Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

7. Western European Union – Information report

(Presentation of the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1334)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Lopez Henares, co-Rapporteur, and Mr. Tummers, Chairman and co-Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 84) ³.

8. Acts of rape and castration, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia

(Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1355)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Stoffelen, Mrs. Fischer and Mr. Iwinski (*Observer from Poland*).

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 86) ⁴.

9. Emergency assistance to Somalia

(Motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1356)

The President announced that Mr. Furré and others had tabled a motion for a recommendation on emergency assistance to Somalia, Document 1356.

This motion would be referred to the Political Committee.

10. Close of the session

The President declared the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

Speaker: Mr. Caro.

The sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.

1. See page 46.
2. See page 48.
3. See page 49.

4. See page 50.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. De Carolis Ferrarini Leccisi <i>Vinci</i> (Manisco) <i>Gottardo</i> (Mannino) <i>Trabacchini</i> (Maroni) <i>Mesoraca</i> (Pecchioli) Pizzo Rodotà Tatarella	Portugal Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Amaral) MM. Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal) <i>Poças Santos</i> (Machete) Roseta
MM. Biefnot Kempinaire Pécriaux <i>De Decker</i> (Sarens)		
France		Spain
MM. <i>Gaits</i> (Beix) Caro Durand		MM. Borderas Cuco Diaz Lopez Henares Martinez Moya de Puig Roman
	Luxembourg	
Germany	Mrs. Err Mr. <i>Dimmer</i> (Lentz-Cornette)	
Mr. Antretter Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler)		United Kingdom
	Netherlands	Mr. <i>Hughes</i> (Banks) Earl of Dundee Lord Finsberg Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Jessel) Lord <i>Newall</i> (Rathbone) Sir Keith Speed
Italy	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. De Hoop Scheffer Stoffelen <i>Tummers</i> (van Velzen)	
MM. Agnelli Benvenuti Bosco		
The following representatives apologised for their absence:		
Belgium	MM. Holtz Irmer Kittelmann Menzel Meyer zu Bentrup Müller Reddemann von Schmude Sprung Steiner Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	Portugal MM. Fernandes Marques Pinto
MM. Chevalier Kelchtermans Seeuws		
France		Spain
MM. Alloncle Bassinot Baumel Forni Fourré Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Masseret Oehler Puech Seitlinger Valleix Vial-Massat		MM. Alvarez Fabra Homs I Ferret Perinat
	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Andreotti Colombo Foschi Paire Parisi	MM. Atkinson Cox Dame Peggy Fenner Mr. Hardy Sir Russell Johnston Lord Kirkhill MM. Litherland Redmond Sir Dudley Smith Sir Donald Thompson MM. Thompson Ward
	Luxembourg	
	Mr. Goerens	
Germany	Netherlands	
Mrs. Blunck MM. Böhm Büchler	MM. Aarts Eisma Verbeek	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 534***on European security – reserve forces and national service***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising that adequate standing forces must still be maintained to preserve the requirement for defence incumbent in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the more binding modified Brussels Treaty;
- (ii) Conscious that with the ending of East-West conflict in Europe there is a reduced need for sizeable standing and largely conscript armies and that instead, smaller, flexible, mobile and more professional forces are required;
- (iii) Bearing in mind, however, the imperative of maintaining a capability for home defence in Europe which might be increasingly entrusted to reserve forces;
- (iv) Recognising the devotion to duty of the Atlantic Alliance's reserve forces and mindful of the sacrifices made by those who serve in the reserves;
- (v) Underlining the important liaison rôle played by reserve forces in linking the armed forces with the civilian population, which strengthens public spiritedness and promotes better understanding in our nations of defence problems;
- (vi) Considering the current debate in many member countries on the relative advantages of conscription vis-à-vis all-volunteer and professional forces, although aware that the latter are proportionally more costly;
- (vii) Witnessing the general reductions in the length of national service in the majority of member countries, or its abolition, and wishing to highlight the obvious effect on the availability of properly-trained reservists;
- (viii) Determined to promote full and frank debate in WEU on the subject of national service and reserve forces in member countries;
- (ix) Convinced that more coherent arrangements for assuring a cost-effective European security system should be possible, given greater co-operation and consultation between member states, both within WEU and together with the other nations of the Atlantic Alliance and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council;
- (x) Knowing that the Central European states would welcome the opportunity to discuss matters such as national service and reserve forces;
- (xi) Supporting the efforts of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) to stimulate informed discussion among its members on a wide variety of issues, and hoping that the CIOR will soon include all Atlantic Alliance nations, at least as observers, and liaise with the Central European nations which are full members of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council;
- (xii) Recalling Recommendation 469 adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989;
- (xiii) Believing that multinational units such as the Franco-German Brigade serve as a channel for the enthusiasm of those who wish to place their national service in a European context and that the idea of attributing reserve forces for the European Corps provides a further opportunity for integration;
- (xiv) Considering the increasingly strong calls by the armed forces for modern, varied technologies enabling them to provide further training, particularly for the volunteers who are required to serve for a long enough period, which will be useful for their subsequent employment as civilians;
- (xv) Asserting that the arrangements for organising and mobilising reserve forces in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland may serve as a future model for both the Western European and especially the Central European states,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take every opportunity to ensure that the debate on reserve forces and national service in any member country benefits from a common fund of experience and requirements and include discussion on the subject on the agenda of the next WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting;

2. Stimulate informed debate in member countries on revised rôles for reserve forces as well as on reductions in and possible restructuring of national service;
3. Provide a forum for discussion of such matters among member states and also with Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland and interested Central European states;
4. Strongly encourage WEU countries without volunteer reserve forces to consider the example of those which already possess such an asset which is indispensable for countries abolishing national service and to provide proper equipment and training for the reserves;
5. Explore the idea of creating a European "national guard" for territorial defence, using the reserve forces of WEU member states;
6. Reconsider the Assembly's previous recommendation to "take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult" (Recommendation 469);
7. Give priority to training volunteers who would be asked to form reserve forces whose training would be continued for long enough after their return to civilian life for them to be, if necessary, a useful complement to regular military personnel;
8. Decide to give a symbol of European identity to all forces – ships, aircraft, vehicles and regular and reserve personnel – taking part in WEU operations;
9. Establish and develop a liaison with the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR);
10. Ask the WEU Institute for Security Studies to make a thorough examination of national service and the structure of reserve forces in member states and of the possibilities for co-operation;
11. Invite WEU parliamentarians to participate in discussions on these topics.

RECOMMENDATION 535***on European security – reserve forces and national service***

The Assembly,

Further developing the theme of “European security – reserve forces and national service”,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage member states to consult with a view to:
 - (a) safeguarding the status of national servicemen or reservists from both the public and the private sectors to allow them “leave of absence” to serve in the forces;
 - (b) introducing fiscal advantages for firms which employ reserve servicemen;
 - (c) proposing European norms for equipment, service structures and command organisation;
2. Consider forthwith the idea of establishing a “European guard” composed of reserve forces which would be used to help defend the common European territory of all member states;
3. Propose that member states which shorten the length of, or abolish, conscription should make the terms of voluntary military service more attractive especially with regard to pay and allowances and also give those leaving the forces priority treatment for employment within the public sector;
4. Urge member states abandoning the practice of conscription to *suspend* legislation relating to national service rather than revoking it entirely, thus leaving current legislation on the statute books in case of future requirements;
5. Ask the ministries of defence of member states to organise the dissemination of appropriate information regarding military matters to all parliamentarians and especially those who have no service background.

ORDER 84***on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the report on the draft of a new booklet on WEU submitted by its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations;
- (ii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians and the public in member countries,

INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. To ensure that, with the aid of national delegations, a booklet on the report submitted is published in the seven languages of the WEU member countries;
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet is brought up to date in the event of major developments in WEU prior to its publication.

RESOLUTION 86***on acts of rape and castration, crimes against humanity
and war crimes in former Yugoslavia***

The Assembly has been informed that on the territory of former Yugoslavia:

1. thousands of women and children, sometimes concentrated in special camps, are victims of brutal rape;
2. women are being forced to complete the resulting pregnancies;
3. men are being castrated.

The Assembly condemns most strongly these sexual aggressions perpetrated as acts of humiliation of the human being and used as a weapon of war.

The Assembly urges the governments of member countries:

- (a) to intervene immediately to bring about an immediate end to these tortures and war crimes;
- (b) to bring to trial those responsible for these crimes against humanity;
- (c) to assist the victims by all the means at their disposal.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 30th November 1992

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Tribute to a former President of the Assembly.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Observers.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (*Presentation of the first part of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council*, Doc. 1343); Address by Mr. Colombo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Replies by Mr. Colombo to questions put by: Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Hardy, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Fry, Mr. Ward, Mr. van Velzen, Mr. Marten.
8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (Doc. 1321).
9. Changes in the membership of committees.
10. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1346).
Speakers: Mr. Foschi (*Vice-President of the Assembly*), Mr. Caro, Mr. Liapis (*Observer from Greece*).
11. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council: Part One: European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1342, Part One).
Speakers: Mr. Goerens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Marshall, Mr. Müller, Mr. Antretter, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Soysal (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. de Puig, Mr. Vazquez, Mr. Colombo, Mr. Caro, Mr. Liapis (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Goerens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman*).
12. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union which was adjourned on 4th June 1992 at the end of the seventh sitting.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Tribute to a former President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before we proceed to our first item of business, I have to inform the Assembly of the sad news of the

death, on 17th August, of Lord Muirshiel who, as Mr. John Maclay, was the first President of this Assembly from 1955 to 1957.

Lord Muirshiel had a distinguished career as a member of the United Kingdom House of Commons from 1940 to 1964, displaying similar qualities to those he brought to his position as President of this Assembly. He was a minister of the United Kingdom Government and in particular Secretary of State for Scotland from 1957 to 1962. On leaving the House of Commons, he became a member of the House of Lords with the title Viscount Muirshiel.

The Assembly is privileged to have had him as its first President. Though his tenure of office was short, he conducted the Assembly's affairs with firmness and wisdom during the critical period when the Assembly was taking its first steps. He will be missed.

I invite the Assembly to observe one minute's silence in memory of Lord Muirshiel.

(Members of the Assembly stood and observed a minute's silence)

Thank you.

1. See page 15.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our last session, whose names have been published in Notice No. 8.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I welcome our new colleagues to the session.

5. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I should like to welcome parliamentary observers from Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey who have done us the honour of following our proceedings.

May I welcome them to our debates, together with members of the Permanent Council who are present at this part-session.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, as so often happens, our session is starting a few days after a ministerial meeting of WEU which was marked by a number of important decisions. The meeting was held in Rome on 20th November, i.e. when the committees had already adopted the reports that they are to present to the Assembly, thus confronting us with the problem of adapting the texts on which we are to vote to the new situation. Our Political Committee had to meet this morning to revise, in the light of the ministerial decisions, Mr. Ward's report on the enlargement of WEU bearing in mind these realities, and several of the amendments on which we shall have to vote will probably express not so much the disagreement of those tabling them vis-à-vis the recommendations presented as their concern to update the texts we shall have to adopt.

In these circumstances, the Presidential Committee, which met the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council in Rome on 18th November, has had to modify the Assembly's order of business by cancelling the sitting that was to have been held this morning. It has also had to take account of the fact that two of our delegations – those of the United Kingdom and of the Federal Republic of Germany – are having to leave the session early to take part in important debates on European affairs in their respective parliaments. I therefore have to express the regret of the Presidential Committee which had to take into account a situation which became clear only

very late in the day and, consequently, obliged it to modify the order of business of the session.

This being said, I do not think we have to deplore this situation because it has already allowed, and still seems to give promise of, a fruitful dialogue with the Council and I wish to thank the Italian Chairmanship-in-Office very warmly for all it has done to make this dialogue a useful one. The Italian Ministers have not merely kept the Assembly informed of the progress of the Council's work, they have been very receptive to the Assembly's messages, and we are satisfied to find, in the communiqués issued at the close of the ministerial meeting, a number of responses to the concerns we had conveyed to it, either in our recommendations and written questions, or at the meeting on 18th November.

In the eighteen months during which armed conflict has been waged on the territory of former Yugoslavia, the Assembly has demonstrated that it considered one of the main tasks incumbent upon WEU was to take action to promote the restoration of peace in that region.

Today it is no longer possible to consider the events that have been taking place in former Yugoslavia in the last eighteen months as an internal, small-scale matter for that country and outside our responsibilities. The dimension it has already attained makes it a matter of concern to the whole of Europe.

The splitting up of the Yugoslav state is due to the end of the confrontation that for forty years had been dividing our continent. The unfortunate peoples of the region are in the throes of a tragedy which, if we are not careful, may become a tragedy for the whole of Europe. All the forms of cruelty that we thought had been eliminated from our destiny for half a century are resurfacing. All the crimes that are being committed there every day – massacres, deportations of populations, torture, concentration camps – are drawing us back to a past that we thought we had left behind and at the same time show us the importance of what the western part of Europe has done to ensure peace and develop an international society on new foundations. To tolerate such a return to barbarity at our frontiers would involve the risk of seeing it gain the upper hand elsewhere and, perhaps, one day among us.

Ideologies we might have thought we had permanently cast off are now resurfacing in the Yugoslav fighting: fanatical nationalism, religious intolerance and the will to dominate are the foundations of the doctrine of ethnic cleansing which is refusing millions of individuals the right to exist on a territory where they have always lived. If we allow such concepts to triumph, they will sow discord not only

The President (continued)

in the Yugoslav republics or provinces of the Serb Republic that are still spared, but also in vast areas of Central and Eastern Europe where only tolerance and respect for persons and peoples can establish or consolidate a peaceful order. States and frontiers are contested in many regions but, however legitimate this challenge may seem, it must give precedence to a more important value: the maintenance and organisation of peace in Europe.

Moreover, Serbia's refusal to accept the independence and frontiers of other republics and systematic recourse to the most odious forms of violence to change frontiers and expel minorities are a challenge to the principles on which all the European states agreed, barely two years ago, in the Charter of Paris. All countries participating in the CSCE subscribed to it. By acting in this manner, Serbia has outlawed itself from Europe, just as its leaders or those who, in the name of another republic, have been guilty of crimes against humanity, have outlawed themselves from society. If we wish Europe to remain a peaceful continent, we must not only prevent them from succeeding; we must also ensure that systematic violation of an emerging European law that had just expressed itself in positive terms does not go unpunished.

Our Assembly will therefore unreservedly approve the decision taken by the Ministers to strengthen the measures to apply the naval blockade decided by the Security Council in order to make it effective. On 18th November, we also noted that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council was in favour of making public the infringements noted, which would be a strong deterrent to any possible offender which the Council had hitherto refused. Moreover, the Council has decided to respond favourably to the requests for technical assistance from some of the countries along the Danube with a view to making the monitoring of navigation along the river more effective. Finally, it proposes to resume the studies started in autumn 1991 to ensure the promotion of security areas for humanitarian purposes on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, therefore, it is possible for us to envisage serious action on its part to promote the restoration of peace on the territory of former Yugoslavia. This is essential if we wish to prevent the struggle spreading into other regions. However, it was no less necessary if we wish Europe, as we intend to build it in the framework of the Community and of WEU, to gain real international weight. The weakness it showed made many doubt this will. The decisions taken in Rome seem to herald the adjustment long requested by the Assembly.

We know full well that these measures are not enough to restore peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina

but they seem to suggest a new attitude on the part of Europe. Admittedly, our countries have been very slow to react with the necessary force to crimes to which they thus became accomplices. However, this slowness is largely due to the difficulty we have in adapting our minds and organising our forces vis-à-vis a new situation many parts of which still elude us.

(The President continued in English)

As long as our security was threatened by the deployment of conventional and nuclear forces by the Warsaw Pact, we managed to find appropriate answers to the challenge facing us. NATO, WEU and the European Community were sections of an edifice that associated what proved to be effective deterrence with the building, in the area where this was possible, of a new international society.

From the moment the facts of the situation underwent a radical change, we have been finding it difficult to set up a European security organisation in which military deployment and nuclear capability no longer play the main rôle but in which any political and economic initiatives taken by the European Community have become an essential factor of a policy intended above all to avert confrontation and also, where necessary, to limit its effects and put an end to it.

The Yugoslav crisis has shown us that nothing is permanently guaranteed and that all the treaties signed by states and all the principles to which they have subscribed carry little weight as long as the peoples and their political leaders do not realise that the maintenance and organisation of peace in Europe must come before each nation's own claims, however legitimate they may be. We quite understand that the return of national minorities to states that they believe best embody their aspirations is a legitimate aim for several European countries. We are aware that the presence of strong Russian minorities in the Baltic countries or some of the republics of the former Soviet Union is difficult to accept for states that were oppressed for many years. We quite understand the problems raised for the Hungarian Republic by the fate of the Magyar populations of Vojvodina, Slovakia and Romania and, for Romania, that of the inhabitants of the Moldovan Republic and, for Poland, that of the Polish minorities in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. Yet we know quite well that no real solution can be found to these questions outside a European political and juridical order guaranteeing each person and each linguistic, ethnic or religious community the possibility to exercise all their rights on the territory where they live.

For ourselves, it is essential for Central and Eastern Europe not to remain an area in which the juridical and political vacuum allows the

The President (continued)

re-emergence of an atmosphere of violence, ignorance and political fanaticism that permits groups that are often not properly controlled by political authorities with ill-defined responsibilities to fix the political geography of tomorrow's Europe.

This is the view that our Assembly has steadfastly defended since summer 1991 when the Yugoslav question was put in new terms. At each of our sessions, we have examined the development of the situation in the region. We have followed attentively the initiatives taken by the Council to ensure that WEU helps to bring about a cease-fire and restore peace. Our Standing Committee met on 3rd September, in the middle of the summer holiday period, to adopt, under urgent procedure, a recommendation on the initiatives it expected the Council to take to strengthen WEU action, not only in order to protect the humanitarian action being taken by our countries but also to impose an end to the hostilities that respects the principles proclaimed by the CSCE and reaffirmed since then by the London Conference.

However, it is not yet time to be triumphant. The war is continuing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is a danger of it flaring up again in Croatia and the apparent peace in Macedonia, Vojvodina or in Kosovo and the Sandjak seems increasingly fragile. Any sign of weakness, lack of interest or discouragement on the part of Europe would be interpreted as encouraging recourse to violence in those territories and as a renunciation of the application of the principles on which peace in Europe is based. We are perfectly aware that the nine – soon to be ten – member countries of WEU do not constitute the whole of Europe, but we can also see that, at least in the Yugoslav affair, they are the only countries in Europe able to place at the service of the United Nations or the CSCE armed forces that no one can suspect of serving special interests or wishing to influence the balance between the great powers. Europe, as embodied in the European Community, has moral and political authority that is in no way negligible and the link established by the modified Brussels Treaty and confirmed by the Maastricht Treaty between the Community and WEU means that our organisation, in spite of its limited military capability, must be very active in promoting a return to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a move by all the republics which once constituted Yugoslavia towards a peaceful settlement of their disputes.

In 1987, the WEU governments defined, in the platform of The Hague, their common aims in security matters and spelled out the means by which they intended to attain them. Although not old, this text now hardly corresponds to the

requirements of European security as we now perceive them. It is perhaps now time for us to ask the Council to prepare a new platform to take into account the changes that have occurred in Europe and their consequences for a joint defence policy. The Assembly for its part might make a useful contribution to thinking on this matter.

WEU as a defensive organisation has lost none of its value. It is more than ever necessary for Europe to pool its efforts to maintain peace or to restore it where it is threatened. While NATO is still an essential structure in any peaceful order in Europe, particularly because it alone can counter the risks created by the reawakening of nationalism on the territory of the former Soviet Union, WEU is probably better prepared than any other European body to meet the other requirements of today, because it is not linked with a specific military deployment.

One of the main requirements is no doubt to give Europe the means to ascertain everything that might endanger peace, and the decisions taken by our governments in 1991 to guide WEU towards the mastery of space-based observation technology is a major step in this necessary reorientation. Similarly, the regular meetings of chiefs of defence staff and the creation of a planning cell are appropriate measures in view of the need for Europe to assume new responsibilities on our continent and, if necessary, to counter threats to international peace that might emerge in other regions of the world, as provided for in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

However, this reorientation also implies a complete rethinking of the constitution of our armed forces. Increasingly, they have to intervene in peace-keeping operations in a precise, limited manner, under the directives of the United Nations or the CSCE. Troops, weaponry, training, operational doctrine and even national legislation will have to be adapted to this new vocation, whereas our defence budgets, in the very interest of our security, will have to be reduced to allow far larger contributions to international solidarity, which is the best guarantee of peace. The economic reconstruction of Eastern Europe and assistance to the third world will make a larger contribution to averting new dangers than would the build-up of armaments. Conversely, nuclear, conventional and chemical disarmament will remain at the centre of our concerns.

(The President continued in German)

(Translation). – But if WEU is to play an essential part in organising tomorrow's peace, it must not overlook the rôle of other bodies with which it will have to co-operate far more closely than in the past. From the outset, WEU has been

The President (continued)

associated with NATO. This association should be redefined in the light of the situation today. The naval blockade of Montenegro, where ships from the same countries carried out the same mission on behalf of both organisations shows us that they continue to pursue the same aims but that their efforts still need to be better co-ordinated. At meetings of Assembly committees in Brussels in October, we were able to see that the most senior NATO authorities were prepared to examine, together with WEU, the possibility of better task- and responsibility-sharing. As soon as the new United States administration defines its concept of the rôle of the United States in Europe and the world, we shall have to continue the search for more rational co-operation between European and American members of the alliance, the better to meet the requirements of the new situation.

However, it is in its relations with the European Community that WEU must define more clearly the area of its responsibilities. Since Europe's security is now a global matter, the Community will also have to exercise considerable responsibility in this area.

The main responsibility seems to stem from the awareness of most Central and Eastern European states that the principal hopes they can cherish for their future lie in drawing progressively closer to a European Community whose goal is not only to ensure the prosperity of its members but to extend security guarantees to the whole of Europe, as well as respect for the principles on which democracy is based. This means that henceforth the solidarity that has grown up among the Twelve will have to be extended to their eastern neighbours and the Community is already taking part in a search for solutions to certain disputes such as that between Slovakia and Hungary over the Danube waters. Its dialogue with those countries allows it to voice its views. However, this also means that, whenever necessary, it must give those countries the material assistance they need to solve the problems arising from the legacy of their past. This will apply to Slovakia in particular unless we are prepared to see it forced to make excessive use of armaments exports in order to solve the difficulties it will inevitably have to face once it becomes independent.

The Maastricht Treaty laid the foundations for a European Union in which WEU will take its place, thus paving the way for parallel action by the two organisations to promote the progressive integration of Europe around the Community nucleus. The Yugoslav crisis has already indicated how the common foreign and security policy of the Twelve and WEU can complement one another. Central European countries that have entered into association with the Com-

munity with a view to joining it when they are able to do so have also responded to the offers of dialogue made to them by the WEU Council. However, the Assembly was the first to open its doors to delegations of parliamentary observers from those countries and we are gratified to see them taking part in our sessions in ever-growing numbers.

However, we must face the facts. There is little probability of achieving the merger of WEU and the Community, in a European Union whose responsibilities would include defence matters, within the time-limits envisaged by those who signed the Maastricht Treaty. For quite some time, building on its own treaty, WEU will have to continue the work it embarked on by introducing the establishment of a European operational system. The peoples of our countries are still very attached to national sovereignty as soon as they have to commit armed forces. Clearly, the attribution of defence responsibilities to the European Union will come about only as the culmination of the building of a political Europe that is still far from complete.

Thus, those of us who were able to take part in the joint meeting between the Presidential Committee and the Chairmanship-in-Office noted with satisfaction that the Minister, Mr. Colombo, admitted that the Assembly's objections to the affirmation in the Maastricht Treaty that 1998 might be a deadline for WEU were not without justification. He accepted the proposal that we made to him last June that legal experts be consulted on this matter. We believe this is no minor matter because we have no doubt about the legal validity of our arguments and the attitude adopted by the governments was likely to weaken the authority of the institution that brings us together and its Assembly, just when it is necessary to take a number of decisions concerning the effectiveness of their work in the decade ahead.

We also welcome the decision taken by six new countries to join our organisation in various capacities. Pending the ratification of the protocol of accession of Greece to the modified Brussels Treaty, they are taking part in meetings of the Council and we are pleased to welcome to our midst delegations of observers from their parliaments. Some already attend our sessions regularly, while others are here for the first time. Their presence among us, and that of countries which have applied for membership of the Community but had hitherto stayed outside any form of co-operation in defence matters, testify to our vocation to remain the European parliamentary assembly in which delegations from Europe's parliaments can meet to examine every aspect of the security of our continent. This twofold vocation shows the position to which we can lay claim in a European Union in which parlia-

The President (continued)

mentary supervision cannot be exercised solely by an assembly elected by direct suffrage. An assembly composed of representatives of national parliaments must have a place there, in particular to deal with matters such as defence that will still be under the authority of the individual states. It is with this in mind that we have responded to the wish expressed by the governments to see the Assembly establish closer relations with the European Parliament. We can but hope that the latter will be prepared to listen to us and develop a dialogue that can be based only on equality and reciprocity.

We shall now have to draw the necessary conclusions from the decisions adopted in Rome, especially in regard to the welcome our Assembly should extend to the new member of WEU, the new associate members and the new observer countries. Mr. Ward's report studies the political dimensions. Between now and the next session, we must prepare the necessary changes to our Rules of Procedure, taking account of the nature and content of the texts on which each country has based its new relations with WEU. We shall then have to examine the financial repercussions and turn once again to the Council to ensure that it shoulders the burdens that its decisions impose upon us.

The ministerial meeting in Rome has therefore responded in what we consider to be a satisfactory manner to a number of our Assembly's recommendations, by demonstrating a firmer will to act to restore peace on the territory of former Yugoslavia and by clarifying, as was necessary, the status in WEU of European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and members of the European Community. The Italian Chairmanship-in-Office has also managed to place the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly at the appropriate level, in particular by reacting swiftly to our recommendations and ensuring that answers to the matters we raise are not evaded.

However, we can but regret the slow implementation of the operational decisions taken by the Council in 1991 and 1992. My concern to allow the Assembly to start its work prevents me from enlarging further on this matter. I must stress, however, that, at a time when there is so much uncertainty about the future of the European Union and the institutions on which it is based, our Assembly cannot base its legitimacy on juridical considerations alone. The quality of its studies and their future scope, the scale of its debates and the rigour it shows in its dialogue with the Council are important points in its favour. The fact that, on many essential matters, the Council has taken account of our views encourages us to continue along the course we have adopted. Here I will conclude with the

wish that, in spite of a very full agenda and the organisational difficulties we have had with it, the second part of our thirty-eighth session will prove to be fruitful.

7. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council

(Presentation of the first part of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1343)

**Address by Mr. Colombo, Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Italy,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council: presentation of the first part of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council by Mr. Colombo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 1343.

Mr. Chairman-in-Office, it is with considerable interest that our Assembly is about to listen to what you have to say, not only because of your chairmanship of WEU at such an important moment in its history, but also because of your singular authority in European affairs. Not only have you served in a variety of major ministerial posts in your country, leading the government from 1970 to 1972 and holding the financial affairs and foreign policy portfolios on several occasions, you have at the same time had a remarkable career as a European parliamentarian crowned by your election as President of the European Parliament in 1977 and 1979.

In 1979, your European vocation was recognised by the award of the Prix Charlemagne, when you joined the founders of Europe on its roll of honour. Not that this high dignity meant an end to your European activity. Instead, that activity led you when you were again Minister for Foreign Affairs, in company with your German colleague, Mr. Genscher, to prepare and present the plan which links your two names together and was the starting point of the movement, via the Single Act and the Treaty of Maastricht, towards the fashioning of European Union.

Lastly, during Italy's chairmanship of WEU you have strongly influenced the activity of our organisation in ensuring that the decisions taken by our countries in Maastricht are put into effect by the appointed time and with proper respect for the terms of the treaty. This is a point to which our Assembly will attach special importance for it is, in the Assembly's view, essential.

But it also keenly appreciates the new drive you have imparted to relations between the Council and the Assembly. We have noted the

The President (continued)

weight you attach to our receiving prompt answers to our written questions and recommendations and in particular answers that do not dodge the issue. We valued the quality of the discussion to which you invited our Presidential Committee on 18th November, when we gained the impression that you were not only a minister prepared to enlighten us about the activities of the Council but also a listener attentive to our concerns and ready to relay them to your fellow ministers.

All these reasons mean we shall be lending an attentive ear to your address, Mr. Chairman-in-Office, before putting all the questions prompted in us by the decisions you took at the ministerial meeting in Rome. It is with gratitude that I now invite you to address the Assembly.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking the President for his kind words about me which will probably turn out to have been somewhat unwarranted in view of what I am about to say.

I should first like to thank you for inviting me to take part in your discussions in my capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Ministerial Council of WEU, in order to report to you on the activities of our organisation which, as you know, culminated in the decisions taken at the recent ministerial meeting of 20th November that I have no hesitation in describing as particularly significant. I shall deal with them at more length later.

I shall begin my speech, which I hope to keep short and informal, by offering you, in return, my warmest greetings.

It is a particular pleasure for me to see your President, Mr. Soell, again a few days after our meeting in Rome, and also your committee chairmen, who accompanied him and with whom we have already had a very useful exchange of ideas. I think I can say that our contacts on the eve of the ministerial meeting confirmed the constructive atmosphere of relations between the Council and the Assembly and the value of such contacts for European Union as a whole.

On this point I would like to emphasise that Italy has made great efforts – and I wish to thank the President for acknowledging this – to maintain direct and co-operative contacts at all levels. We are well aware of the stimulating central rôle that our parliamentary Assembly plays in the life of WEU, because in our view action by governments must take the fullest possible account of public opinion to which the Assembly gives sure expression.

In this spirit we have tried to answer your recommendations and written questions as quickly as possible and to let you have the usual half-yearly report without undue delay. I do not know whether we have succeeded completely, but we are well aware that further improvements can and must be made both as regards speedier action and as regards your closer involvement in government thinking. I can tell you that during the second half-year we shall make every effort to meet these targets.

I now come to what, with good reason, is for you a very sensitive issue, namely the Assembly's budget. I wish to assure you that we are aware that the Assembly's activities have increased and that its financial requirements will naturally be greater than in the past as a result of the numerous contacts and the changes to your structures necessary to meet the needs created by enlargement.

I am sure that all of you, as members of your national parliaments, understand the economic difficulties now facing our governments. I would like, however, to assure you that we shall do our best, within the limits imposed by the present straitened circumstances, to see that your justified demands are recognised.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should now like to make a few general remarks before going on to report on the results of the Ministerial Council held in Rome on 20th November.

We are now at a critical stage in the process of European integration. The new realities which have emerged in Europe following the extraordinary events of recent years have certainly required the redefinition of political structures and of the objectives on which the countries of Europe have to focus their attention. What is involved, in fact, is a combined effort to work out a new system of balances which will make maximum use of the potential of existing multi-lateral structures and will seek to establish peace, stability and co-operation on a sounder basis.

This is, moreover, one of the major features of the overall purpose of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, within which Western European Union is destined to play a very major part.

I have no need to remind you of the immediate origin of this plan which stems from the need to enhance Europe's political identity in response to two events of historic import in Europe. First, we have the breakdown of the old equilibria in Eastern Europe, and secondly, we have the reunification of Germany which the Bonn Government itself wanted to be kept firmly within the European framework.

The Maastricht Treaty was designed to respond positively to these two historic events

Mr. Colombo (continued)

by including closer economic integration in a genuine political union, which must be strong and internally cohesive so that it can be more open and generous in relations with the other protagonists on the European scene.

This strategic plan incorporates the organic relationship which the Maastricht Treaty established between the political dimension of the union and WEU as a constituent element in the security and defence of that union.

Maastricht is certainly not a fully satisfactory answer to the changes which have taken place in Europe, where the old order is breaking down and a difficult process aimed at establishing democratic régimes and market economies has begun. The treaty might have provided a more adequate response if the political and institutional dimensions for which it provides had been given as much importance as the economic objectives. Even within its limits, however, this is now the road which we must follow in order to avoid the danger of moving backwards.

The ratification procedures are, however, running into difficulties. The sense of responsibility which the Europe of the Twelve felt it must show as a contribution to stability, collaboration and the promotion of a new European order to be constructed after the collapse of communism seems to be failing if not disappearing altogether - to such an extent that today, after the Danish referendum, the tension which preceded the nevertheless positive outcome of the French referendum, and the United Kingdom's doubts, we are breathing a dangerous atmosphere of uncertainty which is slowing down all the procedures and may fail to provide a stable reference framework for European Union. One consequence of this has been tension and a lack of collaboration in the monetary system and, as a result, violently fluctuating European exchange rates. We must also ask ourselves how the sovereign states which have emerged in Central and Eastern Europe feel they could rely on promises of enlargement from a Community which is finding it hard to define its own powers, particularly of a political character, and to establish effective institutions capable of handling the responsibilities to be taken on.

The European Council in Edinburgh will be the focus of many hopes but also of many doubts, and maybe more doubts than hopes. We have laid down the principle that the treaties are not negotiable and therefore that the ratification procedures cannot be reopened. This is a firm starting point which must be defended. We must, however, be careful to ensure that an incorrect definition of the principle of subsidiarity or a wrong solution to the Danish problem does not rob the original European

design of the founding fathers, as we usually say, of its force and coherence. If that were to happen or the problem of ratifying Maastricht remained unsolved, the launching of any enlargement policy would not have the firm foundation of a political union.

A policy of reasonable settlements cannot, or indeed must not, in any circumstances change the basic framework clearly defined by the Treaty on European Union or prejudice future developments.

I should now like to report to you on the meeting of the Ministerial Council which was held in Rome on 20th November under Italian chairmanship and is basically a part of this difficult process of achieving European Union. The main features of this meeting were the completion of the enlargement process and the debate and the associated decisions on the Yugoslav crisis, with particular reference to implementation of Resolution 787 of the United Nations Security Council.

As regards enlargement, following discussions with the applicant countries, a protocol was signed for the accession of Greece as a full member, a declaration adopted offering observer status to the other two members of the European Community, Denmark and Ireland, and a document signed enabling the three other European members of the Atlantic Alliance, Iceland, Norway and Turkey, to become associate members. This last document can be ratified by any countries wishing to do so, or approved by the most appropriate procedures for a political document, which is what most of the partner countries seem to favour.

Enlargement will become fully effective when the Greek protocol of accession comes into force following ratification by Greece itself and by the nine present members of WEU. By January next, however, when the Permanent Council and secretariat are transferred to Brussels as planned, the six countries now joining will be entitled to send observers to WEU meetings.

The completion of the process of enlargement sooner than anticipated in the Maastricht and Petersberg declarations, 31st December, is certainly a vital step in the development of WEU as the defence component of European Union and the instrument for strengthening the Atlantic Alliance.

May I remind you that the Brussels Treaty, subsequently modified in 1954, stated that its aim was "to associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination", and also "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe".

The Maastricht and Petersberg declarations took the same line by providing for accession,

Mr. Colombo (continued)

association or the acquisition of observer status by member states of the European Community and European members of the Atlantic Alliance.

With the completion of enlargement and the transfer of the Council and secretariat to Brussels in accordance with the timetable and arrangements finally agreed by the Ministerial Council on 20th November, a new phase is opening for the organisation when it will be possible to strengthen WEU's operational rôle as planned and to link it more closely with European Union and NATO.

This new phase will basically have to satisfy the ever-increasing public demand for Europe and will have to match developments in the European situation with the demand for a Europe capable of making a growing contribution to the peace, security and stability of our continent, while still retaining the Atlantic links.

I would say also that the discussions with the applicant countries were demanding and in some cases complex, but certainly led to better understanding of general issues on both sides and to a greater awareness of common interests and objectives.

I would add that the enlargement ceremony and the subsequent fifteen-power discussions were also attended, symbolically, by a representative from the European Community in the person of the head of the permanent secretariat for political co-operation and by the Secretary-General of NATO.

The debate on the Yugoslav crisis was very wide-ranging and produced decisions of major importance. On the basis of a report by the ad hoc group on Yugoslavia, made up of representatives of the foreign and defence ministries, it was decided first and foremost that the rôle of the WEU naval force already operating in the Adriatic in implementation of Resolution 787 of the United Nations Security Council should be extended from simple monitoring of the embargo to stricter forms of control which, like the action planned by NATO for the STANAVFORMED operations, will include the halting, search and diversion of suspect vessels.

As regards diversion, Italy has announced that ports and anchorages are available along the southern Adriatic coast for the fuller inspection of ships.

It was agreed that the new operations will be co-ordinated with the NATO action and that this link-up will be administered by the Italian presidency. It was also agreed that the WEU force will be under the command of an Italian

admiral. The presidency appealed to partner countries to ensure that the WEU fleet should be given the required multinational character, by increasing the contribution of the Nordic countries.

The link-up with NATO was put into force immediately by the presidency and the new naval operations in the Adriatic, in implementation of Resolution 787, began ahead of the planned date on Sunday, 22nd November. It seems to me, therefore, that the action taken by WEU in the Yugoslav crisis, first through the decisions taken at Helsinki and now with those taken in Rome, are of the greatest practical significance, both as regards enforcing the embargo and as regards member countries' contribution to the humanitarian aid action co-ordinated by the United Nations. Unfortunately, however, this is not enough.

Despite efforts from many directions, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina remains extremely grave and is a matter of very great concern. It should be accepted, therefore, that in such circumstances Europe should give tangible expression to its determination to exert significant influence on the course of the crisis and to bring it to a peaceful solution.

It is, of course, primarily in the United Nations that the most appropriate decisions should be sought. Nevertheless, it is our duty to make the most fitting contribution to solving the problems on the ground and to show a commitment to match public expectations which are sometimes sidetracked by transient and momentary attitudes.

Our action must, of course, be governed by the principles and decisions adopted at the London conference. In any case, the possibility must be identified of a visible and effective contribution by WEU in line with our declared aim of strengthening its rôle.

The Council of Ministers adopted a declaration on Yugoslavia which, in addition to expressing consternation at the continuing aggression, violence, pursuit of ethnic cleansing and repeated violations of human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and announcing the launching of new operations to enforce the embargo in the Adriatic, again stated that the WEU countries were prepared to offer technical and other assistance to the riparian Danube states to prevent the evasion of sanctions and similar help to enforce compliance with the land embargo. In addition, the WEU member countries reaffirmed their collective determination to help with the delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to study possibilities for promoting a security zone for humanitarian purposes. An ad hoc group is to meet in Rome on 15th December to put these operations into practical effect.

Mr. Colombo (continued)

Again, during the nine-power discussion, ministers approved a number of documents of major importance drafted by the Council working group over the last six months. I am referring in particular to co-operation on implementing the Open Skies Treaty, to joint space activity with the early commissioning of the Torrejón centre, to the prospect of absorbing the work of the Independent European Programme Group and the Eurogroup into WEU, to relations with third countries and, most important of all, to the decision I mentioned earlier to transfer the Council and secretariat to Brussels as from January next.

There remains one last and vital question which was only partly examined at the Council meeting, but is unquestionably the focus of our attention and will remain so over the coming months. It is the future rôle of WEU and its relations with European Union and NATO. Very briefly, I would say that WEU's essential rôle is gradually to build up the ability to work out a common European security and defence policy without detracting from but rather increasing the effectiveness of the structures and machinery of the Atlantic Alliance which guarantee collective defence at sixteen-power level.

The development of WEU will also have to enable the European countries to make a more significant contribution to maintaining security and peace and to preventing conflicts in Europe. The Petersberg declaration also affirmed that member countries intended to further the implementation of measures to prevent conflicts and to manage crises including the peace-keeping activities of the CSCE and the United Nations Security Council.

I said earlier that the new equilibria in Europe will have to be promoted by using the potential of the existing multilateral structures to the full. WEU is naturally one of these multilateral structures and must be said to have every potential required for various types of effective action ranging from humanitarian aid to peace-keeping and peace-making.

At the Petersberg Ministerial Council it was made clear that, in addition to joint defensive tasks in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty, WEU forces will also have humanitarian aid, peace-keeping and combat duties in the management of crises, also including peace-making.

Such contributions by WEU will, in any case, have to be linked with duties that NATO may be performing in its own sphere of competence.

As part of the construction of the new European architecture, links between the institutions at present operating in Europe must be improved. From this standpoint the transfer of

the WEU Council and secretariat to Brussels will undoubtedly contribute to a clearer understanding of problems and solutions and to the establishment of appropriate links. As I stressed at the outset, the development of foreign and security policy at twelve-power level will, of course, have to be borne in mind. So far as security and defence is concerned, these developments will at all times have to bear in mind that in the ongoing process foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty there must in future be neither distinctions nor contradictions, but convergence towards the final objective of the link between a common security and defence policy for European Union and the inclusion of WEU in its structure. In other words, the achievement of the common defence policy as provided for in Article J.4 of the treaty.

A link must also be established between the various aspects of NATO and WEU activity with due regard for the principles of complementarity, co-ordination and transparency. From the political standpoint, this means basically harmonising the lines of development of NATO and WEU in the new context now emerging in Europe, in such manner as to enhance the stabilising functions of both and to avoid harmful competition. It is particularly in the area of peace-keeping and preventing conflict that this will have to be brought about. A basic requirement, therefore, consists in fuller exchanges of information and closer contacts between the two secretariats. Both at the Petersberg WEU Council and within NATO texts have been adopted on practical measures for linking the two organisations, with particular reference to the exchange of documents and attendance at each other's meetings. It will also have to be borne in mind that WEU and NATO do not have identical structures and that the maintenance of separate identities for the two organisations combined with the pursuit of convergent objectives requires a practical management approach which will avoid detrimental distrust and misunderstanding.

I should like to conclude by reminding you that all these requirements and initiatives mark a phase of great political significance of vital importance for the future of our continent. This means that all of us, governments and parliaments, are called upon to make a particularly firm commitment and to exercise great responsibility.

If you feel it to be necessary I shall be glad to enlarge on some of the points I have touched on in reply to any questions you may wish to ask.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman-in-Office, for your address.

I am sure you are ready to answer members of the Assembly who have questions to ask.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – While preparing its report on the enlargement of WEU, the Political Committee faced some problems which are now preventing a discussion on this report during the Assembly's session. In particular, it had difficulties assessing the status of associate member states of WEU and the possibilities of the Assembly granting representatives of associate members satisfactory status.

In its reply to Written Question 300, the Council stated that associate members of WEU are not parties to the modified Brussels Treaty and that it appears that only representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe can be full members of the WEU Assembly. On the other hand, the Secretary-General stated in a public meeting with members of the United Kingdom parliamentary delegation to the WEU Assembly that the Assembly is fully autonomous when granting status to representatives of associate member states.

Apart from this, there are other questions regarding the suspension of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty under certain circumstances. The Political Committee will submit these questions in writing to the Council and I ask the Council to provide a prompt answer to them, so that the report on enlargement of WEU can still be discussed in a meeting of the Standing Committee at the beginning of next year.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in my opinion the Assembly is completely autonomous and sovereign as regards the possibility of including representatives from associate member countries' parliaments in its activities; furthermore, if you also want the opinion of the Council Chairman, I can say that it is favourable.

As regards formal questions and requests I can give an assurance that a prompt reply will be given so as to facilitate the committee's work and further permanent relations between the Assembly and the Council.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Will the Minister recommend or support the suspension or expulsion of any member state from this organisation if evidence reveals that it has failed to take action to prevent the supply of weaponry or military equipment to assist the maintenance of war in former Yugoslavia? Will he ensure that the proposition is considered urgently by the Council of Ministers; and that, if this Assembly or a sister organisation endorses this view, it will ensure that such action is taken as a matter of urgency?

Does the Minister agree that, if any European country is reluctant to supply the military capacity that may be needed in support of international authority, the least it can do is to take rather more positive political action than hitherto – if not on its own behalf then in support of international approaches such as the Vance-Owen initiative?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I consider that the first and second cases presented clearly demonstrate a deliberate failure to fulfil the obligations entered into in WEU...

I was saying, Mr. President, that the first two cases presented constitute clear proof of deliberate failure, on the part of one or other member country, to fulfil the obligations deriving from membership of the organisation. This applies in particular in the specific cases where a commitment to comply was given without reservation. In such circumstances it is clear that the member country is deviating from organisation policy so that the case concerning that country must, if there are proofs, be examined by the competent authority which in this case is the Council.

As regards the possibility of expulsion, as has been requested, it would be necessary to assess and judge the gravity of the action and to check whether this is clear evidence of a desire not to fulfil the duties deriving from membership of the organisation.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – When answering Mr. Stoffelen's question, will the Minister answer a simple question for me as well? Is the Assembly entitled to grant votes to associate members and observer members? Secondly, as we have already been told by Ministers that they are not prepared to tell the Assembly which nations committed the 71 suspected violations of sanctions, how can we judge whether to withdraw membership from the offending countries? Will the Minister come clean and tell us which nations were involved in those 71 suspected cases?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in reply to the first question I believe that it is the right and duty of the Assembly to assess the differing value of the commitments entered into by full members, observers and associates, and to draw the appropriate conclusions. In this matter, I do not believe that a decision can be taken by ref-

Mr. Colombo (continued)

erence to an illogical criterion which is that governing membership of the organisation and therefore the duties of each member in the various assemblies.

On the second question, I must say that, as things stand, no denunciation is required if I have properly understood the question, and I have therefore no advice to offer.

The PRESIDENT. – Lord Finsberg, would you care to ask your second question again?

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – An answer to one of our questions informed us that there have been 71 suspected violations of sanctions. In his reply to Mr. Hardy, the Minister said that the Assembly would have to weigh up the problems involved if there were proof of sanctions-busting. How can we judge that when Ministers refuse to give us the names of the countries involved?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – If there are suspicions we have to move on to proof. Until such time as we have proof I do not believe that suspicions should be aired.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Fry.

Mr. FRY (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that question and answer, can the Minister tell us whether, under the new régime for checking on the embargo, if ships are stopped and there is proof that the country in question is breaking the embargo, he will take the action for which my colleagues Lord Finsberg and Mr. Hardy have asked?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – If proofs are forthcoming, the appropriate procedures will, of course, have to be set in motion. As regards the kind of procedure and penalties, I think that these should be decided by reference to the extent of sanctions-busting and its consequences. I do not think that we can talk, as I heard someone say, about expulsion: I am sure that no judge would decide so summarily or immediately without assessing the extent of the violation and of the consequent penalties.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Ward.

Mr. WARD (*United Kingdom*). – Let me again follow up that question. It will be obvious to the Minister that we regard the issue of sanctions-busting as extremely important. There is a

double set of values here. May I therefore ask the Minister to take away with him the mood of the Assembly? Can he assure us that, if people are sanctions-busting, proof will now be available, because they will be stopped, and that, if sanctions-busting cargoes are found, we shall be given three pieces of information: what the cargo is; who is carrying it; and who is sending it to Yugoslavia?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, a number of basic distinctions may need to be drawn. Replying first to the last question I would say that, clearly, with the new arrangements and the enforcement of sanctions, penalties must be imposed if any violation is proved.

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not wish there to be any confusion about our discussions. I would not wish that, starting from sanctions-busting by private individuals using merchant vessels to carry arms and other cargo, the blame should be passed on to states: that is quite a different matter.

I felt that there would be some confusion on this point and that is why I have thought it appropriate to make this important distinction.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van Velzen.

Mr. van VELZEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I think we all have the feeling that the problem does indeed exist, but that somehow or other the official proof does not. Mr. Colombo has just told us that a meeting of the Council will be held very shortly, and it will, of course, also deal with matters relating to the maintenance of sanctions. Is it possible that the Council may decide to strengthen the control, not only by sea but also by land, to put an end to this ambiguity?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I do not fully understand this question. If the whole of the debate is based on the new departure represented by the implementation of Resolution 787, which is concerned with enforcement of the embargo and therefore with sanctions, checks, etc., what you say does not need a reply because it is already given in the United Nations resolution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Marten.

Mr. MARTEN (*Germany*) (Translation). – What co-operation is there with countries bordering the Danube, particularly Bulgaria,

Mr. Marten (continued)

Romania and Hungary, in monitoring the sanctions? Are there organisations responsible for this? Or have these groups still to be set up? Sanctions violations are constantly seen to be occurring at places where Serbia borders the Danube. Will this be monitored better and more accurately in future? Or will additional units be assigned there?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – So far as the Danube is concerned, responsibility lies with each of the riparian countries. So far as I know there is no kind of institutionalised collaboration between these countries for the enforcement of the embargo. As everyone knows, this is one of the routes along which the embargo is violated. At the last meeting in Rome on 20th November, we had no right to remind others of their duty. We did, of course, invite the Danube countries to be more thorough and we also offered our assistance. If our collaboration were accepted, we could help the countries concerned to enforce the embargo.

At various meetings since 20th November, acting both as Italian Minister and in particular as WEU Chairman, I personally have repeated to these countries the invitation to step up their surveillance and have renewed our offer to collaborate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you once more, Minister, for your replies.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Thank you, Mr. President.

8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 1321)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly as set out in Document 1321.

I believe Mr. Stoffelen wishes to propose an amendment to the draft order of business.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I have already tried to make my point to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. This morning, the Political Committee tried to enter into discussion about the report on enlargement. We discovered that, apparently, the Council of Min-

isters was not able, or willing, to make it possible for associate members to be granted the necessary status. Members of countries with observer status also present a problem.

The answer is clear. Article IX has been contravened. I have already said that we shall put a written question, stating that, as long as we do not know what our limits are supposed to be, we shall not be able to complete our discussions.

I have a double request. First, in accordance with Rule 33, paragraph 1(d), on behalf of my committee, I move that the report on enlargement be referred back to the Political Committee. Secondly, we want to put clear written questions to the Council of Ministers, and we want formal written answers. Then we can complete our discussions, and the Standing Committee can discuss the report.

In accordance with Rule 20, paragraph 2, I ask the Assembly not only to refer the report back, but to include this item in the agenda. In the meantime, I hope that the Presidential Committee will ask the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to study my question, in co-ordination with the Political Committee. I hope that the Standing Committee can then meet in March.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – So Mr. Stoffelen, on behalf of the Political Committee, proposes that the debate on the report on the enlargement of WEU should be withdrawn from the order of business of this part-session.

The Assembly no doubt agrees.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

I therefore propose to the Assembly that the draft order of business for tomorrow morning's sitting be amended so that the debate on the report on Turkey presented by Mr. Moya on behalf of the Political Committee will begin immediately after the election of the Clerk of the Assembly and be interrupted at 11.30 a.m. for the address by Mr. Rifkind.

I call Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Thank you for giving me the floor, Mr. President. I wish to ask you to consult the Assembly on another amendment to the draft order of business. The point is that I am down on the order of business for Wednesday morning's sitting, late on, to present a report on the Yugoslav situation on behalf of the Political Committee. Two days ago I heard that the Portuguese Prime Minister would see me that very day at 3 p.m. which means I have to leave the Assembly by 11 a.m. at the latest. That is why I wish to ask you to consult the Assembly and seek its agreement, by arrangement if necessary with the Rapporteurs, to a change in the order of

Mr. Goerens (continued)

business whereby the report I have to present would be moved from third to first place, i.e. 9.30 a.m.

I was not able to inform you of this, Mr. President, at the meeting of the Presidential Committee because I only received the invitation three days later. Thank you for your understanding.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It is not easy. I would suggest 10 a.m. Two debates are programmed, one on European security policy, for which you are Rapporteur, Mr. Goerens, on behalf of the Political Committee, and another on the Yugoslav crisis.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Could you ask Mr. Rathbone if he would be kind enough to present the two reports on budgetary questions after mine?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That will be difficult because Mr. Rathbone is not here. I hope the Assembly will be able to decide on Wednesday's order of business tomorrow.

Subject to that reservation, I take it there is no objection to the amended draft order of business.

The draft order of business, as amended, is adopted.

9. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The changes in the membership of committees requested by a number of delegations have to be agreed by the Assembly.

They have been published in Notice No. 8 which has been distributed.

The changes are subject to ratification by the Assembly in accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure.

Has anyone any objection to their ratification?...

The changes are agreed to.

10. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1346)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee, Document 1346.

I call Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly and Rapporteur.

Mr. FOSCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, after the President of the Assembly's general political review and the address by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, my report is a lightweight, but I shall add a few thoughts about the rôle of the Presidential Committee as the provider of continuity, between sessions, in the Assembly's relations with other institutions.

The committee has had two main political concerns: the protection of the people of former Yugoslavia and the future of WEU. At its meeting in Bonn on 25th June the Presidential Committee strongly emphasised the helplessness of European governments in face of the tragic events in the last year in former Yugoslavia and particularly in the last three months in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Presidential Committee said the time had come to ask governments to act immediately to halt the barbaric fighting devastating former Yugoslavia. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina having deteriorated seriously last August, the chairmen of the political groups in the Assembly decided for the first time to convene a meeting of the Standing Committee in Paris on 3rd September 1992. It had been set up for the specific purpose of adopting recommendations in emergencies. The Standing Committee was informed by Mr. Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy, about the latest developments in the situation in former Yugoslavia and the arrangements made by WEU.

I had previously given an account of my talks with Mr. Emilio Colombo, who had received me specifically so that I could explain his views to the Standing Committee. In this way, the Italian Chairmanship-in-Office, which had also organised a study mission in the Adriatic for the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Defence Committee, enabled the body that is a miniature assembly to deliberate in full knowledge of the facts. After a detailed exchange of views the Standing Committee adopted Recommendation 525 on strengthening the embargo. This text was transmitted to the Council in the same way as the recommendations adopted during the first part of our session. The Presidential Committee had organised a joint meeting with the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council on 18th November in Rome, just two days before the ministerial meeting. Mr. Colombo and Mr. Andò met this wish to resume joint meetings in full and the Presidential Committee noted with satisfaction that the Council was at last starting along the course advocated in the recommendation transmitted to it on 3rd September.

Tackling the question of the enlargement of WEU at the joint meeting on 18th November, the Presidential Committee referred to the position adopted by the Political Committee.

Mr. Foschi (continued)

The Rome communiqué seems to have partly satisfied the latter.

We are gratified that at least one of the three members of the European Community not members of WEU signed a protocol of accession, on 20th November, enabling its delegation, once parliament has ratified the protocol, to play a full part in the work of our Assembly.

Last June, in Recommendation 517, the Assembly contested the affirmation in the Maastricht Treaty that 1998 might be a deadline for WEU and asked that legal experts be consulted on this subject. At the joint meeting in Rome, Mr. Colombo gave favourable consideration to this proposal. The Presidential Committee welcomed this because it believes it is essential for the authority of WEU not to be weakened just when it is given a vital rôle in ensuring security in Europe and the world.

As is customary, the Chairmanship-in-Office, held by Italy since 1st July, is represented at this session by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Colombo, and the Minister of Defence, Mr. Andò. The Presidential Committee also decided to invite Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, whose views on the matters we are to debate will be heard with the greatest attention.

In June the Presidential Committee invited the Minister of Defence of Sweden. At this part-session it is the Minister of Defence of Austria who is to address our Assembly. It is particularly important for the Assembly to hold a dialogue with the representative of a country that wishes to accede to the European Community with full knowledge of the prospects offered by the Maastricht agreements. Austria's position at the heart of Europe confers a special weight on the opinions of its government on the problems affecting part of our continent.

I would add that the Assembly had indicated the value it attached to associating representatives of the parliaments of neutral countries with its deliberations. The Presidential Committee decided to send, for the first time, an invitation to the Swiss parliament which showed its satisfaction at taking part in the work of our Assembly. Lastly, during this part-session, the Assembly will be addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, Mr. Melescanu. Through his contribution to our work we shall learn of his vision of European security which necessarily transcends the framework of the three defence organisations and implies the establishment of an order of justice and peace throughout Europe. Finally, the Presidential Committee has made the necessary arrangements to enable the Assembly to elect a new Clerk.

There are also matters I have to point out concerning budgetary questions. The President of the Assembly, accompanied by the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, informed the Permanent Council at its meeting in London on 24th June of the guidelines for our draft budget for 1993 and the Assembly's wish to be apprised of the Council's opinion earlier than in the past. To speed up procedure, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee adopted this draft budget on 22nd July 1992 and it was immediately transmitted to the Council, whereas it is not usually transmitted until the end of September.

I would like to emphasise, as the President of the Assembly has already done, the backing the Assembly was given on that occasion by the Italian chairmanship. Its representatives recognise that the Assembly should have resources commensurate with its tasks. We can but regret that the Italian presidency was unable to convince all members of the Council to examine the Assembly's requests more benevolently.

However this may be, the Presidential Committee will make every effort to ensure, in 1993, that the Assembly's requests set out in Assembly Order 80 are met and that the dialogue between Assembly and Council on the budget takes place in more harmonious conditions than in the past. The Secretary-General and the members of the Permanent Council can testify to the efforts made by the Presidential Committee to that end.

To conclude this brief report, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to say that we are able to confirm Mr. Colombo's commitment to continued dialogue with the parliamentary Assembly. I feel, however, that we, too, have to maintain this continuity in dialogue and vigorously assert the central aspect of the Assembly's rôle now that WEU's field of prospective action has widened. True, there are many uncertainties and reservations. There are many difficulties in taking action that is really effective. However, I feel that, with its autonomy, the Assembly is able to make a concrete contribution and not simply proclaim its central rôle in the western democratic systems in bringing about the conditions of peace, but also support action by the ministers in co-ordination with other institutions at the international level. Given the scarcity of plenary assemblies, action by the Presidential Committee must remain the body ensuring continuity in dialogue. The first meeting of the Standing Committee showed how useful and necessary it was that it should meet more frequently, particularly in so variable a time where changes and risks are so great.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I would like to thank our Rapporteur, Mr. Foschi, very warmly for his full, even exhaustive, report on the work of the Presidential Committee whose importance can never be sufficiently stressed.

Secondly, I would like to pay a tribute to you, Mr. President, for the way in which you preside over the work of the Assembly and its various bodies and the administrative services that support us and which, in these particularly complicated times, have managed, with the benefit of your wisdom and know-how, to meet the demands made upon them and, whilst not perhaps satisfying every one of our ambitions, to enable us, at least, to perform our rôle as well as possible.

My third comment is to do with relations with the Council of Ministers and links up with Mr. Foschi's last point. I am talking about political contacts, of course, and essentially those with the Chairmanship-in-Office, but I also refer to our relations with the other colleagues of the Chairman-in-Office, be they in foreign affairs or defence. I feel that, in times as complicated as those we have been through in the case, or, I should say, the frightful tragedy of former Yugoslavia and the problem of the implementation of the decisions that gave rise to the Petersberg declaration, we could probably have done better. I think it would be a good thing, Mr. President, apart from your own personal efforts and those made by Mr. Foschi on your instructions and with the agreement of the Presidential Committee in the preparatory relations he entered into with Mr. Colombo – these are simple, flexible and effective measures – if we could agree with the Council of Ministers to go back to the system we had in the past and which a number of us put into practice. It was invented by Mr. Genscher and we called it the *Gymnisch* method. It consisted in informal meetings on important occasions. There was nothing regular about it. We met with a minister or ministers to reach agreement on the essential items which the Chairmanship-in-Office wanted on the agenda at Council meetings or else when there was a serious decision to be taken. I feel that, in advance of the important and highly official meetings there have to be between the Presidential Committee, very often backed up by the Defence Committee or the Political Committee, the Chairman-in-Office and the swarm of ambassadors' advisers, it would be a good thing for specific points to be discussed by policy makers at government and parliamentary levels before decisions are taken on them. At such meetings we could well have a constructive dialogue that would be useful to both sides.

Mr. Foschi wondered how relations with the Council could be improved. There is no need to systematise anything or to invent new rules. When there are big decisions to be taken it is

personal contact at the political level which is the most important.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Liapis, Observer from Greece.

Mr. LIAPIS (*Observer from Greece*). – I do not want to take part in this debate, but I wish to express the deep satisfaction of the Speaker and the other members of the parliament of the Hellenic Republic at the recent accession of our country, as a full member, to Western European Union. The invitation, addressed to Greece at Maastricht, to accede to this defence component of the European Union was a natural consequence of the wide recognition that our country is interested in and capable of contributing positively to European security and defence.

As Greek parliamentarians we are both honoured by and aware of the great responsibilities that are placed on our shoulders by the fact that this thirty-eighth session of the Assembly is the first occasion on which representatives of our country have been present here since Greece was made a full member of WEU.

In this respect we are confident that we will be able to participate fully from now on in the work of this Assembly, as the precedent of the accession of Spain and Portugal has established.

We are determined to carry out our responsibilities with confidence that the rôles of Europe and WEU, as well as that of Greece, as factors of stability in our sensitive area have been enhanced by the recent enlargement of WEU. We intend to ratify as soon as possible in our national parliament the protocol of accession, and we are confident that the same speedy procedures will be followed by all other national parliaments of member states.

The members of the Greek Parliament look forward to contributing to the construction of a Europe based on our common values and ideals. In doing so we start by conveying today our warmest greetings to our colleagues from the other member states.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does Mr. Foschi wish to reply?

Mr. FOSCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I do not need to, Mr. President. My statement has been fully supplemented by the speeches of my colleagues.

I very much hope that we shall be able to continue working under your presidency in the coming months when a wealth of decisions will have to be made.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I take it that the Assembly agrees that the action of the Presidential Committee be ratified.

Is there any objection?...

It is so decided.

11. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:

Part One: European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1342, Part One)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council: Part One: European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1342, Part One.

I call Mr. Goerens to present his report.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, after the report on the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty that I had the honour of presenting a little over a year ago, following that on Western European Union after Maastricht, I now have to present one on European security policy – European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht. This report is a sequel to a series of studies I have had the honour of presenting on behalf of the Political Committee and forms a further step in a coherent approach first defined by the Political Committee and then adopted by the Assembly.

Some of you will not have failed to observe that I have criticised rather severely the shortcomings I was able to detect at various points. They are in fact obvious when you think that the thirty-seventh annual report only reached us on 25th May last, in other words, one week before the Assembly met. So there was no way we could prepare any reply about the work of the Council relating to the previous year, although Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty requires the Assembly to give its views on the annual report. If the annual report reaches us at so late a date making it impossible to refer to the committees, this is clearly a serious default on the part of the Council in regard to our Assembly.

So the report reached us too late. In addition, it says nothing about the activities of certain bodies that still have a statutory existence. I am thinking, in particular, of the Agency for the Control of Armaments whose rôle is certainly residual but which, nevertheless, is monitoring the Geneva chemical disarmament negotiations. Because it is statutory it ought to be mentioned in the annual report. You will find comments to that effect in the written report which you received in good time. Thus, apart from the late appearance of the report, it has some manifest shortcomings that also call for criticism.

My report then analyses the consequences of Maastricht for Western European Union, the Petersberg declaration, the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament, and the dialogue with the Central European countries.

As regards the direct consequences of Maastricht for WEU, I would remind you that the Assembly voted practically unanimously in favour of the last report that I had the honour of presenting which, in the preamble to its draft recommendation, invited the Assembly to make all necessary efforts to bring the process of ratification of the Maastricht agreements to a successful conclusion. Events since then have not made any change to the attitude of the Political Committee whose report I present here today.

However, the comments prompted by the Danish “no” rightly cause us concern. Here, of course, I speak not only as Rapporteur but also as the representative of a small country. The comments following the Danish “no” are worrying to the extent that a “no” vote in a referendum in a small country tends to be passed off as just another news item. We have also heard other comments on the possible “no” of a major country also obliged to have a referendum to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. There a “no” would have been far less likely to be treated as a minor event and, naturally, there was a question, depending on the result, of renegotiating the treaty.

A minor news item in the one case could have been a serious situation in the other because a bigger country was involved. I believe that this attitude infringes the principle of the equality of states. We should denounce it and keep doing so.

This is not the only question prompted by the difficulties encountered by the ratification process among the Twelve. The monetary crisis which could well upset the timetable for the establishment of economic and monetary union is one of the other factors suggesting that the implementation of the treaty will probably be slower than planned.

There are others but I will spare you the details. Speculating on the possible refusal to ratify by one of the Twelve is not a game I wish to play. That is not my rôle. However, there is the question, should ratification fail, of whether Western European Union might not be obstructed or even prevented altogether from contributing to the establishment of a European dimension of security and defence.

In that connection I will quote the questions and answers on the problem that has just been raised. You will find them in Chapter II of my report.

A few months ago I had an opportunity to ask the Council what the effects of these delays and

Mr. Goerens (continued)

the Danish referendum would be on the measures decided in Maastricht to bring about an early alignment of WEU and the European Community. The answer given me at the time was that the two WEU declarations were closely related politically to the Maastricht Treaty and could only be understood in its context. This was clearly reflected in the fact that Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union was quoted in full in the declaration of the Nine on the rôle of Western European Union and its relations with the Atlantic Alliance.

On receiving this answer, the Rapporteur put the following question: "The declarations by the nine member countries of WEU adopted in Maastricht are part and parcel of the legal arrangements agreed upon in Maastricht. Would they still be valid in the event of the Maastricht Treaty not being ratified?" The reply given us on 2nd November last was: "As far as formal aspects are concerned, the declarations of the Nine, given their political nature, are not subject to ratification and would thus remain valid even in the event of the Maastricht Treaty not being ratified."

I have no intention – as I said – to go in for speculation but it would be interesting to table questions in parliament in all our governments in order to find out whether the two declarations of the Nine are really an integral part of the Treaty of Maastricht, as the Chairman-in-Office of the Council said at the time, or whether the policy defined at Petersberg can be framed outside the treaty.

It shows that the political will was certainly present at the two intergovernmental conferences concerned with the establishment of economic and monetary union and external policy and joint security, but also that there is a tendency to neglect the specifically legal and pragmatic dimension for which there is every justification in an exercise of such strategic importance.

This highlights all the value of and reason for the modified Brussels Treaty. There are two choices: either the Petersberg declaration, vital for the future of WEU, is only made possible once the Maastricht Treaty is ratified by the twelve countries of the European Community, or else there has to be some other legal basis to start from in order to put the approach defined in Petersberg into effect.

Another important point is the reference in the Maastricht Treaty to a possible 1998 deadline. The Assembly has always contested any interpretation to the effect that the modified Brussels Treaty should end in December 1998. Our understanding is that this is not a deadline but an opportunity allowing member countries

to bring to an end their participation in the work of Western European Union after a period of fifty years that began with the lodging of the last ratification in the capital where the treaty is domiciled.

For the Assembly this period begins in 1954, not 1948, and could not therefore come to an end in 1998. I would not hide from you the fact that there is no agreement yet between the Assembly and the Council on the interpretation of this clause. That is no reason for dodging the issue and leaving this problem of unquestionable importance unresolved.

I am grateful to Mr. Colombo, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for having replied so frankly and directly to the question that we asked him at our meeting on 18th November last. He approved the approach proposed by our Assembly at its last session to the effect that independent legal experts should be invited to give their opinion on the question. This has to be done if, with a view to the situation to be established in 1996, we are to reconsider European security policy as a whole and as set out, too, in the preamble to the Maastricht Treaty.

I am very pleased at the attitude of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and I hope that, there being strength in unity, we may find an answer to this vital question fairly soon.

My report also refers to the Petersberg declaration whose importance is comparable to that of those preceding it, in particular the Rome declaration and the platform of The Hague.

The Maastricht Treaty, with the declarations of the Nine, could be said to constitute the triggering of a process whose purpose is to spell out how the Council intends to apply the two Maastricht declarations, including the Petersberg declaration. It is in three parts on which I have commented at length with the help of the Political Committee and Mr. Burgelin, its adviser. With their valuable assistance I was able to analyse the importance of the Petersberg declaration in greater detail. Its first part concerns WEU's place in the system ensuring Europe's security. The second relates to relations between WEU and NATO. I shall spare you the details and go on straight away to another section which drew the attention of the Political Committee, namely relations between WEU and the European Parliament. It has to be realised that this problem would not arise if each, in its own field, embarked on actions stemming directly from the application of the treaty on which its activity is based.

An example I would like to quote is the order of the French Constitutional Council which says very clearly that the European Parliament has only the responsibilities defined by the treaties attributing them. In the case of security and

Mr. Goerens (continued)

defence questions, it must not be forgotten that the Maastricht negotiations in no way cancelled the modified Brussels Treaty which, in Article IX, defines the responsibilities of our Assembly very clearly. These are defined in a manner enabling our Assembly to express itself through the presentation of an annual report which we divide up into a number of parts corresponding to the different committees in our Assembly. After consultation in these committees, and the adoption of a report, these actions, proposals, recommendations, resolutions and draft orders are debated here in the Assembly and then we send to the Council a number of recommendations to which we then await the Council's reaction.

It is this non-stop to-and-fro between monitoring activities and political initiatives that is the reason for our Assembly's existence and the foundation of our tradition and whose implication is that Europe can no longer do without the only European parliamentary assembly authorised by treaty to discuss defence and security questions.

It is obvious that the more integrated Europe becomes – let us assume that the Twelve ultimately ratify Maastricht – the more the European Parliament will concern itself with security questions as set down in the Maastricht Treaty. Needless to say, both the treaty and the declarations attached to it spell out very clearly the prerogatives of our Assembly. If, as intelligent people, we can agree on the interpretation of the treaty and the declarations, the question of responsibilities should present no problem.

To my mind, it is either deliberate bad faith or failure to recognise elementary truths that is at the root of the problems of interpretation regarding the responsibilities of our parliamentary Assembly in defence and security matters.

Frankly, I hope that it will be possible in the future to establish proper relations between the European Parliament and our Assembly based on reciprocal recognition and on a dialogue between equals. There needs to be full respect for the powers of each institution and the objectives of European Union.

That, Mr. President, is a very brief summary of the essence of the report. It would be quite impossible to give every detail of the comments made with regard to the Council, whether in the form of criticisms or suggestions. Having been relatively hard on the Council, however, I would like to tell you that the dialogue between our Assembly and the Council undoubtedly suffers from an obvious affliction as regards the publication of the annual report and its transmission to the Assembly. I say this in all frankness.

But I would also like to tell you that, in other respects, our dialogue with the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council is of a completely different quality when it comes to giving us information by word of mouth. It is far fuller than when transmitted to us in writing.

It is my belief that our determination in striving to establish good relations based on proper information has not been without result. We learned a few days ago that at the ministerial meeting we finally won satisfaction on several points of which the following are only the most important.

It was finally accepted that the Assembly viewpoint on the wrongly-named 1998 deadline was worthy of study and that the specialists should be consulted. That is one very important result. We hope soon to have the Council's reply following that consultation.

I shall spare you further details, Mr. President. I would simply like you to know that in the end the Political Committee was unanimous in its adoption of this report whose draft recommendation I also urge you to adopt. I agree that it is a very lengthy recommendation. But in a complicated situation simplification has its pitfalls. Which is why both the report and the draft recommendation in their turn reflect the complexity of the subject.

I would lastly like to thank you all for your attention and also the Council, in spite of the criticisms that I have levelled at it. I would urge you all to respond to what is asked of us, namely to make our contribution to the formulation of a European security and defence dimension. The Assembly is expected to play a major rôle. This we shall do by calling on all those energies capable of making political initiative the true engine of European security and defence. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we are running a little late. There are ten names down to speak so I propose five minutes for each speaker.

Does anyone object?...

It is so decided.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL (*United Kingdom*). – I am delighted to address the Assembly, and particularly delighted to follow the Rapporteur. Those who have read the report – and I assume that everyone has – will conclude that it is not only comprehensive but thought-provoking. It touches on all the main issues, including the relationship between WEU and the European Community and the relationship between WEU and the European Parliament; moreover, it highlights – perhaps better than any other report

Mr. Marshall (continued)

that I have read – what happens when politicians work in haste to cobble together an association that seeks to satisfy so many different parties.

At the heart of the report is a clear statement. Any alliance has three foundations: political aims, legal framework and effectiveness. The report questions – rightly, in my view – whether some or all of those foundations have been weakened in an attempt to give WEU a superficially coherent structure.

Perhaps inevitably, in a period of rapid change such as that currently experienced by WEU, there is a tendency to blur political aims and to bend the rules in order to compromise and seek unanimity. I think that both the blurring of political aims and the bending of rules are illustrated by the compromise on Greece and Turkey. That must not take place, however, at the price of undermining the effectiveness of the organisation. I think that we would all agree that the revitalised WEU that is now emerging as one of the major elements of the new European security architecture is itself a compromise between those European states who believe that European Union should assume a greater responsibility for its own defence – separate from those still allied to the United States – and European states like my own, Britain, to which NATO remains the indispensable and irreplaceable framework of European defence.

That compromise is at the heart of the Maastricht Treaty, which states that WEU is to develop as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. My country prides itself on having persuaded other European states to accept the principle of strengthening NATO's European pillar; yet, paradoxically, we in particular will be faced with the logical consequence of that: the European contribution to NATO will be channelled through WEU.

If the new relationship between WEU and NATO is to work effectively – as others have pointed out – it must be based on complete transparency and complementarity, not on competition. I fear, however, that there is already competition, particularly in the offer of both organisations' services to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe for peace-keeping operations. I hope that these are teething troubles and not a sign of things to come.

In the longer term, we shall have to face the fact that some states do not want a Europeanised NATO. They want a genuine two-pillar alliance with Europe's contribution mediated through a single structure, namely,

WEU. In a few years' time perhaps that will not seem such a radical option to my own country. It may be perceived as a good idea, not a bad idea, and, incidentally, one which the United States will not oppose.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*). – Ladies and gentlemen, what is known as chaos theory is nowadays very prominent in discussions about modern physics and philosophy. I am reminded of this chaos theory when I think about the current situation of European unification policy with regard to European Union, and a common defence policy.

In the days of Talleyrand and Metternich it would have been inconceivable for the states which were signatories to the Congress of Vienna to have appended their signatures before the terms of the treaty had been worked out in detail by the diplomats and officials. Perhaps the reason why such a sound achievement was possible in those days lay in the happy fact that there was as yet no television. Now that the German Bundestag is going to vote on the Maastricht Treaty this very week, the day after tomorrow, it rather reminds me of an honour guard of soldiers firing the last salute by an open graveside.

And the reason why I feel like this is that during the last few months we simply have not managed to recognise what it is all about – we have ducked the big decisions and have really been trying to improvise.

In his report Mr. Goerens has given an excellent account of these difficulties. I do not wish to dwell upon them further, but would simply add the following remarks.

One of the problems is the whole method of parliamentary involvement. Mr. Goerens has pointed out how late Council reports arrive, how incomplete they are and that certain questions such as the Agency for the Control of Armaments are not touched upon at all. I should like expressly to emphasise what we are asking of the Council in the recommendation: which papers we should like to see, which reports we should like to hear, because they are necessary and important to our work.

Or take another example of improvisation or chaos theory: the argument as to whether the treaty came into force from 1948 or from 1954. If, as the Council says, it was from 1948, then are Germany and Italy involved at all? Can they wash their hands in innocence from the start, or are they excluded?

Or take the question of the delimitation between NATO and WEU. If, under the Petersberg declaration, WEU is to become responsible for certain tasks with the help of

Mr. Müller (continued)

some logistical support from NATO, does this not pose the question whether the whole of WEU is not capable of acting until unanimous resolutions have been passed in NATO? For NATO has more members than Western European Union. So what independent rôle can WEU play if matters are to remain as described here?

Or take the current situation in the Adriatic and the Balkans. It reminds me of Vivaldi's four seasons: the naval forces have one command under NATO, and they have a parallel command under WEU; the ground forces are under United Nations supreme command, but besides this there are also other units under national command – in other words there are four different possibilities. And the whole thing is presented as a common European defence policy, like an Italian opera. I think this shows up the weaknesses we are living with, and about which we simply must do something.

At the end of his introduction Mr. Goerens referred to the rôle of the European Parliament, the rôle which it arrogates to itself. Here he is of course touching on a point which affects parliamentary government in the whole of Europe – that there are in Europe wide areas of policy in which representative democracy involving monitoring by parliaments simply no longer exists. For either the European Parliament does not possess the rights in question or national parliaments no longer carry out the scrutiny, because the decisions are taken by councils of ministers whose members can theoretically be removed by a vote of no confidence in the national parliament, but this is something which will never happen in practice.

Clearly it was a political decision that no real integration in defence policy was provided for in the Maastricht Treaty, although this could have been done. As Mr. Goerens correctly pointed out, one is bound to ask: what will happen in 1998, if the treaty runs until 1998 and then European Union is supposed to be created; will WEU be simply taken over, or will some new organisation be created? All this is still unresolved.

And that makes it clear that what we really want from Europe is not being delivered. If Europe is to be what, I hope, most Europeans want it to be, namely a federative structure with common policies on unity, foreign affairs and defence, then that is more than a free trade association or an optimisation of bureaucracy.

I therefore call upon us all to place renewed emphasis on the rôle of parliaments, of representative democracy, and not to leave everything clouded in the uncertainty epitomised by the question: 1948 or 1954? And I wish

expressly to thank Mr. Goerens for giving such a lucid account of the weaknesses.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next speaker is Mr. Antretter.

I would ask all speakers to keep to five minutes.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – The pressure upon European governments to produce results at the time of the Maastricht summit conference led the WEU Council of Ministers to pass far-reaching resolutions and make declarations, some of which were obviously not fully thought out; the Petersberg Declaration in particular raises a whole series of questions. For this declaration has far-reaching effects, penetrating into the substance of the contractual basis of WEU and into the essence of its organisation. Consequently the supervisory function of our Assembly has seldom been so important as in the present year, precisely because the Council has made it practically impossible for the Assembly to enter into a timely dialogue with it about the substance of its intentions.

Thus Mr. Goerens deserves all the more thanks for his report, which brings to light in a penetrating and accurate analysis the main points at which the policy of the Council is defective. Amongst these I consider the modified Brussels Treaty to be of fundamental importance, as Mr. Goerens with good reason repeatedly stresses.

Political union in Europe must not be purchased at the price of a dilution of the basic elements of its security policy. But unhappily the Council of WEU has already taken a first dangerous step in that direction by linking the recent enlargement of WEU to a vague reservation referring to security guarantees and defence undertakings arising from the treaty, which are clearly not set out. Hitherto the assistance clause has been the main pillar of WEU and its specific nature. But on the basis of the Petersberg declaration nobody now knows to what extent this clause is still operative.

The way in which this reservation came into being is particularly suspect. If we fall into the habit of allowing reservations of this kind, which affect the substance of the treaty, to become effective simply through declarations, this will lead to creeping defections from and alterations to treaties, without their being legitimised by ratification in the parliaments.

If the Council really believes that the reservation is justified and covered by Article VII of the treaty, it must be prepared to say why it was ever necessary. Obviously the Council thought it was necessary because of the unclarified relationship between Greece and Turkey. But the reservation is so imprecise that nobody knows

Mr. Antretter (continued)

whether or not it might affect other provisions of the treaty. This procedure cannot be within the meaning of Article VII.

Therefore it has to be said quite clearly that the Council of WEU has abandoned its well-tried policy, supported by the Assembly, according to which every enlargement was supposed to help strengthen WEU and its particular constitution, as it emphasised in October 1987 before Spain and Portugal joined WEU. Instead of making the permanent cessation of the conflict between Greece and Turkey a condition of acceptance of those two states as full members, in Maastricht the Council consented to what can only be described as a shabby compromise, which can be in nobody's interest and which brings the foundations of WEU into question. Those are not good omens for the future.

Of the many problem areas analysed in the report, clarification of the relationship and division of work between WEU and NATO within Europe seems to me to be particularly important. Indeed, one important aspect might have been brought out even more clearly. The essential basis of the North Atlantic Treaty is a traditional alliance between the member states and governments. Yet the modified Brussels Treaty contains objectives going beyond the traditional intergovernmental alliances, objectives aimed at the integration of Europe, as clearly set forth in its preamble. Closer military co-operation in WEU as a precursor to the developing European Union is not incompatible with the alliance and its structures, since the integration of Europe would be incomplete without co-operation in the field of security policy, as has already been stated in The Hague platform.

In this connection it is important that the undertaking to co-operate closely with NATO should also subsist in the framework of political union. It is particularly important for this objective of WEU to be explained and emphasised at this time to the new administration in the United States. That is really one of the few points that seem to me to be slightly lacking in Mr. Goerens's report – a clear signal to the new American President, calling upon him to continue the existing co-operation in security and defence policies.

In closing I should like to touch upon the following point. The secret diplomacy about the Petersberg declaration has aroused considerable apprehension in our parliaments. The latest letter from the Secretary-General on this subject reached us only a few days ago. It contains a list of data, but little information of substance. I believe we all have lessons to learn from the referenda in Denmark and France. A Europe that is negotiated behind closed doors in artificially-

tailored phrases will encounter distrust and arouse opposition. This applies pre-eminently to co-operation in Europe on defence policy, if control by parliaments is no longer effective.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I wish, first, to compliment Charles Goerens on his report. It is long, thoughtful and discursive – typical of someone who has given so much over such a long time to the work of this Assembly. In a five-minute contribution it is impossible to do any justice to it; what I have to say will consequently be blunt and short and perhaps even crude and brutal.

The Rapporteur raises a range of questions which rightly focus on the lack of decisiveness and clarity within the Community and WEU about defence and the way in which the existing arrangements should be changed.

In paragraph 30 of Mr. Goerens's report, commenting on remarks made by Mr. Wörner, the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Goerens states, "For WEU to be deprived of 'effective means for military action' without 'NATO's assistance' means giving up all hope of making WEU the instrument of a European Union and reducing its rôle to that of a branch of NATO and denying the Twelve any means of basing a common external and security policy on the possibility of recourse to force."

In my view, Maastricht failed to achieve a clear, logical consensus within the Community on defence. Although clearly, as Charles Goerens said, implying the disbandment of WEU in favour of the hoped-for European Union by 1998, Maastricht hedged this around with so many reservations as to make any definition of this position, or how it would be institutionally achieved, impossible – to make no mention of the absence of any progress, which is more than declamatory – as in Title I of the Maastricht Treaty – about European Union itself.

I shall not follow Mr. Goerens into speculation about the possibility of Maastricht not being ratified by all the Twelve – for a British member that enters the realm of prayer. Rather, I shall confine myself to five short assertions.

First, the Community needs a foreign policy and defence component, and WEU provides an existing structure through which that may be established and subsequently widened. Through all the institutional and legal problems, we must not lose sight of that basic point.

Secondly, this does not need to change the basic form of NATO – although that organisation's aims are now, of course, in the process of change, from an alliance against the threat of the Soviet Union to one with the task

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

of maintaining political stability in its area of influence. All that would change would be that our European members of NATO would be not individually but collectively represented – including, en passant, France.

Thirdly, as to the attitudes of potential members of the European Community, especially those which, for a variety of reasons, pursued policies of neutrality – I think especially of Ireland, Sweden and Austria – the world has changed. Frankly, any justification for non-involvement in defending stability and democracy – which, in my view, was never very strong – disappears.

Fourthly, the question of the relationship between the European Parliament and this Assembly offers, in my opinion – even when defence is fitted into the institutional framework of the European Community – the potential for an imaginative solution, permitting national parliamentarians from this Assembly to maintain an input in Community institutions. That is an interesting way of looking at it, and we should look at these matters positively.

Fifthly, and lastly, I end with just a sentence or two on the former Yugoslavia. This, for me, has been the painful, anguished proof that we must have an integrated European defence capacity, and the right and ability to act.

Recently, I was told of a French general who said: "Give me the means and I will end the siege of Sarajevo in one day." Creating such a possibility by the integration of forces and command structures does not, of course, ensure correct political decisions at the end; but as we are, we do not seem able to make any proper decisions at all.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soysal, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. SOYSAL (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – With your permission I would like to congratulate Mr. Goerens, always supposing the congratulations of a mere observer count for something in this Assembly. His report is a masterpiece of legal analysis, I would even say legal reasoning; the way it brings out the gap, the contrast and the distortion there is between the will of this Assembly and the action, decision-making and attitude of the Council is excellent.

This gap between us is not without its consequences, though the legal implications, perhaps, are not too serious. The work of the Political Committee should bring some clarification as regards the new status assigned to my country, the terms of which the Council has not wholly succeeded in making clear and which leave us very much in the half-light. I would point out, however, that the Assembly was perfectly clear

about what it wanted in this regard. Lord Finsberg's report, which you adopted almost unanimously at the last part-session, says no distinction should be made between new members of the organisation, but in the Council's interpretation we have no idea whether we have voting rights or whether we can join in the work of the committees.

But that is just one particular point. Other consequences of this difference are more important and even disastrous, particularly for former Yugoslavia. Several speakers have already made the point: the discontinuity between what the Assembly wants and what the Council has in mind has tragic consequences for thousands of people who are continuing to die because the Assembly's wish for a total embargo – by sea, land and air – is inadequately followed through by the Council. A blind eye is being turned to certain violations, as we heard very recently and again today. This is an important issue.

To sum up, Mr. Goerens's report draws attention to the institutional malaise which our Assembly must do what it can to allay. It could have very serious consequences for the future of the organisation. As an observer I cannot wholly disinterest myself in that future because Turkey hopes one day to become a full member of the organisation. Given the gap there now is between the very firm resolve of the Assembly with regard to Yugoslavia and the attitude of the Council, and given the fact that our new status does not even give us the right to vote or serve on the committees, I fear that the Turkish national assembly will not be very enthusiastic about ratifying the latest instruments signed in Rome on 20th November last.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to say a few words in support of Mr. Goerens's report, which not only presents the Council of Ministers with an interesting set of recommendations, but also touches upon some of the fundamental problems concerning the construction of Europe at the present time. I am concerned, just as he is – indeed, we are perhaps all concerned – by the situation surrounding the process of European Union, which is not the same as that which prevailed when the Treaty of Union was signed in Maastricht.

There has been a process of slowing down; there is some uncertainty about the project, as Mr. Colombo said, and it is also true that this is because the situation has changed, in both economic and political terms. At Maastricht there was more confidence, more certainty and more optimism, both economically and politically. Now neither the expected solution to the crisis

Mr. de Puig (continued)

nor the end to the recession has materialised, and we are faced with serious economic problems, with having to revise economic forecasts, and also with the increasingly evident cost of the fall of the wall and the resultant problems of mass emigration and rejection; with the political problems this causes in some countries; with the demonstration of the weakness of the European monetary system which has created this turbulent situation of falling values and of currency devaluations which have clearly had the effect of reducing confidence in the future of Europe. The same is true of the referenda. One referendum was lost, and this caused concern, but another which was won also caused us concern. So confidence has to a certain extent waned and this is, therefore, more than ever the moment to support and defend the building of Europe, so that this will be only a slowdown, not a full stop or a step backwards.

In terms of defence policy, the subject before us, this brings us to some of the problems set out by Mr. Goerens when he refers to steps taken at the level of the WEU Council, or of some WEU institutions, behaviour which could delay the process or create problems in its implementation. We see decisions being taken in Petersberg and we do not quite know whether they militate in favour of this political plan or against it. I could not accept a situation in which chaos reigned, but there is indeed some confusion in the decisions which are being taken – chaos or confusion – because decisions are being taken which touch upon the very essence of the Maastricht decision. Maastricht says that in defence matters we have certain objectives and we are choosing an instrument to implement them. These objectives are the creation of a common defence policy today to give us a common defence tomorrow, and the instrument is WEU and the modified Brussels Treaty. And we are now witnessing actions which go beyond, or not so far as, the modified Brussels Treaty.

I call for strict compliance with the treaty. In my view anything which involves going beyond this project takes us away from what Maastricht signifies and leads us away from the correct way of building Europe. I mean that when we are talking of new members or of particular behaviour, the decisions of this Assembly must remain strictly within the terms of the treaty. If we strain the terms of the treaty this will create confusion, not efficiency; there will be no definitive proposal for a common defence policy. As I see it, we must defend the treaty, because it is Maastricht's chosen instrument in the field of European defence. Because it is the very construction of Europe which is involved; it is increasingly viewing the work of WEU and, consequently, the function of the modified Brussels Treaty, as an integral part of the construction of

Europe. All members who are awaiting a reply, and those who are going to apply for membership of WEU, must know that membership of WEU means, and will increasingly continue to mean, being part of European unity and that the aim of this project must be that all members of WEU are also members of the European Union. Let us not distort the terms of the treaties, or try to go beyond their provisions, for that is only prudent and logical.

Mr. Goerens's report disturbs me somewhat in bringing up these problems, and I was also concerned to hear that in this Assembly we have chosen, indeed, we have said we have voted unanimously in favour of those countries which have become associates having the same rights as member countries. I am not in favour of this and I recall that this was not voted for unanimously; it simply cannot be, not bearing in mind the Brussels Treaty, nor even for reasons of efficiency. Full members take decisions; associate members work with us, but that is not the same thing. What I would like to see is all those countries which have applied for membership of WEU, those which are already associates and those which will be in the future, becoming members of this Assembly and this institution. This is because I also hope that at a future date they will be members of the European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vazquez.

Mr. VAZQUEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in common with nearly all the previous speakers, I would like to begin by saying that Mr. Goerens's report is excellent because it highlights most of the problems being experienced in the construction of Europe in the sphere of security and defence policy. A moment ago, Mr. de Puig referred to the problems in the overall construction of Europe rather than merely in the area of security, problems which doubtless call into question many of the issues we are discussing.

I believe that at times such as this – times of chaos, confusion or turbulence – Europe needs more than ever to speak with a single voice and for the countries of Europe to act together. This is what, in theory, was being sought in the Maastricht Treaty, which aimed to establish a common foreign and security policy – obviously one of the basic pillars in the construction of this new European architecture. Yet this course is beset by problems; one has only to look at the complex obstacles and impediments contained in Article 3 of the treaty to identify potential common defence policies leading to a common, shared defence. A fundamental element of this must be the relationship between WEU and NATO.

As far as my political group, the Unified Left, is concerned, a true European defence would

Mr. Vazquez (continued)

have to meet at least some requirements: complete independence, undisputed subordination to the political authorities, multinational composition with human resources from the Twelve; strategy, operational capability and size of military contingent compatible with the concept of joint security encompassed within the spirit of the CSCE. In a word, we see European defence as an instrument underpinning a common foreign and security policy devised by the European Union through all of its institutions – the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament – and hence subject only to the civil authorities of the European Union itself.

My political group holds that defence, be it national or European, must be an instrument in the service of an overarching policy. That is why we favour a concept of European union and defence for the European Union which calls for exclusive Europeaness, fully independent of existing organisations. By independence we obviously do not mean something that can be interpreted as confrontation with or antagonism towards others. No, full co-operation, but with each party retaining its independence; the autonomy of the military organisations which exist at the present time.

Mr. President, I repeat that Mr. Goerens's report seems to me to be very important because, as has already been shown, it highlights the fact that we have reached a particularly sensitive point and that in some cases – as the report itself states – at this time of confusion concerning the ratification of Maastricht, new avenues appear to be opening up and we do not know where they will lead. We believe that the report has the virtue of pointing out all of this and that identification of the problems may lead to their solution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vittorino Colombo.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I confess as well to dissatisfaction and concern about the present state of the idea of European security and its achievements.

Our Rapporteur, Mr. Goerens, refers us to precise facts and to events which have occurred since Maastricht and we thank him for this.

In my opinion, it would be more useful, however, to highlight the real political situation and the post-Maastricht consequences. That treaty was to be the ultimate springboard for European political union and therefore for security; unfortunately, it would appear on the contrary to have provided reasons for obstruction, or even worse, a flare-up. I am thinking of the “no” vote in Denmark, the only 51% “yes” in France, the delay in the United

Kingdom and the doubts in virtually every other European country.

These are really matters for concern which should make us think about the great question-mark of where the European idea is going to finish up. Why this cultural, political and psychological hold-up involving the peoples of Europe, their parliaments and governments and the European organisations?

A powerful new political drive is required, in particular from WEU and in the first place from our Assembly.

Another important event is the change of President in the United States; there is a danger that Clinton's United States may prefer to turn inwards on to America's domestic problems and to loosen its relations with Europe.

How can this tendency be fitted into the context of a new solidarity between America and Europe?

Maybe the United States will not be alone in changing its policy; the same may apply to European countries which give the impression of preferring domestic to international policies. Here we could all do with some self-criticism, including France intransigently defending the interests of its own farmers in connection with the GATT to the detriment of prospects of increased international trade.

Then there is the policy of the Bundesbank, in other words Germany putting high interest rates first, and the breaking of ranks on the second Delors package by the rich EEC countries in their rejection of an increased Community budget that would benefit the poorer countries. Basically, ladies and gentlemen, there is a tendency to prefer safeguarding the prerogatives of the nation state to making some effort to achieve a great ideal.

The same applies to the problems of security and defence. A bitter war is going on in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia. This is in Europe, where we live! It is not enough to talk about WEU as the pillar of Europe's defence and security if it cannot take practical action in the form of ideas, structures, resources and decisions and thus rise above things of minor importance. I would just mention the transfer of WEU headquarters from London to Brussels.

Regarding the most important problems connected with security, we must clarify once and for all the relationship between WEU and NATO; we have all talked about this and must give it proper consideration and draw the right conclusions. From the United States there are increasing signals of a gradual reduction of the American presence in Europe. We are hearing that Europe must organise and pay for its own defence... do more to protect the emergent democracies in the East.

Mr. Colombo (continued)

These are questions which must be answered.

Another important issue is the Franco-German army corps, joined by no other WEU or NATO country whose command is independent of both WEU and NATO. In practice, this creates a third defence organ. This continuous multiplication of bilateral initiatives does nothing to strengthen Europe's security and leads to confusion and delays. Delays relating to Europe's security structure are particularly obvious in the case of Bosnia and of former Yugoslavia in general; here we have the recent decision to send two naval forces to the Adriatic to enforce the embargo. Two naval forces: one from NATO and one from the WEU countries.

This decision is clearly no example of strategic efficiency or of the ability and determination to intervene; on the contrary, it is a demonstration of indecision, lack of political will and weakness in the ability to command.

I could go on but I shall conclude by repeating my conviction that our WEU Assembly should make a realistic and courageous assessment of the post-Maastricht situation, starting from the new political conditions in Europe and the world and boldly urging all the countries of Europe to create their own security.

It is for us Europeans and not for others to give concrete proof of what we are resolved and able to do in and for Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – My thanks to Mr. Goerens for his excellent report. It is a rich source of reference that we can dip into throughout our proceedings, particularly in the case of the arguments he gives us in favour of retaining the modified Brussels Treaty in full. My great concern is how fast time goes by and the little left to us till 1996, which the Maastricht Treaty has set as the second great deadline for the construction of political union incorporating common defence and foreign affairs policy.

Where do we stand?

If WEU is to be the central pillar for this organisation, without a defence dimension there can be no joint foreign policy. Between now and then is WEU to be diluted and disguised or, on the contrary, will it be kept and strengthened?

To go by Mr. Goerens's report, it is my regretful opinion too that we are headed for a watered-down WEU treaty and there is even a risk of losing what is now its major distinction

compared with all military alliances. My reference, of course, is to the Petersberg declaration and the reservation it makes about Article V of the treaty applicable to all member states. This question needs further debate.

WEU's place among the three organisations concerned with security needs to be clearly defined. This is a task for the Assembly in the light of the Maastricht Treaty. First, we have the alliance of which we are part. The alliance – NATO – has set up NACC, which is a kind of NATO updated now the East-West conflict is over. Then we have the CSCE which is changing completely with a basic conflict-prevention organisation. Lastly, we have Western European Union. I am talking about the modified Brussels Treaty, including the little quarrels like those I have just mentioned and those about the treaty's "deadline", deadline being in inverted commas because it is not so much a deadline as a right for a member country to leave the treaty if it so desires.

What I hope, therefore, is an end to these seemingly endless questions. Forgive the tautology. We need the clarity argued for by Mr. Goerens in paragraph 41 of his report if we are going to make any progress. That, of course, is what we are concerned about. To some extent we are the spokesmen for public opinion. But what do we do when we see this rather shocking or even diabolical outbreak of attempts at destabilising our society almost everywhere we look, sometimes reaching down to the roots of what we had hoped to eradicate once and for all in the minds of our society, whether it be in former East Germany, other movements spreading through the big cities or outbursts of utter discontent crossing political and trade union boundaries and relating, for example, to the way we conduct our negotiations in the GATT for agricultural exports? We have a kind of propensity in our society and in our populations to grasp anything that threatens individuals' daily lives or makes the future uncertain, as a pretext for discontent.

What do young people of eighteen to twenty, faced with these mounting problems, think? It is up to us to show them that the future we are building is one of optimism and security. At the moment it has to be admitted that the achievement of peace and security is a task we are failing to perform, at least in our deeds if not in our intentions; as to the speeches we make, our treaties, legal texts and public declarations, regardless where we make them, they prompt so much debate and varied interpretation at the legal and political levels that in the end it is no longer clear what we are doing. As Mr. Antretter said a moment ago, treaties cooked up on the quiet have no effect on public opinion.

We have to have young people in mind.

Mr. Caro (continued)

That is why I want us to prepare for 1996, at the parliamentary level, with the utmost clarity and simplicity of language.

I feel, Mr. President, that if it were our mission to build tomorrow's world we would have a remarkable doctrinal base for European defence in the many resolutions and recommendations that the Assembly has already adopted. We ought to try to set out exactly what our objectives are in a few clear paragraphs covering one or two pages and then ask our governments to put them into effect. But we first have to take the big turning in this new direction with public opinion in our sights. Simplicity and clarity of language must be our aim.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The last speaker is Mr. Liapis, Observer from Greece.

Mr. LIAPIS (*Observer from Greece*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on his excellent work. I have nothing to add to the report, but I wish to elaborate on some points that are greatly important to the future of our organisation, and that of Europe as a whole.

Following the year of the Maastricht summit, Europe must deal with a good many problems – problems involved in the ratification of the treaty by certain member countries; problems of monetary union and economic stability; even problems relating to security and defence policy. Nevertheless, we all agree that the Maastricht summit was an important further step towards the unification of Europe – not only a step towards economic and monetary union, but a political step.

Of course, we must walk a long way and overcome many obstacles before reaching our desired end. It is our responsibility to deal courageously with the consequences of the Maastricht Treaty, and we must be neither apathetic nor pessimistic. We must begin by confirming our devotion to the cornerstone of our organisation and the European Community: solidarity. That is the key word, not only in economic terms but in terms of politics and, especially, defence. There can be no strong union without strong links between member states.

It is not possible to fulfil the ideal of a European Union without taking into consideration the weaknesses and the needs of some of the less rich countries, or the will of the people to express themselves more directly and more democratically to the European institutions. Mr. Goerens dealt successfully with all those delicate issues in his report.

It is our responsibility to persuade our people of the consequences of the Maastricht Treaty. I must admit that there is a great deal of concern and scepticism in some European countries

about the future of the Community. Sometimes that scepticism is justified. People want to be involved more directly in the reunification process. They are right to do so. They want to be responsible for their own future. They do not want the bureaucrats of Brussels to be responsible for their future. People need a less complicated language which they can understand. They need a sensitive and human approach. They are fed up with statistics and sophisticated reports.

I should like to deal now with a point that the Rapporteur mentioned. He said in his report that, from a legal point of view, the Maastricht Treaty will be null and void unless all the signatory countries ratify it. That is correct. I also agree that the Danish people's denial of their approval and the small majority of the French approval of the treaty show that there are many reservations in our countries.

However, we must make a distinction and recall that some countries have already ratified the Maastricht Treaty. That is true of Greece. I must underline that the treaty was ratified almost unanimously by our parliament. Only the Communist Party voted against it. That party represents less than 4% of our electorate. All other parties have agreed on not only the Maastricht Treaty but European ideals and that Greece should be solidly orientated towards Europe.

So the report is not correct or fair when it says in paragraph 18 (ii) that the undertaking entered into with Greece is known to have been given in exchange for its accession to the Maastricht Treaty. That does not correspond to the truth. How can we blame a member country with such strong feelings about a united Europe when it seeks to enter another European foundation which, in the Maastricht Treaty is called the "armed branch" of the Community?

Nevertheless, Mr. Goerens dealt accurately with all the other problems that WEU faces, especially when he said in paragraph 84: "Europe has shown that it is not allowing itself to be divided by certain differences of views." So let us work together for a better Europe, a more sufficient defence policy and a better understanding between member states.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I would like to thank all the members who have spoken on this report. If I were to list all those in agreement with me, we could go on for an hour. I have heard practically no note of disagreement. One or two interpretations may perhaps have been slightly different from mine,

Mr. Goerens (continued)

as is perfectly normal. I cannot be other than gratified at the respect for the modified Brussels Treaty demanded by practically all the speakers. In general terms, this treaty – and more particularly Article V, with the clause of mutual assistance in the event of aggression – must remain the credo of this Assembly, otherwise it has no further reason to exist.

I would simply like to tell Mr. Soysal that, with regard to the Turkish observers, there will be no ratification. That is clear. There is only ratification for a country's full and complete accession to Western European Union, not for associate members. Because, Mr. President, we are practically unanimous in endorsing the analysis made by the Political Committee, I can only invite the Assembly to show the same unanimity in adopting the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the committee, wish to speak?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I intend to speak not for five minutes but in five sentences. First, in this short debate, most colleagues, for good reasons, complimented the Rapporteur on his excellent job. Secondly, the Rapporteur criticised the Council of Ministers, for very good reasons. Thirdly, I hope sincerely that that criticism will lead to better relations between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. The fourth sentence is a bit tricky: it is rather easy to criticise governments and heads of state who, in the process of negotiation, are confronted, for instance, with an attitude that is sometimes described as "blackmailing". The last sentence: I hope sincerely that in the future there will be a convincing, effective security policy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1342, Part One.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

12. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 1st December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Election of the Clerk, Document 1347.
2. Turkey (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1341, addendum and amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.
4. Turkey (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1341, addendum and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.50 p.m.)

1. See page 16.

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 1st December 1992

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Change in the order of business.
4. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly (Doc. 1347).
5. Turkey (*Presentation of the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments*).
Speaker: Mr. Moya (Rapporteur).
6. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly (Doc. 1347).
7. Solemn declaration of the Clerk-elect before the Assembly.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Burgelin (Clerk-elect).
8. Turkey (*Debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments*).
Speakers: Mr. Müller, Mr. Cuco, Mr. Barrionuevo, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Borderas, Mr. Zierer, Miss Özver (Observer from Turkey).
9. Address by Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.
Replies by Mr. Rifkind to questions put by: Mr. Cox, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lopez Henares, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. van Velzen, Lord Finsberg, Mr. De Carolis, Sir Keith Speed, Mr. Andreotti.
10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Change in the order of business

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In the light of the requests made when we were adopting the draft order of business yesterday, I suggest that the draft order of business for Wednesday, 2nd December, be amended as follows:

At 10 a.m.:

European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council: Part

Two: Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia; WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis (Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1342 Part Two, 1337, and 1337 supplementary draft recommendation and amendments).

At 3 p.m.:

1. Address by Mr. Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy.
2. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 1325 and addendum).
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1328 and addendum).
5. Composition of the political groups – Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure (Presentation of and debate on the report

1. See page 21.

The President (continued)

of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Document 1331).

6. European armaments co-operation after Maastricht (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1332 and amendments).
7. Anti-ballistic missile defence (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1339 and amendment).

Is there any objection to this change in the order of business?

It is agreed to.

4. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly

(Doc. 1347)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the election of the Clerk of the Assembly, Document 1347.

Under Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure, the Clerk “shall be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee”.

The recommendations of the Presidential Committee are contained in Document 1347, which includes the curricula vitae of the candidates and has been distributed to all the members of the Assembly. I have to tell you, however, that Mr. Janssens and Mr. Rogers have withdrawn their applications.

The two remaining candidates, in alphabetical order, are Mr. Burgelin and Mr. Cameron.

Both are members of the secretariat of the Assembly, and in the view of the Presidential Committee are on that account specially suited for the post.

There was a clear majority in the Presidential Committee in favour of Mr. Burgelin.

Would any representative or substitute who has not yet done so please sign the register of attendance?

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly is required to vote in secret ballot by roll-call. The votes cast have to be counted by two tellers chosen by lot. Only ballot papers bearing the name of one of the abovementioned candidates will be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of votes cast.

Ballot papers and envelopes have been distributed to all representatives or substitutes who have signed the register of attendance.

Please put your ballot paper in the envelope and place it in the urn on the rostrum. If any envelope contains more than one name the vote represented by such envelope will be invalid.

You will also note that under Rule 36 (c) of the Rules of Procedure an absolute majority of votes cast is necessary for election at the first ballot and a relative majority for election at the second ballot.

I shall now draw by lot the names of two tellers to count the votes cast.

They are Mr. Pécriaux and Mr. Litherland.

Each representative or substitute who has signed the register of attendance will be called to the rostrum to place the envelope containing the ballot paper with the name of the candidate voted for in the urn.

I shall now draw the first name for the roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Galley.

The voting is open.

(A vote was then taken by roll-call and secret ballot)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

Would the tellers, Mr. Litherland and Mr. Pécriaux, withdraw to Room C to count the votes cast.

Meanwhile the sitting will continue with Mr. Moya's presentation of his report.

The bell will ring continuously for two minutes before the result of the vote is announced.

5. Turkey

(Presentation of the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Political Committee on Turkey, Document 1341, addendum and amendments.

I call Mr. Moya, Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like first to welcome Turkey as an associate member of our organisation and to express the hope that Turkey will participate fully in the work of this Assembly and this organisation. I am sure we all agree that Turkey should accede to this new

Mr. Moya (continued)

status. Turkey is extremely well qualified to contribute to western security, having been a bastion against the Soviet Union during the cold war and a reliable member of the alliance, and having played a distinguished rôle in the Gulf war. In the cause of the security and defence of the West it has shown itself to be more than worthy to participate in the work of our organisation in the field of security.

As regards the procedure for acceding to our organisation as an associate member and the status of such members, the report does not refer very directly to the conditions of this status or to its practical consequences. It is true that I have tried, in the report, to reflect the characteristics and conditions expressed in the Petersberg declaration, but I did not wish to duplicate Mr. Ward's report which deals with the enlargement of WEU and analyses these aspects in greater depth. However, I would like to put forward some ideas which I consider to be fundamental and which go some way towards explaining the sometimes complicated and intricate legal principles on which the conditions of Turkey's participation are based. For instance, the Council's decision to negotiate Turkey's candidature by means of a document of association rather than by means of Article XI of the treaty is, in my view, consistent with the interests of the Council to make a clear distinction between full and associate members. Behind this there is, I think, an underlying philosophy which we could well call the Maastricht philosophy. This is a philosophy which I understand and share and which could be summarised by saying that if WEU has to become the nucleus of a European security and defence identity, and what has been called the armed branch of the European Union, there is a specific European logic in the desire to shape WEU, in the first instance, around those members who constitute and are part of that European Union.

But we should also recognise that the Maastricht philosophy generates the need for complementarity of WEU and the alliance and the need to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance and, as a corollary to this, to extend to those European members of the alliance such as Turkey, Norway and Iceland an invitation to become associate members of Western European Union. I believe that this philosophy, which I have called the Maastricht philosophy, to build the nucleus of WEU's identity around the members of the European Union and to have as associate members those who are part of the Atlantic Alliance, is what underlies the whole process governing the nature of Turkey's accession to the organisation.

I am aware that this status has caused some disappointment to the Turkish authorities, who

would have preferred the status of full member, but in my view it should be seen as an important and encouraging step for both Turkey and Europe because I am convinced that the negotiating process between Europe, the European Union and Turkey is precisely that, a process which has its own rhythm and phases, its own obstacles to be overcome and conditions to be met, but also a final aim, namely the integration of Turkey into this European Union. This is why I think that Turkey's accession as an associate member is one step, an important step, in the right direction for both Turkey and the European Community.

Along with an analysis of Turkey's rôle in assuring western security, a rôle which, as a member of the alliance, it has played in the past and which, as an associate member of Western European Union, it can now continue to play, the report focuses on one fundamental objective: presenting the situation of Turkey in the area of security from a geostrategic perspective in relation to neighbouring areas where substantial changes have been made on the map, together with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the situation in the Middle East, particularly since the Gulf war.

In view of this new situation, the rôle of Turkey in security has a different perspective, a different background, but it has not diminished. Turkey was a bastion against Soviet expansionism during the cold war but attention is now focused on other sources of tension – the Middle East, the Caucasus region, the Balkans, and the republics of Central Asia. On all these fronts Turkey is, in my view, called upon to play an important rôle in making an effective contribution to security in the area, a rôle which also takes account of the strategic interests of Western Europe.

At a time of regional instability, with crises such as that in Iraq during the Gulf war, the rise of fundamentalist movements in Central Asia assisted by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reshaping of new states buffeted by economic depression and insecure political structures, it is important that Europe should have an ally in the region which has often demonstrated its willingness to co-operate in many different ways, to become the ideal contact and to form a bridge for communication with such areas. I believe that Turkey may be a country which shares, and consequently understands, some affinities with such countries and areas from a cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic point of view and that, at the same time, it has adopted the abiding principles of the western democracies along with their imperfections or the changes they bring, but which are clearly based on a philosophy built around principles of political pluralism, parliamentary tradition and the market economy. Turkey's dual capacity as having cul-

Mr. Moya (continued)

tural, religious and ethnic affinities with these countries and as a valid point of reference for political organisation could make it a useful contact for Europe in the area.

In another context, I feel that the report has tried to be a little too ambitious in the diversity of the aspects and subjects it deals with, and it would be tedious and, I am sure, boring for you to go into each and every one of them now. Let me just say that I have dealt with all those aspects which I judged to be basic characteristics of what could become the nucleus and guiding principles of Turkey's foreign and security policy. In this connection I think we need to recapitulate Turkey's present position in foreign security and defence matters, where so many different problems are involved. They are analysed in the report as: the situation concerning the Kurdish people, the issue of Cyprus, the different disputes with Greece, negotiations with the European Community, the Black Sea regional co-operation agreements, relations with Transcaucasian countries, Turkey's position with regard to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the situation concerning Turkish minorities in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, etc.

As I mentioned earlier, the report pays special attention to relations with the former Soviet republics, now Central Asian republics, because I thought it would be interesting to explore different aspects rather than restrict myself to a description and these, I believe, go beyond the usual conclusions. I will mention one or two of what I consider to be the most significant, without going into any detail now.

First there is the excessive importance which some western analysts attach to so-called Pan-Turkism, which is not a decisive factor at this moment. It is not the aim of political groups in Turkey, nor is it an intention or aim of the government, nor is it an aspiration of the new political leaders of the emergent Central Asian republics which are channelling their energies into rebuilding their own countries, redefining their own governments, organising from a more democratic point of view and geared towards the market economy countries which are considerably off course. Consequently we would say that those dreams of Pan-Turkism which some commentators have mentioned are the exclusive concern of tiny minorities within Turkey rather than in the Asian republics, but they are a truly minor phenomenon.

A second element to which we return again and again is the problem of fundamentalism; this is also dealt with at some length in the report. Again, I will not linger on this point, but would simply say that it has to be set in its true context; after making a detailed study of the sit-

uation and as a result of conversations, visits, etc., I have reached the conclusion that the fundamentalist risk in Turkey and in these republics is more cultural than political and that it is moderate rather than radical, mainly because the Sunni version of Islam is more dominant than the Shiite version. It could of course become more of a problem in future if conditions for economic development in the neighbouring areas to Turkey were to stagnate or to produce a situation of failure and instability which could cause unrest in the heat of this latent cultural and religious fundamentalism. However, at the present moment, it is a cultural phenomenon rather than political radicalism.

I will not weary you any longer. I believe the report is thorough when it deals specifically with all those aspects which I have already mentioned. I could draw conclusions from each one of these but that would extend this first presentation enormously, so I will finish as I began by expressing the desire for effective and constructive co-operation in Turkey's new rôle in WEU.

I believe this Assembly will ensure the greatest possible participation from the Turkish Delegation in its work. I am similarly confident that Turkey will continue to be a reliable ally within the alliance and to co-operate in the European cause within our organisation.

I also have confidence in the negotiation process for Turkey's accession to the European Union. This moves at its own pace and has its own difficulties and obstacles, but also clear objectives leading to integration. I hope this process will also lead in that direction and I am convinced that the work of WEU and this Assembly will be to the benefit not only of Turkey but of the entire European cause.

6. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly

(Doc. 1347)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The result of the ballot for the election of the Clerk is as follows:

Number of votes cast	96
Number of blank or spoiled ballot papers	1
Absolute majority required	48
Votes for:	
Mr. Burgelin	50
Mr. Cameron	45

As Mr. Burgelin has obtained the required majority, I declare him elected Clerk of the Assembly and offer him my congratulations.

7. Solemn declaration of the Clerk-elect before the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Rule 48, paragraph 2, requires that, on appointment, the Clerk will make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence.

I therefore invite Mr. Burgelin to make this declaration.

Mr. BURGELIN (*Clerk-elect of the Assembly*) (Translation). – I solemnly declare that I will carry out the duties entrusted to me as Clerk of the Assembly of Western European Union loyally and conscientiously, respecting the confidence placed in me.

I undertake to perform my duties in complete independence of, and uninfluenced by, national considerations, and that I will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of my duties from any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will at all times refrain from any action incompatible with my position as a European civil servant.

8. Turkey

(*Debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the debate on the report of the Political Committee on Turkey, Document 1341, addendum and amendments.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I warmly thank Mr. Moya for his very comprehensive and objective report on Turkey and I also endorse the conclusions set out in the draft recommendation.

But let me speak frankly and point out that I personally would prefer it if Turkey became a full member of WEU and not just an associate member.

I believe that, even in historical terms, Turkey has always shown itself to be a country that can be relied on. Let me just remind you that exactly five hundred years ago, in 1492, the year America was discovered, it was Turkey that took in most of the Sephardic Jews driven out by fundamentalists at the time. In 1912, when Salonica became part of Greece instead of Turkey, half the town's population was still of Jewish origin. I think we must acknowledge the important rôle Turkey played there in promoting human rights.

I also find it most regrettable that a major cultural tradition of Turkey, and of the Ottoman civilisation in particular, is being destroyed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in the Balkans, during these particular weeks. The priceless cultural traditions and values that are being destroyed in Sarajevo, Mostar and elsewhere are an irretrievable heritage of mankind.

I also welcome the fact that Turkey has now assumed a major responsibility in the Transcaucasian states, right up to the Chinese border, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Through the major rôle it is playing here, with its satellite programmes, its logistical support for newspapers, printing works and television programmes, Turkey is performing a vital function, and one which we cannot rate highly enough; in carrying on the secular tradition of Atatürk, it is helping to counteract certain fundamentalist challenges. I believe that we should acknowledge this particular commitment on the part of Turkey.

Yet I would like to add something else in this context, because of certain amendments tabled to Mr. Moya's report. I would like to point out that Turkey is being challenged by terrorist movements at home, and not just by the PKK, which is mainly supported by Kurds; as in the past, Turkey is still being challenged by left-wing Marxist Turkish movements. While most regrettable and reprehensible incidents have occurred in my own country, Germany, in recent weeks, such as setting fire to a building housing Turks, obviously the work of neo-Nazis, we find that at the same time activists from left-wing radical groups have also attacked Turkish buildings in Germany – such as banks and travel agencies – using explosives, occupying premises, etc.

That is why I have no sympathy at all for some of the amendments that have been tabled and that propose a kind of protective shield for the Kurds without clarifying the real situation.

A short while ago the fashion magazine Marie Claire, a very expensive women's magazine that only the daughters of the bourgeoisie can afford, printed a sixteen-page essay on the freedom fight of Kurdish women against Turkish oppression. The photos had been taken in Lebanon. The outfit worn by these freedom fighters suggested the fashions shown in high-class boutiques rather than the real conditions in the mountains of Lebanon. These action pictures, set up there and then put on show, make it clear that radical left-wing forces have begun trying to destabilise Turkey.

When I then see an amendment adding a new phrase to the effect that Turkey cannot be accepted as an associate member until it stops oppressing the Kurds, I wonder very much how far this oppression actually goes, for after all the

Mr. Müller (continued)

Turkish Foreign Minister who signs this protocol is himself a Kurd, is himself of Kurdish origin. That shows what the real situation is in Turkey and that this is a deliberate attempt to draw a picture that is not consistent with reality.

As a German I also found it most illuminating to discover the following. Some liberalisation has taken place under the new Turkish Government, allowing people to celebrate the Kurdish new year festival in the spring of this year in Sirhak, where the Turkish security forces were then subjected to provocation. At exactly the same time as this provocation was taking place, the PDS group of former East German communists was holding a meeting in Sirhak. We are bound to ask ourselves why it met at that specific place at that specific time. Once again it becomes clear that certain old ties survive and that certain friendships may be being cultivated.

Let me conclude by underlining that just as Turkey was important to western security in the past, in view of future developments, when the emphasis will shift elsewhere, towards the Mediterranean, now that the East-West conflict has come to an end, this area cannot be made secure for the West and for the western principles of freedom and democracy without Turkey.

The challenge of the Shiite fundamentalist movements, in Iran for example, but in Lebanon too where they also exist, cannot be met without the help of Turkey and without its co-operation. That is why I appeal to all of us not only to be grateful to Turkey for the part it has played in the past but also to welcome it now so that it will continue to stand by us and help to resolve the problems that may arise in the future.

I thank Mr. Moya for clarifying that in his report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cuco.

Mr. CUCO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the draft recommendation in Mr. Moya's report on Turkey begins with two statements which, in my view, explain the entire political philosophy of the report. First, the Rapporteur highlights Turkey's complete reliability as a member of NATO and the vital contribution it has made to security in Europe throughout the long years of East-West confrontation. Secondly, he lays emphasis on a well-known fact, namely the geostrategic situation of Turkey, which events of recent years with the independence of the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia only serve to emphasise.

Clearly, from the European point of view, respect for the values of parliamentary

democracy which has prevailed in Kemal's Turkey is a much more attractive model for those former Soviet republics than the fundamentalist ravings of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose historical and cultural influence in the area in the past has been significant. Even today, its influence is still considerable, both for religious reasons, especially in Azerbaijan, and for linguistic and cultural reasons, and here I am referring to Tajikistan, which is ethnically Persian. Each of these points is clearly an excellent argument in support of relations between Turkey and WEU being conducted along the lines of friendship and co-operation, as has been the case until now, and even for such links to be strengthened. Turkey's new status as associate member of WEU is proof of this and I would therefore like to offer my congratulations to our Turkish colleagues.

Obviously, every political balance has its good and bad points. The recently-approved report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the human rights situation in Turkey which Mr. Moya cites, but on which he does not comment, has I believe been a cause for concern to many of us who believe that closer ties between Turkey and the countries of Europe must also take account of such action which deviates from such fundamental principles. My personal impression is that no great progress has been made in such matters in recent times.

As a Spanish deputy I am fully qualified to say that violence and terrorism must be clearly and unreservedly condemned, and that politically they frequently only engender further violence. Such a vicious spiral must be broken and, as Mr. Moya so rightly says, we must remind the Turkish Government that one way of doing this, at least as far as south-east Anatolia is concerned, is to abide by the promise to recognise the cultural and administrative rights of the Kurdish people; this would be a first positive step towards normalising such a disturbing situation. On the other hand, over-reactions such as have occurred in the repression of terrorism are not only illegal, but reduce the likelihood of finding reasonable political solutions with the majority of the Kurdish people.

The question of human rights, expressly acknowledged by the Rapporteur in paragraph 42 of his text, is surely the most obvious point against the closer links between Turkey and the European Community which, in other respects, are so positive. There are other issues, such as the Cyprus problem, which has not improved substantially since 1974, when a period of history came to an end with the arrival of Turkish troops on the island. Clearly, Mr. President, there is genuine need for a gradual rapprochement and collaboration between the Republic of Turkey and the Twelve. For my part, I am convinced that Turkey can and must

Mr. Cuco (continued)

put forward ideas and initiatives which will help, first, to resolve the crisis in the Balkans and, secondly, to maintain a stabilising influence in distant but geostrategically important areas such as the Caucasus or Central Asia. I also hope that positive developments will take place to enable Turkey to overcome the problems we have referred to so that it can form increasingly close links with the countries of Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Barrionuevo.

Mr. BARRIONUEVO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the report on Turkey which Mr. Moya presented is, we believe, well balanced. On occasions, reports on Turkey and on its relations with the various European institutions have exhibited a degree of either arrogance or lack of awareness; arrogance in the sense of trying to preach the obvious and lack of awareness in the sense of failing to discuss matters which are perfectly capable of being dealt with between allies.

It is, as I said, a balanced report, dealing realistically with controversial issues to which previous speakers have referred – problems in its relations with Greece, the situation in Cyprus, the position of minorities in Turkey and of Turkish minorities in other countries. But the report also gives encouragement and support to the long-standing efforts of some Turkish citizens who believe strongly in Europeanness and in democratic institutions.

I would like to associate myself fully with these Turkish citizens and with the efforts of their government to ensure that full democracy is practised by all institutions and in the conduct of affairs. I should also like to express our solidarity with the Turkish people who are so unjustly and cruelly the victims of a terrorism which erupts with alarming frequency. Similarly, I applaud the efforts to improve the standard of living of the Turkish people both materially and culturally.

I said that we must approach the problems which Turkey, like any other country, has in a spirit of friendship rather than in other ways which have been referred to, because the Turkish people have shown themselves to be a tolerant people. They demonstrated this, for instance, and Mr. Müller highlighted this point, by welcoming the Spanish Jews who were at one time unjustly expelled from my country.

For all these reasons, Turkey's association with WEU is an important step, and the report recommends that this association should take the widest possible form. We believe that this new relationship which Turkey is entering into with a European institution such as WEU could

enrich both our members and Turkey by establishing news forms of co-operation and collaboration.

Finally, we join with the report in encouraging Turkey's rôle in the development of the new, former Soviet, republics, with which it has close cultural, social and political ties in Central Asia. In all these respects, we believe that this report is worthy of support. May we add our congratulations to those which have already been given to our Turkish colleagues on Turkey's new association with WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, our colleagues may have the impression that the majority of speakers in this debate are Spanish; it is natural to wish to participate in a debate which has as its rapporteur a Spaniard. However, we have a special reason for wishing to participate; over the past months we have observed Mr. Moya in the production of his report and have witnessed the care he has taken to give a balanced and reasoned view dealing with delicate issues, issues which, as previous speakers have intimated, could be controversial. I wholeheartedly support Mr. Moya's views, both explicit and implicit. Although there is always the possibility that a report of this nature may be controversial, in my view it is correct, precisely because the presentation and draft recommendations it contains are extremely prudent.

The report did not set out to provide a specific analysis of each and every one of the political situations inside or outside Turkey. Nor was the aim to study the situation in Turkey in general, but rather to try to see what we think the rôle of Turkey could be in a particular area of the world. The object was to make what was fundamentally a geostrategic analysis, and obviously although this is a specific analysis, it was still necessary to comment upon, explain and note aspects of domestic policy and international policy concerning Turkey. This is what Mr. Moya has done, but he has done it without entering into detailed discussion or taking a position on all of the problems which might exist inside or outside Turkey, but simply noting their existence and concentrating his efforts on what is our prime concern – the rôle we think Turkey should play in that area.

Clearly there was the temptation to raise once again the problems we discussed in the Council of Europe. This has been obvious from some of the speeches made in committee and some of the amendments which have been presented. Some of our colleagues would have liked to discuss human rights, the question of Cyprus, the Kurdish issue and many other problems concerning Turkey's foreign or domestic policy, and

Mr. de Puig (continued)

to go on in such amendments to denounce Turkey and demand that it pursue particular policies. In my view it is a mistake for some of our colleagues to wish to view matters in this way, which is so different from what Mr. Moya has done. In the first place, no one can deny that such problems exist. We have discussed them in the Council of Europe, whether they relate to human rights, or to the question of Cyprus which is at this moment being dealt with in the United Nations, or to the Kurdish question. But although we must acknowledge the existence of these problems – as indeed Mr. Moya has done – we must not content ourselves with simply acknowledging or condemning the existence of such problems because what can we hope to achieve by such condemnation and its, shall we say, immediate consequences? It is clear that if we succumb to the temptation of abandoning Turkey and simply condemning any irregularities which may occur, Turkey will continue to play a leading rôle in that area of the world.

Do we, as Europeans, really want to detach ourselves from Turkey? Do we wish to marginalise Turkey? Of course not. Indeed, I say that precisely the opposite is true. It is obvious that, at present, now that the wall has fallen and following the upsurge of movements which has occurred in Turkey's cultural area, it is more than ever in our interests that Europe and Turkey should be closely linked. Because Turkey will have this important, influential rôle in that region whether we support it or not. If we abandoned Turkey and, for reasons of principle related to the problems which exist, allowed a situation to arise in which Turkey did not follow the same steps at the same pace as Europe, we would be making a mistake.

Europe knows that Turkey has played an important rôle and is hopeful that Turkey will resolve these problems in the appropriate way, in the way we Europeans have indicated in so many of our institutions. Furthermore, we are the ones who must encourage Turkey to be this reference point, this model for those countries in its area which are undergoing democratisation because clearly Turkey's influence on such countries, which once formed part of its empire, is enormous and it is in our greatest interest that it should use its influence.

This is, furthermore, what democrats in Turkey are asking us to do. They are not asking for condemnation, or asking us to make demands on Turkey which we are not making on other countries. I, personally, have been rather shocked by some of the amendments which have been presented. Why should we make the future accession of Turkey to WEU and to Europe conditional upon it proclaiming the right to self-determination for the Kurds when this demand

is not made by member countries on other countries applying for membership? Why should we make this demand on Turkey when, if we are to be fair and realistic, we know that the problem is much more complicated? Representatives of the Turks and leaders representing the Kurds are working side by side. Mr. Talabani, whom we all know, is acting alongside the Turkish Government. When Kurds are persecuted in other countries, they go to Turkey. We can discuss whether any progress can be made in granting the Kurds cultural or administrative rights, but the truth of the matter is that we have reason to say that the one place in the world where the Kurds are most welcome is Turkey. This does not at present mean that we have to accept that the terms on which Turkey deals with the Kurds are the best or that they cannot be changed. We must continue to press for an improvement in the situation and for certain rights to be granted to them. However, it would be unwise to say otherwise and we must bear in mind the incidence of terrorism and its consequences. This is why I believe that some of the amendments which have been presented are mistaken and go against our interests as Europeans. It is in the interests of us all that Turkey and Europe should be increasingly closely linked to one another.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

I call Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, for the last two years I have been working on a report on the Mediterranean basin as a member of the Mediterranean Basin Sub-Committee of the Civilian Affairs Committee of the NATO assembly. I presented my report in Bruges a fortnight ago. I visited Turkey in January of this year, going all the way to the south-east of Anatolia, where, in Diyarbakir, the capital, I had the opportunity of holding political talks with a number of Turkish personalities. I think that there is a desire in the West for an ally, an associate – and a faithful country given its difficult geopolitical situation at the far end of the western world and Europe. Consciously or subconsciously, we wonder whether Turkey is where the East begins or the West comes to an end, but it is definitely an eastern country, we should have no doubt about that. The Near East is a different world, but even so we have to put this outdated question behind us and see Turkey as a friend.

Turkey's advance towards modernity is encountering huge difficulties. It is a country of Islamic tradition, its history following an oriental path. Progress towards democracy is disturbingly slow and per capita income is not yet \$2 000. But in spite of all this and its severe climate Turkey has the desire, the aspiration and the will to succeed in adopting our system and our convictions. We must therefore help it.

Mr. Borderas (continued)

However, helping means also counselling and recommending. As a Spaniard, and indeed as a Basque, in a region which has suffered and still suffers from radicalism, intransigence and also terrorism, I feel this especially keenly. But we have to obey the rules of a legitimate government. The road to democratic stability and modernity is via respect for minorities, freedom of the individual and of expression, women's rights, legal assistance to arrested persons, freedom of association, and renunciation of the use of torture. All these confer credibility, demonstrate a country's democratic intentions and create a future for democracy.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I firmly support Mr. Moya's report and the investment it represents in the democratic future of Turkey, a country already associated with WEU and this Assembly. In my view the report is based on sound logic.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Zierer.

Mr. ZIERER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Turkey's participation in NATO is indispensable. It is Turkey's job to protect the south-eastern flank of Europe, our soft underbelly, so to speak, from any threats or attacks coming from the crisis-ridden CIS countries and the traditionally troubled near eastern region. Turkey will prove an equally indispensable partner in an independent European security system. So any measures to ensure that Turkey quickly becomes an associate member of WEU are to be welcomed.

Another factor needs to be taken into account. We Europeans would be well-advised to involve Turkey as closely as possible. Here I am thinking not just of the Turkish state's embroilment in a kind of civil war with the Kurdish separatists and their terrorist organisation. I am thinking more of the regeneration of the traditionalist Islamic movement in Turkey and of the increasingly aggressive appearance of pan-Islamism. These backward-looking movements want only one thing in the final analysis, namely to reverse the integration of Turkey into Europe and the increasingly westernised approach it has taken since the days of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, known as Atatürk. They want to destroy the modern, westernised Turkey, with its equal rights and opportunities and secular state. They want to restore Turkey's position as a major power under the green banner of the Prophet and turn it into a spearhead of Islamic expansionist aspirations. The final objective would be a Mullahcracy, if I may call it that, the rule of the religious despots, an alien thorn in the flesh of Europe.

Of course, the rulers in Ankara will not agree with this assessment. But it is realistic. We are seeing much the same today in westernised countries such as Egypt and in the Maghreb states, for instance in Algeria. We know that in many ways the balance is precarious in the territory of the Bosphorus too. We know that we must not leave Turkey alone as it moves towards Europe. The majority of the Turkish people are in favour of a modern Turkey in an ever more integrated Europe. So let us not leave them in the lurch.

A word on the German supplies of weapons to Turkey, which I approved as a member of the Defence Committee in the German Bundestag. Of course, Germany must honour its commitments towards its allies. That is the duty of friends. Of course, these weapons, intended purely for external defence purposes, must not be used against Kurdish separatists or terrorists. We trust our Turkish friends who gave their word that they would not do so. Friends help one another. I believe that being comrades in arms presumes sufficient trust. For the rest, the combat weapons supplied by Germany are not the means of opposing terrorists, unless one fights law-breakers with fragmentation grenades and other weapons.

The just fight against Kurdish terrorism must not – I think we all agree – degenerate into a kind of civil war involving military operations and reprisals against the civilian population. So I would be very glad if we could come to an agreement to this effect with our Turkish friends.

I regard the proposals put before the Assembly as further steps on our common road to greater mutual understanding, to friendly relations and to a close partnership in the building of our common Europe. I thank Mr. Moya for his report. The amendments tabled should be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Miss Özver, Observer from Turkey.

Miss ÖZVER (*Observer from Turkey*). – I should like to say a few words about the report on Turkey prepared and submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Moya.

I should like to express our appreciation and thanks for Mr. Moya's comprehensive and balanced report, which we have carefully studied. It reflects almost every aspect of Turkish foreign policy, as well as the significant developments unfolding in that context.

For the sake of clarification, we have already conveyed to Mr. Moya our views on certain topics covered in the report, so I do not intend to repeat them here, I shall, however, try to emphasise our understanding of the basic issues. We all aim at and work for a stable and peaceful order in Europe. To that end we must contain

Miss Özver (continued)

conflicts and cope with new political realities in and around the continent. We genuinely believe that the security and defence of Europe are indivisible. We have contributed to it unwaveringly for the past forty years, and we shall continue to do so.

Turkey's application in 1987 for full membership of WEU – as well as our decision to become an associate member – fall within the general context of our relations with Europe. At this point, I stress that we consider our associate membership status as transitory: our objective is full membership.

As a result of the radically changed circumstances and environment of Europe, Turkey's position is no longer that of a flank country. We now find ourselves centrally located in a geographical area adjacent to three regions of increasing instability – the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

As the events of the past two years have proved, those regions at the periphery of Europe have the greatest potential for instability, conflict and risks, and negatively affect peace and stability in Europe. Turkey is now expected to play a different rôle in the security and defence of Europe – to project stability to the regions in question. As compared with the traditional, rather more static rôle that we played in the alliance, that rôle is significant and more challenging.

Now that we have concluded the negotiations, and signed, in Rome, the associate membership document, we look forward to the alteration of our present observer status so that we can participate fully in the activities of this forum – including the right to vote.

The Turkish Parliament and Government are taking all the necessary steps and passing all the necessary laws to enhance and fortify democracy and human rights in Turkey. The latest example of our efforts is the passage by the Turkish Parliament of the revised law on the rules and procedures of criminal courts. With this consideration in mind, we believe that we can contribute significantly to European security and defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now adjourn the debate to hear the address by Mr. Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.

9. Address by Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.

I should like to extend a special welcome to Mr. Rifkind, and to the Minister of Defence of the French Republic, Mr. Pierre Joxe.

Since his appointment in the spring of this year, Mr. Rifkind – although having to face problems concerning the United Kingdom's defence budget similar to those that beset all other WEU countries – has been determined to bring a positive approach to alliance co-operation. That co-operation has extended to the defence industry, where the United Kingdom is taking part in a wide range of bilateral and multilateral ventures and where British industry is increasingly interested in the idea of bringing the IEPG under WEU to form the European armaments agency; and to arms control, in which context the United Kingdom has provided much impetus for negotiations such as the open skies agreement and for the forthcoming convention on chemical weapons.

Most particularly, Mr. Rifkind has brought a positive approach to European defence co-operation – in fact to our own organisation, Western European Union. Speaking at the Centre for Defence Studies in King's College in the University of London in May this year, Mr. Rifkind brought a pragmatic attitude to bear on the earmarking of forces and headquarters to be "answerable to WEU". He succeeded therefore in putting the Franco-German Eurocorps into perspective and started the process of ensuring that WEU is developed both as the European pillar of NATO and as the military arm of European Union.

A few months later, in September, speaking in this very building, Mr. Rifkind opened up another perspective – that of Anglo-French co-operation in nuclear matters.

Secretary of State, we are all looking forward to hearing about whichever perspective you choose to tackle this morning: the floor is yours.

Mr. RIFKIND (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, members of the Assembly, I am delighted to be able to address you all today. At a time when Western European Union is going through a period of momentous and invigorating change your current debate addresses the theme of enlargement. I, too, would like to reflect on this. I should like also to offer some thoughts on how we may take forward the development of WEU's operational capability, in the context of the framework of European security institutions of which WEU is a crucial part.

In Europe today we have, in the jargon, an intricate network of interlocking security institutions – the United Nations, CSCE, NATO, WEU. Some characterise this as "alphabet soup". The question is does this alphabet add up to a coherent sentence – or, more ambitiously, a paragraph?

Mr. Rifkind (continued)

I take the view that we can make that jumble of letters read coherently. In other words, the institutions listed can work together, in a complementary way, to address the real problems of European security.

But certain conditions need to be fulfilled. In particular, between the two, treaty-based, defence organisations – WEU and NATO – there must be: genuine transparency of the workings of both institutions; a common understanding between them of how they will work together in a complementary way to resolve European security problems; a determination to avoid presenting each other with faits accomplis; clarity on the rôles that each is to fulfil.

There is a great prize to be won here, but it will require consistent effort to achieve it. That prize is a greater and more coherent European contribution to the security of our continent. It is common ground among Europeans and across the Atlantic that a proportionally greater European contribution to our own defence is both timely and desirable. The United Kingdom wholly endorses that objective. But to state it is not necessarily to achieve it. That requires detailed work in a spirit of openness between WEU and NATO.

Common sense tells us not only that it is in our interests to promote a spirit of the two institutions working closely together but that that is well within our grasp. After all, WEU and NATO have a history of complementarity and close association dating back to the late 1940s. All the members of WEU are also members of NATO. This remains true today, following the very welcome enlargement which has so recently been put in place and is further strengthened by the incorporation as associate members of WEU of three staunch NATO allies, Turkey, Norway and Iceland, in a way that will allow them very full participation in the councils of this organisation.

Common sense, common membership and common history are therefore on our side in this endeavour but so too is the compelling logic of the Treasury and the budget. Not one European nation seriously contemplates the generation of additional forces specifically for WEU separate from those that we already declare to NATO. The approach adopted at the Petersberg ministerial meeting in June was one of making available to WEU military units from the whole spectrum of the conventional forces at the disposal of member states.

Concerned colleagues illustrated this by reference, for example, to the United Kingdom-Netherlands amphibious force and to the Multinational Division (Central) now being estab-

lished in the Central Region of NATO Allied Command Europe. Both are examples of multinational formations well suited to WEU purposes. Likewise, the Franco-German Corps is a unit which the United Kingdom strongly believes should – and will – find a place within the structures of both organisations: we very much hope that progress towards this end will be visible in the coming months.

With all this logic on our side, how could we possibly fail to make a success of the creation of a European defence identity, you may ask. Well, we could – although it would take a great deal of mismanagement to snatch such an unhappy result from the promising steps which have been made in the past year.

Of what should we then beware? In the first place, I believe that we need to reflect upon the meaning of enlargement. It was agreed at Maastricht that full WEU membership, or observer status, should be open to all members of the European Community – which will become in due course the European Union – subject to conditions to be agreed between the candidate members and the existing members of WEU in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty. Happily, that process was taken a step forward in November, following painstaking work organised with great success and application by our colleagues in the Italian presidency. In due course, other candidates will put themselves forward. Their applications will enjoy the same process as this year's candidates underwent, and it will be a substantial and serious business. That is right.

As is well known, the Brussels Treaty contains in its fifth article a security guarantee of a strength exceeded by no comparable body. It states that treaty members will afford to any member subject to an armed attack “all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”. There is no reference here to mere consultation; rather, there is a firm guarantee of military assistance. I know that all current and new members of WEU take seriously the obligations that they accept under that heading.

The United Kingdom fully support the acquis which was reached at Maastricht on the question of WEU enlargement. I would simply say that, for real European security, such a progression may be a necessary condition, but is surely not a sufficient one. I have in mind the probable effect on countries that are unlikely to be early candidates to be swiftly drawn into the WEU network and the need to engage with them in as close a way as possible to sustain genuine confidence, mutual understanding and wide participation in European security issues. It is to be expected that not all nations will move towards WEU at the same pace as others, and if we neglect the concerns and interests of such countries we shall truly have failed to make Europe a more secure

Mr. Rifkind (continued)

and safe place. It will be my wish that the problems of European security will therefore be approached so far as possible in an inclusive way – a way, in other words, that gives all the sense that they are participating in a common endeavour. This argues for the fullest commitment to institutions such as the CSCE and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, at the same time as we develop WEU.

I now wish to say a little more about WEU's operational capability.

It is undeniable that, in a sense, events have pressed WEU to run before it can walk. It remains, at present, a small organisation in terms of underpinning military structures – though one with great potential and promise. Events, however – not least in the former Yugoslavia – have impelled WEU to address security problems of the most profound and intractable kind at an early stage in its reinvigoration. I shall have more to say on the subject of Yugoslavia in a moment; at this stage however, there is one general, structural point which I should like to make.

We have clear and coherent plans to progressively strengthen WEU's ability to play a rôle in European security, but they have not yet fully matured. It is therefore that much more to the credit of the organisation that it has played a pro-active rôle in the events that we have faced. In this context, I should again like to pay tribute to the leadership of the Italian presidency.

Nevertheless, it is my hope that we can do better than we have managed up to now. The operations in the Adriatic, which see vessels under NATO and under WEU command engaged in the same enterprise, is not a pattern that I would like to be repeated. We can surely make better use of the scarce military resources at our disposal than to run two such operations to the same end.

That is not to say that a good level of co-ordination has not been achieved, or that worthwhile results are not being obtained. Through conscientious work, a *modus vivendi* has in fact been achieved; but we can do better. It is surely not beyond the capability of organisations as mature as NATO and WEU – with the close links that exist between their members and structures – to achieve a coherent approach on the basis of close liaison, openness and clear divisions of responsibility.

In saying that, I stress the need for both organisations to show flexibility and adaptability. It would not be right for NATO, as a reflex action, to take fright at any sign of WEU taking on an operation or commitment. The discussions held at the NATO summit in November last year testified to the validity of a

European rôle. Likewise, WEU must not always seek to rush to action. By mature common sense and close understanding, we can take further our approach to complementary working between the two alliance structures.

Most recently, we have taken the decision at the Petersberg meeting to set up a WEU planning cell in Brussels, to be collocated with the WEU secretariat when it moves there in January. The planning cell will have the task of developing operational plans under the political guidance of the Ministerial Council. This will be the mechanism for the development of a genuinely coherent and organised approach to a WEU military capability. Among the key requirements will be a close liaison and understanding with the staffs at SHAPE who are planning to use the same forces supplied by the same countries for NATO operational purposes as must be used by WEU for its needs.

In this there is no question – nor should there be – of the one organisation being subordinate to the other. What is needed is a clear mutual understanding of how military plans are to be developed, who is going to do what and with which forces. Again I stress that we shall all be planning to use the same forces for our respective purposes; that cannot be done without sensible co-ordination and close liaison. That will be the way to give WEU a real operational capability, which provides a net added value, so to speak.

Let me now revert to events in Yugoslavia and the international response to them. Those events are important in their own right; they also serve to illustrate some of the general themes that I have addressed. Several WEU nations have been and are involved in the various military and humanitarian operations being undertaken by, or on behalf of, the United Nations with the aim of helping to bring an end to the conflict. There are of course limitations on what can usefully be done militarily to help reach that goal. The overarching need is for a negotiated political solution to the Yugoslav conflict, but there are ways in which our armed forces can make a very significant contribution. The Assembly will be familiar with the main strands.

In Croatia, the United Nations Protection Force was deployed with the aim of demilitarising the predominantly Serb-inhabited United Nations protection areas to create conditions in which the Yugoslav army could be expected to withdraw. Contributors to that force include France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark; and the United Kingdom is providing a field ambulance unit to provide a second-line casualty evacuation capability. Levels of violence in the United Nations protected areas have been restrained by the presence of United Nations troops, the UNPROFOR's task was made more

Mr. Rifkind (continued)

difficult by the Serbian decision in May to cut loose from the Yugoslav army large numbers of regular personnel domiciled in Croatia, who were thus transformed into irregular troops – or, at best, armed individuals. Disarming them has presented a far more difficult task than UNPROFOR would otherwise have faced in Croatia, and the United Nations Secretary General has made it clear that, in spite of the efforts made, in no sense can the original plan for the United Nations protected areas be considered to have been fully accomplished.

In regard to Bosnia, where the conflict has been even more bloody and seemingly intractable, the response by the international community has taken a number of forms. The sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro which were imposed in United Nations Security Council Resolution 757 of 30th May were a direct response to the developing crisis in Bosnia, aimed at putting pressure on Serbia to bring its influence to bear on the Bosnian Serbs to desist from their expansionist policies in the republic.

In July, the separate but co-ordinated operations to which I have referred were established by WEU and NATO in the Adriatic to monitor compliance with these sanctions, and with the arms embargo imposed on the whole of the former Yugoslavia in the Security Council resolution of 25th September 1991. Stop-and-search operations have since been authorised in the Security Council resolution of 16th November. Ships, maritime patrol aircraft and NATO airborne early-warning aircraft have all been involved in these operations.

Many of the same nations have also been taking part in the humanitarian aircraft to Sarajevo which began in July and which resumed on 3rd October following the suspension of flights after the shooting down of the Italian transport aircraft. These operations which have, of course, also involved the deployment of United Nations personnel to Sarajevo, have provided much-needed relief to the people there; but the risks of starvation and exposure are widespread throughout Bosnia. That is why the United Kingdom and other nations had to act to make forces available to the United Nations – so that the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force could be extended under the terms of the Security Council resolutions to provide protective support for humanitarian convoys throughout Bosnia. Of the WEU nations involved, France and Spain, like the United Kingdom, are providing battalions, and Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal are providing support units. Other units are being provided by Denmark, Norway, and the United States; Canada is providing a battalion.

The deployment has been complex, and has required careful reconnaissance and subsequent adjustment of plans. In Britain's case, the phased deployment of our 2 400 personnel and their equipment, including 96 armoured fighting vehicles, has involved ten ships and 55 flights. We were grateful to the United States Government for their assistance in providing the airlift for our troops.

The task of the new United Nations contingents in Bosnia, under their Commander Major-General Morillon, is to escort relief convoys operating under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to where they are needed, on the basis of negotiated passage. The convoys will operate with the consent and co-operation of the warring parties, and are not intended to fight their way through opposition.

They are already bringing desperately needed relief to the people of Bosnia. In the United Kingdom's case, for example, our battalion's first major escorting task was the delivery of supplies to Tuzla – the first United Nations relief to reach the town in the seven months since it had been besieged by the Serbs.

The mission of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, then, is a humanitarian rather than a strictly peace-keeping one. Still less is the force there to intervene in the conflict. It is of the utmost importance that our troops are impartial, that they avoid any appearance of taking sides and that they do not undertake any tasks which could lead to their being sucked into the conflict.

A notable feature of the efforts in Bosnia has been the number of different organisations involved: the United Nations, NATO, WEU and the CSCE, fulfilling, for the most part, distinct and complementary, but overlapping, rôles. One may ask whether this is necessary and appropriate and whether the alphabet to which I referred produces a coherent sentence.

In fact, there have been good reasons for the division of labour, not least the fact that this is the first major challenge for the new security order in Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. It has obviously been right that all the military operations within the former Yugoslavia should take place under United Nations command. That has been conducive to the safety of the troops, and has been important in terms of perceptions of the impartiality of the peace-keeping force. For example, the French, Egyptian and Ukrainian battalions at Sarajevo deliberately mirror the religious affiliations of the Croats, the Muslims and the Serbs.

Equally, there have been tasks which it has been proper for the United Nations to look to individual nations or regional organisations to

Mr. Rifkind (continued)

perform: the airlift at Sarajevo, for example, and the naval operations in the Adriatic. It has been right for the CSCE to be involved, for example in the long-term missions to Vojvodina, Sandjak and Kosovo, the monitoring mission to Skopje, the Thomson report on war crimes and, jointly with the EC, the sanctions assistance missions in Romania, Hungary and Albania. There have been some cases – for example, the provision of AWACS aircraft to monitor compliance with the no-fly zone imposed in Bosnia and the provision of the core of the headquarters personnel for the United Nations two-star headquarters in Bosnia, where only NATO has had the capability or the resources to act.

Perhaps one of the main lessons to be drawn is that we must not let institutional rivalry influence decisions on which organisation is best placed to act in a particular case. Especially while the new security order in Europe is settling down and developing, it will be important to maintain a flexible and pragmatic approach. Competition between NATO and WEU, or between any of the institutions with a potential rôle to play, can only be fruitless and distracting.

We meet here today shortly after WEU has taken a major step forward through enlargement arrangements brought to fruition on 20th November. For me, the priority now must be to make a success of the move to Brussels early in the new year and the development of WEU's operational capability through the creation of a planning cell with clear directions as to its functions and operating procedures. There the cell must begin work under the close direction of the Ministerial Council, to set out the capabilities and rôles to which the organisation is to give priority. It must liaise closely with comparable NATO staffs to achieve a satisfactory outcome. If we make a success of this, we shall truly have added to Europe's security. The United Kingdom will play a full part in this endeavour.

Mr. President, that concludes my remarks. I shall now be happy to respond to any questions which members of the Assembly might like to put to me.

The PRESIDENT. – I thank you for your precise and interesting address.

I call Mr. Cox to ask the first question.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – As the first member to be called, I congratulate you on your wide-ranging and detailed presentation to the Assembly which, I am sure, was of great interest to all members and especially to your United Kingdom colleagues.

I should like to ask you a specific question on a matter on which you did not touch, although I

accept that you could comment only on a limited number of subjects. Sadly, we are again seeing the sale of military arms and equipment to certain countries in the world about which many of us have grave anxieties in terms of their commitment to peace and co-operation with the organisations you outlined in your remarks.

Will you tell the Assembly what action you are taking, or would like to take, along with European colleagues, to control such sales of arms, or at least to have some clear guidance and checks on the purpose of those arms sales?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. RIFKIND (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). – First, I thank you for your opening remarks. I shall respond to the important question that you have asked about arms sales. Of course, there are vast sales of arms around the world. Many of them are legitimate in the sense that they are intended for the proper defensive requirements of member states of the United Nations. Where countries sell arms to other countries which need them to defend themselves and if those countries have no aggressive intentions towards their neighbours or the international community, sales of arms are legitimate, proper and responsible.

However, other arms sales do not meet those criteria. The objective of the international community must be ensure some coherence and some sense of responsibility and to set proper criteria for arms sales. The British Prime Minister, Mr. Major, made a successful proposal some months ago that a register of such sales should be established so that such matters could be properly monitored. I hope that that can be taken forward in the full spirit in which it was intended.

We also face a particular new challenge in the changed situation in Russia. Russia has traditionally had a massive arms-making capability, largely to meet its own requirements. It is now in a different situation, but one where whole cities, towns and regions are, for the time being, overwhelmingly dependent on arms production. We have seen a tremendous increase in Russian interest in selling arms around the world. There is the disturbing development of Iran receiving four Russian Kilo-class submarines – it is the first country in the region to have such a capability – and there are other examples of that kind.

We must impress upon all such countries the need to ensure responsibility in terms of the destination of any arms sales so that they can enhance international security rather than diminish it.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I was very interested in the Minister's comments about the need for sensible and intelligent co-operation between NATO and WEU. Now that we have the much-needed embargo in place in the Adriatic, does the Minister see the complementary naval forces of WEU and NATO continuing on that basis, or will there be some realignment? Does the Minister intend switching the British frigate – which I believe was originally operating under the NATO banner but now operates under the banner of WEU – backwards and forwards?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. RIFKIND (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). – The initiatives in the Adriatic were very important because that was the first time both WEU and NATO had to address the question of their relative rôles in such initiatives. One should go back to first principles. When both NATO and Maastricht concluded that it was appropriate to develop a European defence dimension, it was emphasised at that time – I think that it continues to be the policy of all countries concerned – that the new enhanced rôle for WEU was to be complementary to that of NATO rather than an alternative to it and that all the countries of WEU should continue to endorse the view that the Atlantic Alliance remained the foundation of our mutual defence, and would continue to do so for many years to come.

Given such a situation, logic would suggest that, when there is a need for an international initiative, either NATO or WEU should respond to it. It is difficult to see a coherent argument as to why both should be involved, given the similarity of membership and of military assets available and the risk of confusion and uncertainty that would result from any alternative approach. I indicated in my opening comments – indeed, it is my view and that of the British Government – that there is something profoundly uncomfortable about the current arrangement in the Adriatic whereby both NATO and WEU sometimes use the same assets while changing the designations of those on whose behalf they operate as the weeks and months go by. I think that the operation should be either a NATO operation or a WEU operation. The idea of it being both is a recipe for possible confusion and difficulty.

I do not complain about that. It was an initial change. I think that we have all learned quite a lot from that matter. I have to accept that, in practice, the operation is working reasonably well. Now that we have moved on to the enforcement of the embargo, it is right and proper that they should be allowed to get on with the job.

You asked me a direct question. My answer is that we should not try to duplicate the provision

in this way. A political judgment should be reached as to whether NATO or WEU is the more appropriate organisation for an initiative of this kind. All the efforts should be concentrated on whichever one is chosen to be the more sensible way of responding to international need.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – May I first endorse the initial comments of our colleague, Tom Cox. The Minister may not be aware that yesterday Mr. Colombo appeared to agree with my suggestion that, where countries have exported or readily allowed the export of arms to the former Yugoslavia, the action of WEU and the Council of Europe could properly be the suspension of their membership. However, in answer to a question from Lord Finsberg, he said that, of course, the information about such breaches of embargo and decency would remain confidential – which, of course, would prevent the Council of Europe and WEU taking any action. That is not an acceptable position, and I hope that the Minister agrees.

If the Minister can, will he seek to persuade his ministerial colleagues in WEU – if not within the Council of Europe as well – to provide information on where breaches of sanctions have been clear and incontrovertible? It is appropriate that international opinion should be expressed on such matters.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. RIFKIND (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). – I freely acknowledge the seriousness of the point that you raised, and the need to make progress in ensuring that the spirit and letter of international embargoes that have the authority of the United Nations behind them are fully and properly implemented. If it is believed that there has been a contravention of the embargo, it is clearly a matter of judgment as to the best way of trying to resolve that problem. Sometimes it makes sense, at least in the first instance, to make representations privately, through diplomatic means, to the country that one believes may not be carrying out its obligations, in order to achieve a change of behaviour. As long as there is a reasonable prospect that those approaches may produce a proper response and an end to any breaches of the embargo, that is the preferred course of action – rather than precipitating public condemnation, with all the difficulties associated with that.

I certainly accept that if, at the end of the day, one could not but conclude that the country in question had no intention of complying with its international obligations, and if its breaches of the embargo were flagrant and substantial, in due course it would be right and proper for the

Mr. Rifkind (continued)

world to know of that act so that that country could either justify its behaviour or seek to respond to criticism. It is a matter of timing and judgment as to the best way to respond to any real or believed breaches of any embargo of that kind.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*). – I congratulate the Minister on his excellent speech and on its detailed information. I have two questions. We are working in this organisation, in its different committees, according to what is called the spirit of Maastricht, and we are making recommendations and passing resolutions based on that premise. We know that there is a hypothetical possibility that the Maastricht Treaty will not be fully ratified by the twelve countries. Do you think that we are working in the right way, according to the spirit of Maastricht, bearing in mind that possibility?

Secondly, you said at the beginning of your speech, as I understood it, that our organisation is not yet mature enough to take much more effective action. Do you think that that lack of maturity results from the nature of things, or from a lack of political will? In this case, if we are sure that stronger co-operation is necessary, should we emphasise the political will in that way?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. RIFKIND (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). – You describe your first question as hypothetical. It is normally the first rule of politicians, particularly ministers, to decline to answer hypothetical questions. But on this occasion I think that I can be more positive.

It is my view that the arguments for developing WEU as the European dimension of the Atlantic Alliance are sound and sensible, independent of Maastricht. It so happens that Maastricht was the occasion on which this objective was proclaimed, but it had already been considered by NATO some months earlier, and NATO gave its own sympathetic endorsement to the approach. The arguments for giving WEU this new rôle are soundly based on good defence grounds. The rationale for them must be complementary to the Maastricht process – but it can also be sustained independently of it.

As for your second question, the problem is not a lack of political will. We are at the beginning of an evolving process after the cold war. All the countries – not only Europe but North America too – are seeking to identify the changes that may be right and sensible now that the Soviet Union no longer exists – now that the

defence situation in Europe has changed dramatically. The cold war has ended, but that has not brought peace to Europe: it has brought hot wars in several parts of Europe for the first time in fifty years. So defence challenges are as important as ever. European countries and the United States need to think long and carefully about the way in which European countries can co-operate more effectively and coherently in support of the wider Atlantic Alliance.

The fact that this will happen at a modest pace should not be a cause for concern. NATO has almost fifty years of experience of sharing military assets, of joint training, of joint exercises and of familiarity with developing a common military doctrine. It would be astonishing if WEU, which has not had that sort of rôle, even wished to compete with that structure in the time that we are talking about. We are, however, developing a European dimension at a time when the new democracies in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia and when countries that have not traditionally been part of NATO all wish to come closer together to enhance European security. WEU can perform a valuable rôle in assisting these countries' aspirations, without weakening the NATO alliance.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Mackie of Benshie.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHEIE (*United Kingdom*). – I, too, enjoyed your speech, Secretary of State. It was the product of your logical mind, which I have long admired – but it appeared to be an admirable tune played while Rome was burning.

You said that we must be careful to be impartial and not to give offence to any group in Yugoslavia. That policy has resulted in the Serbs, the main offenders, being able to continue, and to encourage others to continue, a policy of barbarity unseen in Europe for fifty years. Surely our rôle should be to provide proper air cover for our troops, to show that we have the political will to erase this blot on the face of Europe, of which we should all be thoroughly ashamed.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. RIFKIND (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). – My reference to not showing partiality had to do with the rôle of British and other troops in Bosnia carrying out United Nations humanitarian objectives. The troops that we, France and other countries have sent to Bosnia have been sent there under an explicit United Nations mandate to provide food and medical supplies to hundreds of thousands of people in communities that would otherwise starve over the coming months. The United Nations has not authorised them to be involved in trying to sort out a civil war or to take sides between the different factions. So it is

Mr. Rifkind (continued)

crucial that these soldiers carry out their tasks and relieve these communities while rigidly adhering to the United Nations mandate.

Of course, the United Nations has expressed strong views on many aspects of the Bosnian situation and it has sought to attribute responsibility and blame when it believes that to be justified. The economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro are an obvious case, as are certain other aspects of the embargo.

You raised the possibility of air strikes. What would the purpose of such air strikes be? Those responsible for controlling the convoys bringing food and medical aid do not believe that air cover is necessary to carry out their functions. There may be a need for some method of enforcing a no-fly zone in Bosnia. The United Nations has passed a successful resolution governing fixed-wing Bosnian Serb aircraft, but there has been some evidence of helicopters still being used by Bosnian Serb irregulars in Bosnia. At some stage that may require enforcement action under a resolution to that effect by the United Nations.

I have heard no coherent case for the contribution that air power could make to the resolution of the agony of former Yugoslavia. It is not a conventional war, and even if we wanted them we have no conventional targets that might be appropriate to this kind of military action. One should be very careful before advancing proposals without being clear about how they would be used to further the objective that they have in mind or about the likelihood that they will produce the desired results. The immediate objective in the next three months must be the relief of communities that have been besieged for several months and which are likely to suffer great hardship if food and medical aid do not reach them. That is why our forces are in Bosnia. The operation must be conducted in strictly humanitarian terms, or the troops will be prevented from achieving their objectives.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van Velzen.

Mr. van VELZEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I have listened with much interest to the Minister's speech, especially the references to Yugoslavia, and I should like to ask some questions about that.

I understand the Minister's reasoning when he says that we should act under the mandate of the United Nations. However, we are faced with a serious crisis in public opinion in the western countries with regard to the credibility of European policy. Furthermore, a very serious situation will arise with the onset of winter in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So I should like to ask:

firstly, when will Europe be in a position to ensure effective land monitoring to secure observance of the embargo? Secondly when shall we really be in a position to prevent all flights in the airspace above Bosnia-Herzegovina? Furthermore are we ready to take the appropriate measures to bring this about?

Thirdly, how can we avoid getting into a situation where the Islamic countries cease to be passive spectators of the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Are we prepared at that point, as an international community, as the United Nations, to take the necessary measures? And finally, why can we not set up safe havens to make sure that, whatever happens, the refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina, numbering over 100 000, still have a place where they can spend the winter in safety? Can we expect suitable initiatives on this point from the British Government, which at present holds the presidency of the European Community?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. RIFKIND (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). – You have asked four questions, and I shall try to respond to each of them. First, you asked about the embargo and how it can be made more effective. The embargo is both a land and a sea embargo. The sea embargo is operated in international waters in the Adriatic, and it is therefore proper and straightforward for the United Nations, through both NATO and WEU, to use the naval vessels available to enforce it. That is now happening, and there is every reason to believe that it will be a successful operation.

The land embargo obviously depends on decisions of sovereign independent governments, but the countries that border former Yugoslavia – Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and so on – are independent states. They have accepted their responsibilities under the United Nations and naturally we hope that they will carry out those responsibilities fully, to the letter and in the spirit of what the United Nations requires. Through customs officials and others, advice and assistance have been made available to those who need such help to enforce the embargo. Ultimately, however, independent countries and their governments must answer for the policies that they pursue.

You asked about the implications for an air embargo. The United Nations has already passed a resolution banning air activity above Bosnia. As I said, that has been successful with regard to fixed-wing aircraft and, as far as I am aware, there have been no attempts by Bosnian Serbs, the only group with aircraft, to use fixed-wing aircraft for military purposes since the United Nations resolution was passed – although there has been some evidence of helicopter activity and further action may be

Mr. Rifkind (continued)

required to ensure that full compliance with the no-fly zone is achieved.

You mentioned the position of Islamic countries, and their understandable concern about the trauma affecting their Muslim co-religionists. Much of our humanitarian effort is being expended for the benefit of Muslim communities – the communities most exposed by the sieges and various other military operations. We must redouble our efforts to achieve a political solution that does not recognise any frontiers that have been changed, other than by the agreement of those communities most concerned.

Finally, you asked about the safe havens and why we could not implement them. Much depends on what you mean by the approach. There are many parts of former Yugoslavia where there is no fighting taking place, and where those who have fled or been evicted from their homes are now living in relative peace. They are destitute and have been gravely afflicted by the war, but they are not subject to physical danger at the moment. Those are, in effect, safe havens. I suspect that what you are really considering are communities – particularly Muslim communities – in areas where fighting is still taking place, which are in physical danger because of bombing attacks with artillery, mortars and so on.

However agreeable the concept of safe havens may be in practice, it can be implemented only if there is a cease-fire – unless one is prepared to send United Nations forces in to fight their way through and impose them by military means. If it is the latter that you contemplate, I must emphasise that that would be a massive operation. There are something like 80 000 Bosnian armed irregulars fighting in various parts of Bosnia. If the United Nations wished to take action to try to impose a solution in areas where conflict is currently taking place, that would require more than 100 000 United Nations troops – a massive, open-ended commitment. It would almost certainly lead to major casualties among the troops of countries that contributed to the United Nations force and would probably result in the need to take over the administration of large parts of Bosnia. It would, I believe, have grave consequences. That is why virtually all the countries in the United Nations believe that it is unwise to contemplate military solutions to the kind of conflict that is taking place within that community.

That is not a comfortable conclusion or one with which any of us can be entirely happy. Nevertheless, we need to consider the implications of an alternative course of action that indefinitely committed vast numbers of United Nations troops to deal with a situation that they

could not control and into which they were likely to be sucked, themselves becoming targets of attack, aggression and physical injury. One must take those factors into account.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Tributes have already been paid to the Secretary of State for his speech; and some of us have been impressed by the way in which he has been able to answer questions without needing advisers whispering in his ears.

I want to change the subject and refer to something that he mentioned in his speech. Is he really satisfied that countries such as Poland, Hungary and, at present, the Czech Federal Republic, are happy with the security guarantees being given by the Atlantic Council consultative body, or does he accept that there is real anxiety that those former Warsaw Pact countries do not know where they can turn should there be some threat to their security?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. RIFKIND (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). – It is certainly the responsibility of all of us to try to help with the security of Europe, and that must include the security of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe – in particular, the countries that Lord Finsberg mentioned, some of which have become great enthusiasts for NATO. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have indicated a desire to join NATO, and that aspiration may one day be realised. It is bound to take time, however, but the unavoidable conclusion is that membership of NATO or WEU involves not only rights but responsibilities. Any country that joins a military alliance must be able fully to contribute to the objectives of that alliance. That will take time and careful consideration should be given to the question of how progress can best be achieved. We already have close dialogue, through the NATO Co-operation Council, with the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, and that needs to be taken further. There are various other forums – CSCE, for example – relevant to that objective.

Perhaps the single most important objective for European security over the next ten to twenty years will be to see Russia not only remain but become more fully a normal country of the European family. We must therefore concentrate all our efforts on measures that will enhance security not only in the rest of Europe but in relationships between Russia and European countries generally. I should be slightly concerned if we moved towards a situation where the whole of Europe except for Russia was part of a military alliance from which Russia, itself continuing to move to a more liberal, western-style political and social structure, seemed excluded.

Mr. Rifkind (continued)

None of us can predict with any certainty what will happen in Russia. At the moment, Russia has a government that is responsible and liberal and wishes to make it into a normal European country, which it has not been for more than seventy years. We must concentrate on encouraging that process. Things could change, and they could change for the worse, however; there must be a continuing need for NATO and WEU as no one can be certain what the future holds. As long as there are grounds – as there are at the moment – for believing that Russia is moving in a positive and constructive direction, all our debates about security issues and the rôle and membership of NATO and WEU must take into account the implication of any changes for attitudes within Russia, for the relationship of Russia to its neighbours and for its rôle within Europe as a whole. The prize is too important to be placed in danger because we are dealing with less important considerations at any given time. Those factors are relevant to Lord Finsberg's question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Carolis.

Mr. DE CAROLIS (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your extremely clear and meaningful report, which shows how closely in touch with defence problems you are.

The political upheavals of the last three years have, however, radically changed the picture of European security, in the same way as happened after the Napoleonic wars and in the years after the first and second world wars. What we have to do, therefore, is establish a lasting and fair peaceful order in Europe.

As long ago as 1967, the farsighted Harmel report set this objective as the main guideline for allied policy. Today you spoke of Article V of the Brussels Treaty as a fixed point and on this there can be no disagreement.

My question is the following: NATO is the military alliance with the greatest success in history and we are all very happy about this. The military division of Europe belongs to the past; the problem now is to resolve the differences between Europe's stable and unstable and wealthy and poor regions. Minister, do you not consider that WEU, not only in co-operation with NATO but also acting independently should play a rôle of its own to avoid being no more than an armed or underarmed part of NATO in Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RIFKIND (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). – You are right to say that the challenges that we face today may be

more profound than any that we have faced since the Napoleonic wars and the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Some things do not change, and suspicion, which has always been a European theme, goes back many centuries. I recall reading with some relish of how in 1815 Prince Metternich, the Austrian statesman, was informed by one of his aides that he had just heard that the Russian ambassador had died. Apparently, Metternich's response was: "Really? I wonder what his motive can have been." Suspicion, then, is not a new phenomenon; we have seen it all before.

Your specific question related to the rôle of WEU, and whether it was to be seen simply as the European arm of NATO. We must be careful here. If we start, as I certainly do, from the proposition that the Atlantic Alliance remains crucial to the security of both Europe and North America, we must ensure that any European initiative is not intended to weaken that alliance – and, moreover, that it does not risk being interpreted in that way, however mistaken such an interpretation might be.

It is inevitable that, in any alliance of democratic countries, there will be an ongoing political debate. Such a debate, however, is taking place not just in Italy, Britain, Germany or France; there is also an internal political debate in the United States. We must be certain that nothing that we do on this side of the Atlantic is misunderstood in the United States and taken to suggest a lack of interest in the relevance of NATO in the years to come. I believe that the current development of NATO is seen explicitly as the development of a European arm of the Atlantic Alliance. That, I think, is the right balance. It will ensure better co-ordination in Europe without leading to misunderstanding, indifference or hostility in North America. Those are the twin objectives that we should try to sustain.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Keith Speed.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – In your admirable speech you mentioned the ten ships that are necessary – along with American aircraft – to take British troops to Yugoslavia. A general theme of the Assembly, and indeed of your speech, is the fact that there is to be an evolving rôle for WEU. Are you satisfied that there is the merchant shipping capability, under WEU control, to enable us to carry out our various tasks?

We have already seen the Iran-Iraq war and the Desert Storm operation; now we are seeing what is happening in Yugoslavia. Many of us fear that our merchant shipping capability is declining, and will decline to dangerous levels within the next few years.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. RIFKIND (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). – You used an interesting phrase: “under WEU control”. That in itself opens up a number of questions. If we are contemplating international action authorised by the United Nations or some other international body, all the available evidence suggests that there is no problem or difficulty about access to merchant shipping that may be needed to support any such operation. In the Gulf war there was no problem of availability of merchant ships to meet British requirements, and I think that that also applies to the requirements of other countries.

There has been a worrying decline in merchant shipping, particularly merchant shipping flying the flags of various European countries. That has important implications. I think that, in defence terms, that would be a matter of major importance only if it involved a purely national operation that was unlikely to have the support, or even the acquiescence, of other countries; obviously, however, it could create problems with regard to certain categories of shipping if ships were not available under the flag in question.

This is not just a question of ships. Even more important is the question of seafarers. A country must be confident that, if it needs to charter a ship for a military operation and if the seafarers on that ship are nationals of another country, the government will not inhibit the contribution of that vessel to whatever may be required.

I am aware of no reason for us to be concerned about any difficulties that WEU countries might face; but there is a worrying trend which, if it continued indefinitely, could lead to a severe restriction of the number of merchant ships available. That would not be relevant to a United Nations or international operation, but it could have implications if a purely national effort were required.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I too welcome the Secretary of State’s speech which could be the subject of many questions. I should like to ask only one, about Yugoslavia.

We have been reminded that yesterday the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs was asked what punishment should be meted out if a merchant ship carried arms in breach of the embargo and whether a state deemed to be responsible for this could be expelled from the organisation. I feel that the Minister was rightly careful in answering because past experience has shown how difficult it is to prove that a government is responsible when sanctions are broken.

My question is as follows. Do you not think that it might be more useful to adopt a measure which proved very effective in reducing the hijacking of aircraft? It consisted in governments undertaking to require airlines to discontinue all flights to or via states failing to detain an aircraft landing in their country with hijackers aboard and allowing it to take off again. This proved to be most effective. I do not know whether this was the reason but hijackings of aircraft which were previously frequent became very few and far between. I believe – and I would ask you whether you agree – that there might be an undertaking to ban the docking at any port in our countries of merchant ships from a country responsible for carrying arms in breach of the embargo.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. RIFKIND (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). – You have raised some crucial issues. Any expulsion or suspension of a member state of WEU could only be an extreme response to a grave situation. You are right to suggest that, if there is evidence of sanction-busting – of a breach of the embargo – the first question is whether that action had the acquiescence or the support of the government concerned, as opposed to being simply an initiative on the part of a shipowner or private businessman who was acting without the knowledge or the approval of his government.

Careful investigation and examination of the circumstances would be necessary before one could assume that the government of the country involved was involved in such a breach. However, if evidence was available that a breach had the tacit or explicit approval of a government, clearly that would be a serious international issue which could lead to strong representations against the government in question.

There are ways in which one could respond to such an irresponsible position. You mentioned the rights of airliners to land in airports and so on. That is a matter for the civil aviation authority. But there are precedents for taking action to enforce sanctions or embargoes where it is believed that that would be helpful in achieving the desired end.

It is difficult to give a straightforward answer to your question because unless one knows the circumstances of a particular case it is not clear what is the proper response. In some cases, legal action against an individual, businessman or private citizen may be sufficient to achieve compliance. In some cases, it may require diplomatic representations in private. Sometimes, the embarrassment of public exposure can lead to a change of policy. On other occasions, the breach may be so serious and ongoing that some action by the United Nations against the country responsible for that unacceptable behaviour may be required.

Mr. Rifkind (continued)

If the reputation of the international community and the United Nations is to be upheld, it is necessary to ensure that the resolutions which enforce embargoes are taken seriously. If they are not taken seriously, not only will the objective not be realised but the very authority of the United Nations will become seriously diminished. Inevitably, that would cause grave concern.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Secretary of State. The Assembly is grateful to you for honouring it with your visit today, for your address and for answering the questions which have been put to you. On behalf of the Assembly, I thank you very much.

***10. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Melescanu, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania.
2. Turkey (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1341, addendum and amendments).
3. Defence: Central Europe in evolution (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1336 and amendment).
4. Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1333).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.)

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 1st December 1992

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Melescanu, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania.
Replies by Mr. Melescanu to questions put by: Mr. Cox, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Perinat, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. Reddemann, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Agnelli, Mrs. Verspaget.
4. Turkey (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments.*)
Speakers: Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Liapis (Observer from Greece), Mr. Pahtas (Observer from Greece), Mr. Agnelli, Mr. Bosco, Mr. Slatinski (Observer from Bulgaria), Mr. Moya (Rapporteur), Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman), Mr. Bosco, Mr. Moya.
5. Defence: Central Europe in evolution (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1336 and amendment.*)
Speakers: Mr. Cox (Rapporteur), Mr. Caro, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Vacaru (Observer from Romania), Mr. Rockenbauer (Observer from Hungary), Mr. Iwinski (Observer from Poland), Mr. Philipov (Observer from Bulgaria), Mr. Cox (Rapporteur), Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman), Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. Cox; (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Mr. Goerens, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Hardy.
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.25 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Melescanu, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Melescanu, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania.

It will be a privilege, Minister, for our Assembly to hear you speak on what is actually your country's national day and I take this opportunity to extend our best wishes to your country for its prosperity.

This is the first time that our Assembly has had a Romanian minister at one of its sessions. But it was privileged to be addressed by your predecessor, Mr. Nastase, at the symposium the Assembly held in Berlin last April to discuss all the questions that arise for the security of Western Europe as a result of the changes that the central and eastern parts of our continent have gone through. In other words, you are not here by chance but as one stage in a wide-ranging process orchestrated by the Council of WEU – which has this year brought into existence a forum for consultation with eight countries, including Romania – and our Assembly.

We particularly welcome your readiness to address us, since it will give us a very early opportunity – one of the earliest – of hearing the views of your government after the recent elections to which you made sure that observers from the Council of Europe and the Assembly of WEU were invited, evidence of the Romanian authorities' wish to link together the country's return to the practice of democracy and its rapprochement with the countries whose objective is a European Union in which Romania should one day find its place.

We look to you for a clearer understanding of how your country sees its integration in this new

1. See page 24.

The President (continued)

Europe, and in particular how it views the problems of maintaining peace across the continent, including that of how to restore peace to former Yugoslavia, now torn apart by a fratricidal war.

No one could have been fitter than you, Minister, to hold your present office. Your studies were focused on international relations and you have made diplomacy your career, occupying high-level posts that have given you a rare authority in the field of international organisations and in security and disarmament. You represented your country at the Vienna conference on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe and on other occasions, and in 1991 you were appointed head of the Department of European and Atlantic Affairs in the ministry of which you are now in charge.

For all these reasons, your address will be of the very greatest importance and interest to us.

If you agree, we shall ask you afterwards to answer questions from the floor.

Please take the rostrum, Minister.

Mr. MELESCANU (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, may I first express my very sincere thanks to Mr. Hartmut Soell, President of the Assembly of WEU, who invited me on your behalf to speak to you today. This invitation is further evidence of the fundamental changes that have taken place in the relations between WEU and the Central European countries, including my own, since the Petersberg conference of 19th June 1992. Another indication of these changes is the presence here of Mr. Ion Diaconescu and Mr. Vasile Vacaru, two distinguished members of the Romanian Parliament, to whom I extend cordial greetings.

Also, before putting forward some ideas on the subject you are debating, I should like to express our thanks to the members of the Defence Committee and its Chairman, Sir Dudley Smith, for the excellent report on Defence: Central Europe in evolution, presented by Mr. Cox.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in geostrategic terms, Romania is in a unique situation. Geographically and politically it is a Central European country; but at the same time it is near the Balkans and the Black Sea, it is on the Danube and its two biggest neighbours, former Yugoslavia and what was once the Soviet Union, are in a state of violent dissension. In addition, for the first time in its modern history, Romania no longer has a great power as a neighbour.

All of this, in our view, explains why the major concern of the recently constituted government is to ensure the security of the country in a difficult period and in a difficult area.

One principal and urgent task is therefore to work out a new strategy for Romanian security making allowance for the profound changes that have taken place on the continent, the waning importance of factors of purely military insecurity and the mounting significance of other aspects of a political, economic and ethnic nature.

In that context I would like to offer you a few preliminary thoughts.

First and foremost, the Romanian Government well realises that a fundamental factor in national security is the country's internal stability during the process of economic reform and transition towards a democratic and pluralist society guaranteeing respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, including those of national minorities.

In the last two and a half years Romania has seen radical economic and social changes in which economic reform measures have affected all levels of society. However, as in all the Central European countries, the process of transition towards a market economy has come up against great difficulties. In Romania the paralysing effects of the over-centralised system of government and structural imbalance inherited from the former régime, coupled with the difficulties implicit in the transition process itself, are particularly intense.

The new government has set about investigating every respect in which the reform process is not working properly and the complex sources of the crisis in Romania, an exercise seen not as an end in itself, but as an essential preliminary to pursuing structural reforms in conditions which will keep the social costs inevitably involved in transition at a reasonable level. We reaffirm that the continuance of economic reform remains our basic policy.

In 1993 the main objective will be first to reduce the decline in production, and then bring it to a halt by the second half of the year, in order to create conditions conducive to economic recovery from 1994 onwards. We shall be improving the country's infrastructure, modernising its banking and financial system, improving fiscal policy and toughening up financial discipline.

The government will bring in measures to speed up the privatisation process, an essential element in economic reform and in the operation of market mechanisms. It is also introducing other measures designed to intensify the privatisation of trade, tourism and services.

The government's policy of support for private enterprise will include preferential loans

Mr. Melescanu (continued)

and tax relief on reinvested profits and on profits earned by exports. Our constant concern will be to attract foreign investment to Romania, by supplementary and improved legislative and institutional measures. We are convinced that all of this will increase investors' confidence in the Romanian economic climate.

Consolidation of the institutions of education, research, culture, health and law and order and development of the social dialogue, the system of non-governmental institutions and civil society all feature in the transition strategy.

In this context we would stress the urgency and importance we attach to handling the question of minorities in accordance with international rules, as enshrined in the relevant United Nations and CSCE documents, in accordance with the results of the follow-up Helsinki conference in 1992.

In addition, the Romanian constitution provides the members of national minorities with the guarantees they need to safeguard, develop and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity. Here the constitution makes explicit provision for international law to take precedence over domestic law, enabling members of minorities to enjoy rights consistent with the highest standards generally recognised at the European level.

It is the Romanian Government's intention to sign the instruments adopted by the Council of Europe on this subject and to take the necessary steps to incorporate them in domestic legislation. My government also intends to supplement its legislation on non-governmental organisations, and to bring in a policy giving priority to the growth of organisations actively engaged in the social, educational and cultural sectors and other fields, from which the state will gradually withdraw.

Mr. President, this economic and political restructuring has to be accompanied by the moral reform of Romanian society through the general assertion of the values of democracy, the end in view being to open Romania up without restriction to Europe and the world.

We shall continue to take a firm attitude towards all kinds of intolerance, xenophobia, antisemitism and other forms of racial hatred that could have serious repercussions on the internal and international political climate.

Using a practical metaphor, Romania's security concerns can be likened to a building on three floors.

The first consists of its neighbouring countries. The wish of the Romanian Government is to operate a good-neighbour policy and wholly normalise its relations with all the countries on

its borders and in the region; this will include the signing of bilateral political treaties, complying with the principles of international law. We shall spare no diplomatic effort to seek political settlements to the conflicts in neighbouring territories, beginning with the area to the east of Moldova and the countries that used to be Yugoslavia.

Relations with the Republic of Moldova have a special place in Romanian policy, practical objectives in Romania's relations with this country being economic integration and the creation of a common space, and freedom of movement of individuals, capital and services.

We should also like to expand the network of bilateral treaties with all European countries as a back-up to the efforts towards continental and regional integration. We attach special importance to the rapid conclusion of this kind of treaty with all Romania's close neighbours.

The second floor of the security structure lies at the sub-regional level, which is why participation in the political projects and consultations of the Central European Initiative is of special importance to Romania. Indeed, my first official duty as Minister for Foreign Affairs was to attend the CEI ministerial meeting at Graz in Austria for the ministers for foreign affairs of Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine.

Similar thinking is behind Romania's aim to set up a Black Sea economic zone and establish co-operation among all the Balkan and Danube countries.

In our view, all these arrangements with stability and co-operation in mind, designed to form basic elements in the new European structure, have a potentially important part to play in Romania's security.

The third and last floor consists of the efforts of the Romanian Government to join the organisations of the West, in particular Western European Union, the European Communities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Council of Europe, this – for us – being an absolute priority. We are especially interested in the changes taking place in the CSCE, and we intend to contribute to its adaptation to the new realities in Europe.

I will take this opportunity to voice the Romanian Government's satisfaction at having initialled the association agreement with the European Communities, and at knowing there are plans for it to be signed very shortly – this month, in fact – in Brussels. This milestone will have a great political and economic impact on Romania's progress in the long term towards integration in the Community.

Romania is also actively involved in international economic life. A few examples are the signing of the agreement with the European

Mr. Melescanu (continued)

Free Trade Area and the strengthening of co-operation with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other financial and banking institutions.

With the priority objective of integration in European structures and, first and foremost, the European Communities, WEU and the Council of Europe, the Romanian Government intends to set up a special body, i.e. a ministry responsible for marshalling resources, identifying activities and working out a strategy to speed up the process which could be lengthy. The Romanian policy of a closer relationship with and integration in European and Euro-Atlantic structures is shared by all the political forces in the country; it is not just a minority or short-term stance.

In this context, Western European Union assumes a high priority. A first reason is that, through the decisions it has already taken in Petersberg and Rome this year, or will soon take on the basis of the report by Mr. Cox, WEU will become a key institution deeply implicated in the security of the Central European countries and therefore of Romania.

The first step in the process of institutionalising co-operation between the WEU member countries and the eight Central European countries in Petersberg on 19th June 1992, with the extraordinary meeting of the ministers for foreign affairs and defence of these countries, represents a qualitatively new stage in the field of European co-operation. Our wish is to develop relations with WEU to the greatest possible extent at the highest level which its member countries are prepared to accept. We welcome the idea of creating affiliated status for the Central European countries. We are in favour of co-operation in the production of military equipment, and of mutual exchanges of information, in accordance with the Romanian Government's policy of openness and transparency.

We welcome the Rome press communiqué issued by the WEU Council of Ministers on 20th November, and we consider that the seventeenth anniversary forum for consultation set up in Petersberg is a new departure likely to strengthen stability throughout Europe. This forum might also be used to co-ordinate action by our countries in various international bodies and especially in the context of the CSCE in Vienna. We likewise welcome the declaration by the WEU Council of Ministers, and we reaffirm Romania's active support for the provisions of Resolution 787 of the United Nations Security Council.

We wish to express appreciation for WEU's support for the monitoring of the sanctions

imposed on Yugoslavia by that resolution. Romania is prepared to join in the efforts by WEU countries to enforce the measures laid down in the resolution, and we ask these countries for their support in enforcing the embargo along the Danube. It is our conviction that this is the quickest way to arrive at a political solution to the tragic crisis in former Yugoslavia.

May I reiterate the importance of the parliamentary dimension, the key democratic component of the process of redefining the architecture of security and co-operation in Europe, to which the recently-elected Romanian Parliament wishes to make a more active contribution. If the new Central European democracies are to find their natural place in the great European family again, it has to be without brawling with each other.

In that regard, WEU and its Assembly are models of international action and co-operation at governmental and parliamentary level for the whole of Europe.

To conclude, Mr. President, may I express the hope that from now on relations between Romania and Western European Union will intensify. May I assure you parliamentarians of Romania's intention and its wish to contribute to the establishment of a united, prosperous and stable Europe, to the benefit of our fellow citizens and of the world as a whole.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your address, Minister.

I am sure you will be prepared to answer questions from members of the Assembly.

I first call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – Minister, as the member who later this afternoon will present the report to which you kindly made reference in your speech, may I say that it has been a great pleasure to listen to you and to hear the details that you gave. The applause that greeted the end of your speech was a clear indication of the interest, and the warmth, that the Assembly feels for you and your country.

I should like to ask a question on a specific matter on which you did not touch – I realise that you could comment on only a limited number of subjects. We are now seeing the movement of people from Central and Eastern Europe into other areas of Western Europe. Sadly, that presents problems for those countries. However, it is of even greater importance to many of us that problems are created for the people who move. People face social problems and also, sadly, have suffered racial attacks. What is the policy of your government on such issues?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELESCANU (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania*). – To tell the truth, the position of our country evolved in an interesting manner after the December 1989 revolution. One of the few achievements of that revolution which was not challenged by anyone was freedom of movement for our citizens. We believe that freedom of movement should be an absolute principle and that no one should be sent back home unless he has expressed in a clear manner his intention and desire to return.

Nevertheless, the position has developed since then. Some of our partners in Western Europe have faced a substantial flow of what I would call economic refugees. There has also been an increasingly strong reaction back home against the phenomenon. We have therefore realised that one of our basic obligations as a responsible government is to take care of our citizens and bring them home. That is why in the past year one of the main activities of the Ministry of the Interior in Romania has been to conclude technical arrangements with other ministries of the interior in various countries. The most well known is Germany but we also have agreements with Austria and we are negotiating with other countries.

Under those agreements the Romanian Government undertook to take back every Romanian who was illegally resident in another country. For example, Romanians might no longer have a valid visa or might have been unsuccessful in transforming a tourist visa into a working visa. The government's policy must be complemented by an internal policy to rehabilitate the citizens who return. That is one part of the policy of social protection which the new government intends to promote in the near future. We are aware that our policy does not require money alone. Sometimes money is easier to obtain than facilities to retrain people.

I assure you that it is not easy to retrain and rehabilitate some of the people who return. Some of the Romanians who lived abroad illegally are gypsies who have had little education. That makes them more vulnerable to unemployment, which is beginning to increase in Romania. There are only a few centres of rehabilitation. It is a problem of money but also of a lack of knowledge about how to rehabilitate such people. However, I assure you that it is one of the crucial problems with which the new government will deal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I echo the comments made by Mr. Cox in welcoming you here. I wish to ask you the same question that I put to Mr. Colombo yesterday and to Mr.

Rifkind this morning. I should be pleased to have the Romanian view on this serious matter.

Clearly, the disregard of sanctions and the flow of weaponry into the former Yugoslavia is extremely serious. Do you agree with my view, which is shared by several other members of the Assembly and of the Council of Europe – where we are pleased to have Romanian colleagues and friends – that the position in the former Yugoslavia would justify the suspension or expulsion of any member state of either organisation if it was shown to have allowed weaponry to be exported from its territory or to have engaged in the export of such weaponry? Do you agree that that would be a means of demonstrating to the rest of Europe that such a system of trade is simply unacceptable in these, the last years of the twentieth century?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELESCANU (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania*). – I think that that is a matter on which I may, with your permission, Mr. President, comment. The United Nations Security Council has imposed a clear ban on the export of arms to Yugoslavia. Romania, as one of the states that has decided to apply that decision, is practically committed to doing everything in its power, both officially and in trying to prevent private persons or companies from exporting arms.

There is an important matter: the transfer of such weapons across our territorial waters or air space to the former Yugoslav federation. I think that I completely share your point of view, Mr. Hardy. Ignoring such an important resolution of the Security Council could be a reason for adopting specific and severe measures against any offending state. I believe that everyone can understand the danger of such a policy or behaviour.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Perinat.

Mr. PERINAT (*Spain*) (Translation). – Thank you very much, Minister, for your very full statement which clearly explains the present situation in Romania. You mentioned Moldavia, or Moldova as you call it. I appreciate that this is a delicate problem for a minister for foreign affairs, but it is obviously still a topical one.

This is a country with two different populations, one of Romanian origin and the other of Slav, Russian or possibly Ukrainian origin. How do you see these problems being solved in the long term: by federation, perhaps with Romania, or in the Republic of Moldova itself or possibly with Ukraine? Could you throw some more light on this question?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELESCANU (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania*) (Translation). – May I briefly recall the situation in this territory. It is a region or part of Romania, which has always been inhabited by Romanians. Following on the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in 1940, it was absorbed into what at that time was the Soviet Union.

From our point of view, there are two distinct questions. The first relates to the historical situation of the province. What we clearly have here is one half of a province which has always been Romanian, and has always been inhabited by a very great majority of Romanians. From this point of view there is no difficulty in appreciating that for Romanians as a whole, this is a province which belongs to Romania.

The second is one of Realpolitik. The present situation in this province is that it has become an independent state following on the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Romanian Government was one of the first to recognise the existence of the state, which is independent but inhabited by a clear majority of Romanians. The policy of the present Romanian Government is to recognise the existence of the two independent sovereign Romanian states.

With this in mind, the government's concern is firstly to ensure the creation and free development of a common cultural space. Romanians living in Bessarabia have suffered from cultural oppression for far too long. An attempt was made to create the myth of a Moldovan language, and to replace the Latin alphabet by the Cyrillic alphabet. Higher education in the Romanian language was more or less banned. An entire cultural history needs to be reconstituted. The Romanian Government for its part has decided to give its full support to the creation of a common cultural space, so as to promote Romanian culture, the use of the Romanian language and the practice of the orthodox Christian religion.

A second priority is that these people are members of the same spiritual community; in my opinion, one of the prerequisites for any kind of development of relations with Romania concerns links with the Romanians who live on the other side of the River Prut. Thus the second priority of my government is, as I have already said, to ensure the free movement of capital, manpower and services, in other words everything involved in a free market economy. The government's aim is to create a zone of economic integration between Romania and Moldova.

The third aim is to promote the continuing political rapprochement of the two countries. If you ask me for my opinion, I can give it – not the official position, but my personal opinion. My view is that the reunion of Moldova and

Romania is a process which will unfold concurrently with the integration of Romania and the Republic of Moldova in the European Communities. I see no other solution. Raising territorial issues at this stage is a bad mistake. In our region there are already plenty of sources of insecurity. An approach on these lines would not only fail to provide any guarantee of success, it could be very dangerous.

Another very important question is that what we really need to ensure prevails in Europe today is the spirit of co-operation and negotiation to be found in the documents adopted under the CSCE system and by bodies such as WEU, the Council of Europe and NATO. This in practice is the only possible way of bringing the Romanians who live in the two provinces together.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Minister. The list of members wanting to ask questions is as follows: Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Péciaux, Mr. Reddemann, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Agnelli and Mrs. Verspaget. The list is now closed.

I call Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.

Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Minister, I revert to a question which has already been raised, but I should like to set it in another context. In your excellent address you said that Romania would participate in the efforts made by other European countries to enforce the embargo. Yet we have seen pictures on television of lines of petrol tankers queueing up at your frontier. This was only last week. How can you claim to comply with the land and air embargo if lorries or planes still get through, carrying petrol or Romanian equipment whose purpose must, in practice, be to keep the war going in former Yugoslavia?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELESCANU (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania*) (Translation). – I watch a lot of television, but that does not mean that I believe everything I see. I have long experience in this field, and I beg you, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, please believe what I say.

As regards the queue of trucks, crossing between Romania and Yugoslavia by land is more or less impossible. I am not basing this just on reports by Romanian customs officers, but also on the conclusions reached by the international inspection team which came to Romania, and is still present at the main frontier crossings between Romania and Serbia. One sensitive question has still to be settled, that of the passage along the Danube of barges loaded with oil or other products covered by the embargo. Until now Romania's difficulty, as for all riparian countries, has stemmed from the fact

Mr. Melescanu (continued)

that the Danube is held to be an international waterway on which traffic cannot be interfered with.

For this reason, Romania has only been able to inspect barges forced or agreeing with the Romanian authorities to berth in Romanian ports and thus entering Romanian territory. Following the Security Council resolution to which I referred, which provides for the application of the United Kingdom stop and search principle, i.e. stopping barges and inspecting their cargo, Romania like others now has the legal right to stop and inspect the cargo of any type of barge in transit on the Danube. There is however something of a gap between what is legally permitted and Romania's technical capacity to put it into practice. As I said earlier, speaking on more general lines, Romania would be glad to receive even just a little support in this field; this would concern two types of equipment. First, we would need two or three high-speed launches to intercept barges travelling along the Danube and second, we need a communication system to enable us to contact, in real time, both the barges and the places their cargos are bound for. If this material support were provided Romania could substantially enhance its contribution to the enforcement of the embargo.

May I also say that the Romanian customs authorities have already contacted the Bulgarians, our neighbours on the other side of the Danube; we are also in the process of establishing contact with the Hungarians and the Austrians with a view to real co-ordination to ensure uniform implementation of embargo procedures on the Danube.

I thus very much hope that then we shall be able to show you television pictures that will be far more reassuring than those you last saw.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

I call Mr. Pécriaux.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Minister, along with very many other members of this Assembly I most heartily welcome the new energies now at work in Romania, a country to which we are greatly attached. In your address you spoke of your desire to construct the Europe of tomorrow, and you mentioned several institutions. This being the case, you will not be surprised, in the context of Western European Union, if I ask you a question specifically related to defence matters. Could you briefly describe how you stand as regards the problems of a possible restructuring of your armed forces, and tell us how you envisage the whole problem of defence in your country today?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELESCANU (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania*) (Translation). – To be honest, this is probably one of the most difficult questions facing the Romanian Government, for two reasons.

The first is the inflation we have in Romania, combined with the budgetary difficulties with which we are faced. As you know, Romania has close relations with the International Monetary Fund, which imposes a limit on a country's budget deficit. The Romanian national defence budget has therefore shown a downward trend in the last two years.

The second is that the military threats to Romania's security are diminishing as we see them, and also by comparison with the other factors I have already mentioned, including technical considerations.

From this point of view, an analysis of the restructuring of the army might be regarded as an unarguable need. There is however a difficulty bound up with Romanian traditions: we have always had compulsory military service which is, however, far from being solely military in nature. It is, in fact, a system that finishes off the education of young men, and in rural areas is regarded somewhat as the way to become a man.

In the village I come from, no girl would think of marrying anyone who had not done his military service. I do not know what happens in other countries, but in Romania this is a widespread tradition. We shall consider several possibilities, two alternatives being to reduce the period of military service or to reduce our armed forces as a whole. The military say that shortening military service too much will lower the quality of young men's military training. Shorter than a certain length of time, military training apparently becomes pointless. To be frank, one possibility envisaged was the formation of a professional army or a cadre of professional soldiers which would make it possible to provide an efficient and cost-effective national defence. This would be a very hard core, coexisting with compulsory service that would include the possibility of civilian service for those not wanting to do their compulsory service in the army.

Many other possibilities are being looked at in this period of great tension at two of our frontiers, those with former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. In practice, however, our armed forces are being reduced in accordance with the provisions of the agreement signed in Paris on conventional arms in Europe. Romania had a very large number of these and was one of the countries most affected by the quotas laid down but the Ministry of National Defence is now implementing the provisions of that agreement. A start has been made on restructuring, determined mainly by the obligations

Mr. Melescanu (continued)

already entered into. Thought is also being given to what might be done in the future but this is still somewhat in the ideological and philosophical field.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I certainly do not intend to start an argument with the Minister, but for just a moment there I was rather glad not to be a Romanian citizen, because if the same custom prevailed in my own country, that a girl would not marry a man who was not a soldier, I would still be a bachelor. But enough of that.

I have a question to put to the Minister in my capacity as Chairman of the Political Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Since the subject has been brought up there, I can certainly raise it here too. With the agreement of the Standing Committee, the Political Committee decided to establish contacts with the member countries of the Council of Europe and with those countries that sit in at the Council of Europe, in order to discover which countries are still supplying weapons or other material to Serbia or Montenegro contrary to the United Nations' embargo decisions.

Especially after what you said in connection with the Danube, I would like to ask you now whether, if we come to you in January and ask if you can make any definite statements about countries that breach the embargo, your government will be willing to give us this information, and furthermore whether you are willing to co-operate with the Council of Europe's Political Committee too, in order to establish that your country is not involved in breaching the embargo?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELESCANU (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania*). – I apologise, Mr. Reddemann. I ought to tell you that the custom to which I refer comes from my native village, which is a very small village in Romania.

You asked about co-operation between the Romanian Government and WEU on the embargo. We have issued a standing invitation to all CSCE participants – to all countries attending the all-European process – to participate, through observers or in any other manner, in the surveillance of the embargo. I can only reaffirm that, and reiterate that any delegation from WEU or any of its participating states is most welcome to come to Romania, and that we will do our best fully to co-operate with the application of the embargo.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister will be aware that a small delegation from the Defence Committee of this Assembly visited Romania six or seven weeks ago. I wish to place on record formally our sincere appreciation of the courtesy and kindness with which we were received there. We learnt a great deal and our beneficial visit resulted in a useful input into the paper on the evolution of Central Europe which is to be considered later this afternoon. We have established good links with Romania as a result.

While we were there, we went to the Danube – where we were within a stone's throw of Serbia – and saw the efforts that you are making. We were very impressed. We had only a snapshot view but it was evident that, to the best of your ability, you were carrying out what you should have been carrying out.

We have heard from my good friend Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, who is not given to making wild statements, that she has seen on television that Romania is breaking the embargo. Likewise, my good friend Mr. Reddemann asked you to stand up and say what you are doing – to name those who are breaking the embargo and also to show exactly what your format is and what it is you are trying to achieve. I say quite humbly that I believe that you are doing extremely well. But will you not only publicise this matter increasingly widely but say what extra efforts you are making to ensure that the embargo – now, thank goodness, enhanced by the United Nations and WEU – works even better?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELESCANU (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania*). – Thank you, Sir Dudley. We were gratified by the presence of you and your delegation in Romania and we are grateful to you, not only for our good contacts there, but for your good advice.

One of the first decisions adopted by the Romanian Government was to accept the procedures of the European Community for checking on all exports to Serbia and Montenegro and on all the merchandise in transit to Serbia and Montenegro which is permitted under the United Nations resolution. That standard procedure is applied even now.

A second step taken by the Romanian Government a few weeks ago, after the adoption of Resolution 787, was to issue a new governmental order giving all the necessary legal responsibilities to customs and border police to stop and search all vehicles engaged in the transit of goods on the Danube. As I said, one idea is to try to put properly into practice,

Mr. Melescanu (continued)

together with our neighbours from Bulgaria and Hungary, a fully co-ordinated system to prevent any breach of the embargo. I can only promise that we shall try to do more, through the use of television and other mass media, to publicise such measures. We welcome missions such as yours and invite anyone who would like to come to Romania to check, verify and give advice.

I emphasise that I am speaking to you about the position of the Romanian Government and that my remarks do not necessarily mean that there is no private person who tries to take advantage of the position or benefit from it. With your help and with the help of neighbouring countries, however, I feel that we can become very effective in preventing that from happening.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I have no need to ask my question, which was on Bessarabia, as Mr. Melescanu already answered it a short while ago in connection with a question by another member.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Agnelli.

Mr. AGNELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, I should like to begin with an acknowledgment and thanks. The acknowledgment is for the continuing determination of Romania to work for European integration; I think the time has come to recognise your determination without hiding behind pretences which are no longer justified.

My thanks stem from the fact that we are talking in Western European Union which you have named as the first institution where there could be collaboration, precisely, I believe, in connection with control of the Danube.

I think you are quite correct in recognising the need to maintain the international character of the Danube; the means to carry out checks must be available, however, and these might be provided by WEU which will therefore have to collaborate with Romania.

Of course you cannot believe everything you see on television; I am well aware that on the occasion of the Tirgumures incidents the Romanian was said to be the murderer when in fact he was the victim. But I have no idea how many people have realised the true facts almost three years after the incident. We all know, too, that television is manipulated and I believe, therefore, that in Western European Union it is our duty to help you in making checks. We should in any case look to you who know the region better. Furthermore, there is, in my view, too much emphasis on unilateral action in the

matter and more information is needed concerning the source and destination of the trade in arms. The facts are much more complicated and the solution cannot be unilateral.

Having said this, Minister, there is the further matter of what might be called your western vocation and beyond this the problem of your eastern vocation which raises two distinct questions.

In my view, it is right that you should raise the problem of Bessarabia as it is hard to understand why you should be the only ones to suffer from the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov agreements.

I also raised these points at the meeting of the parliamentary assembly of the CSCE in Budapest; the Italian Delegation supported what on particular occasions the Moldovan representatives have also argued – not many but we also supported them. So you are entitled to raise this problem but it must also be raised in the CSCE. Let us forget the myths; the principles of the CSCE state that frontiers are inviolable but at the same time that peoples have the right to self-determination; these are in fact two conflicting principles.

Until now, the problem has been resolved by the so-called self-determination of the federated states, but this is not the same as the self-determination of peoples. I believe that we must have the courage to ask the question: do you imagine that the problems relating to self-determination of peoples are not obvious to me, an Italian from Trieste, who had to witness the murder of Italians in the years immediately after the war and the ethnic cleansing of 350 000 other Italians? Today, however, I find myself in the position that these terrible distortions are not recognised.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Agnelli, please ask your question.

Mr. AGNELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – As there is a contradiction which I mentioned earlier between the principles of the CSCE, and because you have great diplomatic dreams from the time of Titulescu, are you in a position – and I am asking you personally because you replied personally earlier – to suggest any way of going beyond frontiers in the narrow sense? Does this possibility also exist for the problem of Moldova?

I have an additional question. I was in Romania during the elections and I witnessed at Braila the dealings still taking place on a large scale, no longer between Turks and Greeks, as in the works of Panati, but between Armenians, Russians and Ukrainians. Can you continue in that direction?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It is not customary in this Assembly to put questions in this way.

I call the Minister.

Mr. MELESCANU (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania*) (Translation). – First, as regards Romania's integration in European organisations, I consider that this is a very important question not just for Romania but for all other countries. Participation in major European structures is another way of contributing towards stability in the areas where we live.

Thank you also for your comments on Bessarabia. I am sure that no one can believe Romania to have been the only victim of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. In any case, the Supreme Soviet of the ex-Soviet Union declared the provisions of that secret agreement invalid.

Lastly, it is naturally in Romania's interest to develop its relations with the republics in the south of the former Soviet Union. I also consider that the purpose of setting up a Black Sea economic zone would be to set up an organisation for economic co-operation between those countries, i.e. Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

As Mr. Agnelli has pointed out, Romania is a country which is open towards Western Europe – and in fact a part of it – but, as I have already said, we have also very important relations with the Balkans and the countries bordering on the Black Sea.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Verspaget.

Mrs. VERSPAGET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as the last speaker I should like to revert to the first speaker's question about the influx of refugees from Romania. In his reply – which I fully accept – the Minister stated that the Romanian Government is endeavouring to provide all these people with a stable economic base at home. He also regards them as economic refugees. Is it good enough simply to regard them as economic refugees? One has only to read the reports drawn up in recent years by organisations for the protection of human rights, dealing with infringements of human rights, not by the government but by the local population, against gypsies in particular. Yet gypsies represent a high proportion of this wave of refugees.

Does the minister feel that economic projects are enough? Or should the position of this minority be re-examined? What is the Romanian Government doing about it? Is it, for example, taking action against the people who have violated human rights in this way? Is the government's policy directed towards information and tolerance? Lastly I ask: what can we in WEU and the Council of Europe, where many of us also meet, do to help you with these problems?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELESCANU (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania*). – You have been very tough with me on the subject of pogroms. I have no knowledge of such things; but it is true that disturbances took place in various villages, and that there were incidents between different tribes of gypsies and between gypsies and Romanians. Perhaps I can discuss the problem with you at greater length by letter: it is much more complicated than it appears at first sight.

An important majority of gypsies are fully integrated in Romanian society. We have ambassadors in our foreign service who are gypsies, and we are proud of that. We have ministers who are gypsies, and gypsies occupy various other important posts. Gypsies, however, belong to different tribes, and some of them – *les gens du voyage*, as the French call them – are not educated and have no fixed abode. They have their own problems.

I am sorry that I gave such a short answer to a question about an important social problem; the problem of introducing gypsies into Romanian society is perhaps more important than the economic problem. It takes two to tango, and WEU could help by putting at our disposal any sociological or psychological information that could enable us to handle the problem.

The government have no official policy against gypsies. We have generous legislation, but there are two sides to the coin. One side is our legislation, which conforms to the European standard; the other is the application of that legislation in practice. That depends very much on the educational levels of the ordinary citizen, and also on the advance of the democratic society in Romania. It is important to protect minorities, but it should not be forgotten that they do not live in a vacuum: their circumstances will improve as democratic society in Romania evolves. Tolerance is extremely important if the majority are to understand better, and take better care of, the minority – whether it is a religious minority, an ethnic minority, a cultural minority or any other kind.

Even if we had perfect legislation, there would be problems in practice but so long as we have a legal system which permits the judiciary to exercise its power, we are on the safe side. The government – the executive power – can only seek to bring information to the office of the public prosecutor and other bodies, such as the ombudsman. However, the legislation exists. It is not applied fully because that depends on many factors. We have the necessary instruments to deal with any violence. Recently prolonged sentences were handed out in connection

Mr. Melescanu (continued)

with incidents between different groups of gypsies, as well as between the gypsies and other Romanians.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, thank you very much for having accepted our invitation to address the Assembly and for having given such clear and impressive answers to the questions from the floor.

You have our very best wishes.

4. Turkey

(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1341, addendum and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee on Turkey and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1341, addendum and amendments.

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, time is short, so I shall be relatively brief. As so often happens in this Assembly, the schedule is overcrowded and there is not time for all the discussions that we should like to have.

I wish to put on record my support for Mr. Moya's report, which is so valuable at a time like this. I speak as a friend of Turkey. Throughout a large part of my political life I have been a friend of Turkey, but I emphasise that to be a friend of Turkey does not imply that one is an enemy of Greece, any more than that anyone who is a friend of Greece is an enemy of Turkey. Alas, all too often people take sides, and that is certainly true in the case of Greece and Turkey.

I wish to make several relatively simple points which have been underlined by other speakers but bear repetition. First, I am unhappy that the powers that be have decided that Turkey should have only associate membership of the Assembly. That is wrong. I know the reasons for the decision and I understand the points about the treaty and other matters. Nonetheless, it is possible to make changes and we would have done ourselves a service if we had granted full membership, quite apart from helping Turkey.

In his draft recommendation Mr. Moya refers to "Turkey's most loyal membership of NATO". We are all extremely impressed with what Turkey has done and the way in which it has conducted itself as an indefatigable and worthwhile member of NATO. I am sure that that will continue. I am aware that Turkey is not happy about having merely associate mem-

bership of WEU, whatever that may mean. Turkey might just as well be an observer. I hope that, as time goes on – I hope, not too long – we shall take the opportunity to change the position and make Turkey a full member of WEU.

I am interested in the Cyprus question. I am glad that Mr. Moya has enabled us to include several paragraphs about Cyprus in the report. I do not quarrel with them. It is a complicated and difficult subject. I do not suggest that I have any prejudice but I have a house in northern Cyprus. That enables me to see the problem close at hand and to observe and understand the problems and difficulties of both sides of the community.

The position is well summed up by Mr. Moya in his report when he says: "Genuine respect for minorities should be the basic principle without which a future federal state of Cyprus will never prosper. Finally, a solution of the Cyprus question cannot be a prerequisite for starting talks over other disputes between Greece and Turkey." So say all of us. I began by talking about the enmity between Greece and Turkey. It cannot be used as the basis for settling other disputes. There must be genuine respect for minorities on both sides. That can be achieved. Despite some of the suggestions made during negotiations, I have always felt that a line down the middle and limited federalism are perhaps the only answer. It may well be necessary to adjust boundaries in Cyprus.

I am impressed that, since the intervention which took place in the early to mid-1970s, not one person has been killed or badly injured as a result of political disputes along the border or, indeed, in any other connection. It is true that murders have taken place in Cyprus but they have been civilian murders which had nothing to do with the dispute. Few countries in the world can say that they have no political murders.

Peace which will ensure the kind of stability which protects the individual, from whichever side of the community, is of the utmost importance. Therefore, both sides should perhaps be allowed to live their lives with a limited degree of understanding which can be assimilated and understood by the population and people outside Cyprus.

Turkey is of the utmost importance to the future security of Europe. That point was brought out in Mr. Moya's recommendations. He referred to the future security and framework of WEU. We shall have to rely very much on Turkey in years to come because of its geographical position on the flank of Europe. It is vital for all of us to accept that we need Turkey's friendship, co-operation and understanding. I am certain that Turkey understands that fully. That is shown by the fact that

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

although Turkey changes its government, as all democratic societies do, the theme continues that it must be a loyal member of Europe and NATO. It deserves the support and understanding of Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we are running a little late. I therefore suggest that we should limit the time for the remaining speakers to five minutes each.

I call Mr. Liapis, Observer from Greece.

Mr. LIAPIS (*Observer from Greece*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on his hard work. I shall not allow myself to be tempted by several of his points, so I shall not express my personal differences of opinion with his report – although some of his remarks were obviously theoretical or, let me put it politely, not accurate. I want to point out one argument that was not mentioned clearly in the report and to give a piece of information that the Rapporteur was not in a position to know while he was elaborating on his report.

First, I have to remind you that on many occasions the European Community has underlined the fact that the solution to the Cyprus problem is the only itinerary that is necessary for Turkey to join the European Union: if she wants to join the Community, she has to implement all the international resolutions on Cyprus. That is also the position for Greece, in terms of improving her relations with Turkey. We cannot start a serious and fruitful dialogue with Turkey when she undermines it with the occupation army in Cyprus and with violations of human rights on the island.

Secondly, when the Rapporteur was preparing his report, the talks between the two Cypriot communities in New York, under United Nations' auspices, had not yet finished. But now the situation has changed. The talks have come to an end – unfortunately, without any results. I have to inform the Assembly that, since then, the report of the Secretary-General and a new resolution of the Security Council have been published.

I should like to brief the Assembly on what has evolved in the Cyprus talks. The most recent effort by the United Nations to solve the Cyprus problem was the last round of talks between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities under the chairmanship of the United Nations Secretary-General. That round was aimed at reaching an overall framework agreement, using as a basis the Secretary-General's set of ideas. Mr. Butros Butros Ghali, in his report to the Security Council, noted that that was not achieved, mainly because the Turkish Cypriot side insisted on some negotiating positions that were fundamentally at variance with the set of ideas. The

Security Council, by its most recent Resolution, 789, endorsed the Secretary-General's report and called upon the Turkish Cypriot side to adopt positions that were consistent with the set of ideas in order to achieve an agreement at the next round of talks scheduled for early March 1993.

Let me quote paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of that resolution. Paragraph 4 states that the Security Council: "Reaffirms further its position that the present status quo is not acceptable and that an overall agreement in line with the Set of Ideas should be achieved without further delay." Paragraph 5 states that the Security Council: "Notes that the recent joint meetings did not achieve their intended goal, in particular because certain positions adopted by the Turkish Cypriot side were fundamentally at variance with the Set of Ideas." Paragraph 6 states that the Security Council: "Calls upon the Turkish Cypriot side to adopt positions that are consistent with the Set of Ideas on those issues identified by the Secretary-General in his report."

Last, but not least, if Turkey wants to contribute to peace and stability in the region, and if she wants good and fruitful relations with Greece and the EC, she has to understand and accept that a just solution to the problem of Cyprus, according to all United Nations resolutions, constitutes a necessity. Thus Turkey has to undertake all necessary steps and influence the Turkish Cypriots to bring about a viable and functional solution to the problems of the island. If that happens, I assure you that a new era will begin, not only for the two communities in Cyprus but for the two neighbouring countries.

(*Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pahtas.

Mr. PAHTAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – Our Rapporteur has referred in several places in his report to his views on relations between Turkey and Greece. Allow me, Mr. President, to make a few comments which I feel may be helpful in our debate.

In the first place, as regards the question of Cyprus, I would refer to the results of the recent negotiations that the two communities had with the United Nations Secretary-General, culminating in the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 789 on 28th November, which is therefore not covered by Mr. Moya's report. Unfortunately, the negotiations ended yet again in failure. Both the Secretary-General and the Security Council name the party responsible in the resolution. As the preceding speaker has just referred to this, I shall not dwell on the point.

Mr. Pahtas (continued)

I must, however, emphasise the fact that the problem of Cyprus is not a bilateral affair between Turkey and Greece. It concerns the international community as a whole, since the principle of compliance with international law cannot be applied on a selective basis.

This is in essence a political problem concerning the invasion, occupation and partition of the island by the Turkish army.

It is also a problem which has an only too frequently neglected humanitarian aspect, arising from the fact that one-third of the population of the island has been moved, and from the restriction on freedom of movement due to the existence of the last wall of shame on European territory; above all, it is due to the denaturing of the demographic structure of the island brought about by the arrival of Turkish colonists from Anatolia, who are given both Cypriot nationality and the right to vote.

According to Turkish Cypriot political leaders, the Turkish colonists and soldiers together outnumber the Greek Cypriot community, whose number has declined because of continuing emigration after the Turkish colonisation.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Kurdish people, consisting of millions of individuals, is scattered among different states. It represents an ethnic minority which is a victim of violence, repeated attempts at forced assimilation and violations of human rights.

The question of ethnic minorities today is a very serious one and an eloquent yardstick of the depth of democratic ideals in Europe and their acceptance by states which are members of European organisations and have signed international conventions.

For centuries now, the Kurdish population has been subject to brutal oppression. It is denied its identity, freedoms and rights, including the use of the Kurdish language in the mass media. Currently it is again the victim of new massacres.

If we are intransigent in our condemnation of attacks by terrorist organisations we should also condemn similar practices by security forces, and we should likewise bear in mind that in a democratic state any response to terrorist provocation must remain within the limits set by law.

I would also point out to the Rapporteur that unilateral claims should not be equated with disputes between two countries. The question on which disagreement continues between Greece and Turkey is the definition of the limits of territorial waters. It can and should be resolved at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, in accordance with the rules of international

maritime law; this is a legal issue, not just one more political problem.

By joining WEU respectively as a member and an associate member, Greece and Turkey have accepted in full the content of the Petersberg declaration and have thus agreed to base their relations on the settlement of disputes between them by peaceful means. Our Rapporteur rightly stresses that Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty gives sound guidelines in that regard. It is up to all of us to apply the principle.

Taking this constructive and peaceful approach, namely respect for the principles and resolutions of the United Nations and of other international organisations, respect for the individual rights of each citizen, respect for the administrative and cultural rights of the Kurdish population and insistence on the peaceful settlement of disputes between countries, we must join together throughout the democratic world in waging an unending struggle for the prosperity of our peoples and the creation of a shared future.

This is our most earnest desire.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Agnelli.

Mr. AGNELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this problem has already been discussed in the Political Committee and I think we must recognise the validity of Mr. Moya's report as regards the points most closely connected with Western European Union. In this effort to achieve European integration, which to us represents one of the main applications of the Maastricht Treaty, we can only be pleased to see the start of the process.

I think that from this standpoint not only do we all recognise the contribution made by Turkey to the West by joining NATO, but we also remember that Turkey was, perhaps, the only country to take part in the Korean war on the basis of a United Nations Security Council resolution.

Nevertheless, there are problems which in my view must be approached with due care. First and foremost, it is not right that we should use double standards here by insisting on denouncing particular violations of the international order – about which there is a very large measure of doubt – and then going on to bend over backwards when Cyprus was invaded which has for years been recognised by the United Nations.

Furthermore, the situation in which the Kurds find themselves must not be forgotten. Following on from the previous speaker, I recall that in the Political Committee I also supported

Mr. Agnelli (continued)

a statement by Mr. Speroni, who then tabled three amendments together with Mr. Bosco; two of these were subsequently withdrawn while I believe that the third will be maintained as an amendment by the Italian Delegation.

Yes, therefore, to European integration and yes to the strengthening of WEU; but great caution is required. In the eighth clause of the preamble, Mr. Moya's report refers to all the reservations of the Council of Europe. I believe, however, that if we wish to be honest and not to fall into the error of unilateralism, which I have already described as most regrettable, we cannot fail to take account of these reservations. With these reservations and possibly with the adoption of the amendments I think we can accept the report and the resolution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bosco.

Mr. BOSCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the amendments which I have tabled, together with Mr. Speroni, call for absolute respect for the rights of peoples to self-determination and, in this specific case, those of the Kurdish people. Our purpose is to set a firm prior condition for Turkey's becoming an associate member of WEU, even though we recognise the great significance of the proof offered by Turkey as a trustworthy ally in the recent war with Iraq.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Slatinski, Observer from Bulgaria.

Mr. SLATINSKI (*Observer from Bulgaria*). – The report on Turkey is undoubtedly accurate and it reflects some excellent knowledge of the issues at stake. Yet the matters raised in it lose their strict academic style as soon as they come into contact with the hearts and minds of the Balkan peoples. I want to point out our great historical heritage and the complicated ethnic and religious factors at work in Bulgaria. I should also like to discuss relations between Bulgaria and Turkey.

First, we are located in the Balkans, where the discrepancies between geographical and ethnic borders are dramatic. Second, the largest ethnic minority in Bulgaria originates from Turkey, a country under whose domination we spent five centuries. The memory of our people bears that heavy burden. Third, the largest minority in Bulgaria, the Turkish minority, lives on the border with its country of origin. Fourth, that minority originates from a country which is much stronger than Bulgaria, both economically and militarily. That gives rise to strong feelings of fear among the population. Fifth, in the areas bordering Turkey the Turkish minority population outnumbers the Bulgarian community. Sixth, Bulgarians and the large Turkish minority

are fundamentally divided in terms of their religion. They profess the Eastern Orthodox faith and Islam respectively – a problem that can lead to huge contradictions. Life in the Balkans provides ample proof of that statement.

I am nevertheless confident that Bulgaria has left behind its bad minority problems. We have accepted the idea that the army and the police cannot solve ethnic conflicts. That is now a guiding principle of domestic policy. The Bulgarian way aspires to the fully-fledged integration of minorities into our political and economic life. We also believe in strict guarantees of the basic human rights of all Bulgarian citizens and in not using force of any kind – administrative, protectionist or police – to settle ethnic issues.

Finally, we believe in a realistic and pragmatic combination of national interest and European democratic principles. In Bulgaria, Bulgarian nationals with Turkish ethnic self-consciousness are represented in parliament by the Rights and Freedoms Movement. We sincerely hope that members of our parliament will look only to the interests of the state and will disregard their ethnic self-awareness. That is the surest guarantee of equal and mutually beneficial relations with all our neighbours. Our society has reached a reliable consensus on this fundamental principle, which underlies our foreign policy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Moya.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, first of all, I would like to express my thanks for all the comments on my report, not only from those who praised it, but also from those who were rather more critical or who opposed some of the ideas expressed in it. I welcome all such comments, favourable and unfavourable, because they only serve to enrich and clarify the debate which has continued throughout today. In view of the limited time available to us at the moment, I will not reply individually to each speaker, but will select three themes which appear to me to have arisen throughout the debate and which in some degree summarise the debate we have had.

Some speakers referred to the status of associate member, which is the capacity in which Turkey has acceded to WEU. Some speakers have expressed their dissatisfaction with this status. I myself said, when I was at the rostrum, that the Turkish authorities had shown some dissatisfaction. But I also wanted to explain the philosophy which was and is behind granting Turkey associate membership, a philosophy which I finally defined as the Maastricht philosophy – as I have already explained at the rostrum – in the sense of granting full mem-

Mr. Moya (continued)

bership to members of the European Union and observer status to members of the Atlantic Alliance. Although some deputies may not agree with this, it is an accepted decision after Maastricht and is dealt with in detail in the Petersberg declaration, and I do not consider that it would be useful to reserve it.

The most helpful way of approaching the matter is, first, not to belittle the status of associate membership which Turkey has been granted, but rather to give it substance and to see it, as many speakers have described it, as being a step towards identifying objectives and towards full integration into Europe and its defence and security mechanisms. I expressed the wish that events would lead along this path and it is my hope that this will be a positive and courageous step in the right direction.

Secondly, many speakers referred to the problem of human rights in Turkey, mainly in relation to the Kurdish question. I did not, in the first instance, wish to make any direct reference to the question of human rights. This was a conscious decision, and I will explain the reason for it. Had I spoken on this subject, I did not want the debate then to focus almost exclusively on human rights or on the Kurdish problem. I believe that in an assembly such as this, we must restrict the debate on Turkey to matters of security and defence and to that country's contribution to western defence and security. We must restrict it to these matters. I was trying to carry out an exercise in parliamentary instruction and to focus the debate on Turkey's contribution to security, the rôle played by Turkey up to the present time, the challenges it faces as regards influence in the area from the point of view of regional security, and Europe's interest in developing the geostrategic rôle of Turkey. I held that in the forum of WEU, in a report dealing with Turkey's relations within WEU, this was an appropriate boundary for the debate. This does not mean to say that in my report I ignored the question of human rights. Not at all. I believe I dealt with it in a very precise manner and I will also explain this very briefly.

For the draft recommendation, I made an explicit and clear reference to the resolution of the Assembly of the Council of Europe which I believe is the appropriate forum for discussing such matters in depth. In my opinion, this is the most that can be done in this respect, namely to refer to this declaration explicitly, because it contains the precise details of all aspects relating to the subject of human rights. And, if further proof is required, in paragraphs 26 to 30 of the report I describe some of these elements in relation to the defence of the rights of the Kurdish minorities. And obviously I also give a

description of the fight against terrorism and the activities of the PKK.

That is where I believe the problem of references to human rights should be placed, by explicitly referring in the draft recommendation to the resolution of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, rather than entering into great detail about the resolution, because that would be duplicating the work of another forum and here we are in the Assembly of WEU.

Finally, some speakers, notably from the Turkish Delegation or representatives of Turkey and also of Greece, have naturally expressed differing points of view, although in general, one of the general lines of the report has been accepted. I think it is perfectly reasonable for there to have been differences of opinion. It is only natural that, as I was attempting to produce a balanced, objective report not coinciding with the viewpoints of either of these governments, there should then be some disagreement with its contents and divergences with respect to the position of the Greek and Turkish Delegations. This also highlights the fact that there are clearly problems still to be resolved, and continuing disputes, but I would simply conclude by expressing the wish that the presence of both Greece and Turkey in this forum may help to overcome such disputes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You have seen for yourself, Mr. Moya, that a large number of members appreciated your statement.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I have but two remarks to make. First, I express my sincere compliments to the Rapporteur, who produced an excellent report – fair, objective and well argued. I am glad that the great majority of members of the Assembly recognise its quality.

Secondly, I feel that I must defend the Rapporteur on the question of human rights. The committee fully endorsed his view that we should not duplicate the excellent report and resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, of which we are all members. Do we really want to duplicate our work there or to express ourselves more strongly than we did in that resolution? I think not. The Rapporteur included several paragraphs that dealt with the human rights situation in a fair and balanced way. I emphasise, too, that it is not fair to demand that Turkey grants more rights to minorities than we have included in our own draft conventions and resolutions.

I am sure that the Assembly will want to accept my committee's report as it stands.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have three amendments to the draft recommendation in Document 1341.

The President (continued)

Amendments 1 and 3, tabled by Mr. Speroni and Mr. Bosco, read as follows:

1. Leave out paragraph (*ix*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Concerned about the repression of the Kurdish people living in Turkey;”

3. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Establish as a condition for the accession of Turkey recognition of the Kurdish people’s right to self-determination in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki declaration.”

If I am not mistaken, from what I have heard in the debate some amendments may be withdrawn. What is the position of the members tabling them?

I call Mr. Bosco.

Mr. BOSCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – In view of the Rapporteur’s reply, I withdraw Amendments 1 and 3; Amendment 2 has already been presented and the comments are made in the hope that the rights of the Kurdish people can be recognised by peaceful and democratic means.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – So the only outstanding amendment is Amendment 2.

Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Speroni and Mr. Bosco, reads as follows:

2. After paragraph (*x*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Wishing the rights of the Kurdish people to be recognised by peaceful, democratic means;”

I call Mr. Bosco to speak to his amendment.

Mr. BOSCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I maintain this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. Moya, I was going to ask you if you wanted to tell us what the committee’s opinion was, but if you wish to speak as a parliamentarian against the amendment, we could avoid one speech.

I call Mr. Moya.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – I would just like to give my reasons for opposing the amendment. They are not substantive in the sense that I disagree with or reject the contents of the amendment, because I think it has been quite well drafted; however, I feel that the amendment is unnecessary. I repeat, the ref-

erence we make in the draft recommendation is much more precise, specific and forceful than what could be achieved with this amendment. The reference we make to the resolution of the Assembly of the Council of Europe specifies which of the rights of the Kurdish people must be recognised. Furthermore, thinking only about the wording of the amendment, this is very general in nature, referring to “the rights of the Kurdish people”. In my view, the Council of Europe’s resolution is much more specific and precise in dealing with the rights of the Kurdish people. It seems to me, therefore, that what is being presented here is a catch-all wording which could give rise to some misunderstandings; by simply referring to “the rights of the Kurdish people” it might be thought that this includes the right to self-determination, etc. I think we have to be very precise and specific on this subject, and that the best way to proceed is to retain the reference to the resolution of the Assembly of the Council of Europe which details very precisely every aspect of the human rights issues relating to Turkey and the Kurds.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1341.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

5. Defence: Central Europe in evolution

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1336 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee on Defence: Central Europe in evolution and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1336 and amendment.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Cox.

¹ See page 25.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I found the experience of being a rapporteur very interesting. Rarely can a rapporteur have had the opportunity to hear about, and witness, changes such as those that have taken place in such a short period. I am delighted – as I know the Assembly is – that parliamentary observers from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania are present, for those countries form much of the basis of the report. I am also pleased to note that three delegates with observer status will be taking part in the debate.

In all our meetings, it was clear that the countries concerned wanted to build up an ongoing relationship with WEU and NATO. Our discussions were very frank and open. The countries face real economic problems, and that will determine the nature of the changes in military policy that they wish to make. It became clear in our meetings that much of the equipment that the countries possessed in the old days of Soviet military involvement is now out of date, but replacement equipment is expensive and hard to obtain.

As was mentioned earlier, certain countries are deeply concerned about their borders and their security, and the tragedy of Yugoslavia has added to that concern. The names of the senior ministers whom we met are listed in paragraph 2 of the report. We discussed the political situation, and the rebuilding of democracy. Real progress is being made, and I salute the countries concerned: they have put in a lot of effort in a very short time.

The countries must now decide their futures, but I believe that we have a right to express our views and, at times, our concern. That certainly applies to any infringements of human rights that may take place, and to ethnic groups.

Section II of the report outlines what WEU has done to build contacts and confidence. This is a vital involvement, developing contacts, understanding and, I hope, an awareness of the aid and assistance that may be given to a country under threat. Since April 1990 there have been eighty meetings with, or visits to, countries in Central and Eastern Europe: that is clear evidence of our commitment to those countries. We also discussed their economic circumstances.

Economic change is never easy. High unemployment, inflation and the closing of industries create tensions and increasing problems. Although we all welcome the overthrow of the old system under which these countries were forced to live for so many years, we must make the effort to help them to develop economically, or they will feel that we have let them down.

Section VI of the report deals with foreign policy developments, and I wish to outline some of them. We now see closer European

involvement, and the report outlines the contacts that now exist: membership or guest status of the Council of Europe, agreements of association with the European Community, regular meetings with parliamentarians and visits to our countries, as well as the development of policies to avoid conflict – all of which are to be welcomed and must continue to develop.

I turn to the armed forces and to the defence policies which we hope will be followed by these countries. Their rôle will be to modernise and to reorganise their forces. As I said, progress and change will depend on their economic policies and developments. As was made clear to all of us at our meetings, the wish is to develop well-trained, professional military forces that are well-equipped and have modern support structures.

The Defence Committee's recommendations were unanimously supported. Section VIII of the report refers to defence industries. Earlier today, questions were asked about that industrial development. Representatives of several countries said to us in our discussions that they saw a future for military equipment sales and developments in Europe and in the world generally. We made it clear to them that although such policies could be beneficial a clear policy was needed against the sale of arms or equipment to any country seeking to be involved, or already involved, in a military conflict or terrorism. I think that that was well understood, but the Assembly must issue clear guidelines.

In view of the shortage of time, I turn to the committee's recommendations. I have already touched on recommendations 1 to 4. Recommendation 5 outlines what our countries can do. Most of the suggestions would not cost large sums. All of us have skills to pass on, and I hope that we shall do so. I hope that we shall know what each country is offering to help with so that there is no overlapping of help or assistance, which often happens and which, as we all know, is a waste of our resources. We should all clearly know what each country is doing.

I have touched on recommendation 6, which is of great importance, and recommendations 7 and 8. Recommendation 9 shows that it is essential to know what progress is taking place. Recommendation 10 is a positive suggestion which could be helpful and would not involve large costs or extra staffing and could be linked with recommendation 5.

Only one amendment has been tabled, to insert a new paragraph at the end of the draft recommendation. I am aware that delegates will be able to speak on the amendment when it is presented, but it may be helpful if I make some points. The amendment deals with the export of military equipment, and it was discussed and

Mr. Cox (continued)

accepted by the Defence Committee at its meeting this morning.

In a short time, we have seen great changes take place in Central and Eastern Europe. We now know many of the parliamentary members and countries to which the report refers – many of those parliamentarians have become colleagues; many have become friends. That shows the strength of the organisations to which we belong. We must continue to build trust and understanding, and I am in no doubt that such a wish exists.

We come from countries which have great skills and long experiences, and I believe that we must share them, with one another and certainly with countries in Eastern and Central Europe.

I mentioned in my opening remarks how interesting it was to be a rapporteur. I thank Mr. Colin Cameron, the committee secretary. He arranged meetings and visits and, often after a great deal of negotiation, managed to find a convenient time for our meetings. Without his help and involvement, the report would not have been so detailed or would not hold so much interest, and I thank him sincerely.

I hope that this will be the first of the reports which will follow as we develop our links and, above all, our friendships in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, just as we have started to do now.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Cox, for your report and your comments.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. Cox for the report he has presented and for his explanatory address. The report is full of substance and the work he has done is masterly.

While I would make it clear that I shall vote firmly in favour of the report, the purpose of my comments will be to place it in the context both of the evolution of WEU and of relations with the Central European countries, more particularly in the light of their own security needs.

As is obvious to us all, WEU's future in the context of the Treaty of Maastricht, in the comprehensive work of the CSCE, and in relation to the changes in the Atlantic Alliance, particularly through NACC, holds prospects which go very much beyond the sphere under WEU's wing so far. WEU constitutes an important institution by virtue of its founding treaty; it is also a kind of spearhead as far as bringing new countries into institutions is concerned.

In this connection I welcome the parts of the draft recommendation proposed by the Defence

Committee which define in detail what might be called the growth, expansion and deepening of all kinds of co-operation and relations with the states of Central Europe. The more we can meet with these states, the more it will be possible for them to be associated with our work; the more we move towards them, the easier it will be to reach agreement. I think that this is a vital basis for our work.

However, we are also called on to build a security structure in Europe; and I should like to speak about this idea, which is part of our political doctrine for Europe. Let us therefore render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's. It was Jean Monnet himself who said that the day when security was based on alliances is past. It is now based on joint institutions which impact on the life of each country and each people. Here I welcome the proposal in paragraph 6 of the recommendation for the development of a European armaments agency with which these countries might be associated. This should help us to operate in greater depth. These Central European countries, even more than others, are those that are going to be associate countries of Western European Union. It may be difficult for them to become members straight away, but they can at least become associate members.

If a member of the Atlantic Alliance does not become a member of Western European Union because it does not want to, then that is its affair. But if it is because we in this Assembly are against it, then we have to think about it. It is Turkey I have more particularly in mind. Having a Central European country on the same level as Turkey, a member of the Atlantic Alliance, would create a problem for the future.

When we institutionalise our relations with the Central European countries, it is no use just giving them an observer's seat, holding meetings, travelling together or doing joint studies. We have to enable them to be associated in our work and to play a part by making their own proposals. This is what we have already tried to do by proposing associate status for the three countries in the Visegrad agreement: Poland, what was then the Czech and Slovak Republic and, of course, Hungary. We see no reason why countries such as Bulgaria, Romania or the Baltic countries, to take only a few examples, should not be interested in co-operating on such a basis.

It is in an institutional framework like this that each country will also be able to give effect to its wish to contribute to the construction of Europe.

My time is short, so I come to my last comment, Mr. Cox. It is a point on which I always feel very strongly. We set up the CSCE, and the Conflict Prevention Centre, under cir-

Mr. Caro (continued)

cumstances which are well known. The recent history of France, in particular the ethnic struggles which are sometimes within and sometimes between states, and the problems arising from the breakdown of stability and peace, should be dealt with by bodies able to forestall crisis situations by means of research, information and encouragement to diplomatic action. It is obvious that in the CSCE we have not yet reached that stage. The exerting of influence by WEU, thanks to its powers under the Brussels Treaty and also in the CSCE context, for the maintenance of co-ordination and the promotion of systems making it possible to prevent conflicts and equipped with the necessary resources – here I have the tragedy in Yugoslavia in mind – is in my view one of our first duties with regard to problems arising within or between states.

That is the question I wanted to ask you, my object being, every time, to help us forward another step. My renewed congratulations on your report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The report reveals not only the splendid efforts of the clerk of the committee – I was delighted that Mr. Cox made reference to that – but the long and considerable experience of the Assembly that my friend, Tom Cox, has gained. The preamble reveals the progress and change which have taken place in Europe. The Rapporteur also welcomes the developing cordiality in relationships between East and West. However, it is worth noting that the Rapporteur also reveals a vestigial distrust – almost a cynical distrust – of governments by making the noteworthy point that the Assembly maintains East-West relationships itself. That is realism.

The realism of Mr. Cox's report reminds me that on this day in the year 588 St. Eligius was born near Limoges in France. He was noted for the realism that is also displayed by my British colleague. St. Eligius fought an uphill struggle in the seventh century against sin and paganism in France and Flanders. There is a trace of his realism in the few sermons which, fortunately, have been safeguarded. One of the sermons revealed his attempt to ensure that people kept in line with refreshing change and accepted realism.

St. Eligius preached against the pagan notion that a sneeze was a grave omen of impending disaster. He pointed out that the sneeze was a sign of nothing more ominous than the common cold. He reminded the pagans of the day that they had to be prepared to accept new views, changes and challenges. Without ascribing the

qualities of bishop or saint to my British colleague, I suggest that he treads along the same path of realism.

In his reply to our questions this morning, Mr. Rifkind properly reminded us of the legitimacy of arms trading where it is between responsible governments in pursuit of national defence and is not a means of sustaining aggression. Many members of our group have called on Eastern Europe in other debates and probably in other assemblies to sweep away its rules and regulations and make its lands fit for entrepreneurs.

Sweeping away controls is dangerous, not just in terms of economics but in terms of the security of mankind. It is a pity that more members of our group are not here to make the same point.

There are those in the West who would be quite happy if Eastern Europe were to become involved in the less attractive aspects of the arms trade. That would be possible if realism and international interests were discarded. That is why I thought it right to sound a cautionary note and to table my amendment, which refers to this.

I am grateful to the Rapporteur and to the committee for unanimously agreeing to the report. Given that the Rapporteur has accepted the amendment, I propose to do no more than move it without speaking to it. I hope that both amendment and report are unanimously accepted by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vacaru, Observer from Romania.

Mr. VACARU (*Observer from Romania*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to extend my very warm congratulations to Mr. Cox for the report he has presented on behalf of the Defence Committee. As a representative of the Romanian Parliament, I would like to express our satisfaction at the WEU initiative in recommending the creation of the new status of affiliate member for the Central European states.

Romania is prepared to participate in developing any process which will forge closer links with the WEU countries, and in any exchange of views which could culminate in a new European architecture. The special significance of this session therefore needs to be stressed, since it shows the emergence of new ideas such as the single European identity as a subject in education.

You have just heard the address and replies by Mr. Tendor Melescanu, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Romania. Allow me one brief comment on the important problems concerning the region in which my country is located. As I have already said, Romania has been – and continues to be – an island of stability in a region

Mr. Vacaru (continued)

torn by conflicts which are now becoming chronic, in spite of the hard-won progress we have made during these last three years of transition. In this context the decisive rôle played by Romania's policy of dialogue and openness, and the efforts made by Romania to find constructive procedures and an institutional framework designed to defuse sources of tension in the region, deserves prominent mention.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Romanian parliamentary elections of 27th September 1992 represent a further stage in the consolidation of the rule of law in Romania. In my capacity as a representative re-elected to my country's parliament, I must firmly emphasise that all political forces in my country wish to see Romania continue on the path of reform, democracy and respect for fundamental human rights.

This can be confirmed by Mr. Ion Diaconescu, my colleague on the Romanian Delegation, first Vice-President of the National Christian Democrat Peasant Party, which is the main opposition party – and I must admit that it is a strong but constructive opposition.

In a Europe increasingly threatened by internal conflicts of ethnic origin, it is worth noting that in Romania the constitution makes provision for one seat in the Chamber of Deputies to be set aside for each minority organisation unable to win enough votes to be elected. The total number of these seats is thirteen. The Magyar minority obtained thirty-nine seats in parliament for Romanian citizens of Magyar nationality.

This information I have just given you regarding the new legislative context designed to preserve ethnic identity and give expression to the specific cultural and spiritual values of minorities is the best proof of Romania's will to comply with international standards in this field. It is therefore alarming to see the trends appearing on the question of national minorities in a number of states, which currently use concepts not admitted in international practice. As I did in my statement before this Assembly last June, I refer to the over-riding force of the international authorities' rules on human rights over domestic law wherever a contradiction between international and national law arises. Romania fully complies with this requirement. I declare that my country is ready to sign any pan-European convention on human rights accepted as such by all the states of the continent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rockenbauer, Observer from Hungary.

Mr. ROCKENBAUER (*Observer from Hungary*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies

and gentlemen, Mr. Cox's brilliant report on the evolution of the defence situation in Central Europe makes it unnecessary to describe the situation in Hungary, and enables me to note with satisfaction that WEU continues to follow with increasing interest the course of developments of concern to the Central European countries.

Obviously, the institution of a European defence system necessitates a joint effort to set up the institutions required for lasting peace in our region, and the Hungarian Government and Parliament both naturally wish to take part in this effort.

Hungary has been a full member of the Council of Europe since 1990. It has been an associate member of the North Atlantic Assembly since early 1991, and the association agreement signed with the EC on 16th December 1991 strengthens the political ties linking Hungary with the European Community. The preamble to this agreement, and its first title, explicitly refer to the manifest will of Hungary to become an integral part of the new Europe in all fields: political economic and security.

Hungary thus wishes to reinforce to the maximum its relations with WEU, described by the Maastricht Treaty as an integral part of the defence of European Union. Since Hungary is already an associate member of the future European Union, it seems logical to base relations between Hungary and WEU on the same status. We know, however, that the Maastricht Treaty reserves associate member status for NATO members which are not members of the EC. As a result, the Council of Ministers, meeting in Rome in November 1992, decided to grant the status of associate member to Iceland, Norway and Turkey.

We welcome Mr. Cox's proposal for the creation of a new status, that of affiliate member, which could apply to Hungary. My country, which looks forward with pleasure to the possibilities this affords for rapprochement, attaches special importance to the significance of such status.

In this connection the prospect of hearing more about the work of the WEU planning cell, and possible participation in the setting-up of a European armaments agency, is highly encouraging. The specific proposals for staff training, improved budgetary management, work on command and control systems and indeed all the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Mr. Cox's recommendations, correspond to a number of our expectations. It is, however, not clear to us whether WEU will take an active part in applying the recommendations in this paragraph, or whether it will be satisfied to act as an intermediary between its member states and the Central European countries.

Mr. Rockenbauer (continued)

Though we have carefully read the preparatory documents published for the present proceedings we have not been able to find two provisions which did appear in Assembly Recommendation 516 of 1st June 1992. These are two paragraphs of the recommendation, the first of which refers to the conclusion of a peace-keeping agreement between WEU on the one hand, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Poland and Hungary on the other, and the second to the proposal in the fourth paragraph of the recommendation for the establishment in WEU of "an automatic mechanism for mobilising politico-military consultation in order to react to serious crises in Central and Eastern Europe".

Hungary is fully prepared to study all these questions with WEU.

Of the many and varied possibilities for co-operation to be found in other fields, I shall refer to only two.

Hungary, which does not have the necessary technical resources, would be glad to receive WEU assistance in monitoring the ban on navigation on the Danube of craft bound for former Yugoslav countries.

Similarly, we consider it important to be able to discuss the possibility of co-operation between WEU and Hungary in applying the Open Skies and CFE Treaties.

In the context of our shared wish to strengthen institutional ties between Hungary and WEU, a number of activities can also be envisaged. For example, the Hungarian Parliament might participate more actively in the various kinds of work done by the WEU Assembly. It might be possible to envisage Hungary's participation as an associate member in the work of the political groups, committees and rapporteurs of the Assembly. The purpose of all such activities would be the institutionalisation of security and defence questions affecting WEU and the Central European countries.

Ladies and gentlemen, confident in our common future, through the strengthening of the institutional links which alone can guarantee lasting peace in Europe and convinced that WEU and Hungary will find ways of advancing towards greater rapprochement, I thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Iwinski, Observer from Poland.

Mr. IWINSKI (*Observer from Poland*). – First, I congratulate Mr. Cox on his objective and versatile report, which rightly deals not only with the political situation but with economic and foreign policy and defence issues. Of course, owing to the passage of time, some of the data is

not so accurate as it might have been, but that is not the point. Undoubtedly, security must be viewed in its broadest sense as encompassing not only military but political aspects, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as economic, social and environmental matters. That is already something of a cliché.

The problems of security and defence in Central Europe should be our common concern. We, the people of the region, should not feel isolated or like insects being examined by an entomologist. As the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Skubiszewski, pointed out: "Instead of Europe being divided into specific areas, our continent should be considered as a uniform security area." With some conscious exaggeration, the idea is to avoid a new Sarajevo, even if – fortunately – in Central Europe such an eventuality seems unlikely.

In the case of Poland, bilateral treaties, especially with Germany, Russia and the Ukraine – and such an agreement with Lithuania is being prepared – contribute to our common security. But broader guarantees of security are needed for my country, even if Poland's geopolitical situation is better than it was.

In saying this, I keep in mind the different development scenarios in Central Europe. I shall confine my remarks to three aspects of them: first, internal reconciliation and the continuation of reform under stable conditions; secondly, the Latin-Americanisation of the region; thirdly, growing anarchy and nationalism which may lead to the appearance of new dictatorships or, to resort to a notion coined in seventeenth century Russia, a so-called "smuta" period. In the event of the last two scenarios materialising, security could be endangered.

Moreover, new conflicts may arise as a result of the Czech and Slovak Federation split as well as the growth of the nationalism and ethnic problems which bedevil a number of states in the area. Poland's deep desire is to maintain good relations with both states which are soon to emerge from the still-existent Czechoslovakia. That is in the interests of the whole of Europe.

The official stand of the Polish Government is that joining NATO is a strategic target. Mrs. Suchocka, our Prime Minister, visited the headquarters of the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels. The new official Polish defence doctrine adopted two weeks ago is based on the assumption that Poland now has no enemies. Frankly, however, that approach is not widely shared in society. Future membership of NATO could also be a bone of contention from the point of view of some Polish political forces. But there are no reservations concerning close links within the North Atlantic Co-operation Council.

The report stresses that "not without Russia" is the probable NATO response to the applica-

Mr. Iwinski (continued)

tions of several Central European governments to become members of the Atlantic Alliance. There is a desire not to offend Russia and thus aggravate inter-state tensions in Europe. Mr. Rifkind referred to that matter this morning.

Although the interest of the Polish nation is our supreme goal, my personal feeling is that such arguments cannot be totally neglected. The Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Kozyrev, recently spoke about NATO as a "stabilising factor", but Poland's membership of the alliance could make our four eastern neighbours – Russia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Byelorussia – somewhat sensitive.

The crucial subject of our discussions is our relations with WEU. This situation is, or should be, very clear. We greatly appreciate the progress that has been made, including the decisions taken at the extraordinary meeting in Bonn of the Council of Ministers with the states of Central Europe in June this year. The system of mutual consultation, personnel exchanges, the organisation of seminars, better staff training and so on are important and useful, but those or similar steps can hardly be treated as the only, or even the main, way to the emergence of an effective security system in our region or the establishment of the highest level of co-operation.

Perhaps we should not confine ourselves to dialogues even if they are as fruitful as that which took place during the Berlin symposium. I shall quote one opinion from the report of Mr. Etienne Pinte: "I do not see why a place cannot be found for Poland in Western European Union."

For all those reasons, I fully support the draft recommendations of Mr. Cox's report although, to be frank, I see one significant difficulty. Paragraph 2 looks forward to the creation of the new status of affiliate membership of WEU for Central European states. Why "new", and why "affiliate" rather than associate membership? The Brussels Treaty provides for the acceptance of new states. Recently Iceland, Turkey and Norway were given associate membership status. I hope that that decision will pave the way for similar solutions in other cases.

Affiliation or association: that is the question. "C'est le ton qui fait la chanson", to quote the French saying. I remind the Assembly that its recommendation to the Council of Ministers, formulated during the first part of this session, which took place in June, contained the following phrase: "Starting this year... associate the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland with WEU." I believe that that is still in force.

Due to lack of time, I have not touched on the problems of restructuring the military sector in

Poland or on our efforts towards a smaller but more effective army. We have the second biggest army within the Warsaw Pact.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Philipov, Observer from Bulgaria.

Mr. PHILIPOV (*Observer from Bulgaria*). – This is a great honour and privilege for everyone who is here for the first time, but for those of us who are here as observers it is an especially great experience. This is a very important paper. The observers from Bulgaria will do their best to ensure that all our members of parliament study it carefully – and, in particular, that the Foreign Affairs Commission and the Security Commission study it, because it contains advice that will be useful for both internal and external relations.

Let me make some remarks about the current position in Bulgaria, which is not dealt with fully in the text. First, let me deal with the political situation, which is featured in Section III. I am sorry to see that there is no mention of the elections that took place on 13th October last year: they were more important than the presidential elections that took place in January. On that occasion, for the first time, the union of democratic forces took the majority of the vote by a narrow margin.

Secondly, let me deal with the security questions that feature in Section V. Important figures are involved, which could reflect relations between adjacent countries. According to our calculations, ethnic Turks form between 5% and 7% of the population in Bulgaria, not 10% to 15% as the report claims.

Then there is the Macedonian question – the hot potato of the Balkans. The report contains a technical mistake. The San Stefano treaty gave Bulgaria the whole of Macedonia one hundred years ago, but the Berlin Treaty gave Bulgaria only one part of Macedonia. However, that is history. More important, the report mentions the calls in Bulgaria for union with the Macedonian republic. It is a very touchy question for Bulgaria, and we know that, given the present circumstances in the Balkans, this is not the right time or the right place to discuss a separate union with Macedonia. No self-respecting political force in Bulgaria would discuss that seriously.

Thirdly, I want to mention foreign policy development and the confederation between Greece and Bulgaria, which has been considered by Bulgarian leaders. The Bulgarian Delegates here represent the biggest political force in Bulgaria, and, further, represent 90% of MPs. No one has seriously suggested creating a new axis in the Balkans; we know that that would be a very bad idea. However, we want equal relations with all the neighbouring countries.

Mr. Philipov (continued)

Finally, our small delegation would like to express its respect to the Rapporteur. We shall do our best to fulfil the recommendations, and we stress our willingness – and that of our parliament and our government – to widen relations with WEU.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I know that the whole Assembly is aware not only of the many years for which Mr. Vacaru has been a member, but of his ongoing involvement in the changes in Central Europe. We all respect his knowledge. He outlined the various kinds of treaty, and the differences – and, perhaps difficulties – that some of them now present. I am sure that all that will be the basis of continuing discussion. He commented specifically on recommendation 6; that is crucially important, and I am sure that the British Parliament will discuss it on many occasions.

I must show a certain respect to Mr. Hardy, who leads the political group to which I belong. Mr. Hardy, however, went back in history a little further than I would have liked. I can only hope that, perhaps tonight or during one of our late-night sessions in the House of Commons – we are likely to have some in the coming months – he will be generous enough to buy me a beverage. We can then discuss in more detail an aspect of history which, I am sure, fascinated all of us.

Mr. Hardy touched on another fascinating point about the arms trade, which he has made here repeatedly. This morning, the British Secretary of State for Defence expressed concern about certain arms sales, and Mr. Hardy's point was very valuable. I am sure that many of us – irrespective of which country we come from – receive letters from our constituents expressing similar concerns.

I congratulate the observers on their constructive speeches. Mr. Vacaru mentioned the elections that had taken place in his country, and cited evidence of the new democracy that is being built up there. I was delighted to hear about the protection of minorities that exists in his parliament. Although only a small number of parliamentarians are involved, it helps a country to know that its parliament contains a group that has the right to express the views of minorities.

Mr. Rockenbauer, from Hungary, made several important points. I was struck by his comments about the willingness – indeed, the need – for political and military talks to take place to avoid conflicts. I am sure that we all welcome that. I also noted his country's

involvement in a possible Danube embargo. I am sure that representatives of foreign governments will take note of what he said and will read the report tomorrow. I know that you, Mr. President – along with other members of the Assembly – will join me in saluting Hungary for the major rôle that it plays in the Inter-Parliamentary Union. That is yet another example of its rôle in world affairs.

Mr. Iwinski also touched on issues of crucial importance. He spoke of the security of his country – and we all remember the suffering that Poland had to endure many years ago. It is our duty to protect such countries as soon as possible in the event of any threat of conflict. Mr. Iwinski also described the status that he would like countries such as his to enjoy. That is also of crucial importance. I am sure that in future reports we shall examine with great interest the comments and suggestions made by our colleagues from Central Europe.

Mr. Philipov said that the report would be discussed in the Bulgarian Parliament. I salute him. I only wish that the British Parliament discussed many of the reports that we discuss here. In view of the work and effort put into many of the reports that we produce, it is a tragedy that they are not discussed in our national parliaments.

Mr. Philipov also referred to events in Macedonia. They cause deep anxiety to countries such as Bulgaria, and in future reports the Assembly will give these events the consideration and detailed examination that they merit. I and many members will listen with interest to any comments that he may make in compiling such reports.

I thank all who have taken part in the debate. As we know from our national parliaments, it is often the general debate on the report which brings the key issues to the attention of chairmen of committees and rapporteurs. That was admirably done by the six members who have taken part in the debate today. I thank them most sincerely.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cox for your comments and your work.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I could not let the occasion pass without saying on behalf of the committee that we wholeheartedly support Mr. Cox's efforts and this important report. There is no question but that Europe is evolving. Sometimes, the pace of events makes us take things for granted.

Who among us ten years ago would have dreamed of the events which are taking place now or, indeed, that Mr. Cox and his committee could have produced such a report? The report encompasses all the echelons of the various

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

countries which it mentions, their hopes and aspirations, their needs and the way in which we, as an important organisation, can help to bring those countries together.

As Europe unravels, troubles unravel but opportunities also arise. Mr. Cox's recommendations begin with the idea that there is now a formal understanding between Central European countries and this Assembly. So there is. In those circumstances, we are glad of the support which the Assembly is giving.

I congratulate the observers on taking part in the debate. It is encouraging when they do so. Indeed, the observers have attended our debates assiduously. I hope that the report will have a fair wind and that it will be a reasonable contribution to the work of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – The committee has tabled a draft recommendation, to which one amendment has been tabled by Mr. Hardy and others. Amendment 1 is as follows:

1. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Ensure that both WEU member states and Central European states develop effective arrangements to prevent the export of military equipment to those countries and groups which pursue policies of militant nationalism or of aggressive intention.”

Mr. Hardy has already defended the amendment.

Does anyone wish to speak against it?...

I call Mr. Pécriaux.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I must reassure my United Kingdom colleagues and friends who signed this amendment, which is one of undeniable interest. It takes an entirely new line of logic. May I add that we have recently passed a law in Belgium, on the proposal of the Minister for Foreign Trade, in which the thinking, on the sale and export of arms, follows, I am glad to say, the same line as this amendment. I am convinced that if it had been proposed for signature to other members of the Assembly it would have received wide approval.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pécriaux.

Does the committee wish to express any opinion on the amendment?

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – All that I wish to say is that the amendment was fully discussed this morning and unanimously supported by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by a show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1336, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation, as amended, is adopted unanimously¹.

Dear friends, we are a little late in our schedule and, as you know, we have a reception which we should attend. Therefore, it seems reasonable to close our sitting now and resume tomorrow morning.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I thought that the session continued until 7 p.m. Will the Assembly start tomorrow morning with Mr. Nuñez's report? I ask that question because two members of the British Labour Party delegation intend to make their maiden speeches in that debate. As you know, we have changed our delegation substantially following the general election. Some of us have to return to Westminster. If we curtail the sitting now, two of my colleagues may be prevented from making the maiden speeches that they were prepared to make this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT. – As you may imagine, the President is ready to continue until 10 p.m. It does not matter to me. I do not know whether your colleagues who expected to speak would like to address an empty chamber. In any case, we could start at 9.30 a.m. instead of 10 a.m. tomorrow. Would that be reasonable?

I call Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – The orders of the day presented by our President, Mr. Soell, has me down to speak first tomorrow at 10 a.m. Can I be sure of doing so?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does this mean, Mr. Goerens, that you are suggesting that we should begin at 9 a.m., so as to come to your report by 10 a.m. at the latest?

I call Mr. Tummers.

1. See page 26.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you say you would like to stop now because there is little interest. But if you want to make an earlier start tomorrow, you will once more be facing an empty auditorium.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – No, Mr. Hardy, I have to rule now; this is not the assembly of third-year Yale. Therefore, the Chair is going to rule that we shall start tomorrow at 9.15 a.m. We shall follow with the business as foreseen, and we shall appeal to our colleagues to be reasonable and brief so that we can all fulfil our responsibilities.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I wish to get this on the record. It is an abysmal pity and rather a disgrace that the Assembly, which should be sitting until 7 o'clock, has to stop so that some members can attend a reception. We meet for only a short time – in effect, two and a half days – and to finish in this circumstance when we have a serious report to consider is utterly regrettable.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy. Your comment on this is placed on the record.

6. *Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 2nd December, at 9.15 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1333).
2. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council: Part Two: Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia; WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis (Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1342 Part Two, 1337, and 1337 supplementary draft recommendation and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 2nd December 1992

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Organisation of debates.
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy.
4. Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maas-tricht Treaty (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1333*).
Speakers: Mr. Nuñez (Rapporteur), Mr. Antretter, Mrs. Frias, Dr. Godman, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Paasio (Observer from Finland), Mr. Nuñez (Rapporteur), Mr. Tummers (Chairman).
5. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council: Part Two: Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia; WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and*

of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recom-mendations, Docs. 1342 Part Two, 1337, and 1337 sup-plementary draft recommendation and amendments).

Speakers: Mr. Goerens (Rapporteur of the Political Com-mittee), Mr. Marten (Rapporteur of the Defence Com-mittee), Mr. Steiner; (point of order): Lord Mackie of Benshie; Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Pini (Observer from Switzerland), Mr. de Puig, Mr. Vazquez, Mr. Andreotti, Mr. Verivakis (Observer from Greece), Lord Finsberg, Mr. Iwinski (Observer from Poland), Sir Keith Speed, Mr. Pahtas (Observer from Greece), Mr. Fry, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mr. Ferrari, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Agnelli, Mr. König (Observer from Austria), Mrs. Err, Mr. Slatinski (Observer from Bulgaria), Mr. Marten (Rapporteur of the Defence Committee), Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman of the Political Committee), Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman of the Defence Committee), Mr. De Decker, Mr. Andreotti, Mr. Pécriaux, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. De Decker, Sir Dudley Smith.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 9.20 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Pro-cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-vious sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Organisation of debates

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As we have a particularly full order of business for today, I propose, under Rule 34 of the Rules of Pro-

cedure, a time-limit of five minutes for each speaker, apart from the chairmen and rapporteurs of committees.

May I remind you that under the same rule, the Assembly has to vote on the proposal without debate.

Are there any objections?...

The time-limit is agreed to.

I call Mr. Hardy, on a point of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Several British epithets come to mind at this time but most of them are so crude that I would not inflict them on the Assembly. Yesterday afternoon we started 25 minutes late. At 25 minutes past six, the acting President decided that we should finish for the day, even though the order of business included another debate in which two of my British col-leagues intended to make their maiden speeches. They had remained in the chamber for a long time waiting to deliver their speeches.

We finished the sitting and decided to begin today at 9.15 a.m. – of course, it was 9.20 a.m. when we commenced proceedings. I suggest that a practice which many people apply in Britain is adopted by the Assembly from 1st January. It is

1. See page 29.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

the practice of making new year resolutions, in which we seek to change our pattern of conduct. The new year resolution for the Assembly should be that we start on time and seek to stick to the agenda. If not, we shall not be the pillar of western security; we shall be the pillow of western security. There is a profound difference, and the second term is more appropriate than the first.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Hardy, I too am sorry that we cannot always start as punctually as we should. As President of this Assembly, I try to ensure punctuality. But there are a number of circumstances that affect our activities, including the fact that we also have committee meetings and that there are certain social events which at least part of the Assembly is keen to attend. We have, so to speak, to find a way through these and other constraints, which is difficult, and the other chairmen and I try to do so. I hope we will succeed today in spite of the heavy agenda.

4. Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1333)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty, and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1333.

I call Mr. Nuñez, the Rapporteur.

Mr. NUÑEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as Rapporteur I was here punctually at 9.15 a.m. and I will endeavour to be brief to see if I can fulfil the saying, the shorter the better! At the beginning of this report I would like to make one or two comments on its scope and content.

It is basically a descriptive report of the debates which have taken place on the security policy provided for at Maastricht, of parliamentary debates which have been held in the nine member countries of our organisation plus the three countries which, until now, have been the only observer countries. It also includes debates held in the European Parliament.

The information contained in the report applies up to the end of October, when the report had to be written up. Consequently, it does not include important debates which have taken place in some countries. The information

is more or less complete, for each country in respect of debates which have been held and according to information which has been obtained from the secretariat of the committee, whom I must thank for all their efforts, particularly Mr. Pedregosa.

Within these confines, the report gives an overview of the way in which defence and security policy has been dealt with in the debates in the different parliaments. One conclusion that can be drawn is that these debates have not been adequate in depth or in breadth. I cannot linger on this point and analyse each of the countries in the debate on the policy of the Maastricht Treaty concerning economic and political union, but in general the strictly political and economic aspects have been debated in greater depth and breadth than those associated with security and the defence of Europe, as is provided for in the treaty itself.

In many countries no reference was made to the declaration on WEU attached to the treaty. Consequently, in the draft resolution, it is requested that governments and parliaments should hold debates on the subject of security and defence, as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty, on the declaration annexed, on Western European Union and on relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. Not only do we need more parliamentary debate, which would be the second part of the resolution, but we also need better public information on security and defence in Europe.

In many countries, there are still some circles, including political and professional circles at university level, which are unaware of the definition of European security and defence as dealt with by the treaties of the union. And by the same token it must extend to other sectors as well, because there is a widespread view in many of our countries that European security and defence policy is not a subject of any importance.

Now that the Berlin wall has come down and the communist bloc disappeared, many of our people believe that European security and defence are no longer endangered and that there is no need for concern. And yet these same groups of our citizens then contradict themselves by asking us politicians again and again: what are we doing; what are we going to do to stop the conflict which exists, for instance, in some of the territories of the former Yugoslavia? And they also say to us: why do you not take some action to stop this confrontation? Consequently I think that this is an opportune moment to revive this debate with specific examples to make the people of Europe aware of the importance of this aspect of European Union, and of defence and security policy.

Mr. Nuñez (continued)

Until the citizens of Europe realise that defence and security policy in Europe form part of the European Union, we cannot speak of European Union: there will be a democratic deficit when Europe is built. This democratic deficit has its roots in the lack of information and participation by the people of Europe. This is why the resolution mentions the need to establish a consensus between political and social forces and public opinion so that, in the present important phase in the building of Europe, we can build on Maastricht to create a space for the defence and security of Europe.

Mr. President, I said I would be brief and I will finish shortly; we are at a turning point in Europe. We need the help of all sectors of society, especially in a subject about which the general public is so comparatively ill-informed as about defence and security policy. This is the age of communication. I stress this because this report comes from the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. Anything of which the general public is unaware might as well not exist as far as they are concerned. So we must make an effort to inform the public about these matters. We have already gone some way to do so with parliamentary debates, although these have been inadequate as far as defence and security policy is concerned. We must persist in our efforts and strengthen this debate by dedicated parliamentary debates on these matters. Nor must we forget the declaration appended to the treaty; relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance must be discussed at the same time. I believe that now is the appropriate time for this debate and I hope this report will help to bring it about.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, today, as we discuss the reaction of the national parliaments to the Maastricht Treaty, I do not think it is an exaggeration to speak of an awakening of the national parliaments.

In recent years we have all witnessed the insidious process of national powers being transferred to the EC without the European Parliament obtaining the appropriate means of control or participation. It has become clear during the process of ratification that the national parliaments are no longer prepared to tolerate this undermining of their powers and are calling for better information and a say in all EC Commission proposals. In the Federal Republic of Germany, given our system of government and constitution, this applies in particular to proposals that affect the competence of the Länder.

Something else has become clear. If we are now preparing for more intensive co-operation in WEU defence policy, then I think we need a clear distribution of tasks which ensures that participation of troops in military actions remains within the competence of the national parliaments. Decisions on war and peace or on involvement in United Nations actions must be reserved to the national parliaments alone, for they alone have been authorised by their electors to take such decisions. That is why our Assembly, the WEU parliamentary Assembly, remains the forum for debating questions of defence policy, in line with WEU's interstate approach. Of course that does not mean that the European Parliament could not find a rôle to play, for example as regards monitoring European security policy, the measures imposed by the EC, or arms exports.

Mr. President, I would like to raise a final point, to avoid any misunderstandings about the rather critical light cast on some matters that are being discussed in relation to Maastricht. Whenever Maastricht is discussed this week, it must be made clear that the future of Europe lies in political union and not in a renaissance of the sovereign national states of the last century, and that our continent will have no chance if we give a chance to the radical right-wing nationalist forces that are becoming alarmingly active in Western Europe too, and whose aim is to destroy the work for European integration of Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, Alcide de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt, and of living national leaders as well. Our aim must be a Europe of patriots who love their own countries, with no room for nationalists who despise the countries of other people.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Frias.

Mrs. FRIAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to congratulate the Rapporteur on the most interesting and objective report which he has presented to us today.

Foreign and security policy is one of the most difficult challenges which the European Union faces. It is also one of the most urgent challenges, as the crisis in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates. This fundamental aspect of the treaty is the very one about which the public knows least, and this is perhaps because little attention has been paid to it in parliamentary debates, judging from the analysis of debates in the various parliaments. There is, therefore, a need for a campaign such as is suggested in the conclusions of the report to inform public opinion about the objectives of the treaty and the instruments for implementing foreign and security policy.

I am also in favour of specific parliamentary debates for the purpose of informing our citizens

Mrs. Frias (continued)

about WEU, its functions and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. The foreign policy requirements of the treaty, covering mutual information, co-operation and joint action where necessary – and I believe that all action which has United Nations backing comes into this category – and, in particular, close collaboration in international organisations and conferences, all these requirements are deeply felt by our citizens to be absolutely necessary, as being the only way to solve the serious conflicts raging within and on the frontiers of Europe.

Each one of us, as a member of the WEU Assembly, has a duty to speak out in favour of early ratification of the treaty by those countries which have not yet ratified it, not because in so doing we shall solve existing problems, but because as long as it is not ratified such problems will clearly only become worse.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Godman.

Dr. GODMAN (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to make a brief speech on this important subject and to comment on this fine, well-written report. I do not believe that anyone here will reject its recommendations.

I believe that one day WEU will supplant or succeed NATO in the defence of Europe. In the meantime I should like to comment on the Maastricht Treaty from the point of view of a Scottish member of parliament. I do not have time today to go into my reservations about the treaty – there are too many of them to elaborate this morning. I am, however, only too well aware of the fact that I live in a highly centralised, multinational state: the so-called United Kingdom. I have no wish to live on the periphery of an over-centralised European Union. Our massive problem in Britain is what we usually label the democratic deficit.

I am deeply sceptical – nay, cynical – about the United Kingdom's understanding and probable implementation of Article 3b of the treaty, which concerns the principle of subsidiarity. Rightly and properly the people of Catalonia and Andalusia enjoy regional government. The same holds true for the German Länder. I can say with confidence that the overwhelming majority in Scotland want a Scottish parliament in Edinburgh. For my part, I would be only too happy to live in a federal United Kingdom in a federal Europe.

The outcome of the passage of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, which is being debated in the British Parliament right now and to which I return at lunchtime today, will be a close-run thing. It began its prolonged committee stage yesterday; many other Scottish

members share my reservations about the treaty as it is interpreted by the United Kingdom.

I should like to deal briefly with the much canvassed relationship between WEU and NATO, as viewed by the United Kingdom Government. Mr. Nuñez refers in the report to a speech by Prime Minister Major. Paragraph 158 of this excellent report runs as follows: “‘On defence’, continued the Prime Minister, ‘the position is clear. We have in NATO the means of our defence. At the recent summit all the members of NATO were clear that we must do nothing to call in question the continuing American and Canadian presence in Europe’.” This prompts the question: what happens if the Americans and Canadians dismantle their pillar? That is precisely what the Canadians are doing at this very moment.

NATO should never be allowed to engage in military activity outwith the territories defined in the North Atlantic Treaty, except when NATO forces are placed under the overall authority and control of the United Nations – I sympathise with what Mrs. Frias said about that. WEU and NATO may have complementary rôles to perform, but there is a view gaining ground in America that Europe should be defended by European nations. The American writer Gore Vidal recently said that Europe is rich enough to pay for its own defence. Granted, he is not the most popular American with American citizens, but that sentiment is getting stronger in America.

As a new delegate I welcome the growing importance of WEU; it is a force for the future. By contrast, NATO is going into decline. I believe that this union should look to the day when it supplants NATO once and for all.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hughes.

Mr. HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on a most engaging report. It is a particular pleasure to follow my colleague Dr. Godman.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its virtual disintegration many people believed that security and defence would take a back seat. That has not happened. The dreadful events in Yugoslavia, the horrors that seem to go on day in and day out, are evidence enough of that. They are a blot on the idea of a secure and united Europe.

Coincidentally, we began the committee stage to ratify the Maastricht Treaty only yesterday in the House of Commons. The ratification bill to amend the Treaty of Rome and other EC treaties is known as the European Communities (Amendment) Bill. Its passage will be a long and laborious business, fraught with difficulties and with no guarantee of eventual ratification. When

Mr. Hughes (continued)

the Maastricht Treaty was last debated in the House of Commons the Prime Minister's survival was at stake. In the event he survived by three votes. The House of Commons is composed of no fewer than six hundred and fifty members. The Prime Minister survived only because he was supported by the third party – the Liberals.

We have an old saying in Britain about putting the cart before the horse. The moral that may emerge from this debate on security under Maastricht is that the very future of Maastricht is not guaranteed. The obvious message is that we should tread carefully. Co-operation and consensus are all very well but the British people do not want to be put in a straitjacket. No British Government can allow their hands to be tied in matters of defence and foreign policy. That may come as a blow to idealists who dream of a federal Europe. Maastricht is seen by many as a conveyor belt to federalism.

For my part I want close and friendly relations between my country and others, but I do not want those relations enshrined in treaties that would tie the hands of government and restrict their independence of action. All the opinion polls show that people in Britain and in many other parts of the EC resent the bureaucracy of Brussels. In all major policy areas, including security, I suggest that we proceed with great caution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Paasio, Observer from Finland.

Mr. PAASIO (*Observer from Finland*). – Mr. President, fellow parliamentarians, on behalf of the Finnish Parliament I wish to express our gratitude for your kind invitation to attend as observers.

As you know, we in Finland follow attentively developments in Western European Union. In that regard, we highly appreciated Secretary-General van Eekelen's recent visit to Helsinki.

Finland believes that it can best secure its national interests and further its international aspirations by joining the European Community. Its membership application last March launched a new phase in the country's foreign and security policy.

Finland is prepared to take an active part in the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, the aims and methods of which are envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty. Members are expected to commit themselves to the common goals and objectives of the union and to make a constructive contribution to joint efforts. They are to support the common policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.

Finland is prepared to demonstrate its capacity to fulfil these obligations.

In applying for membership of the EC, Finland stated that it accepts the objectives of the Maastricht Treaty, including the defence dimension. On that basis, we will in due time consider and develop our relations with WEU. At the same time, Finland aims at promoting security and stability in Northern Europe. We believe that our military non-alignment and independent defence are in harmony with the interests and aspirations of other states.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. NUÑEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – I have listened with great interest to what my colleagues have had to say, because I believe that such comments serve to enrich the report I have presented, and I will deal with them in the order in which they spoke.

Mr. Antretter's point was taken up, although expressed differently, by Dr. Godman and Mr. Hughes; it concerns the model for the construction of Europe which is being followed in the transnational institutions which exist within the Community. I agree that this model is not entirely satisfactory; one reason for this is that we need to ensure the participation of the people. There has been talk of a democratic deficit, but such a phenomenon has its roots in democracy and the basis of democracy is the citizen. Parliaments and governments, although essential, are not the ultimate base of democracy; no, the root of democracy is the citizen. And as we have seen from parliamentary debates, the citizens of Europe do not consider that they are taking part in the construction of Europe. They do not perceive it clearly. And as Mr. Antretter said, this is why a rigid model for the construction of Europe is being followed through the transnational institutions. We must, therefore, give a greater rôle to the different nations and states, and debates must be held in each and every one of our countries and each and every one of our parliaments.

This does not mean, as has been suggested, that we should confuse nation with nationalism; when we talk of a nation we are dealing with a social reality related to our era, whereas nationalism is a reality which is out of phase from a historical point of view and which does not lead to the construction of anything. It may lead to destruction, to the destruction of everything, in fact, and this is why, as the report indicates, we must ensure wider national and parliamentary debate. Parliament is the institution which represents the citizen and it is the citizen we must inform and whose participation we must secure. We must do this through the WEU Assembly,

Mr. Nuñez (continued)

because the Assembly is a sort of hybrid and this, in my view, is very important.

This institution may be transnational, but at the same time we are here as direct representatives of our parliaments. This is why it is a very appropriate forum to be debating such important matters as European defence and security. Because of this dual representation, it is from this forum that we must begin to disseminate information to the public.

At the final meeting of the committee, Mr. Tummars will be able to comment on this matter, in view of the concern we feel for the lack of public information. In the committee we have been studying new measures for keeping the public informed of our work on these matters, because without them nothing can be built. As I said before, some of this same feeling, this same concern, was embodied in the comments made by Dr. Godman and Mr. Hughes.

In his speech, Dr. Godman raised objections as to the way in which the Maastricht debate is being conducted, particularly in the United Kingdom, and he also mentioned some complicated matters, difficult because they are so subtle and imprecise, such as the subject of subsidiarity, which can be interpreted in so many different ways. In fact, it is a concept which stems from the Scholastic doctrine of the Middle Ages. Those celebrated groups of philosophers spent long days in complex discussions which formed the basis of Scholasticism, and long, complicated arguments took place affirming the major premise and denying the minor one, and thus reaching a conclusion. I do not think that we should involve ourselves too much in this matter of subsidiarity as a means of building Europe. What we should do is to involve ourselves as much as possible in detailed, specific debates, ensuring the participation of our people. This is the only way to put an end to dialectics.

I welcome the fact that you mentioned that some of the autonomous communities of Spain, such as Andalusia and Catalonia, have their own statutes. This is correct, and I believe that in Spain we have a model for the construction of a state which is very important. It was difficult, because there are so many different interests to take into consideration, but in the end I think it is a model which has been accepted by all of the peoples of Spain. In my view, this model, federal or confederal, is a good model, especially for Spain. Each country can have the system it considers most appropriate.

The Atlantic Alliance is a subject which several speakers, including Mr. Hughes, referred to, and the report mentions the need for a debate, when referring to the construction of

Europe and to security and defence policy, to include the subject of the Atlantic Alliance through complementarity. I also share this desire to strengthen Western European Union, but retaining complementarity with the Atlantic Alliance.

I have already partly answered Mr. Hughes in my previous comments. He says that we are building the house by starting with the roof; this is what I said when I was talking about discussions in transnational institutions, concerning the building of Europe. We must also avoid bureaucracy. At the present time the technocracy is in the ascendant; people think that through technical, legal and social knowledge we can succeed in building Europe and that it will enable us to develop fantastic robots and construct wonderful systems, but this is not building reality; reality is constructed with the backing of technology, but who does that technology support? It supports the decisions of political representatives. This is an appropriate time to reaffirm the importance of politics and of political representatives and of society itself, rather than the influence which technicians and technocracy can have on the construction of Europe.

I must thank my colleague, Mrs. Frias, for her kind words and the very specific suggestions she made which are consistent with the report's recommendations. I am also pleased to see that Mr. Paasio is attending this debate as an observer and that a country as important as Finland is prepared to participate in the building of Europe in such an important matter, so vital for Europe, as security and defence. I am sure that from all these different suggestions we can succeed in building a democratic Europe and creating a European defence and security area, which we all need.

The Maastricht Treaty, with all its failings, is in my view a very important step forward. And as for defence and security, we must not forget not only the provisions contained within the treaty itself, but also the annexed declaration. It is important that this declaration, too, should be included in the parliamentary debates and public information campaigns.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummars, the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I begin, following their maiden speeches, by wishing Mr. Hughes and Dr. Godman much success in their subsequent work in this Assembly.

Our committee works rather like a conductor of information. It is very important to emphasise this. We shall have the opportunity of going into it again in more detail on Thursday, when the new report on information concerning WEU is presented. For the sake of brevity I shall

Mr. Tummers (continued)

confine myself to two observations this morning.

You yourself, Mr. President, referred to the origins of WEU during your introductory speech when you changed from French to your native language, German. WEU was created so that the defence of Europe could be founded on social, economic and cultural stability within the territories of the signatory states. But in fact with the Maastricht Treaty we have once more given WEU its rightful place. After much wandering through a number of countries and following a curious confrontation with the doctrines of NATO, we have accorded WEU its proper place in Europe as a whole, as set out in the Maastricht Treaty.

My second observation is as follows: yesterday evening, after the failed reception at which we were not in fact received, I had the good fortune to meet a military attaché who was willing to talk about the problems they are facing just now. This attaché was about to retire, and he wanted to take a job informing young people in particular, in countries where the army is being reorganised to the point where it is no longer certain whether young men – and possibly young women – will join the army. He wanted to explain to these young people what peace and security mean. In other words, he wanted them to understand clearly the importance of reorganising the army if WEU was really to take the form initially intended for it.

I thank the Rapporteur for all the work he has put into this report, and I particularly thank the secretariat which has spared neither time nor money in making contact with all the parliaments in which the Maastricht Treaty has been debated, in order to keep us informed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft resolution in Document 1333.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft resolution is adopted¹.

1. See page 30.

5. European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council:

Part Two: Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia

WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1342 Part Two, 1337, and 1337 supplementary draft recommendation and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee on European security policy – reply to the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council: Part Two: Europe and the crises in former Yugoslavia, and of the Defence Committee on WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis, and votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1342 Part Two, 1337, and 1337 supplementary draft recommendation and amendments.

I call Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as I have been invited this afternoon to see the Prime Minister of Portugal of whom I requested an audience a long time ago, I shall be obliged to leave before the end of the debate. Would you kindly excuse me? I have asked my friend Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Political Committee, to take my place at voting time. Actually, given the affinities in the recommendations which I am presenting on behalf of the committee with those that Mr. Marten will be presenting on behalf of the Defence Committee, the conclusions of the debate could well be valid for both.

The recommendation on which you will be invited to vote was agreed by the Political Committee on 6th November last prior, therefore, to the ministerial meeting on 20th November at the end of which a press communiqué was issued on the situation of former Yugoslavia. As you can see for yourselves, much of the substance of the recommendation itself is repeated in the communiqué. Does that mean that the wording I am proposing to you today is out of date and is no longer applicable? To my mind, not at all. Clearly it is not for the Assembly to echo clauses on which the Council has already agreed, but since these decisions reflect the views already voiced by the Political Committee it is the Assembly's duty to urge the Council to act on our recommendations and to make it clear that, while it approves the attitude taken by the Council in this area, the Assembly now expects it to put every effort into carrying out these recommendations, in respect of which the Rome communiqué gives us no assurance at all.

Mr. Goerens (continued)

I do not wish to go back over the events of recent months and recent years on former Yugoslav territory, including in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina. These events are as well-known as they are difficult to interpret, since it is not easy to see who precisely is responsible whether for originating the war now tearing their unfortunate country apart, or for perpetrating the countless acts of cruelty and violations of human rights accompanying it. It is patently obvious that under all three headings Serbia and its government have committed especially reprehensible deeds. It is, however, equally clear that other republics, and in particular other groups of combatants whose real links with the legitimate governments of the republics of former Yugoslavia no one knows, have been guilty of similar crimes. Our problem today is not to mete out justice, but to put an end to the fighting which is tearing a region apart at the very centre of the European continent.

It is true that neither WEU nor any of its members has an alliance either with former Yugoslavia or the republics it has split up into. We thus have no special obligations towards them. But we cannot overlook a number of considerations which oblige us to take action, where we are lawfully entitled to do so and have the necessary resources in order to help restore peace.

The first and most evident of these is related to the very horror of the war and the fate of civilian populations being massacred and deported before our very eyes, or so it seems when we look at the television pictures. No one can be indifferent as the tides of violence and savagery unfurl so close to our frontiers.

Next there is history which in this case is not so very old. The first world war broke out only eighty years ago in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1991 Europe was united and strong enough not to be divided to any depth by the clashes erupting on Yugoslav territory. We remain united, as the London Conference showed last October, in applying that unity to ending the hostilities. We have to succeed while there is still time because, behind the apparent unanimity of the Twelve, we can already see cracks that could quickly widen, particularly where recognising the independence of the former Republic of Macedonia is concerned.

But the most cogent reason for our intervention in the affairs of former Yugoslavia has to do with the present and future of Europe as a whole. The end of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union has created an area of instability in the centre of our continent which most countries in that region see as a threat to the peaceful organisation of Europe. Like us, they signed the Charter of Paris in November 1990 in which the

CSCE member countries, including Yugoslavia, undertook to base peace in Europe on certain principles, foremost among them the respect for human rights, protection of minorities and inviolability of frontiers. If we give the impression today that we are unconcerned at violations of these principles or at least unconvinced that they call for real sacrifices on our part to ensure they are respected, there would then be every reason to fear that Soviet domination would be followed by a period of armed conflict and violence the duration or extent of which no one could foretell.

Prompted by the fears caused by the disappearance of an oppressive but efficient European order, most Central and East European countries looked for ties with the European Community in the hope of joining an economic order ensuring the development of their societies and a political system supporting democracy, and guaranteeing international peace and stability. By identifying our organisation as an integral part of the process of European Union, the Maastricht Treaty has named WEU as the instrument with which Europe could act if international peace and economic stability were threatened as is the case in former Yugoslavia today. Were we not to act with vigour to bring that region back to peace, it would be a sign to ourselves, to the populations of our countries, which have occasionally shown a certain scepticism about the Maastricht Treaty, and above all to the states and peoples of Central and Eastern Europe that Europe is incapable of meeting the promises it seemed to be making for the organisation of peace in Europe.

That said, it is clear that we cannot do just anything just anyhow. Neither the Charter of the United Nations nor the Charter of Paris gives authority for the use of force to ensure respect for the principles they contain. At the moment the Security Council is the only body empowered to define the methods and extent of any deployment of forces in Yugoslavia. Nor can we invoke the passionate feelings aroused among the public by the pictures of the grim events during the siege of Dubrovnik, the bombing of Sarajevo, the discovery of mass graves, the streams of refugees who have lost everything and the injured and mutilated children as justification for assuming that our peoples are ready to face the consequences of armed intervention which we know would be long and involve considerable losses.

These were some of the considerations in the mind of the Political Committee when it adopted the report I have the honour of presenting to you. At its meeting on 6th November last it felt the WEU governments could take firmer action with a view to restoring peace without at the same time launching into military

Mr. Goerens (continued)

adventures that would get out of control. Here, the committee was taking the same line as the Standing Committee of the Assembly, which had adopted Recommendation 525 spelling out the Assembly's thinking on 3rd September. There is no question of WEU imposing its own peace on the peoples of former Yugoslavia but what we do want to do is to make the civilian and military authorities of these republics themselves agree on a peace complying with the principles we all recognise. The first stage of course at the beginning of a winter which could have immeasurable consequences is to equip ourselves with the means of bringing aid to the populations who are victims of the fighting, forced removal and the barbarous deeds perpetrated in the bitter warfare. Our draft recommendation therefore proposes an increase in the deployment of forces in order to protect the distribution of humanitarian relief to the civilian populations.

Two other points in the recommendation refer to the measures designed to strengthen United Nations action aimed at putting an end to military operations; one deals with enforcement of the Security Council's embargo.

Certainly everyone now knows that opinion, even in Serbia, is far from unanimous in supporting a government which bears such heavy responsibility for the continuance of the war and the ethnic cleansing policy and its violation of the elementary rights of persons and peoples. On the contrary, the federal government of the new Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and Montenegro has shown itself in recent weeks to be much more aware of the wishes of a public which is weary of war and now seems to be ready to negotiate in acceptable conditions. Thus one of our main objectives must be to encourage this segment of opinion to assert itself in Serbia, now that the Serbian authorities are claiming they are ready for a ten-year war. This is the prime objective of the Security Council's embargo on Serbia, but the Council will only succeed if the embargo becomes really effective, which has hardly been the case so far.

Indeed we all know that the naval operations undertaken under WEU and NATO auspices have been confined to monitoring shipping and to reporting on any violations of the embargo. We know that some violations have been discovered, but that no recourse to force had been agreed on up to the beginning of this month, unlike what had been achieved by 1990 in the sanctions on Iraq. What we are asking the Council to do is to request the Security Council for the necessary means to take effective action.

In my view the first of these is to have the violations publicised. On that score the members of the Presidential Committee who heard the

address of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 18th November last in Rome were gratified to note that he shared their views. It was just then that the Security Council authorised the arraignment and search of ships bound for ports in Montenegro.

The second condition for strict enforcement of the embargo is the supervision of shipping along the Danube by the countries neighbouring the republics of former Yugoslavia involved in the war and the security of the land frontiers with these republics. The aim is not for WEU to take any country's place but to provide the help they need to be able to take effective action. We know, to take one case, that Romania has made requests to WEU on these lines, but the Council had not told the Assembly what it has done in response.

However, the communiqué issued by the Council on 20th November informs us that the Council is planning moves of this kind and has said it is ready to follow them up. It matters that the Assembly should assure the Council of its support if it puts them into practice and state clearly that they reflect its own views, in order to encourage the Council to waste no time going ahead with decisions so far still expressed only in somewhat vague terms.

I therefore consider it useful to adopt the paragraphs of the recommendation covering these points and I can tell you in advance that for my part I will gladly vote for any amendments whose object is to make them clearer, after incorporating any decisions adopted by the Council since the Political Committee agreed on these recommendations.

The remainder of the draft recommendation deals with the preservation of peace in regions where it is not yet actually broken, primarily Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia.

But clearly, in these three regions, peace is seriously threatened, so much so that the resumption of communications between Serbia and Croatia through the zone protected by the UNPROFOR mission has not been possible. In Kosovo, the Serbian Government seems disinclined to make any concessions whatsoever to the claims, put forward by a population the great majority of which is Albanian, largely justified though they appear to be. Further, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has so far failed to win recognition for its independence – even though the grounds for that independence are not seriously contested by the EC countries – on account of the over-sensitivity of one of these countries. I would add that this is the one point on which the Council has not already made known its agreement with the recommendation agreed to by the Political Committee.

This recommendation therefore, which might have been considered bold on 6th November,

Mr. Goerens (continued)

now appears almost tame. It did not divide the committee even at a time when our countries were seriously contemplating reduced naval action in the Adriatic so it should not divide our Assembly at a time when these same countries have decided, as they did on 20th November last, to keep their ships at station and increase their capacity for effective intervention.

The recommendation is a sort of corollary to Greece's protocol of accession to WEU, now directly concerned with Balkan affairs. We can no longer stay out of what is going on in that part of the world. Instead we must include it in the areas where WEU must be prepared to act with a view to restoring and maintaining peace in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Marten, Rapporteur of the Defence Committee.

Mr. MARTEN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, day after day the ghastly pictures of murder, torture and violence flicker across our television screens; we can take part in the war in Yugoslavia through the television. What are we doing, what is Europe doing, what in fact can we do for what remains of Yugoslavia, a Yugoslavia that has broken apart and now finds itself at war?

The crisis in Yugoslavia has shown how important it is for Europe to have its own security instruments. They are designed to help us tackle this kind of crisis successfully. That is why WEU has asked me to examine its potential future operational rôle as the defence branch of the projected European Union.

To supplement my report, WEU's operational organisation and the Yugoslav crisis, I would like to begin with a few points of principle to round off the whole question and also say a few words about WEU as such.

WEU was founded in the framework of the Paris Agreements in 1954 and entered into force on 6th May 1955. Its member states are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. The WEU Council of Ministers decided in Rome to accept Greece as a tenth member.

WEU has a Council of Ministers in London, a parliamentary Assembly of one hundred and eight members and an Agency for the Control of Armaments in Paris. In the event of aggression, WEU member states automatically give each other assistance. Unlike NATO, however, the WEU alliance does not have its own military organisation.

Pursuant to Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations has the

right to impose a naval blockade in the event of a threat to peace or a violation of peace. The decision has to be taken by the United Nations Security Council. A blockade of this kind was imposed on Iraq during the Gulf war; it has now been decided to impose it on the former Yugoslavia.

At their Lisbon summit on 27th June 1992, the EC heads of state and government turned to WEU when they had to decide about a military operation to protect the humanitarian aid destined for the disintegrating Yugoslavia.

The foreign and defence ministers of WEU agreed in Rome on 20th November 1992 that WEU naval units would engage in stop and search actions in the Adriatic as part of the more stringent monitoring of the United Nations embargo and thus participate in the naval blockade. Pursuant to United Nations Resolution 787, warships will be able to stop all merchant vessels and make a thorough check to see whether they are carrying a cargo that infringes the United Nations embargo. Vessels that try to breach the blockade may be brought in and seized.

Danube shipping is also to be monitored, with the support of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The overland transit of goods of strategic importance to Serbia and Montenegro is to be banned. Imports of humanitarian aid such as medicines are excluded from all embargo measures.

Ladies and gentlemen, German vessels will not take part in the military peace-keeping actions represented by the – if necessary forcible – stopping and searching of vessels. Although in principle Article 2(5) and Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations oblige every member country to give military assistance, opinions differ in Germany about whether such military action is compatible with the German constitution. That is why the Federal German Government has not allowed its armed forces to take part in the coercive measures used to monitor the United Nations sanctions against the former Yugoslavia, with a view to preventing the procurement of weapons and other war materials and thereby reducing its economic and military strength.

Pursuant to Article 24(2) of its Basic Law, Germany may join a mutual collective security system. It has done so in the case of WEU and NATO. The United Nations is another such security system, but since it does not have its own troops it has to rely on contingents of troops being made available to it, as in the present Yugoslav crisis.

Germany is prepared in principle to supply troops, but until the question of constitutional law has been resolved they may not take part in actions of a military nature.

Mr. Marten (continued)

Over recent years, the political and strategic situation in Europe has changed radically with the end of the East-West conflict. That is why a new European security structure with a network of interlocking institutions needs to be created. It would include the United Nations, WEU, NATO and the CSCE, and through them the Europeans must assume more responsibility for their own security and for the defence of the international legal system in the framework of transatlantic partnership. The civil war and genocide in the disintegrating Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflicts in the states of the former Soviet Union have demonstrated this need very drastically.

The European Union sees WEU as the European component of a common foreign and security policy and hence as the cornerstone of a future common defence. WEU could thus complement NATO by taking over tasks transcending the limits laid down in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. That means operating outside the NATO area.

NATO and the CSCE must continue to have their specific areas of competence in future, even though their aims are becoming increasingly similar – however different their historical roots.

The CSCE has not had any real impact on the Yugoslav crisis. The United Nations has refused to allow NATO to commit itself any further. WEU, however, as the operational nucleus of the European alliance, has built up and consolidated its position.

The Secretariat-General of WEU will move from London to Brussels, where WEU will be able to perform its dual rôle as the European pillar of NATO and future defence policy arm of the European Community more successfully. Furthermore, the new WEU planning cell responsible for planning future humanitarian or peace-keeping action has been operating in Brussels since October. WEU sees this as a chance to be promoted to the military arm of the European Community even before the 1995 date set by Maastricht.

WEU, NATO, European Union and the CSCE are complementary institutions in a European security network. However, the European security union must be capable of acting in the event of a threat to European security, even in the absence of a classical alliance situation in accordance with WEU or NATO treaties. The deployment of European security forces must – according to the Athens declaration of the European People's Party – be covered by a majority decision of the European Parliament.

The Yugoslav crisis has faced WEU and therefore Europe with a difficult test. In order

that they may pass it successfully, I as Rapporteur propose the following priority measures. First, the WEU member countries must take appropriate measures to ensure that the embargo against the former Yugoslavia is just as effective as the embargo against Iraq was in its time. Obviously that also means that any WEU member country which violates the embargo will be called to account. Second, the WEU member countries must ensure that the countries bordering the Danube obtain the necessary expertise, technical assistance and equipment to enforce the embargo on their inland waterways and on land. Third, the WEU member countries must draw up contingency plans to have an adequate air defence capability in readiness to help protect the United Nations troops deployed in the former Yugoslavia. Fourth, the WEU and NATO member countries must ensure that the troops they deploy in the crisis area co-operate operationally, and as efficiently as possible. Fifth, the WEU member countries must provide the WEU budget with the financial resources essential to its increased activity in dealing with the crisis in Yugoslavia.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is incumbent on all of us to play our part in putting an end to the criminal actions, torture and murder in the former Yugoslavia.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The joint debate is open.

I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the two reports before us, on the operational organisation of Western European Union and on the Yugoslav crisis, which are connected, are in my view among the most impressive and topical reports our Assembly will be debating today. Mr. Goerens and Mr. Marten have clarified the need to strengthen Western European Union in operational terms on the basis of security policy developments, earlier discussions in this Assembly and in the Council of Ministers and with reference to certain very important documents.

Mr. Marten, in particular, indicated in which areas good beginnings had been made in accordance with the declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to strengthen WEU's operational rôle. But he also showed us the weak spots that are already appearing during this attempt to strengthen WEU and he has made good and constructive recommendations that we should all be able to support. This report is one of the few to be adopted unanimously in this Assembly's Defence Committee. I also think it has come at the right time, for we are still at the stage of consolidating the operational arrangements for Western European Union.

Mr. Steiner (continued)

The Rapporteur emphasised the importance of the projected planning staff, as I would call it, in terms of carrying out the many tasks for which Western European Union will be responsible in future. He also spoke very clearly on the position of this planning cell or staff in the hierarchy, and the as yet unresolved question of funding it. I shall address both these questions here in the Assembly again, because I believe there is an acute need for parliamentary action.

I would like to make a few comments on the hierarchical position of the planning cell or staff. On 19th June 1992, the Council of Ministers decided in Bonn to set up the planning cell by 1st October 1992 and to put it under the authority of the Council. In his opening remarks when he introduced his report, Mr. Goerens pointed out that there were problems arising from the involvement of the work of Western European Union, and in this context of the planning cell too, of course, with the parliaments. The Council of Ministers then approved the terms of reference for the planning cell and decided that it would be located in the same premises as the Secretariat-General of WEU in Brussels. But nothing was said about how the co-operation was to be organised, i.e. the flow of information between the important instrument represented by the planning cell and the Secretariat-General, or even between the planning cell and the Assembly, and how parliamentary involvement is to be achieved. I think it is up to us members of parliament to have this matter clarified.

I am inclined to say that there must at least be links with the appropriate specialist committee. Just to share the same premises is not enough; that would merely suggest that some information is exchanged, but no more than that. It is also quite justified to ask under which budgetary heading this planning cell comes.

Both Mr. Goerens and Mr. Marten make it very clear how necessary this planning cell is in terms of Western European Union's efforts to deal with the Yugoslav crisis. I hope the Council of Ministers will rapidly draw what I regard as the long-overdue logical conclusions.

I feel it is almost embarrassing that we have to provide an impetus yet again in our recommendations. We all continue to be very concerned – I am referring to Yugoslavia – that there has still been hardly any progress in the search for a political solution in former Yugoslavia and that the people in Serbia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in other parts of former Yugoslavia will face even worse suffering as winter begins. Our President, Hartmut Soell, spoke a few very plain words on this matter in his opening address and I can only endorse them in full.

Even though my sense of powerlessness has increased in recent months and weeks, I still shall not cease in my endeavours to help the people concerned, and as rapidly as possible. In my view the recommendations before us are the appropriate means of doing so. I think we may assume that the Council of Ministers will not only adopt but also implement our recommendations.

I believe I can say this, because the decisions taken recently by the Council in Rome are encouraging.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (United Kingdom). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Are the five minutes up when the light goes on? If so, will you please stop people at that point? I declare an interest: I am fifteenth on the list.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The light will now go on after each speaker has spoken for four minutes.

I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (Portugal) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would first like to thank our colleague, Mr. Goerens, for the quality of his work, which shows thorough research, an analytical mind and a sense of responsibility, all of which are typical of his reports. We are all following with apprehension and anxiety the development of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, where the fratricide continues. In pointing out the historical precedent for the present conflict, Mr. Goerens states that, three-quarters of a century ago, it was the destiny of Bosnia-Herzegovina which sparked off the first world war.

It would have been more accurate to have reminded us that, in the context of the strained relations between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia, the assassination in Sarajevo was nothing more than a pretext; there were other complicated factors involved at a deeper level in the causes of that war.

However, in drawing attention to the period which preceded the formation of the Kingdom of Serbo-Croatia and Slovenia, Mr. Goerens has done us a service. Misinformation concerning the past has meant that issues vital to an understanding of the present tragedy have been forgotten.

For four centuries Croats, Serbs and Slovenians fought side by side against the Ottoman Empire and Bosnians, Muslim or Orthodox, frequently fought alongside Serbs against the Turks. In the nineteenth century, the opposition against which the Slavs of the south united into one single state came from the great powers. Austria, Prussia and later Germany, England and, obviously, Turkey, with the frequent complicity of Russia and France, delayed for decades the creation of one state encompassing all the Slavs of the south.

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

This policy of the great powers wrote history, created and destroyed borders. It cannot be wiped out. It is documented in the correspondence of Bismarck, in the archives of Great Britain and in official documents of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires.

I am recalling this because it is not true to say that the hostility between Serbs and Croats dates back through the centuries as is sometimes claimed. It is basically a phenomenon of this century, for which the great powers of Europe were partly responsible.

In this report Mr. Goerens recalls the fact that Marshal Tito succeeded in creating a true Yugoslav national feeling and, in spite of patriotic sentiments and the difficult conditions of the time, ensured that real order prevailed, laying the foundations for a certain type of federalism – to quote Mr. Goerens. It is useful for this evidence to be on record, because it serves to refresh our memory. There where killing is going on today, the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians fought shoulder to shoulder half a century ago, united by powerful feelings of solidarity against the Nazis who were occupying their country.

In allocating responsibilities, once again we must not forget the rôle of the great powers. Where do the arms come from? Where are the arms produced which are used in the human slaughterhouse into which a large part of former Yugoslavia has been transformed? The answer to this question is very important when we talk of control. The matter merits reflection rather than rhetoric.

Mr. President, Mr. Goerens's call for prudence is fully justified. Given the barbarism and irrationality which have been raging over the territory of the former Yugoslavia, direct military involvement – as Mr. Goerens points out – would divide Europe and could have serious consequences for the peoples of the region.

In my view, one of the greatest merits of this report is the absence of passionate language. The Rapporteur demonstrates that violence does not have to be met with violence.

I would like to associate myself with Mr. Goerens when he stresses that, however tragic the fate of the peoples affected by the war, there can be no question of Western Europe taking unilateral, massive military action in the present circumstances in former Yugoslavia.

The Rapporteur is right when he says that it is not by setting themselves up as arbitrator of affairs throughout the continent of Europe that the Twelve can preserve peace. In the same spirit, I endorse his conclusion that WEU's limited participation should be part of a much wider initiative undertaken by the whole of the

international community, with the aim of progressively restoring peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pini, Observer from Switzerland.

Mr. PINI (*Observer from Switzerland*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I will begin by bringing you the greetings of the Swiss Confederation which I am representing here today for the first time. The Swiss Council believes it would be extremely useful for my country, which is not in WEU but is a member of the Council of Europe, to be granted the status of observer at parliamentary level. I therefore thank you, Mr. President, and ask you one question: may Switzerland apply to become an observer through the intermediary of its parliament?

Ladies and gentlemen, may I now present a few thoughts that come from a small country in the heart of Europe. The fact that Switzerland is neutral does not mean that it takes no interest in anything and is completely indifferent to the history, realities and tragedies of the world, particularly those of Europe, powerless though we may be to intervene.

In a splendid article by a former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Jean-Pierre Hocké, also of Swiss nationality, he discusses the question: why should we not base our approach on the acceptance of four principles, instead of confining ourselves to the four freedoms? The four principles, which Switzerland urges on itself as well, are that Europe should advance on the roads of security, the economy, culture and federalism. In our opinion, and for the parliament I represent, these four points are the keys to overcoming this grave crisis we are now all going through.

Over and above the problem of Yugoslavia, may I, Mr. President, express my most sincere congratulations to the rapporteurs who spoke yesterday and today on the subjects before us. Really all our attention is focused on the curse that seems to be on former Yugoslavia, this tragic example of our powerlessness. This is an issue for a European security policy.

I conclude, Mr. President, by reiterating these four principles from the mouth of a humble Swiss observer: security, the economy, culture and federalism. In our view this is the road Europe should go along.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, first I have to thank the two Rapporteurs for the draft recommendations they have presented and also, of course, for their reports. Both of these reports are timely, meticulous and thorough, and their proposals of immediate relevance. I have read Mr. Marten's

Mr. de Puig (continued)

report in greater detail because it is the report of a committee of which I am a member, and I must congratulate him on his proposals and on the documentation in his report which gives us a splendid chronological account, enabling us to follow the development of this conflict, its causes and the problems involved. So I would like to say thank you very much and give the Rapporteurs my full support.

Ladies and gentlemen, Yugoslavia is the drama which has no end. It is a tragedy of which we are ashamed, which leaves us feeling impotent and ineffectual and which causes some groups to criticise politicians for their inability to avoid this tragedy. We cannot constantly be asking ourselves whether this tragedy could have been avoided, whether different action by Yugoslavia or outside of Yugoslavia would have avoided it. The truth is difficult to accept, but we are now faced with a particular situation and there is little value in our thinking that we could have acted differently.

However, leaving aside the immediate problem and the tragedy of it, permit me to make a comment on the historical perspective. The situation in Yugoslavia provides us with a model which, in my view, is the very opposite of Maastricht. If there is, indeed, a Maastricht model, it is one which tries to take account of the complexity of modern society and to accept the interests and differences, to consolidate them and make them compatible one with another through negotiation and consensus in supranational institutions.

The Yugoslav model takes us back centuries in the history of Europe to the most anachronistic and undesirable historical model of the nation state, of using violence to impose or try to impose the annexation of territories, the expulsion or physical liquidation of minorities and the imposition of a relationship on apparently culturally and ethnically homogeneous territories and social groups. We all know that there is no direct relation between the territories, nor is there cultural or ethnic homogeneity in these societies. This model is, in my view, the very antithesis of what we are seeking for the construction of Europe. In any event, all we can do is to see whether we can assist in finding a political solution to the conflict.

I am not in favour of hostile military intervention and I think we are all agreed on that. This possibility has been ruled out; nor would it apparently be feasible militarily, and it is even less likely to be acceptable to the people of Europe. Nor would it be possible to agree to greater militarisation of the conflict, with one of the parties lifting the embargo. This is neither desirable nor, in my view, acceptable.

Clearly we must take some action; this is what we are urged to do by the United Nations, by the London Conference and the WEU Council of Ministers. We must strengthen the embargo, create security zones, increase humanitarian aid, although there are problems in that respect. I pointed out one to Mr. Marten in the committee: the problem is that, in creating security zones, are we not creating or consolidating other zones of insecurity? What I mean is that by creating areas where obviously refugees and exiles will go, where there will be no bombardment, we should not leave other areas free for soldiers to pass and arms to be fired.

In any event, we must step up this action, and I believe that the proposals of the Rapporteurs are sound and that, above all, we must not lose hope; the hope that the sanctions will work and will seriously hamper the capacity for aggression; the hope that political action will also work. The news this morning that Mr. Panic is presenting himself at the elections in Serbia must give rise to hope. And finally, the hope that little by little common sense will prevail and a political solution will be found with which we are all in agreement.

(Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vazquez.

Mr. VAZQUEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to begin, as previous speakers have, by applauding the quality of the reports of both Mr. Marten and Mr. Goerens, each of which is a useful source of information on recent developments in the war in Yugoslavia. One or two points have perhaps been overtaken by events, but this does not reduce their value given the nature of the war with which we are now faced. I say war, rather than crisis, in the Yugoslav republic; it is a shameful situation which the whole of Europe observes with horror and a sense of helplessness. Events have been taking place for some time now and expressions and concepts such as ethnic or religious cleansing are being bandied about which it was thought had been banished from our history, if not throughout the world then at least in Europe. Winter has arrived in large areas of Yugoslavia and the people are suffering. Along with the other effects of the war, of which we are all aware, this makes not just living, but surviving, difficult in the area. Every day we see pictures of this nature in the media, principally on television, until perhaps the view of some communications experts is proving to be correct – an excess of information disinforms; a kind of insensitivity is being created in our collective consciousness through repeated exposure to this type of daily image.

All of the members of the European Community and of WEU are sending aid in the form

Mr. Vazquez (continued)

of troops under the mandate of the United Nations or in the form of humanitarian aid to the civilian population – as always, the real victim of the war. It will probably be necessary to make a much greater effort than has already been given both in terms of humanitarian aid and by temporarily, let us hope it will be only temporary, accepting refugees.

However, one thing in particular concerns me, in common with other speakers. Neither Minister Colombo the day before yesterday nor Mr. Rifkind yesterday replied to one of Mr. Hardy's questions concerning the responsibility of some countries in arms trading in the area. This is a very delicate matter and must be discussed with great care – that is more or less what the two ministers said. However, while I agree that we have to deal with this matter with great sensitivity, we should also demand in this and other forums clarity and substance from the United Nations, and from WEU in condemning these activities; and this condemnation should be specific, not general. If proof exists, as appears to be the case, of the activities to which we are referring, activities which not only violate United Nations resolutions but also moral and ethical principles, these are factors which should preclude such countries being represented in international institutions such as WEU and the United Nations. Yesterday a suggestion along these lines was put forward by Mr. Andreotti, and I am inclined to agree with him.

The wording to which I refer, the arms embargo, occurs in paragraph 2 of the recommendation in Mr. Goerens's report, and there is another matter which I would stress. My political group and I agree with Mr. Goerens's five recommendations and the eight recommendations of Mr. Marten's report and, in particular, the conclusions of Mr. Goerens's explanatory memorandum, namely paragraphs 51, 52 and 53 of this report, which refer to the position taken in the Council of Europe on 3rd October by Lord Owen. From our point of view, these set out the only possible medium-term solution to this conflict, together with, shall we say, military measures, the no-fly area, the determined implementation of the embargo and civil and political measures, the refusal to accept violation of borders by force, and the refusal to accept ethnically or religiously cleansed areas. We must not give in to the temptation to accept pragmatic, short-term solutions which would heal wounds temporarily and probably prepare the way for further explosions of the same kind as those we are now witnessing in the former Yugoslavia.

I repeat, the three conclusions of the explanatory memorandum of Mr. Goerens's report are, in my view, of vital importance for a medium-term solution to the problem of the war

in Yugoslavia which, I am sure, fills us all with horror.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the subject of Yugoslavia is so important and of such great concern that quite apart from this special debate it has come up in every discussion both yesterday and the day before. Much has been said in fact about being powerless and indeed if we read government documents we find some rather strange forms of words; the most recent communiqué from the Council of Ministers speaks of consternation and goes on to say that so-called ethnic cleansing is inadmissible. It is inadmissible but unfortunately it is going on. We wonder, therefore, if more might not be done and whether what is done later could not be done earlier, in particular by WEU. My feeling is that the delay can be attributed to psychological blockages preventing international public opinion, particularly in the United Nations and the Security Council from recognising that the situation had changed. For many years Yugoslavia was looked upon as a leader among the non-aligned countries, and as a country able to find wise solutions for international disputes so that everybody closed their eyes to the serious sins of omission in the matter of what should have been human rights, and minimum political freedoms.

However that may be, I think that we have today shown that it may be possible, by using an instrument for which our basic statute provides, to deploy forces, both to allow the delivery of at least some humanitarian aid and to enforce the embargo on reinforcements which otherwise would continue to arrive in a most alarming manner.

I do not think that we should overemphasise the difficulties. The joint presence of NATO and WEU forces is a plus in my view. Basically, WEU had sought in vain in the past to establish a separate identity and I recall all the disappointments we had when we tried to act together on the specific point of American orders to European countries for the star wars system; this ended in total failure. Now we have evidence of being able to play a rôle in advance of the more important rôle for which the Maastricht agreement provides. I believe that we must try to enhance this presence because I feel that we are duty bound to take up the challenge even though there may be small gaps in the matter of some supplies; we have heard from the observers from bordering countries that there is greater willingness to accept such control by WEU. In particular, I consider that we must direct our efforts to making the operational checks more effective. Weapons cannot reach Yugoslavia in smugglers' back-packs or through

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

small gaps in the network of internal frontiers. No one can bring in heavy weapons or the massive quantities of explosives used by the Serb airforce except through controlled entry points.

My penultimate comment is that we must recognise that the general public is worried and has somewhat contradictory views because people criticise us for taking no action but say at the same time: "But be sure to avoid the military involvement of other countries." This, however, is often the vexed issue for the takers of political decisions. But I think that military solutions should be confined to the duties I have already mentioned, such as the control of airspace as far as possible, control of seaways and organised aid may be helped by military force but in all cases for the same purpose.

My final comment, however, is that in my view any solution for the Yugoslav problem can only be a political solution. I think that what was made quite clear in the North Atlantic Assembly was quite correct; namely, that we should try to activate the organisation which I feel to be the most appropriate even though it is not very effective at the moment but should be. I mean the CSCE because one of the central points of its charter is the protection of minorities.

The problem of Yugoslavia is this. There can be no solution if we cannot persuade all the former republics to agree to protect minorities. We must not say, however: "As we have not been able to intervene effectively in Yugoslavia what is the use of Europe and what is the use of the Community?" In my view, we should be saying the opposite; we should rather increase our efforts to construct European Union precisely because with a more effective European Union we shall be in a position to prevent happenings of the kind we are now deploring. Europe is not the Europe of the Eurocrats in Brussels; it is the Europe we politicians will be capable of constructing.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Verivakis, Observer from Greece.

Mr. VERIVAKIS (*Observer from Greece*). – I must take the floor for an intervention – which will not be long – on all aspects of the former Yugoslavia crisis, which is a long and complex subject. Mr. Goerens's report dealt with that subject well, but I cannot avoid making a short observation. We cannot remain completely silent on the issue of the name of so-called Macedonia.

Recommendation 5 of the report recommends that the Council "agree to its members urgently recognising the independence of the Republic of Macedonia with a name acceptable to the population of that republic". Practically, that means the name of Macedonia.

I do not intend to remind the Assembly of the well-known decision made on 27th June 1992 by the European Council in Lisbon which still applies: nor do I intend to say what we Greeks say on that point. But I want to draw to your attention the North Atlantic Assembly's last resolution – passed in Bruges in Belgium last month – on the Yugoslav crisis. The three special co-Rapporteurs – Mr. Jorgensen of Denmark, Mr. Ruperez of Spain and Mr. Wilson of Canada – said "The Macedonian issue was reactivated when Marshal Tito set up, out of the Serbian territory in 1946, the 'People's Republic of Macedonia'. One here recalls the Komintern's decision that Yugoslavia seize Greek Macedonia at the occasion of the Greek civil war. Tito's decision was a political move fitting the communist hegemonistic plans at the time. The Macedonia provinces of Greece and Bulgaria were viewed as 'not yet liberated', while the 'free part' of Macedonia was the vector of the unification of all Macedonian regions... The creation of the republic is also widely considered by historians as a means used by Tito to reduce Serbian territory and therefore power within the federation."

The text continues: "Prior to Tito's decision to assign that name to the new Yugoslav Republic, it had not been used in the past as a state or as an administrative denomination for that region since the times of Alexander the Great. Athens' position is that the republic is usurping the Macedonian name for expansionist purposes, and there are also fears that a state or a political force would use this name as a vector for dismantling the Greek state. For Greece, the adoption of the name 'Macedonia' conveys the impression of extending the republic's jurisdiction over all Macedonian provinces of neighbouring states. Indeed, this interpretation may be justified by Article 49 of Skopje's constitution according to which 'the Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighbouring countries as well as Macedonian expatriates, assists their cultural development, and promotes links with them'."

As I believe completely that the NATO parliamentary assembly's last resolution expresses the real history of the problem and the equilibrium on the different, contradictory needs of the region, I wish to draw your attention to it.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – The time has come when Europe can no longer refrain from recognising Macedonia. I hope that that recognition comes sooner rather than later, while making it clear that nothing should hamper the unity of our Greek friends. Macedonia is entitled to self-determination under whatever name she wants.

Lord Finsberg (continued)

I turn to Mr. Marten's report – I compliment him on a first-class report – and to that of Mr. Goerens. The trouble is that we as a parliamentary assembly always seem to be ahead of our governments. More than a year ago, we as parliamentarians wanted to have an enforceable no-fly zone over former Yugoslavia. Had we been listened to, we all know that tens of thousands of people would still be alive today. We called for a full and complete sea blockade at a time when it would have prevented the shelling of Dubrovnik and Split. Sadly, our governments were not prepared to listen to us. I want to know why the United Nations still has not agreed to a complete air blockade and a financial blockade. Without all that, we will not come to grips with the Serbian problem.

I think that we must now reluctantly conclude that any military intervention would be a mistake. We would find ourselves engulfed, with a growing number of troops and, at the end, we almost certainly would have to come out with our tails between our legs. I think that the time for military intervention is no longer with us. So, what do we do? We have to be much firmer over blockades and sanctions. I was very disappointed at the answers given by Mr. Colombo to the questions put to him yesterday.

Two actions are essential. We must tell the states controlling the Danube to agree without further equivocation to stop and search. We have already asked them to do that, but we have heard nothing from them yet. That must change.

Secondly, we must ensure that we give publicity to the countries breaking the blockade for financial motives. Private companies in one of our states may be responsible but it is up to our governments to take action against them. I hope that those who represent the official side of WEU will take back this message to the Secretary-General and the Council of Ministers. We are entitled to demand the names of the states found to be breaking the blockade. If ministers do not want to do anything about this, well and good, but we may want to suspend the membership of states that are deliberately breaking the blockade.

I hope that this afternoon this question will be firmly put to the Italian Defence Minister. I hope that someone will warn him so that we can have a proper answer – unlike the sort of answers we were given yesterday. We must demand that our governments take action. In the end they are responsible to parliamentarians – a fact which I fear is sometimes overlooked.

If words could help the Bosnians and the Herzegovinians, not one inch of their territory would be occupied by Serbs and Montenegrins –

but we know that words are of no value. We must insist that governments live up to their high-sounding communiqués and take action. They are in a position to judge what should be done and how. We are entitled to demand action to stop the genocide that we see on our television screens day in, day out.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Iwinski, Observer from Poland.

Mr. IWINSKI (*Observer from Poland*). – The conflict in former Yugoslavia is the greatest since the second world war. Millions of people have been shocked by it. Poland has special historical links and contacts with the nations of former Yugoslavia. Perhaps that is one of the reasons why our statesman, Mr. Mazowiecki, has been chosen to act as special United Nations envoy in the area and has been asked to prepare reports on human rights there.

Only last Sunday I went with a special mission on behalf of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We were looking into the tragic plight of the refugees and displaced persons. I was one of the four members of the mission, which was headed by Mr. Flückiger from Switzerland. We talked to state and parliamentary leaders as well as to representatives of international humanitarian organisations, and we got acquainted with what is happening and saw the refugee camps. Last Friday, we also visited Sarajevo, where there was no electricity or water and where the noise of mortar fire accompanied our talks with President Izetbegovic.

We are all aware of the scale of the Yugoslav tragedy: more than 150 000 people have died and there are more than three million refugees and displaced persons. It is evident that the Bosnian Muslims are the greatest sufferers in this conflict. It gives one a new perspective to see the situation with one's own eyes – even though I have in the past visited Palestinian camps, and camps in Indochina and Africa. I shall never forget the graveyard in Mostar, in front of the hospital, where the bodies of Muslims, Croats and Serbs were lying.

It is clear who started this war. A few days ago the International Herald Tribune published the first account, given to it by one of the perpetrators, of how the Serbian nationalist forces carried out their ethnic cleansing. Still, we should not view the whole conflict in black and white. Unfortunately, all three sides have violated human rights and committed atrocities. External factors have also been in play. I refer, for instance, to the premature decision to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Sarajevo and many other places we were asked to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and even to bomb strategic targets in Serbia and in Bosnian areas controlled

Mr. Iwinski (continued)

by Serbs. Such actions could only escalate the war. By and large, military intervention is not the solution. As Mr. Andreotti pointed out, there must be a political solution. Action to stop the war and the ethnic cleansing must be based on United Nations Security Council resolutions.

This war is full of contradictions and paradoxes. Sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro are actually helping Mr. Milosevic to win the election coming up on 20th December. All political organisations in Serbia, including the democratic opposition, are against the sanctions.

I fully support the recommendations in Mr. Goerens's report. It is crucial to protect the humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only yesterday, the United Nations halted humanitarian flights to Sarajevo after a United States military aircraft was hit. Europe and the world must do more to hasten the end of the conflict and to bring in the food and warm clothes that are needed for the coming winter if more people are not to die.

Last week, the Polish Parliament adopted a resolution stressing the need to help refugees from former Yugoslavia and inviting our government to take appropriate measures. We also appealed to other European parliaments to co-operate in this work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Keith Speed.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. Goerens and Mr. Marten on an excellent report. Mr. Marten's useful chronological summary will be a great help to us here and in our national parliaments.

The situation is changing fast. United Nations Resolutions 786, 785 and 765 have already overtaken this report, and I agree with Lord Finsberg that this Assembly has throughout the Yugoslav crisis been way ahead of our governments in advocating stronger blockades, maritime blockades and greater humanitarian efforts. Enforcing the blockade even more strongly is certainly not beyond the bounds of possibility. We need to reinforce it on the Danube, as Lord Finsberg said. We certainly need to reinforce the air blockade and should have escorts for humanitarian flights if need be. We know that there have been attempts – alas, successful in the case of an Italian plane – to shoot down humanitarian flights from America and elsewhere. We should add to that the economic blockade, should consider the possibility of an electronic blockade to try to jam some of the VHF radios of Serbian and other forces and should use all modern technology to try to

ensure that the land, sea and air blockades are truly effective. I hope that we shall be able to do more.

We are all frustrated. We know of the terrible tragedies that are taking place and we know who is perpetrating them, yet we realise that, ultimately – as various distinguished speakers have said this morning – a military solution is not possible. The concern of the public is an informed concern. I believe that calls for high profile military solutions are basically coming from the media, which perhaps do not fully understand the situation.

Let us look back to what happened in the second world war, when the Germans and Bulgarians had thirty-three divisions in Yugoslavia, with 16 000 to 20 000 troops per division. They were tied down by 120 000 guerillas or partisans – call them what you will. When Mr. Rifkind spoke about the need for perhaps 120 000 United Nations or other troops to contain the estimated 80 000 army or whatever, he was wrong. The true figure would be nearer to 500 000, and once the body bags started coming home, all of us, as constituency members of parliament, would find the position difficult to defend.

It has to be a political solution. People are breaking the embargo, and allegations have been made and correspondence entered into by the Defence Committee in respect of one country that is about to become a member of this organisation. In fairness to that country and to others, we should start to name names. It is no good saying that a private company, shipping company or individual is responsible. Private individuals and shipping companies are responsible to their national governments, and if national governments are not prepared to take action against them, the international community certainly should. We must not take no for an answer.

Recommendation 8 of Mr. Marten's report refers to the possibility of WEU having its own insignia – whether on shoulder flashes for our troops, flags for our ships or transfers for our aircraft or armoured fighting vehicles. That excellent idea was adopted long ago by the United Nations and, as WEU, alas, becomes involved in more and more such operations – one thinks of the Iran-Iraq war and Desert Storm as well as what is happening in Yugoslavia – we should consider adopting such a small but important symbol to let all those taking part and, indeed the outside world, know what WEU is doing. When we put that suggestion to the Secretary-General at a meeting in London last week, he, too, warmly welcomed it. I hope that, when we adopt the reports, as I know we shall, that small but not unimportant recommendation may be acted upon quickly so that we are not still discussing it in a year's time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pahtas, Observer from Greece.

Mr. PAHTAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate the difficulties a number of you have in understanding Greece's position on the question of Macedonia. Kindly allow me to dwell somewhat on this point, and particularly the present stage of the problem, beginning with Tito's declaration on 2nd August 1944, and his definitive founding of the small people's state on 30th April 1945, later named the democratic socialist state of Macedonia. As easily and as rapidly as it had obtained the name and existence of a state, this new Macedonia also acquired nationals who were told they belonged to a state no one previously knew of, namely Macedonia, and spoke a language thereafter to be called Macedonian.

The intention, international diplomacy-wise was that these events would be treated as the internal affair of a neighbouring country and therefore of no concern to anyone else.

However, the facts are quite otherwise. Given the régime of the time, this was the takeover of a Greek name, i.e. Macedonia and its derivatives. It falsified the scientific meaning of the name, which is definitely that of a region, in other words a geographical term, by attributing to it an ethnological basis. It thus usurps all the history and traditions so closely linked to it. This is a falsification of Greek history not just an internal affair of a neighbouring country. It is a vital question of direct concern to us and not, of course, confined to a mere appellation. In Skopje, a new entity was created which nevertheless pretends to be old. A new language was invented which also pretends to be old. The aims and reasons are clearly political, and cannot be disguised.

The creation of a new entity is a commonplace in modern history, and one might even say – why not? – legitimate, as was the case for the United States, Canada and Australia. But this was not a question of creating something new. It was in fact a discovery. It was a case of rediscovering a country which had pre-existed for centuries, even though this pseudo-country had never been recognised at any time down the centuries or in any place. So they set about de-Hellenising Macedonia and de-Bulgarising and de-Serbising its citizens; and then, one fine morning, the people of the region were told the name of their country had changed and so had their national identity.

So clearly Greece and the Greeks can never accept international recognition of the Republic of Skopje under any name that has any reference to Macedonia. To do so would in fact expose Greece to the same claims, the same challenges

as to its frontiers, and the same insecurity as in the past. All the more so in that the new leaders in Skopje seem in no way inclined to break with the past. To realise this you only have to read the constitution written for the new republic, which overflows – literally speaking – with expansionist implications.

Last month the sun symbolising the Macedonian kings of ancient Greece was added to their flag.

What then is the alternative?

In our view, the best solution would be the name Republic of Skopje, or any other name that avoids all reference to Macedonia and not just because it would calm the justified misgivings of the Greeks, but also for another reason.

The state of Skopje is, in fact, a multi-ethnic state. Alongside the Slavs, who are in the majority, live large numbers of Turks, Gypsies, Vlachs, and Greeks, and above all a large minority, nearly one third of the total population, of Albanians. But these people, like the many Serbs inhabiting the area, have never considered themselves to be Macedonians. Would they not feel much more at home in a country with a more neutral name? And would not this help to avoid developments similar to those leaving their tragic mark today on Bosnia-Herzegovina? In the recent referendum in the Republic of Skopje only 17% of the population gave Macedonia as their first choice for the name of the new republic. This should not be ignored.

Naturally, more than a name will be needed to avoid similar developments in the future. We shall need international guarantees of the security and the integrity of the territory of the Republic of Skopje, and a hefty international economic and financial effort to help it start resolutely on the path of progress towards democracy and peaceful coexistence with its neighbours. Not only is Greece not opposed to such a prospect, it is ready to contribute actively towards bringing it about.

One example is the recent Greek initiative to guarantee the frontiers of the Republic of Skopje by its four surrounding countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, all of whom have said they agree. We know that the peace, prosperity and security of this country are closely linked to our own. We therefore believe that this project should be developed on a sound basis to rid the country of the demons and nightmares of the past and enrich the outlook for the future. From its painful history of the past fifty years, Greece knows that the name under which this republic will be internationally identified is vital.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fry.

Mr. FRY (*United Kingdom*). – I, too, congratulate the Rapporteurs on their excellent reports. I shall restrict my remarks to Mr. Goerens's report and to two of its draft recommendations in particular – first, that we should approach the Security Council to make coercive measures much more effective, and, secondly, that we should recognise Macedonia as a republic. Those of us who have known Yugoslavia well over the years knew perfectly well when Slovenia was attacked that Croatia would be worse. When fighting broke out in Croatia, we knew that Bosnia would be much worse. Now we have the prospect of even more bloodshed and loss of life in Macedonia and Kosovo. That will be due only partly to the inter-ethnic conflict; it will also be due to the failure of the European Community to act decisively, and to act early enough.

In Macedonia, a tragedy is waiting to happen. It is likely that in the winter many of the old will die of hypothermia because of insufficient heating and that many of the very young will also be at risk. That, however, will not be primarily because of warfare; it will be a result of the economic strangulation that is already happening. The government of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia has held its elections; it has shared power with the Albanian minority; it has abided by the United Nations security embargo, although 60% of its exports formerly went to Serbia and it has therefore lost its most important market. At present, Macedonia's industrial machinery lies idle, public transport is virtually non-existent and agricultural produce is rotting because there is no means of transporting it to the market.

Why is this? Because Macedonia is being starved of oil. The Greek Government refuses to recognise the republic, although it has satisfied the criteria for recognition – far better, indeed, than either Bosnia or Croatia, because it has effective control of its borders and territories. I am told that the Greeks will not allow oil into Macedonia, because there is no such place that can be recognised. Let me ask my fellow members of WEU – and, indeed, Greek observers – whether that is really the attitude of a civilised nation – a member of the European Community and, indeed, a nation that will shortly be a member of this organisation.

I commend the courage and good sense of recommendation 5, if only in the name of humanity and with the aim of preventing many people from suffering and dying this winter. It could also prevent the growth of the forces that could break up Macedonia and turn it into the next fiery cockpit in what we used to call Yugoslavia. Economic starvation today, conflict tomorrow: that is the prospect for the people of

Macedonia. Surely we cannot stand by and let it happen.

I also want to refer to recommendation 2. We have watched the international community move from no action to recognition of some republics, to sending in observers, to an arms and trade embargo, to sending in relief forces, to strengthening the means of applying the embargo, to sending in armed troops to protect convoys carrying food and medical supplies. It is a progression of deeper involvement – but the fighting continues, many people are still dying and many more are being made homeless or refugees. We must consider how coercive measures may be made more effective and stop the fighting in Bosnia. We have an obligation to do that, because the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia has made the achievement of the political solution on which so many have insisted that much more difficult to achieve, given that not enough reassurance was given to deal with the strong fears of the Serbian minorities, particularly in Croatia.

If the present coercive measures are insufficient, we shall be faced with a choice: either we must make those measures more effective, or we must continue as we are now – which I fear will mean our continuing to watch Bosnia writhe in its death agonies. I feel that we have a responsibility to accept our presence in Bosnia. We must realise that it is now just a short step towards forcing aid through to the communities that have been cut off and, indeed, to physically protecting those communities from aggression. Unless we give help and hope to the dispossessed, as refugees they will remain Europe's problem for generations. Unless we give our protection, they will be ethnically cleansed again. Unless we become more effective in restraining the fighting in Bosnia – and, indeed, throughout Yugoslavia – we must all hang our heads in shame for ever.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie of Benshie.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHEIE (*United Kingdom*). – I am very pleased to follow Mr. Fry, who made an effective and sensible speech. I feel enormously emotional about what is going on; I also feel the deep sense of shame that others have already expressed.

The reports are excellent: a lot of hard work has been done, and I agree with most of what they contain. Let us look at the solid facts, however. Under Tito, people lived together in peace for forty years. Who is the main culprit? There is no doubt that an appalling torrent of ancient and traditional hatreds has been unleashed by the Serbian population under President Milosevic. Having identified that, we must consider how effective the measures that we have taken have been, and what signals they

Lord Mackie of Benshie (continued)

have sent. Then we must admit that they have been pathetic. There used to be queues for petrol in Belgrade, but now those queues have disappeared and I understand that the price of petrol has plummeted. If ever there was a sign of total ineffectiveness of our measures, it is that.

We must change the signals. Those that we have given so far have been enormously cautious, as a number of speakers have pointed out. My friend, Sir Keith Speed, said that we must be careful in case our constituents do not like it, but that is not my impression; I have no constituents but I know a great many people, and I know of no situation that has stirred up as much worry, shame and eagerness for action as that of Yugoslavia. When people see appalling pictures of rows of men in cattle sheds, beaten, cowed and starved, of course they want their government and their members of parliament to take action. The report represents an attempt to relieve that suffering in a humanitarian way, by sending in convoys and protecting those people.

Yesterday, the British Secretary of State for Defence said that air cover over the exclusion zone had been effective – except, he thought, for a few helicopters flying about. Helicopters are an essential element of the shelling and destruction of Sarajevo. We must be effective. We must have proper air cover. We already have 2 800 people from Britain alone in that area. They must have protection. Therefore, I support the amendments tabled in the name of several members, led by Mr. De Decker. The amendments say that we must study plans for effective military operations to relieve the region of Sarajevo, liberate the prison camps and put an end to the policy of occupation.

In the Financial Times, I read that Mr. Panić intends to challenge Mr. Milosevic in the election on 20th December. The present President can point to his great success. He has got away with it. He has ethnically cleansed – a terrible phrase – various areas and the international community has done nothing. We must adopt the draft recommendations and the amendments, otherwise Mr. Milosevic would say that the WEU parliamentary Assembly's talk was all of caution. He would say that that was a clear signal that his policy was successful.

Mr. Panić is backed by large sections of the Yugoslav Serbian population who want peace and to be part of the international community again. They are ashamed of what is going on. I should like to see the Assembly send a clear signal of our determination to pursue the ends that I have outlined and make the blockade effective. If we upset the President, we might make a political solution possible. If we sit here and wring our hands and hang our heads,

nothing will be done and more killing will take place.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, everything was comparatively easy when we were talking in this Assembly about interlocking institutions and sharing responsibilities between WEU and NATO. Today, six months later, the former Yugoslavia is in crisis and we are talking about genocide and about a situation reminiscent of Europe's darkest years. Europe is now receiving the largest wave of refugees since 1945, with all the suffering that involves. This influx has many destabilising effects on our own societies, where the duty to protect those in need sometimes turns into xenophobia.

Above all, Mr. President, let us not harbour the illusion that excesses such as we now see in Germany are a problem peculiar to that country. We all face that problem, including those countries which, as regards receiving refugees, have said: after you. Those countries are also represented here. Unlike Germany, they do not have hundreds of thousands of refugees within their frontiers.

Have we done enough? Have we done what we could to alleviate the sufferings of people living within two hours' flying time from here? The answer has been given by several of the previous speakers this morning, and the answer is no. We have a lack of political leadership in Europe, and a London conference which ended with signatures written with expensive fountain pens on expensive paper. What was that about the heavy arms that were to be handed over? What was that about the parts of Bosnia that were to be given back? Do we still remember all that? It was not so very long ago. True, after some months there is an embargo that at sea, at least, is beginning to look like a blockade. Happily, WEU is playing a part in this. Military and humanitarian support has been provided. But is the blockade on the Danube complete? Are transit cargoes effectively shut off now? Has it been explained to the countries helping to make the blockade work that all this must and will have an effect on their financial relations, for example with the EC? No, Mr. President, we have not made nearly enough progress on these points. I associate myself with Lord Mackie's comment: shame is the right expression.

But that in no way absolves us from the duty of saying what it is still possible and necessary for us to do to prevent this human tragedy from continuing to mount. The excellent reports by Mr. Marten and Mr. Goerens – both of whom I sincerely congratulate – contain a number of ideas for more extensive measures. With Lord Finsberg, I would ask: were we not already far

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued)

ahead of our governments a year ago, and is that not still the case? What should be done? This has already been said, so I shall be brief.

First, very urgent study should be given to the possibility of setting up safe havens for the refugees, in so far as this can still be done. This means a willingness to supply real military protection as well. As my colleague Mr. de Puig very properly said this morning, this creates political and moral dilemmas. Nevertheless, I think it must be done, if you set it against the human suffering that is now taking place, and is bound to increase.

Second, we must ensure that action is taken by the Europe of the Twelve, and more especially by WEU. Here I am addressing my colleagues from the United Kingdom and France. Their countries have seats on the Security Council. They must make sure that the exclusion zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina does not become just as ludicrous as the embargo has been so far. More than one hundred violations have been recorded by the United Nations. This means that WEU countries must be prepared to take part effectively, i.e. with aircraft.

Third, our governments must do everything in their power to prevent the situation from becoming much worse. I have in mind the conflict spreading to Kosovo and Macedonia, a republic which has long fulfilled the criteria for recognition laid down by the Europe of the Twelve some months ago. Thus it is vital to find a solution to this problem at the Edinburgh summit meeting: recognition, linked to the stationing of a preventive United Nations security force sanctioned by the Security Council, and also financial assistance from the EC to the recognised republic.

Mr. President, I say again that if massive military intervention can bring an end to the violence, we must consider it. In my opinion and that of many others, however, this is not in fact the case.

In closing, may I say that we in Europe have to ask ourselves how high we can allow the political and moral costs to run and how long it will be before here too, as in Somalia, the United States feels obliged to play a more prominent part. Did we not rightly say in this Assembly that the Europe of the nineties faces a much heavier responsibility? Was – and is – that not the whole idea of Maastricht? Mr. President, Europe's impotence in former Yugoslavia is already having serious effects on the process of integration. Perhaps more serious than what we hope is a temporary no from Denmark to the Maastricht Treaty. We must do everything in our power to prevent Europe from finally failing the test. Let us so act that we do not have to feel

ashamed every time we speak here about what has not happened and what should be happening. Let us prevent the gap between ourselves and our governments from widening by the time of our next Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ferrari.

Mr. FERRARI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have read with the closest attention the reports produced for the Political Committee and the Defence Committee by Mr. Goerens and Mr. Marten. I appreciate in particular Mr. Goerens's very detailed introductory account of previous history which has made life unsafe to a degree in the part of the Balkans occupied by former Yugoslav territory. His report also describes how the fighting between Yugoslav countries has developed and gained in ferocity since spring of last year and how all attempts by various international organisations including WEU at mediation or bringing the fighting to an end have failed.

I have no intention of criticising any organisation and even less our Assembly which, as this report shows, has fulfilled its duty to the letter. To be honest, however, the report as a whole reveals a clear feeling of impotence and inability to control events which cannot fail to be a matter of concern to us, first as European citizens and secondly as politicians.

It is true that every organisation with any responsibilities has its own reasons, or at least has some good reasons, for refusing to become involved more decisively in efforts to bring the fighting to an end. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, people are still dying; indeed, in this area of terrible suffering one of the bloodiest massacres, second only to the dreadful one in Vietnam, is continuing.

The West, to judge at least from my country, Italy, does not seem to realise what is going on.

In my view we must be more explicit and more determined on the subject of the fighting in former Yugoslavia; we must be bolder and in other words we must approve a stronger recommendation.

A short time ago Mr. Marten reminded us of one example of our uncertainty; in July we despatched a few ships to keep watch in the Adriatic off the coast of former Yugoslavia. They were to log any ships passing or, at most, to call them up by radio asking the commanders what they were carrying. If the answer was "bananas" it had to be believed. Now, since about ten days ago, everything is changed; the same stretch of sea is being patrolled by the same ships but it will be discovered whether the bananas are a cover for rifles and cannon or not.

Mr. Ferrari (continued)

Why on earth so long a delay in enforcing a stricter embargo when, in June 1991, as Mr. Goerens says in his report, the length of time for which the various warring factions would be able to continue operating without reinforcements was put at not more than a fortnight?

From this a worrying question automatically comes to mind; if a stricter embargo had been enforced much earlier, how many deaths would have been avoided?

Obviously, I cannot give a reply; I would simply conclude by saying that at this time and in this context the military option cannot and must not be rejected, so that limited co-ordinated intervention can be planned with a specific target.

In my view, the first step which Europe should take through its various political and military institutions, including WEU, is to form a coalition comprising the United Nations, the United States, Russia and other countries.

I have the impression that if we do not press for this practical initiative in January or February, the new President of the United States, Mr. Clinton, will do so first and once again Europe will be left behind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Fischer.

Mrs. FISCHER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, my very warm thanks for the reports by Mr. Goerens and Mr. Marten. Once again we have a very good and important opportunity to look at the situation in and around former Yugoslavia more carefully.

Belgrade's ambition to create a greater Serbia, accompanied by ethnic cleansing, has now spread from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbian-led former Yugoslav army supported the Serbian ambitions from the outset because it regarded Serbia not just as an ideological anchor but also as a guarantor of its material safety. Even without the embargo, Serbia itself can produce weapons all round Belgrade at any time and without hindrance. We are not defending Bosnia-Herzegovina, we are not helping the people. We have imposed an arms embargo. I am opposed to the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even if we are not helping these people, we should at least give them a chance to defend themselves instead of having to stand there defenceless and be massacred.

We will find that in the medium term Serbia will face further crucial tests. At present it is the Muslims who have to make the most sacrifices. Seeing that some politicians still seem to think we can and should not do too much apart from

making a few more or less ineffectual speeches, let me refer you to the report the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has just presented and condemn all those who are doing nothing about the huge terror camps in which thousands of mainly Muslim women, young girls and children are being humiliated and often tortured to death. Women are to be forced to give birth to Serbs because the Serbs need warriors. How long are we really supposed to go on shrugging our shoulders and looking the other way?

In the medium term Serbia will experience political difficulties. I think the Albanians in Kosovo are beginning to organise themselves. Relations between Albania and Macedonia are taking a positive turn. The Muslims in Sandjak might feel encouraged to split away from Serbia and link up with Kosovo. The final ally, Montenegro, is also making cautious attempts to distance itself.

It is essential to ensure unbroken control of the sanctions against former Yugoslavia, if necessary by the use of military force, if we are to prevent further escalation, save human lives and put a stop to the destruction of irreplaceable cultural treasures.

The greatest challenges facing Europe in security policy are not only the civil war in Yugoslavia but also the great instability throughout the CIS. The Caucasus and the Balkans will remain a source of constant unrest, at least until political solutions have been found to the ethnic questions and the economic decline has been stopped. Regional conflicts which begin in the CIS states and then spread to neighbouring countries also have and will have a great impact in future. In my view the conflict in Azerbaijan takes on a particularly important dimension because it could provoke the first confrontation between a NATO state – Turkey – and a CIS member. For that reason alone it is urgently necessary for the CSCE, NATO and WEU to be structured in such a way that mechanisms can take effect without delay. WEU must have means of intervention in case NATO does not or does not want to take action or only offers support.

We regard a common foreign and security policy on the part of the EC states as necessary and even essential, however difficult this may prove to achieve. We have here within WEU the parliamentary Assembly of WEU. Whenever we discuss reorganisation we should remember that we do not have a democratic deficit. Before the parliamentary Assembly merges into other bodies, we should try to remove the democratic deficit in those other bodies wherever it is in our power to do so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Agnelli.

Mr. AGNELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we owe a great debt of gratitude to our Rapporteurs, Mr. Goerens and Mr. Marten, who have analysed the situation accurately and, may I say, in very great detail. I do not think it would be fair to support the criticisms of those who consider WEU's action to be inadequate, even if it is insufficient in absolute terms; but in fact this is really the first time WEU has been put to the test and, as I see it, internal co-ordination has so far been brilliant. There seems to have been no friction with NATO, and the two appear to be co-operating to the maximum. I believe, therefore, that we must clearly appreciate that at a point when WEU has scarcely begun to take on a specific rôle, this is all that can be expected of it. On the other hand, in terms of absolute values, the position is completely different.

In particular, I greatly appreciate Mr. Goerens's balanced report which shows no unilateralism and is prepared to recognise the problems wherever they have appeared, since the situation facing us is very intricate. I am sure that our Portuguese colleague was right to recall some of the history of the Balkans over the last two centuries. Almost always the pattern of the region has been as the great powers have wanted. We must take care that European intervention is not seen as much the same as what happened in the past. Let us be clear; we must not ignore the past but must instead seek to understand it properly; but as we are aiming at maximum integration in Europe we must look to the future. The solutions must be entirely new but account must be taken of the heavy inheritance from the past on which I need not dwell further. The fact is that the pattern of the area was fixed by the Congress of Berlin and the peace treaties at the end of the first and second world wars. I do not regard these as exemplary models. What might appear to be a prime example of imposition from outside – the Balkans planned by Bismarck in 1878 – is very nearly not the worst. That is why we must try to identify the exact terms of the problem and to increase our historical knowledge which is even non-existent in some cases.

We must try to see how the resources of WEU can be made more effective because there is a problem of making means available over and above the problem of finance. We must thank the Rapporteurs for highlighting this problem. For that precise reason the reports were approved unanimously by the Defence Committee and even we who are not specifically concerned with defence questions recognise the great value of their work.

As Mr. Andreotti said, however, it is a certain fact that the solution must be political. Furthermore, we are here all members of the WEU Assembly. We shall endeavour to direct our

efforts to strengthening what is becoming a major instrument of the European Community, but not in opposition or as an alternative to other European and international organisations. So, while directing our efforts mainly to strengthening WEU, we must not forget that our fundamental objective is the creation of an integrated Europe which can only be achieved through political instruments. The fact is that European crises can only be resolved by using political instruments. This means, therefore, more politics; if I may say so, it means a greater knowledge of history and then more effective defence instruments. It seems to me, therefore, that we are setting off along the right road if we look at the results of the debate and at the contributions not only of members of the Assembly but also of observers, such as our Polish and Greek friends, who have provided valuable information.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. König, Observer from Austria.

Mr. KÖNIG (*Observer from Austria*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank you, also on behalf of my colleague Konecny of the Second Chamber of the Austrian Parliament, for your invitation to take part as an observer in the parliamentary Assembly of WEU.

When it applied for accession to the EC, Austria declared its support for the political objectives of Maastricht, including the common foreign and security policy, and we are indeed prepared to take part in a common, collective military defence system in the framework of the EC.

On the question of Yugoslavia, which concerns us greatly as neighbours, and where the Austrian people are making a huge contribution and exhibiting great generosity, let me make a few comments on those points in the excellent reports by Mr. Goerens and Mr. Marten on which I take a different view, based on what we know about the situation.

The reference in paragraph 6 of Mr. Goerens's report to the regrouping of Croats in Bosnia is certainly not accurate; this is the result of the refugee movements produced by the Serbs' ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, which means that the Croats naturally seek protection and flee towards Croatia and into the Croatian areas.

Paragraph 8 is equally mistaken in referring to the Croats expelling Muslims from Bosnia. Croatia has the highest number of Muslim Bosnian refugees in the country, in a country that is so poor and is devastated almost unendurably by warfare.

I would also ask for a little fairness towards the Greeks. When Mr. Fry said that Greece would strangulate Macedonia and not allow

Mr. König (continued)

certain supplies in, we must remember that in the past those identical supplies were passed on to Serbia via Macedonia and that Greece was then condemned for violating the embargo.

According to our information, it is not true that Macedonia is receiving no oil, though certainly much less than before, because most of the previous supplies were obviously not needed in such a small country, but were being passed on.

I now come to my fourth point, which is particularly important to me. When recommendation 2 says that the coercive measures against the parties to the conflict must be made effective, I believe we should call a spade a spade. The Security Council decided to impose an embargo on Serbia and Montenegro as the aggressors in former Yugoslavia. There are no Croatian troops in Serbia, there are no Bosnian troops in Serbia; but there are Serbian troops in Croatia and Bosnia. That is why the embargo measures must be directed solely at the aggressor, for this offers the only chance of achieving a political change in Serbia itself and of the Serbian people themselves changing the political situation.

Unfortunately, we really do not have any military option left; there too I agree with the Rapporteur. So in the short term all we can do is to intensify the economic embargo and implement it in full against former Yugoslavia. In the long term – and here I agree with President Andreotti – we need a binding settlement of the question of military rights because that alone can ensure a lasting peace.

Let me also endorse Mrs. Fischer's view that those people who are now being slaughtered, massacred, tortured and raped in their thousands in Bosnia must actually find it very hypocritical that while on the one hand there are more than enough weapons available thanks to the Yugoslav federal army, and on the other hand western troops are not being deployed for good reason, yet the supply of weapons for self-defence is also being prevented. I would like to say that here I have some sympathy for the Islamic Conference's wish to put an end to this situation so that the victims of attack are not deprived of the human right to self-defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Three speakers remain. The Rapporteurs have to reply and we still have to vote. I therefore ask speakers to be brief.

I call Mrs. Err.

Mrs. ERR (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – As you request, Mr. President, I shall be very brief.

One of the Rapporteurs asked the question: what are we doing and what is Europe doing,

and what can we do and what can Europe do? I should like to add: which Europe? Like all the other questions, this one is still unanswered. Also unanswered is the question of protected zones which I feel should be set up and would be highly effective, and the other question of the justification of the embargo extending to all parts of former Yugoslavia, etc., etc.

Whatever the replies to these vital questions and pending such replies, WEU must raise its voice in protest against violations of human rights and those of the individual. Silence here could be taken as consent. No one can remain indifferent to the terrible war raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the risk it presents of extending into Kosovo and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.

We must denounce from the rooftops ethnic cleansing and crimes against the civilian population, including in particular the rape of women, mainly by the Serbs. Violations of the rights of the individual, and in particular the existence of extermination camps, continue to shock public opinion, but there is little reaction. Rape in wartime is nothing new, but what is new in former Yugoslavia is that the rape and humiliation of women is being used as a weapon of war. Europe and WEU must denounce this.

The results of this war will not be quickly forgotten, if only on account of the migration flows which affect the life of all our populations.

Mr. President, however difficult the present situation, I consider that the powerlessness of Europe confronted with the war in former Yugoslavia demonstrates the need for a common foreign and security policy. This has become an imperative necessity in spite of, or perhaps even because of, the difficulty there is in putting it into practice. The same conclusion applies regarding a common policy for the protection of minorities.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Slatinski, Observer from Bulgaria.

Mr. SLATINSKI (*Observer from Bulgaria*). – Members of the Bulgarian Delegation congratulate Mr. Goerens and Mr. Marten on their excellent reports.

The events in what was formerly Yugoslavia are the greatest concern and the most painful wound of our continent. Bulgaria is not merely an observer of the dramatic events there: we can feel the hot breath, hear the cries of pain and despair, make out the cannon shots and see the tears of the refugees.

Those developments are no surprise to us. We have repeatedly warned that the Euro-Atlantic and European collective security structures should act faster and respond more adequately to what is happening in the disintegrating Yugoslavia. Now that the developments have reached

Mr. Slatinski (continued)

a critical point, we must all do our utmost to find a solution to the problems of the Balkans.

Bulgaria accepts the following clear-cut unequivocal principles that should underlie that solution: first, the unconditional recognition of the existing realities in the Balkans and of all the countries that have separated from Yugoslavia; secondly, a declaration by all the Balkan countries that they have no territorial claims against their neighbours and will not use arms and military force in the prevention, containment or precipitation of conflicts in the region; thirdly, respect for the right of peoples to determine their own social system and all other attributes pertaining to the sovereignty, independence and identity of their statehood; fourthly, the condemnation of all attempted and actual ethnic cleansing of territories and effective measures to overcome the consequences of such violence.

International treaties and agreements are the guiding principle of our foreign policy. The consistent elimination of hotbeds of religious confrontation is in the interests of the security of our countries. In that respect, the main point for the Balkans must be the strict observance of the charter of human rights.

The settlement of some current problems in the region is paramount to peace and security in the Balkans but that should by no means entail any violation of international agreements or – first and foremost – the charter of human rights. I make that statement to confirm once again that Bulgaria has no claims over Macedonia, as is hinted at in paragraph 16 of Mr. Goerens's report.

In the process of guaranteeing security in the Balkans, an essential rôle is played by the existing European security structures, NATO and WEU, which have means and mechanisms of defending freedom, democratic principles and human rights that have been in operation for decades. Bulgaria will continue to seek ever closer contacts with both those structures and with our good neighbours, Greece and Turkey. Those contacts constitute an essential element of our new foreign policy and are a prerequisite for the strengthening of regional security and peace in the Balkans.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The joint debate is closed.

I call Mr. Marten, Rapporteur of the Defence Committee.

Mr. MARTEN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your kind words about my report.

I can really only ask you to adopt the measures and recommendations proposed by the

Defence Committee as unanimously as possible, perhaps together with the two amendments before us. We must make it clear to the outside world that we have democratic reasons in common for implementing these recommendations.

Let me take this opportunity to thank the Italian Government for the outstanding preparation and organisation of our visits to Rome and the Adriatic. I also thank the Romanian Government for the preparation and organisation of our visits to the Danube border.

I am sure there are a few other points in the report that can still be raised when the amendments are discussed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Political Committee.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I am speaking both as a replacement for the Rapporteur and as Chairman of the Political Committee.

Once again, every speaker has expressed the same feelings – a feeling of shame, and a feeling that we are sitting here using words but apparently unable to prevent what is happening. We promised after the second world war that it would never happen again. In Salzburg, Lord Owen pleaded for the return of frontiers between republics, and said that change should not be accepted other than by agreement; he also said that the search for illusory cease-fires must be abandoned in favour of a progressive end to hostilities.

What can be done? Almost every speaker has expressed the same ideas. Let me start with Macedonia. My committee recommended the Assembly to make a plea for agreement to "members urgently recognising the independence of the Republic of Macedonia with a name acceptable to the population of that republic". The recommendation was adopted unanimously, for good reasons: the republic meets all the criteria. But it would be too simple just to make a plea for recognition; there is also a need for preventive security forces, for better protection of the rights of minorities and for financial aid. I compliment Mr. Fry on what he said about that.

We also need to strengthen the blockade. The committee pleaded for a total blockade – land, air and sea. We have no option but to make the blockade effective, and eventually we must ask for measures of retaliation – always based, of course, on the discussions of the Security Council.

The committee asked repeatedly for better protection of humanitarian convoys, safe zones and effective air cover. We are also worried about the tremendous gap between public opinion in our countries and official policies.

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

There is an equally large gap between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers.

We make our plea as politely as possible, but we are fed up and we want action. Let us adopt the recommendation, and make that urgent plea for an end to this terrible tragedy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Defence Committee.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I will be brief, as time is not on our side.

It is only fair for me to point out that, although the Defence Committee adopted Mr. Marten's report with no members against, there were six abstentions. I think that that was largely because certain people wanted to go further. I am pleased to say, however, that the supplementary recommendations were passed unanimously. They largely reflected discussions that had taken place in the committee earlier.

The committee has given the report a fair wind, and a number of people have been kind enough to describe it as excellent. It does credit to Mr. Marten's work. Let me put on record my thanks for the excellent help that he and I, and two officials, were given when we went to the Adriatic at the end of the summer. The Italians could not have been more helpful, and could not have organised the tour better; we are extremely grateful.

We like to think that the work that we did then was something of a catalyst. As soon as we returned to London, we said that we felt that the embargo should be strengthened forthwith. It has taken a long time, but, thank goodness, we were in the vanguard – as, indeed, have been many of my colleagues, judging by the comments that they have made both inside and outside the Assembly.

The Defence Committee agrees that there must be a political solution: that is the only way. Although there have been many side discussions on Macedonia and other troubles which may arise, the clear and unequivocal message from speaker after speaker, from country after country, is that we want tougher, workable sanctions and we want every aspect of the sanctions to be applied to stop the terrible bloodshed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1342, Part Two.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1337.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted².

On the supplementary draft recommendation in Document 1337, two amendments have been tabled which will be called in the following order: Amendment 2, Amendment 1.

Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. De Decker, Lord Mackie of Benshie and others reads as follows:

2. After paragraph 4 of the supplementary draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Take measures for and announce sanctions to be taken by member states against shipping companies and airlines guilty of violating the embargo decreed by the United Nations;”

I call Mr. De Decker to support this amendment.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – As this amendment was suggested or inspired by President Andreotti's address yesterday, I would ask him to be so kind as to speak to it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is a very simple amendment. Yesterday we spoke about this hypothesis; failing heavier penalties of the kind suggested here, up to and including expulsion from WEU if it could be proved that some governments were responsible for traffic in arms and were so breaking the blockade; this seemed to us to be like a penal system in which the only penalty was capital punishment. In that case it would be an ineffective system.

We are thinking of a penalty which would be to some extent simpler but more effective and

1. See page 31.

2. See page 32.

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

imposed on people carrying arms by sea or by air. If governments agreed to impose on such operators the penalty which has proved fairly effective against countries abetting hijacking by not retaining the aircraft at airports, I believe this would be effective. If the amendment is approved, therefore, we would ask the presidency to put the matter at once to the Council of Ministers so that this measure may possibly be adopted as early as the Edinburgh meeting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – An amendment to Amendment 2 has been tabled by Mr. Pécriaux to leave out “shipping companies and airlines” and insert “all sea or air transport operators”.

I call Mr. Pécriaux to speak to the amendment he has tabled to Amendment 2.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – As just noted by President Andreotti, the aim is to apply sanctions to the carriers. My amendment to the amendment proposed that the phrase “against shipping companies and airlines guilty...” be amended to read “against all sea or air transport operators guilty...”.

This wording would be more comprehensive in that it would extend beyond official companies to include all those who operate transport services, in conditions which are perhaps not always legal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment to Amendment 2?...

Does the committee wish to comment on Amendment 2 and its amendment?

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – On balance, the sub-amendment is helpful so we do not object to it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will now put to the vote the amendment to Amendment 2.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amendment to Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We will now vote on Amendment 2, as amended.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. De Decker, Lord Mackie of Benshie and others. It reads as follows:

1. After paragraph 4 of the supplementary draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Study plans for a European military operation to relieve the region of Sarajevo, liberate

the prison camps and put an end to the policy of occupation and ethnic cleansing pursued by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”

I call Mr. De Decker to move Amendment 1.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – As the Chairman of the committee has just said, when Mr. Marten’s report was adopted in committee in its first version a number of members abstained, because they thought the draft recommendation did not go far enough. I was one of them and I am naturally very glad to see the excellent supplementary report which backs up this document and confirms the will of the WEU Assembly to do everything in its power to convince governments to take all necessary steps to put an end to the conflict.

In this connection, I am sure we are all delighted at the victory won by Mr. Marten and the committee in particular when the United Nations decided to strengthen the embargo, which we had been campaigning for for months.

We are grateful that this report calls for the definition of security zones and the publication of all violations of the embargo. Mr. Stoffelen has just rightly stressed both the gap between politicians and public opinion, and that between this parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Ministers. We have perhaps been rather too quick in easing our consciences by arguing that there is no military solution to the Yugoslav problem. The worst aspect in Bosnia-Herzegovina is clearly the ethnic cleansing policy, the prison camps and the encircling of Sarajevo. It is perhaps too soon to say we are not in a position to end this situation by military action. I am by no means convinced of this.

In fact, I fear we are seeing a deterioration of the situation in Kosovo and even in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for one thing because the Muslim countries will not accept the genocide now taking place in that country. If we do not mount a possible – I repeat, possible – military operation to put an end to this situation, as Mr. Ferrari has just said, when the United States decides to do so we shall once again follow its lead, but we shall not have had the courage to say that we wanted, and had, the means to put an end to the situation.

Which is why, ladies and gentlemen, I have tabled this amendment, with Lord Mackie, signed by Mr. Caro, Lord Finsberg and Mr. Hardy, its sole purpose being to recommend that the Council of Ministers study the launching of a possible European military operation to relieve Sarajevo, liberate the prison camps and put an end to the unacceptable policy of ethnic cleansing at present applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Our most important responsibility is quite simply to think of and set down every possible

Mr. De Decker (continued)

item we could make use of to bring these unacceptable violations of the most fundamental human rights now taking place in Bosnia to an end.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

May I have the opinion of the committee?

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – We accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the supplementary draft recommendation as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, and in particular the Rapporteurs, who have done excellent work.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy.

¹. See page 34.

2. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 1325 and addendum).

4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1328 and addendum).

5. Composition of the political groups – Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Document 1331).

6. European armaments co-operation after Maastricht (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1332 and amendments).

7. Anti-ballistic missile defence (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1339 and amendment).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 2nd December 1992

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. The situation in East Timor (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1353).
Speaker: The President.
4. Address by Mr. Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy.
Replies by Mr. Andò to questions put by: Mr. Ferrarini, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Fry, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Covi, Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mrs. Fischer.
5. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
Replies by Mr. van Eekelen to questions put by: Mr. Stoffelen, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Eser (*Observer from Turkey*).
6. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget*, Doc. 1325 and addendum).
Speaker: Mr. Lagorce (*in place of Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur*).
7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts*, Doc. 1328 and addendum).
Speaker: Mr. Lagorce (*in place of Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur*).
8. The situation in East Timor (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1353).
Speakers: Mr. Brito, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. de Puig (point of order), Mr. Brito, Mr. Stoffelen (point of order).
9. Composition of the political groups – Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision*, Doc. 1331).
Speaker: Mr. Thompson (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
10. European armaments co-operation after Maastricht (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1332 and amendments).
Speakers: Mr. Lopez Henares (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Borderas, the Earl of Dundee, Mr. Lopez Henares (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
11. Anti-ballistic missile defence (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order*, Doc. 1339 and amendment).
Speakers: Mr. Lenzer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lopez Henares (*Chairman*), Mr. Lenzer.
12. Acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1354).
Speaker: The President.
13. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

1. See page 38.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. The situation in East Timor

(*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1353)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have received from Mr. Brito and ten others a motion for a resolution with a request for urgent pro-

The President (continued)

cedure on the situation in East Timor, Document 1353. This document has already been distributed.

I propose that the debate on this request be held after the vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993.

**4. Address by Mr. Andò,
Minister of Defence of Italy**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy.

Minister, this is the third time you will have addressed our Assembly and its institutions since Italy has held the presidency of WEU. It shows the interest which you and your government have in our work. Thank you very much.

When you addressed our Standing Committee on 3rd September under the urgent procedure to debate a recommendation about the situation in former Yugoslavia, you helped us considerably by the detailed information you gave us and the in-depth dialogue we held, enabling us to formulate useful and realistic provisions. I know that the Italian presidency did much to ensure that Council replies reached us in good time for the preparation of our reports – it has been successful. The presidency also persuaded the Council to adopt a number of measures at its ministerial meeting on 20th November, which, though prudent, were nevertheless very helpful in enabling WEU to make what we hope will be an effective contribution to the re-establishment of peace in those unhappy republics of former Yugoslavia.

This afternoon the situation there is on the agenda again. We are particularly happy to welcome you, Minister, and look forward to hearing what you have to say on behalf of the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council about the way in which Europe, through WEU, feels it can contribute to a peace effort whose success would decisively help not only the victims of this tragedy, but also the future of Europe as a whole.

I therefore give you the floor and ask you afterwards to be kind enough to reply to any questions members of the Assembly may wish to ask.

Mr. ANDÒ (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am happy to be speaking for the first time at a plenary session of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU, after having had the

pleasure of meeting the Presidential Committee twice, here in Paris and in Rome.

I believe that both meetings were profitable and that the second provided the presidency with useful information about the Assembly's feelings and thoughts in preparation for the ministerial session of 20th November.

This method of work seems to me to be very sound and Italy intends to use it while it has the Chair of the Council and to encourage other member countries to follow suit.

Since WEU was reactivated in 1984 it has been the Italian Government's constant line to make the best use of the organisation's parliamentary body. I promise to carry on in this direction, adding to its content in line with the developments at Maastricht and Petersberg which have made WEU into the operational arm of political union in the defence sector.

A few months ago, when I attended a seminar organised here in Paris by the French Defence Minister, Mr. Joxe, I stressed that as the process of integration went ahead, the democratic shortcomings of the European institutions needed to be remedied particularly in the security sector, which involves the most jealously guarded area of national sovereignty. You therefore have an indispensable part to play in ensuring that the strengthening of Europe's defence rôle remains at all times under the democratic control of the peoples of WEU countries. With this end in view, the Italian presidency will continue to recognise the function of the Assembly and to enhance it in appropriate measure.

I shall devote the first part of my speech to presenting the most important results in defence matters at the ministerial meeting in Rome.

The position in former Yugoslavia is, of course, the prime concern, particularly as I know that a recommendation on the subject is being discussed here today.

The declaration of 20th November was intended to be a strong reassertion of our countries' undertaking to help in solving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If we look back over the last few months and at the concrete undertaking, including a military contribution, on the ground we can see that Europe has been the driving force for diplomatic action in the United Nations and elsewhere, and has assumed responsibility for implementation.

In anticipation of my conclusions, I think that we can be satisfied with the rôle our organisation has played and is still playing.

The WEU member governments must be grateful to the Assembly for acting as a stimulus and for encouraging them to act more vigorously.

Mr. Andò (continued)

I am well aware that the results to date are very far from satisfactory. There are criticisms from various quarters that the international community has not done enough to put an end to what is quite rightly described as a nightmare. These understandable feelings must not, however, obscure a realistic assessment of the intricacies and complex contrasts of the situation in Bosnia which limit the feasibility of intervention. Just this morning there is news of the latest failure to arrange and consolidate a cease-fire between the opposing parties. I feel that we can fully endorse the reasons why political and diplomatic management of the crisis was entrusted to the United Nations and the European Community. The United Nations gives to international involvement the legitimacy which no other organisation could give. In this context, thoughts turn quite naturally to the situation in Somalia and to the action which the United Nations is preparing for in order to establish conditions enabling humanitarian aid to be distributed. Only with the visible involvement of the United Nations can it be hoped that the various factions in Somalia will agree to intervention by the international community if only for humanitarian purposes.

Returning to the crisis in Bosnia, the European Community which is again claiming its right to act as a visible and identifiable political agency, is signalling that a focus of serious tension in the heart of the continent requires a commitment in the first place from the European countries themselves. That is why the United Nations and the EC, as joint sponsors of the London Conference on former Yugoslavia, are continuing their efforts despite many difficulties and opposition and, it must be recognised, not a few disappointments.

In this context, it is the function of WEU to implement on the ground any measures which the United Nations may decide upon to further the diplomatic process and prevent the crisis from spilling over into neighbouring countries with consequences which would be truly catastrophic.

From this standpoint, our organisation can be satisfied at having taken timely and vigorous action.

A WEU fleet has been closely monitoring the naval embargo in the Adriatic. Three thousand seven hundred and thirty-six vessels have been questioned to reveal seventy-six cases of suspected breaches of the embargo which have been referred immediately to the United Nations Committee on Sanctions. Because of the nature of the checks carried out it is only possible to refer to suspected and not proven breaches. Despite these limitations there is no doubt that this operation and this type of check have served

as a deterrent which has at least discouraged the use of the seaways to supply Serbia and Montenegro with goods banned by the relevant United Nations resolutions. The WEU countries have made a satisfactory contribution to the naval monitoring exercise. By supplying naval units, Italy, Belgium, France and Spain have contributed to the success of this action initially involving Portugal and the United Kingdom also. Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands have also organised air-sea patrols. France has provided an AWACS aircraft and Italy several helicopters.

European action is under way and is being co-ordinated in exemplary fashion with NATO, represented by STANAVFORMED, in accordance with the spirit and decisions of the Rome Atlantic summit and the Maastricht European summit.

The Italian presidency has played an active part in initiating and co-ordinating these operations. We have been successful because we have been helped by all our partners. I firmly believe that when the planning cell starts work and has been run in, WEU will maintain its ability to respond to further tasks required of it on a permanent basis.

These tasks are ours already now that the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro has come into force.

It is fair to say, first of all, that the decision taken by the Security Council meets the wish expressed by WEU and primarily by the Italian presidency that international action to resolve the Bosnian crisis should be more vigorous. When I met the Assembly's Presidential Committee on 3rd September last I spoke up for this demand. It was, therefore, logical and essential that WEU should give immediate effect to the Ministers' decision to go forward from monitoring to joint control. This was achieved in the remarkably short time of forty-eight hours as a result of prior contingency planning. The action is going ahead effectively using for the time being the same forces as were deployed for the monitoring operations. Up to the moment, WEU units have questioned 348 merchant ships and teams from aboard our fleet have inspected 42 vessels, seventeen of which have been diverted to the ports of Bari and Brindisi and inspected by Italian coastguards. These checks found one vessel carrying materials – steel rolls – which were embargoed and therefore reported to the United Nations Sanctions Committee for appropriate action; the ship will have to return to its port of origin at Bar in Montenegro and will have to unload the prohibited items. Of course, the embargo applies to cargo not only bound for Serbia and Montenegro but also coming from these countries. I consider that adequate sanctions must be imposed on shipping countries guilty of breaches. WEU

Mr. Andò (continued)

should act as examining judge to enable the United Nations to take the appropriate decisions. I think that here my line of argument is fully consistent with what the Assembly has discussed and decided yesterday and today.

NATO and WEU are also contacting Albania seeking that country's agreement to extend surveillance to its territorial waters. Sharp Fence, which is the code name for enforcement of the naval blockade, is at present being handled by the same forces as those used for monitoring. Our planners take the view that there will be no need for significant increases from the previous, less strict phase. It nevertheless remains true that with the greater political commitment now required of us the wider involvement of WEU countries is to be desired. Among other things, this would require greater solidarity between us.

We are also convinced that the embargo should above all be enforced at the land and sea frontiers of Serbia and Montenegro, and that is why the problem was taken up in the declaration on former Yugoslavia after the Ministerial Council in Rome. In compliance with the terms of Security Council Resolution 787, the WEU countries, as members of the European Community, undertook to provide technical and material assistance to help the countries along the land and river boundaries with Serbia and Montenegro in enforcing the embargo as they are required.

I believe this to be the vital feature of the embargo. The land and river boundaries, in fact, provide the greatest opportunities for violation and the transit of weapons and drugs. In this respect, we cannot overlook the fact that the large quantities of arms present in such an unstable area could also be a source of supply to terrorists.

Still on the subject of Bosnia, may I remind you that WEU has undertaken to help with the monitoring of Bosnian airspace and that if the United Nations Security Council decided on that course of action, our member countries would not fail to collaborate in a joint ban. As is known, Italy has already made the Martina Franca centre available to receive information from AWACS aircraft and other sources.

Of equal practical importance and political significance is the involvement of the WEU countries in strengthening UNPROFOR for the protection of overland humanitarian convoys in Bosnia. I say politically significant because the involvement of the WEU countries, which is by far the greatest, is recognition that the crisis in former Yugoslavia affects first and foremost the countries of Europe, so that it is quite right that they accept more responsibility in the efforts to restore peace and stability.

There is also a major contribution to the airlift carrying humanitarian aid to Sarajevo under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which has involved the loss of lives; the tragic loss of the Italian G-222 painfully confirmed the dangers of a situation in which no reliance can be placed on the most solemn and official undertakings given by the military forces operating in Bosnia.

These various activities confirm my opinion that, even though it is still only an embryonic structure, WEU is capable of producing speedily and effectively any military plans required of it.

I believe, therefore, that WEU now has a convincingly higher profile. It will become higher as we gain experience with our tasks and with the attendant consolidation of the process of political integration. The prospects for a European defence dimension cannot be dissociated from the achievement of political union.

Returning again to the results of the ministerial meeting in Rome, I think it may be useful to remind you that we agreed that it would be expedient to transfer the subject of co-operation between arms industries from the IEPG to WEU. This is a significant step as it clearly shows that Europeans intend to co-operate more closely with a view to setting up an armaments agency. At the same time, I would stress that this transfer of responsibility, on which a decision will be taken tomorrow or the next day at the ministerial conference of the IEPG in Bonn, will fully respect the rights and responsibilities of members of that organisation which are not full members of WEU but, since Rome, are associate members or observers.

The remaining technical and procedural problems can and must be resolved pragmatically by a joint IEPG-WEU group which we expect to be set up very soon. Ministers were equally pragmatic in discussing the subject in Rome, where they sought to reconcile the retention of IEPG procedures with WEU's institutional set-up.

I would now like to enlarge on a second aspect of the strengthening of WEU, namely the assignment of military forces for action by our organisation.

The underlying general principles for this plan are clearly defined and can be summarised as complete transparency and complementarity with NATO. This means that forces must continue to be assigned to the Atlantic Alliance but that WEU will have to be able to call on military resources when necessary.

This means in practice that the forces assigned to NATO and WEU will have to have two hats so that the development of a European defence function does not harm the Atlantic Alliance which, among other things, accounts for the North American presence in Europe. We must

Mr. Andò (continued)

faithfully apply in practice this principle of transparency with NATO. To this end, Italy has been working for final determination of the status of the Franco-German corps in relation to NATO and WEU.

On 30th November, the two countries concerned sent notes to the North Atlantic Council and WEU setting out the principles on which relations between the army corps and the two organisations should be based. Italy takes a very favourable view of this long-awaited initiative.

Of course, any judgment of substance will have to await complete assessment of the documents by each partner in consultation with the others. We can, however, say straight away that these are steps in the right direction and we firmly believe that when the process of consultation has been completed in NATO and WEU and the operational agreement has been concluded with SACEUR, we shall be in a better position to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and at the same time to advance the establishment of a European rôle in the defence sector.

In the same spirit of transparency with NATO, and the same desire to strengthen Europe's defence identity, we have worked out a proposal with France and Spain for the creation of a European naval airforce, to be activated when necessary for missions undertaken by our organisation in any part of the world. I should like to stress this last point because the proposal has sometimes wrongly been presented as centred exclusively on the Mediterranean.

I should like to consider another point. It is clear that our joint military resources will increasingly have to be used for tasks very different from the defence of their own members for which NATO and WEU were originally formed. It is now generally accepted that changes in the strategic realities of Europe and surrounding areas mean that we shall have to intervene actively when crises and instability become potential threats to our security in ways less immediate than the traditional threat to our territorial integrity. This context includes the interacting institutions of the CSCE, NATO and WEU itself, which have to manage the transition from the bipolar cold war to stability based on a genuinely co-operative approach to security.

Like NATO, WEU is showing that it can meet the challenge of the new requirements – and I have already referred to the important evidence from former Yugoslavia – which need complete rethinking of the way in which our armed forces should operate. I would like to ask you to give some thought to this point.

The work in the various WEU groups on the identification and characteristics of the forces to

be assigned to the organisation shows that military units will have to be increasingly professional and able to fit into multinational contingents. NATO strategic thinking is on similar lines.

The idea of massive static forces will gradually have to be abandoned in favour of more flexible slimmed-down structures capable of operating with units from other countries. Such adaptation will require considerable effort because, additionally, money will have to be committed in order to change the structure of our forces. In this we shall be helped, however, by the considerable experience of interoperability which we have gained in the Atlantic Alliance.

The new defence model we are now setting up in Italy meets these objectives.

We shall have to cultivate new mental attitudes favouring integration and co-operation between armed forces. I firmly believe that this Assembly which speaks for public opinion in our countries will be able to contribute effectively to the debate.

Thank you, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, for listening to me and allowing me to provide material for a debate in which I shall be very happy to take part and to answer any questions you may wish to ask.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your detailed and relevant remarks, Minister.

I call Mr. Ferrarini.

Mr. FERRARINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, I should like to thank you for your very detailed and pertinent speech. Regarding the situation in former Yugoslavia, it has rightly been said here several times that the feelings and wishes of the general public differ from those of parliaments and those of parliaments differ from those of governments. I think that your speech can be numbered among those which help to narrow the gaps.

My question is more specific, however. We have been talking a great deal about questions concerning an effective and efficient embargo on Serbia and Montenegro, particularly as regards arms traffic. The problem of ending the fighting in former Yugoslavia is of tragic importance and is aggravated by the fact that, as you recalled, arms are being exported to European countries to supply terrorism and organised crime. The impression is that former Yugoslavia is becoming a kind of compulsory staging area or alibi for various purposes connected with the illegal international trade in arms. Some finds in Italy, clearly originating from Yugoslavia and in the hands of criminals, are extremely worrying. Can you give us any more details on this point?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDÒ (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I think that Mr. Ferrarini's concern is well founded because of evidence which we undoubtedly have in Italy. I am referring to finds of arms held by dangerous criminal organisations; the arms in question are of such a nature that they seem to have come more from countries and areas where fighting is in progress than from the usual stocks of arms held by organised crime. I am thinking for example of some portable missiles of the Stinger type that have been discovered in Italy in the possession of criminal organisations.

Basically, there is strong evidence that traffic can come from an area awash with arms like Yugoslavia, first into Italy and then into other European countries. From this standpoint another matter of concern is that the Yugoslav side of the frontier with Italy, for example, is not adequately guarded and there are many gaps.

All this undoubtedly helps the traffic and the traffickers and calls for special vigilance from us in dealing with the problem upstream. I am talking of the ease with which today's warring parties can be supplied across land frontiers.

In one sense this is therefore an argument for intensifying frontier controls and the embargo, but through 360° since an embargo limited to the Adriatic is fated to be ineffective because anything and everything can enter across the land frontiers. This very real danger has been stressed by the Assembly on several occasions. In my opinion, if the aim is to cut off sources of supply for the fighting this can only be achieved by establishing a virtually unbreakable circle round the whole 360° of the area involved in the fighting and so preventing reinforcements of arms and munitions entering from any direction.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in reaction to the Minister's reply to a question from my Italian colleague, I should like to ask the following question. This morning the Assembly voted unanimously in favour of a recommendation containing the following passage: "Publish the evidence of any known breach of sanctions and particularly of cases where arms or other military equipment were exported to the Serbs and other warring factions in the former Yugoslavia."

Is the Minister prepared to receive this request from the Assembly and to speak to the Council of Ministers on its behalf? My second question relates to the Minister's reference to Albania. The Minister said that he hoped shortly to make contact with Albania in order to try to persuade that country to see to it that the sanc-

tions were more strictly observed. We all realise that the economic situation in Albania is particularly bad. So I think Albania would certainly agree more readily to fall in with the Minister's request if we were to offer financial assistance in return. Can he say something more about this? How does he propose to persuade Albania to uphold the sanctions?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDÒ (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – My answer to the first question is that I believe that, as things stand, the sanctions must be effective for the embargo to be effective. There is little point in identifying a violation by efficient surveillance, if no real deterrent is imposed to prevent the violation from being repeated. I think that the recommendation you have drafted is both timely and effective. Naturally, this leads on to the organisational problem of how to link up the work of those who discover the violations with that of those who have to impose the sanctions.

I mentioned the type of work normally done by an examining judge. The countries which are enforcing the embargo and can certify and describe the violation should act as examining judge, prepare a case history and pass on all the information in their possession in order to set in motion the imposition of sanctions in two stages; official confirmation of the violation committed on the basis of the documents submitted followed by a sanction requiring return to the countries from which the goods originated and where the vessels are registered, thus forcing them to be really vigilant. Failing this, our threats and checks will be nothing but crying in the wind. A step further forward is therefore needed in the matter of sanctions.

Mention has also been made of sanctions which have proved very effective in similar situations; I am thinking of the hijacking of aircraft. In my view, something very effective is required so that anyone who has offended once will not be encouraged to do it again, pretending not to hear or not to understand.

As regards Albania, I was talking about any active involvement. As an Italian I would be particularly unhappy if I thought that Albania might have a part in such missions, as I am well aware of the true situation in that country, where a thousand-strong Italian mission is operating along the coast to provide aid and succour in a country of disaster in which there is little or no civilian administration. I was referring rather to the fact that Albania might also agree that the controls carried out by our forces might be extended to its territorial waters. From that point of view we are seeking political agreement to exercise legal powers which do not call for the use of Albanian forces.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Fry, Lord Mackie, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Covi, Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer and Mrs. Fischer have questions to ask. The list is now closed.

Will speakers please confine themselves to one very short question, as we are running late.

I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall be very brief. I simply wish to thank the Minister for the detailed information he has given us. My specific questions, Mr. President, are as follows: I will not ask any more questions concerning Yugoslavia even though I am tempted to do so, but would like to refer to the subject of co-operation within WEU. The Minister made reference to existing co-operation with IEPG and the creation of a European armaments agency. As the Minister is aware, at the Oslo meeting last March, subsequently confirmed by the Petersberg declaration, it was said that IEPG and WEU experts would meet to draft proposals on the structure and functions of this agency.

My question is this: have these experts met, and if so, may we have their conclusions as quickly as possible?

My second question, Mr. President, is this: again in the Petersberg declaration it was established that the member countries of the organisation would make military forces available to WEU and the Council for multilateral action. Fortunately, this is already in operation, but my question is, who determines the number and nature of such forces – is it the various member countries of the organisation or the Council? I ask this because some members of the organisation may be less willing to collaborate in this way, which would lead to a lack of solidarity. So my question is designed to ascertain whether the Council has any influence in this matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDÒ (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – The Ministerial Council in Rome in fact decided to set up a joint committee of experts to work out solutions for a number of practical and organisational problems. It is due to meet for the first time after the meeting in Bonn on the 4th. I should add that the outstanding problems do not seem to me to be very major. From this standpoint, therefore, the experts' work will not be particularly demanding as the major political problems have been resolved.

The second question, which is of a general character, raises the problem of methods. How should the organisation operate every time a contingent has to be assembled? My opinion is that, instead of laying down a general principle,

the principle adopted should be to act in a flexible manner, deciding on each separate case according to the nature of the mission and the readiness of countries to participate. Only when information is available on these two points will it be possible to allocate the tasks. I see no other possibility.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fry.

Mr. FRY (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister was kind enough to refer to this morning's debate on Yugoslavia. Has he had time to see one of the new recommendations, which was that there should be a study of "plans for a European military operation to relieve the region of Sarajevo"? At the very least that appears to suggest that food and humanitarian aid should be forced through to Sarajevo even if such action is militarily opposed. What is the Minister's initial reaction to that recommendation? Does he see any immediate prospect of Sarajevo being relieved, which is what the Assembly wants?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDÒ (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – This is a real problem which in a certain sense is one of effective ways of meeting the targets set for the humanitarian mission. You spoke of a further step forward, meaning substantially the use of military force against opposing forces to achieve a humanitarian purpose. This is a problem which undoubtedly arises if the steps so far taken prove ineffective. I think, however, that from this point of view we must have a prior assessment by the United Nations to establish that the decisions on the basis of which we have operated, taken options and organised a contingent are no longer practicable. At that precise moment, when it is clear that this method cannot succeed, the problem of a substantially different form of intervention will arise.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie of Benshie.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHEIE (*United Kingdom*). – Several of our colleagues this morning were complimentary about the help that they had received from the Italian Defence Ministry. We are all grateful for that.

I think that I heard the Minister say that seventeen of some five hundred ships monitored had been sent to Italian ports to be searched. He mentioned that one of them was carrying steel coil out of Serbia-Montenegro. How many ships have been diverted in the course of carrying oil or military equipment to Serbia-Montenegro?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDÒ (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I thank you for your appreciation of the work of the Italian presidency. In answer to the question, the facts are as follows. WEU units have arraigned 348 merchant ships and teams aboard our fleet have inspected forty-two vessels, of which seventeen have been diverted to the ports of Bari and Brindisi, where they have been inspected by Italian coastguards. These inspections discovered one vessel carrying embargoed cargo – steel rolls – and, therefore, informed the United Nations Sanctions Committee for necessary action. The timely and provisional measure then taken was to order the vessel to return to its port of origin at Bar in Montenegro and to unload the cargo at the port from which it had sailed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – For the last ten years I have been working as a member of a team on a co-operative space and satellite observation project. The parliamentary Assembly in WEU has taken some decisions, regularly confirmed by reports. With Mr. Malfatti, who used to be a representative here, we tried to promote this European dimension of observation by satellites, an essential activity whose importance was clearly demonstrated during the Gulf war.

I should like to know to what extent beyond the first phase decided upon by our Assembly there is still active support for this project, particularly from your country.

I should also like to ask a second, very quick question. Would the Minister please tell me what he thinks about the lack of reaction from WEU? I personally find this hard to understand, and indeed have raised the question in our parliamentary Assembly. I should also like to know what the Minister thinks about the absence of any wish to intervene in the case of a country that probably deserves as much of our attention as Yugoslavia, which is receiving it. I mean Somalia. I am surprised that no European initiative is being envisaged whereas projects seem to be in preparation elsewhere.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDÒ (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – As regards space co-operation with special reference to the Torrejón centre, the contract for the first stage has already been approved. I hope that the centre will open in March or April but there have been difficulties with the placing of certain orders. Italy has played a positive rôle in seeking an agreement and overcoming the difficulties. This seems to have been successful and I hope that now it will be possible to go ahead and keep to the set timetable so that the centre can open in March or April.

In the case of Somalia we are of course hanging fire and waiting to see what the Security Council will decide. I believe it is not yet possible to determine the true political significance of the Butros Ghali initiative, but one thing appears certain to me. Every national government and every country – and I mean our countries – is today finding it difficult to explain to the general public that objectively it is powerless to help a people decimated by hunger. I believe that this offends the humanitarian feelings of every one of us regardless of the decisions which each is willing to take or the technical solution each has in mind to support. I believe that once the Security Council's decision is known, it will have to be implemented by way of the national offers of interested countries which would provide a multinational contingent capable of operating as quickly and effectively as possible. At the moment, nothing can be predicted; we simply have the willingness of each country individually to back the initiative decided by the United Nations.

The United Nations will also have to work out some kind of organisation that will cope with local difficulties and be as fully effective as possible in achieving the set objectives. These seem to me to be of two kinds. First, a humanitarian mission has to be organised so that people do not starve to death, and second a realistic peace-making process has to be started bearing in mind, however, that this is no ordinary war nor simply a matter of interposing forces between warring armies. For one thing, it is not clear how many armies there are because in addition to the two major factions there are swarms of irregular groups getting bigger and bigger and recently growing to an enormous extent. There is, therefore, the problem of restoring civil authority, creating a police force and so enabling the country to defend itself from one or more sets of gangsters which paradoxically are taking food provided by humanitarian aid – the supply of which has given rise to new criminal activities aimed at controlling the distribution of food. The technical organisation of these operations has to await the decision of the Security Council. If several countries are involved we shall be entitled to assess jointly the duties we shall have to carry out and take a common stance on that basis. At the moment, however, I do not think that the time is ripe to start considering operational solutions. Basically the Security Council's decisions must be known first.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Covi.

Mr. COVI (*Italy*) (Translation). – My question has been at least in part made superfluous by the Minister's reply to the previous speaker concerning the amendment adopted this morning to

Mr. Covi (continued)

the decision on Yugoslavia which foresees the possibility of using force to end the situation in Sarajevo.

I would nevertheless like to ask the Minister whether he thinks it was advisable for the Assembly to approve this decision and what use the Council of Ministers intends to make of it particularly to bring pressure to bear on the United Nations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDÒ (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I think that great credit is due to the Assembly for what it has done and is continuing to do in pressing for a more vigorous European initiative producing clearer concrete results. I have to say that in this respect the Assembly has quite rightly put pressure on the Council so that the technical times required to arrive at the decisions subsequently implemented could be cut to a minimum. I think, therefore, that the decisions the Assembly has taken today are fully in line with pressure from public opinion in our countries for intervention which will produce results other than goodwill.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pécriaux.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – This is a very short question. Just now the Minister stated that air-sea co-ordination had been organised between France, Spain and Italy. The Minister also said, if I heard correctly, that missions were not confined to the Mediterranean. My questions are very simple: can the Minister tell me what kind of missions are involved? Who is performing them? Have contacts been arranged with other naval forces of WEU member countries?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDÒ (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you for this question because the brevity of the comments on this point may lead to some perilous misunderstandings. When France, Italy and Spain began to discuss collaboration on naval air matters, Italy was concerned not to promote an initiative which might, it seemed, create the same situation on the sea as occurred for land forces when the Franco-German army corps was set up; in substance, that is, a second proposal for a privileged agreement between two or three countries which would face the other WEU countries with a *fait accompli*, and then force them to take up a unilateral initiative as an initiative of the organisation or its member countries.

We therefore made it clear that the proposal for naval co-operation was a good idea provided

that, before details were discussed, it should at once be placed before WEU and should come into being as an initiative open to the other WEU countries. I repeat that we did not wish to find ourselves for a second time in the position where France and Germany have since found themselves with the Franco-German army corps, that is faced by other countries which persistently asked: "Tell us, when you have set up this force, how do you intend it to be made available to WEU and NATO?" This gave rise to a great deal of misunderstanding which I feel does not help to keep the organisation in sound health.

Today, therefore, when I spoke of the Mediterranean it was with reference to our organisation and this effort to relate everything to the tasks, duties and institutional identity of WEU as such and hence to everything that the organisation can do in the Mediterranean in the matter of the fleet and the proposal for the direct involvement, from the outset, of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in his second reply to Mr. Fourré, the Italian Minister laid stress on technical problems with reference to Somalia. These problems certainly exist. However, I should like very respectfully to say to the Minister that as regards Yugoslavia, which we discussed this morning, the problems are not technical but political. We are up against a lack of political will; there is no real political leadership in Europe. That is the nub of the problem, and that is why the Assembly adopted these recommendations this morning.

Hitherto Europe has proved to be utterly incapable of taking the action needed to bring further relief to the sufferings in Yugoslavia. Does the Minister agree with me that this impotence on the part of Europe might one day present a greater threat to the pursuit of European unification than the Danish no to Maastricht, in the context both of WEU and of the EC? In other words, are not the risks connected with this absence of political leadership in Europe much greater than our governments are prepared to admit?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDÒ (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – It was not my intention to contrast the political problem of if, how and when to act with the technical problem of how to do so. Nor did I think I was hiding any political decisions behind the camouflage of technical questions. You have quite rightly recalled the state of affairs in Yugoslavia and I do the same as an example of political delay which results in terrible technical complications – a mistake we need not repeat. It is important to understand –

Mr. Andò (continued)

and this is the political aspect which must be looked at in the case of Somalia – how far participation and interference – I use the term objectively – by a multinational contingent will be welcomed. I note a difference. Last September all the major factions were agreed that there should be no intervention by a military contingent which, as things then stood, could well have become the third or fourth combatant instead of an intervening force. For troops to be able to intervene, the others involved must agree to their doing so, otherwise they would be nothing but a new force intervening in the fighting which would spread as a result.

This was the position last September when the main Somali factions said they needed at most five to six hundred men for police duties to help to reconstitute a local police force. It seems to me that things have changed. The major factions have understood that they are unable to finish off a conflict which is now drawing in new combatants, thus risking a challenge to their own rôle. The political problem, therefore, is to know in what conditions we should intervene in the fighting. Events in Yugoslavia show that it is one thing to intervene when accepted and asked for on the spot, in which case a certain number of men will be needed, and quite another thing to intervene when not wanted on the spot, in which case the necessary resources have to be deployed.

Ascertaining the political facts is also a necessary condition for the technical organisation of the mission. By this I mean a preliminary study to determine how to make a start and what we shall probably find on arrival in Somalia.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The last question is from Mrs. Leni Fischer from Germany.

Mrs. FISCHER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, the reply to your last question – and I just want to say this very quickly – also raises the problem that all the national and international bodies will become increasingly overstretched in material, financial and staff terms – I need only think of the many United Nations missions we have now – if every group has to become involved in every one of the many, many disputes in the world.

I have another question. Does the Italian presidency have any secure information on the scale of the systematic rape by Serbian troops of five- to seven-year-old girls, young people and women in some of the women's camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina and is the Italian presidency prepared to seek to halt these atrocities, to endorse the demand that systematic rape and torture be included as war crimes in international legal

conventions and to improve the institutional arrangements for international criminal prosecution in this context?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDÒ (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – As to who should participate in the missions, I think I can say that this is a problem which can be studied and resolved in political terms. There are no statistics as a guide for sharing out, so to speak, the contributions of forces needed to form a contingent in which every country would always have to contribute; if anything, the contrary is true.

It is unthinkable that every country should be involved in every mission; it is the planning that will ensure that contributions are equal. However, it would be wrong for some countries never to participate – which I put forward as a hypothesis only. That is why I said a short while ago that forces must be contributed on an equal shares basis and that the use made of the forces committed must be influenced by developments in the countries providing them. I feel this is not only a sound yardstick for fair distribution but also a guarantee of effective intervention when the need arises.

From this standpoint the problem is both political and technical; I think that if, for example, in response to a request from the United Nations we from time to time make such offers of forces we should assess what has, up till then, happened to those who have taken part in other missions. In this respect I do not think that it would be difficult to uphold the principle of equality with particular reference to the forces required from each country.

As regards the problem of the atrocities and crimes to which you referred a short time ago, I must say that this is exclusively a political problem; basically we are dealing with criminals who should be brought to trial before an international court. All the precedents support that view.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you again, Minister, for your address and for the way you replied to questions.

5. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.

Mr. van Eekelen, I invite you to address the Assembly.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Mr. President, members of the Assembly, usually I address you at the beginning

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

of your session. Today my address comes towards the end of the session. I must admit that I find it more useful to speak a little earlier. It is more useful for your information, for clearing up any misunderstandings and for answering any questions which may have an impact on your discussions. It would have been particularly useful to address you at the beginning of this session because the sequence of events and the rhythm of our activities has been so quick that several of your reports could not be fully up to date.

However, speaking to you later in the session gives me the opportunity to express some personal views on the relations between the Council and the Assembly and on the situation in Yugoslavia, which I regard as becoming very dangerous. You had an important debate on Yugoslavia this morning.

I must express on behalf of the Council a certain disappointment that it was not possible to invite the representatives of the governments of countries which have recently become our partners as part of the process of enlargement to sit on the "banc du gouvernement" today. However, I understand that you did not have the time to take a decision on that matter because our meeting in Rome took place only ten days ago. It would have been an important signal that the Assembly supported the construction of the European pillar and the security and defence dimension of European integration at the same time.

Of course, it is entirely up to the Assembly to determine the rights and obligations of associates and observers and the status of active observers which we shall accord to all our new partners during the next eight or nine months, until the treaty of accession with Greece has been ratified by all members. In that respect, you still have ample time to make up your mind.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). – Mr. President, I am glad that the Standing Committee is now to support the Presidential Committee in ensuring continuity of political action by the Assembly. The Permanent Council in Brussels should have regular meetings with it, and the practice of hearings should be extended as needed. The progress already made towards earlier communication of the Council's report and of replies to questions and recommendations from your Assembly should be improved on under the Italian presidency's influence. I have already taken several opportunities of demonstrating that I am available to provide information to your committees and rapporteurs but, for these contacts to be more efficient, it would be best to time meetings so that they come before you have

completed your reports and drafted your recommendations.

Like you, I believe it is indispensable that WEU should from now on undertake major tasks within the framework set by the modified Brussels Treaty and the texts on which reactivation is founded. Once this has been done, with the European pillar taking concrete form, the statements made by our ten member countries will have to pass the test of their collective political will. Perhaps, as President Soell suggested, it is time to go back to the drawing board with the report on the conditions for European security on which The Hague platform was based in 1987. The foreseeable delay in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty is likely to provide an opportunity for WEU to make its contribution to future common foreign and security policy for the future European Union here and now. The Council and the Assembly ought, therefore, to be drawing up proposals to that end.

In addition to this rôle of conceptual initiative in designing the framework of reference for the defence of Europe, the Council and the Assembly will have to accomplish the important task of clarifying and defining the operational links between WEU and NATO at at least three levels: command structures, organisation of the forces made available to both organisations and contingency planning.

The planning cell's job will be to work out WEU's three priority missions – humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-making – and form manpower groups and plan their transport, logistic support, communications and command. As regards command, we are reinforcing the headquarters staff already available, to which officers from countries taking part in the operation in question could be added. The action in the Adriatic is a good example: we are using the Italian naval command, with some assistance from officers on the ships of the other participating countries.

The test of co-operation between WEU and NATO will come when common European positions are taken in consultations within the alliance. The requirement will be to influence and persuade, neither imposing nor submitting, and avoiding duplication where it is clearly pointless.

Hence the main objective in the coming months must be to make progress in defining the objectives of the construction of Europe in the security and defence area, while ensuring the European pillar has the necessary structure, effectiveness and hence credibility.

Only the quality of our work will persuade our member countries to assign us the material resources needed for the tasks falling to the various components of WEU. Unfavourable

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

economic circumstances, the installation of the satellite centre and planning cell, plus the inevitable cost of moving the Council to Brussels mean that all of us will have to go on trying to achieve our ambitions with limited resources.

(The speaker continued in English)

What does that mean for our activities in particular? On a personal basis and in all modesty, I suggest that our Assembly should concentrate on the new rôle and place of WEU as the European pillar of NATO and the security and defence dimension of European integration. I wish to make a number of personal comments on that matter.

First, I believe that the notion of defence is changing. It is changing in the direction of the protection of wider interests than the defence of our national independence and the territorial integrity on which it was focused in the past. We are moving, therefore, in the direction of a more intervention-orientated use of military capabilities, and of course that poses new problems. It poses in particular the problem of legitimacy. How do we justify our right to intervene? I submit that that is a very important political question on which the contribution of our Assembly is of the utmost importance.

Perhaps what is happening today in Somalia is of interest – one of our members referred to that just a few moments ago. In Somalia it seems that, for the first time, the United Nations is moving away from the traditional notion of peace-keeping, where it acts only with the agreement of all the parties, when a cease-fire is in place, to a more intervention-orientated, imposing-the-peace activity. It would be interesting to follow that path. This is not the first time that that has happened: in Kurdistan we had something similar, when we imposed the safe havens. Let us not forget that in Kurdistan that was done on the autonomous initiative of the countries concerned, without a precise resolution by the United Nations Security Council.

Second, I have the impression that the United States of America is now more interested in an alliance that is based on the two-pillar arrangement. In a way, that seems logical, as the United States' presence in Europe is being reduced. I, for one, hope that the United States maintains its presence, but I think that the United States can maintain it only if it can base its presence on a clear definition of what the Europeans are prepared to contribute and what functions we think the Americans should provide for the years to come – functions without which we will not have the full effectiveness of our own security and defence activities.

Of course, the two-pillar alliance has to be shaped in such a way that we introduce our positions in a constructive fashion in NATO consultations. That is one of the main tasks that I, as Chairman of the Permanent Council, will have when we move to Brussels. We must ensure that we do that in a constructive way, step by step – not exaggerating our European capabilities, but making a constructive contribution to decisions which will have ultimately been taken in the NATO alliance.

My third point refers to the notion of mutually reinforcing institutions. Mr. De Hoop Scheffer referred this morning to that notion. I agreed with him when he said that, in practice, one organisation is hiding behind the other – not so much that WEU is hiding behind NATO or vice versa, as that we are all hiding behind the United Nations. I have the feeling that we are all talking about peace-keeping, but we forget that, at least in Yugoslavia, there is no peace to keep.

We are failing in our response to that situation. What can we do if there is no peace? Nevertheless, our main concern is that we should avoid a process of escalation which could be very dangerous to peace and security in Europe.

My concern also is that we may insist so much on mandates – either from the United Nations or from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe – that we become so completely dependent on them, and on their not being issued, that we imperil ourselves and lose any capability of autonomous action. If that happens, our public will quickly realise that our military forces will never be used, and they will soon lose the will to finance them.

My fifth comment is an utterance of surprise that, after forty years in which we have built our security on deterrence – the demonstration of military capability, solidarity and political will as the main underpinning of our defence – we are now in a situation in which we do not use our military capability at all, even to support our political objectives by a demonstration of their availability.

A year and a half ago, I said – I think in this very hemicycle – that if we had had a military capability – if we had had the flotilla in the Adriatic that we have today – I do not think that the bombardment of Dubrovnik would have taken place. If we had had some capability to back up the political activities, first of Lord Carrington and now of Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, to act as an interposing force as soon as a cease-fire was in place and holding, I think that the political credibility of Europe would have been greater.

In that context, the European Community has the potential for the convergence of foreign, economic and security policy. We have some lev-

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

erage on the neighbouring countries if they do not want to participate in our activities in support of the United Nations and so on. On the contrary, we are applying a kind of counter-deterrence by repeatedly saying that our military forces are in Yugoslavia only for humanitarian purposes, that they will not be used for any military engagements. No wonder our credibility is so low. No wonder all the cease-fires which we have painfully negotiated are broken within a day or so.

Sixth, my concern about Yugoslavia may sound cynical, but we must consider not only the enormous human suffering involved but the very real danger of an escalation towards a new European war in the Balkans and the danger of the loss of the CSCE principles. Those principles are being violated in Yugoslavia. The status quo is being changed by force. Borders are being changed against the will of the countries concerned and minorities are not allowed to live in peace where they belong.

Our concern should be that people do not get the impression that they can get away literally with murder and that only power counts, especially the power of the gun. If we allow that, the Helsinki principles will fall by the wayside and our hope of a new code of conduct, our hope for orderly relations in Europe, will evaporate into thin air. Those dangers are even more pressing than what is happening in the many individual tragedies in the former Yugoslavia.

That is why we must be prepared to ask for sacrifices on the part of our military men and women. Without their contribution the weeks and months to come will be many times worse.

To restore our credibility in Yugoslavia, we must first concentrate on limited objectives. We also owe it to our military personnel to clarify our objectives – they are not yet clear. Let us strive to do well the things that we say we want to do. If we say that we want to enforce an embargo let us make sure that it is effective – at sea, on land, on the Danube, and in the air if it is necessary to enforce the no-flying zone resolution.

Second, if we say that we want to bring humanitarian relief to Sarajevo and other places we must make sure that it gets there and that we allow the limited use of force if necessary, focused on particular missions announced in advance.

We created safe havens in Kurdistan without first seeking a precise Security Council resolution. Why not do the same in Yugoslavia? That is my *cri de cœur*. I was happy this morning to hear members of the Assembly speaking along roughly the same lines. I was

also encouraged to continue the difficult but important task of being Secretary-General of WEU. Thank you for your support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your address.

I am sure you will be prepared to reply to members of the Assembly who wish to ask you questions.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this time I shall speak in Dutch, because I am not speaking as Chairman of the committee and I have not had the opportunity to consult my committee. I have two short questions.

The Political Committee has tried to have Mr. Ward's report on enlargement debated in this Assembly. We were unable to do so because we had just received a reply from the Council of Ministers indicating that to invite countries other than the contracting parties would have been contrary to the treaty. Thus we were not allowed to invite representatives of any kind from countries that are not yet members, even if they are observers or associate members. Faced with this last-minute reply, we could only adjourn the discussion. Is the Secretary-General aware that because of the reply from the Council of Ministers and the fact that it was received so late, we were unable, out of respect for the Council of Ministers, to do what the Secretary-General blames us for not doing, namely inviting all those who should in fact be here?

The Secretary-General must be aware that for the last eighteen months this Assembly has been making desperate efforts to induce the Council of Ministers to take action on Yugoslavia; efforts to achieve what, apparently at least, the Secretary-General blames this Assembly for not achieving. Is the Secretary-General aware that we should be very glad if he were to address equally harsh and indeed condemnatory language primarily to the Council of Ministers? I have emphasised that public opinion at home blames us, and our policy, for doing nothing. This Assembly blames the Council of Ministers for always doing too little too late and too ineffectively. Is the Secretary-General prepared to aim the stern language he has used to us much more sternly, critically and effectively at the Council of Ministers?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I have been charged by the Permanent Council with conveying to this Assembly the fact that that Council sees no objection to inviting official representatives of the six new partners to take their places on the "banc du gouvernement" in the hemicycle. We see no

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

contradiction between that and the answer to a different question on the status of associate members given before 20th November. All arrangements are provisional until the treaty of accession of Greece has been ratified by all member countries. We would be the last to put any legal obstacles in the way of the Assembly extending an invitation to our new partners. We are implementing almost all the provisions governing the new status of Greece, Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Denmark and Ireland, and have been doing so since the last meeting of the Permanent Council in London. I regret any legal problems that may have prevented their presence here.

I did not quite follow Mr. Stoffelen's remark to the effect that I had shown insufficient understanding of the Assembly's activities. On the contrary, I greatly appreciate the commitment of many members of this Assembly. I would only add that the Assembly should not expect much more information in the form of written questions and answers and in the annual report of the Council. It is always difficult for the presidency and the secretariat to formulate answers fully compatible with the views of the nine – soon to be ten – member countries.

Secondly, many member countries do not provide that kind of information to their own parliaments, let alone it being possible for international organisations to provide it to theirs. That problem is inherent in our relations, and that is why I would very much prefer it if we developed other possibilities for dialogue and discussion, and to that end I have said that I am available, and my deputy is available, if people want to see us. We are prepared to talk to your rapporteurs, as we have on many occasions. We have invited President Soell to come to us and explain his strategic priorities for the Assembly to the Permanent Council. The new Standing Committee will enable you to have the dialogue rather more easily than you could as a full Assembly. That is probably a more constructive way of working together.

On your last point, many members of the Council think that I am going too fast.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Lest he should misunderstand me, let me start by saying that I am 100% a staunch supporter of the Secretary-General. I listened to his speech with growing astonishment, and then dismay. I felt astonishment because, frankly, what he was saying is what has been said for eighteen months or more on this side of the rostrum. His speech today was more like that of a member of parliament than that of a secretary-general. I felt

dismay because it is clear to me from what he said, both in his speech and in answer to questions, that he cannot convince the Ministerial Council of the wisdom of his ideas. What he said proved that, to get a report, we have to use the lowest common denominator because that report has to be agreed by everybody. It is, therefore, virtually useless.

To have the Secretary-General talking to us is a bonus, but does he really believe that he will be able to convince not the Permanent Council but ministers of the sense of what he has been saying or does he think that we shall be here in twelve months' time wringing our hands and bemoaning what is happening in Kosovo, Macedonia or wherever, knowing that we have done our best to get things right but that the Secretary-General has been blocked because he cannot get a unanimous decision of ministers?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Lord Finsberg asked me a very difficult question, because I am the servant of the Council and I can only jump as far as the Council will allow me. I am confident, however, that we are doing effective work – even if some of it may be too little and also a bit too late.

It is remarkable how much progress we have made in WEU in the past year, at a time when many other European activities have been in difficulty. I find it encouraging that all the aims that were set out during the German and Italian presidencies have been realised – enlargement, the move to Brussels, the satellite station in Torrejón, the planning cell.

You may say, as I am inclined to, that that is merely the institutional and procedural framework, and that it is now the substance that matters. At the same time, I believe that, when arrangements and structures are available, people will probably make use of them, and it is my task – admittedly a limited task – to have the capabilities ready so that nobody can hide behind the fact that the capabilities are insufficient. Once we have the capabilities ready, together – and the Assembly has an important rôle in this – we can say, let us try to use them. Otherwise, everything will be in vain.

I am realistic enough, however, to realise that many countries have valid reasons for the position that they are taking and that it will be difficult to involve them in common action. Nevertheless, we have made some progress.

I pay tribute to the Italian presidency, which has done a very good job. The political decision was taken in Helsinki in July, and two days later our surveillance action started. On Friday, 20th November, we decided on embargo enforcement, and the following Sunday it took effect. We are showing that it is possible, but we must

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

go further. As I said with some emotion, I am grateful to the Assembly for helping us to sail in that direction.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – My question deals with an issue that may seem somewhat minor in the context of all the important issues on which you have reported today.

You expressed your disappointment that Greece has not been able to attend this week as a full member. Many of us are similarly disappointed that Greece and the other countries could not be admitted to their rôles. When they are admitted, major problems will arise for the Assembly, one of which is accommodation. We are now under extreme pressure because of the demands upon our existing accommodation and that problem will be further aggravated when Greece and the other countries are entitled to come to WEU in their various capacities. To support their rôle here, they will require office space and various other accommodation and facilities. It has been reported to me that the Socialist Group has now had to move into a room which is little more than a cupboard and which is also used for other purposes. That is the sort of pressure that we are under. You will be aware that any future expansion of WEU is likely to render this building and its facilities inadequate to allow us to conduct our business properly. Can you give us any guidance, help or suggestions on how we can overcome that serious problem?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I gave a brief response to that question when our President invited me to address the Political Committee when it met in London a month ago. In the first place, the Council has always been willing to provide the necessary resources immediately connected with enlargement. When Spain and Portugal joined we decided to renovate our facilities in this building and agreed to additional personnel for the secretariat of the Assembly to facilitate Spanish and Portuguese representation.

I am convinced that the Council will be prepared to do the same and to see to it that adequate translation facilities and staffing of the Office of the Clerk are provided to allow Greece to be represented.

It is up to the Assembly itself to formulate its needs. You have some time, but not much because I expect the treaty to be fully ratified at about this time next year. Your December

session will probably be the first occasion on which Greek parliamentarians will formally be part of the Assembly. We have some time, but the initiative must come from the Assembly; you must make proposals which we will then be prepared to discuss with you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Secretary-General, I should like to ask two questions connected with the organisation of WEU and its operation. As co-Rapporteur with Mr. Tummers of the report on organisation on which the information brochure is based, I need a chart showing the structure of the organisation. We asked the Council of Ministers for this and their reply was very disappointing: they could not give us an organogram. This is very disappointing because the organisation is very complex and it would be very useful to be informed about the chain of command and the responsibilities at the different levels. Why can no one give us such an organogram for WEU?

My second question relates to the choice of contractor to equip the Torrejón satellite centre. Several firms were competing for the contract and I should like to know what procedure was followed. Was the final choice made by the Council of Ministers or by the Secretary-General?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I shall gladly reply to your two questions.

The first is about the organogram. We are at the moment changing it. With the move to Brussels the organisation has to be slightly different. We shall have certain new duties and I hope to get some additional staff. I have therefore decided to reorganise my secretariat and to create a political division in the proper sense by separating the Council secretariat service from the press department. With the advent of the planning cell, due to be fully operational by about 1st April, there will be some additional work for the accountants and the administrative staff.

Furthermore, with this building, which is much larger, more modern and much better equipped than the London building, a somewhat larger maintenance department will be required.

We were working with Ambassador Holthoff only last Monday on the organogram which we will be submitting to the Budget Committee due to meet in London this Friday. The Council ought to give its decision next week or the week after. You have my word that as soon as the

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

Council has approved the organogram I shall transmit it to the Assembly so that you can use it in your future reports.

Your second question concerns the contract for fitting out the satellite centre. Immediately prior to the ministerial meeting in Rome on 20th November, we agreed that it would go to the Marcol consortium, but a few details still have to be settled before the firm order can be placed. The choice has been made, only the specification remains to be settled. I hope we shall be able to give the go ahead before the end of this year, so that work at Torrejón can begin as quickly as possible. On Tuesday, when you were here, we signed the contract by which the Spanish Government places the land and the building, which is of excellent design and construction, at our disposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eser, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. ESER (*Observer from Turkey*). – I thank Mr. van Eekelen for his excellent report. I do not wish to ask a question as such, but I wish to say something about Kurdistan. The Secretary-General used the word Kurdistan several times, but I think that it should be known as Northern Iraq. That name has not been recognised or registered. Let me remind the Assembly that generations of people in Turkey have sacrificed themselves to serve others in a time of universal crisis.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Mr. Eralp, the leader of the Turkish Delegation in discussions on associate membership status, was one of the best negotiators whom I have ever observed: he was most constructive.

Although associate members – obviously – are not full members, they will now be able to participate fully in our activities. That is the essence of what I have described as the European pillar of NATO. We want all NATO's European members to sit around the same table as all the members of the European Community: only in that way can we make an effective contribution to NATO's consultations.

There is also the question of the independent European programme on equipment and co-operation, and other European activities. It makes sense to transfer such functions to WEU. I have not advocated that actively, but the groups involved have recognised the logic of a transfer; our side has said that, in terms of activities in which they already participate as full members, there will be no difference between a Norwegian, a Turk and a Dane. Clearly, any

organisation that merges with WEU will have the same rights and obligations as full members. In such activities, all European members of NATO will have the same status within WEU. That is an encouraging development, which will enable us – slowly, perhaps, but definitely nonetheless – to move towards the establishment of a European armaments agency, which will eventually make realistic European armaments co-operation possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I repeat all our thanks to you, Secretary-General.

6. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration
and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1325 and addendum)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 and vote on the draft budget, Document 1325 and addendum.

I call Mr. Lagorce who is deputising for Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is Mr. Rathbone who should have been presenting this report on the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 1993. But you know the sad reason preventing him from being here today, namely the recent death of his step-daughter in a car accident. Our hearts go out to our colleague at this time in friendship and sympathy.

Mr. Rathbone has sent us the material on which his report was to be based. I shall therefore read it to you off the cuff, and I thank him for having made my task so much easier in this way.

The draft budget of the Assembly for 1993 was transmitted to the Council on 22nd July 1992 in order to improve the procedure in accordance with Order 80. The President of the Assembly and the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration had already gone to London on 24th June to give the Council details of considerations on which its draft budget had been based, the steps it was proposed to take to meet the requirements of the post-Maastricht situation and the staff required to put these intentions into effect. They also stressed matters of concern to the Assembly and also the Assembly's wish to be informed in good

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

time of the funds on which it could count in order to organise its work.

The WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, however, was unable to have its first exchange of views on this draft budget until 24th September 1992, a meeting attended for the first time by the Chairman of the Assembly Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. Unfortunately, the review was not completed until 13th November 1992 so that the Assembly was not informed of the Council's opinion until just before the part-session, obliging the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to hold their meetings while the part-session was in progress and with no time to study the effects of the reductions made to the Assembly's programme in any detail.

Everyone knows, of course, that the Secretary-General and WEU's other ministerial committees now have a heavy workload and some top priority problems to handle connected with the establishment of the new agencies – the satellite centre at Torrejón and the planning cell – and with the move of the Secretariat-General from London to Brussels. It is therefore to be hoped that the new procedure for the approval of the Assembly's budget, as proposed in Order 80, will be on the agenda at an early meeting of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and that it will be possible to apply this procedure next year.

As pointed out in Document 1325, the draft operating budget of the Assembly for 1993 identifies three major priorities: to expand the Assembly secretariat, in particular by creating three B3 assistant posts, to increase the appropriations needed for running the activities of the various organs of the Assembly, and to obtain the sums needed to update the installations and purchase the equipment required because of Greece's accession to WEU.

While approving the recommendations finally proposed by the WEU Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, the Council felt it should hold the rate of growth at zero although in certain cases it might be possible to take account of the new dimension in the rôle of the Assembly given the present political situation. It was therefore unable to accept the proposals for creating new posts and regrading four existing posts. It also wanted F 522 000 to be deducted, i.e. the whole of the sum that had been put into the budget to cover the costs of Greece's joining WEU, in view of the fact that, allowing for the process of ratification of the agreements, the accession was unlikely to take effect in 1993. As regards the operating budget of the Assembly, it decided on a growth rate of 6.5% over the previous financial year to cover the salary scales

adjustment approved by the co-ordinating committee for the permanent and temporary staff mentioned in Heads I and II of the draft budget for which the estimates were revised at the request of the Budget and Organisation Committee. It was decided to leave the Assembly free to adjust the estimates concerning its operating budget, in accordance with its priorities, within the limits of the growth rate of 6.5% – in so far as a margin for adjustment still remained. It accepted the Assembly's pensions budget after deducting a sum set aside for contributions to the pensions fund now that the proposals concerning permanent staff of the secretariat of the Assembly had been withdrawn.

Thus the draft operating budget of the Assembly has been reduced from F 30 990 000 to F 27 925 000, and the overall draft budget, including pensions, from F 34 298 000 to F 31 268 000. The new amounts represent a 6.5% growth rate for the operating budget and 7.17% for the budget as a whole.

Clearly, such a massive reduction to the proposed budget will mean having to revise the programme of activities for the coming year, although it had been drawn up with the likelihood of a considerable expansion of the Assembly's relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and North America, the countries of the European Community and of NATO which are not members of WEU, and the Mediterranean countries in mind.

The Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration nevertheless note that the Council found it necessary to grant the Assembly a higher growth rate for its budget than the rate of inflation in France, which OECD puts at 2.6% for 1993, whereas this rate was applied strictly to the ministerial organs of WEU.

At this time of economic difficulty, which is forcing all member countries to make considerable reductions in their budgets, the Council has thus to some extent shown the value it places upon the part played by the Assembly in a particularly important phase of political development on the international stage.

This being so, however frustrating so big a reduction in the budget may be, the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration decided to recommend that the Assembly accept the opinion of the Council as set out in the addendum to Document 1325. It will be the Presidential Committee's responsibility to make the necessary changes in the draft budget to ensure that the resources available are used in such a way as to bring about the largest possible increase in the activities of our Assembly, and in the effectiveness and efficiency of its work, which is constantly increasing in importance.

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

It is for the reasons set out above that we recommend the Assembly to accept the revised budget.

(Lord Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Lagorce.

The debate is open.

There is only one speaker, Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe, who is not with us.

We shall now vote on the draft budget contained in Document 1325 and addendum.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

We shall now vote on the draft budget for the financial year 1993.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft budget for the financial year 1993 is adopted.

7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1328 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1328 and addendum.

I call Mr. Lagorce to present the report.

Mr. LAGORCE *(France)* (Translation). – Mr. President, I can only say that the auditor's report was adopted unanimously by our Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Lagorce.

We shall now vote on the motion to approve the final accounts contained in the addendum to Document 1328.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The motion is agreed to.

8. The situation in East Timor

(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1353)

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now consider the request for urgent procedure for the motion for a resolution on the situation in East Timor, Document 1353.

In accordance with Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure, this request has been presented by ten or more representatives.

I remind the Assembly that the following only may be heard: one speaker for the request, one speaker against, the Chairman of the Political Committee and one representative of the Bureau speaking in its name.

There is a problem in that the Bureau has not had an opportunity to meet to consider this matter. It will therefore not be possible for anyone to speak on behalf of the Bureau. If there are members of the Bureau who feel that, in those circumstances, no view can be given by the Bureau, I suggest that it would be wrong to grant urgent procedure. As I am presiding, I shall not give a view on that matter. At the appropriate time, I shall ask if any members of the Bureau wish to speak. In the meantime, everyone is limited to a five-minute speech.

I ask Mr. Brito to speak to the request for urgent procedure.

Mr. BRITO *(Portugal)* (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, on 20th November, Xanana Gusmao, leader of the Timorese resistance, was imprisoned by the Indonesian army. Since then, Xanana Gusmao has been denied any legal assistance, the Indonesian governor having failed to respond to the calls of the United Nations Secretary-General for the prisoner to be visited by the International Red Cross.

We also have reliable information that hundreds of people were imprisoned at the same time, some of whom have been tortured and others have died.

The life of the leader of the Timorese resistance is consequently in danger. He is being

Mr. Brito (continued)

deprived of his most basic human rights, having been imprisoned during the course of a military operation.

It is my view, therefore, that this Assembly, in the context of other resolutions which it has already taken in defence of human rights, should make a stand in this case because his life is in danger. If we delay such action, which could give the government of Indonesia an opening, then obviously the opportunity will be lost. So I am calling upon this Assembly to do everything in its power to approve the resolution on this matter.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the request?...

I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I fully understand the powerful plea of our Portuguese colleague regarding the arrest of the Fretilin leader in East Timor. He will realise that this subject affects us in the Netherlands as well. Nevertheless, for reasons of principle which I shall now state, I will be voting against this motion. Those reasons have nothing to do with the content of the motion.

I believe that we should be weakening WEU if we neglected the good old Dutch proverb which runs: *Cobbler, stick to your last*. I leave the translation to our interpreters. Do within Western European Union those things that are within the remit of Western European Union; do in the United Nations those things that are within the remit of the United Nations, and do in the Council of Europe those things that are within the remit of the Council of Europe. If we fail to do this and begin to confuse our responsibilities, we shall be running two risks. First the risk of triggering a reaction based purely on form – in other words: what is WEU interfering in? Secondly, there is the risk of doing no good to the cause. As regards the cause itself, I fully endorse the views of those who submitted this motion.

For the sake of our Assembly's credibility, we must not take this course of action. I know that there are precedents for it, but I believe them to be mistaken. That is why I intend to vote against this motion.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Does the Chairman of the Political Committee wish to speak?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – As you know, the committee did not discuss this motion for a resolution, but it decided on the programme of work for the next six months and it

did not include this item in the agenda. My guess is that my committee will stick completely to the programme of work and will not include other items.

In addition, my committee and the Defence Committee presented to this Assembly extremely important reports on the tragedy in Yugoslavia, where at least 100 000 lives are in danger. It would not be in the interests of that debate if an important debate on the life of someone in another continent were suddenly to be held here. That could damage the credibility of this Assembly, and I know that that is not Mr. Brito's aim.

Would it be possible to send to the Indonesian Ambassador, from many members of this Assembly, a letter with the same content as the motion?

That would have an immediate impact and would be much more in line with the feelings of members of the Assembly. I therefore ask Mr. Brito and others not to pursue their attempts to hold an urgent debate and instead to send a letter with the same sort of content. The letter could be drafted today. My advice to the Assembly is not to agree to the urgent procedure.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – It seems to me that we are beginning to discuss procedure rather than substance. I do not know if it would still be possible for the Bureau and the Presidential Committee to study this text and reach a point of view before submitting it to the Assembly. You told us, Mr. President, that the Bureau had not had an opportunity to do this, but I see that the people signing this request for urgent procedure include several members of the Presidential Committee and some outstanding personalities of the Assembly. So it would seem unthinkable to shelve a problem like this simply on procedural grounds.

I should be grateful for an answer.

The PRESIDENT. – I shall treat that as a point of order. I remind the Assembly that I have asked the Clerk to go and get the documents. I do not have them yet but we did something similar in December 1991, when we instructed the Clerk to take a resolution to the Indonesian Embassy in Paris.

The problem with Mr. de Puig's good suggestion is that if it were adopted the Assembly could not be given the proper period of notice. It would therefore not be possible to deal with the matter tomorrow. It would have to wait until the Standing Committee considered it, but by the time the Presidential Committee has met the orders of the day are already prepared.

The suggestion by the Chairman of the Political Committee is probably the wisest

The President (continued)

course of action. No one here dissents from the substance of what is being proposed; it is merely a question of how best to achieve it. I hope that Mr. Brito will accept Mr. Stoffelen's view and will prepare a suitable letter which could go to the Indonesian Embassy tomorrow. I am certain that far more people than are present here now would be prepared to sign it. That would be more effective than trying to push through an urgency motion which would probably be lost. Does Mr. Brito feel that he can accept Mr. Stoffelen's helpful suggestion?

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Stoffelen's proposal is, I think, positive, but it is not a substitute for the influence which this Assembly can bring to bear. So, while welcoming and supporting Mr. Stoffelen's initiative, I believe that this Assembly has a moral obligation to take action on this matter, because it relates to a violation of human rights during a military operation.

As the protection of human rights is one of the basic principles of our institution, to neglect or postpone the discussion and approval of this resolution is not the best way of dealing with this human rights issue.

The PRESIDENT. – You have made your point, Mr. Brito. I remind the Assembly that the arrest took place not yesterday but a few days ago. The document could therefore have been presented on our first day, but it was not. Members have now heard the proposal for urgency being opposed by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer and by the Chairman of the Political Committee.

I will now put the proposal to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The proposal for urgent procedure is adopted.

It is referred to the Political Committee and the Assembly will discuss the substance of the text tomorrow morning as the final item in our order of business.

Are there any objections to that?...

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. This decision makes it necessary to declare that the meeting of the Political Committee will now take place at the end of this afternoon's sitting.

The PRESIDENT. – That has been noted. I deprecate the absence of good order from these proceedings. The Political Committee will meet; if no members are available to attend it, it will not be able to meet, and nothing can be done about that.

9. Composition of the political groups – Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1331)

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the composition of the political groups – Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure and vote on the draft decision, Document 1331.

I call Mr. Thompson, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report.

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – As Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges I should like to add a little more to my explanatory memorandum, and to explain the background and the reason why the proposed amendment to Rule 39, paragraph 4, came about.

Earlier this year, a motion submitted by the Unified European Left Group proposed that the Presidential Committee be given powers to waive the rules of the Assembly regarding the minimum size of political groups, because that group's numbers had been significantly reduced following the Italian elections – to below the figure of nine stipulated in Rule 39 as the minimum necessary to establish a political group. At that time the Unified European Left Group wanted to seek permission from the Presidential Committee to continue as a political group even though membership was down to six – as a separate political group it no longer exists. It has now been absorbed into the Socialist Group so to that extent the problem has disappeared.

The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges began to consider modifying Rule 39 and discovered that this rule, established before Portugal and Spain joined WEU, specified the number nine, not one-tenth or 10% as originally determined. After Spain and Portugal joined WEU in 1988 the number of representatives rose from eighty-nine to one hundred and eight, so the change of rule will mean that the minimum number of representatives necessary to form a political group will rise from nine to 10.8, which could be rounded up to eleven.

The amendment to Rule 39 will also provide for any future changes in numbers of representatives – an increase or, less likely, a decrease in the number of member nations – and will avoid any future changes being necessary, thereby making the rule more practical.

The Assembly is aware of the proposals included in Mr. Ward's report which is being prepared on behalf of the Political Committee and of the fact that consideration is being given to the acceptance of Greece as a full member, of Norway, Iceland and Turkey as associate

Mr. Thompson (continued)

members, and of Denmark and Ireland as observers. The amendment will accommodate these changes as and when they come about. The attention of the Assembly is also drawn to another aspect of the composition of political groups – the number of nationalities which should be represented in a group. Our sister organisation, the Council of Europe, with a wider membership than WEU, has a rule defining an acceptable political group as consisting of at least three different nationalities, and although the instructions to the committee did not require us to examine that issue, in theory a political group of WEU could consist of one nationality. The committee invites the Assembly to instruct it to examine that and report back. Our rules are based upon the requirement to maintain strong democratic principles by supporting political groups while also maintaining practical arrangements for the operation of the Assembly. The modest change in Rule 39, paragraph 4, would further that aim. I commend it to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Thompson.

I see that no one has tabled an amendment or asked to speak. The debate is therefore closed.

We will now vote on the draft decision contained in Document 1331.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft decision is agreed to¹.

I stress that the draft decision is carried and, with it, the request for the additional work of which Mr. Thompson spoke. You have permission to carry out that extra work, Mr. Thompson, but, in fact, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges can always do what it wishes to examine matters. It does not require permission to start work.

10. European armaments co-operation after Maastricht

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1332 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on

European armaments co-operation after Maastricht and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1332 and amendments.

I call Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee, to present the report.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Andò, Minister of Defence of Italy, whom we had the pleasure of having here with us a few minutes ago, said in a recent interview in Defense News that the conventional military threat from the East has practically disappeared, even if a residual nuclear deterrence is still needed. But other risks are emerging, especially from the southern European and Mediterranean regions. Fortunately we do not fear, said Mr. Andò, a massive military attack, but we are worried about the growing instability, indirect threats to our security and unpredictable limited attacks against our territory and lines of communication.

It is a fact, Mr. President, that owing to the quickening pace of events in the past few years, of which we are now suffering the effects, we are living in a period of uncertainty and doubt concerning the future.

Compared with the polarised structure on which international relations have been based for forty years, the world stage today offers a disturbing panorama of bloody conflicts, some on our very doorsteps within Europe, such as the horrible war in the former Yugoslavia which we all find so distressing, and other conflicts, concealed under a blanket of silence, which may break out at any moment, filling us with uncertainty and anxiety.

This is why an organisation such as ours must be vigilant and keep its means of deterrence at the ready and be prepared to respond to whatever challenges the future may hold.

The Franco-German European brigade initiative is a case in point, as is the announcement by the ministers of defence of Italy, Spain and France on 7th September 1992 of their intention to create a European air-sea force under the aegis of WEU, about which Mr. Andò spoke a few minutes ago.

Recent experience, and in particular the Gulf war, has highlighted the existence of ultra-modern weapons, especially the so-called smart weapons, which render many of the conventional arms of our military forces quite obsolete. This has also been shown by the use of intelligence and command equipment via satellite, space-based observation and electromagnetic monitoring devices, strategic mobility by sea and air, the use of accurate so-called stealth systems and the need to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. All of these new circumstances

1. See page 39.

Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)

give cause for reflection and should encourage us to take action to ensure that our system of collective security is adequately resourced. This is why, Mr. President, in the declaration, first in the Maastricht Treaty and then in the Petersberg declaration, reference is made to the need for a greater co-operation effort and, as one expression of such co-operation, the creation of the European armaments agency.

We can summarise the situation as follows.

First, there are very many unco-ordinated programmes in the area of bilateral and multi-lateral co-operation, based on specific agreements between the states and industries concerned.

Second, there are differing requirements and opinions on the number of states which should participate in such multilateral action.

Third, the IEPG – Independent European Programme Group – a European body dealing with the standardisation of equipment since the abolition of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee – SAC – has recently intensified its efforts to harmonise requirements and draw up a programme of research and technology. Its experience could be very useful when the time comes to orchestrate greater co-operation.

Fourth, the process of joint redefinition of the threat and the equipment required to respond to the present, unspecified threat is currently under discussion.

Fifth, all government expenditure, and in particular defence spending, is coming under strong pressure from public opinion for its reduction, not only because of economic problems, but also due to changing priorities now that the former threat has disappeared – what has come to be called the peace dividend.

Sixth, on the other hand, Mr. President, technical developments in all types of armaments indicate that we shall have to make an economic effort to maintain a European-style level of development in research into leading edge technologies if we do not wish to be overtaken.

Seventh, as regards the export of arms, an important subject upon which the Assembly has already pronounced following Mr. Aarts's important report, we must also take the necessary action.

With these points in mind, the treaty of European Union, as I said previously, indicated the need to establish a European armaments agency. I welcome the reply Mr. Andò gave only a few minutes ago when he stated that, at the recent meeting of the Council in Rome, acting on a requirement we had laid down in the Presidential Committee, attempts were made to

promote and bring forward the meeting of experts from the European Independent Programme Group and Western European Union so that they could formulate or propose the necessary attributions of this agency and also its functions, because neither the treaty nor the Petersberg declaration contained any specific reference to these matters.

The objectives of the agency would be mainly to promote the efficient use of resources in research, already implemented with the EUCLID project through the Independent European Programme Group, but an area in which further experience would be useful.

Another aim would be to increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment, an essential requirement given that these multilateral actions will be increasingly required by our organisation, for two main reasons: first, because such joint action is desirable and secondly, so that what has come to be called the European defence identity may progressively take shape.

Finally, it is also necessary to safeguard a specifically European industrial base, given the degree of development reached by our respective countries and by the Community as a whole.

In research matters the accent must not be solely on more efficient use of available resources, but an inventory must also be made of the financial resources required to enable Europe to remain technologically competitive and in a position to use the various projects currently under investigation.

I must also say that, in my view, with an agency of this kind and with such co-operation it should be possible to reduce the financial effort required to carry out joint projects and to strive for co-operation rather than competition.

In my report I describe the attributes this agency must have and the relations it must maintain with the institutions of the European Community; this is an important question especially in industrial matters for the harmonisation of policy in this area. I also describe the close collaboration with the appropriate NATO institutions which is essential to ensure both efficiency and good relations and to eliminate any mistrust of the transatlantic allies.

In addressing us two days ago, Minister Rifkind said that we had to take great care in this organisation, not simply to avoid endangering good relations with our Atlantic allies, but also to avoid any suspicion of rivalry in this area.

Naturally I am in favour of seeking to defend and intensify the European identity, because I believe this is possible, but at the same time maintaining a clear, transparent and loyal

Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)

relationship within the North Atlantic organisation.

In conclusion, for forty years, Mr. President, expenditure on defence and military equipment in all member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance has been a heavy burden on national budgets, since the threat had to be met. The threat having disappeared, the Western European countries are now faced with new challenges, in particular the need to assist in the development of eastern countries and to contribute to economic, political and social stability which has been so seriously eroded not by military threats but by the economic upheavals we are all suffering and by the outbreaks of xenophobia and exclusive nationalism.

The number of citizens believing that defence budgets should be cut is steadily rising. At the same time, Europe is at a point where the risks of conflict in the world are many and serious, but not readily foreseeable. If Europe wishes to continue to make advances in defence technology, consistent with its developed status, and if it must use its financial resources in the most effective way, and deploy efforts to give more attention to human and social problems, it must pool its capabilities and energies in this area.

In these circumstances, we must not hold back the introduction of more efficient, less costly European co-operation on defence equipment in the framework established by the treaty for European Union and the spirit in which it was signed. I must elaborate on this point; as a result of this debate and our meeting with the ministers, although the treaty has not been ratified by all parties and there have, in fact, been problems and some differences of opinion, nevertheless – and in this respect I was very gratified to hear Minister Rifkind's statement – the spirit of Maastricht is still alive. It is alive in that the desire to make a joint effort as regards defence is firm and resolute and for this reason I believe that the Assembly and its institutions should be satisfied and proud of having advanced the implementation of some of the ideas contained both in the treaty, in declaration 30 of the treaty, and in the Petersberg declaration.

Furthermore – and I am about to conclude, Mr. President – with co-operation in armaments matters we are not only helping to enhance and promote a policy of integration in defence; we are also being faithful to the ideas contained in our organisation's charter on the need to promote, intensify and foster the process of political union.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to

congratulate Mr. Lopez Henares on his report, which I have read with great interest, and to make one or two comments on it.

The words co-operation, collaboration and standardisation appear constantly in our debates and, especially, during debates in this Assembly. We talk about Maastricht but when we talk of that beautiful Dutch town we are referring to agreements concerning European unity, collaboration and co-ordination at all levels. Furthermore, the author of this interesting report also refers to the production and distribution of arms. In this respect I fully support the idea of a European armaments agency, contained in item V of the draft recommendation of this report. We, as parliamentary representatives are all committed to defence, and one point on which we are all in agreement is that defence structures, armaments, equipment, communications systems, electronic components, physical systems such as radar, combat or flight simulators for aircraft or helicopters, not to mention the training of technicians, officers, soldiers, etc. – all of these items are incredibly expensive and, at times, impossible for some countries to produce.

It is not because of political problems that there is no common European defence policy; however, such a policy is becoming an economic imperative.

Mr. President, our budgets will not permit us to maintain individual, distinct and no doubt blind policies which will lead nowhere, or rather which will lead to markets for defence systems and equipment which are not European. This obviously creates dependence and is a disaster for industry, for employment and for the creativity of our technicians, who will probably leave, and go across the Atlantic.

Mr. President, how can we talk of a European army or planning cell for the defence of Europe if we are not united on armaments? If no standardised type of ammunition exists we cannot separately build fighter aircraft, for which there are various joint projects under way, nor tanks, vehicles, artillery, etc. We cannot even produce these jointly. We still do not even have an inter-European armaments agency as recommended in Mr. Lopez Henares's report. So this report is very welcome, as is Mr. Lopez Henares's initiative and I am pleased to be able to give it my unqualified support.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Dundee.

The Earl of DUNDEE (*United Kingdom*). – I begin by congratulating Mr. Lopez Henares on the report before us and on the clear way in which he has explained the problems of defence in Europe and proposed some solutions.

However daunting the new task of defence, we know that there is an enormous amount for

The Earl of Dundee (continued)

which we should be grateful. Of course, the present difficulties are infinitely preferable to the previous ones. The challenge which the present difficulties present stems from the success in pulling down the iron curtain and from the success in liberating from communist tyranny in Eastern Europe hundreds of millions of people who for seventy years have been either threatened with or directly subjected to oppressive régimes.

Nevertheless, although in theory those millions are now free, we need only consider the crisis in the previous Yugoslavia debated here this morning to realise that thousands of men and their families who are being killed, maimed and tortured would probably have been protected from their present ordeal if the old hard-line communist order were still in place. On that comparison and on the gift of the collapse of communism we may perhaps do well to reflect, as at an earlier date others are said to have reflected upon the Trojan horse: "Timeo danaos et dona ferentes."

In highlighting the priorities which affect defence issues, many of us might be inclined to start by selecting two which are rather more pragmatic and technical and to end up choosing a third which is rather more political and humanitarian. The pragmatic concerns are, first, to rationalise to the best effect the defence cuts which almost every government in the West wishes to make now that the military threat from the Soviet Union has disappeared. Secondly, we need to make the most of advances in military technology which, if handled effectively, can help to control, minimise and prevent bloodshed and violence. Those two pragmatic aims have as their background, thirdly, the political and humanitarian priority, which is simply the common desire to save lives and maintain peace through a higher degree of co-operation in defence matters among European countries.

Indeed, it could be argued that if such political will and co-operation were already in place, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia would not have escalated as it has. Many of us believe that that situation would have been kept in check if, at the outset, a clear signal had been given to the perpetrators of the violence. If necessary, we could have demonstrated our intention by concerted action. Western governments could have shown that they were prepared clinically to bomb and destroy munitions centres and key parts of the infrastructure. That would have involved minimum loss of human life and no commitment of troops on the ground.

It goes without saying that advances in defence technology may well be of little avail if

western governments do not co-operate with one another in design and standardisation, to which Mr. Borderas ably referred, and if those same governments cannot agree when to put such technology to use.

Conversely, as Mr. Lopez Henares comments in his report, if a proper level of co-operation can be engendered, we shall have the real prospect of not only preventing trouble before it occurs but of limiting and rationalising arms sales in a manner which is perfectly consistent with the aims of industry and employment. Clearly, as Mr. Lopez Henares also says, there are several ways in which those aims can be achieved, through the offices of WEU, IEPG and NATO.

Equally appropriate, given the guidelines in the Maastricht Treaty, is the case for a binding treaty which will cover IEPG, WEU and any other appropriate body in order to expedite and encourage results. So far, results have been achieved painfully slowly.

If we have learnt anything from the world wars and massacres which have taken place in our own century, it is that it is never good enough to act to cure the disease, once it is manifest. Obviously, we must act to prevent the disease taking hold in the first place. Recently, we have been given a golden opportunity which only five years ago would have been dismissed as a pipe dream. That opportunity depends on our political will and realism in co-operating on defence matters. There is a risk that through delay and muddled priorities we may let the opportunity slip by. If, instead, we grasp the nettle, there can be real hope, after years of disillusion and despair, that for the first time this century much of the world may be made safe for democracy.

The PRESIDENT. — That concludes the debate.

Does the Rapporteur wish to make any comment?

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). — I thank the two speakers for their kind words. I am aware of the difficulties to which Mr. Borderas has alluded but the art of politics is to make possible what is necessary.

(The speaker continued in English)

I thank Lord Dundee for his warm comments on my speech. I agree that many of the problems that we have today in Europe should not produce anxiety on our part. Many of the problems dealt with in the report are a consequence of the favourable development of countries being liberated from communist tyranny. As he said, the main priority now is to improve the economic and social position of those countries. I agree.

Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)

As the subject of my report was specifically co-operation in developing arms, I emphasised that aspect. But it is not incompatible with the main priority which Lord Dundee emphasised. He conceded that the two were not incompatible. Consideration of the problems referred to in my report is not incompatible with our obligation to respond to the challenge of improving economic and social conditions. But we must work on co-operation in our arms manufacturing activities. I thank Lord Dundee for his comments and his support for the report.

The PRESIDENT. – The Technological and Aerospace Committee has produced in Document 1332 a draft recommendation to which three amendments have been tabled.

The amendments will be called in the order in which they relate to the text: Amendments 1, 2 and 3.

Amendments 1 and 2, tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Socialist Group, read as follows:

1. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “not too burdensome”.
2. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add the words “and retain records of such exports”.

Is there anyone to support Amendment 1 in the absence of Mr. Hardy and Mr. Thompson?...

No. The amendment is not moved.

Is there anyone to move Amendment 2 in the absence of Mr. Hardy and Mr. Thompson?...

No. The amendment is not moved.

We now come to Amendment 3, tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares, which reads as follows:

3. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add “and promote the notification of such exports to the United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers”.

I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*). – This morning the committee considered the principle of Amendment 2, which was tabled by Mr. Hardy and Mr. Thompson, but we thought that it did not fit well with the sense of the draft recommendations. All members of the committee agreed with Amendment 3, and I submit it to Assembly for approval.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

That is not the case.

I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

11. Anti-ballistic missile defence

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1339 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on anti-ballistic missile defence and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1339 and amendment.

I call Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur of the committee, to present the report.

Mr. LENZER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as the last Rapporteur in line this afternoon, I have pleasure in presenting a report, on behalf of our committee, that deals with a very difficult subject, anti-ballistic missile defence. This is a first step into a very complex field, which will be followed by further work, as stated in the draft order before us for adoption.

Let me make a few comments on the geopolitical situation, which forms a kind of background to this subject. The question of anti-ballistic missiles was first taken up by NATO in the 1980s. A major impetus came from the United States, for example with the strategic defence initiative, SDI, a research and development programme relating to anti-missile defence technologies and defence systems. NATO discovered crucial gaps in air defence against a potential threat of thousands of tactical-range ballistic missiles. With their new, improved pinpoint targeting technology, these missiles gave the former Warsaw Pact forces an additional conventional attack option against which there was no effective defence.

Ladies and gentlemen, this geopolitical situation has since altered radically. With the disappearance of the actual, direct military threat of East-West confrontation, a latent potential for conflict, but deriving from a wide variety of

1. See page 40.

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

causes, is now the main focus of security precautions. This potential could destabilise international order in the event of crises; it could also turn into a direct military threat to our member states' defence system; or it could escalate on our periphery, i.e. the periphery of WEU. It is difficult to estimate either the time or the likelihood of latent risks turning into this kind of threat.

I know that many people do not regard this subject as very topical at the moment, for many of our fellow citizens in our member states believe that with the disappearance of the two blocs, which seemed so transparent and so orderly, no more threats arise from any part of the world. But although it could be concluded that military conflicts leading to total destruction are becoming increasingly unlikely in Europe, we must also assume that there is still a growing potential for crisis both within and outside Europe. I think the term former Yugoslavia and the events in some of the states that have emerged from the former USSR tell us something about the risks that still exist.

If economic questions overlap with ethnic, demographic and perhaps even religious problems, and these in turn overlap with power-political interests in these potential areas of conflict, then the danger of a military conflict arises.

These risk areas will not necessarily lead to a direct military threat to our territory; but if regional conflicts escalate at the same time, they could in fact destabilise Europe's internal order and that of neighbouring regions.

An approach centred only on Europe or our systems of alliance would certainly not be adequate to meet future challenges. We already see threats to security and stability in Europe and outside it, in regions such as North Africa and the Middle East. So while we must evaluate the whole spectrum of risk from a European and alliance point of view, we must always do so from a worldwide perspective as well. Similarly, the capacity for political action in the context of the various collective systems must take more account of the wider horizon of possible future crises and conflicts to be overcome.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, let me give you a few figures which form the background and working basis of this report. It has emerged from international investigations that – if the present trend continues – some fifteen states even in the third world already have ballistic missiles, that fifteen third world states will be able to build their own missiles by the turn of the century, that twenty-four or more third world states may have procured ballistic missiles by the year 2000, that at least six third world states will have missiles with a range of up to

three thousand kilometres by the year 2000, that at least three third world states may even have missiles with ranges of up to five thousand five hundred kilometres by the year 2000, that four third world states with missile programmes have or will have nuclear weapons in the near future, and lastly, that eight third world states with missile programmes will either have nuclear weapons by the year 2000 or even have a fixed programme of this kind.

Against that background I now come to our draft recommendation. First of all, it refers in very simple and summary terms to the threat, based on the experiences of the Gulf war. So I will not repeat that but turn at once to the recommendation to the Council.

The first need is for a risk assessment. The new risks resulting from the changed geopolitical situation must be assessed and incorporated in a general survey.

Secondly, Europe's needs arising out of these risks must be identified. That also involves a critical assessment of the means of reacting adequately to these threats.

Thirdly, we urgently need the member states of Western European Union to adopt a joint position.

Fourthly, we request the Council to submit its conclusions to the Assembly for further deliberation.

Ladies and gentlemen, I said right at the beginning that this report was a first step into a complex field. That is why we also ask you to approve an order that will enable our committee to pursue its work and to explore the subject in greater depth. To that end we intend to organise a symposium next year, probably at the end of March in Rome – we discussed that briefly in committee this morning – but certainly in Italy, at which industrial and scientific experts, engineers, virtually all those concerned, can contribute their experience.

Thank you for your attention, and may I say on behalf of our committee as well that I would welcome your approval.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for that masterly presentation.

Does the Chairman want to say anything?

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*). – The committee warmly approves of Mr. Lenzer's report.

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Atkinson and others, which reads as follows:

1. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Promote the participation of the largest possible number of countries and competent

The President (continued)

international and national institutions to share the burden of the establishment of a global protection system;”

I call Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this supplementary amendment is virtually a formality. At the penultimate committee meeting it did not prove possible in the heat of battle to agree the form of wording. That has now been done. From the fact that the Chairman of the committee and I as Rapporteur have both signed this amendment you can see that it is not controversial. We ask you to vote for it.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

We shall now vote on the draft order in Document 1339.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is adopted².

12. Acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia

(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1354)

The PRESIDENT. – I have just received from Mr. Pécriaux and others a motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure on

acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia, Document 1354. It has not been circulated because there was no time, so it cannot be referred to a committee but it will have to be considered at tomorrow's sitting and it can be dealt with only by a roll-call vote. I will read the motion to the Assembly.

The motion reads as follows:

“Thousands of women and children are victims of the most brutal acts of violence. They are physically and morally humiliated and forced to have “Chetnik” children. Reports by women who have been raped prove that they are aggressed in an incredible sexual manner and totally humiliated. Each day they are ill-treated by several men – sometimes at the same time – and are forced to watch acts of violence committed on those close to them. The psychological consequences are difficult to image. These women can expect no help from their compatriots, who believe that the women who have been raped have lost their honour. Those responsible for the rape wish to reduce the Muslim population, which is tantamount to ethnic cleansing. Women and girls are held in “rape camps” where each day they are humiliated and tortured repeatedly and by groups and are often even killed.

The parliamentary Assembly of WEU considers that these acts and war crimes are in the context of the policy of violence by armies at war and urges:

1. the governments of member countries to endeavour to ensure that these tortures and war crimes are brought to an immediate end;
2. governments to examine the question of including rape as a war crime in conventions of international law;
3. the governments of member countries to earmark financial means for counselling and assisting women and girls who have been raped;
4. the European Community to take effective steps to put an end to the war, extend aid programmes, assume joint responsibility for assisting refugees and examine guarantees for receiving the women concerned;
5. international organisations such as the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to strengthen their assistance to the women concerned in Bosnia-Herzegovina, establish true areas of protection and increase their medical and psychological assistance to the victims of torture.”

1. See page 41.

2. See page 42.

**13. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 3rd December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia (Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1354).
2. European security – reserve forces and national service (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1338 and 1338 supplementary draft recommendation).

3. Address by Mr. Fasslabend, Minister of Defence of Austria.
4. Western European Union – Information report (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Document 1334).
5. Situation in East Timor (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the motion for a resolution, Document 1353).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 3rd December 1992

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1354).
Speakers: Mr. Pécriaux, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Caro.
4. Change in the order of business.
5. Address by Mr. Fasslabend, Minister of Defence of Austria.
Replies by Mr. Fasslabend to questions put by: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Ferrarini, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Lopez Henares.
6. European security – reserve forces and national service (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations*, Docs. 1338 and 1338 supplementary draft recommendation).
7. Western European Union – Information report (*Presentation of the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order*, Doc. 1334).
Speakers: Mr. Lopez Henares (*co-Rapporteur*), Mr. Tummers (*Chairman and co-Rapporteur*).
8. Acts of rape and castration, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia (*Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft resolution*, Doc. 1355).
Speakers: Mr. Caro (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Iwinski (*Observer from Poland*).
9. Emergency assistance to Somalia (*Motion for a recommendation*, Doc. 1356).
Speaker: The President.
10. Close of the session.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Caro.

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

1. See page 45.

3. Acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia

(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1354)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will now consider the request for urgent procedure for the motion for a resolution on acts of violence in camps, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia, Document 1354.

In accordance with Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure, this request has been made by at least ten representatives. May I remind you that only the following may speak: one speaker for the request, one speaker against, and one representative of the Bureau speaking on its behalf.

Under Rule 32 (7) no representative may speak for more than five minutes.

I call Mr. Pécriaux to give the reasons for this request.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we heard yesterday several members of the Assembly who were moved by the particularly difficult and critical situation in former Yugoslavia. One of those speakers was Mrs. Fischer. I am sure that Mrs. Fischer will be able to speak much better than I could about the tone we wanted to express while we were drafting this text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Fischer.

Mrs. FISCHER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am most grateful for the support many colleagues have given me on this question, for it concerns not just women but our basic concept of humanity. Everyone surely knows that rape has occurred during wars in every century. In this case, however, it is a question of the systematic rape of small girls, young women, and in particular Muslim women in many camps. Anyone familiar with the Koran and the Muslim religion knows that this degradation marks these women for the rest of their lives. I would be very glad if we managed to adopt a joint declaration on the matter here today. We must also pay special attention to this question in our national parliaments at home. We should call not only on our national parliaments and governments, but also on the international organisations and communities and possibly also on the WEU Council to work towards a solution to this problem. This systematic rape concerns us all and we share the blame if we do not devote special attention to this matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against this request?...

Does the Chairman of the Political Committee wish to speak?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – If, as I hope, the Assembly approves this request and the sitting is interrupted, I intend to call a meeting of the Political Committee immediately after the interruption. I promise that we will do our best to bring that meeting to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does a representative of the Bureau wish to speak?...

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – If my colleagues in the Bureau will accept me as their spokesman, let me say that I fully agree with the procedure you have instituted, Mr. President. What we consider important is the substance of this matter, which touches on one of the most critical points in the present situation. This being so, I can but support the direction taken

by the unanimous vote in the Assembly just now.

I should also add that the Presidential Committee, according to the procedures submitted to it, adopted this procedure by seven votes in favour to five against.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the request for urgent procedure.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The urgent procedure is adopted.

The resolution is referred to the Political Committee for examination.

The sitting will be suspended during the meeting of the committee and the substance of the matter will be discussed by the Assembly at the end of the morning.

4. Change in the orders of the day

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Presidential Committee has decided to withdraw from the orders of the day the debate on East Timor.

Is there any objection?...

It is so decided.

The sitting is suspended.

(The sitting was suspended at 10.20 a.m. and resumed at 11.05 a.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

5. Address by Mr. Fasslabend, Minister of Defence of Austria

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the speech by Mr. Fasslabend, Minister of Defence of Austria.

Minister, this is the first time that the WEU Assembly, which is responsible for the application of a treaty of alliance between nine European countries, soon to be ten, has gathered to listen to a minister speaking on behalf of the Federal Republic of Austria. Your coming is particularly important because it demonstrates the death of one Europe, the Europe of hostile military blocs, which compelled your country to adopt a statute of neutrality in its constitution. At the same time it reveals the birth of a new Europe, where there is no longer any room for the ideas that have dominated international life over the last forty years.

(The President continued in German)

Minister, let me continue in our common language. We know that the government of the

The President (continued)

Republic of Austria has applied for membership of the European Community. Pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty of last December and the declaration of the Nine in Maastricht, Western European Union's task is to form the European pillar of NATO and make preparations for creating a common European security system. We are to become the security policy arm of a future European Union.

To that end, and against the background of the disintegration of the blocs, we are naturally interested in the scale and type of co-operation Austria envisages in security policy as well, given that it applied for membership in Brussels.

You are not the first Minister of Defence of a neutral country to address our Assembly. Your colleague, Mr. Anders Björck, whom we all came to know when we were working together in the Council of Europe, was here in June. The neutral countries are re-examining their neutrality now, so to speak, and contemplating various models of co-operation with Western Europe. In this context, may I extend a very warm welcome to you. You have the floor.

Mr. FASSLABEND (*Minister of Defence of Austria*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to have the opportunity to address you today and to put my thoughts and points of view to you. This is also the first time a member of the Austrian Government has addressed the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union. Perhaps that is a sign of the rapid and wide-reaching change in the security policy of our continent, the security policy of all the individual countries, but also of Europe as a whole.

(The Minister continued in French)

Both for Austria and for the rest of Europe, security policy conditions have changed more in the last four years than in the previous four decades. These developments could be summarised as follows: the end of the traditional East-West conflict and in particular the threefold collapse of Eastern Europe – the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and the communist ideology which sustained them both – have brought about radical changes in the balance of forces within the international system. One of the main characteristics of this development, which has not yet finished, is the enlargement of Europe's field of action. Nevertheless, as against a Western Europe which enjoys a sound economic foundation, all that part of the continent which used to be communist is ravaged by strong forces of disintegration.

Leaving out the Caucasus region, fourteen states have emerged, still as yet in a very unstable situation. One of them, the Ukraine, constitutes at least potentially a great European

power. Thus we are faced with some entirely new geostrategic facts in Europe.

After the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, Russia still represents the largest political entity in the world. With a surface area of around seventeen million square kilometres, the country is larger than the United States and Canada put together, and comparable in extent with the whole of the South American continent.

Since Byelorussia and the Ukraine seceded from the historical pan-Russian area, Russia has for the first time in its history lost its frontier with Poland and simultaneously its frontier with Central Europe. The breakdown of the Soviet Union means that Russia's frontiers to the west and south have retreated and are now roughly the same as they were at the beginning of the seventeenth century, before the territorial gains of the Tsar Alexis and the conquests of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great from the eighteenth century onwards, when it acquired two means of access from the sea. It has also lost the Caucasus and much of the territory acquired in the nineteenth century, the era of colonisation.

At the present time there is every reason to think that Russia will be mainly preoccupied with solving its own internal problems and finding out where it stands with its immediate neighbours. A take-over bid in Western Europe in the short- or medium-term can be virtually excluded.

Between the Baltic and the Black Sea, or even the Caucasus, several new states have come into being, all exhibiting a high degree of political and social, and especially ethnic, instability.

None of these states has frontiers more than seventy-five years old, their governments have had no democratic tradition for fifty years. Their economies are ruined and, in most cases, sharply contracting; social problems are returning, due particularly to increased unemployment and a multitude of ethnic problems. For the next few years, if not for decades, this interim Europe will be an area of great instability, owing to the imbalance of military forces. To regain some stability it will require effective assistance from outside. At the same time, probably for the first time in several centuries, none of the great powers which used to exercise control in these areas seems likely to possess the capability for forceful intervention during the coming years. Thus a pattern favourable to stabilisation and to a new order based on a new balance seems to be taking shape.

At the present time the United States does not seem to be definitely committed in Europe and for Europe. The efforts of the Americans to keep NATO in being are clear proof of this. Despite the proclamation of a new world order, the Gulf war showed the limits of the American economy

Mr. Fasslabend (continued)

when torn between the demands of international policy and those of domestic policy, both economically and socially.

Because of the new situation in Eastern Europe and the steadily increasing importance of Asia and the Pacific area, it seems unlikely that Europe will be the theatre of a confrontation in the short- or even the medium-term.

In this context I should like to ask some questions which may prompt our thinking about the first real war to have occurred in Europe since 1945, a war which has already been going on for a year and a half. Was the attack on Slovenia, then on Croatia and finally on Bosnia by the federal Yugoslav army and by forces fighting for a greater Serbia really inevitable? If fourteen thousand United Nations soldiers had been sent to Croatia before the war was even declared, would not this have had a sufficient preventive effect? Are the armed conflicts forecast by the experts, in Kosovo and Sandjak, and their threatened extension to other states such as the republic of Skopje-Macedonia really inevitable? Should we be deterred by the high cost and considerable risk from intervening more forcefully in this conflict, when leaving it to flare up means letting other, even more exorbitant, costs accrue in the short, medium and long term?

If greater Serbia were to achieve its warlike aims and to succeed in maintaining its territorial conquests and its ethnic cleansing under present conditions for the medium or even the long term, it is not hard to forecast that recourse to military measures would once more become an instrument of policy in many regions of Europe.

We are witnessing a war which not only violates the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Paris Charter for a new Europe, but which also endangers our own security.

The danger of increasing participation by fundamentalist Islamic countries is obvious, with all the unforeseeable effects that such participation would have on relations between the West and world of Islam.

Therefore, Europe has no alternative but to look to the indivisibility of our own security; the extreme complexity of the situation and especially the potential for internationalisation of the conflict make it absolutely essential to set up satisfactory arrangements for solving these problems without delay. The first policy objective must be to prevent escalation, that is to say the forcible extension of specific conflicts resulting from political activism. That would involve the danger of igniting other conflicts that would do irreparable damage in the short and medium term; added to which they would be taken as examples, leading to unforeseeable consequences.

The new security system should be based on existing European institutions and should have the specific resources available to these institutions.

If we consider this vast concept of security both geographically and in respect of its chosen objectives, the CSCE might in theory be the organisation best fitted to deal with these new requirements. However, its large membership militates against fast, effective reaction in the event of political and military conflicts. Until it can get over the unanimity clause and until it has the power to apply sanctions, the CSCE will have only a limited capacity to react to crises.

But this should not lead us to neglect the importance of the CSCE. One of its main functions could be, as it were, to act as a first institutional vehicle for new political entities. Also, the CSCE provides a suitable institutional framework for dealing with ethnic problems, which could be considered as the main reason for the emergence of conflicts. It goes without saying that Austria would give its firm support to the consolidation of CSCE as an institution.

Even now that the Soviet threat has disappeared, NATO is still the key component of the European security system, because it is still carrying out its traditional rôle. It is the only organisation to have a range of military resources giving it the capability for military intervention in crises of all types and guaranteeing the basic institutional link with the United States.

This is the first time in history that Europe has had a chance of achieving peace and stability without relying on the traditional balance of forces and on the bipolar mutual deterrence of blocs. In passing, let us not forget that the stability we formerly enjoyed was bought at a price that both nations and individuals had to pay.

The new quality of security should come mainly from increasing economic and social interdependence and should ultimately rest upon the integration of free and democratic nations. With nations regrouped, war should become not only unthinkable but also practically impossible.

The European Community best embodies this new concept of co-operation in the field of security. We must not forget that it is thanks to integration that we have succeeded in bringing peace to the western part of our continent.

The ending of the cold war has enabled us to extend this idea of the maintenance of peace and stability, based on economic and political integration, to the eastern part of our continent. Reducing the gap between the new democracies and the West economically and politically is the only effective way to counteract the threats,

Mr. Fasslabend (continued)

especially the non-military ones, coming from the East and weighing upon European security as a whole.

But the European Community cannot meet this historic responsibility to maintain peace and stability unless it has decision-making arrangements and effective means of implementing decisions. The war in former Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates the West's inability to act in foreign policy and security matters because it lacks adequate instruments.

The first encouraging steps to achieve this objective were taken at Maastricht. I do not wish to speak about current problems connected with the ratification of the treaty. Nevertheless, the Federal Government of Austria hopes that the Twelve will be able to take advantage of this historic opportunity to find solutions acceptable to all, so that the Maastricht Treaty can be implemented as soon as possible.

The Community's ability to take action faster and more effectively at international level will be strengthened by systematic collaboration between member countries and by taking joint action, including adopting for the first time in its history decisions taken by a qualified majority in the areas of both foreign policy and security.

A European security policy depends for its implementation mainly upon the resources it possesses. Although there is no doubt about the need to broaden the aspects of security, its military aspects are still important.

Of course conflicts must be resolved by peaceful means as far as possible. But if peaceful means fail because of serious violations of international law – as is happening in former Yugoslavia – we shall have to prepare for the radical application of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, which also permits military action as a last resort.

The great hopes that were placed on the working of the collective security arrangements set up under the United Nations at the end of the cold war have been disappointed. Sarajevo, Bihac and Goradze specify places where the international community has not been able to act against brutal aggression affecting the territorial integrity and political independence of a sovereign state.

The establishment in Europe of a system of collective, co-operative and common security seems to me to hold out much more promise. The obvious consequences of the Yugoslavian crisis should lead to the creation of a genuine European military power. Europe must cease to be at the mercy of outside assistance to guarantee the protection of its interests. It must be in a position to rely on resources of its own.

Therefore it is only right and proper that decisions aimed at a common foreign and security policy "shall include... the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence". In this context it was logical to make WEU the engine of this advance.

Therefore we applaud the efforts that have been made during the past six months to strengthen WEU's capacity to act.

We have in mind the following arrangements: first, the proposal of WEU member states to place troops at the disposal of missions aimed at the maintenance or re-establishment of peace under the mandates of the United Nations and the CSCE; in this respect I think it very desirable for effective action to take precedence over the question of legitimacy; secondly, the creation at Brussels of a military planning headquarters which would improve WEU's capacity to take action; thirdly, the institutionalisation of a dialogue intended more specifically to meet the security needs of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are already linked to the European Community by a treaty of association; and fourthly, actively attacking security problems and taking initiatives. I believe this last point to be essential.

I believe that a strengthened Western European Union is not only compatible with the maintenance of the rôle of NATO, but that by offering its services as a forum for consultation and co-ordination to European members of the alliance it could help to strengthen the European side and, by the same token the effectiveness of NATO.

In view of the new geopolitical configuration, how does Austria define her security policy at the present time? What part does neutrality play? I should like to clarify the following points straight away: Austria has benefited greatly from the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe. But there is no doubt that the principal threats to our security also come from that region. They are threats of a new, much more complex kind. They are tensions coming mainly from the countries themselves, not from outside.

I said at the beginning that lasting peace in this region will not be possible unless the internal dimension of security is also considered, that is to say the political, economic and social, but above all the politico-ethnic dimension. Only a European Union is capable of taking up this challenge. Our motivation to participate as a fully paid-up member in the process of European integration goes well beyond purely economic considerations. Membership of the European Community has become one of the key questions of security for Austria. That is why Austria fully shares the European Union's objectives of a common foreign and security policy. It is now becoming

Mr. Fasslabend (continued)

apparent that the points of view of Austria and the European Community in these two areas are drawing closer together day by day. Furthermore, Austria also accepts the prospect of a common defence policy as provided for in the treaty on European Union.

This position taken by our government was set out in a resolution adopted by a large majority in the Austrian Parliament last month. What I am going to read to you should throw light on its new position with regard to security problems: "Parliament welcomes the stated position of the Austrian Government that Austria is in full agreement with the main objectives of a common foreign and security policy for the European Union. It will become actively associated with this policy and its development. Parliament fully approves the declaration by member states expressed in the preamble to the Maastricht Treaty, dealing with the pursuit of a common foreign and security policy and its main objectives."

I need hardly say that the acceptance of a common defence policy and of the prospects it opens up also has a bearing on the nature of the relations to be maintained in future with WEU.

In the memorandum sent by the Austrian Government to member states of the European Community at Lisbon, it was stated that on accession to the European Union, Austria would accept all the necessary consequences. The Maastricht Treaty does in fact attribute a very important rôle to WEU in the context of the development of European Union. This declaration takes account of the fact that until now WEU has not laid down any kind of institutionalisation of relations with prospective members.

Bearing in mind the present situation in south eastern Europe and the increasing similarity of the interests of Austria and of the Community in regard to security, I for my part see a favourable opportunity for making use of the procedure for institutionalising our relations with WEU, as soon as negotiations for our accession have begun.

Never mind if it is now called a special relationship or a provisional observer status. The possibility of an in-depth dialogue on security matters is far more important than what the status is called.

My presence here, and the opportunity it gives me, as the first member of the Austrian Government to address this Assembly, are certainly an important part of such a dialogue. Also, we attach the greatest importance to the parliamentary dimension, since this is the second time that members of the Austrian Parliament have attended the parliamentary Assembly of WEU

as observers. We should like to make this exchange between our parliamentarians and those of WEU into a long-term relationship.

Please allow me one further concluding observation: I have dwelt on the advantages that Austria, as a fully paid-up member, will derive from participation in the process of European integration; but Austria will not arrive with empty hands.

First, and most important, economically and politically Austria is the only strong pillar in a very fragile geopolitical region. In particular, our ability to meet non-military threats emanating from our neighbours in the east and the south-east is extremely important to the security of the European Union. Furthermore, for many decades now, Austria has been one of the main suppliers of some of the most experienced troops to have taken part in peace-keeping activities under the auspices of the United Nations. At the present time more than one thousand Austrian soldiers are permanently assigned outside their own country. A glance at the map is enough to show the geographical position of our country as regards stabilisation in central and eastern Europe, in south-eastern Europe and beyond that, as regards North-South relations in Europe.

Furthermore, the relationships we have traditionally maintained with these regions are a valuable contribution to European Union. This aspect was also expressed in the committee's opinion. The importance of 1989 as a turning point in history is recognised, but certain aspects still elude us. It is in the interests of our survival to play a full and active part in building a new European security structure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Minister for his speech. I am sure he will agree to answer questions by the members of this Assembly. He may do so from his seat.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I fear the Minister does not understand Dutch. None the less, I would like to speak in my native language. Would you be so kind as to put on your ear-phones? Can you hear me? No. In that case I will speak German.

This morning the Minister confirmed the good impression the Defence Committee of Western European Union gained last year when we were your guests in Austria. I well remember that even at the time the Minister pointed to the very great significance of the Yugoslav war – we can say quite definitely that it was already a war then. Since you referred to safe havens even at that time, now that everyone is talking about them I would like to hear your view on the part Austria will play in the debate on these safe havens.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FASSLABEND (*Minister of Defence of Austria*) (Translation). – I too will endeavour to answer your question in my native tongue.

By virtue of its geographical position, Austria undoubtedly has a particular knowledge of the Balkans and indeed of south-eastern Europe as a whole. We have considered these questions in depth and believe that we can certainly achieve some progress if we take active foreign policy measures in this area. I know that Austria has very often been suspected of wanting to re-establish links with ancient history. Let me say here quite openly and frankly that we are far too small a country to do so; after seventy-five years we have found our own rôle, and we feel very much at home with it. We do not want to pursue power politics. I can say that quite plainly. But on the other hand, as a stable entity and as the most eastern of western European countries, we regard it as our duty to contribute towards stabilising this area. That is why I believe that one of our foreign policy aims must be to seek to understand the problems as well as the attributes in this area.

I would therefore like to repeat something I tried to say earlier. It is possible that a decisive confrontation will take place in Posavina, in what is called the corridor connecting western Serbia and the former Yugoslavia. If the Serbian forces actually manage to take over this area, it will hardly be possible to prevent greater Serbia from achieving its war aims. It would almost automatically have implications for other regions of Europe if it were found that the attempt to gain territory by military means became worthwhile again.

I think our first objective ought to be to prevent the war from spreading. So I am glad that serious efforts have already been made to take protective measures for Kosovo and Sandjak. If you look at the military situation in Sandjak today you will see that it is in fact no different from that in Sarajevo a year ago. The artillery and tank guns are already pointing at the town of Novi Pazar, prepared for another strike. I think there is a need for safety measures here and that we must not lose any time. One of our main priorities must be to prevent the war from spreading, to avoid a huge conflagration.

Secondly, we must try to stabilise those areas that are not at war and provide humanitarian aid at the very least. The establishment of safe havens was an attempt to give at least some assistance to the 2.5 million people who are now refugees in wintertime, the harshest season of the year.

Thirdly, we must aim to prevent Serbia from achieving its ambition of becoming greater Serbia, for that could have repercussions in

many eastern and south-eastern European countries.

Since this is the first question, perhaps I may say something else about it. People keep discussing whether or not it makes any sense to consider possible fundamentalist threats arising from the occupation of Bosnia. I think they will inevitably arise if the Muslim population of Bosnia, which was never fundamentalist and always felt European, is not given a chance to have its own living space and to live as it wants. If it is driven out of its living space, that is bound to affect its links with fundamentalist organisations. I would not like to predict what effects that might have on other European countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ferrarini.

Mr. FERRARINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, I should like to offer you my compliments and thanks for your very full and detailed report, and to welcome at the same time your country's growing involvement in the process of European Union.

The question I should like to ask is, however, more specific and limited. What may be the imminent division of Czechoslovakia into two separate countries is a cause for concern because of the complications which may result in the country's domestic and international relations, even if, we hope, the dramatic events of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet republics are not likely to occur in this country's case. I hope, therefore, with separation looming for 1st January 1993, there will be some rethinking in both Bohemia and Slovakia and that foreign initiatives to avert separation will not meet with a negative response. Your country has a long boundary with both Bohemia and Slovakia. What is your view on the possibility of separation? Are you worried? Has your government taken any action in the matter?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FASSLABEND (*Minister of Defence of Austria*) (Translation). – I was born in a small town on the border between Austria and Slovakia. Many of my school friends spoke Slovak as their mother tongue. So I knew something of the situation in Slovakia from an early age.

Without wishing to boast, I was already pointing out that Czechs and Slovaks would probably split up one day, at a time when most Czech and Slovakian politicians did not regard this as possible or probable, and that was because of my knowledge of the special situation in Slovakia, which for many centuries had never felt that it was able to handle its own affairs.

Let me say one thing right from the start: the entire Austrian Government and I personally deeply regret the division of a state that has been

Mr. Fasslabend (continued)

working extremely well since the first world war. I regard it as a very good sign that the current process of separation is occurring so rapidly. This means that the wounds inflicted on both sides can be kept relatively small, and at present the bulk of the population obviously feels more pain at the separation than joy at the idea of two new separate countries. I think that is very important for a later period because it may in future enable a confederation to be built up on a voluntary basis that will have more inner reserves than the former state.

I take this opportunity to say that I would have hoped to see much the same in Yugoslavia. I remain convinced that it would have been possible had the situation been examined at a very early stage and had the aspirations to independence of the individual regions been taken seriously, rather than met with a contrary policy.

On the other hand, I must also say that one cannot simply disregard this kind of break-up of a country. At present there are no indications that anything might arise from it. But given the serious political, economic and social instability and also the ethnic situation, for instance the fact that more than three hundred thousand Slovaks will be living in a separate enclave on the territory of the future Czech republic, certain tensions could arise in the course of time that cannot be foreseen at present. I therefore believe that it is important to help these countries and to put an immediate stop to any signs of nationalist aspirations. That is our task as I see it.

Let me say quite honestly that I am more anxious about the way relations are developing in southern Slovakia between Slovakia and Hungary than about relations between Czechs and Slovaks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I too should also like to thank you, Minister, for your very important speech to us this morning and for your firm declaration of faith in Europe. I can assure you of our wide support for the closest possible links between Austria and WEU, particularly over the next few months.

You were good enough to receive the Defence Committee of WEU in Vienna last year and I should like to repeat my thanks for your help and collaboration.

Now that there are no longer opposing eastern and western blocs in Europe, the Australian and Swiss military model based largely on reserves and mobilisation is becoming the model not only for the West European and NATO countries but also for the countries of Central Europe

and more especially Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Could you give us some idea of the relations you have with these Central European countries and with your counterparts?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FASSLABEND (*Minister of Defence of Austria*) (Translation). – The fact that the geostrategic situation in eastern Central Europe has changed fundamentally has led us to adapt our military system so that we will have a stronger presence and can react rapidly to any sudden crisis that may arise. At the same time this should enable us to reduce our overall mobilisation.

In future we must be in a position to act as a stabilising factor in this whole area thanks to our efforts on the military side. We are endeavouring to co-operate closely with all our neighbours. I regard it as a particularly important task – if I may say so – for us to have a stabilising influence on the situation in Slovakia.

What is the geographical situation of Slovakia? On the one hand it is situated between Poland and Hungary. Because of the question of minorities, its relations with these two countries are not without difficulties. I referred to the situation in southern Slovakia earlier. The Teschen question is another matter, with regard to Poland.

The situation vis-à-vis the Ukraine, our eastern neighbour, is marked by the fact that the Ukraine actually changed its national affiliation after the second world war.

So we can probably say that Austria will be Slovakia's only entirely unproblematic neighbour, even if the political situation changes. We therefore regard it as our special task to have a stabilising effect there on the basis of close co-operation. That means we are concentrating our efforts on co-operation with our immediate neighbours, and rather less with more distant ones such as Poland. Naturally we are also observing developments in those countries, but not as closely as in the case of our immediate neighbours.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I, too, should like to congratulate you, Minister, on your remarkable speech. I share your view of the world situation.

Your presence among us is symbolic because this is the first time we have had a minister from Austria here. This is clear evidence of the changes which have taken place in the world. It is also important for a second reason; your very clear speech and precise declarations show that Austria, with a government which has wide support because it is a coalition, has abandoned

Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)

its previous neutrality, as Mr. De Decker just said. We welcome the fact that your government has changed its position. Public opinion in Austria no doubt takes the same view but do opinion polls indicate whether the public shares the ideas you have outlined?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FASSLABEND (*Minister of Defence of Austria*) (Translation). – I am convinced that the situation in Austria does not differ substantially from that in the Western European countries: the general mood of the government is slightly ahead of that of a large part of the population. And that is probably necessary. In general our people are keenly interested in the problems in neighbouring countries. We find ourselves in a situation where, after a period of neutrality between two blocs, we now give priority to European solidarity. Of course, it takes some time for people to get used to a new situation.

When I look at the trend of discussions in our own country now, and at the many meetings and talks I have had with people from all over the country, I find that interest in this question has waned rapidly, even in the course of the past year. I personally am convinced that in five years' time hardly anyone anywhere in Austria will be raising or discussing the question of neutrality. A process of rethinking is taking place, which requires a greater commitment on our part. As in other countries, so too in Austria any deployment of military forces outside the country is questioned by the people: is it right and is it necessary?

Let me point out that we have a very long-standing tradition. Many more than thirty thousand Austrian soldiers have served under the United Nations in Africa, in Asia and in the European area, for instance, even now, in the island of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. So the general population is relatively prepared for the necessary military deployment abroad.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your statement and for being so kind as to answer our colleagues' questions.

(*Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

6. European security – reserve forces and national service

(*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Doc. 1338 and 1338 supplementary draft recommendation*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee

on European security – reserve forces and national service, and votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1338 and 1338 supplementary draft recommendation.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The report I am presenting today has been on the Defence Committee's agenda for many years. Because of the strategic upheavals which have taken place in Europe in recent years, the committee decided, however, to postpone the debate on the report until this session. This is a good thing because the question of national service and its corollary, reserve forces, has been brought up again or is being studied in detail in almost every member state.

Now that the threats to Europe are of a fundamentally different nature, the Atlantic Alliance has reviewed its defence plans and force structures, while WEU has become more than ever necessary for dealing with the regional crises and wars which are becoming ever more numerous round the borders of Europe and the NATO area.

Now that the risk of a general conflict in Europe between the Atlantic bloc and the now dissolved Warsaw Pact has disappeared, a rethink has become possible about the armed forces which our countries and alliances really need.

Europe, which is finding some difficulty in going ahead with political unification, has, with the Maastricht agreement, finally decided to provide itself with a common foreign and security policy, and named WEU as the forum for planning and implementing the defence policy of European Union.

In this constantly changing context, the Gulf war taught our countries a great deal. It showed that the lifting of the iron curtain and the end of communism, together with the emergence of liberalism in Central Europe did not automatically mean the risks of conflict were no more. On the contrary, it showed that the armed forces which we shall increasingly need will be forces that Europe can deploy at great distances in very different parts of the world. Just like the Yugoslav crisis, it showed finally that the main future missions of our armed forces will be specialised operations for keeping or restoring peace, requiring more professional troops than did the traditional mission of defending national or European territory for which whole nations under arms and therefore conscripts naturally had their place.

At the same time these changes in the international scene where out-of-area is becoming increasingly important must not lead us to forget our primary basic responsibilities. Every state must be able to defend itself and the first duty of

Mr. De Decker (continued)

every government must be to ensure the security of its people.

At international level and within our alliances, Article V of the Brussels Treaty and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty require our countries to maintain the capacity to come to the assistance of our allies and friends in defence of the peace, freedom and democracy of our continent. Your Rapporteur has the feeling that, unfortunately and dangerously, awareness of this vital ability to defend Europe is fading all too quickly in our governments' sense of their priorities. For demagogic reasons some are preparing to cut defence resources substantially and over-quickly. Some, like the Belgian Government for example, have no hesitation in ending national service, too, without giving sufficient thought beforehand to the many consequences of such an important decision and without prior consultation with their allies.

The report and its accompanying recommendations should be taken as a code of good conduct for member states planning to shorten or even end national service. Although I am convinced that the main future missions of Europe's armed forces will require more professional soldiers, I am not arguing for total professionalisation which, while offering operational advantages, has many disadvantages. These are mainly the considerable increase in the cost of serving personnel, more unemployed, the breaking of the democratic link between the army and the nation and the loss to the armed forces of highly-qualified specialists, technicians and university graduates.

Nevertheless, the basic lack of equality in the rules governing national service in our countries is a serious threat to it as an institution which is, of course, closely linked with the principle of defending one's national territory, and not well fitted to the needs of future missions a long way from Europe.

Your committee felt, therefore, that following the pattern of the insular powers, i.e. the United States and Great Britain, the ending of national service which is likely not only in Belgium and the Netherlands but soon perhaps in other member states must necessarily be accompanied by the formation of volunteer reserve forces similar to the American National Guard and the British Territorial Army, as the only way to provide a minimum capacity to defend our own territory.

All member states are cutting down the structures of their armed forces. The Defence Committee believes that this tendency, which is natural in the present international context, should be accompanied by a renewed awareness and a new definition of the rôle of mobilisable

reserves which, if properly planned and used, could with advantage become numerically the largest component of our land forces, once their numbers on active service are reduced. Your Rapporteur is therefore proposing something of a cultural revolution. Our general staffs, governments and defence ministries must learn in the future to attach as much importance and give as much thought to reserve as to active forces. It is the only way our countries will be able to slim down their costly active forces without endangering Europe's defence capacity.

As a way to improve Europe's defence capacity in the present context, your committee also suggests the creation of a European guard drawn from the reserve forces of all member states to provide a mobilisable joint formation. This European guard would operate under joint rules introduced stage by stage for both training and equipment and should in case of need be able to go into action anywhere within the territory of European Union.

These are the main lines of the report I am presenting to you. I hope that you will make good use of it in your national parliaments because the greatest present threat to our defence effort would be to renationalise the debate.

Europe still has a very long period of instability in front of it and will be drawn willy-nilly into many conflicts. Our security must therefore be more collective than ever and in this respect WEU provides the ideal forum for joint consultation, study, co-operation, decision and action.

In conclusion, I should like to extend my warmest thanks to the United States Government and to Mr. Dick Cheney, Defence Secretary and Mr. Stephen Duncan, Deputy Minister, for the excellent arrangements made for the Defence Committee's visit to the United States in 1990.

I should also like to thank the governments of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland for enabling us to make the extremely useful visits we paid last year. Lastly, our grateful thanks go to the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers for the highly important and interesting information it has supplied.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

There are five speakers on the list. I propose that the Assembly limit speeches to five minutes' duration.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

I call Lord Newall.

Lord NEWALL (*United Kingdom*). – This is an important report, and a very full one. It

Lord Newall (continued)

brings out many of the key factors that demonstrate the importance of possessing the right kind of reserve forces. Particularly important factors are the worldwide shrinking of budgets, which has affected the financing of our forces; the increased costs of sophisticated equipment; the general reduction in military national service; and the continuously changing needs of Europe.

Yesterday, the Secretary-General pointed out that the meaning of defence had itself changed: defence no longer means just defending one's own borders. At a time when regular armies are reshaping themselves and, in some cases, becoming smaller, it seems not only sensible but imperative for the shortfall for national defence to be filled by part-time soldiers, sailors and airmen, backed up with modern equipment and adequate training. Such forces can be extremely cost-effective – very much cheaper than military people who might be kicking their heels in the barracks day after day, month after month. As has already been explained, our experience in the United States in 1990 showed us how efficient reserve forces can be. The smaller regular forces can then be used fully in supporting the United Nations, NATO or, perhaps, Western European Union, to deal with the many problems that are occurring now and will undoubtedly occur from time to time in the future.

We must also do more to make our equipment universal. NATO has experienced many problems in the attempt to get our forces to co-operate with their equipment; surely, however, the smaller regular forces that are coming into being, and the continued political and economic co-operation that is now slowly taking shape, mean that there is an even greater need in Europe for the regular forces who will be asked to co-operate with other foreign forces to be given equipment that is at least interoperable, so that there can be true co-operation – not only between governments but on the ground. Certainly various navies have found that possible, as is shown by examples of the Gulf and, possibly, the Adriatic embargo. More work needs to be done in that regard.

The report's recommendations are full and varied, but I feel that two items in particular need to be emphasised. They are not necessarily the most obviously important at first sight. First, we are asked to spread the word about reserve forces, and to exchange information so that forces can be integrated correctly. If I may say so, the United Kingdom provides an excellent example of progress and success over a number of years. I know that our own military personnel would be only too happy to give advice based on that success.

For hundreds of years, the armed forces have fought and served under some flag that symbolised their loyalty and unity. As WEU becomes more important, and as the forces of Western European countries serve more frequently alongside one another it is imperative for many reasons for WEU to have a suitable and sensible flag that could be recognised and respected by serving forces. Not only would that give them a sense of unity; it would be identified by the media and the public. It would help to give wider publicity to WEU – which could certainly use some better publicity – and it would help our cause in the future.

I hope that the report's recommendations will be followed up vigorously.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Moya.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I first congratulate Mr. De Decker on his substantive report and the opportunity it provides at this time for a valuable debate on this question.

I think that European countries have now reached the stage where we are discussing the structure of our armed forces with a view to agreeing on the same common parameters as those adopted by the Atlantic Alliance and WEU. In Spain we have for the last two years been debating about the future and structure of our armed forces. The conclusion has been a set of assumptions which might be summarised thus: we have opted to continue a basic form of national military service, i.e. conscription. It will however be substantially updated, its duration will be reduced from twelve to nine months, and the number of professional, i.e. volunteer personnel, will be increased to 50% of the total strength of the armed forces, which will be reduced in number. This reduction is in fact in line with the reduction being carried out by all European countries in their plans and programmes with a view to obtaining more streamlined armies and forces which will be more mobile, more versatile, and better equipped for action.

This reduction in strengths, as pointed out by the Rapporteur in his report, in my view emphasises the rôle to be played by reserve forces in the immediate future. Obviously, as considerable reductions are made in professional armies, there will be a corresponding need to promote the development of the reserve forces and increase their capabilities.

Speaking specifically for my country, I think that this is specially significant in that a fundamental change is now occurring in Spain. Whereas traditionally we have had armed forces based solely on a standing army, today we are faced with the challenge of building up armies which will be based not only on regular but also

Mr. Moya (continued)

on reserve forces. In my view this is a major challenge for my country which I think is on the lines noted by the Rapporteur in his report.

May I also say that the Spanish military service option, i.e. the conclusion of the debate in favour of conscription combined with an increase of the professional component to 50%, reflects a final decision based on a number of considerations into which I shall not enter today, of a sociological, economic, demographic nature, etc. We have however also been prompted by one reason which I think I should point out. This is that we have sought to align ourselves on European parameters, to join the majority model in Europe, i.e. the context shared by our allies. On these lines of thought we have sought to act cautiously, bearing in mind the European context and avoiding drastic or too radical reforms departing from the model adopted by our allies.

Another interesting point is noted in the report, or rather in the supplementary draft recommendation; this is also especially significant for my country, namely the need to adopt and provide incentives for those entering military service as volunteers, since this is one way of helping to increase the number of volunteers. We have had some years' experience in this field, where difficulties have arisen in recruiting volunteers for national service. Provision has been made in Spain for measures such as those listed in paragraph 3 of the supplementary draft recommendation, with a view to giving priority to facilitating a return to civilian life on completion of national service by the adoption of measures to promote reintegration into civilian life.

There are other interesting aspects on which I could speak at greater length, but I have confined myself to those I consider the most important and most clearly related to what is being done to reform the structure of the armed forces in Spain. May I end with my congratulations to Mr. De Decker, and my thanks for the opportunity afforded by this debate of holding a discussion on such an important theme at this time in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Keith Speed.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I, too, congratulate Mr. De Decker on an excellent report. I spent 22 years in the naval reserve in the United Kingdom before I became navy minister so the report struck a real and personal chord with me.

I should like to concentrate on two of the recommendations. The first has already been mentioned by other speakers. In times of severe constraints on the defence budgets of all member

countries of WEU it is cost-effective to maintain reserve forces for the navy, army and air force, and in my country for the marines. It is valuable to have men and women – I stress women because they play an important rôle in the reserves, certainly in the United Kingdom – trained and available for whatever conflict or emergency might arise.

If a country is to have men and women trained and available for conflicts, two things follow. First, they must be trained and they must have at their disposal modern, up-to-date equipment. When a new class of mine-sweeper was introduced in the United Kingdom navy it was first introduced in units of the naval reserve. Mine-sweeping is an important and useful rôle for reservists in many of our countries. The reservists in the United Kingdom had priority over the regulars when new equipment was introduced. The proficiency of the reservists in, for example, mine-sweeping, especially with up-to-date mine-sweepers, is exceptional. The first lesson that all of us must learn is that it is no good providing the reservists with obsolete equipment. It is unfair to them. It is not an efficient way of using manpower.

Secondly, reservists must have proper and regular training. Whether they have been in the regular forces or whether they are volunteers straight from civilian life, they must be trained in their specialisations so that they can be effective if they are called upon to serve. That training has to be kept up to date. We all appreciate how fast modern technology in warfare and military equipment is proceeding.

My second point is mentioned in the supplementary draft recommendation drawn up by Mr. De Decker. It is the question of employment and employers in civilian life. I happen to believe that, if men or women serve in the army, navy or air force reserves, they will be better at their civilian job. They are used to discipline and teamwork. They are used to dealing with modern technology. That makes them better employees, whether they are accountants, whether they work in a factory or whatever they do. So there is a real advantage for employers in employing reservists.

Therefore, we must do all that we can to encourage employers to release personnel to enter the reserves and undergo training. But it is not always easy. It is certainly not easy in a small firm of perhaps four or five people. If one key man or woman goes away for several weeks at a time for training the firm may be severely embarrassed by their absence. We should consider financial and other support for such firms.

There is a more insidious way in which employers can bring pressure to bear on employees if they do not want their employees to go away for reserve training. The employer

Sir Keith Speed (continued)

may say: "Yes, it is fine. You may go to do your training but you may jeopardise your prospects of promotion."

Another person who remains in the factory or the office and does not go away for two weeks' training may be in a better position to get the new job. That problem is difficult to define. It is difficult to bring pressure to bear on the employer not to coerce his employees to remain full time at the firm and not join the reserves. We should consider that problem.

I endorse what Lord Newall said. WEU countries should exchange ideas and experience about reserves. As countries abolish conscription they will find, whether they like it or not, that reserves play an important part in keeping their forces up to strength. I hope that we can enhance our reserves along the lines suggested in the report. We will save money and enhance the security of Europe by doing so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have already stated during the meeting of the Defence Committee that I consider Mr. De Decker's report to be an excellent document, one which can help to facilitate discussions on the function of the armed forces. These discussions are taking place now, mainly in Western European countries and in the United States. Personally, I expect the discussion to widen and include all the countries of Europe. The report contains a general overview covering far more ground than the issue of reserve forces. Now that we are all talking about the size of our forces, a connection has to be made with the army's function. We sometimes forget that this function must first be clearly defined before possible reductions can be considered.

The fall of the Berlin wall symbolised the end of the cold war. At that time we were in a euphoric state. We thought we were on the verge of paradise. The tragic thing about the fall of the Berlin wall is that we are now in an extremely critical situation in Europe. At the moment I cannot see how the situation is going to develop. It has more to do with our security than with our defence. Since the end of the cold war the relationship between the concepts of defence and security has changed. Reserve forces cannot be considered separately from the ending of conscription, the creation of a professional army and the introduction of a call-up system. In the Netherlands, the government proposed several weeks ago that conscription should not be abolished. Instead, the government is considering making a gradual change in the nature of the obligation to respond. A decision is shortly to be

taken about this in parliament, but the idea of placing the accent on the obligation to respond is, I think, the right one. That is also the opinion of Mr. De Decker.

In setting up a force of reservists we must, however, avoid following the American example. Some years ago the Defence Committee made a study of the situation of reservists in the United States in the course of which we found that the reserve forces were made up largely of black Americans. This is also connected with social conditions. We must avoid the reserve army being made up of poor men's children. This means that reservists must be well paid. Conditions in society must be such that people are not compelled to become reservists for want of opportunity. Mr. De Decker emphasised in his introduction that we must avoid being left with an army that has no motivation. To me this means decent pay. In paragraph 1 (b) of his supplementary draft recommendation, Mr. De Decker has proposed that firms should be given fiscal advantages. This point has been taken up by the Defence Committee. It is about firms which employ reserve servicemen. There will have to be more discussion about how this proposal is to be implemented. The report provides a strong incentive to in-depth consideration of the issue.

In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation, Mr. De Decker invites all parliamentary delegates to participate in discussions on these topics in their national parliaments. It is too important a matter to be left to others to deal with.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Dundee.

The Earl of DUNDEE (*United Kingdom*). – Following the collapse of communism, one of our main challenges in defence matters is to prepare for new contingencies on reduced budgets. Here, the rôle of the reserve forces and national service should be addressed every bit as carefully as that of regular armies. For the clear way in which he has done so, I should like to join others in congratulating Mr. De Decker on his excellent report which is under discussion today.

If we now have different aims and problems in defence from those encountered a year or two ago the first question to ask is: what bearing do these changed circumstances have on the rôle of regular army and reserve forces? Regarding a threat or anticipated aggressor, two changes are fairly obvious. The threat from the old enemy outside has virtually disappeared: there is no longer the same need to maintain large standing armies to defend Western Europe from attack east of the iron curtain.

On the other hand, as evidenced by the current crisis in the former Yugoslavia, debated

The Earl of Dundee (continued)

here yesterday, the threat from an enemy within has clearly greatly increased. Ironically, as we are all well aware, that crisis would not have developed as it has if the previous régime of hard-line communism were still in place; nor would it have developed as it has if, at its outset, a clear signal had been sent by us to the perpetrators of violence. Concerted action by western governments and our preparedness clinically to bomb and destroy from the air munition centres and key parts of the infrastructure would have helped to contain the situation with minimum loss of human life and without any need to deploy ground troops.

The implications of the changes of direction in defence strategy are that we should spend less money on preparing to fight an external enemy and spend much more time and effort developing co-ordinated systems of response among ourselves.

In both those changed directions, it is essential to give a new rôle to reserve forces as well as to regular forces. Mr. De Decker has rightly pointed out that we need smaller, flexible, mobile and more professional forces. That requirement certainly applies to regular soldiers and reservists alike; indeed, in the United Kingdom, as has been pointed out, the emphasis has been on reservists for the past twenty or thirty years.

Mr. De Decker also highlighted the importance of analysis and study among ourselves before embarking on any new formula. Many European countries are already altering, or planning to alter, the system of conscription. In seeking to replace those forces and to achieve the best formula, the varied experiences of our countries should obviously be studied and made use of including the useful practices of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. However, it must be for each country to decide where the best balance lies between conscription and reserves. The social and financial considerations affecting that balance vary considerably from one country to another; indeed, Sir Keith Speed has ably elaborated on the balanced formula which we should bear in mind as it usefully affects employment. Suffice it to say that it is timely to analyse and rationalise in each country the position of conscript and reserve armies as part of a new European defence strategy. Each country must make its own decision according to its circumstances. Equally, however, each country must take note of the new European challenges and priorities. No longer do these come from a fairly predictable Soviet Union. Now we need to be far more alert and vigilant to combat the enemy within.

In our European defence organisations we must act with far greater co-ordination and

resolve than has been our custom hitherto. Mass violence and killing, when they come, may often have been hard to foresee. If when violence does manifest itself our job remains to combat and redress, more than ever now is it also our task to think and act in advance to forestall, predict and pre-empt.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to thank the five members who have been good enough to support my report and the recommendations which the committee will be sending to the Council of Ministers.

I am sure that, today, with all the changes in world strategy that are taking place, we all know that the structures of the armed forces of every one of our countries are undergoing major changes. It has to be realised that these changes are being made in difficult circumstances and with many implicit dangers if these issues are not approached very seriously and with proper thought. Improvisation is out of the question here because the consequences could be far too grave.

To sum up, I have tried, in my report, to make the point that we must try to bring about a cultural revolution in defence. Indeed, our governments in the past have too often, though with good reason, become accustomed to concentrate solely on the active forces, the fighting units, and have generally given very little consideration to reserve forces except in countries which, like the United Kingdom, have discarded conscription. Today, if we hope to get through this transitional period successfully this revolution in ideas must come about not only in governments and parliaments but also among heads of companies because, as you have stressed, if a reserve force is to be set up employers must also be made to understand the importance of the rôle of reserves.

I welcome the developments described by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman in the Netherlands and by Mr. Moya in Spain, where the policy is not to revoke legislation on conscription too quickly. Some of our countries may be able to go ahead, untroubled, with the suspension of military service, relying only on professional forces, but our governments must still be able to remobilise bigger forces quickly in case of need. That means retaining our present legislation on the subject as part of the law of the land so that it can be used if necessary.

That is all I have to say ladies and gentlemen, and I thank you for your support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – As acting Chairman of the Defence Committee I should like to add that although this report may have come before the Assembly rather late, I am convinced that it has come at the right time. Both the report and the addendum were unanimously adopted in the Defence Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1338.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

We shall now vote on the supplementary draft recommendation.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The supplementary draft recommendation is adopted unanimously².

(Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

7. Western European Union – Information report

(Presentation of the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1334)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on Western European Union – Information report and vote on the draft order, Document 1334.

I call Mr. Lopez Henares, co-Rapporteur.

1. See page 46.

2. See page 48.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I take the floor, but I intend to be very brief in view of this morning's heavy workload, and also because the report and the draft order I am presenting were prepared by Mr. Tummers and myself with the aim of being absolutely objective and therefore non-controversial. This is borne out by the fact that no one has asked to speak.

Our sole purpose is to make it clear that we are submitting for approval by the Assembly the draft of a new information booklet on Western European Union.

Mr. President, the presence here today of the Austrian Defence Minister is symbolic of the vast changes taking place in our organisation. Both his presence, and the address he has given to the Assembly, would have been unthinkable only a few years ago, not to say even a few weeks ago. The booklet provides up-to-date information on these changes, and thus covers major events such as the Gulf crisis, the Maastricht Treaty, the Petersberg declaration, the problems of Yugoslavia and the enlargement of WEU. Our organisation has not only been changed by events but has also effected genuinely qualitative changes within itself. I would go so far as to say that it has already become a different organisation. Proof of this is the fact that its instruments are also undergoing a process of change or enlargement: the Torrejón satellite centre, which is a major innovation, the recently proposed armaments agency, the planning cell and the committee of chiefs of defence staff, are all key innovations which call for recognition in the report.

I have two brief comments, Mr. President, on the draft order. First, its purpose is to obtain a decision by the Assembly that the new booklet should be published in the languages of all the member states. While the draft order refers to the seven languages of the WEU member countries, I should like to point out to the Assembly that this should logically include future associate members, so that public opinion in each country will have access in the national language to general information about WEU and its responsibilities.

Second, the Assembly is also invited to agree that, in view of the bewildering speed of events in the world and in Europe, provision should be made for the inclusion of any new developments which may take place before the publication of the report. In addition, developments and changes are in fact so extraordinary, and continue to be so, that any attempt to reproduce an accurate photograph of our organisation would produce merely a blurred image. Indeed, it would be necessary to shoot a film about WEU, if we wished to make an on-going record of its transformation. In the draft order we therefore invite the Assembly to agree that the text of the

Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)

booklet may be brought up-to-date to include new developments. In concluding, Mr. President, I wish to acknowledge before the Assembly, on behalf of Mr. Tummers and myself, the highly skilled assistance provided by the committee secretariat in preparing this draft.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers, Chairman and co-Rapporteur.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not need to say very much more. We referred to the importance of this committee when, at the beginning of the week, Mr. Lopez Henares presented a report on Western European Union and the consequences of the Treaty of Maastricht. At that time I emphasised that when one thinks about the origins of WEU and the prospects opened up by the Treaty of Maastricht, WEU seems gradually to be finding its proper place in the Maastricht Treaty and is at last able to carry out its initial intention, namely to ensure its own defence thanks to social, cultural and economic stability within member countries. That is practically a definition of what at present we summarise as security.

I must also say one other thing. I am sorry that, for administrative reasons, the WEU department responsible has not managed to have this booklet published in a series which would have given it wider circulation. There are series containing publications about the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and NATO, but none in which WEU is represented. I should like to ask the secretariat and the presidency to ensure once more that this booklet is not only made available in several languages here and in the parliaments of the various countries, but also given wider circulation in a suitable published series.

Those are my comments. I thank those who have committed themselves to completing this booklet. My last word on the subject is that our committee is working for relations with parliaments, but that in fact its greatest difficulty is in establishing relations with the members of parliament who should be filling this chamber now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – No one is down to speak.

We shall therefore vote immediately on the draft order in Document 1334.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is adopted¹.

**8. Acts of rape and castration,
crimes against humanity
and war crimes in former Yugoslavia**

*(Presentation of and debate on the oral report
of the Political Committee
and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1355)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee on acts of rape and castration, crimes against humanity and war crimes in former Yugoslavia and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1355.

I call the Rapporteur of the Political Committee, Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – A draft resolution has been tabled by several members concerning some of the most terrible and horrifying attacks on human rights on former Yugoslav territory, in particular following the receipt of information from Bosnia-Herzegovina. These attacks involve methods which some of us regard as being very closely linked with the shameful practice of ethnic cleansing pursued by the Belgrade Serbian authorities.

In my view, the information which the Assembly has been able to obtain naturally requires more detailed investigation, but the facts are there. Even if there is shown to be only one infringement of human rights and only one crime against humanity, the whole Assembly must react resolutely.

The present case involves essentially sexual violence and assault perpetrated with all the brutality that human beings in a state of uncontrolled savagery are capable of. History is, alas, filled with terrible happenings of this kind and we all thought that after the second world war it was over and done with, particularly after what the Nazi bosses had been guilty of in the occupied countries and in Germany itself.

The Nuremberg trials had elevated the prosecution and condemnation of anyone responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes to the level of international law.

What is the purpose of this resolution?

I hope that the Assembly, like the Political Committee, for which I am reporting, and like

¹. See page 49.

Mr. Caro (continued)

the authors of this text, will not indulge in over-reaction and pointless emotion. This is a matter in which our decisions must be governed by cold reason. Although, because of the unforeseeable demands of parliamentary work, this resolution only reaches us at the end of the session when many of our members have left to return to their duties in the capitals, our Assembly must give it the full and calm consideration it deserves.

Thousands of women are being raped with unbelievable savagery. These are not just isolated rapes but genuinely organised assaults. In some cases special camps have been set up for this kind of multiple rape. Under the direst threats the women raped are forced to bring their babies to birth. The ethnic interests underlying the method are very easily imagined. Children themselves, too, are sexually abused when they are not actually murdered. The worst horror is that these crimes are often perpetrated in front of families or friends. Men are also subjected to sexual violence of all kinds, with castration becoming a regular practice.

How can the mind come to terms with such behaviour in our Europe of 1992, where so much effort has been made to free people from dictatorship, totalitarian ideologies and the repression of freedom of thought and speech? Nor should we omit mention of the resurgence of racism and its visible effects through reversion to the old Nazi methods that some people seem to be welcoming not only in Germany but also in some of France's cities too.

The fact is that society can be destabilised by such acts of violence even though they may be condemned by the vast majority of humanity. In the meantime, in former Yugoslavia, in addition to the fighting which is destroying a brother people, atrocities against humanity are being committed with unbelievable savagery.

The Political Committee was therefore asked to draft a resolution summing up the Assembly's opinion and expressing horror at these specific acts. The text that the committee submits for your approval is as follows:

“ The Assembly has been informed that on the territory of former Yugoslavia:

1. thousands of women and children, sometimes concentrated in special camps, are victims of brutal rape;
2. women are being forced to complete the resulting pregnancies;
3. men are being castrated.

The Assembly condemns most strongly these sexual aggressions perpetrated as acts of humiliation of the human being and used as a weapon of war.

The Assembly urges the governments of member countries:

- (a) to intervene immediately to bring about an immediate end to these tortures and war crimes;
- (b) to bring to trial those responsible for these crimes against humanity;
- (c) to assist the victims by all the means at their disposal.”

Out of respect for humanity and the Europe we are seeking to construct, I trust, ladies and gentlemen, that the Assembly will hear and act upon this appeal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Political Committee.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – It would be wrong to do other than to endorse fully the resolutions that the Rapporteur has presented so skilfully.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Fischer.

Mrs. FISCHER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to thank the Political Committee for managing to produce this resolution at such short notice. I am sure we will be hearing more about it in future. The text has of course become rather meagre now, if I may put it that way. What I really miss is an appeal to the international organisations – the Red Cross and UNHCR – really to set up safe havens. But I think that for now we can be content with this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Iwinski, Observer from Poland.

Mr. IWINSKI (*Observer from Poland*) (Translation). – I fully support the draft resolution, provided that the information on which it is based can be confirmed.

Last week, a Council of Europe mission visited Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and both the members of the mission and the journalists who accompanied us spoke constantly to people in refugee camps – refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. We visited about ten camps, and no one was able to say: “ Yes, I saw it – they did it ” – except, that is, for one woman in Posuznija camp in Herzegovina. She had been told that one guard had committed a rape, although the woman concerned denied it.

I feel that it is my duty to say that I fully condemn such crimes, provided that concrete information is at our disposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Iwinski, I am sure what you said just now contained an important reminder. But when we look at the methods used there we must

The President (continued)

remember one thing: because the fate of the people in question is regarded as shameful, we are faced with the situation that these women and girls remain or have to remain silent so that their shame is not prolonged, so to speak. That is the dilemma facing us.

That is why I think that this resolution does have some significance after all and that is why we asked for an urgent debate.

No one else has asked to speak.

We shall now vote on the draft resolution in Document 1355.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft resolution is adopted unanimously¹.

9. Emergency assistance to Somalia

(Motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1356)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I have to inform you that Mr. Fourré with a number of other members has tabled a motion for a recommendation on emergency assistance to Somalia, Document 1356.

The text of this motion will be printed and distributed and I propose that it be referred to the Political Committee.

As President of the Assembly, I shall be writing to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to tell him that a number of members have taken this initiative.

It is important that the question to which this motion relates be considered as a matter of urgency.

1. See page 50.

10. Close of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we have now reached the end of the session.

Before closing I wish to congratulate and thank members for their hard work and their valuable contributions.

I am sure I can speak for the whole Assembly in offering my warmest thanks to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Ministers and the Secretary-General who have addressed us and have been willing to be shot at by our questions.

My good wishes also go to press representatives who have followed our debates and reported them to the public in all our countries.

Finally, our thanks go to all permanent and temporary staff, and in particular to our interpreters who have been efficient as always and have enabled our debates to go ahead smoothly.

Perhaps a little early, I offer you all my best wishes for Christmas and the coming year. I invite you to the next session in 1993 which I hope will be as fruitful as its predecessors.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, no one can foresee the future but it is the concern of all of us to promote the work of our institution and of our Assembly. My dearest hope would be to continue working together with my colleagues under your wise and workmanlike authority. I am also speaking to a friend. I do not know whether we shall be seeing you here again in the post you now occupy to the great benefit of the Assembly but I am sure I am speaking for everybody when I say how much I have appreciated the manner in which you have presided over proceedings and shouldered responsibility for Western European Union as a whole. In the difficult times we have been experiencing you have succeeded in combining your sense of responsibility as a full time member of parliament with the qualities of a great diplomat, a combination of skills that probably came naturally to the historian you are. For all of us you have been a great president, but unfortunately not long enough perhaps. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Jean-Marie Caro, I thank you for your kind remarks. I feel greatly honoured.

I now declare closed the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

(The sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.)

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