

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1991

IV

**Minutes**  
**Official Report of Debates**

WEU

PARIS



ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART


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
PARIS



The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.



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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
CHEVALIER Pierre	SP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
SEEUWS Willy	SP
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. UYTENDAELE René	CVP

#### Substitutes

MM. CAUWENBERGHS Frans	CVP
COLLART Jacques	PS
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
THYRAUD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	PC

#### Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BALLIGAND Jean-Pierre	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
de GAULLE Jean	RPR
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
ROGER Jean	RDE
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

### GERMANY

#### Representatives

Mr. ANTRETTOR Robert	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD

MM. BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHLER Hans	SPD
BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MENZEL Bruno	FDP
MEYER zu BENTRUP Reinhard	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TERBORG Margitta	SPD
Mr. VOGEL Friedrich	CDU/CSU

#### Substitutes

MM. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. JUNGHANNIS Ulrich	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
LUMMER Heinrich	CDU/CSU
MAASS Erich	CDU/CSU
MARTEN Günter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. MASCHER Ulrike	SPD
MM. MATSCHIE Christoph	SPD
MICHELS Meinolf	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
PROBST Albert	CDU/CSU
REIMANN Manfred	SPD
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHLUCKEBIER Günter	SPD
Mrs. von TEICHMAN Cornelia	FDP
Mr. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

### ITALY

#### Representatives

MM. BENASSI Ugo	PDS
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FALCUCCI Franca	Chr. Dem.
MM. FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	PDS
GUIZZI Francesco	Socialist
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MANZOLINI Gianni	Socialist
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	PDS
PIERALLI Piero	PDS
RODOTA Stefano	PDS
RUBBI Antonio	PDS
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.

#### Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CAPANNA Mario	ProL. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
COLOMBO Vittorino	Chr. Dem.
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.



**LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES**

Mrs. FRANCESE Angela  
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio  
GRECO Francesco  
MESORACA Maurizio  
NEGRI Giovanni  
PASQUINO Gianfranco  
RAUTI Giuseppe  
RUBNER Hans  
SCOVACRICCHI Martino  
STEGAGNINI Bruno  
TRIGLIA Riccardo

PDS  
Chr. Dem.  
PDS  
PDS  
Radical  
Ind. Left  
MSI-DN  
SVP  
PSDI  
Chr. Dem.  
Chr. Dem.

**LUXEMBOURG**

**Representatives**

Mr. GOERENS Charles  
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle  
Mr. REGENWETTER Jean

Dem.  
Soc. Chr.  
Soc. Workers

**Substitutes**

Mr. DIMMER Camille  
Mrs. ERR Lydie  
Mr. KONEN René

Soc. Chr.  
Soc. Workers  
Dem.

**NETHERLANDS**

**Representatives**

MM. AARTS Harry  
DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob  
EISMA Doeke  
JURGENS E.C.M.  
STOFFELEN Pieter  
van VELZEN Wim  
VERBEEK Jan Willem

CDA  
CDA  
D66  
Labour  
Labour  
CDA  
VVD

**Substitutes**

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN  
Elisabeth  
MM. DEES Dick  
EVERSDIJK Huib  
van der LINDEN René  
Mrs. SOUTENDIJK van  
APPELDOORN Marian H.J.  
Mr. TUMMERS Nicolas  
Mrs. VERSPAGET Josephine

Labour  
VVD  
CDA  
CDA  
CDA  
Labour  
Labour  
Labour

**PORTUGAL**

**Representatives**

MM. CANDAL Carlos  
ESTEVEZ Antonio  
FERNANDES MARQUES  
Joaquim  
MOREIRA Licinio  
SILVA MARQUES José  
SOARES COSTA Manuel  
VIEIRA MESQUITA José

Socialist  
Socialist  
Soc. Dem.  
Soc. Dem.  
Soc. Dem.  
Soc. Dem.  
Soc. Dem.

**Substitutes**

MM. AMARAL Fernando  
BRITO Rogério  
CONCEIÇÃO Fernando  
MOTA TORRES José  
PINTO Carlos  
ROSETA Pedro  
VARA Armando

Soc. Dem.  
PCP  
Soc. Dem.  
Socialist  
Soc. Dem.  
Soc. Dem.  
Socialist

**SPAIN**

**Representatives**

MM. ALVAREZ Francisco  
BORDERAS Augusto  
CUATRECASAS Llibert  
CUCO Alfons  
DIAZ Lorenzo  
FABRA Juan Manuel  
LOPEZ HENARES José Luis  
MARTINEZ Miguel Angel  
MOYA Pedro  
PERINAT Luis Guillermo  
de PUIG Lluís Maria  
ROMAN Rafael

People's Party  
Socialist  
C.i.U.  
Socialist  
Soc. and Dem.  
Centre  
People's Party  
People's Party  
Socialist  
Socialist  
People's Party  
Socialist  
Socialist

**Substitutes**

MM. BARRIONUEVO José  
BOLINAGA Imanol  
DIAZ DE MERA Agustin  
Mrs. FRIAS Milagros  
MM. GARCIA SANCHEZ Daniel  
GONZALEZ-LAXE Fernando  
Mrs. GUIRADO Ana  
MM. LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO  
Santiago  
NUÑEZ Manuel  
PALACIOS Marcelo  
RUIZ Alberto  
VAZQUEZ Narcis

Socialist  
Basque Nat.  
People's Party  
Socialist  
Socialist  
Socialist  
Socialist  
People's Party  
Socialist  
Socialist  
People's Party  
United Left

**UNITED KINGDOM**

**Representatives**

MM. ATKINSON David  
COX Thomas  
Dame Peggy FENNER  
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG  
MM. GARRETT Edward  
HARDY Peter  
JESSEL Toby  
Sir Russell JOHNSTON  
Earl of KINNOULL  
Lord KIRKHILL  
Mr. PARRY Robert  
Sir William SHELTON  
Sir Dudley SMITH  
Mr. SPEED Keith  
Sir John STOKES  
MM. THOMPSON Donald  
THOMPSON John  
WARD John

Conservative  
Labour  
Conservative  
Conservative  
Labour  
Labour  
Conservative  
SLD  
Conservative  
Labour  
Labour  
Conservative  
Conservative  
Conservative  
Conservative  
Conservative  
Labour  
Conservative

**Substitutes**

MM. BANKS Tony  
BOWDEN Andrew  
Sir Anthony DURANT  
MM. EWING Harry  
FAULDS Andrew  
HOWELL Ralph  
HUGHES Roy  
Sir John HUNT  
MM. LAMBIE David  
LITHERLAND Robert  
Lord MACKIE of BENSHIE  
Lord NEWALL  
MM. RATHBONE Tim  
REDMOND Martin  
Lord RODNEY  
Mrs. ROE Marion  
MM. ROWE Andrew  
SOAMES Nicholas

Labour  
Conservative  
Conservative  
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Conservative  
Conservative  
Conservative



**I**

**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

## EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 2nd December 1991

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1278).
5. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1296).
6. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. The evolution of WEU's public relations (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1286).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 11.05 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Resumption of the session**

The President declared the thirty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.

#### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **3. Examination of credentials**

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of certain of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 8 had been ratified by that Assembly.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 8 whose ratification had not been communicated by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, subject to conformity with their subsequent ratification by that Assembly.

#### **4. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The President addressed the Assembly.

#### **5. Observers**

The President welcomed the observers from Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Turkey and the USSR.

#### **6. The situation in East Timor**

##### ***Procedure for approving the budget***

*(Motion for a resolution and motion for an order with requests for urgent procedure, Docs. 1295 and 1297)*

The President announced that Mr. Brito and ten of his colleagues had tabled a motion for a resolution on the situation in East Timor with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1295, and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration a motion for an order on procedure for approving the budget with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1297.

In accordance with Rule 44 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided to examine these requests for urgent procedure immediately after the adoption of the draft order of business.

#### **7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session**

*(Doc. 1278)*

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business.

The draft order of business for the second part of the session was adopted.

### 8. Procedure for approving the budget

(Doc. 1297)

In accordance with Rule 44 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for an order on procedure for approving the budget.

*Speaker:* Mr. Rathbone.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

The debate would take place on Wednesday, 4th December, at the afternoon sitting, after the vote on the draft budget.

### 9. The situation in East Timor

(Doc. 1295)

In accordance with Rule 44 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a resolution on the situation in East Timor.

*Speakers:* MM. Brito and Stoffelen.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

The debate would take place on Thursday, 5th December, as the final item of business.

### 10. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

#### *Standing Committee*

##### *Netherlands*

- Mr. van der Linden as a titular member and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer as an alternate member.

#### *Defence Committee*

##### *Netherlands*

- Mr. van der Linden as a titular member and Mr. van Velzen as an alternate member.

#### *Political Committee*

##### *Netherlands*

- Mr. De Hoop Scheffer as a titular member.

#### *Technological and Aerospace Committee*

##### *Netherlands*

- Mr. Jurgens as an alternate member.

#### *Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

##### *Netherlands*

- Mr. Jurgens as a titular member;

##### *United Kingdom*

- Mr. Bowden as a titular member;
- Mrs. Roe and Mr. Soames as alternate members.

#### *Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*

##### *Netherlands*

- Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn as a titular member.

#### *Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations*

##### *Netherlands*

- Mr. Eversdijk as a titular member;

##### *United Kingdom*

- Sir Anthony Durant as an alternate member.

### 11. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1296)

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Reddemann, Rathbone, Stegagnini, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Amaral.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly ratified the action of the Presidential Committee <sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>. See page 16.

**12. Address by Mr. van Eekelen,  
Secretary-General of WEU**

Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

**13. The evolution of WEU's public relations**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report  
of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations  
and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1286)*

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Ewing, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Tummers, Müller and Roman.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Ewing, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 507)<sup>2</sup>.

*Speaker (explanation of vote):* Mr. Reddemann.

**14. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.*

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2. See page 17.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Spain</b>
MM. Biefnot <i>Eicher</i> (Chevalier) Kempinaire Péciaux <i>Noerens</i> (Seeuws)	MM. Benassi <i>Colombo</i> (Caccia) <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti) Fioret <i>Fassino</i> (Guizzi) <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Malfatti) Mezzapesa Parisi Pieralli <i>Triglia</i> (Sarti) <i>Stegagnini</i> (Sinesio)	MM. Cuco Lopez Henares Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Uyttendaele		
<b>France</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Bassinet Baumel <i>Masseret</i> (Collette) Durand Fourré Jeambrun Jung <i>Lagorce</i> (Oehler) Thyraud Valleix	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mrs. <i>Err</i> (Regenwetter)	MM. Atkinson Cox Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Lambie</i> (Garrett) Hardy Jessel Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) MM. <i>Bowden</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) <i>Ewing</i> (Lord Kirkhill) <i>Litherland</i> (Parry) Sir <i>Anthony Durant</i> (Sir William Shelton) Sir Dudley Smith Lord <i>Newall</i> (Speed) Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Sir John Stokes) MM. D. Thompson <i>Rathbone</i> (J. Thompson)
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	
MM. <i>Bindig</i> (Antretter) Böhm <i>Schluckebier</i> (Büchler) <i>Matschie</i> (Holtz) Irmer <i>Lummer</i> (Kittelmann) Müller Reddemann <i>Pfuhl</i> (Soell) Sprung Vogel	MM. Jurgens <i>Tummers</i> (Stoffelen) van Velzen Verbeek	
	<b>Portugal</b>	
	MM. <i>Vara</i> (Esteves) Fernandes Marques <i>Brito</i> (Moreira) Silva Marques Soares Costa Vieira Mesquita	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Portugal</b>
MM. Beix Caro Forni Galley Gouteyron Seitlinger Vial-Massat	Mrs. Falcucci MM. Gabbuggiani Manzolini Martino Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi	Mr. Candal
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>Spain</b>
Mrs. Blunck MM. Bühler Menzel Meyer zu Bentrup von Schmude Steiner Mrs. Terborg	Mr. Goerens	MM. Alvarez Borderas Cuatrecasas Diaz Fabra Martinez
	<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
	MM. Aarts De Hoop Scheffer Eisma	Mr. Ward

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 506**<sup>1</sup>  
***on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis***<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Deploring the constant worsening of the civil war that is tearing Yugoslavia apart;
- (ii) Considering that pursuit of the war is endangering peace throughout Europe;
- (iii) Considering that it is for WEU, under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty, to help to restore peace in Yugoslavia to the best of its ability;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that the Community and member states have called on the WEU Council to implement the military aspects of the policy defined by the Twelve;
- (v) Considering that the commitment of the European Community, in agreement with the CSCE and with the subsequent support of the Security Council, allowed the peace conference to be convened in The Hague in which all the parties to the conflict are taking part and which may lead to a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis;
- (vi) Deploring, however, that this co-ordination has not yet allowed a real, lasting cease-fire to be achieved as a prelude to a return to peace in Yugoslavia;
- (vii) Expressing the hope that the mission assigned to Lord Carrington will succeed in the near future;
- (viii) Gratified that the Council duly informed NATO and the CSCE of the results of its meetings but deploring the fact that it neglected to inform the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Decide upon and implement without delay effective measures to ensure respect for the embargo on all supplies of arms to Yugoslavia decided upon in Security Council Resolution 713;
2. Proceed immediately to prepare the possible implementation of each of the various options considered on 30th September to help to ensure respect for a cease-fire once it becomes effective;
3. Strengthen its organisation and ability to intervene to ensure Europe's security and urge the Security Council and the CSCE to give a further mandate to WEU to facilitate a return to peace;
4. Continue to associate any European countries that might make a contribution with all appropriate action to secure a cease-fire and eventual peace in Yugoslavia;
5. Use all appropriate means to bring pressure to bear on the parties to the conflict to ensure the success of the conference in The Hague on peace in Yugoslavia;
6. Continue to inform NATO and the CSCE of its decisions;
7. Inform the Assembly without delay of the results of each of its ministerial meetings.

1. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 15th October 1991 in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure.

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1283).



**RECOMMENDATION 507*****on the evolution of WEU's public relations***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the public's interest in WEU's future rôle and function has never been so high as in the second half of 1991;
- (ii) Deploring that neither the Council nor member governments have so far been able to explain adequately in public the organisation's achievements and contributions, particularly during the Gulf crisis, in order to avoid misunderstanding among the European and American public;
- (iii) Considering that the Council's reply to Recommendation 494 is insufficient;
- (iv) Noticing that the two parts of the thirty-sixth annual report and the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council contain no mention of the Council's public relations activities,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Consider again the Assembly's proposals made in Mr. Pontillon's Written Question 285 and in Recommendation 494 and in particular:
  - publish basic information documents for widespread circulation in all member countries and in North America;
  - create a WEU periodical in the official languages of the member countries;
  - urge member governments to release more information about the activities of the various WEU bodies;
2. By implementing an effective communications campaign, provide a clear public explanation of WEU's position in the present international debate on its future rôle and place in the European and Atlantic framework;
3. Instruct the Secretary-General to implement his reported plan to circulate a booklet on WEU in the languages of all member countries for the use of pupils in the senior classes of secondary schools;
4. Study the possibility of circulating other information documents with the assistance of the WEU Institute for Security Studies;
5. Resume its information to the Assembly on its public relations activities in its annual reports as used to be the practice;
6. Earmark sufficient funds for a study of a general communications strategy and the wherewithal to implement it.

## NINTH SITTING

Monday, 2nd December 1991

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Address by Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece. | (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1284 and amendments). |
| 2. WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU    |   |

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

#### 1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

#### 2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### 3. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

##### *Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*

##### *Germany*

- Mr. Matschie as an alternate member;

##### *Spain*

- Mr. Amaral as a titular member.

#### 4. Address by Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece

Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Mitsotakis answered questions put by Sir John Hunt, MM. Baumel, Stoffelen, Cox, Martinez, Jessel, Reddemann, Müller, van der Linden and Soysal (*Observer from Turkey*).

The sitting was suspended at 4.05 p.m. and resumed at 4.10 p.m. with Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

#### 5. WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1284 and amendments)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Reddemann, van der Linden, Eser (*Observer from Turkey*), Müller, Perinat, Colombo, Martinez, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Pahtas and Spiliotopoulos (*Observers from Greece*), Barrionuevo, De Decker; (point of order): Lord Mackie of Benshie, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; Mr. Petersen (*Observer from Norway*).

The debate was closed.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Pieralli:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "Atlantic Alliance" add "and of the European Community".

*Speakers:* Mr. Pieralli, Lord Mackie of Benshie and Mr. Stoffelen.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Socialist Group:

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"3. Prepare to invite other European countries to co-operate with members of WEU in diplomatic or military action designed to keep the peace in Europe;"

*Speakers:* Mr. Hardy and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The amendment was adopted.

*Speakers* (points of order): MM. Pieralli, Fourré, De Decker, Stegagnini, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Sir Dudley Smith.

The Assembly proceeded to vote by roll-call on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II), by 31 votes to 7 with 14 abstentions. 27 representatives who had signed the register of

attendance did not take part in the vote. (This recommendation will be published as No. 508)<sup>1</sup>.

***6. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 3rd December 1991, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.*

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1. See page 22.

## APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>MM. Moreira</b> <i>Amaral</i> (Silva Marques) Soares Costa Vieira Mesquita
<b>MM. De Decker</b> (Biefnot) <i>Eicher</i> (Chevalier) <i>Noerens</i> (Kempinaire) <i>De Bondt</i> (Seeuws) Uyttendaele	<b>MM. Benassi</b> <i>Colombo</i> (Caccia) Mrs. Falcucci <b>MM. Rauti</b> (Filetti) Fioret Gabbuggiani <i>Stegagnini</i> (Guizzi) <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Malfatti) Mezzapesa Parisi <i>Rubner</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli <i>Triglia</i> (Sarti)	<b>Spain</b> <b>MM. Palacios</b> (Borderas) Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
<b>France</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>MM. Bassinet</b> Baumel Beix Durand Fourré <i>Lagorce</i> (Oehler) Valleix	<b>Mr. Goerens</b> Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	<b>MM. Atkinson</b> Cox Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg <b>MM. Lambie</b> (Garrett) Hardy Jessel Sir Russell Johnston <b>MM. Bowden</b> (Earl of Kinnoull) Lord Kirkhill Mr. Parry Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Sir William Shelton) Sir Dudley Smith Sir John Stokes Lord <i>Newall</i> (D. Thompson) Mr. J. Thompson Lord <i>Rodney</i> (Ward)
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	
<b>MM. Bindig</b> (Antretter) Böhm <i>Schluckebier</i> (Büchler) Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler) <b>MM. Matschie</b> (Holtz) <i>Lummer</i> (Kittelmann) Menzel <i>Lenzer</i> (Meyer zu Bentrup) Müller Reddemann <i>Maass</i> (von Schmude) <i>Pfuhl</i> (Soell) Sprung Mrs. <i>Mascher</i> (Mrs. Terborg) Mr. Vogel	<b>MM. Aarts</b> <i>van der Linden</i> (De Hoop Scheffer) Jurgens Stoffelen van Velzen Verbeek	
	<b>Portugal</b>	
	<b>MM. Brito</b> (Esteves) Fernandes Marques	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
Mr. Pécriaux Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Mrs Blunck <b>MM. Irmer</b> Steiner	Mr. Eisma
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Portugal</b>
<b>MM. Caro</b> Collette Forni Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	<b>MM. Manzolini</b> Martino Rodotà Rubbi Sinesio	Mr. Candal
		<b>Spain</b>
		<b>MM. Alvarez</b> Cuatre Casas
		<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Mr. Speed

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 3 by roll-call on the draft recommendation on WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU (Doc. 1284)<sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	31
Noes .....	7
Abstentions .....	14

*Ayes*

MM. Aarts	MM. Jurgens	Sir Dudley Smith
Atkinson	<i>Bowden</i>	MM. Soares Costa
Böhm	(Earl of Kinnoull)	<i>Pfuhl</i> (Soell)
<i>Schluckebier</i> (Büchler)	Lord Kirkhill	Sprung
Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler)	MM. Lopez Henares	Stoffelen
Mr. Cox	Menzel	Sir John Stokes
Mrs <i>Roe</i>	<i>Lenzer</i>	Lord <i>Newall</i> (D. Thompson)
(Dame Peggy Fenner)	(Meyer zu Bentrup)	MM. J. Thompson
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	Müller	van Velzen
MM. Hardy	Parry	Lord <i>Rodney</i> (Ward)
Jessel	Reddemann	
Sir Russell Johnston	<i>Maass</i> (von Schmude)	

*Noes*

MM. Benassi	MM. Fourré	MM. <i>Lagorce</i> (Oehler)
<i>De Decker</i> (Biefnot)	<i>Matschie</i> (Holtz)	Pieralli
<i>Eicher</i> (Chevalier)		

*Abstentions*

MM. <i>Bindig</i> (Antretter)	Mr. Fabra	MM. Moya
<i>Palacios</i> (Borderas)	Mrs. Falcucci	Perinat
<i>Colombo</i> (Caccia)	MM. <i>Stegagnini</i> (Guizzi)	de Puig
Cuco	Martinez	Roman
Diaz	Mrs. <i>Mascher</i> (Mrs. Terborg)	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 508*****on WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 make it necessary to re-examine the organisation of the security of Europe as a whole and in particular Western Europe;
- (ii) Noting that the rôle of WEU in the organisation of European security must be redefined in the context of the process of a Community policy and adapting NATO strategy to the new situation in Europe and the world;
- (iii) Considering that the accession of further countries to the modified Brussels Treaty should be considered after the rôle of WEU has been redefined;
- (iv) Noting that the nine member countries are unanimous in considering that the Atlantic Alliance is and must remain the essential framework of western defence in Europe;
- (v) Considering that NATO is not at present in a position to take direct action outside the area defined by the North Atlantic Treaty nor to respond effectively to certain threats to peace in Central or Eastern Europe, but recalling that it is essential that measures taken by WEU in such cases, in accordance with Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, should guarantee Euro-American cohesion,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Explore and set in motion the best possible machinery for co-operation with the European countries which so wish, while bearing in mind that, in present circumstances, it would not be wise to invite formally countries which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty in application of its Article XI;
2. Encourage the participation of European countries so wishing and fulfilling the necessary conditions in those of WEU's activities and institutions which, not involving the application of Articles IV and V of the treaty, concern the implementation of Article VIII;
3. Prepare to invite other European countries to co-operate with members of WEU in diplomatic or military action designed to keep the peace in Europe;
4. Prior to any engagement of forces under the aegis of WEU, hold consultations with NATO to ensure the smooth running of the Atlantic Alliance.

# TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1991

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. General report – activities of the WEU Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1285 and amendments*).
2. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Doc. 1289*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

### 1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

### 2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

### 3. Election of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

*Speaker:* Mr. Stoffelen.

The Assembly decided to send a message of congratulations to Mr. Butros Ghali on his election as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

### 4. General report – activities of the WEU Council

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1285 and amendments)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Moya, Brito, Amaral and Lopez Henares.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Socialist Group:

1. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, after “WEU” insert “where this is approved by national governments”.

*Speakers:* Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Stoffelen.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Hardy, on behalf of the Socialist Group:

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “allow Europe to play a more active rôle in disarmament matters” and insert “make it possible for Europe to play a much more active rôle in disarmament matters”.

*Speakers:* Mr. Hardy and Mr. Stoffelen.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 509)<sup>1</sup>.

### 5. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Doc. 1289)*

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur.

*Mr. Aarts, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

1. See page 26.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* Mr. Lambie, Mrs. Terborg, MM. Müller and Probst.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Stegagnini, Chairman, and Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

***6. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 12.25 p.m.*



## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Spain</b>
MM. Biefnot <i>Eicher</i> (Chevalier) Kempinaire Pécriaux <i>De Bondt</i> (Seeuws)	Mrs. Falcucci MM. Fioret Gabbuggiani <i>Fassino</i> (Guizzi) <i>Stegagnini</i> (Malfatti) Martino Mezzapesa Parisi <i>Rubner</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli <i>Triglia</i> (Sarti) <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Sinesio)	MM. Alvarez <i>Palacios</i> (Borderas) Cuatrecasas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
<b>France</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Bassinet Durand <i>Lemoine</i> (Forni) <i>Lagorce</i> (Oehler) Valleix	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mrs. <i>Err</i> (Regenwetter)	MM. Atkinson Cox Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Lambie</i> (Garrett) Hardy <i>Bowden</i> (Jessel) Sir Russell Johnston Lord <i>Rodney</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Lord Kirkhill Mr. Parry Sir <i>Anthony Durant</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) Mr. <i>Howell</i> (Speed) Sir John Stokes MM. D. Thompson J. Thompson <i>Rathbone</i> (Ward)
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	
Mrs. Blunck MM. Böhm Büchler Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler) MM. <i>Matschie</i> (Holtz) Menzel <i>Probst</i> (Meyer zu Bentrup) Müller Reddemann <i>Pfuhl</i> (Soell) Sprung Steiner Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	MM. Aarts Eisma Jurgens Stoffelen van Velzen Verbeek	
	<b>Portugal</b>	
	MM. <i>Brito</i> (Candal) <i>Moreira</i> (Fernandes Marques) <i>Roseta</i> (Moreira) <i>Amaral</i> (Silva Marques) Soares Costa Vieira Mesquita	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Baumel Beix Caro Collette Fourré Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	MM. Antretter Irmer Kittelmann von Schmude	Mr. Goerens
	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
	MM. Benassi Caccia Filetti Manzolini Rodotà Rubbi	Mr. De Hoop Scheffer
		<b>Portugal</b>
		Mr. Esteves
		<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Sir William Shelton

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 509*****on the activities of the WEU Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Satisfied that WEU has enabled Europe to play an active part in applying the measures decided upon by the Security Council for establishing a new, peaceful order in the Middle East;
- (ii) Noting with satisfaction that the Council has undertaken to provide the Community with the means they may require for possible action to promote peace in Yugoslavia;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction that, during the year, the Council has developed the means available to governments for co-ordinating their action in areas within the purview of WEU;
- (iv) Considering that the various proposals concerning the future of European security that have been presented at the intergovernmental conference all assign a major rôle to WEU both as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and as the military organisation of the Twelve;
- (v) Welcoming the fact that the successive French and German presidencies made considerable progress in these areas;
- (vi) Welcoming the fact that, at its ministerial meeting in Vianden on 27th June 1991, the Council took useful decisions for adapting WEU to the new requirements of European security;
- (vii) Regretting however that the Council, at the level of the Permanent Council, applies only in a limited manner its commitments under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty and, in particular:
  - (a) by sheltering behind formalist considerations so as not to answer the Assembly, as has frequently been the case, and especially in its replies to Recommendations 479 and 490 and Written Question 288;
  - (b) by taking liberties with the facts as was the case in several respects in its replies to Recommendations 490 and 494 and in the first part of its thirty-seventh annual report;
  - (c) by resorting to generalities and vague phrases as in its reply to Recommendation 492;
  - (d) by breaking away from its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty as in its replies to Recommendations 490 and 491;
- (viii) Regretting further that the public is still insufficiently informed of the activities of WEU,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Examine without delay the adaptation of WEU that has become necessary due to the transformation of Europe, the development of the European Community's external and security policy and the reorganisation of NATO and inform the Assembly of its conclusions but not relinquish in favour of institutions other than WEU decisions concerning the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, as it appears to be envisaging in its reply to Recommendation 490;
2. Set up the WEU satellite data interpretation centre without delay and quickly define the conditions for developing Europe's observation satellite capability;
3. In consultation with NATO, study attentively command structures allowing forces assigned to NATO or to national commands to be used for missions defined by WEU, taking into account the lessons learned from the Gulf crisis and the Yugoslav question;
4. Study the disarmament proposals made by the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1991 in order to ascertain Europe's security requirements and make it possible for Europe to play a much more active rôle in disarmament matters;
5. Define areas in which consideration might be given to countries that are not members of WEU, including Greece, Norway, Turkey and certain Central European countries, being associated with the activities of the Council or of its subsidiary organs;

6. Not neglect the application of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, which makes the Assembly an essential organ of WEU, and to this end:
- (a) Ensure that it replies pertinently to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions and in particular:
    - (i) not take as a pretext for refusing to reply the fact that the Assembly, which it keeps inadequately informed, is not always able to word its texts in a manner it considers pertinent;
    - (ii) ensure that it does not give credence to statements not very close to reality;
    - (iii) ensure that the English and French texts of its replies correspond as accurately as possible;
    - (iv) give sufficiently precise and detailed replies to precise and detailed recommendations;
    - (v) respect the law embodied in the modified Brussels Treaty in its decisions and in its replies to the Assembly;
  - (b) To allow a true dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, ensure that:
    - (i) its replies to recommendations reach the Assembly in time for it to be able to study them before the sessions following their adoption, i.e. within three months of being communicated to the Council;
    - (ii) its replies to written questions reach the Assembly within a reasonable lapse of time;
    - (iii) its half-yearly reports reach the Assembly within three months of the end of each half-year;
  - (c) Transmit to the Assembly those of its discussion papers, reports and proposals which are not secret, as is normally done by the European Community authorities in the case of the European Parliament and as it did on 22nd February in the case of the working paper submitted to it by the Secretary-General;
  - (d) Inform the Assembly of progress made with the study on Europe's development of a means of strategic, maritime and air transport;
  - (e) Inform the Assembly of the nature and aim of the military group on Yugoslavia set up in Metz;
  - (f) Apply its own decision of 13th November 1989 concerning the WEU Institute for Security Studies:
    - (i) by communicating to the Assembly "the results of the Institute's unclassified work", including "discussion papers on topical subjects" and "reports ... on the seminars it had arranged";
    - (ii) by not opposing the Institute giving the Assembly opinions on topical questions;
7. Implement as soon as possible the decision to which all the governments have agreed on moving the seat of the Permanent Council to Brussels and having that body formed of the permanent representatives of member countries to the European Community;
8. Instruct the Secretariat-General to prepare and circulate to the press a periodical information bulletin on the activities of WEU.

## ELEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1991

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.
2. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1289 and amendments*).
3. Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence matters (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1287 and amendment*).
4. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe; Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee, Docs. 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### *1. Attendance register*

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### *2. Adoption of the minutes*

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### *3. Address by Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*

Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Dienstbier answered questions put by MM. Noerens, Banks, Müller, Eisma, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Büchler, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Reddemann, Soell and van Velzen.

*The sitting was suspended at 4.35 p.m. and resumed at 4.45 p.m.*

#### *4. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland*

*(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1289 and amendments)*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mrs. Blunck on behalf of the Socialist Group:

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Speakers:* Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Stegagnini, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Atkinson and Stegagnini.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “(IEPG)” to the end and add:

“as an ideal framework to gain familiarity with procurement procedures for democratically controlled armed forces, in particular with a view to including them in:

(a) those regular meetings of government officials known as the “European sessions for armament managers”, organised with the objective of exchanging information related to the operation of organisations in charge of arms procurement;

(b) the work of Panel I, which would help them to harmonise their equipment requirements with other European nations and to identify potential projects for collaboration,”

*Speakers:* MM. Atkinson, Lambie and Stegagnini.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Socialist Group:

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Speakers:* MM. Tummers, Atkinson and Stegagnini.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee:

4. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after "skills" insert "conversion".

*Speaker:* Mr. Atkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 510)<sup>1</sup>.

#### **5. Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence matters**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1287 and amendment)*

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Lopez Henares, Rapporteur.

*Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* Mrs. Fischer, MM. Tummers, Hardy, Scovacricchi, Müller, de Puig, Nuñez and Roseta.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Lopez Henares, Rapporteur, and Mrs. Fischer, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft order.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Socialist Group:

1. In the draft order, at the end-add "on a basis of equality".

*Speakers:* Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Lopez Henares.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 79)<sup>2</sup>.

#### **6. Change in the order of business**

The President proposed a change in the order of business.

The proposal was agreed to.

#### **7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 4th December 1991, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.*

1. See page 31.

2. See page 33.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Scovacricchi</i> (Gabbuggiani) <i>Fassino</i> (Guizzi) <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Malfatti) <i>Stegagnini</i> (Manzolini) Martino Mezzapesa Pieralli Sinesio	<b>Spain</b>
MM. <i>Eicher</i> (Chevalier) <i>Noerens</i> (Kempinaire) <i>De Bondt</i> (Seeuws)		MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez) <i>Palacios</i> (Borderas) Cuatrecasas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Uyttendaele		
<b>France</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
MM. <i>Hunault</i> (Caro) Durand <i>Lagorce</i> (Oehler)	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Mr. <i>Pfuhl</i> (Antretter) Mrs. Blunck Mr. Büchler Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Büchler) MM. <i>Matschie</i> (Holtz) Menzel <i>Probst</i> (Meyer zu Bentrup) Müller Reddemann Soell Steiner Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	MM. Aarts De Hoop Scheffer Eisma <i>Tummers</i> (Jurgens) Stoffelen van Velzen Verbeek	MM. Atkinson <i>Banks</i> (Cox) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Lambie</i> (Garrett) Hardy Jessel Sir Russell Johnston Sir <i>Anthony Durant</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) Mr. <i>Howell</i> (Speed) Sir John Stokes MM. <i>Rowe</i> (D. Thompson) J. Thompson Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Ward) Mr. <i>Bowden</i> (Sir William Shelton)
<b>Italy</b>	<b>Portugal</b>	
Mrs. Falcucci Mr. Fioret	MM. <i>Brito</i> (Candal) <i>Vara</i> (Esteves) Fernandes Marques Moreira <i>Roseta</i> (Silva Marques) Vieira Mesquita	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Seitlinger Thyraud Valleix Vial-Massat	MM. Filetti Parisi Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi Sarti
MM. Biefnot Péciaux		
<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Portugal</b>
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Collette Forni Fouillé Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung	MM. Böhm Irmer Kittelmann von Schmude Sprung	Mr. Soares Costa
	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
	MM. Benassi Caccia	Earl of Kinnoull Lord Kirkhill Mr. Parry

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 510*****on the defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the complete economic reform from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy now taking place in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, here also to be referred to as the Triangle;
- (ii) Recognising that the Triangle, in the framework of the former Warsaw Pact, was obliged to develop a large defence industry with considerable armaments and equipment production and several hundred thousand employees;
- (iii) Aware that the traditional export markets for this defence industry, mainly the former Warsaw Pact allies and third world countries formerly in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, have virtually collapsed overnight;
- (iv) Conscious that, due to arms control, severe budget cuts and restructuring of the national armed forces, the home market of the Triangle's defence industry has also shrunk dramatically, with immediate negative consequences for its production level;
- (v) Aware that massive unemployment in many of the Triangle defence industry's establishments will lead to a complete collapse of those regions where they are the exclusive generator of economic activity and the basis of the social and cultural structure as is often the case;
- (vi) Recognising that conversion in a narrow sense, insofar as it means turning defence manufacturing companies fully or partially into manufacturers for the civilian market, will mainly have to depend on private enterprise initiatives;
- (vii) Understanding that the Triangle countries, after more than forty years of complete dependence and submission, have a legitimate interest in an autonomous defence capability linked to the maintenance of a national defence industrial base;
- (viii) Conscious that the Triangle countries have pledged to stop arms exports to areas of tension and terrorist organisations;
- (ix) Recognising that the Triangle countries will gradually have to adapt their armed forces and defence equipment to their new security needs and to their future rôle in a larger European security framework;
- (x) Aware that, in the foreseeable future, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are bound to be full members of the European Community and that in parallel they will be included in a future European security and defence system;
- (xi) Aware that the defence ministers of the member countries of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) recently initiated appropriate contacts between the IEPG on the one hand and, on the other hand, Western European Union and the European Community, both engaged in the elaboration of the future European security architecture;
- (xii) Convinced that for the Triangle nations the IEPG as a European forum is an ideal framework to start harmonising their operational requirements and re-equipment time-scales, while offering them, through a concerted European military research programme and cost-effective defence equipment programmes, a fair chance to adapt their slimmed down defence industry to new circumstances and include it in European collaborative efforts;
- (xiii) Recalling that, notwithstanding considerable liberalisation in the Cocom export control régime, in particular regarding Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, these countries are still among the proscribed countries of Cocom,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urgently call for negotiations between Cocom and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to remove these countries from the list of proscribed countries as soon as possible;

2. Promote the participation of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in the activities of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) as an ideal framework to gain familiarity with procurement procedures for democratically-controlled armed forces, in particular with a view to including them in:

- (a) those regular meetings of government officials known as the "European sessions for armament managers", organised with the objective of exchanging information relating to the operation of organisations in charge of arms procurement;
- (b) the work of Panel I, which would help them to harmonise their equipment requirements with other European nations and to identify potential projects for collaboration;

3. Urge all member states to respond positively to requests for advice on re-training, the acquisition of new skills, conversion, special help for self-employment and the establishment of small businesses, attracting new industries and developing employment opportunities by establishing enterprise zones.



**ORDER 79*****on transatlantic parliamentary co-operation  
in security and defence matters***

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced that the establishment of a regular dialogue between the WEU Assembly, on the one hand, and the United States Congress and Canadian Parliament, on the other, is necessary and in the interests of all;
- (ii) Regretting that the invitations sent by the WEU Assembly regularly since 1988 to the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament to send observers to its sessions have so far not been taken up;
- (iii) Concerned that incomplete information available to Congress and the American public on the thinking and positions of Europeans may aggravate existing and create further misunderstanding on the other shore of the North Atlantic;
- (v) Convinced that parliaments in Europe and North America might and should help and consult each other more with a view to strengthening their parliamentary rights and powers vis-à-vis the executive in foreign policy and security,

**REQUESTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE**

To contact the United States Congress and Canadian Parliament in order to:

- (a) encourage their committees and sub-committees whose responsibilities include questions dealt with by the WEU Assembly to take a closer interest in the activities of WEU and its Assembly;
- (b) promote the formation of American and Canadian parliamentary groups responsible for establishing relations with the WEU Assembly;
- (c) promote meetings between representatives of the United States Congress and of the Canadian Parliament and members of the WEU Assembly to establish a regular system of parliamentary co-operation and communication.

## TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1991

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council, Document 1282; Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany.
2. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe; Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee, Docs. 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council, Document 1282**

*Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Genscher answered questions put by Sir John Stokes, MM. Rowe, Jessel, Fioret, Ewing, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Pahtas (*Observer from Greece*), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Martinez, Baumel, Lopez Henares, De Hoop Scheffer and Soell.

*The sitting was suspended at 11.30 a.m. and resumed at 11.40 a.m. with Mr. Sinesio, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **4. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe**

##### **Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis**

*(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee, Docs. 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur.

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur.

The joint debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mrs. Roe.

*Mr. Uyttendaele, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Reddemann, Kotenkov (*Observer from the USSR*), Hardy, Tummers, Menzel, Scovacricchi, Barrionuevo and Fioret.

The joint debate was adjourned.

#### **5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Spain</b>
MM. Biefnot <i>Eicher</i> (Chevalier) <i>Noerens</i> (Kempinaire) Péciaux <i>De Bondt</i> (Seeuws)	MM. Benassi Caccia Mrs. Falcucci MM. <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti) Fioret Gabbuggiani <i>Fassino</i> (Guizzi) <i>Stegagnini</i> (Malfatti) Martino <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Parisi) <i>Rubner</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli <i>Scovacricchi</i> (Rubbi) Sinesio	MM. <i>Diaz de Mera</i> (Alvarez) <i>Barrionuevo</i> (Borderas) Cuatrecasas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
<b>France</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Baumel <i>Hunault</i> (Caro) Durand Jung <i>Lagorce</i> (Oehler)	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	MM. <i>Rathbone</i> (Atkinson) <i>Redmond</i> (Cox) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Lambie</i> (Garrett) Hardy Jessel Sir Russell Johnston Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) MM. <i>Ewing</i> (Lord Kirkhill) Parry Sir <i>Anthony Durant</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes MM. D. Thompson J. Thompson <i>Rowe</i> (Ward)
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	
MM. Antretter <i>Junghanns</i> (Böhm) Büchler Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler) MM. <i>Pfuhl</i> (Holtz) <i>Lummer</i> (Kittelmann) Menzel <i>Probst</i> (Meyer zu Bentrup) Reddemann Soell Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	MM. De Hoop Scheffer <i>Tummers</i> (Jurgens) Stoffelen Verbeek	
	<b>Portugal</b>	
	MM. <i>Brito</i> (Candal) Fernandes Marques Moreira <i>Roseta</i> (Soares Costa) Vieira Mesquita	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Bassinet Beix Collette Forni Fourré Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Seitlinger Thyraud Valleix Vial-Massat	Mrs. Blunck MM. Irmer Müller von Schmude Sprung Steiner	Mr. Aarts Eisma van Velzen
	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Portugal</b>
	MM. Manzolini Mezzapesa Rodotà Sarti	MM. Esteves Silva Marques
		<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Sir William Shelton

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## THIRTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1991

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – Address by Mr. Wimmer, Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany.
2. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe; Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations*, Docs. 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments).
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget*, Doc. 1281 and addendum).
4. Procedure for approving the budget (*Presentation of and debate and vote on the motion for an order tabled by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*, Doc. 1297).
5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts*, Doc. 1279 and addendum).
6. Arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee*, Doc. 1288 and addendum).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council**

**Address by Mr. Wimmer,  
Parliamentary Secretary of State to  
the Ministry of Defence of Germany**

Mr. Wimmer, Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Wimmer answered questions put by Mr. Stegagnini, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Rowe, Lopez Henares and Speed.

*The sitting was suspended at 4 p.m. and resumed at 4.10 p.m. with Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **4. Change in the order of business**

The President proposed a change in the order of business.

The proposal was agreed to.

#### **5. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe**

##### **Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis**

*(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments)*

The joint debate was resumed.

*Speakers:* MM. Lummer, de Puig, Lambie, Antretter, Brito, Sir John Stokes, Mr. Cuco, Sir Russell Johnston and Mr. Cuatrecasas.

*Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Vacaru (*Observer from Romania*), Pilarski (*Observer from Poland*), Stegagnini, Rowe, Roseta and Mile (*Observer from Hungary*).

The joint debate was closed.

Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur of the Political Committee, and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur of the Defence Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation in Document 1293.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Jurgens on behalf of the Socialist Group:

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to prepare the" and insert "to consider which"; and after "meeting" insert "should be prepared".

*Speakers:* MM. Tummers and Stoffelen.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Pieralli and Brito:

1. In paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "outside the NATO area or".

*Speakers:* Mr. Pieralli, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Stoffelen.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Socialist Group:

3. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, at the end add "under the authority of the United Nations".

*Speakers:* Mr. Ewing, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Stoffelen.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 511)<sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation in Document 1294.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Socialist Group:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "operations", insert "under the authority of the United Nations".

*Speaker:* Mr. Ewing.

An amendment to Amendment 1 was tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Defence Committee:

In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "operations" insert "preferably under the authority of the United Nations".

1. See page 40.

*Speaker:* Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The amendment as amended was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Lagorce:

3. In paragraph 5 (c) of the draft recommendation proper, after "the United States" add "and Canada".

*Speakers:* Mr. Fourré and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Socialist Group:

2. In paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper, after "pollution control" insert "protection of cultural heritage".

*Speakers:* Mr. Tummers and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 512)<sup>1</sup>.

*Speakers* (explanation of vote): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Stoffelen.

#### **6. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1281 and addendum)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* Mr. Noerens, Gonzalez-Laxe and Büchler.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft budget.

The draft budget was agreed to unanimously.

1. See page 42.

**7. Procedure for approving the budget**

*(Presentation of the motion for an order tabled by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion for an order, Doc. 1297)*

The motion for an order was presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion for an order.

The motion for an order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 80)<sup>1</sup>.

**8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts**

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1279 and addendum)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.

The motion was agreed to unanimously.

**9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 5th December 1991, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 7 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup>. See page 44.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Fioret <i>Stegagnini</i> (Malfatti) Martino Pieralli	MM. Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig <i>Gonzalez-Laxe</i> (Roman)
MM. <i>Eicher</i> (Biefnot) Chevalier <i>Noerens</i> (Pécriaux) De Bondt Mrs. Staels-Dompas	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
<b>France</b>	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	
MM. Bassinet <i>Hunault</i> (Caro) Fourré	<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>Germany</b>	MM. De Hoop Scheffer <i>Tummers</i> (Jurgens) Stoffelen	MM. <i>Rathbone</i> (Atkinson) <i>Redmond</i> (Cox) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Lambie</i> (Garrett) Jessel Sir Russell Johnston Earl of Kinnoull MM. <i>Ewing</i> (Lord Kirkhill) <i>Litherland</i> (Parry) Lord <i>Newall</i> (Sir William Shelton) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Sir <i>Anthony Durant</i> (D. Thompson) Mr. <i>Rowe</i> (Ward)
Mr. <i>Antretter</i> Mrs. Blunck MM. <i>Junghanns</i> (Böhm) Büchler Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler) MM. <i>Reimann</i> (Holtz) <i>Lummer</i> (Kittelmann) Meyer zu Bentrup Reddemann Soell	<b>Portugal</b>	
<b>Italy</b>	MM. <i>Brito</i> (Candal) Fernandes Marques Moreira <i>Amaral</i> (Silva Marques) <i>Roseta</i> (Soares Costa)	
MM. Caccia <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti)	<b>Spain</b>	
	MM. <i>Diaz de Mera</i> (Alvarez) Cuatrecasas	
The following representatives apologised for their absence:		
<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Müller von Schmude Sprung Steiner Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Kempinaire Uyttendaele		Mr. Aarts Eisma van Velzen Verbeek
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Portugal</b>
MM. Baumel Bassinot Beix Collette Durand Forni Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Seitlinger Thyraud Valleix Vial-Massat	Mr. Benassi Mrs. Falcucci MM. Gabbuggiani Guizzi Manzolini Mezzapesa Parisi Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi Sarti Sinesio	MM. Esteves Vieira Mesquita
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>Spain</b>
MM. Irmer Menzel	Mr. Regenwetter	Mr. Borderas
		<b>United Kingdom</b>
		MM. Hardy J. Thompson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 511*****on European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe***

- (i) THE ASSEMBLY notes that, while events in summer 1991 both in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia do not directly endanger the security of WEU member countries, they significantly increase the risks to Europe's security.
- (ii) It hopes the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht will allow a decisive step to be taken towards co-operation between WEU and the Community in the framework of a European union.
- (iii) It welcomes the fact that the various proposals made at the intergovernmental conference on external policy and security and the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council in Rome tend to strengthen the rôle assigned to WEU in ensuring the maintenance of peace throughout Europe.
- (iv) It reiterates the advice given by the Presidential Committee to the WEU Council of Ministers and the intergovernmental conference that "parliamentary control of the measures by which WEU shoulders Europe's new security and defence responsibilities must remain the task of the WEU Assembly which is composed of delegations from national parliaments whose attributions in this respect are unchanged".
- (v) It considers that, at the present juncture, the modified Brussels Treaty provides more than ever the juridical basis for European co-operation in defence and security matters and it regrets that the Council has not yet agreed to give it any indication about the course it intends to follow in revising the treaty.
- (vi) It notes with satisfaction that, at its meeting on 18th November, the Council decided to set up operational bodies meeting some of the requirements implied by WEU's new responsibilities.
- (vii) It welcomes the fact that NATO has taken decisions to strengthen the CSCE and started to organise a permanent dialogue with all the countries which were members of the Warsaw Pact and that the Council has decided to organise parallel action.
- (viii) It notes, too, that the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland have started to take coherent action in all areas leading to their association with Western Europe but also that they are expressing serious concern about their security.
- (ix) It recalls the urgency of implementing its Recommendation 506 on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis.

## IT THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Meet at ministerial level the day after the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht to prepare the adaptation of WEU to the new situation created by the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council in Rome and by the Maastricht meeting, with particular regard to:
  - (a) the organisation and command of WEU forces earmarked for the defence of Europe, and their co-ordination with NATO;
  - (b) the organisation and command of possible WEU rapid action outside the NATO area or in the framework of United Nations or CSCE decisions;
  - (c) the necessary revision of the modified Brussels Treaty;
  - (d) defining the respective rôles of the IEPG and a future WEU armaments agency;
  - (e) moving the Permanent Council and the Secretariat-General to Brussels in order to help WEU to carry out its share of responsibilities in decisions on external and security policy matters taken by the European union and to develop co-operation between WEU and NATO along the lines of the Presidential Committee's advice of 26th March 1991.
2. Propose forthwith to the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland:
  - (a) participation in meetings of the Council when matters relating to the security of Central and Eastern Europe are discussed;
  - (b) association with the activities of the WEU satellite centre for everything relating to the verification of the CFE Agreement;



(c) the possibility of participating in the activities of the IEPG and all forms of European co-operation in armaments matters.

3. Propose to Hungary, and any country making a formal request, the posting of military observers to Hungarian territory, in the area of its frontier with Yugoslavia, in order to record any further violation of Hungarian territory or air space by Yugoslav belligerents.
4. Take without delay the necessary military and naval measures to enforce the embargo on certain supplies to Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav republics decided by the Twelve on 8th November.
5. Co-ordinate as soon as possible humanitarian operations for Yugoslav civilians and afford them naval protection.
6. Establish the necessary co-operation between member countries with a view to their participation in a peace-keeping force in Yugoslavia as soon as the conditions exist for making this legitimate under the authority of the United Nations.

## RECOMMENDATION 512

### *on operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendation 506 on Europe and the crisis in Yugoslavia;
- (ii) Welcoming the series of initiatives taken by the WEU Council to help support the continuing search for a lasting peace in Yugoslavia;
- (iii) Congratulating the Council especially concerning the prompt actions taken to prepare the possible options for a WEU peace-keeping force and in particular France for making available the necessary facilities at Metz to allow the WEU joint contingency study group to function effectively;
- (iv) Pleased that some member countries are prepared to participate in operations to establish humanitarian corridors and that Italian and French ships are already involved in evacuating children and the wounded;
- (v) Supporting the efforts of WEU member states in the United Nations Security Council in favour of a resolution concerning peace-keeping operations in Yugoslavia and stressing the readiness of WEU nations to give practical support to such operations, in addition to making available to the United Nations details of the contingency planning work already carried out by WEU;
- (vi) Reiterating the warning that the stationing of peace-keeping forces should not sanction the seizure of any territory by force;
- (vii) Convinced that the achievements of WEU over the past three years in creating the necessary ad hoc operational structures to meet different contingencies with pragmatic and practical solutions augur well for the important new rôles soon to be devolved to the organisation;
- (viii) Considering that all the various proposals concerning the future organisation of European security assign a major operational rôle to WEU, both as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and as the defence dimension for the coming European union;
- (ix) Convinced that there must now be a rationalisation and concentration of WEU;
- (x) Stressing the importance of adequate and appropriate operational structures, together with a realistic budget, for all component parts of WEU,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue every effort to find a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis, supporting the continuing initiatives of the European Community, the CSCE and the United Nations;
2. Make all the necessary preparations to ensure that appropriate forces would be ready to take part in peace-keeping operations, preferably under the authority of the United Nations, given the right conditions, in particular concentrating on command and control arrangements, rules of engagement, communications, intelligence and logistics;
3. Encourage all member states to take part in humanitarian operations, whatever may have been previous limitations on action outside traditional areas – “all of one company” should be the example set by WEU nations;
4. Instruct the joint contingency study group to examine urgently the most effective ways of:
  - (a) grounding all military aircraft in Yugoslav air space;
  - (b) using electronic counter measures (ECM) to best effect;
  - (c) imposing effective arms and oil embargos on all Yugoslav belligerents (even to the extent of helping control landward frontiers by offering to second police and/or customs officers to third countries);

and make available the results of such studies to the United Nations and other bodies as appropriate;

5. In the light of experience of both the Gulf and Yugoslav crises and in the knowledge that WEU will be given a definite rôle to play as an operational organisation complementary to both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community, take the necessary preliminary measures:
  - (a) to move the seat of the Permanent Council to Brussels and form the Permanent Council itself by "double hatting" either NATO Permanent Representatives, or EC Permanent Representatives, or with a combination of the two;
  - (b) institute a planning staff as urged by the Assembly in Recommendation 502 and ensure that it maintains a liaison link with both the Atlantic Alliance and European union;
  - (c) invite the United States and Canada to appoint an Ambassador to Western European Union;
  - (d) form a military advice group of nine experts on detachment for normal lengths of appointment, to provide the military expertise necessary for the Secretariat-General and to ensure continuous liaison with national defence ministries;
6. Give the necessary political and military impetus to the above by:
  - (a) convening an extraordinary Council meeting after Maastricht;
  - (b) convening a further meeting of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff early in the New Year;
7. Help the four countries (France, Germany, Belgium and Spain) which have decided to form a European army corps, to be headquartered in Strasbourg, to elaborate ideas so that such a unit will be compatible with proposals regarding a European rapid action force;
8. Ensure that appropriate provisions are made concerning
  - command, control, communications and intelligence;
  - transport;
  - logistics;
  - standardisation, if possible, or at least interoperability of equipment used by multinational units;
  - common procurement (e.g. through links with the IEPG and the Eurogroup);
9. Seek to develop military satellite communication systems within WEU, as suggested by the French Defence Minister, Mr. Joxe, on 6th and 7th November 1991, and associate non-member countries such as Canada and Norway (which have already expressed an interest) with not only this project, but also the satellite data interpretation and training centre and in addition the study on a European space-based observation system;
10. Examine the possibility of making a WEU concerted contribution when it comes to disaster relief, pollution control, protection of cultural heritage and crisis management generally, thus ensuring that WEU expertise is used to best advantage.

**ORDER 80*****on procedure for approving the budget***

The Assembly notes that present procedure for approving the budget:

- (a) makes it impossible for it to consider properly the Council's position on its draft budget before the plenary session at which it has to be voted;
- (b) seems to give technical arguments by budget experts priority over political considerations.

It consequently asks the Presidential Committee to work out, in agreement with the Council, new procedures based on a political dialogue between the Council and the Assembly to ensure that the Assembly and its committees have time for proper reflection and debate.

## FOURTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th December 1991

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendations, Doc. 1288 and addendum*).
2. Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1292*).
3. The situation in East Timor (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1298*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Sinesio, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. Arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendations, Doc. 1288 and addendum)*

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Tummers and Moya.

*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speaker:* Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe.

The debate was closed.

Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur, and Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1288.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 513)<sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1288 addendum.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 514)<sup>2</sup>.

#### **4. Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1292)*

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Speed.

The debate was closed.

Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stegagnini, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 515)<sup>3</sup>.

#### **5. The situation in East Timor**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1298)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Brito, Rapporteur.

2. See page 49.

3. See page 50.

1. See page 48.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Roseta, Amaral, Fernandes Marques and Sir Dudley Smith.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Brito, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 84)<sup>4</sup>.

#### ***6. Close of the session***

The President declared the thirty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

*The sitting was closed at 11.50 a.m.*

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4. See page 51.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>MM. Fabra</b>
MM. <i>Eicher</i> (Biefnot)	MM. <i>Stegagnini</i> (Malfatti)	Lopez Henares
Chevalier	Pieralli	Martinez
<i>Noerens</i> (Kempinaire)	Sinesio	Moya
Mrs. Staels-Dompas		de Puig
Mr. Uyttendaele	<b>Netherlands</b>	Roman
	MM. <i>Tummers</i> (Jurgens)	
<b>France</b>	Stoffelen	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Mr. <i>Hunault</i> (Caro)	Verbeek	Mr. Atkinson
	<b>Portugal</b>	Dame Peggy Fenner
<b>Germany</b>	MM. <i>Brito</i> (Candal)	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Mr. <i>Antretter</i>	Fernandes Marques	MM. <i>Lambie</i> (Garrett)
Mrs. Blunck	<i>Amaral</i> (Silva Marques)	Jessel
Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler)	<i>Roseta</i> (Soares Costa)	Sir Russell Johnston
MM. <i>Reimann</i> (Holtz)		Earl of Kinnoull
<i>Zierer</i> (Kittelmann)	<b>Spain</b>	Sir Dudley Smith
<i>Probst</i> (Reddemann)	Mr. Alvarez	Mr. Speed
Soell	Mrs. <i>Guirado</i> (Borderas)	Sir <i>John Hunt</i>
	MM. Cuco	(D. Thompson)
	Diaz	Mr. <i>Rowe</i> (J. Thompson)
		Sir <i>Anthony Durant</i> (Ward)

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Irmer	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Pécriaux	Menzel	Mr. Aarts
Seeuws	Meyer zu Bentrup	De Hoop Scheffer
	Müller	Eisma
<b>France</b>	von Schmude	van Velzen
MM. Bassinet	Sprung	
Baumel	Steiner	<b>Portugal</b>
Beix	Mrs. Terborg	MM. Esteves
Collette	Mr. Vogel	Moreira
Durand		Vieira Mesquita
Forni	<b>Italy</b>	
Fourré	MM. Benassi	<b>Spain</b>
Galley	Caccia	Mr. Cuatrecasas
Gouteyron	Mrs. Falcucci	Perinat
Jeambrun	MM. Filetti	
Jung	Fioret	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Oehler	Gabbuggiani	MM. Cox
Seitlinger	Guizzi	Hardy
Thyraud	Manzolini	Lord Kirkhill
Valleix	Martino	Mr. Parry
Vial-Massat	Mezzapesa	Sir William Shelton
	Parisi	Sir John Stokes
<b>Germany</b>	Pecchioli	
MM. Böhm	Rodotà	
Büchler	Rubbi	
	Sarti	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 513*****on arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the changes affecting peace and security which have occurred in recent years in Europe resulting in major progress in disarmament agreements and offering henceforth unprecedented possibilities for greater reductions in all types of armaments;
- (ii) Noting the importance of the agreements achieved so far for the reduction of conventional and nuclear armaments and the monitoring and verification of the ban on certain weapons of mass destruction;
- (iii) Welcoming the proposals for radical reductions in nuclear weapons recently made by President Bush and President Gorbachev which represent a major step forward in this area in both qualitative and quantitative terms;
- (iv) Welcoming the reduction in nuclear armaments agreed by NATO at its recent meeting in Taormina;
- (v) Convinced, however, that the principles reiterated in The Hague platform remain a mainstay of European defence;
- (vi) Convinced that the CFE Treaty will be a milestone in the limitation of these armaments and expressing the wish that this treaty be ratified without delay by all countries;
- (vii) Considering that there are new prospects of developing conventional disarmament in the framework of the CSCE and of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (viii) Recognising the efforts made in the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference for a total ban on chemical and biological weapons;
- (ix) Aware that WEU has an important rôle to play in backing the process of disarmament and in taking initiatives for its achievement in practice;
- (x) Determined for its part to maintain a permanent debate on arms control matters in co-ordination with all appropriate forums,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Contribute by its action to the advancement of all initiatives for peace and détente now being taken, in particular by endorsing disarmament and arms control proposals;
2. Act continuously to promote a consensus between member countries on disarmament in order to draw positions closer together, harmonise legislation and take joint measures to reduce and control armaments, including the regulation and transparency of arms sales;
3. Ensure that the organisation of peace at European and national level concords increasingly with quantitative and qualitative criteria in defence matters to achieve reasonable minima;
4. Actively support the Bush-Gorbachev proposals to reduce nuclear weapons and efforts to avoid their proliferation, in accordance with the terms set out in the non-proliferation treaty and to obtain a ban on nuclear testing;
5. Elaborate and subscribe to a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence which takes account of recent changes but which safeguards European interests;
6. Continue to press for the banning of the production, deployment and sale of chemical and biological weapons;
7. Resolutely endorse the CFE Treaty by urging member states to ratify it without delay, thus ensuring that WEU sets an example in this respect;
8. Give impetus to the verification agreements so as to be able to establish verification systems and programmes acceptable to all member states;
9. Ensure that the satellite data interpretation centre is integrated into the verification process to be instituted;
10. Implement the necessary procedure for WEU to participate in a co-ordinated manner, in particular with the Atlantic Alliance and with other responsible bodies in the necessary exchange of information and elaboration of disarmament proposals.



**RECOMMENDATION 514*****on arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU***

The Assembly,

(i) Welcoming the positive results of the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Bonn on Monday, 18th November 1991, namely:

(a) the decision to establish the WEU satellite data interpretation and training centre at Torrejón, in Spain, with effect from 1st January 1992;

(b) the decision to form a study group in 1992, in France, to examine the necessity and desirability of a medium- and long-term realisation of a European space-based observation system;

(ii) Pleased that the Council has taken so many of the Assembly's previous recommendations on arms control verification to heart and strongly approving the 18th November communiqué on the subject:

“ Ministers took note of the progress made on co-operation among member states on the verification of arms control agreements. In this context, they underlined the link between space co-operation and arms control verification, including verification of the CFE Treaty.

Ministers noted with approval the preparatory steps taken to set up multinational inspection teams as part of the implementation of the verification régime laid down in the CFE Treaty. They approved a set of rules for the co-operation of multinational teams.

They decided to take into account in their subsequent deliberations the possibility of co-operation with all CSCE member states.

The Council welcomed the progress made following the resumption of the open skies negotiations in Vienna, which gives hope for their successful conclusion by the time of the Helsinki follow-up meeting. The ministers continue to attach great importance to accelerating the search for cost-effective solutions in the implementation of an open skies agreement. ”

(iii) Taking account of the new strategic concept defined by NATO at its Rome meeting and its consequences and urging still further practical co-operation between WEU member states to cover all aspects of arms control and disarmament;

(iv) Concerned however that not enough international concertation has been applied to the particular problem of pollution control now urgently required to ensure the safe disposal of both conventional and nuclear weapons;

(v) Welcoming all moves towards a reinforcement of the missile technology control régime and especially the People's Republic of China's recent declared willingness to abide by its provisions,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Support the Atlantic Alliance's new strategic concept and show that WEU, as the European pillar, is ready to respond to current challenges by producing a specific initiative on arms control which would demonstrate our considerable political, legal and technical capabilities;

2. Encourage the participants at the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces to reach positive conclusions to be presented at Helsinki in March 1992;

3. Encourage member countries and CSCE colleague states to pay greater attention to the environmental problems linked with the destruction of both conventional and nuclear weapons, study and report on avoiding this type of potential pollution, thus ensuring greater transparency in this important domain;

4. In addition to seeking progress on verification, satellite observation, multinational inspection teams and open skies, actively seek a greater respect for the missile technology control régime.

**RECOMMENDATION 515*****on arms and equipment for a European rapid action force***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the decision of NATO's Defence Ministers to establish a multinational Allied Command Europe rapid reaction corps;
- (ii) Aware of the declaration on European security and defence issued jointly by Italy and the United Kingdom on 4th October recommending that WEU members develop a European reaction force;
- (iii) Aware of the Franco-German initiative of 14th October on security and defence in the European union recommending the creation of military units under WEU's responsibility;
- (iv) Convinced that there is an irreversible trend towards more political responsibilities for Europe on the international scene in the context of a political union;
- (v) Recognising that a political union with a common security policy also implies a stronger European defence identity in the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy;
- (vi) Conscious that now and in the future the United States defence budget is and will be subject to considerable restraints which, as a consequence, will increasingly limit the possibilities for European armed forces to rely on United States equipment;
- (vii) Recognising that WEU member countries will be obliged to provide the full range of equipment needed for an operational and effective European rapid reaction force, in particular including an autonomous strategic and tactical airlift capability;
- (viii) Aware that major equipment procurement programmes are long-term projects requiring timescales up to 15 to 20 years before coming to fruition,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**


1. Instruct the committee of chiefs of defence staff of WEU to examine urgently the possible contributions of all member countries which have agreed to participate in a future European rapid action force in order to harmonise the arms and equipment of this force at an early stage;
2. Urge the Defence Representatives Group to proceed energetically with its study of a European sea- and airlift capability and include in this study the possibility of establishing a European strategic airlift command in the WEU framework.

**RESOLUTION 84*****on the situation in East Timor***

1. While affirming its commitment to defending the freedom and democracy of nations in accordance with international law, the Assembly condemns the massacre in East Timor on 12th November and the continuous violence of the occupying Indonesian forces.
2. From the outset of annexation, the occupying Indonesian forces were faced with resistance from the population of East Timor. In sixteen years, this has led to the death of 200 000 Timorese.
3. In face of a policy of forced annexation by the Indonesian Government, constituting a crime of genocide, which is being pursued and is worsening, the Assembly considers the international community must take further action to bring about conditions in which the people of East Timor may exercise the right to self-determination and independence. This right is recognised by the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of that organisation's Security Council and General Assembly, the Council of Europe, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the European Parliament and also by the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.
4. To this end, the parliamentary Assembly of WEU calls upon the Indonesian Government:
  - (a) to stop all violence and violation of international standards guaranteeing respect for human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence;
  - (b) to withdraw armed forces from the territory of East Timor and create the political conditions necessary for the free exercise of self-determination;
  - (c) to open up the territory of East Timor effectively and immediately and allow international aid and human rights organisations and United Nations missions to exercise their humanitarian activities there and assess the situation in regard to the violation of human rights.

The Assembly asks all member states:

- (i) to place an immediate embargo on arms for Indonesia;
- (ii) to suspend immediately military support to Indonesia.



**II**

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES**

## EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 2nd December 1991

### SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Examination of credentials.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Observers.
6. The situation in East Timor; Procedure for approving the budget (*Motion for a resolution and motion for an order with requests for urgent procedure*, Docs. 1295 and 1297).
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1278).
8. Procedure for approving the budget, Doc. 1297.  
*Speaker*: Mr. Rathbone.
9. The situation in East Timor, Doc. 1295.  
*Speakers*: Mr. Brito, Mr. Stoffelen.
10. Changes in the membership of committees.
11. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1296).  
*Speakers*: Mr. Soares Costa (*Vice-President and Rapporteur*), Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Stegagnini, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Amaral, Mr. Soares Costa.
12. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
13. The evolution of WEU's public relations (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1286).  
*Speakers*: Mr. Ewing (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Tummers, Mr. Müller, Mr. Roman, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Reddemann (*explanation of vote*).
14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 11.05 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### **1. Resumption of the session**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the thirty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union which was adjourned on 6th June 1991 at the end of the seventh sitting.

### **2. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### **3. Examination of credentials**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substi-

tutes nominated since our last session, whose names have been published in Notice No. 8.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

At this point, I can tell you that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is about to have a leading member of our Assembly, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, as its new President.

The credentials of representatives and substitutes for whom the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has not yet sent me a statement of ratification, can be ratified by the Assembly in accordance with Rule 6(2) the Rules of Procedure, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I should like to welcome our new colleagues including those not yet present due to the fact that the parliamentary procedures for appointing delegations to our Assembly have not yet been completed in some countries.

1. See page 15.

#### 4. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, a French humorist once said that the first trial for the bride and groom was the mayor's speech and the first shared pleasure was the end of it.

It is what I say to myself every time I have to open a new session and yet the opening address meets a need in bringing together the ideas, suggestions and events that have occurred since the last one and interpreting their logic.

The second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session of our Assembly is being held at what we all feel to be a decisive moment in the history of Europe. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, the Soviet Union has just experienced an extremely serious crisis, the final outcome of which no one can predict but which will in any event prevent it from playing an essential rôle on the international stage for some time to come. Claims by its republics just when Yugoslavia is being torn apart by a merciless war between its own republics and peoples and when the re-emergence of national passions is calling in question the political geography of the whole of Central and Eastern Europe which not so long ago might have been thought to be firmly established, compel us to rethink Europe's security in entirely new terms.

We may – and do – of course welcome the fact that these changes are almost everywhere leading to cuts in defence budgets and lower levels of armed forces. The reduction or considerable slowing down in armaments programmes has resulted in a very widespread feeling, in the West at least, that we are no longer threatened.

However, it would be dangerous to be too euphoric. The guarantees we thought were to be found in the arms limitation treaties in yesterday's two great alliances pale before the uncertainties of today's Europe. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe which, it is to be hoped, foreshadows the new peaceful order that must reign in tomorrow's Europe is proving incapable of imposing such an order in face of present conflicts. Which states will form the Europe of tomorrow? What armed forces will they have? To what extent will they be bound by the non-proliferation treaty and the Soviet Union's commitments in regard to the limitation of strategic, tactical, conventional, chemical and bacteriological weapons? These are vital questions for the security of Europe as a whole and today no one can answer them satisfactorily.

On the other hand, we know how the members of the Atlantic Alliance intend to meet the new situation since, at the very important meeting of NATO heads of state or government

held in Rome at the beginning of this month, they defined, if not an actual strategy, as they claim, at least a policy of defence and the principles of military deployment corresponding to what the West can do to ensure its security and organise peace in the situation that is now beginning to take shape.

I believe the papers issued at the close of that meeting show a profound transformation in the relationship between Europe and America in security matters. On the one hand, the importance of the transatlantic link is more strongly affirmed than ever. Moreover, the responsibilities incumbent upon Western Europe, not only for its own defence but for peace-keeping throughout our continent, or even outside it, are assuming a new dimension. NATO now intends to be a forum for dialogue with Eastern Europe and is proclaiming that its sole military vocation is the defence of the territory of member states just when the Yugoslav crisis, after that in the Gulf, is showing clearly that Europe's security implies commitments of another kind at the service of peace in Europe and an international order in which the United Nations will undoubtedly have a greater rôle to play.

NATO's new orientation should lead the Assembly to found its relations with the United States on new bases, too. I must say – as you are well aware, ladies and gentlemen – that the failings have not been on our side. Allow me, therefore, once again to express the firm hope that, henceforth, the United States Government and Congress will embark upon a continuing dialogue with WEU's parliamentary bodies.

New dimensions are therefore taking shape for a European security and defence policy and our session will be overshadowed by the summit meeting of the Twelve in Maastricht next week which should specify how Europe can and should shoulder its commitments in this area. This is at one and the same time fortunate and unfortunate for us. Fortunate because conditions for our reports, speeches and votes to influence government decisions have never been so favourable. Unfortunate because we shall have to vote before knowing the guidelines those same governments will tomorrow be laying down for Europe's policy and institutions. This uncertainty must not inhibit us too much.

However, I will refrain today from forecasting the Maastricht decisions, although it does seem possible to infer from all we know about the preparatory documents that a considerable area of responsibility will be assigned to WEU, whose links with NATO will be reaffirmed, whose relations with Community Europe will be considerably developed and strengthened and whose place in joint external and security policy will have been defined. That will mean that the Council will have to prepare itself to play, on a permanent basis, a rôle that it had hitherto

*The President (continued)*

played only episodically, e.g. during the Gulf crisis when it did so by organising meetings of chiefs of defence staff of member countries, deciding to set up a centre for the interpretation of satellite data and for training, pursuing its study of co-operation in strategic transport and undertaking another study of the requirements of a European military space policy. Henceforth, it must give new impetus to those initiatives so that they may fit into a coherent whole and develop at a more sustained pace.

The present civil war in Yugoslavia – and there is no foretelling to what extent our institution will become involved in the days to come – has shown that, while WEU has been ready to give political co-operation the military instrument it might need, that co-operation was unable to impose the cease-fire essential for the success of the peace conference being held in The Hague under the aegis of the Community. Can this be described as a failure on the part of Europe? Is it not rather a failure of international law of which respect for international frontiers and non-interference in internal affairs of states was once the beginning and end? One may now wonder how far it can and should evolve. WEU should certainly develop the means to move more quickly from words to deeds than it did at the beginning of July. This is what we are hoping for from the meetings of chiefs of defence staff of member countries. However, we cannot ask it to create a right for third parties to intervene that the international community is a long way from including in its law.

Furthermore, because of the new responsibilities it will have to assume, WEU is faced with a problem that also faces the Community: it must find the means to associate with WEU's activities those Central European countries which clearly opt for the same kind of internal administration and external policy both in principle and in practice as we have. These three countries are concluding association agreements leading eventually to their accession to the Community. So far, associate status is not possible in WEU and it is easy to understand why our governments are wary about extending to other states the guarantees offered under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. However, if the Maastricht summit meeting is to establish permanent institutional links between the Community and WEU in the context of a future European union, it is hard to see why countries that are to join the Community should continue to be excluded from WEU's activities. Last June, the Assembly asked that associate status be created for them. The report Mr. Goerens is to present to us on behalf of the Political Committee proposes a type of association which does not involve Article V. The Assembly has made a start on defining the nature of this kind of asso-

ciation and it is not just coincidence that, after hearing the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Poland in 1989 and Hungary in 1990, it has invited to the present session Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, who is expected to give us details of his country's concerns and intentions in this matter. The Assembly is entitled to expect the Council's answer to this point to match the seriousness with which the Assembly, for its part, studied the matter.

Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece, will also give us his views on the future of his country's relations with WEU which, on the eve of the Maastricht meeting, will obviously be of very special interest.

Naturally, any action the Assembly may assume to take will depend largely on the quality of its dialogue with the Council. The Assembly can but be satisfied at its relations with successive chairmen-in-office and, in particular, in 1991 with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France and then Germany. We shall have the good fortune to hear Mr. Genscher at this session and also Mr. Wimmer, Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany. Our contacts with the Secretary-General have been many and fruitful. However, the Assembly has not found the body responsible for ensuring the continuity of the Council's action, i.e. the Permanent Council, to be the kind of partner it had the right to expect.

I have no wish here to analyse yet again the Council's failings in its institutional relations with the Assembly. Mr. Roseta's report is edifying in this connection. But I would like to give you three recent examples of the mediocrity of our dealings with the Permanent Council which show how far we still have to go.

Wishing to avoid a repetition in 1992 of the complications we had with the adoption of the Assembly's budget for 1991, I personally went to London on 7th November to explain to the ambassadors the relatively simple idea that the considerable increase in WEU's activities and its relations with additional countries – which has been strongly encouraged by the Council for several years – necessarily had budgetary implications and, in particular, demanded some slight increase in staff in the Office of the Clerk. On that occasion, I had a most agreeable and interesting talk with the ambassadors and returned home convinced, on the basis of what I had been told, that the governments would be asked to instruct the Budget and Organisation Committee to agree to the Assembly's requests. However, the following week, that committee, meeting at the same place, decided to throw out all the Assembly's requests calling for adjustments to the staff budget. I think it must be deduced from this that the Council, the Assembly's only interlocutor, has to be given by



*The President (continued)*

the governments the instructions it needs to be able really to play its proper rôle. A committee of financial civil servants should quite obviously be limited to its own task of advising the Council and not empowered to act as final arbiter of the Assembly's needs with no right of appeal.

For the second matter, you have all the facts of the case since I am referring to the Council's replies to the recommendations adopted by the Assembly at its June session. Admittedly, the Council has the right to accept or reject our recommendations. But for it to have failed to respond to all the recommendations after six months or, worse still, to have given us answers that are evasive and ill-disguised refusals to have any discussion between executive and legislative organs is unacceptable. Unfortunately, there is also a deficit of democracy in the Assembly of Western European Union.

Finally, but I will not dwell on this point as Mr. Roseta deals with it, it is unacceptable for the Council systematically to put up a screen between the activities of WEU and the Assembly preventing the latter from calling representatives of the Institute for Security Studies or any subsidiary body of the Council or receiving any of the preparatory documents for the Council's discussions; in other forums, such as the intergovernmental conference, the same governments make the preparatory documents they submit public even when they relate to matters that are effectively within the purview of WEU. In particular, this is what was done in Italy and the United Kingdom on 4th October 1991 and in France and Germany on 14th October 1991. I would however add that, thanks to an understanding Secretary-General, we have agreed on our procedure which may possibly help to set our relations with the Institute for Security Studies on a normal footing. I think I glimpsed Mr. Roper a moment ago who is completely in agreement with this plan.

Now that the governments have to reconsider WEU's activities, I make a solemn appeal to them to bear in mind the fact that the institution also includes an Assembly which cannot help to make the public grasp the meaning of WEU's work unless the Council is prepared to treat it as a partner worthy of the name. That is the democratic logic of systems based on parliamentary principles.

As is quite normal, negotiations relating to the new organisation of Europe's security have as yet hardly touched on the governmental aspect of the new structures whereas, in other areas, the intergovernmental conference has addressed the responsibilities and powers of the European Parliament so much so that these matters, even today, constitute a serious hurdle in the prepara-

tions for the Maastricht summit. The Council for its part has refused to examine the recommendation adopted by the Assembly in December 1990 on a report by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on the possible revision of Article IX of the treaty. Yet this is a matter on which thinking has to progress, particularly as each of the European- or Atlantic-scale parliamentary assemblies now seems to be doing its utmost to mark out the territory it believes should be its own within this kind of institutional magma in which Europe of tomorrow will somehow have to be organised.

The proposal addressed to the presidency of the intergovernmental conference by France and Germany on 14th October refers to "closer co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament". Although vague, this wording should prompt a definition of the purposes for which such co-operation might and should be envisaged. On several occasions in recent years the Assembly, for its part, has received delegations of observers from the European Parliament to whom it gave the right to speak. It has never, however, received a similar invitation from the European Parliament which has merely invited WEU observers to meetings of a sub-committee. I for my part have never succeeded in meeting the President of the European Parliament in order to discuss prospects for co-operation.

Believe me, ladies and gentlemen, these thoughts do not reflect a parochial spirit making the implementation of co-operation that everyone should consider desirable subject to individual or collective susceptibilities. On the contrary, they cause one to face the prevailing uncertainty about the nature and basis of such co-operation and to recognise, moreover, that the modified Brussels Treaty is far clearer about relations with Community Europe that it imposes on WEU than the Rome Treaty is about relations between the Community and defence Europe. To be more specific, it closed a door on such relations which only the Single European Act unlatched and Maastricht will probably finally open.

While this juridical vagueness has not encouraged the European Parliament to entertain a sustained relationship with the WEU Assembly, it nevertheless led it to intervene on many occasions in matters that are solely our responsibility. It did so quite recently by adopting a text concerning the WEU Institute for Security Studies. In so doing, I do not think it took the best path for ensuring co-operation between the two assemblies.

On the contrary, I believe such co-operation, of whose importance we are well aware, should be based on a certain concept of the Europe which our two assemblies wish to build and

*The President (continued)*

which, moreover, our governments say they are ready to put into effect. Whatever our individual positions, we agree that the responsibilities of Europe and of its component states will have to be clearly defined, though they will have to be the subject of discussion, consultation and co-operation. From this standpoint, any parliamentary institution should obviously consist of two bodies, one elected by direct universal suffrage, whose first aim would be to monitor the exercise of Community powers, the other being the expression of the parliaments of member countries, with the primary rôle of monitoring all areas reserved for intergovernmental bodies. Such provisions would not of course prevent each of the two assemblies giving its views on matters primarily within the purview of the other. This kind of two-chamber system exists in all political organisations associating sovereign states in a democratic framework. It will inevitably be necessary in the Europe of tomorrow. This is the basis on which I consider it would be possible to consider here and now the future of healthy co-operation between the two assemblies whose vocation is to participate in the European union of tomorrow. Hence I believe the question the European Parliament poses for us requires two answers. The first, concerning the immediate future, should be discussed by the Presidents of the two assemblies before being entrusted to a joint body with respect for the sovereign nature of any parliamentary assembly. The second, aimed at defining the place of each assembly in the European union of tomorrow, would need in-depth study in accordance with official procedures, and I could well see our Political Committee presenting a report on this important subject at a future session.

These are if not long-term then at least medium-term considerations. Events are forcing us to think and act in a far shorter-term perspective, but I believe that our Assembly deserves recognition for pursuing its activities coherently in both dimensions at one and the same time with some success. More than ever, circumstances are forcing this upon us: we have had to consider immediate action to promote a cease-fire – I dare not mention peace-keeping – in Yugoslavia while at the same time thinking about the future of Europe and its security. Learning lessons from the recent past and at the same time making reasonable, realistic recommendations, the reports you will be considering open the way for a dialogue with the Council which should be useful if the governments are prepared to listen. The ministers who are to address us will be talking on subjects at the heart of our debates. There is every reason to hope that on the eve of the Maastricht summit meeting the WEU Assembly will be able to play its rôle to the full. That is its ambition and I am

convinced that it will clearly demonstrate its determination in this respect.

**5. Observers**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, may I now welcome the parliamentary observers from Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania and Turkey, and what I still find it simpler to call the Soviet Union, who are honouring us with their presence.

I also welcome the members of the Permanent Council attending this part-session.

**6. The situation in East Timor*****Procedure for approving the budget***

*(Motion for a resolution and motion for an order with requests for urgent procedure, Docs. 1295 and 1297)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have received from Mr. Brito and ten others a motion for a resolution on East Timor with a request for a debate under urgent procedure, Document 1295. The relevant text has been circulated.

I have also received from the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration a motion for an order on the procedure for approving the budget with a request for a debate under urgent procedure, Document 1297. The relevant text has been circulated.

I propose that the Assembly discuss these requests immediately after the adoption of the draft order of business.

***7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session***

*(Doc. 1278)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session, Document 1278.

Are there any objections to this draft order of business?...

*The draft order of business is adopted.*

***8. Procedure for approving the budget***

*(Doc. 1297)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now consider the request for a debate under urgent procedure on the motion for an order on the procedure for approving the budget pre-

*The President (continued)*

sented by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Document 1297.

I call Mr. Rathbone to explain the reasons for this request.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I do not intend to delay the Assembly for anything like as long as that, Mr. President. The reason for the Budget Committee's motion is that before the end of this year we want to establish a better procedure for budgetary planning. We want to get to work on that immediately at the beginning of next year. It will be possible to debate budgetary matters on Wednesday afternoon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the request submitted by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration?...

Apparently not.

We shall now vote on the request for a debate under urgent procedure.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

The request for a debate under urgent procedure is agreed to.

I propose that the debate on the matter of substance be added to the order of business for Wednesday afternoon after the vote on the draft budget.

Is there any objection?...

It is so decided.

### 9. *The situation in East Timor*

*(Doc. 1295)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now consider the request for a debate under urgent procedure on the motion for a resolution on East Timor, Document 1295, tabled by Mr. Brito and ten others. Mr. Brito knows that this problem is of great concern to me also.

I now call Mr. Brito to explain the reasons for his request.

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we are fortunate and perhaps honoured as parliamentarians to belong to an institution which deals with the security and defence of Europe, which of course involves ensuring compliance with international law, and are also members of an international forum which is governed by the defence of human rights. It is in this dual capacity that I believe we must face the problem of East Timor.

Over a period of sixteen years more than 200 000 men, women and, above all, children of East Timor have died in defending their right to self-determination and independence. Many of these deaths were passed over in silence because of geopolitical or economic considerations, but fortunately for the people of East Timor, representatives of the press were present at the latest massacre which took place last November and which, because of the shocking pictures, made the whole international community aware of the brutal action unleashed by the Indonesian Government aimed at exterminating a nation.

I say again that I believe that in our dual capacity as defenders of both international law and human rights we cannot remain silent or passive in the face of these events.

It was because of this that I tabled the motion for a resolution condemning the repressive acts perpetrated by Indonesia against the people of East Timor so that these people may be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and so that human dignity may be respected in this Asian country – and I have been honoured to see that the draft resolution has been signed by other members of all shades of opinion in this parliamentary Assembly.

I think this is all I can say, and I leave it to the conscience of all members.

I will simply remind you that, even before the international community was alerted by recent events, the Council of Europe was already conscious of the desperate nature of the situation as a result of the work done and the report submitted by Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly of WEU. The Council of Europe had thus already adopted a resolution at its plenary session last summer.

I would therefore propose, ladies and gentlemen, that you approve this motion for a resolution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against this request?...

Apparently not.

Does the Chairman of the Political Committee wish to speak?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Many members of the Political Committee have signed the text of Mr. Brito and the committee is willing and prepared to discuss the motion tomorrow morning, so any moment after tomorrow morning would be suitable to deal officially with this urgent debate on the situation in East Timor.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall ask the secretariat if this will be possible tomorrow; we had intended to propose postponement of the discussion until the sitting on Thursday morning.

*The President (continued)*

I am told that for purely technical reasons it will be difficult for the committee to meet before Wednesday. I am sure you understand, Mr. Chairman.

This being so, I shall first take the vote on consideration of this request for a debate under urgent procedure which, if adopted, as seems likely, will then be referred to the Political Committee.

I now put to the vote the request for a debate under urgent procedure.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

The request for a debate under urgent procedure is agreed to unanimously.

The urgent procedure is therefore approved and the debate on the matter of substance will take place either on Wednesday or at the end of Thursday morning.

As the order of business for this part of the session is very full, I propose that in accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, speaking time in all debates be limited to five minutes, except for committee chairmen and rapporteurs.

May I remind the Assembly that under the terms of the same rule, a decision on this proposal is taken without debate.

There is no objection?...

It is so decided.

**10. Changes in the membership of committees**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly has to decide on the changes in the membership of committees proposed by several delegations. These changes have been published in Notice No. 8 which has been distributed. They have to be agreed by the Assembly in accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure.

Are there any objections?...

*The changes are agreed to.*

**11. Action by the Presidential Committee**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1296)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee, Document 1296.

I call Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly and Rapporteur.

Mr. SOARES COSTA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Secretary-General, I have the honour to present the formal report on action by the Presidential Committee.

The report concerns two areas: first, political action and the monitoring of such action by the Presidential Committee and, second, administrative and budgetary aspects.

With reference to the political activity of the Presidential Committee, I should like to make two basic points, the first being that the Presidential Committee has very closely followed the progress of the negotiations now under way for building the new defence architecture of Europe.

The second is that the Presidential Committee has paid particularly close attention to the problems posed for Europe because of the crisis, little short of civil war, in Yugoslavia to which the President has already referred.

After our plenary part-session last June, the Presidential Committee took steps to maintain and intensify its dialogue and links with the Council of WEU through regular meetings; these continued after the carry-over from the French to the German chairmanship.

A first meeting was held in Bonn with Minister Genscher, with joint representation from the Presidential Committee and the Political and Defence Committees of our Assembly.

At that time the crisis in Yugoslavia was already the paramount problem and the Presidential Committee therefore issued a statement about Yugoslavia immediately after that meeting.

It will no doubt be remembered that at the time the fundamental problem was to reconcile the requirements of the right of self-determination with the inviolability of frontiers, a principle deriving as we know from the Helsinki Final Act and reaffirmed by the Paris Charter.

WEU, as the defence organisation of a considerable number of European countries – nine – clearly had a fundamental responsibility in relation to the crisis in Yugoslavia. In its statement, therefore, the Presidential Committee asked member countries to provide all possible assistance with a view to framing conditions for lasting peace, acceptable to all the parties involved in the conflict.

However, as time went by the situation in Yugoslavia degenerated into more bitter conflict which prompted the Presidential Committee to call an emergency meeting in Strasbourg on 23rd September following on the adoption of a resolution on Yugoslavia by the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

*Mr. Soares Costa (continued)*

After the meeting the Presidential Committee issued a further statement requesting the Council of Ministers and member countries to invite the Security Council of the United Nations to set up and equip a military force strong enough to bring about conditions for a real and lasting cease-fire in Yugoslavia.

It was no secret that several cease-fires proposed and negotiated with the assistance of the European Community had been violated and that the conflictual situation was getting worse.

But the Presidential Committee also realised that WEU would not be able to intervene clearly and effectively in this situation simply by issuing statements. The committee therefore felt that it ought to submit a recommendation to the Council of Ministers based on the mandate of the Presidential Committee under Rule 14 of our Rules of Procedure.

This recommendation – about which, incidentally, I shall make some observations in a moment – was approved by the Political Committee and by the Presidential Committee, and in the report now before you it is requested that the Assembly adopt the recommendation as provided for in our Rules of Procedure.

In drafting the recommendation, the Presidential Committee felt it would be useful to obtain clearer and more concrete information from the Council about the situation in Yugoslavia and for the Political and Defence Committees jointly to analyse the political and military conditions in which WEU might intervene for the purpose of maintaining the cease-fire and peace in Yugoslavia.

That is exactly what the Council of Ministers and, through the Secretary-General, the WEU Institute for Security Studies was asked to do. On behalf of the Presidential Committee, I am bound to report that unfortunately only one member country was represented at the meeting and provided information, i.e. the member country which held the chairmanship, namely Germany. But the Institute for Security Studies did not produce the study that the Assembly, through the Secretary-General, had requested; indeed, as far as we know, the Institute has not even been authorised to provide the Assembly with the information which would enable it to exercise its right to monitor the political action of the Council in this matter.

I therefore believe that the Assembly should make known its dissatisfaction that this information and the study by the Institute for Security Studies have not been forthcoming.

Meanwhile, I would stress that the Presidential Committee has not confined its

attention to current crises but has given its consideration to the future as well.

For that purpose the Presidential Committee decided to hold a symposium on a just and lasting peace in the whole of Europe, and also decided to study aspects to do with the present situation in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. It was therefore proposed that the symposium be held in the Reichstag, Berlin, from 31st March to 2nd April of next year. I believe members already have the programme for this meeting.

Furthermore, given recent events, particularly in Yugoslavia, and the present situation in Central Europe and in view of the current work of intergovernmental conferences on the establishment of a European defence identity which the Presidential Committee has been following, a number of changes have been made to what was originally planned for this part-session. Two reports are now included – the report by our colleague, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, on operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis and the report by Mr. Goerens already mentioned by our President.

I should now like to say a few words about the second aspect, namely administration and budgets.

The Assembly will doubtless recall our plenary part-session in June at which we were put into difficulties because our budget for 1991 had not been approved in time and the fact that this had led to sharp differences of view between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers regarding budget approval procedure.

The matter caused the Presidential Committee considerable concern because for the first time the Assembly had to live on monthly instalments until October, as it was impossible to obtain approval of the revised budget for 1991 until then. The delay was due to the difficulty the Council had in approving the budget submitted to and approved by this Assembly at its June part-session.

The Council maintained that the budget should not be increased by more than 5.51%; all it could do was to approve a revised budget, the expenditure resulting from the creation of two A2 and A4 posts authorised by the Council, but so far not filled, not having been paid out. It was only through the availability of these unused sums that the Council would be able to approve the revised budget, making an increase of only 5.51%.

The Presidential Committee gave its approval on the proposal of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in accordance with the provisions of Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure, but this has to be ratified by the Assembly during the present part-session.

*Mr. Soares Costa (continued)*

But, as our President has already mentioned, what is more disquieting is what is happening with regard to the framing of the budget for 1992 and its approval by the Council.

Two points call for mention: first, I am sure the Assembly will want to show its appreciation of the steps taken by our President, Mr. Pontillon, who, together with Mr. Rathbone, Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, the Clerk and the Clerk Assistant responsible for these administrative and financial matters, went to London on 7th November for a meeting with the Permanent Council which the Secretary-General both attended and presided.

Basically, the purpose of this meeting was to explain to the Council the policy reasons for which the Assembly had requested the budget proposed for 1992, reflecting as it did not only the actual growth in the Assembly's activities due to events calling for more active intervention by WEU but also the fact that our Assembly now has – and has had for over a year – two new member countries, thus calling for a change in the structure both of our activities and of the staff in the Office of the Clerk at the service of the Assembly.

The present situation is that, if the two new members soon to be added to the staff of the Assembly are to be able to work efficiently, there will also have to be B grade staff to support them.

In this connection, the latest information we have, and which gave rise to the request for urgent procedure by Mr. Rathbone a moment ago speaking on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, suggests that the present system for approving the budget creates difficulties for this Assembly – and not just of a material nature but also procedural difficulties, because it is unacceptable for the Permanent Council to have waited almost to the opening day of this part-session before stating its position regarding our budget for 1992. This forces the Assembly to hurry its consideration of the subject in order to decide on its position at our meeting on Wednesday, which is the day when we shall be considering this subject.

This situation, to which the President has already referred, is very worrying and it would be desirable for the Permanent Council to adopt a new procedure for approving the budget and to arrange to consult and discuss with the Assembly on the subject at an earlier date: it is unacceptable for a parliamentary assembly to be at the command of civil servants wanting to impose a particular budgetary decision-making procedure of their own when in fact they have no authority to do so. This responsibility

belongs essentially to the parliamentarians who are members of this Assembly, because they have been directly elected by the peoples of Europe who in the last resort hold the real power in a democracy.

The parliamentary Assembly of WEU cannot go on in this way, because otherwise it would be unable to carry out its two tasks and to meet its two fundamental challenges, namely to be effective and to continue to uphold the dignity that a parliamentary assembly should have.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to thank our Rapporteur. As far as I can see, at least, there have not been very many reports from the Presidential Committee of this Assembly which have discussed in such detail and with such precision the issues that have been important to our Assembly in the period under review.

I would also like to thank Mr. Soares Costa for his work in this Assembly. He will be leaving us quite soon. I believe this is the last report he will be submitting to us in his official capacity. I think the Assembly owes him a particular debt of gratitude for the time he has devoted to the Assembly, either as a rapporteur or as a member.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Reddemann, for saying first what I fully intended to say on your behalf. I am glad you were able to do so.

I call Mr. Rathbone, Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on the job that he has done in this excellent report.

I intervene because of the importance of budgetary affairs to us all. I do not want to anticipate Wednesday's debate, but I want to pick up two points to do with the budget which have been identified in the report.

The report accentuates the difficulties that we have been having in striking a budgetary agreement with the Council. Sad to say, there has been increasing antagonism where there should be complementary effort as between the Assembly and the Council. As you, Mr. President, pointed out so excellently when we met the Council's ambassadors in London recently, this has been the main problem.

The Council is expanding and increasing its contacts with and interests in Central and Eastern Europe, the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and is coming to grips with the confusing changes in Europe's security struc-

*Mr. Rathbone (continued)*

tures, which embrace not only European nations but our allies across the Atlantic in Canada and the United States. As the Council embraces these wider responsibilities, so the Assembly must embrace them too.

I am afraid that the Council seems not to appreciate that to embrace these additional activities the Assembly requires more finance. We must create a better appreciation in the minds of the Council and its constituent governments of the Assembly's funding requirements. We must build into our systems a better way of planning, discussing and agreeing our budget; hence the special motion that the Assembly has agreed to debate on Wednesday afternoon.

I thank our Rapporteur for drawing attention in the report to these crucial elements. They are not part of our political debate but without them we cannot continue that debate or properly fulfil the Assembly's brief to monitor all the security requirements of our continent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too should like to express to my friend, Mr. Soares Costa, my appreciation of all he has done for our Assembly. Turning to the substance of our report, however, I feel bound to support the speakers who have criticised the budget procedures which, as you will remember, have involved us in tiresome and frustrating efforts to obtain for our Assembly the minimum funds needed to cover its activities. It is also hard to obtain the new staff who will be needed for our secretariat.

The Presidential Committee will in future have to be more active as a driving force providing information and monitoring the work of our organisation at a time when information, comparison and debate are essential.

Discussions are at present going on in WEU about the possibility of sending a United Nations, or partly European, force to Yugoslavia. I believe that parliamentarians who represent the peoples of Europe have the right and duty to be kept informed and to express opinions on the subject.

We have had important meetings like that in Bonn with Mr. Genscher. At such a difficult time I believe that we should make our presence more decisively felt not only in our own institution but also in relation to the other international and European organisations so as to exert more timely and stronger pressure on the decisions which are to be taken.

My experience in the Presidential Committee has been positive because we have had serious

discussions on important subjects. I would have preferred us to have dwelt more on real political activity and to be able to concentrate less on the drama of our budget which has caused our work to suffer – as we did not know, for example, whether we could approve a journey or a mission for a rapporteur to obtain a minimum of information and produce a valid document – and more on serious political discussion of the crucial problems with which we are faced.

Mr. President, I wish to endorse other members' appreciation of the report and of the Presidential Committee's work. I hope that in future it will be possible, if the necessary funds are available, to take more meaningful and effective action in the interests of our institution, of our peoples and of the democracy we represent for our countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I will not add to the debate except to say that, as we all realise, if governments decide to be awkward and block developments we shall achieve nothing. I wish to concentrate on a more fundamental issue.

I thank Mr. Soares Costa for his report, of which I have only one criticism: this is the only time that I have criticised Mr. Soares Costa in all the years for which I have known him. The document is much too diplomatic.

Paragraphs 9 to 13 of Document 1296 ought to have said, very firmly, that requests by the Presidential Committee to be briefed by those whom we wish to brief us were blocked by the chairmanship-in-office. We must have the right to decide who we want to brief us; it is not for ministers to make it clear that that may not happen. I know of two examples of this problem. Governments who were asked specifically to brief us on the Yugoslav problem were told firmly that it was not acceptable to the chairmanship-in-office. That is not acceptable to me, or, I hope, to the Assembly.

Secondly, if we ask for a briefing from the Institute for Security Studies, it is not for the chairmanship-in-office to refuse us that briefing. We should put it on record that a parliamentary assembly is composed of members of parliament to whom ministers are responsible; civil servants are responsible to ministers, and ministers are responsible to parliamentarians. We must have the ultimate right to decide who we want to brief us.

Finally, the briefing that we did have was lousy. I have never heard such an inaccurate briefing; those who gave it knew nothing about the subject. As my colleagues will agree, we felt that our time was wasted. That is not the way to achieve the co-operation that we need.

*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)*

This organisation has a major rôle to play. If it is badly served by those who are meant to serve us, there is no point in their trying to serve us any more. We should ask for better people to do the job.

That is my only criticism of Mr. Soares Costa's report. It is so fundamental that I believe that the Assembly ought to adopt it with unanimity and acclamation and to convey those views very firmly to the ministers concerned and to the chairmanship-in-office.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The reaction to your remarks shows how apt they are felt to be by the whole of our Assembly.

I call Mr. Amaral.

Mr. AMARAL (*Portugal*) (Translation). – I should like to take this opportunity to endorse and reiterate the comments of Mr. Reddemann and Mr. Stegagnini on the work done by our Rapporteur, Professor Soares Costa.

As a member of the Portuguese Delegation, I am familiar with and can testify to the excellent work that Professor Soares Costa has done as leader of our delegation. It is therefore with some sadness that we see his period of office coming to an end and note that this is his last report.

We are well aware of his competence, enthusiasm and commitment and, above all, of the courage he has displayed in solving the many problems faced by the head of the Portuguese Delegation.

As a Portuguese, I thank him for all the commitment and enthusiasm he has shown in defending our interests and those of WEU.

I should also like to say a few words about the excellent report that he has produced. That report points, in my opinion, to the unfortunate fact that there is a divorce or maladjustment between the organs of WEU. This is a matter of considerable concern at a time when Europe is in turmoil with many imbalances, and when it is therefore important to feel united in action, share the same attitude and, above all, have the absolute unity of purpose that would encourage each of the organs of this institution to make its work really effective.

This disharmony and lack of co-ordination hinders the very work of WEU, unfortunately leading us all too often up a blind alley.

It would be most satisfying were this report, whose purpose is precisely to highlight these difficulties of co-ordination, or what might almost be called this divorce between the Presidential Committee and the Council of Ministers, to succeed in bringing this dissension to an end, thus allowing WEU to fulfil its noble vocation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the Rapporteur wish to speak again?

Mr. SOARES COSTA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – I shall be brief, because all the comments on my report have emphasised the difficulties I have described.

My thanks to Mr. Reddemann and Mr. Amaral for their very kind remarks concerning my forthcoming retirement from the Assembly. It is very encouraging to have one's work recognised by colleagues and for me it is very important that this recognition comes from an international assembly and therefore carries more weight than that which we sometimes receive in our own countries. Once again, I should like to thank everyone who has been appreciative of my work.

Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Stegagnini and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg are agreed on the contents of my report; they have even expanded on its ideas and with their forthright words as parliamentarians have stressed the negative aspects which I underlined: namely the budgetary problems and the difficulties we have experienced in getting information from the Permanent Council and the WEU Institute for Security Studies for use in this most important study requested by the Presidential Committee in order to give expression to the Assembly's views and recommendations on the Yugoslav crisis.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

I fully endorse Sir Geoffrey's comments. We should find a way to put a stronger accent on the points raised in the report. I accept the criticism but the Assembly will recognise that my speech was much harsher than the words in the report. My speech reflects the fact that I am thinking along the same lines. I said that it was unacceptable that we did not receive the study that we requested from the Institute for Security Studies and that we were not briefed properly by experts from that organisation.

I thank the Assembly for accepting my report and I thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to respond to comments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Soares Costa, we shall very shortly be turning our thoughts to the tribute due to you from this Assembly. Thank you for your report and for your most valuable contribution to our debates.

The debate is closed.

I believe that the Assembly will agree to ratifying the action of the Presidential Committee as more fully explained and commented upon.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.



**12. Address by Mr. van Eekelen,  
Secretary-General of WEU**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, whom I invite to take the rostrum.

Mr. van EEKELLEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, members of the parliamentary Assembly, like the conclave of EC Foreign Ministers that is also meeting today, this session of WEU's parliamentary Assembly is in a way a curtain raiser for the European summit in Maastricht. There are those who expect it to be a leap forward towards European union. Others predict that it might be something of a setback, camouflaged by ingenious diplomatic artifice. In practice, however, it is likely that a middle path will be found and that we will be able henceforth to refer in our work to the Treaty of Maastricht just as, since February 1986, we have based our action on the goals enunciated in the Luxembourg Single Act.

If we look back over our shoulder, we see how much ground had to be covered between the Treaty of Rome and the single market, and we can take heart from the brisker pace of our progress towards more political unity. The time is ripe, moreover, for a better balance between the economic and monetary *démarches* on the one hand and the political *démarche* on the other. Only through their union can the countries of Western Europe be true exporters of democracy, stability and security.

I should like today to address three issues: what point we have reached in the institutional debate on the rôle and place of WEU, what point we have reached as regards our operational prospects and what point, finally, have we reached in relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe?

*(The speaker continued in English)*

First, I should like to say a word about the rôle and place of WEU. Since the ministerial meeting of 22nd February 1991, no effort has been spared in re-casting the working document on the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture.

This work has culminated in a draft declaration which could be annexed to the text of the treaty on political union but it could also become a WEU text in its own right. The Special Working Group has directed its efforts towards identifying the points of convergence and the questions that need to be settled at a higher level. On that basis, my belief is that the problems of security and defence should be no obstacle to the success of the Maastricht summit.

WEU member states are resolved to forge a European security and defence identity and, as a result, to assume growing responsibilities in these fields. That will be done in stages. WEU will be an integral part of the process of European unification and will strengthen its contribution to the Atlantic Alliance, with which it is in complete solidarity. The future of the common defence policy will be compatible with that of the alliance. The European pillar can have no existence within the alliance unless there is transparency and complementarity between the operation of the alliance and the process of building a common European defence.

Clearly, WEU has a place in both the process of European unification and in the alliance. Its institutional relationships must therefore be tailored to the needs of these two fundamental elements of European security. Since WEU is at the heart of a dynamic twofold process, both as partner and as an active player, its rôle should be regularly reviewed where necessary. This will be done in the light of the changing requirements and any revision of current and future treaties, and without prejudice to decisions yet to be taken.

Turning to the future development of an operational rôle for WEU, nobody today would dispute the urgent need for WEU to have the practical means to perform such an operational rôle. We are at the stage of formulating a framework for action and decision making. This gradual process must continue, for otherwise WEU reactivation would not move beyond the stage it has reached since the Gulf crisis, and that would be tantamount to regression.

Although it is right to advance step by step, we still need to create at least the minimum conditions for our work to be effective. To mention just three, we need, first, military expertise in the secretariat. Several member states have already proposed making officers available, and a planning cell is under consideration; secondly, provision for flexible consultation of both the competent bodies in the alliance and European political co-operation; and the third condition, which follows naturally from the first two, is the relocation of the Permanent Council and Secretariat-General to Brussels. I am happy to note that Mr. Goerens's report to the Assembly makes a similar recommendation.

The practical consequences of these measures will be to ensure that, in the performance of future missions, the requisite structures can be set up. In parallel, the resources can be identified and then assigned. Obviously, military co-operation must be broadened, especially in the fields of training, strategic transport and logistics. It will have to be based on renewed co-operation in the field of armaments and greater interoperability. Proposals along these

*Mr. van Eekelen (continued)*

lines are being drawn up, as suggested by the mention of a future European armaments agency in the October letter from President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl.

One last word on this subject: may I point out the exemplary way in which space co-operation has been developed.

As this Assembly will know from the ministerial communiqué, the WEU satellite centre will now be established in the building provided by the Spanish Government on the airbase at Torrejon near Madrid with effect from 1st January 1992. I will shortly be appointing Mr. Barry Blaydes, a highly competent scientific expert, who is currently serving with the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, as director of the centre. It is hoped that the centre will be formally inaugurated in June next year.

As far as longer-term studies are concerned, an international invitation to tender will be issued shortly for a contract worth some 5 million ecus. These industrial studies will be overseen by a study management team, comprising representatives from WEU member countries and based in Paris under the auspices of the *Délégation générale pour l'armement* (DGA) of the French Ministry of Defence. The team will be headed by Mr. Gagliardi of the *Agenzia Spazia Italiana* (ASI).

Overall supervision of space co-operation within WEU will continue to be provided by the Council's Sub-Group on Space which meets regularly in London under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Holthoff.

I have a few words now about the dialogue being developed with the five countries of Central and Eastern Europe. What is being done in the WEU framework complements the démarches of the Sixteen and of the Twelve. It is a dialogue based on an exchange of information, a comparison of views and a substantive debate on the security needs of those countries which, to a growing extent, will be our partners.

One important step in the development of this dialogue will undoubtedly be the meeting at ministerial level which is to take place early in 1992. I want to point out the genuine success of the seminars held under the auspices of WEU's Institute for Security Studies in March and at the end of last week here in Paris. They have shown that there are expectations – often anxious expectations – among our interlocutors. For two days of substantive debate, the Institute brought together experts and diplomats from national delegations to the Council's Special Working Group with their counterparts from

Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, with the addition this last week of representatives from Bulgaria and Romania. Initiatives of this kind are necessary but they are not sufficient. These five countries expect much of WEU. Indeed, it is clearly in our interest not to disappoint them.

One essential aspect of conflict prevention in Eastern Europe is the dialogue on security with the new democracies. Only through a joint démarche can Europeans be effective and influence the course of events. This is particularly true as regards the constitution of autonomous armed forces and the risks of the spread of nuclear weapons.

It may seem paradoxical to see Central and Eastern Europe moving against the tide that in Western Europe is carrying us towards greater unity. The reason lies less in a romantic vision – one that we are perhaps too ready to dismiss as anachronistic – than in a rejection of decades of uniformity. The problem is that the Soviet yoke has been lifted, but before a fully-developed European model can guarantee an evolution towards stability.

The question now is whether the yearning for ethnic nationhood can be reconciled with universality of the clear commitments that we have made in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe framework and with the prospects for European integration. The choice of a security model for the greater Europe of tomorrow depends on the answers which will be given to that question. For the time being, we must make every effort to ensure that the countries of the East do not experience wars of secession.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

(Translation). – The rôle of the Twelve and WEU in the Yugoslav crisis – a crisis that has taken a tragic turn since our last session – should, I feel, be viewed in a broader context in that it is a twofold challenge to the status quo inherited from Versailles and Yalta. That challenge is to be seen not only in the Balkans but also throughout Eastern Europe.

We stand witness to suicidal folly that shames the whole of Europe. We cannot wash our hands of it merely because the blame is shared and no one side has a monopoly on murderous fanaticism. There is no point in trying to rewrite the history of Western Europe's involvement in this crisis through retrospective scenarios or futile computations. There has been no lack of warnings to the Yugoslavs from our leaders. If those warnings have fallen on deaf ears, it is because the independence claims of some have been met by the use of force by others to alter borders.

The eruption of savagery and violence among ethnic groups in the former Yugoslav federation could have been predicted, given its recent past, but it took us by surprise and outraged us.

*Mr. van Eekelen (continued)*

Dubrovnik and Vukovar will linger in our minds as symbols of the wanton destruction to which fanaticism and the denial of other people's rights may lead. There can be no excuse for such barbarity.

What must not emerge from this turmoil is a "Yugoslav precedent", i.e. the notion that challenging frontiers and settling ethnic disputes by force pay off. This would be a disaster with untold repercussions for the whole of Europe. The changes sought by the populations concerned should not be hampered, provided that they come about by a peaceful, democratic and therefore negotiated process. Where thorny problems arise, there must be recourse to arbitration. This means that Europe must rapidly set up new institutions that are effective for this purpose, having a dual function of prevention and cure. Time is not on our side.

Was there any alternative to the efforts undertaken by the Twelve and the Nine through the peace conference, sending observers, making contingency plans, deciding on sanctions and, more recently, humanitarian aid? I believe not, though, personally, I could have wished WEU to have a certain capability to intervene at its command. It would have heightened Europe's political credibility. But faced with this crucial challenge, our states had first to resist the temptation to act unilaterally. They did not fall into the trap of impulsive national reaction prompted by atavistic loyalties. This unity of action and inspiration was a vital first step in defining a common policy towards the belligerents.

Now, as you know, the accent is on action by the United Nations but clearly peace-keeping operations are likely to be drawn out and costly. Europe has a rôle to play in ensuring that there is no outright victor nor outright loser, as this might prompt a return to the terrorism of the thirties.

How can regional wars be avoided? How can a political settlement of ethnic conflict be imposed? These are questions to which a common political answer must be found before any joint military action can be considered. On this point, we are only on the threshold of giving Europe the means of speaking with one voice and acting in concert. The decisions to be taken at Maastricht will to a great extent determine whether a strategic vacuum to the East, which would be enough to trigger off war on its own, can be avoided.

I should now like briefly to address the question of relations between the Assembly and the Council.

Mr. Roseta has submitted a very detailed report which has received my fullest attention.

I find that, all too frequently, there are misunderstandings between the Council and the Assembly, but they are as much the result of geographical separation as of the inevitable differences of timing in our respective work. We must endeavour to put that right by displaying a spirit of mutual openness, where common sense and humour also have their part and I pay tribute to your personal contribution, Mr. President. However, I am a little surprised at the criticisms levelled at the Council's annual report. Our report is surely richer in information now than at the time of the *Sleeping Beauty*, a period that none of us, I imagine, wants to see return. More generally, though, we have to play by the same rules of the game, in particular the budgetary principle of zero growth.

Our respective aims are therefore often more circumscribed than we would like. I have to say that, as a result, most of the imaginative proposals put forward by the Assembly in the field of information and public relations are not feasible. The secretariat is working with resources calculated down to the last penny, pending decisions which will determine the rôle and place of WEU. I take on the bulk of the public relations work on behalf of the Council for whom, after the presidency, I am the spokesman. The main aim of my work is to help create, let us say, a European strategic culture. I therefore give priority to informing the Assembly and to contacts with the press and with all those groups that, in different ways, help to form public opinion. In my information letter you will find a very long list of the main references to WEU that have appeared in the international press. Here, in my opinion, the improvement is vast compared with the situation six or twelve months ago. To do more at this time is not possible, but I recognise that one can always do better with the means available. The outcome of the debate on the rôle and place of WEU will determine the future in this field, as in all the others. This applies to the Assembly and the Secretariat-General.

However this may be, industry can have a general communication strategy but, for inter-governmental organisations, the golden rule is that information remains a national prerogative. WEU's public relations function cannot grow any faster than the rate at which the organisation itself develops. Confirmation and development of its operational rôle will therefore have implications at this level too.

Our efforts must be directed at preventing European disorder from being a major obstacle to the progressive achievement of a democratic order of peace and stability – first on our continent, then on another. National aspirations must be satisfied through the European construction process, and they must be neither ignored nor thwarted. Otherwise the democratic

*Mr. van Eekelen (continued)*

deficit, one of the EC's main shortcomings, would be increased by reactions of rejection. Europe must have a will to exist, inextricably linked with a goal of mobilising every field of human endeavour. Will this best be expressed in a free trade area? By a league of European nations? Or by creating an organically linked whole, namely a union in the true sense of the term? These fundamental questions go to the heart of the issues at stake at Maastricht.

I hope that your debates will offer reference points that may provide answers to the questions from European public opinion.

*(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – Secretary-General, on behalf of the Assembly I thank you warmly for that speech, which was, as always, the model of clarity, giving us as much information as possible. Whatever the differences may be between the Assembly and the Council, you have always done your utmost to find a way through them.

Because of the time, I shall not attempt at this stage to deal with the points that you made about Mr. Roseta's report or what will come in Mr. Ewing's report. We thank you very much for what you have said and hope that you will continue to do what you can to get the Assembly as well known as possible.

### **13. The evolution of WEU's public relations**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1286)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on the evolution of WEU's public relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1286.

I call Mr. Ewing to present his report.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – On behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, I am honoured to present our report on the evolution of WEU's public relations. I want to take up one or two points made by the Secretary-General a moment or two ago. He said that information is the prerogative of national governments. I do not accept that; if we accept it, we abdicate our responsibility at WEU to inform the European public about developments in WEU.

Secondly, the Secretary-General claimed that as the work of WEU develops so will the work of the WEU information and press department. I truly wish that there was evidence to support

that statement, but the opposite is true. Who would have dreamed this time last year that WEU would assume such a significant rôle in the past year? Hardly a day has gone by without WEU being mentioned in the media. Without a shadow of doubt, we have assumed a much higher profile. The reports in the media would be valuable if they were co-ordinated further to develop the press and public relations rôle of our department, but tragically that is not happening.

I do not apologise for being critical of the Council of Ministers and its secretariat and I hope that my constructive criticism will be accepted in the spirit in which it is offered. I am critical today because I hope that we will never again hear rapporteurs from my committee presenting the sort of report that I must present this morning.

My colleagues will recollect the remarkable way in which the United States Government used the media during the Gulf war, when there was no mention of the rôle played by WEU in the mine-sweeping operation which was instigated, co-ordinated and carried out under the aegis of WEU.

Much more important was the rôle played by WEU in the imposition of the naval embargo on Iraq, at the behest of the United Nations Security Council. The first representation made to the Council about the imposition of that embargo came from this Assembly, but WEU's rôle was not mentioned. That was not a failure of the parliamentarians assembled here; it was due to the failure of the Council of Ministers to free our press and public relations department to highlight WEU's important rôle.

I have chosen these examples because they are recent. Listening to radio and television commentators – and reading others in the press – trying to describe WEU is a painful experience. In June this year, the Guardian in the United Kingdom described WEU as an organisation sitting uncomfortably between the European Community and NATO. In paragraph 25 of my report I have listed a host of other examples of similarly ill-informed publicity: "Western European Union, the obscure defence group... whose membership even political specialists have difficulty identifying"; "WEU, not even a paper tiger but a paper butterfly"; "Embryonic defence grouping"; "WEU, Europe's teetering pillar".

Having highlighted the problems I am, of course, obliged to suggest some cures. The budget has been mentioned. I and my committee wish to record our appreciation of the press and public relations department of WEU here in Paris and of the way in which the secretariat has struggled, on a restricted budget, to highlight the work of WEU. We will continue to

*Mr. Ewing (continued)*

work as hard as we possibly can to highlight the work of WEU. We do not know how the outcome of the Maastricht summit will affect WEU. I have listened to foreign minister after foreign minister saying in recent weeks that their purpose is to strengthen and expand WEU's rôle. Being an innocent fellow I believed them, but I have never heard any definition of what that rôle or purpose should be. These foreign ministers must explain what it should be in the wake of Maastricht. I believe that I speak for the whole Assembly when I say that we will not accept continual references to an expanding rôle for WEU if they are nothing more than camouflage for doing nothing. That is what they have been for the past twelve months.

It was not the Council of Ministers which issued the first statement that there would be no military intervention in Yugoslavia: it was the foreign ministers of the Twelve. The EC gave WEU a mandate to come up with measures to protect the monitors in Yugoslavia and gave the clear impression that we were to be under the aegis of the EC, not the Council of Ministers.

The Council of Ministers made no mention of that, apart from a press conference held by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

I hope that I have managed to highlight the struggle experienced by the press, the public relations department and my committee in continually presenting reports to the media. Our report has been unanimously accepted; I present it to the Assembly with pride, and ask for it to be endorsed unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Ewing. I liked the new definition of the word “innocent”.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I congratulate the Chairman of the committee on the fact that his committee's report is already on the agenda. It is unusual for this committee to have a report on the agenda at so early a stage. As a rule only the long stayers hear what this committee has to do, but it is an important subject.

It is important that we now have an opportunity to discuss the problems referred to in Mr. Ewing's report, immediately before the Maastricht summit. In paragraph 25, he himself quoted from the many remarkable headlines revealing what the press thinks of Western European Union. That does not begin to tell us what the public know about Western European Union. I once suggested that we should go down to the market on a Wednesday and ask the people there what kind of meeting is being held

in this building. If you told them it was a meeting of Western European Union, they might at best ask whether they ate cherries there or would like to buy something else at the market. They do not know anything else about it.

The electorate must know where their elected representatives stand and in which bodies they are able to perform their task effectively. This is a big problem. At the moment there is something of a proliferation of parliamentary assemblies, constituted and not constituted. Fortunately, there are only a few constituted parliamentary assemblies. As we see some honour in being a constituted parliamentary assembly, we must also have dealings with such assemblies and not with the chance meetings of parliamentarians for which there are no set terms of reference. I emphasise this because I very much hope there will not be renewed difficulties after the summit at Maastricht, when others concern themselves with peace and security in Europe. At one stage there was real envy and competition between the European Parliament and the Council of Europe. We must avoid a recurrence of this between Western European Union and the European Parliament. At this meeting, before Maastricht, the committee of which Mr. Ewing is the Chairman and the Presidential Committee must draw up a schedule for discussing with the President of the European Parliament the conclusions reached at Maastricht on peace and security in the light of Western European Union's appointed task. As soon as Maastricht is over, after all, the European Parliament will want to grab the relevant sections for itself.

I have two questions to finish with. Was the committee or the Chairman of the committee involved in the discussions on the aftermath of Maastricht referred to here? Can the committee or the Chairman of the committee join with our Assembly's Presidential Committee this week in seeking a form of consultation with the President of the European Parliament so that the outcome of Maastricht may be considered in an atmosphere of co-operation rather than rivalry and envy?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Western European Union's relations with the public are constantly being discussed in our Assembly. We have always stood at a wailing wall, to which we have attached messages saying that something must be done to make WEU known.

The Rapporteur, whom I would like to thank very much for his report, also mentions in it that neither Mr. Pontillon's questions nor the last report drawn up on them, which included Recommendation 494, had received the appropriate

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

rapid response from the Council of Ministers. This is surprising, because aspects of public and published opinion are questions which deserve quick responses and quick reaction, which makes it all the more astonishing that it takes up to a year before the appropriate answers arrive.

Those of us who have been members of this Assembly for some considerable time will feel that it is particularly surprising that more notice has been taken of WEU in recent years than was previously the case. This is connected with the fact that, when the WEU Assembly was first established, its intentions were quite different, that there was then a time when NATO overshadowed everything, and that it was only the events leading up to the Gulf war and then the hostilities in Yugoslavia that focused public interest on WEU.

In his report, Mr. Ewing regrets certain headlines on WEU such as, and I quote, "WEU, not even a paper tiger, but a paper butterfly". I think it is a sign of success that WEU is mentioned at all, because it was not mentioned in the old days, it was not even criticised. Today we can at least get annoyed about headlines and quotations like this. This is some progress at least.

I believe that above all we should expect the Council to be more professional in its activities. When I read in the report, for example, that it was decided at the meeting of 19th September not to issue a communiqué, but that the various people attending the meeting then made statements to the press or television, I have a slight suspicion that they may have wanted to make a statement only for domestic reasons, to be on national television again, but that they had no interest in placing the emphasis upon WEU. So there was no communiqué and no joint action. I feel WEU too needs a little professionalism at the top.

Let me remind you what I said during the debate a year ago. Where WEU's public relations activities are concerned, we should be focusing not only on the Council but also on the Assembly's rôle. We must make it clear that the Assembly, with its elected parliamentarians, is a crucial factor in the process.

Nor do I understand, I must say, why more has not been made of what WEU accomplished in connection with the Gulf war, for example: the fact that thirty-five ships were sent there, that dangerous mines were cleared by units of the national navies under WEU leadership without there being one accident, and that aid to the Kurdish refugees was co-ordinated by WEU. This information was withheld from the public. Let us imagine another organisation or, let me go further, a private organisation, a private firm

doing something like this. Its description of what it had done would be completely different from WEU's. In public relations they say: "Do good and talk about it." I believe WEU still has to learn to apply this standard.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The final speaker is Mr. Roman.

Mr. ROMAN (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to thank Mr. Ewing for being so frank; perhaps this owes something to British parliamentary tradition. I believe that his approach was quite clear and that his proposal is timely, although for my part I would have qualified some of the ideas he has put forward. In my opinion, there have been four important events during the past year which have gained increased publicity for WEU, at least in my country.

In the first place, the broadening of the membership of Western European Union was important, not only because Portugal and Spain became members but also because to some extent this signified a revitalisation of the organisation which, as Mr. Müller pointed out, has shown a degree of lethargy for some years.

Secondly, there was of course WEU's rôle in the Gulf war. There is no time to say more about that.

Thirdly, there was the public debate as to whether WEU should intervene in Yugoslavia. I believe that, although in fact we played only a minor part, the doubts and hesitations on whether WEU should be involved or not have been rather played up by the international press.

Lastly, there is the discussion now taking place about the Franco-German and Anglo-Italian proposals. At least there is discussion about WEU, and on that point I cannot agree with the speaker. WEU is in the news and even if, as Mr. Müller said, the debate is not very enlightened, at least it is going on.

I believe that WEU's problem is a problem of substance – a public relations problem agreed, but also one of substance, namely that of defining the rôle of WEU. The future rôle of WEU is naturally not perceived with sufficient clarity because there are many ideas regarding its future organisation. WEU's image could be projected more clearly through the work of a number of specialists in communications media or corporate image. But if it is to carry conviction this image must be based on the quality of the product, and this cannot be ensured unless an organisation like ours demonstrates not only vigour but above all coherence in its purpose, objectives and activities, and if it adapts its instruments and its structures to the requirements of this coherence which must characterise the organisation as a whole. And if

*Mr. Roman (continued)*

these conditions cannot be fulfilled, then, in my opinion, it will not be possible to create a clear image of the organisation and to convince public opinion that it has a good reason for existing.

At all important levels we face the task of spreading news about WEU, and in this I entirely agree with you. However, we do not have a range of specific instruments, news, documentation, periodicals, whether from WEU itself or from member governments, and I would emphasise the contents of recommendations 3 and 6 – booklet for schools and provision of funds by the Council for a general communications strategy. It seems to me evident that these are lacking, and this ties in with the debate on the budget and what has already been said about that.

There is a need for more budgetary resources and more political will on the part of the Council: I am convinced that this report and previous reports have shown that in this Assembly there is the political will to brighten up the image of the organisation.

I congratulate the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Rapporteur wish to respond?

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – I thank my three colleagues for participating in the debate and I thank all my colleagues for remaining behind, no doubt spoiling some prearranged luncheon engagement. This has been, and will continue to be, an important debate.

Mr. Tummers asked me two specific questions. No, I have not been involved in the discussions within the building on the consequences of Maastricht. Yes, I shall make myself available, along with Mr. Pontillon, to discuss the matters which Mr. Tummers raised.

In reply to Mr. Müller, I accept that there is no such thing as bad publicity so long as the media get our title correct. At least the bad report and description of Western European Union to which I refer in paragraph 25 of my report mentioned Western European Union.

It took eleven months for the Council of Ministers to answer a question from the President and when that answer came the Council of Ministers decided not to act upon any of the suggestions made by President Pontillon, except for one small detail. That is not acceptable. I can give Mr. Roman the guarantee that we shall take on board his constructive proposals and criticisms.

The PRESIDENT. – The committee has presented a draft recommendation to which no amendment has been tabled. We shall therefore vote on the draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

We shall vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to explain very briefly why I have voted against the proposal. Among other things, the proposal calls for the establishment of a journal, which would be published only in English and French, for reasons of secrecy. As I believe public relations activities should be aimed at everyone and that the vast majority of the population in five countries must not be automatically excluded, I have taken the view that it would be better not to establish a journal of this kind, or to consider it under secret services rather than public relations. I wanted to confirm this by voting as I have done.

The PRESIDENT. – I am sure that Mr. Ewing will consider whether that explanation should be published in Esperanto.

*(Mr. Müller rose)*

You have taken part in the debate, Mr. Müller, so under the rules you cannot explain your vote.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*). – No explanation?

The PRESIDENT. – No, as you have taken part in the debate, Mr. Müller, you may not. If you had not taken part in the debate, you could have done.

#### *14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece.
2. WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1284 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.)*

1. See page 17.

## NINTH SITTING

Monday, 2nd December 1991

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Changes in the membership of committees.
4. Address by Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece.  
*Replies by Mr. Mitsotakis to questions put by:* Sir John Hunt, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Cox, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Müller, Mr. van der Linden, Mr. Soysal (*Observer from Turkey*).
5. WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1284 and amendments*).

*Speakers:* Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Reddemann, Mr. van der Linden, Mr. Eser (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Müller, Mr. Perinat, Mr. Colombo, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Pahtas (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Spiliotopoulos (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Barrionuevo, Mr. De Decker; (point of order): Lord Mackie of Benshie, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; Mr. Petersen (*Observer from Norway*), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman*), Mr. Pieralli, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; (points of order): Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Fourré, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Stegagnini, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Sir Dudley Smith.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### **1. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### **3. Changes in the membership of committees**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly must approve the changes in the membership of committees which have been proposed by several delegations. These changes have been published in Notice No. 9 which has been distributed. I now submit them to the

1. See page 20.

Assembly in accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure.

Are there any objections?...

*The changes are agreed to.*

#### **4. Address by Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece.

Prime Minister, welcome to this Assembly. It gives us particular satisfaction to have you with us here today.

On the eve of the Maastricht summit, which will establish the new powers of the European Community and decide what the links between Western European Union and the future European Union, in which your country has its natural place, will be in the Europe of tomorrow, the views of Greece are, in our opinion, of great importance.

As a member of both the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance, Greece has taken part in a number of WEU's activities over the past two years. It has applied for membership of our organisation and our Assembly, for its part, has shown its encouragement for this step by regularly opening its doors to parliamentary observers.



*The President (continued)*

Whatever may be the motives which have, until now, caused governments to defer Greece's accession to WEU, it is obvious to us all that, by virtue of its history, which is also our own, and its contribution to our civilisation and, in particular, to European political thought, Greece has long been a full member of our family.

You have our assurance, Prime Minister, that we all hope and trust that the obstacles which have so far stood in the way of full Greek participation in Western European Union will soon be removed.

We are also gratified that you have chosen to come in person, Prime Minister, to let us hear your views. Your record as a member of the resistance, first against the Nazi occupation and later against the dictatorship of the Colonels, has made you a hero of democracy. Few men have been prepared to pay so dearly for their devotion to a cause.

Finally, your duties as Minister of Finance, Minister for the Economy and then Minister for Foreign Affairs have given you a wealth of political experience which commands our respect.

It is therefore with great interest that we shall be listening to what you have to say. Afterwards, with your permission, members of the Assembly will put a number of questions.

Prime Minister, will you please take the rostrum.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is both an honour and a special pleasure for me to be here with you today and to address your distinguished Assembly.

I would first like to thank your President, Mr. Robert Pontillon, for his kind invitation.

It is gratifying to see, in that invitation, the importance that your Assembly, which has long been interested in possible Greek membership of WEU, attaches to the Greek Government's views on European security. Clearly this question is the central concern of this Assembly – the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss all aspects of security, including questions of defence.

Security is a complex concept definable in terms of several factors. Socio-political phenomena such as the ethnic aspirations sometimes exploited by third parties, ideological and religious rivalries, socio-economic inequalities and demographic pressure, and international political differences can all endanger security and therefore the peace and stability of a region.

Discussion of security in Europe must also include the situation in nearby regions of the

world like the Mediterranean countries and the Middle East, and in particular the impact of the changes now taking place in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, not to forget, of course, the USSR. Then there is the particularly sensitive area of the Balkans affected as it is by the crisis in Yugoslavia, where manifestations of hypernationalist sentiment are threatening the stability of the whole region.

The wall which once split our old continent into two worlds and two opposite camps has finally crumbled, hastening the end of the bipolar security system in Europe set up four decades ago with the confrontation of two big political and military coalitions, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, its primary feature.

We are rightly glad to see the end of the old world order of the Yalta agreements, but history tells us that phases of transition have always been accompanied by instability and uncertainty.

For over forty years our continent has lived under the real military threat of a large-scale offensive from the East. Today, we have the prospect of peace before us, but we are also faced with situations of conflict and they too could degenerate into serious threats. These new dangers to security are of a different nature, being regional or local and caused by the resurgence of nationalism after decades of suppression.

In the face of this new situation, sustained effort and plenty of imagination will be needed by the architects of the new European security system. At the moment, the risks of conflict, though probably more limited in military potential, are even greater than before, being more diverse and less predictable and thus more difficult to detect and bring under early control.

Because of this, given the fluid nature of the new political and military scene in Europe, the various security institutions are having to change and redefine their objectives. The first step in this direction is to define the rôle of these organisations in concrete terms with a view to greater harmonisation and co-ordination and thus avoid the risk of duplication and overlapping. This is an extremely difficult task because of the constantly changing situation: ever since the peaceful revolution of 1989, the pace of European history has been accelerating.

In this changed situation, the new architecture of European security will be a three-tier structure – at transatlantic, European and pan-European levels.

At the transatlantic level, the cornerstone of European security is unquestionably NATO. The Atlantic Alliance is still our most important

*Mr. Mitsotakis (continued)*

defence and security organisation, because it offers mechanisms for political consultation and crisis management, and efficient and integrated military structures. It also maintains the transatlantic links between Europe and the United States and Canada and gives them credibility, an essential factor in the security and stability of our continent.

The recent radical changes occurring at lightning speed and the historic events of the last two years in the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe require that the rôle and strategic concept of the alliance be reviewed. For example, the centre of gravity of the alliance has changed. We are moving away from the idea of defence towards a global concept of security and at the same time we can see a strengthening of its political mission in the direction of greater dialogue.

The reduction of the military forces of the alliance now under way will not impair its ability to protect its members from possible aggression. In this respect the change over from conventional forces into rapid reaction forces, towards which Greece has offered a contribution, and the curtailment of the rôle of nuclear weapons to that of deterrent of last resort, are important measures raising the curtain on a new concept of defence. The decisions which NATO has just taken at the Rome summit reflect the new situation in Europe, and the new strategic concept of the alliance is headed in the right direction to find the answers to the problems raised.

NATO recognises the existence of a large number of dangerous situations in Central and Eastern Europe, and the importance for security in the alliance of stability in the southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The same applies to the existence of military powers in the Middle East and the proliferation of technologies for producing weapons of mass destruction. For all these reasons Greece, as a key country in the area, is a sensitive and important component in any European security system and in the alliance in particular.

Within this defence system bridging the two sides of the Atlantic a European pillar has begun to be built during the last few years with the reactivation of Western European Union.

The Brussels Treaty which has bound the six countries of the European Community together with more specific ties within the Atlantic Alliance now has particular importance for the countries of Europe.

With the three additional members of the EC also belonging to NATO, it seeks to play a greater rôle in European security – but complementary to, not competitive with, NATO.

Since it was formed, WEU has been purely a more specific alliance among the countries of the European Community within the great transatlantic alliance. It is altogether normal for it to wish to retain this specific rôle within the alliance by enlarging to include all the member countries of the European Community which would like to join.

That thought, ladies and gentlemen, brings us to the second level, that of the Europe of the Community of Twelve and the grand design these countries have for political union. The cornerstone of the new architecture of Europe is clearly the European Community, which was a point of reference for the people of Eastern Europe and acted as a catalyst in the crisis precipitating the fall of totalitarianism. And it is the Community of Twelve, transformed into a political union, which will also form the new foundation of Europe and will therefore need the resources, institutions and powers to take decisions, determine policy objectives and manage crises. This will require a political will based on awareness of the common essential interests of the member states.

The Community, while attracting applications for membership from other European countries, is irreversibly embarked, in order to be able to meet the great challenges of our time, on the road towards political union. Political union implies common foreign policy and common foreign policy automatically implies policy that embraces security and defence.

The Community, which cannot be an economic giant and at the same time a political dwarf on the international stage, will no doubt give itself a security and defence identity and thus assume a decisive rôle in the stability and peace of Europe and the world. For almost two years we have been working at all levels on a draft of a new treaty of political union. Substantial progress has already been made and it is to be hoped that at Maastricht we will have the wisdom to give Europe the new institutional framework it needs to meet the challenge of history.

Only recently, consensus was reached at the Rome summit on two complementary ideas: first, the principle that NATO constitutes an essential element of European security and, secondly, the principle of a European security and defence policy which now no one questions. The principle of a European security and defence identity is already unanimously agreed by the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

Far from weakening NATO and the bonds of transatlantic solidarity, this would on the contrary strengthen the European component of the alliance. Here let me recall the terms of The Hague platform which Greece accepts and which states that a free, independent and more

*Mr. Mitsotakis (continued)*

united Western Europe is vital to the security of North America.

As you know, Greece first officially notified its wish to become a full member of Western European Union in 1987. Its accession should now be automatic because, with WEU in the process of becoming an institution embodying European defence policy, any Community country that wishes to join should obviously be able to become a member. On the basis of this principle we are sure that, as a member of the European Community and NATO and having fully accepted The Hague platform, Greece will find its proper place in this truly European institution.

Having discussed these two levels – NATO and the Community – I now come to the third: CSCE.

At the pan-European level, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is the only forum – and the first ever – where all European countries can consider questions concerning their security in close co-operation with the United States and Canada. We attach particular importance to the promotion and development of CSCE's rôle particularly in the field of crisis management, conflict avoidance and the peaceful solution of disputes.

We see CSCE as the main institutional framework for arms control and reduction on our continent and for the establishment of confidence-building and security measures. In order to ensure the effectiveness of these measures and so that no country should feel itself threatened by an excessive accumulation of weapons and the creation of an offensive potential in its own environs, their field of application should be as wide as possible.

In this way the post-Helsinki security process could serve as a new starting point for the creation of a system of co-operation, stability and security. The fact that all CSCE states are already fully participating in this process is an assurance that a general system of security and stability will eventually be set in place for Europe as a whole.

The pan-European nature of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe gives this institution exceptional importance.

It is therefore vital that CSCE develop whilst continuing to observe its principles and international law. Respect for the law at the international level, particularly in periods of uncertainty and tension, like the present when we are seeking a new world order, is essential for the consolidation of security and peace.

Mr. President, my country also attaches great importance to the concept of regional security

and we believe that appropriate mechanisms can be developed to enable the states concerned to address this question with their own interest and that of stability in their region in mind.

Greece has made concrete proposals to its neighbours, Bulgaria and Turkey, on this subject and will not miss any occasion to make progress in that direction and to help establish a climate of confidence and security in its own geographical area.

When discussing security in Europe, it is natural to consider developments in neighbouring regions like the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In addition, different political, religious, cultural, social and ideological systems are developing in these two areas in a climate of economic inequality, political instability, arms proliferation and the absence of any security structures. Such a climate carries within it the seeds of local quarrels and conflict likely to degenerate into regional crises, to say nothing of problems long unresolved like those of Cyprus and the Arab-Israeli conflict which continue to be dangerous centres of friction and tension.

Given the interdependence between security in Europe and security in the surrounding areas, particularly the Mediterranean countries, our task must also be to create a general system of co-operation and security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

By reason of its geographical position and its historical relations with the peoples of the region, Greece acts as both bridge and meeting point between Western Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East. So the active participation of my country in any European and regional security system is essential for the maintenance of stability in South-Eastern Europe.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to sum up my message to you today with the following words.

Greece, birth place of democracy, is pleased to be able to offer its contribution once again particularly now when our continent is striving to achieve unity and to leave behind the nightmares of the past. The Europe destroyed by war is being reborn by democracy. In this situation, in which my country is making every effort to reach our common goal, that of a unified and peaceful Europe, its place is in the European institutions.

May I once again express my warm thanks for your invitation and your welcome.

It is a great pleasure to be here in this wonderful city whose buildings speak eloquently of our historic links and our common European heritage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Prime Minister, for an excellent speech.

*The President (continued)*

I am sure you are ready to answer questions from members of the Assembly.

I call Sir John Hunt.

Sir John HUNT (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to ask a question relating to the possible accession of Greece to Western European Union to which the Prime Minister referred. He will know that one of the reasons that the application by Greece for WEU membership creates a problem for us is that it does not accept certain international undertakings. Is Greece now prepared to apply Article 14 of the Paris Treaty of 1947 on the demilitarisation of the Dodecanese?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – I have already said that we had decided to accept and respect The Hague platform, the only barrier to Greece's membership of WEU; otherwise Greece would already have been a member of WEU for several years.

As regards our obligations, we are ready to accept international obligations and to discuss any point of concern to you. Greece is a loyal partner of the international community and fully abides by international law.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, let me ask you a very direct question. Greece, along with others, bears some responsibility for the inaction of European countries as regards the crisis in Croatia.

Why does your country, the cradle of democracy, as you recalled only a few moments ago, assent by its silence to such aggression and breaches of the most basic humanitarian rights? Why does it not do more when its neighbour is in such a tragic situation? Do you not think that this conflagration on your frontiers is bound sooner or later to have some unpleasant effects for you? On the eve of the meeting in Maastricht, when some people are asking whether the independence of Slovenia and Croatia should not be recognised in the name of the freedom of nations, what will be your position? Will you join those in favour of recognising the independence of these two countries, and crucified Croatia in particular, or will you take the path of prudence and abstain? If you agree to recognise their independence, will you also go farther and recognise the independence of your neighbour the republic of Macedonia and, in that case, what will be your government's position?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – Thank you for that question: I will give you a direct reply.

Three days ago I was in Belgrade for a stay of several hours to observe what was happening there. I had talks with the Serbian Government and President Milosevic, and also Mr. Marcovic, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia.

What you are assuming to be facts are not altogether beyond dispute. You seem to have no doubt that responsibility for the civil war in Yugoslavia belongs to only one side; according to our information, that is not so. There is some responsibility on both sides. So we have to be very careful before taking any decision.

There is talk of sanctions. In our view, we should wait and see. The Serbian Government has just agreed to co-operate with Mr. Cyrus Vance and the other representatives of the United Nations with the object of enabling the blue berets to be sent in. Discussions are now under way and the outcome of these will very probably be positive. The warring parties have promised to observe the cease-fire.

This being so, I believe that unilateral recognition of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia would be a mistake. Even if sanctions were imposed, it would be a mistake. So we ought therefore to wait to see exactly what is the best thing to do.

I would add that were we to recognise the independence of Croatia, then the question of borders would arise, internal borders drawn by President Tito and reflecting neither ethnic nor historical reality. So, are we ready to discuss the question of internal borders? I don't think anyone is.

Summarising our position, I would say that we should still try to uphold the unity of Yugoslavia, be it in the form of a confederation or a union of independent republics.

This is the policy of our government and we are determined to pursue it and work towards that objective. As far as I am aware, all of our partners in the Community, the United States and all those countries with whom we have been in touch agree that we should try to maintain the unity of Yugoslavia. It is also the Soviet position.

So, as I say, we should wait and see.

In the event that recognition of independence becomes necessary, Greece will consult with all its Community partners; we are prepared to take a decision together.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, I would like to express my admiration for the rich content of your speech and the frankness of your replies.

However, I have a concrete question to put to you: what is the exact content of the proposals for regional settlements that Greece has made to Bulgaria and Turkey?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – It was a concrete idea with the details open to discussion: to withdraw offensive weapons from an area along the border between our countries: Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey. We took this initiative in agreement with Bulgaria but Turkey was not so keen. We still believe that if we could agree on such a proposal it would be a good thing for peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – You, Prime Minister, spoke about your confidence, but there is a country, as you know, near to yours, Cyprus, where there is little confidence about its future. As Greece and the United Kingdom are guarantor powers, as indeed is Turkey, can you tell the Assembly what hope you have that, with the formation of the new Turkish Government, there may at long last be a willingness to enter into meaningful discussions to end the divide that has existed in Cyprus for seventeen years to the detriment of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – I can only express the hope that the new Turkish Government will agree to continue the negotiations, which were at quite an advanced stage before the elections in that country, aimed at finding a fair and viable solution to the Cyprus problem.

Progress had been made thanks to the efforts of the United States with the direct support of President Bush, and an agreement was imminent. All of us, United Nations, Americans and Greeks, had this impression but unfortunately, at the last minute, probably for domestic reasons due to the proximity of the elections, the Turks pulled back and we failed to reach the agreement we had hoped for. I trust that Mr. Demirel, with whom we have agreed to continue the dialogue on our bilateral problems, will continue with the work begun by Mr. Ozal and Mr. Yilmaz. It is my hope that the Cyprus problem will be resolved before next year is over.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for that message of confidence, Prime Minister.

I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – You know how friendly Spain is towards your country. I congratulate you on your speech and on your courageous and frank replies.

As regards Greece's possible membership of WEU, of which we are very much in favour, can you count on the unanimous support, or a very large consensus, of Greek political forces?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – All Greek political parties approve the application which Greece has submitted for membership of WEU, just as practically all Greek people are now pro-European.

This is a recent development and we are very pleased about it because, previously, the situation was quite different. To be able to say that Greek people as a whole agree that Greece should join WEU gives me a further argument in support of my application.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We do not want to take too much of your time, Prime Minister, but there are still several members with questions they want to ask.

I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – May I please ask the Prime Minister of Greece a question about defence and the European Community? When Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait several European Community countries, including your own, Mr. President, and mine, responded robustly, but several others were weak, craven and vacillating. As the purpose of defence is to defend, which is an end in itself and not just some expression of foreign policy, and to keep our peoples safe and free, and as throughout human history peoples have attacked one another and it would be arrogant to imagine that human nature has changed permanently for the better in our own generation, how could we ever possibly rely on the institutions of the European Community to respond quickly, certainly and effectively in the event of an outside attack?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – It all depends on the decision the Twelve take at Maastricht. If they decide on political union, that will mean we will also have a common foreign policy, and therefore a common defence policy.

There is no other road Europe can take. Our country will do everything it can with that aim in view. We are a small country which, I confess, feels threatened by the events taking place

*Mr. Mitsotakis (continued)*

around it in the Balkans, and in particular by those of the last few weeks. So we too want to belong to a united Europe, and will help to create it. This is the aim we have set ourselves and Greece will do all it can to achieve it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Germany*) (Translation). – I would like to revert to what the Prime Minister said about Yugoslavia. If he had said in this Assembly a year ago that he was in favour of Yugoslavia's unity, he would have been generally applauded, because at that time no one here intended to support anyone who wanted to put an end to their federative republic.

In the meantime all kinds of things have happened. We are witnessing a situation that is far worse than the civil war he had in his country after the second world war. We are witnessing a situation in which the republic is literally falling apart. We are witnessing a situation in which non-interference will have roughly the same effect as it had during the Spanish civil war, when for all practical purposes non-intervention helped those who were smashing democracy.

My question is this: how long can the belief in a united Yugoslavia be sustained? Would it not be better to consider the possibility of first separating the warring factions and then later, when the present anger has subsided, working towards a new form of co-operation among the present states in Yugoslavia?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – It is quite true that a great deal has changed, but as far as I know, the policies of the various countries have not changed in this respect. When I talk to my counterparts in the European Community about maintaining the unity of Yugoslavia, no one is opposed to it. They all accept this as the only solution.

I also mentioned the question of internal frontiers just now. What will happen to the internal frontiers? That is a question that cannot be answered because, as long as attempts are made to retain these internal frontiers as they are at the moment, there will be no real solution to the problem.

We in Greece therefore feel that attempts must continue to the very end to maintain unity in Yugoslavia, as in the Soviet Union – the situation is the same. If it is not possible, then we will have to see what we can do. But I cannot abandon hope of a solution being found which will maintain Yugoslavia's unity. That is the position we are still adopting.

I have to tell you that Mr. Milosevic accepted this a few days ago in Belgrade and that Mr. Markovic told me the same thing. I asked Mr. Markovic what he thought about sanctions. He was utterly opposed. I asked him what he thought about the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. He opposed that as well. So we are not the only ones to take this view. There are people everywhere who would still like to keep on trying. That is our policy, our position.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – I have two brief questions to put to the Prime Minister. The first follows on from Mr. Reddemann's question. Does Greece recognise the right of nations to self-determination, yes or no? A brief answer is enough.

The second question is whether the reports in the press are true – you can read them here in France as elsewhere – namely that unless it becomes a member of WEU Greece will veto a decision at Maastricht.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – The answer to the first question is yes. Of course we recognise this right, but through negotiation, not through force of arms.

As regards the second question, we have applied to participate in WEU. We believe Greece has the right to expect this of you, because Greece belongs to Europe and it belongs to the NATO alliance. I find it hard to believe that a member of a common, united Europe does not have the right to expect solidarity from the others where its security is concerned. That is my answer.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Linden.

Mr. van der LINDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have two questions to ask the Prime Minister. First, does he believe that there is any chance of European political union, including – I hope – defence, unless the problems between Greece and Turkey are solved?

Secondly, if he looks at the Franco-German and Anglo-Italian proposals, does he believe there is a reasonable way of establishing a European defence community if the British do not become rather more European and the French rather more Atlantic?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – My answer to the second question is yes.

*Mr. Mitsotakis (continued)*

As regards the first question, I have to say quite frankly that it is not we who are to blame for the Cyprus problem remaining unsolved. We are all responsible, if you like, the whole world, but Greece is not responsible. There are still troops occupying a European country in the Mediterranean region. This is a disgrace for us all, but it is not a disgrace for Greece, not at all. So we have to try to solve the Cyprus problem.

We must also try – we ourselves are doing so seriously and with good will – to solve our bilateral problems with Turkey. There are no insurmountable difficulties. Personally, I feel that, if there is good will on the other side, our problems can be solved. We will be making a serious attempt. We have been waiting for a government in Turkey that is prepared to take responsibility for negotiating on these problems. For a while I thought this was the case with Mr. Ozal and Mr. Yilmaz. We actually had discussions with them, but at the last moment they were unable to take a decision.

We are prepared to go on down this road and to try everything possible, but we cannot be punished because the Turks may not want to join in.

I did not mention Turkey at all in my address today. Do what you like with Turkey. We are not putting up any barriers, but we are part of Europe, we are a European country. We have also met the conditions allowing us to belong to WEU. That is where I stand, and I believe I am quite right.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Prime Minister, the last person down to speak is a Turkish observer. Would you please answer his question. Last year, when we were honoured with the presence of President Ozal, he too kindly answered a question from a Greek observer.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – Of course, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I was sure you would, Prime Minister, which is why I asked you.

I call Mr. Soysal, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. SOYSAL (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to speak: as a Turkish observer, and given the precedent you referred to, I would like to ask our guest a question. Prime Minister, I was very pleased to hear your speech which was so frank and so full of promise for peace in the region.

I would not have put any question if you had not used a word which, I believe, must be rejected. In connection with the Cyprus matter, you talked of pulling back. In actual fact, if

I rightly remember, I believe that you and Mr. Yilmaz agreed that the time was not yet ripe for a quadripartite meeting. I think you agree that the essential requirement for the solution of the Cyprus problem is that the two communities on the island should agree on the need for such meetings. However, you both observed that the ground had not yet been well enough prepared for a four-cornered or international meeting, as you stated.

It would therefore be unfair to use words like pulling back because under any government, whether it be the previous government or the present government in which my party is one of the partners, Turkey has always been ready to find a solution to this tragedy, provided that the two communities take part in the meetings and that the ground is well prepared in advance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. MITSOTAKIS (*Prime Minister of Greece*) (Translation). – It is true that Mr. Yilmaz and I agreed, at the end of our discussion which lasted over two hours, that we could not reach an agreement because we could see that differences remained. This was our conclusion.

But when I say that the Turkish party pulled back, this is in relation to what was communicated to us by the United Nations. We were informed by the United Nations and American representatives of the Turkish Government's replies to the United Nations representatives visiting Ankara. It is in this context that I said that the Turkish Government had pulled back.

On the other hand, I agree with you that the two communities in Cyprus itself have to reach agreement; it will be an agreement between two communities, not Greece and Turkey.

I will say to you in all honesty and friendship, that personally I do not believe Mr. Denktash exists. In a private conversation with Mr. Yilmaz I told him: "Don't talk to me about Mr. Denktash. In any case, he has to abide by Turkish policy." I personally also said to Mr. Ozal: "Who commands the troops? Mr. Denktash or you?"

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Prime Minister, when we decided to invite you here, we were, of course, expecting to hear a frank address delivered with great freedom of expression. We have not been disappointed.

I would like to thank you in any event for spending so much time with us and for the honesty of your remarks. We now are better able to understand Greece's position and this, I hope, will enable us more easily to clear the path towards your accession to Western European Union. Thank you again, Prime Minister. We wish you a safe journey back to Athens.

The sitting is adjourned for five minutes.

*The President (continued)*

*(The sitting was suspended at 4.05 p.m. and resumed at 4.10 p.m. with Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair)*

The sitting is resumed.

### **5. WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1284 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1284 and amendments.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I shall not be as brief as usual because this is a very complex report and I wish to be certain that the implications are fully realised.

The report starts by reiterating the advice given by the Presidential Committee in Palermo to the Council of Ministers, and to the intergovernmental conference. We made it very clear that WEU must be the bridge between Europe and North America. It is through WEU that Europe can make its voice heard in the Euro-American dialogue. That is repeated in Mr. Goerens's report, which we shall be discussing later this week.

We went on to say that, if we were to fulfil our new tasks, we must look more favourably on enlargement, and, where appropriate, act more swiftly. I notice a distinct lack of members of the Ministerial Council; they were responsible for the long delays in the admission of Spain and Portugal. The Assembly was swift, but we waited for some two years for the Ministers to reach agreement. That will always be one of our difficulties when everything must be done in organisations such as this, in which the reluctant can sometimes hold back the majority.

I was glad to hear our President say a few moments ago that he hoped that Greece's application could be dealt with swiftly. He, of course, can only speak for the Assembly, but I hope that those words will be heard.

A basic point about the report is that it is, of necessity, interim, and must be flexible. So much is happening in the world today whether it be the fourteenth, or fourteenth and a half, cease-fire in Yugoslavia, the imminence of Maastricht or what may follow Maastricht, nothing can be set in stone. At this stage

however – at the time when the report was written, and at the time when I am making this speech – I believe that what I am saying points us in the right direction, and gives us the guidelines that we may require.

We have pointed out that rigid principles cannot be defined at this stage; the document must be provisional. We shall meet again as relevant committees after Maastricht to see exactly how our future fits into the decisions – if there be decisions – made at Maastricht, and also what the NATO summit recently concluded.

WEU has been a very valuable segment of European security. It has performed a major rôle in indicating, on two occasions since it woke from its slumbers, that European countries can act together, that Europe is able to play an important part in a crisis. Our existence was recognised and welcomed by North America when we kept the sea lanes open in the Iran-Iraq war and when we provided well over three quarters of the search vessels when sanctions were being implemented against Iraq in the recent Gulf war.

We must take into account the CSCE. I noted what Prime Minister Mitsotakis said about the need for a pan-European body that can discuss that subject, while including North America. A pan-European body already exists which has all the countries of Europe as members or guest members, including countries of the ex-Warsaw Pact. It would be delighted to welcome North America to a debate on the CSCE. I refer to the Council of Europe.

The break-up of Yugoslavia – for it is a break-up – and the break-up of the Soviet Union leave us in a very dangerous position. No one will laugh at those who say that the world was perhaps a safer place when NATO and the Warsaw Pact existed. Their mutual powers of destruction almost certainly guaranteed peace.

Now we have a real problem that will get worse long before it gets better. There is the Ukrainian referendum, and the situation between Croatia and Slovenia; there is the domino effect that could result in the event of a total break-up. If the other republics of Yugoslavia come to the surface – and they will – we may be left thinking that the present Serbo-Croat conflict is child's play in comparison to what has been unleashed on the world; unless, that is, we are able to find a way, through our organisations, to play a major rôle. A major rôle is not played by a Europe that sits wringing its hands and saying: "Oh dear, we cannot do anything until both sides agree to let us go in and do something." Meanwhile, we see women, children and old men being massacred every day. That is not action by Europe; it is inaction.

Where do we go from here in the enlargement of WEU? In an excellent speech this morning,



*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)*

the Secretary-General referred to the problems that may emerge with the creation of new, independent states. Let me say to the Secretary-General, and to governments: "You must not recognise the independence of any new state unless it agrees automatically to undertake all the obligations assigned by the state of which it was earlier a part. If you do not do that you have no control over nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation, and you will be in a very dangerous situation in regard to nuclear weapons, human rights and everything else." A new, independent state cannot be accepted unless it agrees beforehand to conform to civilised behaviour and the acceptance of treaties signed on its behalf. If that is not done by governments, we shall unleash utter chaos on the world and we, as politicians, will be responsible.

In the document we say firmly that there is a myth that has existed for a long time – that one can accede to WEU only if one is a member of the European Community. That condition exists nowhere in writing but it has been accepted. Rather like the emperor's clothes, it is a myth. It must not be allowed to continue.

In the document we talk of membership being available, quickly I hope, to both Greece and Turkey. There are two separate reasons, but they are compelling. Greece should be allowed in because she is a member of NATO and of the Community. Turkey should be allowed in because she is a member of NATO and played a major rôle, at great financial sacrifice, in the recent Gulf war. Both have applied to join and both should be allowed to join at the same time. That would result in a strengthening of this organisation.

We must recognise the part to be played by the United States. If we are serious in our support of NATO – I fail to see how we cannot be, recognising as we do that we are a pillar of NATO – we must recognise that it is not possible for membership of WEU to be made available to any country that is not in NATO. That is because of the effect that could be triggered by a dispute. If NATO had to respond to defend a non-NATO member it would be impossible for the Americans to participate. It would destroy overnight the whole NATO umbrella in its existing form and in the new form being talked about as a result of the Rome summit.

We must remember that it is not possible for a non-NATO member to become a member of WEU.

I do not stress the points that I make in the document about the pitfalls involved in certain actions relating to the Assembly not having the relevant information.

A difficulty also arises in relation to the neutral members of the Community, if a member of the Community is automatically entitled to be a member of WEU. There is already one neutral member. Soon there could be three for a variety of reasons. I would not dream of arguing about those reasons. However, can one imagine the defence of Europe being implemented when there are three neutral states who are in a position to block any decision? That is another reason why we should not confine membership of WEU to membership of the Community as a whole. By saying that I am saving myself the trouble later of making a speech against Mr. Pieralli's amendment which I find unacceptable.

Where are we to go if we are to talk to the ex-Warsaw Pact countries who want some association with us? Mr. Goerens's report makes some helpful comments. My report is complementary to his report. Between them they provide the opportunity for a formal linkage with this Assembly which does not jeopardise what I said about North American involvement.

Speakers from Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia have addressed our Assembly and the Presidential Committee has, for four years, held annual meetings with representatives from the Supreme Soviet. As parliamentarians we can do that without jeopardising or involving government. There is a difference in this matter.

We want to find a linkage for the ex-Warsaw Pact countries but that does not mean that ministers are compromised or forced to follow. I hope that will reassure the Ministerial Council that we are trying to recognise our responsibilities as parliamentarians without undermining any rightful ministerial functions. If we do not find a practical way of at least associating with the parliamentarians of ex-Warsaw Pact countries, we let them down. They need the assurance that they have a voice that can be heard by parliamentarians.

Members of the Assembly will find the usual recitation of the present situation in the document. The four recommendations are clear. They try to find the right machinery through which we can co-operate. They try to assess how it is possible for European countries to fulfil their obligations and to join us. We invite countries to make a useful contribution and I am happy to accept Mr. Hardy's amendment. We must be firm in that if there is an engagement of forces under the aegis of WEU, consultations with NATO are essential.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Sir Geoffrey, for this introduction to your very important report.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Germany*) (Translation). – I would like to thank our Rapporteur, not only because he has listed in his familiar precise way what is important in Europe at the moment and what options there are, but also because he pointed out once again when presenting the report that Western European Union is not just some European organisation that intends to turn away from the United States, but one that must be seen as a bridge between Europe and the United States. I believe that agreement on this statement will put an end to much of the discussion we have had in the past, and will do so in a reasonable way.

Madam President, I would like very briefly to single out three points which I believe to be particularly important for Western European Union's future.

Firstly, we have spent long enough believing that the real problems in Europe were caused by Yalta, or what happened after Yalta, and still exist today. We overlooked the fact that the real problems were due to the possibility of creating a new culture of coexistence in the Western European countries which became or remained free, that we no longer insisted on old national privileges, that we considered one principle inviolable, the principle that disputes between nations must henceforth be resolved by negotiation, not by military means, and that, if anyone should seek to change frontiers, the result must never again be military conflict.

This is not yet true of the eastern part of Europe. The fact that the Soviet Union kept these countries under control for decades and that it was not possible to eliminate the shadows of the past, of the years before or during the second world war, is again, now that the Soviet bloc has collapsed, posing problems that in fact emerged in the 1920s or ought to have been solved in the 1920s.

In other words, particularly in the Balkans and in the disintegrating Soviet Union, we are faced with problems which our common consensus also tells us ought really no longer to exist.

For example, in the not too distant future we will have to consider relations between Poland and the resuscitated Lithuania, between Poland and the emerging Ukraine and Byelorussia. We will have problems in the present Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. We will also have problems in relations between Hungary and Romania, between Romania and Bulgaria, between Bulgaria and the Turkish Republic.

In other words, we are now suddenly faced with things of which we were simply no longer conscious. This means that we, as Western European Union, have the additional task of not only relying entirely on negotiations between

our countries as a matter of course, but also of taking this method of resolving disputes to the other part of Europe as well.

The second point I want to make, Madam President, is this: there are more changes to come in the Soviet Union. I am even afraid that, after the expected harsh winter, there will be problems not only between a strong Russian republic and other republics leaving the old Soviet Union, but also a wide range of problems in the new Russian republics, and this in areas where nuclear weapons are stored, and we will not then be sure that they are in the right hands.

Nor, I am afraid, is there much hope for the proposal from the Russian President, Mr. Yeltsin, that the problem of disarming the old Soviet Union should be solved by first destroying the nuclear weapons in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan and then concentrating everything in Russia. This may, in fact, lead to fresh wrangling within the present Soviet Union.

This means, thirdly, that we in Western European Union must resist the forces within our countries that believe eternal peace broke out with the end of the confrontation of the last forty years, and that we have a duty to stop demonstrating our military strength.

Let us be clear about one thing: none of us is thinking of engaging in hostile activities. But everyone is bound to fear that in the event of a conflict beyond the frontiers of our countries there are still people who believe they could reorganise the world militarily and impose their ideology outside their own country.

NATO's motto that vigilance is the price of freedom will, I believe, continue to apply for some considerable time in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Linden.

Mr. van der LINDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too would like to begin by congratulating Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

One of the crucial statements in his report is that NATO must remain the basic framework of western defence. I want to emphasise this. I would add that we really should question the involvement of the United States in the more distant future. It is in Europe's own interests to make a greater effort to ensure the United States' involvement. President Bush's speech at The Hague made this absolutely clear. The United States emphasised once again that European defence also strengthens NATO.

But the developments in Eastern and Central Europe have left a wide gap. The European Community is being drawn into this gap, as it were. It will have to assume greater responsibility in the external sphere, for which it is not yet entirely prepared. I am also afraid that insuf-

*Mr. van der Linden (continued)*

ficient speed will be made at Maastricht, given the problems Western Europe faces. I agree with what Mr. Reddemann said about Russia. Developments in the next few years will not leave us much time. A European political union with a security and defence component is therefore needed, and the pace must be increased.

Is a sufficient balance being maintained between NATO members and EC members in connection with the enlargement of WEU? Is the growing political dimension of the European Community not making it necessary for Western European Union to have these two bridges at once, one to NATO and the other to the European Community? It rather looks to us as if this relationship depends on the will of individual members who do not yet belong to Western European Union. I feel it should be made very clear that this must not be an open-ended option.

This being the case, there has to be a question mark over the possible enlargement of the European Community. As Mr. van den Broek has stressed in the Dutch Parliament, the European Community rightly feels that deepening and widening must be parallel processes. If the deepening slows down, the widening should slow down too. We cannot slow down the deepening and speed up the widening, because then things will go wrong.

The report is perhaps too open in its discussion of neutrality. The European Community cannot afford to admit members who assume a neutral stance. They will be obliged to accept the *acquis communautaire* and the *acquis politique*. I will not consider what neutrality means at present. Incidentally, this is also increasingly true of Ireland. We are glad to see some movement in Ireland's case in this respect.

In paragraph 51, the report says that the accession of the EFTA countries could strengthen the bridge to Eastern and Central Europe. This may be so, but the history of Western Europe in the 1970s showed that political ambitions must not be such that the economy is subordinated to them. The European Community must first have the base and the capacity for absorbing new members. It may then mean something to Central and Eastern Europe in economic, political and, later, defence terms. So politics must not dominate without the economic conditions being fulfilled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eser, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. ESER (*Observer from Turkey*). – Madam President, at the outset, I should like to express my sincere appreciation to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg

for his detailed report, "WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU", and especially for supporting Turkey's application to become a full member.

As Sir Geoffrey eloquently enumerated the reasons why Turkey should join WEU I shall not go into that subject in detail. I wish however, to correct lingering misconceptions in the minds of some Europeans about Turkey's rôle in the new configuration of the continent and about the validity of the Turkish application to join the European Community and WEU.

As you are well aware, following the general elections on 20th October in Turkey, there is now a new parliament, and a new coalition government is in office, and Turkey's commitment to the West – its values, principles and ideals, as well as her commitment to its security and defence – is renewed. Indeed, it is stronger than ever.

Geopolitically, Turkey's commitment to the West and her rôle in the Middle East are mutually complementary and an invaluable asset to the security of Europe. Turkey's special function as a catalyst between the two has enabled her to consider regional developments from a broader perspective. The Gulf crisis and the war that ensued have underscored the geopolitical importance of Turkey as well as the usefulness of the insights offered through her prism of experience. The rôle of a secular Turkey in stemming the tides of destabilising currents flowing in from various hotbeds of extremism cannot be exaggerated.

As the new security architecture of Europe is being built within a framework of interlocking institutions in which NATO, the CSCE, the Council of Europe, the European Community and WEU will complement each other, one should bear in mind the fact that Turkey is a full and active member of the first three of these organisations and an associate member of the EC.

Western European Union will be a bridge between the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance – and, as such, will function both as the European pillar within the alliance and the security dimension of the European integration process – and the accession of Turkey to WEU as a full member will contribute to the reinforcement of both sides of that bridge, as well as to the new security architecture of Europe.

I do not need to remind you, Madam President, that, as a stable and reliable ally within NATO, Turkey has been contributing to the peace and security of Europe for more than four decades and will continue to do so in the years to come. The Gulf war highlighted once again the pivotal rôle of Turkey in the security and defence of Europe. It must be recognised that,

*Mr. Eser (continued)*

without the full participation of Turkey, European defence will be incomplete.

Thank you, Madam President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has compiled an excellent summary that will undoubtedly be extremely important for WEU's future work, because we are suddenly faced with new circumstances, if I may put it that way. Whereas the world used to be divided into friend and foe, and we all knew where we stood, who was threatening us, whom we had to protect ourselves against, the situation has now become more complicated.

We are witnessing something that we have witnessed before in European history, together with its grave consequences: we are witnessing the collapse of empires, and no one knows what the final outcome will be.

We are saying today that German reunification and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union virtually mean the end of the policy conceived in Yalta. We might almost go back a few more decades and say we are even witnessing the end of the policy conceived in Versailles, which saw the collapse of large empires – the Ottoman empire and the Habsburg monarchy – and the creation of new states with new complex problems that ultimately played a not insignificant part in the development of the situation before the second world war.

There is a danger of a similar situation arising today. Mr. Reddemann touched on this when he said that we did not know exactly what would become of the Soviet Union. We read today that two parts of the republic of Moldavia, which has declared independence, have themselves declared independence: the Gagauzy and the Dnestr Russians. This goes to show what a jigsaw puzzle can emerge in this situation.

I would remind you that the Soviet Union's old and new Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said immediately after taking office that the greatest threat in the world today emanated from nuclear weapons distributed among various countries. By this he meant the Soviet Union itself.

We know that eleven thousand political parties have now been established in the Soviet Union, and we do not yet know how many nationalities will emerge there. This shows what problems await us. This is true not only of the Soviet Union: it is equally true, of course, of other areas. It is clearly true in the Balkans, and we see the same situation arising in Yugoslavia.

I am referring here to one part of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report – an essential one, it seems to me – the part where he talks about the rôle of the minorities, something Mr. Reddemann spoke of from a different angle: these newly emergent states have not yet adopted the means of resolving disputes that we have in the democracies of Western Europe. So our concern must be to protect the minorities, and also to give them certain rights. This must be achieved not by force of arms but by discussion and by treaties which abide by European views on human rights. I believe this aspect will be particularly important for our future development.

So we must protect minorities, we must ensure respect for the rights of minorities and, as I said before, we must teach others how we in Western or Central Europe resolve disputes.

I should just like to add one comment on the question of Western European Union's future. The report not only discusses external relations – I have indicated what awaits us, how varied and unpredictable these external relations are: it also considers our image of ourselves, because it also discussed WEU's enlargement.

I feel, finally, that we need to rethink our rôle, that we should decide what we really want, what we are capable of, what the present members are prepared to do. Until that has been decided, we should put any idea of enlarging Western European Union out of our minds. I do not think that would be a step forward: it would create new problems. We must first reconsider our own situation and draw fresh conclusions from this process. Then we can think about accepting new members.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Perinat.

Mr. PERINAT (*Spain*) (Translation). – Madam President, there is no doubt that the report submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee on WEU's external relations and the enlargement of WEU deals with a subject of the utmost importance, probably the most important one facing our organisation at this time.

Sir Geoffrey has drafted his report with his customary grasp of European issues, although there are some points on which I would place a different emphasis. I therefore think it necessary to comment on some of the statements in the report because they bear upon such crucial matters as the strategy to be adopted in order to implement a common defence of Europe. In setting out its reasons, the report maintains that the decision taken by Germany and France to create an army brigade that is not integrated with NATO runs the risk of weakening NATO and of giving the impression to the United States that Europe no longer has confidence in that organisation.

*Mr. Perinat (continued)*

Madam President, I believe that such an interpretation is very debatable, to say the least. Nowhere and at no time has a political organisation been created without its own defence system. Only if Europe succeeds in structuring its own defence will it then be able to structure its unity. It goes without saying that this defence must be co-ordinated with the United States and with NATO, both of which are currently indispensable to the safeguarding of peace in Europe; but we are creating the embryo of our own defence, and we should integrate this with our organisation, WEU. How is this to be done? In my opinion, the position of those who hold that WEU must constitute the security pillar of the European Community is the right one; so when we think about enlarging WEU we should have in mind those members of the European Community who are not at present members of this organisation. There is no need to pressurise anybody, as the report suggests at one point; let us simply admit the present members of the European Community, and let membership of WEU be open in future to new members joining the European Community.

As the report correctly states, when they become signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty, they will be helping to ensure the security of Europe and of the Atlantic Alliance. The neutral status of some potential members would be modified by their acceptance of the Brussels Treaty. In this way we should be giving support in security matters to the European Community and thus effectively helping towards the achievement of political union.

Let us create all possible links and the necessary co-ordination with NATO so that we are working in parallel on security matters, but let us not deprive the European Community of an essential instrument, which is in any case bound to come into being sooner or later.

With regard to enlargement, I believe it is premature to consider including the countries of Eastern Europe. As and when they become more integrated with the European Community, they will be completing the stages called for by a political process as complicated as the one required by European union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Colombo.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Madam President, recent political and military events are compelling WEU to reassess continuously the identity of the union and its ability to meet its obligations in practice. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report highlights the most important aspects of this subject, including the possibility of other countries joining WEU. I should like to

look at the first part of the report on the identity and functions of WEU.

In the matter of foreign policy the collapse of Marxism has seen the consignment to history of the Yalta agreements, which, with the United States and the USSR balancing each other, prevented the outbreak of a third world conflict despite periods of serious tension and ensured fairly peaceful conditions throughout the world. The fact is that, within their separate spheres of influence, these two great powers kept the peace. This is no longer the case now that the bipolar balance has collapsed. The most obvious case is that of Yugoslavia. Fighting has broken out because of ethnic differences and for two areas – Slovenia and even more Croatia – has reached the dangerous pitch of real warfare.

The case of Yugoslavia calls for a thorough reassessment of the identity of WEU which was brought into existence specifically with security in mind. We must be bold and practical in our efforts. It is no longer a matter of formulating hypothetical positions and scenarios for the future. Not at all. War has already broken out in Europe. And Europe? In the best of the cases examined it is looking at the matter and is even becoming worried, but the artillery is still firing and people including the defenceless are still dying.

This clearly highlights the inadequacy of WEU or rather the critical inability of such an organisation to fulfil its vital function of maintaining Europe's security. WEU must be strengthened and made into an organisation capable of responding to such serious events. No other solution seems to meet the case. A different solution would be to go through the NATO structure and use its forces which are certainly at greatest readiness and the most effective for a basically military action. I am aware, however, of the many comments which have been made and of the many objections to that possible line of action. The first and by no means unimportant objection relates to institutions; the question is, whether the competence of NATO extends to the dispatch and use of its own military forces to establish a buffer between the belligerents.

There has been a suggestion that the United Nations might intervene by sending a force of blue berets to establish a neutral zone between the parties fighting each other. This is a very worthy initiative but there are obvious difficulties and dangers. However we support the United Nations initiative headed by Mr. Vance which is seeking to halt the fighting and provide space and time for political negotiations. The United Nations and WEU should collaborate positively so that Europe as such is involved in the effort to ensure its own security. In this context, action through the CSCE might reconcile many points at issue.

*Mr. Colombo (continued)*

The overriding need still is that Europe should make itself stronger both politically and in the matter of security. Europe, and therefore WEU, must be responsible for its own security. In recent months the Franco-German and Anglo-Italian initiatives have been noble efforts but these initiatives have obvious dangers and are biased. The right way, I repeat, is still that to be taken by Europe as a whole which must have the courage to set aside its doubts and its sometimes childish attitudes and incredible rivalries to take over the leadership of all the various partners. All of this is useless and even negative effort if Europe does not first make itself stronger.

In this context, the forthcoming Maastricht summit is offering us a valuable opportunity which we must all take.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Madam President, we have known Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for a long time and of course wish to congratulate him on his election as President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Therefore we cannot be surprised at the gravity and depth of his work on a highly topical subject, which we shall certainly wish to consider in connection not only with Mr. Goerens's report but also with the report that members may have seen this morning, Mr. Ewing's report on WEU and public opinion.

It has been said by observers and the media that for a long time WEU was a sleeping beauty, who has now awakened, whether because of the Gulf crisis or the reactivation of the process of building Europe. Certainly, WEU is now giving priority to the problem of its image, to making itself known among our citizens. It is also considering the problem of its own dimensions and of its enlargement, both on its own account, because the member countries of WEU believe that it can and perhaps should be enlarged, and also in view of the challenges arising from outside.

We believe that Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report is timely, though doubtless controversial, because it deals with a subject on which we naturally do not all think alike. Therefore, we wish to express both our appreciation of his work and our disagreement with many of the statements made in the body of his report. I would say that at some point there is even disagreement with the spirit of the text – and I refer to the text of the report rather than the recommendation – a spirit that implies restrictions on enlargement, and that also hints at slowing down the process of building Europe, or at least regarding it with some scepticism. These are well-known attitudes of Sir Geoffrey's, and those who think like him

and, I would venture to say, of his compatriots, and we cannot therefore be surprised by his report.

Nevertheless, we intend to vote in favour, as we have already done in committee, and I should like to explain why. It is because we are in agreement with the text of the recommendation and, above all, we must state clearly here that Sir Geoffrey has made a major effort to build up a consensus with the positions put forward by other colleagues in the Assembly, and in pursuit of this convergence he has accepted many amendments suggested to him by various members of the Political Committee, including myself. Not only did Sir Geoffrey work towards consensus-building, he also stated repeatedly that the text of the recommendation is specifically limited precisely because it refers to the present situation and in no way predetermines the future course of enlargement. It is therefore a text relating to the present moment, a moment of great importance to ourselves and to the process of building Europe.

We can therefore see in the draft recommendation submitted to us by the committee through its spokesman, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, a significant development in Sir Geoffrey's thinking, which we believe to be important, in that it is not only a development in his own thinking, but doubtless reflects a considerable change now taking place in the British Government and, we may hope, also in political bodies, other than the Conservative Party within which Sir Geoffrey works. Above all I should like to think that this change is taking place within the British public itself, for which Sir Geoffrey also speaks in putting forward this changed position. This was already foreshadowed in the Anglo-Italian initiative, which some of us may think does not go far enough, but which is surprisingly extensive when compared to the starting position of the British Government.

Therefore, we believe that without getting on to a collision course with NATO and without reducing the effectiveness of the alliance, we must identify WEU not only with the European pillar, but above all with the platform on which the Community's common security and defence policy is thought out and articulated. Madam President, that is what we must have in view. The primary objective is to increase the number of Community members whenever possible, and we shall vote for the amendment that may be submitted to this effect, but with our minds always open to consensus-building with the other European countries, to the extent that, as Mr. Perinat said, they too are working towards convergence with the European Community.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie of Benshie.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (United Kingdom). – I too congratulate Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on his report. It was an extraordinarily difficult report to write; it is extremely hard to talk about external relations and the enlargement of WEU when we do not really know where we are going ourselves, but Sir Geoffrey managed it rather well. Of course, his own prejudices show through, but, as Mr. Martinez has just said, he was most accommodating: he listened to amendments and accepted them, and the committee is backing him. From an enormously difficult subject, he has produced the best report that could be produced in the extraordinarily opaque circumstances in which we find ourselves.

I do not go along with Sir Geoffrey's views about the certainty of the position when NATO and the Warsaw Pact faced each other, prepared to spend enormous sums on appalling weapons of destruction and to go to the limit to deter each other. That position had a certain amount of stability, but it was not a stability that we wanted to prolong. I agree that we now face a great many dangers; but, although they are great in number they are not as horrific as the danger that we faced in the past. The situation is now full of hope.

Having agreed with the report, every delegate then seizes the opportunity to air his own prejudices. I am about to do exactly the same. I may be keener on Europe than Sir Geoffrey, but I do not think that our present position in Europe is anything on which we should congratulate ourselves. During the Gulf war, we followed some countries more than others, but it was the monolithic power of the United States – and its ability to make a decision as a single, monolithic power – that enabled an aggressor, for the first time, to be stopped in his tracks by military means.

We should not be particularly proud of our decision-making in Europe, but we can be particularly proud of the work done by our mine-sweepers.

We should be careful about accepting new members until they are in NATO, decide to spend the money in their pockets and work out where to go. I want us to go along with NATO because I believe NATO to be enormously important. If the French would drop their peevish attitude to NATO's command structure we could make the Americans understand that Europe is a real pillar within the NATO structure. We could then equip and staff our European pillar.

It is appalling that innocent people are being killed in such numbers in Yugoslavia. The EC tried to exert influence but it had no big stick. If we had had a rapid reaction force under European control there is no doubt that cease-fires would have been kept and more reason would have prevailed. The European arm must

be strong and independent. Let us keep within the practicalities of NATO which already has the staff and equipment that could create a rapid reaction force which we need to keep the peace in Europe. There are grave dangers throughout the world beyond Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pahtas, Observer from Greece.

Mr. PAHTAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – After the demise of the Warsaw Pact, a review of the Atlantic Alliance and its new rôle is needed to take account of the new situation. But another debate is also going on concerning WEU, political union and our own defence system.

WEU is the only European body with responsibility for defence matters. It has the advantage both of its treaty and of its own experience. The future must therefore be built on these assets, both in the political and military sphere where common positions need to be defined and in the more strictly operational sphere.

The political objective of this operation is quite clear and unquestionably responds to a truly European need. We all want WEU to be an organ of political union. There is no other formula if we want to see political and military co-operation between our countries become a part of Europe of the future. Otherwise, there is every chance that all we shall have will be our speeches, reports and polite words, while others have the power of decision and action. We would have our label on proposals, but others would be responsible for operational plans and what is done each day, witness NATO's creation of the rapid reaction force in Europe.

We must be ourselves, while acting in complete harmony with our allies and, more particularly, with the United States. And if we have so far not been able to be as present as we would have wished in the Yugoslav crisis, it is because political Europe does not yet exist. In security and defence terms, the European dimension is restricted by problems, inadequacies and limitations.

The conclusions to be drawn from this crisis – as from the Gulf crisis – are that if we want Europe to act as Europe, we must give it the necessary political clout now. The fact is that the paramount goal is political. If we want to create Europe, it has to include a Europe of defence because this is an integral part of the whole.

For this reason the European defence pillar, enlarged to include those Community and NATO countries that wish to join, as is the case of Greece, becomes an urgent necessity.

The Rapporteur however does not agree with enlarging WEU to all member countries of the Community that want to join.

*Mr. Pahtas (continued)*

If this position is upheld by the majority in this Assembly, my feeling is that this will be a temporary decision and will not last, because the evolution of political life in Europe cannot be halted. Our ambition for political union is that the policy should embrace security and defence.

I would also like to bring up another point in the report concerning Greece's accusations against Turkey. The Rapporteur even made reference to the previous government, that of Andreas Papandreou. I must clarify matters.

It is not Greece that is accusing Turkey. It is the Security Council of the United Nations, in all its relevant resolutions, and the European Community as a whole.

The Cyprus problem is not a bilateral matter between Greece and Turkey. It is a matter which concerns the international community; it is a matter of invasion and occupation by military forces; it is also a matter of demographic change taking place before our very eyes. For there still to be an iron curtain in Europe – for that is what there is in Cyprus – is a disgrace for our political life. Selective observance of international law robs it of any value or foundation. There can only be one universal rule of law, otherwise national independence and the sovereignty of states are completely empty principles.

Let us therefore stop going around with our eyes shut.

It is our duty to show that European will can be expressed in political union by a policy foreshadowing the European defence and security identity. If it is no longer to be the economic giant and political dwarf of the international family, the Community must give itself a security and defence identity; it will then be able to play a decisive rôle in the peace and stability of Europe and the world.

Once again the decision is down to us. That is our ambition today and I am convinced that it will become reality tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spiliotopoulos, Observer from Greece.

Mr. SPILIOPOULOS (*Observer from Greece*). – In the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which is the foundation of WEU, the five allies declared their decision to take the necessary measures in order to foster unity and encourage the gradual integration of Europe, by strengthening the already existing economic, social and cultural ties.

The members of WEU reiterated the above commitment in the Rome declaration of 1984, as well as in the platform of The Hague in 1987, thus reminding themselves of their will to

proceed to the construction of European union according to the Single European Act, which they had signed as members of the EC. Furthermore, they expressed their conviction that a united Europe would remain incomplete if it did not include the dimensions of security and defence.

I emphasise that the Single European Act and the platform of The Hague are international agreements that were signed and ratified by the Twelve of the EC and the Nine of WEU.

The Single European Act of the Twelve became the cornerstone of the commitment undertaken by the Nine of WEU to contribute decisively to European integration. Thus, there is an interdependence between the integration processes of the EC and WEU. Therefore, the absence from WEU of a Community partner who has expressed an interest to adhere to it constitutes a serious anomaly, which on the one hand does not contribute to the cohesion of the EC and on the other hand creates obstacles to European integration.

Greece formally expressed its interest to accede to WEU in February 1987. The Council of Ministers, in its reply, recognised the significant contribution of Greece to the defence of Europe and said that it would place the Greek demand under active review during the time that WEU would be examining the revision of its institutional structures, which became necessary after the adherence of Spain and Portugal.

No other condition was formulated in the answer of the Council of Ministers. It should be pointed out that while integration processes move forward and the future structure and rôle of the Community and of WEU are being discussed, Greece participates fully in the ongoing debate within the EC, but is absent from the WEU deliberations.

WEU should become an institution of the EC, in order to represent the defence pillar of the latter. Therefore, it must be open primarily to all member states of the European Economic Community that wish to accede to it. This is the spirit of the Franco-German proposals of 15th October 1991 addressed to the Dutch presidency of the EC, which we fully endorse.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Barrionuevo.

Mr. BARRIONUEVO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, I too should like to express my appreciation of the generosity and flexibility shown by our Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, in accepting most of the amendments proposed in committee. As Mr. Martinez said, nearly all these amendments were incorporated in the draft recommendation now before us, but Sir Geoffrey



*Mr. Barrionuevo (continued)*

Finsberg very understandably said that amendments to the explanatory memorandum could not be accepted because that was, as it were, his own property. That is true, but it is also true that the explanatory memorandum, written originally for a different draft recommendation, has a somewhat more restrictive tone than the recommendations themselves. Therefore, at the risk of abusing somewhat the generous and flexible spirit which our Rapporteur has shown, I should like to feel that in the same generous way he might agree with the following observations.

It is clear that WEU has two fundamental objectives. The first is, to the fullest extent, to be the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the other is to be the main instrument of the united external and defence policy of the European Community.

It is also clear that, in the transitional situation in which we find ourselves, a degree of prudence regarding enlargement or the definition of WEU objectives is called for, but it is our hope that both the redefinition of NATO objectives and strategy and agreement on the objectives of a united policy for Europe in the field of defence and foreign policy, particularly the latter, will be achieved at the Maastricht summit in the next few days.

This being so, we believe that this is a somewhat restrictive approach which, I repeat, is apparent more in the explanatory memorandum, although it is also present in the draft recommendation, which has some rather contradictory aspects. An example is paragraph 1 where it is implied that accession should be easier for countries in the Atlantic Alliance, perhaps forgetting that one European Community country does not even belong to the Atlantic Alliance. This needs to be rectified in some way by a statement pointing out that the situation is only temporary, because, as was well said by Mr. Ewing in his report, making use of a literary analogy, it seems that WEU was first the sleeping beauty and then Cinderella. Now it may be Snow White, who instead of having seven dwarfs in attendance now has nine. But we must remember that there are other dwarfs seeking the favours of this Snow White, and it is not good to keep them in a state of permanent frustration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I would first like to apologise to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for not having been able to take part in the work of the Political Committee, because of an election campaign at home. That meant I was unable to tell him previously what I am going to say today.

I want to thank Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for the work which he has done but in my opinion the draft recommendation he has submitted is flawed by a fundamental imbalance, a view which I also believe to be widely shared by the Assembly as evidenced by the various statements. The point is that the draft recommendation is too Atlanticist. Those of you who have been attending these meetings for ten years as I have know that my commitment to Atlanticism is not in doubt. When WEU was going through the difficult period of the Euro-missiles, I showed my support for the Atlantic Alliance and my belief that the countries of Europe needed to have a common commitment.

Since then, with the fall of the Berlin wall and the iron curtain, the situation has changed. The report and the recommendation which we are about to adopt need to be a signal for those defining the framework for political union at Maastricht. Unfortunately, in its present form, the draft recommendation is over-Atlanticist and betrays a lack of confidence in the construction of Europe.

As some colleagues have already said, WEU must be both the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the security and defence arm of European political union. To me, therefore, it seems fundamental, just before the Maastricht summit, that our Assembly should approve a recommendation marked with the stamp of European institutional logic.

Paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation reads: "1. Explore and set in motion the best possible machinery for co-operation with the European countries which so wish, while bearing in mind that, in present circumstances, it would not be wise to invite formally countries which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty in application of its Article XI;". It would be desirable to add to this the words "and of the European Community" after "...not members of the Atlantic Alliance".

I wanted to table an amendment to this effect, but it was too late and I am glad that my friend Mr. Pieralli did so. The amendment he has tabled has the Liberal Group's full support, which I wholly share.

Why? Because it is obvious that if we want to have political union one day, it is essential that WEU be enlarged to include all members of the Atlantic Alliance who are members of the European Community.

This is why the Liberal Group is most anxious that Greece, Denmark and, perhaps one day when the problem of neutrality is no longer an issue, Ireland, should join our institution, so that WEU can become the military policy or defence arm of political union.

*Mr. De Decker (continued)*

We have witnessed the Gulf war and Europe's weakness during that war. We also know that no defence of Europe is possible without the United States. But, at the same time, we also know that Europe's interests do not always coincide with those of the United States. For this reason Europe must have its own security arrangements, and this in no way contradicts the logic of the Atlantic Alliance.

Which is why we can only enlarge our institution to countries which are members of the EC. If one day we agree to admit a country to Western European Union which is not a member of the EC, we shall make WEU a useless instrument in the context of European political union.

Our European security dimension must fall wholly within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, but it must also retain its European dimension and its institutional logic within the context of political union.

I therefore urge you to accept Mr. Pieralli's amendment to which I would like to add my signature, given that I wanted to table it myself, the purpose being to remain faithful to an institutional logic which does not, Sir Geoffrey, imply any animosity whatsoever to the Atlantic Alliance, but simply means that we want WEU to be both the European instrument of the alliance and, more especially, the tool of security policy of the hoped-for future European political union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Petersen, the last speaker on the list.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (United Kingdom). – On a point of order, Madam President. How many people whose names appear below the line are to be allowed to speak? When we put our names down, we saw the line firmly drawn, meaning that the list was closed. Yet it now seems that two, if not three, extra people are to be allowed to speak. That is a little outside the customs of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). – Further to the point of order, Madam President. I am sorry, but I must support Lord Mackie. What is happening is intolerable given that we have very firm rules. People can send their names in before we meet – that is permitted – but, once the line is drawn and the list is closed, it is not correct that names should be added. Yet we have now heard two extra speakers. I join Lord Mackie in saying that that is not the spirit in which we operate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Let me explain. We had decided to include members on

the list of speakers who would be arriving late because of fog at several European airports. This mainly concerned Spanish members. Once this arrangement had been made, we left the door open for our Norwegian colleagues too.

Mr. Pontillon gave me the list of speakers before the sitting began.

However, I will consult the Assembly to see whether it will permit Mr. Petersen to speak.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*(The Assembly indicated its agreement)*

I call Mr. Petersen.

Mr. PETERSEN (*Observer from Norway*). – Thank you, Madam President, for allowing me to speak. I was not aware of the rule, but, in any case, I want to make a very short speech.

First, I thank the Assembly for having invited us once again. We value such opportunities most highly and it is most important to us to be able to participate.

Secondly, I want to refer to what your Rapporteur said about membership of the European Community being a precondition for membership of WEU. He is absolutely right that many people think that EC membership is a precondition. Many people in my own country leave the debate at that, and I find that most unfortunate. My party favours much stronger ties with Europe and strongly supports Norway's application for membership of WEU. In that context, the Rapporteur's remarks were most encouraging. Thank you, Madam President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I shall try to respond to the points that were raised. Mr. Reddemann made the useful point that WEU is the bridge between Europe and North America, and rightly pointed out the dangers of nationalism and of trying to change borders. We must regard those as two of the most fundamental dangers facing us in the coming years.

Mr. van der Linden said that NATO was vital, and that we need to redefine the rôle of the United States of America. He is absolutely right. He referred to my remarks about those in NATO being able to join WEU but membership not being permitted solely on grounds of Community membership. I remind you of paragraph 42 of our report and, in doing so, I hope also to cover the rather odd intervention made by Mr. De Decker.

That paragraph says: "The modified Brussels Treaty and North Atlantic Treaty are complementary insofar as Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty makes it compulsory... to hold

*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)*

consultations on any threat... even if it does not concern the area defined by the Washington Treaty."

The document uses the words "at this stage" some six times. It can only be "at this stage", because although things are constantly changing, we have to present a picture at this stage.

At this stage we repeat what we said at Palermo: it is right under these conditions that we should confine applications to join to countries that are members of NATO; otherwise we risk the break-up of NATO, and Europe is definitely not ready for that.

I made it clear in my speech that I believed that both Turkey and Greece should be admitted to membership. Having listened to some of the speeches this afternoon I venture to suggest that if only one of the two were admitted there would be a continual struggle by one to prevent the other from joining. Both must join at the same time. Both have qualified for entry in different ways.

Mr. Müller is right to say that the world is a much more uncertain place. Mr. Perinat criticised me on two counts; first, for leaving out too much. I think that the report is long enough already and I did not want to include much more in it. I hope that he will forgive me if I mentioned some of the issues in my speech that I might have included in the document.

I must take up Mr. Perinat's point about the Franco-German proposals. I refer him to paragraph 10 which makes it clear that a joint army corps, were it not under the integrated military command of NATO, could weaken NATO. Extra forces would not be provided under the Franco-German proposition, and we do not want to weaken NATO now.

Mr. Colombo shared my anxiety about the fact that what Europe has done has not prevented the murder of a single civilian in Yugoslavia. Nor have the activities of the CSCE, of which Yugoslavia is a member. In spite of the efforts of Lord Carrington, Cyrus Vance and many others, it has been unable to prevent the murder of hundreds of people. It is tragic but we are still sitting here wishing that something would happen.

I thank Mr. Martinez for his remarks. The report contains our present view on defence. The Single European Act – this also answers Mr. Spiliotopoulos – did not repeal the modified Brussels Treaty, still the sole treaty dealing with defence and giving it to WEU. The Single European Act did not change that.

It is important to remember that the world is a place in which we live, not a place in which we might like to live. So we must be pragmatic.

My friend Lord Mackie was absolutely right to say that no rapporteur will write a document without showing his prejudices. He admitted that his own speech was full of prejudices – and it was none the worse for that. Sometimes it is better to expose one's prejudices.

I was able to accept a huge number of amendments which have improved the text. I am always grateful for other people's ideas.

I was surprised by what Mr. De Decker said. I understand why he could not attend the committee's meeting and I had not expected him to speak, because he was not on the list. However, the committee is not composed only of Britons. My report was adopted by thirteen to two with no abstentions. My colleagues come from a variety of countries; the committee took a balanced view and I hope that the Assembly will accept the report's contents and recommendations.

Perhaps the most eloquent testimony came from our Norwegian friend, who said that his country would like to join WEU although it is not a member of the Community. I do not want to keep Norway out of WEU. I want it in, just as I want Greece and Turkey to join as swiftly as possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – It is a pleasure to compliment the Rapporteur on his excellent report and his co-operative acceptance of almost every amendment. That does not always happen in committee meetings.

I admire those who can confidently predict the future of Europe for many years to come. I cannot. Perhaps it would be wise to be a little more cautious.

We were all pleased by the revitalisation of our organisation many years ago. We promised each other that we wanted WEU more and more to be the European pillar in NATO. No longer was it to be a one-way street: we had to make it a two-way street. That is still our task.

It is likely that there will be more and more linkage to European political union via the European Council. It is probable that we shall become the European defence arm. However, I dare not predict that with complete confidence before Maastricht.

This has been one of many debates about the future of our organisation, but this is not the only forum in which to express our views on the future of the organisation. Mr. Goerens's report, the Defence Committee report and Sir Geoffrey's report offer a snapshot of the moment, as Mr. Martinez described it. They all offer a picture of our views today. I intend to propose that in the months to come the Political

*Mr. Stoffelen (continued)*

Committee evaluate the outcome of Maastricht in new reports. We may come to different conclusions by then; meanwhile we must be cautious. I advise colleagues to accept this cautious report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There are two amendments to the draft recommendation in Document 1284 which will be considered in the following order: Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Pieralli and Mr. Brito, followed by Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Socialist Group.

Mr. Pieralli's Amendment 1 reads as follows:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "Atlantic Alliance" add "and of the European Community".

I call Mr. Pieralli to speak to his amendment.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Madam President, I think I need only say that it has been very eloquently supported in the statement made by Mr. De Decker, Chairman of the Liberal Group.

The purpose of the amendment is to reaffirm that member countries of WEU must, for an as yet unspecified period of time, be members of both NATO and the European Community.

This would correspond fully with the institutional functions of our organisation whose rôle is to be both the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the instrument of a policy of co-operation, security and defence for the European Community and, later perhaps, European union.

That is the situation in WEU at the present time, and it would be well for WEU in what is expected to be so troubled and difficult a future to continue to consist of countries which belong to both NATO and the Community.

This is the purpose of the amendment; I hope it will be adopted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (*United Kingdom*). – I oppose the amendment for the simple reason that – as I said in my speech, and as the Rapporteur has already pointed out – it would cut out both Turkey and Norway. Both those countries stood firm and put their money where their mouths were in NATO when we faced great peril. I think that it would be foolish to cut them out.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I must declare that the committee has not discussed the amendment since it was tabled yesterday.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1 is negatived.*

Mr. Hardy, on behalf of the Socialist Group, has tabled Amendment 2 which reads as follows:

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"3. Prepare to invite other European countries to co-operate with members of WEU in diplomatic or military action designed to keep the peace in Europe;"

I call Mr. Hardy to speak to the amendment.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – As you have said, Madam President, the amendment has been approved by the Socialist Group, but that certainly should not rule out favourable consideration by other groups.

The reason for the amendment is my dislike of the existing wording, which could appear a little patronising. It seems to suggest that we would judge whether a country was capable of making a useful contribution to European peace. If we refused membership to a country, we would be likely to cause considerable offence, and it strikes me as undesirable to cause offence at a time when the needs of European peace may be both widespread and flexible.

For instance, there are many Albanians in Kosovo, and many Hungarians in another Yugoslav republic. The Hungarians and Albanians in Yugoslavia may well be influenced by the state of Albania or Hungary. It would be foolish to try to cause insult or injury, or to embarrass the governments of those countries. They may say to us that people who live in glass houses should not throw stones, and point to one or two member states in WEU which they may say are not capable of making a useful contribution outside the alliance.

I hope that the Assembly will accept that, at this stage of change, we should be sufficiently prudent and cautious – as Mr. Stoffelen urged us to be a few moments ago – to accept that the need for flexibility and the rejection of exclusivity, and the need to maintain tolerance and to avoid being patronising, are enough to make us change the wording of the amendment in a way that would, I believe, be conducive to the construction of peace in the longer term.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Although the committee did not consider the amendment, as Rapporteur I am delighted to accept it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Would it be possible, Madam President, to let the Assembly know how many votes were cast for and how many against Amendment 1?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Pieralli, the votes were not recorded but we counted twenty-one against and seventeen for.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – There were only fourteen votes against!

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I demand a recount!

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – So do I!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There were no objections immediately after the voting, which was over ten minutes ago and so I am ruling that there were twenty-one votes against and seventeen votes for.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Madam President, some members of the Assembly are under the impression that there were more votes for than against Amendment 1. Mr. Martinez and Mr. Pieralli feel the same; we have to clarify the position. For clarity in this debate on a point of such importance for the future of Europe, it is essential to have the exact figures.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I support the request. This vote is undoubtedly of political importance. We all know this. We should like to know by how many votes Mr. Pieralli's amendment was lost because it is of the greatest importance for our future work and the new relations we must have.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Madam President. This is exceptional; it is not normal for such things to be done. Moreover, there has been plenty of time. We have spoken and voted on the second amendment. Those who are now defying your ruling are simply bad losers. It was clear to anyone looking around the room what decision

had been reached, and you have put that decision to the Assembly.

If Mr. De Decker – whose name was not even on the list of speakers – wished to challenge, he should have called for a roll-call at the appropriate stage. That was not done. It should be learned – especially by those who have occupied the Chair – that when a chairman has made a ruling, that chairman should be supported.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith on a point of order.

Sir DUDLEY SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Madam President. Since you started the roll-call several members have entered the hemicycle, including Mrs. Fisher. Will you re-call those who have recently joined us?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The vote was taken; I refuse to have a second vote, particularly as we have had one false start already because cards of two different colours were used. You had the opportunity to object immediately after the vote was taken.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation in Document 1284.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

*(Five members rise and request a vote by roll-call)*

We will therefore proceed to a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Stoffelen.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows<sup>1</sup>:

Number of votes cast .....	52
Ayes .....	31
Noes .....	7
Abstentions .....	14

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>2</sup>.*

1. See page 21.

2. See page 22.

***6. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 3rd December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. General report – activities of the WEU Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1285 and amendments).

2. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Document 1289).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.)*

## TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1991

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Election of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
*Speaker:* Mr. Stoffelen.
4. General report – activities of the WEU Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1285 and amendments*).  
*Speaker:* Mr. Roseta (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Moya, Mr. Brito, Mr. Amaral, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Roseta (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman*), Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Stoffelen.
5. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Doc. 1289*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Atkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lambie, Mrs. Terborg, Mr. Müller, Mr. Probst, Mr. Stegagnini (*Chairman*), Mr. Atkinson (*Rapporteur*).
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### *2. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### *3. Election of the Secretary-General of the United Nations*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Today, the General

Assembly of the United Nations will elect a new Secretary-General, and it is clear that he will be Mr. Butros Ghali, the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Presidential Committee of our Assembly had the privilege of meeting Mr. Ghali in Cairo, and we were all deeply impressed by his great experience and wisdom. On behalf of the Political Committee, I propose that the Assembly send him a cable conveying our warm congratulations.

The PRESIDENT. – I fully understand your point of order, Mr. Stoffelen, and I wish to associate myself with your proposal. I, too, visited Cairo with the Presidential Committee – along with you, our President, Mr. Pontillon, and other colleagues – and we had the opportunity of meeting Mr. Ghali then. Indeed, we met him on several occasions for long periods. I gained the impression that he was extremely well qualified, and was a man of considerable political dimension. I think that the United Nations has chosen the right man at the right time.

I am sure that the Assembly will wish to associate itself with Mr. Stoffelen's proposal; however, Mr. Pontillon has already sent a congratulatory cable in the name of the Assembly.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Let me clarify my point. The election takes place today. We were able to congratulate Mr. Ghali earlier on his nomination, but we have not formally congratulated him on his election.

1. See page 25.

The PRESIDENT. – I appreciate the difference. Accordingly, I propose that another cable be sent congratulating Mr. Ghali.

#### 4. General report – activities of the WEU Council

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1285 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – We come now to the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on the general report – activities of the WEU Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1285 and amendments.

I call Mr. Roseta to present his report.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as you will shortly be leaving us, to my regret and no doubt that of all the members present, please let me begin by paying tribute to your work as the first Portuguese Vice-President of this Assembly and also as the first Chairman of the Portuguese Delegation in these first two years since Portugal's accession in 1990. As many representatives said yesterday, I am sure that your skill, political clear-sightedness and friendly style will never be forgotten.

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

This time the Political Committee, instead of presenting a formal answer to the annual report of the Council, decided to report on its political activities more generally, not restricting itself to the one-year period as in the past, and giving more weight to the political rather than the merely administrative aspects of the Council's activities.

In my opinion, the Council, under the French and German presidencies, developed a significant rôle in an exceptionally rich and rapidly-changing period in the world, clearly establishing the importance of our organisation.

The crisis in the Middle East was an opportunity for WEU to enable Europe to take an active part in the application of measures decided upon by the United Nations Security Council in order to restore peace to the Middle East after Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

However, we live in a momentous period for the history of European countries. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, the final collapse of totalitarianism which, for decades, had dominated – I could almost say crushed – a large part of our continent and directly threatened our security, the very serious crisis which subsequently developed and even now is sweeping across the former Soviet Union, the rebirth of nationalist passions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the civil

war which is tearing what was once Yugoslavia apart, all of these things mean that we must think of European security in new terms, as our President, Mr. Robert Pontillon, has so eloquently argued. All of these facts saddle Western Europe with new responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, leading on to what we all consider to be a new and very relevant – or rather increasingly relevant – rôle for WEU be it as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance or as the defence organisation of the countries of Europe.

New horizons have therefore opened up for security policy in Europe and at this point I would like to introduce one of the conclusions of my report, namely that – as can be seen from the final lines of the explanatory memorandum – I consider it paradoxical, at a time when governments wish to give WEU a major rôle in the architecture of Europe and when this Assembly can, at last, congratulate itself upon the increasing importance of the organisation's activities, meeting the new security needs in Europe, that the Council should continue to provide poor and inadequate information to the Assembly and, through it, to the public and fail to place relations with the Assembly on the right level.

In fact, although the political action of the Council during the French and German presidencies deserves praise – as I have just praised it – relations with the Assembly leave a lot to be desired, as we shall see.

But let us take these two aspects in turn.

Our overall appreciation of action by the French and German presidencies must be favourable, without doubt; it soared to unusual heights during the Gulf crisis when it was shown that all member countries could act together, setting unprecedented political and military co-ordination systems in place in the capitals and in the theatre of operations.

In my opinion, the French presidency had two principal merits: it gave a precise content to the reactivation of WEU, which previously was far from being the case, and it gave reactivated WEU a place in the new European architecture.

I would also qualify the first stage of European co-operation in space, agreed in Vianden, as a very positive achievement.

The results of the ministerial meeting in Vianden – held, as you know, at the end of the French presidency on 27th June – include the broad lines of a programme very similar to what the Assembly had spelled out in many of its recommendations in recent years, our Assembly finally seeing its rôle as source of inspiration to governments and to the Council confirmed.

The Vianden communiqué makes two essential points with regard to the architecture of



*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

European security: first, WEU is the defence component of the European integration process and, secondly, progress at European and Atlantic levels must go hand in hand.

I would also like to refer to the Council's intention to develop joint action taking European countries' interests into account in matters of disarmament and I only regret the absence of any reference to relations with the Assembly, which were forgotten in Vianden because the Council, unfairly in my opinion, forgot the part played by the Assembly in developing this new spirit.

The German presidency, for its part, began by unveiling a document setting out its programme on 1st July, which Minister Genscher explained to the Presidential Committee and the Political and Defence Committees during the Petersberg meeting on 8th July. The principal objectives of this presidency have been to establish WEU's place in the European context and to define a more operational rôle for the organisation in a number of areas. From Minister Genscher's meeting with the Presidential Committee and with some rapporteurs in Bonn at the close of the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers on 29th October – an initiative which must be welcomed and appreciated – it emerged that, alongside the debate on the new architecture for European security, positive progress was being made in matters of conventional disarmament.

It therefore seems that the Germany presidency is decided to do everything in its power to further WEU's rôle in many areas, and has already succeeded in bringing together the somewhat divergent positions of member states on various issues. I believe that the Assembly can take some pride in this and it has all my encouragement to continue.

The grave crisis affecting the republics of Yugoslavia is referred to in the report, but I am not going to dwell on that because it is to be the subject of another debate. Nevertheless, apart from economic sanctions and arms embargos, no action is possible without an effective cease-fire and agreement between the parties involved. Here too, the Assembly is surprised that the Council failed to keep it informed, as is urged in the recommendation, about the military group set up in Metz.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the content of Chapter V of the report on relations between the Council and the Assembly is obviously not an attack on the Council or a criticism of the report which we received a short time ago but the truth of the matter is that, while informal relations may be friendly, official relations are clearly inadequate. The information given is

incomplete, inaccurate and, in our opinion, sometimes far from reflecting the real facts.

The Secretary-General, whose action I appreciate, yesterday stated that he was rather surprised, but I do not think he should be. For one thing, the way to inform an Assembly with over two hundred members is not by oral briefing to small groups, and for another, the formidable list of facts and evidence – as the French say *les faits sont têtus* – set out in Chapter V of the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 46 et seq., which I will not repeat because you will surely have had the opportunity to read them, shows that the Assembly is right and that many improvements need to be made to relations between the Council, and more particularly the Permanent Council, and the Assembly.

Obviously, the Council has to fulfil its obligations under Article IX of the treaty. The report shows that often it does so inadequately. It is unacceptable that not all of the Assembly's recommendations should be replied to. Obviously, the Council is free to accept or reject them, but it must reply. It is unacceptable for replies to be sometimes vague, beside the point or merely mollifying.

As our President, Mr. Pontillon, said yesterday, the Council cannot put up a screen between the activities of WEU and the Assembly to prevent the Assembly hearing the representatives of the Institute for Security Studies or other subsidiary organs of the Council, or receiving any of the Council's preparatory documents, which governments later make public in other international bodies, such as the intergovernmental conference. Obviously this practice cannot be allowed to continue.

In conclusion, I believe that we must put an end to the paradox of setting WEU on the right road and finding its correct place in the new European architecture on the one hand, and continuing, on the other, to ignore the central rôle of the Assembly which, with the legitimacy of the people's elected representatives that we are, must have a central rôle and cannot in any way be called into question. To this end, the Council must give effect to paragraphs 6 and 7 of our recommendation. We hope it does. In paragraph 8 the further recommendation is made that a periodical information bulletin on the activities of WEU be prepared and circulated to the press.

Yesterday the Secretary-General said that the dissemination of information was the responsibility of governments, but in my view the one does not exclude the other. In all organisations, the assemblies and other organs as well deal with the problem of information in various ways.

There is room for improvement in these areas and it is our intention to be constructive.

*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

I believe that this recommendation will not fall on deaf ears, because if it did there would only be another and more demanding call to overcome the deficiency which does nothing to enhance the prestige of our organisation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Roseta, for the splendid presentation of your excellent report to the Assembly. In particular, I am grateful that you pointed out not only the positive aspects of the work of the Council but the negative ones of the relationship between the Council and the Assembly, which we all wish to see improved in the interests of the organisation as a whole.

The debate is now open.

I call Mr. Moya from Spain to take the floor.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. I should like to begin by congratulating Mr. Roseta on his report. I agree with the President that this is a very full and exhaustive report which, as you have said, has the virtue of referring both to the positive aspects and to those which, in Mr. Roseta's view, seem to be less positive, bearing specifically upon the possibly less than flexible relationship between the Council and the Assembly.

I shall say only one thing on this latter subject. The report seems to me to deal very perceptively with the tasks facing this Assembly, and in this connection it is strongly in favour of a strengthening of the rôle of this Assembly. I believe that that is positive and says much for this report. But it also seems to me that the report is at times slightly too critical of the Council and dwells upon the lack of sufficient flexibility in relations between the Council and the Assembly.

It is true, as the Rapporteur says, that there appears to be some imbalance between what is thought to be the growing rôle of this organisation and an occasional failure of the relationships between the component bodies of WEU. But I think that such occasional failures should not cause too much surprise in an institution which is showing increasing vitality and in which from time to time the interests, or rather the tasks, of the Assembly and the Council are of different kinds, so that certain anomalies may arise in the attitude of one or other of these institutional organs. I am convinced that in time these will be overcome.

As regards the content of the report, I believe that it presents a very full account of what has been achieved under the presidency first of France and then of Germany: or rather, what has been achieved by the Assembly, or the part that the Assembly has played throughout these two presidencies. In my opinion, the development of the rôle of WEU within the architecture of European security is very well summed

up and described. In particular, the explicit references – very well put, in my opinion – to the conclusions reached at Vianden, or the statements made about summits that are not really WEU summits, as, for example, the one held at Copenhagen, or the one in Rome, though this is not mentioned, obviously for reasons of time, give us a very clear idea of developments, and I believe that the Rapporteur wanted to indicate his conviction that the outlook for WEU is increasingly hopeful.

I shall not go into details about specific aspects or advances achieved under the leadership of one or other presidency during this period; I believe that the report itself deals amply with those matters. In my opinion, paragraphs 80 and 81 of the report convey very well what I am saying. But in conclusion I attach importance to something which seems to me to be a good synthesis of what the Rapporteur himself said about the growing perception of an increasing convergence between all European member countries as regards the basic objective of working towards building a European defensive identity. There are differences, of course, but fortunately these increasingly relate to individual points rather than questions of substance; and there are of course still differences about important aspects, such as links with NATO or with the political union or on the subject of the enlargement of WEU, which we discussed yesterday, etc. But in any case I believe that in recent times we have had a greater sense of basic agreement on our common objective, and this is something that should give cause for an expression of satisfaction. I also believe that there is a sense of greater understanding from the other side of the Atlantic and from the members of the Atlantic Alliance as regards the building of a European identity, which also increases our satisfaction.

To sum up, I regard this as an excellent report, even though it sometimes depicts in too sombre colours the relationship between the Council and the Assembly, though naturally in a constructive spirit. It is good that such reports are submitted to this Assembly, and I shall, of course, support this one.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Moya, for your contribution.

I now call Mr. Brito to take the floor.

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. Roseta, let me begin by saying that I consider your report to be objective and a critical but fair and therefore constructive document. Congratulations.

However, I want to make two brief points in connection with two concepts implicit in the draft recommendation, having noted Mr. Roseta's statement about considering WEU as an instrument of European security.

*Mr. Brito (continued)*

While I want this to be the case, let me put this question to him: although WEU is seen, on the one hand, as the pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, it is also proposed as a defence organisation for the Twelve. I refer to this matter not because it is an opinion contained in his report but rather because, in spite of being a statement of fact, it is presented as the result of proposals presented at the intergovernmental conference.

The truth of the matter, in any event, is that this is implicit in the recommendation where it proposes that WEU should be opened up to certain countries of Central Europe. It is on this specific point that I would like to elaborate.

Of course, for WEU to become the defender of European security it must be in tune with its rôle as European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance on the one hand, and with the new European architecture on the other. And it does not appear to me that WEU can assume the rôle of defender of European security if it restricts itself to the concept of being simply the instrument of the Community of Twelve, even were this enlarged to thirteen, fourteen or even fifteen countries. What I mean is that WEU has to plan its future within a concept of the whole European space, that space being increasingly one of union, co-operation and security, and that, even where there are points of instability caused by heightened nationalism, there is every advantage in WEU making it possible for these countries to move closer to it as a forum for debate and co-operation in the search for solutions leading to peace throughout the European area.

I wanted to put these questions to Mr. Roseta because I believe they are fundamental and the affirmation, so to speak, of the contents of the recommendation to the Council.

In any event, and to conclude, I would like to tell him that since I consider his report to be primarily an analysis and a proposal for the behaviour of the Council arising out of that analysis it will have my vote.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Amaral.

Mr. AMARAL (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I take this opportunity of expressing once again my admiration and respect for the way you perform your high function, a source of pride to me as a Portuguese and of great satisfaction as a European.

I should like to congratulate my colleagues and you my dear friend Mr. Pedro Roseta on your work in producing this excellent report. The cogent argumentation, the documentation quoted and the facts adduced provide clear foundation for the conclusions it contains and

lend weight and responsibility to what is said in the draft recommendation. The report is one more proof of the honesty, skill, knowledge and commitment which you always bring to the tasks with which you are entrusted.

The careful analysis you have made of the French and German presidencies respectively in the context of recent events that have dominated the scene in Europe reveals a special political sensitivity that I have long considered to be among the most enlightened and admirable.

Your rightful recognition of the great efforts made by the President now in the chair, Professor Soares Costa, to bring the activity and resolutions of this Assembly to public notice in the midst of so many serious problems is an act of justice consistent with the moral strength for which he is well known.

There are many aspects of this admirable report that deserve praise and comment, however brief, but for reasons of time and to avoid trespassing on your patience I shall refrain from doing so.

But I must comment briefly on the direct and timely criticism in paragraphs (vii) and (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation pointing to a lack of harmony between the Council and this Assembly which cannot be allowed to continue.

The facts and documents provide the background and the reasons for the conclusion spelled out in paragraph 84 of the present report. These facts and reasons compel us to conclude that the parliamentary institution is looked upon as an obstacle to the proper running of the organisation. Realisation of this painful fact hurts me so much that I feel obliged to add my formal protest to the Rapporteur's timely criticism.

Furthermore, the criticism is on the same lines as some of the statements I have read in the excellent reports by Mr. Soares Costa and Mr. Ewing, which we discussed here yesterday. It all adds up to a chorus of complaint against the Council for not keeping this Assembly informed in due time and failing to co-operate or discuss matters of interest with it. Yet the Assembly is the most authentic expression of the will of the people it represents, because all its members have either been elected or belong to venerable institutions in which they have a mandate dependent on the sovereign will of the people who have placed them there.

The democratic power with which this Assembly is invested cannot submit to being pushed aside and marginalised in decisions of the greatest importance to the people it represents. For this reason dialogue and mutual collaboration between the Council and the

*Mr. Amaral (continued)*

Assembly are imperative, especially at a time when the whole future of Europe is in the melting pot. And when I speak about the future of Europe I am not thinking so much about inter-state relations and the satisfaction of their interests, but about the harmonious existence of people and citizens inhabiting this tortured continent and those experiencing other crises, unhappily bordering on tragedy.

The building of Europe will necessarily mean new thinking on defence and development, the principle of the defence of human rights and the representation of the will of the people in the bodies that represent, defend and assert their identity, in the kind of responsible freedom that will ensure that they can coexist in mutual respect.

This task is too important to be left to governments or specialists. All must take part, and the representatives of parliaments or other corporate bodies having similar functions have a special responsibility in this formidable and vital task. As representatives of sovereign peoples, we must participate, collaborate and be informed if we are to inform in our turn.

The activity of this Assembly must be publicised. People cannot support what they do not know about. The Council must therefore recognise the importance of our activity and the usefulness of the contribution that it can and must make in building that future. Without that contribution the construction of the future will be neither possible nor successful.

Such recognition necessarily implies more dialogue, more collaboration, more participation, more resources, and more commitment. And it is against the departures from these requirements that I feel under obligation to add my vehement protest to the criticisms expressed in the report, in the hope that the aspirations of solidarity implied in the purposes for which our valuable organisation was formed may be brought to fruition.

Mr. Pedro Roseta, I beg your indulgence for this statement, and that of other members for taking up their time.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much for your excellent contribution – and your protest. When it comes to vote on the report I believe that the Assembly will react appropriately. Your anxieties are now a matter of record and your opinions are significant.

I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – May I begin by offering my sincere congratulations to Mr. Roseta for his excellent report which gives a very detailed account of the events that have occurred during the period it covers

which I believe to be the most spectacular in the history of this organisation. Events have occurred this year that have redrawn the international scene and the contours of Europe in particular, and have an impact on the security of our continent.

This report is therefore to be commended for its very great detail but I should also like to congratulate Mr. Roseta on its sincerity. In stressing the problem of dialogue between Council and Assembly, I believe his criticism is much to the point because, after all, the essential task of a parliamentary assembly is to monitor and spur on the executive organs; for many reasons, including those mentioned by Mr. Roseta, we in the Assembly are naturally not satisfied with the way our relations have so far operated. This does not mean that we have any radical criticism of the Council itself, or anything like that. On the contrary, it is the sign of a constructive attitude intended to strengthen our organisation. The report comes at a particularly appropriate time when it is frequently being said that the organisation is coming back to life. This year, with the signing of the Vianden agreements and the decision to hold a meeting of chiefs of staff of member countries, not to mention the other actions or decisions that have been taken, has been a decisive twelve months in terms of the revitalisation of WEU.

But in our opinion, Mr. President, this awakening and revitalisation is so far not enough. Decisions have to be taken of much greater depth and extent than those at present under consideration: this is the purpose of some of the reports and draft resolutions placed before this Assembly, and for that reason dialogue between the Council and the Assembly needs to be both intense and flexible. I congratulate you again, Mr. Roseta, for your emphasis on this matter because we have to make our organisation more operational, as your report says. Dialogue must be stepped up and above all, as is said repeatedly in various reports, more information must be provided, because something is at risk in our continent: with all the social problems there are in our countries, Europe has a high standard of living and high levels of satisfaction, and problems of security and defence are thus not very popular topics with the public.

Mr. President, an organisation like WEU with a number of members of parliament to represent public opinion and the Council as an executive organ should be alive to the need to inform our respective publics better in order to increase their awareness of the vital – I use the word advisedly – problems of defence and security in our continent. I say this because the high level of social satisfaction may somehow tranquillise public opinion and dull its awareness of problems that may sometimes arise suddenly and unexpectedly. In a brilliant speech, Mr.

*Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)*

Reddemann yesterday referred to a number of problems and to the unknowns and uncertainties generated by all the changes taking place in our continent. This is why an organisation like ours must be watchful, efficient and operational in devising appropriate instruments of co-operation in order to perform its task effectively.

Mr. President, I should not like to close without congratulating you very warmly on the way you have held your office. We are sad to see you go because, during the brief period you have spent in the Council of Europe and here in Western European Union, what you have done has been extremely productive and capable. As a European but also, with your permission, as a fellow Iberian, I would say that you, Mr. Soares Costa, have given us an example of how to do things well, how to present your convictions tactfully, firmly but always looking for areas of agreement and contact, in the many reports that you have produced. You will be gone but not forgotten, because we shall always remember your presidency and your style of guiding our parliamentary activity.

You take with you, Mr. Soares Costa, our warm appreciation and thanks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Lopez Henares, I should like to begin by thanking you for your very kind words, which come not only from Iberian solidarity but also from the great personal friendship you have shown me during the four years in which we have been working side by side. Thank you very much for this fresh proof of friendship, and also for the contribution you have made to this debate on Mr. Roseta's report. Thank you, above all, for having pointed out that, although both the report and the debate may have contained some criticisms, these criticisms are made in a constructive spirit. I hope that the Council, and especially the Permanent Council, will accept these criticisms from the Assembly constructively and positively, because, as we say, we are all in the same boat with the objective of improving the working of our institution, while taking into account the important contribution made by the Assembly.

Thank you, Mr. Lopez Henares.

*(The President continued in English)*

That concludes the list of speakers.

Does the Rapporteur want to reply?...

I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – I would like to thank the President and members of the Assembly and of the committee for their kind words. They have understood perfectly the

spirit of this report. As I pointed out, it was in no way my intention to make any radical criticism. I never do, anyway, whether the institution be Portuguese or international. On the contrary I have made a point of bringing out the aspects that are positive and crucial for the life of our organisation.

Under the French and German chairmen-in-office, the Council gave living substance to the reactivation of our organisation which is now beginning to be a real presence in the world. Before then – I well remember the time – no one knew of WEU. Today, people know there is a European organisation with responsibility for security and defence. The facts are there and I do not think – Mr. Moya probably exaggerated a bit – that there is any, even slight, insistence on negative aspects in Chapter V.

No, the facts are there. The opinion that the report concludes with is well-founded. There has to be a change. The facts – fundamental in the Spanish and Portuguese sense – are there justifying the conclusions, as I said, and in particular the urgent nature of paragraphs 6 and 7 in the draft recommendation. This is the constructive side that everyone has stressed.

In our opinion the proposals made in several paragraphs could change the state of affairs described.

For the rest, Mr. Moya, I quite agree with your comments. There is no need to repeat them because they are clearly right.

*(The speaker continued in Portuguese)*

Now I should like to speak, in Portuguese of course, to my colleagues in the delegation, Deputy Amaral and Deputy Brito.

Replying first to Mr. Amaral, I should like to tell the Assembly that many of the statements he made are undoubtedly due to his long-standing friendship with me.

However, I think he brought out the main points in the report very clearly. I too expressed appreciation of many positive aspects of the work of the Council, even as regards information in some respects. The meeting called by the German presidency at the Petersburg, and the meeting after the extraordinary meeting of the Council on 29th October attended by the Presidential Committee and some of the rapporteurs, are two examples possibly pointing to a new kind of German presidency that gives information at least to a part of the Assembly. These are two credits that should go on the record. But I also agree with everything he said about the need to widen and deepen dialogue and collaboration between the Council and the Assembly.

It is unthinkable that an institution such as ours, which is supposed to represent the people

*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

who alone confer legitimacy on it through budgetary resources – which are scarce, but will be debated later on at this part-session – because there are representatives here who decide and monitor their use, should not in practice have the required powers of inspection.

As my colleague, Mr. Amaral, aptly phrased it, no corporate body can have executive organs that are not fully supervised, I will not say by the legislature, but by a supervisory organ.

Clearly, this Assembly does not have legislative powers, but it does have powers of inspection; otherwise there would be no reason for its existence. But in order to exercise those powers it must be given full information and there must be total transparency.

Otherwise, ladies and gentlemen, doubt is cast upon the very reason for this Assembly's existence. Since we do not have legislative powers, we may well, if we have no supervisory powers, ask the Council what we are doing here.

It would be better to go home.

We ought to have full powers to obtain information and to supervise, since under the terms of the treaty these are the essential powers justifying the existence of this Assembly. I imagine that there will be general agreement on this point.

Now in reply to Mr. Rogerio Brito – whom I thank for his kind words – I believe that he himself knows that the preamble to the draft recommendation is a quotation from statements presented at the intergovernmental conference which “all assign a major rôle to WEU both as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and as the military organisation of the Twelve”; I shall therefore simply quote and not try to innovate.

With regard to opening up membership of WEU to other countries, I should like to remind my friend that paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation speaks about the need to “define areas in which consideration might be given to countries that are not members of WEU, including Greece, Norway, Turkey and certain Central European countries, being associated with the activities of the Council or of its subsidiary organs”.

Turning to the other questions he raised on this subject and specifically where he asked why I did not enlarge upon certain matters connected with it, the reason is that it did not seem to me to be the appropriate time.

My reply to his two observations is that this report is a report on the activity of the Council up to the present time, and therefore does not deal with matters of general policy nor should it

supersede other reports that were discussed yesterday or will be discussed today or tomorrow – from that by Mr. Goerens to that by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and all the others submitted by the Political Committee. In this way the recommendation avoids duplication with other documents.

That, in essence, is the explanation, although I agree that it is a formal explanation. But my friend knows the way I think and will therefore find it acceptable.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

I thank Mr. Lopez Henares for his kind words and apologise to him for not speaking his language too. In some other forums I do, but here I prefer not to speak Spanish lest I maltreat a language which I admire and which gives me much pleasure to read and listen to.

Mr. Lopez Henares is absolutely right in pointing up the need for a genuine, thorough and broadened dialogue between Council and Assembly. He made clear the essential aspect of executive control in the Council, at the level of the ministers and the Permanent Council. He also agrees with me in confirming that there is no intention to level radical and blanket criticism; rather the criticism is intended to be constructive and to enhance the way our organisation works.

As regards the very great importance of information, you could see that I had only a few minutes to refer to it in my explanatory statement. But I did draw attention to paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation and the importance of the provision of information both within our institutions and outside.

This high level of satisfaction could, as you say, dull the awareness of the peoples of Europe. We all talk too much about what we have achieved. But philosophers, thinkers and statesmen have often warned us not to forget that democracy – and not just democracy but prosperity in general – has to be won afresh each day. The same, of course, applies to security and defence.

The Council's weighty responsibility is to inform public opinion more effectively because public opinion has to learn that nothing is won for good and all. Past civilisations, though very strong and stable and with no external enemies, nevertheless collapsed. Some were not free but others that were forgot that prosperity, independence and security have to be fought for daily. This is the message that our organisation has to transmit to the populations of the member countries and those that want to join us.

Nothing can be taken for granted here. Though we have no declared enemies at the moment – but new ones could arise – all we have gained could be lost, perhaps with sur-

*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

prising speed, if no effort is made, as day follows day, as regards our security and defence.

That is the message I wished to convey to this Assembly.

I thank members for their highly important and highly interesting contribution. The discussion in committee was also extremely stimulating and I thank my colleagues on the Political Committee. I would beg the Secretary-General and our friends on the other side of the Assembly not to take it as a criticism and still less, of course, as an insult if I ask them – even though a few small points of disagreement may remain – to look at the lesson taught by what are the unquestionable facts and find therein the new way forward and the new principles of action that we have to follow.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Roseta.

Does the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Stoffelen, wish to speak?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – The Rapporteur, Mr. Roseta, has presented an elaborate and rich report. On behalf of the committee I thank him.

The report deals with relations between our Assembly and the Council of Ministers. There are always two ways in which to express oneself. One is to be extremely polite and cautious; the other is to express views frankly. Mr. Roseta chose the second option.

The Assembly wishes to be effective in its dialogue with the Council. I am sure that the message in the text will be understood – that there must be a further improvement in the dialogue between the Council of Ministers and this Assembly. I hope that the Assembly agrees that that should be our message.

The PRESIDENT. – I thank Mr. Stoffelen for his assessment of the report.

The Political Committee has tabled a draft recommendation, to which two amendments have been tabled. They will be considered in the order in which they relate to the text of the draft recommendation. The first amendment is Amendment 1, which reads:

1. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, after “WEU” insert “where this is approved by national governments”.

I call Mr. Hardy to support Amendment 1.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I see Amendment 1 as an opportunity for the Assembly to wave a flag in favour of political emphasis and to give scope for a little imaginative language. The amendment makes the report more effective.

I am distressed to learn that the committee regards the amendment as superfluous. I regret that the committee is so lacking in imagination that it cannot see the advantage of the occasional superfluity. How many of us, when making a speech, do not stress and emphasise a particular word or phrase to ensure that our audience knows how important we regard a certain issue? How many of us do not repeat a point because sometimes our audience is incapable of understanding it the first time? I regret that I was not a member of the Political Committee because I believe that I might have had to make my point three or even four times.

Increasingly, we worry because in Europe too much power is taken by the bureaucrats and the lawyers. I hope that I have not sacrificed my amendment by referring to that professional group, but they use precise language; politicians do not. Occasionally it is worth emphasising the point, and I believe that my suggested addition to the report is desirable. We should make it clear, crystal clear, and emphasise that such matters are for consideration by national governments.

Let us suppose that international authority decides that there should be a peace-keeping force. I do not know what happens in most other countries, but in Britain the army is territorially linked and recruited. If a battalion of soldiers from the Yorkshire Regiment, for example, is sent to a troubled part of the globe, and I believe that it does not have adequate support and resources and that it is vulnerable, I need the opportunity to raise the matter in the House of Commons. I need the assurance of knowing that the minister responsible has been fully involved in the decision-making. I do not want that minister to be little more than a rubber stamp. Insistence on democratic involvement is essential. Decisions are the responsibility of elected representatives. That emphasis is worth a degree of superfluity.

I regret that the Political Committee did not approve my amendment, but I am happy to place it before the Assembly in the hope that it believes that my point is worth the emphasis I put on it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I notice that the amendment has been tabled on behalf of the Socialist Group. I see nothing political in this issue but I oppose the amendment on the ground that it is superfluous. If Mr. Hardy had listened to his own speech he would have realised that the amendment is

*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)*

wrongly drafted. I always enjoy Mr. Hardy's speeches, but on this occasion his best point was that he wished the opportunity to raise the issue in the House of Commons. His amendment should have referred to national parliaments, not national governments. If Mr. Hardy reads the recommendation, he will see that it covers missions defined by WEU. WEU is not a body of bureaucrats; it is run by defence and foreign affairs ministers of all countries. I could have sympathised with Mr. Hardy had the amendment referred to "national parliaments".

We both know only too well that most documents emanating from European organisations already have far too many words. I am certain that in his previous incarnation as a distinguished headmaster he would have told his class: "Be brief and concise so that people understand what you are saying. Don't wrap it up." Mr. Hardy then said that lawyers were precise. My God, I have never met a precise lawyer. By the time the meaning of any legal document is worked out, one has paid the lawyer twice the fee that he would have charged anyway.

This time Mr. Hardy is not on to a good point. There is nothing political in it. He is trying to make us use extra unnecessary words. Therefore, I hope that the Assembly will support the Political Committee, which agreed virtually unanimously that it could not accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Sir Geoffrey.

Does the Rapporteur or Chairman of the committee wish to speak?...

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). - I shall not reveal a secret if I say that the Political Committee did not accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. - I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1 is negatived.*

I call Mr. Hardy to support Amendment 2, which reads:

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "allow Europe to play a more active rôle in disarmament matters" and insert "make it possible for Europe to play a much more active rôle in disarmament matters".

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). - I am saddened by the unimaginative response of the Assembly to Amendment 1 and, as a democrat, distressed at the reception of my relevant point. Sir Geoffrey suggested that I should have spoken

of national parliaments rather than national governments. As a democrat, I assume that if we leave a decision to national governments, at least a few crumbs of time will be afforded to national parliaments to consider the decisions of the national governments. I hope that the Assembly will not be defeatist or unhelpful in considering Amendment 2.

My concern is with the use of the word "allow". It may be that my concern is not relevant to those who speak certain other languages, but British members will be aware that "allow" has two meanings. It may be that most British members will not be too worried at whatever use is put to that word, but we need to ensure that Europe is not put into the position of pleading to be recognised as significant. If the unity and development of Europe that is currently envisaged takes place, Europe cannot be for ever placed in a subordinate rôle such that ministers have to queue up to pretend that they have been fully consulted by the superpower when there are international negotiations. It may be that the superpower always has courteously and thoroughly consulted, but I suspect that sometimes it has not.

The fact remains that the size and scope of Europe today is such that the word "allow" can offend. We should recognise that. We are entitled to demand the support of the Political Committee in accepting the amendment that removes the humility in the position, as it is presented in paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation.

I hope that those who have that problem with the word "allow" will accept that the change is necessary. If the change is not made, we shall serve the cause of Europe badly.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

Does the Rapporteur or the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?...

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). - The committee accepts the amendment with pleasure.

The PRESIDENT. - I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to unanimously.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...



*The President (continued)*

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by a show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*<sup>1</sup>.

I congratulate Mr. Roseta on his report and the Political Committee on doing an excellent job.

### **5. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Doc. 1289)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the presentation of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, Document 1289.

I call Mr. Atkinson to present his report.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I have pleasure in presenting the report on defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee. In doing so, I wish to record our appreciation of the considerable amount of background research undertaken on our behalf by our Secretary, Mr. de Gou.

There can be no doubt of the desire of the new democracies to become as closely associated with us as we will allow. This applies not only to those three countries, known as the Triangle, which are the subject of this debate; it applies equally to the newly-independent countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and to all who are our special guests in the Council of Europe. Equally, it should be our desire to help and encourage in every way possible that closer association – an aim which, I hope, will be very much in the minds of those who meet in Maastricht next week.

It would be tragic if the iron curtain were to be replaced by a silver curtain between rich and poor in Europe – between the strong and the weak. And that applies just as much to defence and security as it does to the political, economic and monetary evolution of our continent.

However, at this time, it is, I suggest, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to which we should be giving the greatest attention, now that they have become full members of the democratic club that is the Council of Europe. Western European Union is beginning to do precisely that. Order 77, adopted by us last June,

committed our Assembly to examining carefully the possibility of associating those three countries with our activities, and to defining ways and means of achieving co-operation that is as tangible and as effective as possible.

Recommendation 500, adopted the same day, calls on the Council to allow the countries to co-operate in armament matters. Information links have been established between their embassies and our Secretariat-General. Representatives of their parliaments are observing the debate today. And we look forward to the address of Mr. Dienstbier, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, this afternoon.

Any doubts, on either side, about the wisdom of seeking ever closer association in mutual defence and security were, surely, dispelled when Soviet tanks attempted to reimpose the iron fist on the streets of Vilnius and Riga last January; and during those three days last August when the entire world held its breath at the outcome of the coup whose aim was to reimpose totalitarian communism in Moscow, and as to what might follow if it succeeded.

It was those fears that brought together President Walesa, President Havel and Prime Minister Antall on 6th October to sign a treaty of co-operation, good neighbourliness and understanding at Krakow. We should note the words of Mr. Walesa at that time: "Today, the future of our democracies is at stake. The future of Europe is threatened and the West is avoiding responsibility. Today, enthusiasm has changed to cold calculation and the joy of the liberated nations is turning to disappointment and desolation." We ignore those words at our peril.

It was in response to those trends towards closer association between the Triangle and WEU that the Technological and Aerospace Committee decided that the time was ripe to analyse in some depth the current state of the countries' defence industries, both to understand the formidable problems that they face, and to consider the practical rôle that we can play to help and encourage their conversion to civilian use, which is the subject of this report today.

To understand the present precarious state of the defence industries of the Triangle, we must appreciate that before 1989, before the demise of the Warsaw Pact, each of them represented a cog in the Kremlin wheel over which they had no control; in which any move towards self-sufficiency and independence was thwarted by the continued presence of Red Army officers, with the threat of intervention by the army itself if that were necessary.

The armed forces of each were ultimately militarily and technologically dependent on that of the Soviet Union itself, for which each was

1. See page 26.

*Mr. Atkinson (continued)*

responsible for producing particular types of weapons.

None of them was allowed to make key weapons systems such as anti-aircraft weapons, radar, anti-tank guided systems, helicopter gunships, frontline jet combat aircraft and aircraft spares. Nor were they allowed to sell arms abroad that did not have the Kremlin's approval. Indeed, such exports as were allowed to third world revolutionary states such as Cuba and Vietnam were often imposed without choice and without recompense, as a duty to international socialism.

I emphasise this for fear that what I am suggesting in recommendations 2 and 3 in calling for the participation of the Triangle in the IEPG should be misunderstood as calling for a further contribution to a European defence industry that is already suffering from overcapacity, or for a contribution from us to their defence industries. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The fact is that the current state of the defence industries of the Triangle renders such a fear unjustified today. To bring them within the WEU umbrella of influence and co-operation will be to render such a fear inappropriate for the future.

Any doubts held by members of our committee on that score were dispelled by what we heard, saw and concluded when we visited Bratislava and Prague in October and by what I concluded from my visit to Poland last month. We found Czechoslovakia's defence industry facing a decline in capacity of up to 80%, and the lack of research and development will render what remains obsolete. As a consequence, areas that have relied on arms production for jobs and prosperity face devastation, as do the small businesses that supply them. Up to 80 000 jobs are at stake, and the bulk of them are located in Slovakia, a republic already restive and depressed.

In addition, as Mr. Dienstbier will no doubt confirm this afternoon, Czechoslovakia has committed itself to ending its exports of arms – such as the 300 T-72 tanks that it sent to Syria – without regard to the economic consequences to itself. We should pay special tribute to Czechoslovakia for its determination to end its trade in arms as a commendable example for others to follow, particularly in the wake of the Gulf war. We should also applaud the response to international concern in rendering Semtex detectable.

In Poland, the picture is similar – huge overcapacity in the manufacture of out-of-date arms and equipment with little hope for conversion. However, instead of industries being abandoned, we found advanced preparation and

plans for restructuring and privatisation which would leave only eight of the country's eighty defence industries in total state ownership.

Hungary was the country that led the way with both economic and political reforms and was the first of the new democracies to join us as full members of the Council of Europe. Hungary's national defence has never been so prominent as that of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and today it is almost non-existent. What is left is facing bankruptcy.

I now refer to the recommendations upon which I seek support today. I hope that I have convinced the Assembly that neither the defence policies nor the defence industries of the Triangle constitute the threat posed by their previously enforced Warsaw Pact participation – however reluctant they may have been – which justified proscription under the Cocom rules. I hope that, today, they may be allowed to share the technologies that WEU member states freely share. That would contribute greatly to the economic and social reconstruction and conversion of their defence industries without which recovery and prosperity can only be further delayed and without which their fledgling democracies would be put at further risk. Hence my first recommendation to remove these countries from the application of Cocom rules.

Recommendations 2 and 3 call for the planning and procurement policies of the Triangle to be brought within the activities of the IEPG – the Independent European Programme Group – which, the Assembly will recall, was itself the subject of a report last year.

In view of the misunderstanding which the form of words of the original recommendation has caused some of our colleagues, the committee this morning agreed to a complete redrafting of the recommendation which I hope to submit in an amendment this afternoon. It calls for the future defence needs of the Triangle to be placed and considered within a WEU framework, with the remote hope of being included in whatever European security community eventually emerges.

An amended recommendation 2 will also clearly explain that we will be able to encourage these countries to become more familiar with the parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability which are the norm in our member states. Including them in Panel I of the IEPG will encourage them to harmonise their defence requirements with ours and to identify projects for potential collaboration with us, instead of developing independent defence policies and industries which neither those countries nor we want. They can be in no one's interest.

Recommendation 4 is a sensible and humanitarian response to what we heard and saw in

*Mr. Atkinson (continued)*

Czechoslovakia, to encourage our collective know-how in WEU to be made available to the three countries concerned, and to avoid the worst of the consequences that decline and conversion will bring.

I hope that the Assembly will recognise this report as being timely for the development of relations with our three new Council of Europe partners. I hope that colleagues will agree that the recommendations are a practical and positive response to the formidable problems that these countries face as a result of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact – the collapse which until recently was only a dream. I hope that the recommendations will obtain unanimous support.

*(Mr. Aarts, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Atkinson, for that excellent introduction to your report.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Lambie.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – This good report contains a great deal of accurate and valuable information about the defence industries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. In the future it will become a textbook for students and research assistants supplying information to politicians. I congratulate David and his staff on it. It is not the report that is bad; it is certain of its recommendations.

In committee I accepted recommendations 1 and 4 but I asked the committee to oppose recommendations 2 and 3. Not for the first time I found that I received little support from the committee. I found a more receptive audience when we discussed the report at the Socialist Group and with the help of my colleagues Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Tummers I got the group to oppose recommendations 2 and 3.

To be fair to Mr. Atkinson, he always responds generously to objections, and this morning he said that he was prepared to move an amendment to delete recommendation 3. He has also fundamentally changed recommendation 2 to accommodate some of the criticism of it made especially by Mr. Tummers, so I have nearly got what I advocated without success in committee.

Some of us have maintained not that we are against these countries having a defence industry but that their problem has been that during the cold war they spent too much on arms, and all I want now is that they should become democratic countries. Before we can say that they are, they will have to solve a great

many political problems, as the news this morning of what is happening in the Czech and Slovak Federation shows. We should not tell these countries to build up their arms industries. Now that they have escaped the claws of the Warsaw Pact they should not be grabbed by the claws of WEU. We must tell these countries to spend less on defence, to convert their arms industries to peaceful industries and to build up their economies. Advising them to maintain strong armaments industries will not help their people or their democracy.

I sometimes think that the civil servants of WEU do not accept that the cold war has ended. Everyone knows that it has, however, and people want a peace dividend. We must give them one by converting armaments industries to peacetime industries and building up the economies – not by recommending what this report recommends.

David mentioned 80% unemployment in a defence industry in Czechoslovakia. In Glasgow, naval shipbuilding will come to an end if the British Government does not give us a contract to build Type-23 frigates. So we face 100% redundancy, and I have great sympathy with my colleagues in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary who are facing unemployment. My Tory colleagues from the south of England have not yet faced unemployment on that scale, which is why I ask my colleagues here to delete recommendation 2. That will have no bearing on the report or on the good recommendations 1 and 4.

Let us go forward unanimously and hold out the hand of friendship to our colleagues in these countries. Let us not continue the cold war.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Terborg.

Mrs. TERBORG (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have read Mr. Atkinson's draft recommendation very carefully. I must say I admire his attempt to put an extremely delicate subject across in a workable form. Despite this, I am sorry to say that I have to reject this recommendation. It cannot be changed so fundamentally that I might approve it, and I have to say quite frankly that it is a pointer in the wrong direction at an important crossroads. The problem posed by the threatened defence industries of the Triangle countries is accurately described. I agree with Mr. Atkinson on that. The markets have broken away, the manufacturers are collaborating, unemployment is looming, with all the disastrous regional effects this may have.

What the draft in fact said was that this must not be allowed to happen to three countries which will be full members of the European Community and partners in the security and defence system in the future.

*Mrs. Terborg (continued)*

This, I am afraid, is where the recommendation begins to go off on the wrong tack, because the conclusions drawn from this statement are that we should give the defence industry another chance, that we should open up new markets for it and that we should remove any existing restrictive clauses.

That is the traditional way to solve a problem. It is a solution that is not really in keeping with the times. Europe would have had a genuine chance of taking a practical step towards the conversion of defence industries – and it failed.

I could imagine a completely different step being taken, with all the countries in this new Europe pooling their energies in a pilot project proving that conversion to the production of peaceful products is indeed possible, if everyone pulls together.

I can already hear the objections: the three countries are to be denied what other countries take for granted, the maintenance of their own defence capacities; or the objection that malicious pleasure is being taken in the collapse of a competitor who is troublesome because his products are first-rate, and that new markets are being explored. Or there is the objection that we cannot in effect do without our future partner's know-how in the defence sphere. And finally it is argued that, as the three countries are prepared to adjust to the export restrictions, they would not be escalating the arms race in the world.

I do not find these and similar lines of argument so convincing that I am able to approve the recommendation. My counter-argument is that, in the new Europe we are all striving to achieve and whose first steps we will be accompanying, it is not the maintenance but the reduction of defence capacities that is essential. We could now be embarking on this.

However, such a move would call for reasonable help from countries which are themselves hesitant about the restructuring of their defence industries. So I cannot agree with the recommendation where it assigns the conversion in the Triangle countries entirely to the private sector. This will not work, it cannot work. Here we have a challenge for everyone: the three countries, the private sector and the European community of nations, which must help. We must be capable of this if we really intend to take a step towards a world which does not simply accept peace as the result of the various countries having an increasingly sophisticated stockpile of weapons and which does not immediately try to compensate with new techniques for every step taken in disarmament. That is a waste of resources, which our world, and which Europe cannot afford in the long run.

If we want to take a genuine step towards peace, we should bravely accept that the assistance we provide for the people in the regions concerned cannot consist in preserving and modernising the jobs handed down to them from the past, but must consist in helping them to explore new markets for civilian goods and supporting them in the conversion to these product lines.

I would therefore ask you, ladies and gentlemen, not to approve this recommendation, but to instruct the Technological and Aerospace Committee to submit a conclusive recommendation on the conversion of defence industries at the next part-session.

I am quite sure Mr. Atkinson will perform this task with intellectual brilliance.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, if we had had a report in the past that provided such excellent statistical evidence as Mr. Atkinson's of the level of production of defence equipment in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland and of the level of exports and where they went – to Iraq and Iran, as we can see from the statistics – we would have realised the degree of the potential threat we faced from the eastern bloc.

Today we are accepting a report with the same figures in an entirely different situation, and we note that these figures belong to the past. Nevertheless, ladies and gentlemen, this report also contains a potential threat, that of a social explosion in these countries, because a strong armaments industry that used to export mostly to the third world but also to the Warsaw Pact countries suddenly has no markets left and faces collapse, which is causing enormous social problems.

For example, if we look at the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, as it is now known – which is in itself an indication of the problem – we see that the Slovak Republic is particularly top-heavy and has been hit very hard in the defence sector. The internal stability of these countries may well be in danger, and this may have implications for their neighbours – meaning us.

But this should not lead us to the wrong conclusion. It was very interesting to hear the heartfelt pleas from Mrs. Terborg and Mr. Lambie, but I do not think they have quite grasped the problem as such: even if conversion is what is wanted, it cannot be achieved all at once. That is not possible, either in a planned economy or in a market economy. The aim must be to find a way of converting these industries without causing excessive pain. I feel Mr. Atkinson has proposed the right approach in his

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

draft recommendation. Why should there still be Cocom restrictions for countries that will soon be associated with the EC and will eventually be joining it? Why should they not be removed? Why should there not be equality of opportunity here? Why should these countries be excluded from the Independent European Programme Group? Why should they not co-operate with it? Why should they not be classified, like other countries that do not want to be associated with the EC, as countries that have an evolving defence industry? I see this as rather arrogant on the part of the haves – if I may put it like that – who want to create a class society and are not prepared to give everyone equal opportunities.

No one wants to see an expansion of the defence industry and arms production, although we know Czechoslovakia in particular has had a great tradition in this field since the nineteenth century, since the Habsburg monarchy. We must achieve peace everywhere with fewer weapons, as the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany stated very clearly a few years ago.

But this does not mean the total destruction of these industries from day one, from 21st January, or whatever date we choose. Instead, there must be willingness to co-operate, particularly when a country like Czechoslovakia voluntarily refrains from exporting weapons. The mere fact that that dangerous explosive, Semtex, is no longer freely available to terrorists surely makes it worth finding a reasonable basis for co-operation with a country like this.

Mr. Lambie talked about 100% unemployment in Glasgow. But that is not true. Two years ago Glasgow was the European city of culture. I have seldom seen more positive developments than in Glasgow. When I was in Glasgow for the final of the European Cup between St. Etienne and Bayern Munich, it was a decaying and depressed city. It has abandoned its old industry and has now started a new life. That was another reason for its being the European city of culture. This is an indication of the developments that can also be set in motion in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. But that is a process that does not happen overnight: it will take a decade.

There is something else I would like to say to Mrs. Terborg: it is not, of course, a question of deciding between demolition and continuation, but of achieving the controlled dismantling of the defence industry. People must not simply be plunged into misery. Mrs. Terborg is not consistent in her attitude. If she were, she would have to close the mines in the Ruhr district from one day to the next, which would be a disaster for the miners there, and which is precisely what she is suggesting for the workers in Slovakia. She must be prepared to think in social, not ideo-

logical terms. I am surprised that, of all people, representatives of left-wing parties have no feeling for people and do not commit themselves socially; that they cannot understand that a process such as this cannot be accomplished overnight, but has to be properly organised.

I would also appeal in this context for joint ventures between the industries in the WEU member states and these countries. I advocate the creation of a conversion model in these countries. It simply must be realised that conversion cannot be achieved overnight, but is a slow, difficult process, in which all the various aspects, including the social aspect, must be borne in mind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Müller.

I call Mr. Probst.

Mr. PROBST (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would particularly like to thank Mr. Atkinson and the committee for taking so much trouble over this analysis. But, Mr. Atkinson, this applies not only to your analysis but also to a generally acceptable proposal. You have spared no effort, and there has been a meeting of minds.

There were misunderstandings in committee at first, due to the fact that the proposed paragraphs 2 and 3 might have been interpreted as leaving the way open for an increase in arms exports to third countries. I admit there was a misunderstanding. You never intended it that way, but this misunderstanding had to be overcome.

If we take the countries of the eastern bloc and the process of democratisation there seriously, there is no denying that these countries must also be able to pursue a defence policy of their own and hence, of course, to have their own defence industries. I think that is undisputed. But in that case it is, of course, extremely important for the Triangle to be linked to Europe, because the danger of letting the defence industry there develop on its own, without feedback, possibly with a shift of emphasis, is that one or other country might see this as a way of exporting to earn foreign exchange. Nor, on social grounds, could these countries be denied the right to do so. Close links are therefore of the utmost importance.

Mr. Müller, co-operation, the establishment of joint ventures in this sector might be another advantage of links between these countries and the West. It would be a good thing if this were to happen. But exports of arms from these countries to third countries are certainly not in WEU's interests.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would just like to say a few words about conversion. Mr. Lambie, Mrs. Terborg, if we approve only paragraphs 1 and 4,

*Mr. Probst (continued)*

I believe we will be making a big mistake, because then there will be no encouragement for a link with the rest of Europe. These countries will continue production on a limited scale come what may, but we will not be able to intervene. Nor should we do so, because that really would be arrogant of us. But if we do, the link with the rest of Europe is the most important thing in the whole process; otherwise things may arise in a random way. Mrs. Terborg, Mr. Lambie, it is a mistake to believe that all these industries could, as it were, start manufacturing marketable civilian products overnight. This will not be possible. We know this from our own experience.

I believe it is illusory to think that the situation can be completely turned round. We have now made changes: we have improved paragraphs 1 and 4 and also paragraph 2. I feel that is a good basis for approving your amendment this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the list of speakers.

Does the Rapporteur or the Chairman of the committee wish to reply now?...

I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to offer Mr. Atkinson the committee's warmest thanks for his excellent work on a complicated on-the-spot investigation in the East European countries in politically very difficult and even dangerous circumstances.

When the committee decided to undertake this investigation, and therefore to commission the report, the political circumstances were even more difficult than at present. The eastern countries had taken the first steps towards democracy, but in many of them there had still been no free elections and hardship was being experienced because the communist régime and the supporting military régime had previously been the source of special strength, founded, as it was, on the defence industry.

We concluded that a study of the changes which had taken place, of the real situation of the defence industry and its prospects and of the social and economic implications was of importance, so that Europe could appreciate what could be done to help the new democracies with practical measures and not merely with words.

When Mr. Atkinson and the committee went to Bratislava, the headquarters of the Czechoslovak defence industry – which is a terrifyingly large part of industry employing over 100 000 people – they realised how serious and burdensome the problem is for the new political system. If the West fails to tackle this problem it could result in serious trouble for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, as was made clear by

President Havel's recent visit to Bratislava and the difficult encounters he had there.

The problem therefore has two basic aspects: one is technical and military and the other is political and social. Our report looks at both in relation to the countries themselves and as regards the relationship the West should have with them.

We felt it advisable to propose the establishment, in such a difficult area, of relations between those countries and western organisations such as the IEPG and Cocom so that there would be practical instruments for intervening if, for example, there were a resumption of not altogether legal exports and production activity beyond the real possibilities and requirements of the country.

We also realised that these countries need their own security now more than ever, as the great protectors to East and West have disappeared from Europe. Unfortunately, the internal situation in both these and neighbouring countries is most disturbing and is a source of concern to the new governments in those democracies.

We have to say this, ladies and gentlemen. It seems to us unjust and mistaken simply to announce that these countries have our backing and then to take decisions which rule out any concrete possibility of a link-up with the western alliances. That is why Mr. Atkinson's report has a political importance which will perhaps be greater in those countries than in ours.

Clearly, when Mr. Atkinson proposes that Cocom should reduce or remove a number of nagging restrictions on technology exports and promote co-operation in such an important sector, he is talking about the only real and practical way of helping these countries to redeem themselves, to flourish again and to advance along the road they have taken towards collaboration with the West and the democratic way of life. That is the road to be taken.

When Mr. Atkinson calls for the establishment of a link with the IEPG and the establishment of relations through the Conference of National Armaments Directors, he does so not only to try and involve the countries concerned in the control system and forms of organisation linking the western states together, but also to give them some ideas on how they should proceed with the conversion of their defence industries.

The conversion of a defence industry requires a lot of resources – we can see this in our own countries – and these countries do not have them. So when we say here that we would like the eastern countries to convert their defence industries these are fine words but we all know that there is no real chance of the suggestion being followed. The fact is that even here in the

*Mr. Stegagnini (continued)*

West we lack the essential resources and are wrestling with the economic and social problems resulting from cuts in the defence industry and the export market.

So, Mr. President, this is a very important report, intended as a first practical approach. We have already invited representatives from the new democracies in Eastern Europe to come here; in this report we are seeking to send them a message for a sector which is at present vital for the future of Europe. I am referring to defence and security but at the same time to the defence industry without which there could be no proper security.

Now the provision of resources for the armed forces and for defence in general is a greater need even than before because, paradoxically, the dangers and degree of instability in Europe are perhaps greater than they were. Until recently we had the great protectors and the great coalitions maintaining international security; today they have gone and ethnic and religious conflicts, claims and the settlement of old scores between fractions are the order of the day, not only in the new democracies but also in the countries where democracy is still only an aspiration.

We have tried to make our contribution. On behalf of the committee, I should like to thank Mr. Atkinson and our Secretary. My warmest thanks go to everyone who has taken part in drafting the report.

We have tried to meet the demands and requests of political parties and individual parliamentarians in order to produce a consistent recommendation with the meaning we wish our report to have. We believe we have succeeded and are counting on your vote with a large majority in favour as this is a matter which concerns not only Eastern Europe but, most importantly, relations between the countries in question and the countries of Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I thank all those who have taken part in the debate, in particular for their kind words in support of my report and my presentation of it. I especially thank Mr. Müller, Mr. Probst and our Chairman, Mr. Stegagnini, for their kind speeches and support for my proposals.

Mr. Lambie did not support what I am proposing in recommendations 2 and 3. Indeed, he made that extremely clear. He said that we want to hold out the hand of friendship to Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, but suggested that we should deny them the opportunity of that friendship, which is what we are recommending through their becoming involved in the frame-

work of IEPG. That is not holding out the hand of friendship; it is a slap in the face. I am sorry about that.

Mr. Müller asked why Mr. Lambie seeks to deny those three countries access to the IEPG. I shall be charitable. The reason why Mr. Lambie and Mrs. Terborg oppose recommendations 2 and 3 is because they do not understand even now, after rephrasing recommendation 2, exactly what we are proposing and what the IEPG is all about.

The IEPG is the means by which we in WEU and in NATO anticipate the future defence needs of all our member states. It is the means by which we attempt to harmonise the procurement of those defence needs through maximum co-operation. All the procedures are subject, as always in our member states, to democratic parliamentary control. What is wrong with that? Why should we seek to deny Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary access to those procedures? That they have access must be in their interests and it certainly is in ours. Instead of that, it is being suggested that they must go it alone.

The real reason why the socialists are opposing recommendation 2 is because they oppose all forms of defence expenditure. Indeed, they oppose all forms of defence. Those three countries need to have their defence policies and defence industries. They have real, real problems facing them on their borders both from what might happen in the east in the Soviet Union and from what is undoubtedly happening in the south in Yugoslavia. They face real problems. They need a defence policy and a defence industry. Either they develop that policy and industry in co-operation with WEU, through the IEPG, as we propose, or they go it alone. That is not what they want and it is not what we want. It cannot be in anybody's interests yet that is precisely the situation that David Lambie would force on the Triangle by his opposition to recommendation 2.

I hope that we will keep that clear choice in the back of our minds when we come to vote on the newly-amended recommendation 2 this afternoon. I am happy to dispense with the old amendment in the name of Mrs. Blunck; I make that quite clear. But we do not want to get rid of paragraph 2. We want to substitute for it a new, carefully worked out, better-informed paragraph.

Either the countries come to us, as we propose, or they go it alone, which is not what they want. That is in no one's interest and I hope that we shall oppose the proposal.

I thank all those who have taken part in the debate. I am glad that we have clarified the misunderstanding over recommendation 2, and I hope that it will receive the support of the Assembly this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT. – The vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1289 will be held immediately after the address by Mr. Dienstbier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

***6. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.
2. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1289 and amendments).

3. Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence matters (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Document 1287 and amendment).

4. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe; Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis (Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee, Documents 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 12.25 p.m.)*



## ELEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1991

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.  
*Replies by Mr. Dienstbier to questions put by:* Mr. Noerens, Mr. Banks, Mr. Müller, Mr. Eisma, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Büchler, Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Soell, Mr. van Velzen.
4. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1289 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Stegagnini, Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Lambie, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Atkinson.
5. Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence matters (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1287 and amendment*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Lopez Henares (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Scovacricchi, Mr. Müller, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Nuñez, Mr. Roseta, Mr. Lopez Henares (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Fischer (*Vice-Chairman*), Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Lopez Henares.
6. Change in the order of business.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### *2. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### *3. Address by Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

Allow me to extend to you a warm welcome, Minister, on behalf of the Assembly.

This is the first time that the WEU Assembly will have been addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. In that alone your attendance here is no minor event but its full significance lies in the historic events of which it is the outcome.

For over half a century, sometimes in hope and sometimes in sadness and anxiety, we have been following the tragic events your country has been going through. Our reaction to them has always been passionate because of our affection for your country and because its fate has had great significance in the history of Europe. I personally am particularly affected because it so happened that during the second world war it was in your country and among your people that I took part in the struggle for the liberation of the whole of Europe.

Let me first express our very deep admiration for the way in which your country has faced up to the events of the last few years when it won back its freedom and then exercised that freedom to such effect that Czechoslovakia is now a powerful contributor to the fashioning of the new order of peace and security for the whole of Europe which is our goal as we also know it to be yours.

That tells you how keen an interest we shall be taking in your address. We look forward to the light it will throw on the objectives that your country, alongside some of your neighbours, has in tackling the problems of organising a new

1. See page 30.

*The President (continued)*

Europe in which co-operation, consultation and integration will replace the confrontation of the past. In us you will find an audience that is particularly attentive to your views. May I already express our very deep appreciation for your visit and for the active participation of the delegation of observers from the Czechoslovak Parliament who have been attending our sessions for a number of years already. If you agree, some members of the Assembly would like to ask a few questions after your address, seeking amplification or explanation on any points where you may not have anticipated the query.

I would also like to welcome Ambassador Sedivy, and Mrs. Hoffmann who we know performs a major rôle at your side in the ministry.

Would you please come to the rostrum, Minister.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your invitation. I hope that we shall be able to share our views in the discussion.

One of the main questions with which I had to deal immediately after I had taken up the post of Foreign Minister two years ago in December 1989 was that of ensuring the external security of the country in conditions of accelerating decay of the bipolar security structure in Europe.

The first concrete step that post-November Czechoslovakia took clearly indicated the direction in which external security policy would develop. Within three months, we negotiated a bilateral agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet occupational troops from our territory. The train that we thus set in motion unerringly reached its destination in the summer of 1991, when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in Prague on 1st July. Exactly fifty days later – on 19th August – we fully realised how great a security burden we got rid of by the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact.

The putsch in Moscow and its defeat once and for all swept away from the European scene the security threat that the North Atlantic Alliance had faced for over forty years. The fear of a massive surprise attack by the Soviet army on the West, directly through Central Europe, no longer exists. During the same period, however, the danger of unforeseeable low-intensity conflicts has markedly grown in the geopolitical zone extending east of our frontiers, practically from the Baltic to Yugoslavia.

That is one of the reasons why we began intensifying our interest in the only two defence groupings in Europe whose foundation treaties

include articles on collective defence – that is, NATO and WEU. Both organisations are currently examining themselves, seeking their place in the new European security architecture, and trying to define their relations with other parts of Europe, particularly Central and Eastern Europe. They are posing the questions of their own participation in the main trend of European politics, and what use they can be for their member states – and even more, for non-member states in a situation so radically new.

In my opinion, the answer of the two organisations to the second part of the question will predetermine, to a considerable extent, whether they are in consonance with Europe's longer-term prospects.

The recent NATO summit in Rome intensively dealt with the problem of European defence and security identity. It could not have done otherwise, as the political union towards which the West European Twelve have been heading cannot do without the defence dimension.

At the same time we are alarmed by the voices, heard more and more frequently, which describe a possible failure of the Maastricht summit as a European catastrophe. And the fact that we are capable of understanding their rational core increases our alarm. We really fear that, if the process of West European integration does not continue in its political – that is also defence – dimension, there is the danger of a gradual and inconspicuous, but more persistent, return to old practices. The consistencies in relationship to Yugoslavia provide a warning of this. The old European practices are nothing that we would like to recall – be it national intolerance, spheres of interest and influence, or the formation of various pacts or agreements and counter-pacts or counter-agreements. This would be just a short step from the black hole in European history – from chauvinism, aggressive separatism and destructive nationalism. The whole continent could begin to slip into a state that Central and Eastern Europe can easily reach if western democratic Europe does not begin to feel more strongly a share of responsibility for what is happening on our continent and takes concrete measures to deal with it.

The iron curtain no longer protects anyone against blasts from the East. Your political systems and foreign policies achieved excellent results during the period of tough cold war – but will they be so effective and efficacious today? The share of the West in the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is not merely an investment in the future of the nations of this area; it is also, and perhaps above all, the guarantee of your future, your certainty and your security. It involves the certainty and security of all of us – of the whole of Europe.

*Mr. Dienstbier (continued)*

In my opinion, we must use all the mechanisms that exist for solving these problems – NATO as well as WEU; the European Community as well as the CSCE and the Council of Europe – regardless of the fact that every one of them has a different sphere of membership, different tasks and possibilities and a different history.

In the economic line, the West European Twelve are undoubtedly the attractive pole. In the political line, the Helsinki process and the Council of Europe provide enough leeway for gradual rapprochement. The most debatable results, but also prospects, exist so far in the security field. The CSCE seems to be ensuring the disarmament area of our security problems with sufficient reliability. But what will happen in the event of an armed conflict, however limited it may be?

The NATO summit in Rome has made a concrete offer to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Although it is not a direct security guarantee, it does create a platform on which we can point to our security problems and perhaps suggest the outlines of their solutions. In welcoming the conclusions of the NATO summit in Rome, we are not giving up the idea of still closer forms of future co-operation, including association or full-fledged membership.

In the short run we shall, however, concentrate on giving the Council for North Atlantic Co-operation a real meaning – as far as possible – and on preventing it from becoming just a debaters' club, albeit an interesting one. In this light, we regard the agreement reached in Rome as a practical and concrete step, but as a first step to be followed by further actions.

What can Western European Union offer us in this respect? The status of an observer? The status of an associate member? Full-fledged membership? It is you who must know the answer to these questions. Our side accepts whatever promises a real and concrete improvement in our security situation.

To be frank, we have been noticing in Western European Union the same hesitation, the same indecision and the same uncertainty which we met in NATO in the first half of the past year. Some are offering us more or less full-fledged membership on a trial basis under Article V of the Brussels Treaty. Others seem to favour a temporary, wishy-washy solution. Still others just cannot imagine any closer relations between WEU and Central Europe. I know that members of the Assembly will say that such a wide spectrum of opinions is quite natural, that the strength of Western European Union rests on the very fact that it is always capable of finding a common denominator for this wide range of views.

However, the trouble is that we are not living in ordinary times. Today there is simply no time for lengthy consideration of unclear hypotheses. Developments are rushing forward and Europe has a great deal to do if it is to at least register major events, not to mention influence them. We are running out of time. We must try to find a new architecture, new structures and possible alternatives. But the wind is once again blowing from the East and it may be felt any time in the streets of Western Europe. If we wish to try to catch it somehow and, we hope, direct it, we must know for sure that our efforts are an inseparable part of wider systemic efforts, based on tested and reliable mechanisms.

We need a signal that we are not Don Quixote, but an integral part of the European defence and security area. An area, the stability of which is in the interest – real and matter-of-fact and not only expressed by words – of all Europeans.

Do not allow those east of the old iron curtain to feel abandoned again. Do not forget that the genetic codes of Czechs and Slovaks contain sensors which are highly receptive to the positions and behaviour of the western democracies in critical periods of our existence.

If the good soldier Schweik could have a look around Europe today he would say: "Mrs. Müller, what a damned thing has cropped up in Europe – we have no one to fight against, we have lost our enemy."

We really have lost an enemy, at least ideologically defined. But as a result have we not also lost an orientation to some degree? It is with difficulty that we are mapping the suddenly freed area. Its freedom and greatness startle us. We can choose any direction we wish but we are not sure how far we shall get. We feel we are surrounded by qualitatively new threats but we do not always know exactly what they are or what they could be.

On the other hand we have gained some unenviable certainties. We have realised that external kinds of threats to our security can be of a non-military nature more than ever before. We are facing national and ethnic disputes. We are thinking about the possible consequences of a new Chernobyl.

We are thinking about how we would cope with – or rather fail to cope with – a wave of economic refugees from the Soviet Union without being bogged down in a morass of racism. We are more and more aware of the fact that the fate of nuclear weapons stockpiled on an area of one-sixth of the world is today, in fact, being co-decided by Russia, the Ukraine and others. Few in the West fully understand that the territory of present Czechoslovakia is no longer what it was for more than a thousand years. It is a space between Russia and

*Mr. Dienstbier (continued)*

Germany. What we are today is a space between the Ukraine and Germany. Practically overnight, we have acquired, together with Poland and Hungary, a neighbour which has the prerequisites to become a new France, Britain or Italy – a European power. By and large we have sufficient reasons for making every effort to contribute to a democratic and cultured development on the territory of today's Soviet Union.

In general we can speak most probably about two kinds of security threats Czechoslovakia must and will face.

First, there are conflicts within individual states which can affect the present boundaries in Europe, which can sow tension and spread it into neighbouring countries. Secondly, there are frictions, incidents or even armed conflicts between some states of Eastern Europe or the Balkans.

Neither NATO nor WEU are appropriate for settling conflicts of the first kind, because these organisations were never conceived to settle them. The case of Yugoslavia and the immobility of the two organisations are eloquent testimony to this. As regards conflicts mentioned in the second group, both WEU and NATO regard them as problems out-of-area.

It is my impression that the West European way of looking at both these kinds of external threats proceeds even today from regarding Central Europe as a buffer zone, as a cordon sanitaire, which once failed in the attempt to prevent the victory of Bolshevism in Europe and which should apparently lessen once again today the first and strongest shocks of possible social, economic and civic spasm in the Soviet Union.

If that is so, then I can assure all of you that this new-fangled cordon sanitaire will not be any more successful than the pre-war one, mainly because we are not interested in playing such a rôle. Russia, the Ukraine, the republics of the Soviet Union, or possible independent states, must be integrated into Europe and not isolated from it.

What then are the possibilities of contributing effectively to strengthening a feeling of security in Central Europe? In my opinion there exist two fundamental roads leading to this goal: incorporation of this area into the European defence and security identity or a gradual shaping of a closer security structure to serve only the purposes of this region and formed only by its states. The second road is obviously very inconsistent and debatable and would probably produce more risk than good. On the other hand, the first seems to me to be practical, relatively quickly attainable and capable of being implemented step by step. This would be,

however, on the condition that Western Europe shows the imagination, non-traditional thinking and new approach necessary to the conception of its own security.

We can join in the process of forming a united European security area in the broadest sense of the word through any of its links – ranging from NATO, WEU, the European Community and the Council of Europe to the Helsinki process. However, possible assistance in case of an external military threat exists only through the links of NATO and WEU. It is essential that a connection to these links be accomplished as soon as possible. The road to NATO has already been opened, but the process is a long one.

As regards WEU, we are closely following all the signs of its transformation into a certain effective defence system which would become a security shield of the EC political union. That is a direction in which we are also headed in the long run. The conclusion reached by WEU as long ago as October 1987 – that it cannot remain for ever a closed system of nine states – sounds promising. At the time that conclusion concerned Spain and Portugal, but we hope that the principle is still valid. Let us jointly think about the circumstances under which Czechoslovakia could participate in the process of forming a European defence identity through WEU.

I can imagine, for instance, the following course of action: that our country receives the status of WEU observer as a temporary form of participation in its activities. This status develops relatively quickly into associate membership, that is, a form of participation which provides a real, though not full, share in decision-making. This road could culminate – in no longer than one or two years – in full-fledged membership without any limits. Naturally, that action applies not only to Czechoslovakia but to all those countries in Central Europe which would show an interest in such a form of participation and which WEU itself would consider its partners.

Our joining in the process of building a European security identity will naturally not take place in a vacuum. It will be accompanied by practical development of joint action in the Council for North Atlantic Co-operation and further deepening of the security dimension of the Helsinki process, which we continue to regard as a necessary umbrella.

The success in synchronising these processes could be followed by a more detailed division of labour: the transatlantic as well as the eastern ties would be reflected in various forms in the Helsinki process and in NATO, with WEU having closer security duties – let us call them guarantees, for instance – towards the countries of Central Europe and, possibly, if they show interest, also towards the Baltic countries. Such

*Mr. Dienstbier (continued)*

an arrangement would, in my opinion, prevent anyone from feeling isolated. At the same time, it could react to the different kinds of security problems of individual sub-regions in the area east of the iron curtain in a well-balanced and flexible manner.

We have, therefore, paid considerable attention to the conclusions of the Bonn session of the WEU Council of Foreign and Defence Ministers held on 18th November, which – at least as we see it – show some concrete signs of moving in this very direction.

I should like to conclude my address by pointing to the extraordinary importance that we assign to the quite new phenomenon whose further development seems to us to be a condition sine qua non of the European policy, and that is the formation of an interlocking system of European and transatlantic institutions, which would create an ever more unified, elaborated, non-bureaucratic and financially feasible entirety. It would constitute a mechanism and a commitment guaranteeing our continent the necessary dynamism of social and economic development along with a stable security relationship for all.

I therefore believe that discussion of, and perhaps even some first specific agreement on, concrete interaction between NATO and WEU could become a major political topic on which the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers ought to focus at its Prague session to be held towards the end of next January. The Helsinki follow-up conference and the all-European summit to be held in summer 1992 should be a qualitatively new stage in this respect.

Thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your words, remarks, suggestions and proposals on which I think the Assembly will now make its views known.

I am sure you will be prepared to answer questions from members.

I call Mr. Noerens.

Mr. NOERENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would first like to congratulate the Minister from Czechoslovakia on his statement. I did not take part in the discussion of Mr. Atkinson's splendid report, because I wanted to ask the Minister himself some questions about the conversion of the arms trade and the defence industry, which will have major implications for unemployment in his country. My questions are, incidentally, inspired by the difficulties over the arms trade in Belgium, which resulted in the dismissal of the last government.

Firstly, what steps have been taken by the minister responsible for education and training to retrain the young workers who will have to be released for other duties?

Secondly, what assistance has been offered by foreign governments, particularly by western countries, for the necessary retraining of workers in order to wipe out the traces of the past?

Thirdly, does the Minister have any information on the integration of former workers into newly-established enterprises? Which countries have played a major part in this?

My thanks in advance for the answers to these questions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It is a vast subject.

Minister, you have the floor.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – Thank you. I am glad to hear that someone else has problems similar to those in Czechoslovakia. I know that there are problems in Belgium, but the situation is a little different. The problem in Belgium and other countries like it is one of transition, which can be solved over a long period of time, while in Czechoslovakia we have a combination of different problems.

First, the main military industry is in Slovakia. It was built during the period of Stalinism for the production of tanks and heavy armour for the Warsaw Pact. Now, suddenly, the Warsaw Pact has collapsed and with it this market. It is no use continuing to produce those weapons. That creates political, social and even national problems in Czechoslovakia because in some cities everybody was dependent on the arms industry.

Now in those very same cities, communist or nationalist mayors are elected in free elections because in the past they gave workers well-paid jobs. That is one problem.

The second problem is that we have lost markets. We have lost the Soviet market and the market of the former German Democratic Republic, which was our second biggest partner. Since Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, we have lost the Middle East market and now we have also lost the Yugoslav market – also one of our largest. We have to make the transition.

Our biggest problem lies in deciding what the arms industry should be converted to. The only solution is foreign investment, by investors who have the world market behind them. It is a very complicated problem. We have had a number of interesting visits to our factories – one by Mr. Cheney and a delegation of top American industrialists and several industrialists from Italy and other countries.

*Mr. Dienstbier (continued)*

I do not want to go into too much detail but, to illustrate how difficult the problem is, it is worth noting that, when some foreign industrialists went by car to a city 150 km from Bratislava, they discovered that the roads were so bad that they could not possibly consider investing there. That is just one example of the way in which everything is in disarray. Where do we start and, more important, where do we get the money from?

Retraining people is not a problem because we have a workforce which is in some respects more skilled than that in many developed countries. That is partly because of our 150-year-long tradition of industrialisation and partly because, during the past forty years, people have had to develop even more skills. In a way, our society was one whose gearing to private enterprise was one of the best in the world. Everyone knew how to repair a car, fix the central heating, carry out electrical repairs and mend the roof. Those people could be retrained immediately for any job; but when we tried to retrain the workforce of one of our factories to make Hanomag tractors, we again faced the problem that the market was just not there, and, without a market, it is no use retraining.

The most important thing for the whole region is foreign investment. I am not talking about giving money or technical help. What we seek is normal investment and inclusion in the world market.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – I thank the Foreign Minister for his excellent and most thoughtful speech. I want to ask him a number of questions.

Mr. Dienstbier, you mentioned the ending of the cold war and the part that WEU played in that process. We should all be grateful for the fact that that period of our history is ended, but to what extent do you think that the ending of the cold war carries with it the possibility of the Balkanisation of Europe, which is already happening in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union? Who knows – we may even be seeing it in Czechoslovakia.

Secondly, do you feel that WEU, under the aegis of the United Nations, should intervene militarily in Yugoslavia to try to secure a political settlement?

Thirdly, do you think that a federal Europe, involving the twelve EC countries and then embracing Poland, Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries, could secure long-term peace and security throughout Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – Our security strategy in Europe will depend on our being able to guarantee the conquered space of democracy and to push its boundaries southward to the east and south-east. Democratic régimes in Central and Eastern Europe are the only guarantee of security. Only when relations between all the European countries are the same as those between say, Belgium and Holland, or France and Germany, will that security be assured. That is the goal to which everything else leads.

The worst thing that we could do would be to push the iron curtain a little further east. Worse still, there could be Balkanisation, given that we are used to a neutral Yugoslavia and so on. If we are not careful, we could have a Middle East crisis on the borders of Croatia. The Balkanisation of Lebanon must not be repeated in Europe. If there is not a general solution of the Balkan problem we may have countries supporting Croatia and others supporting Serbia. If that happens, we shall be back to the first world war, or perhaps even before.

If we do not guarantee the victory of democracy throughout Europe, we may face new conflicts – between north and south and between rich and poor. The question is: which countries will be part of this world? If such problems are not solved, we may face a completely new cold war, only this time with different actors.

The Helsinki process, NATO, WEU and the Council of Europe are all institutions that can play only a limited rôle – but these institutions must become more integrated in future. That is the only way forward.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – The Minister has spoken very plainly on security policy in the new Europe, and he has also referred to the uncertainty to which new nationalist movements are giving rise. The feeling is that both the results of the October revolution in the Soviet Union and the results of the peace treaties after the first world war – Versailles and the ones that followed – are being questioned today.

The question I want to put to the Minister – and I put it to the Greek Prime Minister earlier this week – is this: what is his position on the right of the peoples to self-determination and how does he see the rôle of an independent Slovenia and Croatia in this context?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – I am in favour of the right of peoples to self-determination. The trouble is that those who cry loudest for self-determination are not prepared to afford minorities the same rights in their territories. The more people cry out for self-determination, the more prepared they are to violate the rights of minorities. In Central and Eastern Europe the only workable principle is that of citizenship accompanied by human rights. We should not attempt to change boundaries. We should work for a Europe in which boundaries will be unimportant.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Germany*). – That is foolish.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – Perhaps it is, but sometimes what is foolish is also realistic. Let us remember the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia who have often said that they will be completely loyal to the Czech Republic but that if the nationalist principle is applied in Slovakia they will demand that it be applied also to them. How much more true that is of Yugoslavia, where it is impossible to draw boundaries – and even if one could, they would never correspond with natural boundaries. They were often drawn up on table-tops.

Slovenia is a good example of this. Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia – these places are not susceptible of nation statehood. We shall see later what happens in the Ukraine following the referendum on Sunday.

Either the democratic citizenship principle will win or what has happened in Lebanon and the Middle East will prevail in Europe for decades to come.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*). – You mentioned your deep wish to join the integration process of Western Europe as it applies to security and defence. You also mentioned associate and even full membership of WEU.

On 18th November it was decided at the ministerial meeting to hold only one meeting between the Council of WEU and five Eastern European countries. It was also decided to establish contact on an ad hoc basis between them. Were you disappointed by that decision, or by the fact that WEU did not mention your country assuming full membership of our security system?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – I am never disappointed: I am

always realistic. It is a question of long-term discussions. When we visited the President of the United States, the headlines claimed that we had asked for membership of NATO and had been refused. That was nonsense: we never asked for membership of NATO. We say only that it is necessary to include the countries of Central Europe in transatlantic and European security mechanisms. How to achieve that is a matter best left to discussion.

We are not in NATO and we will not be in the foreseeable future, but that does not mean that we should not try gradually to build a pan-European security mechanism which in itself may not be enough to help us overcome the dangers of ethnic in-fighting. We shall need this mechanism all the more in the future because new nuclear powers may emerge which are not happy with the direction in which the world is moving. We all know enough European history to realise the necessity of creating security systems before it is too late.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – With respect, I do not see why guaranteeing human rights – with which I agree – should exclude the possibility of self-determination and the alteration of borders. I do not see the argument for saying that, because there are 12% Serbs in Croatia, Croatia should not be allowed self-determination. I hope that the Minister will say some more about that.

May I extend the question asked by Mr. Banks? What would the Minister do in what used to be Yugoslavia? Personally, I am appalled by the killing – the murder. The destruction of Vukovar was a barbarous act. Despite what the Minister said, it is possible that WEU could institute an aerial or naval blockade. What would he do if he were in a decisive position?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – I am convinced that if we do not find a solution for the whole area, recognising Croatia and Slovenia and their right to self-determination would be simply a capitulation. The problems will be there for a long time in any event, but we must create a basis for a peaceful solution.

Members have mentioned pictures of dead children in Vukovar. I, too, have seen those pictures. I do not wish trickles of blood to become rivers, but that may happen if we recognise only Slovenia and Croatia, and leave the rest to fate.

Greece, for example, opposes the recognition of Macedonia. That is understandable. Macedonia is the apple for which a future war might

*Mr. Dienstbier (continued)*

be fought between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey; there is a Macedonian minority in Thessalonica and its surroundings.

There are Albanians in Skopje, which contains more Albanians than does Tirana. Until a peaceful process can be set up in the region – and even after that – it will be very difficult to find a political solution. But a peaceful process is our only chance. We must send peace-keeping forces – not, of course, peace-enforcing forces, or we shall have a European Vietnam. Forces must be sent to Dubrovnik, and to the boundaries of Serbia and Croatia. They must cover the Serbian belt. It is hard to explain in such a short time; I could speak about this for two hours. It cannot be simplified. Mr. Scepovic was sitting in my office recently, and we talked about it for two hours.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Büchler.

Mr. BÜCHLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – I would like to thank the Minister for his thoughtful speech. I should tell him that my constituency is immediately adjacent to the frontier with Czechoslovakia, and I am in Bohemia almost every day, just as very many Czechoslovaks are, as it were, at home with us and have found work in our country. I must therefore congratulate you on your speech, because you have spoken as a real Czechoslovak and explained the people's concerns to this Assembly.

One of the Czechoslovaks' greatest concerns is how to ensure their security. In any political discussion, in any discussion with the people as a whole, the question we are asked is: when do we reach the stage when you fully absorb us into your security institutions? We know, of course, that Czechoslovakia in itself is one of the most progressive countries, with an enormous reservoir of skilled workers and development potential of which most people who do not have direct contact with the people in Czechoslovakia are completely unaware. Czechoslovakia really does have the potential to rise to the level of other European countries very soon. The question of security really does concern many people and they are asking questions about it.

In his speech the Minister referred to all the security systems and repeatedly pointed out what is and what is not possible. I detected a little sadness about the hesitant attitude of the other European countries. I too am a little sad about it.

Here in the WEU Assembly I would like to ask just one question on a subject he himself has raised: security within WEU would, of course, also be possible for Czechoslovakia if there were some changes. I would like to know rather more about the necessary changes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – That question can be considered on many different levels – for instance, from the viewpoint of a minister of defence. It may begin with political consultations about integration. Should WEU be a European pillar of NATO, or should it represent the structure of the European Community? There will be many discussions in WEU, the European Community and NATO about that. It all depends on whether WEU is taken to be part of the broader system of security. It may be WEU's task to initiate practical defence measures and structures on European territory.

The rules of NATO exclude the use of force outside the NATO area. That means that NATO can hardly be used for operations in Yugoslavia, for example.

A European structure could be used to solve European problems or – better still – to act before fighting begins. Making everyone understand that the force exists and will be used must be the right way. Yugoslavia has a huge internal problem. I speak in general terms because we do not know what will become of WEU. We cannot say what we think is possible. We may have one hundred ideas but something different may happen.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Have confidence in the future of WEU, Mr. Dienstbier, as we ourselves have.

I call Mrs. Blunck.

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation). – I am grateful to the Minister for his thoughtful and informative answers. I would like to ask him if he agrees with me that coping with the economic problems, the earliest possible conversion to a social market economy, might avert the danger of Czechs and Slovaks in his country drifting apart, migration from East to West, accompanied by right-wing radicalism; and does he think that the Cocom list, for example, should be changed very soon, so that an industry with a promising future can be developed in his country?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – There are some changes in the economies and new technology can be used. Another problem is conversion. Heavy industry is experiencing problems. We can no longer afford to build big tanks. We have some traditional industry including production of the famous Bren machine-gun which was used in the second world war after the engineers went from Brno to



*Mr. Dienstbier (continued)*

Britain at the beginning of the war. That product could be useful on the world market in co-operation with NATO and WEU. The production of sporting and hunting guns is also traditional. The conversion from military production is only part of the problem, although it is important. Conversion is necessary in all production because, after fifty years, people are scared of new enterprise. They are not used to enterprise. The conversion of minds might be the most important conversion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I very much regret that I am unable to endorse the compliments that have been paid to the Minister by some members. I have always taken the view – and this has been the view of our Assembly – that we support human rights, that from these human rights arises the right of the peoples to self-determination, and that with people running their own affairs we have the means to change frontiers, not geographically, but in the sense of virtually doing away with them.

The impression I have gained from the Minister's words today is that he is playing off the peoples' right to self-determination against the opening of frontiers, and that he does not accept this right to self-determination in the form we have long considered to be the basis of our policy in the various European institutions.

So I would like to ask the Minister a question. When he spoke of only trickles of blood in Yugoslavia – 10 000 people have very probably died, and 20 000 have been injured more or less seriously. When in heaven's name do we have to concern ourselves about the right of our neighbours to self-determination? When do these trickles become too large for us to go on sitting there, pretending it has nothing to do with us?

I really ask myself whether this can be the policy of the new Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Or was it the speech of Mr. Dienstbier the domestic politician, who knows that there are problems with minorities in his own country?

I really do urge – hence my interjection just now – that we give more thought to what we Europeans have in common and refuse to play off human rights and the right to self-determination and the freedom to cross frontiers one against the other. Otherwise we will find ourselves in a situation that we really hoped we had overcome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – I do not think that. I am an old activist and I have had a lot of dissident friends in the past fifteen or twenty years. We fully recognise the right of Serbia to be a nation. But the problem is not as simple as it seems. Demonstrators came before the palace which is the seat of my ministry demanding that we stop Serbian Bolsheviks killing Croatian children. I have to ask: what about Serbian children who are killed in the same way? Who are the people who kill Serbian children? Is it those responsible for the children of mixed marriages in Zagreb who commit suicide because they cannot cope with the fact that they are bastards because one parent is Serbian and the other Croatian? It is not so simple that only one side is responsible.

Remember the genocide of the Serbs by the Croats during the second world war. We must consider these matters from all sides. There is a hierarchy of human rights and the highest for me is the freedom of the individual. That individual may be organised into groups – national, political, cultural and so on. No rightful national self-determination is acceptable if it is an argument for killing people who are against it, because they, too, have their right to self-determination.

Of course, I must consider the situation in my country, but we do not have the same problem. We have the Czech kingdom and Slovakia and we have had one thousand years of fixed boundaries. It is not a territorial problem. We do not have Slovak or Czech minorities on the other side of the border. The problem is completely different.

Of course we will recognise all nations that want to have their national state, including Slovakia, if the Slovaks wish to have that state. First of all, however, the people must express their will clearly, perhaps through a referendum. It must not lead to the violation of the human rights of everybody else. We will recognise not only Slovenia, but Croatia, on condition that the boundaries will be accepted and that the human rights of other people will be respected, not only by proclamation but really guaranteed.

I know Yugoslavia well personally and I have lots of friends in all parts of it, and I just cannot be one-sided. There must be guarantees on both sides.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – The Minister has said several times that Czechoslovakia wants to accede to the western security organisations as soon as possible. Before the attempted coup in Moscow the main argument against accession to the western alliances

*Mr. Soell (continued)*

advanced by the Central and Eastern European countries, in the early stages at least, was that the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev and the uncertain fate of the Baltic republics had to be taken into account. Since the attempted coup in Moscow and in view of the conflict in Yugoslavia another argument has now come to the fore: the concern felt by NATO and Western European Union about becoming involved in conflicts between nationalities or minorities. As you know, NATO and Western European Union have devised a code of conduct, although it is not always observed, as demonstrated by the Cypriot conflict, which broke out even though both Greece and Turkey are members of NATO. The code of conduct limited the conflict, but it did not prevent it.

What, in your opinion, would do more to help prevent such conflicts from breaking out in the first place: greater distance between the western alliances and the three Central and Eastern European countries, or a specific time horizon for their accession, through such stages as co-operation and association, of course?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – That question would demand some sort of witchcraft on my part to answer it properly. My speech and the discussion following it is just one of the ways to find a suitable solution to all these problems. I mentioned the problems that I have and the possible ways forward, but the result will be a combination of will, resources, understanding of the situation and the co-operation of all existing structures in Europe.

We need the CSCE and the institutionalisation of the CSCE because it is the only mechanism that includes the United States and Canada. That means that it keeps the transatlantic dimension. I cannot say that it includes the Soviet Union because it is now the Union of Sovereign States and we do not know what form it will take in two or five weeks' time. It includes some successors of that state and brings them gradually within some security structure, which we need.

Now we have to find rôles for the different institutions, such as NATO, WEU, the European Community, the Council of Europe and so on. We have to try to find the best solutions for all those institutions. I call it future integrations because it is no use dealing with the same problems with only slightly different membership on different levels. When one sees the same ministers that one saw a week ago at the conference of a different organisation on the

same matters, it is a waste of time. We must go ahead with the integration process but, for many reasons, it will take time. The question is how it can be done and whether it can be done through this institution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van Velzen.

Mr. van VELZEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to ask the Minister two questions. The first is this.

The Minister referred to national minorities, and one of them is, of course, the Hungarian national minority. Is it true that there is talk of autonomy and rights for the Hungarian minority in the current negotiations on the new constitution and state structure, the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic?

Secondly, if I understand the situation correctly, the Slovakian part of the country is lagging behind in programmes relating to the development of a social market economy, with particular reference to privatisation. Is the Minister expecting to receive special aid from the West for conversion and such things, so that, specifically, the large armaments industry in Slovakia may be converted more quickly into a more appropriate industry? Might this also ease the tension that exists between Slovaks and Czechs?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*). – I do not think that privatisation is going especially any more slowly in Slovakia than anywhere else in Czechoslovakia. It is going slowly everywhere because it requires the creation of completely different institutions and structures. Moreover, half the firms in Czechoslovakia are located in Slovakia so although, if one compares the regions, Slovakia's progress may seem slower, proportionately, it is not.

Conversion will not only help to solve Slovakia's economic difficulties; it will help Czechoslovakia. As I said before, the problem is that we must first find people who are prepared to invest money in converting the factories and then find markets in which to sell the goods. So far, our experiences of conversion have been bad. I have been told by many people, including Mr. Wörner of NATO, that, in their experience, it is better and cheaper to blow up or abandon factories and build completely new ones than to try to convert. That may be so. I do not know.

Mr. van Velzen's other question concerned the minority in Slovakia. We are going through a very interesting period in that we are creating three constitutions – for one state and two republics. That job will take several years. At least we have now succeeded in adopting a list of

*Mr. Dienstbier (continued)*

human rights and freedoms as part of our basic constitutional law. That list guarantees all basic human rights. In addition, the Federal Assembly should shortly be ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights. That means that, at a constitutional level at least, human rights will be guaranteed in Czechoslovakia and we shall, of course, see to it that they are guaranteed in practice too.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. You are the last of the representatives of the Central European troika whom the Assembly was hoping to hear. I am sure we have not been disappointed.

Your replies have been clear and frank. They may perhaps not have satisfied everyone's hopes and expectations but they have made a big contribution to an intelligent debate and definition of the responsibilities which we must assume in order to ensure together better and greater collective security in the future for the Europe to which we and you belong.

Mr. Dienstbier, dekuju moc!

Mr. DIENSTBIER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*) (Translation). – May I return your thanks, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen. I hope that we shall have more frequent opportunities to see each other in Western European Union.

Until we meet again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now suspend the sitting.

*(The sitting was suspended at 4.35 p.m. and resumed at 4.45 p.m.)*

The sitting is resumed.

#### **4. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland**

*(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1289 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, Document 1289 and amendments.

I recall that the debate was closed this morning and the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the committee have already replied to the speakers.

There are four amendments to this text which will be examined in the following order: Amendment 1 tabled by Mrs. Blunck on behalf of the Socialist Group; Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee; Amendment 2 tabled by

Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Socialist Group, and Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee. I would remind the Assembly that if Amendment 1 is agreed to, Amendment 3 will fall.

Mrs. Blunck has tabled Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mrs. Blunck to speak to this amendment.

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to begin by thanking the Rapporteur and the members of the committee for showing enormous patience in listening to the counter-arguments.

To turn to the real subject of the debate, one of the political aims of the report is to give the many people working in the defence industry a glimmer of hope. I am convinced that this is thwarted by paragraph 2 of the recommendation.

It is not, of course, a question – and I am now taking up what was said this morning in committee and here in this chamber as well – of converting explosives factories into bakeries overnight. But we must make a start – I say this to Mr. Müller and all the others who have suggested this. We must not allow the Semtex factory to be converted into a TNT factory and then dream of bread or something else being produced in the never-never.

I would also point out that we are adopting a far more radical approach in other sectors of industry. Markets are collapsing, and people are being made redundant. As a German I would also like to mention the thousands of people in the five new Länder who have had to go through this experience and have been very shaken by it.

It is also revealing that, if we do not delete paragraph 2 from the recommendation, the waiving of the Cocom list will be referred to only in the context of developing a defence industry. In this connection I would appeal to Mr. Müller's conscience: there are no safe jobs in the defence industry, Mr. Müller, only the production of deadly weapons. So we must make a start on conversion.

We are living in a society that has to cope with enormous tasks in the social, ecological and economic spheres in a short space of time if we do not want to be exposed to mass migration from East to West, which would lead to a really unacceptable escalation of right-wing radicalism in the West.

*Mrs. Blunck (continued)*

We also have to install – I would just say this in passing – the social market economy quickly in all the CMEA countries. I hope we can divert money from arms procurement for this purpose. So we are saying to the workers in our defence industries in the West: we want to exchange your jobs for safe jobs that are not exposed to the constant vicissitudes of arms procurement, jobs which do not produce weapons for killing. Instead, we want to ensure that we are able to go on living on our much-abused planet. We do not need armaments for that: we need environmental technology, we need intelligent transport systems, we need goods to meet our daily needs.

We should be saying to the men and women in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary precisely what I have just said. To take up something that was mentioned just now, they are not second-class people.

But paragraph 2 of the recommendation means new procurement programmes, and hence expansion rather than contraction of this deadly industry, and this in countries where democracy is taking its first uncertain steps, where dealing with minorities is proving extremely problematic. So the suggestion is that we should export our arms production know-how to a critical area. This is unacceptable.

The Foreign Trade and Industry Act of my country, the Federal Republic of Germany, states unequivocally that neither weapons nor arms production know-how may be supplied to insecure areas. I believe this act is very sensible.

Please vote for the deletion of paragraph 2 of the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call the Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the question asked by Mrs. Blunck was fully discussed this morning in the committee concerned and varying measures of consensus were reached.

At that point, the Rapporteur decided to modify paragraph 2 of the recommendation by submitting in its place an amendment which I believe was accepted almost unanimously by the committee.

I should therefore like to ask Mrs. Blunck to withdraw her amendment to paragraph 2 and to ask our Rapporteur to present the amendment replacing that paragraph as approved by the committee.

This would solve many problems, because following the speech made a short time ago by the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, I

think that paragraph 2 satisfies all the expectations of the Czechoslovak Government which figures very prominently in the report, as I said this morning. That is, the activity of the Czechoslovak defence industry should be linked with the European international organisations and in particular with the IEPG and Cocom, with a view to converting the Czechoslovak defence industry and directing it towards activity compatible with the industries of the western countries. This looks forward towards some form of collaboration between Czechoslovakia and the WEU countries.

Finally, I would ask Mrs. Blunck to withdraw her amendment on the understanding that our Rapporteur, Mr. Atkinson, will replace it with another which was approved almost unanimously by the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – A request has been put to you, Mrs. Blunck. What is your reply?

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation). – I am unfortunately unable to withdraw my amendment, because your proposal really does not say anything different: it is in favour of new procurement programmes for an armaments industry. I too refer to the Minister, who sat here a short time ago and said he wanted conversion, not new procurement programmes set up.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Before I respond to Mrs. Blunck, may I make a personal statement? This morning, during my response to the debate on my report, I cast a disgraceful and unwarranted slur on my socialist colleagues by saying: "They oppose all forms of defence expenditure. Indeed, they oppose all forms of defence."

I accept that that statement is entirely without foundation. It cannot have any foundation because by definition, as members of their national delegations to WEU, those people are, of course, totally committed to defence. Over the years we have observed the support given consistently by Peter Hardy, Pieter Stoffelen and others, for the principle of defence of our democracies.

I can only explain my uncharacteristic and unacceptable statement by saying that I was severely provoked during the debate on my report by the behaviour of two members of the unreformed Trotskyist left, who are still members of the Assembly. It would be wrong to name them, as one is a lady – and I am a gentleman – and the other is a personal friend whose wife, Mrs. Lambie, will be accompanying both of us to Romania next week.

I withdraw my statement unreservedly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – If you are withdrawing what you said, please do not add arguments which may reopen the debate. I simply note that you have corrected remarks which you know could have been offensive to some members of the Assembly.

The position is now as follows, therefore: Mr. Stegagnini has asked Mrs. Blunck to withdraw her amendment but she is not prepared to do so.

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I must have created a misunderstanding, Mr. President. My earlier remarks constituted a retraction of what I said this morning. I now wish to oppose the amendment proposed by Mrs. Blunck, which seeks to withdraw recommendation 2. I hope that that is in order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I agree but I am not very clear; the committee Chairman has asked Mrs. Blunck to withdraw her amendment but the Rapporteur is asking her to maintain it.

I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if Mrs. Blunck is not prepared to withdraw her amendment the committee is opposed to deleting paragraph 2 as you requested.

We are therefore opposed to the amendment calling for the deletion of paragraph 2.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The position is clear now.

I therefore put Amendment 1 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1 is negatived.*

Mr. Atkinson has tabled Amendment 3 on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee. It reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “(IEPG)” to the end and add:

“as an ideal framework to gain familiarity with procurement procedures for democratically controlled armed forces, in particular with a view to including them in:

(a) those regular meetings of government officials known as the ‘European sessions for armament managers’, organised with the objective of exchanging information related to the operation of organisations in charge of arms procurement;

(b) the work of Panel I, which would help them to harmonise their equipment requirements with other European nations and to identify potential projects for collaboration.”

I call the Rapporteur to move Amendment 3.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – As the Chairman of the committee has made clear, we wish to introduce a new form of words for recommendation 2. A misunderstanding has arisen from the original words. We wish to promote a better understanding of what we mean when we seek to bring Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to a closer association with WEU. We in WEU and in NATO, if the amendment is accepted, will anticipate the future defence needs of all member countries, with maximum co-operation between those countries. That process will be subject to democratically-controlled parliamentary scrutiny which is the norm in our countries and which we wish to see in the Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian Parliaments.

Ours is a modest proposal. It might not be quite the response that the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister was expecting but it is a way forward and I hope that the Assembly will accept it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Lambie.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful for the opportunity to speak against the amendment tabled by Mr. Atkinson. I thank him for his apology for his outrageous attack on me earlier. My friends in my constituency will be surprised that I am called a member of the Trotskyist left. Their opinion of me will change when they realise that a person whom they believed to be a right-winger is a left-winger.

As a member of the Trotskyist left I should like to quote from a brief distributed by the British Government. I am in an awkward position in that I am the only member to speak up for the British Government. The brief states: “The United Kingdom Government believes that the best way to rationalise is through the exercise of commercial judgment by the players in the market operating in as equal conditions as possible. The United Kingdom is therefore working for an open European defence equipment market and does not see the IEPG as an exclusive club in this respect... It is highly unlikely they will have any money for new projects for some time to come so it is difficult to see what contribution they could usefully make to specific IEPG activities.”

The British Government thinks that the amendment tabled by Mr. Atkinson will contribute nothing. Why is Mr. Atkinson speaking against the Conservative Government’s policies? Why are my United Kingdom colleagues not supporting me in opposing the amendment? I regret that the previous United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, is not here today because if ever British colleagues needed a slap with her handbag it is today. I urge the Assembly to oppose the amendment, in the name of the British Conservative Government.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The original source is not important! I note that we now have one speaker for and one against.

I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as I said before, Mr. Atkinson this morning submitted to the committee an amendment replacing paragraph 2 to meet the requests made there and confirmed in this Assembly. The great majority of members accepted this amendment in committee. While not a compromise, this amendment can be regarded as a partial acceptance of some members' requests and in particular those of the Socialist Party.

In my view, therefore, the Assembly could approve this amendment which was accepted by a great majority of the committee. Otherwise the whole report would be spoiled and the recommendation would be completely inadequate, particularly in view of what we heard this morning from the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I do not know whether Mr. Atkinson wishes to speak to the amendment but I do think that it should be approved as presented.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Stegagnini. The positions are now clear.

I now put Amendment 3 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 3 is agreed to.*

Mr. TUMMERS has tabled Amendment 2 on behalf of the Socialist Group. It reads as follows:

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Tummers to move Amendment 2.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, these amendments are linked. I voted against Mrs. Blunck's amendment to leave the way clear for the second amendment. Just imagine: there is no mention at all in this document of democratically controlled disarmament. Fortunately, we have inserted this, and it is now up to us to exercise democratic control over the institutions concerned.

If this is accepted, paragraph 3 becomes superfluous. This states quite clearly: "Promote defence industry" and "opening the defence market". The way to conversion becomes clear if we leave out paragraph 3 and pass straight on to paragraph 4. I am jumping ahead to some extent, but it refers to conversion as a task, so we are indicating a gradual, logical development that will make it possible in practice for us to achieve what we want. Paragraph 3 may get in the way in this respect. I therefore hope Mr.

Atkinson will withdraw paragraph 3. That will strengthen the directive in the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall know at once.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Let me first explain that, having accepted the new recommendation 2, we are proposing in recommendation 3 merely a logical extension. The defence industries of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland are so devastated, for all the reasons that I included in my presentation of my report this morning, that they must be recognised as being on the level of developing defence industries which the IEPG recognises already, such as those in Portugal and Greece.

Nevertheless, I recognise the sensitivities that Mr. Tummers has displayed in calling for the withdrawal of the recommendation. To achieve consensus on this matter, which we have had until now, I am happy to support the amendment, as is the committee. Therefore, I am happy to support the amendment which withdraws this recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, adding to what the Rapporteur has said, I would stress that Amendment 2 presented by Mr. Tummers for the deletion of paragraph 3 from the draft recommendation was approved unanimously by the committee with only the Rapporteur abstaining as he had presented another amendment.

The Rapporteur has, however, confirmed that he accepts Mr. Tummers's amendment. It would appear to me, therefore, that the committee is unanimously in favour of deleting paragraph 3 from the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

Mr. Atkinson has tabled Amendment 4 which reads as follows:

4. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after "skills" insert "conversion".

If I understand correctly this is a purely formal amendment.

I call the Rapporteur to move the amendment.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I am absolutely amazed that I did not include this word in the original text of the recommen-

*Mr. Atkinson (continued)*

dation. When it was suggested by my colleague, Mr. Tummers, as appropriate for inclusion, naturally I agreed with him. I have every pleasure in supporting my amendment which I hope will be endorsed by the Assembly, as it was by the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I note that there is complete agreement thanks to the co-operation of Mr. Tummers and Mr. Atkinson.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I presume that the committee's view is the same as that of the Rapporteur.

I therefore put Amendment 4 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 4 is agreed to.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1289, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

I now put to the vote the draft recommendation as amended.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

### **5. Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence matters**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1287 and amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence matters and vote on the draft order, Document 1287 and amendment.

I call Mr. Lopez Henares, Rapporteur of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – As I say at the beginning of the report, it is somewhat audacious of me to have taken on this task for two reasons. First, because this is the first report of its kind, and being first always has its difficulties, and, second, because it has not been possible for either the Chairman of the committee or myself to make direct contact with any parliamentary institutions in the United States or Canada. We have therefore confined ourselves to collating facts and figures from all we already have in this Assembly and its various bodies. I shall begin, Mr. President, by describing the present situation in this area of transatlantic parliamentary relations.

There are, of course, some bilateral relationships between the various European countries and their opposite numbers in the United States or Canada, but these are of an occasional nature. There is definitely a strong parliamentary organisation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in which the United States and Canada are well represented and, more recently, under the agreements signed in Madrid in March this year a meeting convened for the purpose has decided there is to be a first-ever parliamentary assembly of CSCE in July 1992. But until now there have been no regular institutionalised contacts between WEU and the United States and Canada, although there are, or have been, some occasional meetings with our committees.

This being so, Mr. President, we would make the point that this report is both necessary and timely, despite the frustrations we met with in our endeavours to arrange meetings. Our Canadian colleagues responded favourably but, in spite of our numerous invitations to both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the United States Congress has not so far sent anyone. There are many reasons for this; we must be understanding and go on trying.

For us, of course, the problems of Europe are crucial and the centre of our attention, whereas for the American Congress, however important events in Europe may be, and despite other contacts with the European Community, the problems of our organisation are not seen as urgent and compelling. It also has to be said by way of possible explanation that WEU itself has not enjoyed the importance we would all like to see it have in the future, perhaps this year, for reasons that have already been mentioned by several speakers. We have taken some steps towards making our organisation a vigorous organisation for European defence and security, but they are only a beginning and if that is the way we see things it is not surprising that the feeling is similar on the American continent and especially in the United States.

The first question to ask ourselves is whether any such relationship is necessary. As noted in the report, it is both necessary and timely, the

1. See page 31.

*Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)*

reason being that our great ally the United States needs a relationship that is flexible enough on our side to avoid fits of suspicion or misunderstanding and through which the security of the western world based on the effective presence of NATO can be ensured. Our position is this: security will be reinforced by a flexible relationship and understanding between the political bodies responsible for defence and security. Indeed, Mr. President, at this time with, as we are constantly saying, the changes it is bringing in the international scenario and the adjustments these changes demand, it is essential that our partners understand the developments in our structures and the modifications they call for.

Furthermore, the fact that we are now laying the foundations for a changed organisation is another reason why we need to have a relationship and two-way communication with our allies across the Atlantic. And the primary reason why this communication is necessary, a technical one although nothing in political situations is exclusively technical, is so that we may have a detailed knowledge of the *modus operandi* of American parliamentary institutions in security and defence matters, of the views of defence and security bodies in those countries and of the ways in which they monitor the actions of the executive under these headings to enable us to draw the appropriate lessons. But I repeat that basically the main benefit of such contact will be the political advantage of better understanding and the removal of suspicion.

Mr. President, the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs said a few minutes ago that there were two views of WEU. Either it is a European defence organisation or else it is the pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. My reaction was: there is also a third solution – it could be both. That, Mr. President, is the context in which we believe flexible and regular contact needs to be maintained between the parliamentary organisations on both sides of the Atlantic.

But through which agencies? First, as stated in the report and in a very detailed appendix, there are the parliamentary organisations in the United States and Canada dealing with European questions and defence and arms control questions, with which our own organisations working in the same field could have institutionalised, regular contact. In the United States Congress, for example, there is a European affairs sub-committee, a NATO sub-committee and a Europe and the Middle East sub-committee; I think that since our own continent is one unit, there could be a Europe sub-committee. There are also bicameral House of Representatives-Senate committees on arms control and national security, with which contact could be established.

In view of all the above, Mr. President, we believe that now is the time for the Assembly to decide on the draft order whose purpose may be summarised under two headings: a request to the Presidential Committee of the Assembly to contact the appropriate institutions in the United States Congress and make known our wish that groups or bodies should be set up to prepare the ground for a permanent relationship and a proposal that our Assembly bodies, especially the various committees that have already had ad hoc meetings for specific reasons, should now hold them on a regular and periodic basis.

I believe that this order will have a positive effect in strengthening both the alliance and our security and defence in Europe.

*(Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much Mr. Lopez Henares.

The debate is now open.

The first speaker is Mrs. Fischer.

Mrs. FISCHER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, let me begin by thanking Mr. Lopez Henares for his report, which contains a wealth of information that everyone will be able to use at home in his national parliament in defence of our common cause.

I believe a number of points in particular should be singled out. It is important to note that the problem is not that the crucial structures do not exist in the various parliaments. They do exist in the various parliaments. All we have to do is find ways of co-ordinating them more closely with matters of concern to us.

For the members of the American Congress, we are terribly far away. NATO itself has not – for whatever reason – set up a parliamentary assembly equivalent to WEU. The only dialogue takes place in the North Atlantic Assembly.

I am very grateful to Mr. Lopez Henares – I consider this important – for attempting to get United States and Canadian representatives to take a greater and more genuine interest in certain aspects of European security policy.

It appears to be quite a feat – I say this from experience in other parliamentary bodies – to persuade American representatives to attend assemblies in Europe. I am very grateful to Mr. Lopez Henares for pointing out that we should be the ones to use the organs of the Assembly to seek and strengthen contacts. In my experience, Canadian parliamentarians are sometimes more open in answering our questions. They are aware. They put forward ideas if one makes a direct approach.

I particularly welcome the idea of proposing to the Assembly that the Canadian Parliament might be invited to send a delegation to the



*Mrs. Fischer (continued)*

WEU parliamentary Assembly, to enter into a dialogue with us and discuss European security policy issues in depth.

I am very glad that this report reveals a very long-term view by showing WEU's great interest, not only in seeking contact with the Central and Eastern European countries in order to take part in an exchange of ideas, but also in encouraging the transatlantic dialogue.

If you want a job done, do it yourself, as they say, and I therefore hope this Assembly will make a good start once again, and initiate further attempts to strengthen the transatlantic dialogue.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is very pleasing that this particular committee is tackling this subject. I feel that, apart from the formal and objective elements that must exist on both sides if there is to be an exchange between Europe, the Assembly of WEU, and the assemblies of the United States and other countries in America, various other things need to be said.

A kind of exchange culture has emerged. I have the impression that it rather stands in the way of contacts. I will therefore be talking about a few other things, rather than going straight on to the summing-up and the arguments in Mr. Lopez Henares's report.

I do so because paragraph (iii) of the request to the Presidential Committee refers to "the other shore of the North Atlantic". I did not think this phrase was specific enough to indicate who or what we are talking about. I therefore decided to consider whether it was not necessary to give fresh substance to the various terms we use. Can we expand on our new intentions with new wordings or new meanings? In the last year before the commemoration of the fact that five hundred years ago the other side of the Atlantic Ocean was not discovered, but was reached by Europeans, I say to a Spaniard: let us really try to discover America, by which I mean ridding relationships of the old ways. We must give fresh substance to relations between Europe and the United States and Canada.

First of all, there is the much-used term Atlantic, which has in fact become synonymous with NATO's doctrine of deterrence. This has happened over the last forty years. In the new circumstances we must see the Atlantic Ocean more in the way the Romans saw the Mediterranean. We must talk about the *novum mare nostrum*, so as to give clearer expression to the equality, affinity and interdependence of the two continents. The *novum mare nostrum* can become, as it were, a meeting place for cultural movements in both directions.

Europe, Mr. President, is a concept we really need to redefine in depth. Because of the cold war, we talk about Western Europe. Our treaty was named after it. Then we began to talk about the whole of Europe, pan-Europe. Some people have even taken the term "from the Atlantic to the Urals" from the title of General von Kiekmannsegg's memoirs. I do not think that von Kiekmannsegg should be so honoured, via his memoirs, for all the havoc he wrought.

Europe is an entity whose socio-economic and cultural importance we have to reappraise. You might say that we have to redefine its identity. Our treaty, the treaty on which Western European Union is based, has provided ample opportunity for this. I would say that it is a quite specific part of the post-war inheritance of peace. I would almost call it a monument. This shows that the treaty is still up to date and that the purpose for which it was established so long ago can still inspire us to undertake further activities to promote peace and security in our continent. For the summit meeting at Maasticht the word identity has been introduced. We are now talking about the defence identity of the European political union. But the fact that we are only now using the word identity in no way means that the WEU treaties have lost their identity – certainly not!

I feel that the identity of the WEU treaties is best revealed if we briefly compare their identity with that of the North Atlantic treaties.

As I have just said, NATO's identity is determined by the doctrine of deterrence. A doctrine of this kind obviously becomes less effective as time passes. It does not take long for a deterrent to wear off. So a new deterrent weapon is then needed. This results in an arms build-up, destabilisation of national budgets and destabilisation of a country's socio-economic and socio-cultural system.

Western European Union, on the other hand, says in its own treaty that it wants to give expression to stability, on the basis of which peace and security are to be guaranteed. We know all too well that the instability of the 1930s was the cause of militaristic action and war. After the war we therefore sought to achieve stability in the various countries so as to guarantee peace and security.

At the moment the same instability exists in the United States – as you must recognise – and in Eastern Europe. Once again we are talking about socio-cultural and economic stability.

Our plans to lay the foundations for peace and security with socio-cultural and socio-economic stability are extremely important for both Europe and the other side of the *novum mare nostrum*, the United States.

I feel the United States will have to look further than the name of Western European

*Mr. Tummers (continued)*

Union in future. It will have to concentrate less on Western European and more on Union. I also feel it should focus less on the outdated name of NATO, and show more understanding for any new ideas we put forward for relations between the United States, Canada and Europe.

Mr. President, I will finish by saying that I hope the approach adopted in Mr. Lopez Henares's report can be extended to include a genuine renovation of ideas and the revival of a contact culture between the two continents, which will really be effective and will more easily lead to mutual understanding. We must use new concepts, disciplined by the texts of the treaties on which our union is based.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I should not like the Rapporteur to imagine that, just because I have tabled an amendment, I am in any way critical of him or his report. I am exceedingly grateful for the opportunity that this debate provides to make some remarks which I hope will be of service to my constituents. The debate also gives me a chance to comment on other matters of profound importance.

I am under no illusions about the relevance or significance of the American involvement in Europe over the past four decades; nor do I disregard the fact that it is highly desirable that Europe and America should maintain mutual accord and co-operation in the international interest. Sometimes, however, it is necessary to speak plainly, and I shall do that in my speech.

During the next few years, developments in Europe should lead to it possessing greater political and economic resources. That should make it obvious that our relationship with North America must become much more a relationship of equals than it has been. I need not tell members of the Assembly who have been in this forum for a long time that, over the years, WEU committees have visited the United States quite often, and have frequently been regarded as possessing no great importance – although I do not suggest that they were treated discourteously. I do not think that that can continue. In the days of the two superpowers, the fact that Europe was largely excluded from negotiations may have been inevitable, but those days have gone: the past two or three years have changed everything. We should now be considered profoundly important, especially in connection with the negotiations on chemical and biological weapons.

Our relationship should be one of friendship, but a friendship that allows robust comment. One partner should not adopt a subordinate rôle – the posture of a poodle. Nor should we allow

our leaders to be excessively hesitant in offering relevant comments. The Assembly may be aware that I strongly supported the international action in the Gulf, and welcomed the United States' leadership of the international alliance. I think it right to point out, however, that America has generally pursued the path of self-interest – as, of course, we all do. That certainly secured a successful outcome after the Gulf war.

I think that we are entitled to point out that the American involvement in the Gulf war was probably the most profitable exercise undertaken in the history of the human race. America received \$59 billion from five countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Japan and Germany. The congressional record shows that the net cost to the United States of the conflict was \$48 billion; thus it made a profit of \$11 000 million. That profit will be followed by the colossal earnings that will accrue to the United States' commercial interests from the reconstruction of Kuwait. That is rather a lot – perhaps enough to justify the regret at the rather messy end to the conflict experienced by the Iraqi minorities.

I do not make that comment as an anti-American; I make it because such things should be known. They should not be kept secret in case we embarrass Uncle Sam. Uncle Sam is a very robust character, who is not easily embarrassed – as my next remarks may show.

I said that we did not like the posture of the poodle, but, to my constituents and others living near my home in South Yorkshire, it seems that such a posture has been adopted. Some members of the Assembly will have heard me speak about this before, and I do not apologise for doing so again. More than two and a half years ago, some copper waste arrived in my constituency. It was not correctly labelled: it was supposed to be harmless, but in fact it was exceedingly dangerous – indeed, extremely carcinogenic. Over two and a half years later, that waste is still there. It is a profound disadvantage to my constituents, a cause of enormous anxiety to those who live in South Yorkshire and a substantial cost to my local authority.

The matter went to court in the United Kingdom. The American multinational company involved said in the British court that the contracts had been exchanged in the United States, and that therefore the case should be heard in the United States. The British court agreed. When the case began in the United States, the same American multinational expressed the view that, because the waste was in Britain, the case should be heard in Britain. It contradicted its earlier position.

The waste is a threat to our health, an enormous drain on our resources and a profound obstacle to the investment that we need.

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

That story illustrates the fact that sometimes we must pursue the cause of our self-interest.

Although I may have used rather plainer and stronger language than is appropriate in an international forum, our experience in South Yorkshire seems to justify our claim that we have adopted the posture of the poodle – a poodle with all four paws waving in the air in abject submission. That is not good enough. If that is the rôle that Europe must fulfil to serve the existing relationship, it should be subject to urgent reappraisal. The position is not satisfactory. Some of my colleagues may say that I have repeated the same argument in the British Parliament and in Strasbourg, but I shall continue to repeat it until our relationship becomes healthy and robust enough to allow the earth to benefit from the power and resources that Europe and America can deploy.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Scovacricchi.

Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the geopolitical situation again raises the problem of relations between the parliaments of the countries on the two sides of the Atlantic. This problem which has been looming for years can no longer be ignored or set aside. While WEU's regular practice over the years of inviting members of the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament to attend ordinary and extraordinary sessions is greatly to be commended, it has to be acknowledged that this is no longer enough. May I say that it seems odd to me that the partners from across the ocean did not respond in like manner, as the result would have been a most valuable exchange of information and views on foreign policy in general and defence and security policy in particular.

A way must be found for active participation by the parliaments in the formulation of future world policy. This in no way denies governments' rights to determine their countries' foreign policy, the intention is simply to emphasise the possibilities for integrated and constructive co-operation between the legislative and executive powers on such an important subject, particularly in order to avoid the conflicts which are always possible within the individual state institutions.

In view of recent developments, the move towards democracy and independence and the interconnection of all the variables in the world scene, foreign policy can no longer be kept in separate compartments but must be viewed at the global level covering the whole world situation, directly or indirectly. This means that, while still useful, bilateral international relations no longer meet the requirements of the day; in particular the dialogue between Europe and

North America takes place not only at government level and in NATO but also in the North Atlantic Assembly. At parliamentary level it is clearly not enough.

The results of the very recent NATO summit in Rome mean that co-operation between the United States and our continent must be redefined in order to produce a credible European defence and security system. At that summit the United States inclined to the same view. It is not my belief, therefore, that proposals for dialogue at parliamentary level will henceforward fail to be given adequate consideration in North America. Indeed, the idea of European security being treated separately from the process of European political integration and outside co-operation with the United States and Canada in now to be regarded as superseded. What is more, by rejecting the EDC in 1954, Europe missed its one great opportunity to equip itself with a powerful independent means of defence. With the forthcoming summit in Maastricht and in line with what was agreed at the NATO summit in Rome we may be seeing in a little less than a month the emergence of the European defence pillar wanted by everybody including the United States.

In this context, WEU will be the only organisation properly entitled to speak for Europe in relations with the other side of the Atlantic. I therefore wish to express my great appreciation for this report and to stress that it comes at the right time politically. I should also like to pay tribute to the Rapporteur, Mr. Lopez Henares, for his hard work.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the newspapers in the United States recently launched a bitter attack on President Bush. He was accused of paying too little attention to domestic problems. He was also criticised for travelling to Europe for the summit meeting in Rome, while postponing a trip to Japan.

What do these two examples tell us? They tell us, firstly, that the American public and especially the American business community – and the business community always plays the vital rôle in that country – now take a far greater interest in the Pacific region than they did in the past, and less interest in Europe.

Secondly, this commentary tells us that American politics are determined primarily by domestic policy, not by foreign policy. Those who know the United States, go there fairly often and read American newspapers, will know that international political events and events in Europe are of little interest to the American press. In their policies the Americans concentrate largely on aspects of domestic American policy; foreign policy is virtually irrelevant.

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

Anyone who talks even to educated Americans and to congressmen will find that their knowledge of Europe is extremely limited and that they know little of what is really happening here.

On the other hand, the United States is, of course, very heavily influenced by the European heritage. The civilisation of the West has also had an effect on the United States, far more so than the civilisation of the Pacific region. Conversely, the American media, and the entertainment industry in particular, have had a very strong impact on Europe.

What political conclusions should we draw from this? I believe Mr. Lopez Henares took on a worthy task in drawing up this report, because it is undoubtedly important for the future of this world, for the future of our security policy, but not only our security policy, that we should know more about each other, that there should be closer relations, particularly at parliamentary level, between the North Americans – and when I say North America, I include Canada: I do not mean just the United States – and the European democracies. I believe the situation in Canada is rather better than in the United States. In the area of cultural co-operation in Europe within the Council of Europe, for example, we constantly find Canadian experts and also Canadian parliamentarians attending conferences here, whereas the United States is conspicuous by its absence.

Far from giving up, we must go on trying to push open the door, with a view to establishing and maintaining parliamentary contacts, particularly in the United States and, of course, Canada. This in itself calls for joint responsibility. And when we find that invitations to send American observers to the WEU Assembly, for instance, are not accepted, that should not prevent us from issuing them again.

I also recall – as I said in committee – that in the past we had a rather closer relationship with the members of the American Congress, largely due to our efforts. There were far more frequent contacts and visits by delegations from WEU's then General Affairs Committee, for example, to Washington and other parts of the United States. We should step up these contacts and perhaps even consider the possibility of setting up a sub-committee of the Political Committee and this Assembly to be specifically responsible for relations with the United States and Canada.

Even if it is sometimes frustrating – and I will conclude with this – it is essential to maintain these contacts, in the interests of both sides. From twenty-five years of parliamentary experience I have learnt one thing at least: that visits to the United States were always useful, because

they enabled us to find out about various things that had a direct political impact on us in Europe years later. I will give just one example: on my first visit to the United States in 1964 I witnessed the student unrest at Berkeley. We saw the same thing happening in Europe in 1968, four years later. What is cooked up in the United States sometimes has repercussions in Europe later on.

Exchanging experiences, looking around, has never done any harm, not even to parliamentarians. I therefore welcome Mr. Lopez Henares's report.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to begin by congratulating the Rapporteur, Mr. Lopez Henares, not only because he is one of my countrymen, or even because he is a member of the opposition in my country, and it is well known that it is sometimes easier to congratulate members of the opposition than members of one's own party. I do so because in his serious, restrained and apposite speech, he asked us to deal with a subject which I consider should be dealt with here in WEU.

If there is one criticism I would make, it would be that the report was too restrained and diplomatic, but we should not be surprised at this, knowing that Mr. Lopez Henares is a prudent and diplomatic person. As for me, I might have preferred the report to be couched in the somewhat more robust phraseology of some of the speeches we have listened to here, because while we have a great interest in resolving the problem, we also have reason to feel a little sad at what has happened up to the present by way of transatlantic co-operation.

In there anything we can and should do about this? Yes, we should do something, and I believe it is urgent. So what can we do? We can do what Mr. Lopez Henares asks us to do. In general, relations involving co-operation between Europe and the United States are not bad, politically speaking; they could be better, but they are not bad. There are the bilateral relations between states, with lots of agreements and bilateral treaties, as we know; then there are multilateral relations, by whatever name: NATO, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, OECD, or the Council of Europe, when subjects such as the Strasbourg Conference are under discussion. Yes, indeed, there are organisations in which co-operation takes place.

But it is also true that in the parliamentary sense these relations are not all they might be. They are almost non-existent where some organisations are concerned, and hence obviously capable of improvement. Perhaps the North Atlantic Assembly is the only organ-

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

isation in which there is co-operation between parliamentarians from Europe and from North America. I believe that this situation leaves much to be desired. This lack of communication and information gives rise to confusion and to many misunderstandings. As members of the Council of Europe we have experienced many such misunderstandings in recent years. For example, we have seen how the idea got into circulation, and was much discussed, that the European project as such, in the Council of Europe, in the European Community, or in WEU itself, was an anti-American project, outside the Atlantic link, and it was even said that WEU was an anti-NATO design.

This we have heard, and we have seen eminent parliamentarians, such as Mr. Dante Fascell, writing important articles on the subject. We cannot understand how these misunderstandings and confusions arise, because things are not like that; neither in WEU nor in the Council of Europe nor in the Community do we Europeans want the development of our institutions and plans to be in any way directed against the Atlantic link, or against the United States of America and Canada. On the contrary, we are unanimous in wishing to maintain the link with America, the transatlantic link. We know our history, the part played by North America when things were difficult for Europe; we know the significance of United States participation in two world wars. For example, I as a Spaniard can say: would that the United States had liberated us at the end of the second world war! Had it done so, Spain would have had many more years of democracy than are now recorded in its history.

But whatever we think, and however many times we repeat it, there is this resistance, this lack of understanding and a failure of communication, and we must face these facts, as well as the paradox that the Americans, for their part, have not made much of an effort in terms of listening to us, making contact, communicating or exchanging views. That is why some of this confusion persists. As Mr. Lopez Henares has said, we have to make efforts, in the form of visits, contacts, collaboration and exchanges. We must encourage the American Congress and Senate and members of the Canadian Parliament to take part in these exchanges, in order to dispel these insinuations. I am certain that if such contacts are created we shall all benefit and in particular, I believe that they, too, will benefit.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Nuñez.

Mr. NUÑEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the report and draft order presented by Mr. Lopez Henares were considered some weeks ago in the Spanish city of Valladolid in a

discussion of great range and depth, necessary because of the many difficulties standing in the way of transatlantic co-operation between, basically, the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the United States and Canada. These difficulties are both internal, i.e. in WEU, and external, primarily in the United States and Canada.

So if the report reads in places like a litany of complaints or lamentations, it is because the task is no easy one, since at times, as I have already said, there is a total lack of co-ordination in our own organisation. Only yesterday Mr. Ewing reminded us in his report that the WEU Council of Ministers had not yet replied to President Pontillon's request for information offices to be set up in Canada and the United States. Similarly, we members of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations have not yet been able to make an official trip to the United States. These are clear examples of our internal difficulties.

What are so far external difficulties are also apparent: as yet we have had no reply from the United States or the Canadian Parliament to the invitations to attend our plenary sessions as observers that were sent to them some years ago. I am reminded in this situation of the depressing words of a Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gasset, who wrote: "Unsuccessful effort may lead us to melancholy."

Nevertheless, with laudable tenacity Mr. Lopez Henares tells us that we have to build the foundations of permanent parliamentary co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the United States and Canadian Parliaments. I fully agree that we must tirelessly pursue this path because we are in the age of information and communication when what is not known about does not exist. There is something contradictory and paradoxical about the fact that the governments of all the WEU member countries should now be stressing the importance of WEU as an institution within the union of Europe and are also agreed that our institution, WEU, should become the European defensive pillar of NATO.

Paradoxically, the other fact is that we should lack any means of communication and information vis-à-vis the two largest countries on the other shore of the Atlantic. So, either we are going about things in a disorganised way or else we do not realise how important information and communication are. It is therefore time to draw attention to the need for this parliamentary co-operation which is absolutely necessary. I wonder, Mr. President, how many North American citizens know where Europe is. Many American citizens just do not know in what part of the world Europe is to be found, and we might well wonder how many North American parliamentarians there are who know nothing of the existence of WEU, Mr. President,

*Mr. Nuñez (continued)*

and how many citizens and how many parliamentarians there have no knowledge of the important part played by WEU in the Gulf war, for example.

In other words, we are at the level of basic information. That is why Mr. Lopez Henares's report deserves our full support and why, recognising the difficulties but also aware that the first step is information and mutual collaboration – which I hope, on the basis of this report, WEU will initiate – he is to be congratulated on the balanced document he has produced.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much Mr. Nuñez.

The next and last speaker on the list is Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to thank Mr. Lopez Henares for this excellent report and for the draft order; in my opinion they are timely and factual. This is not surprising, since the quality of the Rapporteur's work is well known.

Much has been said about the radical changes that have taken place in Europe. Seldom in the history of our continent has so much changed in so short a time – little more than two years – and every period of change calls for more dialogue, more information and a greater effort of understanding especially, as we shall see, on a subject such as transatlantic parliamentary relations.

Dialogue between parliamentarians on the two shores of the Atlantic is now more necessary than ever. Nobody disputes the need for the Atlantic Alliance, which has been the foundation of our security and has enabled us to live in peace for a very long period, something unknown in Europe – at least the western part of Europe – for centuries. But in a situation changing at gathering pace more and more dialogue is needed to explain these changes and avoid misunderstandings – as indeed some speakers and the Rapporteur himself have already pointed out – and to make it clear why there have to be changes in position while safeguarding what is essential, namely the values and principles we all share in the alliance itself. None of this, to my mind, is up for discussion but, as I say, to avoid misunderstandings we have to promote the dialogue between our Assembly and the Congress of the United States and the Canadian Parliament.

So far that dialogue has not got very far, but the situation in days gone by was different: it was stable and only routine information was required. There were no changes to be explained, whereas now, as the Rapporteur rightly says, the need for dialogue is much greater.

But to return to the problem of information: here we are not talking about the internal provision of information among ourselves, which was the issue this morning. Here I agree with the more restrained and realistic tone of Mr. Lopez Henares's report and his draft order. And the reason is that it is not concerned with somebody we can easily contact like one of our own organisation's institutions such as the Council, or the governments of member countries. So we have to overcome the information problem we face in this case in the ways envisaged in the draft order.

The little interest that most parliamentarians in the United States traditionally take in foreign affairs is well known, the fact that members of the House of Representatives take even less interest than do senators being an even more familiar truth.

Several authors have advanced countless reasons to explain this relative lack of interest: the United States is a continent; the United States has its own special characteristics and problems, a different pace of development from ours, a special kind of federal structure, and problems that are also on the continental scale. All these factors taken together make it very difficult for them to understand the varied problems of the twenty or thirty countries in Europe – the count now is nearer forty.

Then there are the peculiar characteristics of the American political system which are well known to the Rapporteur. We have to remember that, whereas we are elected for four or five years, congressmen are elected for only two, a period that passes extremely quickly so that their thoughts are constantly on the next election campaign. All the above explains the comparative lack of interest shown by American parliamentarians in foreign policy.

That is why I believe that in the areas of security and defence – I am not, of course, discussing other areas – it is up to us to do all we can to interest the United States Congress and convince it that dialogue will be of benefit to both sides, not just one.

I believe that they could be receptive to this idea given that we both agree the alliance must be kept in being even though the justification – the existence of an enemy – is no longer there; thank goodness for that! The alliance is positive in itself, because of its values, because of human rights and because of its model of a free society. It is not there purely for negative purposes.

I also think it would be useful if we were to familiarise ourselves with the broad lines of United States and Canadian foreign and security policy, trends in these policies and the ways in which they are framed.

To conclude, Mr. President, I should like briefly to refer to the position of my country. As

*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

you will certainly be aware, Portugal has a tradition of openness to the world in its foreign policy – especially by way of the sea! We also have a very active and strong Atlantic tradition having close ties with the United States and Canada and also other countries, of course!

This being so, it is inconceivable to us – and doubtless to everyone else – that Europe, just because it is no longer under threat, should close in upon itself economically, socially or otherwise, or in areas of more concern to WEU, namely security and defence.

This reference to a constant theme in Portuguese foreign and security policy will explain why I vigorously support Mr. Lopez Henares's report. May I say in closing that I do not believe that efforts to enter into dialogue with parliamentarians across the Atlantic will be easy – someone has already made that point today – but I do believe they will be useful.

It may not be very easy to put the draft order into effect and to achieve the three objectives set out in sections (a), (b) and (c), which I do not need to read out. It could take some time. Earlier today in the meeting of the Political Committee we were exchanging ideas about how necessary it always was to take great care in the preparation of these transatlantic contacts and to do so well in advance, not to leave things to the last minute, and I came to the conclusion that, however this may be, now is the right time; we have to do it now.

That is why I heartily congratulate the Rapporteur for having so well reminded us of that fact.

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the debate.

Would the Rapporteur like to comment on the speeches?

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – May I first sincerely thank the speakers for their comments on the report – for two reasons, Mr. President, firstly because their contributions will enable future readers to perceive the political depth of the purposes for which the report was written and secondly because even those who voiced some dissent nevertheless offered their congratulations. Given the quality of the statements I should like to make a few brief points.

Mr. Tummers, as befits his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Culture and Education of the Council of Europe, made a brilliant speech about the cultural aspects. I have often thought during these debates that whereas it is the urgent and direct problems that attract our attention, this sometimes means we overlook the primary objectives of our and other

European organisations, namely the noble aims of peace and freedom. This is the ultimate goal of our organisation: peace and freedom based upon and rooted in the defence of our shared cultural values. Mr. Tummers's references to these roots therefore seem to me highly relevant, and that in essence is the reason, Mr. President, why we defend the Atlantic Alliance firmly and on occasion passionately against differing points of view; this is in the nature of things. This unequivocal and friendly alliance with the other side of the Atlantic is not one of those short-lived pacts that history shows us are so prone to be broken; the Atlantic Alliance is built upon close collaboration in defence of our western civilisation's fundamental values such as human rights and the democratic, pluralist system.

Mr. Hardy also made some remarks referring to contracts and contamination which seemed to be more applicable to his own constituency. He said one thing with which I fully agree, namely that we should be more ambitious; of course we should. If Europe has taken certain positions on these defence problems that are not consistent with its economic potential and historical greatness, the only ones responsible are we Europeans. Nobody prevented us from making the effort that we ought to have made; each of us in our respective countries must shoulder the political responsibility for mobilising opinion so that Europe may reach a level deserving a better and more dynamic metaphor than that used by Mr. Hardy.

Please allow me one brief remark. Referring to the Gulf war, Mr. Hardy said something about its economic benefits and high profitability. I do not feel that assessments of this kind should be made lightly, although I respect his right to do so. There can be no questioning the effort made by our North American ally, in the blood of its soldiers and economically. The economic situation in the United States is currently not at its best, largely because of the extraordinary effort made by that country to achieve the strength that has clearly been a successful deterrent to the other potential aggressors that we can all call to mind.

The most direct beneficiaries, at the cost of only a minor effort, were us Europeans, for what would have happened, Mr. Hardy, if that unfortunate war had lasted longer or been lost? What would our economy in Europe now be like? So for all these reasons I do not believe we should refer to the profits made by our ally, but rather to a victorious outcome to the benefit of all.

In closing, I should also like to thank my fellow countrymen, Mr. de Puig and Mr. Nuñez, for their kind words. May I also reiterate, with regard to Minister Dienstbier's statement a moment ago that we had to choose between WEU as the Community's instrument of defence

*Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)*

and WEU as a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, that the right posture is to combine the two together in complete harmony.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would renew my thanks and congratulations to the speakers: their statements have been of a high standard and will undoubtedly help to clarify the objectives of the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. I suppose that the committee wants to express a view. Its Chairman, Mr. Ewing, is not present, so I give the floor to the Vice-Chairman, Mrs. Fischer.

Mrs. FISCHER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the committee has shown the Assembly this week with regard to parliamentary public relations how important we consider relations with our own parliaments and the public. We are very pleased to have the support of the whole Assembly in this.

I would just like to say a few words about official contacts with Canada and the United States. We had observers here from 1974 to 1976. Since 1988 we have again been extending invitations to Canada and the United States.

I wonder if the problem is that the invitations are always sent to the top people, who cannot accept them because they have too much work, too many appointments and invitations. Another question is how far we might succeed in setting up contact groups in both the Canadian and the American Parliaments, with a view to arousing interest on a more personal basis.

It is of course worth considering whether we should not make another attempt by extending invitations to the WEU symposium in Berlin specifically to Canadian and also to United States representatives.

Finally, I would like to thank the committee most sincerely for the work it has done and the Assembly for the way in which it has received these reports. The committee and the Rapporteurs really have gone to a great deal of trouble to describe the crucial issues.

The PRESIDENT. – The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations has tabled a draft order, to which one amendment has been tabled.

I call Mr. Hardy to support Amendment 1 which reads:

1. In the draft order, at the end add “ on a basis of equality ”.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be brief, but I must make one thing clear. As my British colleagues will know, I was a critic of the

Iraqi régime long before criticism became politically fashionable. On a number of occasions, I expressed clear and wholehearted support for the United Nations’ action. Members may have heard me make such speeches here. I certainly did not oppose the Gulf war, but I do not think that our relationship with America should lead us to be excessively quiet and discreet about the fact that America’s involvement in that necessary enterprise was – as I have already said – the most profitable exercise in the history of the human race. America pursues a course of enlightened self-interest, and we sometimes have to do the same.

Let me illustrate the case for the amendment with a simple analogy. I refer to the toxic waste in my constituency. The export of carcinogenic waste was allowed under the American law that governs its export to Europe and elsewhere. Under a different American law, however – the law that governs the import of toxic waste – that same waste is regarded as toxic and is not allowed back into the United States. That is an example of the inequality that stares Europe in the face today.

I believe that it is essential, in terms of political relationships, commercial practice and social awareness, that equality should increase on this planet. It is in that spirit that I tabled the amendment; it is in that spirit that my group supported it; and it is in that spirit that the Assembly will, I hope, endorse it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I confess to being puzzled. The Socialist Group is one of the most important groups in the Assembly. While I feel great respect and affection for my friend, Peter Hardy, two or three of his amendments in the name of the group are totally non-political. I cannot understand why a great political group should say that he should move them on its behalf.

That does not in any way lessen the importance of what Peter Hardy has said as an individual representative looking after the interests of his constituents. The amendment is misconceived, however. By tabling it, Mr. Hardy has assumed that our parliaments are not already equal to those of North America. We are one of the oldest parliamentary democracies – far older than those in North America. The wording of the amendment is unnecessary and, in some respects, demeans our own parliaments.

I hope that the Assembly will not accept the amendment. It would do no credit to us, and it does no credit to the Socialist Group to allow its name to be put to an important individual item by an individual representative.



The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?...

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*). – I have the greatest respect for Mr. Hardy's assertions, and even for his amendment; but I do not think that we can accept the amendment – for two reasons, but mainly because it is not necessary. I do not wish to return to this morning's discussion and say that it is superfluous, but it is unnecessary and useless. As Sir Geoffrey Finsberg just said, the wording of the amendment implies that we have an inferiority complex. It is obvious that the relationship must be equal; it is not necessary for the Assembly to make a declaration to that effect.

My second reason is this. When we speak of a basis of equality, we should bear in mind that, for instance, the Canadian Parliament and the United States Congress are national bodies, while ours is an international organisation. It is confusing to imply that equality requires relationships to be on a national basis.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1 is negatived.*

We shall now vote on the draft order in Document 1287, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

The draft order is adopted unanimously<sup>1</sup>.

### **6. Change in the order of business**

The PRESIDENT. – As the Assembly knows, the order of business provides for us to hear the presentation of the reports tabled by Mr.

Goerens and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe and on the operational arrangements for WEU in the light of the Yugoslav crisis.

Having consulted both Rapporteurs, I have decided, on grounds of common sense – both in the interests of the Assembly and for media reasons – to adjourn the sitting so that these two very important reports may be presented by the two Rapporteurs after Mr. Genscher's speech tomorrow morning.

Is there any objection?...

*The change in the order of business is agreed to.*

### **7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 4th December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council, Document 1282; Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany.
2. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe; Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis (Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee, Documents 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.)*

1. See page 33.

## TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1991

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council, Document 1282; Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.  
*Replies by Mr. Genscher to questions put by:* Sir John Stokes, Mr. Rowe, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Fioret, Mr. Ewing, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Pahtas (*Observer from Greece*), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mr. Soell.
4. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe; Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee*, Docs. 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Goerens (*Rapporteur of the Political Committee*), Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (*Rapporteur of the Defence Committee*), Mrs. Roe, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Kotenkov (*Observer from the USSR*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Menzel, Mr. Scovacricchi, Mr. Barrionuevo, Mr. Fioret.
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### *2. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### *3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council, Document 1282*

*Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the presentation of the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the

Council, Document 1282; Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Genscher, may I welcome you to this Assembly in your capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council. The chairmanship has rarely had such major responsibilities as at this time when the structure of European defence has to be decided.

I know that you have great ambitions for this new Europe which we are going to try to bring into being. Western European Union, of whose Council you are Chairman, will have to play a major rôle because our security has to be assured at a time when Europe is having to face growing responsibilities and the risks are changing both in kind and on the map.

We shall listen to you with particularly close attention as you will be able to brief us not only on the outcome of the debates in the Ministerial Council of Western European Union held on 18th November last but also on the meetings which have taken place since. In particular, you have just attended the intergovernmental conference of the Twelve which is one of the many stages on the way to the Maastricht conference due to start in a few days time. We should also like to hear your views on the shape of our future political union which will also be a union for security and defence.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are about to listen to a great European. It is therefore with special

1. See page 35.

*The President (continued)*

pleasure that I call you to the rostrum, Mr. Genscher.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your kind welcome. I am glad to have this opportunity to report to the members of the WEU Assembly on the first six months of the German presidency of the WEU Council of Ministers.

WEU has undergone a dynamic development in recent years. When the French Foreign Minister, my friend Roland Dumas, submitted his report in June at the end of the French presidency, he was able to inform you about the activities of the nine member states during the Gulf war, the initial contacts and talks with the countries of Central Europe, and of the intensive discussions on WEU's future place in the European security architecture.

Since Germany assumed the presidency, WEU's activities have increased further still. Indeed, our organisation is the focus of attention in the European debate on security and defence.

Ladies and gentlemen, we Europeans find ourselves in the midst of fundamental changes, politically, economically and ecologically, and in terms of our security. We are called upon to create, in accordance with the CSCE's Charter of Paris, a free and democratic Europe based on the right of self-determination as well as the rights of minorities.

We must courageously seize this great opportunity for Europe. There must be no relapse into narrow-minded nationalism. Such a process of political "renationalisation" in Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe would be a danger for Europe. Only by combining all our energies can we avert that danger and fulfil the natural desire of all nations for a democratic way of life in prosperity and security.

We Europeans can achieve this great goal if we tackle the following three tasks with courage and determination: first, developing the European Community into a European union, a United States of Europe; second, incorporating the countries of Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union and the sovereign republics belonging to it, in a peaceful order spanning the whole of Europe; third, consolidating and strengthening the transatlantic partnership and the Atlantic Alliance.

In all three areas WEU must render major contributions of its own. The European Community plays the central rôle in shaping Europe's future architecture. The fundamental

structures that have withstood the test of decades must now be reinforced and qualitatively improved.

Both intergovernmental conferences are striving to put the Community on course for economic and monetary as well as political union. The conclave of the twelve foreign ministers ended only yesterday in Brussels, having achieved further compromise on a number of issues.

A central element of the political union being sought is a common foreign and security policy and defence. I was very interested, Mr. President, to note that you too spoke just now of defence, rather than of a defence policy. All member states advocate a European security identity as well as greater European responsibility for matters of defence.

It has been proposed that the elaboration and implementation of that policy be placed in the hands of WEU, which will thus become the union's defence component. This key issue, the future task and rôle of the organisation, was the main topic of discussion at the last two meetings of WEU ministers on 29th October and 18th November, who were asked to consider several constructive proposals: a British-Italian declaration; a Franco-German initiative launched by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand; and deliberations by Secretary-General van Eekelen.

The ministerial discussions focused on three crucial topics: first, the development of WEU into the defence component of European integration and the corresponding organisational measures; second, WEU's political and organisational integration with the European union. European union is the goal. Originally only the term "union" was used, but I am glad that everyone is now prepared to add "European" to that rather colourless concept; third, the complementarity and transparency of the relationship between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance.

After the ministerial meeting, the discussions were continued by foreign and defence ministry experts.

Owing to the great political significance of the decisions to be taken, crucial questions still remain which will have to be resolved by the time of the summit meeting or in Maastricht itself as part of the overall package. On 27th November Germany, as Chairman-in-Office, sent a report to the Dutch President of the EC Council.

In Brussels yesterday it was possible to achieve substantial progress on foreign and security policy and with regard to the European defence identity.

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

It lies in the nature of the EC-WEU relationship that membership of WEU must be open to member states of the European Community. We are aware of Greece's wish to become a member of WEU and – I am speaking for Germany – view it favourably.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the second major task facing us Europeans is that of strengthening our transatlantic links. Here several European organisations must work in parallel.

In recent years we have consistently intensified the European Community's consultations with the United States. The joint declaration of November 1990 placed relations on a solid foundation and gave them a new quality. That relationship must be developed further still.

The NATO summit conference held in London in 1990, the NATO Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1991 and the NATO summit in Rome on 7th and 8th November of this year have produced unequivocal declarations on the future rôle of the alliance in a changing security environment. The final communiqué of the Rome meeting underscores NATO's key rôle in developing a new and lasting peaceful order in Europe. The contribution which the United States and Canada are making to collective security and defence, as well as their rôle in the CSCE, emphasise the quality of the transatlantic relationship.

At the NATO foreign ministers' conference in Copenhagen and the NATO summit in Rome it was also confirmed that it is up to the Europeans to decide on the development of Europe's defence identity and its rôle in defence. WEU's increasingly important rôle was emphasised in this connection. In this way the alliance's heads of state and government gave a fresh impulse for the development of a European security and defence identity.

WEU's endeavours to establish its own defence identity in the framework of European unification not only enhance Europe's identity but also, in the view of the nine members of WEU, strengthen the alliance's European pillar.

In debating Europe's security and defence identity WEU also considered the question of its close co-operation with the Atlantic Alliance. We are all agreed that this co-operation must take place in the spirit of mutual trust. WEU has made proposals regarding the structure of that co-operation, the basic requirements of which should be transparency and complementarity. WEU is thus rendering its own important contribution to the safeguarding and strengthening

of the transatlantic partnership. Our joint undertaking consolidates and reinforces the alliance. This has been confirmed by NATO's Copenhagen and Rome declarations.

The third major challenge in building tomorrow's Europe is to lead the new democracies in Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union and the sovereign republics belonging to it, into the western community. With the cold war and Europe's ideological division over we cannot afford a new kind of division, this time between rich and poor. Such a separation would pose a threat to our own security since security increasingly presupposes economic, social and ecological stability.

This policy of co-operative security is consistent with the Harmel report of 1967 and was incorporated in the Charter of Paris adopted on 21st November 1990. The CSCE has thus initiated the conceptual breakthrough into a new peaceful order in Europe.

The CSCE's instruments for settling political conflicts and preserving the co-operative security structures and the obligations assumed must be further strengthened. The truth of this is demonstrated day in, day out by the brutal war being waged by the Yugoslav People's Army against Croatia.

The European Community is perseveringly seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict in Yugoslavia. It has sent a monitoring mission there and convened the conference on Yugoslavia chaired by Lord Carrington. All Community initiatives have met with the explicit support of the CSCE and the United Nations. There are good prospects of the Security Council sending a United Nations peace-keeping force to Yugoslavia. The condition for this, however, is an effective cease-fire and the approval of all parties to the conflict, which already exists in principle.

At two extraordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers in September, and at the meetings on 29th October and 18th November, WEU discussed the situation in Yugoslavia at the request of the European Community. On the instructions of the ministers an ad hoc group of representatives of foreign and defence ministries discussed the possibility of WEU actively supporting the EC monitors in Yugoslavia.

This work was supplemented after the last ministerial meeting on 18th November by deliberations as to how WEU could render its own practical contributions should the United Nations send a peace-keeping force. The member states also stated their willingness to participate in measures to establish humanitarian corridors in order to help the civilian population, and especially children, and possibly evacuate them from the battle areas.

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

As President of the Council I can inform you today that WEU has made the necessary arrangements and for the time being completed its deliberations with a view to supporting, if necessary, operations by the European Community or the United Nations in Yugoslavia within the scope of its capabilities.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the conflict in Yugoslavia proves that our efforts to create co-operative security structures in Europe only mark the beginning. We need more intensive dialogue, consultation and co-operation between all of Europe's organisations and the countries of Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. Those organisations are, apart from the CSCE, above all the European Community, the Council of Europe and NATO, but also WEU.

A few days ago the European Community initialled association agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. They are intended to enable these three countries to establish closer economic relations with the West with a view to their future membership of the Community. Agreements with the other democracies in the region must follow.

The Council of Europe has already admitted Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia as members. It has also offered itself as a forum for political dialogue to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union and paved the way for their involvement in Council activities through accession to major conventions. In this way the Council of Europe is promoting the reform processes in these countries and awareness of the common European heritage, human rights, rule of law and pluralist democracy.

At the NATO summit in Rome, the Atlantic Alliance proposed the institutionalisation of its contacts and consultations with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe including the Soviet Union and invited their foreign ministers to attend a meeting of the NATO Council in December. That meeting will decide on the creation of a North Atlantic Co-operation Council and other measures designed to intensify contacts.

WEU, too, has been meeting this challenge. At the request of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and latterly Bulgaria and Romania, the WEU Secretary-General and a representative of the presidency have been on fact-finding trips to these countries. At the last WEU ministerial meeting on 18th November it was decided to invite their foreign and defence ministers to come to a special meeting with the members of the Council.

The presidency and the Secretary-General are to make further exploratory missions to the

Soviet Union and the Baltic states, if the latter so wish. The seminars which the WEU Institute has conducted with representatives of these countries, the last one having taken place in Paris at the end of November, serve to promote mutual understanding. The WEU activities are complementary to the parallel activities of the alliance and the European Community.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, there are other WEU activities I should like to mention which reveal the organisation's new dynamism.

Co-operation among the member states in outer space is acquiring a new dimension. At the meetings of the Council of Ministers on 22nd June and 18th November it was decided to establish a satellite data analysis centre and training facility in Spain as from 1st January 1992. In addition, a study group consisting of representatives of member states is to be set up in Paris to explore the possibilities of a European space-based observation system.

The study of ways and means of intensifying operative co-operation in the political-military and in the military sphere has been continued intensively.

Member states have continued their discussions on the verification of arms control agreements and have approved a set of rules for multinational inspection teams. In July, acting on behalf of WEU, I contacted the Soviet Foreign Minister with a view to reactivating the open skies talks. They have since been resumed.

Finally, the Working Group on the Mediterranean has continued to discuss proposals regarding security in that region. They were also asked to consider the question of developing contacts between WEU and the Maghreb states.

Allow me in conclusion to summarise briefly the outlook for the second half-year of the German presidency. We can already see where the emphasis will lie.

WEU will continue to be occupied with the Yugoslav People's Army's war against Croatia and its implications for European security and stability. Whether our organisation will participate actively in peace-keeping operations will depend on the decisions of the United Nations, the European Community and the CSCE. I shall if necessary convene another special meeting of the Council of Ministers to decide whether, in a given case, WEU should participate.

The decisions on European foreign and security policy and defence to be taken by the European Council in Maastricht will also be crucial for WEU's future rôle as the defence element in the process of European integration. The German presidency hopes to be able to launch the implementation of those decisions as

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

soon as possible in the competent bodies of WEU. I think it will be necessary for the ministers to consider this matter once again.

In compliance with the decision taken by ministers on 18th November, I shall at the beginning of next year invite the foreign and defence ministers of the Central and Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, to attend a special ministerial meeting at which the most recent developments in the Soviet Union will also be considered. At that meeting we shall together decide on the creation of a consultative council and other co-operative measures.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the exceptional dynamism that has enveloped WEU in recent months requires continuous dialogue between the Council and the Parliamentary Assembly on the basis of mutual trust. I wish to take this opportunity to thank you all for your co-operation and valuable contributions in recent months. You have stimulated our work and eased the task of decision-making. I appeal to you to continue to give the Council your advice and support in its efforts to cope with the important tasks confronting it in the months ahead.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your speech which provides a great deal of substance for us to debate.

A number of members have put down their names to speak. I shall call them in the order listed. If other members wish to speak would they please inform me quickly so that we can keep to the set time-limits.

I call Sir John Stokes.

Sir John STOKES (*United Kingdom*). – We are all grateful to Mr. Genscher for spending so much time with us and for giving us such a wide review of WEU's activities. May I please ask him something about Germany that I heard yesterday or the day before from Dutch television executives about the rise of Nazism in Germany itself? How serious is that and what are the German Government doing about it?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we are currently witnessing the growth of extremist groups throughout Europe. In Germany the first pan-German elections, held a year ago, showed that these groups enjoy really minimal support among the electors. This is evidence of the maturity of democracy in united Germany.

This does not alter the fact that we utterly condemn excesses of the kind that are occurring,

particularly in eastern Länder, and that we are doing everything we can to counteract these developments, politically and by other means.

I must tell the honourable member that we also have to bear some of the burden of forty years of communist rule in East Germany, a communist rule that persuaded the people there that that part of Germany had nothing to do with Germany's past, which meant that there – in contrast to the Federal Republic – the German past was not dealt with democratically, but dictatorially obliterated from memory. We now have to bear the effects of this, along with other burdens inherited from forty years of socialism.

But German democracy has such persuasive power that I have not the slightest doubt that we shall cope with this development. We derive the power of German democracy from the strength of democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany, and from the strength of the peaceful movement for freedom in East Germany in 1989 and 1990. One result of this development, of which I am extremely proud, is the fact that representatives from East Germany have now joined us in Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rowe.

Mr. ROWE (*United Kingdom*). – I thank Mr. Genscher for the final sentences of his speech in which he accorded this parliamentary Assembly a value. He will know that the Council of Ministers is about to receive a report, of which the general tone is that the Council has been somewhat contemptuous of this Assembly's actions. I believe that the contempt would not be possible if the parliamentary Assembly were really useful to the Council of Ministers. Similarly, I believe that the Americans would come here if they saw a value in coming. I wonder whether Mr. Genscher, as Chairman of the Council of WEU, would give us some advice on the ways in which this parliamentary Assembly could increase its usefulness to ministers, so that the Council of Ministers would accord us a more practical value than would appear sometimes to be the case.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Willingly. The value we attach to the Assembly is expressed not only by my presence here, but above all by the discussions we have with representatives of the Political Committee, discussions which the German presidency feels should be held as often as possible. I have always found these discussions very informative, and I hope they will be held again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I can vouch for the fact that the German presidency has been most willing to keep parliament informed and to improve the quality of relations between the presidency and the Assembly.

I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Genscher mentioned both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and in both the federal system is subject to centrifugal force: they are both breaking up. There are other examples in the world such as Quebec and Kashmir. Will the German Government, within the EC, play its part to ensure that nothing is done to sow the seeds of any possible break-up in future?

May I remind Mr. Genscher, on Maastricht, that the motion on which the British Prime Minister, John Major, secured a substantial majority in the House of Commons two weeks ago included the words “on issues of Community competence concentrates the development of action on those issues which cannot be handled more effectively at national level and, in particular, avoids intrusive Community measures in social areas which are matters for national decision”? The motion also includes the words “avoids the development of a federal Europe”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The questions raised by Mr. Jessel open up a wide debate. To the extent that the House of Commons has endorsed the view that tasks better performed at national level should be performed at that level, it has endorsed the principle of subsidiarity, a principle which we Germans value particularly highly, because it is a concept derived from federalism.

The reservations of the House of Commons about federalism do not entirely accord with this. This is because the term federal has a completely different sense in the United Kingdom from, say, its interpretation in Germany. I deliberately refrain from using the word continental and say instead in Germany, because for us federalism is the opposite of centralism, whereas in the United Kingdom it tends to be seen as a movement towards centralism.

Now we know arguments over words are the enemies of all reasonable solutions. If we can basically agree to apply the principle of subsidiarity while creating Community bodies capable of action, it will not be all that important whether we call them federal or something else. What is vital is that we create a European Community that is capable of action.

As regards Yugoslavia, Mr. Jessel put a question to me as German Foreign Minister, so I

will answer him in that capacity. United Germany believes it has a responsibility to support even more resolutely and explicitly those values which unite us and which we set out in the Charter of Paris. These common values include human rights, the rights of minorities and the right to self-determination.

It was only by exercising the right to self-determination that we regained German unity, with the support of all our partners in Europe. It would be inconsistent, implausible and, in fact, cynical of us to deny other European peoples this right to self-determination. This means that in this matter Germany is not siding with one or other nation in Yugoslavia: it is entirely on the side of peace and opposed to war, on the side of human rights, the rights of minorities and the right to self-determination. We will also uphold this view in the future in any position of responsibility we may occupy.

We are trying to ensure that all these problems can be solved through negotiation. I would remind you that the peace conference in The Hague is the outcome of a Franco-German initiative, as is the arbitration committee. This shows how interested we are.

We are also interested because close and friendly relations developed between Germany and Yugoslavia after the second world war. It was Germany that made particular efforts to bring Yugoslavia closer to the European Community. It was Germany that gave particular emphasis to Yugoslavia's leading rôle in the non-aligned movement. That is why we are also interested in seeing good relations restored among all the peoples in Yugoslavia, with Germany and also with the European Community.

As regards the proposed solutions now under discussion, including the recognition of the independence of those republics that want it, a time-limit has been set, as you know, not by Germany but by the Dutch presidency, which stated on 10th October 1991 that the political process would be allowed a month, or at most two months, and a decision on recognition would then be taken. This time-limit expired on 10th December. That is not the whole solution. It must be accompanied by the European Community's willingness to offer association to the republics which gain independence, are co-operative and acknowledge the principles of the Charter of Paris. We must not push them away from Europe. We must not banish them to an outmoded form of nationalism: we must give them the chance of becoming part of Europe, by offering them association agreements which may eventually lead to membership.

Allow me to say this, ladies and gentlemen: if we Europeans in the European Community and here in Western European Union have a respon-

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

sibility, it is that we must not abandon to nationalism any of the nations in South-East and Central Europe which are now able to express their identity after decades of ideological suppression. We should accept that Europe must open its doors to them, our Community must open its doors to them. We must give them a European option. Otherwise, we will drive them back into nationalism.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next speaker is Mr. Fioret.

Mr. FIORET (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Genscher, as you said in your excellent speech, peace and security at this moment of history can be threatened by strife between people of different race and nationality, as is indeed happening in Yugoslavia. In order to prevent or put an end to any conflicts that may arise do you think, Minister, that it would be possible and useful to set up, within WEU, a permanent integrated peace-keeping force to be used as such if so requested by the United Nations?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Senator, I do not believe there are any differences of opinion in Western European Union on the need for this organisation to make forces available for measures designed to preserve peace. But in recent months we have witnessed a significant development where Western European Union is concerned. In the past many of the members of Western European Union worked on the premise that Western European Union stood, as it were, between NATO and the European Community and had no special relationship with the European Community. But in recent months the European Community has called on Western European Union to make its potential available within the overall effort to find a peaceful solution in Yugoslavia. In other words, a relationship, if you like, has been established between the European Community and Western European Union, which is also reflected in the Franco-German initiative taken by the Federal Chancellor and the President of the Republic.

What is important is not only that the European Community has issued this mandate, but that this effort has also been endorsed by the CSCE countries.

The Committee of Senior Officials, known as the emergency mechanism, has considered this development under German chairmanship several times. The European Community's decisions, including those in which the Community addresses Western European Union, have had

the support of the CSCE, including, therefore, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Our organisation, Western European Union, has thus been given a task which places it in a completely new European context.

I remember the days when Western European Union was defamed as being a special cold-war organisation. Today it is an organisation at the service of all CSCE member countries. This shows what has changed in Europe, how awareness has changed. But it also shows what acceptance of our organisation means.

The interesting thing is that the CSCE has said that European countries which belong neither to the European Community nor to Western European Union may participate in the monitoring mission or provide troops for any peace-keeping measures. For example, there are monitors from Poland. Poland and Czechoslovakia have offered troops. This means that our organisation is becoming the nucleus of a European force, not in opposition to anyone, but with the approval of all CSCE countries.

The fact that this new quality – which is really what we now want to achieve in Maastricht – is no more than the logical consequence of a development that has now actually occurred, is what makes me so confident about the tasks of this organisation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ewing.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – I always enjoy listening to Mr. Genscher. He is the longest serving foreign minister in the European Community and his extensive knowledge of world affairs is obvious to all. Therefore, if I am slightly critical of him, that must be seen against the background of my respect for him.

During my time as a member of the parliamentary Assembly, successive Chairmen of the Council of Ministers have come here and succeeded in leaving us with the clear impression that we are an important body doing an important job.

So much for the rhetoric: the record bears no relation to it. I offer two or three examples in support of my claim. I agree with what my colleague Andrew Rowe said about our not being treated with the kind of respect to which a parliamentary assembly is entitled. It was not the Council of Ministers of WEU that issued the statement that there would be no military intervention in Yugoslavia, for instance. It was the foreign ministers of the Twelve. There was no press comment except for the press conference held by Mr. Genscher himself.

It was also the foreign ministers of the Twelve who gave the parliamentary Assembly the mandate to seek ways of protecting the monitors in Yugoslavia, and those same foreign ministers



*Mr. Ewing (continued)*

gave us the clear impression that we were answerable to the European Parliament, not to our Council of Ministers.

The restrictive budget within which the Assembly must operate does not reflect the new dynamism to which Mr. Genscher referred in his otherwise excellent address. There is simply no evidence of this new dynamism.

My final example concerns the establishment of the satellite data station, the decision on which was not communicated to WEU until two months after it was taken – that is how long it took the Council to tell us about it. I suggest, in the friendliest possible way, that there is no evidence to support the view that Western European Union is set to become a more powerful or meaningful body. Until we see evidence to the contrary, I hope that Mr. Genscher will not blame us for being slightly sceptical.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – As regards the statements made on the conflict in Yugoslavia by the European Community on the one hand and Western European Union on the other, I would ask Mr. Ewing to bear in mind the relationship between the two organisations. It would certainly be an undesirable duplication of effort, which would be scarcely comprehensible in view of the identical membership situation, if Western European Union were now to have some kind of policy of its own on Yugoslavia. But it is probably right to say that Western European Union places itself – and is also placed – at the service of the political decision-makers in the European Community. This relationship will become even clearer in the future, which will not mean a loss of importance for Western European Union, but a gain in its tasks and responsibility. That is how it must be seen.

I cannot answer the question about information on the satellite programme. I will look into it, of course, because I cannot imagine that you would say something without having just cause.

As regards the financial endowment, this is a problem with which every parliament understandably has to wrestle – and every ministry, for that matter. I could have joined in the applause at this juncture, but I think it dangerous to assume that dynamism is a question of money. Dynamism in politics is as much a question of money as piety in church is a matter of money.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to ask Mr. Genscher one more question about Yugoslavia. The approach to the problem on the part of the United Nations, the Council of WEU and the EC has been that we would be prepared to intervene once the conflict had ceased and a cease-fire had stuck. It has been said that we will wait and behave even-handedly.

Mr. Genscher has doubtless seen the report by EC observers of 26th November, however, which specifically blames Serbian aggression. He has confirmed that himself today. The observers go on to say that WEU should consider the possibility of deterring the aggressors by both aerial and naval means. Will the Foreign Minister comment on that?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I feel I have made myself sufficiently clear on the question of who is to blame for the hostilities. This has been the Federal Government's position from the outset. We naturally consider it important that the monitors have supported this position. I hope the monitors' report will be read in all the capitals, including the one from which we heard only yesterday that Germany was siding unilaterally with Croatia.

As regards the deployment of armed forces without the approval of parties to the conflict – intervention, in other words – the Security Council of the United Nations has sole authority in this respect. The Security Council has not taken a decision to this effect. Western European Union has as little authority as the European Community or the CSCE as currently constituted.

I would like to make it clear to Sir Russell Johnston that I regret the fact that the institutionalisation of the CSCE has not yet reached a stage where we can take measures to ensure security and stability, even on a limited scale, in the territory of the CSCE countries. That would be an advance. It would also comply with the Charter of the United Nations, which explicitly permits the establishment of regional organisations.

May I say at this juncture that I was extremely interested to read the comments of the outgoing Secretary-General of the United Nations. He said the time had come when it should be possible for international organisations to intervene when human rights, the rights of minorities and the constitutional order were under threat. I defended this view on Germany's behalf at the CSCE conference held in Moscow in September, when I said the time had come for us in Europe to have the capacity to intervene, even against

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

the wishes of the country concerned, if it was a question of safeguarding the constitutional order, safeguarding human rights, and safeguarding the rights of minorities.

I can tell Sir Russell that this proposal has particularly strong support from the Soviet Government, following the experience of the failed coup. But I should also add that considerable reservations were expressed by quite a few friendly governments, who were afraid this might now become the accepted thing, in various forms. We have to learn to live with this.

We had good reason to introduce the principle of consensus in the CSCE, as the only way in which we could set in motion the process of development we intended to set in motion with the Helsinki Final Act. I believe the time has now come, not to question the principle of consensus, but to modify it to mean the consensus of everyone except the country concerned. If we could achieve that in the CSCE, we would be making progress. This is not itself an answer to the question about military intervention, which in our world order only the Security Council can decide, and for which it alone is responsible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pahtas, Observer from Greece.

Mr. PAHTAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – I should like to thank Mr. Genscher for the tremendous constructive efforts which Germany, his country, and he himself have made on behalf of European integration.

In your speech, Minister, you said that WEU was the defence component in the process of European integration. This objective is first and foremost political. Do you not think that if we ultimately achieve European political union our institution, WEU, should be enlarged to include all the member countries of the European Community – not just those which are also members of the Atlantic Alliance – which want this to happen so that the European security dimension can have its logical place in the political union and can be backed by the necessary political resources?

Do you think a start could be made at Maastricht in the coming days?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I agree with you that it follows on logically from the relationship between the European Community and Western European Union that the member states of the European Community should be able to become members of Western European

Union if they want to. There are no obstacles to this. That is what I implied in my statement. I therefore feel that Greece should be supported in its intention to become a member of Western European Union.

But Mr. Pahtas has introduced a restriction by referring to the member states of the European Community that belong to NATO. Although minds have not been made up on this within Western European Union, I do not believe this restriction should be compulsory. It might even be an advantage for a country which belonged to the EC but not to NATO, and was prepared to enter into all the obligations that go with membership of Western European Union, to become part of the joint defence effort in this way. I can only speak for myself, but that is how I would see it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Over the years, Mr. Genscher, you have built up a reputation for freedom, for supporting the rule of law and for believing in the paramouncy of parliamentary democracy.

In your speech, you said that you thought that WEU membership should be open to members of the European Community; you then specified Greece. As you will know, this parliamentary Assembly is composed of members of all nine parliaments, including your Bundestag. Are you aware that, only two days ago, this parliamentary Assembly passed a document which stated that membership should not be confined to members of the Community, but should be open to members of NATO, and also specifically linked Greece and Turkey? Will this be an opportunity for ministers to recognise the paramouncy of their parliamentarians, and – a point made by Mr. Ewing and Mr. Rowe – to listen to the views of those parliamentarians; or will they continue to take little or no notice of the Assembly when it deals with such an important issue in such a constructive manner?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I must begin by telling Sir Geoffrey Finsberg that I did not comment on this question in my address. What I did comment on was the question whether countries that belong to the European Community have a right to become members of Western European Union. If I understand what you said about the recommendation correctly, you share this opinion.

This does not answer the other question, about whether countries that belong to the

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

NATO alliance and fulfil all the other conditions, but do not belong to the European Community, may join Western European Union. A more convincing answer to this question will be possible after the European summit meeting in Maastricht, because the definition of the relationship between the European Community, European union and Western European Union will tell us more about this. It is clearly possible under the treaty. There is absolutely no doubt about that: it is possible under the treaty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as leader of the Spanish Delegation, I should like to tell Minister Genscher that we are fully in agreement with the lines of his statement and that what he has said fills us with hope regarding the future rôle of WEU.

After many dormant years the union is reviving, we think principally for two reasons, first because of progress in the construction of Europe and secondly, and paradoxically, because of a certain disengagement by the United States and that country's demand that we Europeans shoulder more responsibility for our own security.

Mr. Minister, it gives us great satisfaction that this revival or reactivation of the organisation should coincide with the accession to WEU of Spain which became a member as part of the process of our integration with Europe. This is why we believe that the alliance will not be weakened but rather strengthened by WEU as the eastern pillar of the alliance, because WEU must be the platform on which Community policy with regard to security and defence is discussed and framed.

This explains why it is of prime importance to enlarge WEU to include Community countries that are not members. Hence my first question is: does not Minister Genscher think that it is extremely urgent to extend membership in WEU to Community countries not already members? And Mr. Genscher will see that on this subject there are parliamentarians within this Assembly who hold completely opposite views to those of other parliamentarians, which is of course inevitable.

My second question to Mr. Genscher is this: if WEU does not take on the job of defining and framing Community policy on security, do you not think that the Community will be forced to create another instrument which would not only duplicate and overlap functions but would also deprive Western European Union of much of its substance?

Thank you, Mr. Minister. Please be assured of our confidence and support in the performance of your office.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – If Mr. Martinez studies the NATO document, by which I mean both the statement made by the foreign ministers in Copenhagen and the declaration at the Rome summit, he will see that NATO assigns an important rôle to Western European Union. This is to be welcomed and shows that the work we do here, including the development of a European security identity, a European defence policy and even European defence, will not, I hope, pose any problems for NATO.

In preparation for both the conference in Copenhagen and the conference in Rome, I joined with my American counterpart in putting forward a proposal concerning, on the one hand, our relationship with our eastern neighbours and, on the other hand, the various aspects of the European security and defence identity in the alliance, because we Germans are interested in ensuring that the United States and Canada are fully aware of every step we take in Europe and that, while every step we take is helpful to the European identity, it also strengthens transatlantic ties.

In my discussions with the Americans – if I might just add this – I have found them to be more European than some Europeans in certain respects or, to put it another way, it is no good pointing to the United States as an excuse for avoiding closer European unification. The Americans are aware of this. There is simply no other way. We must not forget that, when the United States launched the Marshall plan after the second world war, it did so in the expectation that there would be Western European or European unification. This basic approach in American post-war policy keeps on coming to light. So I do not see what we have undertaken to achieve at Maastricht and what this will entail for our union as a problem for the western alliance. If we treat this with great openness, sincerity and transparency, which is how it was discussed in Rome, I feel it can only strengthen the transatlantic relationship.

The Maastricht communiqué – this much we can already say – will make it clear that the European Community sees Western European Union as an integral part of the process of European unification. If that is included in the treaty, it will also determine the place of our Western European Union.

It would therefore be completely wrong to think up another organisation. I even take the

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

view that, if it did not exist, it would have to be invented, so that provision could be made for defence. In all these developments, I really see only a belated but all the more emphatic confirmation of the need for our union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, according to some sources, you have said that Germany intends to recognise the independence of Croatia on 11th December. I should therefore like to ask you one or two questions.

Do you intend to put this item on the agenda for the Maastricht summit?

As some of the twelve member states are well known to have serious reservations about this declaration of independence, does your country intend to take the decision after Maastricht?

Do you think that recognition of Croatian independence can help to resolve that country's tragedy?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Germany has never been outdone in its loyalty to the decisions of the European Community, and this is equally true here. A study of the European Community's declaration will show that all twelve member states foresee the prospect of recognising the independence of the republics, which is what they want. The chronological sequence has been set by the Dutch presidency without any opposition from the other eleven: one to two months from 10th October. So this two-month period has almost expired.

The European Community's communiqué of 28th October clearly reflects the intention to recognise these republics. So if Germany proceeds to recognition, it is doing what the European Community has decided. Those who do not recognise these republics will be distancing themselves from the Community's decision. So it is not Germany that should be accused of going it alone, but those who are not complying with yesterday's declarations. But I am sure they will all follow.

We do not intend to consider this matter in Maastricht, if only because the Maastricht agenda is already overloaded and also because the time-limit, 10th December, is the second day of the summit meeting at Maastricht. But there will be a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 16th December, when this item will be on the agenda, and we will discover which countries have, like us, opted for recognition in line with the decisions taken earlier.

As I have already said in answer to an earlier question, recognition is only one element: it is simply the recognition of the peoples' right to self-determination. This presupposes, of course, that the countries wanting to be recognised commit themselves to the principles of the Charter of Paris and the Helsinki Final Act and particularly to respect for the rights of minorities. Given the ethnic mix in Yugoslavia as it once was, this question is particularly important in that country's case. Germany is not advising the republics wanting independence as a government, but as an expert on international law and human rights in the development of instruments to protect the rights of minorities. We are advising these republics that they should accept each and every proposal Lord Carrington has made on the EC's behalf with respect to the rights of minorities.

The acceptance of the rights of minorities also presupposes – and I attach considerable importance to this – that frontiers are not violated. I believe our premise that frontiers are inviolable did a great deal to ensure peace and stability in Europe after the second world war. I must tell Mr. Baumel that during the discussion of the Helsinki Final Act in 1974-75 all the various countries apart from the then Federal Republic of Germany agreed that there should be a reference to the immutability of frontiers. We said at that time that provision must be made for peaceful change in at least one case, that of German unity, because we Germans wanted the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic to become one state and the frontier between them to be removed. We wanted to achieve this not by warlike but by peaceful means. So peaceful change was included. But there is a general consensus on this.

This was not just theoretical talk on Germany's part: it was put into practice, because in connection with German unity we concluded a treaty on the German-Polish frontier which brings a painful chapter of our European history to an end. This decision – I would just add, Mr. Baumel – clearly demonstrates how responsibly united Germany is acting. Remember, this treaty was approved in the Bundestag with very few dissenting votes, which is surely evidence of responsibility, even though it was certainly a decision that no one found easy to take.

So I say that any idea of rewarding the Yugoslav National Army's conquests by changing the borders in Yugoslavia would encourage all those living elsewhere in Europe who feel that, as the frontiers are not as nice as they might be, they should be changed by force.

I really must appeal to all political forces to accept this basic wisdom for the sake of European peace and stability. Let us leave fron-

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

tiers as they are, and let us do more to protect minorities. That is the way to ensure peace in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I should like to congratulate Minister Genscher on his speech and especially on what he said about the revitalisation of our organisation. This idea, Minister, underlies all the speeches made at this part-session of the Assembly. Thus the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and this Assembly are in full agreement.

Two questions, Mr. Chairman. One – how could it be otherwise – also has to do with Yugoslavia. There is deep public sadness at the scenes of horror we have seen of the war in Yugoslavia. And one has the impression that not everything that could be done is being done, or that the European organisations have not done all they could to put an end to the massacre.

My question is one which has already been partly answered, Minister, only I should like to ask for a precise answer: is the reason why more effective, bolder and more fearless steps have not been taken the lack of unity between the members of the European Community and of WEU?

A second point under this heading is that the Minister said in his speech, almost as though we were the first to hear it, that he could tell the Assembly that agreement had been reached by the Council only yesterday and that the Council would take the necessary steps; but he did not tell us what those steps were. We should be grateful if he could tell us more about them.

The other question, Mr. Chairman, concerns the Franco-German initiative for a joint army unit which has caused a certain amount of surprise among the other members.

With the greatest respect, Minister, I should like to ask: would it not have been better to propose an initiative of this kind with a larger number of members involved from the start so as to avoid suspicion, or was there an urgent need for a proposal involving these two members only?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – To take the last question first, Spain was certainly not surprised, because it is one of the countries that support the initiative. We said from the outset that, if multilateral forces were formed, the door

would be open to others; it is in the nature of a trigger.

In the process of European unification we repeatedly find one country or a number of countries pressing ahead and presenting a proposal or putting an idea into effect. Such ideas are a threat to European unification only if they claim to be exclusive, but not when they are open. The idea of multilateral forces is open. I believe yours is among the most open of countries where this idea is concerned. So we will have no problems in this respect, nor, I hope, in others.

As regards the decisions on Yugoslavia taken by the Council of Ministers on Monday, I will take this opportunity to answer your question and so perhaps correct some of the public comments that have been made. When we met in Rome on 8th November on the fringes of the NATO meeting, we took a decision on economic sanctions. The intention at that time was that the sanctions should be imposed on the republics in Yugoslavia that are responsible for the war.

The legal situation as it relates to agreements between the European Community and Yugoslavia means that all contractual relations had to be put under notice and suspended. This applied to all the republics. The idea behind the decision taken the day before yesterday was to reinstate all the suspended arrangements in the case of the republics which are co-operative and are not therefore responsible for the continuation of the war. They are the four republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. On the other hand, the sanctions continue to apply to Serbia and Montenegro, which is supporting Serbia above all with troops to besiege and battle for Dubrovnik.

This restriction of sanctions to two republics and the extension of positive measures to four republics does not constitute legal recognition. But it is a burning political issue, because it shows the European Community is no longer thinking in terms of Yugoslavia as a single nation, but is capable of distinguishing between the various republics. It is also an assignment of political responsibility. Consequently, Mr. Lopez Henares, I see the political relevance as being almost more important than the economic implications of these political decisions. This also shows, of course, that the European Community is capable of taking action.

To the question whether the Community had problems in agreeing in the past, I must reply this: it did have problems. Sometimes I simply could not understand what development we envisaged. But the number of countries supporting the German position increased – even to the point of unanimous decisions. I am very grateful for this. I quite appreciate that differ-

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

ences of history and traditions initially resulted in different assessments.

This makes the monitors' report I have mentioned, which, having been drawn up by monitors from all the member states, is highly objective, all the more important. The monitors, who are concerned to present a very balanced picture, have surely made it abundantly clear who is to blame.

I believe that, in coping with this grave development in Yugoslavia, we must make it absolutely clear that in the last decade of this century we simply cannot allow political problems to be solved by military means. We had hoped we had reached that stage, in Europe at least, but we now find in the middle of Europe a military machine subject to no political control, waging a war on its own initiative, but with political backers of course. That is unacceptable. If the world and Europe simply look on, others who think and may be prepared to act in the same way will be encouraged.

So we are deciding not only on our attitude towards the peoples of Yugoslavia but ultimately on what we are prepared to do for peace in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, when the lives of many thousands of Kurds were in danger in Northern Iraq at the beginning of this year, we decided to send military personnel there to create safe havens for them. In so doing, we also created international law. We did so although this was to some extent in conflict with international law.

In Yugoslavia we are now seeing a crisis much closer to home. In reply to a question from Sir Russell Johnston, the Minister rightly said that any military intervention on our part must be based on a mandate from the international community, in other words the United Nations. Now, I am the last person to want a massive military intervention in Yugoslavia at the moment. The way has not been paved for this. I would urge Minister Genscher not to make himself a hostage with this statement to one country, one permanent member of the Security Council, which might impose its veto on any action of this nature, if the right conditions were created. And how are we going to solve this in the future? I am saying this to you, Mr. Genscher, because you play a prominent part in the CSCE mechanism, which will have to develop in Europe into a mechanism that is capable of containing conflicts of this kind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, I am going to call Mr. Soell, the last speaker on

the list, to put his question now, so that you can answer him together with Mr. De Hoop Scheffer in the five minutes which remain.

I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, the length of the questions put by our colleagues shows that we parliamentarians are inquisitive. In your address you said that progress had been made in Brussels yesterday in the formulation of a common foreign and security policy. We would like to know precisely what progress has been made. I am sure this would interest the Assembly.

Secondly, you rightly said that the United States has taken a serious interest in European unification, certainly since 1947, since the Marshall plan. We know the Americans are not delighted with everything that this process of European unification entails. They naturally want to maintain their political influence, despite a dwindling military presence following the events in Eastern Europe.

How do you explain the United States' almost total political abstinence in connection with the conflict in Yugoslavia? After all, this conflict is taking place in a region that is situated between two NATO countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I will first reply to the question on the work of the Security Council. As I told you, I would be very pleased if we could provide the CSCE, as a kind of sub-organisation in Europe, with a set of instruments that enable action to be taken. I hope we will have the general support of all CSCE member countries in this. It would also be appropriate to create a set of pan-European instruments of this kind, in view of the new quality of European relations. It cannot be achieved in any other way, but it will take some time. Otherwise, we will have to rely on the familiar mechanisms, which did in fact fulfil their task in the Gulf war. There was no veto in the Gulf war. So all we can do is try to improve the quality of our institutions and instruments in view of the high quality of the relations developing in Europe – notwithstanding any setbacks such as we see in Yugoslavia.

As for Mr. Soell's question about the progress being made – I mentioned this in my address – we have made considerable progress in matters relating to European security and defence, in as much as Western European Union has been allotted an integral part in the process of European unification, this being the crux of the Franco-German initiative. As a result, we are capable of action in this field as well. Answers to a number of other questions can then be derived from this.

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

As regards the United States' attitude towards the process of European unification it is in total agreement: it welcomes it. The fact that the Americans do not agree with every one of our decisions is a matter of give and take. From time to time Europeans have objected to this or that decision by the United States. There is nothing unusual about that.

What is important is that we establish a trustworthy and transparent relationship that accords with our process of unification and does not result in the Atlantic becoming wider thanks to European unification, but, on the contrary, in our moving closer together. The proposed transatlantic and North Atlantic co-operation council would in fact bring the United States much closer to Europe.

As regards the United States' abstinence where Yugoslavia is concerned, there is food for thought here. But I cannot give an answer: it can only come from the American administration.

Mr. President, thank you for your patience and attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. Genscher. The Assembly's applause shows how much your contribution is appreciated. Thank you for what you have said and for your expression of confidence in WEU. We shall now look forward to the Maastricht meeting with far fewer worries.

The sitting is adjourned for a few minutes.

*(The sitting was suspended at 11.30 a.m. and resumed at 11.40 a.m. with Mr. Sinesio, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair)*

The sitting is resumed.

#### **4. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe**

##### **Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis**

*(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee, Docs. 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the reports of the Political Committee on European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe and of the Defence Committee on operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis, Documents 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments.

I call the Rapporteur of the Political Committee, Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, because of developments in Europe since our last session the Political Committee has changed the subject of the report I am to present today.

Following the reports concerned more particularly with the need to revise the modified Brussels Treaty, the committee first thought it would be best to start by analysing the intergovernmental conference of the Twelve on European union with reference to external and security policy and to draw conclusions for the Council of WEU before it, too, turns to the revision of the treaty.

The deepening Yugoslav crisis followed by the coup in the Soviet Union both argued in favour of considering the new security situation and its implications for WEU.

It is in the context of the report now entitled European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe that on 15th October the Presidential Committee adopted a recommendation on events in Yugoslavia. As this recommendation is attached to the report I am now presenting I shall not go into details.

I subsequently went on an information visit to Hungary and Poland on 7th and 8th November last. My conversations with the political authorities in those two countries gave me a useful insight into the concerns of Central European countries regarding security and the possibilities for closer co-operation with Western European Union.

As my talks in Warsaw and Budapest confirmed, the European Community is facing monetary, institutional, economic, internal and external challenges. Europe of the Twelve, which is looked upon from the outside as a model for development and integration, must move ahead faster with integration if it wants to take up the many challenges it has to face over the last few years of the century.

The same is true of Western European Union, whose modified Brussels Treaty states very clearly that its purpose is to contribute to the construction of Europe as a whole.

The results of the two intergovernmental conferences are bound to highlight Western European Union's responsibilities in working out a new order for peace and security in Europe. Our Assembly is keeping a very close watch on the problems facing the European Community and will not fail to make its contribution wherever it feels it to be necessary and more particularly in the areas where it considers that WEU is directly or indirectly involved.

This was the approach taken by the Political Committee in its analysis of the problem of enlargement of the European Community, the

*Mr. Goerens (continued)*

collapse of the Yugoslav state, developments in the Soviet Union, European union on the eve of the Maastricht summit, the Anglo-Italian and Franco-German proposals of October 1991, the last NATO summit in Rome, WEU and Central Europe and the meeting of the WEU Council on 18th November last.

The enlargement of the European Community cannot be considered without taking security and defence into account. In this respect, three categories of European countries have expressed interest in joining the European Community as soon as possible.

Such neutral countries as Switzerland and Austria, which are neutral by international treaty and have a prosperous economy with structures similar to those of the European Community, could fit into a single market with a single currency without major difficulty. Against this, their neutral status would hardly be compatible with membership of a European union with a common foreign and security policy.

Other neutral countries like Sweden and Finland whose neutrality has a completely different historical context would be able, if need be, to waive the principle of neutrality without this involving any revision of an international treaty.

In addition, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta have officially asked to join the European Community.

Moreover, the European Community and the three Central European countries which have gone furthest with democratic and economic reform have in practice already moved closer together. This is clearly demonstrated by the association with the European Community now being worked out.

As I am sure that members of the Assembly will have read the written report carefully I shall not go into too many details and will turn to another problem, that of Yugoslavia.

I shall not repeat in detail the analysis of events in Yugoslavia, but the break-up of that country, the threat of extension of the conflict and the principles involved which are sometimes mutually exclusive all indicate that we must move very carefully in seeking a peaceful European solution for this serious conflict.

Having noted the relative inability of the European Community to intervene in the Yugoslav problem, the report goes on to list the obstacles in the way of more effective or even tougher action by the European Community or Western European Union in this crisis.

In this context it should, of course, be recalled that views within the Council of the European

Communities on essential questions differ. As a single example, no agreement can be reached on whether the Slovene and Croatian republics should be recognised.

Of course, everyone loudly proclaims the right of nations to self-determination and respect for the rights of minorities. It is only when these principles have to be applied that differences start to emerge. The fact is that international law includes few precise, clear and binding references to the protection of minorities or to self-determination as matters of positive law. Positive law on this point contains only vague allusions and in this context I quote the Copenhagen agreements in the framework of the CSCE and the recent German-Polish treaty on the subject.

Being unable to overcome all the obstacles, Europe's only option has been to act through diplomatic channels in the Yugoslav crisis. The only alternative to the European Community's policy would have been a completely different kind of action aimed at imposing peace by the use of force.

I do not intend to go over what everyone knows was a complex debate but I would quote as an example the fact that on 6th July last the Soviet Union – long before the coup – made its opposition known. The United States was not in favour and the United Kingdom ruled out any major action. Should Europe then have shown its strength so as not to have to use it? I gladly leave experts more qualified than myself to answer this question.

Let us try, however, to draw some lessons from a debate of emotions versus reasoned argument. If the use of force to impose peace in Yugoslavia is ruled out, the only remaining means of action are those just mentioned by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Genscher. I will therefore spare you all these details.

On the other hand, the machinery whereby Western European Union is at the service of the Community of the Twelve to implement their policy has worked fairly well. Here I refer you also to the four options listed by the Council of Western European Union in the report.

I now turn to developments in the Soviet Union. With the break-up of that country, security in that part of the world has taken on a completely new pattern. Nobody can be pleased about the critical questions which are mounting up and to which it is becoming increasingly difficult to find the right answer. What army for what political entity? What will happen when the nuclear weapons are dispersed and no longer under central control? Will it be possible to avoid fighting between the different parts of the Soviet Union now moving towards total break-up?



*Mr. Goerens (continued)*

In this context, the Assembly welcomes President Bush's spectacular proposal of 29th September last to eliminate all American short-range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. This brought a favourable response from the Soviet Union, as Mr. Gorbachev replied in positive terms on 5th October 1991 when he in turn made new proposals.

The abandonment by the Soviet Union of its rôle as world policeman is, of course, a challenge to the West and consequently to the European Community and Western European Union whose rôle in helping to maintain order in Europe is starting to become clearer.

As was to be expected, the NATO summit and the WEU Council of 18th November 1991 discussed the problem I have just mentioned in their different ways. The NATO summit declared that the Atlantic Alliance would work towards two objectives simultaneously; these are the adaptation of military co-operation between Western Europe and America to the new international realities and the development of a pan-European security system. This means that the alliance intends that Western European Union should play a greater part than hitherto in the deployment of NATO forces.

In addition, as part of the development of a pan-European security system, the efforts of the CSCE and the Council of Europe should be supported by Western European Union in order to establish the pattern of peace in Europe.

In this context, Western European Union could guarantee support to a number of countries which are concerned about the possible consequences of the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies in Central and Eastern Europe and more particularly in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union today. What I am saying is not to be confused with the enlargement of WEU to take in some Central European countries, as this is not on the agenda. May I however remind the Assembly that last June the Council was asked to make arrangements to associate three Central European countries with the activities of WEU.

The report we are considering therefore follows a line set in advance by the Assembly. Consequently, one of the Political Committee's tasks was to explore the possibilities for closer co-operation between WEU and the three Central European countries - Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland - which have gone furthest with democratic and economic reform.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as I do not wish to overrun my time-limit I shall now turn to the recommendation, concentrating on its most important points.

The Political Committee supported the draft recommendation now before you by a very large majority. It deals with the need to revise the modified Brussels Treaty. This shows consistency on our part. We were the first to begin consideration of the fact that the treaty needed to be revised for reasons on which I shall not dwell. We therefore call on the Council to start work on revision after the Maastricht summit.

We have also tried to explore the possibilities for closer co-operation with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland and suggest that they should be invited at once to participate in meetings of the Council when matters relating to the security of Central and Eastern Europe are discussed. Co-operation might later be extended to association with the activities of the WEU satellite centre for everything relating to the verification of the CFE agreement and participation in the activities of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and all forms of European co-operation in armaments matters.

I do not want the Assembly's position on associating these three countries more closely with WEU to be misunderstood. The Assembly of course made a choice; it wished to co-operate more closely with three countries which appear increasingly likely to join the European Community in the medium or long term. The talks I had in Hungary and Poland show that this was the right line for the committee to take.

As an example, which is dealt with more fully in the report, I shall simply mention the insecurity felt in Hungary because of the violation of Hungarian territory by the Yugoslav army. It is the people who live along the frontier who are most worried. I can also tell the Assembly that the countries I visited are anxious that nothing should be done which might lead the warring parties to spread the conflict across borders. This is why Hungarian troops have been withdrawn from places close to the frontier with Yugoslavia. I can also tell you that Hungary and Poland are very strong in their support for the attitude taken by the European Community in this affair.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I shall limit myself to this presentation which is, of course, incomplete but fuller details can be found in the report which I would ask you to read again. I hope that the Assembly will give the same massive support as the Political Committee to the draft recommendation, so that the Council will be pressed and forced to act in accordance with the Assembly's wishes.

My thanks go to the Political Committee for its valuable assistance in producing the report, and more particularly to Mr. Burgelin of the secretariat who was closely involved in the work of analysis and actual drafting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I should like on your behalf to thank Mr. Goerens who has produced a magnificent report for the Political Committee and has provided in the shortest possible time so much valuable material for a highly topical debate, particularly in the context of the work of WEU.

I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur of the Defence Committee.

Mr. De HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*). – The report that I have the honour to present on behalf of the Defence Committee is, of course, closely related to the report just presented so eloquently by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee. With good reason we gave our report the title "Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis". It tries to answer the question of what kind of operational arrangements our organisation needs to give it its place in a new Europe. It does so on the basis of experience gained during the Gulf war. It looks at what has been done up to now by the relevant WEU bodies and what more should be done to improve our organisation and, given the right conditions, our military effectiveness. This is all in the framework of the efforts at present undertaken by the United Nations, the EC, the CSCE and WEU to bring an end to another crisis on our doorstep – the civil war raging in Yugoslavia.

We should support all the initiatives, and it is good to note in that respect that the present line of thinking in the United Nations – the possible creation of fifty or so safe havens in Yugoslavia – originated in WEU.

The European Community has done all it can to mediate in the crisis but unfortunately it has not been very successful so far.

Political decisions taken in the EC framework certainly have not left WEU untouched. Ministers change their EC hats for their WEU caps more easily than they did during the Gulf crisis. The Yugoslav crisis has shown us at least that WEU can play an important rôle to form the bridge between the Atlantic Alliance and European political union.

That is not to say that WEU should develop into an organisation which operates on the basis of instructions by ministers in another capacity. WEU has its own responsibilities based on its Brussels Treaty. There is a link between WEU and forthcoming European political union. We should support efforts to keep the CSCE involved in the process of finding a lasting solution to the crisis in Yugoslavia.

It is good to know that some countries have already earmarked units for possible peace-keeping operations under a United Nations umbrella and that they are concentrating on

questions of command and control and rules of engagement. That is something else that we learnt from the Gulf crisis and the war, where planning on those vital matters started much too late.

The participation in humanitarian operations should not be refused by any country. Limitations on actions outside traditional areas should not be taken into account. Where the lives of innocent women, children and elderly people are concerned, every country should play its part. It is sad to note that the present humanitarian operation is not operating under a WEU umbrella. There would have been strong arguments in favour of such an operation being operated under a WEU umbrella.

As we look to the days and weeks ahead, we think that it is of great importance that the military joint contingency study group, which has already done useful work in Metz by preparing and presenting the four options to ministers and by providing the United Nations with the result of its work – as I have already said, the United Nations plan is the WEU plan – should reconvene at short notice to analyse other measures which ministers might wish to consider to bring further pressure to bear on those parties who bear the heaviest responsibility for the continuing bloodshed in Yugoslavia. Colleagues will find a number of possible options in my report, among which are measures against indiscriminate bombing by sealing Yugoslav air space, a focus on so-called defensive defence, using electronic counter-measures to best effect, and imposing effective arms and oil embargoes on the Yugoslav republics held responsible for continuing the war. In that respect, I refer to the decisions taken the day before yesterday in the framework of European political co-operation.

It is important to note that the rôle of navies in policing a possible oil embargo should be worked out, as well as the idea of helping third countries that border on Yugoslavia control their landward frontiers, obviously at their request. That need not necessarily be limited to the stationing of military personnel, as proposed in the report just presented by Mr. Goerens. In the view of the Defence Committee, police and/or customs officers could be of great value too.

From my remarks it may be clear that the process of analysing and thinking within WEU must not stop now that the focus of attention is, understandably, shifting towards the United Nations. The thinking seems to have halted and Mr. Genscher did not remove my worries in that respect. That signal is wrong. Every night we see suffering and bloodshed on our television screens. We owe it to our constituents, and for the sake of public opinion about us, to do everything we can to prevent further loss of life and cruelty. That does not allow us to stop thinking

*Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued)*

and analysing, yet that seems to be the situation endorsed by ministers and it is unacceptable. Please mark my words: I am not advocating any form of WEU intervention; I am simply asking ministers to give their subordinates more thinking to do in order to be prepared when further political decisions need to be made.

When I began my brief introduction I spoke about the positioning of WEU in the developing European security structure. WEU has its own – I underline the word own – rôle to play. In other words, there can be no final decision on the operational and political position of WEU at the Maastricht summit of the Twelve at the beginning of next week. WEU ministers should, in the proper forum which is the Council of Ministers, reach further decisions on the basis of the Bonn communiqué of 18th November, taking into account the debates and discussions during the Maastricht summit.

If our organisation wants to be the bridge between a developing European union and the organisation which, in my view, has lost nothing of its validity in securing peace and stability in Europe – I am referring to NATO – a more formal link with the United States of America is important. Therefore, one of our recommendations is that the United States should appoint an ambassador to WEU. One of the amendments invites Canada to do the same. I am happy with that. By appointing ambassadors it would make it clear that on both sides of the Atlantic WEU is seen as an organisation which is complementary to the Atlantic Alliance and has its own rôle to play in debates on the new European defence architecture.

WEU for the 1990s and beyond needs an organisational structure which is up to standard and can face the new and, to a large extent, unforeseen challenges. In my report colleagues will, therefore, find several recommendations to that effect, among which is the strengthening of the position of the Secretary-General by providing him with a military advice group. I am not talking about sending a number of retired generals to London and later to Brussels. I am talking about a real military advice group to advise the Secretary-General and to liaise with national capitals and national defence ministries. There is a recommendation about the institution of a planning staff, as already recommended by the Assembly in its Recommendation 502 in the report presented by our Belgian colleague, Mr. Uyttendaele. There is much about developing a military satellite communications system within WEU, as suggested by the French Defence Minister, Mr. Joxe, early last month.

What more do we need? We need appropriate provisions for command, control, communica-

tions and intelligence. We need further study on air and sea lifts if we want a European rapid reaction force. Sir Dudley Smith will certainly come back to that point when he presents his report tomorrow. Obviously, we need the best standardisation that we can achieve on procurement.

Let me end my introduction with what in the beautiful French language is called a *cri du cœur*. We are all faced with the challenge of building a new Europe in all areas, be they economics and finance, or foreign security policy and defence. That developing new Europe still has many deficiencies. One of those is of vital interest to us as parliamentarians and that is the constant lack of democratic legitimacy of decisions made by governments on the European stage. That democratic gap is a wide one. Let us in this Assembly – the only parliamentary body in Europe with a responsibility for matters of security and defence based on the Brussels Treaty – face the challenge and contribute as much as we can towards making WEU into an organisation that cannot be missed in the Europe of the 1990s and beyond. Ministers, please give us a budget that allows us to do our work properly.

That, in brief, is the core of the report that was unanimously adopted by the Defence Committee and that I have the honour to present today.

I thank the numerous people who made a vital contribution to the writing of the report. Those in the capitals – London, Bonn and Paris – were of great help. I also thank my colleagues on the Defence Committee and – last, but not least – Mr. Colin Cameron, whose help in preparing the report was invaluable.

I hope that we shall use this opportunity to have an interesting and fruitful debate both on this report and on that presented by Mr. Goerens. We are talking not only about Yugoslavia but about the position of our WEU in the near future and beyond.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, for your excellent report.

Twenty speakers have put their names down for the joint debate which will now follow on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee. As the debate has to be closed by the allotted time I must urge speakers to be brief.

The first speaker on the list is Mr. Reddemann. I am sure, however, that he will not object if I first call Mrs. Roe who has a plane to catch. You have the floor, Mrs. Roe.

Mrs. ROE (*United Kingdom*). – I am extremely grateful to you, Mr. President, and to Mr. Reddemann, for giving me the opportunity to speak first. As you said, I have a plane to

*Mrs. Roe (continued)*

catch. The situation has arisen because the debate was not called yesterday and I am afraid that I could not stay until this afternoon.

I congratulate Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on his clear analysis of the Yugoslav crisis and welcome the detailed report that has been presented to the Assembly, because it provides a focus on the sad and tragic catalogue of events that have taken place in the past five months in that war-torn country.

The resolution of this nightmare of conflict, slaughter, destruction and devastation provides the international community with an enormous challenge.

Of course, the possibility of some kind of military intervention has been discussed throughout the summer, but I believe that the member states of WEU were right to be reluctant to commit a peace-keeping force as long as the conflict is still escalating in unpredictable ways with little sign of a durable cease-fire in prospect. It seemed clear that no peace-keeping force could actually impose a cease-fire against the will of the combatants.

To keep the peace one must first have a peace. There must be an effective cease-fire; those who request it must genuinely be prepared to accept it on their territory; the deployment of the force must be seen to be positively productive in terms of contributing to a settlement.

At the moment, if any forces were introduced anywhere in that country, they would be shot at by both sides. They would be committed to an operation that would be lengthy in its duration and extremely hazardous in its character. The most that might be achieved by a peace-keeping force would be the strengthening of a cease-fire already in existence.

We have all seen with horror the appalling scenes on our television screens of the violations of cease-fire agreements especially by the JNA and Serbian irregulars attacking the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik.

It is vital that under no circumstances should territorial changes brought about by force be recognised. No change of frontier should be accepted unless it has come about by peaceful means.

The report before us demonstrates clearly the frequency with which hopes of the achievement of a cease-fire have been dashed – now fourteen times – and we watch again the latest efforts of the United Nations envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, in his mission to clear the way for the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force.

The European Community lifted sanctions the day before yesterday against Yugoslav republics that endorsed the latest European

peace plan, but left them in place against Serbia. Sanctions are also still in place against Serbia's ally, Montenegro, thus further isolating the two, cutting them off from western aid and investment and opening the door for a possible United Nations oil embargo. It is absolutely right that pressure is increased on those responsible for the continuing bloodshed and suffering in Yugoslavia in an attempt to bring the fighting to an end.

Mr. President, I should like to draw attention to three important points that should be taken into account when considering whether the United Nations would actually approach WEU to mount a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia.

First, one of the first considerations in the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation is that the force should be acceptable to the parties involved in the conflict. It is not clear whether all members of WEU would be acceptable to the Yugoslav parties. Surely on this basis it would be for the United Nations to approach individual member states rather than blocs of states.

Secondly, Articles 52 and 53 of the United Nations Charter, which concern regional arrangements, provide for regional agencies to make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes before the disputes are referred to the Security Council. Enforcement action by a regional agency can be taken only with authority from the Security Council and no such decision has been taken.

Thirdly, the United Nations has not reached any agreements with any states or groups of states to provide forces to the United Nations under Article 43 of the Charter.

While I applaud every effort that is being made by WEU to help support the continuing search for a lasting peace in Yugoslavia, I believe that we must also face the realities of what intervention would involve.

*(Mr. Uyttendaele, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddeman.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it was a pleasure for me to allow the lady from the United Kingdom to speak before me. I will even try not to respond to the explanations, which do not quite fit in with my thinking.

But I would point out, Mr. President, that we are in an extremely difficult position not only in political but above all in humanitarian terms. As a rule sanctions imposed on a country do not affect those they are designed to affect, the people in power, but those governed by the people in power.

*Mr. Reddemann (continued)*

I was therefore grateful to the EC Council for its decision to lift economic sanctions at least on the republics which are not to blame for the present crisis. Despite this, I would be grateful if in the course of our work we could consider the possibility of easing the sanctions which, as I have said, affect not the rulers but the ruled.

Military sanctions are completely different. In this case I consider it imperative to implement the recommendation of the Defence Committee. We must ensure that as few weapons as possible reach Yugoslavia, so that this civil war raging between the republics there does not go on for years as the Vietnam war did twenty years ago – even if we or the superpowers do not intervene.

Mr. President, I would be grateful to the Defence Committee if it would consider once again whether action should not be taken against member states of Western European Union or even non-member states which continue to send weapons and other military equipment to this trouble-spot despite the military sanctions imposed. If this Assembly could rouse itself to decide that any country wanting to become a member of Western European Union would ruin its chances for years to come if it continued to supply weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia, we could easily close the present sanctions gap in a reasonable way.

The Defence Committee's Rapporteur has referred to the cease-fire in his recommendations. The question today is whether it was the sixth, seventh, eighth or ninth cease-fire when the Defence Committee gave its approval. We will have a slight problem if we call today for adherence to a cease-fire which we know is no longer being observed, which will in effect mean that we are again simply waving a piece of paper, when rather more pressure is needed.

My appeal to the governments of the member states of Western European Union is that they should impose stricter sanctions on those of the parties still engaged in the civil war who do not accept the cease-fire that has been announced under the aegis of, say, the United Nations or Lord Carrington's committee – and this includes the idea of an oil embargo.

Finally, I feel the Assembly of Western European Union needs to consider in even more detail than the Political Committee with its outstanding Rapporteur how we should concern ourselves in the future with the sovereignty of nations, with the existence of present frontiers and with the explosive potential that exists, particularly in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Because if we only ever become involved in the dispute of the moment, if we only ever think about the current civil war and its outcome, we

will never arrive at an overall concept enabling a just order to be established in that region, based on human rights and the right to self-determination.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Kotenkov, Observer from the USSR.

Mr. KOTENKOV (*Observer from the USSR*) (Translation). – I appreciate the honour of attending the Assembly. I have been following its debates closely and note that it shares my anxiety about the disintegration of the former USSR. I do not believe one can stand in the way of the people's right to self-determination and I am quite aware of the enormous responsibilities my country will have to assume in order to control the processes now under way so as to safeguard the stability of Europe.

At a recent meeting of representatives of all the former republics of the union except the three Baltic states, agreement was reached on a number of points: the right of each sovereign state to have its own armed forces, respect for the principles of collective security and recognition of existing international treaties and undertakings to which the USSR had subscribed. It was also agreed that there must be central control of nuclear weapons. Special working groups have been set up for this purpose.

If disintegration cannot be prevented, the Russian Republic will consider that it can assume the responsibilities and guarantee the commitments of the USSR, including disarmament agreements. As a representative of both the Union and the Russian Parliaments, I can assure the Assembly that all necessary steps will be taken to prevent instability.

Whatever the outcome, there will be a need for co-operation with Western Europe. There can be no question of remedying the imbalance caused by the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact by unilaterally strengthening the forces of the Union. The Union has renounced the ideological dogmas of the past and now wishes to move towards partnership with Western European Union. I hope my country will be able to find the most appropriate form of active co-operation with WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I was rather surprised when you changed the order of the list of speakers, but having heard Mr. Kotenkov's contribution I am delighted that you did, because it allowed the Assembly to hear a call for civilised change. I greatly welcomed the comments made by our Russian guest. Many of us take the view that change must be civilised but also that there is a powerful case for the establishment of central struc-

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

tures of co-operation in the USSR, especially in areas touching on foreign security, energy and macro-economic policy. If that lesson were repeated in Yugoslavia the whole of Europe – particularly the residents of Yugoslavia – would greatly benefit.

These two reports serve the Assembly well. I am sorry that Mr. Goerens's report must be overshadowed by the Yugoslav crisis because it contains much of enormous relevance besides. Mr. De Hoop Scheffer's report is overwhelmingly concerned with the crisis itself.

The problem lies in the display of inadequate crisis management. The disintegration of Yugoslavia has been germinating for more than ten years, since Tito's death. It has become almost inevitable since 1988 when the historic changes in Europe began. Now we are reacting, rather than seeking to make the arrangements that would have prevented the appalling scale of the current crisis.

I am sorry to have to be critical, but, unfortunately, some European countries and politicians have not been helpful. I think that I was in a substantial minority in Strasbourg when I expressed the view that the call for recognition that issued from one or two Yugoslav republics was of no assistance whatever. The recognition of Slovenia may have been appropriate, but neither Slovenia nor Croatia can be removed from the context of the eight republics as a whole.

That call for recognition did not improve the position in any part of Yugoslavia. We were far too conveniently forgetful of the minority problem that exists in all eight of those republics. Even in Slovenia, one person in ten is not Slovenian. In Montenegro, three people in ten form a substantial minority; in Old Serbia, three out of twenty are not Serbs. In Croatia, a quarter of the population is not Croat. A third of Macedonia's population is in a minority, whereas in Bosnia-Herzegovina there is no majority at all, and the largest group is Muslim. In Kosevo three-quarters of the population are Albanian, and the example of Croatia and Slovenia could propel that majority in the direction of Tirana; the problems are enormous.

We have called for economic action. Economic action can harden the heart, and embitter those who are capable of conciliation. Then there is the call for military action. I do not wish to bore my colleagues, but let me remind them that more than three hundred thousand highly professional, highly competent German soldiers were in Yugoslavia during the war, and the Yugoslav people know that they controlled only a small part of the country's territory.

There are those who think that we can send 20 000 or 30 000 men under the auspices of the

United Nations. That will not work. If the peace-keeping force is small, it will be inadequate; if its quality is not good enough the problems will become graver than they were before the troops were sent. If the force is adequate, on the other hand, the drain on the resources of the country that has sent it is likely to lead to serious public disquiet.

We are in a mess. I believe that the only answer is contained in a question that I put to the representatives of the republics in Strasbourg – a question that was largely ignored, and received only a negative response. I asked: "Do you not accept that, even if Europe agrees that Yugoslavia as a separate state is finished, the establishment of separate republics living in isolation from one another will be impossible because of the minority problem?"

It must be recognised that some loose confederation must be established, even if it is merely transitional. That is the only way in which we can ensure that we establish structures to deal with minorities and human rights in Yugoslavia; such a transitional confederation cannot be allowed to expire until those structures are in place. That is the heart of the problem, and until it is tackled – before there is any question of recognising any individual republic – the horrors of war will continue.

Reference has already been made to the repeated efforts of the EC to bring about a cease-fire. I know that there have been disappointments, and it is possible that there will be more; but there is no logical alternative to the course that I have recommended, and I wish the EC well in its endeavour.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, let me first say how much I respect the work Mr. De Hoop Scheffer has done in connection with the various conflicts that have recently occurred in and near Europe. I would just like to add something to his report. Yesterday I raised the question of the cultural dimension, in the broad sense of the term, during the debate on contacts between the Western European Union countries and the United States and Canada.

Today I have to raise a more critical question of a cultural nature. Our cultural history and the European cultural heritage clearly lie within the original purview of the treaty on which our organisation is based. They even form part of its identity. Reference should at least be made by someone here to these subjects when we are discussing our political concerns, not in order to put on airs, but because in this debate as in others we must not present a distorted picture of our work, we must show that we are aware that peace and security are there for the sake of the

*Mr. Tummers (continued)*

quality of human life and at the highest level, too.

The way in which the war is being conducted in Yugoslavia has definite features of cultural destruction. A British newspaper even produced the headline: Art war. As there is nothing new about this, I am surprised that specific attention was not paid from the outset to the phenomenon of the use of the cultural heritage as a weapon and as a target. When I say there is nothing new about this, I should perhaps illustrate my point by referring to the Reichstag in Berlin, a building of great public symbolic value, which was deliberately destroyed by fire, and whose restoration was entrusted to Franco Salamancá, as an honour to him. The cultural heritage has been guarded in war zones since the first world war. The well-known German patron of the arts, Karl Ernst Osthaus, did his military service as an officer responsible for historical monuments. This post also exists in the Netherlands, and I do not think we are alone in this. As far as I know, there is no training for this operational post in the WEU context.

When we talk about these things, we are not, of course, overlooking the actual human suffering that is caused, of the worst and most objectionable kind. When the question is raised of the cultural heritage being used as a weapon or as a target in wartime, no one dismisses it, but – and I particularly want to draw attention to this – do officers trained in this field form part of the missions, of whatever nature, that are involved in the conflicts in Yugoslavia? If a cease-fire is established, along with successful arms sanctions, other types of weapons will be sought, especially for conflicts of this type. We know from experience what kind of weapons these are. We know from the Middle East and from Cyprus. I have already given more ancient examples.

It is the cultural heritage that gives a face to the non-material values that are vital to the various ethnic groups.

Mr. President, please regard this speech as an extended argument in support of the simple amendment which I have proposed to Mr. De Hoop Scheffer's report and which will be discussed shortly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Menzel.

Mr. MENZEL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as a German representative from one of the new Länder, I am happy and grateful for this first opportunity to address this Assembly. For us citizens of Eastern Germany who fought for freedom and democracy under a repressive régime with no respect for human life, it is something really

special to be appearing as a representative of a free Europe, as an equal among equals.

It was just two years ago that the WEU Council heard Minister Genscher's first impressions of the fall of the Berlin wall. Precisely two years ago there was an all-day debate here on the changes in Europe and especially in the former German Democratic Republic. I heard reports of the spontaneous and sincere expressions of sympathy uttered by WEU's Assembly on that occasion. Surely no one could close his eyes to what it means for the wind of change to cross walls and barbed wire fences, for the people's yearning for freedom and self-determination to be fulfilled.

The preamble to the Brussels Treaty refers to "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person" and "the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty". The member countries also undertake "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe". On this basis alone WEU has from the outset been a vital element of a development in Europe which, after almost forty years, has now filled in the trenches and torn down the fences. Under the aegis of the CSCE, and as a bridge between the two guarantors of security, freedom and economic prosperity, the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community, it will play an even more important rôle as the European defence component in the future as Europe converges. In so doing, it will ultimately strengthen Europe and the alliance. The Maastricht conference will, it is hoped, set the course for the decisive step forward.

In the specific, often challenging and sometimes painful political developments of recent months, WEU has also demonstrated its importance at this particular time. Minister Genscher pointed out that the ministerial meeting on 18th November was followed by a discussion of the form in which WEU might make its own practical contributions if United Nations peace-keeping forces were sent to Yugoslavia. It is thus following the example of the Gulf operation in 1987-88 and above all its co-ordinating activities during the recent Gulf war, from which we might pick out the mine-sweeping operations and the help given to the Kurds. In Yugoslavia, too, the main aim will be to prepare for humanitarian measures on behalf of the suffering civilian population and for any possible evacuation measures.

Ladies and gentlemen, like the other European and international organisations at which so much criticism is currently being levelled, WEU cannot work miracles where brutal armed force holds sway. German liberals cannot simply approve the kind of hazardous venture that entails the deployment of military units without a clear or well-thought-out mandate

*Mr. Menzel (continued)*

from the United Nations. This is quite independent of the fact that Germans cannot and must not send troops to the Balkans, not only because their constitution prevents this at present, but also because of the horrors of the second world war. But a United Nations peace-keeping force in the present battle area is certainly to be advocated, if all concerned give their approval.

Ladies and gentlemen, we fully endorse any activity that helps to support and extend the link to Central and Eastern Europe. We Germans in the new Länder had the privilege of being integrated into the EC and WEU almost automatically. We therefore feel particularly sympathetic towards Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other Central and Eastern European countries which are now in no-man's-land as regards their economy and security and are looking to prosperous Europe. In these countries, too, there are people who are attached to the old, common European culture. They too would like to take their fate in their own hands at last and to join together freely in working for a better life, a life of dignity, security and prosperity. Only if steps are taken to smooth their way to Europe – and here WEU has been setting a good example for years – will they have any hope of a future of this kind.

We must offer help and co-operation, not least to the Soviet Union and its republics – those that have broken away and those that want to remain together in a kind of confederation. With its contacts with the Supreme Soviet, the WEU Assembly sent out signals at an early stage.

The words we have just heard from the Soviet representative, Mr. Kotenkov, leave us with the justified hope that these Soviet republics have a strong desire to become part of Europe.

I wish the work of this body, which as usual has taken on an ambitious task, the success it deserves.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scovacicchi.

Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I must say that many of us here will regret still being faced with such a tragic problem so many months after its first appearance. The most serious feature of the whole affair is that despite numerous efforts Europe has a war within its boundaries and cannot bring it to an end. I am a native of Friuli province and throughout my life have lived in close contact with Slovenes and Croats. I know about the tragedy of unity imposed on them by force in the past and I have seen from close quarters the consequences which can follow from violation of a people's right to self-determination. Please excuse me if I add to this

experience another left from the war when I served in Croatia and Bosnia where we snatched whole minorities from death particularly in areas controlled by Anton Pavelic and where I witnessed so many terrifyingly similar cases of cruelty on both sides between Chetniks, Ustashi and so on. These violations over many years have built up into undying hatreds which were originally repressed by the Communist dictatorship and then re-emerged with explosive force at the first glimmerings of freedom.

Right from the start of the fighting, the border regions of Italy directly interested, and in particular Friuli Venezia Giulia, urged the central government in the strongest terms to recognise the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in the belief that this would avoid the bloodbath which is now unfortunately taking place. At that time there were many calls for a decisive lead from the Community authorities, who appeared to want to delay as if the problem were not serious and urgent. Nothing happened until the first pictures arrived of women, old folk and children killed by the barbarities of a war already well under way. Even today, after months of death and destruction, there is vacillation over the question of recognition and the sanctions imposed are in name only. The immediate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would have meant that what today has wrongly to be called a civil war would have become aggression against a legitimately recognised state by an army which is the last weapon of Yugoslav communism. Intervention by Europe, but not Europe alone, to halt the slaughter in Yugoslavia would have carried much more weight and the Serb communists would have hesitated a little before carrying hostilities to their ultimate consequences.

Of course, the fall of the Berlin wall and the reunification of Germany were of great significance for the construction of Europe. This cannot mean, however, that Europe is to be built solely by pursuing, at all costs and in all the states, the process of aggregation – the Ukraine has just seceded – at the expense of the peoples' right to self-determination and independence which almost paradoxically can on the contrary help to speed up political unity.

Mr. President, we are living through a particularly fascinating and extraordinary time in history and one full of contradictions, but in all its complication there is an underlying trend towards aggregation which cannot now be halted.

The most obvious new proof of this comes from the Baltic states and even more from what is happening in Yugoslavia. In any case, I believe that the objectives listed in the draft recommendation are very useful and timely with a view to establishing the links required in Europe for action to preserve peace and further development. The draft recommendation therefore has my full support.



The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Barrionuevo.

Mr. BARRIONUEVO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is clear that on this subject events are moving so rapidly that some of the information contained in our reports is already out of date. Despite this, however, I believe that the ideas set out by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer in the introduction to this debate and in the background report submitted by Mr. Goerens are based on principles that are reasonable and still valid.

It is not surprising that a subject as tragic as the situation in Yugoslavia should dominate the debates, questions and speeches in this Assembly both yesterday and today. Nor is it surprising that some of the contributions should, as they do to my mind, contradict one another. During yesterday's questions put to our distinguished visitors, for example, Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece, and the Czechoslovak Minister, there seemed to be a tendency to try to present some human rights as being more important than others, and that cannot be right. I hope it is not overdramatising things, Mr. President, to say that the situation reminded me of some of the events during the Spanish civil war.

A poem in Spanish entitled *Spain in the heart* by Pablo Neruda, a Chilean poet, tells how works of art, monuments and cities were destroyed and how there were generals who were traitors. But one line in this poem was constantly, almost obsessively, repeated: "But come and see the blood in the streets, but come and see the blood in the streets." Let us keep to the main point which, in my opinion, is what is contained in these two reports and therefore what may be considered to be more reasonable.

For example, there is a paragraph in Mr. Goerens's report which says that "a marked failure of the conference in The Hague could but lead to recognition of the independence of the republics by the international community, which would in no way settle the main problem, that of the right of minorities within the republics".

I therefore think, Mr. President, that although we sometimes tend to sink into a certain pessimism or frustration at the thought that all the initiatives taken by the international community have been ineffective, we must also bear in mind that with the resources we do have, though undoubtedly insufficient, it has been possible to get things done, decisions made and action taken in an attempt to avert the most tragic results of this situation; this may not have been successful but, as I say, there is no need to give way to pessimism. On the contrary, I believe

that we must persevere and act with resolution and tenacity both in this organisation but also through decisions taken by member countries, we must continue to maintain a total embargo on the supply of arms to all the warring parties, we must continue with humanitarian assistance in co-operation with other organisations including UNICEF, we must maintain our efforts to keep open bridges of humanitarian communication between the populations affected and we must certainly continue to refrain from any unilateral decision that would encourage those fighting to persist in a state of confrontation and violence.

Lastly, Mr. President, although this may be a specific and undoubtedly controversial issue, I believe it is necessary to pursue co-operation in the United Nations and the efforts – subject to the conditions laid down such as the agreement of both parties – to send to Yugoslavia a force to keep the two sides apart and ensure that the fighting and killing cease. That is the most important thing, because everything else can be discussed thereafter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fioret.

Mr. FIORET (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Yugoslav problem has been the focus of debate in our parliaments and international organisations in an attempt to find a fair and acceptable solution for a crisis now dominated by arms deep in the heart of our Europe, the continent which had set itself the ambitious target of creating a common home for its peoples.

The bitter fact is that Europe, despite its utmost efforts, has proved impotent and unable to put an end to the fighting, just when a European solution could have presented to the world a fresh image of a model based on understanding and co-operation between nations with different histories and traditions.

But the events which led on to the inevitable consequences were the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federal Republic with the removal of internal balances under the new 1974 constitution, the failure of the 1983 stabilisation plan, to which the only alternative would be a brave move by Yugoslavia to join the European political and economic systems and the weakening of all ideological links in 1986 at the Thirteenth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

With the triple crisis involving federalism, self-administration and non-alignment, the old Yugoslavia has ceased to exist and unavoidably a different kind of link will have to be forged between the republics based on the autonomy demanded by the peoples of Yugoslavia.

*Mr. Fioret (continued)*

Finally, the failure of the last attempt to salvage the federal structure by the 1988 package of constitutional amendments opened the way to the present conflict which is changing the geographical boundaries of the republics into ethnic boundaries, with devastating consequences on both sides.

In order to have any status in this tragedy, Europe should have spoken with one voice to promote, define and support different forms of balance based on institutional and political pluralism and complete protection for ethnic minorities.

History proves that ethnic homogeneity is not essential for peaceful coexistence, as there are multinational states which have been settled communities for centuries and have achieved excellent targets of economic and civilian development. On the other hand, no one must use force to deprive others of the right to self-determination.

The first essential requirement is that the guns should stop firing and that reason should prevail in the efforts to achieve the clear objective of closing the book on the past and opening a new chapter, bringing in a political system based on the peoples' right to self-determination.

Without ifs or buts, therefore, the efforts of the United Nations and the European Community to mediate should be supported.

In this context, WEU could play a valuable supporting rôle by declaring its readiness to provide a peace-keeping force under United Nations mandate.

The recommendation before us points in the right direction and might have sufficient authority to convince the belligerents that the freedom and well-being of their republic is better defended by promoting the freedom and well-being of the other republics as they must do if they wish to participate in European integration which has to mean putting an end to the quarrels that have for centuries led to bloodshed on our continent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The joint debate is adjourned.

### **5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – Address by Mr. Wimmer, Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany.
2. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe; Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis (Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments).
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 1281 and addendum).
4. Procedure for approving the budget (Presentation of and debate and vote on the motion for an order tabled by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Document 1297).
5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1279 and addendum).
6. Arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Document 1288 and addendum).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)*

## THIRTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1991

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council; Address by Mr. Wimmer, Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany.  
*Replies by Mr. Wimmer to questions put by:* Mr. Stegagnini, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Rowe, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Speed.
4. Change in the order of business.
5. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe; Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Lummer, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Lambie, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Brito, Sir John Stokes, Mr. Cuco, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Cuatrecasas, Mr. Vacaru (*Observer from Romania*), Mr. Pilarski (*Observer from Poland*), Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Rowe, Mr. Roseta, Mr. Mile (*Observer from Hungary*), Mr. Goerens (*Rapporteur of the Political Committee*), Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (*Rapporteur of the Defence Committee*), Mr. Tummers, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Pieralli, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Ewing, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Stoffelen,
6. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1281 and addendum*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Rathbone (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Noerens, Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe, Mr. Büchler, Mr. Rathbone (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
7. Procedure for approving the budget (*Presentation of the motion for an order tabled by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion for an order, Doc. 1297*).  
*Speaker:* Mr. Rathbone (*Chairman*).
8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Docs. 1279 and addendum*).  
*Speaker:* Mr. Rathbone (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### *2. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

1. See page 39.

#### *3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council*

*Address by Mr. Wimmer,  
Parliamentary Secretary of State  
to the Ministry of Defence of Germany*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council: address by Mr. Wimmer, Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany.

I have to announce that I have received a letter from Mr. Stoltenberg, Federal Minister of Defence of Germany, in which he apologises for not being able to address the Assembly today because of unexpected parliamentary commitments which require him to be in Bonn.

The Assembly will therefore have the pleasure of hearing Mr. Wimmer, Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany.

*The President (continued)*

May I welcome you to the Assembly, Mr. Wimmer.

We are grateful to you for taking the place of the Federal Minister of Defence of Germany, as representative of the Chairmanship-in-Office.

We know that you already have long experience, spread over at least three years, as Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence in Germany and that you sometimes have the difficult task of defending government policy in the Bundestag when the Minister cannot be present.

I also welcome you, Mr. Wimmer, as a parliamentary colleague who has been a member of the Bundestag since 1976.

You are acquainted with every aspect of local and regional politics and you are also interested in the international aspects of security and defence policy.

You therefore have all the qualifications required of an experienced politician to hold a dialogue with our Assembly.

Will you please come to the rostrum, Mr. Wimmer.

Mr. WIMMER (*Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, within a few days two events will take place: Christmas and the Maastricht summit. I am not sure on which of the two we can make more accurate predictions, but we naturally hope for the best.

In a few days, when the heads of state and government of the European Community member states meet in Maastricht – which, I must confess, is close to where I live – to hold two government conferences on the establishment of a European political union and a European economic and currency union, the hopes of Europe will go with them.

For the Federal Republic of Germany, these two conferences are interrelated. Political union is an indispensable prerequisite for the establishment of a European economic and currency union.

In the government statement made by Chancellor Kohl before the Federal German Parliament on 6th November 1991, the Chancellor declared that the treaties resulting from these two conferences will be considered as a test for the preparedness of the European Community member states to link their destinies for a common future.

From the German point of view – as was stressed this morning – a European political union would be incomplete if it did not provide

clearly defined and substantial foundations for a common foreign and security policy including, in the longer term, a common defence policy.

These issues have played an important rôle in the government conferences and deliberations which have taken place during the past few weeks and months within the Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union. However, a common understanding on these issues has not yet developed, particularly with regard to the responsibilities of the European political union or the rôle of Western European Union in the future European security structures.

At present, these security structures consist of the diverse approaches taken by the bodies in which we Europeans participate together with others, namely the European Community, NATO and the CSCE; they have different geographical spheres of action and their memberships and objectives also differ. All of these organisations will have to be developed further and harmonised with each other. All of them make their own specific contributions to peace and stability in Europe with the common aim of developing a responsible security policy based on peace and stability in Europe.

A few weeks ago, in Rome, the Atlantic Alliance successfully concluded an important phase in the process of re-defining and adjusting itself to the changed conditions of European security. I say this in the presence of the representatives of the Russian Supreme Soviet, whom we welcomed here this morning. We in Europe must all work towards leading a Europe of 19th- and 20th-century structures into the 21st century. All the NATO member states have therefore jointly developed a new strategy and far-reaching proposals for institutionalising regular relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In Russia, more and more voices are being heard in favour of NATO membership for that country.

The Atlantic Alliance has been very successful in adjusting to these changed conditions. It continues to be our most effective instrument for our common defence on a new basis. At the same time, the alliance has also demonstrated its ability to give more tangible form to its readiness for dialogue and co-operation with our neighbours in the East.

All the NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic are quite clear and united in the assessment that the Atlantic Alliance is best equipped to deal effectively with the security risks which might still arise in the future, and to guarantee the stability of Europe. As our neighbours in Eastern Europe also recognise, the alliance is the indispensable forum for consultation and for harmonisation of political measures that may affect the defence and security responsibilities of its members within the scope of the NATO treaty.

*Mr. Wimmer (continued)*

However, the NATO summit in Rome also made it clear that the Europeans will have to think about the contributions they can make, and would wish to make, to meet possible future risks in Europe and the surrounding areas, risks which no longer fit into the former pattern of the East-West conflict.

In their message to the European Community member states on 6th December 1990, Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand had already pointed out that a common European foreign and security policy would be one of the central issues to be dealt with in the treaty on the future European political union.

In their further initiative on 14th October 1991, Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand wished to give further impetus to the political discussions on this topic and to express their conviction that taking greater European responsibility in the area of defence and security, which all the European Community states consider to be necessary, also means taking concrete decisions and establishing appropriate institutions.

The desire, in the long term, to include a common defence policy within the scope of this common European foreign and security policy, and to make Western European Union an integral component of European political union, has led to a number of misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

May I reply, in clear terms: the European effort to develop a common foreign and security policy and, in the longer term, a common defence policy, does not imply a desire to weaken or even to replace the Atlantic Alliance. What we have here is an effort to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance by strengthening its European pillar, in line with the new political developments.

In our view, Europe must continue to be linked with the United States in a strategic alliance, while soon being in a position to speak with one voice within the alliance as an expression of a European security identity. This of course implies that the Europeans should be able to make their own contribution to risk limitation and crisis management wherever necessary, particularly where the Atlantic Alliance cannot take action, owing to the provisions of the NATO treaty. An example of this would be actions within the scope of the United Nations.

By developing close links between Western European Union and the future European political union, European governments could send clear signals to popular awareness in the member states as to the importance of the European integration process. They could also

pool their dwindling resources and deploy them more effectively for the benefit of our common efforts within the Atlantic Alliance. But most of all they could create the political and military instruments required for the implementation of a realistic and responsible security policy in the future.

Western European Union itself has recently adopted an increasingly operational rôle. I refer to its rôle in the war between Iran and Iraq in 1988, to its rôle in the Gulf war in 1990-91, and to the co-ordination of various actions taken by WEU member states to protect the Kurdish population of Northern Iraq earlier this year. I should also like to mention the contributions made by WEU military experts to the political consultations held by the European Community member states on the conflict in Yugoslavia up to the present day. All these efforts show that Western European Union is already capable of being an important instrument of security policy, and indeed of defence policy as well.

Now, what rôle might Western European Union play in the future as part of the European integration process? It will first of all be necessary to avoid superfluous dual structures, and to develop effective institutional and procedural working relations between Western European Union and the European political union, as well as between WEU and NATO. A prerequisite for this, of course, will be that the twelve EC member states and the nine WEU members should have or be prepared to reach common views on the basic security issues.

The way to get there will be an evolutionary process – and who could blame us for that? We can already predict that Maastricht will be only one phase of this process, though a decisive one. The German Government will make every effort to continue this process in the spirit of the joint initiative taken by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand on 14th October 1991, so that further substantial results can be achieved as soon as possible.

In my opinion the twelve EC member states cannot avoid developing a majority of views and procedures in common with respect to relations and co-operation with the Soviet Union and its successor states. The same applies to the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. This also affects the further development of the CSCE process, the development of transatlantic relationships and policies within the United Nations and other international organisations. The important thing for all of us will be to harmonise our specific experiences and interests and include them in this process.

We are all equally convinced of the necessity for active and wide-ranging support for the processes of political and economic change in Central and Eastern Europe. We all want to help

*Mr. Wimmer (continued)*

in the development of economic prosperity in this region, in order to improve the foundations for a stable Europe. Nevertheless, the different views we hold, and the different contributions we are making – such as financial and economic support for the Soviet Union, or the efforts to solve the conflict in Yugoslavia – prove that we still have a long way to go before we can harmonise our national positions, which are determined by our diverse experiences and interests.

The same applies to the issues included in the joint initiative of Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand: arms control and disarmament in Europe, including other confidence- and security-building measures, especially in connection with the United Nations, nuclear non-proliferation and the economic aspects of security, that is, armaments co-operation and the control of arms exports.

Using the example of armaments co-operation, I would like to point out that diminishing funds for defence procurement in all the European countries will undoubtedly force us to co-operate more realistically on arms issues. In future we shall no longer be able, as in the past, to discuss standardisation and co-operation in different groupings and allow decisions to be motivated exclusively by differing national arms policy interests.

We are facing new challenges which no single nation will be able to meet alone in future. I am thinking here, for example, of the growing necessity to recognise and evaluate critical developments at an early stage; of the procurement of equipment; of procedures and structures for timely decision-making and for command and control functions; and of the necessity for more flexibility and greater mobility in our shrinking forces, with the possibility of at least Europe-wide deployment.

Our desire to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and to avoid structural disadvantages should find expression in a change of location for Western European Union. As a consequence of its newly-defined rôle, the WEU Secretariat-General should be moved to Brussels, the seat of the European Community. Such a move would also contribute to closer co-operation with the NATO agencies located there.

A more active rôle for Western European Union will also have consequences in the area of personnel. Accordingly, deliberations are now under way to strengthen the Secretariat-General by adding military officers to its staff, so that their expertise will be available to WEU. In addition, the creation of a planning and co-ordination staff would be a suitable means for co-ordinating the planning and implemen-

tation of possible joint actions by the WEU member states. Of course, this can only take place in close co-operation with the responsible agencies in the capital cities of the WEU member states and the appropriate agencies of the Atlantic Alliance.

A start has already been made in strengthening our military co-operation, particularly in the areas of logistics, transport, training and reconnaissance. Studies are already being conducted within Western European Union on improved naval and air transport components, so that the respective requirements can be better evaluated against the background of the changed security policy conditions and so that joint programmes may also be developed where appropriate.

Much progress has already been made in taking the necessary decisions on the establishment of a centre for analyses and evaluations, in which satellite data will be interpreted for the purposes of arms control verification and environmental protection.

Arms control, which I mentioned earlier, is one of the original objectives of Western European Union. In the meantime, however, disarmament and verification have attained such significance that Western European Union is being used for co-ordination and co-operation in this area as well. In this context, the nine WEU member states will also be concentrating on the issues of the CFE follow-up negotiations, on further confidence- and security-building measures and on the open skies initiative.

Finally, the development of the political situation in the Mediterranean area is also of special importance to Western Europe and particularly to the West European states bordering the Mediterranean. This area's security issues will therefore necessarily be of increasing importance in the respective consultations of the nine WEU member states.

The establishment and strengthening of our relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for the purposes of improving stability is also an important challenge to our security policy. Like the Atlantic Alliance, in its resolutions passed at the summit in Rome, so Western European Union too wishes to make a concrete contribution towards co-operation in this area. It will therefore complement the respective contributions of the alliance as a whole and the contributions made by the individual member states, insofar as these are made on a bilateral basis.

In this context, let me refer to a statement in the alliance's new strategic concept. In paragraph 52, the new concept emphasises that integrated multinational European structures, as they develop within the scope of the nascent European defence identity, will increasingly play a rôle of similar importance to that of NATO,

*Mr. Wimmer (continued)*

particularly in the context of strengthening the alliance's potential for co-operation in the area of a common European defence.

This is the background against which the proposals contained in the Franco-German initiative of 14th October should be understood. These proposals include not only closer military co-operation to supplement the structures of the Atlantic Alliance, but also military structures directly assigned to Western European Union. The aim of strengthening Franco-German military co-operation, with a European perspective extending beyond the existing brigade, is a contribution to this goal. These Franco-German units will in future be available in Europe for the military planning of the Atlantic Alliance, together with the contributions made by other European NATO member states who wish to join in this initiative. This will also demonstrate our objective of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The governments of both countries will seek at an early date to develop the appropriate co-ordination within the Atlantic Alliance in the interests of the desired transparency and coherence. We shall of course be particularly concerned to eliminate any misunderstandings that may still exist and to create greater clarity as regards our intentions.

In conclusion, let me just add a few thoughts on the CSCE. The aim of the CSCE process is to improve the stability of Europe through a permanent security policy dialogue and the creation of mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The CSCE's importance has already been increased through the creation of emergency mechanisms for the rapid investigation of crisis situations and the establishment of a conflict prevention centre. But we still need a permanent body which is really capable of dealing with the issues of security, arms control and conflict prevention.

The conflict in Yugoslavia has clearly indicated the existing limits of our present institutions. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has raised many questions, to which no satisfactory answers have yet been found. Quite apart from the question of the nuclear potential, or future limitation of forces, in the republics as they become independent, these include the question of the implementation of the agreements previously signed by the Soviet Union, and the distribution of treaty-limited weapons systems among the new states developing out of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, against this background, the member states of Western European Union and of the Atlantic Alliance will continue in their

efforts to achieve the early ratification and implementation of the CFE treaty signed in November 1990. They will also insist on substantial progress in the current negotiations on personnel reductions and on progress toward agreements on further confidence- and security-building measures, so that these can be successfully concluded by the start of the Helsinki follow-up meeting in the spring of 1992.

We will also make use of every opportunity to ensure that the negotiations on conventional arms control continue within a new framework that will include all the European states, and to make the CSCE structures more effective than they have been so far in the areas of crisis management, conflict resolution and conflict prevention.

On the whole we can say that since the autumn of 1989 the conditions for the formulation of security policy have fundamentally changed. The East-West confrontation is over. The Warsaw Pact and Comecon have been dissolved. In Central and Eastern Europe, democracies have already developed or are now in the process of being formed and the disintegration of the Soviet Union seems to be continuing unabated. Unlike the pre-1989 period, there is now no direct military threat to our countries. As a result, we have new responsibilities, for which we still have to find concrete expression in our attitude toward these new neighbours. This includes our mental attitude. We must all realise – perhaps this is a German problem – that for the first time we are actually surrounded by democratic neighbours. This must also affect our approach to them.

The expectations which now exist in the newly developing democracies with respect to concrete economic and financial assistance from the West have their counterpart in their increasingly obvious desire – in theory at least – to depend more and more heavily on western security structures. Because of the specific differences between the Atlantic Alliance, the European Community, Western European Union and the CSCE – organisations which are all important for the security and stability of Europe – it is now important for us to make use of the specific possibilities of each of these organisations so that conflicts in Europe may be effectively prevented and coexistence and co-operation between the states can be developed in a positive manner.

We Europeans – as we are now all fortunately conscious of being – feel called upon to assist in the development of full democracy and economic prosperity in Europe. We should accept these challenges and dare to take the steps that will lead to a better future. The Federal German Government has dedicated itself to the goal of a European Germany and is prepared to draw the necessary conclusions to this end.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Wimmer, for your address.

I call Mr. Stegagnini to ask the first question.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to thank Mr. Wimmer for his speech which offers great encouragement for the future of our union.

He touched on a large number of points and made a number of interesting and telling proposals. I refer for example to the possibility of setting up headquarters in Brussels for the new WEU, which would put us in a position to intervene if necessary with the forces which will gradually be built up.

Mr. Wimmer also touched very briefly on the need for greater co-ordination between all the bodies concerned with armaments in Europe. I should like to ask him specifically if he agrees that relations might be institutionalised between WEU, the IEPG and its counterpart EDIG, and the European Community which, as he recalled, is taking great steps forward in that area. The objective would be to rationalise defence industry production, stimulate European collaboration in defence research and development, and not only there – I am thinking for example of the Euclid programme and the space programmes – and press for the definition of European military balances for the purpose of achieving our objectives.

I think that the first aim should be the creation of a European defence market and the strengthening of its industrial base now that our countries are cutting their defence budgets. In addition, account must be taken at the same time of the need to strengthen and modernise Europe's forces, particularly as the United States is reducing its military commitment.

WEU could fulfil this important function of guidance and co-ordination as part of its growing political and military rôle in European security.

I should like to hear Mr. Wimmer's views on my brief comments not only in his capacity as a member of the German Government but primarily as WEU Chairman-in-Office.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wimmer.

Mr. WIMMER (*Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – I will try to answer Mr. Stegagnini's questions as briefly as possible. As I have just said, we in Europe must become more aware of the fact that we sit at various tables – including the transatlantic one – in our efforts to cope with the tasks we face.

As I see it, therefore, the question of co-operation is essentially a management

question, a question of how we can so organise co-operation that we do not lose sight of the main tasks when sitting at our various tables, and that we co-ordinate things as effectively as possible.

I am perhaps more British in this respect than I am entitled to be. The British have the splendid idea of a fleet in being. In Europe we have several fleets that are in the process of becoming – if I may put it that way – where we are facing up to these joint tasks. We should be constantly asking ourselves what we must do at these various tables in order to cope with these tasks as effectively as possible.

I am therefore opposed to any thinking that excludes one table or another. We must endeavour to rationalise things while taking account of the various tasks. It is not just a question of how we co-operate in Western Europe: Europe has become larger, but we have less time, so we must work all the more effectively.

As regards the question on the defence industry: I believe that, if Europe is our goal, we must indeed take a different view of the relevant provisions of the treaty on the European Community. A converging Europe cannot lose sight of this economic component. We must create joint structures here, because, if we do not, we shall be unable to fulfil our tasks. The only question is: what form will this course take?

We cannot dissociate co-operation in the defence industry from overall economic developments. We must see it as part of these developments; I believe we must see it as a phenomenon. We must create reasonable opportunities in every field for all the countries that sit at these European tables so that they retain their interest in this European co-operation.

Let me take this opportunity to raise a question that may be a problem for us in the longer term. In the past, the armed forces of our countries have frequently claimed to be particularly innovative in the technical sphere. But we must ask ourselves whether other sectors of the economy have not long since taken over this task and whether the armed forces have not fallen behind. If we consider the normal tasks of the troops in our armed forces, we sometimes have the feeling that, where technical innovations are concerned, they are being prepared for the Stone Age rather than the future. We must ask ourselves what rôle the armed forces are to play in our societies in the longer term in this field of technical innovation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I wonder whether the Minister would try to clear up a puzzle. As I understand it, under the



*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)*

German constitution, troops may not be used outside a certain area. I recall that there were problems in the Iraq mine-sweeping operation but that the Federal Government found a way round them by sending ships to the Mediterranean to replace those that had had to be taken away. If there is to be a unified defence force, with a unified policy arising out of Maastricht – this is a hypothetical question because I do not think that it will happen – exactly how would the German forces be able to operate in the out-of-area activities of WEU, which might not be under the control of the United Nations?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wimmer.

Mr. WIMMER (*Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – As you know, Sir Geoffrey, this is one of the most difficult issues in German internal politics. As I assume you greatly approved of Mr. Genscher's words this morning, I will not dwell on this point. I would point out that opinions on our constitution also differ within the government, but I am not in a position to dispute Mr. Genscher's interpretation in this respect. I am being as frank as I can.

However, in government practice in the Federal Republic of Germany in recent years we have seen the political view of the constitution being gradually adjusted to take account of the facts. As you have pointed out, something that appeared impossible only four years ago is now possible after all. By this I mean the problems in the Red Sea at that time, when it was allegedly impossible for units of the federal navy to be deployed. But this was recently possible in the Persian Gulf.

I do not want to move the debate on the constitution from the Federal Republic of Germany to this Assembly, but I would point out that we Germans might do well to adopt a very cautious approach to the deployment of armed forces in agreement with our European neighbours, given the changing rôles in Europe.

I believe we would all do well to feel our way forward towards a common, European way of thinking. Although we are not Japanese, of course, the debate that has taken place in the Japanese Parliament in the last few days may have some influence on the willingness of the Federal Republic of Germany to adopt a more open approach in this international thinking.

As far as I can tell from the sources available to me, the Federal Republic of Germany has acceded to all international agreements without resorting to certain exclusion clauses concerning the deployment of its armed forces in particular. We are in the process of making Germany com-

patible with Europe and the emerging European structures. We can only do this together with our neighbours, who should therefore give us strong support if we are prepared to go down this road.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next speaker is Mr. Rowe.

Mr. ROWE (*United Kingdom*). – I was greatly encouraged by much of what you said, Mr. Wimmer, but I wonder how confident you are that we have enough time to engage in this rather stately round of negotiations. It seems to me that in some respects Europe is a more dangerous place now, and I am anxious about the timing.

How long do you think the process in which you are engaged will take; and does that timetable accord with the necessary urgency?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wimmer.

Mr. WIMMER (*Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – I believe we must take a long, hard look at the various tasks and urgent questions. If we consider Europe's security, we may all come to different conclusions, but be convinced none the less that the worries we may have today are infinitely more attractive – if that is the right word in this context – than the worries we had until 1989.

In these issues, which find expression in rounds of negotiation, one point is crucial to us. In our deliberations on how to make our armed forces part of a common force – including deliberations which fall outside an earlier context – we must focus on one thing as regards the tasks to be performed. This Europe, as such and as the European pillar, will very largely depend on our joining forces internally in a system of checks and balances. In the preferences that our various countries develop, we must attach importance to our all agreeing to this co-operation in the various fields that emerge. We may therefore have to list our tasks in order of priority. We should focus our discussions on our joint interest in establishing units capable of action in the various areas of the policies in question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. May I first congratulate the Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic for outlining his views on harmonisation between our organisation and the Atlantic Alliance, and on the political goals of WEU.

I should like to ask you two questions, Secretary of State. First, in your speech you more than once referred to the mechanisms for co-operation within Western European Union,

*Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)*

particularly in the logistics field. My question therefore is this: for many years our organisation has been mainly a forum of debate, and, less frequently, decision, but of late this has been changing. It has to be an operational organisation. The words operational effectiveness have been heard a great many times during this part-session. To that end, we believe that frequent meetings of the chiefs of staff of the various members are necessary – indeed such meetings should be virtually institutionalised so that clear, concrete and decisive measures can be set in motion for the co-ordination and articulation of European defence. Is the Secretary of State in favour of operational action of this kind?

My second question, Minister, is this: we have often said here that multinational units for the collective defence of our continent would be a good thing. In the educational field we have the Erasmus Fellowships scheme to encourage studies in different countries and to promote a pan-European rather than nationalist spirit among our young people. I believe that, with multinational units and participation in collective defence units, a large number of our young people could serve in military units of other countries, provided, of course, they did so voluntarily. Clearly, serving in such units would not only help to maintain the efficiency of some of these units but would also enable the young people concerned to learn another language and discover other countries, besides gaining specialist technical knowledge, thus helping to strengthen the spirit of European unity among a large proportion of our young people. What does the Secretary of State think about launching an operation of this kind?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wimmer.

Mr. WIMMER (*Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – In my answer to the second part of Mr. Lopez Henares's question I can only agree, of course, that this may be one development.

Against the background of developments in our armed forces, we are faced with the question as to whom we shall eventually see in charge of these forces. As less importance is now generally attached to armed forces in Europe, in view of the political developments and, of course, the developments in other social and governmental spheres, it might be more attractive for able young people to enter the service of government organisations other than the armed forces, or of economic entities that are again not part of the armed forces. As I see it, we will indeed face the question of deciding which of the responsible achievers in society, where the younger gene-

ration is concerned, we will eventually see in the leading positions in our armed forces, so that we may adopt the approach to which you have rightly drawn attention.

I also say this as a German who is aware that one should speak French in Paris and English in London. As Europe grows closer together, there will also be another new trend where the armed forces are concerned. If there is co-operation between our armed forces and those of our Eastern European neighbours, as there is with our Western European neighbours, we will also meet representatives of countries who can all speak German. I can manage comfortably in my mother tongue in Poland, the Ukraine, even Mongolia. In other words, there will be developments in the language sector that will require our attention, because German is the lingua franca of Eastern Europe and as such is moving into a position like that of English in the West. These things become increasingly attractive where ease of movement in certain areas is concerned.

The intensification of any kind of co-operation within Western European Union's terms of reference poses the first problem – which we will simply have to solve – of attaining a high level of co-ordination among those responsible for performance where the armed forces are concerned. Unless we know each other very well, nothing will work. If the structures of Western European Union can help in this respect, that is precisely what they should do.

I made the point just now that you have addressed – that a highly flexible view should be taken of Western European Union's destiny. It may in fact be one of the fleets in being, fleets that can be used when we fill them with life and when we have some idea of the tasks to be performed. Perhaps the times in which we are now living may be the very ones in which we should ask for which packages of tasks we have the appropriate treaty organisations. You are also familiar with the debate in the United States as to whether we may need to create additional forms of organisation for all the tasks we have to carry out, which include the North-South context, for which we have no established forum. In a world that is organised between San Francisco and Vladivostok in the northern hemisphere, we shall get nowhere without this kind of close co-operation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Speed, the last speaker.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I heard you say that you would welcome the enlargement of WEU to incorporate the other members of the European Community. You also said that you wanted to strengthen the alliance. What do you

*Mr. Speed (continued)*

think about European members of the alliance who are not members of the Community? Would you agree that Norway and Turkey should certainly be incorporated in an enlarged WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wimmer.

Mr. WIMMER (*Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – The decision on this question can be taken only in direct European dialogue in the appropriate forums. I believe it would be inappropriate, for me at least, to admit to any preferences in this place with regard to the criteria that should be applied. We have to find a way of involving the partners in the various forums in such a way that we are able to carry out our tasks together. It is not just a question of Turkey today and Norway tomorrow: the day after tomorrow it will be the Poles, the Czechs and possibly even the Ukrainians. The scope is infinite, and we cannot define it here unless we are in close agreement.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, I wish to thank you for the great consideration you have shown to the Assembly and for your readiness to answer the many complicated questions you have been asked.

I should also like Mr. Stoltenberg, whom we would have liked to see here, to know that he has been very well represented.

Thank you, Mr. Wimmer. A safe return to Bonn!

The sitting is suspended for a few minutes.

*(The sitting was suspended at 4 p.m. and resumed at 4.10 p.m. with Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair)*

The sitting is resumed.

#### **4. Change in the order of business**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Because many members down to speak have not yet spoken in the joint debate on European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe and operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis, I propose that the presentation by Mr. de Puig of the report on arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU, Document 1288 and addendum, and the debate on that report be postponed until the start of the sitting on Thursday morning.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

#### **5. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe**

##### **Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis**

*(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1293 and amendments and 1294 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed joint debate begun this morning on two reports: the report presented on behalf of the Political Committee on European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe, Document 1293 and amendments, and the report presented on behalf of the Defence Committee on operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis, Document 1294 and amendments.

The joint debate is resumed.

I call Mr. Lummer.

Mr. LUMMER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to add a few comments on Yugoslavia, because there is obviously some difference of opinion in this Assembly and it is perhaps worth while trying to reach the widest possible measure of agreement. I very much favour the position defended by Mr. Genscher today, because it is the position adopted not only by the Federal Government but also by the parties represented in the Bundestag.

We have heard several complaints today about the international community's having to look on helplessly as events unfold in Yugoslavia. And people ask why is this? One of the reasons is undoubtedly that international law fails to provide the necessary instruments. Mr. Perez de Cuellar has commented on this in the last few days. I see a genuine need for an improvement in the opportunities for international action where peace is threatened and human rights are violated to this extent.

But we must also realise that the ability to take action is still determined by the interests of certain powers. If, for example, the United States' interests in the case of Yugoslavia had been as urgent as in the case of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council would doubtless have taken action even sooner than it has done. I hope the occasional cynics are not right in saying that since there is no oil in Vukovar and Dubrovnik, and Yugoslavia is not a country that is about to become a nuclear power, that is a reason for great restraint. That would be a pity. There must be a greater commitment when such violations of international law occur.

Secondly, what is our criterion for taking action? If you listen carefully, you will some-

*Mr. Lummer (continued)*

times hear voices that reveal the different interests. Historical alliances, historical links and inclinations play a part in this. I feel our decisions today must be dictated by necessity. This is not a decision for one or other side in Yugoslavia, for one of other of its peoples: it must be a decision for freedom, self-determination and commitment to minority rights.

We Germans in particular therefore feel that we must be restrained, because of our historical liability. In practice this is also expressed in our view that Germany should not recognise the republics unilaterally and that Germany must not be directly involved in the deployment of troops in Yugoslavia.

This morning one speaker said that those who were quick to advocate the recognition of the republics had not done the cause any favours. He felt this had been damaging. I claim precisely the opposite. I believe it would have been better to recognise the republics at an early stage. It was obvious that Yugoslavia was breaking up, and recognition is unavoidable.

Yesterday we had a discussion with the Slovenian President, Mr. Kucan, who strongly supported a view that has also been expressed by one speaker in this house today: early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in, say, the spring of this year might have prevented the hostilities that have since occurred. If such recognition is a politically unequivocal statement and represents a correct assessment of developments, such political determination, if shown by Europe, would probably have helped to persuade the Serbs to drop their plans for hegemony.

But it must also be appreciated that recognition will enable the republics to join international organisations. We have heard that, once recognition comes, the civil war will become an international conflict, for which there is a different set of instruments. Recognition would also have made it easier in practice to impose sanctions. I feel there was every reason for this step to have been taken earlier than we eventually took it.

At the moment the deployment of peace-keeping forces depends on a cease-fire holding, and on the various parties concerned giving their approval. In practice this means that it will be the Serbs who decide whether and when the peace-keeping forces are deployed. In practice – and this really is unsatisfactory – we find the Serbs scoring more victories from one cease-fire to the next, and when they have their way, when they have achieved their objective of a pan-Serbian empire, they may perhaps accept the umpteenth cease-fire. But that cannot be the point of the exercise if we accept what Mr. Genscher has said today: one of the basic tenets

of European policy is the inviolability of frontiers. Nor must the peace-keeping forces become a means of sanctioning gains made by force. We should all be wary of this.

Ladies and gentlemen, the aim here is not to apportion blame but to join in securing a peace that is important to Europe, because it is still true to say that, while peace is not everything, without peace everything is nothing.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am one of the few members of this Assembly privileged enough to serve on both Political and Defence Committees. So I have seen at close quarters the work the two Rapporteurs, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer and Mr. Goerens, have done in feeding into this debate not only a well-prepared and up-to-the-minute explanatory memorandum – to cover the very latest developments in case hoped-for solutions materialised – but also a number of draft recommendations, which, at least in my view, allow us to hope and expect that the Assembly will be able to pass an important resolution on this matter.

Naturally, in the Political Committee the debate was more legal and political, whereas in the Defence Committee discussion centred more on finding operational and organisational ways of trying to intervene or at least to do something, at a time when it is essential for WEU to come forward with some alternative initiative for the situation in Yugoslavia.

I shall support these proposals, first because I believe it is important for us to proclaim that WEU has a position and is taking this initiative, and secondly – here I refer mainly to our organisational potential and operational capability – because even without the situation in Yugoslavia, it is important for WEU to make it generally known that it has capabilities and powers and resources and that it can, when the need arises, take the initiative and act.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this is a very sad time. A war is being fought in Europe at the end of the twentieth century. As has been said, it is a disgrace. It seems incredible for it to have happened, but it has, and neither Europe nor the Europeans, nor even the world through the United Nations, has been able to prevent it. There are several reasons why. One is the situation in Yugoslavia which we all understand, and which was spelt out in the speeches this morning. It is a situation of unavoidable complexity with its confrontations, specificity and the pressures of history plus the need to find solutions in the prior knowledge that none will be satisfactory to all – but that is the reality with which we are faced.

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

Then again, one of the explanations for Europe's inability to act or to bring the confrontation to a halt is a very simple fact that we sometimes omit, or prefer not to mention, namely the divisions among Europeans. The underlying reason why Europeans have failed to act in the Yugoslav situation is that we are not agreed amongst ourselves, our opinions differ; deep down, Europeans are divided. And that division could not only affect possible action regarding Yugoslavia by favouring one or other of the warring parties, it could also make its damaging mark on other undertakings such as the building of the Community, WEU and CSCE.

That is the reality, and whilst because of it we have so far been unable to prevent what has happened, perhaps we can prevent it from continuing. No one I am sure would have thought things could have got to the state they have now reached. I am sure there is no one in the Community, WEU, any of the European institutions or national governments who thought such a pitch of destruction, human disaster and architectural ruin could have been reached in open war. Everyone thought that Lord Carrington's committee would get results and that the cease-fire agreements would hold. Perhaps it also explains why hope – in the event not realised – existed. Perhaps it shows in some way that there was good faith in the position of the Europeans. But we can no longer place hope in the cease-fire agreements; we must do something.

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer and Mr. Goerens propose that we should begin to take joint action to put together a peace-keeping force. Whether this be with the agreement of the Security Council of the United Nations or by agreement between the parties, it is a crucial initiative, and we must try to see that the move becomes known and acts as a means of pressure so that military confrontation may at last be replaced by political negotiation. The political negotiation could involve confrontations but it could be political, and that is the level at which we have to deal with the problem. WEU can and must help.

Many thanks to Mr. De Hoop Scheffer and to Mr. Goerens for their proposals.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lambie.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – This morning Mr. De Hoop Scheffer said that these reports were about not just the crisis in Yugoslavia, but the future rôle of WEU. The Assembly knows that I have continually pointed out, not only in this organisation but in the Council of Europe, that now the cold war has come to an end there is no longer any need for

an organisation such as NATO and that there is certainly no need for one of its political arms, WEU. To use an old Marxist expression, both organisations should wither away.

Unfortunately, instead of WEU and the Council of Europe in Strasbourg withering away and the old generals and civil servants going out to grass, they are getting stronger and stronger and more and more reports from them advocate ever greater strength and more equipment. Indeed, tomorrow my old friend Sir Dudley Smith will advocate a strategic airlift capacity for WEU. I have never heard so much nonsense in all my life. At a time when people throughout the world are looking for peace, we are again preparing for war.

I am particularly disappointed in my German, Italian and Austrian colleagues who are not here but who have argued against the Yugoslavs and the Yugoslav state. They all forget that not so long ago the same people were thanking the late President Tito and the Yugoslav army for being the first grouping to break away from the Warsaw Pact and attack Stalinist policies. At that time Tito and the Yugoslav army, which the German Foreign Minister criticised today as the people's army, were equipped and supplied with arms by the very people who are now making the criticisms. When the Yugoslav army takes part in a war today it is doing so not with Warsaw Pact arms, but with western arms supplied by western nations and the United States. People should have long memories. We should not jump the gun on every action and criticise former colleagues.

There is a problem in Yugoslavia and it has been caused by the encouragement of certain groups of people. The Croats have been encouraged to declare their independence. Earlier in the debate a German colleague said that that should have been declared earlier. The Croats were encouraged to break away without giving any consideration to existing commitments and certainly to the minorities within Yugoslavia.

Croatia should have independence, just as in my united country of Great Britain my country of Scotland should have independence, but we have to work within the constitution of the United Kingdom. We cannot just declare independence unilaterally, as Croatia has. Germany, Austria, Italy and, I am sorry to say, an old friend of mine, His Holiness the Pope, and the Roman Catholic Church are giving great encouragement to Croatia to break away. It lost the battle in 1941-42 when more than 100 000 Serbs were killed and murdered in an act of genocide by the very same country and army that is now asking for military intervention in the Yugoslav crisis.

We want peace. That is why I am glad that the Socialist Group has tabled an amendment,

*Mr. Lambie (continued)*

which I believe will be accepted, to the effect that all action should be channelled through the United Nations. If action is taken through the United Nations, groupings such as WEU will not be given the opportunity of doing what is suggested in the report we should do. The United Nations would work through individual countries, as it always has done, and not through regional groupings. With the help of the United Nations and non-aligned countries from Asia, Africa and South America, we might get peace in Yugoslavia. However, if we leave it to the Germans, Italians and Austrians, we will certainly not get peace in Yugoslavia. We shall get war.

We hope that we shall thus persuade this organisation to realise that we can no longer have regional war groupings in areas such as Europe. If we are to have peace in the world, we must act through the United Nations. If action is taken through the United Nations, it will have my support, but I am afraid that if there is any going it alone, I will vote against.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as the very title of Mr. Goerens's report reveals, the Rapporteur and the Political Committee faced the not inconsiderable problem of dealing with two major subject areas in one document. There is no denying the close links between political union and developments in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. But despite the Rapporteur's commendable efforts to forge links and to draw conclusions from the conflict in Yugoslavia for the intergovernmental conferences and for Maastricht – I refer you in particular to paragraphs 85 and 86 – the overall impression is that the two main parts of the report are separate entities. The text of the recommendation gives the same impression.

The heads of state or government face a very similar problem, which leads them to state that the conflict in Yugoslavia must not completely overshadow the deliberations on European political union and should be treated only as a fringe subject in Maastricht.

While we are forced by the Presidential Committee decision to extend the subject of Europe to include the Yugoslav problem and internal developments in the former Soviet Union, there are numerous interrelated factors and subject areas in which Europe will have to consider its rôle and identity, and particularly its institutional structure. This applies not only to security questions as such, but also to the criteria on which a new European order should be based. Should it be based on the traditional nationalities or on the right of peoples to self-determination?

The report discusses this aspect in paragraph 33 and the following paragraphs, pointing out that the ideological conflict, as the report calls it, between the proponents of the traditional system of balance and those who place the emphasis on the right of peoples to self-determination dominated the whole of the nineteenth century.

It is remarkable in this context that the Rapporteur considers this problem only in the part of his report that concerns Yugoslavia. It might legitimately be asked whether these reflections could and should not have been developed in the other main part of the report, concerning European political union. There may be reasons for not creating this connection, either because Yugoslavia is regarded as a special case, and the future of the Soviet Union will obey its own laws, or because of a desire not to overload political union with yet more problems. But in this case it might have been better to submit separate reports.

Where the recommendation proper refers to Yugoslavia, a further dilemma emerges. It essentially consists of practical, technical and humanitarian proposals, and refers to a peace-keeping force. At a time when there is no question of maintaining peace, but only of restoring it, this reference to a peace-keeping force is particularly absurd.

As no one wants to restore peace by force of arms – nor have I heard any of the participants in other debates today calling for this – we have to consider what political means can be used to resolve the conflict. This was considered specifically in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Recommendation 506 of the Presidential Committee of 15th October 1991. I do not think it is quite enough for Mr. Goerens's report to confine itself to referring to this recommendation, seeing that the situation in Yugoslavia has not changed for the better since October.

If WEU has been very cautious – rightly so, in my opinion – in preparing military options, it should be all the more thorough in its search for further political solutions, and in making recommendations in this respect. The report avoids any comment on the issue of recognition for Slovenia and Croatia. It also confines itself to describing controversial press reports and differences of opinion that emerged between France and Germany in the summer.

Finally, it points out that the Europe of the Twelve has not been very successful in its efforts to restore peace. Against this background, where, I would like to know, is the political statement? I would like to ask the Rapporteur why he has been so restrained. Does WEU feel this no longer falls within its terms of reference? Is it now just an organisation that co-ordinates military action, or is the subject too contro-

*Mr. Antretter (continued)*

versial? I feel we should not avoid debates on controversial issues in this Assembly. Nor should we regard ourselves simply as a body that implements defence policy.

Something undoubtedly needs to be said about various other aspects of the report. I do not think it is altogether a happy thought, for example, to group the Treaty of Versailles with treaties used in an attempt to develop Europe on the nationality principle.

As regards the part of the report that concerns political union, it seems to me that the conclusions it draws from the conflict in Yugoslavia are sobering, and yet realistic.

I also endorse the observations on WEU's rôle in its relations with Eastern Europe, but I feel we should soon reconsider whether Bulgaria does not also meet the requirements which would enable it to enjoy the privileged relations restricted in the recommendation to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

In conclusion, I particularly support the reference to the need for the treaty to be revised. This really cannot be delayed any longer. May I refer in this context to the excellent report you presented this summer, Mr. Goerens. The treaty must be revised without further delay, and the same goes for the future composition of our Assembly.

On the whole the report keeps very strictly to WEU and – as usual – makes a recommendation to its Council of Ministers. This is perhaps a wise restriction. Then, so shortly before Maastricht, I believe a clear political appeal in this report to the heads of state or government would have been very appropriate and useful to the importance and the reputation of our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Brito.

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the crisis in Yugoslavia is just one outbreak in a vast and what could, without exaggeration, be called explosive area ranging from the Middle East to the Balkans and the Caucasus.

The instability and violence unleashed by inflamed nationalism, and by the lack of respect for minorities' rights, disregard for international law, breaches of frontiers and the violation of human rights are a veritable nightmare weighing heavily on the conscience of all those for whom freedom, democracy, the right to self-determination and the sovereignty of states are the criteria of a modern society, ensuring economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific development and promoting security, co-operation and mutual help between peoples and states.

So it is right and legitimate for WEU to assume part of the responsibility falling upon the international community, and on Europe in particular, to find the path to peace, law and justice.

However, this should not cause us to ignore certain implications in the recommendations to the Council that could suggest a tendency for our parliamentary organisation to be drawn by the sheer tragedy of the situation into a position that is hardly, if at all, compatible with international law. Here I refer to words that picture us as self-proclaimed defenders of Europe – “The organisation and command of WEU forces earmarked for the defence of Europe” – or even envisage military action outside the framework of United Nations or CSCE decisions. I quote again: “The organisation and command of possible WEU rapid action outside the NATO area or in the framework of United Nations or CSCE decisions.” This recommendation implies intervention outside the framework of United Nations or CSCE decisions.

I fear that this blown-up view of the powers and capabilities of WEU is not enshrined in any mandate recognised by Europe or implied by any right conferred under international law; instead it may be interpreted as interference and the symptom of an improper paternalistic attitude.

Let me explain lest what I say or think is misunderstood. My meaning is that in the recommendations to the Council that I have quoted there is a clear and evident claim, or one that may be understood as such, to European authority or representativeness that is wholly questionable given the fact that WEU fails to cover a large number of countries in neither NATO nor WEU, or in NATO but not in WEU, or in neither the EC nor WEU or that, though in neither NATO nor WEU, are applying for associate membership of the EC – which now has twelve members but may have more later – or are in NATO but not in WEU or the EC, added to which there are all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

What I mean by this is that the concept and the right to European security and defence cannot be confined to or assumed by just one part of Europe.

The formation of a new political and military bloc as part of the new European architecture is not logical or acceptable. The European identity, including security and defence, can only be based on the pan-European concept of CSCE. This is a fundamental question on which I would invite you to reflect.

How can any military intervention, rapid or otherwise, outside the NATO area or not, take place except under the aegis of the United Nations or CSCE? In my view, the European

*Mr. Brito (continued)*

dimension of defence has to embrace the security, co-operation and solidarity of Europe as a whole.

CSCE rather than any bloc of European countries is the indispensable bond for any organisation with a just claim to speak for and defend Europe. Outside this framework the European identity will never be valid, and WEU will lose a great opportunity to help assert that identity and force home its claim to be an integral part of Europe. It must also ensure that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe play their part in the new architecture of the continent.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as to the remaining recommendations under discussion, and in accord with the political principles I have just stated, I have no hesitation in supporting the two reports.

In closing, with regard to the Yugoslav crisis, I would say that, in my opinion, WEU should continue, using all legitimate political means that help attain it, to work to promote and develop peace and respect for international law, including the maintenance of peace itself.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Stokes.

Sir John STOKES (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate my colleague and friend Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on his excellent report on the Yugoslav crisis. Apart from its many interesting suggestions, with only two or three of which I disagree, he has given us a useful chronology and an excellent and fair summary of events in Yugoslavia.

All Europeans agonise over the turmoil and suffering that we see daily on our television screens and in our newspapers as they report what is happening in Yugoslavia. It seems difficult if not impossible to intervene by force of arms, and it is difficult to know how we can help at all.

Those of us who are members of WEU, especially members of the Defence Committee – under its gifted Chairman and defence counsellor it goes from strength to strength – are naturally anxious to extend the power and influence of WEU in any possible reasonable way.

As for item (viii) in the recommendations, I certainly salute WEU as “the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance”, but I query the rest of the sentence: “the defence dimension for the coming European union”. I am not sure what that means. We should be careful before we start talking about events that have not yet come to pass. We do not fully understand them, or their implications.

We must also be extremely careful to ensure that WEU does not challenge or upset NATO, the one main defence organisation of the West which includes the vital link with the United States and Canada.

We must make sure that the United Nations gets all the help it can from WEU. It is the body that will have to handle the Yugoslav crisis and I hope it will later send a peace-keeping force there. We must help the United Nations all we possibly can.

I therefore hope that WEU will be ready to help in any way it can, but I also hope that it will not try to do more than that or to overstretch its capacity. WEU has been going for a very long time. After an initial useful period, there followed many years of absolute stagnation. Now the times are much more exciting, and great opportunities as well as dangers will arise. We must be careful, however, that we do not take any unwise steps or upset other great organisations such as the United Nations, NATO and the EC. We must tread carefully but firmly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cuco.

Mr. CUCO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is now over six months since the conflict that had long been festering in Yugoslavia degenerated into open war of a ferocity and brutality which people of my generation had never before known in Europe. Reports of this type of carnage – I repeat, for people of my generation – had always been confined to remote parts of the globe, which is why they appeared less real, less to do with real flesh and blood people.

The tragic conflict convulsing Yugoslavia, or what we have so far known as Yugoslavia, is of a kind that could spread, not only to other parts of the country but clearly to other parts of the Balkan peninsula. Everyone now seems agreed that the spectacular fall of communism has revealed, under the thick ice cap which prevented us from seeing to the bottom of things, the existence of a complex reality in which the difficulty of adapting to economic, political and democratic systems, the striving to recapture lost national identities and the resurrection of old ancestral ghosts which, only half a century ago, had reigned over these lands, taking an appalling toll in death and desolation involving mainly Ustashi and Chetniks are all combined.

Mr. President, I must emphasise this last aspect of the problem, because there is no doubt, as Mr. Goerens has pointed out so well in his report, that if the aim of the government and the federal army at the start of the conflict was to maintain a Yugoslav state, it appears obvious now that this is no longer true. The non-Serbian



*Mr. Cuco (continued)*

members of the collegiate presidency and the federal state left that institution at the beginning of October and Croats and Slovenians have been deserting from the federal Yugoslav army en masse. At the same time, the number of uncontrolled guerrillas outside the control of the governments of Zagreb and Belgrade is multiplying. It is this element which, in my view, has accounted for the most bloody aspects of the conflict.

Western Europe has watched the fighting with a considerable degree of impotence. Yesterday an ex-prime minister of France, exaggeratedly in my view, used the words the shame of Europe. With so little time before the Maastricht summit, a difficult meeting when the future of the Twelve will be largely at stake, I feel we have to admit that, in our common foreign and security positions, the image we have presented has been a fairly faithful reflection of the contradictions and vacillations that have accompanied our own internal progress towards union. The construction of Europe, Mr. President, is a long-term process calling for neither too much optimism nor too much pessimism. It must, though, be embarked upon with a firm political will. If that will is present in each and every one of its members, we will also be able to reach real agreement on foreign and external problems, even though they be as close geographically as those causing such turmoil in Yugoslavia today.

Mr. Goerens's and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer's reports seem to be cautious and realistic efforts to contribute towards a peaceful solution of the crisis in Yugoslavia and doubtless because of this have been approved almost unanimously by their respective committees. In my view, it seems particularly important that WEU forces for the defence of Europe should be established and co-ordinated with those of NATO, and that rapid reaction forces should be organised to meet their objectives outside the NATO zone within the framework of United Nations or CSCE decisions. In any event, my view is that urgent measures are needed, given the tragic turn of events and the spiral of destruction we are witnessing in the Yugoslav conflict.

My reference here, first and foremost, is to the need to find all possible means of implementing the embargo ordered by the Twelve on 8th November, particularly as regards arms and oil. Then, as all the reports of the specialised international organisations, and I am referring to wholly reliable sources such as the International Red Cross, stress, there is the enormous disaster constituted by the hundreds of thousands of displaced people, a tragedy of which Europe has not seen the like since the second world war. That must not of course mean we should not

make the necessary preparations so that we are in a proper position to send the forces required to guarantee peace in the region.

Mr. President, as the new and brilliant member of the Académie française, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, recently wrote: "Le sentiment national a fait basculer le communisme dans l'histoire des utopies mortes." Let us at all events avoid uncontrolled and irrational national sentiment also having the effect of converting human rights into a forgotten Utopia, at least in some areas of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I warmly congratulate Mr. Goerens – my Luxembourg liberal colleague – and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on two excellent reports. Both are invaluable sources for anyone who may be investigating the genesis of the Yugoslav crisis and the European response to it. As time is limited, I shall have to truncate my remarks and paint with a broad brush.

The precise outcome of Maastricht, in terms of foreign, security and defence issues, is still shrouded in a deep fog of diplomatic activity. It was clear from Mr. Genscher's speech that he is capable of answering questions directly and clearly, and that he can answer – or not answer – very indirectly when he feels like it. Let me say boldly what I think the results should be, not necessarily next week in Maastricht but as soon as possible.

I do not think that political co-operation, as established by the Single European Act, is at all adequate for the requirements of an economic entity the size of the European Community – an entity which, inevitably, will grow still larger. Such an economic giant cannot continue with the political and foreign policy powers of a pygmy.

That means, by some means and by stages, making foreign policy a Community responsibility. It is impossible to have a foreign policy without a defence policy, and defence contains overlapping elements: the individual policies of individual states – two of which are nuclear powers – and those of Western European Union and NATO. Outside that are the European Community and the CSCE. There are also different stresses on European integration and the importance of the transatlantic link, reflected to some degree in the Franco-German and British-Italian proposals.

I do not wish to impose a time-table, although the revision of the Brussels Treaty which established WEU might be an appropriate moment. However, the final outcome will – and in my view and that of all European liberal parties should – be the European Community's

*Sir Russell Johnston (continued)*

adoption of the defence responsibilities of its members, while remaining within NATO. Let me say to Mr. Lambie that NATO's function will no longer be to deal with East versus West, because there is no such thing. It will function as a major area of political stability.

The move from the present circumstances to those that I have described will be achieved through WEU, and the final outcome may well rest on structures that develop in WEU in the coming years. I refer to military command structures and forces. We shall need to be able to prevent – and, if necessary, police – the small conflicts that may well break out; we shall need to be able to defend minorities and human rights.

It is possible that this parliamentary Assembly can survive in its present advisory capacity and as a contribution to the process of bridging the link between national parliaments and European institutions, including the European Parliament. That is already the subject of much debate and concern. A bridge is a structure that must be crossed; the prospect must be faced. Having crossed the bridge, however, we do not necessarily blow it up behind us.

I should like now to discuss Yugoslavia. If ever there was a situation which brings clearly to our attention the urgent need for a European capacity to act coherently in foreign affairs and defence matters it is in Yugoslavia. I have no doubt that if these functions had been in place there would have been an early recognition that Yugoslavia, like Humpty Dumpty, could not be put together again, and there would have been a willingness to face up quickly and firmly to the aggression of President Milosovic.

During questions to Mr. Genscher I referred to the report on the Serbo-Croat war by the European Community observers presented on 26th November. That report is not available to parliamentarians. It is not available here or in our home parliaments. When I asked in London I was told that the report would be available, perhaps, in two weeks. The report is quoted in the press. That is a problem that we often have to face.

Yesterday, 3rd December, The Independent stated: "EC monitors have no doubt the Serbs bear greater responsibility, being under army protection." It says EC governments face four choices: to continue the monitors' mission, though it is increasingly ineffective; to withdraw "with all the ignominy implied for themselves"; to generate a new United Nations or European initiative; or to deter the Yugoslav army by force. Amplifying this last point the report says: "The warship that fires on a defenceless city from a safe distance out to sea" – I expect that

the reference was to Split or to Dubrovnik – "must be put in a situation where it knows it can do so at the cost of being promptly sent to the bottom. The battery that shells a hospital must know that within 20 minutes of so doing, it risks being obliterated."

It is that kind of direct and blunt talking and the presentation of choices – if I could take that last option I would – there seemed to be no way to bring about within the existing institutional framework and limited military co-operation. All of that appears to exacerbate the general lack of foresight which seems to blight so many of our foreign offices.

The first item in Mr. De Hoop Scheffer's chronology at the end of his report states: "The WEU Ministers for Foreign Affairs express their keen concern at present developments in Yugoslavia. They appeal to Yugoslav leaders to avoid confrontation, refrain from recourse to force and resume the dialogue in order to safeguard national unity. The Ministers want a return to the normal operation of federal institutions." That was totally out of touch – as if WEU ministers have been meeting on the moon.

A month earlier than 27th June, in the House of Commons on 26th May, I asked our junior minister, Mr. Douglas Hogg, whether he would urge that the European Community might offer its services as a mediator and consider a peace-keeping force. I was thinking in terms of WEU. The Minister was dismissive. He said: "I do not think the European Community should play such a rôle." By 5th July we were already heavily involved, and by 3rd September Lord Carrington was in place.

All this was too slow, well-meaning but ineffective. There was talk of being even-handed while Vukovar, defended by rifles, was pounded to rubble without any discrimination by Serbian heavy guns, tanks and aircraft. As Mr. Cuco said, this has not been a good chapter in European history. We can only hope that the United Nations, through Cyrus Vance, will be successful in its current negotiations. In the months ahead we must not turn away from our responsibilities. Not only will they remain, but they will increase and we must meet them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cuatrecasas.

Mr. CUATRECASAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – The reports by Mr. Goerens and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer highlight what are unfortunately two immediate matters of concern in the draft recommendations by the Political Committee and the Defence Committee to the Council of Ministers which increasingly require urgent action because of what is happening in Yugoslavia and in Central and Eastern Europe. These events have shown us how differently member countries of the European Community and of the

*Mr. Cuatrecasas (continued)*

Council of Europe and other countries are reacting. In most cases the reactions to the collapse of the totalitarian systems are typical of the twenties and thirties. We are moving back in history and witnessing a rebirth of the extreme nationalisms of those years.

Over the same forty years, however, Western Europe in the shape of the Council of Europe has built up structures aimed at the union and recognition by peaceful means of several states moving along different paths but all seeking union. We shall see whether this can be given practical form at Maastricht where the more stable and long-lasting European union that we all want is to be created.

The rôle of WEU is gaining in immediacy. A European union must have its own defence capacity to guarantee at least what we call the common achievement not only of the European Community but also of the Council of Europe. Here we have a complete philosophy which does not belong to us alone but must be offered to the whole of Europe including Central and Eastern Europe.

We are witnessing the Yugoslav crisis and the war in which the federal army is becoming a partisan army waging dishonourable warfare against largely civilian objectives. When this strife is over, however, these Balkan republics will be knocking on the door to join European union.

What will they have to do? They will have to agree between themselves because anyone who wishes to join a European union must first agree on the realities of present-day Europe. They will want to belong to a single market and they will want their sovereignty to be based on European institutions.

For the moment none of this exists in the Balkan countries where so many civilians are suffering from distressing and unfortunate events. Well, these countries are entitled to exercise their right to self-determination, they have the right to be themselves but they must also preserve basic rights, human rights and essential solidarity with their neighbours. Then it will be possible to construct the Europe to which they will all want to belong when this terrible war is over.

I believe that the Europe which is seeking to unite in Maastricht must state quite clearly what obligations every state must fulfil in order to belong to it. Of course, if reason does not prevail Europe has the right to defend itself and even to intervene in this country where reason fails. I think it is unfortunate that today we have to await a United Nations decision before we can act because the problem facing us is an internal problem for Europe.

I suggest to Mr. Goerens that the Political Committee should consider how – if after a decision by the Vienna Conflict Prevention Committee no solution is reached – WEU might be asked to intervene with the rapid action force suggested in the draft recommendation. It is the obligation and duty of Europeans to safeguard their common achievements and all the rights that Europe has established for the benefit of its peoples which some people seem temporarily to be forgetting.

*(Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cuatrecasas. I appeal to members to keep to the time allotted for their speeches. Otherwise, we shall not finish the debate and agenda in the time foreseen.

I call Mr. Vacaru, Observer from Romania.

Mr. VACARU (*Observer from Romania*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am honoured to represent the Romanian Parliament together with my colleague, Professor Constantin Topliceanu of the Ecological Movement, at this second part of the thirty-seventh session of Western European Union.

This year brings the first occasion for a delegation of Romanian parliamentarians to be invited to attend a WEU session as observers and our participation is a logical part of the process of establishing links between the Romanian Parliament and the WEU Assembly. I should mention another first; last week Romanian experts attended a seminar organised in Paris by the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

However, it was perhaps when the Secretary-General of WEU paid an official visit to Romania early in November that we were able to convey the importance we attach to relations with WEU.

I personally am convinced of the soundness of the assessment made by the President of the Assembly, Mr. Robert Pontillon, who stated in clear terms the new responsibilities of WEU towards the East European countries. In that part of Europe events are moving rapidly and in ways which cannot be foreseen and the new democracies of the region are facing risks which are difficult to manage.

Romania itself lies between two foci of instability and other latent sources of tension are not far away. These are some of the grounds for our concern to consolidate national security and regional stability. The problem demands an immediate solution and WEU must give practical help in convincing the countries of Europe that they now have greater responsibility for ensuring the security and stability of the continent, including its central and eastern region.

*Mr. Vacaru (continued)*

In this context I would emphasise that the decision taken by the WEU Council of Ministers in Bonn on 18th November to invite the foreign and defence ministers of five Central and Eastern European countries to attend a special meeting with members of the WEU Council had a very favourable reception in Romania.

In an official statement the Romanian Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence accepted the invitation with pleasure, taking the view that it opened a new phase of active, worthwhile co-operation between our countries in the framework of WEU and in so important an area as security.

Turning to the report presented by Mr. Goerens and the draft recommendation, I believe that these mark the achievement of a major first stage in the development of relations with some of the countries in our region and that it is essential to widen and deepen this collaboration with the other East European countries.

Ladies and gentlemen, Romania is at a decisive stage on the way to establishing the rule of law, changing to a market economy and creating the political, legislative and institutional framework which will guarantee respect for human rights and freedoms and integration into the structures of democratic Europe.

After much hard work, the Romanian constituent assembly elected in May 1990 adopted the new Romanian constitution marking the country's return to democracy on 21st November 1991. The most important democratic guarantees of Romania's new basic law are a multi-party system, the separation of state powers, a guarantee for human rights in general including the rights of national minorities, relations between the main state institutions and machinery to check that legislation is constitutional.

There will be a national referendum on the new Romanian constitution on the eighth of this month. Local elections are planned for 9th February 1992 and parliamentary elections will follow in the spring.

At the same time as it was debating the constitution, the Romanian Parliament adopted 118 laws as the concrete basis for the economic and social reforms needed to give Romania a market economy. For the first time in forty-five years the state is looking at the problems of old people, handicapped persons and orphans.

This radical and far-reaching restructuring of Romanian society would be impossible without the experience, assistance and co-operation of western countries and the European and international organisations, and our presence here is proof of that.

In conclusion, Mr. President, may I say how much we appreciated being invited to be observers at this session of the WEU Assembly, taking place at this time for thought so vital for the future security of our continent.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pilarski, Observer from Poland.

Mr. PILARSKI (*Observer from Poland*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I first offer you our warmest thanks for your invitation. It is a great honour for us Polish parliamentarians to attend this meeting of such eminent European political figures.

At the same time I would like to point out that, despite difficulties, walls and curtains, Poland has belonged to Europe for centuries and still does. Mr. Genscher's speech this morning and the debate which followed have raised this session to the highest political level.

I should like to make a few modest comments on behalf of the Polish delegation.

The collapse of the totalitarian régimes in Central and Eastern Europe has been greeted with euphoria in both East and West. These events have been accompanied by declarations and promises of help, frequently kept, from the countries of Western Europe. As an example, I would mention the assistance with my country's debts for which we are extremely grateful.

The new circumstances have brought new problems. Today let us look at problems not of aid but of co-operation. We are now into a new phase and are running up against serious and unexpected difficulties. From time to time, some leaders betray signs of a lack of confidence and even fear. Of course this does not apply to the members of parliament. These are my personal remarks as a representative attending the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. The clearest proofs of this are the reports presented by Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Goerens and other members at this session.

What is needed now is an effort to implement these declarations; in my opinion, it may even be necessary to fight to do so.

We can confirm that democratisation and a free market are the only possibilities for us. This is the only effective way to bring in economic reforms in Poland.

We are at all times ready to co-operate with the international organisations in the various spheres such as economic policy, security, defence, ecology and culture. We therefore seek co-operation with all democratic forces in Europe and throughout the world on the basis of rules accepted by everyone because the future is important for our continent and is our common goal.

*Mr. Pilarski (continued)*

In conclusion, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we should like to invite the members of the Assembly of Western European Union to have closer contacts with the Polish Diet and Senate. Mr. Goerens's very detailed report is highly promising in this respect.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, when you and I went to Belgrade twelve months ago as Rapporteurs for the Council of Europe to promote the entry of Yugoslavia into that organisation, neither of us would have dreamed that, in a few months' time, that country would be in the throes of an awful tragedy. As you will recall, Europe was most anxious that the political situation should change; we met the people who had drafted the new federal constitution but we met others who did not agree with the government and in particular with the Kosovo representatives. Even then, we did not realise that the country's problems would shortly be reaching the terrible proportions they unfortunately have.

I have to say that, faced with the Yugoslav crisis, the international community has behaved very cynically as we suddenly found when we realised that the United Nations was slipping away from intervention and was delegating Europe to resolve the problem or in any case to mediate between the warring parties. The fact was and still is that for almost thirty years Yugoslavia had been a world leader in the group of non-aligned countries. The world was divided into three blocs – the western bloc, the Soviet bloc and the non-aligned bloc. In the United Nations these blocs balanced each other in all the crises that the organisation had to deal with.

Consequently, the United Nations has preferred not to intervene directly out of regard for a country which played its part as leader of the non-aligned countries as recently as during the Gulf crisis.

The buck was therefore passed to Europe but Europe has been unable to take it up with any real will to intervene. Just think, the only action that Europe has succeeded in taking has been to send Community observers dressed in white like ice-cream men, in many cases under the protection of troops lent by the few countries prepared to take part. The results have been minimal. The European Community has demonstrated its total inability to respond to the gravity of the problems.

Lord Carrington has done all he could but as we have all realised, particularly during our meeting at the Council of Europe with the presidents of the parliaments of the Yugoslav republics, the conflict now seems to be beyond remedy.

In reply to a specific question, I was told that the border between Croatia and Serbia was an historic and not an administrative border and that Croatia would never be prepared to hand over territory where Serbs lived.

There was therefore a total lack of understanding and of any willingness to agree a peaceful solution or to resolve the crisis by negotiation. Unfortunately it is weapons which are now doing the talking between the parties. The winds of war from Yugoslavia are causing anxiety not only in Western Europe but above all along the Danube, in East and South-East Europe, and most particularly in the new democracies where ethnic and religious strife might break out within their borders.

If the fire is not put out it is likely to spread, with all the dangers we have pointed out over these last few days.

The United Nations must take serious action to intervene. United Nations Resolution 173 was, however, a toothless document which placed an embargo on weapons but made no provision for sanctions to prevent weapons from continuing to flow into Yugoslavia. And they did flow in. Two months ago, it was being said that arms were about to run out but this did not happen. The fact is that the federal army has continued a major offensive with all the terrible consequences we can see.

But Europe has also been missing from humanitarian action. Any humanitarian action by European countries and measures to protect the civilian population have been organised with great difficulty through lengthy bilateral negotiations without Europe as a whole being able to take part in helping the people trapped by the fighting.

UNICEF has been the only international organisation which has succeeded in some measure in saving refugees and with great difficulty getting a few thousand people out of the countries caught up in the war.

Europe must shoulder its responsibilities and we hope that the United Nations will mount an action capable of stopping the fighting with Europe participating under the aegis of WEU. Here, the Maastricht summit will provide precise guidelines and will probably be the first opportunity for Europe to show real readiness to intervene when conflict and danger threaten its security.

In conclusion, I should like to congratulate Mr. Goerens and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer for their most informative document with its very detailed analysis of the problem of the Yugoslav conflict and of the problems which Eastern Europe is posing not just for WEU but for Europe as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Stegagnini was so absorbed in his subject he had not noticed that his time has run out.

I call Mr. Rowe.

Mr. ROWE (*United Kingdom*). – I am happy to take part in the debate because both reports have been remarkably well put together and I congratulate both Rapporteurs on them.

I am relatively new to this Assembly, so perhaps my frustrations are less blunted by the elegance of Paris and its wonderful food and drink than are those of some of my colleagues – but I want to share some of them with you this afternoon.

First, we have no time to carry on as we are. Nero is said to have played the violin while Rome burned around him, because he wanted to redesign the city. We have no such ambitions in Eastern Europe – at least I sincerely hope not – but our European city is already on fire and virtually all we do is talk. The Czechoslovak Minister spoke for many when he said that countries like his cannot afford the time to meet the same ministers in slightly different groups on the same topics in successive meetings. Such stately minuets may have been appropriate when we were facing a cold war glacier in Eastern Europe but they are not when that glacier has erupted into a volcano whose eruptions grow every day more menacing.

It is a good rule in life to believe what people say about their intentions. Soviet army commandos have signalled their clear intention to use force to protect themselves. We all know where that may lead. What is more, Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shevardnadze are among those who have already prophesied another coup and/or civil war. Hungary is scared and Romania is anxious about the Yugoslav war. In the Soviet Union the Ukraine is only one of many republics determined to have its own army – 400 000 men, and with a nuclear capacity – and to eject Soviet forces from its soil. I heard what Mr. Kotenkov said this morning and it may have been meaningful but I have no confidence in it.

So what do we do? First, we must move much faster to put together a WEU force. In the short term that means contingents from member countries, with all the chaos of different communications systems, weapons and equipment. We should already be moving beyond that. It must be right for Europe to have armed forces of its own. That would allow a unified command, unified procurement and proper career structures. Such forces would be able to buy what they needed from the best sources. They would be able to recruit from states that might not yet be able fully to enter into the political command structure. It would also be possible for member states to keep their own forces for domestic pur-

poses without the fear of suddenly weakening the European force to meet a domestic crisis.

A WEU force would undermine the present powerful arguments that some countries cannot be allowed to join WEU because of operational incompatibility. We cannot go on edging towards a half-hearted invitation to participate in WEU, extended perhaps in 1993 to Greece, Turkey or Czechoslovakia. The heat in Europe is already intense; it may well be an inferno by 1993.

Such a force could serve only purely military ends if the situation allowed. In this very building the splendid exhibition on the Via Domitia points out that the Roman empire's roads were built by the finest soldiers in the world. There are plenty of humane pursuits, such as finding water in the Maghreb and delivering supplies to isolated communities, which would act as training exercises and which could be offered free or for payment to governments in Europe and on its boundaries.

Secondly, we must look closely at the so-called peace dividend which, in the short term, is largely an illusion. All our countries face dreadful problems of homelessness and unemployment among our disbanded troops. We have heard of the costs being borne in many countries by armaments industries. If there is eventually to be a peace dividend, how will it be spent? At least in part, it will be spent on conflict-avoidance. If we were to devote a tiny share of the \$ 49 billion given to the United States for the Gulf war on modelling the known sources of tension in Europe and on setting up informal arbitration mechanisms to work on them before the shooting starts, we might eliminate the shooting altogether. Our Centre for Conflict Reduction should be the best endowed, the most active and the most hard-working resource in Europe, not some sort of tentative, slow-moving experiment to be evaluated in ten years' time.

Finally, we need to ask ourselves whether our preoccupation with our own importance is a help or hindrance to rapid progress. We cannot afford the present mishmash of overlapping alliances and security agencies, nor the paralysis that they engender. This Assembly can bid to be the sole parliamentary Assembly for defence in Europe; or to enlarge itself to take in others; or to give up its rôle to someone else.

When communism died we all rejoiced, but I remember that it was Robert Walpole, the British Prime Minister, who said at the start of a popular war: "They are ringing the bells now; they will be wringing their hands before long." It is for us to act now to keep the European bells, not the hands, ringing.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – May I first congratulate the Rapporteurs on the work

*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

they have done and underscore some of the points made in the speeches we have heard today.

Two years ago everybody thought that the end of history had come and that we were going to be living on a bed of roses, at least in Europe. But such periods of optimism, like roses, are apt to fade, because in truth history does not end and humanity continues on its often thorny path.

After a very short time, we are up against very serious problems again. No one ever thought these massacres and this bitter fighting could occur in Europe; no one ever thought we would see these people who have had to leave everything and have therefore lost everything, or to see this return to the past taking us back decades, if not centuries in history.

Yet that is what we are witnessing with the resurgence of inflamed nationalism in Yugoslavia, or rather what used to be Yugoslavia. These are like the Jacobin nationalisms of the nineteenth century, as one of our colleagues has well said.

This is not simply a civil war; it is aggression against Croatia perpetrated by a military machine out of political control, a machine that makes war blindly, almost without limits and without clear objectives. The worst thing that can happen is when a military force goes out of control and cannot therefore be reined in because there are no limits placed upon it by obedience to agencies of the civil authority.

This serious situation therefore requires strengthened international co-operation.

I have always thought, and this is my country's policy, that without an effective cease-fire and without the agreement of the parties involved there is no way a peace-keeping force can be set in place. It would be almost impossible and extremely risky if not actually illegal, failing a prior resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council as some members have already said.

Needless to say we think the United Nations Security Council should discuss the situation in Yugoslavia just as we think there should be respect for international law and self-determination, but, as Minister Genscher has said, the rights of minorities and individuals must also be guaranteed.

Therefore, as our Rapporteurs have suggested, we must make every effort to find a peaceful solution and to prevent the killing from spilling over into neighbouring countries, particularly Hungary, which seems to be most at risk.

I would therefore stress that instead of sending armed forces – which, I repeat, appears

totally unrealistic – it might be effective to impose sanctions. This is what our Rapporteurs have urged, giving arms and oil as examples. This embargo must be enforced, if necessary by suggesting at the United Nations that a resolution should be passed in the Security Council imposing general sanctions. Our own action must be confined to the European area.

Clearly, we are not in a position to order sanctions that would apply to countries in other continents, but we have a duty to alert the international organisations about the need for this embargo on arms and oil and its observance by all countries. This is the only way it will be effective.

Furthermore, I should like to see a clear distinction made between the four republics in Yugoslavia that now accept the road to peace and the other two, Serbia and Montenegro, responsible for the continuation of the war. To make this distinction seems to me an act of justice and Minister Genscher also made this point.

I should also state that, although I do not share all the opinions expressed in Mr. Goerens's very full report, I believe it has a central idea that needs to be underlined. It is a very long report and its explanatory memorandum contains many debatable opinions on various aspects, but its central idea is the need for intensive co-operation with the new democracies. These of course include Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, as the Rapporteur stated, but clearly they do not exclude all the other democracies of Eastern Europe.

I believe that to attain this objective we ourselves have to co-operate more closely and, as was approved yesterday in the recommendation stemming from my own report, we need to transfer the seat of the Permanent Council and the secretariat of our organisation from London to Brussels because today this scattered location of our offices is completely inefficient.

Furthermore, we ought to give special attention to the economic and social aspects, although these are not part of our organisation's remit, and develop the necessary economic and social co-operation with these countries in order to prevent economic breakdown and the even worse political and social problems it would bring in its train.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Mile, Observer from Hungary.

Mr. MILE (*Observer from Hungary*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to begin by congratulating Mr. Goerens on his excellent and very full report and to thank him for the work he has done.

*Mr. Mile (continued)*

The Hungarian delegation is basically in agreement with his analysis of the tragic situation in Yugoslavia. I would add, however, that the Yugoslav crisis is a threat to the security not only of the peoples of Yugoslavia and of its neighbours but also to that of Europe as a whole.

It is in our common interest to prevent the fighting from spreading and spilling over frontiers. As you know, there have been disturbing incidents on the frontier between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Our airspace has been violated several times. You will remember that bombs have fallen on our city of Barcs and that a missile was recently found near the frontier. That is why we welcome the proposal to send observers to our country as we have several times requested; we shall welcome them and do everything to ensure that they can work effectively.

Some people in Yugoslavia are accusing us of training Croatian troops in Hungarian barracks and camps. We are willing to show the observers anything they may wish to check. The facts are these: there are camps in Hungary but only for refugees. The problem is really serious because we have almost 40 000 refugees from Yugoslavia and it is virtually impossible to resolve without co-operation; here again we need international assistance.

In our view, Hungary's security is not yet sure, so we are very pleased to be able to take part in the work of WEU. Our observer status is taking acceptable form, with our participation in the satellite programme, the invitation of our members of parliament, the invitation to Berlin and so on.

It is our hope that we shall together be able to work out the most suitable arrangements for closer association. We are willing to participate in WEU's work in all ways, we want to become partners, we want to work together regularly. In December, as you know, our Prime Minister will be signing the agreement for our status as associate member of the European Community.

In any event, it is our interest and our aim to live in an area that is stable; we are doing all in our power to arrive at full integration.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Mile. I assure you that we are keen that you should not only come to the Assembly as an observer, but promote the contact that we wish to be established.

That concludes the list of speakers. I suppose that the two Rapporteurs will take the floor and comment on the various interventions.

I call first Mr. Goerens, who represents the Political Committee.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – As our time is limited and there are still votes to be taken my reply will be confined to just one or two comments.

In general I am very pleased with the turn the debate has taken. I admit there have been a few criticisms, some levelled at the complexity of the report. I would say, however, that a complex situation calls for a very full description involving research which the complexity itself did not make any easier. That is quite clear.

I would also point out that the Political Committee found during its discussions that it had to change the title of the report. The upheaval of 19th August in the Soviet Union changed the picture somewhat and the ongoing Yugoslav crisis was a further complication.

On the eve of the Maastricht summit which may decide to give the European Community a security and foreign policy dimension, it was not very easy to cover European union, the intergovernmental conferences with their implications for Western European Union and the enlargement of the European Community, all subjects closely linked with the defence and security aspects, at one and the same time.

It may be said that WEU has cut a poor figure in the Yugoslav crisis but I would stress that the Assembly has not stood idly by. I was President of this Assembly long enough to know that the Presidential Committee which provides the link between plenary sessions meets very rarely to present an emergency recommendation to the Council. The fact is that the Political Committee and the Presidential Committee both took up the case.

During the Council of Europe's session in Strasbourg, the Presidential Committee held a special meeting to draft an emergency resolution. A communiqué was issued and a recommendation was produced.

May I remind you that in Recommendation 506 the Assembly called on the Council "to promote without delay effective measures to ensure respect for the embargo, to proceed immediately to prepare the possible implementation of each of the various options considered on 30th September, to help to ensure respect for the cease-fire, to strengthen its organisation and ability to intervene to ensure Europe's security, to continue to associate any European countries that might make a contribution with all appropriate action, to use all appropriate means to bring pressure to bear on the parties in the conflict and to continue to inform NATO and the CSCE".

The Presidential Committee did all that. It approved and even amended slightly the draft recommendation submitted to it by the Assembly's Political Committee.



*Mr. Goerens (continued)*

I would ask members to take an overall view of the work done by the Political Committee. By that I mean that when the report is criticised Recommendation 506 must also be taken into consideration.

I wish to thank all colleagues who have spoken and in particular the observers and the specially-invited guests. We have all been impressed by the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union and Russia who in fact represents the Russian Federation and what remains of the Soviet Union. My thanks go also to the representatives of Hungary, Romania and Poland. I am sure that I am right in saying that through their representatives all the countries concerned have shown that they wish to co-operate more closely with WEU. This is wholly in line with the conclusion that the Political Committee sought to draw. I hope that the report answers the points which have been raised.

I shall not say any more about the complexity of the debate on Yugoslavia. Events in that country should teach us all to be modest. We have to recognise that we are powerless in face of the gaps in law on the subject. To begin with the European Community was first and alone in stating a position on the problem. With its existing structures as we know them to be, all the criticisms cannot be levelled at the Community, nor can it be blamed for all the errors. It would certainly have been possible to do more but this would have required the agreement of all the governments.

I think it fair to say that WEU has operated more or less correctly. Our organisation has been very responsive to messages from the European Council and a special working group has defined four options which you will find in the report. We can be satisfied with the sharing of the work between the European Community and WEU insofar as it achieved what was properly to be expected.

This report cannot, of course, satisfy everyone. I agree with most of the comments that have been made but I would point out that the number of amendments tabled is in inverse proportion to the number of favourable and unfavourable speeches. I feel, therefore, that I can count on a large majority from the Assembly and I would ask you to support this report which is certainly important. Once again, I thank my colleagues on the Political Committee and in the Assembly who assisted with its production.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I am sure that we appreciate the work that you, Mr. Goerens, have done in compiling this significant report.

I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*). – I shall try to be brief. I thank all my colleagues who, using different nuances, support the report and its recommendations. One could conclude that the Assembly agrees about Yugoslavia and that it cannot accept any territorial change accomplished by force. We agree that there is room and reason to increase the pressure.

Many colleagues have spoken about imposing an oil and arms embargo. I agree with those who say that it is high time that the Security Council resolution was adopted. Unfortunately, we have not yet gone so far.

I share Mr. Reddemann's disappointment and frustration at there being no cease-fire. The Defence Committee is disappointed to discover that nothing has been done, although we have tried hard to find a solution to the unnecessary bloodshed, the dying, the cruelty and the killing in Yugoslavia.

I agree with Mr. Tummers who tabled a motion and spoke at length about our cultural heritage. He is right that this is our war. The European Community and WEU should be furious about the war and try to stop it. I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Tummers's remarks.

Many members have discussed human rights and humanitarian measures and actions. As I said this morning, I was disappointed and sad at the humanitarian actions that have been tried during the Yugoslav crisis. We have seen Italian ships and French and British frigates trying to do as much as they can but it has been on a bilateral basis. I share the opinion that WEU has a part to play, par excellence, in such action. It is sad that we have not seen WEU co-ordination in that respect. That is why this morning I said that the thinking, planning and analysing should not stop. I agree with many colleagues that we should give human rights prominence in WEU's approach to the Yugoslav crisis.

Mr. de Puig has rightly said that WEU has its own position and should not depend on what other bodies do. I agree with him and we must be realistic about that. We have only ourselves to blame for not being able to do as much as we should because to a large extent we do not agree about the exact policy that we would have to adopt vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. The debate about the recognition or non-recognition of Croatia is a good example of that. If we conclude that Croatia and other republics should be recognised, I can only hope that we do it together and not unilaterally. That is vital, not only for the European Community but for WEU. We should act together in WEU and in other organisations.

In conclusion, I must raise one specific point. Soon we shall come to the vote. I raised this matter this morning in a question to Foreign Minister Genscher. It concerns the action by

*Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued)*

WEU in the framework, or, preferably, under the authority, of the United Nations. We shall come to the amendments. I should like to repeat – I say this on behalf of the Defence Committee which discussed the matter at great length this morning – that we should always try to secure the authority of the United Nations if we envisage political or military measures. My only worry is that, taken to the extreme, that opinion could make us the victim of one member of the Security Council who could block any resolution with a veto. That is where my worry stems from. We had exactly the same debate on our last report, which was on the Gulf.

This is an important issue. I have taken a stance on it and others will do so. My summing up would be incomplete if I did not mention that specific problem.

I thank all my colleagues who have participated in the debate and who, with the exception of one or two, support the recommendations in my report. This is not the end of the debate; it is a continuation of the debate. As I said this morning, we should not stop thinking about or analysing the problems that face us. As it is already past 6 o'clock and we have other work to do, I shall close my remarks.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer. You can be sure that the Assembly is aware of your excellent work on a subject that fascinates us and is not easy. Nevertheless, I have a feeling that we may reach a unanimous decision or, at least, a consensus on the final text.

Despite the excellent interventions of the two Rapporteurs, the Chairmen of the two committees will wish to close the debate. No, I was wrong. Neither of the Chairmen wants to add anything because they think that everything has been said. This is a good precedent.

We now come to the votes on the draft recommendations on European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe, Document 1293, and on operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis, Document 1294.

We shall take first the draft recommendation tabled by the Political Committee, Document 1293 – that is the report of Mr. Goerens – to which three amendments have been tabled. The amendments will be considered in the order in which they relate to the text of the draft recommendation, that is to say, Amendment 2, Amendment 1 and Amendment 3.

I call Mr. Tummerts to move Amendment 2 which stands in Mr. Jurgens's name and which reads:

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to prepare the" and

insert "to consider which", and after "meeting" insert "should be prepared".

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Jurgens's intention is not to draw conclusions too directly but to leave some time for reflection on the outcome of the conference.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

That is not the case.

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – The committee has rejected the amendment by a great majority. Our problem is that most of us do not succeed in grasping the meaning or sense of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall proceed to a vote on Amendment 2.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is negatived.*

I call Mr. Pieralli to move Amendment 1 which reads:

1. In paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "outside the NATO area or".

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Amendment 1 is not opposed to the rapid action force, but seeks to base it firmly on sources of incontestable legitimacy, such as the United Nations Security Council and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as it may become, if the development called for this morning by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs takes place.

The committee decided not to support the amendment and there is very little chance of its being approved. As Mr. Brito did not vote in the same way as I did in committee, I personally confirm that whatever happens to the amendment I shall vote in favour of Mr. Goerens's report and the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I suppose that it might be said that this is something of a re-run of the other two debates. The whole purpose of Mr. Pieralli's amendment is to go backwards rather than forwards. The great advantage of WEU is its ability to operate in a way that the Washington Treaty and NATO do not allow. For that reason, we must retain the flexibility that we have in WEU, and I urge the Assembly to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman of the committee wish to say what was the result of the debate on that issue?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – The committee rejected the amendment by a great majority.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1 is negated.*

We come now to Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Socialist Group, which reads:

3. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, at the end add “under the authority of the United Nations”.

I call Mr. Ewing to support Amendment 3 on behalf of Mr. Hardy.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – I promise the Assembly that I am not Mr. Hardy and that I will not speak on the amendment for as long as he would have done.

It is almost embarrassing to propose an amendment to such an excellent report, but the Socialist Group was most anxious that any arrangements for a peace-keeping force in Yugoslavia should be made under the auspices of the United Nations.

It goes without saying that the United Nations now has a greater standing than it has had at any time in its forty-year history, born of its involvement in the Gulf war and the recent negotiations for the release of hostages. In the view of the Socialist Group, confidence throughout the world in the United Nations is now extremely good, and we think that it would be much better if any peace-keeping activity came under the auspices of that body.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – My friend Mr. Ewing made a very nice speech. It would have been a perfect speech if we lived in a perfect world, but, alas, we do not.

We know from our own sources that much of what could have been achieved by the United Nations in respect of Yugoslavia is being blocked by one member country of the Security Council. If we are to operate only under United Nations authority, we shall be sitting here while men, women and children continue to be murdered in Yugoslavia. I say that with great bitterness.

Of course it would be preferable to operate with the authority of the United Nations, but we must not limit ourselves to such a course,

otherwise we shall sit here wringing our hands and saying: “Oh dear, I wish something would happen.”

I was bitterly disappointed by what Mr. Genscher said today. There comes a time when democrats must be prepared to act to save lives, and I cannot accept the amendment because I believe that it will increase the likelihood of more lives being lost – just because we want to give an all-embracing rôle and a clean sheet to the United Nations.

I welcome what the United Nations was able to do over the invasion of Kuwait because there was unanimity among the permanent members. On this occasion, however, there is not. That fact is hamstringing us and, for that reason, I urge the Assembly to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – It is relevant to remark that the Political Committee adopted the amendment with a clear majority.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 3 is agreed to.*

I think that you, Mr. Ewing, can tell Mr. Hardy that you defended his amendment at least as convincingly as he would have done.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1293, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

Mr. Goerens, your document has been adopted with one abstention. I think that we can regard this as a successful and significant vote by the Assembly.

We now come to the draft recommendation tabled by the Defence Committee on the Yugoslav crisis, contained in Document 1294. I have received four amendments and have ruled that Amendment 4 is an amendment to Amendment 1. The amendments will be considered as follows – Amendments 1 and 4 together, then Amendment 3, then Amendment 2.

1. See page 40.

*The President (continued)*

I propose that Amendment 4 should be treated as an amendment to Amendment 1 because its purpose is to insert the word "preferably" in the amendment tabled by Mr. Hardy. I suppose that the amendment to Amendment 1 is unanimously supported by the committee.

The procedure is as follows: the amendment will be proposed and then the amendment to the amendment will be voted upon, followed by a vote on the amendment. Amendment 1 reads:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "operations", insert "under the authority of the United Nations".

The amendment to Amendment 1 reads:

In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "operations" insert "preferably under the authority of the United Nations".

I call Mr. Ewing to move Amendment 1.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – It is not necessary for me to repeat the arguments that I advanced to the amendment in relation to the other report. My colleagues from the United Kingdom know me as a kind and protective person and I should explain to Sir Geoffrey, Toby Jessel and all the conservative members from the United Kingdom that the amendment embodies their government's policy. I should not want it to filter back to Westminster that these good and kind people come out here to Paris and misbehave by defying government policy. I did not see Dame Peggy, but I, of course, include her in my advice. When I see John Major tomorrow, I shall give him a list of names. Now that I have rescued them from themselves, I hope that they will support the amendment.

The amendment to the amendment provides a way out by inserting the word "preferably" and while I have no strong view on the subject of the amendment, I should like to test the view of the Assembly on the Socialist Group's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Perhaps the Assembly will allow me to speak to the sub-amendment, because I have waived my right to speak on the report, and to say how much we admire the energy and skill shown by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer in presenting it. As a colleague on the Defence Committee, he was extraordinarily helpful. He also did extremely well, as the Assembly knows, on the Gulf war report. This is a repeat performance and we are grateful to him.

I cannot go along with what Mr. Ewing says. The argument is clear as to why we should

include the word "preferably" as the sub-amendment provides. Many of us on the committee were against Mr. Hardy's amendment but, in the spirit of compromise, we tabled the sub-amendment, which received the unanimous support of socialists and conservatives alike on that committee.

Being socialists, they will probably turn on their heads and vote the other way. I have seen that happen many times before and I expect to see it again – particularly on the part of people like Mr. Ewing, who is destined to remain in opposition to my party.

I commend the amendment: I believe that it shows that we should not be hostages to the whims of some member of the Security Council of the United Nations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I do not believe that Sir Geoffrey Finsberg wants to spoil the atmosphere of consensus. I am afraid, Mr. Ewing, that we are not going to test the Assembly. The procedure is that the amendment to the amendment is decided first and the amendment afterwards.

We shall now vote on the amendment to Amendment 1.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The amendment to Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

We will now vote on Amendment 1, as amended.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1, as amended, is agreed to.*

I now call Mr. Fourré to move Amendment 3 which reads:

3. In paragraph 5 (c) of the draft recommendation proper, after "the United States" add "and Canada".

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Lagorce proposes the insertion of "and Canada" in paragraph 5 (c) of the draft recommendation simply as a reminder that it has always been traditional for our Assembly to think of the United States and Canada together whenever the occasion so requires.

We believe that in this way the links which have already existed for a number of years between Assembly committees and our Canadian parliamentary colleagues will be strengthened.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone want to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Just to speed things up I may say that the committee is very much in favour.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on Amendment 3.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 3 is agreed to.*

I now call Mr. Tummers to move Amendment 2 which reads:

2. In paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper, after “pollution control” insert “protection of cultural heritage”.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I feel that my statement has adequately explained the reasons for this amendment. Having said this, if the amendment is adopted, I would like to see the committee's bureau or the Rapporteur asking for the advice of the Council of Europe, because WEU does not have any expertise of its own in this matter.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – We take note of what Mr. Tummers says. We will do what we can; in any case the committee fully supports what is proposed.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1294, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

As far as I can see there were only one or two votes against and one abstention.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I want to take this opportunity of explaining why I voted in favour of Mr. Tummers's amendment. I issue an appeal to the Socialist Group. Such amendments should not be tabled

as party issues. The moment that is done it puts people's backs up and makes them suspicious. The amendment is superb in itself but the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats does not do this sort of thing and I appeal to all political groups, by all means, to table political amendments under the names of their groups. Otherwise they should refrain, because such action produces unnecessary divisions, which we would do well to avoid.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Geoffrey. I hope that you will appreciate the flexibility of the Chair in allowing you to speak even though you had spoken in the debate.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I had not.

The PRESIDENT. – Then the Chair ruled properly in any case. Your explanation was accurate.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Every member of every group tries to act within that group. Of course we discuss proposals by governments and if we do not accept them we try to change them by amending them. We cannot act as a parliament without allowing parliamentary groups to act as parliamentary groups. Still, I can understand the appeal for agreement between groups, perhaps in the form of combined amendments. I do not agree that parliamentary groups cannot act as parliamentary groups. They are not merely applause machines or a club in which to reject proposals. All groups want to be as co-operative as possible and if we do not like a proposal we make that clear.

The PRESIDENT. – The text presented by the Defence Committee has been adopted by an overwhelming majority. That is significant given the difficult issues involved. The Assembly should congratulate itself and those who provided us with such a good instrument.

### **6. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1281 and addendum)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992 and vote on the draft budget, Document 1281 and addendum.

I call Mr. Rathbone to present his report.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – We return at this rather late hour to the difficult subject of our budget which we have debated

1. See page 42.

*Mr. Rathbone (continued)*

before at all times of the day and night. We are looking towards the budget for 1992. This debate has been anticipated and trailed in the report by Mr. Soares Costa and the debate on that report, in the questions raised on the Secretary-General's report, in Mr. Ewing's report and the debate on it, and most recently in questions to Foreign Secretary Genscher this morning.

Our debate takes place in the light of the deplorable way in which the 1991 budget has been prepared and agreed. Let me remind my colleagues of one or two points which should be borne in mind when we are considering budgetary affairs. This year, the Assembly and the Council reached an impasse: the Council did not even agree a proper staffing increase to meet the requirements of the two newest members of our Assembly, Spain and Portugal. We first debated the matter this time last year; in the ensuing months, there was a to-ing and fro-ing of negotiations that resolved nothing.

At the June meeting, the Budgetary Committee, with the blessings of the Presidential Committee, had to ask the Assembly for a recommitment to the original budget in order to challenge the Council's intransigence. That was carried by the necessary roll-call vote. At the same time, the President was charged with establishing contact with the presidency of the Council of Ministers in an attempt to reach a conclusion.

The President subsequently engaged in fruitful talks with the Secretary-General and ambassadors during an official visit to London in July. Finally, after further to-ing and fro-ing, agreement was reached on 7th October, as requested by the Presidential Committee in its submission to the Council on 9th September. That was some three-quarters of the way through the current year. During the previous three-quarters, the Assembly had had to operate on the basis of one-twelfth per month of the previous year's budget. That was an atrocious sequence of events, which provides a sorry background for consideration of 1992.

Some other considerations were taken into account in the preparation of the budget for 1992 and the activity plan that it funded. First, there seems to be general agreement between the Council and the Assembly that there should be even-handed treatment of staff responsibilities and remuneration between the two bodies within WEU. Secondly, there has been a growing acceptance of the fact that increased activity on the part of the Secretary-General – inspired by the Council of Ministers – must inevitably lead to increased activity on the part of the Assembly, in terms of increases in the number of people involved, expanded facilities and more travel.

Thirdly, there is a reassurance from the three experts who reviewed all the Assembly's work in 1990 that we are reasonably efficient in our work methods, our staffing numbers and our staff capabilities. Fourthly, the Council and the Assembly should be complementary, not antagonistic. That point was made very clearly by the President of the Assembly with the Secretary-General and ambassadors in London earlier this year, during preliminary talks about the 1992 budget.

As the Council expands its areas of competence and interest, so must the Assembly – most particularly, perhaps, in Central and Eastern Europe, the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, but also in its relations with other European bodies, the United States and Canada – in regard to future security in Europe. The Assembly must be seen to give all WEU activities parliamentary legitimacy; that is all the more important as the dimensions of WEU work change.

It was with all those points in mind that President Pontillon and I, along with the Clerk and the Clerk Assistant, met the Secretary-General and the ambassadors at WEU's London headquarters on 7th November. We met to review all the background in detail and to review in general terms the 1992 budget submission, previously prepared by the Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and approved by the Presidential Committee.

Our discussions were very positive. It was, therefore, all the more surprising, annoying and disappointing to hear that, far from approving the budget that we had submitted, the Council's Budget and Organisation Committee – which met on 15th November – had decided on swingeing cuts.

It had refused to provide three new staff posts in the Office of the Clerk, which were crucial to the proper handling of present and anticipated workloads; it had also refused regrading for existing posts to reflect increasing responsibilities, and had allowed a smaller increase in the number of temporary staff than had been requested, despite the refusal to increase permanent staff numbers. It had also granted an operational budget increase of only 4.5%, when an increase of 7% had been requested. After various other adjustments, particularly those made to cover pension payments, that represents an overall budget increase of 8.2%.

In spite of an opportune intervention by the President of the Assembly, who wrote to Foreign Minister Genscher in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of WEU on 18th November, the budget – as reduced by the Budget and Organisation Committee – was approved by the Council on 26th November, just one week ago. It was reviewed here by the Committee on Bud-

*Mr. Rathbone (continued)*

etary Affairs and Administration early last Monday morning, and by the Presidential Committee the same afternoon.

I have given some weight to the schedule of events to emphasise the unsatisfactory nature of the decision-making method, as well as the unsatisfactory nature of the decisions themselves.

In reviewing the Council's decision, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was strongly influenced by four factors. First, there was the need to avoid the impasse of the current year. The Assembly cannot operate properly on such an untidy basis, and we do ourselves no service by incurring the risk of backing into it again. Secondly, there is a growing awareness – in spite of, or even in the face of, the Council's decision – of the complementary nature of all the component parts of WEU, particularly the Council and the Assembly. That is featured in our reports and statements and in reports from the Secretary-General and from Ministers.

Mr. Genscher drew attention to that when he referred to the exceptional dynamism of WEU, and stated categorically this morning that there was a requirement for positive advice and support from our Assembly. He was questioned on that, and provided further reassurance for my colleagues Mr. Rowe and Mr. Ewing, among others.

The third factor was the growing importance of WEU in the evolving CSCE process. Foreign Minister Genscher put it succinctly when he described WEU as being at the service of all CSCE member states. The democratic element represented in WEU by this Assembly is of paramount importance.

Fourthly, there is the forthcoming Maastricht conference, at which so many decisions will be made and so many directions established – bearing on security matters as well as economic and political affairs. Only after that conference, and after its outcome has been properly digested, shall we be able to plot with any degree of assurance WEU's future rôle, its future relationship with the European Community and NATO, and the relationship between those two bodies, which will also have a bearing on the issue. The Assembly will have an important input into all that.

There seems to be only one certainty. We shall hardly be in a position to grasp the parameters of future planning before the end of the year, and the debate about the future will continue well into next year. Any conclusions are bound to come far too late to have any positive influence on our activity plans or budget for 1992.

With all the stimulating uncertainties, the Budget Committee agreed unanimously to recommend to the Presidential Committee and to the Assembly the acceptance of the budget, even in its truncated form. I hope that the Assembly will agree to that decision.

The recommendation comes to the Assembly with three significant riders. First, acceptance of the reduced budget in no way invalidates the reasoning behind the original 1992 budget submission or the level of budget originally requested.

Secondly, acceptance of the process by which we come to that conclusion does not detract one iota from the arguments that we have developed and which we wish to pursue to establish a vastly improved procedure for budget decisions and agreement.

Thirdly, after Maastricht we shall be in entirely new circumstances in which WEU will have to develop a new rôle for the future. The Assembly's part in that rôle will become increasingly important, so the Assembly must be put in the proper position with sufficient resources to live up to all the demands put upon it and to maintain its democratic function in future security matters.

If all that has a bearing on 1992 activities, we must retain the right to come forward with supplementary budget requests for next year. That will bear heavily upon activity and on financial support for that activity in the future.

With those three important riders, I request the Assembly to approve the budget as it stands.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rathbone. Your report, even on a heavy and intensive day, illustrates perfectly the English saying, "Last but not least".

I call Mr. Noerens.

Mr. NOERENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would first like to congratulate the Rapporteur on his report, which was drawn up in very difficult circumstances, and to include the President of this Assembly in these congratulations. The committee has worked regularly; very early, on Monday morning at 8 o'clock, and, now, very late. I am not taking the floor now to express my disapproval. I have approved this budget, but with some hesitation, because WEU's future tasks, which are mentioned everywhere, are not in fact reflected in the budget itself.

Drawing up plans for the future will necessitate fresh appropriations and increases in existing appropriations in 1993. Without discussing the expected adjustments for 1992, we want to see WEU playing the rôle expected of it.

*Mr. Noerens (continued)*

I would like to say something about the make-up of the staff, since the member states' contributions are disproportionate to the number of staff in the WEU administration. I will anticipate a possible answer, consisting in a reference to the two official languages of WEU, French and English. But I am proud, and I seem to remember that, as Vice-President of the Council of Europe, I was the first to speak the language of more than twenty million Europeans, namely Dutch.

I now come to the statistics on which I base my request that when staff are recruited in the near future thought should be given to the need to reduce the virtual monopoly held by two countries and to pay special attention to smaller communities which are proud of their language and culture. Recruitment and promotion restrictions in 1992 are an established fact, but I hope that in 1993 the staffing situation will be different, and that the other countries will limit the monopoly position of these two countries and prevent all the expenditure on pensions from going to their nationals.

The figures on the present situation are sufficiently revealing. France, with 29.41% of all staff members in category A, and Britain, with 23.53%, account for 53% of all category A staff. France, with 64.29% of category B staff, and Britain, with 28.57%, account for 93% of all category B staff. The other countries, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain provide 34% of the category A staff and 7% of category B staff, but they contribute 66% or two-thirds of WEU's budget, as compared with the 17% each contributed by France and Britain.

The counter-arguments advanced by the countries with a monopoly are simple. English and French are the official languages, and it is difficult to recruit category B staff from outside Paris. I accept that, but the representatives of only one of the nine member states of WEU speak English. The representatives of France, part of Belgium, and of Luxembourg speak French. The remainder, or two-thirds of the representatives, speak other languages.

So is it not logical that I, as an inhabitant of a small country, should appeal for other nationalities, including Dutch speakers in Belgium, to be considered when staff are recruited in future? This will encourage the small countries to think about the financing of WEU. I am certainly not against French and English, but as a liberal I am in favour of open recruitment and an open market policy, even in the composition of the establishment. There is a fine task here for WEU, ensuring respect for the cultures of the member states and further integration in Europe, without requiring additional funds, even in the budget for 1993.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe.

Mr. GONZALEZ-LAXE (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I begin by congratulating Mr. Rathbone, the Rapporteur, on his report though I feel we should also see it in relation to the fruitful discussions we have had here this week, all of which have pointed up the importance of WEU and its function, and the policies to be followed, action to be taken and resolutions to implement.

I should like to take all the decisions adopted so far and set them against the WEU budget. I am sure we all agree that for an organisation to function, we have to decide first what it is supposed to be and then what it needs in order to be what it is supposed to be. WEU's object and goals are defined but the resources needed for the purpose are at times rather inadequate. The Rapporteur made this clear not only in his report but also in his oral presentation five minutes ago. The impression he conveys, apart from his sincerity, is that an organisation like WEU, whose importance every speaker at this part-session has stressed, cannot go on holding its debates because if three more people are engaged and four others reclassified or, if an offset machine is replaced by a multicopier or photocopier, it will jeopardise the finances of WEU.

In this connection, I should like to refer to some of the decisions we have adopted during this part-session and two in particular which I believe to be extremely important. The first concerns the cost and purposes of publishing and publicising the work of WEU and the second the cost of information, i.e. giving effect to one of the Monday morning recommendations, namely, to step up WEU publicity in the communications media. These two items in the 1992 draft budget have been reduced. With these budget cuts, it will be difficult to put these measures into effect except by virtue of the great devotion and considerable efforts of the staff and the admirable spirit prevailing in the relations between members of the Assembly and the staff that serve it.

I therefore hope that all the aims set out in the budget can be fulfilled because every member of the Assembly thinks the budget is too small and would like more, and every economist wants to have the resources with which to achieve his objectives. Here, perhaps, these two things tie in with the great effort that we all expect of WEU, most of all after the point made by Mr. Genscher about money this morning: the more money there is, at least a realistic, pragmatic amount, the better can objectives be achieved.

This is what I have to say about the budget. I would remind members that these two recommendations and proposed items have been cut



*Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe (continued)*

from the budget; but I also agree with the Rapporteur that in 1992 there may be a supplementary budget or a change to the one we have that would enable all the committees and the Assembly itself to operate, thus achieving both the objectives that are now planned and those that may be added after the March summit.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Büchler.

Mr. BÜCHLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, just a brief word, because I feel obliged to add something to what has been said here. Both the previous speakers have made it clear what difficulties we have had to contend with in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. On the other hand, the Chairman, Mr. Rathbone, has clearly expended a great deal of energy – for which we must thank him – in attempting to find the cash, as it were, to enable him to present his budget in its present form.

I would like to point out that the Belgian member has touched on a very sore point, which we Germans also regard as very critical: the unequal distribution of posts within our organisation's establishment plan. I drew attention to the fact that the German members said during the deliberations that the next time a budget was presented with this kind of staff distribution among so few countries, we would not give it our approval.

So I would be grateful if something could be done in the very near future, as Mr. Noerens also suggested.

The PRESIDENT. – The list of speakers is concluded. Does the Chairman and Rapporteur wish to comment?

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be brief. We must take note of the comments made by our colleagues, Mr. Noerens and Mr. Büchler. We have applied ourselves to them in the committee.

There are difficulties with always going for the best people available in the location in which an international office finds itself and in filling the vacancies in the most cost-efficient way. Decisions are influenced inevitably by the two working languages of French and English. Within those constraints we can certainly take that to task, as we can take into account the continuing aim within the Assembly to increase the number of opportunities for women.

On the major point made by Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe, he is absolutely right to draw attention to the need for an increased budget. We must consider that when we plan for 1993 and keep an eye on it during 1992. It was absurd that last year the bone of contention amounted to about F 120 000. That is little more than a good minis-

terial dinner party. It is absurd to pay terrific attention to weeny details in setting these budgets.

With those comments, I hope that the Assembly will approve the budget as it stands.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft budget in Document 1281 and addendum.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

We shall now vote on the draft budget for the financial year 1992.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft budget for the financial year 1992 is adopted unanimously.*

## **7. Procedure for approving the budget**

*(Presentation of the motion for an order tabled by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion for an order, Doc. 1297)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day, as decided by the Assembly on Monday following a request for urgent procedure under Rule 44, is the presentation of the motion for an order tabled by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the procedure for approving the budget and vote on the motion for an order, Document 1297.

I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – At this late hour I will not go into great detail in supporting the motion. It provides an important cornerstone for our negotiations with the Council, our planning internally and, I hope, the agreement much earlier next year than it was this year of our 1993 budget.

Steps have already been taken. The President of the Assembly has already written to all the leaders of national delegations pleading for their support within national assemblies and parliaments. That is absolutely crucial. Unless we carry the necessary principles through into our everyday activities, we shall never get anywhere.

We also had mention of the budgetary plans for the future in a letter that the President of the Assembly sent to the Chairman of the WEU Council before the budgetary considerations this year. Most recently, earlier this week, we discussed the importance of planning for the

*Mr. Rathbone (continued)*

future, which was stressed in the report of the Secretary-General. I hope that, with the Assembly's support of the emergency motion, we can get the process of budget-setting, discussion and agreement under way soon after the turn of the year. We can then get a move on early in 1992 and start looking forward to 1993.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rathbone. There are no names on the list of speakers so we shall now vote on the motion for an order in Document 1297.

Under Rule 35, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The motion for an order is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

**8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts**

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1279 and addendum)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the presentation of the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 – the auditor's report and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1279 and addendum.

I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I can assure the Assembly that the matter has been professionally accounted and reviewed by the President of the Cour des Comptes de France, and I therefore have nothing to add.

The PRESIDENT. – There are no speakers on the list, so we shall now vote on the motion to approve the Assembly's final accounts for the financial year 1990.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The motion is agreed to unanimously.*

**9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 5th December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendations, Document 1288 and addendum).
2. Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1292).
3. The situation in East Timor (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1298).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 7 p.m.)*

1. See page 44.

## FOURTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th December 1991

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendations, Doc. 1288 and addendum*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. de Puig (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Tummers, Mr. Moya, Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe, Mr. de Puig (*Rapporteur*), Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman*).
4. Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1292*).  
*Speakers:* Sir Dudley Smith (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Speed, Sir Dudley Smith (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stegagnini (*Chairman*).
5. The situation in East Timor (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1298*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Brito (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roseta, Mr. Amaral, Mr. Fernandes Marques, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Brito (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman*).
6. Close of the session.

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Sinesio, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### *2. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### *3. Arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU*

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendations, Doc. 1288 and addendum)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee

on arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1288 and addendum.

I call Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honour for me to be presenting this report and draft recommendation on arms control which, in reality, concerns both disarmament and arms control. May I first describe the present position on the initiatives, agreements and treaties of recent months and their implementation so far. As you will see, an addendum was added to the report at the last moment: the document had to be updated several times to reflect the considerable changes taking place in the situation and this is the reason for the addendum containing new facts and last-minute information.

The report is therefore somewhat provisional. Some of the agreements and initiatives are only weeks or months old. The committee agreed that we shall have to watch developments and see how the agreements and negotiations are given effect in order to be able to provide a more complete and definitive view of the situation than we can give you today.

So the report contains much data and information, some technical and some comparative, analytical and documentary. It was not a report I could have produced based on my experience in the navy where, as the Chairman, Sir Dudley Smith, knows, I did not rise above the worthy rank of leading seaman. Instead it is the fruit of

1. See page 47.

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

important contacts and the information given us during visits to different countries and governments. Here I would record my gratitude for the welcome we received in London, Vienna, Geneva and Madrid and I should especially like to thank Mr. Cameron, Secretary of the committee, who accompanied me at these meetings and has once again proved his worth as an excellent documentalist, enabling me to present to you the serious, accurate and analytical document you have before you.

However, its conclusions and political assessments and hence the draft recommendation are my sole responsibility. I said I would give you a situation report on disarmament and arms control negotiations. Here, I have to say that, in my opinion, we are in a new era; there is a new order of things. We have not yet attained our most cherished goals, but the progress made during the last few months, or better the last year and a half to two years, has no parallel in history. As I say in my report, we have only to see the advances made in the field of disarmament and nuclear control which go further than the START Treaty, significant though that is. In recent months there has been President Bush's unilateral initiative and President Gorbachev's positive response. There is the Atlantic Alliance's unilateral decision at Taormina to eliminate 80% of tactical nuclear weapons, something that would have been unthinkable only a short time ago. It happened because we are living through historical changes following the events in Eastern Europe and have a new international climate, and also because of a process that has long been under way, not only under the influence of events in the East but also as a result of deliberate policy and the wish of the people to move forward in disarmament and arms control negotiations.

Turning now from nuclear to conventional weapons, there are the agreements that have already been signed on conventional forces in Europe though these still have to be ratified in our countries. I have the honour to announce that in Spain the agreement on conventional forces in Europe will be ratified in a few weeks' time. But that is not the only one; there are also the talks now being held in Vienna which should result in much greater progress in this field at the forthcoming Helsinki meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. According to some experts to whom we have spoken this should lead on to a new phase, in preparation for a further Helsinki to follow the March Helsinki when conventional disarmament should be taken another step forward.

As regards chemical weapons you know that progress is being made towards the signature of an agreement on control, although the goal is not just control but total prohibition of chemical

and biological weapons. The instruments at present in place in the biological arms convention or chemical weapons agreements cannot yet be said to ensure total prohibition of the manufacture, sale and storage of such products, but progress is being made in that direction. There is a clear will to attain that goal and our duty is to support the work being done by the various bodies.

That, then, is a brief review which, from the viewpoint of disarmament and control policy, is positive. But we have to add that in parallel with this political will there is now a technical capacity that did not formerly exist. Nowadays agreements, contracts, conventions and treaties on disarmament are possible that can be implemented. Use of the technical control and verification capability now possible through technological development means that compliance can be verified and non-compliance detected. We can therefore say that if every one of our countries accepts the verification and inspection system laid down in current agreements, arms control can be fully implemented.

So strategically there has been a radical political change. We are no longer in a system of blocs, we no longer accept armies or defence arrangements that are offensive and we are in an area of compromise and verification where conflicts are transposed away from military force and formations to the political sphere and to political negotiation. That is why the assessment with which I conclude my report is positive. In my opinion, it is true to say that we are making unprecedented progress in this field, that the arms race is coming to an end and that we are now moving towards peace and away from war. If I may be allowed the comparison, we are getting closer to St. Augustine, who defined peace as *tranquillitas ordine* – I use the Latin so that my Christian Democrat friends will appreciate the value of the quotation – and away from Clausewitz, for whom war was a continuation of politics, and that must be a good thing.

In spite of this assessment, however, many problems remain. As I said at the beginning, we are far from reaching our ideal objectives. There are problems in the nuclear field; they are not disguised in the report and I have no wish to conceal them here. President Bush does not make the same proposals on nuclear disarmament as President Gorbachev. Moreover, as the comparison presented in the report shows, there are differing assessments and interpretations.

It also remains to be seen what positions are finally adopted by France and Great Britain who are powerful members of this organisation and have nuclear weapons. There is also the enormous problem of who is to guarantee security in the nuclear field on the Soviet side. We are seeing republics with nuclear arms on their territory becoming independent.

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

Mr. Tummers spoke to us in committee about his anxiety at the fact that the Ukraine and other republics might become nuclear powers but not necessarily subscribe to the agreements signed by President Gorbachev. Who is to guarantee that these agreements will be observed by the republics? Who is to guarantee that Mr. Gorbachev's proposal will also be agreed to by the republics with nuclear weapons? This is a tremendous worry and a question to which we do not so far have an answer.

Then there is the other worry about the proliferation of nuclear armaments. Mr. Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council of Ministers, spoke to us at a recent meeting in Bonn about the ministers' unease at Soviet scientists' being invited to share their nuclear know-how with third countries. We were told by Sipri, the famous Swedish institute, about certain countries advancing towards the mastery of nuclear technology in which, as yet, we have no clear method of monitoring the situation. There is the monstrous example of Iraq, showing the world the progress it could make in this technology. So there are worries and problems to be resolved.

Lastly, there is another smaller problem in the nuclear field. We talk about a minimum capability, but we have not yet agreed on what those minima should be. That is another problem that concerned Mr. Tummers and progress will have to be made in the future in defining these minima so that although the nuclear capability will exist it will play a solely political rôle, with any use of nuclear weapons virtually, not to say absolutely, impossible.

Turning to conventional arms, agreements do indeed exist but are yet to be ratified by all countries. We must see to it that they all do and that they do so on the basis of verification conditions and agreements that are also acceptable, because there are major problems in the interpretation of verification agreements. You all know about the dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union at the arms reduction talks because the Soviet Union's interpretation of the agreement differed from our own. For example, each of our countries will have to decide to what extent it will allow inspection, who shall have the right to inspect, and whether aerial inspection is to be permitted. There may, for example, be open skies agreements whereby inspection could be made from the air. Not all countries are signatories to the agreement, and the problem has not yet been resolved.

Then there is also the proliferation of conventional arms. Mr. Uyttendaele spoke to us in committee about the threat presented by the proliferation not of nuclear but of conventional

missile technology. Iraq offers an example of what that could mean. On this subject of conventional weapons it has to be said quite clearly that technological progress has reached the point where minima will have to be determined and we shall have to decide which weapons can no longer be described as conventional.

So there is no lack of problems here or in connection with chemical and biological weapons, as I say in my report; not only has no convention on chemical weapons been signed at all but the 1972 convention on biological weapons is still only signed by very few countries. The problem is that there are several countries that are not implementing that agreement – even some that have signed it – and others have not even accepted it. In the case of these horrible and fearful weapons of mass destruction, therefore, we have not yet reached the stage we would like and which, in my opinion, we should be striving for. That is why the process has to go on. It has begun and must continue as should our interest in seeing how the talks and agreements on the various aspects of disarmament and arms control develop.

In my report and recommendations I refer to the need for WEU not to be absent from this scenario, progress and positive agreements; WEU must play a major rôle. It is not just that we are in a position to act in these areas. I believe that our institution has a duty to take part in these processes, especially there where we have direct responsibility but also in all the others, in co-ordination with other institutions. The nuclear field is a case in point. There is much for us to do in the harmonisation of our legislation and indeed in progressing to Europe-wide agreements and in that way defining, through initiatives taken by our own organisation, those aspects which I have referred to as still awaiting definition.

We can work in co-ordination with the CSCE and NATO. In our visits with Mr. Cameron we realised how very advantageous these direct contacts and exchanges of information are, not only for us but also for those on the other side of the table who are grateful to have WEU sharing its information with them and giving them the benefit of its views and organising abilities, which are not to be scorned.

In the field of conventional disarmament not only must we be alive to what each of our countries does on this question, we must also progress towards a common stand and thus see whether a general consensus can be reached for the harmonisation of legislation and the acceptance of common arms control measures, and even progress made in such an apparently obvious matter as the organisation of defence. A glance at the defence systems of each of our countries shows how different they all are and there is a great deal of work to be done here to

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

achieve something more like a common type not only of weapons but of systems of military service in both quantitative and qualitative terms, etc.

Then there is the matter I referred to earlier, namely verification. Here WEU has a special part to play and that is to bring into being a single verification system and common verification programmes applicable to all member countries, not least because we are now to have a centre capable of playing a direct technical rôle in this field. I refer to the satellite data interpretation centre which I am proud to be able to say is to be located at the Torrejón base in Spain. This centre will be equipped to help implement, and be fully integrated in, the conventional arms reduction agreements and verification programmes, an activity which our organisation can of course conduct in full collaboration with SHAPE and SACEUR. I have to tell you that we were received in SHAPE by Minister Brown and at NATO headquarters in Brussels by Mr. Nedimoglu, who are responsible for these matters in Brussels, and who said how gratified they were at being able to work with us. They have been with us in Paris as observers during this part-session.

And so there is every opportunity for you to take action. Why should not we, WEU and this Assembly, come forward with initiatives for confidence-building and security measures, control of the arms trade and new legislation? Why should not we point to certain avenues for new disarmament agreements?

I believe we have a part to play, and in my conclusions and, above all, draft recommendation I list a number of ways in which the Council of Ministers of WEU could be requested to take action in that sense.

In closing, Mr. President, may I say that the conclusions I draw are very positive. This is a time of change but events already point towards that historic transformation of which I spoke at the outset. There is a real change of policy in everything connected with arms and security; a fundamental decision has been taken and, reading the Rome declaration and the proceedings of the NATO summit of a few weeks ago, we can see the momentous change that has occurred and observe the feeling that we are progressing towards the development of security systems that are purely defensive. Even simply putting forward the idea of adequate defensive minima would have been regarded as revolutionary only two or three years ago. What is more, combining the people's desire for disarmament, an end to the danger of excessive armaments, the advent of unarmed détente and deterrence by political negotiation, not by force

of arms – the combining of this latent desire of the people in our countries today with guarantees of security, minimum security but guarantees nevertheless – that I believe is the phenomenon that is now taking place.

That is the basic theme of my report and my proposals. If such a report and proposals had been presented only a few years ago, they would have seemed like the speech of an out-and-out pacifist. The advantage is that I can now tell you they are based on reality. My proposals are specific, but the pacifism they reflect is neither idealistic nor utopian but realistic and effective, shared by responsible politicians who certainly could not argue for imaginary disarmament but are striving to make real disarmament possible.

What I have tried to say to you is that this is actually being done. Thank you for your attention in the debates in committee. May I assure you that I shall devote the same attention to the ongoing work on this report and its recommendations in the coming months. I hope I may count on your voting in its favour.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. de Puig, for your very full report to the Assembly.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we often congratulate people on their reports, but I really must congratulate Mr. De Puig on his brilliant introduction and on the way in which he, as a realistic pacifist, has got to grips with this important subject. The manner in which he has defended the report certainly says as much about his commitment as the simple quotation from Clausewitz which everyone has, of course, known for years.

In preparing for this public debate, we discussed this subject at great length. I do not need to repeat what was said, except for one point. That is the reason why I had my name entered on the list of speakers. Since I first began in politics, I have learned the basic rule that political expertise implies considering the consequences of your decisions.

In this case considering the consequences of your decisions also means considering the consequences of destroying weapons. We are not simply sweeping away a few guns or tanks: in the course of arms reduction and disarmament tens of thousands of large pieces of technical equipment have to be disposed of in one way or another. This raises enormous pollution problems.

As an example on a small scale, take a simple filling station on your street that has to be wound up so that a house can be built in its

*Mr. Tummers (continued)*

place. All kinds of things have to be done to ensure that the piece of land is sound and suitable for building purposes. Increase the scale somewhat. Think of all the things that have to be done to clean up land formerly occupied by a breaker's yard.

Western Germany has inherited from the East tens of thousands of pieces of military equipment, tanks, guns, vehicles, you name it. It is easy to instruct a contractor to saw these things up and melt them down, but this high-quality equipment includes all kinds of environmentally harmful substances which cannot simply be disposed of. Even if you could vaporise them, they would stay in the atmosphere. It is an extremely serious problem, and this is what I mean when I talk about considering the consequences of your decisions. The decision is a good one, but the question is, how are we to keep the consequences under some kind of control? What are we doing in this field? We simply do not have an answer to this question, other than the genial response that we must take care. But we do not yet know how to deal with these things technically.

I am therefore very glad that the addendum to the recommendation, in paragraph 3, now refers to the need for member countries and CSCE-colleague states to be told that this problem is coming up. But this is not enough. We must also take action within WEU. I would therefore like to see the Chairman of the committee that drew up this report asking the Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee to report on the technical consequences of the destruction of weapons. The Institute available to us here may be able to lend a helping hand, so that, when we make recommendations like this, we can make it clear that we are taking the consequences into account.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fabra. As he is not here, I presume he does not wish to speak.

I call Mr. Moya.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this report is very useful because it deals with all the negotiations and advances in disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, and because it gives very full and systematic coverage of a complex and therefore difficult subject. To my mind, it has the merit of providing this Assembly with a clear overall picture of considerable help to us in assessing the depth and extent of the problem.

I also think it is a very sound decision to envisage a second-stage report to deal with further phases of disarmament during the

coming years or months, and to make the present Rapporteur, Mr. de Puig, responsible for it, given his success with the first stage.

I fully agree with that part of the draft recommendation where, referring to the scenario in which this process is taking place, he says that this represents a radical change from the previous situation.

I feel we all agree too that while changes in political structures are still taking place at a very rapid pace, those in security structures and disarmament are proceeding at a much slower and more cautious rate. In this connection I remember a phrase used by a present minister of defence in a member country of the Community, who said that as a principle it was normal and right to be bold in political matters and cautious in matters of security and disarmament. This is true axiomatically, but I believe we are now in a period in which the two fields are beginning to merge, and that just as very bold action has been taken in transforming political structures, there is a place for a somewhat similar audacity in transforming security structures, though it should be tempered by caution.

The report deals in some detail with the agreements reached in the CSCE negotiations, the Bush-Gorbachev initiative, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the decision on unilateral arms reduction in the Taormina agreements. Then there is the strategic concept worked out at the Rome summit, the proposals that have also been advanced for the reform and restructuring of military doctrines and for the restructuring of military forces in Europe, not to mention the Copenhagen agreements and the submission of highly enlightening documents such as the Anglo-Italian or the Franco-German proposals, etc. All of this suggests that this radical change has been made with caution but also with the audacity required. I fully share the philosophy of the report in that we are in transition from a situation of threat to a situation of risk, that this calls for greater emphasis on the exercise of political and diplomatic rather than military instruments, and that this in turn will lead in the end to a defensive system defined in the report as levels of reasonable sufficiency, i.e. sufficient to guarantee and preserve peace. This applies to both nuclear and conventional aspects.

On this subject of progress in disarmament, there have been, in my view, not only unprecedentedly large quantitative changes but also – and this seems to me possibly more important – qualitative changes in both nuclear and conventional fields. In the nuclear field, which I believe is analysed with great accuracy in the report, we are now leagues away from the flexible response philosophy, having moved on to the concept of deterrence designed to prevent a possible aggressor from resorting to a policy of attack or

*Mr. Moya (continued)*

aggression. The words used are lowest or minimum level, and extremely distant and remote use, so it is a radically different philosophy, a different scenario, a major qualitative change in the nuclear field which will doubtless have to be followed up during the coming months.

But there has been a qualitative as well as quantitative reduction in the conventional field as well with a clearcut change from bipolar confrontation to mutual security both bringing about and based upon a relationship of confidence. In my view, therefore, whereas on many occasions the diplomatic language used in agreements is designed to conceal a reality or content that is completely different from the apparent meaning of the words, the language and the words in these disarmament agreements describe real disarmament.

That gives me great satisfaction, and I thank Mr. de Puig very much for the report he has submitted and wish him every success in the second stage of his work.

*(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe.

Mr. GONZALEZ-LAXE (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, after Mr. de Puig's speech in explanation of an excellent report and providing all the information we need to give us the situation of WEU initiatives, I as his friend can do no more than express my satisfaction at the large number of both initiatives and proposals.

I should just like to pick out one of the features which could, I feel, highlight WEU's orientation or scenario, or definitive nature. Basically, it has to do with technological progress. There can be no doubt that this is one of the areas in which it is both very difficult to keep watch on what countries are doing and also very easy to make rapid progress.

The report deals with the economic changes caused by the political events of the present phase in which military strength represented by the armies of yesterday is giving place to democratic authority based on political power, but it is in the sphere of technology that a greater effort is needed. The report makes a connection between technology and arms control and verification. Although generally, as previous speakers have said, the processes of disarmament, reaching agreement, co-operation and transparency are difficult but possible, and although we now have the ability to achieve what is possible and desirable, this is much more difficult in the case of biological technology and disarm-

ament. In the future, attention will therefore need to be paid to co-operation among countries, effective control and harmonisation of legislation for the verification and control of weapons that are biologically based and technologically delivered. Since the Rapporteur said that he will be doing further work and producing more recommendations on the subject, that is one of the aspects that I would wish to underline and activate.

In conclusion, may I congratulate Mr. de Puig and all the members of his committee for the excellent document they have given us.

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the list of speakers.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this has been a short debate with few members present, which is usual on a Thursday morning in our plenary sessions. On this occasion however, perhaps because of my positive way of seeing things, I will not attribute the absences and the small number of speakers to any failing on members' part but simply assume that everyone is in agreement with the report and draft recommendation. So I thank those who have spoken because they have been the spokesmen for the majority, as was also seen in the discussions in committee. However, Mr. President, I would just like to reply to those that did speak.

Mr. Tummers had already spoken in committee and was responsible not only for our bringing the subject of damage that might be caused to the environment by some of the arms destruction operations into the draft recommendation, but also – for which I thank him – suggested some of the things I have included in my address, because he prompted discussion on important matters relating not only to the problems of arms destruction but also to the problem of disarmament in general. So I thank him for having suggested another topic for a report when he pointed out the value of producing one on environmental matters in the appropriate committee. I think this is a good idea; possibly it could be taken up by the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

Mr. Moya is well acquainted with the matter he raised, because he is a leading Spanish representative to the North Atlantic Assembly. He spoke about convergence between the political decisions and discussion and strictly military ideas. He has witnessed this at work in debates in the Atlantic Alliance assembly, as we were all able to see when we read the contents of the new strategic concept in Rome. I thank him for referring to it; it is one of the great documents of our time. This much more political definition that was produced in Rome is a document that



*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

our organisation should always have before it. It represents an advance with great potential for the future.

I also thank Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe for what he said. I fully agree with him.

Mr. President, I thank those present for supporting this report.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman of the Defence Committee, Sir Dudley Smith, wish to reply?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Let me say on behalf of the Defence Committee that we admire Mr. de Puig's enthusiasm and integrity, and the way in which he has tackled an ongoing problem to which we shall return time and again with our reports. Despite all that is now happening in the world – all the imbalances, changes and anxieties – it may seem to some that the question of disarmament and proper regulation has been put on to the back burner; it does not seem to have the same prominence that it had a year or eighteen months ago. That is why reports of this kind are so important.

Mr. de Puig has gone into the subject very thoroughly. He talked of being a radical pacifist; that might have been said some time ago. The report contains some quite hawkish sections, but they are also sensible and balanced, and I cannot believe that any member of the Assembly, except an extremist, would not go along with them.

The Defence Committee agreed unanimously with all the proposals, and gave the Rapporteur good support. I am sure that the Assembly will echo that support, and that – although our numbers are small this morning – we will endorse its recommendations. No doubt we shall go on to produce other reports which can make a material contribution to the eventual peace and tranquillity of Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – My friends Mr. de Puig and Sir Dudley Smith have mentioned that there are not many members present this morning. I think that we can take it that we have quality rather than quantity.

We shall now vote on the first draft recommendation contained in Document 1288.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call...

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

We shall now vote on the second draft recommendation contained in Document 1288 addendum.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

*(A vote was taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously<sup>2</sup>.*

Let me add my compliments to those that have already been paid to both the Chairman and the Rapporteur.

#### **4. Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report  
of the Technological and Aerospace Committee  
and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1292)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the presentation by Sir Dudley Smith of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on arms and equipment for a European rapid action force and debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1292.

I call Sir Dudley Smith to present his report.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – In my brief summary of the report, I shall attempt to explain what the report is not. There have been some misunderstandings. The report does not propose the establishment of a rapid reaction force. That has already been dealt with by NATO foreign ministers. The report follows in their wake.

The report does not propose an adventurous mercenary-type army which starts wars and becomes involved in conflicts which are none of their business. The report is about arms and equipment for a rapid reaction force which will be established in Europe. It will become part of the stronger European defence capability. That is of extreme importance. Throughout this week WEU has been examining the various aspects involved in the stronger European defence identity. WEU is a defence organisation.

A defence organisation must be efficient and credible. We must ensure that the rapid reaction

1. See page 48.

2. See page 49.

*Sir Dudley Smith (continued)*

force is credible and that it has the right equipment and the right weaponry, and that it is well organised and easily deployable so that it discourages those who might embark upon an adventure.

The recommendations in the report are modest. They are but two. They emphasise the importance that we attach to the European defence issue. The report stresses the need for harmonisation of arms and equipment. In the cold war days members of the Assembly said that harmonisation of weaponry was essential between the various allied countries. That was achieved to some extent, but there were imbalances. Fortunately, they were not put to the test. If they had they would have been found wanting in several particulars. Today it could be said that we need a smaller force with different dimensions. It will be a help to know that our equipment and arms are credible and workable.

The second recommendation stresses the need for a strategic airlift command. Some people believe that that is premature, but I like to think that we are ahead in our thinking. The Gulf war demonstrated the chronic need for an airlift capability to take men and equipment to various parts of an area. All modern weaponry and supporting ancillary equipment is expensive. These days aeroplanes cost millions of pounds, so any investment must be wise and prudent to ensure value for money. Without modern equipment it is not possible to deploy a rapid reaction force efficiently.

The proposed rapid reaction force will enable the western allies to protect their vital interests throughout the world. The Gulf provided a good example of how easily things can go wrong and how our interests can be jeopardised. In that crisis immediate reaction was required and fortunately all was well in the end. It might not have turned out that way.

Throughout the week we have been discussing the Yugoslav crisis. There is no sign of an end to the civil war there. The war is on European territory and we are asked to find the appropriate answer. We should also remember the failed putsch in Moscow. It was the firing of the starting gun for the complete dissolution of the Soviet Union. Everything is happening at a breathtaking pace. It is not just a question of glasnost. The Soviet Union is in a state of turmoil. One cannot help feeling sorry for those who have to pick up the pieces and to find peaceful and progressive economic solutions.

Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance cannot afford to wait to adapt their defence capabilities to the changed circumstances. The report makes it clear that the allied countries

still have considerable problems in organising their defence. The initiatives taken to prepare for the changing events will be considered further at Maastricht in the next few days.

The report deals with command and planning structures, logistic support and the reorganisation of military exercises. I am speaking of only a few of the problems that must be faced by the allies. Face them they will, and we hope to encourage them by our recommendations.

There is a continuing need to monitor the situation. We need to keep up with the play in a changing world. The world has changed more in the past eighteen months than it changed in the previous fifty or sixty years. Who can say what will happen in the next five years? None of us knows. That is why we make this modest contribution.

Our report would not have been possible without the help and skill of Mr. Floris de Gou. He is a man of considerable ability and I welcome his recent promotion. Our loss is someone else's gain. We are pleased for him because he is a very popular, agreeable and able counsellor.

We have had many discussions about the report, but at the end of the day it remained intact. I cannot imagine that anybody will vote against it. There is an understanding of the need for proper equipment and arms.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

I call Mrs. Blunck.

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I hold you all in the highest esteem, I enjoy listening to you, I learn a great deal from you. So I am also quite sure that I can put forward a completely different viewpoint here and that you will tolerate this because you cannot convince me that your opinion is the right one unless you know what my opinion is.

Security is no longer just a military concept. Joint security is threatened not only by an excessive arms build-up, weapons of mass destruction and military aggression, but equally by global destruction of the environment, excessive consumption of energy and raw materials, over-population and an unjust world economy. Struggles over distribution and migratory movements are as much of a threat to international security as ethnic and religious tensions, violations of human rights and the persecution of minorities.

Sir Dudley Smith's report now assumes that we need a multinational rapid reaction force for our security. I listened very carefully, Sir Dudley. You said we were simply taking up a proposal from the NATO defence ministers. But, quite apart from this, I am sure we must first declare the conditions for an international

*Mrs. Blunck (continued)*

reaction force of this kind, because I am still wondering if we intended to march into Yugoslavia. Today we heard the news about Belfast: do we intend to march into Belfast? This must be established in advance. In my view this has to be done before anything else.

In terms of military logistics, a military task force is always an offensive force. I find that absurd. While the Warsaw Pact was still intact, we were always proud of having a defensive, not an offensive army. Our aim was to provide a structural basis for non-aggression. Now that the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated, we want to set up an offensive force. In my view that will not do.

I know that it is difficult in practice to draw a line between offence and defence, but in logistical terms our mobility and hence, of course, our offensive capability was impaired by the fact that we had fewer tank transporters, fewer bridge-building tanks, other units in place of mobile supply units, and that we procured no combat helicopters. But these things would have to be acquired if we were to set up a reaction force, because combat helicopters are light, mobile and lethal. What we need is a large-capacity aircraft. I would remind you that the Russians refused to transport equipment to the Gulf. I tell you this is a procurement programme worth at least ten billion to the defence industry – and this at a time when hunger is widespread in the world and people are starving, particularly in the eastern part of Europe.

We are a risk-taking community. The world is a fragile entity. I am convinced that military action is not a political option. Anyone who believes it is represents the old school of thought, because in an age of hyper-modern weapons of mass destruction and global ecological crises we must take other, appropriate, responsible decisions. What makes me very bitter is that decision-making powers are sadly not always accompanied by discriminating judgment.

The report refers to Frederick the Great. I would like to recall another historical personage, Bertha von Suttner. On 18th April 1906, eighty-five years ago, she received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo. She had a vision; she had a dream. She campaigned against conflicts being resolved by force in any way. She wanted to set up an international court of arbitration to resolve conflicts between states without the use of arms.

“Peace is not everything, but without peace everything is nothing.” This is in my party’s manifesto. “Peace is not everything, but without peace everything is nothing.” It is based on the certainty that wars conducted with

nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional weapons of mass destruction are irresponsible in our fragile world. It is based on the conviction that war is not the continuation of politics by other means, but is always a sign of political surrender. It is based on the knowledge that dictatorship and torture are abominable, despicable and abhorrent, but that war stands for death, and thus for absolute hopelessness.

I would remind you all that we did not resolve conflicts in Czechoslovakia by military means. War cannot protect frontiers. War always means suffering without frontiers. War is violence, exploitation and oppression. It does not lead to the fair distribution of the world’s resources, it does not respect human rights and it does not guarantee the protection of the natural foundations of life.

The PRESIDENT. – I am interrupting you, Mrs. Blunck, because you have had two minutes over your time. Would you please resume your seat?

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*). – I am sorry.

*(The speaker continued in German)*

(Translation). – But I do urge you to reject the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. The last speaker in our debate is Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I warmly welcome and support this excellent report produced by Sir Dudley Smith. I must say to Mrs. Blunck, who has just spoken, that ringing declarations about peace are not enough. It was not an adventure when various WEU countries and other members of the United Nations went to the Gulf a few months ago. It was in response to a vicious dictatorship which tried to take over another country and was slaughtering millions of people. To sit at home, wring one’s hands and ask for peace in our time is not the answer to that type of aggression. Therefore, in the new situation facing us today, with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and, indeed, the disintegration of several countries in Eastern Europe, we must look to the future security needs of both the alliance and, in particular, Europe. Sir Dudley pointed out the limited extent to which the report addresses that.

There is nothing new about the concept. In my report to the Assembly more than two years ago, I urged the need for a fast reaction force. The French have had the force d’action rapide for many years, and a most effective force it is too. We are talking about the proposal put forward by NATO which, I hope, we can adapt for WEU.

In paragraph 62 of the explanatory memorandum, and in his speech, Sir Dudley underlined the vital need to harmonise equipment in all our countries. Two or three times I have

*Mr. Speed (continued)*

visited the Franco-German brigade and I have seen how the various military vehicles must have two radio sets for the French and Germans to communicate back to headquarters. Communications, radio and the various sensors of radar, identification of friend or foe and all the rest must be properly harmonised if any future security organisation is to be sensible.

Equally, the procurement of helicopters, which will be a vital component of such a fast reaction force, will be necessary.

On a rather longer-term scale, I am pleased that my own country – the United Kingdom – and France have announced that they will be working together on a new anti-aircraft frigate. That is the sort of direction that we must take.

One particular problem has been referred to in at least one report that has been presented this week and in a number of questions to ministers. Some people wish the European Community eventually to progress to political union. If that happens, and if WEU is its security and defence arm, a problem will arise with other members of the alliance – Norway and Turkey, in particular – which are not members of the EC at the moment. In a funny way, the report highlights that, although not explicitly, Turkey is prepared to contribute troop divisions to a fast reaction force and Norway occupies an important strategic position for the North Atlantic. If those countries are not to be members of WEU – and they both wish to be members – we shall have a major lacuna in any future arrangements for a fast reaction force.

Various people have argued about the different problem of command and about whether the force will be a NATO force, a WEU force or, indeed, an EC force. There are countless examples of commanders being both NATO commanders and national commanders in what is called the twin-hatting arrangement, so that is not, in fact, a problem. Commanders of a NATO force operating within area could also have relevant command positions in a WEU force operating out of area. They could even have a national command as well. The concept of twin-hatting is a tried and tested one, and such arrangements have been in place for many years – since NATO was established. One cannot, therefore, argue that we cannot have an alliance force and a WEU force composed of the same people. We certainly can.

I congratulate Sir Dudley and the committee on an excellent report and hope that it will be carried by a very large majority.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Speed, for keeping to your time-limit.

Does the Rapporteur wish to respond?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Several of Mr. Speed's observations were absolutely right. I support what he said about Norway and Turkey, whose position could be a matter of considerable disquiet to us in the next few months unless matters are put on a better footing by those responsible for the WEU Council and its development. Turkey's record during the Gulf war was exemplary, and it should not be neglected in that particular.

Mr. Speed was also right that harmonisation is the key and the report emphasises that repeatedly. I also wholeheartedly agree that ringing declarations of peace are simply not enough. We are a democracy, and Mrs. Blunck is fully entitled to put her point of view – as, indeed, am I. It is perhaps a good thing that we are not always totally in agreement.

Having said that, let me try to put her right on a couple of matters. As I tried – perhaps inadequately – to explain in my report, it is not a question of marching in. We are not establishing a force to go off on adventures but as a defensive mechanism by which we can look after ourselves. I know that the Yugoslav crisis is a particularly difficult problem because the civil war in Yugoslavia is extremely complicated, and has come very much at the wrong time – as we begin to evolve our new strategies for the end of this century and beyond.

Was it not the Three Musketeers whose motto was "One for all and all for one"? That is very much the view that I take. The position in NATO has always been that, if one member country is attacked, the others come to its rescue. That pertained throughout the cold war and it is still true today. If Mrs. Blunck's country or mine were attacked, we should expect the other countries to rally round and protect us, whether the attack came from within, from another country in the main European area – which is now in many ways inconceivable, although one can never be certain – or from outside, as happened with the Middle East.

We have to be prepared. There is absolutely no point in saying, now that the cold war is over, let us make all our weapons into ploughshares and go home and hold up our hands in horror if a country starts playing up. We cannot afford to do that. We need a credible and sensible force, and that is what the rapid reaction force that we propose will be. It is our job to try to encourage from the sidelines and to ensure that we have an efficient, properly equipped force that fulfils its rôle as a purely defensive mechanism. Its rôle will certainly not be to go out marauding and attacking other countries.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in its report the committee has tried to tackle promptly a vital concept in the

*Mr. Stegagnini (continued)*

new European security order seen from the standpoints of the Community, WEU and NATO. The formation of a rapid action force is certain to be one of the main subjects of the forthcoming Maastricht summit and is real and concrete evidence of Europe's determination to meet calls for immediate action to protect the security not only of an individual country but of all countries, because attacks on one country or violent revolution could affect the whole international community and Europe in particular.

Our report does not, however, discuss political issues or the rôle of the rapid action force. We have confined ourselves to looking at the technical and military requirements and the armaments needed to equip such a force. We have taken a census of all countries' requirements and their willingness to combine existing rapid action forces which must, of course, be homogeneous, capable of fitting in with each other and interdependent and interchangeable as regards command and control. This also applies to resources and armaments. It would in fact be impossible to set up a rapid action force in Europe if the forces of the individual countries were unable to co-operate and use similar systems of standardisation and procedures.

The report stresses that the important rôle of a rapid action force lies in the ability to deploy it rapidly wherever it may be needed. One section of the report emphasises the need for aircraft, helicopters and warships to be available so that they can be deployed and respond quickly to any need which may arise.

Mr. President, this will not be the committee's last word on the subject of the rapid action force. We have already made arrangements for another report which will be focused even more closely on the decisions taken at Maastricht. In other words, we plan a sequel to this first report to deal specifically and in concrete terms with the new force which must be decided upon after the Maastricht decisions and, more particularly, with the types of armaments and military units needed to meet Europe's requirements. We do not therefore anticipate an attacking rôle for the rapid action force beyond what is needed by Europe, at least under European control. If a higher international authority such as the United Nations were required, the question will be considered at the right time.

This report is intended as proof that the Assembly is responding promptly to a debate which is taking place in all European countries and all international bodies. Once again, therefore, I believe that our action is timely. This is the first report on the subject to be produced by an international organisation.

My sincere thanks go to our Secretary for his assistance. Unfortunately he is leaving us to

become secretary of another committee. I also wish to thank the Rapporteur who was asked to produce the report not only because of his knowledge of the subject but also because of his position of authority, since he is also Chairman of the Defence Committee.

We have therefore sought to produce a timely and authoritative report and we believe that we have responded very quickly to the needs of a debate now in progress and have made a positive contribution. My thanks to all speakers and I hope that there will be a big majority for the report, as in the committee where there was virtual unanimity.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1292.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

### **5. The situation in East Timor**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1298)*

The PRESIDENT. – The final order of the day, following the Assembly's decision of Monday last in response to a request for urgent procedure, is the presentation by Mr. Brito of the report of the Political Committee on the situation in East Timor and debate and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1298.

I call Mr. Brito to present his report.

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I think that the justification for the draft resolution on East Timor submitted for your consideration is sufficiently explained in the first three paragraphs of the report.

I will merely add that the conscience of the international community must surely be troubled by sixteen years of silence about the extermination of a people which, in spite of everything – and everything means over 200 000 killed – is still resolved to assert its will and its right to self-determination and independence.

These sixteen years of silence, criminally imposed for a variety of geo-strategic and eco-

1. See page 50.

*Mr. Brito (continued)*

conomic reasons, have not only helped suppress the rights of the Timorese people, but also sanctioned the intransigence of the Indonesian Government.

On 12th November last there was yet another massacre of defenceless people in Dili, a further example of the cold-blooded attempt to exterminate a people. Only this time the press and the power of the camera and the microphone was there; this time there was no hiding the horrors and suffering of the Timorese people.

I am proud to be a member of the Council of Europe, doubly proud because the Council of Europe condemned the Indonesian Government and the illegal occupation of Timor when the Community was still passive and silent in the face of these crimes.

I am convinced that, of itself, membership of this Assembly, whereby we assume the dual capacity of defenders of human rights as members of the Council of Europe and defenders of international law as members of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU itself, justifies a resolution condemning the Indonesian Government and expressing our fellowship for the people of Timor.

I will conclude by thanking the Political Committee for its unequivocal support in unanimously approving and supporting the request for urgent procedure so as to have this item added to the order of business for this part-session.

I would also like to thank the Assembly for recognising the urgency of the matter and enabling it to be dealt with here and now.

In that connection, as well as my colleagues in the Portuguese Delegation who, not being members of the Political Committee, were unable to vote for the proposal in committee, let me first mention our President, Mr. Pontillon, author of the Council of Europe report on the East Timor question and, secondly, the new President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, who has shown keen and active interest, not forgetting all those who have given their support and assistance in enabling the voice of the people of Timor to be heard in this forum.

I believe that these two expressions of active support also demonstrate the fact that, in the defence of human rights and international law, the most varied ideological groups can take a common stand for the good of our society and for the good of a world which we all want to be free and democratic.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the facts and the seriousness of the situation speak for themselves in this matter. Thanks to the media, we are now aware of them, and they are arousing world-wide public indignation.

I would also like to thank the Political Committee for having adopted, by an overwhelming majority, this motion for a resolution on the situation in East Timor and the request for urgent procedure for its consideration.

As a representative of Portugal which, under international law, is the administrative power in East Timor – and I would like to draw your attention to the fact that I am speaking, as are my colleagues in the delegation, not only as a Portuguese deputy but also as a representative of the people of Timor – I am grateful to all my colleagues in this Assembly for their support in approving this resolution.

In fact, the terrible massacre on 12th November in Dili, the capital of Timor, when Indonesian soldiers fired into a crowd of unarmed and defenceless civilians, killing over a hundred people, must not be allowed to go uncondemned; and Indonesia must face the consequences.

I must remind you that for sixteen years this country has illegally occupied a territory which does not belong to it – against the will of the people of Timor, represented here by Portuguese deputies – in contravention of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, ignoring the condemnations of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers of the Twelve, the Non-Aligned Conference and the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Indeed, Indonesia not only ignores the rights of the Timorese people to self-determination and independence, but also repeatedly violates human rights, the fundamental rights which we value so highly. The repression of the Timorese people's valid resistance to the occupation has now turned into genocide, which has already brought about the death of more than 200 000 people over the years.

I believe that this Assembly, along with all the other international forums – within their respective areas of competence, obviously, since we are not here to deal with economic or other matters – enhances its image by demanding that the Indonesian Government should cease its occupation, put an end to all violence and guarantee that human rights will be respected and, obviously, that international law will be observed, including the right of peoples to self-determination and independence. I mean, of course, that the Indonesian armed forces must withdraw from the territory which they are illegally occupying.

*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

In conclusion, I would like to make one final point: there can be no doubt that we are competent to deal with this matter, for a number of reasons. Firstly, as I have already said, Portugal, a member of this Assembly, is the administrative power in that territory under international law. Consequently, this aggression is also directed against Portugal, which is a member of Western European Union.

Secondly, as I have already said, we are confronted with clear and serious violations of international law and human rights, in the face of which we cannot remain silent.

Furthermore, the resolution concentrates on areas within our competence by calling for an end to military occupation and asking for an immediate embargo on arms for Indonesia, together with the withdrawal of all military support. These are indeed matters within the competence of our organisation.

Finally, we are competent to deal with this matter because we cannot have two sets of standards. This Assembly roundly condemned, by a crushing majority and in some cases unanimously, the forces of the Serbian military dictatorship for armed aggression, massacres and violations of human rights in Croatia, and also the Iraqi military dictatorship in Kuwait – a country similar in size to East Timor – therefore to be consistent we cannot but condemn with the same vigour similar acts carried out with scandalous persistence by the Djakarta military dictatorship, and request the same sanctions.

Many thanks to the President of this Assembly and also to the Chairman of the Political Committee who is here today, and to all the members of this Assembly for showing consistency, in the vote which is to follow, with the positions this house has adopted, which have enhanced its reputation. Once again, it will be highly respected and even more appreciated by Portuguese public opinion which, like public opinion throughout the world, is exceptionally sensitive to this scandalous situation under which Timor is suffering and which must be brought to an end as a matter of urgency.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Amaral.

Mr. AMARAL (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this important assembly has before it for consideration and analysis an extremely important draft resolution. Although our main preoccupation is defence and security in Europe, we cannot and should not shy away from events which jeopardise world peace.

Besides, peace and security in Europe also depend very much on the attitudes which threaten them in other areas. The world has

become too small for individual states or continents to be able to ignore or remain indifferent to events in other states or regions, however distant they may be.

The network of relationships between states is increasingly strong and dense, regardless of their geographical situation. Hence the pressing need for this Assembly to be mindful of events beyond the objective limits of its immediate concerns, especially when faced with phenomena which endanger respect for human rights and directly contravene international law.

In the case under consideration, the world has learned with indignation of the genocide which the Indonesian military government has been practising on the people of East Timor. For sixteen years, as we have already heard today, it has tortured, assassinated and murdered over 200 000 Timorese citizens, and this genocide is continuing with outrageous insolence.

That dictatorial and despotic government is occupying land which it intends to annex by terror and by use of arms against a defenceless people who are fighting for their identity, their dignity and their liberty.

The United Nations, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and other prestigious international organisations have already protested against this foul crime which the Government of Indonesia is committing against the Timorese people as, in all fairness, this Assembly should also declare itself, so that those who are responsible for international policy may put an end to the preposterous and reprehensible attitude of the Indonesian military government.

The United Nations has recognised the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination, and in order that this could become a reality, it recognised Portugal as the administrative power. However, as long as Indonesia illegally occupies the territory Portugal cannot carry out that mandate.

The draft resolution now under consideration is one further call for the member states of our organisation to affirm the positions it maintains, in order to defend the justice, peace and security to which we aspire. I therefore welcome the action it calls for, in the hope that the recommendations implicit in it are put into effect and that we are not left with mere words.

I heartily congratulate the signatories to the resolution and hope that the member states of WEU will successfully defend human rights and the observance of international law so that peace may be possible, and even more so because, unfortunately, there is no alternative.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Fernandes Marques.

Mr. FERNANDES MARQUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I feel it is hardly necessary for me to speak on this matter because I will only be repeating what my colleagues in the Portuguese Delegation, Mr. Brito, Mr. Roseta and Mr. Amaral, have already said.

However, I believe that although the international community has reacted effectively against violations of human rights in some situations – the invasion of Kuwait, for example, by a power as armed to the teeth as Iraq was – there are others where it has not. East Timor, where a small nation has successfully resisted the Indonesian occupation and dictatorship at the cost of great sacrifice and 200 000 lives is a case in point. I will not go back over events in that country during the years that have gone by or the sacrifices that the people of Timor have been made to suffer, but there are two things I really cannot fail to reiterate. The first is to do with the credibility of the international organisations, and this organisation in particular which is said to be the effective defender of human rights and international law.

The approval of this draft resolution, presented and approved by the Political Committee of this Assembly, will show that we are indeed ready to uphold the principles for which we stand with firm action. That is why I say that it is the credibility of international organisations which is at stake when their members fail to act in support of what we claim to defend.

My second point is that, just as we are all aware that the peaceful development of events in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was only possible because of the power of the media and the increasing extent to which people and nations can be informed of events, so it is that the reason the international community knows about the latest massacre in Dili and is finding out what is actually happening in the country is that the media were present.

The horrifying pictures we all saw on television, with young Timorese people being attacked and killed by Indonesian soldiers showing not the slightest mercy for defenceless and unarmed people, compelled the European Community and the United States of America and other, particularly Asian, countries to reconsider their position and the silence they had kept until then.

For these reasons I believe that the approval of this motion for a resolution by our parliamentary Assembly will help to increase its credibility and result in respect for human rights and international law and especially the right of the Timorese to self-determination, soon becoming reality.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I am sure that I speak for all my colleagues when I say that we fully support the recommendation and commend it to the Assembly. We are glad that our Portuguese colleagues, who are relatively new in WEU, have produced their report. Their action is timely. Some might ask what WEU has to do with what is happening in East Timor. There are several reasons for our involvement. Human rights are involved and indirectly WEU is concerned. The Council of Europe has been prominent in its championing of human rights

WEU is an international body. Although it is anchored on the continent of Europe, it has influence in many parts of the world. International bodies must take an interest and support protests of this kind. If we do not take an interest the spotlight of attention will fade and grave abuses and injustices will not be corrected. We must express our disgust when human rights are abused.

Portugal should be supported in its attempts to achieve justice and regularity in East Timor. We do not like what we read and see about East Timor. For the media it is way down the pecking order because the place is so far away. Many people are not aware of the tremendous injustices that occur in East Timor. It is our duty to put the spotlight on such places and to attempt to introduce normality. We should commend our Portuguese colleagues for their initiative in tabling the emergency resolution and for putting their case so sensibly and accurately.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

Does Mr. Brito wish to respond?

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will leave it to the Chairman of the Political Committee to reply.

However, I am very moved and would not like to let this opportunity go by without saying thank you on behalf of the Timorese people for everything that has been said. I am sure that at this time we all share in a spirit of solidarity and fraternity for a suffering people, a people which has been martyred.

Once again, I would like to thank you all and, in these special circumstances, Mr. Stoffelen, the Chairman, for enabling our Political Committee to allow the Assembly to deal so expeditiously with the question of Timor.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – It was clear at the meeting of the Political Committee and it is clear in this Assembly that we feel the need to express how horrified we are by the continuous violence in East Timor and how fully determined we are to support, not just as a sign of solidarity, the text originally tabled by Mr. Brito and now by the Political Committee.



*Mr. Stoffelen (continued)*

We agree with Sir Dudley who, to avoid misunderstanding, explained why WEU deals with a part of the world far from Europe. Indeed, I fully agree with these three reasons. Human rights are at stake in a horrible way. More than ever the Assembly has a clear impact and influence not just on Europe. Certainly, we are the only Assembly with competence to deal with arms questions. That is included in the text.

I must advise the Assembly to support the text, if possible unanimously. I have another suggestion. We are about to ask our governments to take action, but we should also make an urgent appeal to the Government of Indonesia. I suggest that, after we adopt the text, the Assembly should ask our Clerk to present the text to the Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia immediately, accompanied by as many journalists and photographers as possible. I say that with due respect for the independence of the press. That is my sincere suggestion. Let us adopt the text and ask our Clerk to take our decision immediately to the representative of the Indonesian Government.

The PRESIDENT. – That applause shows the Assembly's support for your suggestion, Mr. Stoffelen. First, however, we must again check the text. I will read the last sentence of the draft resolution as it should be, first in English and then in French. In English it should read: "To suspend immediately military support to Indonesia." In French it should read: "La suspension immédiate des appuis militaires à l'Indonésie."

We shall now vote on the draft resolution.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft resolution is adopted unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

We will instruct the Clerk to take the resolution to the Indonesian Embassy, accompanied by our press representative and photographer. We hope that as many of the world's press as possible will go along there. We will send to the Council of Ministers in the normal way the decision that calls for this to go to member states. The resolution will be taken to the Indonesian Ambassador this afternoon preferably, so that there is no delay.

#### *6. Close of the session*

The PRESIDENT. – Ladies and gentlemen, we have now reached the end of the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly. I thank you for your co-operation.

I therefore declare closed the thirty-seventh ordinary session.

*(The sitting was closed at 11.50 à.m.)*

<sup>1</sup>. See page 51.



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IMPRIMERIE  ALENÇONNAISE  
Rue Édouard-Belin : 1<sup>er</sup> trimestre 1992  
N° d'ordre : 21720

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PRINTED IN FRANCE

