

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1990

I

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

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Assembly Documents

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The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

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Mr. WILKINSON John	Conservative

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MM. LAMBIE David	Labour
LITHERLAND Robert	Labour
LORD Michael	Conservative
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. RATHBONE Tim	Conservative
REDMOND Martin	Labour
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
Mrs. ROE Marion	Conservative
MM. THOMPSON John	Labour
WARD John	Conservative

AGENDA

of the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session
 Paris, 5th-8th June 1990

I. Report of the Council

Thirty-fifth annual report of the Council
 (second part)

II. Political questions

WEU in the Atlantic Alliance

*Report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf
 of the Political Committee*

III. Defence questions

1. Vienna, disarmament and Western
 European Union

*Report tabled by Lord Newall on behalf of the
 Defence Committee*

2. The future of low flying

*Report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the
 Defence Committee*

IV. Technological and aerospace questions

1. The Independent European Pro-
 gramme Group (IEPG) and Western
 European Union

*Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the
 Technological and Aerospace Committee*

2. Observation satellites – a European
 means of verifying disarmament –
 guidelines drawn from the symposium

*Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the
 Technological and Aerospace Committee*

3. Developments in command, control,
 communications and intelligence (C³I)

*Report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Tech-
 nological and Aerospace Committee*

V. Budgetary questions

Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial
 organs of Western European Union for
 the financial years 1989 (revised) and
 1990

*Report tabled by Mr. Lord on behalf of the Com-
 mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

VI. Parliamentary and Public Relations

1. WEU, research institutes and non-
 governmental organisations concerned
 with security and European defence

*Report tabled by Mr. Stegagnini on behalf of the
 Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
 tions*

2. The new rôle of national delegations in
 the activities of the WEU Assembly

*Report tabled by Sir John Hunt on behalf of the
 Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
 tions*

ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session
Paris, 5th-8th June 1990

TUESDAY, 5th JUNE

Morning

Meetings of political groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Re-enrolment on the agenda of reports of committees.
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session.
8. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens, former President of the Assembly.
Debate.
9. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
10. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance:
report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.

WEDNESDAY, 6th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
2. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance:
Resumed debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance:
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union:
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Newall on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.

THURSDAY, 7th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium.
2. Address by Mr. Jeszenszky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary.
3. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament – guidelines drawn from the symposium:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Address by Mr. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States.
2. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
3. WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stegagnini on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Votes on the draft recommendation and draft order.
4. The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir John Hunt on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolution.

FRIDAY, 8th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. The future of low flying:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I):

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lord on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION

INFORMATION LETTER

*from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs*

(16th November 1989 – 14th March 1990)

London, 15th March 1990

Dear President,

My previous information letter to you in November 1989 coincided with the first signs that a truly revolutionary challenge to the old order in Eastern Europe was gaining momentum in the wake of the opening of the Berlin wall. The fall of the Ceausescu régime with so much bloodshed on 25th December marked the end both of the first stage of a general upheaval and of an era: almost fifty years of Leninist socialism in subjection to the Soviet Union are now a matter for the judgment of history. Simultaneously with the proclamation of independence from Moscow by the Lithuanian Communist Party on 23rd December, perestroika came up against the urgent need for large-scale institutional reforms to meet the challenge of ethnic and religious demands on the western and southern fringes of the Soviet empire.

The USSR as we know it is, to say the least, in the throes of wholesale changes; Stalin's empire is falling apart but Russia is still alive and will always assert itself as a great power on the continent of Europe, particularly if it succeeds in adopting a political régime conducive to its development. Moscow must be encouraged to allow the peoples of the Soviet Union the fundamental right freely to choose their type of economic and social organisation, which presupposes a guarantee of political freedoms. President Gorbachev recognised this right for the nations of Eastern Europe in his speech to the United Nations on 7th December 1988. Events are showing us that such recognition is inescapable. If it is given quickly, there will be less violence. In this respect, the landslide victory of the Sajudis movement in the Lithuanian elections on 24th February 1990, followed by the declaration of independence on 11th March 1990, has triggered an irreversible process.

In these circumstances, the Western European countries linked in the European Community and WEU must exert their full political influence, in view of Gorbachev's wish to attract western capital and technology to the USSR on a large scale. In all matters concerning the application of the fundamental principles embodied in the Helsinki final act, West Europeans must take a bold political line and not be held back by the unfounded criticism that they are threatening Russia's vital interests. They are not. If a document issued by the Novosti press agency early this month is to be believed, elimination of the threat of war is the first priority of the armed forces of the Soviet Union whose foreign policy is based on the renunciation of the arms race and power politics. Following the example of all the other European countries committed to the CSCE process, the USSR declares that it has no territorial claims, that it does not consider any state or people to be an enemy and consequently that it will never start hostilities or even less be the first to use nuclear weapons. In this context, the rights of peoples are an integral part of the political dialogue and can no longer be regarded as a subject of confrontation. Looking only at the western fringes of the Soviet Union, it is no longer appropriate for the WEU countries to stay silent, considering the extent of the demonstrations in Moldavia and the success of the candidates seeking independence at the elections in the Ukraine. Caution is essential in military matters, but a bold and open approach in support of the values which the peoples have brought to triumph in the East is essential in the political dialogue with the Soviet power. Here the Assembly has taken positive initiatives which should be carried further.

Eastern Europe's re-entry into history, which we are watching closely and with enthusiasm, is marked by the powerful re-emergence of national, ethnic, religious and cultural identities. National feeling and religious faith have been the driving forces in the escape from communist domination. Everything must now be done to prevent any drift towards aggressive attitudes. Consolidation of the new democratic régimes must be accompanied by the emergence of original forms of regional

Mr. Charles GOERENS,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union

co-operation capable of stifling any resurgence of the local conflicts which have remained below the surface since the forties and any inclination to dispute frontiers with the risk of the chain reaction which such foolish ideas would trigger. Where there are minority problems, frontiers should be relaxed and opened to allow the free movement of people by way of bilateral or multilateral agreements. But why not go further and consider the establishment of real European rights for minorities to be implemented through the CSCE? The WEU Assembly could usefully open the debate on this subject from the standpoint of European security. In this area, the Council of Europe could no doubt add fruitfully to its remarkable contribution in the matter of human rights. It is time to take action in that direction so that certain problems in the Balkans for example do not one day become European security problems.

The complete regeneration of the East European economies will demand heavy sacrifices from the peoples. A market economy is not a panacea; its introduction will be an arduous process and there will be no quick results. A completely new European strategy is needed in order to mitigate the adverse political and social repercussions of the unavoidably enormous cost of what amounts to economic reconstruction. This strategy must be global and, therefore, political as well as financial and industrial. To encourage the assertion of the right to self-determination is not to deny obvious economic interdependence, but rather to give it a new basis and create a climate favourable to reconstruction by cross-investment. The opening of the USSR to the outside world is as much a condition for its recovery as for the strengthening of peace and security for all Europeans.

The European Community will gain in cohesion in the search for new balances if it follows such a strategy with determination and without slowing the progress towards its economic and monetary union. The one lesson to be learned from the current debates on the future structure of Europe is that the answers to the challenges to be faced – German unity, monetary union of the Community, organisation of European security and economic recovery of Eastern Europe – are all expressed in terms of unity and cohesion: strengthening of European union, affirmation of new solidarities in confirmation of existing ones and enlargement of the scope of possible and necessary co-operation. The European Community must be able to forge ahead and assert itself as the inspiration and even the main architect of the continent's new order.

Any withdrawal into over-sensitive nationalism and any return to the pleasures of the power game on the basis of outworn ideas about European equilibrium will lead nowhere and could well end up by giving substance to some of the fears played upon in some quarters about certain frontiers or national minorities.

German unity has always been recognised as the common aim of the western allies. It has been made possible by the collapse of the GDR, since which the wishes of the people have been made quite clear in the streets. Can there be any doubt about the result of the elections? The WEU countries and the members of the Community are at Germany's side and support it in a process which will start with the elections of 18th March. The speedy completion of this process will be to Europe's advantage because united Germany will be firmly established in the community of pluralist democracies and free peoples to which the East Germans show daily they wish to belong. Are not thousands of them still taking the painful decision to leave?

Germany will not turn its back on its allies because it knows that its unity is being achieved through the solidarity maintained within the Atlantic Alliance which resisted Moscow's political blackmail throughout the years of the cold war. As a dynamic partner in the European Community, Germany has made a notable contribution to economic changes in the West and South of our continent: it is only fair that, in return, our countries are joining with Germany to prepare for the essential changes in the GDR. It is, however, to the whole of Eastern Europe that the European Community is turning, as German unity is unavoidably a stage on the way to establishing closer links with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

WEU's basic task is to analyse by regular consultation how the current changes will affect the security of member states. The extent of the changes is so great that WEU cannot stop there. Future prospects are therefore being discussed jointly in the search for new solutions and in preparation for future decisions concerning the implementation of agreements for the reduction of armaments and the restructuring and redeployment of forces. The protection which the Atlantic Alliance affords us will not spread across the map to the East, even though several of the new democracies have already shown interest in the West's ideas about collective security. The CSCE, which has competence in this field, has no means of acquiring authority and practical capacity to take action. The creation of institutions for its security dimension is no more than a remote possibility at the moment. As it is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact can be reformed to restore a minimum of credibility for it, two possible ways of filling this gap, already considered by the experts, deserve to be explored and debated by the WEU parliamentarians: the first would be to equip the CSCE to play an operational rôle in the establishment of a just

and lasting peace over the continent of Europe as a whole. This would involve a substantial North American contribution. The second possibility would amount to going beyond the Single European Act and giving wider security powers to the European institutions.

A third scenario would be the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance, represented by WEU, by giving it an operational rôle in the deployment of European forces in accordance with the undertakings given in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and the Hague platform regarding the response to armed attack and the defence of frontiers. The legitimacy of European forces stationed on the territory of member states of the union would be enhanced by their organisation into multinational units which might be deployed on both sides of frontiers. The stationing of these forces further to the East would add a military guarantee to the political guarantees regarding the inviolability of frontiers, by demonstrating in practical terms that force of arms can never again be used on European soil exclusively to serve national interests.

The future of the Atlantic Alliance is in no way in question. Has it not just given dazzling proof of its success in defending peace and promoting the values on which the active solidarity of its members is founded? When the time comes, the future organisation of the continent's security will benefit greatly from the experience gained by the alliance in the continuous strengthening of the collective security of sixteen nations resolved to co-operate profitably with each other. Neither the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact nor the bilaterally-negotiated withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe could justify the disappearance of NATO or of American forces from Western Europe. Changes to the alliance's defence posture will follow from the future CFE treaty and the timetable for its implementation. It would be irresponsible to anticipate developments which are at their earliest stage and to create dangerous vulnerability at a time of uncertainty when the emergence of new threats cannot be ruled out. Europeans must say clearly to the Americans what they expect from the continued presence in Europe of forces which they are agreed must be genuinely effective in military terms. Talks must be held with the United States and Canada to explain their deterrence rôle and operational missions. This must be done in order to avoid any ambiguity in relations between the two pillars of the alliance and to give them a new equilibrium on the basis of the increased security responsibilities Europeans are having to take on.

*
* *

In December, the *Permanent Council and its working groups* began planning their programmes for the implementation of the decisions taken at the Ministerial Council on 14th November 1989. The Permanent Council has met eight times: on 22nd and 29th November and 13th December 1989, on 17th and 30th January 1990, when the Council was enlarged to include the political directors of foreign ministries and representatives of chiefs-of-staff, and on 7th and 21st February and 14th March.

The *enlarged Council* of 30th January 1990 discussed the likely consequences for member states of the upheavals which had taken place since the ministerial meeting in Central and Eastern Europe and in the USSR. Some effects of these events have been signs of interest in WEU from some of the new democracies, the emergence of pan-European ideas echoing Gorbachev's "European home" and keener discussions of the new European "architecture" likely in the future. This turmoil calls for clearer statements from the existing European institutions and in particular from WEU regarding the likely development of the security dimension of European construction now that the Warsaw Pact is breaking up and the range of options open to the Soviet Union is narrowing. The Council recognised that a signal should be given in practical and concrete terms by WEU at the ministerial meeting on 23rd April.

The enlarged Council agreed that the "post-CFE" political and military environment should be the subject of on-going studies on which the working groups would report regularly to the Ministerial Council and would use as the basis for suggesting future discussions by ministers on more specific subjects such as the co-ordination of reductions, the future of stationed Soviet and American forces or the political expediency of considering the formation of multinational European units.

At the 751st meeting of the Permanent Council on 14th March, the Ambassador of the Portuguese Republic to the Court of St. James's announced that, on 13th March, the Portuguese Parliament had passed a law authorising ratification of the protocol of accession of Spain and Portugal to the modified Brussels Treaty done in London on 14th November 1988, thus completing the process of ratification by the nine member states. The instruments of ratification had been deposited in Brussels by the United Kingdom on 18th April, the Netherlands on 12th June, Luxembourg on 27th July and Spain on 9th August 1989, by Belgium on 8th January, France on 28th January and Italy on 23rd February 1990.

The *Special Working Group (SWG)* met jointly with the *Defence Representatives Group (DRG)* on 12th December 1989 and separately on 22nd January, 22nd February and 13th March. The SWG discussed the following subjects:

- an analysis of recent developments in East-West relations with specific reference to the proposal for a meeting before the end of 1990 of a "pan-European summit" in the framework of the CSCE process when the CFE treaty would probably be signed;
- preparation of the security agenda of that summit;
- consideration of the implications for European security of the proposals for free overflight of territory and arrangements for an "open-skies" régime which were on the agenda for the Ottawa conference and study of the need for co-operation on this subject in WEU;
- acceptance by the Soviet Union of the American proposal for setting ceilings for their forces stationed in Europe and its consequences for the deployment of the forces of WEU member countries;
- repercussions of the German unification process on the CFE negotiations and on WEU;
- the idea of multinational European forces from the standpoint of the balance between North America and Europe within the Atlantic Alliance and of public reactions in member states.

At the same time, the SWG continued its work on the European security environment 1991-1995 and on the conditions necessary for the maintenance of an undiminished level of security during the transitional period pending full implementation of the future CFE treaty. Against this prospect, the SWG tried to identify the problems posed by continuation of the CFE process, as the pace of developments in Central and Eastern Europe was so great that any pause in the arms control negotiations in Europe would scarcely be appropriate. The CFE treaty will no doubt have to be supplemented on several points and the possibility of creating institutions for the security dimension of the CSCE should be examined in depth by the WEU countries.

The political subjects under consideration by the members of the SWG are:

- the strategic aims of the Soviet Union and the impact of its institutional reforms and of developments in its republics on how it perceived its vital interests;
- the consequences for European security of the emergence of new democracies in the Central and Eastern European countries;
- the new prospects for East-West co-operation, particularly through the CSCE;
- changes in the Atlantic Alliance and transatlantic relations, particularly as regards the stationing of American forces in Europe;
- the extra-European dimension of European security.

The WEU countries will have to be in a position fairly quickly to define the minimum requirements for security and the level of deterrence which they consider to be sufficient and credible given the force reductions which will follow the implementation of the CFE treaty. They must also consider the prospects which the new strategic environment will create for their co-operation in security matters.

At its meetings on 16th January, 15th February and 6th March 1990, the *Defence Representatives Group* concentrated on the military aspects of the report on the European security environment 1991-1995, the practical aspects of co-operation between member states for the verification of the future CFE treaty and the introduction of an "open-skies" régime. Under the heading of topical defence questions, the group analysed the CSCE seminar on military doctrines. This seminar revealed a total lack of cohesion between the Warsaw Pact countries. The USSR had expressed concern at the naval superiority of the Atlantic Alliance. The group also exchanged information on the agreements concluded with the USSR on the prevention of accidents at sea and bilateral contacts with the Soviet armed forces. As regards co-operation on verification, a questionnaire had been sent to WEU member governments to provide information for a document summarising the different ways in which verification is organised at national level, proposals for multinational teams and the idea of bilateral trial inspections.

On 13th February, *experts on the shared data-processing for verification* met to study a Netherlands proposal for a common information system and to hear a report on the French data base system. This meeting was followed by two more on 26th and 27th February to draft a report which was adopted by the DRG on 6th March.

The *ad hoc Sub-Group on Space* met on 15th January and 14th February 1990, with instructions from the Ministerial Council to carry out the necessary preliminary technical studies for the preparation of a possible ministerial decision on the development by WEU member states of a European satellite observation programme. These studies will be directed in the first place at identifying and evaluating national and European operational requirements which could be covered by satellite observation and also the corresponding technical resources as regards sensors, satellite platforms and ground facilities. At the same time, the usable data already provided by scientific, commercial and military satellites now in service will be listed. The sub-group will assess the quality of these data and their adequacy for verification purposes and will evaluate the way in which they are processed. For some of these studies, the group will have to call on experts who will meet as and when required. No conclusions concerning either the use of existing satellite systems or the technical and financial feasibility of developing a European satellite observation system can be drawn until all the parameters of the verification arrangements under the CFE treaty now being negotiated in Vienna are known.

The *Mediterranean Sub-Group* met on 12th January and 1st March 1990. The first meeting of the year was largely devoted to the implications for European security of the proliferation of ballistic missiles which, in view of the range of this type of weapon now being deployed in the Near and Middle East, constitute a greater potential threat not only to the WEU countries bordering the Mediterranean. The sub-group also discussed the renewed military activity in the Sahara conflict and the implications of events in Eastern Europe for the Mediterranean/Balkans area, where the uncertain situation in Yugoslavia and the future of the Albanian régime threaten to undermine stability. Finally, the sub-group exchanged information on prospects for the development of co-operation in the Western Mediterranean, the unknown factors in the construction of the Arab Maghreb Union and the progress of the Greco-Turkish dialogue in Cyprus.

The *Institutional Working Group* held two meetings late in 1989 (22nd November and 14th December) and three meetings early this year (23rd January, 19th and 28th February), when it dealt mainly with practical measures for implementing the ministerial decision to wind up the Paris ministerial organs and to set up the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

The group paid special attention to the position of staff of the Paris ministerial organs. The requests for complementary indemnification submitted by the Staff Committee were studied with the greatest care and all the relevant legal, statutory, financial and individual details were forwarded to national authorities to enable them to reach a decision in full knowledge of the facts. I spared no effort in pressing for a solution which was indeed on the lines that you and the Presidential Committee preferred. After prolonged discussions, a consensus emerged in favour of applying the terms of the Staff Rules. As a result, the Permanent Council decided on 14th March not to pay complementary indemnification to members of staff not re-employed by the WEU Institute for Security Studies. It was the unanimous view of national authorities that the allowances provided for under the rules were generous enough. Moreover, recognising its responsibilities towards the co-ordinated organisations, the Permanent Council did not wish unilaterally to set a precedent. Lastly, the budgetary situation of member states and their wages policy preclude payment of complementary indemnification.

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As to direct relations between the Council and the Assembly, I would simply recall, Mr. President, that we had the opportunity last December freely to take stock, together with representatives of the presidency and our immediate collaborators, of a number of problems. We agreed to hold consultations as often as necessary. It is indeed vital to avoid any hasty conclusions being drawn as a result of a misunderstanding of the Council's working methods and which might lead to unfounded criticisms being made. We are all aware of the inevitable gap which will always exist between the information the Assembly would like to receive and that which the Permanent Council is able to provide under the consensus rule. To some extent, the Secretariat-General can remedy this situation and I believe this is one of its essential tasks vis-à-vis the WEU parliamentary Assembly and its Office of the Clerk. That is why I should like to reiterate here and now, as preparations are made for the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly, that I am always at the disposal of any rapporteurs, their committees or national delegations who might consider it useful to hear the Secretary-General's views on any given aspect of the Council's activities. At the end of January, I did in fact have the pleasure of a visit to London by Lord Newall, Sir William Shelton and Mr. Cameron with whom I had useful talks.

In keeping with tradition, the meeting between the Presidential Committee and the Belgian presidency in Brussels on 7th March provided an opportunity for a wide-ranging discussion which was especially useful coming as it did just two weeks before the extraordinary session of your Assembly. These exchanges of view could perhaps be more structured as far as their political content is concerned

so as to bring a greater degree of convergence between the work of the Assembly's committees and that of the Council's working groups. This is vital if WEU is, in the coming months, to develop the concept of a European defence identity and give operational expression to that identity. Only in this way will WEU establish itself on the European scene as one of the reference points for future decisions on the European security architecture and as one of the key players in building a new security system on the continent.

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On 18th January in Rome, I had a series of talks on the future of WEU with Mr. de Michelis, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Martinazzoli, Minister of Defence, and Mr. Vitalone, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

On 1st February, I paid an official visit to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg during which I had talks with His Highness, the Grand Duke, the Prime Minister, Mr. Santer, Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

On Thursday, 1st March, I was received by Mr. Douglas Hurd, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Finally, on Wednesday, 7th March, I met Mr. Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission.

In the field of public relations and information on the rôle and activities of WEU, the Secretariat-General was represented either by myself or by my colleagues at the following events:

- on 16th November 1989, I addressed the Politischer Club in Berlin as part of a conference organised by the USIS and the German Marshall Fund;

- on 18th and 19th November, I took part in the international symposium of the Hans Seidel Stiftung;

- on 20th November, I took part in a seminar organised by the Danish Institute for International Studies and gave an address on "The European pillar". The following day, I was received by the Danish Commission for Security and Disarmament;

- on 23rd November, I gave a speech entitled "Transformation of East-West relations: from confrontation to collaboration" to the Europa Dispuut Circle in Groningen;

- on 27th November, I had a visit at the secretariat from Sir Geoffrey Johnson-Smith, Head of the United Kingdom Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly;

- on 28th November, I gave a talk at All Souls College, Oxford, on "WEU, NATO and the arms control process";

- on 30th November, I took part in the CEPS annual conference in Brussels on "Governing Europe";

- on 1st December, I delivered the closing address to the Second European Session of Advanced Defence Studies;

- on 20th December, I spoke to students at the Institut royal supérieur de défense in Brussels;

- from 2nd to 14th January, I took part in the third Dolder conference in Zurich on "East-West relations and the prospects of the arms control dialogue";

- on 15th January, I addressed a symposium of the Fondation du Futur in Paris;

- on 19th January, I took part in a meeting of the European Strategy Group (ESG) in Rome;

- on 31st January at the secretariat, I received a group of French executives on a study visit to London and spoke to them about WEU and the problems of European defence;

- from 2nd to 4th February, I took part in the 27th international Wehrkunde conference;

- on 9th February, I addressed the high-level seminar organised by the German Atlantic Association in Bonn on the future of defence policies;

- on 12th February, I took part in a conference organised by the Royal Naval College at Greenwich on "Britain's wider interests post-CFE";

- on 14th February, I took part in a conference at Wilton Park on " Re-balancing the alliance?: development of common foreign security and procurement policies in the European pillar of NATO ";
- on 16th and 17th February, I was in Berlin for a conference of the Politischer Club;
- on the same dates, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, attended a colloquy in Paris organised by the Cercle des Libertés Republicaines on the subject of German unity and Europe;
- on 22nd February, I gave a talk on WEU to students from the Norwegian Defence College who were visiting the United Kingdom;
- on 23rd February, Mr. Richard Tibbels spoke on the " Rôle of WEU in the verification of conventional arms control agreements " at a seminar on conventional arms control verification organised by the Netherlands Institute for International Relations, Clingendael, The Hague;
- on 26th February, I spoke at a European defence seminar organised by Unisys. My theme was European problems affecting defence policies in the 1990s;
- on 1st March, I received the President and Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Assembly, Mr. Patrick Duffy and Mr. Peter Corterier;
- on 5th March, I addressed the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva;
- on 8th March, I spoke to members of the NAVO-KRING in Louvain;
- from 9th to 11th March, I took part in the Ebenhausen conference on " Future tasks of the alliance ".

I have, finally, endeavoured to increase the number of direct contacts with both the press and television so that their comments on European security give WEU the importance it deserves.

**DRAFT OPINION ON THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEARS 1989 (REVISED) AND 1990 ¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. Lord, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Lagorce (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Dhaille, Durand, Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, Mr. Greco, Mrs. Haas-Berger, Mrs. Hoffmann, MM. Masseret (Alternate: Hunault), Morris, Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti (Alternate: Rubner), Redmond (Alternate: Lord), Sinesio (Alternate: Parisi), Triglia (Alternate: Colombo), Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990***

The Assembly,

(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for 1989 (revised) and 1990, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;

(ii) Considering that:

(a) the budget of the Secretariat-General for the financial year 1990 may be considered provisional insofar as the proposals to create seven new posts, withdrawn at the request of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, will be considered subsequently on the basis of a management survey to be conducted by a specialised body;

(b) in doing this, the Budget and Organisation Committee has relinquished responsibility for organisation, which is part of its attributions;

(c) the "liquidation" version of the 1990 budget of the Paris agencies is based on a wholly theoretical assumption and is therefore liable to be changed significantly;

(d) the operating budget of the WEU Institute for Security Studies has not yet been drawn up;

(e) the Assembly is consequently unable to express an opinion on the abovementioned budgets;

(iii) Regretting that:

(a) the Council has decided not to pay additional indemnities to officials not recruited by the WEU Institute for Security Studies;

(b) the participation of representatives of the staff of the co-ordinated organisations in negotiations on procedure for adjusting salaries does not appear to correspond to their legitimate expectations;

(c) there is no agreement between the secretaries-general of the co-ordinated organisations to facilitate the movement of staff from one organisation to another, which would have been very useful on the occasion of the winding up of the Paris agencies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Reconsider the composition and mandate of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, in particular its responsibility for organisational matters;

2. Support the action taken by the staff associations of the co-ordinated organisations with a view to playing a more effective part in negotiations on staff employment conditions;

3. Ask that the question of the movement of staff from one organisation to another be included in the agenda of a forthcoming meeting of the Committee of Secretaries-General of Co-ordinated Organisations in order to work out means of fostering and facilitating such movement.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lord, Rapporteur)

I. General

1. According to Article VIII (c) of the Charter of the Assembly, "the Assembly shall express its views in the form of an opinion or recommendation on the annual budget of Western European Union as soon as it has been communicated".

2. The present report has been prepared in application of this provision and relates to the revised budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1989 and the ordinary budget for the financial year 1990. It is placed in the framework of the reply to the Council's annual report on its activities; in point of fact, to the study of its activities made by the Defence Committee, the Political Committee and the Technological and Aerospace Committee has to be added the assessment of the financial implications of these activities, which is the responsibility of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

3. The first part of the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council to the Assembly (1st January 1989 to 30th June 1989) refers to increasingly intense activity by the Council and the Secretariat-General due to the enlargement of WEU and political developments in which the rôle and aims of WEU are arousing growing interest. In addition, there are the activities of the working groups (Special Working Group, Defence Representatives Group, Mediterranean Sub-Group, ad hoc Sub-Group on Space).

4. Conversely, the activities of the Paris agencies seem to have consisted merely of analysing the problem of their abolition and replacement by an Institute for Security Studies, decided upon by the Council on 13th November 1989. The second part of the Council's report will perhaps contain further details allowing a better assessment to be made of the activities of the WEU ministerial organs, particularly the Paris agencies, but at the time of writing the Council's report for the second half of the year has not yet reached the Assembly.

5. In any event, the intensification and expansion of the duties of the Secretariat-General seem to justify the increase in the number of its staff proposed in the draft budget for 1990, i.e. the creation of three new grade A posts and four new grade B posts, this being a minimum solution. In the explanatory memorandum to the abovementioned budget, it is

specified that: "There may well be scope for a larger increase in personnel, but it seems preferable for the time being to proceed step-by-step, taking a 2/3 year view, and to allow for ample discussion based upon experience gained and flexible use of all members of the secretariat."

6. However, the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee concluded - as moreover it did for similar proposals made by the Assembly - "that a management review on the staffing situation should be carried out first before any proposals for additional staff could be considered" and asked that this review be conducted by experts in organisation.

7. By doing this, your Rapporteur considers that the Budget and Organisation Committee has relinquished one of the duties attributed to it, i.e. organisation which, with good reason, forms part of its title. In the past, it carried out this duty and assumed all its responsibilities. The fact that it is now referring to its lack of competence in regard to organisation creates a precedent which can but have unfavourable repercussions on the operation of the institutions. Henceforth, indeed, the latter will no longer be able to adapt their organograms quickly enough as their needs evolve if each proposal for a change in staff has in principle to be accompanied by an assessment by an expert in organisation.

8. In this connection, your Rapporteur wonders how valid such a review really is if it is conducted by experts having only very limited knowledge of international organisations of a political nature to which it is certainly not possible to apply the criteria and assessment parameters used in industry, where the essential aims of keeping production costs down and optimising results are never forgotten.

9. Furthermore, the Secretariat-General employs only fifty-two staff (including switchboard operators, chauffeurs and security guards), who are assigned to the four branches of the organisation: Political Affairs Division, Press and Information Service, Translation Service and Administration Division (see Appendix I). In these circumstances, your Rapporteur wonders whether the management review requested by the Budget and Organisation Committee was really necessary.

10. There will certainly be an opportunity to return to this matter when the conclusions of the

review are known; but it seems timely here and now to consider the mandate assigned by the Council to the Budget and Organisation Committee and the membership of that committee.

11. The sums requested for the creation of the abovementioned seven new posts having been withdrawn from the budget of the Secretariat-General for 1990, this budget, except for the strengthening of communication equipment, is essentially – as will be shown in Chapter III – a renewal and is not particularly affected by the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU.

12. In regard to the budget of the Paris agencies for 1990, the initial draft submitted to the Budget and Organisation Committee under reference BA (89) 16 was recast following the Council's decision to abolish the agencies as from 30th June 1990 and to set up an Institute for Security Studies in their place. Consequently, the new draft budget was reduced to half the previous one and approved by the Council subject to the preparation of a "liquidation budget" including expenditure involved in the context of the abolition of the agencies and the dismissal of the staff, plus a separate budget for the Institute for Security Studies, which is to start work on 1st July 1989.

13. This liquidation budget was in fact drawn up as a "provisional supplementary budget for 1990 of the Paris ministerial organs", under reference B (90) 1. It shows the maximum budgetary implications of winding up the agencies, calculated on the basis of the "legal" effects of applying current rules in respect of thirty-nine officials. As indicated in the explanatory notes, "this provisional supplementary budget will have to be revised in due course to incorporate amendments resulting from practical circumstances and further Council decisions regarding the staff".

14. Some of these thirty-nine officials may be re-employed by the WEU Institute for Security Studies as from 1st July 1990. Consequently, no payments will have to be made in 1990 to staff taken on by the institute (be it the indemnity for loss of job, the leaving allowance provided for in the Pension Scheme Rules or even the pension).

15. The precarious nature of the agencies' liquidation budget and the fact that the institute's operating budget has not yet been drawn up make it quite pointless to analyse the various budget heads in detail. However, it must be noted that this situation, in which the cost of abolishing the agencies and organising a new subsidiary organ – the institute – is still uncertain, is due to the Council not having taken decisions in this connection until November 1989, although the problem of restructuring the Paris ministerial organs had

been dragging on for years and the fate of the staff affected by this abolition is still uncertain. Brief consideration should therefore be given to the impact of these decisions and an assessment made of their implications for the staff, particularly as the latter have informed the Assembly of their concerns and confusion.

II. The abolition of the Paris agencies

16. The abolition of the Paris agencies, decided upon by the Council on 13th November 1989, was preceded by a restructuring of the former ministerial organs (Agency for the Control of Armaments and secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee) on 1st January 1986, which involved the creation of three security agencies each having an hors cadre director. One of these agencies incorporated what remained of the ACA, staff assigned to it wearing both hats. Henceforth, with a few exceptions, posts falling vacant as their holders retired remained unfilled, so that the number of staff fell from seventy-eight in 1985 to seventy in 1986.

17. At its meeting in The Hague on 16th October 1987, the Council of Ministers then decided to merge the three agencies for security questions in a single agency under the authority of the Secretary-General. As a result, the posts of the three directors of the former agencies were abolished, thus, with vacancies that had occurred in the meantime in the natural course of events, bringing the number of staff down to fifty-two at the end of 1988.

18. In June 1989, with a view to the establishment of a WEU Institute for Security Studies, the Council terminated grade A contracts of fixed duration and provisionally authorised the half-yearly renewal of contracts of the same type for grade B and C staff. At this point, the Staff Committee, which had hitherto been kept out of the matter – in spite of the staff's legitimate interest in its fate – took the initiative of proposing that, recognising the changes that had taken place in the former employment relationships, the Council take steps to facilitate voluntary departures. The Council agreed to this proposal but limited its application to grades B and C. Seven officials having taken advantage of this measure, towards the end of 1989 the number of staff in the Paris ministerial organs fell to thirty nine, plus another official assigned to the Agency for the Control of Armaments who is responsible for the only remaining control of the non-production of A, B and C weapons.

19. The decision of 13th November 1989 on the abolition of the Paris agencies therefore concerns thirty-nine officials whose fate is still uncertain. In confusion, they informed the

WEU parliamentarians at the December 1989 session of their anxiety about the conditions in which the Council was preparing to terminate their contracts. Only on 13th December 1989 was the Staff Committee invited to submit the staff's proposals to the Council, which may be summed up as granting an indemnity in addition to the indemnity for loss of job on the basis of existing precedents, particularly in the EEC and other co-ordinated organisations.

20. On 19th December 1989, the Council wrote to these thirty-nine officials terminating their contracts, thus bringing into application the provisions of the Staff Rules (indemnity for loss of job) and the Pension Scheme Rules. In its letter, it asserted that it would pay all due attention to the proposals for additional measures submitted by the Staff Committee and said "it would be possible for the staff to apply for posts in the organogram of the institute in accordance with the procedure agreed upon".

21. At the request of the Presidential Committee, the President of the Assembly wrote to the Secretary-General on 19th January 1990 "to ensure that the question raised by the departure of part of the staff of the agencies is solved in a manner that takes due account of the social and humanitarian aspects, established rights and the duties of an organisation towards persons who have served it for what has, in some cases, been a very long period".

22. Furthermore, on 22nd January 1990 the Standing Committee of the Staff Associations of the Co-ordinated Organisations wrote to the Secretary-General of WEU asking him to draw the Council's attention to the need to ensure that every step is taken to find a satisfactory solution for all the staff as soon as possible. It said it endorsed any action the WEU Staff Committee might have to take to defend the staff's interests and hoped the Council would take the necessary measures to facilitate the re-employment by the new institute of staff now in the process of being dismissed.

23. In a letter of 25th January 1990 answering the President of the Assembly, the Secretary-General reviewed the situation. He gave an assurance that he would "continue to do everything possible to ensure that this matter is handled with the utmost respect for its essential social and human aspects". At the present juncture, the thirty-nine members of the staff of the former agencies whose contracts have been terminated have only one hope: that the Director of the institute will give priority to considering their possible applications for posts in the new organisation, or that the Council will decide on indemnities additional to those already provided for in the Staff Rules.

24. Your Rapporteur thought it necessary to describe the background to this problem because for many years the staff of the Paris agencies were unaware of the future the Council's new guidelines held in store, although they affected their jobs and thus concerned their future. It is regrettable that, until December 1989, the Council did not consider the human aspects of this serious problem and did not allow representatives of the staff – in accordance with Rule 60 of the Staff Rules – to give their opinions and co-operate in the search for a solution to the crisis, so distressing for the staff. This is particularly striking since, already, in 1984, the former Director of the ACA drew the Secretary-General's attention to the grave consequences the restructuring then being considered would have for the staff and proposed appropriate measures. The Assembly itself had an opportunity (see the report presented by Mrs. Pack on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Document 1184) to note "that the practice of renewing contracts every six months, from lack of a decision on restructuring, is a practice which is detrimental to the morale and dignity of the staff concerned".

25. The recent letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly indicates that the matter will finally be the subject of an in-depth study. However, as no solutions have yet been found, the Assembly trusts the Council will adopt the most reasonable decisions, so as to reduce as far as possible the distressing consequences that the staff will have to suffer following the winding-up of the Paris agencies.

III. The budgets of the Secretariat-General

26. The trend of the budget of the Secretariat-General (see Appendices V and VI) compared with the initial budget for 1989 (which was studied in the previous report, Document 1184) may be summed up as follows:

- a difference of £41 867 in respect of sums brought over from the financial year 1988 that had been committed but not paid before 31st March 1989;
- the provisional transfer of £93 500 from Head I "Staff" to Head III, i.e. £6 500 for covering the cost of running the WEUCOM network and, under Head A.I.A., Sub-Head 3, £87 000 for leaving allowances paid to two senior staff members who left the organisation;
- a supplementary sum of £107 140 to restore to Head I the provisional deduction of £93 500 and increase the pensions budget by £13 640.

27. With the abovementioned changes, the final budget for 1989 has a net total (expenditure less receipts) of £1 835 096 excluding pensions and £2 229 797 including pensions, i.e. an increase of 2.75% and 7.16% respectively compared with the initial budget.

28. Regarding the budget for 1990, your Rapporteur has no other comments to add to those set out in Chapter I above. There is a 7.9% increase in the net total operating budget and 6.08% in the overall net total, including pensions compared with the revised budget for 1989.

IV. The budgets of the Paris ministerial organs

29. As shown in Appendices X and XI, the initial budget of the Paris ministerial organs for 1989 was revised as follows:

- a difference of F 48 126 in respect of sums brought over from the financial year 1988 that had been committed but not paid before 31st March 1989;
- a reduction of F 1 720 000 in operating expenditure to offset a fall in receipts, cover expenditure relating to the departure of ten officials and pay an invalidity pension to a grade C official.

30. With the abovementioned changes, the final budget for 1989 has a net total (expenditure less receipts) of F 20 357 476 excluding pensions and F 27 317 876 including pensions, i.e. a reduction of 3.11% and an increase of 0.18% respectively compared with the initial budget.

31. In regard to the budget for 1990, the estimates in the agencies' liquidation budget are based on the assumption that the contracts of all staff (twenty-nine contracts of indefinite duration and ten non-renewed contracts of fixed duration) will be terminated on 30th June 1990. Estimates therefore take into account the payment of the indemnities provided for in the Staff Rules and the Pension Scheme Rules. They are consequently a maximum which may be lower if present officials are taken on by the Institute for Security Studies. Conversely, the possible payment of an additional indemnity in accordance with the Staff Committee's proposals was not taken into account and, if appropriate, will be the subject of a subsequent revision of the liquidation budget.

32. Compared with the 1989 budget, there is a decrease of 5.58% in the net total of the provi-

sional liquidation budget for 1990 excluding pensions and an increase of 16.48% including pensions and leaving allowances.

V. Conclusions

33. From the foregoing, it seems clear that the budgets of the WEU ministerial organs reflect a provisional position pending a revision of the organogram of the Secretariat-General and the organisation of the new Institute for Security Studies. Only at the end of this process will the Assembly be able to give its opinion on the adequacy of the means made available to these organs in relation to the tasks set for them.

VI. Action taken on Recommendation 468

34. In adopting Recommendation 468, the Assembly drew the Council's attention to the need:

- (a) to set up an Institute for Security Studies and fix its methods of work bearing in mind that the Assembly can be made responsible for common services;
- (b) to make the necessary amendments to the Financial Regulations to adapt it to the requirements of budgetary management;
- (c) to afford its backing to the staff associations in their action to defend their right to take part in negotiations in the framework of co-ordination on the conditions for the employment of staff;
- (d) to make a study to determine how to facilitate the movement of staff between the co-ordinated organisations in order to improve career possibilities.

35. Your Rapporteur can but be gratified that the Council of Ministers decided to set up the Institute for Security Studies in accordance with the Assembly's recommendation and asked the Permanent Council "to take appropriate decisions, after consulting the Assembly, on the organisational aspects of setting up the institute in the organisation's building". Consultations have not yet been held. Your Rapporteur wishes there to be the closest co-operation between the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly and the institute, inter alia in the organisation of the common services and the management of the premises.

36. In its reply to the abovementioned recommendation, the Council said the Budget and Organisation Committee would examine the

question of amending the Financial Regulations and would give its views on the matter once restructuring was completed. The Assembly will therefore have an opportunity to return to this matter.

37. In regard to the more effective participation of staff associations in negotiations on salary reviews, the Council's reply refers to the importance of the contribution made by representatives of the staff in these negotiations. However, the latter do not express the same feelings. In a communiqué issued after the negotiations on salary adjustments held on 1st July 1989 and the establishment of procedure for annual reviews covering the next three years, they said: "CPAPOC does not feel bound by a text which is not the result of tripartite negotiations and which contains elements which it had previously denounced as being unacceptable to the staff... At the close of these long dealings, which marked a serious setback in the tripartite system, CPAPOC can but note the absence of a negotiated solution and invite the staff of the co-ordinated organisations to embark here and now upon a long-term struggle with a view to 1992." Only then will further negotiations be held for updating salary scales. The Assembly trusts the WEU Council will bear in mind the legitimate aspirations of the staff to play an active part in these negotiations.

38. On this last point, the Council, referring to the possibility of officials from one co-ordinated organisation being recruited by another, adopts no precise position. The fact is that transfers from one organisation to another are in practice possible only if specific agreements are reached between the secretaries-general of the organisations concerned. Your Rapporteur can but note with regret that, if agreements existed, the winding up of the Paris agencies might be less painful for the staff and less costly for WEU from the moment some officials could be taken on by other co-ordinated organisations. The importance of this problem therefore goes beyond the framework of measures allowing prospects of a career, as envisaged in Recommendation 468. It is desirable that the problem be included in the agenda of a forthcoming meeting of the secretaries-general of the co-ordinated organisations.

Addendum to the explanatory memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lord, Rapporteur)

16th March 1990

In his information letter to the WEU Assembly of 15th March 1990 (No. 9), the Secretary-General said:

"The Institutional Working Group held two meetings late in 1989 (22nd November and 14th December) and three meetings early this year (23rd January, 19th and 28th February), when it dealt mainly with practical measures for implementing the ministerial decision to wind up the Paris ministerial organs and to set up the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

The group paid special attention to the position of staff of the Paris ministerial organs. The requests for complementary indemnification submitted by the Staff Committee were studied with the greatest care and all the relevant legal, statutory, financial and individual details were forwarded to national authorities to enable them to reach a decision in full knowledge of the facts. I spared no effort in pressing for a solution which was indeed on the lines that you and the Presidential Committee preferred. After prolonged discussion, a consensus emerged in favour of applying the terms of the Staff Rules. As a result, the Permanent Council decided on 14th March not to pay complementary indemnification to members of staff not re-employed by the WEU Agency for Security Studies. It was the unanimous view of national authorities that the allowances provided for under the rules were generous enough. Moreover, recognising its responsibilities towards the co-ordinated organisations, the Permanent Council did not wish unilaterally to set a precedent. Lastly, the budgetary situation of member states and their wages policy preclude payment of complementary indemnification."

One can but note this decision with regret. It is contrary to the staff's expectations and the Assembly's recommendations.

The draft recommendation therefore has to be amended accordingly.

APPENDIX I

Table of establishment – Secretariat-General¹
(excluding proposed additional staff)

No. Grade	Function	No. Grade	Function
1. H.G.	Secretary-General		<i>Section-Finance and budget</i>
2. H.G.	Deputy Secretary-General	21. A.3/4	Controller (A.4)
3. B.4	Personal Assistant to Secretary-General	22. A.2	Accountant
4. B.4	Personal Assistant to Deputy Secretary-General	23. B.4	Financial Assistant (B.3)
	<i>Political Affairs Division</i>		<i>Section-Registry and communications</i>
5. A.6	Head of Division	24. A.2	Head of Section
6. B.3	Secretary to Head of Division	25. B.4	Senior Clerk
	<i>Section-Council Secretariat</i>	26. B.2	Clerk/repro
		27. B.2	Clerk/repro
7. A.4/5	Head of Section (A.5)		<i>Section-Secretarial assistance</i>
8. A.2/3	Committee Secretary (A.3)	28. B.4	Head of Section
9. A.2/3	Committee Secretary (A.3)	29. B.2/3/4	Assistant (B.3)
	<i>Section Policy and planning</i>	30. B.2/3/4	Assistant (B.4)
10. A.3/4	Head of Section (A.4)	31. B.2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B.2)
11. A.2/3	Planning Secretary (A.3)	32. B.2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B.3)
	<i>Press and Information</i>	33. B.2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B.3)
12. A.4	Head of Section (A.4)	34. B.2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B.1)
	<i>Translation Service</i>	35. B.2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B.3)
13. LT.5	Head (Reviser E/F)	36. B.2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B.2)
14. LT.4	Translator/Reviser F/E	37. B.2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B.2)
15. LT.3	Translator E/F	38. B.2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B.2)
16. LT.3	Translator E/F	39. B.2/3/4	Shorthand Typist (B.2)
17. LT.2	Translator F/E		Shorthand Typist (B.3)
	<i>Administration Division</i>		<i>Section-General services</i>
18. A.5	Head of Division	40. B.1	Telephonist
19. B.3	Secretary to Head of Division (B.2)	41. B.1	Telephonist
20. B.4	Administrative Assistant	42. C.3	Messenger/storekeeper
		43. C.2	Messenger (C.3)
		44. C.3	Chauffeur
		45. C.3	Chauffeur
		46. C.4	Head Security Guard
		47. C.3	Security Guard
		48. C.3	Security Guard
		49. C.3	Security Guard
		50. C.3	Security Guard
		51. C.3	Security Guard
		52. C.3	Security Guard (C-B (89) 1)

1. C-B (89) 28.

APPENDIX II

*Table of establishment – Ministerial organs in Paris¹**Unit No. 1*

Post No.	Grade(s) of post	Function
AS I - 1	H.G.	Director **
AS I - 2	A.5/6	Expert
AS I - 3	A.4/5	Expert
AS I - 4	–	Suppressed a/o 1st July 1988
AS I - 5 *	A.2/3/4	Expert
AS I - 6 *	A.4/5	Expert ***
AS I - 7	B.4	Personal assistant to the Director
AS I - 8 *	B.4	Assistant
AS I - 9	–	Suppressed a/o 1st July 1988
AS I - 10 *	B.3	Shorthand typist
AS I - 11	B.2	Shorthand typist

Unit No. 2

Post No.	Grade(s) of post	Function
AS II - 1	Previously H.G.	Post not provided for in the budget
AS II - 2	A.5/6	Expert
AS II - 3	A.4/5	Expert
AS II - 4 *	A.2/3/4	Expert
AS II - 5	A.2/3/4	Expert
AS II - 6 *	B.4	Personal assistant to the Director
AS II - 7	B.4	Assistant
AS II - 8	B.3	Shorthand typist
AS II - 9 *	B.3	Shorthand typist

Unit No. 3

Post No.	Grade(s) of post	Function
AS III - 1	Previously H.G.	Post not provided for in the budget
AS III - 2 *	A.5/6	Expert
AS III - 3	A.4/5	Expert
AS III - 4 *	A.2/3/4	Expert
AS III - 5	A.2/3/4	Expert
AS III - 6	B.4	Personal assistant to the Director
AS III - 7	B.4	Assistant
AS III - 8 *	B.3	Shorthand typist
AS III - 9	B.3	Shorthand typist
AS III - 10	B.2	Shorthand typist

1. C-B (89) 28.

* In post on 1.1.1990.

** Sole post of Director provided for in the draft estimates for 1989.

*** Dual function: Expert of Unit No. 1 and Deputy Director of the ACA.

Joint services

Post No.	Grade(s) of post	Function
<i>(a) Administration and Legal Affairs Division</i>		
SC Adm - 1	A.6	Head of Division, Legal Adviser WEU
SC Adm - 2 *	B.3	Chairman of Budget Committee
SC Adm - 3 **	A.3/4	Secretary of Budget Committee Assistant Legal Adviser
<i>Finance and Administration Section</i>		
SC Adm - 4 *	A.4/5	Head of Section
SC Adm - 5 *	A.3/4	Deputy Head of Section, Head of Finance and Accounts Office
SC Adm - 6 *	B.4	Assistant for the Building and General Services
SC Adm - 7 *	B.4	Accountant
SC Adm - 8 *	B.4	Accountant
SC Adm - 9 *	B.4	Administrative Assistant and Secretary of the Section
SC Adm - 10 *	B.4	Administrative Assistant and Shorthand typist
SC Adm - 11	-	Suppressed a/o 1st July 1988
SC Adm - 12	C.4	Under Assistant for General Services Storekeeper
SC Adm - 13 *	B.3	Telephonist
SC Adm - 14 *	B.3	Telephonist
SC Adm - 15	C.5	Chief roneo operator
SC Adm - 16 *	C.4	Roneo operator
<i>(b) Linguist Service</i>		
SC L - 17	L.4	Translator-Reviser
SC L - 18 *	L.3	Interpreter-Translator
SC L - 19 *	L.3	Interpreter-Translator
SC L - 20 *	L.3	Translator-Verbatim writer
<i>(c) Documentation Office</i>		
SC Doc - 21	A.3/4	Head of Office
SC Doc - 22	-	Suppressed a/o 1st July 1988
SC Doc - 23 *	B.4	Assistant Documentalist
SC Doc - 24 *	B.3	Clerk-Shorthand typist
SC Doc - 25	B.3	Documentation Clerk-Typist
<i>(d) Security/Archives Office</i>		
SC Sec/ar.- 26 *	A.3/4	Head of Office
SC Sec/ar.- 27 *	B.4	Assistant for Archives and Registry
SC Sec/ar.- 28	B.3	Clerk responsible for Security
SC Sec/ar.- 29	B.3	Clerk-Shorthand typist
SC Sec/ar.- 30 *	C.4	Head Security Guard
SC Sec/ar.- 31 *	C.3	Security Guard
SC Sec/ar.- 32 *	C.3	Security Guard
SC Sec/ar.- 33 *	C.3	Security Guard
SC Sec/ar.- 34	C.3	Security Guard
SC Sec/ar.- 35 *	C.3	Security Guard
SC Sec/ar.- 36	C.3	Security Guard
SC Sec/ar.- 37 *	C.3	Security Guard
SC Sec/ar.- 38 *	C.3	Security Guard
SC Sec/ar.- 39 *	C.3	Security Guard
SC Sec/ar.- 40 *	C.3	Security Guard
SC Sec/ar.- 41 *	C.3	Security Guard

Service vehicles

AS-VS - 42 *	C.4	Chauffeur-mechanic
AS-VS - 43	C.4	Chauffeur-mechanic

* In post on 1.1.1990.

** Post provided for in the 1990 budget estimates of the Secretariat General.

APPENDIX III

SECTION A

*WEU first supplementary budget for 1989*¹

	B (89) 9 Credits b/f from 1988	C-B (89) 1 1989 approved budget	B (89) 10 1989 Transfers	Proposed Supplementary Budget	Revised Estimates
	(£)	(£)	(£)	(£)	(£)
Personnel costs	—	2 241 061.00	(93 500.00)	93 500.00	2 241 061.00
Travel	—	59 500.00	—	—	59 500.00
Other operating costs ...	21 867.00	250 455.00	6 500.00	—	278 822.00
Purchases	—	36 300.00	—	—	36 300.00
Buildings	20 000.00	16 995.00	—	—	36 995.00
Total expenditure	41 867.00	2 604 311.00	(87 000.00)	93 500.00	2 652 678.00
WEU tax	—	805 582.00	—	—	805 582.00
Other receipts	—	12 000.00	—	—	12 000.00
Total income	—	817 582.00	—	—	817 582.00
Net ordinary budget	41 867.00	1 786 729.00	(87 000.00)	93 500.00	1 835 096.00
Net pensions	—	294 061.00	87 000.00	13 640.00	394 701.00
Net total budget	41 867.00	2 080 790.00	—	107 140.00	2 229 797.00

National contributions

	600ths	£
Belgium	59	10 535.00
France	120	21 428.00
Germany	120	21 428.00
Italy	120	21 428.00
Luxembourg	2	358.00
Netherlands	59	10 535.00
United Kingdom	120	21 428.00
	600	107 140.00

1. C-B (89) 14.

APPENDIX IV

SECTION A

Summary of estimated expenditure and income for 1990 – Secretariat-General¹

	Expenditure/ income 1988	Credits revised for 1989	Credits proposed for 1990	Difference between 1990 and 1989	
	(£)	(£)	(£)	(£)	(%)
<i>Expenditure</i>					
I. Personnel costs	1 995 869 (a)	2 241 061	2 489 188	248 127	11.07
II. Travel	55 382	59 500	70 950	11 450	19.24
III. Other operating costs ..	213 027 (b)	278 822	318 400	39 578	14.19
IV. Purchases	16 982	36 300	22 150	- 14 150	- 38.98
V. Buildings	- (c)	36 995	750	- 36 245	- 97.97
Total : Gross operating costs	2 281 260	2 652 678	2 901 438	248 760	9.38
<i>Income</i>					
VI. WEU tax	705 243	805 582	909 788	104 206	12.94
VII. Other receipts	42 142	12 000	11 500	- 500	- 4.17
Total : Operating income ...	747 385	817 582	921 288	103 706	12.68
NET TOTAL OPERATING COSTS ..	1 533 875	1 835 096	1 980 150	145 054	7.90
NET PENSION COSTS	333 054	394 701	385 230	- 9 471	- 2.40
TOTAL	1 866 929	2 229 797	2 365 380	135 583	6.08

Footnotes

(a) Includes an item p.m. in respect of education allowance.

(b) Includes an item p.m. in respect of Appeals Board and amounts brought forward from 1988.

(c) Includes amounts brought forward from 1988.

APPENDIX V

Trend of budgets of the Secretariat-General of WEU between 1989 and 1990

	Approved budget for 1989 CB (89) 1 <i>a</i>	Brought forward from 1988 CB (89) 9 <i>b</i>	1989 Transfers B (89) 10 <i>c</i>	1989 supplementary budget CB (89) 14 <i>d</i>	% $\frac{d-a}{a}$	1990 ordinary budget CB (89) 28 <i>e</i>	% $\frac{e-d}{d}$
	(£)	(£)	(£)	(£)		(£)	
A. Operating budget							
I. Staff	2 241 061	2 241 061	2 147 561	2 241 061		2 489 188	
II. Travel	59 500	59 500	59 500	59 500		70 950	
III. Other operating costs	250 455	272 322	278 822	278 822		318 400	
IV. Purchase of furni- ture and equipment	36 300	36 300	36 300	36 300		22 150	
V. Buildings	16 995	36 995	36 995	36 995		750	
Total expenditure	2 604 311	2 646 178	2 559 178	2 652 678	1.86	2 901 438	9.38
Receipts	817 582	817 582	817 582	817 582		921 288	
NET TOTAL	1 786 729	1 828 596	1 741 596	1 835 096	2.71	1 980 150	7.90
B. Pensions budget							
Pensions and allow- ances	371 080	371 080	458 080	471 720		470 430	
Pensions receipts	77 019	77 019	77 019	77 019		85 200	
NET TOTAL	294 061	294 061	381 061	394 701	34.22	385 230	-2.40
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	2 080 790	2 122 657	2 122 657	2 229 797	7.16	2 365 380	6.08

APPENDIX VI

Variations in the budgets of the Secretariat-General of WEU in 1989

	1989 approved budget C-B (89) 1 <i>a</i>	Brought forward from 1988 B (89) 9 <i>b</i>	1989 Transfers B (89) 10 <i>c</i>	Supple- mentary budget C-B (89) 14 <i>d</i>	1990 ordinary budget C-B (89) 28 <i>e</i>
	(£)	(£)	(£)	(£)	(£)
A. Operating budget					
I. Staff	2 241 061		- 93 500	93 500	248 127
II. Travel	59 500				11 450
III. Other operating costs	250 455	21 867	6 500		39 578
IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	36 300				- 14 150
V. Buildings	16 995	20 000			- 36 245
Total expenditure	2 604 311	41 867	- 87 000	93 500	248 760
Receipts	817 582				103 706
NET TOTAL	1 786 729	41 867	- 87 000	93 500	145 054
B. Pensions budget					
Pensions and allowances	371 080		87 000	13 640	- 1 290
Pensions receipts	77 019				8 181
NET TOTAL	294 061		87 000	13 640	- 9 471
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	2 080 790	41 867	-	107 140	135 583

APPENDIX VII

SECTION B

*Ministerial organs in Paris – Revised estimates for 1989¹**Summary*

	Credits approved for 1989 (F)	Amendments proposed (F)	Revised estimates (F)	%
<i>Expenditure</i>				
B. I. Personnel costs	28 921 950	- 1 532 500	27 389 450	- 5.30
B. II. Travel	400 000	- 150 000	250 000	- 37.50
B. III. Other operating costs	2 046 900	- 38 100	2 008 800	- 1.86
B. IV. Purchases	30 000	-	30 000	-
B. V. Buildings	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	31 398 850	- 1 720 600	29 678 250	- 5.48
<i>Income</i>				
B. VI. WEU tax	10 007 100	- 1 158 300	8 848 800	- 11.57
B.VII. Other receipts	195 000	145 100	340 100	74.41
TOTAL	10 202 100	- 1 013 200	9 188 900	- 9.93
NET TOTAL	21 196 750	- 707 400	20 489 350	- 3.34
Pensions	6 073 000	707 400	6 780 400	11.65
NET GRAND TOTAL	27 269 750	-	27 269 750	-

1. C-B (89) 22 (Part I).

APPENDIX VIII

SECTION B

Summary of estimated expenditure and income for 1990 – Ministerial organs in Paris¹

	Expenditure/ income 1988	Revised credits for 1989	Credits proposed for 1990	Difference between 1990 and 1989	
	(F)	(F)	(F)	(F)	(%)
<i>Current expenditure</i>					
B. I. Personnel costs ..	30 476 120.54	27 389 450	11 410 650	- 15 978 800	- 58.34
B. II. Travel	270 000.00	250 000	100 000	- 150 000	- 60.00
B. III. Other operating costs	1 707 569.28	2 056 926	1 141 250	- 915 676	- 44.52
<i>Capital expenditure</i>					
B. IV. Purchases	29 839.20	30 000	-	- 30 000	- 100.00
B. V. Buildings	-	-	-	-	-
Gross operating costs ...	32 483 529.02	29 726 376	12 651 900	- 17 074 476	- 57.44
<i>Income</i>					
B. VI. WEU tax	10 537 669.40	8 848 800	3 680 000	- 5 168 800	- 58.41
B. VII. Other receipts ...	421 359.47	340 100	80 000	- 260 100	- 76.48
Operating income	10 959 028.87	9 188 900	3 760 000	- 5 428 900	- 59.08
Net total operating costs	21 524 500.15	20 537 476	8 891 900	- 11 645 576	- 56.70
<i>Pensions</i>					
B.I.A. Costs	8 195 421.06	7 623 600	8 243 000	619 400	8.12
B.VIII. Receipts	960 826.78	843 200	350 000	- 493 200	- 58.49
Net pension costs	7 234 594.28	6 780 400	7 893 000	1 112 600	16.41
Net total costs	28 759 094.43	27 317 876	16 784 900	- 10 532 976	- 38.56

1. C-B (89) 28.

APPENDIX IX

SECTION B

*Ministerial organs in Paris – Provisional supplementary estimates for 1990
Summary*

	Credits approved for 1990	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates	%
	(F)	(F)	(F)	
<i>Expenditure</i>				
B. I. Personnel costs	11 410 650	10 500 000	21 910 650	92.02
B. II. Travel	100 000	–	100 000	–
B. III. Other operating costs	1 141 250	–	1 141 250	–
B. IV. Purchases	–	–	–	–
B. V. Buildings	–	–	–	–
TOTAL	12 651 900	10 500 000	23 151 900	82.99
<i>Income</i>				
B. VI. WEU tax	3 680 000	–	3 680 000	–
B. VII. Other receipts	80 000	–	80 000	–
TOTAL	3 760 000	–	3 760 000	–
NET TOTAL	8 891 900	10 500 000	19 391 900	118.08
Sessions	7 893 000	4 536 200	12 429 200	57.47
NET GRAND TOTAL	16 784 900	15 036 200	31 821 100	89.58

APPENDIX X

*Trend of budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU in Paris between 1989 and 1990**(French francs)*

	1989 approved credits C-B (89) 22 <i>a</i>	1988 transfers B (89) 6 <i>b</i>	1989 revised budget C-B (89) 22 <i>c</i>	% $\frac{c-a}{a}$	1990 ordinary budget (1) C-B (89) 28 <i>e</i>	1990 provisional suppl. budget B (90) 1 <i>f</i>	% $\frac{f-c}{c}$
	(F)	(F)	(F)		(F)		
A. Operating budget							
I. Staff	28 921 950.00	28 921 950.00	27 389 450.00		11 410 650.00	21 910 650.00	
II. Travel	400 000.00	400 000.00	250 000.00		100 000.00	100 000.00	
III. Other operating costs	2 046 900.00	2 095 026.00	2 056 926.00		1 141 250.00	1 141 250.00	
IV. Purchase of furni- ture and equip- ment	30 000.00	30 000.00	30 000.00		-	-	
V. Building	-	-	-		-	-	
Total expenditure	31 398 850.00	31 446 976.00	29 726 376.00	- 5.33	12 651 900.00	23 151 900.00	- 22.12
Receipts	10 202 100.00	10 202 100.00	9 188 900.00		3 760 000.00	3 760 000.00	
NET TOTAL	21 196 750.00	21 244 876.00	20 537 476.00	- 3.11	8 891 900.00	19 391 900.00	- 5.58
B. Pensions budget							
Pensions and allowances	6 965 000.00	6 965 000.00	7 623 600.00		8 243 000.00	13 315 000.00	
Pensions receipts	892 000.00	892 000.00	843 200.00		350 000.00	885 800.00	
NET TOTAL	6 073 00.00	6 073 000.00	6 780 400.00	11.65	7 893 000.00	12 429 200.00	83.31
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	27 269 750.00	27 317 876.00	27 317 876.00	0.18	16 784 900.00	31 821 100.00	16.48

1. This budget relates only to the first half of 1990.

APPENDIX XI

*Variations in the budgets of the ministerial organs in Paris between 1989 and 1990**(French francs)*

	1989 approved credits C-B (89) 22 <i>a</i>	Brought forward from 1988 B (89) 6 <i>b</i>	1989 revised budget C-B (89) 22 <i>c</i>	1990 ordinary budget <i>e</i>	1990 provisional suppl. budget B (90) 1 <i>f</i>
A. Operating budget					
I. Staff	28 921 950.00	-	- 1 532 500.00	- 15 978 800.00	10 500 000.00
II. Travel	400 000.00	-	- 150 000.00	- 150 000.00	-
III. Other operating costs	2 046 900.00	48 126.00	- 38 100.00	- 915 676.00	-
IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	30 000.00	-	-	- 30 000.00	-
V. Buildings	-	-	-	-	-
Total expenditure	31 398 850.00	48 126.00	- 1 720 600.00	- 17 074 476.00	10 500 000.00
Receipts	10 202 100.00	-	- 1 013 200.00	- 5 428 900.00	-
NET TOTAL	21 196 750.00	48 126.00	- 707 400.00	- 11 645 576.00	10 500 000.00
B. Pensions budget					
Pensions and allowances	6 965 000.00	-	658 600.00	619 400.00	5 072 000.00
Pensions receipts	892 000.00	-	- 48 800.00	- 493 200.00	535 800.00
NET TOTAL	6 073 000.00	-	707 400.00	1 112 600.00	4 536 200.00
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	27 269 750.00	48 126.00	-	- 10 532 976.00	15 036 200.00

APPENDIX XII

RECOMMENDATION 468¹*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1988 (revised) and 1989, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
 - (a) no decision has yet been taken by the Council on the restructuring of the ministerial organs;
 - (b) the budgets of these organs are still based on former organograms;
 - (c) consequently these budgets are not a valid estimate of requirements in relation to programmed work;
 - (d) consequently the Assembly is not in a position to give an opinion on the budgets in question on the basis of a cost/efficiency ratio;
 - (e) in the framework of budgetary management, a new practice seems to be introduced (which is to transfer from one financial year to the next unused credits within the limits of the total contributions of member states), which does not correspond to Article 10 (c) of the Financial Regulations of WEU which is referred to as justification;
- (iii) Regretting that:
 - (a) the staff of the Paris agencies is still uncertain about its future;
 - (b) furthermore, in the framework of "co-ordination" there is a tendency to limit the participation of staff representatives in the negotiations on determining conditions of employment,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Follow up without delay Recommendation 467 adopted by the Presidential Committee on 16th March 1989;
2. Make the necessary amendments to the Financial Regulations to regularise the procedure for transferring credits from one financial year to another outside the provisions of Article 10 (c) of the Regulations;
3. Afford its backing to the staff associations in their action to defend the right of their representatives to take part in negotiations in the framework of "co-ordination" on the conditions for the employment of staff;
4. Make a study to determine how to facilitate the transfer of staff between the co-ordinated organisations in order to improve career possibilities.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs. Pack on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1184).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 468***

1. Recommendation 467, proposing substantial organisation and management changes, is still being considered. The Council will, in due course, inform the Assembly of progress.

2. The Council has considered the recommendation of the Assembly concerning the transfer of budgetary credits from one financial year to the next. It recognises that the system of budgetary control has to have some flexibility in practice to meet special circumstances, providing modifications to agreed budgets are made with the authority of the Council on the recommendation of the Budget Committee. The Council notes that, in the instances referred to, the secretariat sought and obtained the appropriate authority.

The Council is fully aware of the exceptional nature of the circumstances in which the secretariat has to operate at present. It does not consider that a new criterion has been set in adopting a practical response to meet the unusual situation.

Whilst it may be somewhat premature to modify permanently the Financial Regulations to meet what is in effect a transient phase, this matter will be examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee to consider whether a change would be advisable in the long term.

3. The rôle of the staff associations to take part in the negotiations in the framework of "co-ordination" is recognised. Considerable progress has been made in the past ten years to establish and develop this participation and the process continues to be refined and improved. The positive attitude of the staff, as well as their contributions during the discussions and negotiations, are much appreciated.

The framework of "co-ordination" is, however, complex and often time-bound, and sometimes one or other of the three parties involved may feel that it should have had more influence or that the outcome of the negotiating process should have resulted in a more favourable compromise.

The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, within its sphere of competence, endeavours to give each side its proper due and arrive at a common consensus as much as possible before submitting its recommendations to the councils.

4. The movement of staff between co-ordinated organisations ought not to be considered "transfers", but rather the leaving of one autonomous organisation (resignation, expiry of contract, etc.) and the entering of another autonomous organisation (recruitment).

Staff mobility between co-ordinated organisations is enhanced by the more or less automatic transfer of pension entitlements under the common pension scheme, and in that generally in recruitment, preference will be given to appropriate staff members from other co-ordinated organisations, maintaining, wherever possible, acquired grade and seniority, whilst recognising also opportunities for career advancement.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th September 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th September 1989.

*Second part of the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council
to the Assembly of WEU*

(1st July – 31st December 1989)

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I. Introduction

1. The second half of 1989 saw Europe embark upon a new phase in its history. The fundamental principles set out in the Helsinki Final Act laid the groundwork for the break-up of totalitarianism and the overcoming of the division of Europe. Today, we are seeing that division disintegrate.

The remarkable thing about this is its peaceful nature. However, we must not be blind to certain latent risks or to the extremely high social cost of the necessarily slow transition of a closed and interventionist economic system to an open market economy. For the USSR, the uncertainties are even greater, given the challenges of all kinds facing President Gorbachev's reform policy.

2. At their meeting on 13th and 14th November 1989 in Brussels, Ministers had a detailed exchange of views on the latest developments in Eastern Europe, particularly in the German Democratic Republic.

In the face of this extremely promising situation, they unanimously stressed the absolute need to support the development of the reforms under way. They also recalled that the Harmel doctrine, which provided for the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe, was still valid. They were pleased to see that the ideas they had originally put forward now had a genuine prospect of becoming reality. Their aim was to achieve successive stages of disarmament in an atmosphere of reciprocal balance, control and stability.

They stressed the need to pursue and implement the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE process and respect for human rights, insisting that a pluralist democracy be established following free elections.

They stressed their commitment to the pursuit of European integration, and in particular to the implementation of the Single European Act.

3. Ministers' discussions ranged over the main issues affecting European security.

In this field, they stressed the need to maintain a system of deterrence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, having regard to the changing climate of the arms control negotiations.

Ministers hoped that developments in the security field would take place in a climate of stability. They added that it was not in their interest unilaterally to make capital out of the current changes taking place in Eastern Europe.

4. Ministers exchanged views on the European security environment in the period 1991-1995.

Whilst emphasising the undeniable benefits of a CFE agreement, they noted that the residual capacity of the Soviet Union following the reductions would continue to pose a potential military threat.

They concluded that, against the background of rapid political change, the reforms in the East had to be supported in any event.

Following this initial discussion, they concluded that an assessment of the likely security environment of Western Europe in the period 1991-1995 would be an important topic for discussion at future meetings.

5. Ministers examined an interim report prepared by the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space on the potential for security-related co-operation between WEU member states in the field of space technology, a field in which, in contrast to ambitious civil programmes, the potential at their disposal had not been exploited.

They agreed that satellite observation was of interest to Europe mainly in the field of verification of arms control agreements, and for monitoring crises with security implications and also environmental hazards. It could offer greater security for member states and the alliance as a whole, an increase in Europe's contribution to, and expertise in, the verification of arms control agreements and an enhancement of European industrial and technological capabilities.

6. Ministers decided to set up a "WEU Institute for Security Studies". Essentially, the rôle of the institute would be to promote a European security identity and to assist the organisation in implementing the provisions of The Hague platform.

Accordingly, its main tasks would be:

- (a) to carry out research, principally for the Council, calling on national experts if necessary and in consultation with the Secretariat-General; this research would be carried out independently and objectively;

- (b) to encourage and help the existing institutes in the member states to promote a greater awareness of European security issues and, specifically, to organise courses and seminars to that end;

- (c) in collaboration with existing institutes, to organise meetings with institutes in countries not belonging to Western Europe, particularly those in the Warsaw Pact countries;

- (d) to establish and keep up-to-date a data bank for the purposes of research into the defence efforts of the WEU member countries and for studies relating to European security. The institute would submit a proposal to the Council concerning the practical arrangements for this measure;

- (e) to contribute to academic work on these topics.

7. The Ministers representing the Belgian Presidency, Mr. Mark Eyskens and Mr. Guy Coëme, briefed Assembly representatives on the outcome of last year's ministerial meeting on 13th and 14th November 1989.

II. Activities of the Council

1. During the period under review, the Permanent Council, both at its regular meetings and at "enlarged" sessions, continued to follow all the activities of the WEU intergovernmental bodies and discussed a number of topical questions relating to the developments in Eastern Europe.

2. The Council paid close attention to institutional questions and oversaw the work of the Institutional Working Group which it had established following the mandate given by Ministers in April to the Permanent Council to study the question of setting up an institute. After the Council of Ministers' meeting on 13th and 14th November, the Council set in motion the necessary procedures for implementing the ministerial decision, the most important aspect of which was the appointment of a Director. A selection board was created to assist the Council in making its decision and met once in the period under review. In accordance with the ministerial decision, a Director had to be appointed by 1st February 1990 so that he could take up his duties as soon as possible, and no later than 1st June. It was expected that the institute would therefore be fully operational during the second half of 1990.

3. Following the ministerial meeting, the Permanent Council also examined how to implement the Ministers' decision to abolish the Agencies for Security Questions (except for the ACA) and the Standing Armaments Committee.

It asked the Defence Representatives Group for an opinion on the work done by the remaining SAC working groups.

4. In accordance with the consultation procedure agreed between the Council and, respectively, Greece and Turkey (cf. Document 1200, page 2), high-level contacts took place between representatives of the Council presidency and the Greek and Turkish authorities following the ministerial Council on 13th and 14th November 1989 in Brussels:

- on 20th November 1989, a meeting between the Belgian Deputy Director-General for politico-military affairs and the Greek Ambassador to Brussels;
- on 30th November, a meeting between the Belgian Deputy Director-General for politico-military affairs and a delegation of seven senior Turkish officials;
- on 15th December, talks between the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Eyskens, and his Turkish counterpart, Mr. Yilmaz, in the margins of the North Atlantic meeting in Brussels.

5. The Council followed progress in the national ratification procedures of the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain signed on 13th November 1988. By 31st December 1989, five member states had ratified the protocol.

6. The Council had further preliminary exchanges on the review of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols and examined the question of the Agency for the Control of Armaments in the light of the ministerial decisions taken in November 1989.

7. The Council closely followed matters relating to Assembly requirements directly ensuing from enlargement and agreed upon a supplementary budget to finance the necessary alterations to the Assembly's seat which should be completed prior to the Assembly's June 1990 session.

III. Activities of the Special Working Group

1. The SWG's discussions of topical politico-military questions during the period under review have focused on two areas:

- the implications for Europe of the results of the Atlantic Alliance summit meeting in May 1989;
- the implications for the WEU member countries of the dramatic changes which took place in Central and Eastern Europe in the second half of 1989.

These discussions have contributed towards the emergence of a shared European appreciation of these developments and to an increase of European influence within the alliance, thus helping to strengthen the alliance's rôle in the arms control negotiations. Very fruitful discussions took place on how best specific European security interests could be reflected in the western position at the CFE negotiations in Vienna. This broad consensus was reflected at the ministerial meeting in November 1989.

2. An important part of the SWG's conceptual work during the period covered by this report was devoted to evaluating what Europe's security environment might be during the period 1991-1995. On the basis of the discussions in the SWG, the Belgian presidency introduced this topic at the ministerial meeting in November 1989. Ministers invited the SWG and DRG to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth study and to prepare a report for the April ministerial meeting. This report should include some aspects more specifically related to maintaining an undiminished level of security during the transition period pending the full implementation of a CFE treaty.

3. The decisions at the May 1989 alliance summit to accelerate the timetable for concluding a CFE treaty highlighted the necessity for consultation on how in practice European countries could implement a CFE treaty, particularly as regards its extensive verification provisions. Discussions in the SWG and DRG emphasised the fact that, while verification would be a national responsibility, a considerable amount of co-operation and co-ordination would be required. Such co-operation within WEU would have the double benefit of demonstrating that Europe had a security identity while at the same time contributing to (and not duplicating) the work being done in the alliance. It was for these reasons that Ministers, at their November meeting, mandated the SWG and DRG to present joint proposals on the practical arrangements for co-operation between member countries with regard to the procedures for verifying a CFE treaty.

4. The SWG has also discussed member states' security interests regarding the proposal put forward by President Bush at the alliance summit in May 1989 to establish an "open skies" régime. In this area too, the potential for practical co-operation between WEU member countries is being examined by the SWG and DRG.

5. In the context of the extra-European dimension to WEU's activities, the SWG has conducted an exchange of information on member states' security-related programmes of assistance to third world countries.

6. The defence implications of a single European market by 1992 is also a subject which remains on the SWG's agenda.

IV. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group

The Defence Representatives Group held four meetings in its own right during this period, as well as three joint meetings with the Special Working Group. The majority of its activities were devoted to the preparation of a report for the November Ministerial Council on the subject of training.

As requested by Ministers at their April 1989 meeting, this report considered how best to promote further co-operation with a view to maintaining effective and realistic training while keeping the associated inconvenience to a minimum. It recognised that proper training was essential for the credibility of the armed forces and that there was no substitute for exercises in open terrain. It assessed, however, that there was scope for changing the present mix of studies currently under way, and by increasing the use of simulators. The report also contained detailed information on member states' training facilities and exchange programmes in order to assist bi- and multilateral co-operation in these fields.

The DRG was also actively involved in discussions on the question of practical co-operation on verification, in conjunction with the SWG (see above). This subject was of particular interest to the DRG since the ministries of defence are likely to have to provide the majority of the resources for verification activities. Various topics discussed included the size and shape of national verification organisations, the possibility of including inspectors of other member states in inspection teams, the training of inspectors and bilateral trial inspections.

Other activities of the DRG during this period included discussion of topical defence questions such as agreements with the Soviet Union on avoiding military incidents and military-to-military contacts with the Soviet Union. It also began its initial discussions on the military aspects of the report which is being prepared on European security requirements in the period 1991-1995.

V. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group

At its meeting on 20th October 1989, the sub-group continued its exchange of information on developments in the Balkans, the Maghreb and Cyprus.

The sub-group also studied a report on naval deployments in the Mediterranean, which

showed that the European countries must continue to shoulder their responsibilities in that area with adequate forces capable of playing an active peacetime rôle in preventing local crises.

In view of the unending conflicts on its eastern perimeter and the major development problems facing countries on its southern shores, the Mediterranean was very clearly of considerable importance for Europe's security.

The sub-group recognised that its mandate remained geographically limited to the Mediterranean, but felt that it should not ignore outside areas where political and military challenges affected the security of European states. More attention should be given to the North/South dimension of European security.

It was therefore decided to make a detailed study of problems relating to the proliferation of ballistic missiles with special reference to the disputes in the Middle East and the Gulf and to capacities for manufacturing chemical weapons.

The group would continue its analysis of regional situations and its exchanges of information on bilateral relations. As and when necessary, it would propose subjects for discussion by Ministers concerning developments which represented major challenges for Europe's security.

VI. Activities of the Sub-Group on Space

In essence, the mandate agreed jointly on 17th May 1989 by the Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group for a study of space questions concerned the identification, by collecting details of technical means already available or to be established, of those areas where co-ordination of member states' activities was both necessary and beneficial.

After four meetings, between 5th July and 29th September 1989, the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space of the Special Working Group produced an interim report and unanimously approved its final chapter. The Enlarged Council adopted this report and its summary. These texts were submitted to the Ministerial Council which took due note. Ministers discussed in depth the value for Europe's security of member states' space programmes currently in progress or planned. They considered the possible uses of space technology in three areas: the verification of arms control agreements and the monitoring of ecological hazards. On that basis, Ministers requested the ad hoc sub-group to continue its work and to undertake the technical studies required for the preparation of a possible ministerial decision on the development by member states of a European satellite observation programme.

These pre-feasibility studies would have to cover both the use of satellite systems already in existence or being developed and also the technical and financial feasibility of developing a European satellite observation system. They would involve the definition and analysis of the various national and European operational requirements which satellite observation might meet and of the corresponding technical means as regards sensors, satellite platforms and ground facilities. The inventory of usable data from scientific, commercial and military satellites and the study of how such data are to be processed and assessed for quality will have to be conducted in parallel. Finally, consideration will be given to the definition of an appropriate institutional framework for the effective management of the programmes involved.

These different subjects will therefore be on the agenda of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space during 1990.

VII. Activities of the Institutional Working Group

1. Following the decision taken by the Ministerial Council in London on 3rd April 1989 to instruct the Permanent Council "to review the question of an institute for strategic studies and the related question of the WEU agency with a view to a further discussion at its next meeting", the Institutional Working Group (IWG) was convened and, after four meetings, produced a draft ministerial decision.

2. This draft was submitted to the Ministerial Council in Brussels on 13th November and adopted. Under the terms of this decision, a "WEU Institute for Security Studies" was set up for the purpose of strengthening the organisation's impact on the identification of European security by giving it a study capacity.

The institute was set up in accordance with Article VIII (2) of the modified Brussels Treaty and with the conclusions on institutional questions reached by Ministers in The Hague on 27th October 1987 and 19th April 1988.

3. In addition to the Director, it will have four permanent experts and a Head of Administration. Funds will be earmarked for enlisting expertise to carry out specific and in-depth studies.

The Director and the experts will carry out their tasks independently and objectively. The Director will report to the Council on the execution of the tasks assigned to him and on how the budget has been used. For 1990, the budget will be F 11 380 000, including F 1 730 000 for functional expenditure. Ministers instructed that the Director should be

appointed by the Council by 1st February 1990 at the latest.

4. The Council of Ministers also decided to wind up the Paris-based Agencies for Security Questions¹ and the Standing Armaments Committee. The Permanent Council was instructed to terminate the contracts of the staff of those bodies in accordance with the legal provisions in force.

Ministers also asked the Permanent Council to take appropriate decisions, after consulting the Assembly, on the organisational aspects of setting up the institute in the organisation's building.

VIII. Relations with the press and information

1. The ministerial bodies have continued to be very active in this field. Action taken by the Secretary-General and his participation, together with members of his staff, at various events concerned with the challenging issues and problems of European security were reported in detail in two information letters sent to the Assembly during the second half of 1989. Continuing to work in the same direction and in the same ways, the ministerial bodies again sought to foster public relations with the press and with the many institutions involved in the debate on the changing state of member countries' security policies. This continuity is largely attributable to the basically unchanged political and budgetary constraints to which an intergovernmental organisation is subject.

The most noteworthy event of late 1989 was the second European session of advanced defence studies held at the Palais d'Egmont in Brussels from 26th November to 1st December. In the very short time available, and against the background of headlong developments in European history, this session succeeded in identifying all the basic political and military questions now facing Europeans and in looking at them in a new light; it also suggested possible ways of responding, providing food for thought. The credit for this remarkable success goes to the outstanding team from the Belgian Centre for Defence Studies, which formulated terms of reference – shown to be highly relevant by the day-to-day events – and succeeded in attracting an array of most talented speakers.

IX. Relations with the Assembly

1. During the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly (4th-7th December 1989), the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers of the Belgian presidency,

1. This does not apply to the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Mr. Eyskens and Mr. Coëme, the French Defence Minister, Mr. Chevènement, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Schäfer, and the Italian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vitalone, all spoke and answered questions from the parliamentarians (see Volume IV of the Proceedings of the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly).

2. The now official meetings between the Ministers of the Belgian Presidency, the Secretary-General and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly took place before and after each Ministerial Council on:

- 17th October, and
- 14th November in Brussels between the Ministers of the Belgian Presidency, the Secretary-General and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly.

These meetings are extremely valuable as the occasion for face-to-face, informal talks and the exchange of up-to-date information. They also provide an opportunity for presenting new ideas on the political and military activities of each of the organs and for questions about institutions.

3. Other forms of dialogue such as the Secretary-General's information letter to the President of the Assembly and the organisation of special meetings have been devised with the constant aim of improving relations between the Council and the Assembly:

(i) On 12th September and 22nd November 1989, the Secretary-General, Mr. Willem van Eekelen, wrote to Mr. Charles Goerens, President of the Assembly, briefing him on the activities of the intergovernmental organs.

The texts of these letters were distributed to all members of the Assembly.

(ii) On 1st November 1989, the Secretary-General, Mr. Willem van Eekelen, received members of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Assembly, with whom he discussed the main questions before the Council.

(iii) When he visited Paris on 6th November 1989, the Secretary-General had talks with Mr. Jean-Pierre Fourné, Chairman of the French Delegation to the WEU Assembly.

(iv) Speaking at the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly on 4th December 1989, Mr. Willem van Eekelen expressed his willingness to be consulted as and when necessary by the Assembly committees or national delegations.

X. Activities of the Paris ministerial organs (1989)

1. The year in question has witnessed a gradual run-down in the staffing and output of the Paris ministerial organs, following the

streamlining in 1988 of the principal activities entrusted to the Agencies for Security Questions by Ministers in April 1985.

The agencies have however contributed usefully to the work of the Council working groups; in particular for the:

- Special Working Group on:
 - arms control verification
 - space
 - chemical weapons
 - 1992 single market
- Defence Representatives Group on:
 - military aspects of arms control verification
 - training
 - demography

2. Under the general heading of European armaments co-operation, the three remaining working groups of the Standing Armaments Committee continued their work on test procedures for wheeled vehicles and on operational research. A seminar on artificial intelligence was organised in June at the Paris offices. Contacts and exchanges of information with FINABEL were maintained.

3. In addition, experts of the agencies attended specialist conferences and symposia, contributed articles on defence issues to professional publications and advised the Secretary-General on specific military matters as required.

4. In its decision of 13th November 1989, the Council of Ministers set up a WEU Institute for Security Studies, whose essential rôle will be to promote a European security identity and to assist the organisation in pursuing the objectives laid down in the platform. It was also decided that the Agencies for Security Questions (but not the ACA) and the Standing Armaments Committee should be abolished, with staff contracts being terminated with effect from 30th June 1990.

In view of this decision, the Council agreed that its Defence Representatives Group should examine the future of the work of the remaining working groups of the SAC, and report its findings to the Council in due course. The Paris ministerial organs have contributed a report for consideration by the Defence Representatives Group.

5. The Agency for the Control of Armaments continued its residual tasks in respect of atomic, biological and chemical weapons control, at the levels existing at the time of the Rome Declaration of 1984 and in accordance with the procedures agreed up to that time².

2. See Annex IV.

For this thirty-fourth ACA control year, the juridical sources used to justify control levels and procedures remained unchanged in 1989.

The ACA continued to follow the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and especially the work on negotiations on a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. It also took part in the Special Working Group's meeting on chemical weapons.

XI. Public Administration Committee (1989)

The Public Administration Committee held its two six-monthly meetings at Bad Mergentheim on 25th and 26th April and at Caen from 18th to 20th September.

The reports on these meetings will be forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly where they will be available for members' inspection.

A new feature of the past year was the attendance for the first time of representatives of the Spanish and Portuguese Directors-General of Public Administration.

The thirty-eighth seminar for government officials took place from 15th to 21st October 1989 in Bruges, Belgium, on the subject of "Informatics, individual liberties and public security".

XII. Budgetary and administrative questions (1989)

1. At its meeting in November 1989, the Ministerial Council decided:

- to abolish the Agencies for Security Questions as from 30th June 1990;
- to maintain the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) in its present form until further decisions were taken;
- to establish a "WEU Institute for Security Studies" as from 1st July 1990.

2. As a result of the abolition of the Agencies for Security Questions, all A, L, B and C grade staff were sent letters before 31st December 1989, giving notice of the termination of their contracts with effect from 30th June 1990, in accordance with the provisions of Annex VI to the Staff Rules, leading, in appropriate cases, to the payment of a loss of job indemnity.

It is hoped that some members of staff will find a post in the new WEU institute; the small number seconded by their governments will return to their national departments; efforts will be made to help find posts for the remaining staff in other WEU bodies or international organisations.

3. Staff for the new WEU institute, recruited from the Agencies for Security Questions or elsewhere, will be offered renewable, three-year limited-term contracts.

On 13th December, a selection board, made up of the permanent representatives, held its first meeting in the presence of the Secretary-General to appoint a Director for the institute.

4. Following the accession of Spain and Portugal, the Assembly's new office and conference material requirements have called for reappraisal of the premises in terms of the available space and the purchase of equipment. At the same time, the abolition of the agencies and the establishment of the institute have resulted in a net reduction in staff numbers.

The institute will occupy the third floor of the WEU premises in Paris. Arrangements for co-operation between the Assembly and the institute are now being worked out.

5. As a result of the unexpected departure of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General, a supplementary budget has had to be submitted as the cost of the leaving allowances could not be covered from savings elsewhere in the budget.

6. On the recommendation of the Budget and Organisation Committee, the Council decided in November 1989 that a management survey of the Secretariat-General and the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly must be conducted before any posts could be added to the establishment table.

ANNEX I

***Ministerial decision concerning the setting-up
of a "WEU Institute for Security Studies"***

Brussels, 13th November 1989

The Ministerial Council:

Convinced that, as stated in the platform on European security interests adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987, the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence and that WEU makes an important contribution to the broader process of European unification;

Determined to increase the effectiveness of the organisation and to contribute to an overall solution to its institutional problems;

Stressing the importance of having within WEU a capacity to study, and provide documentation on, questions concerning European security;

Recalling that the Assembly, in Recommendation 467, has expressed interest in the establishment of such a capacity,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

1. A "WEU Institute for Security Studies" shall be set up. Essentially, the rôle of this institute shall be to promote a European security identity and to assist the organisation in pursuing the objectives laid down in the platform. Accordingly, its main tasks shall be:
 - (a) to carry out research, principally for the Council, calling on national experts if necessary and in consultation with the Secretariat-General; this research will be carried out independently and objectively;
 - (b) to encourage and help the existing institutes in the member states to promote a greater awareness of European security issues and, specifically, to organise courses and seminars to that end;
 - (c) in collaboration with existing institutes, to organise meetings with institutes in countries not belonging to Western Europe, particularly those in the Warsaw Pact countries;
 - (d) establish and keep up-to-date a data bank for the purposes of research into the defence efforts of the WEU member countries and for studies relating to European security – the relevant practical arrangements will be the subject of an institute proposal to the Council;
 - (e) contribute to academic work on the same topics.
2. It is decided that the Agencies for Security Questions³ and the Standing Armaments Committee shall be abolished.
3. The institute shall be placed under the authority of the Council which shall appoint the Director for a period of three years. The Director shall be responsible to the Council for the management of the institute.
4. The institute shall be located in Paris in the premises of WEU. The question of its location shall be reviewed in the light of the conclusions of the Ministerial Councils of 27th October 1987 and 19th April 1988 regarding the collocation of WEU institutions, necessary in the context of the European construction process.
5. The Assembly may, with the Council's approval, assign to the institute studies relating to the Assembly's own activities. The Assembly shall have access to the results of the institute's unclassified work.
6. The Director of the institute shall be appointed by 1st February 1990 at the latest. He shall take up his duties as soon as possible, at the latest by 1st June 1990.

3. This does not apply to the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

ANNEX II

Co-ordinated organisations (1989)

1. The Co-ordinating Committee held eight meetings in 1989. In addition, there were ten meetings of the Committee of Heads of Administration, and nine joint meetings of the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General with the Standing Committee of Staff Associations.

2. The main subjects dealt with in the framework of co-ordination, some of which are still under review, were as follows:

- a review of the adjustment procedure for salaries and appropriate allowances, resulting in an approved new adjustment procedure taking effect with the annual review of 1st July 1989;
- an evaluation of the cost of the pension scheme;
- effects on the pension scheme of the introduction of part-time work in the OECD;
- the periodic adjustment of salaries and allowances.

ANNEX III

*Application of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty
on forces of Western European Union (1989)*

1. The Council has continued with its customary controls on levels of forces of member states, consistent however with the political declaration adopted by the Council of Ministers on 14th November 1988 concerning a review of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols.

For 1989, as for preceding years, the Council received information concerning the levels of forces of WEU member states under NATO command, in accordance with Article IV of Protocol No. II. This information was transmitted, as previously, to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by SACEUR to that end. This annual presentation to the Council once again gave permanent representatives an opportunity to hold a substantive exchange of views with the SHAPE representatives on a wide range of topical European defence issues.

The Council keeps its procedure for forces control under annual review, so that it may continue to implement the essential control measures set out in Protocol No. II.

2¹. The Government of the United Kingdom has informed the Council that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1989 in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II was 52 127. The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1989 there were on average 747 personnel deployed in this way to Northern Ireland. In addition, an average of 523 personnel were deployed to meet commitments in Cyprus. These units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.

So far as the strength of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force in 1989 is concerned, there is one minor change from the 1988 table, in that the Reconnaissance Squadron, previously shown as Jaguar/Tornado, is now solely Tornado.

The revised table is shown below:

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/attack	Tornado	7
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Tornado	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
	Chinook	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1

1. The text hereafter was communicated to the Assembly on 23rd May 1990.

ANNEX IV

*Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (1989)*1. *Atomic weapons*

The ACA does not exercise any control of these weapons.

2. *Biological weapons*

All member states agreed to carry forward for 1989 the list of biological weapons subject to control in use in 1988. The Council took note.

However, as for previous years, the ACA exercises no control of these weapons.

3. *Chemical weapons*

All member states notified the agency that they agreed to carry forward, during 1989, the list of chemical equipment products (chemical weapons) subject to control which was in force in 1988. The Council took note.

Following the usual procedure, the agency asked the member states whether any effective production of chemical weapons was being carried out on their mainland territory. All member states replied in the negative.

No country reported holding chemical weapons on the mainland of Europe.

Also following the usual procedure, four "agreed non-production control measures" were carried out at chemical production plants. In executing these controls, the ACA observed nothing contrary to the undertakings not to manufacture chemical weapons.

*Action by the Presidential Committee***REPORT**

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly*

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1. As usual, in the first half of 1990 there were two aspects to the Presidential Committee's action: administrative and political.

I. Administrative action

2. In regard to administration, the Presidential Committee examined the consequences of the enlargement of WEU and the restructuring of the administrative organs. The former concerned it directly since the increase in the number of members of the Assembly and its committees, and the addition of two further languages to the organisation's five official languages, compelled the Assembly to transform its premises and increase the size of its meeting rooms. The abolition of the WEU security agencies involved human factors to which the Presidential Committee felt it could not remain indifferent.

(i) Reorganisation of the seat

3. In the first part of 1990, the Presidential Committee had to ensure that the first session of the Assembly of enlarged Western European Union was held in conditions which respected the Rules of Procedure and the dignity of its debates.

4. The reorganisation of the WEU building was thus one of the Presidential Committee's constant concerns. It is common knowledge that, because of the Council's delay in giving its agreement, work included in the Assembly's extraordinary budget started late. One of the firms awarded a tender having gone bankrupt, it had to be replaced forthwith and the time lost

due to this incident had to be made good. In short, every effort has been made to ensure that the premises are ready by the time the session is opened in spite of the hazards involved in this kind of work.

5. Not only, therefore, shall we be able to welcome the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations, henceforth sitting as full members, it is also to be hoped that there will be a significant improvement in the Assembly's working conditions.

6. The new committee rooms replace rooms that were badly ventilated and which had too few seats for the former number of members of the Assembly.

7. Furthermore, in addition to English and French, as provided for in the Rules of Procedure, it will be possible to have interpretation into the language of any other member country if the delegations concerned so wish and recruit interpreters at their own expense.

8. Offices assigned to delegations are now slightly larger than the previous ones. Their furnishing and equipment will be improved. The Presidential Committee is nevertheless aware that the situation is not yet satisfactory. It regrets that the Council agreed only to expenditure relating to work directly connected with the enlargement of WEU.

(ii) Staff of the security agencies

9. 1990 is also the year for the application of the twofold decision to set up a WEU Institute for Security Studies and to abolish the security agencies.

10. Mr. Roper, appointed Director of the institute, is a former member of our Assembly and a former Chairman of the Defence Committee. I have wished him every success in a task which involves close co-operation with the Assembly that he knows well.

11. The institute comes into operation on 1st July. In order to leave its Director absolutely free to choose his staff, the Council decided to terminate the contracts of all officials of the Paris ministerial organs. However, the conditions in which this was done aroused keen concern of which the Staff Committee of the agencies informed the President of the Assembly. The Staff Committee regretted the absence of a negotiated agreement on the conditions in which staff recruited to work for the future WEU Institute for Security Studies would stay on and on the financial compensation that would be paid to those who would have to leave the organisation following what amounted to collective dismissal.

12. The Presidential Committee decided to examine this problem and started a dialogue with the Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, who assured it that he fully shared its concerns and had asked the Director of the institute, Mr. Roper, to give priority to the candidatures of staff of the Paris ministerial organs.

13. Finally, the Council refused to grant the staff of the agencies who had been dismissed any indemnity other than that provided for in the Staff Rules. At the joint meeting with the Council, the Presidential Committee was informed that this matter had now been settled once and for all.

14. To my great regret, this is the situation that I have to report to the Assembly.

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II. Political action

15. Politically speaking, the beginning of 1990 was marked by the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of last year. These were the subject of debates at the extraordinary session held by the Assembly in Luxembourg on 21st and 22nd March. The Presidential Committee for its part has endeavoured to establish new forms of dialogue with certain Warsaw Pact countries and, by visiting Moscow, to strengthen links with the Supreme Soviet, initially established in 1987.

(i) New forms of dialogue with certain Warsaw Pact countries

16. To facilitate the examination, at the extraordinary session in Luxembourg, of events in

Central and Eastern Europe, the Presidential Committee decided, for the first time, to invite members of the Polish and Soviet Governments.

17. Instead of Mr. Shevardnadze, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was unable to attend, it was Mr. Falin, Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs, who addressed the Assembly in Luxembourg.

18. The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Skubiszewski, was able to accept the invitation and he attended almost all our debates and spoke twice. The Assembly listened with the utmost attention to his reasoned comments on his country's foreign policy in his first address and was then gratified to hear him speak again after Mr. Genscher's address. The Assembly was privileged to promote a fruitful dialogue between those responsible for foreign policy in two neighbouring countries reconciled after the drama of recent history thanks to the recognition, just repeated by Mr. Genscher on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany, of the intangibility of the Oder-Neisse frontier.

19. It should be added that Mr. Falin regretted not being able to conduct a similar dialogue because Mr. Genscher had had to leave, but his address and well-documented answers to questions allowed a better assessment to be made of areas of agreement and the extent of the differences that still have to be overcome.

20. The Presidential Committee also decided to invite the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the future Hungarian Government to attend the June session. At the time of writing this report, it is to be hoped that we shall be able to hear one of the very earliest foreign policy statements by the first Hungarian Government to emerge from free elections.

21. Finally, parliamentary observers from countries with special guest status in the Council of Europe have, for the first time this year, been invited to the Assembly's sessions.

22. Only Hungarian and Yugoslav parliamentarians were able to attend the Luxembourg session but we hope that parliamentarians from Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia will be able to attend the June session, together with others from the German Democratic Republic, in order to enrich our debates with their remarks.

(ii) Visit by the Presidential Committee to Moscow

23. The Presidential Committee's visit to Moscow from 2nd to 6th April 1990 was made in the framework of the regular relations estab-

lished by common agreement between the Supreme Soviet and our Assembly.

24. I congratulated those we met on the initiative taken by the Supreme Soviet of inviting a delegation from the WEU Assembly to Moscow in April 1987. Last year, the Assembly in turn invited a delegation from the new Soviet Parliament following the spring elections. It has been agreed that these visits will henceforth be organised on an annual basis, alternately in Paris and Moscow.

25. I told the Soviet authorities that the dialogue now under way encouraged mutual understanding and a spirit of co-operation favourable to the search for solutions to our common problems. We all hope that a just, peaceful and secure order will be established in Europe. The WEU Assembly for its part had been reflecting on this subject, the first stage being marked by the adoption, at the extraordinary session held in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March, of the recommendation to the Council submitted by Senator Pontillon on behalf of the Political Committee.

26. In the same spirit, the Presidential Committee, aware of the magnitude of the problems facing the Soviet Union, did not want it to be weakened but, on the contrary, hoped perestroika would be successful since we did not endorse the cold-war reasoning that whatever harmed one side served the interests of the other, but advocated co-operation implying that we need each other.

27. Mr. Zagladin, Mr. Gorbachev's advisor and a member of his Security Council, presented the present situation in a similar light. He believed international relations now revealed the coexistence of two dissimilar approaches: that of the past, when diplomacy was viewed solely as the defence of national interests, and that of the future, which sought to build an international community in which each one considered the rights of all the others.

28. He personally concluded that the future of the different security systems should now be envisaged in the framework of all-European joint security. He added that the Soviet Union would never resort to force, even if the situation turned against it.

29. The Soviet authorities, in particular Mr. Dzasokhov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet, while stressing the need for the unification of Germany to be co-ordinated with that of Europe, stressed the frequent similarity of views expressed by each side, especially on the intangibility of frontiers.

30. However, major differences emerged as soon as the question of German unification was tackled. From a Soviet standpoint unified Ger-

many's membership of NATO would upset the balance of forces in every area, particularly at military level. What would the West say, one of them pointed out, if unified Germany joined the Warsaw Pact?

31. Without calling attention to the lack of realism of this retort, we answered that, legally, the German people must remain free to choose its alliances and, politically, all the alliances had an important rôle to play in promoting the consolidation of an order that ensured security in Europe. Unified Germany's membership of the Atlantic Alliance should not be considered as a threat. On the contrary, the alliances would have a major rôle to play in the context of the new European order.

32. In this connection, our German colleagues stressed that Germany could not be subject to special conditions for ever. Whatever the concerns for balance or bad memories of the past, the people of the new Germany would have to choose their destiny like other peoples. The need for Germany to be free to express its political choices was confirmed by the other members of the Presidential Committee.

33. The members of the Presidential Committee nevertheless showed that they were aware of the security concerns of the Soviet Union by indicating their agreement to the alliances, in the future, being assigned a political rôle which might progressively take over from their military rôle. In the meantime, there would have to be substantial balanced and adequately-controlled disarmament.

34. We were told at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the Vienna negotiations would have to be concluded in the framework of the present mandate. A new mandate would then have to be adopted to allow further reductions in conventional forces and new measures in the framework of a collective security system.

35. On the Soviet side, the wish was expressed that the nuclear disarmament talks would allow a substantial reduction in such weapons and the abolition of tactical nuclear weapons, but they admitted that the West should retain nuclear weapons "as a guarantee against the machinations of irresponsible political leaders". Thus, there seemed to be the first signs of some recognition of the need for minimum deterrence.

36. Emphasis was also laid on the growing importance of co-operation between the two alliances to meet the dangers of nuclear and chemical proliferation and the growth in imports of advanced technology military equipment in various parts of the world.

37. The frankness of the talks allowed the Presidential Committee to express its concern at events in Lithuania. Were we not witnessing on

this occasion the existence of a limit to perestroika?

38. The Soviet authorities voiced their concern for stability and balance. Events in the Baltic region raised economic and also moral problems. Each ethnic group should show respect for the other groups. Furthermore, the problem raised was not confined to Lithuania but concerned all the nations in the region. Everything that had been achieved in recent decades was being called in question. It was therefore legitimate to call for a referendum to be organised.

39. Some pointed out that attribution of the city of Vilnius to Lithuania was a consequence of the pact between Stalin and Ribbentrop. The treaty question was therefore more complex than was thought. Above all, the Soviet Union wanted time to find a way out.

40. Generally speaking, emphasis was laid on the importance for the Soviet Union of the present transitional period. The move from an inward-looking to an outward-looking policy was painful, but success was necessary not only to ensure the salvation of the Soviet Union but to place European security on sound foundations.

41. Mr. Zagladin was particularly optimistic about the future of perestroika, which would move more quickly this year. Steps would be taken to ensure significant effects before the end of the year.

42. In conclusion, we all agreed on the interest of the talks just held and the value we attached to the pursuit, in a particularly changing context, of the dialogue on the conditions of European security.

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* *

43. I wish to express a few personal thoughts on the Presidential Committee's visit to Moscow.

44. While remaining one of the world's two great military powers, the Soviet Union is passing through a period of change which is disorganising its economy and upsetting the foundations of its social cohesion and national identity. This combination of strength and weakness implies, on our part, a new organisation of European security.

45. We must first take account of the fact that, for the first time, East and West are referring to the same principles. Although there is still an economic gap between the two parts of Europe, the ideological struggle has come to an end with the eastern countries' endorsement of the principles that guide the West.

46. Already in April 1987, when receiving the Bureau of the Assembly in Moscow for the first time, the Soviet authorities were no longer presenting their system of social organisation as a model. While underlining their loyalty to socialist ideals, they recognised not only economic failure due to "the time lost in the Brezhnev era" but above all the need for sweeping democratisation of society and institutions.

47. Although less rapid than in other European countries, this democratisation seems to be making steady progress. However, only in the Soviet Union is it endangering the very unity of the state.

48. The introduction of democracy, through perestroika, in the immense heterogeneous empire assembled by the tsars is more of a revolution than a reform. Only the slowness of the process had concealed its extent, which is now glaringly apparent. The upheavals that it is causing are linked with the emergence in an authoritarian, set society of the two factors of mobility implied by democracy: freedom of expression and pluralism.

49. The first offers the peoples of which the Soviet Union is composed the possibility of demonstrating their personalities in an often uncompromising manner at a time when the Western and Central European countries, where there were national movements a century and a half ago, are stressing their solidarity. The plurality of opinions that may now be expressed in the Soviet Union is weakening the party as the instrument of power and calling in question the factor of cohesion represented by a dominating ideology. Finally, in the other Warsaw Pact countries, the emergence of democracy has led to the dismantling of the ramparts that the Soviet Union considered to be an essential part of its security.

50. Nevertheless, the military power built up by the Soviet Union during the period of tension is still intact, declarations of intent concerning its reduction not yet having had any significant effect. We know the factor of inertia that applies to disarmament. It is not easy to implement quickly even the most sincerely proposed reductions.

51. The danger inherent in the present situation is represented by the fact that, now the Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of rapprochement with the West, the army has become its most stable institution and, whatever happens, will remain the basis of its strength for a long time to come.

52. To such a new problem, the West cannot merely give the military answer prepared in response to threats expressed by the Berlin blockade, the Korean war or the Prague coup d'état.

A new international order must be established in agreement with the Soviet Union and the eastern countries. As in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, we are in agreement on the principles to be applied. But the legitimate principle today is the right of peoples to self-determination.

53. At the Vienna Congress, the principle of monarchical legitimacy was applied, taking into account concerns relating to balance considered as a factor of security. Today, it is the Soviet Union which is asking that respect for the will of the peoples be linked with the need to maintain the balance of forces. This request is fanning the flames of controversy over the unification of Germany since respect for the clearly-expressed will of the German people implies strengthening the western camp.

54. This strengthening certainly involves no risk for the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, each side fears the potentialities of the other. Only the establishment of an all-European security order will therefore allow peace in Europe to be made lasting and give a stable basis to intra-European co-operation. This means combining conventional arms reductions, a ban on the production of chemical and biological weapons and the existence of minimum deterrence to counter threats from any direction. Moreover, we must show imagination in ensuring that the implementation of democratic principles is a factor of mutual confidence rather than the start of new

crises. With the fear of clashes between peoples and ethnic groups more attached to affirming their personalities than to respecting that of others, Europeans must find ways of making their own diversity a factor of richness rather than disorder.

55. We must not forget that the governments used WEU to settle the Saar problem in 1955 and that WEU has allowed Federal Germany to be rearmed in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. Today, the purpose is to found a new European order guaranteeing the security of all. In such circumstances, can WEU, the forum for Europeans to give thought to their own interests, remain silent? We urge the Council to assume in full the important responsibilities incumbent upon it.

56. The Assembly for its part acts with the means it has. The recommendation it adopted at the close of its extraordinary session in Luxembourg is a first set of proposals aimed at giving WEU a major rôle in organising the new European order. It has established a dialogue with the Supreme Soviet which will be extended to include other Central and Eastern European countries. In so doing, it is endeavouring to promote a great Europe in which confidence is the basis of fruitful co-operation and a smaller European union that is destined to assume greater responsibility for its own security to make a safer world.

Activities of the IEPG

*Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly*

11th April 1990

Dear President,

In view of the interest which has been expressed by members of the Assembly in the activities of the IEPG, most recently at the meeting on 7th March 1990 between the Presidential Committee, the Belgian presidency and myself, I have pleasure in attaching an information letter which it prepared in 1989 on its activities. I would be grateful if you would arrange for it to be circulated to members of the Assembly.

I am currently investigating whether it might be possible to establish a more regular exchange of information of this kind.

Yours sincerely,
Willem van EEKELEN

Mr. Charles GOERENS,
President of the Assembly of WEU

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*IEPG information letter to the WEU Assembly**Introduction*

1. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) was founded in 1976 to provide a European forum for discussion of defence equipment matters in which France could participate. All European members of NATO, except Iceland, are in the IEPG. In 1984, the group met for the first time at Defence Minister level. It was recognised at that meeting that ad hoc methods for generating collaborative programmes were no longer suitable and this, coupled with the call in the Nunn amendment for Europeans to do more for their own defence, led to Ministers seeking to inject more dynamism into the IEPG and to promote more systematic collaboration.

2. Through its comprehensive membership, the IEPG remains the natural vehicle for defence equipment collaboration among European members of the NATO Alliance. When Ministers met in 1984, it was agreed that the aim for the group should be to promote European collaboration in order to permit more effective use of funds for research and development, to increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment, to maintain a healthy defence industrial base in Europe, and to facilitate a realistic two-way street between Europe and North America. In an attempt to improve European capabilities, Ministers commissioned the European Defence Industry Study (EDIS). This was published in late 1986 and recommended various steps to be taken to achieve the goals set by Ministers at their 1984 meeting. In particular, the EDIS report advocated the pursuit of a transnational open and competitive market, and a stronger European research effort. The IEPG subsequently drew up an action plan to implement the main recommendations of the report.

Structure of the IEPG

3. The IEPG functions through three panels which report to six-monthly meetings of National Armaments Directors (NADs). The NADs, in turn, report to Defence Ministers who meet three times every two years. The Chairmanship of the IEPG rotates every two years between member states. The UK, the current Chair nation, will relinquish its responsibilities at the end of 1990. The outline structure of the IEPG is at Annex A.

*Current activities**Panel I*

4. Panel I, under Norwegian chairmanship, is responsible for operational requirements and equipment programmes. In 1989, the panel completed its 5th annual review of a document called the equipment replacement schedule (ERS) in order to identify, on a systematic basis, those areas which offer scope for European collaboration. In addition, the Chairman of Panel I is analysing in detail how to develop a mechanism for looking at long-term military requirements (15-20 years) with a view to improving the identification of co-operative programme opportunities. As a first step, a trial involving concept papers is taking place in the 1990 ERS programme. Finally, Panel I oversees several project groups which range from the exploratory to those approaching full development. These groups are at Annex B.

Panel II

5. Panel II, chaired by France, is responsible for research and technology. In the past, there has been too much duplication of effort in European research. Since 1985, there has been work on co-operative technology areas, but this has been limited in its impact. A major new initiative has now been taken to devise a European technology programme. Work is under way to agree the management structure and funding for the programme, and IEPG Ministers agreed in Estoril in June this year that details of the plan – to be known as Euclid (European co-operation for the long term in defence) – should be released to industry and other centres of research as soon as possible so that they could come forward with proposals to meet European research priority needs. The work of Panel II will become more widely known in 1990.

Panel III

6. Panel III, under German chairmanship, oversees economic matters, including implementation of proposals in the action plan, such as the establishment of national focal points, the publication of contracts bulletins, agreement on criteria for contract award, devising a recording system for cross-border defence procurement, and improvements in technology transfer.

7. The action plan represents the IEPG's resolve to break with past practice and open up the European defence market to contractors from other nations. If we are to make the best possible use of defence resources, it is important to accept greater competition in principle and in practice. In a period of static or declining defence budgets it is vital to achieve the best value for money, thereby permitting the wider use of funds for research, development and procurement.

8. To achieve greater competition, it is important to have increased visibility of bidding opportunities and to be able to enter new markets. To this end, earlier in 1989, IEPG nations nominated focal points at which companies wishing to enter new markets could register an interest, receive advice on national procurement procedures and make an important initial contact with national defence ministries. As a result, potential bidders will have a source of knowledge to support their bids, and ministries will have a wider supplier base. IEPG nations have also agreed to publish, in the near future, bulletins of contract opportunities similar to those already produced by the UK and France. The focal points and bulletins are central to opening up the European defence equipment market.

9. However, there remains much to be done. IEPG nations are currently examining the possibility of introducing on a transitional basis a flexible and pragmatic system for operating *juste retour* which will not undermine the philosophy of an open market. Initial figures on the balance of defence trade between nations are being collected and will need to be carefully analysed before further action is taken. Work is also continuing on technology transfer to ensure that intellectual property rights are adequately protected. It is also important for the IEPG to ensure that all members follow similar procedures when awarding contracts. As a result, the IEPG has drafted criteria for contract award which Defence Ministers will be asked to endorse early next year.

1992 Study Group

10. Naturally, the IEPG remains aware of parallel activities in the EC directed towards opening the civil market. A study group has been established, under Belgian Chairmanship, to report on the implications of 1992 for defence procurement.

Secretariat

11. Earlier this year the IEPG established a permanent secretariat in Lisbon. The precise nature and rôle of the secretariat can be expected to evolve in time. In the short term, the function will be one of co-ordination and administrative assistance to the Chair nation. The secretariat will offer increased

continuity for the organisation and can be expected to play a progressively more valuable part in support of panel activities.

Developing defence industries


12. A long-standing issue within the IEPG has been that of assistance to the developing defence industries (DDIs) – Greece, Portugal and Turkey – to develop their defence industries. A working group has been tasked to look at ways to enable DDIs to play a full part in European defence procurement. Proposals have included price-preference on bids, subsidies, opening markets without seeking immediate reciprocity and free technology transfer. The challenge is to identify practical means of assistance whilst preserving the advantages of the open market. Indeed, the open market will benefit DDI nations by allowing them to exploit areas where they already have expertise. Several countries have offered to make places available on project management training courses and in research establishment for DDI officials and scientists in an attempt to help the DDI nations.

Atlantic dimension

13. It has sometimes been overlooked that the revitalisation of the IEPG in 1984 was intended, in part, as a means of improving the European contribution to the alliance. The IEPG has no wish to damage or undermine the alliance, and members are concerned to avoid any measures which might be construed as protectionist on either side of the Atlantic.

ANNEX A

Structure of the IEPG



ANNEX B

Panel I sub-groups

ACTIVE/PASSIVE
TOWED ARRAY
SYSTEMS
IT BE FR GE
UK (SP)

155MM
ARTILLERY
SYSTEMS
FR BE DE IT
NO PO SP UK

ARMoured
BRIDGELAYER
INTEROPERABILITY
BE FR GE IT
NL SP (UK)

ADVANCED PILOT
TRAINER
SP PO

ARMoured CARRIER
VEHICLE
BE FR GE NO
(UK)

M113 MLU
TU BE DE NO
ge

VEHICLE
ROBOTICS
GE FR SP UK
nl

SURVEILLANCE
& TARGET
ACQUISITION
UK BE IT NL
SP

NBC
FR IT SP UK

LOGISTIC
VEHICLES
SP BE FR GE
IT NL UK

FUTURE LARGE
AIRCRAFT
BE FR GE IT
SP TU (UK)
po

MPA
FR IT NL SP
(UK)

HEAVY SUPPORT
WEAPONS/AGL
BE FR GE NL
SP (UK)

MICROWAVE
LANDING SYSTEM
UK BE FR GE
IT NO SP
(NL) de

COASTAL
MINESWEEPER
BE NL NO
(PO)

MSAM
FR BE GE IT
NL NO SP UK

MEDIUM & HEAVY
MORTARS
SP BE FR NO UK
(IT)

SONOBUOYS AND
ACTIVE DIPPING
SONAR/MAD BUOYS
UK FR GE IT

ANTI-TANK GUIDED
WEAPONS THIRD
GENERATION
FR BE GE NL
SP UK

ANTI-TANK MINE
(DIRECT EFFECT)
FR GE UK

ASRAAM
UK FR NO sp
CA US

AMRAAM
NO UK
(IT)(NL)(SP)

MISTRAL
FR BE DE IT
SP no

STINGER
GE GR NL TU

M483/M864 155MM
ARTILLERY
AMMUNITION
NL TU UK

Key: () - Observer
lower case - Considering

APPENDIX I

*Ministerial resolution for Euclid**June 1989*

At our meeting in June we resolved to institute a European research and technology programme to be called Euclid. Although some areas of uncertainty remain, building on our previous proposals we have agreed that Euclid will take the following form:

1. The Euclid will consist of several Common European Priority Areas (CEPAs) in each of which there will be a number of Research and Technology Projects (RTPs).
2. The general conditions for the Euclid will be defined in the Programme MOU (PMOU). Individual RTPs will be covered by implementing arrangements to the PMOU.
3. These conditions will be interpreted in such a way as to encourage and support the participation of DDI nations in the programme.
4. Each RTP will be undertaken by international contributors represented by a single legal contractor, chosen by competition wherever practicable. The single legal contractor will be responsible for placing subcontracts with other participating contractors.
5. Each RTP will be managed by a lead nation on behalf of participating nations. The lead nation will deal with the single legal contractor representing national industries and laboratories of all countries whose governments have decided to participate in the RTP.
6. The lead nation will use its own contract rules and regulations, amended to ensure the rights of other participating nations, in accordance with the PMOU.
7. It is intended that the participation of nations in an RTP will be on the basis of an equal government share of the anticipated costs, unless the governments participating in a specific RTP decide another breakdown, especially to facilitate the participation of DDI nations. Nations will pay for their own workshares, making funds available to the lead nations for that purpose so that money will not cross national boundaries.
8. The participating industries will be expected to contribute, using their own funds.
9. Intellectual property will be owned by those generating it but will be made available for the use of participating nations for their own defence purposes subject to conditions to be defined in the PMOU.
10. The programme will be conducted in full consultation with EDIG using the structures formulated for this purpose.
11. The list of priority areas which will be studied initially is attached.

*Attachment**Preliminary area from which Euclid projects will be drawn*

- Modern radar technology (airborne radars)
- Si-microelectronics
- Composite structures
- Modular avionics
- Electric gun
- Artificial intelligence
- Signature manipulation
- Opto-electronic devices
- Satellite surveillance technology (including verification aspects)
- Underwater acoustics
- Human factors, including technology for training and simulators.

APPENDIX II

*Gleneagles communiqué**21st February 1990*

The defence ministers of the thirteen IEPG nations met in Gleneagles on 21st February 1990. Against the background of recent events in Eastern Europe and the accelerating pace of arms reductions, they stressed that, whatever the outcome of these developments, there would be a continuing need for European co-operation in research, development and production of defence equipment. They reaffirmed the rôle of the IEPG as the main forum for achieving this and for strengthening the European contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance. Ministers reviewed the progress made so far on a number of important IEPG initiatives, including the implementation of the action plan for a step-by-step opening of the European defence equipment market, and the establishment of the Euclid European research and technology programme. They underlined their view that these developments will ensure the most effective use of resources and will maintain and strengthen the industrial and technological base of all IEPG countries.

Opening the European defence equipment market

Directing that work should continue on the timely implementation of the action plan, ministers welcomed the progress already made, with the publication of bulletins announcing defence contract opportunities, and the establishment of a network of IEPG national focal points within each defence ministry to provide a point of first contact for industry.

Most IEPG countries have now started the regular publication of bulletins of defence contract opportunities for companies. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of these bulletins for promoting awareness of contract opportunities and for encouraging competition at all levels. They noted with satisfaction the progress of work on the important issues of the qualification of companies for bidding, criteria for contract award and technology transfer. They noted that the armaments directors will prepare a policy document drawing together the principles of operation of the open defence equipment market, technology transfer and *juste retour*.

Ministers gave their support to the study of the incidence of cross-border contracts. They noted that work would continue on improving and implementing a pragmatic and flexible system of *juste retour* through concrete, transitional measures.

Ministers noted with approval that a study group on 1992 issues has been set up to consider the consequences for the European defence equipment market of wider developments in Europe.

Publicity

Ministers welcomed the rôle of the permanent secretariat in exchanging information within the IEPG and in co-ordinating IEPG publicity. They noted with approval the work of the secretariat to produce a brochure to disseminate information about IEPG activities.

European session for armaments managers

Ministers noted the value of regular meetings of this forum. Two meetings are to be held this year, in France and in Spain.

Next meeting

To ensure that present levels of progress are maintained, ministers agreed to meet again before the end of the year.

Future chairmanship

Belgium accepted ministers' invitation to take the chair of the IEPG from January 1991 for a two-year period.

*The future of low flying***REPORT ¹**

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee ²
by Mr. Klejdzinski, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mr. Fourré, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (Alternate: Stoffelen) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Cariglia, Chevalier (Alternate: Kempinaire), Cox, De Decker (Alternate: Péciaux), Ewing, Fiandrotti, Fillon, Fioret, Irmer (Alternate: Klejdzinski), Jung, Kittelmann, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Maris (Alternate: Verbeek), Nijpels, Pecchioli, Scheer (Alternate: Ahrens), Sinesio, Speed, Steiner, Sir John Stokes, MM. Uyttendaele, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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Rapporteur's Preface

In preparation for this report, *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows:

In October 1989 in Bonn and subsequently:

Mr. W. Wimmer, Parliamentary Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence;
Lieutenant-General H. Jungkurth, Inspector of the Luftwaffe, Ministry of Defence;
Lieutenant-General J. Schnell, Deputy Inspector of the Luftwaffe, Ministry of Defence;
Colonel M. Menge, commanding the 36th Fighter-Bomber squadron;
Mr. W. Kolbow, Vice-Chairman of the Bundestag Defence Committee and Chairman of the sub-committee on military aircraft noise.

30th October 1989 – Ministry of Defence, London

Air Commodore Tim Garden, Director Air Force Staff Duties;
Group Captain Bogg, Air Force Staff;
Wing Commander Cable, Air Force Staff;
Mr. Jim Anderson, Operational Requirements.

31st October 1989 – Headquarters RAF Strike Command, High Wycombe

Air Vice Marshal Richard Johns, RAF, Senior Air Staff Officer;
Wing Commander Bill Nevison, Headquarters Staff.

8th January 1990 – Ministry of Defence, The Hague

Mr. A.L. Ter Beek, Minister of Defence;
Mr. H.P.M. Kreemers, Policy Directorate, Defence Staff;
Commodore B. Droste, Deputy Chief Operations, Air Force Staff;
Lt. Col. M.H.J.Q. Holland, Staff Officer Military Strategic Affairs;
Lt. Col. G.F.A. Macco, Air Force Staff, Operational Training Branch.

9th January 1990 – Twenthe Air Force Base, the Netherlands

Colonel Kronenbourg, Wing Commander Flying;
Squadron Leader Tiggelman, Commanding Officer 315 Squadron;
Squadron Leader Victor, Headquarters Branch;
Captain Komin, 315 Squadron RNLAf.

12th March 1990 – Ministry of Defence, Lisbon

General Gonçalves Ribeiro, Director, National Defence Policy;
General Conceição Silva, Chief-of-staff of the Portuguese Air Force.

13th March 1990 – Montijo Air Force Base, Portugal

Colonel Nico, Commandant, Montijo Air Force Base;
Lt. Col. Ramalho, Air Operational Command.

14th March 1990 – Madrid

Lt. Gen. Francisco Veguillas Elices, Director General of Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence;
Commander Rafael Barbudo Escobar, Head of External Relations, Ministry of Defence;
Major Rafael Barbudo Gironza, Defence Policy Directorate, Ministry of Defence;
Lt. Col. Arturo Rubi de Cevallos, Air Force Headquarters;
Major José Porta Carracedo, Air Force Headquarters.

The committee as a whole was addressed by the Italian Minister of Defence, Mr. Martinazzoli, in Rome on 15th February 1990.

The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions.

The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation*on the future of low flying*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling the motion for a resolution on the banning of low-altitude military training flights, tabled by Mr. Büchner and others¹ on 5th December 1988 (Document 1169);
- (ii) Aware that the effects of low-altitude flying are suffered in all member states of WEU, as well as in most other European countries, including those of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation;
- (iii) Considering the easing of tension between East and West;
- (iv) In view of the prospect of agreement in Vienna to make substantial reductions in certain categories of conventional weapons including combat aircraft;
- (v) Convinced that it should be possible to make greater use of simulation in preparing pilots for low-altitude flight;
- (vi) Stressing that there should be greater consultation and agreement between member states to share the burden of low-altitude flight training;
- (vii) Recalling that in the past the Council has forwarded certain recommendations of the Assembly to the NATO authorities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Include the subject of low-altitude flying and attendant problems in its own agenda and urge the NATO authorities to do likewise, with the aim of making an urgent study of the ways in which the universal European problem of low-altitude flying may be attenuated in the future, including research into public knowledge of and attitudes to the problem;
2. Ensure that the general and specific points made in the present report are taken into account and, in particular, fully examine the following suggestions with a view to their adoption by NATO and national governments as norms for the future:
 - (a) in peacetime, minimum heights for low-altitude flights over urban areas to be not less than 300 metres;
 - (b) interception exercises and formation flying at low altitude to be banned in the vicinity of heavily populated areas;
 - (c) aircraft speed to be limited to 420 knots maximum, so that noise is reduced;
 - (d) very low-altitude flights (i.e. those at less than 75 metres) to be authorised only over training areas of sufficient size and consideration to be given to suppressing the use of all such areas in peacetime, to be reactivated only in time of tension;
 - (e) all low-altitude flying to be banned after 10 p.m. (even in training areas) and generally on Sundays and bank holidays;
 - (f) the authorisation of night low-flying routes to be subject to agreement by national authorities;
 - (g) all necessary training for flights at low and very low altitude in "real" conditions to take place in areas where geography allows such flights without causing considerable disturbance to the population;
 - (h) although the current state of simulation techniques cannot completely replace actual low-altitude flying, consideration to be given to further research and development with the aim of improving low-altitude flying simulation (the high financial cost would be more than justified);
 - (i) consider, in addition, ways in which the unsocial aspects for aircrews of training in areas overseas or remote from home bases might be alleviated;

1. MM. Biefnot, Holtz, Eicher, Périaux, Stoffelen, Schmidt, Mrs. Luuk, Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Scheer.

- (j) the standard of the equipment of various types of aircraft should not be the only factor for determining low-altitude training techniques and conditions;
- (k) whereas, formerly, low-altitude training flights in potential zones of action were desirable for making use of geographical data and for tactical reasons, the greater perfection of navigational aids has virtually removed the need for visual contact, thus allowing such training to be carried out in other more sparsely populated areas;
- (l) units of the air forces of WEU member countries must be able to conduct low-altitude training with realistic advance warning, after an analysis of the actual threat, which at the present time does not justify exercises based on the hypothesis of a few hours' warning time.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Klejdzinski, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. This report on "The future of low flying" owes its origin to the Motion for a Resolution (Document 1169), entitled "Banning of low-altitude military training flights", tabled by Mr. Büchner and others¹ on 5th December 1988 during the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly and in the wake of the tragic flying accident at Ramstein in the Federal Republic of Germany. The text of the motion reads:

"The Assembly,

CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER STATES to ban all low-altitude military flights and air-combat exercises over heavily built-up areas and also flights towards targets such as nuclear plants, hospitals, schools, places of worship, public buildings and factories, etc."

2. Rather than succumb to the obviously heightened emotions of the moment, the Assembly decided to refer the motion and the whole subject of low flying and its future to the Defence Committee for examination. Your Rapporteur was appointed because of his double experience: he is both a sufferer from the effects of low flying (like virtually every other citizen of the WEU member countries), living beneath one of the busiest low flying exercise areas in the Federal Republic of Germany, and he is also a former perpetrator of low flying, having served for a number of years as a fighter pilot. He hopes therefore that his colleagues will find the present report totally objective from all points of view. Although the reader will find that the orientation concerns particularly the problems of low flying on the Central Front and therefore in the Federal Republic of Germany, most of the points made in the report also apply to the majority of WEU member countries and in particular to the United Kingdom, where on average there are some 40 000 *more* low flying sorties per year than in the FRG!

II. The present situation with particular reference to WEU's alliance interests within NATO

3. Western Europe's close association with the United States and Canada is very important for the maintenance and shaping of peace in the European continent. If there is to be solidarity within the alliance, Western Europe must make

and increase its contribution to joint defence and, co-operating as a partner, lend weight to the influence it has on the policy of the leading power in the Atlantic Alliance. Security co-operation in Europe is being stepped up to this end.

4. Closer European co-operation within Western European Union (WEU) is to make an effective contribution to the maintenance of appropriate military strength and political solidarity within the western alliance and, on this basis, to promote co-operation between East and West. This calls for operational and effective training even in peacetime. At present, low-altitude flying is needed if we are to maintain our defence capability. In every country such training flights are a particular burden on the population concerned.

5. Striking an acceptable balance between the public's legitimate claim to a reasonable quality of life, and security requirements, is therefore a goal constantly to be pursued. While it is essential for air forces to be able to fulfil their mandate, the utmost importance must be attached to maintaining the highest possible level of air safety. The risk both to the public and to aircrews must not be allowed to increase. Although major efforts have already been made in the past to ease the burden on the public while maintaining high training and safety standards, there is growing unwillingness on the part of the public to accept low-altitude training flights without criticism.

III. The security policy background

6. With their political strategy – set out in the Harmel report in 1967 – of combining a guaranteed defence capability with the offer of a wide-ranging East-West dialogue, the western alliance partners have long been urging the Warsaw Pact countries to co-operate.

7. Western hopes of reducing East-West confrontation remained unfulfilled until the mid-1980s because of the ambivalence of the Soviet Union's policy of coexistence, its expansive military policy and its policy of arming itself to the teeth, which it now admits was inappropriate. It is only since General Secretary Gorbachev put forward his idea of a modern, economically more efficient Soviet Union as the precondition for a credible world power policy that priorities have changed and resources have been diverted, and this is having a clear and positive impact on East-West relations. The Warsaw Pact countries are following a similar line.

¹ MM. Biefnot, Holtz, Eicher, Pécriaux, Stoffelen, Schmidt, Mrs. Luuk, Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Scheer.

8. The question is what implications this has for western defence policy.

9. For NATO, and especially for the WEU countries, the maintenance of a guaranteed defence capability has not lost any of its importance even though conditions have changed. Many take the view that it was the West's guaranteed defence capability which paved the way for stability in Europe and made the "new thinking" in the East possible: the East's willingness to negotiate is a visible result. One thing is certain: stability in the security sphere can be achieved in the long run only with unequivocally defensive military doctrines and strategies, balanced military capabilities and, therefore, comparable military options. As far as can be seen politically, the Soviet military doctrine for Europe is developing into a doctrine of preventing war. In terms of the deployment of armed forces, equipment and training its military-technical component is, however, still geared to an offensive concept, although statements by senior military personnel indicate the possibility of change.

10. Of prime importance for an assessment of the situation are current military potential and resulting military capabilities. The Soviet Union certainly has no aggressive intentions at present. If its political objectives should change, however, its military capabilities will still enable it to take offensive action towards Western Europe in the future. The unilateral reductions announced by Gorbachev, the political and psychological effects of which are to be enhanced by similar and, quite obviously, co-ordinated measures by other Warsaw Pact countries, hold out the prospect of an East-West relationship featuring more dialogue and co-operative coexistence.

11. However, what may lie behind these reductions needs to be properly analysed from every angle. The announcements may well be intended:

- to permit a reduction of the Soviet Union's superior conventional potential without loss of face so that it may proceed to the conventional arms control (CFE) talks anticipating the outcome and in a stronger starting position;
- to gain western confidence in the Warsaw Pact's ability to revise its security and military policies, and also to eliminate western ideas about the military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact;
- to make it seem that the new principle of defence sufficiency is already a reality or about to become one;

- to alleviate the personnel problems arising from the unfavourable demographic trend in the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic;
- to help reduce budget deficits and concentrate attention on the solution of economic problems.

12. In any force comparison it should be remembered that the Warsaw Pact forces still have twice as many tanks and more than twice as much artillery. Additional reductions by other Warsaw Pact countries will do little to change this situation. This being so, the West must press for further reductions in the Warsaw Pact forces deployed throughout the Soviet bloc and for the adoption of a defensive posture by the armed forces. The NATO countries want the CFE talks to result in reductions to identical ceilings on both sides. Only then can there be stability in respect of military forces in Europe. The western governments take the view that it is more conducive to European security for them to maintain their own defence capability so as to provide an incentive for negotiations on identical, verifiable ceilings and then to disarm to agreed lower levels. Prior unilateral concessions are rejected. Table 1 gives an overview of the relative strength of the two sides.

IV. Analysis of the threat to the territory of the Western European countries

13. This analysis of the threat is based on present circumstances and options and will need to be revised when clearly definitive defence structures and strategies, which have been announced, are implemented. This description underlines the need for a substantial reduction in the air attack component.

14. The Warsaw Pact's tactical/operational air forces are crucial to the achievement of the objective of its military strategy in the Central/Western European theatre by means of air operations, i.e. destroying the most important and strongest groups of NATO's armed forces. As a result of the greatly improved performance and penetration capability of the Warsaw Pact's air forces (increased range, electronic warfare and mid-air refuelling), they are able to attack vital NATO facilities throughout the Central European sector after a brief period of preparation.

15. Encouraged by the initiative seized and the offensive launched in the early stages, the Warsaw Pact can prepare its many tactical aircraft for a wide range of tasks:

- first, drastically reduce NATO's air defence and air attack capability;
- establish superiority in the air;
- disrupt the deployment of troops;

- prevent the introduction of reinforcements;
- eliminate NATO's nuclear potential.

16. Features of Warsaw Pact air operations will be initial mass air attacks and their concentration on specific parts of the theatre of war. Intruding fighter bombers, helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft, bombers, fighters and support forces will fly at different altitudes and attempt to split or saturate NATO defences at specific points. Besides efficient aircraft, modern weaponry (anti-radar, range capability, precision, blanket fire capability) and conventional ground-to-ground missiles will be the principal means used to break down NATO's resistance. As aircraft can be moved over great distances very quickly, it is also important for airfield infrastructure in border areas to be considered during disarmament negotiations if there is to be effective monitoring of reductions. As counterattacks on the Warsaw Pact's airfields will be a crucial means of eliminating the offensive potential of its air forces and disrupting the co-ordination needed for offensive operations, Soviet air defence troops (in the German Democratic Republic, for example) have orders to carry out air defence operations in co-operation with the other national forces at the Soviet Union's western outposts.

17. A feature of Warsaw Pact air defence operations is the combination of land-based and airborne forces, with an extensive early-warning system designed to provide a major response period for the weapons systems used. For this purpose, the Warsaw Pact has developed a dense, partly overlapping, vertically and horizontally tiered defence system, which is constantly and quickly modernised with a view to closing any gaps in cover or combat capability that may be identified. Active and passive sensors located near borders, backed by the Soviet airborne early-warning and guidance system (Mainstay), are designed to give the appropriate command posts information on the situation in the air early enough to permit economical defensive action against the various weapons systems.

18. The air defence system of the Warsaw Pact's land forces, which is highly mobile and active well beyond the spearheads, and in the future mobile anti-aircraft missile systems of the land-based air defences (SA-10), a line of SA-5 anti-aircraft missiles capable of reaching targets some 150 km inside the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, protection over a wide area and the latest fighter aircraft (e.g. Fulcrum/Flanker) are designed to limit the combat strength of NATO's air forces and threaten their ability to survive, especially in the first few critical hours and days of a war, when attacks on enemy airfields to repel the offensive will be most important.

19. The Warsaw Pact air defence operation will include offensive elements (e.g. escorts for fighter bombers, raids on enemy territory by interceptors), one of their tasks being to engage enemy air forces as early as possible, i.e. while they are still on the ground. For an assessment of the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact's potential for aerial warfare it is therefore essential to know the options open to the main combat units responsible for air operations and air defence operations.

20. Where the threat to the WEU countries is concerned, the Warsaw Pact's aerial warfare potential, especially in the initial phase of a conflict, is significant, since its operational flexibility makes it a particularly effective instrument at all levels of warfare (tactical/operational, strategic). Although current political developments in the Warsaw Pact countries allow the assumption that there is no threat to the WEU countries, a proper analysis calls for a response to existing capabilities, the requirements of military strategy and options. Thus, although capabilities must be substantially reduced, until disarmament has occurred all options must be taken into account in the assumed threat.

V. The importance of air forces

21. The possession of instruments of aerial warfare on a scale and of a quality appropriate to the tasks they are required to perform enables an alliance or a nation to exercise air power. Air power represents an instrument of military power which denies enemy instruments of aerial warfare sole use of airspace. In principle, the capabilities inherent in instruments of aerial warfare make it impossible for an adversary to escape their effect. The threat they wield can be countered only with similar instruments. The only answer therefore is to meet air power with air power.

22. Air power enables combat strength to be extended over considerable distances relatively quickly. Although air power cannot replace land power, especially over a longer period, it can correct the balance of power and so compensate for local disparities of land and naval forces. Air power thus moves the frontiers of space and time. If used correctly, it opens up new dimensions for the reciprocal relationship between space, time and forces. Air power thus:

- removes the boundaries of the battle area;
- prevents an aggressor from restricting acts of war to areas of his choice;
- subjects the enemy's hinterland to air attacks;
- makes it impossible for him to maintain sanctuaries.

Air power (especially when it includes offensive operations) counteracts offensive strategies if the assumption is that an aggressor will always endeavour to carry the fight into enemy territory in order to protect his own. The more he is denied this opportunity or the less likely he is to succeed, the greater the risk he takes in the event of an attack. In these circumstances, credible air power based on efficient air forces assumes special importance for strategic defence which sees itself committed to a defensive strategy concept.

23. In peacetime air forces make a major contribution to preventing a surprise attack through their presence and their reconnaissance capability. They force the aggressor to spend a great deal of time and money on preparation, which is again identified by the air forces' instruments of reconnaissance, giving the political leaders a warning period to decide what action they should take to strengthen their own defence capability. To deter a potential aggressor from attacking, he must have no doubt about our capabilities.

24. Whether immediately mobilised or not, which is a requirement for improvement in available combat strength, air forces which are in place can be raised to their combat readiness status without delay. In view of their ability to react and their limited threat profile, air forces thus constitute a particularly suitable instrument for political crisis management and crisis resolution. Raising the responsiveness of defensive instruments of aerial warfare to the highest level of readiness does not represent any kind of political or military threat. It is solely intended to increase significantly the risk a possible aggressor takes in launching an attack.

25. Although air forces may attack targets in the enemy's territory at any time and at any place and threaten to destroy them, they do not have the ability to launch an invasion and take possession of land for any length of time. They thus jeopardise the enemy's military options without seriously threatening his viability.

26. The air forces of some WEU countries have already been integrated into the NATO command structure in peacetime. This is conducive to a united response from the alliance and risk-sharing. The potential adversary does not therefore face any national enemy air forces or have the option of restricting his activities to a country of his choice. Any idea of launching an attack means confrontation with the alliance as a whole and its air forces. At times of crisis air forces thus make a major contribution to stability. In wartime air forces can regain the initiative and create and maintain the favourable situation in the air which is imperative for successful defence. After an offensive initiative favoured by the military strategy adopted has been successfully repelled with defensive instru-

ments of aerial warfare – the subsequent battle must take the form of a balanced combination of offensive and defensive air operations.

27. Continued persistent attacks on the enemy's aerial warfare capability weaken his offensive strength and ability to take the initiative. They prevent him from concentrating solely on attack and give the attacker's own forces new room for manoeuvre. They thus pave the way for successful forward defence, help to prevent the early use of nuclear weapons and, by undermining his potential to launch an invasion, make it impossible for the enemy to achieve his strategic objectives. These fundamental considerations remain valid even if troop reductions should bring parity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.

VI. The range of tasks for tactical air forces

28. The main task of the air forces in defensive warfare is to strike at the enemy's aerial warfare capability. They also have the task of attacking land forces deep inside the enemy's territory to prevent him from bringing up further troops to strengthen his own offensive forces. In addition, the air forces' airborne weapons systems have the task of making reconnaissance flights to obtain intelligence on the enemy's intentions (primary reconnaissance) and, in the case of defence, information on targets to be attacked (secondary reconnaissance).

29. The following tasks of the air forces are thus relevant in the context of the debate on low-altitude flights:

- air reconnaissance;
- air defence;
- air attack.

(i) Air reconnaissance

30. Comprehensive and reliable intelligence is a major requirement for efficient decision-making. Air reconnaissance in peacetime and at times of crisis is intended as a means of identifying signs of an attack in good time. In wartime success depends on the availability of correct and up-to-date information on the enemy.

31. Tactical reconnaissance aircraft play their part in this. They are equipped with optical and infra-red sensors and with high-resolution side-looking radar. If up-to-date and reliable data are to be obtained as a basis for determining the targets of air attack operations, these aircraft need to penetrate into the enemy's airspace after he has attacked.

(ii) Air defence

32. NATO's air defence is geared to combating offensive air operations by the Warsaw Pact. Its goal is to ensure that NATO's forces are

able to operate freely, to preserve its defence capability and to protect the public and economic resources. It is capable of safeguarding the deployment of NATO land forces and protecting them against enemy air attacks during the initial phase.

33. NATO assumes that attacks by third- and fourth-generation combat aircraft combined with tactical conventional air-to-ground and ground-to-ground missiles will have to be repelled.

34. Land-based air defence systems are inadequate for this purpose. Fighter aircraft are designed to strengthen and complement the protection afforded by land-based air defence systems. Fighters are essential for the rapid concentration of forces. Their task is to protect flanks and to cover any weak points and gaps that emerge in the land-based air defence system. They alone are able to engage enemy aircraft even when mass air attacks are saturating land-based air defences or, by *flying under the enemy's radar* at high speed, to paralyse the offensive capabilities of his land-based air defences by electronic means. Fighters can be used actively as an instrument of crisis management in the event of Warsaw Pact provocative incursions into NATO airspace.

(iii) Air attack

35. Given the relative strengths of the two sides at present, air defence forces alone cannot undertake sustained defensive operations with sufficient chance of succeeding. Air attack complements air defence. It is an essential means of combating the enemy's offensive potential. Air attack is directed against the enemy's defensive and offensive aerial warfare capability. This is the only way to ensure that NATO will achieve its objectives and that the enemy is denied the use of his combat aircraft.

36. To this end, fighter bombers must, in case of war, penetrate the enemy's territory to attack his weapons systems and impede his offensive. Only by operating deep inside enemy territory can they also disrupt the introduction of further Warsaw Pact land forces so persistently that the latter suffer increased losses or are delayed, thus making it impossible for them to achieve their strategic operational objectives.

37. As the most important targets lie relatively deep in the enemy's hinterland, the combat aircraft must avoid the Warsaw Pact's dense systems of air defence missiles and overcome defences at the target. The reliability of the ability of these weapons systems to reach these targets is therefore extremely important. They must be able to fly at low altitudes and high speeds and to take advantage of the terrain since, by so doing, they reduce the time they spend in areas covered by enemy air defence

systems. In addition, action needs to be taken specifically to reduce the options which are still open to the Warsaw Pact's air defences at low altitudes.

(iv) Summary

38. The strategy of the NATO alliance is explicitly geared to repelling a possible attack in the context of forward defence and to restoring territorial integrity. It is essential for defensive operations to succeed and for the initiative to be gained if military operations are to continue with the aim of bringing the conflict to an early end at the lowest possible level of military response. Action must be taken against the land and air forces of an aggressor at his point of departure with a view to weakening him and hampering the development of his operations to such an extent that NATO remains capable of cohesive defence and loses as little territory as possible.

39. The air forces have a particularly important rôle to play in this context because of their inherent combination of such properties as range, speed and combat strength. They are capable of preventing surprises, reacting to enemy concentrations quickly and over wide areas, denying an aggressor the opportunity to create sanctuaries and eliminating imbalances of forces. This flexibility exists only if manned aircraft are used, land-based missiles being a substitute or complement only in certain sectors and for very limited periods (single use).

VII. Operational justification of tactical low-altitude training

40. Knowing how quickly the West's air forces are able to react, the Warsaw Pact uses a complex, multi-layered and deeply tiered system of land-based air defence to protect those of its forces capable of launching an invasion. This system has gaps below about 100 metres, and the closer a target flies to the ground, the larger these gaps become. In addition, fighters are used to attack aircraft at medium and high altitudes. However, their effectiveness against aircraft flying at extremely low altitudes is very limited. This is also true of fighters capable of "look down/shoot down".

41. Discussions with experts in the WEU countries indicate that low-altitude flying is an essential tactical measure if manned weapons systems are to perform the function required of them in wartime even when effective electronic countermeasures are taken and if losses of aircraft to the enemy's air defence system are to be reduced to an acceptable level.

42. These weapons systems must be able to fly very fast and low so that they minimise the time the enemy's air defences have to react and,

where possible, avoid detection and/or attack. Thus the reaction time of radar-controlled, land-based anti-aircraft systems is reduced by 75%, i.e. from about four minutes to about one, if an aircraft approaching at a speed of about 1 000 km and an altitude of 150 metres reduces its altitude to 30 metres – the altitude at which the lowest-level training flights are carried out in Canada.

43. Effective and credible forward defence requires of NATO's air forces not only a high degree of presence but above all optimum combat capability of aircrews, especially during low-altitude flight. In other words, crews must be in a position not only to navigate their aircraft at 30 metres but also to use them as weapons systems in the intended manner. NATO therefore takes the view that aircrews must above all be familiar with weather conditions, the topographical features and the structure of airspace in Central Europe. At present, this capability is achieved and maintained through tactical unit training at altitudes of 150 and 75 metres at home and very low-altitude training at 30 metres at Goose Bay in Canada, for example. There is now very little public acceptance of low-altitude flying, especially in the areas where it is carried out at 75 metres.

44. A second focal area of training for air force units is the use of weapons. In addition to the training undertaken for this purpose at air-to-ground ranges at home and abroad, aircrews are required to practise simulated tactical attacks. The success of these tactical operations entirely depends on all participating aircraft being co-ordinated with pinpoint accuracy. These operations are therefore highly training-intensive. To meet this need for flying following the contour of the land at the lowest possible altitudes (terrain-following), which is particularly vital during the attack phase, it is considered necessary for there to be continuous training flights at an altitude of 75 metres in appropriate areas at home.

45. It is true to say that neither attack procedures nor flying at ground level can be properly practised at higher altitudes. The usefulness of training at higher altitudes is insignificant.

46. To ensure that weapons are sufficiently effective whatever the target and that aircraft can overcome enemy air defences by means of saturation and possibly direct attack, a wide range of weapons systems often needs to be used. Such operations involving a combination of aircraft and air forces are not feasible without intensive training. Tactical flying in large formations at low altitudes is therefore the third focal area of training for flying units.

47. Low-altitude training flights must also continue to be guided by the reality of the defence scenario. The ability of the armed forces

to fulfil their mission and air safety must not be affected. The air forces of the WEU countries therefore would wish tactical low-altitude training over the territory of the Western European countries to continue in the future. An aircrew is required to view low-altitude flying as an essential part of its training. Removing it from the training programme of the overall defence system would, it is claimed, result in shortcomings in training and thus lower the standard of all the other components. To escape detection by land-based or airborne radar, aircraft must approach and attack their targets at a very low altitude, i.e. 30 metres, at maximum speed using features of the terrain and on-board electronic defence systems releasing chaff and flares.

VIII. Low-altitude training in the Federal Republic of Germany

(i) Structure/use of airspace

48. The situation has changed radically, to the disadvantage of military air traffic, since the era of the propeller aircraft, when the civil air traffic control authority was required to make its services available only up to an altitude of 6 000 metres and civil air traffic made very limited demands on airspace.

49. The structure of airspace was simple in the 1960s. At that time, unlike today, we had a "fair-weather air force". In other words, although aircraft could be flown blind, visual contact had to be made with targets on the ground and in the air before they could be attacked. The air forces had 80% of all airspace available to carry out visual flights with their jet aircraft. A diagram of the airspace structure at that time is shown in Table 2. The far more complex situation today is depicted in Table 3.

50. With the introduction of jet aircraft, the civil air transport sector began to make growing demands on airspace. The airways, which had at first extended to an altitude of 6 000 metres, were raised to 7 500 metres, then to 11 500 metres and ultimately to 15 000 metres. The routes of the airways follow the main flows of civil traffic as closely as possible. As air speeds increased, so did the speeds at which aircraft approach each other in the air. This resulted in the basic principle in visual flying – "see, be seen and take prompt evasive action" – failing with growing frequency.

51. The number of near-misses between aircraft flown visually and aircraft flown on instruments rose. This led to the banning of visual flying above 3 000 metres in 1976. The air forces "lost" 66.3% of the airspace they had previously been able to use without restriction in good weather. Although some compensation was achieved through the establishment of

“temporarily reserved airspace” (TRA), most of the airspace concerned had already been available for flights in and out of the airfields. This airspace for training flights and aerial combat is situated between the airways and accounts for 13.3% of the total. In effect, then, 53% of the airspace of the Federal Republic of Germany is no longer open to visual flying, and the use of the 13.3% just mentioned is subject to restrictions (see the diagram in Table 3).

52. While military visual flying was once possible in 80% of total airspace, only 8% is now available for this purpose (below 3 000 metres, outside control zones around airports and prohibited areas). All civil air traffic flying by visual flight rules, which has increased sharply in the meantime, also depends on this airspace. This means that 750 000 military and 300 000 civil visual flights have to make do with 8% of the country's airspace, whereas almost 80% is used for some 1 150 000 flights by instrument flight rules.

53. The trend in the volume of traffic that has to be monitored by the civil and military air traffic control authorities is shown in Tables 4 and 5. It is clear that civil instrument flying is rising sharply, whereas military traffic remains almost constant.

54. The division of responsibility for the control of short- and long-haul air traffic in the lower airspace is shown in Table 6. Although most military training areas are also used for short-haul military flights, these areas are opened to civil transit flights on request wherever the German Air Force controls this air space and when the volume of traffic allows. Recent statistics on transit flights are to be found in Table 7.

55. The Eifel and Ramstein areas are controlled by the United States Air Force, the Lahr area by the Canadian Air Force. No figures on transit flights through these areas are available. The attitude towards closing airspace for manoeuvres is also extremely conservative. During the largest NATO exercise, Central Enterprise, a mere 0.8% of German airspace was closed for two hours on each of five days. The German Air Force does not claim any more airspace than necessary. This statement is underlined by the fact that almost all civil requests for transit flights through training areas can be met and all military airspace is made available to the civil air traffic control authority once military flying operations cease.

56. At weekends and on public holidays this airspace is in any case always available to the civil air traffic control authority. However, the same delays occur as on weekdays. While it is true that civil air traffic is in principle required to fly round military training/short-haul areas, military aircraft have to make even greater

detours in some cases because the airspace structure has been optimised for civil purposes and because of the heavy volume of civil short-haul traffic.

57. It is thus clear that the military use of airspace is not the cause of delays in civil air transport. The opposite is the case: the German Air Force is more willing to co-operate with the civil air traffic authority than its counterpart in any comparable country. This is the only explanation for the safety of flight operations in the Federal Republic of Germany despite the extremely high density of air traffic.

(ii) Low-altitude training in the German Air Force

58. Air forces which are in place and always ready for action make a major contribution to a credible deterrent. The operational capability of the air forces depends on crews which are highly trained and whose standard of performance is high. This standard of performance can be achieved only if each crew makes sufficient training flights each year. Throughout the alliance the scale of flight training is based on decades of experience. The annual training programme specifies the nature and number of individual training flights needed and the standard to be achieved and maintained.

59. NATO has therefore very deliberately set the target for the air forces of all member countries at 240 flying hours per aircrew and year. This requirement, which has remained unchanged for years, is not met by the German Air Force. Instead, it relies on a concentrated, concise form of training to bring German aircrews up to the *optimum* standard to meet expected operational requirements in Central Europe. To achieve and maintain an adequate level of combat capability with the 180 hours considered to be the minimum necessary, the German Air Force trains its aircrews on the basis of programmes which are tailored strictly and in detail to the respective operational pattern and complemented by appropriate simulator training.

60. Within this short time-frame the following focal areas of training:

- mastery of flight operational patterns over the whole range of technical and aerodynamic performance;
- tactical low-altitude training geared to the threat;
- training in the use of weapons;
- training in tactical flying in large formations at low altitudes,

together with such other necessary operational training as instrument flying, flying in formation and aerial combat, determine the scale and

content of the tactical training programmes. As a statistical average, low-altitude training (excluding training in the use of air-to-ground weapons) accounts for about one third of the overall tactical training programme.

61. In the 1980s the German and allied air forces substantially reduced their low-altitude operations over the Federal Republic of Germany. From a total of some 100 000 hours of low-altitude flying a year in the 1970s the figure had fallen to around 68 000 hours by 1988. Of the total of 42 000 hours of low-altitude flying undertaken by the German Air Force in 1989, some 23 000 took place over the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. A further reduction was achieved when the Federal Minister of Defence withdrew the order to the German Air Force to train German fighter units to play the secondary rôle of fighter bombers and the fighter bombers' additional task of joining the reconnaissance squadrons was dropped.

62. In recent years the German Air Force has transferred an average of some 19 000 hours of low-altitude flying to other countries:

- neighbouring countries	8 000 hours p.a.
- Portugal	3 500 hours p.a.
- Italy	3 000 hours p.a.
- Canada	4 500 hours p.a.

This means that the German Air Force has already transferred about 46% of tactical low-altitude training and two thirds of its air-to-ground weapons training, a particularly noise-intensive part of tactical training, to other countries with a view to achieving, among other things, fairer burden-sharing in the alliance.

63. When the tactical training programme is established, the nature and mix of the already limited amount of low-altitude flying is optimised to suit specific weapons systems. On average, German crews spend about 52 hours p.a. in low-altitude training (about 28 hours p.a. of this at home), the standard of performance and experience of the crews being generally taken into account when the number of flying hours required of each is determined.

64. If more low-altitude flying is transferred abroad, however, it must also be remembered that weapons systems have to be used in tactical combination with the command structure and other forces. This is not possible abroad. The abovementioned reduction in 1989 could be achieved only by sacrificing certain functions and thus operational flexibility.

(iii) *Low-altitude training by the allies over Federal territory (1988)*

65. The 23 000 hours of low-altitude flying by the German Air Force compare with 45 000 hours by the allies, i.e. the German Air Force

accounts for less than 35% of the total. Of the allied air forces, the USAFE and RAFG in particular make use of German airspace (about 20% each). The ratio of the German Air Force's low-altitude hours to the allies' roughly corresponds to the relative strengths of the air forces in NATO's European sector.

(iv) *Airspace structure and the disturbance caused by low-altitude flying*

66. The airspace over the Federal Republic of Germany is already among the world's busiest. A further increase in the volume of traffic is likely in the future.

67. In April 1985 a Eurocontrol working party consisting of experts from its member countries submitted an interim report on the draft description of a future air traffic control concept, which it had taken five years to compile. According to this report, the volume of general air traffic is likely to be 36% higher in the year 2000 than it was in 1980.

68. The experts estimate that there will be no numerical increase in military air traffic as a whole. Thus there will continue to be 800 000 to 900 000 military flights in the Federal Republic of Germany each year, the vast majority governed by the visual flying rules, i.e. not subject to air traffic control. Low-altitude flying by jet-propelled combat aircraft within the overall altitude band set aside for this purpose will account for only about one tenth of this volume of traffic.

69. A particular problem is posed by the fact that many sectors of the Federal Republic's airspace are in principle completely or occasionally closed to general use. These are danger areas, areas where flight restrictions apply, control zones, CVFR areas, temporarily reserved airspace (TRA), the flight inspection zone (ADIZ), etc. This hampers the choice of routing in many cases. The crews of combat aircraft are also aware of this when they are forced to fly round certain areas and so have to put up with long detours. The fact is that these areas are not used continuously and often for only limited periods.

70. Clearly, there is considerable *economic* importance to be attached to throwing open free airspace and allowing it to be used flexibly and rationally for civil purposes. From the military angle, the uneven spread of the disturbance caused by the noise of air traffic is a factor that is gaining in importance.

71. Commercial and other civil aircraft and operational aircraft flown by military pilots thus make different, sometimes conflicting demands on the airspace structure and ground services. Commercial aviation, for instance, sees airspace primarily as a necessary medium in which safe and the shortest possible routes should be pro-

vided between airports and so views it from the *transport route* angle. Given their military mission, the armed forces use it principally as an *operational area*, in which sovereign territory within the alliance is to be defended. Amateur pilots set store by being as unrestricted as possible in their freedom to use airspace. For them it is virtually a *leisure area*.

72. All users' claims to airspace are valid, though in varying ways. However, it is not possible or advisable to allow all demands on airspace to exist side by side unco-ordinated and completely unrestricted. Commercial, private and leisure interests take second place to certain priority arrangements arising from the defence mission and allied rights. This is true, for example, of air defence flights and the arrangements for the area east of the Federal Republic of Germany. In practice, however, the resulting military priorities, which are applied restrictively by the armed forces, do not represent an unsurmountable obstacle to civil aviation. Even such special sectors of airspace as danger and restricted areas can in principle be penetrated by scheduled civil flights today once there has been appropriate co-ordination.

73. Restrictions which have had to be imposed for general reasons of flight safety are a different matter, i.e. more stringent, for all categories of traffic. In the past decade airspace was increasingly withdrawn from unrestricted use, especially under visual flying conditions. As a result of the establishment of a wide variety of rigid and no longer penetrable airspace structures and the introduction of highly complex airspace rules, section 1 of the Air Transport Act ("The use of the airspace shall be free") is becoming less and less applicable in our airspace as the total volume of (civil) air traffic grows. These restrictions are especially true of military and general aviation.

74. Some years ago steps were taken to enlarge the area in which low-altitude flying is permitted through the comprehensive removal of unjustified restrictions, thus generally reducing the frequency of overflights. This marked a reversal of the trend in the 1960s and early 1970s, when airspace *not* available for low-altitude flying had been increased by 50%. The larger the area available for low-altitude training, however, the fewer the number of flights over a given place.

75. It remains essential in this context that compromises at the expense of safety should not be accepted in the future. There are consequently a number of natural limits to further deregulation. Thus there must be no withdrawal of the ban on low-altitude flying over airfields and the danger areas surrounding them, cities and conurbations and the areas near the southern and eastern borders of the Federal Republic of Germany as they now stand. Addi-

tional protected zones or even prohibited areas needed for certain regional installations have therefore always had to be assessed from this angle, with likely future requirements also borne in mind.

76. In 1980 an independent society carried out a survey of low-altitude flying for the Federal Ministry of Defence and in the process calculated the scale and the distribution over time and geographically of low-altitude flying by jet aircraft in the airspace of the Federal Republic of Germany, with a breakdown by countries. As the data presented in the 1980 survey seemed out of date, particularly in the light of the effects of arrangements made and other measures taken in the meantime (self-imposed restrictions such as the midday break in low-altitude flying and the 50-minute rule), a fresh survey was carried out in late 1986/early 1987. The study confirmed the claims by the Federal Ministry of Defence that the volume of low-altitude flying and thus the disturbance caused by aircraft noise have declined considerably since the 1980 survey. In all, there are fewer than 70 000 *hours* of low-altitude flying over the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany each year, with the Federal armed forces accounting for about 23 000 hours (1988). This is almost 20 000 hours fewer than in 1980.

77. In Northern Germany the areas over which flights may be made are heavily, though uniformly, affected. The opening up of new areas for low-altitude flying and better use of the area near the eastern border could ease the situation here. As the British, Belgian and Dutch air forces make particular use of the northern area of the Federal Republic of Germany, these countries' participation in a future NATO tactical fighter centre would have a particularly favourable impact.

78. In the south of Germany the volume of low-altitude flying and the resulting noise nuisance are not evenly distributed. One of the main areas of concentration extends from the Palatinate in the direction of Western Middle Franconia. Less badly affected by low-altitude flying are the central and southern Black Forest and the north and north-east of Bavaria. The area over which low-altitude flying is permitted in the south of Bavaria has been greatly increased, mainly because parts of the line beyond which such flying is prohibited have been moved southwards and the size of the military control zones has been reduced. In general, opportunities for better distribution can still be identified in the southern half of the Federal Republic of Germany.

79. All in all, the study has shown that there are still areas subject to particular disturbance. Where opportunities for changing this situation are available, they are to be seized with the help of modern technology. To this end, the work on

the early introduction of the computer-assisted collection and evaluation of flight plans continues apace. When completed, the computer project known as TMS (Tiefflug Management System – Low-altitude Flight Management System) will also permit a suitable, specific and early response to particularly disturbing situations.

80. In an overall evaluation of the disturbance caused by the noise of air traffic in a given area, the disturbance due to low-altitude flying at 75 or 150 metres is only one factor to be considered. A contributory, and in some regions the determining, factor is the disturbance experienced by those who live near military airfields and air-to-ground ranges or under one of the temporarily reserved airspaces already referred to.

IX. Effects of low-altitude flying

(i) Low-altitude flying as a source of noise

81. The noise emitted by aircraft consists of broadband sounds, i.e. it ranges from the infrasonic through the human range of audibility to the ultrasonic.

82. The primary cause of serious disturbance to the public is the noise of successive approaches and departures or of low-altitude and supersonic flights of military aircraft, which diminishes with distance. The disturbance is all the greater where such flights occur at otherwise quiet times of day or night.

83. Besides individual low-level overflights, interception operations at low altitudes over land (500 to 5 000 feet above ground level) are particularly disturbing, even though operational restrictions have already helped to reduce noise in this case. In addition to the high flying speeds needed for tactical reasons during interception operations, the following factors help to create a particular noise problem:

- at least two flight movements are always involved (target-hunter);
- flight manoeuvres are carried out at high engine speeds;
- the flight path is restricted to a relatively small geographical area, especially in the case of combat air patrols (CAPs);
- repeated overflights, especially in the case of CAPs;
- sudden and unexpected overflights at high speed.

The medical question that arises here for the public as for aircrews is whether the scale of this noise may impair health or even cause organic damage.

84. The degree of noise nuisance is, by comparison, far less important since it reflects subjective impressions and cannot therefore be measured by objective standards. Studies have thus confirmed the significance of motivation for the subjective evaluation of aircraft noise.

85. Above all, the limits at which permanent *auditory damage* is caused by continuous and/or repeated exposure to intensive noise have been determined. In many countries these findings are used as the basis for appropriate legislation. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, they have been taken into account in the law on protection against aircraft noise in the vicinity of airfields in the calculation of the *equivalent continuous sound level*, which is used in the definition of the *noise protection area* and its division into protection zones. There is insufficient evidence, however, to deny that there is in principle a link between aircraft noise and auditory damage.

86. The claim that “noise makes you ill” has not been refuted.

87. Leaving aside the effect of aircraft noise on the auditory system, research findings published so far show that, although it may *influence vegetatively-controlled functions*, such as breathing, circulation and sleep patterns, there is as yet no scientific *evidence of a causal link between the effect of noise and certain diseases*. Nor has it yet been possible to describe any syndrome that can be unequivocally attributed to aircraft noise.

88. Where *secondary effects* on health and functional capacity are concerned, *reactions to being startled* are probably the subjectively most unpleasant effect aircraft noise has on the public.

(ii) Research projects – findings so far

89. Although the findings of the preliminary study carried out in 1985 in the Federal Republic of Germany by the Federal Health Agency's interdisciplinary working group on the effects of noise, which focused on the clarification of methodological questions, led to the justified assumption that the possibility of the noise of low-altitude flying in 75-metre low-altitude flying areas having long-term effects on the auditory and cardiovascular systems could not be ruled out, no conclusive evidence was produced.

90. The object of the Federal Health Agency's preliminary study was to determine whether methods hitherto used in medical research into the effects of noise were suitable for research into the noise of low-altitude flying and to put the hypotheses on the possible implications of the noise of low-altitude flying for health in a more precise form. A distinction was made

between effects occurring immediately after overflights (acute effects) and effects manifesting themselves only after a fairly long period of exposure to the noise of low-flying aircraft (long-term effects). For financial reasons the study was confined to children and elderly people, who must be regarded, according to preliminary surveys, as population groups particularly affected by such noise. The field surveys were carried out in a "low-altitude flying area" (area 7). Adjacent areas were used for the purposes of comparison.

91. The findings of the examinations of school and pre-school children for long-term effects showed that reduced auditory acuity, increased blood pressure in girls and disturbed sleep as after-effects of the noise of low-flying aircraft during the day and, in very rare cases, psychiatrically-relevant symptoms, cannot be ruled out.

92. The work for the main study was initiated as part of the 1987 environmental research plan. In view of the complexity of the research methods, representative findings cannot be expected before 1990. The Rapporteur is unaware of studies in other WEU countries.

93. Such scientists as Professor Jansen take the view that the noise of low-altitude flying constitutes a genuine hardship for the public and that something must be done about it for health reasons.

94. He believes that, when certain noise levels, which have yet to be accurately defined, are exceeded, many people suffer changes in physical functions (vegetative overmodulation reactions, etc.).

95. At the 98th meeting of the Bundestag's Defence Committee on 23rd June 1986, Professor Jansen then made the following statement:

"We have not yet managed to prove that noise causes an extra-aural disease, that is, a disease outside the ear. Nor, as I am

sure my colleagues will agree, will we ever be able, as far as we can see, to define a monocausal extra-aural disease that can be ascribed only to noise, for the simple reason that noise excites the whole nervous system. It affects the weakest point, which is usually the circulation."

96. A study carried out in 1987 by the Institute for Psychology and Biocybernetics of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg on "Damage to the auditory system possibly caused by the noise of low-flying aircraft", on whose research report the Federal Environment Agency has meanwhile submitted an opinion to the Federal Defence Ministry, concludes that low-altitude flying is unlikely to result in *chronic* damage. Experiments on animals led to the development of a criterion for daily human noise exposure above which *slight acute* damage to the auditory system cannot be ruled out. The criterion is the noise level. The Federal Environment Agency's opinion states that the assumptions made in the study are wholly plausible and scientifically defensible.

97. The findings of the Erlangen study can be summarised as follows:

- where a noise level of 125 dB(A) is exceeded in one instance, the possibility of the risk limit being exceeded cannot be ruled out;
- instances in which noise levels of between 115 and 125 dB(A) are reached are tolerable no more than once or twice a day;
- where more frequent overflights occur on any one day, none should expose members of the public to noise levels higher than 115 dB(A);
- where multiple overflights occur in rapid succession and where the number of overflights per day averages about 40, none should exceed a noise level of 105 dB(A).

*Measurements of noise levels generated by standard
low-altitude flights*

*Average peak levels in dB(A) standardised
to an altitude of 75 metres at 15 °C and 70% relative humidity*

<i>Tornado</i>		
Reference speed	420 knots	105.8
Reference speed	450 knots	108.7
Final approach speed	480 knots	112.2
Final approach speed	0.8 M	119.0
<i>Phantom</i>		
Reference speed	420 knots	112.4
Reference speed	450 knots	117.0
Final approach speed	480 knots	120.1
Final approach speed	0.8 M	123.0

<i>Alpha Jet</i>		
Reference speed	360 knots	98.0
Final approach speed	400 knots	101.6
<i>Harrier</i>		
Reference speed	450 knots	110.6
Final approach speed	480 knots	114.7
Final approach speed	540 knots	118.3
<i>Jaguar</i>		
Reference speed	420 knots	109.2
Reference speed	450 knots	111.8
Final approach speed	480 knots	116.7
Final approach speed	0.8 M	119.0
<i>Mirage V</i>		
Reference speed	420 knots	105.7
Reference speed	450 knots	107.0
Final approach speed	480 knots	108.3
Final approach speed	540 knots	112.2
<i>NF 5</i>		
Reference speed	450 knots	109.5
Final approach speed	480 knots	113.4
<i>A 10</i>		
Reference speed	270 knots	100.8
Reference speed	300 knots	101.4
Final approach speed	330 knots	104.9
<i>F-16</i>		
Reference speed	420 knots	104.6
Final approach speed	480 knots	110.0
Final approach speed	520 knots	114.2
<i>F-111</i>		
Reference speed	450 knots	114.8
Final approach speed	480 knots	114.2

(iii) Pollution

98. There have been many studies on the emission and immission problems posed by aviation.

99. The Technical Supervisory Board (TÜV) investigated exhaust gas emitted by air traffic over the Federal Republic of Germany in 1988. The principal findings of this study can be summarised as follows.

100. In any comparison of emissions from civil and military aircraft the difference in the nature of flying must be borne in mind. Thus the majority of military flight movements take place at low altitudes and at higher speeds than is the case in civil air transport. In addition, some jet aircraft are equipped with after-burners, which are used principally to increase thrust during take-off. As they have more engine power than civil aircraft, military aircraft spend much of their time, about 70 to 85%, flying in the lower partial load range, while civil aircraft fly in the medium or upper load range.

101. Tables 9 to 12 show total emissions of CO, HC, NO_x and SO₂ for the whole range of altitudes at which civil and military aircraft flew in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984.

102. The areas around Frankfurt, Munich and Düsseldorf in particular account for an above-average proportion of total emissions due to air traffic.

103. To illustrate the civil and military contributions to total emissions from air traffic, the exhaust gas emissions of the two categories at altitudes above and below 10 000 feet are summarised in Table 13.

104. It can be seen that, in relation to fuel consumption, military air traffic accounts for a larger proportion of CO and HC emissions than civil air traffic. Particularly at altitudes below 10 000 feet military traffic accounts for 50% of CO emissions and 54% of HC emissions. This is partly due to the very small proportion of flight movements by military aircraft above 10 000 feet. The high CO and HC emissions can also be ascribed to frequent flying in the partial load range of the engine and the use of the after-burner.

105. Emissions at altitudes above 10 000 feet are largely due to civil air traffic.

106. Most military flights are made at altitudes such that pollutants are quickly returned to earth by the weather (clouds, rain). For the pur-

poses of comparison, they must be related to the pollutants emitted by power stations, industry, domestic heating systems and road traffic. It then becomes clear that, at less than 0.3% of the total, pollutant emissions by military air traffic are very low. Fuel consumption by aircraft totals 2.8 million tonnes (1988), with civil aviation accounting for 1.6 million tonnes (the Federal Armed Forces 0.4 million tonnes, the allies 0.6 million tonnes).

107. Fuel consumption by motor vehicles is many times higher in the Federal Republic of Germany.

108. About 1% of total pollutant emissions is thus due to civil and military air traffic.

109. As air traffic accounts for a very small proportion of pollutant emissions, it must be considered unlikely to have any effect on the dying of the forests. There is no evidence to the contrary; even under airways, local effects on an appreciable scale are unlikely since the high altitudes at which aircraft fly result in pollutants being spread over a wide area. Studies by the Defence Geophysics Agency of the Federal Armed Forces have shown that even forest areas under low-altitude flight paths and woodland adjoining airports have not suffered any appreciable additional damage (German Bundestag, 10th Legislative Period, Document 10/2821).

(iv) Aspects of air safety/danger due to low-altitude flying

Situation/trend

110. The aviation industry spends more on staff and equipment for the maintenance and improvement of safety than virtually any other sector. The efforts that have been made over many years have resulted in a high level of safety. This is true in principle of all air forces. The statistics shown in Table 14 (air accident rates in the Federal Armed Forces, 1958-1988) confirm the positive trend towards further stabilisation at a low level. The results achieved in 1988 (air accident rates: 0.35 in the Federal Armed Forces, 0.37 in the Federal Air Force and 0.47 in the case of jet aircraft) were bettered only in 1983 and 1987.

111. The trend towards lower absolute figures persists. If this positive trend is to continue, current efforts must be consistently maintained and aircrews must have adequate training opportunities and flying hours, as bitter experience in the past has shown.

112. To summarise, the air accident rate (accidents per 10 000 flying hours) fell from 3.6 in 1958 to 0.35 in 1988, and the number of jet aircraft crashing per 100 000 hours fell from over twelve in 1971 to under three in 1988.

Air safety risk

113. Since 1958, 956 people have lost their lives as a result of military aircraft crashing in the Federal Republic of Germany, including 133 people on the ground not involved in flying operations (at 6th June 1989/31.5 years).

Risk inherent in low-altitude flying

114. Only about 40% of crashes involving military jet aircraft occur during low-altitude operations.

Air safety and training

115. Air safety largely depends on the quality of the personnel, i.e. on their personal and physical aptitude, training and experience.

116. Selection procedures and the further training of aircrews must ensure that those selected meet the aptitude requirements. The training programmes have been optimised on the basis of the many years of experience gained by the Federal Armed Forces and other air forces. If the required high level of training is to be achieved and maintained, however, sufficient opportunities for training and exercises are essential. If minimum requirements are not met, air safety will suffer.

Effects of military flying operations on buildings/parts of buildings

117. Since 1966, Land, local and church authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany have blamed overflights by military aircraft for 11 cases of damage to buildings of cultural, historical or other value.

118. To this must be added less well-known or widespread cases of damage to other buildings (e.g. the partial collapse of a farmhouse in Saarland).

119. These flights resulted in cracks in plaster, the detachment of plaster, damage to wall paintings and cracks in roof structures.

120. In every case, however, the investigating authorities felt that wear due to age could not be ruled out as the cause of the damage.

121. In no case were flying operations regarded as the cause, although the possibility of their having triggered the damage was taken into consideration.

122. No information on other WEU countries is available.

Scientific studies on the effect of acoustic pressure waves on buildings

123. The effect of acoustic pressure waves has been the subject of several scientific studies in the past, examples being the studies carried out by the Curt Risch Institute at the Technical University of Hanover, the Technical University of

Stuttgart and the Institute for Solid Construction and Building Materials Technology of the Technical University of Karlsruhe.

124. According to the report by Professor Koch of the Curt Risch Institute of the Technical University of Hanover, buildings suffer damage when pressure shocks involving sudden changes of pressure of at least 50 kp/m² occur at ground level. In the case of supersonic flights at 11 000 metres, pressure shocks at ground level do not as a rule exceed 1 kp/m².

125. In exceptional cases, i.e. when aircraft are accelerating or turning and under certain meteorological conditions, pressure shocks of between 5 and 10 kp/m² can reach the ground even when aircraft are flying at supersonic speed at or above 11 000 metres.

126. Aircraft flying at a speed of 450 knots (830 kph) and an altitude of 150 metres (500 feet) cause pressure shocks well below 1 kp/m².

127. These findings are confirmed by research carried out at the Technical Universities of Stuttgart and Karlsruhe in 1987, which showed that the acoustic pressures during overflights within the prescribed parameters are too low to cause damage to buildings.

Flight operation rules

128. The flight operation regulations applicable to the Federal Republic of Germany, which are binding on both the Federal Armed Forces and the allies, also take account of the findings of the studies on the effect of acoustic pressure waves on buildings.

129. With a view to reducing noise and also preventing damage to buildings the following stipulations were made:

- supersonic flights over land: minimum altitude 11 000 metres (36 000 feet);
- maximum speed below 10 000 feet (EDR-9 ceiling): Mach 0.9 (and thus well below the speed of sound/Mach 1).

Current knowledge indicates that, if these regulations are heeded, military flight operations will not do any damage to properly constructed and maintained buildings. The strength of the pressure waves occurring at ground level is thus insignificant.

Assessment of damage/settlement of claims

130. The area of potential damage caused by a supersonic flight at low altitude (along the flight path) extends over several kilometres longitudinally and laterally.

131. All damage caused by pressure waves during overflights has occurred where the flight operation rules have been infringed (maximum speed exceeded, supersonic flights below the minimum altitude).

(v) Exposure of aircrews to mental and physical stress

132. The introduction of modern, complex, third-generation flying weapons systems has generally increased the demands on aircrews. Flights at low altitude and high speed require special skills and high mental and physical tolerance.

133. Several conditions help to ensure that this tolerance exists: rigorous selection, intensive and constant training, continuous flight training in formation, the help of automatic and semi-automatic pilot and control systems and, not least, the support of a weapons systems officer (F-4F, RF-4E and Tornado).

134. In medical circles it is claimed that during low-altitude training flights the pilots of jet-propelled combat aircraft are not only exposed to considerable physical stress but are almost constantly forced to operate at or beyond the limits of their functional capacity in the mental-neutral performance range. From this they infer that pilot error during low-altitude flying is almost inevitable and that disastrous crashes are therefore bound to occur. Essentially, the following "arguments" are advanced:

- in military technical systems, safety aspects take second place to operational criteria in development and day-to-day flight training;
- the pilot who can be distracted can no longer meet the complex requirements arising in intricate flying situations and through his "human failings" reduces the reliability of the overall system;
- during low-altitude flying aircrews of combat aircraft are exposed to extreme shock loads and accelerative forces (up to 10 times gravitational acceleration), which may reduce vigilance seriously and even lead to unconsciousness;
- the strong physiological activation of the human organism during low-altitude flying is normally accompanied by distinct losses of mental capacity;
- the danger of exceeding the limits of the aircraft's capabilities exposes the pilot to constant emotional stress;
- when combined with the special operational conditions obtaining during low-altitude flying, the numerous actions required of a pilot when flying a combat aircraft leave him "a minimum of time" to take decisions and action;
- the pilot's visual and vestibular perceptivity is so impaired by the high flying speeds over ground and the G-forces that he often becomes spatially disoriented;

- the demands on concentration due to the wide range of factors to be considered in flight are so high that fatal lapses of concentration cannot always be avoided;
- ergonomic improvements in cockpit design are as unlikely to help reduce risks substantially as optimisation of pilot selection and increased training in behaviour in the aircraft that complies with the safety regulations;
- as a general rule, excessive "structural" demands are thus made on the pilots of low-flying combat aircraft.

135. Studies carried out for the Federal Air Force show that low-altitude flights account for a surprisingly small proportion of the total number of accidents when the scale of such flights is considered: since 1975 the accident rate for jet aircraft at low altitudes where crews have been involved in or caused accidents has been just under 21% of all flying accidents. There is thus less risk of an accident in low-altitude flying than in other types of military flying. This statement is confirmed by absolute figures: in the five years from 1984 to 1988 combat aircraft of the Federal Air Force involved in low-altitude training over the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany caused 10 accidents, two of them at sea. In all, aircraft of the Federal Armed Forces were involved in 78 accidents. The proportion of accidents occurring during low-altitude flying (13%) has thus continued to fall in recent years. Comparisons of numbers of flying accidents involving civil and military aircraft show that military training flights, and specifically low-altitude flights, are no more hazardous than civil aviation, where standards are allegedly geared more closely to the optimisation of safety.

136. No specific research findings on the air forces of other WEU countries are available, but the situation described above has been confirmed in personal discussions.

137. As regards the argument that excessive structural demands are made on pilots during low-altitude flying, it must be admitted that they are acting under quite specific external and internal conditions which take them close to the limits of their capabilities.

138. The very high G-forces of up to 10 times body weight said by critics to occur during low-altitude flying and the resulting losses of mental capacity, even extending to unconsciousness, are relevant to the crews of jet aircraft on this scale only for brief, though very frequent periods. In principle, therefore, interception training at low altitudes over populated areas should be prohibited.

139. The abovementioned danger of disorientation during low-altitude flying is sufficiently alleviated by the aircraft's instruments (artificial horizon, radar altimeter). Where a pilot is distracted or suffers a lapse of concentration, for example, limits may, of course, be temporarily exceeded.

140. Of interest in this context is the conclusion drawn from the analysis of the human factor during research into the causes of flying accidents that attitudinal, motivational and social problems are far more frequent determinants of pilot error than excessive physical or mental demands.

(vi) Strain on military equipment

141. The jet aircraft of the Federal Armed Forces are not currently equipped with a system that records the stresses to which the cell structures are exposed during each mission. It is not therefore possible to determine a change in the degrees of damage to aircraft structures related to low-altitude operations (more literally: a change in the degrees of damage to aircraft structures related to low-altitude operations is not therefore possible).

(vii) Cost of low-altitude operations

142. The Federal Air Force does not have any data on the cost of maintaining aircraft or of the fuel consumed on a mission-by-mission basis. The basic guide parameter used in air force logistics is the flying hour, to which the cost of maintenance work and consumption units is related. Flight profiles are of secondary importance in logistic reflections of this nature. Data logging and the submission and evaluation of reports are geared to this objective.

143. The following² figures give some idea of the average quantity of fuel consumed by aircraft per hour:

Tornado	4.6	} m ³ of F-34 per flying hour*
Phantom F-4F	6.15	
Alpha Jet	1.6	
Phantom RF-4E	5.6	

* Price of F-34 on 1st May 1989: DM 323/m³.

The cost of maintenance in 1988 was:

Tornado	7.48	} thousand DM per flying hour
Phantom	6.06	
Alpha Jet	4.61	
Phantom RF-4E	6.21	

2. Source: Federal German Ministry of Defence.

X. Measures taken to reduce noise

(i) Current situation

144. The military training flights that take place over the Federal Republic of Germany are a particular burden on the public in the areas concerned and undoubtedly cause them considerable hardship. Restricting such flights to an unavoidable minimum is therefore an obvious and constant requirement and objective. The aim must be to find an acceptable compromise between the legitimate claims of our fellow citizens to a reasonable quality of life and our country's security requirements in the western alliance. Maintaining air safety (particularly during low-altitude training) is of prime importance in this context. The risk to crews and the public must not be increased.

145. Although major efforts have been made in recent years to ease the burden on the public while maintaining high training and safety standards, those directly affected are subject to particular hardship:

- the Federal Air Force's low-altitude training over the Federal Republic of Germany was almost halved between 1980 and 1986;
- all flight training of potential jet pilots, 46% of low-altitude training and two thirds of the noise-intensive weapons training of the Federal Air Force's aircrews have been transferred abroad;
- a wide variety of restrictions has been imposed on air traffic, although they are not considered adequate.

(ii) Objective

146. Every conceivable effort should be made to ease the burden on the public as far as possible, and the financial implications must not be a determining factor in this.

147. Low-altitude training flights should be geared to actual defence at various threat levels.

148. No reduction should detract from the ability of the armed forces to play their designated rôle, air safety and thus responsibility for the lives and health of pilots and the public. It should be ensured in this context that the social situation of pilots and technicians, who are already forced to spend up to three months of the year away from their families, is not made any worse.

149. There cannot therefore be any radical solutions. Solutions consist only in a justifiable compromise between the imperative requirements of the military defence of the country and the understandable expectations of the public.

(iii) Measures so far taken to reduce noise

150. German aircrews undergo most of their training on jet aircraft outside the Federal Republic of Germany – in the United States, the United Kingdom and Portugal. This accounts for some 40 000 flying hours a year.

151. The air forces of eight countries train in the Federal Republic of Germany. One requirement is that these air forces know their operational area, its geographical and meteorological peculiarities. They must train as an integral part of the existing operational organisation, together with ground-based air defences and the land forces, whose troops – as in the allied context – have their stand-by and operational areas on German soil³. This density of forces and thus of training activities imposes a major burden. One of the main tasks for the German Air Force and the allies has therefore long been to take steps to reduce aircraft noise.

152. Efforts to achieve a wider spread of low-altitude flying by greatly increasing the area in which it is permitted, thus generally reducing the frequency of overflights, began many years ago.

153. This marked a reversal of a trend in the 1960s and early 1970s, when the area in which low-altitude flying was *not* permitted was substantially increased. The larger the area available for low-altitude training, however, the lower the frequency of flights over a given place, even if it is assumed that the volume of flying remains constant. Specifically:

- so-called high-density air traffic areas were abandoned;
- control zones were reduced in size;
- the boundary beyond which low-altitude flying was not permitted was moved southwards;
- protection zones were abandoned or reduced in size;
- parachute-dropping areas were used only when needed.

154. Additional protected zones or even prohibited areas requested for hospitals, health resorts and nature conservancy areas, to name but a few, were not approved for fear of setting a precedent for many similar claims.

155. This is an indication of the dense population of the Federal Republic of Germany.

156. Extending the training areas to include areas of the WEU countries with comparable populations would produce similar results.

3. This often-quoted argument is not absolutely sound.

157. In the Federal Republic of Germany there are 68 cities, 23 000 towns and municipalities with 3 300 hospitals, 40 000 schools and 20 000 homes for the elderly. The area available for low-altitude flying is therefore very small.

158. Even more careful preparation, stricter planning and more consistent flight operations have made it possible to limit the time aircraft spend at low altitudes. Thus instructions were issued at the beginning of 1985 to restrict the low-altitude part of any operation to a maximum of 50 minutes. Although these instructions were originally binding only on the Federal Air Force's operations, the allies later followed suit. The remainder of any operational flight is made at medium and high altitudes. Studies carried out in the meantime prove that it has been possible to reduce to 42 minutes the average time any aircraft actually spends in the low-altitude band during training. Despite the intensification of low-altitude training, the total number of hours has consequently been reduced to about 68 000 (1988) since 1980, i.e. by about a quarter.

159. Besides reducing the *duration of noise*, the Federal Air Force and the allies have imposed a number of restrictions on themselves to reduce the intensity of noise:

- a ban on the use of after-burners below 3 000 feet;
- restriction of supersonic flights to altitudes above 36 000 feet over land.

160. The times at which low-altitude flying is permitted have also been limited: it is allowed only between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. from Mondays to Fridays, and from May to October it is banned between 12.30 and 1.30 p.m.

161. Areas of population are not used as navigation points and, above all, the minimum altitude is in principle 500 feet (150 metres). Flying at an altitude of 250 feet (75 metres) is permitted only in certain areas at certain times and on a limited scale. German crews fly only short distances at this altitude.

162. No training flights are made by jet aircraft below 250 feet in the Federal Republic of Germany. This important form of low-altitude training is carried out exclusively in the extremely thinly populated district of Labrador in Canada.

163. The measures taken to reduce aircraft noise until mid-1989 are again listed below (in brackets the year in which the measure was first ordered, revised, amended or tightened up):

(a) *Flight operations (general)*

- transfer of flight training facilities for basic training; advanced training; and training on combat aircraft; much of

the low-altitude and weapons training of operational units to friendly NATO countries (since 1957; since 1988 the goal has been an increase in capacity at Goose Bay/Canada by 1991); transfer of high-grade aerial combat training, including the leasing of civil target simulation equipment, to the ACMI/Decimomannu;

- consistent work on the further development of simulators (since 1988);
- reduction in low-altitude flying through the abandonment of the fighter units' second rôle (1988);
- utilisation of the airspace over the North and Baltic Seas (since 1972, increased in 1988 through the transfer of about a quarter of the Federal Air Force's aerial combat training to maritime areas). Once all the measures take effect, some 80% of the Federal Air Force's aerial combat training will take place over the sea;
- general restriction on military flight operations at weekends and on public holidays (since 1972, revised in 1983, tightened up in 1986);
- restriction of day-time low-altitude flying to the period from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. from Mondays to Fridays (since 1965);
- midday break in low-altitude operations by jet-propelled combat aircraft from 12.30 to 1.30 p.m. from May to October (1986);
- restriction of total duration in the low-altitude band to a maximum of 50 minutes per operational flight (1985);
- restriction of military flight operations at night (1970);
- general termination of night flying at low altitudes at midnight (since 1970, amended in 1983);
- fixing of minimum altitude for night flying at predominantly 1 000 feet (about 300 metres) above ground level (since 1970, revised in 1983);
- ban on training flights at supersonic speed at midday and at night; restriction of operations to the periods from 8 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and 2 to 8 p.m. from Monday to Friday and from 8 a.m. to 12 noon on Saturdays (since 1970, revised in 1984);
- ban on supersonic flights below 36 000 feet (about 11 000 metres) over land (1970, amended in 1983);

- general low-altitude flying at altitudes between 500 and 1 500 feet (150 and 450 metres), with the added requirement that the upper part of this altitude band be used whenever tactically feasible (revised in 1983);
- general ban on low-altitude flights by operational units near their home airfields out of consideration for the communities adjoining airfields and in surrounding areas, which are the worst affected (since 1983);
- time and spatial restrictions on the use of the seven 250-foot (75-metre) low-altitude flying areas (1986);
- general closure of the 250-foot (75-metre) low-altitude connecting routes (since 1974);
- exclusion of specific towns from 250-foot low-altitude flying areas (since 1976, revised in 1983);
- restriction of the low-altitude reference speed to 450 knots (about 835 kph) (revised in 1983);
- general use of navigation and target points outside populated areas (1983);
- ban on the use of after-burners at low altitudes (except in emergencies) (since 1983);
- ban on military low-altitude flying over urban centres with more than 100 000 inhabitants whenever possible (since 1960, revised in 1983);
- instructions to aircrews to avoid urban areas with fewer than 100 000 inhabitants whenever possible (introduced in 1982);
- ban on flying over nuclear power stations (introduced in 1975, revised in 1983, tightened up in 1988);
- establishment of protection zones around airfields with a high volume of air traffic (permanent monitoring);
- establishment of a Flight Operations and Information Centre (FLIZ) at Cologne/Porz (1985) to analyse and respond to complaints about noise; allocate the 250-foot (75-metre) low-altitude flying areas to the allies; and co-ordinate low-altitude training.

(b) Specific measures at airfields and air-to-ground ranges

- definition of approach and departure paths with account taken of population density (amended in 1984);

- establishment of noise protection areas near military airfields predominantly used by jet aircraft (Aircraft Noise Act of 30th March 1971, Federal Law Gazette, page 282, permanent);
- establishment of noise protection areas near air-to-ground ranges (since 1979);
- local arrangements at military airfields to reduce noise (e.g. ban on flying over inhabited areas, permanent);
- communities near airfields kept informed of special projects (permanent);
- establishment of noise protection commissions at all Federal Air Force and Navy airfields at which jet aircraft are based (since June 1989); the allies have similar bodies;
- resettlement of communities near airfields exposed to extreme noise levels (1977).

(c) Structural measures at airfields (since 1970)

- construction of noise-insulated hangars for the ground-testing of jet engines (second generation from 1975);
- installation of noise-insulating embankments, woodland, plantations, screens, etc. at military airfields (from 1980).

(d) Education and training

- teaching aircrews and staff and technical personnel to bear the problem in mind;
- constant monitoring of the density of low-altitude flights and of discipline with Skyguard radar equipment (since 1985);
- informing the aircrews of all units of the Federal Armed Forces and of the allies who fly in the Federal Republic of Germany of the burden imposed on the public by aircraft noise and of ways of using airspace that take account of the problem (1985).

(e) Measures to increase knowledge and understanding of unavoidable aircraft noise

- prior announcement of major aerial exercises (NATO and Federal Armed Forces) through regional media (since 1974, revised in 1983);
- conferences on aircraft noise to inform the public about the task to be performed, how it is performed and what environmental measures are taken (stepped up since 1983);

- periodic dissemination of information to the national media (press, radio, television, etc.) (since 1984);
- individual oral and written answers to all questions, complaints and petitions concerning aircraft noise (since 1960, revised in 1985);
- informing the public and operational units about special problems connected with aircraft noise through FLIZ (since 1983);
- the progressive development of a Low-altitude Flying Management System (TMS) to support efforts to achieve an effective reduction in the noise to which the public is exposed.

164. The aim of all the arrangements listed above is to reduce flying operations to a minimum, which is assumed to be the level essential for the maintenance of operational readiness. It cannot be denied that aircraft noise still causes hardship.

(iv) Measures to reduce noise due to low-flying aircraft taken in co-ordination with the allied air forces

165. To reduce the noise to which the public is exposed, the following measures have been ordered:

(a) A reduction in low-altitude flying speed

The low-altitude flying speed for the navigation phase of combat aircraft is reduced from 450 knots (835 kph) to 420 knots (778 kph) throughout the low-altitude flying area.

Where noise is concerned, this means:

- the lower engine speed greatly reduces the noise emitted - by up to 25%, depending on the type of aircraft. Peak noise levels considered critical in research on aircraft noise are not as a rule reached at this speed. In the future only about 5% of flights will have to be made at higher speeds for technical and tactical reasons;
- owing to its lower speed, the aircraft's appearance is less of a surprise. The shock is greatly reduced, and the auditory system is better able to adjust to the volume of noise.

(b) A reduction in low-altitude interception training

Low altitude interception training is carried out at altitudes of 150 to 450 metres. As several high-powered aircraft are simultaneously present in a small area for a fairly long time in this type of

training, the noise level and stress are particularly high because of the frequency of overflights at low altitude. Under a new training concept incorporating a new generation of radar equipment, known as pulse Doppler radar, this training too is now carried out at altitudes above 450 metres when weather conditions are appropriate. A large proportion of allied combat aircraft are already equipped with radar of this type. Its installation in aircraft of the Federal Air Force will begin in 1992.

This will immediately reduce such low-altitude training by about a third. The noise impression at ground level will be approximately halved as a result of the greater altitude at which aircraft equipped with this radar will fly. Its installation in aircraft of the Federal Air Force from 1992 will bring further reductions.

(c) A significant reduction in low-altitude flying (at 75 metres) in the special low-altitude flying areas

The highest noise levels are caused by aircraft flying at 75 metres. However, flying at this altitude is still one of the most important elements of the whole training exercise, since it includes the phases of penetration, (simulated) weapons use and departure from the target. It is the most important requirement if the transition to training abroad at the necessary operational altitude (about 30 metres) at operational speed is to be made safely and quickly. German and allied aircrews differ widely in terms of the nature and operational rôle of their weapons systems, their familiarity with geographical and climatic conditions in Central Europe and the opportunities they have to train at low operational altitudes. The need for flying at 75 metres therefore varies. Currently, operational flights at this altitude still last up to 28 minutes. After a lengthy debate, the allied air forces, which account for the largest proportion of such training, have reappraised and modified their training requirements.

In the future aircraft will spend only about 15 minutes at this altitude. It can be assumed that the average for all operations will be about 12 minutes.

This represents a reduction by about 45% over the special 75-metre low-altitude flying area.

As most training flights at 75 metres will also be made at reduced speed in the future, the noise in the low-altitude flying areas will be approximately halved. In

addition, the number of towns in these areas which may not be flown over at 75 metres has been significantly increased (from 25 to 61).

(d) A reduction in low-altitude flying hours

The tactical training of unit leaders of the allied air forces is being transferred from Central Europe to Belgium. The Federal Navy is reducing its low-altitude flying over land by 50% and stopping weapons training at German air-to-ground ranges. This will reduce low-altitude flying over the Federal Republic of Germany by a further 2 000 hours.

(e) Easing the burden on areas with a high density of low-altitude flying

Areas over which the density of low-altitude flying is increasing – owing to the location of cities and airfields and to other restrictions – are at a particular disadvantage. By the end of March 1990 pilot projects in two areas will have been completed and evaluated. In these projects the minimum altitude for overflights is raised to 300 metres (weather permitting), and simulated air-to-ground attacks and interception operations are forbidden. With the reduction of speed to 420 knots, this arrangement seems likely to bring a significant reduction in the high noise levels to which the public in these areas are exposed. If the pilot projects are successful, these arrangements are to be introduced in a number of other areas similarly exposed to high noise levels.

(f) Monitoring of low-altitude flying

Four Skyguard radar sets are being used to monitor low-altitude flying at focal points for airspace monitoring and also at the request of politicians and local authorities. Even though culpable infringements occur in only 1% of all flights recorded, great care will be taken in the future to ensure that the regulations are observed.

(g) A reduction in aerial combat training at higher altitudes

Unlike low-altitude interception, aerial combat training over land is always carried out at high altitudes (above about 3 000 metres) in Temporarily Reserved Airspace (TRA). In the future 86% of Federal Air Force training of this kind will be undertaken over the sea or abroad, leaving only 14% over the Federal Republic of Germany (current situation: about two thirds over the sea or abroad).

The allies are also considering how much more of this training can be carried out outside the Federal Republic of Germany.

(h) Avoidance of excessive regional noise levels

As a first development stage, the Federal Air Force has installed a computer-assisted, central Low-altitude Flying Management System for the flight operations of its units. A trial phase has begun. At present this system is capable of recording and depicting low-altitude movements with the aid of the flight plan data input by the German units. Concentrations both on individual days and over longer periods can be analysed and advice on changes of routine provided.

As soon as the system is fully operational, it will be possible to adjust the low-altitude flight plans of the units and so achieve a more uniform and, therefore, less onerous distribution of low-altitude flying. Besides lowering the noise levels to which individuals are exposed, a wider spread of low-altitude flying will also reduce the risk of collisions, thus further improving air safety.

The allies have shown an interest in participating in this system after a trial phase.

(i) Summary

All the various measures will result in an immediate and substantial reduction in noise, especially in the areas which are worst affected today.

- Speed restrictions, leading to a reduction in noise by up to 25%;
 - the reduction of low-altitude interception operations by a third; and
 - the reduction of the time spent at 75 metres in the low-altitude flying areas by 45%,
- will make the greatest impact. They take account of the concern felt by the public without unjustifiably affecting operational readiness or safety.

(v) Longer-term measures to reduce noise

166. Work on the achievement of the longer-term objectives in this context continues:

(a) Efforts to transfer low-altitude training abroad

- Under an agreement signed with the Canadian Government in 1986, the capacity of Goose Bay, the only

location from which the air forces can fly at an altitude of 30 metres, is to be increased to the agreed level by 1991.

- The negotiations on the renewal of the agreements on the use of the Portuguese air force base at Beja are being conducted with a view to improving the opportunities for the use of this facility.
- It is hoped to improve the use of the Decimomannu location for aerial combat training.
- The decision on a NATO Tactical Training Centre and on its possible site - Konya in Turkey or Goose Bay in Canada - needs to be given careful consideration. The centre is intended for particularly demanding training of a type that is not possible in Europe. An establishment of this kind could lead to the transfer of further low-altitude flying, although the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Brian Mulroney, was quoted recently as saying that NATO might be forced to abandon the project because of the current relaxation of East-West tension. The subject is on the agenda for the NATO Defence Planning Committee meeting in May. In passing, it is worth mentioning that the prospect of Goose Bay being used more extensively is meeting increasing opposition from local inhabitants...

At present there are no other areas in Europe to which low-altitude flying could be transferred. The development of a new facility remote from any population centres abroad and its maintenance are beyond the means of one country acting on its own and would entail major risks. It can only be a joint facility. The social hardship for crews and technical staff also imposes serious constraints on the transfer of further low-altitude flying.

The Spanish Government is reported as having offered to take a future multi-national training centre for the European Fighter Aircraft (similar to the tri-nation Tornado Training Unit at RAF Cottesmore in the United Kingdom). Such an offer is to be welcomed as would be any similar offer from Portugal and Spain to take more allied low flying in the Iberian Peninsular, where, in comparison with other countries of the alliance, there is rather less "burden" being carried, (with, in consequence, rather fewer protests from the population).

(b) Trials with low-altitude flying simulators

The German and many other armed forces are becoming increasingly involved in the development of methods to enable military training to be transferred to simulators. The Federal Armed Forces were the first to commission the development of a low-altitude flight simulator, acting on a decision of the Federal Government and with the approval of the Bundestag. The first step will be to consider whether - and to what extent - low-altitude flying can be replaced with simulated flying. Until the prototype has undergone trials, beginning in late 1990, it will not be possible to say whether series production is justified. The first model being developed is for the Federal Air Force's Tornado combat aircraft.

This development could result in a further reduction of low-altitude flying. It cannot, however, completely replace low-altitude training.

(c) Promotion of technological measures to reduce noise

Although their power output has remained the same or even increased, subjective and objective reductions in the noise emitted by aircraft engines have been achieved from one generation to the next in the past. A Tornado, for example, is about 40% quieter than the older Phantom. A study on the development of even quieter engines has been commissioned. It is unlikely, however, to have practical implications in the foreseeable future.

(d) The Federal Ministry of Defence has requested NATO's Supreme Allied Headquarters in Europe to examine certain requirements to be binding on all air forces. NATO is currently considering whether:

- training operations in the supersonic range over land can be completely abandoned; although these operations are all carried out at altitudes above 11 000 metres and are already very limited in number, the sonic boom makes them very noisy;
- an aircraft- and rôle-related reduction can be achieved in the number of annual flying hours considered necessary for aircrews by present standards and thus in the time they spend flying at low altitudes.

XI. Low-altitude flying and the development of alternative approaches

167. No current developments indicate that low-altitude operations can be completely abandoned in the near or even distant future, unless rôles are reallocated.

168. Operational measures to reduce the noise caused by low-altitude flying in the short term may, however, be joined in the medium term by a number of technical measures that can be taken on equipment already in use. For the most part they consist of modifications to the source of noise itself, i.e. the aircraft or its engines.

169. Specifically, they may consist of changes in configuration, leading to reduced air resistance and thus to reduced engine thrust requirements, or changes to the engine itself, ranging from the removal of the after-burner through the use of sound absorbers to the development of new jet designs.

170. The goal of these developments should be to reduce the noise level by at least 10 dB and so to halve the subjective noise impression.

171. The implementation of these measures depends not only on solutions to technical problems being found but also on such parameters as safety, reliability, flying performance, their effects on operations and, not least, added costs.

172. Studies of these aspects have begun. Unequivocal statements cannot yet be made.

173. There are signs of technological developments in the long term which are likely to have implications for tactical operational concepts and overall strategy and so not least on the nature and scale of low-altitude flying in the future.

174. Current perceptions indicate that progress in the following areas in particular will contribute in this respect:

- navigation and pattern recognition methods;
- stealth technology;
- engine construction;
- ammunition technology;
- EDP/automation.

Depending on the range of targets and the depth of penetration, a variety of options capable of performing at least some of the tasks of current low-flying combat aircraft is conceivable.

175. The approaches that might be considered include the following:

- high-flying aircraft operating at hypersonic speeds;

- high-flying stealth aircraft which penetrate enemy airspace at supersonic speeds;
- high-flying combat aircraft which are equipped with intelligent long-range weapons, operate at subsonic speeds and do not penetrate enemy airspace;
- reusable and non-reusable, low-flying, unmanned aircraft operating at subsonic speeds;
- use of conventional missiles instead of manned flying weapons systems.

These options are the subject of studies and development work at national and international level. Initial statements on the possibility of some of these options becoming reality have been made.

176. In other words, the development of defence concepts that do not rely on low-altitude flying depends on the availability of effective alternative equipment. Given the present technological and financial environment, however, it is likely to be some considerable time before they are implemented.

XII. Low-altitude flying and public opinion

177. Despite the extensive measures taken by the air forces which train in the Federal Republic of Germany to reduce aircraft noise by changing the airspace structure and the flight operation rules, public opposition to military low-altitude flying has grown appreciably. In general, this is also true of a number of other WEU countries. Increasingly, complaints are made not only by individuals but also by politicians and other holders of public office, local authorities and citizens' action groups.

178. The armed forces have so far done a great deal of public relations work. Explanations, some going into detail, have been given in answer to all written submissions. An attempt has been made to engage in objective argument and to focus on local/regional problems at local meetings and in the media or to disseminate information on this complex subject. Despite this, it has so far proved impossible to halt the trend described above.

179. The most recent public relations exercises include:

- a telephone hot-line at the local rate - this hot-line has been installed at FLIZ in the Federal Air Force Agency (Luftwaffenamt) and is open to any member of the public;
- the establishment of aircraft noise commissions at all the Federal Air Force's operational airfields.

XIII. Low-altitude flying and arms control

180. At their meeting on 30th May 1989, the NATO heads of state and government accepted in principle ("Bush initiative") the proposal from the Warsaw Pact countries that the first round of negotiations should cover not only battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers, but also combat aircraft and combat helicopters as separate categories.

181. Given the wide range of unanswered questions concerning combat aircraft, particularly with respect to definition, criteria for counting numbers and ceilings, it is impossible to say when these negotiations will produce results. The Warsaw Pact appears to have the political will to come to an early agreement.

182. An agreement along the lines proposed by the West – equality of armed forces at a lower level – might change the need for training and exercises. The arms control dialogue today is based on a *guaranteed* defence capability and will continue to be so in the future. If operational capability and combat strength are to be maintained, low-altitude training for the NATO air forces seems imperative.

183. The operational capability of the air forces depends, however, on aircrews with a high standard of training and performance. This standard of performance can be achieved only if each crew makes *sufficient* a number of low-altitude training flights each year. Arms control measures can thus affect only the number of flying weapons systems available.

184. The logic of this assumption reflects the view that a ban on low-altitude flying is not to be recommended as a "confidence-building measure". Confidence-building measures are intended to increase transparency and predictability, to reduce the danger of a surprise attack and generally to improve our security.

185. Another aspect of arms control concerns verification (a subject close to the Assembly's heart). As well as considering the possibility of overflying not only the CFE areas, but also *all* the territory of the nations concerned (the "Open Skies" proposals), the idea has surfaced in Vienna of using light aircraft, flying low, for verification purposes. It is to be hoped that this proposal will be easier to sell to our populations than low flying by fast jets...

XIV. Recommendations to the WEU countries


186. Efficient air forces in place are a crucial element of our *defensive* strategy, which is geared to preventing war and containing political and military conflict. There can be little doubt that the high standard of training of our aircrews that is essential for this purpose can be achieved and demonstrated convincingly only through constant practice within the overall defence system.

187. The air forces have, however, always been subject to the requirement that they limit low-altitude training to the minimum essential on operational grounds. However, our populations are increasingly making their voices heard and consider, for instance, that noise levels in the 75 metre low-altitude flying areas are extremely high and are now totally unacceptable.

188. Hence the recommendation of this report that all the WEU and NATO partners who carry out low-altitude exercises should take suitable measures in the future to reduce the noise to which the public is exposed to an unavoidable level. The Defence Committee's recommendations are of an essentially practical nature, avoiding, your Rapporteur hopes, all polemic. The Council is urged therefore to take early action in line with the ideas expressed in the present report.

TABLE 1


*NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and announced reductions
(August 1989)*



* Including France and Spain.
Source: Federal Ministry of Defence.

TABLE 2

Airspace structure in the 1960s







-  military visual flying possible
-  military instrument flying
-  civil instrument flying

TABLE 3

Airspace structure of the Federal Republic of Germany (since 1976)



Source: Federal Armed Forces Air Traffic Control Office.





TABLE 4





TABLE 5

TABLE 6

Military Areas of Competence (Lower Airspace)*Military Areas of Competence:*

- Bremen Radar, NR 5, NR 4, WR 2, WR 4
- Clutch Radar: CR
- Eifel Control, EIFEL
- Ramstein Approach: Ramstein
- Lahr Approach: Lahr
- Bremgarten Approach: Bremgarten

Source: Federal Armed Forces Traffic Control Office.

TABLE 7

Transit flights through training areas (TRA)1. *Air Traffic Control Sector B, Bremen area 201/202*

	<i>requested</i>	<i>approved</i>
January-June 1987	2 374	2 373


2. *Air Traffic Control Sector C, Düsseldorf area 203*

	<i>requested</i>	<i>approved</i>
January-June 1987	438	438

3. *Air Traffic Control Sector A, Maastricht area 301/302*

Approved transit flights May-December 1987	14 868	
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
TABLE 8
Control Sectors (Upper Airspace)



Source: Federal Armed Forces Air Traffic Control Office.

TABLE 9

*Annual emission of sulphur dioxide by all air traffic
at all altitudes in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984*



(Sulphur dioxide in tonnes)


8°

Total: 2 746 tonnes

Source: Institute for Energy Technology and Environmental Protection.

TABLE 10

*Annual emission of nitrogen oxides by all air traffic
at all altitudes in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984*




(Nitrogen oxides in tonnes)

Total: 28 892 tonnes

Source: Institute for Energy Technology and Environmental Protection.

TABLE 11

*Annual emission of hydrocarbons by all air traffic
at all altitudes in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984*



(Hydrocarbons in tonnes)


8°

Total: 9 156 tonnes

Source: Institute for Energy Technology and Environmental Protection.

TABLE 12

*Annual emission of carbon monoxide by all air traffic
at all altitudes in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984*



(Carbon monoxide in tonnes)

8°

Total: 47 823 tonnes

Source: Institute for Energy Technology and Environmental Protection.

TABLE 13

*Emissions of CO, HC, NO_x and SO₂ by civil and military air traffic
in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984*

Source	Altitude ft	Fuel		CO		HC		NO _x		SO ₂	
		Tonnes p.a.	%	Tonnes p.a.	%	Tonnes p.a.	%	Tonnes p.a.	%	Tonnes p.a.	%
Civil air traffic (including visual flying	< 10 000	591 889	21	12 990	27	3 016	33	7 318	25	591	22
	> 10 000	1 004 671	36	10 170	21	1 064	11	11 412	40	1 003	36
	all alts	1 596 560	57	23 160	48	4 080	44	18 730	65	1 594	58
Military air traffic	< 10 000	1 073 934	38	23 578	50	4 937	54	9 036	31	1 028	37
	> 10 000	131 945	5	1 085	2	139	2	1 126	4	124	5
	all alts	1 205 879	43	24 663	52	5 076	56	10 162	35	1 152	42
Total air traffic	all alts	2 802 439	100	47 823	100	9 156	100	28 892	100	2 746	100

Source: Institute for Energy Technology and Environmental Protection.

TABLE 14
Air accident rates in the Federal Armed Forces, 1958-1988




TABLE 15

*Annual fatal accidents (average)
(at 23rd October 1988)*

Road traffic	10 400
Households	6000
Leisure activities	2800
Employment	1400
Railways	210
Civil air traffic	80
Military air traffic	31 *

* Including 4 civilians on the ground.

APPENDIX I

*Definitions**CVFR area*

A controlled airspace with fixed dimensions in which only IFR and CVFR flights are permissible.

(ICAO ¹)

Restricted flying area (ED-R)

An airspace with fixed dimensions over a country's territory or territorial waters in which flights are restricted owing to certain conditions.

(ICAO, NATO)

Flight information area (FIR)

An airspace with fixed dimensions in which a flight information service and flight alarm service are available.

(ICAO)

Air traffic control route

A fixed route intended for channelling the flow of traffic so that it satisfies the requirements of the air traffic control services.

(ICAO)

Low-altitude night-time interception area (LANIA)

An airspace with fixed dimensions, occasionally established to permit low-altitude night-time interception training flights.

(AFSBw ²)

Danger area (ED-D)

An airspace with fixed dimensions in which activities dangerous for aircraft may be undertaken at set times.

(ICAO, NATO)

Control area (CTA)

A controlled airspace extending upwards from a fixed line above the earth's surface.

N.B. A control area may consist of short-haul areas, air traffic control routes and other controlled airspace, except control zones.

(ICAO, BFS ³, NATO)

Control zone (CTR)

A controlled airspace extending upwards from the earth's surface to a fixed upper limit.

(ICAO, BFS, NATO)

Air defence exercise area (ADEXA)

An airspace with fixed dimensions which is temporarily established to permit training protection flights and air defence training flights.

(AFSBw)

Short-haul area (TMA)

A control area usually situated where air traffic control routes meet near one or more airports.

(ICAO, NATO)

1. International Civil Aviation Organisation.

2. Federal Armed Forces Air Traffic Control Office (Amt für Flugsicherung der Bundeswehr).

3. National Flight Co-ordination Authority (Bundesanstalt für Flugsicherung).

Upper flight information area (UIR)

An airspace with fixed dimensions above flight information areas, in which a flight information service and flight alarm service are available to aircraft flying at high altitudes.

(ICAO)

Upper control area (UTA)


A controlled airspace in an upper flight information area.

Temporarily reserved airspace (TRA)

An airspace with fixed dimensions temporarily established to permit uncontrolled VFR flights by military aircraft.


(AFSBw)

APPENDIX II
Central European weather environment




This graph illustrates environmental factors which affect low-altitude flying in the Central Region. The weather often forces aircraft to operate at low altitude below a ceiling. Additionally, decreased hours of daylight at certain times of the year force increased concentrations of low-altitude traffic during available daylight hours. The periods of night time also show the need for the night/all weather capability of the F-16 LANTIRN and F-15E.

APPENDIX III

Attrition model results over moderate terrain (FRG)


This graph demonstrates the relationship between combat attrition by enemy defences and aircraft altitude. Attrition, due to the threat, increases dramatically as aircraft altitude increases. The shaded area on the chart shows the altitude below 500 feet is best for reducing attrition due to enemy defences.

APPENDIX IV

Probability of ground kill (fully trained pilot)

This graph illustrates the relationship between aircraft altitude and the probability of hitting the ground. The model assumes moderate terrain features similar to those found in Germany. As altitude decreases below 150 feet, the probability of the pilot hitting the ground rapidly increases. This probability becomes unacceptably high below 100 feet (see shaded area of the chart).

APPENDIX V

Mission survival

This chart combines data from the previous two graphs to demonstrate how mission survivability in combat varies with aircraft altitude. As altitude decreases, survivability from the threat increases until approximately 100 feet. Below this altitude, survivability rapidly decreases because of the greater probability of the pilot hitting the ground. The shaded area on the chart shows 100 to 300 feet is the best altitude to fly considering the combined attrition of enemy defences and ground impact. However, some training benefit is realised while flying in the 300 to 500 feet altitude block.

Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee ²
by Lord Newall, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mr. Fourré, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (Alternate: *Stoffelen*) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Cariglia, Chevalier (Alternate: *Kempinaire*), Cox, De Decker (Alternate: *Péciaux*), Ewing, Fiandrotti, Fillon, Fioret, Irmer (Alternate: *Klejdzinski*), Jung, Kittelmann, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Maris (Alternate: *Verbeek*), Nijpels, Pecchioli, Scheer (Alternate: *Ahrens*), Sinesio, *Speed*, *Steiner*, Sir John Stokes, MM. *Uyttendaele*, Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Rapporteur's Preface

In preparation for this report, *the Rapporteur* held discussions in London on 22nd and 23rd January 1990 with:

Mr. Paul Lever, Head of Security Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
 MM. David Chuter and Ian Manson, Defence Arms Control Unit (DACU), Ministry of Defence;
 Mr. John Roper, Director of Studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs;
 Mr. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.

The Rapporteur also had interviews with the following permanent representatives to the CFE and/or CSBM talks and their staff in Vienna on 19th and 20th March 1990:

H.E. Mr. M. Edes, Ambassador, Head of the United Kingdom Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. J. Coene, Ambassador, Head of the Belgian Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. G. Joetze, Ambassador, Head of the Federal German Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. F. Plaisant, Ambassador, Head of the French Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. P. Pucci di Benisichi, Ambassador, Head of the Italian Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. R. Bloes, Ambassador, Head of the Luxembourg Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. L.W. Veenendaal, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. M. Barreiros, Ambassador, Head of the Portuguese Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. J.A. San Gil, Ambassador, Head of the Spanish Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. Gleissner, Ambassador, Head of Arms Control Department, Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs;
 H.E. Mr. Peel, Ambassador, Head of the Canadian Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. Meiszter, Ambassador, Head of the Hungarian Delegation;
 Mr. P. Kaplan, Minister, United States Delegation;
 Mr. Y. Evstafiev, Minister, Soviet Delegation,

and with General Sir Richard Vincent, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (Chief of the Defence Staff Designate), in London on 4th April 1990.

The Rapporteur met the following at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 25th April 1990:

H.E. Mr. Amedeo de Franchis, Ambassador, Deputy Secretary-General;
 H.E. Sir Michael Alexander, KCMG, Ambassador, United Kingdom Permanent Representative;
 H.E. Mr. William H. Taft, IV, Ambassador, United States Permanent Representative;
 Dr. Jamie Shea, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General;
 Mr. Harry Brown, Special Assistant, Strategic and Global Events, SHAPE;
 Brigadier General T.G. Waanders, NLAR, Deputy Assistant Director, Plans and Policy Division;
 Colonel W. Meyer, GEAR, Arms Control and Disarmament Branch, Plans and Policy Division;
 Mr. D. Beattie, CMG, United Kingdom Deputy Permanent Representative;
 Air Commodore Mike Butler, COS, United Kingdom Mil. Rep.;
 Mr. David Fisher, Defence Counsellor, United Kingdom Delegation;
 Messrs. Jon Day, Ian McEwan and Geoff Magnus, United Kingdom Defence Staff;
 Mr. Guillaume Parmentier, Assistant Director of External Relations;
 Mr. P. Jenner, Information Directorate.

The committee as a whole was addressed by the Italian Minister of Defence, Mr. Martinazzoli, in Rome on 15th February 1990; by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Mr. Skubiszewski, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Luxembourg on 22nd March 1990, during the extraordinary session of the Assembly; and by Mr. Eyskens, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Coëme, Belgian Defence Minister, in Brussels on 24th April 1990.

The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, ambassadors, officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions.

The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation**on Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union**

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the recent developments in Europe which promise a dramatic reduction in East-West tension;
- (ii) Considering, however, that the establishment of lasting security greatly depends on decisions which have to be taken forthwith;
- (iii) Aware that the democratic evolution in the countries of Central Europe faces growing problems of internal argument and traditional nationalism;
- (iv) Convinced that progress in the Vienna talks, both on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), is an essential prerequisite for stability and security in Europe;
- (v) Stressing the necessity to continue arms control negotiations immediately after the signing of the first CFE treaty;
- (vi) Certain that further cuts in weapons and force levels in Europe are desirable but that they must be agreed collectively and not decided unilaterally;
- (vii) Noting the convergence of views on arms control between WEU member countries and a growing number of Warsaw Pact countries;
- (viii) Recognising that few nations, in the East or the West, continue to have the financial means to maintain defence spending at former levels;
- (ix) Determined that there must be greater European co-operation in the field of defence and security, especially over arms control in general and verification of agreements in particular;
- (x) Pleased that the NATO nations have tabled a series of measures in Vienna which are setting the pace for the forthcoming CFE treaty;
- (xi) Saddened that the French Prime Minister's proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU should start a specific programme of immediate co-operation with regard to verification and disarmament has not yet been taken up by the Council;
- (xii) Encouraged, however, by the proposal on 23rd March 1990 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany to create a centre for verification in Europe, which echoes previous French ideas on the necessity for transparency and reciprocal openness;
- (xiii) Recalling that Recommendation 465 proposed the creation of a European observation satellite agency to assist in the verification measures agreed by each member country;
- (xiv) Welcoming the fact that the Council is studying a possible WEU contribution to the CFE verification system based on the enhancement of European capabilities and the pooling of all member country's assets;
- (xv) Convinced of the urgent need for a *European verification centre* and struck by the fact that the ideal nucleus for such a body is WEU, plus those other states (signatories of the forthcoming CFE treaty) desiring to take part;
- (xvi) Suggesting that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, together with the Secretary-General, should immediately begin consulting not only member states but other interested nations from both East and West which meet the necessary requirements with a view to their participation in the work of this centre,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Take the action necessary to create, under WEU auspices, a *European verification centre* in which all states which meet the necessary requirements, from both East and West, be invited to participate.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Lord Newall, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The aim of the present report on "Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union" is to ensure that the key issues regarding the major arms control negotiations are brought before the Assembly for debate, continuing the process of education emphasised in the past year by two other Rapporteurs for the Defence Committee, Mr. de Beer and Mr. Steiner¹.

2. As previously, there is a particular danger that what is written today may be overtaken by events tomorrow – which is why your present Rapporteur intends to limit comment to the essential facts necessary as a catalyst for sparking the process of debate so vital in a parliamentary democracy. The recommendations which have been formulated are directed at translating the debate into effective action so that the WEU member countries help initiate, rather than merely follow, the arms control process which has become the key issue for European security and stability. The record thus far is poor and pressure from the Assembly is vital to emphasise the requirement for urgent action by the Council.

3. Appended to this report will be found the original mandate for the Vienna CFE talks, which shows the scope of the discussions, as well as a comprehensive glossary of terms and acronyms.

II. European developments

4. Since Mr. Steiner's report for the Defence Committee on "Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential)" in November 1989, events in Europe have moved at an ever-increasing tempo. Large Soviet and Eastern European unilateral force reductions have begun, with all the inherent problems concerning possibilities and/or requirements for verification of their authenticity and their enduring nature (many commentators are unhappy that such reductions are not taking place in the context of any treaty and are not subject to continuing verification). The Warsaw Pact organisation appears close to a de facto dissolution, with less and less "consultation" on

1. "Current aspects of arms control: the Western European Union position – reply to the annual report of the Council", Document 1182, 25th April 1989, Rapporteur: Mr. de Beer; "Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) – reply to the annual report of the Council", Document 1204, 6th November 1989, Rapporteur: Mr. Steiner.

the arms control process, and indeed with one member about to become united with a member of the erstwhile "opposition". Do such developments mean that a possible treaty on conventional forces in Europe (the CFE negotiations) is in imminent danger of being overtaken by events?

5. Your Rapporteur would argue that, on the contrary, the need for a CFE treaty is even more pressing! At a time of increasingly rapid change both in relations between East and West and, perhaps even more importantly, between East and East, the conclusion of a treaty to establish defined parameters to constrain military forces in the European theatre – their numbers, equipment, dispositions and utilisation – will per se be a stabilising factor.

6. The CFE treaty will also help counter the previously-cited problem of unilateral reductions and withdrawals by setting specific limits to various force levels in particular European zones.

7. In addition, by initiating an extensive exchange of data on force structures and equipment holdings and with an intrusive verification régime, the treaty should considerably increase East-West "openness" (the "transparency" to which the French Prime Minister, Mr. Rocard, has frequently referred), and thereby reduce risks of misunderstandings, as well as instituting a safeguard against the possible aggressive use of military capabilities.

III. Progress to date

8. Given that the CFE negotiation is much larger in scope than any other present or previous arms control forum, that there are 23 participants, theoretically taking part on an individual basis, but in reality, at least hitherto, divided into the two alliances (16 on the western side (NATO) and seven to the East (the Warsaw Pact)), with an area of application covering some six million square kilometres between the Atlantic and the Urals, including as many as 4 000 garrisons and well in excess of a quarter of a million items of equipment to be treaty-limited, in addition to several hundreds of thousands of United States – and Soviet-stationed personnel – with so many factors to be considered it is of considerable credit to the negotiators in Vienna that any progress at all has been possible!

(i) Categories

9. At the beginning of the negotiations, with the negative legacy of the MBFR talks, there were

major differences between the two sides. Since then, agreement has been possible on the five categories of equipment to be treaty-limited:

- main battle tanks;
- armoured combat vehicles (with three sub-categories: armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, and heavy armoured combat vehicles);
- artillery;
- combat helicopters;
- combat aircraft.

(ii) Definitions

10. An agreed definition has proved possible for artillery systems, and definitions are imminent at the time of writing for battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles. The western side has modified its position on definitions for combat helicopters, dropping the proposed "look-alike, count-alike" rule which could have involved transport and ambulance helicopters, and it is hoped that an agreed definition is close. The one major sticking point is on combat aircraft where the two sides remain some distance apart.

(iii) Ceilings

11. As far as overall ceilings are concerned, agreement has been forthcoming for battle tanks and combat helicopters, is very close on armoured combat vehicles and should soon prove possible on artillery.

(iv) Troops on the ground

12. With reference to limitations on United States- and Soviet-stationed forces in Europe, as a result of President Bush's initiative and intensive US-Soviet bilateral contacts, it seemed at Ottawa during the Open Skies conference that agreement had been reached on the numbers involved:

- 195 000 Soviet soldiers in Eastern Europe, outside the territory of the USSR;
- 195 000 US troops in Central Europe (FRG, Benelux and Denmark), plus a total maximum of 30 000 US soldiers in the rest of Western Europe (United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Turkey);
- this would mean reductions of some 370 000 Soviets (from 565 000) and c. 80 000 Americans (from 305 000).

Since Ottawa, the Soviets and East Germans have tried to suggest an overall troop ceiling for each alliance of 700 000, but without any noticeable enthusiasm either from the West or indeed from other Warsaw Pact members.

(v) Verification proposals

13. Regarding verification of reductions, the work is only now beginning in Vienna, with the West submitting a draft protocol on inspection and the proposed text of two articles of the future treaty: verification and information exchange.

14. The western allied proposals place an accent on on-site inspections at declared and undeclared sites. Each country would have to accept a minimum required quota of three days of inspection a year, plus one day for every 100 aircraft and helicopters or 300 tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery pieces. Furthermore, each country would have to accept an additional day of inspection for every 50 000 km² of territory. Declared sites would be sites where equipment covered by a CFE treaty are regularly or periodically stored; undeclared sites would be places which serve or could serve to break or circumvent the obligations specified in the treaty. Each inspection team (no more than six people) could spend no longer than two days at a single site or 10 consecutive days on the territory of a country being inspected. The proposals also foresee strict time limits for different phases: notification, arrival, announcement of choice of site, duration of presence. The measures are modelled on inspections already permitted under the framework of the CDE and the INF treaty. They do not handle the problem of armaments factories.

15. Much of the preparatory work for the western proposals on verification has reportedly taken place in the WEU working groups, drawing on over 30 years' experience of running a successful verification régime under the modified Brussels Treaty. In his information letter last November, the Secretary-General made the following comments:

"The Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group are to present joint proposals, for the next ministerial meeting, on the practical arrangements for co-operation between the WEU member countries in order to ensure their optimum participation in the process of verifying the implementation of a CFE treaty. These proposals might, for example, include the co-ordination of verification activities such as those of inspection teams or even co-operation in the training of inspectors."

Your Rapporteur hopes that this work will intensify over the next few months and lead to growing recognition and appreciation for WEU's rôle by all concerned...

16. In addition to the above, drafting has also begun on the treaty text itself and especially on the necessary articles concerning rules of procedure, such as arrangements for review confer-

ences. Fortunately both sides seem to be on the same wave-length when both structure and outline of the treaty and its related annexes and protocols are discussed.

(vi) *Zones and storage*

17. Good progress has also been made towards a common understanding on the very difficult issue of the zonal structure to be applied in the treaty and the related question of how to deal with equipment held outside active units in monitored storage. Agreement has been reached on a definition for monitored storage and, although some details still have to be clarified, on the associated rules governing the use of such storage.

18. There is also a broad understanding that, following the general lines of the initial western proposal, there will be an inner Central European area consisting of the Benelux countries, Denmark and the FRG – on the West – and the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary – on the East, within which there will be sub-ceilings applying only to equipment in active units. There will also be a wider Central European zone including the above countries, together with – on the West – the United Kingdom, France and Italy, and on the East, the Baltic, Byelorussian and Carpathian Military Districts in the Soviet Union. Within that wider area there would be an overall ceiling on equipment in active units and in monitored storage, and a sub-ceiling on equipment in active units. Although this part of the zonal structure is subject to broad agreement, the thorny problem remains of the areas outside Central Europe, and in particular, with the specific concerns of the flank countries which are worried that stored equipment will be foisted onto them.

(vii) *Combat aircraft*

19. As mentioned earlier, the two sides are still far apart on combat aircraft. On the eve of the Ottawa meeting, the West agreed to adopt the eastern ceiling of 4 700 for combat aircraft, but offered – first – to add to this an additional entitlement of 500 air-defence interceptors and – second – to exclude so-called primary trainers. In Moscow, during the US-Soviet bilateral meetings before Ottawa, the Russians responded by proposing that there should be a basic entitlement of 4 700 combat aircraft, to which should be added an entitlement for 1 500 to 1 600 combat-capable trainers and a further entitlement of 1 500 air-defence interceptors. The Russians confirmed specifically that they were willing to include intermediate bombers, such as the Tu-16, Tu-22 and Tu-22M (Backfire). But they emphasised that they were *not* willing to include land-based naval aircraft of these types or, indeed, any other land-based

naval aircraft. No mention has been made of long-range heavy bombers, which the Russians say are covered by the START talks between themselves and the Americans.

20. The large numerical difference between the two sides, with the Russians talking of a total of 7 700 or 7 800 aircraft and the West of 4 700 plus 500 air-defence aircraft, constitutes a significant problem. The absurdity of a situation where, if Russian proposals are accepted, the West in theory would have to build and acquire *more* aircraft to reach the ceilings involved must be brought home to the Soviets.

IV. *The problem of verification*

21. In spite of the progress made in the Stockholm agreement on confidence- and security-building measures and in the INF agreement, and the many positive references to verification by Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shevardnadze, old attitudes towards verification in the Soviet Union, particularly among the military, die hard. There remains a very great reluctance to accept the degree of openness with respect to military matters which is already common practice in the West, let alone the much more intrusive procedures necessary in the arms control context.

22. Inspections under the Stockholm agreement are limited in number and are relatively constrained. Verification of the INF agreement is tightly focused, with the enormous advantage of a zero agreement, and both sides rely heavily on national technical means. CFE will entail, if western requirements are to be met, a verification régime of a quite different order, both in terms of the number of inspections and the range of facilities to be covered without right of refusal; and in terms of its intrusiveness.

23. However, the Soviet response is not merely the legacy from old-style, pre-glasnost paranoia and secrecy. There are also real concerns which relate to the scale of the military reorganisation now under way, and the size of the reductions implicit in the CFE agreement. The Soviet bureaucracy, in particular the military, are – with some justification – very conscious of the sheer burden which their already over-stretched administrative machine will have to bear. It must not be forgotten that the problems of rehousing and resettlement for those demobilised in the USSR are enormous and far greater than for any of the NATO allies. The logistics and costs of this exercise alone are causing great concern. As has already become evident both in Vienna and, more recently during the Open Skies negotiation in Ottawa, the Russians will look very closely indeed at the large verification bill now being presented by the

West, and will probably seek to strike as many items off it as they can.

24. Where our own WEU member countries are concerned, we also want to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and excessive costs in implementing a verification régime. A number of nations have already announced the formation of inspection teams, the start of language-training courses, etc., etc., with a view to being prepared to make a prompt beginning once the CFE treaty is signed and ratified by national parliaments. Belgium, the Federal Republic, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have all begun the necessary processes (as has Hungary on the eastern side), but there is a growing realisation that the costs involved could prove prohibitive.

25. Hence the need for co-operation between nations, beginning with the obvious advantages of such co-operation in Western European Union, where proposals for trial inspections on a bi- or trilateral basis are being implemented at long last, after much prompting from the Assembly. The work being accomplished in WEU's Special Working and Defence Representatives Groups will prove invaluable, but must be extended in scope and urgency if it is to be timely and effective².

26. In the Defence Committee's report on "Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) – reply to the annual report of the Council"³ the following recommendation was made:

"The Assembly,

.....

(xii) Considering that the WEU member countries' security interests can be defended only in the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance but that in future they must be harmonised more consistently;

.....

(xiv) Pleased that the Council in its reply to Recommendation 470 is considering a WEU contribution to the CFE verification system, emphasising "the exploitation of European capabilities and the pooling of member states' assets",

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

.....

2. See Document 1210 (Information letter from the Secretary-General of WEU on the activities of the ministerial organs) for details.

3. Document 1204, 6th November 1989, Rapporteur: Mr. Steiner.

2. Take up the proposal made by the French Prime Minister on 7th September 1989 and prepare a WEU programme for purposeful verification and disarmament co-operation;

..... "

This, coupled with the proposal made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Genscher, speaking at the WEU Assembly's extraordinary session in Luxembourg on Friday 23rd March 1990, suggesting the creation of a European verification agency, could and should provide the basis for a positive contribution towards the safeguarding of European security.

27. The WEU Council must be urged to take the necessary measures to seize the initiative on verification which otherwise is doomed to suffer from the disparate actions of individual states. The impetus for co-operation should come from us, the European nucleus, and we should invite our neighbours in both West and East, to join us in establishing the new verification régime.

28. Already work is being done in the WEU Ad Hoc Sub-Group on Space to study the possibility of creating a WEU observation satellite agency as suggested by the Assembly⁴, and these various proposals could well be brought together to allow both West and East Europeans to complement the superpowers' "national technical means" and preponderance of advantage. Setting up multinational teams for verification could have an effect far beyond the immediately obvious and could prove an essential confidence-building measure which would serve as a model in other domains as well. (For example, if the Open Skies proposals are to be effective, there will have to be a measure of close co-operation – technical and logistic – between the various nations involved.) Co-operation and complementarity are the two watch-words for success in the realm of verification, as was stressed repeatedly throughout the Assembly's symposium on "Observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament", in Rome on 27th and 28th March 1990.

V. Vienna timings

29. The outstanding decisions and agreements in Vienna must be concluded by the end of June 1990 if enough time is to be available for suitable texts to be drawn up ready for the proposed signing of the treaty at a CSCE summit in November this year. Those most closely

4. "Verification: a future European satellite agency", Document 1159, 3rd November 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Fourné; "Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council", Document 1160, 7th November 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti.

involved are reasonably optimistic about succeeding, but only if further redefining of attitudes is possible, especially where combat aircraft are concerned.

30. Failing such agreement on aircraft, it may prove possible to conclude a treaty without them, although this would be something of a paradox: after all, aircraft were accepted by the West in the original mandate only after considerable Soviet insistence! At present, the possibility of a truncated agreement is not discussed officially for fear of prejudicing the immediate negotiations.

VI. The way ahead

(i) What should the future bring by way of arms control negotiation?

31. Opinions are currently divided. On the one hand, there are those who would wish the CSCE process to take over the whole discussion on European disarmament. The advantage would be that a pan-European forum would be opened further to reconcile and alleviate East-West differences. There would be less of the "bloc to bloc" nature about discussions compared with the CFE setting, which would suit especially French traditional attitudes and, now, many of the Warsaw Pact countries who are seeking to distance themselves from Moscow and who see discussions at the "23" (or "22" without the GDR) level as a continuation of the old order. Others believe, however, that our own interests are too important to be entrusted to the vagaries of some of the neutral and non-aligned countries...

32. The current fashion nevertheless is to seek to institutionalise the CSCE process – creating a permanent structure, offices, officials and perhaps a parliamentary assembly. Your Rapporteur has considerable doubts about the desirability of such proposals, believing that an ad hoc arrangement would be a preferable alternative, with only the lightest supporting framework. But perhaps a "half-way house" might prove a possible compromise.

33. If real progress is to be made in further European disarmament, in an effort to ensure the mutual security which is our aim, the five principal actors amongst the neutral and non-aligned nations (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) should conceivably be invited to join the "22" in continuing the CFE discussions in a broader and deeper manner. Of the five, Switzerland is unlikely to want to participate, which would imply a forum of 26 nations, all committed and directly concerned to ensure mutual security and stability: an "expanded CFE" or CSCE "action group". The present link with the other NNA countries

should obviously continue on a formal basis, providing a useful forum for cross-fertilisation of ideas, as well as an essential confidence-building measure.

(ii) What should be on the agenda?

34. A consensus is emerging for further discussion of the present five categories of weapon systems to aim at deeper cuts than those forthcoming in CFE 1. In a sense, therefore, it would not be a question of a "CFE 2", but rather a "CFE 1 (bis)", for the immediate future. The particular advantage of such an arrangement would be to allow much more emphasis on individual *national* capabilities in an attempt to remove potentially destabilising factors from the European theatre. A number of participants are already indicating that these "national ceilings" should be emphasised in the future. In any event, the next "CFE talks" may well have to be structured differently.

35. Such an arrangement, however, would not be possible without further and parallel discussions in other forums, such as the UN Conference on Disarmament, to ensure that Europe is not left insecure vis à vis the growing armed capabilities of non-European states and regional groupings...

36. The Defence Committee is closely following such developments and negotiations and will be reporting further in due course.

37. The above proposals are strengthened by the fact that the imminent CFE treaty is likely to take at least three years to implement (some authorities say five and the Soviets say even longer), during which time many developments are to be expected, including the possible dissolution of at least one of the alliances involved. As the treaty is based on the principle of parity between two groups of states, groups created for the purposes of the treaty, and not on two alliances, the continuing existence, or conversely the disappearance, of one of the alliances need not affect implementation of the treaty, provided the former members of that alliance remain content to work together as a group for the purposes of implementing the treaty.

38. The key to the continued successful implementation of the treaty will remain political will. If the 22 remaining parties are content to implement the treaty making such practical adjustments as are necessary, then there is no good reason why the treaty should not continue in force. However, even given excellent results from the CFE talks the resulting treaty will not meet everyone's expectations and will not solve all the problems. An agenda for "Vienna 2" must be arranged as soon as possible and the West should respond positively to Soviet proposals to begin the necessary preliminary discussion of such an agenda.

39. In practice, there are a number of new problems to resolve. For example, the ceilings involved may have to be altered to take account of the fact that the equipment of the former GDR armed forces had passed into the possession of the new, larger Germany. Alternatively, instead of adjusting the ceilings, it might be accepted that those on one side would be shared among six, rather than seven. The principal safeguard for the West is enshrined in the sufficiency rule which will limit the proportion of total holdings any one state may possess. There will of course also have to be adjustments to, in particular, the verification procedures, especially during any transitional period in which, say, some limited Soviet forces remained on the territory of the erstwhile GDR. The verification régime envisaged in the treaty should be sufficiently flexible to cope with this sort of requirement, provided the governments concerned have the necessary will.

40. Looking even further into the future, all arms control subjects should be opened to discussion, either in the suggested new CFE framework, or in the wider CSBM context which should continue in parallel as the forum where the majority of the neutral and non-aligned nations are able to exert their influence.

VII. Action for WEU

(i) Spreading the word

41. In addition to the initiatives suggested regarding verification, the WEU Council should now embark on a comprehensive programme to explain arms control imperatives to the general public. For its part, the Assembly should be prepared to urge speedy ratification of the CFE treaty in national parliaments.

42. The whole process could be helped further on its way by increasing the opportunities for East-West contact to discuss and explain attitudes on security matters. Contacts should be multiplied at all levels – between governments, parliamentarians, officials and the public – to ensure all possibilities for cross-fertilisation and mutual education are taken. We should not be afraid of tackling other arms control “hot potatoes” such as short-range nuclear questions, especially now that the Russians seem to have grasped the message of WEU’s Hague platform and are themselves talking about the need for maintaining minimum nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future. The Assembly is looking forward to a fruitful co-operation with the newly-created Paris-based WEU Institute for Security Studies, with a view to furthering such moves.

(ii) A parochial note and a word of thanks

43. In the report on “Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council”, which he prepared for the Defence Committee, Mr. de Beer included the recommendation that the Council:

“9. Urge the Chairman-in-Office to establish at the highest level in his country’s delegation in Vienna, a WEU liaison officer for the CFE talks.”

The recommendation was adopted unanimously both in the committee and by the Assembly on 6th June 1989. In its reply (dated 8th September 1989) to Recommendation 470, the Council said:

“The presidency of WEU will keep the Assembly and the Council informed of developments in the Vienna arms control negotiations. Furthermore, the presidency will endeavour to ensure that the concerns expressed by both the Council and the Assembly are taken into account in the negotiations.”

44. On 16th October 1989, Mr. Roland Beix, in the French National Assembly, asked whether the government:

“is considering endorsing the WEU Assembly’s proposal to urge the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to appoint at the highest level in his country’s delegation in Vienna a WEU liaison officer for the talks on conventional forces in Europe?”

The reply reads:

“On the proposal that the Chairman of the WEU Council appoint a WEU official to follow the Vienna talks on conventional forces in Europe, this has never been discussed by the organisation’s Council. The French Government has therefore not had to decide whether or not to endorse this proposal of which it did not have cognisance.

Basically, the French Government is obviously in favour of the idea of consultations specific to European countries members of WEU in the context of the Vienna negotiations and will support any appropriate initiative in this sense.”

45. Your Rapporteur applauds the latter comment, while regretting the fact that the Council seems to be experiencing a communication problem. To rub salt into this particular wound, the present Chairman-in-Office of the Council is alleged recently to have asserted that the presidency was totally unaware of the arrangement promised in the Council’s reply to

the recommendation... A further failure of communication?

46. Rather than finish on such a disappointing note, your Rapporteur would wish instead to emphasise the positive aspect of the Assembly's links with the Vienna negotiations. Although there is perhaps no defined WEU presence (unlike the European Community, which has a permanent office in the Austrian capital and is now asking for a place at the CSCE table!), nor a formal "WEU Caucus" among the nations represented, an informal pattern of WEU discussion is gradually emerging as a result of the Defence Committee's assiduity in organising regular meetings in Vienna and in ensuring that its rapporteurs are frequent visitors to the various delegations (both from East and West) to the negotiations.

47. The Defence Committee hopes in this way to "show the WEU flag", as well as keeping abreast of developments in Vienna. The co-operation of WEU Foreign Offices and the Vienna Heads of Delegation in helping making the arrangements for such visits and meetings is greatly appreciated by us all.

(iii) The European verification centre

48. In recent years, the WEU Council has been wont to take many of the recommendations emanating from the Assembly with the proverbial "pinch of salt". Apart from one or two notable exceptions to confirm the rule: the creation of the institute, for example, or the current study on the use of satellites for verification, there have been few occasions when practical measures have ensued as a result of the various deliberations of the Assembly. Sometimes it has been a question of the ideas being ahead of their time (for example, the suggested regular meetings of chiefs of WEU countries' defence staffs or the creation of multinational forces or units⁵, but in many cases the Council's formal reply to a specific recommendation has fobbed off the Assembly with the succinct comment such as "not appropriate to WEU", etc., etc. One such recent phrase⁶ runs:

"Given that WEU is not involved in the day-to-day decisions about defence and the conduct of the current negotiations aimed at arms reductions..." (emphasis added).

Assumptions and assertions such as this are not commensurate with the rôle for WEU envisaged by the nationally-elected representa-

5. "Naval aviation", Document 1139, 9th May 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson; "State of European security - intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north", Document 1183, 26th April 1989, Rapporteur: Mr. Speed.

6. Document 1210.

tives who make up the Assembly. The latter is increasingly aware that the time has never been more ripe for Western Europeans to take the lead in bringing halves of our continent back together: WEU's unique contribution is and should be in the realm of defence and security, especially concerning arms control and verification.

49. In its reply to Recommendation 470, the Council made a very positive remark:

"With regard to the CFE verification system, a possible WEU contribution is under consideration, the emphasis being on the exploitation of European capabilities and the pooling of member states' assets.

In this connection, attention is drawn to the deliberations of the Council's ad hoc working group which is studying the possible uses of space-based means for the verification of conventional arms control agreements."

This is very good news and the Assembly hopes that the study will particularly be looking, for example, at the way in which future inspectors are trained, at definitions of methods of work and at the way in which the various verification means are organised. It must be ensured that all member countries have guarantees of equal access to the necessary information. These are the obvious first steps in the process.

50. Further steps in the right direction were announced in the communiqué (the first since 1987) published after the WEU Council meeting on Monday, 23rd April 1990 and elaborated during the committee's joint meeting with the Chairmen-in-Office on Tuesday, 24th April, viz.:

- (a) establishing, by autumn 1990, a programme of mutual trial inspections;
- (b) opening national inspection teams to include inspectors from other countries;
- (c) the possibility of joint training of inspectors;
- (d) member countries to state their preferred geographic areas for inspection (to harmonise efforts in a common sense way).

51. Such moves, together with the proposal by NATO to establish a verification co-ordinating committee at the headquarters in Evère, are warmly welcomed by the Defence Committee although your Rapporteur has two specific observations:

- (a) a slight doubt about France's willingness to take part in a purely NATO alliance-oriented arrangement. No

such reservation is applied by France to WEU (which Paris will preside from 1st July 1990);

- (b) the absolute necessity now to move away from the bloc-to-bloc atmosphere of "NATO" and "Warsaw Pact" *per se* to build better relations for the future.

52. The boldest step now would be for the countries taking part in the CFE negotiations to set up a European verification centre as proposed by Mr. Genscher on 23rd March. Thus, membership of such a centre should not be limited to the present WEU nations, but be opened to all other countries (signatories of the CFE treaty), from both West and East, who would wish to participate. Its purpose would be to help to bring about mutual confidence by comparing and adjusting methods and procedures governing verification operations and developing exchanges of information between all participating countries on the matters tackled.

53. Hence the recommendation of the present report, which we should urge the Council to accept without further ado. A *European verification centre* as a clearing house for co-ordination of all aspects of verification would have an immensely important rôle both in sharing out the tasks between members and ensuring the maximum of co-operation. Whether it is the training of inspectors to common standards of procedure, or running the enormous data-base of information which will be amassed as a result of a combination of on-site inspection, overflying (Open Skies) or from satellite observation, such a centre could play a critical rôle in generating mutual confidence between its members and vis-à-vis the superpowers.

54. It is your Rapporteur's view that the Council should pounce on this new and exciting recommendation without further prevarication and prepare a major Western European Union initiative aimed at furthering our most cherished goals.

APPENDIX I

Mandate for negotiation on conventional armed forces¹ in Europe

The representatives of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America held consultations in Vienna from 17th February 1987 to 10th January 1989.

These states,

Conscious of the common responsibility which they all have for seeking to achieve greater stability and security in Europe;

Acknowledging that it is their armed forces which bear most immediately on the essential security relationship in Europe, in particular as they are signatories of the treaties of Brussels (1948), Washington (1949) or Warsaw (1955), and accordingly are members of the North Atlantic Alliance or parties to the Warsaw Treaty;

Recalling that they are all participants in the CSCE process;

Recalling that, as reaffirmed in the Helsinki Final Act, they have the right to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance;

Determined that a negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe should take place in the framework of the CSCE process;

Reaffirming also that they participate in negotiations as sovereign and independent states and on the basis of full equality;

Have agreed on the following provisions:

Participants

The participants in this negotiation shall be the 23 above-listed states hereinafter referred to as "the participants".

Objectives and methods

The objectives of the negotiation shall be to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. Each and every participant undertakes to contribute to the attainment of these objectives.

These objectives shall be achieved by the application of militarily significant measures such as reductions, limitations, redeployment provisions, equal ceilings, and related measures, among others.

In order to achieve the above objectives, measures should be pursued for the whole area of application with provisions, if and where appropriate, for regional differentiation to redress disparities within the area of application and in a way which precludes circumvention.

The process of strengthening stability and security should proceed step-by-step, in a manner which will ensure that the security of each participant is not affected adversely at any stage.

Scope and area of application

The subject of the negotiation shall be the conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, of the participants based on land within the territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The existence of multiple capabilities will not be a criterion for modifying the scope of the negotiation:

– No conventional armaments or equipment will be excluded from the subject of the negotiation because they may have other capabilities in addition to conventional ones. Such armaments or equipment will not be singled out in a separate category;

1. Conventional armed forces include conventional armaments and equipment.

– Nuclear weapons will not be a subject of this negotiation.

Particular emphasis will initially be placed on those forces directly related to the achievement of the objectives of the negotiation set out above.

Naval forces and chemical weapons will not be addressed.

The area of application shall be the entire land territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, which includes all the European island territories of the participants. In the case of the Soviet Union the area of application includes all the territory lying west of the Ural River and the Caspian Sea. In the case of Turkey the area of application includes the territory of Turkey north and west of the following line: the point of intersection of the border with the 39th parallel, Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent, Gözne and thence to the sea.

Exchange of information and verification

Compliance with the provisions of any agreement shall be verified through an effective and strict verification régime which, among other things, will include on-site inspections as a matter of right and exchanges of information.

Information shall be exchanged in sufficient detail so as to allow a meaningful comparison of the capabilities of the forces involved. Information shall also be exchanged in sufficient detail so as to provide a basis for the verification of compliance.

The specific modalities for verification and the exchange of information, including the degree of detail of the information and the order of its exchange, shall be agreed at the negotiation proper.

Procedures and other arrangements

The procedures for the negotiation, including the agenda, work programme and timetable, working methods, financial issues and other organisational modalities, as agreed by the participants themselves, are set out in Annex I² of this mandate. They can be changed only by consensus of the participants.

The participants decided to take part in meetings of the states signatories of the Helsinki Final Act to be held at least twice during each round of the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe in order to exchange views and substantive information concerning the course of the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe. Detailed modalities for these meetings are contained in Annex II² to this mandate.

The participants will take into consideration the views expressed in such meetings by other CSCE participating states concerning their own security.

Participants will also provide information bilaterally.

The participants undertake to inform the next CSCE follow-up meeting of their work and possible results and to exchange views, at that meeting, with the other CSCE participating states on progress achieved in the negotiation.

The participants foresee that, in the light of circumstances at the time, they will provide in their timetable for a temporary suspension to permit this exchange of views. The appropriate time and duration of this suspension is their sole responsibility.

Any modification of this mandate is the sole responsibility of the participants, whether they modify it themselves or concur in its modification at a future CSCE follow-up meeting.

The results of the negotiation will be determined only by the participants.

Character of agreements

Agreements reached shall be internationally binding. Modalities for their entry into force will be decided at the negotiation.

Venue

The negotiation shall commence in Vienna no later than in the seventh week following the closure of the Vienna CSCE meeting.

2. Available from the Office of the Clerk.

*Extracts from Annex II to the mandate for negotiation
on conventional armed forces in Europe*

Statement of the Representative of Denmark

On behalf of the Government of Denmark, I wish to confirm that the Faroe Islands are included in the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Statement of the Representative of Norway

On behalf of the Government of Norway, I confirm that Svalbard including Bear Island, is included in the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Statement of the Representative of Portugal

The islands of Azores and Madeira have by right the status of European islands. It has been agreed in the mandate that all the European island territories of the participants are included in the area of application. I can therefore state on behalf of my Government that the Azores and Madeira are within the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Statement of the Representative of Spain

On behalf of the Government of Spain, I confirm that the Canary Islands are included in the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Statement of the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I confirm that Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya are included in the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.

APPENDIX II

*A. Current negotiations – a primer**CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe)**History*

The negotiations began on 3rd July 1973 in *Helsinki* and concluded with the *Helsinki Final Act* on 1st August 1975.

The first review conference took place in *Belgrade* from 4th October 1977 to 9th March 1978 and failed to reach any conclusions.

The second review conference was held in *Madrid* from 11th November 1980 to 9th September 1983. In the *Madrid Concluding Document* the “Stockholm Conference” (CDE) was set up.

The third review conference took place in *Vienna* from 4th November 1986 to 15th January 1989. In the *Vienna Concluding Document* two sets of talks were set up:

- (a) the CSBM negotiations, and
- (b) the CFE talks.

Participants: 35

Austria (NNA)	Luxembourg (NATO)
Belgium (NATO)	Malta (NNA)
Bulgaria (WTO)	Monaco (NNA)
Canada (NATO)	Netherlands (NATO)
Cyprus (NNA)	Norway (NATO)
Czechoslovakia (WTO)	Poland (WTO)
Denmark (NATO)	Portugal (NATO)
Finland (NNA)	Romania (WTO)
France (NATO)	San Marino (NNA)
FRG (NATO)	Spain (NATO)
GDR (WTO)	Sweden (NNA)
Greece (NATO)	Switzerland (NNA)
Holy See (NNA)	Turkey (NATO)
Hungary (WTO)	United Kingdom (NATO)
Iceland (NATO)	United States (NATO)
Ireland (NNA)	USSR (WTO)
Italy (NATO)	Yugoslavia (NNA)
Liechtenstein (NNA)	

*(a) CSBM (Confidence- and security-building measures)**History*

The negotiations on CSBMs, within the framework of the CSCE, were originally set up in 1983 following the CSCE review conference in Madrid.

The CDE (*Conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, also known as the “Stockholm Conference”*), held in Stockholm from 17th January 1984 to 22nd September 1986, agreed to a “Stockholm Document”, which improved upon the CSBMs already agreed in Helsinki in 1975.

The third (Vienna) CSCE review conference, unable to agree upon a CDE follow-up, set up as a compromise, in its concluding document on 15th January 1989, the two present sets of “Vienna talks”: the CSBM and CFE negotiations.

The negotiations began on 9th March 1989.

Present location

Vienna.

Participants

The 35 CSCE participants.

Agenda

According to the mandate: "Elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of confrontation in Europe."

*(b) CFE (Conventional armed forces in Europe)**History*

The mandate for the CFE talks, attached to the *Vienna concluding document*, was approved on 15th January 1989. The talks began on 6th March 1989.

Location

Vienna.

Participants

The 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

Agenda

See text of mandate at Appendix I.

(It is hoped that a CFE agreement will be completed by the end of 1990.)

*CD (Conference on Disarmament)**History*

The CD was set up as the negotiating body of the United Nations for disarmament treaties during the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. It is independent of the UN, but considers recommendations from, and reports regularly to the United Nations General Assembly.

Location

Palais des Nations, Geneva.

Participants

40 countries: the 5 nuclear weapon states plus 35 other states.

Algeria 21	Egypt 21	Kenya 21	Sri Lanka 21
Argentina 21	Ethiopia 21	Mexico 21	Sweden 21
Australia	FRG	Mongolia	Venezuela 21
Belgium	GDR	Morocco 21	Yugoslavia 21
Brazil 21	Hungary	Netherlands	Zaire 21
Bulgaria	India 21	Nigeria 21	China*
Burma 21	Indonesia 21	Pakistan 21	France*
Canada	Iran 21	Peru 21	United Kingdom*
Cuba 21	Italy	Poland	United States*
Czechoslovakia	Japan	Romania	USSR*

21 a member of the neutral and non-aligned states within the CD ("the Group of 21")

* nuclear weapon state

Agenda

The permanent agenda of the conference deals with "the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

1. nuclear weapons in all aspects;
2. chemical weapons;

3. other weapons of mass destruction;
4. conventional weapons;
5. reduction of military budgets;
6. reduction of armed forces;
7. disarmament and development;
8. disarmament and international security;
9. collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
10. comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control ”,

most of these subjects being discussed in ad hoc committees.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, established in 1980, with all 40 countries participating, is working on a treaty to ban the possession, production and use of chemical weapons.

START (Strategic arms (limitation and) reduction talks)

History

The United States and Soviet Union agreed on 7th and 8th January 1985 to conduct new negotiations on strategic offensive weapons (following on from SALT I, SALT II, and START (the fifth round of which ended on 8th December 1983).

The first session of the “new” START (also referred to as “treaty on strategic offensive weapons” and “the group on strategic nuclear weapons”) began on 27th March 1985.

Location

Geneva (mainly).

Participants

United States and Soviet Union.

Agenda

“To work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability.”; and ultimately, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Open Skies

History

On 12th May 1989 (after a suggestion by the Canadian Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney – although the idea was originally proposed by United States President Eisenhower in 1955), President Bush proposed “Open Skies”. The aim was to allow flights by unarmed surveillance aircraft over the territory of the superpowers and their allies, in order to strengthen mutual confidence and transparency in connection with military activities. On 23rd September 1989, following a meeting between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Baker, the Soviet Union and the United States issued a joint statement calling for an international conference on “Open Skies”.

Location

The first part of the conference took place in *Ottawa* from 12th to 27th February 1990 and the second part is scheduled to be held in *Budapest* at the end of April or the beginning of May 1990.

Participants

All 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

Agenda

The drafting of a convention permitting overflight of any part of a participant’s territory by aircraft containing members of another participant (operated on a quota system) – a convention initially open to NATO and Warsaw Pact members, but eventually to be extended to other (European) countries.

To encourage reciprocal openness on the part of the participants, thus enhancing confidence and security, and facilitating the implementation and verification of existing disarmament and arms control treaties.

B. Glossary

" 23 " talks	Conventional Forces in Europe talks (CFE)
AA	anti-aircraft
AAM	air-to-air missile(s)
AB	airborne
ABM	anti-ballistic missile(s)
ACM	advanced cruise missile
AD	air defence
AEW	airborne early warning
AFAP	artillery-fired atomic projectile
AFV	armoured fighting vehicle(s)
ALCM	air-launched cruise missile(s)
APC	armoured personnel carrier(s)
ASAT	anti-satellite (sometimes anti-satellite talks or weapons)
ASM	air-to-surface missile(s)
ASW	anti-submarine warfare
ATBM	anti-tactical ballistic missile
ATGW	anti-tank guided weapon(s)
ATK	anti-tank
ATM	anti-tactical missile
AWACS	airborne warning and control system
BM	ballistic missile
BMD	ballistic missile defence
BW	biological weapon
BWC	Biological Weapon Convention
CBM	confidence-building measure(s)
CBW	chemical and biological weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDE	Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe talks
CPD	Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CSBM	confidence- and security-building measure(s)
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CTB	Comprehensive Test Ban
CW	chemical warfare
DEW	distant early warning, radar system across Canada
EDI	European Defence Initiative, for tactical defence of Europe
ENDC	Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, a precursor of the CD
EW	electronic warfare
EWng	early warning
FAC	fast attack craft (gun)
FAC(G)	fast attack craft (missile)
FAC(P)	fast attack craft (patrol)
FAC(T)	fast attack craft (torpedo)
FBS	forward-based systems (US nuclear-capable delivery systems based out of the US "forward" toward the Soviet Union)
FGA	fighter(s), ground-attack
FOTL	follow-on to Lance (SNF missile)
GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile(s)
Group of 23	the 16 NATO and 7 WTO nations which put together the CFE mandate
Group of Six	Mexico, Sweden, India, Argentina, Tanzania and Greece, seek to halt arms race (also known as Five-Continent Peace Initiative and Six-Nation Peace Initiative)
GW	guided weapon(s)

HLTF	NATO's High Level Task Force
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile(s)
IEPG	Independent European Programme Group
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile(s)
KT	kiloton (1 000 tons TNT equivalent)
LCA	landing craft, assault
LCAC	landing craft, air cushion
LCM	landing craft, medium/mechanised
LCT	landing craft, tank
LCU	landing craft, utility
LCVP	landing craft, vehicles and personnel
LHA	amphibious general assault ship(s)
LRTNF	long-range theatre nuclear forces
LSD	landing ship, dock
LSM	landing ship, medium
LST	landing ship, tank
LTB	Limited Test Ban Treaty
MAD	mutual assured destruction
MARV	manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks
MBT	main battle tank
MCMV	mine counter-measure vessel(s)
MENFZ	Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone
MICV	mechanised infantry combat vehicle(s)
MIRV	multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle(s)
MLRS	multiple-launch rocket system
MR	maritime reconnaissance
MRBM	medium-range ballistic missile(s)
MRL	multiple rocket launcher(s)
MRV	multiple re-entry vehicle(s)
MT	megaton (1 million tons TNT equivalent)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NNA	neutral and non-aligned
NNFZ	Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone
NNPA	US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
NNWS	non-nuclear weapon state
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NST	nuclear and space talks, Geneva
NTM	national and technical means, usually referring to verification
NWF	nuclear weapon-free
NWS	nuclear weapon state
PNE	peaceful nuclear explosion, also Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty
PTB	Partial Test Ban Treaty
PUNE	Conference on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
RCL	recoilless launcher(s)
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force (US)
RL	rocket launcher(s)
RV	re-entry vehicle(s)
RW	radiological weapon
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty or talks
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SANFZ	South Asia nuclear weapon-free zone
SAR	search and rescue
SCG	NATO Standing Consultative Group, followed the INF negotiations
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
SES	surface-effect ship(s)
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile(s)
SLCM	sea-launched cruise missile(s)
SNDV	strategic nuclear delivery vehicle

SNF	short-range nuclear forces
SPNFZ	South Pacific nuclear weapon-free zone
SRAM	short-range attack missile(s)
SRBM	short-range ballistic missile(s)
SRINF	shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces
SS	surface to surface, designation for missiles
SSBN	ballistic-missile nuclear submarine(s)
SSD I	First Special Session on Disarmament
SSD II	Second Special Session on Disarmament
SSD III	Third Special Session on Disarmament
SSM	surface-to-surface missile(s)
SSN	submarine(s), nuclear
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
STOL	short take-off and landing
SVC	Standing Verification Commission for INF Treaty
TASM	tactical air-to-surface missile
TTB	Threshold Test Ban Treaty
UNDC	UN Disarmament Commission
V(/S)TOL	vertical(/short) take-off and landing
WDC	World Disarmament Conference
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organisation
Zero option	US INF proposal to stop deployment if Soviets withdraw all medium-range missiles

*Communiqué issued after the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers**Brussels, 23rd April 1990*

1. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of Western European Union, meeting in Brussels on 23rd April 1990, were particularly pleased that the ratification of the Protocol of Accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty had been completed.

2. Ministers welcomed the sweeping changes which had taken place in Europe since their meeting in November 1989. The division of Europe is now being overcome. The emergence of new democracies following free elections is opening up new prospects for broader co-operation among Europeans.

They welcomed the return to democratic standards which the elections in the GDR and Hungary represent, and looked forward to those to be held shortly in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The prospect of the forthcoming attainment of German unity, founded on the unequivocal expression of the wishes of the population concerned, is an opportunity for Europe as a whole and an important step forward towards constructing a just and lasting peaceful order.

The united Germany will thus take its place alongside its fellow members of the North Atlantic Alliance and alongside its partners who have chosen to build a European union.

3. Ministers welcomed the new impetus being given to the CSCE process and the prospect of a conference of heads of state and/or of government taking place by the end of 1990.

The CSCE is the framework within which all Europeans, together with the United States and Canada, can establish new relations and develop co-operative structures capable of assuring each one of them that peace and stability will be maintained and their legitimate interests safeguarded.

4. It was with this new prospect in view that Ministers recalled the importance they attach to building a European union consistent with the Single European Act which they have signed as members of the European Community. They also reaffirmed the importance of the Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union as essential instruments for the security of the member countries and as factors for stability throughout Europe.

The continued presence of the forces of the United States and of Canada stationed in Europe provides a necessary contribution to our common security and overall stability, together with the contribution of WEU countries and their other European partners. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of The Hague platform and the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament of the Atlantic Alliance.

5. Ministers stressed the importance they attach to the concluding of a CFE agreement and to the holding of the CSCE summit before the end of the year. They regard such an agreement as an important achievement in the process of improving security and adapting military postures to the far-reaching changes – both military and political – which Europe is witnessing. They considered that the momentum of the negotiation process should be maintained so as to enhance stability, promote co-operative structures and expedite the attainment of a new peace order in Europe. Agreement on new confidence- and security-building measures in parallel with a CFE agreement would contribute greatly to that end.

6. European stability continues to be based on the collective and individual commitment of all partners in the alliance. It is also an essential matter for the Europeans themselves. For the Europeans to enhance their contribution to stability on the European continent and to the protection of their legitimate security interests, a greater degree of co-operation will be fundamental.

Ministers therefore recognised the need to continue working to strengthen the European identity and to promote the process of European integration including the security dimension. This growing identity is destined to be given concrete expression in the form of close, and even new co-operation between the member countries.

In the field of verification of the CFE treaty and “open skies”, Ministers welcomed the specific measures which had been adopted by WEU member countries particularly as regards the opening of national inspection teams to include inspectors from other WEU member countries.

On the subject of the computerised processing of verification data, Ministers welcomed the fact that a WEU group of experts had jointly defined realistic parameters for a system of interconnected data bases, and that this common WEU viewpoint had been taken into account by the Atlantic Alliance.

Ministers also noted the progress which had been made in studying the possibilities for European co-operation in the field of space-based observation systems for the purposes of arms control verification, and also for crisis and environmental monitoring. They called for concrete proposals to be submitted to them at their next meeting, inter alia with a view to examining the possibility of establishing a satellite verification agency.

7. Ministers recognised that European security has an extra-European dimension. As a consequence the European countries follow closely developments in other regions of the world, in particular the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

8. Peace, security and co-operation in Europe depend on an intensification of the dialogue at all levels. With regard to the new tasks for the organisation proposed by the incoming Presidency, Ministers agreed on the opportuneness of establishing contacts for two-way information with the democratically-elected governments in Central and Eastern Europe. They instructed the Presidency and the Secretary-General to organise these contacts. Ministers recognised that, by virtue of its activities, the parliamentary Assembly of WEU has an important rôle to play in opening up contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This has been illustrated by the recent extraordinary session of the Assembly held in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March. Likewise, the WEU Institute for Security Studies, whose establishment was decided upon at the last Council, and which is to begin operation from July this year, also has an active rôle to play in pooling ideas and in drawing together the new strands of thinking being developed in both the East and the West.

9. Ministers congratulated the Belgian Presidency on the particularly active way in which they had conducted the work of WEU. They hoped that, under its impetus and that of the incoming French Presidency, there would be a continued and intensive process of reflection and concertation among the member countries, particularly with a view to the two major meetings scheduled to take place before the end of the year, namely the CSCE summit and an Atlantic summit both aimed at giving appropriate responses to the changes taking place in Europe.

WEU provides an entirely suitable forum for its members to prepare a common approach to these forthcoming meetings.

WEU in the Atlantic Alliance

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the Political Committee ²
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur***

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submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix (Alternate: Baumel), Böhm, Caro, Coleman (Alternate: Parry), Collart, Eich, Forni, Foschi, Hill, Hitschler, Koehl, van der Linden (Alternate: Eisma), Lord Mackie of Benshie (Alternate: Lord Kirkhill), MM. Müller (Alternate: Kittelmann), Natali, Pécriaux, Pieralli, Mrs. Polfer (Alternate: Kollwelter), Mr. Sarti, Sir William Shelton (Alternate: Speed), Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Stoffelen (Alternate: Mrs. Verspaget), Thyraud.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation*on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance*

1. THE ASSEMBLY recalls that Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty closely associates WEU's activities with those of NATO and that NATO is still the essential guarantee of Europe's security because it is the only framework in which the deterrent power of the United States can be used for the benefit of Europe.

It recognises the progress made towards limiting armaments but notes that the Soviet Union has not yet taken any decisive steps to reduce its forces and armaments and still remains the leading military power on the European continent.

It considers that the security situation in Europe has been fundamentally changed through the democratisation processes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe and the opening of borders, including the one between the Federal Republic and the GDR.

It wishes the CFE negotiations to be concluded rapidly, a new mandate to be drawn up by the CSCE for a subsequent reduction in the level of armaments, exclusively defensive military systems to be established and negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons to be started immediately.

It welcomes the development of the CSCE and the efforts made in that framework to establish a new peaceful order in Europe.

It considers that in the context of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures, the Vienna negotiations and other forums significant steps are being taken to improve the security situation in Europe.

It considers that, with the increasing pace of European developments and the changing nature of security problems, planning for European security co-operation must be accelerated.

It considers that, in the new circumstances, Western European countries will have to play a larger rôle in this planning process, which will require closer co-operation between WEU member states.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council do its utmost to facilitate the United States Government's action to maintain and strengthen the association of the United States with the organisation of European security by:

- (a) asserting itself as the European pillar of the alliance, inter alia by moving the seat of its ministerial organs closer to that of NATO;
- (b) asking those of its members which do not participate in the NATO integrated commands to examine to what extent the new situation and the new rôle to be played by NATO allow them to associate their armed forces more closely with joint deployment;
- (c) keeping the Assembly constantly informed of the discussion that is to be held on the reorganisation, rôle and future of NATO in the context of the transformation of the military pacts into political alliances following arms reduction agreements;
- (d) tightening its links with the European members of the Atlantic Alliance which are not at present members of WEU;
- (e) ensuring that member countries make a military effort sufficient to guarantee a balance of conventional forces between the West and the Soviet Union;
- (f) for this purpose, fixing the troop levels that each of them undertakes to place at the service of joint defence and providing for these undertakings to be revised in conformity with future CFE agreements;
- (g) ensuring maximum security in Western Europe with a minimum deployment of forces and urgently studying the conditions in which multinational units might be set up;
- (h) organising, in the framework of a general reduction in military expenditure and the level of armaments, fair burden- and responsibility-sharing in the alliance and between WEU member countries.

2. THE ASSEMBLY considers it necessary for a reunified Germany not to be neutral and that it be integrated in the European Community and play a full part in an all-European security system as soon as it is set up by the CSCE and, during a transitional period, a search be made for solutions acceptable to all concerned with maintaining balance and peace in Europe.

It also considers that reunified Germany must formally recognise the frontiers with its neighbours resulting from the second world war and recognised by the Helsinki agreements.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council facilitate the search for a status for reunified Germany which ensures that it participates in the collective security of Western Europe while giving the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European countries the political and military assurances necessary for maintaining a balance of forces and advancing future negotiations on peace and disarmament.

It also RECOMMENDS that the Council ensure consultations between its members on matters on the agenda of the negotiations on the status of Germany between the two German states and the four powers directly concerned.

3. THE ASSEMBLY considers that recent developments in certain non-European countries, particularly in the Near and Middle East, are a new danger to international peace and the security of Europe. It notes that the Atlantic Alliance is making no provision for the necessary guarantees against such threats but that any initiatives Europe may take to counter them help to strengthen American confidence that the alliance is operating correctly.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council make regular assessments of all possible threats to European security and inform the public of the results of its work on security in the Mediterranean.

4. THE ASSEMBLY hopes that the difficulties now arising in the CFE negotiations, in particular over the level of air forces, will be rapidly overcome, that an agreement will be concluded in 1990 and that further negotiations will be started before the end of the year to speed up the reduction in the level of forces and armaments in Europe.

It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to co-ordinate member countries' action for applying an open-skies agreement and for ensuring the effectiveness of verification operations.

It RECOMMENDS that the Council contribute to the success of the disarmament negotiations and enable member countries to play an active part in verifying and implementing future agreements by:

- (a) taking an early decision on the joint production and use of observation satellites;
- (b) widening the decision taken in Brussels on 23rd April in order to organise a permanent exchange of information between its members on the results of each one's verification operations;
- (c) organising co-operation between member countries and, possibly, other European members of NATO for training the staff necessary for carrying out these operations.

5. THE ASSEMBLY notes that Western European security continues to be guaranteed through implementation of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council fulfil that guarantee by ensuring that member states make an effort to facilitate the rapid conclusion of the first phase of the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament and urge the immediate commencement of Vienna II negotiations.

6. THE ASSEMBLY notes that the limitation of forces and armaments in Europe will lead to a reduction in arms production and troop levels in national armies.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council exercise its mandate and at last give the necessary impetus to the establishment of interoperability of armaments used by NATO and the standardisation and joint production of armaments by member countries by:

- (a) assessing the requirements of European security in this area during the period of implementation of the CFE agreement;
- (b) fostering understanding between arms-producing firms in member countries, inter alia through harmonisation of relevant national legislation, as suggested in the study conducted by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee in April 1982;
- (c) having the WEU Institute for Security Studies give priority to studying the economic and social consequences of a potential reduction in the activities of the arms industries and the number of persons employed on defence work.

It RECOMMENDS that the Council take steps to prepare for changing military strategies and doctrines and to adjust to the new situation in Europe: whilst retaining defensive capabilities, the present strategy of forward defence and flexible response in Europe will have to be re-examined and in this context the armed forces may have to be changed.

It welcomes the decision of President Bush and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to terminate the follow-on to Lance programme and to cancel any further modernisation of United States nuclear

artillery shells deployed in Europe which indicates the willingness and ability of the alliance to take the initiative in a rapidly changing situation.

7. THE ASSEMBLY welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies are now open to exchanges of views and information with the West on defence and security matters.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council help to restore mutual confidence between Eastern and Central European countries and Western European countries by holding, together with the WEU Institute for Security Studies, exchanges of information with appropriate bodies in the Soviet Union and the Eastern and Central European countries on matters relating to security, disarmament and verification, as decided on 23rd April 1990.

8. THE ASSEMBLY welcomes the Council's efforts to help to inform the public about its work. It notes with satisfaction that, for the first time, the Council has given it a document in which the IEPG gives it information about its activities. It considers, however, that this policy of openness is still inadequate, which is detrimental to the cohesion of NATO.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council provide the public with more information about the work of its dependent organs and the results they obtain. It also recommends that it ask the presidency of the IEPG to report regularly and directly to the Assembly on its activities.

9. THE ASSEMBLY notes that the decisions taken by the Council on the abolition of arms control and of the Standing Armaments Committee have in fact impaired the WEU ministerial organs' relations with NATO. It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to develop other forms of contact.

However, it RECOMMENDS that the Council resume the practice of asking the NATO authorities for an opinion on matters within their purview raised by Assembly recommendations or written questions from members of the Assembly.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The present report was discussed in detail at the Political Committee's meeting on 24th April 1990. The discussion revealed significant differences of views, perhaps less over what should be done in the immediate future than on longer-term prospects for Europe's security. Some members believed the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should take over the major part of the security burden in the fairly near future. Others, on the contrary, including your Rapporteur, feared that the thirty-five powers taking part in the conference, whose foreign and security policy concepts varied considerably, would not be able to assume responsibility for security for quite some time. Furthermore, a French member of the committee referred to his country's position towards NATO. No one, however, contested your Rapporteur's main ideas, and particularly that the association of the United States and Canada with Western European defence through the intermediary of NATO was at present an irreplaceable factor of deterrence of benefit to the European order that alone allowed a policy of arms limitation to be pursued and the restoration of mutual confidence necessary for the CSCE to make progress.

2. Furthermore, the committee noted that forthcoming events at the end of April and beginning of May 1990, with the Community summit meeting in Dublin and the NATO ministerial meeting, were likely to throw more light on the facts of the matter it had to discuss. It therefore decided to defer adopting the report until the end of May.

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3. While the 1948 Brussels Treaty resulted from steps taken by five European countries determined to ensure their security together by a deployment of their own forces, the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949 changed the situation considerably. The signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty included all members of Western Union and, as soon as a military system was established in Europe by virtue of NATO, in 1950 Western Union transferred to it the exercise of its responsibilities as a military organisation. Since that date, WEU's activities have been inextricably linked with those of NATO and, in 1954, this enabled the Brussels Treaty to be used to permit the creation of a German federal army integrated in the NATO military commands.

4. The revision of the treaty naturally took into account the existence and activities of NATO and Article IV defined the basic principles for co-operation between the two organisations, as follows:

“In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military means.”

5. Furthermore, Protocol No. II to the Paris Agreements fixed maximum levels of forces of member countries under NATO integrated military command and, in the case of the United Kingdom, a minimum level that that country undertook to maintain, and made respect for these provisions subject to a review procedure whose basic element was NATO's annual review, which took into account the recommendations of its military authorities. Thus, the rôle assigned to WEU in the military field was to organise member countries' participation in the defence of Europe, which was itself ensured by NATO.

6. This concept of relations between WEU and NATO has not been changed by measures taken by the Seven since 1984 in the context of the reactivation of WEU. The withdrawal of French forces from NATO command in 1965 merely transferred from SACEUR to the French authorities the obligation to inform the Council of the level of French forces, considered to be “internal defence and police forces” under Article V of Protocol No. II (something of a paradox when the forces concerned are stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany). The texts adopted by the Council since 1984 have specified the governments' views on relations between WEU, whose reactivation was making it increasingly an organ for political co-operation, and NATO. The Rome Declaration already indicated that:

“4. ... The Ministers are convinced that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members.

5. The Ministers emphasised the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area. They recalled in particular the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies, and underlined the crucial importance of the contribution to common security of their allies who are not members of WEU. They stressed the necessity, as a complement to their joint efforts, of the closest possible concertation with them."

7. According to the subsequent Bonn communiqué issued on 23rd April 1985:

"2. The Ministers... reaffirmed their determination to strengthen their solidarity and that which links them with their allies of the Atlantic Alliance, which remains the only body for implementing common defence and the expression of the fundamental bond between the security of Europe and that of North America.

.....

7. The Ministers... underlined the importance of the continuing bilateral consultations with their partners in the Atlantic Alliance as an essential element of allied cohesion."

On 30th April 1986, the Venice communiqué added:

"2. The Ministers... recalled the indivisible nature of western security and their firm determination to strengthen the ties and the solidarity which bind them together and to the other members of the alliance."

Finally, the platform adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987 set common goals for the WEU countries and assigned a major rôle to transatlantic relations in the organisation of European security, as follows:

"1.4. ... the security of the Western European countries can only be ensured in close association with our North American allies. The security of the alliance is indivisible. The partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic rests on the twin foundations of shared values and interests. Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, independent and increasingly more united Western Europe is vital to the security of North America."

It added the following point, which is highly important in the new circumstances:

"5. It is our conviction that the balanced policy of the Harmel report remains valid. Political solidarity and adequate military

strength within the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament and the search for genuine détente continue to be integral parts of this policy. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary."

8. It is thus plain that, since the decision to transfer WEU's military activities to NATO in 1950, member countries have not changed their concept of relations between the two institutions. It was to NATO that they entrusted implementation of the defence of Europe. It was to NATO that they assigned as a matter of priority the implementation of a security policy that included disarmament, which they consider impossible other than in close co-operation between Western Europe and its North American allies. WEU's rôle is viewed in terms of the requirements of this defence and this security policy which is to ensure that Europe plays a fuller part in both. Your Rapporteur has been assigned the task of examining how such participation can be ensured in the new circumstances arising from developments in the world in general and in Eastern and Central Europe and their relations with the West in particular.

9. It should be noted, however, that the reactivation of WEU led to a diminishing in its relations with NATO, probably not because of a deliberate will on the part of the governments but because the WEU organs which maintained organic relations with NATO no longer play a rôle in WEU.

10. (a) This is the case for the Standing Armaments Committee, which was abolished in December 1989. Until 1975, it was composed of member countries' permanent representatives to NATO whose activities, including those of its working groups, were open to NATO observers, with whom there were exchanges of information, and whose agreements were open to all NATO member countries.

11. (b) This is also the case for the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which now verifies chemical weapons only and therefore no longer has to rely on NATO for exercising arms controls in respect of integrated forces and reporting on them and no longer holds annual meetings with NATO on the aims and techniques of such controls. The Council's annual visit to SHAPE and its meeting with an officer to discuss matters raised by arms control have therefore lost much of their importance.

12. (c) Conversely, welcome initiatives have been taken by the Permanent Council of WEU to ensure contacts between the two organisations. Moreover, the Assembly's President, chairmen, committees and rapporteurs have always had a warm reception by the NATO authorities.

13. It is thus the weakening of WEU structures that has taken WEU further away from the NATO structures. The Assembly suffers the consequences since the Council seems to have allowed to lapse its hitherto regular practice of asking NATO to answer Assembly recommendations and written questions by its members on matters within the purview of NATO.

14. This situation must now be remedied so that WEU can effectively play the rôle of the European pillar of the alliance, which the Council wants just as much as the Assembly.

II. The new situation

15. The alliance was born in 1949 of the need, following the Prague coup d'état, to bar the way to the expansion of the Soviet Union which had, by force, imposed communist régimes on all the countries "liberated" or occupied by the Red Army at the end of the second world war. The European members of the alliance were anxious to discourage Soviet aggression by ensuring that the United States retained a sufficient military presence to make it clear to the Soviet Union that any attack against Europe would bring American forces into action and that it would, consequently, have to contend with United States nuclear power. The European countries therefore did not play a major part in collective defence and their military deployment was aimed mainly at satisfying the Americans, who did not wish to help to defend countries which would not defend themselves. Hence, it was normal that the United States should play a preponderant part both in the military commands and in alliance policy. This situation obviously made it easier for Germany to accede to the alliance in 1954 but it probably also helped to bring about France's withdrawal from the integrated military structure in 1965.

16. The emergence of Soviet nuclear power, the subsequent shift in the alliance's strategic doctrine away from "massive retaliation" towards "flexible response", completed by that of "forward defence", and then the start of the first nuclear arms reduction talks changed the nature of the respective interests of the European and American members of the alliance. On the American side, it came to be thought that nuclear deterrence could be exercised even after the outbreak of an armed conflict. NATO's military deployment was therefore increasingly aimed at meeting a conventional attack either by stopping it or by delaying it so that negotiations could be held before nuclear weapons were used. The United States consequently insisted that its allies assume a greater share of the conventional defence of Europe and itself deployed so-called theatre nuclear weapons in Europe designed to delay the deployment of strategic weapons still longer. Europeans for

their part feared a decoupling of Europe's defence from that of the United States and therefore made the effort asked of them in order to ensure that large numbers of American forces remained in Europe. They placed emphasis on the political activities of the alliance which were to allow them to have their say in both joint strategy and everything relating to allied security, in particular arms control negotiations. Finally, the United Kingdom, and then France, acquired nuclear weapons that were intended to give Europe a deterrent capability to prevent a possible enemy considering waging and winning a war in Europe thanks to its conventional superiority and escaping nuclear retaliation. Europeans and Americans therefore agreed that the post of SACEUR be assigned to an American, thus enhancing the guarantee of United States participation in the defence of Europe, but also that the Secretary-General of NATO be a European so that Europe might have more influence on alliance policy. The aim of the 1967 Harmel plan was to organise the alliance on these new twin bases.

17. Mr. Gorbachev's coming to power in 1985 marked the start of a major evolution in the threat to which the alliance had to respond, for various reasons:

18. (a) Because they wished to restore the Soviet economy, the new Soviet leaders gave serious thought to means of limiting the country's military expenditure:

- (i) by a general reduction in the level of its armed forces;
- (ii) by abandoning the Soviet Union's armed interventions outside Europe, particularly in Afghanistan and Africa, and making cuts in force levels and the number of Soviet bases far from Soviet territory;
- (iii) by negotiating arms control measures with the NATO countries and accepting the verification measures the West had been insisting on since 1955 but which the Soviet Union had always refused.

19. (b) Since the Soviet Union was anxious that its security should not be affected by cuts in its defence budget, it used all available means to create conditions favourable to negotiated disarmament by the two alliances:

- (i) by replacing the offensive strategic doctrine hitherto followed by the Warsaw Pact with a defensive strategic doctrine and an appropriate military deployment;
- (ii) by making serious concessions to allow negotiations to be started and brought to a successful conclusion,

particularly on verification and the definition of targets such as reasonable sufficiency and equal security, while agreeing to give priority to negotiations on conventional arms, proposing the adoption of confidence-building measures and promoting the solution of conflicts outside Europe;

- (iii) by adopting liberalisation measures, both in the Soviet Union and in the countries under its then control, entering into new undertakings in this sense in the framework of the CSCE and allowing the development of co-operation between Eastern and Western Europe in many areas.

20. (c) It became clear that, although the Warsaw Pact had considerable military forces, it was suffering from serious restrictions on its ability to act: its members lacked cohesion and even the will to defend themselves.

- (i) In the Soviet Union itself, the liberalisation measures showed that the country's unity was questioned by many of its inhabitants, particularly in the Baltic republics, Moldavia, the Caucasian republics, Central Asia and even the Ukraine. The proclamation of Lithuania's independence by its parliament, elected directly by the people in March 1990, followed by Estonian moves towards its own independence, confront the Soviet Government with a formidable alternative: to give in, which might encourage pro-independence movements in other republics, or to use force to make the two countries obey, which would imply renouncing much of perestroika and the democratic line adopted by Mr. Gorbachev. At the time of writing, the Soviet authorities are still trying to avoid this impossible choice and find a middle way, but it is not certain they will manage to do so.

- (ii) As soon as they realised that the Soviet Union was not intervening to maintain the régimes imposed on Hungary and Poland as it had done in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968, the populations of the "people's democracies" demonstrated their desire to escape from communist domination. They have all obtained a promise of free elections in the first half of 1990. They have all questioned the monopoly of power in the hands of the party. Two countries, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, have called for the withdrawal of

Soviet forces from their territory. There is now some question as to whether they will all remain members of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union itself has agreed to reduce its military presence in the Warsaw Pact member countries to 195 000 men instead of the present figure of 500 000, provided the United States reduces its forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany to the same level (they now number about 250 000), while retaining about 30 000 men in the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Greece.

- (iii) According to a well-known expert in the history of the Eastern European countries, François Fejtö¹, the Warsaw Pact has, since 1955, contained secret provisions authorising Soviet military intervention in any member countries where there is a threat to the communist party remaining in power. This is tantamount to the Brezhnev doctrine forming part of the commitments entered into by the members of the pact. Abandonment by the people's democracies and then, in February 1990, by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party of the principle of the monopoly of power in the hands of the party thus calls in question the very survival of the pact. Hungary and Poland have already denounced these provisions, without asking to leave the pact. However, if Soviet forces are withdrawn from those countries in the near future, as some have called for, as Hungary obtained a guarantee in an agreement reached in Budapest on 2nd February and as the Soviet Union has also accepted in the case of Czechoslovakia, their membership of the pact would no longer have much significance and the continued presence of Soviet forces in the GDR would become almost impossible.

21. (d) Communism has stopped giving the impression of an ideology that meets present-day realities. Solidarity between communist régimes and parties has collapsed. No credible proposals are now being made on the organisation of tomorrow's world. In western countries, the electorates are turning away from parties endorsing communism.

1. "The Commission must co-ordinate assistance to Central Europe" in "Les enjeux de l'Europe", Supplement to No. 472, winter 1989.

22. This does not mean there is no longer a threat but that the threat has changed and that military deployment in Europe is not the only means of countering it. Moreover, deployment itself is contested by some western societies, which are finding it hard to accept the financial sacrifices that NATO requires. It is noteworthy that, from 1985 to 1988, when the collapse of the Soviet bloc was still far from evident, the share of the gross national product of NATO countries earmarked for defence fell by an average of 0.3%, which is very significant if it is borne in mind that this share is on average about 4%. There is every reason to think that events in 1989 will lead to even larger cuts in defence budgets in the coming years, particularly in the United States.

23. Similarly, the people of Western Europe, who had accepted the disadvantages of NATO military deployment on their territory in earlier years, are becoming increasingly sensitive as the military threat appears to be diminishing. Campaigns against nuclear weapons, low-altitude flying and all the constraints imposed by collective defence have found a large audience in recent years, particularly in the Federal Republic, where a section of public opinion seems open to propaganda claiming that the military alliances are obstacles to the legitimate aspirations of the German people to the reunification of their country. Finally, in the United States, there is growing pressure on the government to withdraw at least some of the American forces stationed in Europe.

24. In such circumstances, it is essential for the members of the Atlantic Alliance to give new thought, as they did in 1967, to the security concept round which they intend to shape their action, thus implying, as Mr. Harmel said in his paper at the Florence colloquy on 22nd March 1989, that they specify:

- “ (i) the material conditions for the cohabitation of the peoples of Europe, account being taken of geopolitical circumstances;
- (ii) economic and social relations;
- (iii) political relations in their widest meaning;
- (iv) and, of course, the state of existing armed forces and military equipment.”

25. However, it must be noted that the Eastern and Central Europeans, while apparently prepared to deal with all these matters in their relations with the western countries, are in fact able to tackle in depth only the first point, in the framework of the CSCE, and the fourth, in the various disarmament negotiations. Conversely, although the free elections held in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary on

18th and 25th March respectively produced majorities clearly in favour of reverting to economic freedom, they are far from having defined their own concept of economic and social relations in a future which, according to the present governments of the other countries, will remain “ socialist ”, although this word does not refer to any clear options in regard to state participation in economic initiatives, the rôle of the currency, limits on freedom of transactions and the extent of social protection. At the meeting of the European Council in Strasbourg in December 1989, the European Community was instructed to study the economic and social aspects of East-West co-operation with a view to co-ordinating the West's action in this area. The Malta summit meeting aimed at defining political relations between the two sides, but the Eastern and Central European countries, including the Soviet Union, seem incapable at present of determining the nature and extent of the reorientation of their external policies in regard to their relations with their former partners and those they intend to have with the western countries.

26. The aim of examining the security concept is not therefore to speculate on the organisation of peace in Europe but to specify how this concept can be achieved in the shifting context of the Europe of today.

III. A short-term programme

27. Events in Eastern Europe in 1989 led some to wonder about the necessity, possibility and expediency of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance. It is perfectly easy to understand the Central European countries, now that they are trying to put an end to communist dictatorship, endeavouring to rid themselves of the constraints imposed on them by the Warsaw Pact and their bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union and, at the same time, calling for the Red Army to withdraw from their territory. It is obviously easier for them to call for the abolition of military pacts in general, a familiar theme of Soviet propaganda for many years, than to take the Warsaw Pact as their sole target. The fact that the GDR is part of the pact and the Federal Republic a member of NATO makes Germany particularly sensitive to this aspect of détente since the two German states' membership of two opposing alliance systems is an obstacle to and might limit the reunification of Germany. Finally, certain sections of public opinion in the West, too, seem convinced that the existence of alliances is a factor of tension.

28. Yet, however concerned the West may be to facilitate the liberation of the nations of Eastern Europe, it cannot sacrifice an essential element of its own security or renounce a major factor of peace in Europe and throughout the

world. Not only has NATO played this rôle for forty years, it is continuing and will probably continue for a long time to be essential, for several reasons:

29. (a) The Soviet Union has not yet disarmed to any substantial degree. The Warsaw Pact is still there. The Red Army is still present in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Its withdrawal is the subject of agreements between two of those countries and the Soviet Union which, without rejecting its allies' calls, has tried to delay effective withdrawal. While there seems no doubt that Mr. Gorbachev intends to reduce military deployment in Eastern Europe and move towards negotiated arms control, it is not certain that he will remain in power and that the Soviet Union will continue to pursue the policy he started. In any event, the Red Army has not yet been reduced significantly and its armaments are still at their former levels and are being modernised. The West, for its part, can disarm only to the extent that it is certain of the balance of forces in Europe being restored and an acceptable deterrent system being retained to ensure that a change in Soviet policy does not involve the world in a dangerous situation.

30. (b) In 1949, the United States, for the first time in its history, undertook in peacetime to guarantee the security of Western Europe, which was a decisive contribution in raising a barrier against the expansionist tendencies then being shown by the Soviet Union and safeguarding peace. It would be senseless to put a deliberate end to such a positive aspect of United States policy or even to take initiatives that might make American public opinion change its mind about maintaining a large number of forces in Europe.

31. (c) In any event, the Soviet Union will remain a great military power and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, far from affording a better guarantee of peace, might well lead to an increase in national conflicts in Europe. The best way of preventing these conflicts degenerating and threatening international peace is to preserve, for the benefit of the West, a maximum of cohesion and hence of deterrent capability compatible with a policy of negotiated arms control in Europe.

32. (d) Only NATO ensures that American forces remain in Europe. If, for some reason, these forces were to be withdrawn, the North Atlantic Treaty would be even more valuable since it would then represent the only United States commitment towards Europe and NATO's essential military task would be to protect the Atlantic sea lanes between America and Europe so that, if necessary, American forces could return in the event of a crisis. It would also have to ensure that the necessary dépôts remained on European territory to allow

the speedy redeployment of American forces in case of need in view of the facility with which, thanks to territorial continuity, the Soviet Union could redeploy its own forces in Central Europe.

33. (e) The emergence of new military powers outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty makes it more than ever essential to co-ordinate allied efforts to maintain peace outside Europe.

34. (f) The smooth progress of arms control negotiations also requires harmonisation of allied positions to ensure that they do not jeopardise joint security.

35. These various reasons now make the Atlantic Alliance and its organisation, both political and military, more essential than ever, not only for maintaining peace but also for developing disarmament and East-West co-operation. This does not necessarily mean the alliance and its military system must not be open to change, but the present study must consider their adaptation in the light of the new circumstances rather than their disappearance. The prospects of a less dangerous atmosphere are bound to make many of our fellow citizens in Western Europe question the need for continuing high defence expenditure. We have already seen the "peace dividend" syndrome emerge in the United States with many siren calls to spend it before it is earned – earned in the sense of requiring proof of *actual* arms reductions by the Soviet Union. We need to explain the issues clearly and ensure that our parliaments and media have the facts they need to understand the realities of the situation and how important it is to be cautious.

36. The prospects offered by the transformation of the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European countries and the swift development of negotiations on arms control, security and co-operation in Europe and the future of Germany make one speculate about what might become of the Atlantic Alliance in the years ahead.

37. Its rôle may possibly be defined as follows:

38. (a) As long as necessary, its military deployment should be sufficient for the West to continue, faced with the deployment of the Soviet Union and its allies, to be sure of Western European security, to convince those countries that, whatever the ups and downs in their domestic affairs, the policy of détente and disarmament embarked upon by Mr. Gorbachev is the only one that can guarantee peace and security in Europe without endangering internal stability in their countries. This is not a matter that can be settled quickly, in view of the duration of arms control negotiations and, above all, the time it will take to implement any

agreements that are concluded. The CFE agreements, for instance, should lead to the destruction of almost 60% of Warsaw Pact arms and this, according to the Soviet Union, will take at least seven years.

39. However, the West cannot afford to relax its guard until the CFE agreement comes into force particularly as there are clear signs that in the past three months the Soviet position on the CFE, START and other negotiations has hardened considerably. It may well be that Mr. Gorbachev now has to look over his shoulder at a military which feels threatened by force reductions and the consequent weakening of its influence. Many scenarios can be envisaged but one of the worst would be a lessening of Mr. Gorbachev's influence and a partial disintegration of the Soviet Union. This might well produce a resentful Russian Republic which was nationalistic, anti-semitic and xenophobic, with a feeling of isolation, yet powerful in its forces.

40. (b) A strategy should be worked out that meets the new military situation. Some committee members felt the notions of flexible response and forward defence should be radically reassessed. This is not your Rapporteur's opinion.

41. In the case of flexible response, it seems impossible to return to the alternative, mass retaliation, i.e. immediate counter-attacks on the enemy's towns in the event of an attack on alliance forces. More than ever, the only possible credible deterrence is to prepare a counter-attack, sufficient to stop the enemy offensive but not necessarily or immediately raising the level of hostilities to disastrous proportions. Fighting should be avoided but, if deterrence fails, it must be limited. This does not mean that every part of the present western defence system necessarily has to be maintained. Since the international situation makes an armed attack less probable and eliminates the possibility of surprise attack, it may allow some of these parts to be reduced or even eliminated altogether in the framework of specific agreements whose application would be subject to satisfactory verification procedure.

42. Similarly, the notion of forward defence is still irreplaceable, first because Western Europe does not have the required depth to be able to consider sweeping fall-back movements and again because it is difficult, a priori, to consider waging a battle on the territory of allied countries. However, application of this concept leaves wide scope for arrangements, inter alia to avoid giving the Eastern European countries the impression that NATO is able to adopt an aggressive strategy. Be that as it may, the notion of forward defence will have to be defined in the light of the two plus four decisions on the military status of reunified Germany.

43. On these two questions, your Rapporteur was interested in the speech by Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee of the United States Senate, on 19th April, in which he defined the essential elements of a new NATO strategy:

- (i) even if nuclear deterrence remained the basis of western strategy, it would have to be at levels significantly lower than at present;
- (ii) American front-line forces would have to be reduced, while the reinforcement capabilities of their allies would have to be increased;
- (iii) reserve forces would have to be increased and organised to conduct such reinforcement missions;
- (iv) all American forces would have to be trained intensively for missions that might be fixed at the last minute;
- (v) funds earmarked for defence should be reduced but greater thought should be given to their use in order to improve effectiveness;
- (vi) since he did not believe recourse to the threat of a first nuclear strike in response to a conventional attack was credible, Senator Nunn proposed eliminating ground-based short-range missiles and nuclear artillery in the framework of an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

44. These proposals are an interesting attempt to adapt NATO strategy to the evolution of East-West relations and your Rapporteur believes they are worthy of in-depth study by the United States Government and also by NATO and WEU governments.

45. (c) The western defence system should be adapted to the requirements of the arms control agreements and member countries' capabilities.

46. (d) Member countries' positions should be co-ordinated in the arms control negotiations in which each of them takes part.

47. (e) Members of the alliance should be allowed to play an effective part in the verification measures that will be needed in order to implement disarmament agreements and the confidence-building measures and constraints that will be provided for at the conference on disarmament in Europe or even in a future agreement banning chemical weapons. Verification will clearly become increasingly important and involve thousands of experts and very heavy investment. In order to be effective, it will have to be organised and co-ordinated by the alliance so as to record data, study questions arising, develop means, specify tasks and publish results.

48. (f) It must help to organise a new security order in Europe so that the United States and Canada have a place in the system. Some committee members believe the CSCE is the natural framework for this new system. Your Rapporteur thinks it premature to decide this matter today since it is far from clear that forty-two countries, some of which are members of NATO and some of the pact, while others have permanently neutral status or pursue a neutralist policy, would be able to agree not only on defining this new security order but, above all, on guaranteeing its application. The present alliances are still the foundations on which peace should be organised in Europe. Even if the CSCE is the appropriate forum for joint consideration of security matters by eastern and western countries, it has no executive instruments and probably will not have any in the near future.

49. (g) There must be consultations and, possibly, co-ordination between its members' actions so as to meet any threat to peace from countries outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. Out-of-area actions, such as the Gulf, may occur more frequently in the future. Whilst we in NATO and the Warsaw Pact build on confidence measures, other nations not in either alliance possess nuclear and chemical weapons against which both East and West may need to react more swiftly. We must ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place as soon as possible for this purpose. A new-style NATO and a renovated Warsaw Pact with different objectives from the present ones may well have to act as the joint guarantors of peace in Europe, and elsewhere.

50. While there are few objections to such a definition of the future rôle of the alliance, there is certainly not unanimity on the order of priorities to be given to these tasks, particularly in the United States.

51. In January 1988, a group of American experts, headed by Mr. Iklé and Mr. Wohlstetter, proposed a reorientation of NATO, designed above all to counter threats from outside the area covered by the Washington Treaty. Their thinking was based on the idea that any trouble outside that area was, in one way or another, caused by the Soviet Union with a view to weakening the West. Although such an analysis does not seem to have been confirmed, there is a school of thought in the United States, and in Europe too, championed by the former United States Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, that attaches considerable importance to threats to international peace not deriving from the Soviet Union and wishes NATO's activities to be aimed essentially at responding to that threat. All members of the alliance are certainly, to various degrees, aware of this new dimension to the dangers facing the

West, but some of them do not seem prepared to rely on the alliance to counter it. Under the Washington Treaty, they are not obliged to do so, and it seems rather unlikely that there would be a consensus in favour of giving priority to such concerns.

52. Speaking in Berlin on 12th December 1989, the Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, on the contrary described the future of the alliance as being to organise détente and co-operation in Europe. While this conforms with the North Atlantic Treaty, it nevertheless marks a break with the past and would have the disadvantage of putting the Soviet Union and its allies in a delicate position. The Soviet Union could, indeed, hardly agree to NATO becoming the federator of the new Europe because such a Europe would appear to be simply an extension of the American area of influence at the expense of the Soviet Union. In particular, there were negative reactions to the proposal made by Mr. Baker on the same occasion that a reunified Germany be admitted to the Atlantic Alliance, and the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as the European members of the alliance, made a number of counter-proposals and rectifications. On 6th February, the United States Government, following a meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr. Genscher, Federal German Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that it was not considering NATO military deployment on the other side of the Elbe, thus significantly limiting the impact of the proposal it made on 12th December. The question of reunified Germany's membership of NATO is now one of the most delicate aspects of current negotiations on the reunification of the country. While the Soviet Union is no longer making neutralisation of Germany a condition of reunification, it persists in opposing reunified Germany remaining in NATO and at present it is difficult to see how the powers taking part in the two plus four conference will be able to find a solution which ensures that the country remains in a collective defence structure.

53. A significant United States, Canadian and British military presence on the mainland of Europe, i.e. in particular on the territory of the Federal Republic, with adequate conventional and nuclear weapons and under integrated military command, remains an important element of European security, as Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, underlined in an address in St. Augustin, near Bonn, on 6th February. There are now 254 000 American troops stationed in the Federal Republic and 60 000 British, 50 000 French, 25 000 Belgian, 7 700 Dutch and 7 300 Canadian. These levels might be reduced in parallel with a reduction in Soviet forces stationed in the Central and Eastern European countries in conformity with existing treaties and in agreement with the Federal Government and the NATO and WEU countries.

However, such a reduction should not imply military disengagement, which might appear to be political disengagement, too, and would therefore lead to a disturbing weakening of western cohesion and the West's ability to contribute to maintaining peace in Europe. From this point of view, the reference by Mr. Coëme, Belgian Minister of Defence, on 26th January to a possible withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Federal Republic, although referring only to a possible scenario and not to a political decision, had the unfortunate effect of suggesting that the European members of the alliance considered developments in Eastern Europe were likely to make them question their commitment to common security at the very moment when the reorientation of the Belgian military structure had deprived Belgium of any possibility of considering engaging its forces outside an integrated military system. In the event, which many observers do not rule out, of the United States deciding, in the more or less long term, to make further large-scale reductions in their military presence in Europe, and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, the WEU countries' responsibility in western military deployment would be increased and it would be regrettable if premature unilateral decisions deprived them of the means of exercising this responsibility.

54. Conversely, it is possible to improve the defensive and deterrent capability of the forces of WEU countries in accordance with the aims defined in The Hague platform by improving the organisation of their armaments in terms of interoperability, standardisation and joint production.

55. Moreover, on several occasions in recent months, the Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. van Eekelen, has referred to the idea of strengthening European solidarity in NATO, while the latter would redefine the tasks of the American forces assigned to it. Thus, in his speech in Luxembourg on 23rd March, he said:

"The reduction of forces should be done in a co-ordinated manner, taking into account the ways and means of re-deploying American and Soviet forces. Inevitably, the problem of forces stationed in Germany, whatever their nationality or juridical régime, will be a subject of polemic. A possible solution in the direction of European unity would be to form major units on a multinational basis for our forces. It is for WEU to study the practicality of audacious and imaginative approaches leading to increased security for all the nations of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals because they will show that recourse to military force in Europe will no longer ever be a purely national prerogative in the service of egoistic interests."

Much thought is being given to Mr. van Eekelen's concept of a multinational force, but if it is to be even a starting point it has to be recognised that interoperability of equipment is essential.

56. On 27th March, during the symposium organised by WEU's Technological and Aerospace Committee, General Charlier, Chief-of-Staff of the Belgian Army, used the following terms when he presented an outline plan for a military system in the future Europe, thus endorsing Mr. van Eekelen's remarks:

"Once the CFE agreement has been implemented, threats to Europe will no longer be attributable to a single adversary, localised on a single line, pronounced in a single direction; the threat of a massive surprise attack along a wide front will have disappeared so that it may be thought that the military system will be relaxed, forces will move farther apart and they will be less numerous. Since warning time will be increased, a larger proportion of military potential will consist of mobilisable forces. On the other hand, active forces and the ability to deploy military forces from a long way off will have to remain.

The missions of these forces would be of two types:

- multinational stationed forces who, by their presence, would ensure regional balances or ward off or deter conflicts or threats;
- first-strike forces to monitor, channel and delay threats."

While the political advantages of such an initiative seem evident, it would be desirable for countries which have already carried out such experiments, in particular France and the Federal Republic which have set up a joint brigade, to submit a substantiated report on the problems encountered in implementing such an initiative before final decisions are taken in this sense.

57. Two Eastern European countries - the Soviet Union through Mr. Gerasimov, Ministry for Foreign Affairs spokesman, on 1st February and the German Democratic Republic through its Prime Minister, Mr. Modrow - proposed that all foreign forces stationed on the territory of the two German states be withdrawn and that reunified Germany have neutral status imposed on it or, at least, that it be forbidden by treaty to belong to any military alliance. This took up a proposal dating back to Stalin's days that was at the time intended to prevent the Federal Republic acceding to the Atlantic Alliance. Their suggestion was immediately rejected by Chancellor Kohl who, like Chancellor Adenauer

before him, refused to have Germany reunified at the cost of disengagement which would mean the Federal Republic and, through it, Europe as a whole losing the principal guarantee of its security. On 4th February, NATO in turn rejected any link between reunification and the neutralisation of Germany.

58. This question of Germany's membership of NATO was the main topic at the colloquy organised by the German magazine *Wehrkunde* in Munich on 3rd and 4th February. The governments of most alliance countries were represented at a high level, which made the discussions particularly interesting. It became clear there that some SPD representatives thought Germany might be neutralised as a compensation for reunification but that many participants considered it possible for reunified Germany to belong to the alliance, although some of them thought it possible and desirable to grant it special status in the alliance, *inter alia* allowing it to remove its forces from integrated military command. This last possibility was rejected by most member countries, including the United Kingdom, whose Foreign Secretary, Mr. Hurd, recalled when addressing the Konrad Adenauer Foundation on 6th February that the Federal Republic was "a crucial element in the security of us all".

59. Two conclusions can apparently be drawn from the colloquy. First, there are no valid reasons for the dismemberment of the Warsaw Pact, which several of its member countries seem to wish, to lead to a parallel dismantling of the Atlantic Alliance, which was not considered to be linked with continuing East-West tension but far more as a necessary structure for a peaceful order in Europe to which the Soviet Union should not be hostile. Secondly, if Germany were to change the nature of its participation in the alliance in which it still plays a major rôle, it would be desirable, in order to maintain a credible military system in Europe, for France, in the new European security conditions, to resume the place it occupied in the alliance's integrated military system until 1965. One only needs to glance at the map of Europe to see that, if neither France nor Germany forms part of such a system, that system can no longer exist. If WEU managed to bring France more firmly into the defensive organisation of Europe, it would obviously be bound to play an important part in defining a European security policy.

60. There is obviously a close link between the alliance's traditional vocation to maintain a defensive military system adequate to deter any attack against Western Europe, and its new, essentially political, move towards active participation in building a new and peaceful order in Europe, the purpose in both cases being to associate the North American allies as closely as pos-

sible with the attainment of these aims. However, while in a military context it was essential for the United States to play a preponderant part in the allied system to mark the association between the defence of Europe and American nuclear weapons, it seems no less essential for Europe to play a rôle in the alliance such as it has not yet played, because it is peace in Europe that has to be organised and this cannot be done without active European participation. This is one of the conclusions drawn by observers from the *Wehrkunde* colloquy at which many speakers repeated a theme familiar to our Assembly, *i.e.* the need to organise a real European pillar of the alliance. Some, such as the French Minister of Defence, Mr. Chevènement, stressed WEU's vocation to fulfil this rôle, at least during an intermediary period, until such time as the structures that are to preside over the organisation of peace in Europe have assumed a permanent shape, acceptable to all.

61. This does not mean any great change in the attribution of NATO military commands. In particular, the idea of a European SACEUR at the head of NATO forces would give American public opinion the impression that the defence of Europe was no longer a major aim of United States policy. The presence of the United States and Canada in the alliance with a substantial number of troops in Europe is vital and WEU has to make it clear to the United States in particular that it is as welcome as ever. The idea that, for example, SACEUR should be a European would be grist to the mill of those who wish to see an American withdrawal from Europe – and, indeed, NATO.

IV. The future of European security

62. The future of the Atlantic Alliance depends largely on the provisions on which all the countries taking part in the CSCE manage to agree in order to fix the status of reunified Germany and, more generally, organise a new, peaceful order in Europe. However, if the future rôle of WEU is to be examined, that of NATO cannot be disregarded. As in the past, WEU will obviously have to cover ground not covered either by the European Community or by NATO so as to be certain that Western Europe has the means to ensure its security. There still much confusion in the United States as to the different rôles played in defence by NATO, the European Community and WEU. No opportunity should be lost of clarifying the fact that only NATO and WEU are, by treaty, competent to discuss or act on defence issues, that their action is complementary and that WEU's activities are in no way intended to limit the legitimate influence of the United States in the alliance but, on the contrary, to ensure that

Europeans play a greater part in NATO. But in view of prevailing uncertainty about the kind of activities which will effectively devolve on NATO, it is possible only to examine *likely* trends and not to be specific about what WEU's field will actually be. It should be underlined that the modified Brussels Treaty recognises that NATO is the overall alliance and that WEU is the European pillar of NATO. European members of NATO feel somewhat marginalised and it would be of help if Greece, Norway and Turkey became members of WEU.

63. This situation is particularly irksome in view of the fact that, once Portugal and Spain have become members, the WEU Council is to start the process of revising the modified Brussels Treaty. When the decision was taken, it was evident that the planned revision should concern the arms controls provided for in the treaty and organised in the protocols thereto. The governments did not seem to agree that the revision should go any further and, in fact, there does not seem to have been a consensus in favour of altering other parts of the treaty. Some would have liked to delete the provisions relating to economic, cultural and social co-operation between signatory countries because the exercise of WEU's responsibilities in these areas has been transferred either to the European Community or to the Council of Europe. In fact, however, these transfers have facilitated and improved the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and had no adverse effects. On the contrary, it may be useful to retain a link between Europe's security and its economic, social and cultural activities by making member countries' accession subject to endorsement of the principle of coherence between the various aspects of their co-operation. This link is worth recalling now that many Central European countries, whether or not members of the Warsaw Pact, are planning sweeping changes in their external policies.

64. It would obviously be dangerous to associate Central and Eastern European countries with the organisation of European security if they were not prepared to develop the other aspects of European co-operation. The difficulties encountered in implementing the final act of the CSCE in Helsinki as from 1975 showed clearly, in particular with the development of the opposition in Czechoslovakia, on the one hand that *détente* was indivisible and on the other that the CSCE does not offer a firm enough framework to ensure the implementation of principles on which participants seem to have agreed. The presence, among the thirty-five countries participating in the CSCE, of neutral and non-aligned states and countries with very varied views on their security would make it extremely difficult to give it permanent structures to replace those set up by the West over a period of more than forty years.

Moreover, the international structures set up by the Soviet Union for Central and Eastern Europe now seem too weakened to be able to play an effective rôle in the organisation of tomorrow's Europe. It is therefore important for the organisations created by the West since 1945 to remain and to be able to take in any countries really determined to join them, but this opening to the East must not endanger the cohesion of Western Europe as affirmed with ever-increasing strength over the years. Without attempting to encroach on the prerogatives of other organisations, WEU, backed by Articles I, II and III of the modified Brussels Treaty, associates co-operation in security matters with co-operation in economic, social and cultural matters. This is a necessary fail-safe device that the CSCE cannot offer countries taking part in it.

65. The future well-being of Europe may well depend on the construction of a new linkage between the East and the West. NATO and the Warsaw Pact have, in effect, ensured peace for forty years, but now we have to examine a fresh scenario. It is doubtful if there is a strong desire to create yet another permanent organisation, except amongst the bureaucrats, and it would be preferable to build upon the democratic structures we now possess. The work of the CSCE could be parcelled out in three or four ways. Economic matters might be placed with the European Parliament or with OECD, whose activities are overseen in annual debate at the Council of Europe. Security affairs would go either to WEU or remain with a CSCE which was summoned to meet every two or three years and which would not require a permanent secretariat. Matters relating to human rights fall squarely into the realm of the Council of Europe without any real difficulty. In all the preceding suggestions it goes without saying that the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union must be associated in the work of OECD, WEU and the Council of Europe in ways which are acceptable to all parties and which will ensure a democratic parliamentary oversight of their work.

66. Finally, the Assembly, while specifying in Recommendation 472 that it wished to "maintain the provision in Article IX for the Assembly to be composed of delegations from the national parliaments of member countries", has always made it plain that it was not committed to those delegations remaining those appointed to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The Portuguese and Spanish Parliaments, on the one hand, and the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats of our Assembly, on the other, have said they wished national parliaments to be represented in the two European assemblies by wholly or partly separate delegations if they so desired. Such a decision would relieve the

present excessively heavy burden on representatives and allow parliamentarians who are more interested in areas within the purview of one or other assembly to play a better part in work that corresponds to their interests.

67. In present circumstances, however, there are other questions, including that of whether arms controls will not have to be restored because of East-West agreements, particularly in regard to Germany as a whole. It is obviously too soon to express an opinion on this matter, which is subject to decisions on disarmament that have to be taken in the framework of the CFE negotiations or on the status of Germany in that of the two plus four. We must also consider whether member countries will have to undertake to make a minimum military effort for joint security, if only to participate actively in verifying any arms control agreements that may be concluded in the framework of the CFE negotiations and implementing the "open skies" agreement. Verification under the CFE agreement and by the CSCE will clearly be a national responsibility in most cases, but co-ordination of information, standards and training will be vital and WEU has a part to play on this front. It is gratifying that the Council took decisions at its ministerial meeting on 23rd April 1990 in order to advance in this direction.

68. Discussions on these various factors, which have only just started, have shown that there are several possible courses for WEU to follow in the coming years, although it is not yet clear which will prove appropriate.

69. (a) What some, particularly in the Eastern European countries, know about WEU is essentially that it is European, includes none of the superpowers and, for some forty years, has guaranteed that the Federal Republic had none of the arms it renounced in 1954, especially nuclear weapons. Hence they consider WEU to be an instrument capable, in the future, of protecting a Europe in which the Eastern European countries have taken their place, at one and the same time against a possible attempt by the Soviet Union to regain its influence and against the re-emergence of German military power. They could therefore consider countries which are now members of the Warsaw Pact joining WEU.

70. As yet, no one seems to have made a detailed assessment of what such a European security organisation might be. It takes little account of the link that exists between WEU and NATO. In particular, the question of the accession of non-member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty would disrupt the European security system with what might become very serious consequences, either in the event of certain signatories having difficulties in their relations with one of the superpowers or in the

event of crises breaking out in Eastern Europe over matters relating to frontiers or national minorities, for instance. It does not seem, therefore, that the idea of enlarging WEU to include Eastern European countries, apart from the case of reunified Germany, is practical at present.

71. (b) Conversely, some United States and European analysts consider WEU to be merely a rather inactive group of member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and hence a subsidiary body of NATO intended mainly to ensure that member countries assume a greater share of the burden of joint defence carried out in NATO. The perception of WEU in the United States was much enhanced by the action in the Gulf in 1988 but, although the administration still has a good opinion of it, WEU is now falling back to its previous position of being unrecognised by Congress and the public.

72. Such a concept was largely justified in the days when NATO ensured the military deployment of allied forces in Europe. It might be far less so once it seems that the political vocation of the Atlantic Alliance has to be juxtaposed with, if not take over from, its military rôle and Europe has to play a far greater rôle in the alliance. Admittedly, if WEU can help to make Europeans accept the burdens of joint defence with better grace, it will remain a useful instrument, but it will be able to play this rôle effectively only insofar as it also has a political rôle that allows its members to consult each other on security matters, relating inter alia to regions not covered by the Washington Treaty, and to work out truly European concepts in this area.

73. (c) WEU will certainly have to seek a path between these two extremes. It can derive two aspects of its new vocation from the first concept. On the one hand, if necessary, it would guarantee, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its allies, that all its members, and in particular reunified Germany, would continue to pursue a peaceful policy, and, on the other, it would establish and develop links with the Eastern European countries so as to bring about a better knowledge and better mutual understanding of the concerns of all in security matters to allow negotiations to be held in an appropriate framework, and in the CSCE in particular, on aspects of a new European order: security, maintaining the alliances, levels of armaments, force deployment and arms control from all standpoints of direct interest to the Western European countries. This would apply inter alia to application of the CFE agreements and the verification measures they involve, the "open skies" agreement and agreements on confidence-building measures which may emanate from the CSCE summit meeting to be held in autumn 1990.

74. The second concept suggests that WEU might play a rôle in assessing on a continuing basis the nature and magnitude of any threats to Western Europe and the efforts member countries would have to make to counter them and make public opinion understand the need to maintain a level of forces and armaments commensurate with the situation.

75. This would be an important rôle since the threat would stem far less from the deployment of forces of the Warsaw Pact, or even the Soviet Union alone, than from new problems seeing the light of day because of the reduction in, or even disappearance of, the Soviet military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. Although it is to be hoped that the CSCE will define the principles that should govern the establishment of a new European order, particularly in regard to respect for frontiers and the rights of national minorities, there is little chance that such an organisation will immediately be able to settle the specific problems that will inevitably be raised by the implementation of these principles. Since the West may well for a long time to come be alone in having sound international structures, it will have to assume responsibility for meeting any threats to peace that may arise in Central and Eastern Europe. Events in recent months in Bulgaria, over the Turkish minority, in the Soviet Union, over the Romanian population of Moldavia, and the Baltic republics, over the Hungarian minority in Romania, and above all in Yugoslavia, where the survival of the state seems to be in question, not only because of Albanian unrest in Kosovo but also because of the break between the Slovenian and Croat communist parties and the essential Serbian Yugoslav party, indicate that Europe's security will require wide-ranging, continuing diplomatic action in order to counter such challenges to European stability.

76. Furthermore, particularly in the Middle East, powers have emerged that have recently acquired ballistic missiles of sufficiently long range to be able to reach Western Europe and weapons using the most advanced technology, thus including them to a growing extent in Western Europe's security zone. The enormous growth throughout the world of Moslem fundamentalism is a menace to both East and West. We have seen its effects in Iran and in the Soviet Union, and it is unlikely to remain quiescent in other places. Firm resolve by both West and East will be needed to control it, and we have a responsibility to inform our populations so they can play their part in a constructive – not racist – campaign. An examination of the threat from that enlarged zone is now among the tasks of any organisation whose purpose is to ensure Europe's security, whereas it is not among NATO's responsibilities. This obviously does not imply that useful consultations are necessary on this matter with the American members of

NATO or even, if necessary, with the Soviet Union or any other country concerned.

77. This being so, there is a wide range of subjects that the WEU member countries might handle either in the framework of the Community or in that of NATO or the CSCE and on which there can be consultations only in WEU.

78. (a) Member countries' ministers should pay particular attention to the question of Western European countries' share of joint defence since the coming deadline for the single European market at the beginning of 1993 means that they must examine the distortions that will affect the operation of that market due to the varying proportion of member countries' GNP earmarked in defence budgets for joint security. In abolishing the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, the governments chose to tackle problems linked with joint production in the IEPG. However, while this association of users applies procedure for co-operation at technical level, it does not provide the necessary political framework. WEU's vocation, on the contrary, is to give the necessary political impetus to such co-operation at intergovernmental level, as underlined by the WEU Council since 1985. This impetus has become increasingly necessary as détente has led certain countries to consider drastic cuts in the equipment of their armed forces.

79. Political impetus by WEU in this area should follow two lines:

- The consequences should be drawn from past, present and foreseeable cuts in member countries' military investment so as to avoid such cuts leading to over-long delays and allow European industries to maintain the highest level of advanced technology. The reductions that are foreseeable and have already started in the markets that national armed forces represent, together with growing production costs, mean there must be co-operation in:
 - (i) establishing a concerted definition of arms and defence equipment requirements by means of permanent consultations between member countries' military headquarters;
 - (ii) defining programmes that meet Europe's new security needs and in particular, in present circumstances, the requirements of verification;
 - (iii) research and development by pooling results obtained in this area;
 - (iv) production.

- It should be ensured that there is a fair sharing of military burdens and expenditure, not only between the European and American members of the alliance but also between European countries.

80. (b) One of WEU's essential rôles should be to help to establish a new security order associating Eastern and Western European countries in areas for which WEU is responsible:

- (i) by giving the Eastern European countries a guarantee that commitments entered into in the context of disarmament agreements will be respected, be it for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a ban on chemical weapons or limiting the level of forces and conventional weapons;
- (ii) by ensuring that Western European countries are able to take part in verifying such agreements in conditions that they have or will have prescribed by means of a constant exchange of information and the pooling of implementing methods such as the training of inspectors and the use of observation means, particularly from the air and in space;
- (iii) by promoting consultations intended to specify European security requirements for arms, the deployment of forces and everything relating to confidence-building and security measures.

81. (c) In any event, WEU's vocation, as defined in the platform adopted in The Hague, is modified neither by the trend of East-West relations nor by any of the decisions taken in the framework of the European Community. This vocation is to guarantee the security of member countries in face of any external threat, whether or not from Eastern Europe, by ensuring cohesion of military deployment and foreign policy with due respect for the full sovereignty of states. Because of continued Soviet military power, the questions raised by Eastern European countries again having a free hand in their external policies and more internal democracy and the growing military power of a number of non-European countries, this cohesion which, to the benefit of Europe's security and peace, makes the most of the means of deterrence and defence available to member countries, must not be renounced.

82. At the present juncture, the modified Brussels Treaty, due in particular to its Articles V and VIII (apart from the provisions relating to arms control), corresponds more than ever to this aim and the course followed in the Council's work in 1989 conforms with these requirements. However, in the absence of conclusions, it does

not fulfil them completely, if only to the extent that the Council has never managed to accomplish one of the tasks it set itself in 1986, i.e. to inform public opinion of the threats to European security and the efforts member countries had to make to meet them. Action by the Assembly or the Secretary-General in this area cannot make up for the Council's constant failures. Everyone sees WEU as being first of all the Council and if it does not manage to explain to the public the nature and importance of what it does it is not assuming its due rôle. The fact that a very short communiqué was published, for the first time in 1990, after rare meetings at non-ministerial level is not enough to offset this failing. Conversely, there is every reason to welcome the publication of a more substantial communiqué at the close of the ministerial meeting in Brussels on 23rd April.

83. A very senior NATO official usefully drew your Rapporteur's attention to the drawbacks of the inadequacy of information issued by the WEU Council on the organisation's activities for the smooth running of the alliance. He believed the impression that WEU was acting secretly made the American members of NATO and European members not members of WEU fear that a bloc of countries pursuing action different from that of their allies might be formed within the Atlantic Alliance. The existence of the parliamentary Assembly and the Council's obligation to submit an annual report to it were intended to avoid the development of secret diplomacy with the mistrust it might have aroused. However, the way the Council, in recent years and in particular since the reactivation of WEU, has restricted its communications to the Assembly and the public helps to make public opinion wonder whether there has really been reactivation and, wrongly, to arouse suspicion among allied countries.

84. It may be thought that the Institute for Security Studies which the Council decided to set up in WEU in November 1989 and which is due to start work on 1st July 1990 will give it the wherewithal to respond to the needs stemming from the new trend of European security. This will have to be ensured by means of information and political action as much as by military deployment. It remains to specify the tasks assigned to the institute to ensure that it meets the real needs of the decade ahead. However, it is a pity it has not yet been decided to collocate the WEU ministerial organs in Brussels close to NATO headquarters because this would facilitate the necessary co-operation between two organisations which are more than ever complementary.

85. As long as Eastern Europe has not become stabilised, the German problem has not been solved and a new, peaceful order has not been established in Europe, WEU's rôle will remain

primarily to ensure Western Europe's participation in an Atlantic Alliance which, as a structure, is still essential for the confidence of all in peace itself. The scale of this participation may evolve with that of the presence of American forces in Western Europe, with the development of negotiations and the conclusion of arms control agreements and with the establishment, particularly in the context of the CSCE, of new relationships based on greater confidence between eastern and western countries, but it will always be essential because Europe cannot rely on others to ensure its security without jeopardising its own freedom.

V. Conclusions

86. The rate of developments in Eastern Europe in the last six months has made it impossible for western governments to work out a really concerted answer to all the questions thus raised. Today there is still considerable mystery about the very nature of events within the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, not to speak of their relations with Moscow. It would be very hazardous to try to diagnose the Soviet Union's present power. There is a considerable divergence between proposals made in public by political leaders, positions adopted by their representatives in the many disarmament-related negotiations and the actual reduction in force levels, and no one can know on what basis to start reflecting on the future of European security. Similarly, the state is collapsing so fast in the German Democratic Republic that everything now indicates that it will not be possible to apply in time the wise provisions worked out by governments, with a rapidity albeit rare in diplomatic practice, to include the reunification of Germany in the more far-reaching organisation of a peaceful order in Europe. Since the future of WEU depends on how these various questions are solved, it is very difficult to say much that is firm on the subject today.

87. However, precisely because of the proliferation of events and the extent of uncertainty, it would probably be wise today to try, as far as possible, to safeguard those elements which have ensured Europe's security for the last forty years and adapt them to new requirements. Just as the European Community has decided to gather strength in the exercise of its responsibilities to tackle in the right conditions a policy of opening to Eastern Europe and assistance to and co-operation with any Warsaw Pact countries so wishing, the Atlantic Alliance must strengthen its political structures before proceeding to the measures to limit forces and arms that developments in East-West relations in Europe are now making possible. At the same time, it must acquire the necessary means to implement disarmament agreements, in particular the verifi-

cation aspect. WEU must first facilitate adaptation of the alliance to new circumstances by inducing member countries to continue to stand together in détente and disarmament as they did when there was a more obvious threat. This implies that, after due preparation, they must tackle in the WEU Council all the questions raised by western cohesion at this new juncture: the status of reunified Germany, current military deployment, European participation in verifying arms limitation agreements and co-operation in armaments matters. There is no doubt that the Council has grasped the extent of these tasks, to judge by the description of inter-governmental activity in the framework of WEU as described in successive letters from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly.

88. The communiqué issued in Brussels at the close of the ministerial meeting on 23rd April shows that it had learned certain practical lessons:

- the decision to open the national inspection teams set up to verify the CFE agreement and apply the open-skies régime to include inspectors from other WEU member countries, which allows all member countries to play an effective part in these inspections;
- the joint definition of parameters for a system of interconnected data bases which has been "taken into account" by NATO;
- the decision to consider, on the basis of concrete proposals, the possibility of establishing a satellite verification agency, as requested by the Assembly;
- recognition of the opportuneness of establishing contacts for two-way information with the new democratically-elected governments in Eastern Europe.

89. However this may be, the Council has not yet managed to convince public opinion of the importance of the European dimension of security problems. Accelerating events in Eastern Europe and in the vast area of disarmament mean that it must take much swifter action than has been the case hitherto.

90. In any event, at present WEU is still there to resort to and must be kept intact to allow Europe to play its proper part in organising its own security if, on the one hand, NATO does not manage to meet the essential requirements of this security in full or if, on the other, the policy of opening towards the East embarked upon by the European Community does not allow it to take action in areas not explicitly within its purview. This rôle has been that of WEU since the outset and recent developments

in Europe offer no reason to call this in question.

91. The western world is at the crossroads – a choice of routes is open for the first time in over four decades. One road is the old, dark, battle-scarred road which we have been following up to now. The second seems to lead directly to distant sunny uplands, but there are shadowy patches on the way which may conceal dangers. The third looks longer, but winds its way more clearly towards the point at which one will be able to see a further clear stretch ahead.

92. We in Europe, as a pillar of the NATO Alliance, must take this last highway, which has several lanes which sometimes converge and at other times diverge, but to reach our mutual goal they must come together again and stay that way.

93. In this fashion we shall be better able to seize the new opportunities that are available, which can lead to that common European house which has been forty years in the making and in the final building of which our North American partners have a vital rôle.

***WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations
concerned with security and European defence***

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Mr. Stegagnini, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee*: Mr. Pontillon (Chairman); Mr. Ewing (Alternate: *Hill*), Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: *Böhm*) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Büchner (Alternate: *Ahrens*), Bühler (Alternate: *Lenzer*), Caccia, De Bondt (Alternate: Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*), De Hoop Scheffer (Alternate: *Dees*), Fiandrotti, Gouteyron, Greco, Hardy (Alternate: *Parry*), Sir John Hunt (Alternate: *Sir Geoffrey Finsberg*), MM. Kempinaire (Alternate: *Péciaux*), *Kollwelter*, Pfuhl, Seitlinger, Sir William Shelton (Alternate: *Wilkinson*), MM. Stegagnini, Tummers (Alternate: *Eisma*), Vial-Massat.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics*

Draft Recommendation

***on WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations
concerned with security and European defence***

- (i) THE ASSEMBLY is aware that it is important for WEU to take full advantage of the work of the various research institutes concerned with security and defence and which are capable of exercising considerable influence on public opinion and politicians, thus contributing to the enlargement of the public debate on these questions;
- (ii) It welcomes therefore the fact that the organisation of relations with such institutes in and beyond Western Europe and the development of greater public awareness of European security questions are among the tasks of the newly-created WEU Institute for Security Studies;
- (iii) It is gratified that according to the Council's reply to Recommendation 474 the institutes' unclassified work will be widely available to the public;
- (iv) It is happy that one of the tasks of the institute will be to establish and keep up-to-date a data bank for research and information purposes;
- (v) It recalls that its services have so far no means of access to computerised documentation systems established in various research institutes and documentation centres;
- (vi) It considers the advantages WEU could derive from closer collaboration with appropriate non-governmental organisations capable of giving maximum publicity to the organisation's aims, initiatives and achievements and promoting a public awareness of European security questions in all countries concerned.

THE ASSEMBLY therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council:

1. Grant the WEU Institute for Security Studies the broadest possible independence for its work, including the development of fruitful relations with parliamentarians, the media and the public and for establishing an active information policy;
2. Allow the Assembly appropriate access to the institute's documentation data base for its own work;
3. With the help of the institute, develop closer co-operation with those international non-governmental organisations which are particularly representative within the organisation's sphere of competence and, by their activities, are capable of contributing to promoting a European security identity and inform the Assembly of the action taken.

Draft Order

*on WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations
concerned with security and European defence*

THE ASSEMBLY considers the advantages to be derived from closer collaboration with non-governmental organisations capable of giving maximum publicity to the Assembly's aims, initiatives and achievements and promoting public awareness of European security questions in all countries concerned.

THE ASSEMBLY therefore instructs its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations:

To examine how to organise a working relationship between the Assembly and appropriate non-governmental organisations concerned with European security and defence and report on this matter.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Stegagnini, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Recommendation 467 on the establishment of a European institute for advanced security studies was not the first sign of the importance the Assembly attaches to defence and security research. In April 1986, the report by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on the promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters presented by Mrs. Fischer had already suggested improving contacts with institutes that were capable of exercising considerable influence on public opinion and politicians. The committee therefore took advantage of its visit to Portugal on 8th and 9th November 1989 to obtain information on the activities of the Portuguese National Defence Institute in Lisbon.

2. The Council's 13th November 1989 decision to create the WEU Institute for Security Studies gave a new dimension to thinking on this subject insofar as the Council instructed the institute to co-operate with institutes in member countries to encourage greater awareness of European security-related matters and to establish contacts with institutes in other countries, including those of Warsaw Pact countries. It is now time therefore for the Assembly to explain what its interest is in regard to the work of the research institutes concerned.

3. Similarly, consideration should be given to possibilities of developing and making greater use of WEU and its Assembly's relations with non-governmental organisations concerned with defence and European security matters, a question which has so far been neglected somewhat. However, the information report on parliaments, public opinion and defence¹ presented on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations by Mr. Eysink in December 1985 stressed the importance of intensifying links with appropriate non-governmental organisations, the purpose being "to ensure that these organisations take due account of WEU and its Assembly in their own work".

4. The rôle of non-governmental organisations in extending the frameworks in which matters for which WEU is responsible might be discussed with the public was also referred to by Mr. Terlezki in his report on parliamentary and public relations², adopted by the Assembly in December 1986. However, it seems WEU has not yet taken the proper steps to be able to take

full advantage of the existence of non-governmental organisations working in its area of responsibility. This is the subject of the second part (Chapter III) of this report, whose aim is to make a few firm proposals in this connection.

II. Research institutes

(i) Analysis of the activities and specific features of the institutes concerned

5. In the context of this study, your Rapporteur asked the secretariat to contact about a hundred research institutes, mostly in Western Europe, for information on their activities and statutes, a description of their aims, their annual reports and lists of their publications and institutions with which they are in contact.

6. So far, forty-one institutes located in fifteen countries have submitted useful information about their activities. They include two institutes in Belgium, eight in France, six in Germany, four in Italy, two in the Netherlands, one in Spain and eight in the United Kingdom, representing thirty-one institutes in seven WEU member countries. Regarding Portugal, the committee obtained interesting information on the activities of the Portuguese National Defence Institute during its visit to Lisbon in November 1989.

7. The remaining ten institutes which replied to the questionnaire are divided as follows: one institute in Norway, one in Switzerland, one in Greece, one in Denmark, one in Ireland, two in Sweden and one in the United States.

8. Based on the information submitted by the abovementioned establishments about institutions with which they are in contact, a non-exhaustive list of relevant research institutes has been drawn up³. Furthermore, at the committee's request, the Rapporteur's working paper discussed at the committee meeting on 5th March 1990 has been sent to all member delegations to allow them to study it, make remarks and if necessary, complete the list of research institutes and non-governmental organisations. The United Kingdom Delegation has submitted a revised list of United Kingdom research institutes and non-governmental organisations on

1. Document 1038.
2. Document 1080.

3. See Appendix I. Some universities are included although this study covers first and foremost specific research institutes.

the basis of which Appendices I and II of the report have been completed.

9. It is clear that the statutes and aims of the establishments concerned are very diverse. There are *international institutes* which are independent, such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in Oslo, the International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI) in Geneva. Others depend on international organisations such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) or the European Institute for Public Administration (EIPA) in Maastricht or the NATO Defence College in Rome.

10. At national level there are various important establishments which are independent or set up by and responsible to national governments. In regard to the subjects they handle, it must be recalled that the work of the Assembly and its three political committees covers every aspect of security. It is therefore evident that it should be interested in all kinds of research in this connection, i.e. the work of:

- institutes specialising in foreign policy and international affairs;
- establishments dealing more particularly with security, defence and disarmament matters;
- establishments handling technical and scientific aspects;
- those examining industrial and economic aspects;
- those dealing with the evolution of public opinion in security matters.

Whereas the Assembly's political committees should deal mainly with the extent to which institutes are prepared to assist the Assembly in its work and take due account of its activities in their research, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations should give priority to ascertaining how far these research institutes are prepared to develop public debate.

11. The impact on the public is supposed to be less evident for institutes directly dependent on defence ministries which are primarily concerned with training military personnel. However, when the committee visited the Portuguese National Defence Institute in Lisbon on 9th November 1989, it was impressed by the institute's efforts to make public opinion as a whole aware of defence problems and to organise lectures and courses open to those working in public and private sectors, education, science, politics, etc.

12. An important factor that might foster awareness of WEU-related matters is the training of officials in all European countries. There the European Institute for Public Admin-

istration in Maastricht made some useful contributions in 1985 and 1988 although its aims are first and foremost to contribute to the co-operation and integration in the European Community.

13. National research institutes working on specific questions raised by their parliaments or governments such as the German Foundation for Science and Politics (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) in Ebenhausen near Munich can have an important influence on decision-makers and parliamentarians.

14. Among institutes with independent status, close co-operation has been developed between the following four establishments in particular:

- the French Institut des relations internationales (IFRI) (Institute for International Relations) in Paris;
- the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (Research Institute of the German Foreign Policy Association) in Bonn;
- the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) Chatham House, in London; and
- the Istituto affari internazionali (IAI) (Institute for International Affairs) in Rome.

15. These four institutes, which of course have contacts with various similar bodies in Europe and throughout the world, for instance the Council on Foreign Relations (COFR) in New York, co-operate closely in areas of interest to WEU and its Assembly. Thus, on 22nd and 23rd November 1988, three of them organised a conference on Western European co-operation in security and defence matters at the Château d'Esclimont near Paris at which the rôle of public opinion played an important part, but no conclusions on this matter were made public.

16. An annual four-party meeting on politico-strategic questions is organised jointly by IFRI, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House, London), the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Ebenhausen) and the Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, California).

17. In 1985, the abovementioned group of institutes set up the European Strategy Group (ESG) to determine conditions for studying security matters in a wider research framework and to strengthen co-operation with non-European partners such as the Aspen Strategy Group (ASG) and the European-American Institute for Security Research (EAI).

18. In spite of the large number of available publications emanating from research institutes, well known for their high standard and competence, there is a tendency for some of them to restrict participation in their internal discussions to a small select circle. For instance, in

1989 the French Institut des relations internationales launched a new system of restricted meetings: the IFRI meetings in camera attended by people working on the most topical questions of the day. It is therefore particularly important for relations between the institutes and WEU to be developed to allow the latter to be heard and take advantage of the results of their work.

19. In this connection, it would be interesting to study the statutes of the major institutes in order to ascertain how an organisation like WEU might join them in one form or another. This would be possible, for instance, in the case of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London of which WEU as an organisation is a corporate member. Similarly, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the French Institute for International Relations allow other organisations to join them as corporate members.

20. On the other hand, every Assembly member is free to seek individual membership in relevant associations and research institutes located in his home country, and some of them are already doing so. Every parliamentarian should use his membership in such associations and institutions to propagate the views of the Assembly.

21. With regard to the public relations effort of research institutes, it might be useful to study more thoroughly the relevant activities of the *United States Council on Foreign Relations* (COFR), a non-profit and non-partisan organisation dedicated to improving understanding of American foreign policy and international affairs. The Council, based in New York and Washington, has created so-called Committees on Foreign Relations as member organisations composed of influential citizens in thirty-eight major cities across the country. These committees allow important contributions to be made to the Council's nationwide educational mission by offering the opportunity for distinguished foreign policy personalities to meet with influential groups throughout the North American continent.

22. In a country in which the media play a crucial rôle in political life, it is natural for the American Council on Foreign Affairs to have a strong Public Affairs Department, in order to increase the visibility of its activities. It hosts briefings for journalists and has regular contacts with the televised media. Its senior fellows appear regularly on major television programmes. Furthermore, it might be of special interest to know that in 1989 the Public Affairs Department of the COFR finalised a study on foreign affairs programming on television and radio. That study surveyed current foreign affairs programming and recommended alternative broadcasting methods for improving the

media's coverage of international affairs. A summary of the study was published and received positive reactions from foundations, educational institutions and the media. The Council's public affairs efforts include the development of new electronic programming initiatives. The briefings organised by the Council's Public Affairs Department also include foreign parliamentarians. The institute has even created a Public Affairs Advisory Committee, offering guidance on how the Public Affairs Department can be more responsive to the needs of the media.

23. Some of the institutions in Western Europe which submitted information on their work attach similar importance to public relations using different means. The Peace Research Institute (Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung) in Frankfurt for instance organises seminars for journalists, press briefings and exhibitions. Furthermore, it participates in working groups drawing up teaching guidelines on security policy for schools.

24. The Welsh Centre for International Affairs in Cardiff concentrates its activities on education including the creation of an informed public opinion, work in schools, international youth service and information.

25. The Information Section of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) devotes much of its time to answering factual queries on defence issues around the world from members, the media and the public. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) distributes press releases, booklets and other information material to a wide range of policy-makers, researchers, journalists, organisations and the public. A major press conference is arranged in Stockholm every year for issuing the SIPRI Yearbook.

26. The Research Institute of the German Foreign Policy Association organised the first conference of publishers and chief editors of European periodicals and magazines dealing with international relations which took place in Bonn in December 1988 with the participation of representatives of Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. The conference agreed to seek better planning co-ordination, to envisage simultaneous publications and eventually to publish a European periodical containing selected articles from different national publications.

27. These few examples show the very different ways and means chosen by several research institutes for improving the public impact of their activities. Some of them might provide useful impetus for the future public relations effort of the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

(ii) WEU's place in the work of research institutes

28. Although it is impossible to collect complete information on the activities of all relevant research institutes, it seems that several of them are showing increasing interest in Western European Union. Already, in May 1985, the European Institute for Public Administration in Maastricht (Netherlands) had organised a colloquy on the reactivation of WEU and its repercussions on the European Community and its institutions. Major contributions were made to the discussions by the President of the Assembly and the Secretary-General of WEU. Following this colloquy, the institute published a booklet on "The reactivation of Western European Union: the effects of the EC and its institutions". In 1988, the institute published a study entitled "Western security in a changing world: From the reactivation of WEU to the Single European Act".

29. In 1989, the Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament (SND), established by the Danish Government in 1980, published an information booklet on Western European Union. Since it represents the voice of a non-member country institution, it is worth quoting extracts from its summary, in order to understand its attitude towards WEU:

"WEU countries have developed a close co-operation in the fields of information transfer and as for harmonising attitudes to security policy. This co-operation has reached a certain level and is valued by the main Western European countries. At the same time, however, the publication also points out that WEU continues to exist in the shadow of more powerful organisations such as NATO and EEC and its future development remains uncertain...

The uncertainty surrounding the status of WEU and its future stems mainly from the diverging views among members as to WEU's future rôle and tasks...

The paper points to the fact that several of the principals would prefer to develop European political co-operation as a European pillar in the alliance, rather than WEU, but also that there is resistance in some quarters against giving EPS more of a military dimension (Ireland). One of the chances for WEU is that several countries would prefer one European defence organisation which, contrary to economic and social development, is built up without integration and with consensus decisions on all important issues. More recently, contacts between WEU and NATO have become closer and there is little doubt that the potential for development of WEU lies in

a removal of American reservations against the organisation and the establishment of an institutional co-operation or task-sharing with NATO."

30. The same institute issued a report on "The European pillar in NATO co-operation as seen in the context of the European political co-operation (EPC) and Western European Union (WEU)." The Royal Institute of International Affairs in London is considering publishing documentation on Western European Union in April or May 1990.

31. As more information about WEU appears in documentation issued by independent institutions which do not represent the organisation's official position, it becomes more important for the public also to be kept informed by WEU itself and its representatives. It is therefore to be welcomed that, in September 1989, Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, published a study entitled "Future European defence co-operation - the rôle of WEU" in the framework of the European Strategy Group (ESG), whose presidency is now held by IFRI. A first step for providing quick basic information for the general public was taken by the Secretariat-General of WEU in April 1990, when it issued, for the first time, a brief information leaflet on Western European Union.

32. One of the priorities recently set by the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt (Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung) is the foreign and security policies of Western European defence co-operation. But so far the institute has made no specific reference to the rôle of Western European Union in the matter.

33. The interest of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) in WEU matters was shown recently when its Newsbrief published on 30th January 1990 an article on "WEU and future European defence co-operation" pleading strongly for an increased rôle for this organisation, particularly regarding verification. The Centre for Defence and Disarmament Studies of the University of Hull maintains contacts with various defence and security organisations including WEU.

34. Conversely no such relations were so far developed with the German Peace Research and European Security Studies Working Group in Mosbach (Federal Republic of Germany), which is concerned in particular with research into space questions, the SDI, weapons technology and verification, all matters of main interest for WEU and particularly for the Assembly's Technological and Aerospace Committee. According to the list of some hundred participants from both East and West who attended the conference organised by that group in Germany in December 1989 on verification, arms control

and European security, WEU was the only European organisation concerned that was not represented.

35. Thanks to the contacts established with this working group in the framework of this report it was possible to invite its Chairman to the symposium organised by the Assembly's Technological and Aerospace Committee in Rome on 27th and 28th March 1990 on "Observation satellites - a European means of verifying disarmament".

36. Furthermore, it is to be welcomed that, thanks to the symposia organised frequently by the Technological and Aerospace Committee, worthwhile relations have been established between many technological and industrial groups and the Assembly of WEU.

37. On the other hand, there are many examples showing that, among the hundreds of bodies in existence, many work in areas of interest to WEU without being aware of its work and without WEU and its Assembly being aware of the activities of those bodies. This report might, therefore, be a first step towards improving exchanges of information between WEU and research institutes.

38. Your Rapporteur would also recall the initiatives that led to the organisation of European sessions of advanced defence studies, first in November 1988 by the Institut des hautes études de défense (IHEDN) in Paris and then in December 1989 in Belgium. An association of alumni of these sessions has been set up under the aegis of WEU. This association should be better used for enlarging and intensifying the public debate on European security questions.

39. Your Rapporteur believes that all organs of WEU should take note of the activities of research institutes studying particular subjects which might become major security problems in the future. Some of them are:

- the changing nature of *security problems in the third world* (priority given by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS);
- relationship between politico-military security and *environmental security* (priority given by the International Peace Research Institute, PRIO, in Oslo and by the Finnish Tampere Peace Research Institute);
- *ethnic conflicts* in the third world (PRIO);
- the security questions resulting from *refugees and minorities* problems (these issues are studied particularly by the Institut français de polémologie and the Belgian Helsinki Committee in Brussels).

- *social aspects of security, political psychology and peace education* (priority given by the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt and by Tampere Peace Research Institute);

- *conflict management and conflict resolution* (Tampere Peace Research Institute).

40. For the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations it would be of particular interest to develop contacts with all institutes observing the evolution of public opinions. There are various opinion poll institutes in Western Europe and also a public opinion research Institute in Prague. Since the public perception of security problems is a crucial matter, WEU and its newly-created Institute for Security Studies should not overlook establishing links with this kind of research institute.

(iii) The creation of the WEU Institute for Security Studies

41. It is gratifying that one of the tasks which the WEU Council has assigned to the newly-created institute is "to encourage and help the existing institutes in the member states" and "in collaboration with existing institutes, organise meetings with institutes in countries not belonging to Western Europe, particularly those in the Warsaw Pact countries".

42. It is not for the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to establish methods of work for future co-operation between the institute and the Assembly. However, after the Council decided to place the institute under its authority and instruct it to conduct research "principally for the Council", the question is to what extent will the Assembly be able to benefit from its activities and, in particular, the relations it establishes with outside research bodies.

43. According to paragraph 5 of the ministerial decision of 13th November 1989:

"The Assembly may, with the Council's approval, assign to the institute studies relating to the Assembly's own activities. The Assembly shall have access to the results of the institute's unclassified work."

44. Following his appointment by the Council as Director of the institute, Mr. John Roper said⁴: "One of the objectives of the institute is both to provide papers for the governments but also - and I hope this will be the bulk of our work - to make available documents for the public. One of our purposes is to help stimulate and add to the general debate on these important issues of security and defence in

⁴ Interview in the International Herald Tribune, 22nd January 1990.

Europe." It would be very desirable for the independence that the Council grants the institute in conducting its research to be interpreted in the widest possible sense so that the Assembly and European public opinion may derive greater benefit from the institute's activities than it did from the former agencies for security questions.

45. Furthermore, it would be most desirable for the Council to grant the institute all the financial and technical means to ensure the visibility of its activities in the eyes of public opinion and the media.

46. Another area of interest for the Assembly is the task assigned to the institute to "establish and keep up-to-date a data bank for the purposes of research into the defence efforts of the WEU member countries and for studies relating to European security". For documentation purposes, the Assembly has hitherto been working in conditions that do not correspond to the level that most national parliaments and international assemblies have for long considered essential if they are to operate properly.

47. The Assembly has no computerised means of handling documentation and thus has no access to external data banks. This is particularly regrettable since most documentation centres and libraries belonging to parliaments, governments and research institutes now have remarkable documentation services, sometimes with very sophisticated technical facilities with which the Assembly cannot communicate.

48. It may therefore be wondered whether it will be possible to establish close co-operation between the relevant Assembly services and those of the institute so that the Assembly may take full advantage of the computerised documentation system which will be procured for the institute. In any event, the Assembly must have access to all means of documentation and information necessary for its own work.

49. In establishing an Assembly library, there should be exchanges of documents, publications, periodicals and books with institutes working in the same field as the WEU Assembly. There should also be exchanges of information on programmes of work and the dates, places and agendas of conferences organised by the various institutes.

III. WEU and non-governmental organisations concerned with security issues

50. In Europe, there are many non-governmental national and international organisations dealing with matters within the purview of Western European Union, but our organisation has never really taken advantage of their existence to serve as a "conveyor belt" between the general public and WEU.

51. Non-governmental organisations include all kinds of associations, movements and groups independent of governments. They each have their own area of activity and work on a non-profit making basis. Examples of groups which might be of interest to WEU are listed at appendix to this report⁵.

52. In Mr. Terlezki's report on parliamentary and public relations⁶, he recalled that an Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) was set up in the framework of NATO "in 1954 as an international non-governmental organisation composed by the national member associations existing in all NATO member countries on a voluntary private basis.... It created special programmes such as the Atlantic Education Committee and the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders".

53. Whereas the ATA's annual conferences provide a major public forum allowing political and military leaders from the alliance to communicate information, there is nothing comparable at the level of Western European Union.

54. However, there is no lack of initiatives of various kinds in this sense. The creation of the association of alumni of European sessions of advanced defence studies under the auspices of WEU, for instance, is the sign of growing awareness that bodies are needed to convey to the general public the idea of a European identity in defence and security matters, in order to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

55. It would be a great help for all these initiatives if public opinion were better informed about the specifics of Western European Union and the areas in which this organisation alone is authorised to play a rôle. Various interested associations would thus be in a position to propagate the fact that:

- (i) WEU's aim is to "preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law", to "strengthen the economic, social and cultural ties between their members, to afford each other assistance" in accordance "with the Charter of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression" and "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe";
- (ii) on the basis of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, WEU constitutes a defensive alliance far more

5. Appendix II.

6. Document 1080, 17th November 1986.

binding than the North Atlantic Treaty or any other treaty in force since it commits the forces of all the member countries unconditionally in the event of an attack on one of them in Europe;

- (iii) there is no geographical limit placed on WEU's security responsibilities so that at the request of any of its partners WEU shall consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise (the WEU concerted action in the Gulf was the first practical application of that WEU treaty obligation);
- (iv) WEU is the only western forum in which both foreign affairs and defence ministers of member countries are required to meet together regularly;
- (v) WEU is the first successful case of an agreement which makes it incumbent on mainland member countries not to exceed a certain levels of forces without unanimous agreement and to submit their force levels to the Council for approval, making all member countries' heavy weapons subject to verification by WEU;
- (vi) WEU is the only organisation which has created an instrument with successful experience of the control of armaments freely-accepted by a group of states with equal rights which can also offer guarantees for a future European security system;
- (vii) the Assembly of Western European Union assumes crucial democratic supervision responsibilities as the only official international parliamentary body with competence in defence and security matters based on an international treaty.

56. A number of WEU representatives have already taken the opportunity to use contacts with appropriate NGOs to propagate the organisation's position. Mr. Goerens, President of the WEU Assembly, for instance, accepted an invitation from an association called Young Europeans for Security (YES) to speak at a seminar that it organised in Berlin from 4th to 10th February 1990 on "Which Germany in which Europe?". YES is a European youth organisation set up in the Netherlands in 1985 which endeavours to stimulate awareness of common interests in security, peace and democracy as important values in Western European democracies. It has steadfastly shown

interest in establishing closer contacts with the Western European Union Assembly.

57. The Belgian Helsinki Committee, a private organisation interested mainly in the protection of minority rights and in the problems of nationalities, has also expressed the wish to establish closer relations with WEU and its Assembly. It considers that the fair treatment of ethnic and minority problems is a necessary condition for the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe.

58. To take another example at national level, there is the Deutsches Strategie-Forum (DSF) (German Strategy Forum) in Bonn, whose tasks include helping, through information and exchanges of ideas, to bring about awareness of security and defence policy matters both inside and outside the Federal Republic of Germany. For this purpose it organises regular meetings between persons working in the public sector, science and the economy and church representatives. At its meeting in Bonn from 14th to 16th March 1990, Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, spoke about European co-operation in security matters.

59. As reflected in his information letter on the activities of the WEU intergovernmental organs from 16th November 1989 to 14th March 1990, the Secretary-General of WEU continued to make considerable efforts in addressing conferences of relevant private organisations and associations interested in security matters.

60. From an answer to a question put by a member of the United Kingdom House of Commons⁷, we learn that the British Government organises twice-yearly meetings with non-governmental organisations dealing with arms control and disarmament. These organisations include:

- the Verification Technology Information Centre; and
- the European Proliferation Information Centre.

In the United Kingdom, there are also a British-American Security Information Council and a Defence Fax Organisation.

61. The non-governmental organisations with which WEU might establish useful links might also include associations of teachers, newspaper editors, journalists and representatives of libraries, documentation and research centres and industry.

62. In order to establish more regular contacts with non-governmental organisations, WEU might take advantage of the experience gained

7. Question put by Mr. Cryer and answer by Mr. Waldegrave, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Hansard, Volume 166, No. 39.

by the Council of Europe during almost forty years' experience in this area after having decided, in 1951, to take the necessary steps to consult non-governmental organisations handling matters for which it is responsible. It thus established working relations with them in granting them consultative status.

63. The development of relations with non-governmental organisations concerns the WEU Council, the Assembly and the newly-created institute. All WEU organs should be interested in extending the framework of the public debate on matters for which they are responsible. The non-governmental organisations concerned might be a good additional means of giving maximum publicity to Western European Union's initiatives and activities. The Assembly, for its part, would have to decide to establish working relations with the non-governmental organisations and work out ways and means of doing so.

64. These organisations might be consulted by the relevant Assembly organs on matters of mutual interest. They might submit memoranda to an Assembly committee and be invited to give their views, orally or in writing, on matters on the agenda of the committee concerned.

65. They might receive the Assembly's agendas and public documents and be invited to send observers to attend the Assembly's public sittings, without the right to speak.

IV. Conclusions

66. The establishment of closer relations between WEU organs and research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and defence is justified for various reasons. Whereas the impact of the work of the research institutes on the public is limited to a circle of qualified personalities, others have developed considerable means in order to establish relations with the media and public opinion. The experience gained by these institutions and their working results can be very useful for the Assembly's own activities. Working relations with them should therefore be intensified on a reciprocal basis. While it is to be hoped that the Assembly will benefit from the external relations that the newly-created WEU Institute for Security Studies establishes – and the Assembly hopes that the independence granted to the institute will be interpreted in the widest meaning of the word – the latter can but develop its own links with the institutes concerned.

67. Where the rôle of non-governmental organisations is concerned, it is clear that they might be an excellent link between the general public and WEU by giving maximum publicity to the activities of all WEU organs. For this purpose, procedure for institutionalising liaison with the organisations concerned should be introduced in accordance with the above considerations.

APPENDIX I

*Research institutes in WEU member countries,
other European countries and outside Europe**WEU member countries**Belgium*

Paul-Henri Spaak Foundation, Brussels	Institut royal des relations internationales, 1050 Brussels
Institut royal supérieur de défense, 1040 Brussels	Vereniging voor Internationale Relaties (VIRA), Brussels
Centre européen d'études politiques, 1000 Brussels	Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix, 1030 Brussels
Institut européen pour la paix et la sécurité (IEPS), 1050 Brussels	Service d'information internationale pour la paix (IPIS), 2808 Anvers
Comité international pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe	Centrum voor Polemologie, Vrije Universiteit, Brussels
Groupe d'étude des politiques européennes (GEPE), Brussels	

France

Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI), 75863 Paris Cedex 14	Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN), 75700 Paris
Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 75007 Paris	Centre des hautes études d'armement, École Militaire, 75007 Paris
Institut d'histoire des conflits contemporains, 75007 Paris	Institut des hautes études européennes, Centre de documentation européenne, 67081 Strasbourg Cedex
Institut d'études de défense, 75004 Paris	Centre d'études de prospective stratégique, 75007 Paris
Centre d'études politiques et de société, 75007 Paris	Fondation du futur, 75007 Paris
Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, 75007 Paris	Académie de la paix et de la sécurité interna- tionale, 06000 Nice
Institut français de polémologie, 75007 Paris	Centre international de formation européenne (CIFE), 06000 Nice
Centre d'études diplomatiques et stratégiques, 75006 Paris	Institut européen des hautes études internatio- nales (IEHEI), 06000 Nice
Institut d'études des relations internationales, 75007 Paris	École des hautes études internationales (EHEI), 75000 Paris
Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), 75000 Paris	Centre d'études des relations entre technologies et stratégies (CREST)
Fondation méditerranéenne d'études straté- giques, Toulon	Centre interdisciplinaire de recherche sur la paix et d'études stratégiques (CIRPES)

Centre européen de relations internationales et de stratégie (CERIS)

Observatoire européen de géopolitique (OEG),
69000 Lyon

Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques (IRIS),
Paris

Centre de sociologie de la défense nationale (CSDN)

Federal Republic of Germany

Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik,
5300 Bonn

Peace Research and European Security Studies,
6950 Mosbach

Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien,
5000 Köln

Haus Rissen: Internationales Institut für Politik und Wirtschaft,
2000 Hamburg 56

JANUS, Institut für Kernphysik,
Darmstadt

Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
5300 Bonn

Institut für Internationale Politik,
Freie Universität Berlin

Aspen Institut,
Berlin

Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr (SOWI),
München

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,
8026 Ebenhausen

Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung,
6000 Frankfurt 1

Institut für Internationale Angelegenheiten,
2000 Hamburg

Institut für Europäische Politik,
5300 Bonn

Fraunhofer Institut für Naturwissenschaftlich-Technische Trendanalysen,
Euskirchen

Forschungsinstitut der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,
St. Augustin

Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik,
Universität Hamburg

Forschungsinstitut für Friedenspolitik,
Starnberg

Italy

Centro alti studi della difesa,
00165 Roma

Association italienne d'études de politique étrangère,
00186 Roma

Centre d'études et de documentation sur la paix et le désarmement,
00186 Roma

Centre d'études et de documentation internationale,
10129 Torino

Centre d'études de politique internationale (CEPI),
00187 Roma

Forum Problemi Pace e Guerra
50132 Firenze

Institut d'études et de recherches sur la défense (ISTRID),
00186 Roma

Institut italien de recherche sur la paix,
86136 Napoli

Istituto affari internazionali (IAI),
00195 Roma

Société italienne pour l'organisation internationale (SIOI),
00186 Roma

Istituto di studi previsione e relazioni internazionali,
00186 Roma

Centre d'études "Manlio Brosio",
10128 Torino

Institut d'études européennes "Alcide de Gasperi",
20121 Milano

Institut italien de polémologie et de recherche sur les conflits,
20121 Milano

Institut de recherche sur le désarmement et la paix, 00198 Roma

NATO Defence College,
00144 Roma

Centro militare di studi strategici,
Roma

Centro studi e documentazione internazionali,
Università de Turin

National Research Council (CNR),
Istituto Biofisica,
Pisa

Centro studi strategici (CSS),
Università libre de Rome

Luxembourg

Institut européen pour les questions de sécurité,
Luxembourg

Netherlands

European Institute of Public Administration,
6211 HE Maastricht

Centre européen de recherche,
2508 DH Den Haag

Institut néerlandais sur la paix et la sécurité,
2508 CC-Den Haag

TNO National Defence Research Council,
Den Haag

Netherlands Institute of International Relations,
2509 AB Den Haag

Institut atlantique de recherche,
2514 JL-Den Haag

Portugal

Institut d'études stratégiques et internationales,
1600 Lisboa

National Defence Institute,
Lisbon

Spain

Fundacion José Ortega y Gasset,
28010 Madrid

Institut espagnol d'études stratégiques,
Madrid 28046

Institute for International Questions (INCI),
28007 Madrid

Instituto Nacional de Industria,
28071 Madrid

Société d'études internationales,
Madrid 14

Centre d'information et de documentation inter-
nationale (CIDOB),
Barcelone

United Kingdom

International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS),
London WC2E 7NQ

Royal College of Defence Studies,
London SW1X 8NS

Welsh Centre for International Affairs,
Cardiff CF 13AP

Institute for European Defence and Strategic
Studies,
London W1R 3AF

Royal United Services Institute for Defence
Studies (RUSI),
London SW1A 2ET

Royal Institute for International Affairs
(Chatham House),
SW1Y 4LE London

Centre for Defence and Disarmament Studies,
The University,
HU6 7RX Hull

Council of Arms Control,
London

Defence Study Centre (DSC),
University of Aberdeen

The School of Peace Studies,
Bradford University,
Bradford

International Security Information Service,
c/o CSS
London EC4V 5BY

Oxford Research Group,
Oxford OX2 6JA

War Studies Department, King's College,
London

Centre for the Studies of Arms Control,
Lancaster

Other European countries

Austria

Oesterreichische Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik
und Internationale Beziehungen,
1040 Wien

Oesterreiches Institut für Internationale Politik,
Laxenberg

Czechoslovakia

Research Centre for Problems of Peace and
Disarmament, CSSR Academy of Sciences,
Prague

Public Opinion Research Institute,
Prague

Denmark

Danish Institute of International Studies,
1069 Kobenhavn

Danish Peace Research Association,
5672 Broley

Danish Commission on Security and Disarma-
ment Affairs,
1466 Kobenhavn

Institut de recherche Est-Ouest,
University Centre of South Jutland,
6705 Esbjerg

Foreign Policy Society,
DK-1256 Kobenhavn K

Centre of Peace and Conflict Research,
Kobenhavn

Finland

Tampere Peace Research Institute,
33101 Tampere 10

Finnish Institute of International Affairs,
00100 Helsinki 10

German Democratic Republic

Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirt-
schaft (IPW),
Berlin-Est

Institute of International Relations,
Potsdam

Greece

Foundation for Mediterranean Studies,
10671 Athens

Hellenic Society of International Law and Rela-
tions,
10671 Athens

Hungary

Hungarian Institute of International Affairs
(MKI)

Iceland

Icelandic Commission on Security and Inter-
national Affairs

Ireland

International Relations Committee of the Royal
Irish Academy,
Dublin 2

Norway

Norwegian Defence Research Establishment,
2007 Lillestrom

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs,
Oslo

International Peace Research Institute,
0151 Oslo 1

Poland

Institute of Organisation and Management,
Krakow

Polish Institute of International Affairs,
Warsaw

Sweden

Swedish Defence Research Institute,
10254 Stockholm

Centre de recherche de la défense nationale,
S-10450 Stockholm

Swedish Institute of International Affairs,
11128 Stockholm

Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute (SIPRI),
S 171 73 Solna

Institut des relations politiques internationales,
S-11128 Stockholm

Switzerland

Institut suisse des pays de l'Est,
3000 Bern 6

Organisation civile internationale de défense,
1213 Petit-Lancy/Genève

Office central de la défense,
3003 Bern

International Peace Research Institute (IPRI),
Geneva

Turkey

Institut d'études stratégiques d'Ankara,
28/16 Yenisehir, Ankara

Institut de politique étrangère, 28/16 Yenisehir,
Ankara

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Institute of World Economics and International
Relations (IMEMO),
Moscow

USSR Academy of Sciences,
Institute for System Studies

Institute of Europe,
Moscow

Comité pour la sécurité et la coopération en
Europe,
Moscow

Institut d'État des relations internationales
(MGIMO),
Moscow

Countries outside Europe***Australia***

Australian Institute of International Affairs,
Canberra

Canada

Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
Toronto

Centre québécois de relations internationales

Centre for International and Strategic Studies,
North York,
Ontario

India

Indian Council of World Affairs,
New Delhi

Israel

Jassé Center for Strategic Studies,
Tel Aviv

Japan

Foundation for Advanced Information and
Research

Japan Centre for International Exchange

National Institute for Research Advancement

Nomura Research Institute

Tokyo Club Foundation for Global Studies,
Tokyo

New Zealand

New Zealand Institute of International Affairs,
Wellington

Nigeria

Nigerian Institute of International Affairs,
Lagos

Peru

Institut péruvien de polémologie,
Lima

Trinidad

Trinidad and Tobago Institute of International
Affairs, Newtown, Port of Spain,
Trinidad, West Indies

United States of America

Council on Foreign Relations,
New York 10021

Aspen Strategy Group

European-American Institute for Security
Research (EAI)

Arms Control Program, Argonne National
Laboratory,
Argonne

The Wilson Center,
Washington

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (JFPA),
Cambridge (Ma)

“ Manlio Brosio Center ” for European Studies,
Washington

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica

Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington

Institute for East-West Security Studies
(IEWSS),
New York

BDM Corporation,
Mac Lean (Vi)

APPENDIX II

Some non-governmental organisations

- Deutsches Strategie Forum,
5300 Bonn 1
- Belgian Helsinki Committee,
1090 Brussels
- Union des jeunes paneuropéens de France,
75016 Paris
- Club Victor Hugo pour les États-Unis
d'Europe,
Paris
- Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation,
Nottingham
- Union of Concerned Scientifics,
Washington
- Peace through NATO,
London
- Fondation mérite européen,
Luxembourg
- Young Europeans for Security (YES), Paris
- Association du Traité atlantique (ATA),
Paris
- Association for the Study of European Problems
(AEPE),
75008 Paris
- European Association of Teachers (EAT),
B-1420 Braine L'Alleud
- Association of Institutes for Studies (AIEE),
1208 Geneva
- European Democrat Students Union of Christian-Democratic, Conservative and Liberal Students,
London NW1
- International Federation of Journalists (IFJ),
1041 Brussels
- International Federation of the Periodical Press Limited (FIPP),
London SW1W OBS
- International Federation of Catholic Universities (IFCU),
75007 Paris
- World Federation of Catholic Youth,
4000 Düsseldorf 30
- Comité d'action pour l'Europe,
1040 Brussels
- Groupe européen associations industrie de défense,
Brussels
- International Centre of Studies and Documentation on the European Communities (CISDCE),
20123 Milan
- Association française pour la Communauté atlantique,
Paris
- The European Atlantic Movement (TEAM),
London EC4M 7LR
- Jeunesse européenne fédéraliste (JEF),
1040 Brussels
- Verification Technology Information Centre (VERTIC),
London
- Advisory Council on Peace and Security,
Den Haag
- Anciens auditeurs des sessions européennes des hautes études de défense,
Paris
- Cercle Mars et Mercure,
Paris
- Association for Teacher Education in Europe (ATEE),
1040 Brussels
- International Council for Film, Television and Audiovisual Communication (IFTC), UNESCO,
75015 Paris
- International Centre for European Training (CIFE),
06000 Nice
- International Federation of Newspaper Publishers (FIEJ),
75010 Paris
- International Federation of Europe-House (FIME),
1060 Wien
- International Federation of Secondary Teachers (FIPESO),
75007 Paris
- Federation of Young European Employers (FJCEE),
89480 Coulanges s/Yonne
- European Industrial Space Study Group (EUROSPACE),
75007 Paris

International Press Institute (IPI),
Strasbourg

European Young Christian Democrats (EYCD),
1040 Brussels

International Young Christian Workers (Intern.
YCW),
1050 Brussels

Christian Movement for Peace (CMP),
1040 Brussels

Democrat Youth Community of Europe
(DEMYC Europe),
A-1010 Vienne

Council of European National Youth Com-
mittees (CENYC),
1040 Brussels

Liberal International (LI),
London SW1A 2HE

European Federalist Movement,
Paris

The Robert Schuman Institute for Europe
(IRSE),
60501 Chantilly

Young European Federalists (YEF),
1040 Brussels

Association of European Research Libraries
(LIBER),
2800 Bremen 33

European Organisation of Military Associations
(EUROMIL), 5300 Bonn

European Confederation of Public Relations
(CERP),
B-1330 Rixensart

Socialist International (SI),
London SW4 OJW

Socialist International Women (SIW),
London SW4 OJW

*The new rôle of national delegations in the activities
of the WEU Assembly*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Sir John Hunt, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee* : Mr. Pontillon (Chairman) ; Mr. Ewing (Alternate: *Hill*), Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: *Böhm*) (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Büchner (Alternate: *Ahrens*), Bühler (Alternate: *Lenzer*), Caccia, De Bondt (Alternate: Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*), De Hoop Scheffer (Alternate: *Dees*), Fiandrotti, Gouteyron, Greco, Hardy (Alternate: *Parry*), Sir John Hunt (Alternate: *Sir Geoffrey Finsberg*), MM. Kempinaire (Alternate: *Péciaux*), *Kollwelter*, Pfuhl, Seitlinger, Sir William Shelton (Alternate: *Wilkinson*), MM. Stegagnini, Tummers (Alternate: *Eisma*), Vial-Massat.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics*

Draft Resolution

***on the new rôle of national delegations in the activities
of the WEU Assembly***

- (i) THE ASSEMBLY recalls the importance of taking full advantage of a European parliamentary system provided by the modified Brussels Treaty in which the existence of delegations formed in national parliaments ensures their full participation in decisions to be taken with regard to future European security;
- (ii) It regrets that for some time most WEU member governments prefer to avoid public statements stressing the options offered by this treaty;
- (iii) It is convinced therefore that the question of establishing a new peaceful and secure order in Europe requires enhanced efforts by national delegations to disseminate the Assembly's views and proposals and to urge member governments to use the means offered by WEU to respond to all expectations;
- (iv) It welcomes recent initiatives taken by several delegations and their members to intensify the public dialogue with governments on the rôle WEU can play in this matter;
- (v) It stresses, however, that the rapid communication of information and co-operation between all delegations, political groups and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations should be improved,

THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE INVITES THE CHAIRMEN OF NATIONAL DELEGATIONS:

1. To organise insofar as possible joint delegation initiatives in their parliaments when matters within the Assembly's competence are being debated, and to ensure that the Assembly's voice is heard in these debates;
2. To request the governments to report regularly to parliament on the evolution of WEU as is already done by the German Government and to organise debates on those reports in plenary sitting;
3. To organise regular meetings with the press as is done by the French Delegation and to endeavour to have articles published in the international press or appropriate specialised periodicals;
4. To ensure that the relevant information concerning any WEU related initiatives made by members in parliaments, committees, political groups or in the press, are transmitted without delay to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir John Hunt, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. When studying the subject of the following report, it might be justified to ask why national delegations to the WEU Assembly should play a "new" rôle in view of the fact that so far there has been no change in their status and composition.

2. In fact, the rôle and duties of national delegations need to be reconsidered for several reasons. There is a growing number of complaints that national parliaments are being increasingly deprived of means of controlling the evolution of European integration. Of course, this primarily concerns the work of the European Community and the problems of relations between the European Parliament and national parliaments of its members. But there are also complaints that national parliaments do not know enough about the activities of WEU and its Assembly, despite the fact that it is composed of delegations formed in and by national parliaments.

3. The lack of impact of the Assembly's activities in member parliaments is even more critical if we consider the Assembly's rights and responsibilities in controlling the work of the WEU Council. As Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, former chairman-in-office of the WEU Council recalled in his afterword to the booklet "Ten years of seven-power Europe" published in 1964:

"The Assembly has always had a considerable influence on the development of the organisation and I believe what I said in 1955 is still valid; the success of the work that has been undertaken depends to a great extent on the comments, criticism and also the encouragement of the Assembly. It is to be hoped that, as in the past, it will make every effort to fulfil its supervisory and incentive rôle with regard to the member states, and that in the national parliaments, its members, together with those of the other European assemblies, will support and encourage, if necessary, the zeal of those who are impatient to press forward with the unity of Europe which is our common concern."

The political groups and national delegations therefore all have particular responsibility as a link between the Assembly and member parliaments which are still the only bodies controlling governmental decisions in defence and security matters.

4. The forthcoming revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, the importance of which has increased considerably in the light of the radical changes in East-West relations and the need to establish a new security and peace system, probably including new democratic parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe, may affect the composition of the WEU Assembly as a whole and its delegations. It therefore seems necessary to recall the importance and usefulness of maintaining a parliamentary system in which the existence of delegations formed in parliaments ensures their full participation in all decisions to be taken for the future of European security. At the same time, it will be necessary to consider ways of rendering the activities of national delegations more effective for the work of our Assembly.

II. Areas in which the rôle and activities of national delegations should be strengthened

(i) Strengthening the impact of the Assembly's work in parliaments

5. At first, it might be worth considering the development of follow-up action in parliaments on texts adopted by the Assembly and selected by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations for debate in parliaments since last year. As text No. 50 of the collected texts relating to parliamentary action in implementation of recommendations adopted by the Assembly (Paris, November 1989) shows, a dialogue between members and governments could be registered in only three member parliaments between June and November 1989. No such activities were reported in Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

6. Since the session last December, a few encouraging signs of improvement are to be noted, but unfortunately in only four or five member parliaments.

7. A number of United Kingdom Delegation members are active on an individual basis in engaging a dialogue with the United Kingdom Government on WEU issues, in putting oral and written questions and in making speeches on the basis of texts adopted by the WEU Assembly.

8. This was demonstrated recently by the speech made in the House of Commons on 21st December 1989 by *Mr. Atkinson* on Recommendation 477 concerning the future of the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) and the question put by *Mr. Hardy* on 10th January 1990 on Recommendation 476 concerning force comparisons

between NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential.

9. On 15th December 1989 and 16th February 1990, *Mr. Hill* put a series of eight questions on Recommendations 474, 475, 476, 477 and 478 answered by *Mr. Waldegrave*, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and *Mr. Maude*, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; *Mr. Wilkinson* put a question on IEPG and WEU (answered by the Minister of State for Defence Procurement on 7th February 1990). He also made a speech evoking the consequences of the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty for the British military presence in continental Europe during the debate in the House of Commons on 28th February 1990 on the Royal Air Force. In the debate on East-West relations on 22nd February 1990, *Mr. Amery*, who is not a member of the Assembly, pleaded strongly for Western European Union as a nucleus for the necessary European defence system.

10. In a special action on 17th April 1990, *twenty-seven representatives and substitutes of the Assembly's German Delegation* representing the three largest political groups, including *MM. Ahrens, Antretter, Binding, Blunck, Böhm, Büchner, Bühler, Feldmann, Mrs. Fischer, MM. Höffkes, Holtz, Irmer, Kittelmann, Klejdzinski, Lenzer, Müller, Niegel, Reddemann, Scheer, Schmidt, Schmitz, von Schmude, Soell, Steiner, Mrs. Timm, MM. Unland and Zierer*, submitted to the German Government a question without debate. Under the title "WEU initiatives on security in Europe" the delegation put ten questions covering almost all the recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly in December 1989. This is the second time since March 1989 that the German Delegation has taken such an initiative. Since the political impact of such joint action is much greater than putting individual questions, it would be useful if other delegations could take similar steps following procedure in their parliaments.

11. This does not mean that individual action is less important. It is therefore gratifying that on 2nd March 1990 *Mr. Niegel* asked the German Government to inform him about the abolition of the WEU agencies for security and defence questions and the repercussions for their staff.

12. The Bundestag, as well as its delegation to the WEU Assembly, is privileged in a certain way since the government of the Federal Republic of Germany is still the only WEU member government that issues half-yearly written information reports to parliament on the activities of the Council and its organs. Until now, these reports covered the periods between 1st April and 31st March. Since these periods do not correspond to the rhythm of work of WEU, the Bundestag has now decided to request that

the German Government present half-yearly reports covering the periods from 1st January to 30th June and from 1st July to 31st December.

13. At present the Bundestag merely takes note of these information reports in plenary session after they have been transmitted first to the relevant committees. Perhaps it would be worthwhile for the German Delegation to consider procedure by which the impact of these reports might be improved. For instance, the delegation could request that these documents be presented at a plenary session of the Bundestag by means of an oral statement by a member of the Federal Government, followed by a parliamentary debate in which delegation members would have the opportunity to take the floor.

14. It is worth recalling that, in February 1986, on the initiative of *Mr. Murphy*, then a member of the United Kingdom Delegation, the United Kingdom Government was ready to adopt *Mr. Murphy's* suggestion for a government statement on the work of Western European Union to be presented to parliament annually and proposed to make such a statement after the autumn ministerial meeting of the Council. In accordance with the answer given by *Mr. Eggar*, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 8th May 1986 to a question put by *Mr. Murphy*, a written report by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office dated 21st May 1986 on the activities of WEU was placed in the Library of the House of Commons. On 20th February 1987, *Mr. Eggar* announced that the next report to parliament on WEU activities would be made after the spring meeting of foreign and defence ministers in Luxembourg on 27th and 28th April 1987. There is nothing to suggest that there were any further government statements on an annual basis, and there should now perhaps be renewed pressure for these reports to be presented on a regular basis, either by means of a written answer in parliament or by being placed in the Library of the House of Commons.

15. All delegations being regularly briefed by the competent ministers or officials prior to the part-sessions (this is so far practised in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany) should play an active part in these meetings, thus demonstrating that they do not serve mainly as an audience and sounding-board for ministers' speeches. In order to render these meetings as fruitful as possible, specific questions should be prepared by the delegations' secretariat with the help of the Assembly's Office of the Clerk.

16. In *France*, several delegation members have been active in following up Assembly recommendations. *Mr. Seitlinger* put four questions on Recommendations 474, 475, 477 and

478 (1st, 5th and 8th March 1990). The replies of the French Government are not yet known. On 29th March 1990, *Mr. Pontillon*, Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, put two questions on Recommendation 479 on the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe. On 2nd April 1990, *Mr. Fourré* put a question on the situation of the forty agents affected by the abolition of the WEU agencies for security questions.

17. The *Belgian* Delegation has informed the committee secretariat of an intervention in the Belgian Chamber on 9th February 1990 by *Mr. De Decker* on WEU's rôle in the framework of changes in East-West relations.

18. On 21st December 1989, the Permanent Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the *Netherlands* Second Chamber of the States-General – in preparation for the public debate on the foreign affairs budget – put questions on the definition of a European union with full security responsibilities, the future rôle of WEU and the problem of collocation. Your Rapporteur has no particular information about how the *Netherlands* Delegation to the Assembly was involved in the matter. Nor has he any information about particular activities of the *Luxembourg* Delegation.

19. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that increased parliamentary activity on WEU matters is evident. Unfortunately, not all delegations transmit regular or ad hoc information on their activities.

(ii) Strengthening co-operation between national delegations and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

20. Improving the information given to the committee on the activities of member delegations should be relatively easy to achieve since the secretaries of delegations take part ex officio in committee meetings.

21. Thus, at the last committee meeting on 5th March 1990 the *Italian* Delegation secretariat submitted useful information about its efforts to inform the Italian parliamentarians and particularly the foreign affairs and defence committees of the Chamber and the Senate and the chairmen of political groups immediately after Assembly sessions about the recommendations adopted and speeches made. For these purposes, immediately after sessions, the delegation's secretariat issues information notes and summaries of the debates.

22. The *French* Delegation has recently made a particularly welcome effort since it now publishes a regular information bulletin on its activities in the Council of Europe and in Western European Union. The January-February 1990

issue of this document contains useful information on

- a working lunch of the delegation held on 30th January 1990 under the chairmanship of *Mr. Fourré* attended by the Clerk of the WEU Assembly;
- a working lunch with the press organised by the delegation on 31st January 1990;
- correspondence between the French Prime Minister, *Michel Rocard* and the delegation chairman, *Mr. Fourré*, on the future rôle of WEU which was initiated by the latter. It is worth recording that in his letter, the French Prime Minister confirmed that "Western European Union has a leading rôle to play in preparing the more open, more co-operative Europe which is to be built. The actions of Eastern Europe have succeeded in gaining their freedom; it is for the democratic Europe we are shaping to propose to them new processes, new structures for exchanges and political expression, including in the field of defence."

23. The French Delegation's initiative should encourage other delegations to seek their own ways of improving information. In his working paper discussed by the committee on 5th March 1990, your Rapporteur put forward the idea of inviting all national delegations to transmit regular reports on their activities and those of their members between sessions to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

24. Furthermore, he invited delegation secretaries to submit their proposals and suggestions for enhancing co-operation with the committee. The *United Kingdom* Delegation secretariat favours the idea of regular delegation reports to the committee. This has also been proposed in the corresponding committee of the Council of Europe.

25. The *United Kingdom* Delegation secretary submitted the following suggestions in this respect:

"It would be helpful to lay down a timetable and a format for reports from national delegations. In order to allow for the information to be collated, translated and published before each WEU plenary, the periods covered by the report should be the six months from 1st April to 30th September and from 1st October to 31st March. The material supplied by each delegation secretary should be broken down into suitable categories, e.g.:

- debates in the Chamber;
- oral questions and answers;
- written questions and answers;

- motions tabled but not debated;
- specialist committees;
- political groups;
- delegation briefings;
- individual press articles, etc. ”.

26. There are advantages and disadvantages in formalising procedure allowing enhanced and improved information to be communicated to the committee through regular delegation reports. The advantage of annual or six-monthly reports might be to collect comprehensive information. On the other hand, as shown by the experience with the annual reports of the WEU Council, the topicality of the information is lost and these documents become more or less of just historical interest.

27. The committee has always an interest in rapid *ad hoc* information on special activities of delegations in member parliaments in order to circulate such information as quickly as possible. By doing so, similar action can be launched in other parliaments and delegation activities might be intensified in all member parliaments. The delegation secretariats should therefore be asked to transmit by telefax every relevant action immediately to the committee secretariat.

28. Furthermore, in order to ensure more comprehensive and regular information about the delegations' activities, it would be useful at each committee meeting to invite delegation secretaries to give an oral presentation of current delegation activities and to submit, if necessary, the relevant documents. Delegations not represented at the meeting should be asked to submit these accounts in writing. As for the content of information, delegations should be guided by the proposals of the United Kingdom Delegation set out in paragraph 25.

29. Further means of enhancing co-operation should include:

- (a) advance information by delegations to the committees on forthcoming programmes of work, agendas and visits of national committees working on issues that are within the purview of Western European Union. (Some time ago an appropriate information procedure was started with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons.) This information can be used to provide interested committees with relevant Assembly documents;
- (b) as proposed in Mr. Chénard's report on the "Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion"¹, all national

delegations issuing information reports to parliament after ordinary Assembly sessions should be invited to inform readers of the texts selected by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations for transmission to parliaments, emphasizing the reasons for the choice, i.e. that they should be the subject of debates; so far all delegations except the United Kingdom Delegation are producing such documents;

- (c) improving the availability of Assembly documents to interested parliamentarians who are not members of the Assembly. Only in a few member parliaments are Assembly reports distributed to the relevant committees. In most parliaments they are available only on request. But if they are to be requested it is essential to know that they exist.

30. It might be noted that, when Sir Russell Johnston asked in the House of Commons on 27th June 1989 about the availability of WEU documents, Mr. Waldegrave, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, answered as follows:

“ Documents produced by the Assembly are distributed to all members of the British Delegation to the Assembly, who have not so far asked that they be made more widely available ”.

31. In the United Kingdom, the texts of recommendations and reports selected by our committee and sent by the President of the Assembly to the presidents of member parliaments stressing that these texts should be the subject of speeches or questions are normally placed in the library of the House of Commons. Conversely, in the Belgian Senate, they are transmitted to the committee concerned. In the Italian Senate, recommendations are immediately translated and transmitted to the committees concerned and to the political groups.

32. There is no official link between the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and the political groups in member parliaments although they play a crucial rôle in parliamentary activities. These links could be developed through the national delegations, which should also try to co-ordinate the appropriate actions in parliaments with the political groups.

33. The recent initiative of the German Delegation in the Bundestag (see paragraph 10) shows that this can be achieved. In the Netherlands, the socialist delegation members report to the socialist group every three months on developments in WEU. In the United Kingdom, there

1. See Document 1135, 17th April 1988.

are periodic reports by the labour delegation members to the House of Commons Labour Party group.

(iii) Enhancing the public image of delegations in member countries

34. Every Assembly delegation should take advantage of the period during which its government assumes the chairmanship-in-office of the WEU Council to enhance its image in the national press. For this purpose, the relevant delegation chairman should approach the appropriate national authorities to ask them for instance:

- to facilitate contacts between the delegation secretariat and the press services of the appropriate ministries in order to draw up a list of interested press contacts;
- to organise a reception prior to Council meetings to present the relevant Assembly delegation to the national press under the chairmanship of a member of the government, with a speech by the host country and by the chairman of the delegation;
- at the press conference held at the close of Council meetings, invite the chairman of the delegation to sit on the rostrum beside the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the President of the Assembly.

35. Furthermore, delegation and committee chairmen and/or rapporteurs should seek more opportunities for publishing articles in major international newspapers or specialised periodicals on topical security questions with special reference to WEU's rôle. The office of the Clerk is always prepared to help and provide the necessary documentation.

36. The image of delegations could also be improved if their chairmen and members played a more active part in parliamentary debates on security and defence matters. Two concrete examples demonstrate this:

During the debate on France and the future of Europe held in the French National Assembly on 10th April 1990, Mr. Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, sought to limit French ambitions for Western European Union which, in his view, from the very start had suffered from the conditions under which it was created. It was therefore meritorious that Mr. Fourré, chairman of the French Delegation to the WEU Assembly, reiterated the crucial rôle of WEU elaborating a new European security system.

On 29th March 1990, six days after the Assembly's extraordinary session in Luxembourg, the Bundestag debated a motion on "disarmament and security 1990" initiated by the social democrats. Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, recalled on that occasion that some of the French members of the Assembly had assessed as a "cold shower" the speech made by Mr. Genscher in Luxembourg since he had said nothing on the future rôle of WEU. But Mr. Wilz, who is not a member of the German Delegation, was the only parliamentarian to call for a strengthening of the rôle of WEU and its enlargement to include other countries.

III. The rôle of national delegations in the debate on the forthcoming revision of the modified Brussels Treaty

37. In Recommendation 472 the Assembly recommended inter alia that the Council:

- specify as soon as possible which provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty it intends to revise; and
- maintain the provision in Article IX for the Assembly to be composed of delegations from the national parliaments of member countries.

38. Both the United Kingdom and the German Governments have indicated in replies to questions in parliament that they are prepared to contact their respective Assembly delegations before deciding what changes they want to be made in the modified Brussels Treaty. The Luxembourg Government recalled in this connection "that the Luxembourg representatives, because of their dual mandate of deputies and members of the WEU Assembly, would have an important rôle to play if proposed changes to the Brussels Treaty were to be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies for approval".

39. With regard to the future wording of Article IX of the treaty which specifies the composition of the Assembly, so far only the German Delegation has adopted a firm position. In a Bundestag resolution adopted on 21st June 1989 on the ratification of the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain to the WEU treaty, the German Bundestag expressed the wish that:

"Changing the provisions of the treaty should allow an end to be put to the obligation to appoint a single delegation of representatives of the Bundestag to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Assembly of Western European Union."

40. Furthermore, in a question without debate put jointly by members of the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP Groups in March 1989 the Federal Government was asked if it shared the view of the German Delegation to the WEU Assembly that the latter's importance should be enhanced by granting it rights and responsibilities equivalent to those of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in regard to the admission of new members, for instance.

41. The Federal Government confirmed in its reply that it shared the view of the German Delegation that greater weight should be given to the Assembly. It recalled, however, that any change would certainly require the consent of all member states.

42. On the other hand, when asked by *Mr. Klejdzinski* in the Bundestag on 28th November 1989 about relations between the Assembly and the Council, *Mr. Genscher*, Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave the following answer:

“Extension of the responsibilities of the parliamentary Assembly vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers of Western European Union corresponds to our basic democratic concept since all bodies having decision-taking powers – less important in the Council of Ministers of Western European Union than in the European Community – must from the outset be subject to democratic control. However, I consider absolute priority must be given to strengthening the rights of the European Parliament because we are moving towards the European Union.”

43. In fact there is a tendency in the present discussion to look first and foremost at democratic shortcomings in the framework of the European Community and difficulties arising out of the transfer of matters that are the responsibility of national parliaments to European Community bodies. It is therefore essential that the relevant governments be reminded of the importance of maintaining an effective parliamentary control system in European defence and security matters based on national delegations composed of political, military and technological experts.

44. This will require both the definition of a firm Assembly position in this respect based on

a report by the committee concerned and appropriate pressure by all delegations in member countries on their respective governments.

IV. Conclusions

45. Since the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations has obtained the status of a permanent committee in accordance with Article VII of the Charter of the Assembly, its responsibilities are no longer exclusively:

- the selection of texts adopted by the Assembly to be debated in national parliaments; and
- bringing the Assembly's work to the attention of national parliaments and the public and the press in member countries.

46. However, the freedom of action it has obtained in all matters concerning parliamentary and public relations should not lead it to stop carrying out the abovementioned tasks, which will remain an important part of the committee's responsibilities. They require enhanced co-operation between the committee and national delegations at both administrative and political levels. It is therefore particularly important that the secretaries of delegations take part *ex officio* in committee meetings, in order to give advice and support.

47. It is true, as *Mr. Büchner* stressed at the committee meeting on 5th March 1990, that all efforts to enhance the Assembly's public impact are without real effect if the substance of WEU's work is not improved. But it is also true that, by increasing parliamentary political pressure, the Assembly and particularly its delegations can do much to achieve this.

48. Recommendation 479 on the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe adopted at the extraordinary session in Luxembourg, offers an opportunity for specific action. Your Rapporteur therefore invites all delegations and their members to use this document as a basis for a dialogue with their governments. Suggested questions to be put in parliaments on that recommendation are being distributed separately.

*The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)
and Western European Union*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee ²
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stegagnini (Chairman); MM. *Garrett, Hill* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Adriaensens* (Alternate: *Mrs. Staels-Dompas*), *Böhm*, *Caccia*, *De Bondt*, *Dimmer* (Alternate: *Kollwelter*), *Eich* (Alternate: *Kittelmann*), *Mrs. Francese*, *MM. Lagorce*, *Le Grand*, *Lenzer*, *Malfatti*, *Parry*, *Schmidt* (Alternate: *Ahrens*), *Tummers* (Alternate: *Aarts*), *Valleix*, *Verbeek*, *Wilkinson*, *Worms*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)
and Western European Union***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that, in the Rome declaration of October 1984 revitalising WEU, the Council stated that WEU should provide political impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters and reiterated that this is a key rôle for WEU;
- (ii) Believing that reductions in East-West military confrontation in Europe should lead to a necessity for rationalisation, diversification and, where appropriate, specialisation so as to manage overcapacity in defence-related industries;
- (iii) Aware that the possibility of substantial troop reductions on the part of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as of withdrawals of United States military manpower from Western Europe will heighten the significance of weapon effectiveness and sophistication in deterrence at a lower level of in-place forces;
- (iv) Conscious that reductions in defence budgets must be anticipated which will put a premium on the benefits of arms co-operation to secure value for money and on the utilisation of the most economic productive and maintenance capacities for defence equipment;
- (v) Anticipating that, whilst the United States' political and nuclear guarantees to the security of Western Europe will remain, pressures of public opinion in the United States will induce congressional initiatives for reductions of transatlantic co-operative equipment programmes in favour of procurement from United States domestic sources;
- (vi) Mindful that the IEPG operates in a political vacuum sustaining no significant information programme on its work and winning no European constituency of support for its activities;
- (vii) Convinced that the IEPG can offer, through the harmonisation of operational requirements and re-equipment timescales as well as through a concerted European military research programme, cost-effective defence equipment programmes to meet the challenges of a rapidly evolving security situation in Europe, and that its work merits more substantial backing,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Arrange for the presidency of the IEPG to address the Assembly once a year to inform it about developments in European armaments co-operation and to answer questions from members;
2. Organise the regular circulation of progress bulletins to the Committees on Technology and Aerospace and Defence of the Assembly of WEU to sustain a better appreciation of the work of the IEPG among key political opinion formers in Europe;
3. Ensure that the Commission of the EEC is formally informed on a regular basis of the work of the IEPG so as to sustain a beneficial dialogue on issues of mutual interest such as the maintenance of Europe's industrial base, technical capability and competitiveness;
4. Build on the welcome creation of a small permanent secretariat of the IEPG in Lisbon by concentrating the support of the presidency there and by establishing a strengthened corpus of specialist expertise through longer detachments of procurement experts to the secretariat;
5. Pursue vigorously the initial stages towards more integrated European military research under the auspices of the Euclid programme by increased joint funding and the rationalisation of existing national defence research establishments;
6. Explore with the Commission of the EEC possibilities for some acceleration of harmonised European company law to facilitate fair cross frontier competition and the processes of transnational merger, acquisition and collaboration between defence companies;
7. Maintain efforts to secure a more genuinely open defence equipment market in Europe by universal distribution of contract bulletins and data collection and exchange whilst ensuring that the interests of the developing defence industry countries are secured.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Two years ago the committee held a symposium on European co-operation in armaments research and development. The conclusions drawn from this symposium were summarised in a recommendation which was unanimously adopted by the Assembly in June 1988 (Recommendation 455). First, it recommended the establishment of a European advanced defence research agency funded from a common budget initially provided by WEU nations and later by other European NATO member countries as well. Secondly, the Assembly proposed that the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) be granted a small permanent international specialist secretariat and that a regular dialogue be institutionalised between the IEPG and the Assembly of WEU.

2. The purpose of this report is to determine what progress has been made in the IEPG since June 1988 and at the same time to examine what scope for further improvement exists in its rôle in enhancing co-operation in defence equipment procurement and thereby in furthering efficiency and economy in the Western European armaments industry.

II. The structure of the IEPG

3. Before examining current progress in the IEPG, note should be taken of the structure that has been established to perform its various tasks. The main features of this structure are explained in a document which, after repeated requests from the Assembly, has been prepared by the Belgian presidency of WEU for the information of the members of the Assembly.

4. Reference is therefore made to this document, attached to a letter from the Secretary-General of WEU to the President of the Assembly, dated 11th April 1990 (Document 1221).

5. Unfortunately, the document was drafted in 1989 and was not updated before being sent to the Assembly. As a consequence, it does not reflect the decisions taken at the IEPG ministerial meeting in Gleneagles in February 1990, which are dealt with in Chapter VI of the present report. At its last meeting with the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on 24th April 1990, however, the Council stated that, as from now, a firm channel will be established in order to make sure that future regular communications from IEPG about its work will reach the Assembly at the earliest possible time.

6. Here, it should be recalled that the IEPG functions through three panels which report to six-monthly meetings of national armaments directors (NADs). The NADs, in turn, report to defence ministers who meet three times every two years. The chairmanship of the IEPG rotates every two years between member states. The United Kingdom, the current chair nation, will relinquish its responsibilities at the end of 1990, at which time Belgium will take over.

7. Panel I, under Norwegian chairmanship, is responsible for operational requirements and equipment programmes. Panel II, chaired by France, is responsible for research and technology, including the new Euclid programme. Panel III is chaired by the Federal Republic of Germany and oversees economic policy and matters, in particular implementation of proposals in the action plan. Some of the activities of the different panels will be highlighted in more detail in this report.

8. The permanent secretariat in Lisbon, which in view of the increasing activity of IEPG seems to be indispensable, started its work in May 1989. It plays an important rôle in co-ordinating the activities of several bodies and working groups, also ensuring continuity. At the moment, including the head of the secretariat, it is composed of five executive officers of different nationalities supported by a small administrative staff.

III. IEPG ministerial meetings

9. Since June 1988, a number of ministerial meetings have been held in the framework of the IEPG, where important decisions have been taken to set the pace for improved European armaments co-operation. In this chapter, they will be recapitulated briefly.

(a) Luxembourg, 8th and 9th November 1988

10. Ministers agreed an action plan to implement the key recommendations of the 1987 European Defence Industry Study (EDIS) report "Towards a stronger Europe". The main objectives of this action plan for a more efficient European defence industry are:

- the pursuit of a transnational open and competitive market ;
- a dedicated European co-operative research effort ;

- the encouragement of the developing defence industry nations (DDIs): Greece, Portugal and Turkey.

11. As part of their effort to establish an open and competitive transnational market, all member countries undertook to establish focal points within their national ministries of defence, where foreign companies may register their interest in bidding for contracts. A new working group, Panel II, under the chairmanship of France was created in order to develop a co-operative European technology programme.

(b) Estoril, 28th June 1989

12. At this meeting, ministers launched a common research and technology programme in fundamental defence research and technology which they called Euclid, an acronym for European co-operation for the longer term in defence. Common funding was agreed by all the ministers, with contributions by participating countries amounting to 120 million ECU. Each country would participate according to its specific interests and the capabilities of its national defence industries.

13. A working group was asked to make proposals for programmes which should be initiated within the Euclid framework. This working group was requested to inform the European industry and to invite it to make co-operative proposals, including the appropriate financial participation.

(c) Gleneagles, 21st February 1990

14. Ministers stressed that, notwithstanding recent events in Eastern Europe and significant developments in arms control negotiations, there would be a continuing need for European co-operation in research, development and production of defence equipment in Europe. They reaffirmed the IEPG as the main forum for achieving this objective.

15. The ministers reviewed progress which had been made towards the implementation of the action plan for opening the European defence equipment market, such as the publication of bulletins announcing defence contract opportunities and the establishment of a network of IEPG national focal points.

16. They also examined the progress made on the outline plan for the Euclid programme. It was expected that a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with a basic framework for this defence research and technology programme would be ready for signature before the end of 1990.

IV. Opening up the European defence equipment market

17. At their November 1988 meeting in Luxembourg, the IEPG Ministers laid the foundations for an action plan for the creation of a European armaments market. The main features of this action are summarised in the following paragraphs.

18. The IEPG ministers considered the reciprocal lifting of limitations on non-national armaments procurement a first prerequisite to the facilitation and encouragement of cross-border purchasing. To this end, each member country should establish a focal point. These focal points in the national procurement agencies of the member countries have a twofold task. On the one hand they should resolve queries on the opportunities to bid published in the bulletins mentioned hereafter and record data on companies wishing to participate in the programmes which have been announced. On the other hand they should provide support to companies from DDI countries in their pursuit of contracts. In order to facilitate fair competition, compatibility of national procedures for inviting bids and placing contracts should be secured. A very important step forward in this respect was the decision to start publishing contract bulletins containing basic information on bid opportunities for overseas companies to participate in national defence equipment programmes. Each of the member countries has undertaken to publish these contract bulletins at regular intervals, a practice which France and the United Kingdom have pursued for some years already on a bilateral basis. It was also recommended to develop a standardised reporting procedure to be used to record and report to the IEPG those bid opportunities which were publicised on an IEPG-wide basis and the contract awards implemented on a transnational basis, including any subcontracts. According to the presidency of IEPG, all focal points and national contract bulletins will be operative by the end of 1990.

19. Ministers were aware that member governments would accept crossborder competition only if they could be sure to secure an equitable and fair return in a reasonable period to match their vital national interests and individual countries' capabilities. However, while they considered this fair return as a means of obtaining the support of member countries for crossborder competition, it should not be an end in itself. The economic aspects should therefore, as a rule, take precedence over the search for a fair return. Accordingly, ministers state that juste retour could be achieved on a multi-project basis and over a reasonable time scale. A standardised recording procedure for all cross-border contracts as a basis for annual reports to IEPG member countries should be set up. It was

also thought that a central co-ordinating organisation could contribute greatly to summarising national records in an IEPG-wide report which could be the basis for a reasonable fair return system.

20. Transfer of technology was considered to be an important element in the building of a European defence market. The ministers, however, were aware that they could try to make arrangements only as far as technologies resulting from government-funded programmes were concerned. It was decided to work out an agreement to ensure that the intellectual property in government-funded national and collaborative projects is available, through the usual commercial processes, to facilitate subsequent use by other IEPG nations for defence purposes.

21. At the same time the ministers said they envisaged systematic research and technology co-operation based on technological priority areas. Even if they recognised that, for such a co-operative programme, common funding would be the best solution, it was still too early in November 1988 to obtain support for such funding.

22. Finally, the ministers decided that the special problems of LDDI (less-developed defence industry countries), which have since been renamed DDI (developing defence industry countries), would be taken into account in shaping the European armaments market. These three southern tier nations of Portugal, Greece and Turkey will require special treatment in technology transfer and in active procurement initiatives on the part of the more industrially developed members of the IEPG to take advantage of the DDI nations' advantages: low manpower cost, for example in maintenance.

V. WEU, a possible legal framework for an open European defence equipment market

23. Since the adoption of the principles for an action plan leading to the creation of a European armaments market in November 1988, progress has been made. The publication of bulletins announcing bidding opportunities and the establishment of focal points which will be operating in all thirteen IEPG countries by the end of 1990 have been a step in the right direction. Many more steps have been taken, such as the DDI initiative and Euclid, which are all signs of a basically positive attitude among the member countries. But it should be kept in mind that, until now, the initiatives taken were never mandatory. The IEPG is not based on an international treaty between the participating countries. It is based on an agreement to co-operate, but the decisions, even if they are always taken unanimously by ministers, are not binding in that their implementation cannot be enforced.

24. So far, this relatively informal character of the IEPG co-operative arrangements has worked quite satisfactorily as there have been no vital national interests at stake. The IEPG has not yet been much engaged in the important stages of the procurement of major defence equipment. This situation may well be about to change considerably.

25. It can be expected that in the near future the grim financial prospects for defence ministers will compel them to concentrate ever more on the economic aspects. The need to rationalise the European defence equipment market is rapidly impinging upon the Western European governments. Subsequent stages of the IEPG action plan will therefore certainly be more intrusive. If the IEPG countries really wish to create an open European defence equipment market, they will have to accept crossborder purchasing and they will have to give up the preferential treatment of their national defence equipment industries. As a consequence, the structure and even the existence of such national industries may be deeply affected.

26. Such consequences are now far from hypothetical in a shrinking defence equipment market with demand increasingly oriented towards more sophisticated and technologically advanced products, in order to offset the potential reduction in manpower which may ensue from the CFE talks and any subsequent troop reduction negotiations with the Soviets.

27. It may well be questioned if participating nations will still be prepared to act voluntarily when it really comes to the crunch. Historically, the existence of more or less well developed national armaments industries has always been considered vital for national sovereignty. Even the post-war structure of Europe, with an ever more intricate network of binding treaties, and international obligations with increasingly less room for the pursuit of strictly national policies in the field of defence, has not caused this notion to disappear. Admittedly, in some cases national defence industries have managed to gain an important position in export markets, but more numerous are those which have been kept alive with orders from national armed forces and related financial government support on a substantial scale.

28. Unfortunately, arguments of national sovereignty and autonomy have been confused and even obscured by unemployment and social considerations over the closure of national defence industries. No government in Western Europe wishes to face the next election with direct liability for unemployment, even if it is the by-product of the laudable process of defence equipment rationalisation.

* 29. Within the legal framework of the European Community it took many painful

years to bring about the unified internal market, due to come into being by the beginning of 1993. It seems unlikely that the establishment of an open defence market will have an easier genesis, bearing in mind that six of the present IEPG countries, when drafting the EEC treaty, specifically exempted the defence industry in Article 223.

30. Notwithstanding unremitting attempts by the European Commission to include the defence equipment market within its purview, all IEPG countries are strongly opposed to such a development. Only recently, the IEPG made this perfectly clear to the European Commission at the highest possible level.

31. Even so, a number of IEPG member countries, aware of the problems ahead, feel the need for a legal framework to embody a number of obligatory rules to prevent member countries backing out of less attractive obligations. Understandably, there is great reluctance to conclude a treaty to create another European organisation with a rather limited field of action. This is particularly the case in the armaments business in which the imperatives of profitability for manufacturers have to be reconciled with national economic and defence interests.

32. In preparatory meetings for this report, it was rightly suggested by some that the modified Brussels Treaty, which created WEU, could provide a perfect point of departure. It is the only treaty specifically concluded between exclusively European countries in order to maintain peace and security and it is sufficiently extensible to include all related activities, such as the creation of an open European defence equipment market. According to Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council (of Ministers) of WEU can "set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary".

33. Here it should be noted that on 7th May 1955, in application of this Article VIII, the Council of WEU decided to set up a Standing Armaments Committee, which, according to paragraph 10 of that decision, should "in close relation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, seek to improve consultation and co-operation in the sphere of armaments with a view to finding joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in meeting their equipment requirements".

34. In spite of the fact that the Standing Armaments Committee existed for almost thirty-five years, the Council always treated it as an unintended step-child. Without trying to analyse the details of this rather negative attitude, it seems that until recently the Council has been afraid to show too much affection for exclusively European solutions in arms co-operation and defence procurement. Thus it happened that

in the wake of WEU's revitalisation effort at Rome in October 1984, inspired by the wish to intensify consultations on defence issues in a European forum, the Council of Ministers also decided to abolish the Standing Armaments Committee which, due to the reluctant attitude of the Council, has never been able to realise its potential and to develop into a useful body¹. Ironically, the final execution of this 1985 decision took place in November 1989 when, in an unprecedented series of shocks, the entire political situation in Eastern Europe was set in motion causing Western European countries to rethink their security policy and their responsibilities in that field.

35. Altogether, in the light of recent developments, together with the determination of European countries to create an open defence equipment market, there is reason enough to reconsider the opportunities for a legal framework offered by the modified Brussels Treaty. The fact that not all IEPG countries are members of WEU should not necessarily paralyse action in such a direction. The Council has asked a working group to examine the different possibilities of amending the treaty. It is suggested here that consideration be given to the possibility of association agreements with Western European non-member countries for specific ends, particularly entry into a common defence market.

VI. The European research and technology programme, Euclid

36. Since November 1988, when the action plan for the step-by-step creation of a European armaments market was adopted, there has been steady development towards a dedicated effort in European research and technology co-operation.

37. In June 1989, it was decided to prepare the establishment of a common defence research and technology programme called Euclid. It was also agreed that, in 1990, this programme should have joint government funding of about 120 million ECU. The European Defence Industry Group (EDIG) was to be invited to submit proposals for common programmes and also for their financial contribution. Together with the existing common technology projects (CTPs), Euclid was meant to facilitate the technological development of DDI countries.

38. Preparatory work had progressed enough for ministers to clarify the framework of Euclid at their February 1990 meeting in Gleneagles.

1. More details on the recent history of the Standing Armaments Committee can be found in Document 1119, Chapter II (b).

Eleven common European priority areas (CEPAs) have been designated, in each of which there will be a number of research and technology projects (RTPs), all of which are concerned with basic defence research. It is said that all together 60 RTPs are being planned. Initially the following priority areas will be studied:

- modern radar technology (airborne radars);
- silicon microelectronics;
- composite structures;
- modular avionics;
- electronic gun;
- artificial intelligence;
- signature manipulation;
- optoelectronic devices;
- satellite surveillance technology (including verification aspects);
- underwater acoustics;
- human factors, including technology for training and simulators.

39. The general conditions for Euclid will be defined in the programme memorandum of understanding (PMOU), while individual RTPs will be covered by implementing arrangements to the PMOU.

40. Each research and technology project will be undertaken by industries and laboratories from the participating member countries, to be represented by a single legal contractor, chosen by competition wherever practicable. The single legal contractor will be responsible for placing subcontracts with other participating contractors. On behalf of the participating nations, each research and technology project will be managed by a lead nation which will deal with the single legal contractor.

41. Nations participating in a research and technology project will, in principle, contribute an equal government share of the anticipated costs unless they decide a different breakdown, which may, in particular, occur when they wish to facilitate the participation of DDI nations.

42. As regards the important issue of intellectual property, ministers decided that it will be owned by those generating it, but that it will be made available for the use of participating nations for their own defence purposes subject to conditions to be defined in the programme MOU. There can be no doubt that the decisions which have now been taken indicate a promising and energetic approach.

43. Nevertheless, some thorny questions remain to be solved in the PMOU, such as those regarding intellectual property and technology transfer. In an earlier report on this subject², it

2. European co-operation in armaments research and development - guidelines drawn from the colloquy (Document 1141, paragraph 37 et seq).

was argued that, for an industrial company, unique technological knowledge is one of the main means of gaining a lead over competing companies and consequently making profit. Sharing knowledge with others at an early stage of research is therefore, in fact, a contradictory activity in a situation of competition. Also, a clear distinction should be made between government- and privately-funded research. If industry is expected to contribute financially to the RTPs, it should be allowed to reap the rewards of its own investment.

44. There is, however, sufficient reason to suppose that even such problems will be resolved, since all participating countries recognise that there is no reasonable way to be engaged in highly-sophisticated basic defence technology research programmes other than through co-operative programmes. Government funding of the RTPs may be another problem in a period of decreasing defence budgets.

45. On a national level, any progress achieved in arms control negotiations will certainly be seized as an argument to use research and development funds to stop gaps in the defence budget. On the other hand, defence experts in both East and West agree that significantly reduced armed forces would in the future have necessarily to be better equipped, making use of the most advanced defence technologies.

46. For the time being, however, France, West Germany and the United Kingdom, which together account for 90% of all the money spent in defence research and development in Europe, have made it clear that they are fully prepared to go ahead with their funding of Euclid programmes. In particular, the Federal Republic has a long-term research and technology programme which is being funded by the Ministry for Research and Technology. Technological priority projects which have been designated by the armed forces form part of this programme. It is recognised, however, that the programme has some blanks in basic defence research since, for several different reasons, West Germany is not able to tackle such projects on its own. These projects, for which funding is available on the German side, will be suggested as RTPs in the Euclid framework. The United Kingdom has appropriated about 20 million ECU for RTPs in 1990, but its final financial commitment will depend on a case-by-case assessment of the projects which will be available for participation. France has been very active in preparing the establishment of Euclid and funds have been earmarked for participation in RTPs, but it has not made a financial commitment so far.

47. The other ten IEPG member countries, which together account for 10% of the total amount spent on defence research in the IEPG countries, are all positive about their contribution, but it is clear that much will depend

on initiatives taken by the abovementioned three countries and their leading defence industries, which account for the other 90% of defence research spending. Also, it should be clearly understood that, even if government funds have been earmarked for Euclid, the formal commitment to spend will become effective only on the signing of an implementing arrangement for a specific research and technology project (RTP). At present, it is unlikely that enough RTP implementing arrangements will be ready for signature in 1990 for the full amount of 120 million ECU in common funding which has been earmarked for 1990 to be allocated.

48. The financial contribution of the industries which will actually participate in research and technology projects (RTPs) under Euclid is estimated at roughly 25%. The European Defence Industrial Group (EDIG) has already established working groups to discuss, on a permanent basis, all questions regarding Euclid and RTPs with IEPG Panel II. Moreover, important defence industries in five European nations (Aeritalia, Aérospatiale, British Aerospace, Casa and MBB) have recently signed a co-operation agreement to manifest their determination to contribute jointly to the success of Euclid. The signatories pledged jointly, and in agreement with their governments, to propose projects and also to develop for these projects implementing conditions as regards organisation, technology and finance. It should be noted here that this agreement does not affect the interest of the existing defence industries in smaller IEPG nations, as the rule in Euclid will be that industries participating in an RTP will all have an equal share.

VII. Juste retour

49. Juste retour is an established expression for a system whereby mutual agreements guarantee that nations participating in crossborder defence procurement contracts derive an equitable and fair return in exchange for their expenditure. At their Luxembourg meeting in November 1988, the ministers rightly stated that, because of the very important national interests at stake, some kind of juste retour has to be arranged in order to make crossborder competition acceptable to the IEPG countries. Understanding the potential conflict between juste retour and their call for competition, ministers also made it clear that the economic aspect of procurement should as a rule take precedence over perfectionist and mechanistic 100% return. It was their aim to achieve juste retour on a multi-project basis and over a reasonably extended period of time. More specifically, they added that concrete invitations to bid were not

to be interlinked with conditions which might jeopardise competition.

50. Finally, the ministers proposed procedures for juste retour which included a standardised recording system to register all crossborder contracts in order to provide a basis for annual reports. Meanwhile, the permanent secretariat of the IEPG in Lisbon has been made the co-ordinating organ for these activities. The only mention made of juste retour in the Estoril and Gleneagles ministerial meetings of July 1989 and February 1990 was that work would be continued for studying, improving and implementing a pragmatic and flexible system of juste retour through concrete, transitional measures.

51. In its abovementioned report on European co-operation in armaments research and development (Document 1141), the committee has already drawn attention to the fact that juste retour is diametrically opposed to rationalisation, more efficiency and greater savings. Every politician will emotionally understand that governments will stick to juste retour or the principle of fair return with the greatest persistence, but on the other hand one thing cannot be denied. Whatever final solution will be found for the most equally balanced juste retour system, it will always be a painful but indeed almost inevitably circuitous route to the open European defence equipment market.

52. In the chapter which follows, attention will be paid to a fairly recent phenomenon in the defence industry on a European scale which may render many complicated juste retour procedures superfluous. This is cross-frontier co-operation between industries and the growing number of mergers and acquisitions.

VIII. Developing defence industry countries

53. A particular problem in the IEPG is the inequality of capabilities in the defence industries of the member countries. Specifically Greece, Portugal and Turkey, which are referred to as developing defence industry (DDI) countries, have defence industries which are in no way comparable to those which exist in the other nations.

54. In a recent address, the Spanish national armaments director summarised the basic characteristics of defence industries in development as follows:

- shortage of advanced technologies, specialised personnel and modern management techniques;
- lack of capability for the design and integration of arms systems and a low level of research activity;

- small domestic market and difficulty in finding access to foreign trade markets;
- inadequate industrial structure as well as lack of an auxiliary fabric of small and medium-sized enterprises.

55. IEPG ministers have been aware of the desire of these DDI countries to share in the opportunities offered by the opening of the European defence equipment market. It has already been recognised that they should be granted a special transitional period. At the same time ministers are prepared to continue and, if possible, to increase their direct support to these countries in the defence equipment field.

56. The developed defence industry countries have established special information centres for developing defence industry countries in order to guarantee them the possibility of obtaining contracts. A dedicated effort is being made to find ways to let these countries participate in research and technology programmes. Additional measures are being considered, such as technical assistance, capital investments for their defence industry and exemption from entrance fees for co-operative projects. At present a number of programmes have been chosen which will be offered for participation by developing defence industry countries.

57. Even if the approach to the DDI countries which has now been chosen by the ministers should be endorsed, the ambiguity of this question cannot be denied. With an existing overcapacity in the European defence industry and a clear possibility of further reductions in the demand for defence equipment, it appears not to make sense to encourage the development of new or the expansion of existing defence industries in the DDI countries. However, it may well be that DDI countries, where labour is still relatively cheap, are able to make their contribution to the efficient use of diminishing defence budgets. But the increasing sophistication of modern high technology weaponry also requires a great number of highly skilled employees and a high degree of technological know-how, both of which are not always available at moderate prices, even in DDI countries.

58. Trying to secure an appropriate solution to this conundrum which will satisfy both developing and developed defence industry countries will require a balancing act of exceptional finesse. Lower manpower costs in defence equipment manufacture and support are attractive to all IEPG member countries if defence budgets are declining. The problem is that the resources are physically far removed from their markets.

IX. Operational requirements and equipment programmes

(a) Procedures

59. The core of Panel I's work is the equipment replacement schedule (ERS) exercise, its principal mechanism for identifying potential projects for collaboration. The ERS, outlining all the IEPG nations' forward equipment plans, is updated annually in January and compiled in five volumes, regarding maritime, army, air force, communication and electronic and air defence equipment. After publication, these volumes are studied by the individual nations and then thoroughly reviewed by five ad hoc subgroups in mid-June.

60. The purpose of this review is to highlight equipment areas where prima facie reasons exist for co-operation, that is, where two or more nations appear to have broadly similar requirements with in-service dates (ISD) up to a maximum of five years apart. These equipment areas, together with any opinions that the group may have on what might be done to harmonise requirements, will be circulated to all Panel I members for consideration in their respective national capitals in advance of the next Panel I meeting.

61. Nations will subsequently examine the equipment areas highlighted by the ad hoc subgroup and will in addition undertake a further national review of the schedules in order to indicate any additional equipment area which might offer potential for co-operation.

62. The next phase will take place at the Panel I meeting when nations will be invited to comment on the result of the ERS review and their subsequent examination. The panel will prepare a report to NADs, which will outline the equipment areas which appear to offer scope for co-operation, highlighting those for which it is proposed to form exploratory subgroups and those that no longer seem promising.

63. If there are nations with a declared interest in a specific equipment area, exploratory subgroups are set up, composed of representatives of interested nations, and these will actively search for co-operative possibilities and harmonisation of requirements. With national commitments to proceed, the subgroup, in consultation with industry, will continue with the development of a European staff target based on an earlier draft outline European staff target (OEST).

64. Panel I, as its Chairman has stated explicitly, seeks to create an integrated rather than an additive approach to the harmonisation of requirements. At the same time, it seeks to fashion an iterative approach to the establishment of requirements where cost and performance are considered jointly at the margin.

65. In the whole development process of operational requirements and equipment programmes, the European Defence Industry Group (EDIG) plays a useful and constructive rôle. A representative of EDIG sits in as observer in all Panel I meetings. EDIG is therefore fully aware of work and progress in Panel I and vice versa.

(b) Results of the work of Panel I

66. Currently Panel I has some 19 subgroups and a further 18 have been discontinued having run their course without resulting in viable projects.

67. Since revitalisation in 1984, it has produced 17 OESTs/ESTs, but as yet no finalised ESR.

68. Of the 19 extant subgroups, 12 are still at the harmonisation of requirements stage, 5 are running projects and 2 manage dual production arrangements.

69. Since 1985, no projects have moved through the cycle past the EST stage, but draft ESRs for 2 projects are in hand and future large aircraft (FLA) and microwave landing system (MLS) appear to have significant potential.

70. Of the total of 19 current subgroups, 4 projects have been earmarked by NADs as having particular potential for developing into co-operative programmes. These are in addition to the two already mentioned: 155 mm artillery systems and an automatic grenade launcher/heavy support weapon. These are actively followed by Panel I through their various stages of development.

71. The developments in Eastern Europe and the CFE have resulted in a hiatus in nations' equipment planning, which of course is reflected in Panel I's lack of new subgroups, and a number of major projects have been either temporarily postponed or shelved, or nations have withdrawn resulting in projects no longer being viable.

X. European session for armaments managers

72. Among the initiatives taken by the IEPG, the European session for armaments managers is of particular interest. The idea is to offer study programmes of several weeks twice a year to relevant officials, each time in a different IEPG nation. The aim of these programmes is to favour mutual information relating to the operation of organisations in charge of arms procurement, as well as to improve relations between partners who are supposed to work together. They reflect a sincere intention on the

part of IEPG countries to create a European cadre of armaments managers who are well acquainted with each other's procurement problems and procedures and who know each other personally through intensive joint experience, which is also important. The first meetings took place in 1989 in France and the United Kingdom. In 1990, meetings will take place in France and Spain.

73. A full study programme covers four weeks and consists of lectures, working group meetings and visits to industrial and military establishments.

XI. The transatlantic dialogue

74. The determined effort of European NATO allies to create an open European defence equipment market has not failed to cause some anxieties on the other side of the North Atlantic. Americans, and to some extent Canadians, both in government and industry, are worried that the EEC, in constructing a simple integrated market from 1993, is also creating a fortress Europe as regards defence equipment.

75. On the other hand, with serious defence budget constraints in the United States together with congressional pressures for arms reductions and dim prospects for the world defence market in the years to come, Europeans fear that the United States is going to be increasingly protectionist in its own defence market.

76. In order to balance these considerations, the IEPG attaches great importance to explaining exactly what its action plan for the open defence market is and that American worries about a fortress Europe are unjustified. At the last semi-annual meeting of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) of NATO in October 1989, the present Chairman of the IEPG, Sir Peter Levene, took the opportunity of making a statement on the action plan and explained that efforts in the IEPG should not be seen as a move towards protectionism and competition with CNAD, but rather as a European effort to rationalise co-operation between all allies. More activities of such an explanatory nature will be undertaken in order to make sure that the transatlantic dialogue, in defence equipment, can continue at the highest possible level of mutual confidence.

Nunn amendment programmes

77. It will be remembered that the programmes based on the Nunn amendment, adopted by the United States Congress in autumn 1985, made a very promising early

start³. In 1986, twelve arms co-operation programmes obtained funding from both sides of the Atlantic. Four of these had been proposed by the IEPG nations.

78. Meanwhile, initial enthusiasm seems to have subsided into more down to earth realism. The United States Congress has voted considerably less funding than in the framework of a general revision of defence expenditures. The initial amount of \$250 million voted by Congress in 1986 fell to \$154 million in 1987, \$150 million in 1988, \$145 million in 1989 and \$115 million in 1990. In the draft budget for 1991, an amount of \$95 million has been applied for. It was also understood that a concentrated effort in a few programmes would yield more results than a long list of under-funded projects. In fact, it appeared that some of the programmes had been far too ambitious, such as NFR 90, a programme to develop a NATO frigate replacement for the 1990s. In the second half of 1989, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and West Germany successively withdrew, followed in January 1990 by Spain and the Netherlands. The only remaining partners, Canada and the United States, then decided to terminate the programme.

79. Former participants are still considering how to meet their existing requirements. Disagreements on the size and the mission of the frigate and cost factors seem to have been the main reasons for the failure of the programme. Furthermore, the United States and the United Kingdom have opted out of the project for a modular stand-off weapon (MSOW). A full list of programmes under the Nunn initiative is given at Appendix IV.

XII. Reorganisation in the European defence industry

80. With governments actively seeking to improve and rationalise their co-operation in arms procurement, the defence industry is not a passive bystander. A very significant parallel development is taking place in armaments and equipment companies at a European level.

81. While at an earlier stage of armaments co-operation, the impetus of arms co-operation had been collaborative agreements for single specific multinational programmes, mostly encouraged and sometimes forced upon industry by governments, now there is a discernable trend towards far closer industrial links between companies. The European defence industry is

characterised by joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions. Most of these developments since June 1988 have been summarised briefly in Appendix III.

82. There are several reasons why defence companies should strive to achieve closer co-operation and economies of scale. The principal reason is the same as that which forced governments to rationalise their procurement policy, i.e. the excessive increase of research and development costs caused by the intensive efforts which have been pursued in developed countries towards more sophistication in new weapon systems. The application and integration of modern technologies in new weaponry require an ever longer and more expensive research and development period. It may be sufficient here to mention the technologies required for stealth, precision-guided weapons, electronic warfare, all-weather capabilities, electronic warfare and C³I to recall the huge technical problems which have to be overcome.

83. To preserve Western Europe's defence industrial base, armament companies must revise their strategies to accommodate themselves to the considerable changes taking place in world-wide economic and strategic relations which have already recorded a decline in the production and export of weaponry. Moreover, the European defence industry is feeling the fierce competition of an emerging defence industry in third world countries which are offering weapon systems at attractive prices and with ever improving capabilities. Countries such as Israel, Singapore and Brazil are becoming important arms exporters.

84. Finally, both the private and even the government-owned and government-dependent defence industries in Western Europe are too closely linked with civilian industry to ignore the coming into effect of the single market by 1st January 1993. It should not be forgotten that defence-related companies, with the prospect of lean times ahead, will have to diversify and extend their activity into the civilian sector. That is why, not surprisingly, the French company Aérospatiale announced that in 1988, for the first time in its existence, civilian orders had overtaken military orders with 51%, a development which was continued progressively in 1989. In the same vein, the Société nationale des poudres et explosifs (SNPE), a French state-owned company established in particular to ensure the propulsion of the boosters of France's nuclear forces, announced that in 1989, for the first time in its existence, its defence and space division represented slightly less than 50% of its total turnover of F 3.7 billion.

85. In short, defence and civil applications will for economic and market reasons become increasingly interdependent. Defence companies are already seeking to extend the range of their


3. European armaments co-operation - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council, Document 1119, paragraph 77 et seq and Appendix I.

activities and to diversify into such complementary fields as civil telecommunications, air transport, information technology and the space business.

86. The IEPG will have to have the strategic vision to respond to this development by

appropriate liaison with the Commission of the European Communities which, while it has no treaty remit in military matters or relevant expertise, has a definite interest in the efficient use of industrial resources on a European basis and the economic development of Europe's productive capacity.

APPENDIX I

Structure of the IEPG

Note: () Chairing Nation.

APPENDIX II

Panel I subgroups

key: **BOLD** = chair; () = observer; - = considering participation

FUTURE LARGE AIRCRAFT
IT BE FR GE
SP TU
PO

FIMA industrial group is bidding now

VEHICLE ROBOTICS
GE FR SP UK
NL

May be incorporated in Euclid programme

SONOBUOYS AND ACTIVE
DIPPING
SONAR/MAD BUOYS
UK FR GE IT

MOUs signed, in progress towards European staff target

155MM ARTILLERY
SYSTEMS
FR BE DE IT
NO SP UK PO TU

Rocket launchers are also being considered

MPA
FR IT NL (SP)
(UK)

ARMOURED BRIDGELAYER
INTEROPERABILITY
BE FR GE
NL SP (UK)

In progress towards European staff target

ANTI-TANK GUIDED
WEAPONS THIRD
GENERATION
FR BE GE NL
UK

MOU finalised, programme is going ahead

ANTI-TANK MINE
(DIRECT EFFECT)
FR GE UK

Programme is going ahead

MICROWAVE LANDING
SYSTEM
UK BE DE FR GE
IT NO SP
(NL) TU

COASTAL MINESWEEPER
BE NL NO
(PO)

A Belgian-Netherlands design is available, the four nations mentioned are discussing the possibility of using common components

MSAM (medium-range
surface-to-air missile)
FR BE GE IT
NL NO SP UK

Not active at the moment

MISTRAL
FR BE DE IT
SP NO

**LOW CALIBER
INDIVIDUAL AND SUPPORT
WEAPONS**

BE FR GE IT SP (UK)

PO TU

M483/M864 155MM

ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

NL TU UK

NBC

FR IT SP UK

STINGER

GE GR NL TU

**ASRAAM (advanced
short-range air-to-air
missile)**

UK FR NO

CA US SP

**AMRAAM (advanced
medium-range
air-to-air missile)**

GE NO UK

(IT) (NL) (SP) TU

EXPLANATORY GROUPS

ON SUBMARINES

NL FR PO GE NO

Requirements have been identified throughout European nations

In production

Not active at the moment

United States weapon system, in licence production in Europe

The future of both programmes, which are interconnected, is very uncertain

There is not much prospect for these groups

The following subgroups, still mentioned in Document 1221, have been disbanded:

**ADVANCED PILOT
TRAINER**

**ARMOURED CARRIER
VEHICLE**

M113 MLU

**ACTIVE/PASSIVE
TOWED ARRAY
SYSTEMS**

**SURVEILLANCE
AND TARGET
ACQUISITION**

**MEDIUM AND HEAVY
MORTARS**

**HEAVY SUPPORT
WEAPONS/AGL**

**LOGISTIC
VEHICLES**

APPENDIX III

Other European arms co-operation programmes

Inertial navigation system	Canada, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom
EH 101 helicopter	Italy, United Kingdom
Radar for Cobra air defence system	France, West Germany, United Kingdom
MLRS phase 3	Italy, France, West Germany, United Kingdom, United States
Rescue tank	France, United Kingdom
European fighter aircraft (EFA)	West Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom
A-129 Tonal anti-tank helicopter	Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom
RTM 322 helicopter engine	France, United Kingdom
Tiger anti-tank/attack helicopter	France, West Germany
Anti-tank guided missile Trigat	France, West Germany, United Kingdom
Family system of air defence missiles (FAMS)	France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom
Helios observation satellite	France, Italy, Spain
Midge	Canada, West Germany, United Kingdom
NATO NH 90 tactical transport helicopter	France, Italy, Netherlands, West Germany
ANS long-range anti-ship missile	France, West Germany
Aster advanced surface-to-air missile	France, Italy
Hot 2, improved Hot anti-tank missile	Euromissile (France, West Germany)
Milan anti-tank weapon	
Roland all-weather surface-to-air missile	

APPENDIX IV

Programmes under the Nunn initiative as of 1st April 1990

ADA project support environment: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Italy, Denmark; withdrew: Belgium. The MOU has been signed.

Airborne stand-off radar demonstrator system (ARDS): United States, United Kingdom, France; observer: West Germany.

Multi-functional information distribution system (MIDS): United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Norway, Italy, Spain. The MOU for project definition phase has been signed.

155 mm autonomous precision-guided munition: France, West Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Turkey. The MOU for the predefinition phase has been signed, but now that the United States and the United Kingdom have withdrawn, the remaining participants are reconsidering their position as regards this programme.

Modular stand-off weapon: Canada, France, West Germany, Spain, Italy; withdrew: United States, United Kingdom.

Advanced sea mine: United States, United Kingdom.

Enhanced fighter manoeuvrability: United States, West Germany.

The Rockwell/MBB demonstrator aircraft was rolled out in March 1990.

Advanced short take-off and vertical landing technology: United States, United Kingdom.

Battlefield information collection and exploitation system (BICES): United States, Italy; observers: Canada, France, West Germany, Greece, Netherlands, United Kingdom.

HAWK mobility enhancement: United States, Netherlands. The MOU for the development phase has been signed.

Tactical communications system post 2000: Canada, Italy, France, United Kingdom, United States, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, West Germany. The MOU has been signed.

Tactical aircraft night combat capability enhancement: Netherlands, United States, United Kingdom, France.

NATO anti-air warfare system (NAAWS): Canada, Netherlands, Spain, United States.

APPENDIX V

Mergers and takeovers in the European defence industry since June 1988

- September 1988 The French companies SEP and Matra together create a new company, called MSII, for image-processing which should employ 450 people and have a turnover of F 500 million in 1988.
- October 1988 Fiat sells its 22% stake in the United Kingdom helicopter firm Westland to GKN, which is connected with United Technologies.
- December 1988 In Spain a new electronics group unites INISEL's ERIA and Telefonica's Entel to create the leading firm in the Spanish civilian and defence software market.
- January 1989 INI's PESA and INISEL agreed to team up with Telefonica's Amper Espanola in the telecommunications sector.
- January 1989 ESD and Marconi decide to co-operate in the field of self-guidance systems for anti-air missiles.
- February 1989 Thomson abandons its activities in microcomputers and concentrates on electronics for the general public and defence purposes.
- February 1989 In Germany, MBB, Daimler-Benz and Siemens are linked and, if the GEC/Siemens bid for Plessey goes ahead, there will be a share connection which will firmly extend to major United Kingdom companies.
- 16th March 1989 Matra concludes an agreement with Daimler. Matra will create a subsidiary for its space defence activities and will exchange a 20% stake with Deutsche Aerospace. The two companies will make similar propositions to the GEC subsidiary Marconi and to the Swedish company Saab.
- 25th March 1989 Aérospatiale (turnover in 1988: F 28 billion) and Thomson-CSF form a new joint avionics group by merging Aérospatiale's subsidiaries Crouzet, SFENA and EAS with Thomson CSF's General Avionics Branch (AVG). The new group, called Sextant Avionique, employs 9 200 people with a consolidated revenue in 1988 of \$850 billion and is thought by its mother firms to be capable of rivalling European and international leaders. Sextant Avionique is the largest European grouping in this business and the fourth on the world market in terms of turnover after the American companies Honeywell-Sperry, Litton and Allied.
- Proposed merger of the French aerospace manufacturer Labinal and a turbo-engine manufacturer Turbomeca, resulting in a group with annual sales of about \$1.1 billion.
- 15th April 1989 The French Defence Minister announces plans to transform the Groupement Industriel des Armements Terrestres (GIAT) into a nationalised industry with a structure similar to that of SNECMA and Aérospatiale. GIAT is producing land-based systems ranging from rifles to heavy artillery and main battle tanks. The purpose of the reorganisation, reducing the workforce by 1 200 employees, is to give the group greater flexibility and among other things to enable it to associate with other French or foreign companies. GIAT has now 14 600 employees, down from 25 000 in 1977, and a reduced turnover of \$1.1 billion.
- 22nd April 1989 Aeritalia announces the 50% acquisition of Elmer SpA (Rome) and Laben SpA (Milan), both subsidiaries of the United Kingdom electronics and defence group Ferranti. Aeritalia and Ferranti have already collaborated in many projects for many years.
- SAGEM (France) will sign a co-operation agreement in defence electronics with Fiat (Italy). SAGEM, working in the field of inertial systems and optonics, has a turnover of \$1.1 and a workforce of 7 700.
- 24th June 1989 SNECMA takes a controlling 51% stake in FN Moteurs, the aeronautics division of Fabrique Nationale, the Belgian armaments group. FN made it clear that its FN moteurs division, with a \$155 million turnover in 1988, was too small to compete effectively in the future European single market.

- 1st July 1989 Aérospatiale and Thomson-CSF (both France) and Selenia (Italy) establish a consortium to co-operate on a new family of ground-to-air missiles to counter aerial threats of the 1990s.
- 22nd July 1989 Alcatel-Bell buys the space, defence and telecommunications division of ACEC (Ateliers de Construction Electrique de Charleroi, Belgium) which was said to have a turnover of \$66 million.
- Ferranti's turnover in 1988 was \$1.7 billion.
- 2nd September 1989 Philips (Netherlands), which is planning to divert itself from all its defence subsidiaries, sells its major defence subsidiary, Hollandse Signaal-apparaten (HSA), to Thomson-CSF, which now has an 80% interest in HSA.
- September 1989 The West German Government gives its conditional approval to the proposed merger of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) and Daimler-Benz (DB). In an earlier stage, Daimler-Benz had already taken over MTU and Dornier (both in 1985) and AEG.
- All aerospace and defence activities of the new group will be concentrated in Deutsche Aerospace (DASA), with 75 000 employees and a turnover of almost DM 16 billion in 1989, while AEG will be the electronics division with 78 000 employees and a turnover of DM 11.5 billion.
- 23rd September 1989 Matra SA's United States subsidiary completes its acquisition of the United States firm Fairchild Divisions Space, Communications, Electronics and Control Systems.
- 30th September 1989 The Italian firm ELSAG (Elettronica San Giorgio SpA) acquires Bailey Controls, which specialises in automation, control and computerised systems and which had a turnover of \$370 million in 1988.
- In December 1989 and spring 1990 Anglo-French government-sponsored business briefings to be held in Paris and London in order to increase defence co-operation in the industrial sphere.
- October 1989 The Canadian firm Bombardier completes its takeover of Short Brothers, an aircraft and missile manufacturing company in Belfast which incurred a loss of \$250.7 million over 1988.
- 25th November 1989 The French Government announces more radical measures to restructure GIAT, which in 1988 showed a loss of over F 500 million (\$80 million) on a turnover of F 6.68 billion. In 1984, the turnover was F 9.9 billion. The number of employees should be cut by 4 050 in 1992 from today's 15 000.
- 9th December 1989 The Belgian Fabrique Nationale-Herstal makes a bid to take over Matra-Manhurin-Defence (MMD), a branch of the French Matra group, which produces handguns and cartridges with total sales of F 230 million in 1988. FN Herstal has said that this acquisition would bolster its position as a world leader in small arms manufacturing.
- 23rd December 1989 Following the takeover by West Germany's MAN and Daimler-Benz of the civilian branch of Enasa, the Spanish state-owned truck manufacturer, INI, the Spanish state holding group, will shift Enasa's military production to Santa Barbara. INI is said to be planning also a further centralisation of the production of guns and other heavy military hardware in Spain. All these moves are clearly inspired by the future single European market.
- 25th December 1989 Three months after completion of the takeover of Plessey by GEC-Siemens, GEC-Siemens acquires 60% of Plessey, including radar and defence systems.
- 13th January 1990 GEC (United Kingdom) and Matra (France) sign an MOU to establish a European space technology company, called Matra Marconi Space NV. Matra has a 51% shareholding, while GEC holds the remaining 49%.

- 27th January 1990 Deutsche-Aerospace, the defence division of the Daimler/MBB consortium, is negotiating with Matra on closer ties.
- 3rd February 1990 GEC (United Kingdom) takes over Ferranti Defence Systems and Ferranti Italia for £310 million (\$521 million).
- 10th February 1990 The French and United Kingdom Governments give their approval for Thomson-CSF and British Aerospace to integrate their missile activities in a joint missile venture, called Eurodynamics, with a turnover of \$2.35 billion.
- 17th February 1990 Ferranti International and Thomson-CSF announce an agreement on a joint venture in their sonar businesses.
- 3rd March 1990 Deutsche Aerospace (DASA), the result of the Daimler-Benz/MBB merger with its production sectors for aviation, space, defence and propulsion systems divided over MBB, Dornier, MTU and Telefunken System Technik, has a total workforce of 54 640 employees and a turnover of DM 12.36 billion (\$7.4 billion) (see JWD, 24th February 1990 for Daimler turnover), while the 1989 turnover is expected to be DM 14.5 billion.
- 10th March 1990 Aerospatiale and Matra are discussing a joint venture on missiles.
The Italian Government is considering a close collaboration of several units in the defence industry with activities in the field of electronics. The companies concerned are Galileo and SMA, both parts of Finbreda, and Selenia and ELSAG, both parts of Finmeccanica, with combined sales of \$1.2 billion.
- 27th March 1990 Aérospatiale and MBB, which are partners in the anti-tank/combat helicopter Tiger and in the development programme for the NH 90 tactical transport helicopter, have decided to intensify their co-operation. They agree to merge the activities of their helicopter branches and to create a financial company, Eurocopter SA, before the end of 1990, which will control one French and one German company responsible for the industrial and commercial activities of the two groups in the field of helicopters. If the merger is a fact, the new company with sales of \$1.3 billion would be the world's second largest producer after Sikorsky.

APPENDIX VI

Acknowledgments

In preparing this report, the Rapporteur met the following persons, to whom he expresses his sincere gratitude:

Bonn, 5th March 1990

Dr. Knut Schloenbach, Ministerialrat, Ministry of Defence.

Brussels, 6th March 1990

Colonel Michel Mandl, Counsellor to the Minister of Defence.

London, 8th March 1990

Mr. Alan Clark, Minister of State for Defence Procurement.

Sir Peter Levene, National Armaments Director.

Mr. Michael Haworth, Director, Defence Procurement, Ministry of Defence.

Paris, 16th March 1990

Mr. Philippe Roger, Ingénieur en chef de l'Armement, Ministry of Defence.

Lisbon, 11th April 1990

Dr. Eugenio Ramos, Secretary of National Defence.

General Cravo da Silva, National Armaments Director.

Colonel Giuseppe Zuccarini, Deputy Head of the IEPG permanent secretariat.

Captain B. Andersen } Members of the IEPG

Lieutenant-Colonel Martien E. Hermes } permanent secretariat.

Oslo, 27th April 1990

Mr. P. Eggesbø, National Armaments Director.

Captain K.E. Strøm-Pedersen, Defence Procurement Department, Ministry of Defence.

Mr. B.B. Knudsen, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Defence.

Mr. Johannson, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.

The Rapporteur arranged for the following interviews to be conducted on his behalf:

Madrid, 19th February 1990

Mr. Guillermo Leira, National Armaments Director, Ministry of Defence.

The Hague, 17th April 1990

Mrs. Bettina Tammes, International Material Co-operation Office, Ministry of Defence.

Mr. Joost Spierings, Research and Development Department, Ministry of Defence.

*The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)
and Western European Union*

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹

tabled by Mr. Fourré

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after “ cross-frontier competition ” and insert “ and transnational collaboration between defence companies ”.
2. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ developing defence industry ” and insert “ member ”.

Signed: Fourré

1. See 5th sitting, 7th June 1990 (amendment 1 negatived; amendment 2 amended and agreed to).

***Developments in command, control, communications
and intelligence (C³I)***

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur ²***

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submitted by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur

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- II. National military networks
- III. NATO integrated communications system (NICS)
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- X. Command and control of Allied Command Europe (ACE)
- XI. Survivability
- XII. The need to sift information
- XIII. The employment of artificial intelligence
- XIV. Rationalisation and interoperability
- XV. Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stegagnini (Chairman); MM. *Garrett, Hill* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Adriaensens* (Alternate: *Mrs. Staels-Dompas*), *Böhm*, *Caccia*, *De Bondt*, *Dimmer* (Alternate: *Kollwelter*), *Eich* (*Kittelmann*), *Mrs. Francese*, MM. *Lagorce*, *Le Grand*, *Lenzer*, *Malfatti*, *Parry*, *Schmidt* (Alternate: *Ahrens*), *Tummers* (Alternate: *Aarts*), *Valleix*, *Verbeek*, *Wilkinson*, *Worms*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I)

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the tightening of defence budgets in all allied countries;**
- (ii) Conscious of the serious intentions of both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to reduce their conventional armed forces;**
- (iii) Considering that a combination of reduced conventional forces and limited defence budgets calls for improved co-operation between allied forces in order to employ troops and equipment most efficiently;**
- (iv) Convinced that an integrated allied command, control and information system as it is now being planned by NATO will act as a force multiplier and will greatly improve the performance of the lesser-armed forces that will be available in the future to guarantee peace and security for Europe;**
- (v) Convinced that some systems for command, control, communications and intelligence, in particular those for airborne early warning and control and for stand-off surveillance and targeting, could also play an important rôle in the process of verification of conventional arms reduction agreements;**
- (vi) Convinced that the systems mentioned in paragraph (v) could greatly contribute to building confidence about military matters if members of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO agree to open their skies for unarmed aerial surveillance flights over their territory as proposed by President Bush in May 1989,**

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- 1. Urge member governments to endorse NATO's planning for an integrated command control and information system for Allied Command Europe and to provide the required financial means;**
- 2. Study the possible rôle of European and multinational aerial systems for stand-off surveillance and targeting and of airborne early warning and control in the process of verifying the implementation of a CFE treaty, and in the framework of a future open skies agreement.**

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Even if the world of command, control, communications and intelligence, or C³I as it is more commonly designated, is little known outside the community of military and defence experts, it has been an important subject from the very beginnings of organised warfare.

2. C³I is an indispensable process familiar in any kind of war, be it fought with archers and lances or with the most advanced twentieth century equipment, which works along the following lines: the commander, having given his instructions (command), wishes to be able to keep a check on their execution (control), choosing the most appropriate way to convey these messages (communication), meanwhile keeping account of all possible information (intelligence) which is needed for his decisions.

3. The basic components of the process described here have not changed in past centuries, but modern technology has caused an unrivalled progress in means of communications and intelligence gathering, opening up vast opportunities for commanders at all levels of armed forces to follow the action very closely in real time. While this new technology offers great opportunities, its use also involves risks such as the taste of commanders for unrestrained quantities of information or their inclination to be omnipresent. At the same time, the increasing number of systems – operational or under development – creates problems of interoperability and the application of scarce resources.

4. The need for efficient use of existing resources is even more urgent with less money available for defence budgets in NATO countries and consequently fewer troops and weapons systems at their disposal to guarantee the security of NATO territory. The growing interest in arms control with parties engaged in negotiations striving for tangible results in the not too distant future only reinforces this requirement.

5. In this report an attempt will be made to present a picture of C³I systems in use in allied forces in Europe and to examine some important questions related to the subject.

6. It should be recalled, however, that much information on this subject is of a confidential nature. Although discussions with experts in preparing this report have been extremely helpful, much important information could not be obtained and other information could not be

revealed in this report, thus limiting its scope considerably.

II. National military networks

7. A majority of NATO member countries have implemented, or are in the process of implementing, digital strategic and tactical military networks. The strategic defence networks are mainly based on commercial equipment and standardised in accordance with International Telegraphic and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) standards.

8. These networks, while differing in detail, are meshed digital circuit, packet and message switched networks with supporting digital transmission facilities. Within their national boundary, they provide more flexible and robust connectivity and a higher capacity than NATO would be able to build.

9. As most of these systems are already in operation, acquisition or advanced developmental stages, there is little chance to influence their technical parameters. While they are based on certain CCITT standards, hardware and software have been modified to meet military network requirements, such as those regarding security, survivability and network control and management. As a consequence these national systems, while having similar capabilities and characteristics in broad terms, in general are incompatible with each other and require unique gateways to interoperate.

10. Altogether, this has led to a very complex national/NATO communications environment and a level of interoperability between NICS and the national military networks which for the foreseeable future will be limited to special gateway interfaces.

III. NATO integrated communications system (NICS)

11. The general framework for allied communications in NATO is the NATO integrated communications system (NICS) for which the concept was established by the North Atlantic Council in 1970. This concept was to provide an integrated, meshed, common user and automatically switched network to serve the communication needs of all eligible users, NATO's military command and control, political consultations and other civilian agencies across the conflict spectrum.

Nation	Strategic Systems	Tactical Systems
Belgium	BEMILCOM	RITA
Denmark	FIKS*	ANALOG DIGITAL
Federal Republic of Germany	GAFACS (GAFDIN)** ISDN Bundeswehr	AUTOKO (ANALOG) DIGITAL
France	RA 70 (ANALOG)	RITA
Greece	HEDICS	?
Italy	TRI SERVICE NETWORK** DIGITAL UPGRADE	CATRIN
Netherlands	ASCON ASCON REPLACEMENT	ZODIAC
Norway	NDDN	TADCOM
Turkey	TAFICS	?
United Kingdom	UNITER (BOXER SKYNET)** DFTS	PTARMIGAN
United States	DCS EUR AUTOVON ETS (AUTODIN* DDN DEB DSCS)*	TRI-TAC

Military networks used by NATO countries.

12. In the NICS, an important rôle is assigned to the TRI-MNC C² plan, the command and control improvement plan of the three major NATO commanders. This plan is a programmatic document which provides authoritative statements of military requirements, system deficiencies and funding priorities for correcting these deficiencies over the next eighteen years, and is updated every two years.

13. The main integrated communications systems currently in use in ACE (Allied Command Europe) consist of transmission or bearer systems and switching systems.

14. The transmission systems are:

- *landlines*, rented from the national PTT authorities, which provide connectivity where NATO owned systems are not available or have inadequate capacity;
- *ACE HIGH*, an analogue tropospheric scatter system which has already fulfilled its useful economic life;
- *SATCOM 3*, the NATO satellite system which can be regarded as an overlay to both abovementioned systems. SATCOM 3 has one operational satellite, and a number of fixed and transportable ground stations;
- *CIP 67*, a predominantly analogue line-of-sight microwave radio relay system, integrated with ACE HIGH and SATCOM, which is the main NATO transmission medium in the central region;

- a number of *radio* systems, among which are a very low frequency (VLF) system for submarines and several emergency high frequency (HF) systems.

15. Two NATO switching systems provide voice, data and telegraph, using NICS bearer systems. These are:

- *TARE*, a telegraph automatic relay equipment.
- *IVSN*, initial voice switched network, providing voice and limited data facilities.

16. Apart from these strategic systems, the United Kingdom's 11th Signal Brigade has been assigned to SACEUR as a tactical mobile communications resource which can replace, overlay or bypass key elements of NATO's fixed communications system if need be, in particular in the central region.

17. The future NICS will be an integrated services digital network (ISDN) based on common civilian concepts, technologies, standards and protocols to the greatest extent possible. Such an approach will enable all participants to use commercial off-the-shelf technology effectively and to minimise development cost and time scales.

18. The important objective of end-to-end security for classified voice and data traffic will be achieved largely through end-to-end encryption. Switched interconnections with national defence strategic networks based on special gateway converters will be extensively deployed to enhance network survivability and

flexibility. The tactical digital communications interface will be at the gateway level and will use NATO tactical interface STANAGs (standardisation agreements).

IV. Current information systems in ACE

19. Information systems in ACE can be considered in two categories, management information systems (MIS) and automated command and control information systems (ACCIS). They are funded differently because MIS are normally expected to serve a peacetime, office-orientated function and ACCIS the wartime, decision-making function. However, these boundaries are becoming blurred.

20. Each ACE region and SHAPE has a MIS plan to provide for management need in an evolutionary manner. SHAPE is the most advanced in this respect and will have some networked terminals installed next year.

21. ACCIS has also grown up on a regional basis with no attention given to interoperability. The northern region has 3 individual systems being developed as the Northern European Command ACCIS. Priority has been given to air operations so far. UKAIR has ASMA (air staff management aid), a simple national display system, and has a state-of-the-art ACCIS on order to be operational in 1991. This will be integrated with their improved United Kingdom air defence system. The southern region has no integrated regional system as such. There is a maritime CCIS at the MEDCENT HQ in Italy which is being replicated separately at the counterpart HQs in Greece and Turkey. The 3 land/air HQs also have separate interim systems which should start to be upgraded in 1993. SHAPE and the central region have equipment based on the United States world-wide military command and control system (WWMCCS) which allows C2 information to be passed between some 13 HQs in the region.

V. NATO air command and control system (ACCS)

22. NATO's ACCS, an automated command and control system, will combine the control of air defences, offensive air and air support missions. It could be considered to be a vehicle for continuing the close ties between United States and European industry.

23. Early in 1990 NATO will approve the development of the first phase of ACCS which is meant, ultimately, to integrate national and NATO funded systems for air command and control.

24. Data from NATO radar and passive tracking systems will be gathered into fixed and mobile, ground-based automated data-processing computers. Data and signals from different systems and sensors will all be matched and compared in order to provide accurate information on the deployment of enemy forces. Then the information will be disseminated to all participants for use in the air battle through state-of-the-art communications equipment.

25. The full ACCS system, which is estimated at around \$25 billion, will be implemented over the next 15 to 20 years, with the financial means being contributed by both NATO infrastructure funds and individual NATO countries. It is expected that NATO will award a two-year project definition contract likely to be signed in early 1990, which should produce a set of performance parameters in order to enable NATO to develop detailed specifications to be used in the future bid for an offer to the industry. Full implementation and procurement should start at the beginning of 1992.

26. ACCS will interact with other NATO command and control elements now under development. In this framework, the battlefield information collection and exploitation system (BICES) will serve as a complementary programme, while NATO's multifunctional information distribution system (MIDS) will interact with the battlefield collection and exploitation system by controlling air assets which would be used against enemy targets. NATO's airborne early-warning system (AEW) will provide air and maritime surveillance information to ACCS ground systems, respectively naval headquarters/forces.

27. With a fundamental new approach to air command and control, the military requirements will certainly be a challenge for the electronics industry and software developers. One of the most difficult challenges will be automatic sensor fusion, which is the ability of an automated system to pull data from radars and passive sensors to group them together in one place and then understand what the operational consequences should be.

28. A new agency, NATO Air Command and Control Management Agency (NACMA), is being set up in order to implement the ACCS programme. It will be responsible for conceptual design and planning, system integration and interoperability with national systems and other NATO communications networks, procurement and testing and ensuring that new technology does not disrupt the overall network.

29. It has not yet been decided which parts of the programme will be centrally managed by NACMA and which parts by individual nations. Whereas ACCS planners are in favour of central management of issues regarding software and

testing, national experts have not yet agreed to this idea. NACMA's links with the two other NATO C³I agencies, NAPMA and NACISA, will be established through the NATO C3 Co-ordination Office.

VI. BICES (battlefield information collection and exploitation systems)

30. The BICES concept was established as an effort to enable nations and ACE commands to link existing and planned information systems and capabilities to improve the flow of intelligence throughout the alliance. As such this initiative has significant potential in supporting arms control and verification processes.

31. The idea of BICES is to provide an umbrella under which current national tactical C³I systems are linked together. The basic idea is that the data collected by the sensors of the different national systems will be communicated to BICES which will correlate the information received and transmit it to NATO command centres. This means that sensitive national data will be shared throughout NATO. As a consequence, this system requires a high level of security and measures to prevent "hacking". One of the challenges will be to grant access to a large number of users through secret codes which are easy to use but difficult to penetrate. A huge effort will have to be made in software and encryption design.

32. The different computer systems used for information transfer will have to be standardised or at least made compatible.

33. It is expected that at the beginning of 1990 NATO will seek industry proposals for a two-year pilot study which should clearly define the basic specifications which will allow BICES to meet military requirements.

34. While the NATO Communications and Information Systems Agency is responsible for the management of the initial pilot study and the building up of BICES as a whole, the individual NATO countries will be responsible for the funding and development of both hardware and software which should link their own C³I systems with BICES. Initial operation is scheduled for 1993-94, but BICES will become fully operational only after the year 2000.

VII. ACE information systems planning

35. It will have been noted from Part IV that the present information systems in ACE lack interoperability. To put this right a system design and integration contract has been let to recommend how best to go about the task. The report is expected in 1991 and concentrates on

the central and southern regions plus SHAPE whose new integrated information systems will have to interoperate also with the new systems already being installed in the northern region and UKAIR.

36. This will all take time but, by the turn of the century, ACE expects to have a fully-integrated ACE automated command and control information system serving all levels above principal subordinate command (PSC) and with interfaces to the relevant national tactical systems.

37. The new ACE ACCIS will provide the bearer system to convey the information processed on the ACCS and BICES systems, and others not mentioned here, to the NATO commanders.

VIII. Stand-off surveillance and targeting systems

38. In an earlier report, the then Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions paid particular attention to stand-off surveillance and targeting systems (SOSTAS)¹. Such systems are intended to provide military commanders with a continuous picture of the battlefield and rear areas. The use of synthetic aperture radars with both fixed and moving target indicators allows fairly accurate information to be obtained on possible targets such as wheeled and tracked vehicles, tanks and helicopters and even allows these targets to be classified.

39. At the moment, several national SOSTAS are being developed. The most ambitious one is the United States joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS or joint STARS) with radar equipment to be installed in Boeing 707 airframes. Joint STARS will be able to cover an area up to 300 by 400 km in size but, for reasons of self protection, the airborne radar platforms will fly over friendly territory at a considerable distance from the forward line of troops and will cover an area of not more than 150 km behind the enemy lines.

40. France is developing Orchidée, a lower-level system using a Super Puma MK II helicopter with a pulse doppler radar which can detect columns of moving vehicles and helicopters at low altitude at a maximum distance of 100 km.

41. The United Kingdom has a technology demonstrator programme called ASTOR (airborne stand-off radar) with two different platforms. A synthetic aperture radar mounted on a Canberra aircraft will cover a large area with

1. New technologies and their implications for European defence, Rapporteur: Mr. van der Werff, chapter VIII (Document 1186).

fixed target surveillance and a snapshot moving target indicator. Complementary to this, a low-flying PBN Islander will be fitted with a moving target indicator radar which will have the same performance as the French Orchidée.

42. Germany is developing the GEAMOS-LR system with a moving target indicator radar mounted on an unmanned helicopter and with a range of 120 km. At the same time, two other systems, called Lapas and Loras, now under development, are using a high-flying fixed-wing aircraft, Egrett, as their platform.

43. Finally, Italy is working on a system called Creso, mounted in a AB-412 helicopter, with a mode of operation similar to Orchidée, but more modest as far as range and accuracy are concerned.

IX. Airborne early warning and control (AEW&C)

44. The NATO AEW&C programme has been dealt with in full in a report by the then Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in 1984². The NATO AEW&C programme is a unique and specially funded multinational programme established in 1978 to counter the increasing low level threat from aircraft over both land and sea. The AEW&C system provides an all-altitude aircraft warning and detection capability, together with improvement in the alliance's maritime surveillance capability. It also contributes to the direction and control of tactical air forces and to the gathering of information on enemy ship and aircraft movements.

45. In 1985, the last of eighteen NATO E-3A aircraft was delivered and the programme is running to the satisfaction of all participating nations. Meanwhile, three used Boeing 707 aircraft have been acquired from Sabena for training and cargo purposes. After refurbishment and modification, the third of these aircraft was delivered on 22nd December 1989.

46. In the framework of the AEGIS (AEW ground integration segment) programme, forty ground radar sites in nine NATO member countries have been upgraded in order to be able to interoperate with the AEW&C aircraft via the secure data link JTIDS.

47. Apart from the main operating base at Geilenkirchen (FRG), there are forward operating bases at Konya (Turkey), Preveza (Greece) and Trapani (Italy) and a forward operating location at Oerland (Norway). Meanwhile, seven enhanced E-3 aircraft have been ordered

by the United Kingdom and four by France. Italy and Spain are at different stages of negotiation for an order of four, respectively three, E-3 aircraft. At the moment a \$700 million programme is nearing formal approval for the modernisation of the existing 18 NATO E-3A aircraft, with main attention being paid to the radar, airborne communications system, operator controls and the storage capacity of the on-board computer, with self-protection also being investigated.

48. In fact, the situation is such that the nations involved have indicated their commitment to the \$700 million near-term programme. An initial funding of \$100 million can be found in existing NAEW&C programme resources. The remainder will be funded by 12 NATO nations on the basis of a special programme contribution scheme during the years 1991-97.

X. Command and control of Allied Command Europe (ACE)

49. Allied Command Europe (ACE), with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as its chief commander, covers the entire NATO territory in Europe from the North Cape of Norway to the southern borders of Turkey. It is divided into a northern region (AFNORTH), a central region (AFCENT), a southern region (AFSOUTH) and the United Kingdom Air Forces (UKAIR). Within ACE there are also two more organisations directly controlled by SACEUR, i.e. the multinational ACE mobile force (land) and the NATO airborne early-warning force command.

50. In order to be able to deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, to counter aggression with appropriate responses, ACE requires a broad and flexible command and control system. This is a requirement of vital importance, given the fact that SACEUR must have continued ability to command and direct ACE's nuclear assets. ACE's command and control concept must therefore include a significant crisis management and political/military consultation capability. Its communications and information systems must be reliable, interoperable and survivable and provide fast secure systems.

51. At all levels there is a basic operational requirement to have the capability to receive and disseminate information, to conduct decision-making and to send and receive orders.

52. The facilities at SACEUR's disposal to meet this requirement include a network of war headquarters ranging from bunkers to land-based mobile headquarters and command ships at sea.

2. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft, Rapporteur: Mr. Spies von Büllersheim, Document 974.

53. The general requirements of ACE's command and control concept are translated into actual hardware, software, facilities and support systems through the overall tri-major NATO commanders command and control plan (tri-MNC C² plan). This is a long-term strategy for C² acquisition, now in its fourth edition.

XI. Survivability

54. In order to support the strategy of flexible response, which requires NATO to decide upon and conduct any desired form of response regardless of the nature of attack, C³I systems must be highly survivable. In its overall concept, NATO is aiming to provide an acceptable level of survivability through redundancy and selective hardening. Essential wartime users are provided multiple independent connectivities through a combination of NICS, national military networks, commercial PTTs and special overlays in accordance with their needs. Basically, the idea is to have a two-level system available with the level I system being a rationalised military communications network composed of a core of a NATO-owned network and supplemented by national defence networks through interconnects and other means to derive additional redundant paths and media mix. The PTT networks are used to derive alternative connectivities and flexibility. This combination of NICS, national military switched networks and PTT connectivity would be designed to provide the necessary communications support through conventional conflict. Level II system is a low-capacity, hardened overlay network designed to provide additional connectivities to the essential wartime users at higher levels of conflict. This overlay will comprise appropriate media mix, such as adaptive HF and mobile SATCOM terminals, and these will have the necessary protection against jamming, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and other nuclear effects.

55. An important issue is the extent to which the NATO common user network should be hardened against the effects of electromagnetic pulses and other disruptions which may be caused by nuclear explosions. EMP from a high-altitude nuclear burst affects electronic equipment over a range of several thousand kilometers in diameter. It is a threat that renders redundancy, the basic survivability principle, ineffective.

XII. The need to sift information

56. With increasingly sophisticated means of collecting and communicating data, the quantity of information which theoretically could be available for commanders is almost without

limits. Consequently, more attention will have to be paid to developing methods for selecting and sifting information.

57. Apparently there is a need to tackle this problem, but it cannot be done without a better understanding of the process of command. At the moment, it is only rudimentarily understood how commanders reach their decisions and likewise what kind of information would help or on the contrary hinder them in making their assessment before taking decisions and issuing orders. An additional problem is not only that there are many different types of human behaviour, but also that individual commanders will react differently depending on circumstances and the degree of stress. In an ideal situation, C³I systems, designed to support decision-making, should take account of as many aspects of human behaviour as possible, in particular the behaviour of individual commanders under different circumstances. However, knowledge in this area is only in its infancy and spectacular progress should not be expected in the short term.

58. A hierarchical process of sifting information, even with the use of some kind of automation, is clearly inevitable. In many cases, to think only of identification technology, signal processing and pattern processing, no human being would be able to do the job properly. But no filtering system whatsoever should exclude the possibility for a commander to call for that particular information which he personally considers to be vital for his decision.

XIII. The employment of artificial intelligence

59. Basically, commanders need three categories of information:

archival information, which has been collected over a long period and which involves such information as geographical data, enemy doctrine or even biographical data of opposing commanders;

intelligence analysis, which provides an assessment of enemy intent and behaviour over a relatively recent period;

real-time sensor information and reports, which give a continuous update of current events.

60. In order to be able to use their archival information, commanders will need powerful text retrieval technology.

61. Here expert systems might help to find the information which would be relevant for a given situation.

62. Likewise, intelligence analysis requires patterns to be recognised over quite long periods, comparing and associating information on current events with historical information. Expert systems, artificial intelligence and neural network machines could be of great assistance in this kind of work.

63. An urgent problem is the processing of real-time information derived from all kinds of sensors such as radar, sonar, radio receivers and reports from troops in war.

64. Indeed, modern sensor equipment has a built-in data-processing capability which enables it to recognise and extract essential information. However, it will become ever more important to correlate the information available in order to be able to recognise and trace targets, a process which is called data fusion. Expert systems are expected to enhance significantly the effectiveness of data fusion.

65. At the moment, expert systems are being developed which are meant to help commanders in planning their action, thus reducing their planning time from hours to minutes.

66. It should be added, nevertheless, that much of the technology mentioned here is in its early stages and that it still may be a long time before results of research and development now being undertaken will be available operationally.

XIV. Rationalisation and interoperability

67. Given the growing need of modern armed forces world-wide for higher performance C³I systems, defence electronics companies are entangled in tough competition for their share in this important international market. As usual, each of the allied nations is trying to fulfil its C³I requirement with the help of its national electronics industry which results in as many national research and development investments and resulting systems. With less equipment and possible ammunition shortfalls, interoperable communications will be a key feature in NATO's ability to maintain a credible defence system.

68. It should, however, not be forgotten that there are limits to rationalisation from both the technical and operational perspective of maintaining cohesive NATO communications for exercising positive command and control under stress conditions.

69. As far as interoperability with the diverse national military systems is concerned, a common agreement on secure voice terminals, communications security and other system-level parameters is a precondition to achieve the requisite level of interoperability between NATO and national switched networks.

70. In the area of Allied Command Europe, the different regions are now having built their own C³I systems which no longer meet the recommendations of a past architectural design study. It is possible for the regional systems (northern region, UKAIR, central region, southern region) and the system at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to interconnect and to exchange information, but the situation is far from ideal and a practical design for interoperability between all regions is still lacking.

71. NACISA, the NATO Communications and Information Systems Agency, has therefore initiated a study into system design and integration which should indicate how best to integrate future systems with existing ones. Towards the end of the 1990s, this effort should eventually lead to an integrated automated command control and information system (ACCIS) for Allied Command Europe.

72. In the meantime, the systems which already exist or are under implementation are being interfaced, where possible, by STAMINA (standard automated message interface for NATO ACCIS), a specification which has been developed by NACISA to solve current interoperability problems.

73. The future ACCIS will also serve as a bearer for other systems which will provide indispensable information for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to exercise effective command and control. These systems are in particular:

BICES – battlefield information collection and exploitation systems

ACCS – air command and control system

ATCCIS – army tactical command and control information systems (France, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, United States)

NMOS – NATO maritime operational intelligence support.

74. Within NATO the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Programme Management Organisation was set up to be responsible to implement the NATO AEW&C programme. Its executive agency, the NAPMA, manages the programme on a day-to-day basis. The NATO Communications and Information System Agency (NACISA) is responsible for the management of NATO's main C³I efforts. There are firm plans to also establish the NATO Air Command and Control Agency (NACMA) to implement the future air command and control system.

75. When there will be two agencies responsible for the management of different parts of NATO's C³I systems (NACISA and NACMA), and NAPMA responsible to ensure the NATO

E-3A aircraft are interoperable with these systems, it will be increasingly difficult to ensure co-ordination of the overall effort in these activities. NATO therefore decided recently to set up a high-level co-ordinating committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General, with the task of advising the three agencies on how to harmonise all these activities from the political and procedural points of view.

76. NAPMA having its own specific and well-defined task, it is clear that the main effort of the new co-ordinating committee will be directed towards the relations between NACISA and the NATO Air Command and Control System Management Agency (NACMA), in particular since both are developing technically complicated systems which ultimately should be completely interoperable. It remains to be seen, however, whether the co-ordinating committee as it is now being set up, with vague responsibilities and a very small staff, will be able to prevent conflicts between NACISA and NACMA or to settle disputes between these agencies.

XV. Conclusions

77. At the present juncture, with new political changes in Eastern Europe occurring almost every other day, it is extremely difficult to give a clear picture of the requirements for Western Europe's security and defence. However, the CFE negotiations in Vienna will most probably produce quick results, thus leading to significant reductions in conventional arms in Europe. A further tightening of defence budgets is written on the wall. A security system which relies on ever less troops and weapons systems will have to employ these forces in the most efficient

manner. The only way to do this is to have an up-to-date, efficient alliance-wide C³I system. NATO is now trying to achieve this with the planned introduction of an integrated allied command control and information system for Allied Command Europe. These plans should be supported wholeheartedly by all the nations concerned even though it may not always be possible to find cheap solutions for the many problems to be solved.

78. There is one aspect of C³I systems which deserves close attention for a different reason. Data-collection is an important part of any C³I system, given the fact that data on the enemy's activity are the raw material on which military commanders will have to base their decisions. Considerable ingenuity has therefore been injected into many different sensor systems designed to collect such data.

79. Two systems, in particular airborne early warning and control and stand-off surveillance and targeting, might well be able to fulfil a different rôle. They have been designed to provide detailed information on the whereabouts and activities of the enemy's weapons systems, be they in the air or on the ground or afloat. Such systems could also play an important rôle for the verification of conventional arms reduction agreements. The open skies proposal, recently made by President Bush, would offer vast opportunities for such systems, already operating or under development, to be used for the benefit of Europe's security in a manner somewhat different from the one for which they were designed. The BICES and ACCIS projects could provide the essential conduit and collation and processing capabilities to enable the rapid assessment of collected data to support these efforts.

***Observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament –
guidelines drawn from the symposium***

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee ²
by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur***

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APPENDIX

Programme of the symposium – Rome, 27th and 28th March 1990 ,

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Stegagnini (Chairman); MM. Garrett, Hill (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens (Alternate: Mrs. Staels-Dompas), Böhm, Caccia, De Bondt, Dimmer (Alternate: Kollwelter), Eich (Alternate: Kittelmann), Mrs. Francese, MM. Lagorce, Le Grand, Lenzer, Malfatti, Parry, Schmidt (Alternate: Ahrens), Tummers (Alternate: Aarts), Valleix, Verbeek, Wilkinson, Worms.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament –
guidelines drawn from the symposium***

The Assembly,

- (i)** Noting that the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), now taking place in Vienna, are likely to lead to an agreement within a year's time;
- (ii)** Considering that European nations have played a substantial rôle in these negotiations and will also be signatories to a future CFE treaty in their own right;
- (iii)** Aware that a future CFE treaty will also include extensive arrangements for verification and exchange of information considered as confidence-building measures by all parties concerned;
- (iv)** Conscious that, apart from co-operative measures of verification, national or international technical means of verification, in particular satellites which can be employed without the co-operation of the contracting party whose territory is under investigation, are of perennial importance in the entire verification process;
- (v)** Taking into account that verification satellites can also be employed to monitor territories in the world where new security threats might arise;
- (vi)** Stressing the need for Western European nations to develop an autonomous European verification satellite capability in order to meet their responsibilities in a changing security situation while at the same time strengthening the alliance as an equal partner;
- (vii)** Aware that all the technological and industrial capabilities required for the establishment and operation of a full-scale verification satellite system are available in the WEU member states;
- (viii)** Aware of the plans for a research and technology project on satellite surveillance technology in the framework of the Independent European Programme Group's Euclid programme;
- (ix)** Recalling that the European Space Agency has gained invaluable competence and experience in managing complicated international space programmes including earth observation,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Decide as a matter of urgency on the establishment of a WEU satellite image-processing and interpretation agency;
2. Reach decisions on further steps for establishing a full-scale European verification satellite system without delay, taking into account the time necessary for developing the various segments, such as optical satellites, ground stations and, in a later phase, synthetic aperture radar satellites and data-relay satellites.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In December 1988, the Assembly adopted two recommendations (465 and 466) on the creation of a European agency to verify future conventional arms reduction agreements. The recommendations accompanied two reports submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee and the Technological and Aerospace Committee by Mr. Fourré and Mr. Malfatti respectively.
2. The Assembly considered it essential for WEU to fulfil Europe's responsibilities in the implementation of future arms control agreements.
3. To the Assembly's great satisfaction, in spring 1989, the Council mandated an ad hoc sub-group on space of the Special Working Group to examine this subject. An interim report was submitted to the Ministerial Council, which, at its meeting on 13th and 14th November 1989, requested the ad hoc sub-group to continue its work and to undertake the technical studies required for the preparation of a possible ministerial decision on the development by member states of a European observation satellite programme.
4. With the activities of the Council in mind, the Technological and Aerospace Committee thought the time was ripe to organise a symposium to bring together the various political opinions in member states and allow representatives of the European space industry to present their latest views on the technical capabilities available for developing an autonomous European satellite observation system.
5. This report will endeavour to summarise the discussions at the symposium and draw conclusions for inclusion in a draft recommendation. It is hoped that, by so doing, the Assembly will be able to make a useful contribution to the discussions in the Council in preparation for its decision later this year.

II. Prospects for conventional arms reductions in Europe: CFE and beyond

6. Strictly speaking, commenting on arms reduction negotiations and agreements is not the true field of action of the Technological and Aerospace Committee. On the other hand, given the fact that such agreements and their consequences are the main reason for the committee

to be interested in observation satellite systems, a few words need to be said about this subject¹.

7. In the first place, it is important to note that the CFE treaty, possibly to be signed before the end of 1990 or in early 1991, will be the first arms reduction agreement since World War II to include not only the United States and the Soviet Union as contracting parties, but also their allies in Eastern and Western Europe. Here, the European countries have made a substantial contribution in negotiations leading to an arms reduction agreement in which they will be partners, each of them on an individual basis.
8. Effectively, the coming CFE agreement and the commitment to withdraw troops unilaterally from several Warsaw Pact countries will remove the Soviet Union's capability to carry out a surprise attack. Moreover, the CFE agreement will also include an extensive system of verification and exchange of information which is considered as part of a system of confidence-building measures by all parties.
9. All participants in the negotiations on CFE I, even if the treaty itself has not yet been signed, are in favour of using the existing favourable conditions to start negotiations on a follow-up agreement, CFE II, immediately after the signature of CFE I. An important reason for follow-up negotiations is that Western European countries will also have to reduce their military forces if they wish to maintain credibility in the process of détente. Moreover, a positive attitude towards continuing the CFE negotiations would be a political sign to encourage further democratisation in Eastern Europe.
10. Meanwhile, an important parallel development is taking place. Due to a number of internal currents and unilateral decisions, the armed forces of a number of Eastern European countries and in particular the Soviet Union are in the process of restructuring, equipment of disbanded units being reallocated and units withdrawn from Central Europe being deployed in other Soviet territories. Naturally, there are no agreements on verification or inspection of activities in this process.

III. Future threats to European security

11. Naturally, the tremendous changes in Eastern Europe during the last months, confirming the collapse of communism as practised

1. For an extensive discussion on the CFE negotiations, reference is made to Document 1223 entitled "Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union", submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Lord Newall.

by the régimes of the Soviet bloc, delighted everybody in the western democracies. The cold war was over and the threat of a massive Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe had disappeared. To many people it seemed that armed forces were no longer needed now that the most formidable enemy seemed to have vanished. The fruitful development of the Vienna negotiations on CFE only reinforced the idea that war and defence were concepts of days gone by.

12. It should not be forgotten, however, that the antagonism of East and West during the cold war, with its deplorable arms race, nevertheless had the relative advantage of bipolar stability. With this no longer being the case, even for Europe, the world will be a less orderly and sometimes even less secure place.

13. In his address to the symposium, General Charlier rightly pointed out that the existence of a verifiable CFE I and possibly a CFE II will not be a sufficient guarantee for Europe's security in the future.

14. Too many questions remain outstanding, thus creating just as many possible new threats to peace and security. Suffice it here to mention the problems still existing at Europe's borders. The rôle, position and attitude of the Soviet Union in a post cold war era have yet to be settled, and the prospects for a satisfactory solution of the many national and ethnic differences in Eastern Europe and the Balkans are still dim.

15. On top of that, Islamic fundamentalism, a declared enemy of the western industrialised and secularised world, is gaining importance among all nations along Europe's southern border. This fundamentalism, combined with ethnic and nationalistic ambitions and a still increasing arsenal of armaments, is beginning to constitute a serious threat.

16. In this framework, Mr. Martinazzoli, the Italian Defence Minister, made it clear that an important task of the strategic observation satellite Helios will be to survey the Mediterranean area with its many possible crises and conflicts and with some nations deliberately developing new weapons of mass destruction to be delivered by missiles.

IV. The need for an autonomous European observation satellite surveillance capability

17. Mr. Renon, the French State Secretary of Defence, and a number of other speakers rightly stressed that transatlantic solidarity was still a vital part of Europe's security. It is essential for keeping the balance and is even recognised as such by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, with the diminishing Soviet threat and the liberation of the Eastern European countries, some of the conditions in this alliance are bound to change.

18. There can be no doubt that the presence of American forces in Europe will be reduced considerably in the near future. In this new situation, Europe will have to shoulder its responsibilities. While maintaining the alliance with the United States, Europe will have to pull together and respond to the new challenges. Only then will it be able to play its part and guarantee its security in a changing world.

19. With an apparently growing need for monitoring by satellite, for a number of reasons, Europe, notwithstanding the existing capability in the United States, should have its own observation satellite system. The establishment of a European observation satellite system would give a tremendous boost to co-operation between the various national verification organisations which are now being set up in European countries with a view to verification of the CFE agreement. Observation by satellite on a world-wide scale will be one of the key elements in future security measures because it allows the development of threats to be followed autonomously. Europe cannot rely only on the means of verification written into arms control treaties: if one of the contracting parties backs out of its obligations, technical means should remain for observing its military activities to offer warning of any possible threat. Finally, with less armed forces available in Europe in the future, it will be all the more important and timely to have at its disposal detailed information on changes in the military situation and shifts in the proportion of military forces in Europe or adjacent territories with possible consequences for the world's security.

20. With its responsibilities for verifying the existing INF treaty and the future START agreement, the United States will have to make more extensive use of its existing monitoring capability. For budgetary reasons, the United States Congress will be very reluctant to allow the number of satellites to be increased.

21. Opponents of an autonomous European observation satellite capability always refer to the existing American means which, it is said, will always provide the European allies with the information they require. Without blaming the Americans, it should be observed here that they only provide their satellite data up to a certain point.

22. Since the second world war, there has indeed been close co-operation with the United Kingdom in these matters, but this does not apply to other European allies. The United States understandably is reluctant to share with its allies extensive information obtained from its satellites so as not to compromise its capabilities in this field. This has been demonstrated time and again. Whenever the United States has wished to denounce important events or developments in unfriendly territory which no doubt

had been observed in detail by their own satellites, it has always made use of Spot images, as has been the case in many recent editions of "Soviet Military Power", the Defence Department's annual assessments of the Soviet military capabilities.

23. This complete European dependency on United States satellite data was quite embarrassing for some European governments during the INF crisis when, in a discussion which dominated the entire political debate in their countries, they were not able to provide autonomous information on the number of SS-20 missiles deployed by the Soviet Union. The fact that information obtained from satellite data was provided by the United States, considered to be a biased party in the debate, did not help to calm down heated emotions. There can be no doubt that in this case an autonomous European observation satellite would have facilitated a rational debate.

24. For Europe, equal partnership with its American allies requires an autonomous observation satellite capability in order to enable it to co-operate on equal terms with the United States. Mr. Martinazzoli argued that under such circumstances it would be desirable to engineer a specific field of responsibility for the European nations, the purpose of which would also be to avoid allowing relations with the United States to become unbalanced. An autonomous European effort in the verification of arms control agreements would clearly demonstrate the determination of European nations to meet their responsibilities as signatories of such agreements. At the same time, this would lead to a division of tasks between the United States and Europe in an unequivocal effort to share the burden within the alliance.

25. The security interests of the United States will not necessarily be exactly the same in all parts of the world as European security interests. It may well be, therefore, that the United States will sometimes focus its monitoring capability on areas which are of less interest for Europe, leaving no room to use this capability for specific European interests.

V. Verification measures in the framework of arms reduction agreements

(a) Different kinds of verification measures

26. An intricate system of verification measures is part of any arms control agreement, on the one hand to prevent treaty violations and on the other hand to protect the signatories against possible consequences of such violations by other parties, in which case only timely information will enable the potential victim of such violations to take those measures which it deems appropriate.

27. In verification, a major distinction is made between co-operative measures and national means of verification.

28. Co-operative measures can only be applied in co-operation with specific other signatories concerned. Such measures are for instance on-site inspections, aerial survey and exchange of data. National means of verification can be employed without the co-operation of the contracting party whose territory is under investigation. For these national means a further distinction is made between national technical means, including satellites, and other national means of information gathering. Among the co-operative verification measures now being envisaged in the CFE framework are the on-site inspections which allow contracting parties to conduct inspections with teams of verification experts within days of prior notification of the sites covered by the CFE treaty.

29. At the moment, attempts are also being made to conclude a separate agreement on an airborne observation system, called open skies, as a contribution to greater openness in military activities, thus being part of a system of confidence-building measures. It is thought that this open skies agreement could also play a useful supplementary rôle in the verification of a CFE agreement. Such airborne observations, to be carried out by aircraft equipped with appropriate sensors, would also be subject to prior notification.

30. Recognising the inadequacy of co-operative verification measures, both East and West agree that, according to earlier arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, national technical means, in particular observation satellites, can be used for verifying a CFE agreement.

(b) Disadvantages of co-operative verification measures

31. Beyond all doubt co-operative verification measures must be the main constituent of a CFE treaty verification régime, not forgetting their value for confidence-building. Nevertheless, at the symposium, it was rightly pointed out that co-operative measures such as on-site inspections, even if they provide the most detailed information on the treaty implementation, also entail certain disadvantages which are significant enough to prevent them from being the only means of verification.

32. Without claiming to be exhaustive, speakers mentioned the most conspicuous disadvantages as follows. On-site inspections are confined to a limited list of sites as mentioned in the treaty. Even if the contracting parties eventually agree to extend this list, it would still leave large areas undisturbed by inspection. Furthermore, the sheer number of sites included in

the treaty is far too large to allow for more than sample inspection. The number of on-site inspections which really can be carried out is limited by quotas, notification deadlines and rules which leave a malevolent contracting party ample leeway for evasive action.

33. There is one other aspect of the most important category of co-operative verification measures which cannot be neglected. The expected 250 on-site inspections per year in the CFE framework will require a considerable effort in manpower and cost. Mr. Jasani reminded the audience at the symposium that a staff of 1 500 people will be needed, while \$570 million will be needed for establishing the on-site inspection régime with an annual running cost of about \$200 million.

34. Finally, it has been observed that on-site inspections, intrusive by nature, will certainly not improve the atmosphere among contracting parties if they are employed to resolve a dispute on the implementation of the treaty during a period of rising political tension.

(c) Advantages of satellite verification

35. Satellite verification will never be able to provide the detailed information obtained by on-site inspection. Likewise, it does not produce or enhance mutual confidence between contracting parties in the same way as co-operative measures if carried out in a positive manner. But the advantages, as pointed out below, are such that its application is compulsory to make up the deficits of co-operative verification measures.

36. The area of the Warsaw Pact countries between the Atlantic and the Urals to be observed strictly within the framework of the CFE treaty covers some 8 million sq km. There are several thousands of sites where troops and weapons are located, the reduction or the destruction of which is to be verified.

37. Observation from space could provide an overall impression of activities over a vast area in a very short time. It should be noted here that a spacecraft, with a 10 m resolution sensor, travelling at a ground speed of nearly 7 km per second, could observe, from an altitude of 800 km, an area of about 2 850 000 sq km an hour. The same satellite, if equipped with a 1 m resolution sensor, could observe about 285 000 sq km in the same period.

38. The specific ability of a verification satellite to cover vast areas in a short time enables it to fulfil a warning rôle. Anomalies which have been observed by satellite could provide a reason to carry out an inspection in a more intrusive and detailed manner.

39. Satellites are the only means of observing the territory of other nations without prior notification. No co-operation by the contracting party whose territory is to be observed is required, which makes satellite verification particularly useful if the good faith of such a party is open to doubt.

40. Finally, verification satellites enhance security in the framework of reduced conventional forces since they can offer an almost real time picture of the military strategic position of other nations, thus completely ruling out the possibility of a surprise attack on any important site.

VI. Requirements for verification by satellite

41. In their introductions, Mr. Pucci as well as Mr. Holt and Mr. Rothmeyer provided helpful indications regarding the requirements for the satellite system which would be needed to implement verification rôles following a CFE treaty and, with this as a starting point, the following list of basic requirements may be drawn up:

- (i) The area to be verified is the specific area in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, as covered by the treaty, and a rather large area beyond, in order to be able to track possible storage, transformation and other activities carried out on equipment and forces outside the treaty area.
- (ii) The objectives to be verified are the sites notified for location, storage, production, repairs, maintenance and destruction of material, the zones for training and stationing units and the declared points of entry and exit from the treaty zone.
- (iii) The satellite system should be able to obtain information on relevant military establishments and on the five categories of equipment concerned by the treaty, that is: main battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters and combat aircraft. The resolution and quality of the satellite images required depend on the information which is to be obtained. In Appendix I to Document 1160 it can be seen that an increasing degree of detail is required for detection, general identification, precise identification, description and analysis. For general identification of the most important categories of equipment concerned by a CFE treaty, a resolution of around 1 m is required.

- (iv) With a view to the existing geography and weather in the treaty area, a full-scale system should have a day-and-night and all-weather capability. For a system to be effective, it should have both multispectral, panchromatic optical sensors and radar sensors.
- (v) For the detection of any important developments, observation of the same territory once every three days would be an acceptable frequency.
- (vi) The time needed to obtain, process and interpret data from the satellite should be minimised. Control centres for satellite missions and centres for the reception, processing and interpretation of data should therefore be situated in the best possible geographical position. The deployment of a data relay satellite system appears to be inevitable in the long run. Measures should be taken to safeguard the interests of nations participating in the system.
- (vii) Basic ground segment elements are antenna stations for receiving and transmitting data, preprocessing stations, a mission planning centre, satellite control centres, data-processing centres, a verification centre and finally central archives for raw data and results.

VII. Possible tasks of observation satellites

42. Whenever the subject of observation satellites is being discussed, there is a tendency to suggest that such satellites could perform a great number of different tasks. These tasks can be summarised as follows:

- verification of conventional arms reduction agreements, primarily CFE I and a possible follow-up, CFE II;
- verification of other potential arms reduction agreements on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and naval forces;
- verification of the 1986 Stockholm agreement on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe, under which parties are required to give advanced notification of the site and location of military manoeuvres;
- monitoring of territories in Europe or elsewhere where new threats or crises threatening European security could develop;
- managing of future military operational activities;

- monitoring territories which are under surveillance by relatively small United Nations peacekeeping forces, deployed in large areas;
- detection and control of ecological disasters;
- providing information for other civilian applications such as crop forecasts, search for natural resources, coastal protection and environmental planning.

43. At first sight it appears to be attractive indeed to attribute all these different tasks to a future European observation satellite system, not the least because the more political wishes can be fulfilled, more easily will such a system be endorsed by parties of the entire political spectrum.

44. One should however keep in mind that the requirements for the various observation tasks mentioned above do not always correspond. An attempt to meet all political wishes in this matter in one system would lead to an extremely extensive and expensive system which, in addition, would not be available in the short term because of the many technological problems to be solved. Verification of conventional arms reduction agreements should be the first priority, but this choice should leave unhampered the possibility of using such data for other purposes.

VIII. ESA's achievements in earth observation

45. As is well known, the European Space Agency (ESA)², according to its convention, is to provide for and promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, co-operation among European states in space research and technology. ESA is a research and development organisation. Its activities are either mandatory, in which case all member states contribute to the programmes on the basis of gross national product, or optional, where the levels of contributions of participating states may reflect their interest in a particular field of activity. The latter is the case for ESA's earth observation programme.

46. Mr. Goldsmith illustrated a number of ESA's activities which are of particular interest for those European countries wishing to establish a verification satellite capability.

2. The current full membership of ESA includes thirteen countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). Finland is an associate member and Canada has an agreement for close co-operation with ESA and participates in some of its programme.

47. In this framework specific reference was made to the development of the ERS-1 spacecraft. ERS-1 is the first European spacecraft equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR). The principal objectives of this satellite are to exploit all weather radar imagery of ice and ocean features for the prediction of climatic changes. Its SAR provides a single fixed 100 km swath and a resolution of 30 m. Raw radar data are processed and transmitted to data-collection ground stations at a data rate of around 100 megabits per second. ERS-1 will be launched around the end of 1990 into a near-polar, sun-synchronous orbit to perform 14 orbits per day. The programme for this satellite was initiated in 1978, which indicates that collaborative projects require long gestation periods.

48. In addition, ERS-1 is capable of all-weather radar imaging of the earth's surface, using the SAR imaging mode of its active microwave instrument. The data rate of this imaging mode is too high to allow on-board storage, so that images can only be acquired for areas within the reception zone of suitably equipped ground stations.

49. It is interesting to note that ESA has already developed and implemented a very effective ground segment, consisting of three receiving stations in Kiruna (Sweden), Fucino (Italy) and Maspalomas (Canary Islands) with fast processors able to generate one SAR image of a 100 km x 100 km area with a resolution of 25-30 m within 25 minutes. These images will be disseminated to users in participating countries via telecommunication links in order to provide them with near real-time information and data.

50. At the moment, SARs with resolutions of down to 20 m are being studied by ESA in the SAR 2000 project to meet longer-term needs. The SAR 2000 is planned to fly on board the European polar platform around the year 2000 and should allow longer operating time per orbit and more versatile operating modes.

51. To support the needs of future low earth-orbiting systems such as the international space station elements, ESA is developing the European data relay satellite system which, placed in a geostationary orbit, will allow continuous transfer of data to and from low earth-orbiting spacecraft to ground stations. This technology is of the greatest importance if one wishes to obtain real-time data from verification satellites with inevitably a high data rate.

52. Finally, Mr. Goldsmith also referred to other expertise and competence acquired by ESA amongst others in space-qualified technologies, in the management of international space programmes and in data policy which can be extremely useful when establishing an autonomous European satellite verification capability.

IX. Optical sensor capacity

53. In his contribution at the symposium, Mr. Cayla paid particular attention to European capabilities in optical sensors.

54. For several reasons, such as cost and time constraints, it is thought that, in an initial phase, a European verification satellite agency could manage with a satellite with optical sensors with a resolution down to 1 m. This should not be a problem, as considerable experience has been acquired with the Spot satellites now operational, while the technological performance of both the Spot 4 and even more so the Helios satellite will almost meet the needs of a verification satellite.

55. As is well known, the Spot 4 satellite is a further development of Spot 1, 2 and 3, with an enhanced infrared capability and a higher resolution in the range of 5 m. Like the other Spot satellites, Spot 4 will be able to vary the visual angle of its optical system, so as to revisit a given area if need be once every 2.5 days.

56. Helios is a purely military optical reconnaissance satellite system now being developed by France, Italy and Spain in a co-operative programme on the basis of Spot 4 technology. In order to meet military requirements, the image precision and the data transmission and processing speed are being enhanced considerably. With a satellite life-time of five years, the alleged resolution of Helios is in the range of 1 m. The first launch of Helios is expected to take place in 1993.

57. According to Mr. Cayla, there is room for improvement in following programmes, particularly in enhancing the resolution and in extending the spectral field of sensors into the thermal infrared, which would facilitate the interpretation of the satellite images obtained.

X. Radar sensor capacity

58. It is recognised that a European verification satellite agency in an early stage will have to operate with optical sensors exclusively. Considering, however, the many serious shortcomings of an optical sensor, early decisions are required to develop a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite to provide an all-weather and night-observation capacity indispensable for verification purposes in the CFE treaty area and neighbouring territories. At the symposium, Mr. Goldsmith of ESA argued that Europe is well on its way in this field with the ERS-1 satellite, to be launched in 1990, but one should be aware that the performance of this satellite is not adequate for verification purposes.

59. Both Mr. Jean-Claude Husson and Sir Peter Anson gave a succinct outline of what can be done in this area. Mr. Husson explained that

in France studies are being conducted at the Centre National des Etudes Spatiales for a satellite project called Radar 2000 with a variable resolution of less than 20 m and a swath width variable between 20 and 40 km. Studies being conducted for the French Defence Ministry aim at a still higher resolution.

60. Only recently, the French Defence Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, made it clear, however, that for reasons of technical feasibility and the availability of financial resources, the launch of a purely French radar satellite to fill the gaps of the optical Helios system is not foreseen before the beginning of the next decade.

61. Recent studies have demonstrated that with new technologies a resolution in the order of several metres can be obtained, using a solar energy generator of 6 to 10 kw. Such high resolution radars, however, produce a high data rate, with a possible average of 240 megabits per second, which makes high demands for data transmission and, if need be, for data storage capacity.

62. Sir Peter Anson also referred to studies conducted for ESA with a view to developing an SAR 2000 with resolutions of down to 20 m and a variable swath width from 100 to 500 m. This SAR satellite will include technological developments such as a larger steerable phase array antenna and could be readily adapted to provide higher resolutions down to a few metres over a "spotlight" area. According to Sir Peter Anson, the CFE space verification rôle would require no more than the optimisation of existing sensor and processing developments. Here it should be recalled that Mr. Goldsmith referred to the development of several SAR data processors in Europe, for instance in Norway, which will be available in the 1992-94 timeframe. These processors seek higher performances than feasible at present and will, typically, be able to produce a full image in a few minutes.

63. In the framework of the Independent European Programme Group's (IEPG) research and development programme Euclid, a SAR development programme is being considered which is expected to commence at the end of 1990. This Euclid SAR programme is expected to aim at a spotlight resolution of less than 5 m and a data rate of less than 500 megabits. Initial plans foresee launch of such a satellite in 2005, but one could imagine that, if need be, a more concentrated effort could well lead to an earlier launch date.

XI. Data handling

64. Several speakers at the symposium stressed the importance of data handling in a verification satellite system. Important ques-

tions involved here are the data-storage capacity of the satellite, data-transmission capacity from satellite to ground stations, possibly through a geostationary data relay satellite, ground stations, data-processing capacity and the interpretation capacity, whether or not partly through computer detection.

65. The technological challenges connected with data handling should not be underestimated. Optical sensors with a resolution of around 1 m produce high-quality data, and high-resolution radar sensors have even higher performances. Data can be transmitted only if the satellite is in direct sight of the ground station. Only ground stations located near the arctic would be able to receive data from a satellite in polar orbit for a number of minutes during each earth orbit. Ground stations at a lower latitude would be able to do so for only a few earth orbits of the satellite.

66. If data cannot be transmitted to a ground station directly after their reception through its sensors, the satellite will have to store them until the next opportunity to transmit. Should the operator wish to have real-time satellite data available covering the whole CFE area being observed by a verification satellite, a number of ground stations in different parts of the world would have to be set up.

67. A different and in the long run presumably preferable solution would be to deploy data relay satellites in geostationary orbit which would enable the verification satellite to transmit data on the areas of interest at any given time through the relay satellite to a single ground station. This would at the same time solve the problem of data storage on board the satellite with magnetic tape recorders with relatively limited life-time and storage capacity.

68. The next stage is processing the raw data so as to prepare images for interpretation by human experts. This data processing requires high-performance computer capacity and a wide range of techniques such as decompression and decryption for image formation, followed by radiometric and geometric corrections and image enhancement through noise removal, contrast manipulation, smoothing, deblurring, colour coding and finally a process of edge detection on a statistical basis and the recognition of simple patterns.

69. If different sensors, such as optical and radar, were used, image fusion would also be possible and advantage could be taken of their operational and thematic complementarity.

70. Only then does the human expert intervene for detailed interpretation, i.e. the extraction and evaluation of semantic information about objects, object constellations or events.

71. In his address at the symposium, Dr. Drewniok made it clear that the analysis of the huge amount of data is time-consuming and a main bottleneck in the use of observation satellites for verification. He pointed out that the limited quality of satellite imagery does not allow for recognition of objects in an image solely based on visible intensity structures. Many additional sources of knowledge on image characteristics, temporal and spatial scene context and the expected scene contents are needed to give a meaningful interpretation of an image.

72. A large staff of experienced specialists would be needed to guarantee effective and quick data interpretation. Studies have shown that one hundred specialists, working in shifts, would be a minimum requirement for the regular day-to-day interpretation of satellite data for verification purposes alone.

73. The intensive use of computers to support human interpreters is essential for solving the data interpretation problem. Apart from the intensive and still increasing use of computers for various methods of data processing, the use of artificial intelligence could greatly contribute to solving interpretation problems of satellite images. For a number of reasons, however, clearly set out by Dr. Drewniok, there is still a lot of research and development to be done before systems using artificial intelligence for this purpose are ready for practical use. Application of fully-automatic data interpretation cannot be expected in the 1990s.

XII. The road towards a European satellite observation system

74. In view of the many technical, financial and managerial questions connected with the establishment of a European verification satellite agency, the countries involved in the WEU ad hoc sub-group on space still have divergent opinions on the course to follow. At the symposium, several different scenarios were suggested.

75. The Netherlands Defence Minister, Mr. Ter Beek, suggested that the first step should be for France, Italy and Spain to enter into agreements with other European nations on the sharing of information obtained by their Helios satellite for the verification of arms control agreements. Such co-operation could be followed by the creation of a consortium of countries interested in the construction and management of a European observation satellite system, following the example of similar co-operation arrangements within ESA.

76. The suggestion to share data gathered by Helios was however not agreed to by the French speakers at the symposium, who argued that

Helios data will be classified and protected as such. In addition, the capabilities of Helios are fully saturated with the military requirements of the three participating nations.

77. Supported by Under-Secretary of State Gérard Renon, Ingénieur-Général Bousquet of France suggested a different approach in three successive stages.

78. In his view, interested nations could, in a first phase, establish an image-processing and interpretation agency. The main task of this agency should be the training of photo interpreters, making use of images provided by the existing Landsat and Spot satellites. Such a procedure would not only build up an essential staff of photo interpreters at an early stage; it would also help to determine the required performance of the satellite system. The investment for a fully operational agency should be estimated at 100 million ECU, with yearly operational costs of 30 million ECU.

79. In a second phase the abovementioned agency could develop and operate a full-scale European satellite system. This system should at least have one satellite at its disposal at all times, with a replacement satellite to be launched every two or three years. The deployment of a full system would take between five and seven years if technology from the Helios programme is employed. In order not to waste time, a detailed examination of this system should be initiated already in parallel with the establishment of the image-processing and interpretation agency. The investment for this second phase should be estimated at 1.3 billion ECU, the two first satellites and the ground segment included, while maintenance over ten years, replacement satellites included, would cost about 1 billion ECU. If Helios technologies could be employed, one might save a total amount of 600 million ECU.

80. Finally, in a third phase, the satellite system could be extended to include radar and infrared imagery in order to have a day and night and all-weather capability, while at the same time the simultaneous use of different sensors would enhance the observation results. Given the technological problems still to be solved, General Bousquet thought it would be hazardous to make a cost estimate for this third phase.

81. Mr. Trillas Ruiz, Director General of the Spanish National Institute for Aerospace Technology, also recognised that, even if the decision were taken to establish a full verification satellite system, it would take considerable time for it to become operational. He therefore suggested that, during a transitional phase towards an autonomous system, Europe should make use of opportunities already available. Useful experience could be acquired by processing and interpreting images obtained from Spot and

Landsat. Also, Mr. Trillas Ruiz thought that experience gained in the Helios programme could be useful in the initial development stage towards a European system.

82. The Italian Defence Minister, Mr. Martinazzoli, argued that in the short term a co-operative effort among the WEU member countries could be to set up a WEU training centre for specialised staff and to increase co-ordination in the acquisition, analysis and utilisation of satellite data furnished by operational systems. Later, this training centre could be integrated into an autonomous European observation satellite system.

83. Dr. Eschelbacher of the Bundeskanzleramt thought that the establishment of a future system should allow different stages of development. He agreed with previous speakers that a first stage of development should be concentrated on the acquisition of the necessary reference material and training and instructing personnel in evaluating satellite data.

84. A comprehensive concept for the gradual establishment of a full-scale European verification satellite system was also presented by Dr. Hollstein, who proposed distinguishing four different stages. The first should start in 1991 with the exploitation of existing satellite data from Spot, Landsat and ERS-1. The second, beginning in 1995, should include an optical sensor satellite with a resolution of less than 5 m, an adapted processing and receiving station and a satellite control station. The third, beginning in 1998, should comprise an additional SAR satellite, with a spotlight resolution of less than 5 m and a survey mode resolution of less than 10 m. Furthermore, the processing and receiving station and the satellite control station should be adapted for enhanced capability of the system. In the fourth and final stage, beginning in 2000, the existing system should be extended with a data relay satellite, an optical sensor with enhanced capabilities in the visible and thermal infrared light and an adapted ground segment.

85. He accompanied his concept with the following cost estimate:

(million DM)

Time frame	Investment cost	Operational cost per year	Replacement cost
Stage 0 up to 1991	ca. 100		
Stage 1 from 1991 to 1995	ca. 1 700 2 500	from 1991 ca. 20 to ca. 300	
Stage 2 from 1995 to 1998	ca. 2 000 2 600		from 1995 ca. 100 to ca. 200 per year
Stage 3 from 1998 to 2005	ca. 700 800		
Total cost for stage 0 to stage 3 1991-2005	ca. 4 500 6 000	from 1991 ca. 20 to ca. 300	ca. 1100-2000 (total)

XIII. The institutional framework

86. In a quickly changing interplay of forces, it is not easy to decide which would be the best political framework for a European verification satellite system. An additional difficulty is that the development of a full-scale system from scratch will take a number of years and consequently a political framework considered suitable now might be less so in ten years' time. It would therefore be advisable to remain flexible and clearly mark the definition, development and operational phases. With the political maps of Europe in a state of fluctuation, it may not be good policy to establish a fixed core of participants which cannot be extended in a later phase.

87. On the other hand, if a limited number of Western European countries is determined to go ahead for a verification satellite system in the short term, there is no reason to postpone a decision. Taking into account the considerable lead-time before a system will be operational, there is no time to be lost now.

88. For the time being, therefore, the CSCE is out of the question as a viable framework. The sheer number of countries with still widely-diverging political traditions, societies, financial and industrial resources and also national interests would immensely complicate discussions and put off a necessarily early decision endlessly. Moreover, the absence of an essential institutional framework would make itself felt all too soon.

89. With the European Space Agency (ESA), the situation is entirely different. This organisation of European nations has built up, as Mr. Goldsmith rightly pointed out, a unique expertise and competence in international co-operative space activities. It has an existing in-orbit infrastructure and on-ground facilities for satellite testing and data archiving, processing and dissemination. It could provide assistance and support for a European verification satellite programme. On the other hand, it is unlikely to be the institutional framework for a European verification satellite system, the more so if crisis monitoring and related activities are to be an additional task of such a system. Some of the ESA member states are extremely reluctant to be involved in or even remotely connected with international co-operative military or defence activities. To effect a change in this long-standing attitude would take precious time. For the time being, as Sir Geoffrey Pattie put it, ESA will go out of the door as soon as the ministry of defence comes in by another door.

90. Under present circumstances, WEU is the only viable European organisation for defence-related activities. At the moment, it may lack the scientific and technical international staff to manage a programme of the size envisaged for a verification satellite system, but it unites countries which are determined to co-operate in security matters and which, moreover, have the industrial and financial resources necessary for such a system. Only WEU offers a framework to take early decisions, while its basic treaty, the modified Brussels Treaty, is flexible enough to take advantage of future needs.

91. As regards the rights of countries participating in a verification satellite system, there seems to be no reason to depart from the basic rule in European space co-operation that only countries which participate in financial and industrial terms will be entitled to have their equal share in decisions on system architecture, operational management and data distribution.

92. This leaves a number of problems to be solved if at a later stage other countries wish to participate in the system or at least to have certain data at their disposal.

93. The Netherlands Defence Minister advocated that the European observation satellite system should also be of benefit to other users. He thought that, first of all, close co-operation should be established with the United States, each side permitting access to the other's information. Other European countries, from both West and East, and the United Nations should also be allowed to have access to data from these satellites on payment.

94. Here, Sir Geoffrey Pattie rightly brought some delicate questions to the fore on the subject of sharing intelligence. In this regard,

smooth international co-operation may clash with national interests where intelligence systems and intelligence communities are concerned. An important question is also whether data is shared in relation to the amount of funding that is put in. If not, will data be shared on a need-to-know basis, depending on the geographic proximity to errors or faults revealed by the verification system, or will each participant have its data on an equal basis?

XIV. Activities of the WEU Council

95. In its reply of 30th January 1989 to the Assembly's Recommendations 465 and 466 regarding the creation of a European agency to verify future conventional arms reduction agreements, the Council revealed a rather aloof and lukewarm reaction.

96. To the great satisfaction of the Assembly, however, the Council showed a far more positive attitude when, in May 1989, a mandate was agreed for a study of space questions concerning the identification, by collecting details of technical means already available or to be established, of those areas where co-ordination of member states' activities was both necessary and beneficial.

97. On the basis of an interim report, prepared by the ad hoc sub-group on space of the Special Working Group, the Ministerial Council, at its meeting on 13th and 14th November 1989, discussed the value for Europe's security of member states' space programmes currently in progress or planned.

98. Among the Ministers there was a broad consensus on Europe's interest in observation by satellite for verification of arms control agreements, monitoring crises with security implications and also environmental hazards. They also thought that it could offer greater security for member states and the alliance as a whole, increase Europe's contribution to and expertise in the monitoring and verification of arms control agreements and enhance European industrial and technological capabilities.

99. On that basis, Ministers requested the ad hoc sub-group to continue its work and to undertake the technical studies required for the preparation of a possible ministerial decision on the development by member states of a European observation satellite programme.

100. These pre-feasibility studies would have to cover both the use of satellite systems already in existence or being developed and the technical and financial feasibility of developing a European satellite observation system. They would involve the definition and analysis of the various national and European operational requirements which observation satellites might meet and of the corresponding technical means

as regards sensors, satellite platforms and ground facilities. The inventory of usable data from scientific, commercial and military satellites and the study of how such data are to be processed and assessed for quality would have to be conducted in parallel. Finally, consideration would have to be given to the definition of an appropriate institutional framework for the effective management of the programmes involved.

101. At its last ministerial meeting on 23rd April 1990, the Council took note of the progress which had been made in the ad hoc sub-group on space, and called for concrete proposals to be submitted at its next meeting in November 1990, inter alia with a view to examining the possibility of establishing a satellite verification agency.

102. Mr. Depasse in his address pointed out that quite naturally WEU is the European framework to study the possibilities of verification by satellite because this organisation unites the European NATO countries with a common concern over security. He admitted that this framework is not fully satisfactory because the organisation is lacking the scientific and technical staff to manage a study programme for space projects, which is why this study is being conducted now on a governmental base. He thought that WEU will nevertheless be the focal point of a European verification satellite programme in which the production and exploitation of the equipment would depend on its member states, united in a management structure still to be defined.

103. Mr. Depasse made it clear that, in the programme study now being undertaken, an order of priorities is recognised with, in the first place, the verification of conventional arms control agreements, followed by data acquisition to monitor crises in geographical zones of interest for the participants and finally earth observation to help protect the natural environment. In a second study phase, the compatibility of the requirements for different activities will be examined and compared with the technology available. A final decision will also depend on other factors such as the relative importance of verification by satellite as compared to other means of verification but, if a positive decision is taken, Europe would be able to have a clearer view of the world, thus better guaranteeing its security and taking its technological capabilities to new heights, as Mr. Depasse rightly said.

XV. Conclusions

104. The purpose of the symposium was twofold. First, it offered the industry and experts concerned an opportunity to review briefly the technologies and capabilities now

available or under development in Europe which are considered essential for the establishment and operation of a full-scale European verification satellite system. On the basis of presentations at the symposium, it may be concluded without exaggeration that in the WEU member states all the basic technology required for such a system is available, while research and development projects are under way to provide enhanced capabilities. Moreover, ESA has gained invaluable competence and experience in running complicated operational space programmes and also in earth observation. The only thing remaining for governments to do is to take the political decisions to go ahead towards a truly European verification satellite system.

105. Second, it tried to bring political opinions in different WEU member states to grips with the advantages and feasibility of an autonomous European verification satellite system. In fact, irrespective of the political leanings of the different governments, there appears to be a broad consensus in most, if not all member states, on the advantages of such a system for Europe. It was also agreed that the satellite system would gain interest if, apart from verifying arms control agreements, it could also monitor developments with possible consequences for Europe's security in areas other than those covered by arms control agreements and environmental hazards. Tasks other than verification would, however, be considered only within the limits of the capabilities of the satellite system which, in an initial phase, should not be overestimated.

106. With great unanimity it was ascertained that a European verification satellite system could greatly contribute to strengthening the Atlantic Alliance as it would be unequivocal proof of Europe's determination to meet its responsibilities in security matters and be a fully-fledged equal partner as solicited by its American ally.

107. As the satellite system required is quite an ambitious project, a full-scale system will have to be established step by step.

108. Government representatives speaking at the symposium agreed that in an initial phase a European agency could be created to process and interpret Spot and Landsat satellite data available commercially which are of interest for the verification process.

109. No agreement could yet be discerned over the implementation of subsequent steps which should include the launch of an optical satellite, the establishment of a corresponding ground segment, and eventually the extension of the system with a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite and a data relay satellite capacity, both of which seem to be essential for long-term efficiency.

110. While it is known that the cost of a satellite system is a factor which still causes serious hesitation in government circles, not one of the political authorities present addressed this subject at any length.

111. It is the Assembly's conviction, however, that the cost of a full-scale verification satellite system, of which rough estimates were given by some speakers, cannot be an insurmountable

problem. Even though the political climate in Europe has improved, there is yet no reason to consider money spent on defence and security as ill-considered waste. Security still has to be paid for and it can be argued that defence money spent on a verification satellite system is well spent because it can greatly enhance security while not being an aggressive or threatening factor in the military balance.

APPENDIX

*Programme of the symposium**Rome, 27th and 28th March 1990*

Tuesday, 27th March 1990

10 a.m. First sitting

Opening remarks

Mr. GOERENS
President of the Assembly of Western European Union

Mr. STEGAGNINI
Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee

Prospects for conventional arms reduction in Europe: CFE and beyond

Mr. Ter BEEK
Minister of Defence of the Netherlands

Mr. RENON
State Secretary of Defence, France

General CHARLIER
Chief of the Defence staff, Belgium

Discussion

2.30 p.m. Second sitting

The rôle of European satellites in verification of conventional arms reduction agreements

Mr. TRILLAZ RUIZ
Director-General, National Institute of Aerospace Technology, Spain

Mr. MARTINAZZOLI
Minister of Defence of Italy

State of technology required for an observation satellite as now available in Europe

Mr. GOLDSMITH
European Space Agency

Dr. HOLLSTEIN
Dornier, Federal Republic of Germany

Dr. PUCCI
Selenia Spazio, Italy

Mr. CAYLA
Matra-Marconi Space and Matra Espace, France

Sir Peter ANSON
Matra-Marconi Space, United Kingdom

Discussion

Wednesday, 28th March 1990

9.30 a.m. **Third sitting**

Mr. HOLT
British Aerospace Space Division, United Kingdom

Mr. HUSSON
Alcatel Espace, France

Discussion

System architecture and cost

Ingénieur Général BOUSQUET
Directeur des Engins, France

Discussion

Requirements for the performance of a number of different observation satellite activities

Dr. ESCHELBACHER
Bundeskanzleramt, Federal Republic of Germany

Dr. JASANI
King's College, London

Dr. DREWNIOK
Universität Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany

Dr. ROTHMEYER
Electronic Systems Gesellschaft, Federal Republic of Germany

Discussion

3 p.m. **Fourth sitting**

The way forward

The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey PATTIE, MP
United Kingdom

Mr. DEPASSE
Hon. Ambassador, representing the Chairman of the WEU Council

Discussion

Conclusions

Mr. LENZER, MdB
Rapporteur of the symposium, Federal Republic of Germany

5 p.m. **Press conference**

INFORMATION LETTER

*from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs*

(15th March – 10th May 1990)

London, 15th May 1990

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The outcome of the elections in the German Democratic Republic on 18th March and in Hungary on 25th March is clear evidence of the overwhelming resolve of the peoples of these countries to take the most direct path towards democracy in their political and social lives and towards the westernisation of their economic life. They have confirmed their desire for national considerations to take precedence over membership of a pact imposed upon them. Eastern Europe will not be the test-bed for a purified or regenerated socialism, as prophesied by the West late last year, despite the new realities. There will be no third path. Marxist ideology has failed and been rejected, and there is no turning back. The East is drawing closer to the West and coming to share the same aspirations. German unity must therefore foreshadow the unity of a whole continent on the basis of institutional arrangements formulated in Western Europe, whose diversity reflects the dynamic process of European integration.

The second major factor, one that has so strikingly erupted as a central issue in European problems, is the renaissance of nationalism. An equal intensity of feeling underlies the Baltic States' aspiration to independence, the claims to autonomy being made by national groups in the Yugoslav Federation and the upsurge of irredentist and separatist movements triggered off by the new popular democratic régimes. Like the god Janus, such nationalism has two faces, one looking to the past, the other to the future. Now that these peoples have regained control over their own destiny, they should learn the lessons of their turbulent history and reject the temptations of intolerance and the desire to dominate, the inescapable consequences of which were so tragically demonstrated in Transylvania on 19th and 20th March last.

The key issue in the two-plus-four talks is the place that a united Germany should occupy within Europe and its anchorage in a western security system. It would be premature, or even unrealistic, to try to define a pan-European architecture before the developments unleashed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have run their natural course, culminating in the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact in its present form and the full exercise of the right to self-determination for all the peoples of the last continental empire. From now on, Russian and German national interests will coincide, especially in the economic field. A united Germany will honour all the agreements reached between the GDR and the Soviet Union, laying the foundations for close co-operation between them. Germany, a key partner in the Atlantic Alliance, will not be a strategic vacuum generating instability. The withdrawal of Soviet troops will have repercussions on the stationing of allied contingents and on NATO's nuclear strategy and tactical thinking. As the threat recedes geographically, what level of military effort will be regarded by public opinion in WEU countries as acceptable? How far will European defence budgets be cut? There is a risk of countries apeing the American plan to reduce forces by 25% within five years. There are likely to be sensitive discussions on the minimum threshold that should be set for defence to be credible. It is vital for WEU member states to harmonise their policies in this area and to evaluate the economies of scale that might accrue from increased specialisation, closer co-operation on armaments and equipment and the pooling of resources for the verification of future conventional arms control agreements. Europeans are preparing for these steps, which will be the focal issues for the WEU Council's working groups over the coming months. WEU parliamentarians will also be exploring new solutions and opening up new prospects, in so doing giving guidance to the work of Council and, from July onwards, the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

Perestroika is marking time and risks becoming bogged down since it has not yet offered any tangible proof that any inroads have been made into the immense problems faced by the Soviet Union. President Gorbachev is the most powerful leader since Stalin but, because of the fragmentation of what used to be the monolithic structure of Soviet power, he is having to navigate without instruments. Is he the person best equipped for any trial of strength? His standing in the West has barely been affected, but is now being undermined by his tense opposition to the Baltic republics' attempts to expedite the transition to independence. There is a real risk of violent confrontation. The economic blockade is an expedient that will, at most, delay matters, but it will aggravate resentment. Were submission to the dictates of Moscow to be obtained at this price, the Soviet Union would forego the benefits it might otherwise derive from a fruitful partnership based on autonomy of decision. What promises might

exasperated generals exact from their leaders for the sake of the indivisibility of the Soviet Union? Following its timely initiative in making contact with the Supreme Soviet, the WEU Assembly is justified in keeping a watching brief on developments and, if necessary, expressing its views publicly. Surely it is in the accession of reformist elements to local parliaments that hopes for the gradual democratisation of the Soviet Union lie. The conflicting views expressed by Soviet leaders on the security aspects of German unity and their vacillation in the Vienna negotiations testify to their disarray and lack of vision when contemplating this new European landscape. The communist party is losing its leading rôle. Its anachronism and growing discredit are also denying it a stabilising rôle. The moment of truth will be its forthcoming congress.

At the invitation of the Soviet CSCE Committee, I visited Moscow from 25th to 29th April, about three weeks after the visit which you yourself, Mr. President, and the Presidential Committee made earlier in that month at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet. May I now share my thoughts and conclusions with you, in the light of what was in every respect the instructive experience of speaking with high-ranking officers, diplomats, parliamentarians and several experts in international affairs.

My visit provided an opportunity for contacts with the Diplomatic Academy, the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the Institutes for Europe and North America and the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defence Questions. All those to whom I spoke stressed the enormity of the problems to be overcome to ensure the success of perestroika: they recognised the handicaps represented by the loss of a sense of initiative, lack of competitive spirit, ignorance of the way the market economy operates and disappearance of the independent peasant class. Comecon was virtually defunct and the development of new relations with the European Community would be more difficult for the USSR than it would be for the countries of Eastern Europe. As far as the latter were concerned, the challenge was to make the transition from a relationship based on the Communist parties and a homogeneous ruling class to inter-state relations where ideology no longer had any place. The USSR was in the throes of losing its buffer zones (*glacis*) and was preoccupied by the upsurge of nationalist feeling. The Soviets do not appear to have any clear political purpose. They are aware of what they are losing but do not perceive the benefits which may accrue in the longer term. No doubt they fear that things will get worse before they get better. Their concern and uncertainties are heightened by the prospect of seeing this evolution affect whole tracts of the Soviet Union itself, such as the Baltic states. They have difficulty accepting that the treaties still binding them to countries of Eastern Europe should be adapted on the lines of the Finnish model. They do not think that their relations with these countries would be cordial enough to allow this to happen. During my visit to the General Staff, General Moiseev asked me abruptly if, unlike NATO, WEU could enhance the security of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. He then stressed the American desire to strengthen NATO and the fact that, once the CFE agreement had been implemented, NATO would be more powerful than the Soviet Union, particularly in its naval forces.

Turning to the question of German unity, General Moiseev recalled the historical reasons why the USSR wanted watertight guarantees about the inviolability of European frontiers. Neither the German constitution nor Germany's dual membership of both the European Community and a defensive alliance seemed to him to be sufficiently reassuring. The USSR saw itself encircled by 300 NATO bases, and was concerned at the prospect of Hungary joining NATO now that Soviet troops were being repatriated and the Warsaw Pact was losing its military character. The Soviet Union's preferred option was clearly a peace treaty or a comparable legal arrangement regarding the frontiers, underpinned by Germany's membership of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Quite clearly, the current uncertainties over the events taking place for which the Soviets were quite unprepared are wreaking havoc and causing deep concern. All my interlocutors stressed the need for those in the West to understand their need for reassurance, especially psychological in my view. Whereas the Soviets may not have a very clear idea of their security interests, they have at least undertaken a process of reflection on "European architectures" at their Institute for Europe. They perceive the need to create a European peacekeeping force able to respond to any conflicts which might arise from the "political vacuum" in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. That would presuppose a military committee, meetings of Chiefs of Staff, a risk-reduction centre, a verification agency with a space component and a counter-terrorist agency. The Warsaw Pact would be maintained, at least for a transitional period, as a partner in the arms control negotiations and because of the fact that the Eastern European countries are dependent on the USSR for spare parts and training.

At the Institute for North America, attitudes towards NATO were broadly comparable to those expressed at the General Staff headquarters. A united Germany in NATO would be tantamount to a "strengthened adversary" and be unacceptable to the Soviets. NATO had to undergo far-reaching change even if there was no suggestion of pushing the United States from Europe. NATO had to abandon its doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union wanted to be given the rôle of guarantor of regional security in Eastern Europe and could envisage agreements between the Warsaw

Pact, NATO and WEU as well as pan-European security arrangements as an extension of the CSCE process.

The Soviets wished to synchronise the process of German unification and the development of the CSCE in the field of security. The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Petrovsky, and those officials concerned in the CSCE department of the Ministry, have taken up Mr. Genscher's idea of "parallel constructivism" under which Germany would act as a bridge between East and West. The CSCE would thus become a safety net in the transitional period from confrontation to pan-European co-operation in the fields of verification, technology exchange and the environment. The Soviets wanted the entire northern hemisphere, including the Asian part, to be involved, at the same time recognising the need for some flexibility as to what forms participation might take, given the maintenance of the existing organisations. They were also favourably disposed towards initiatives for a conference on the Mediterranean along CSCE lines. The CSCE summit planned for the end of the year could therefore be, in their opinion, an important stage in the construction of the "common European home".

The meeting with the members of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defence Questions provided an opportunity for a fresh debate on these problems. The Committee expressed interest in continuing contacts with WEU.

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The Permanent Council and its working groups met seven times to complete preparations for the Ministerial Council. *The Permanent Council* met on 14th and 29th March and as an Enlarged Council on 6th April at which the political directors from the foreign ministries and representatives of the defence staffs were present. This meeting of *the Enlarged Council* clarified the way in which the ministerial discussions would be organised around the topical questions mentioned in the report on the European security environment and the prospects for conventional arms control and for strengthening the CSCE process. The Council adopted a discussion paper destined for Ministers, the introduction to which restated the conclusions of the Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group concerning the European security environment in 1991-1995. This document set out several questions formulated by the two groups which were designed to stimulate Ministers' discussions on the following topics:

– What should the overall concept and objectives of conventional arms control be following the conclusion of a CFE Treaty and the adoption of new confidence-building measures?

– How can a credible deterrent be guaranteed which is consistent with Europe's minimum security requirements? What should be the mix of nuclear and conventional forces? What balance should be struck within the alliance in order to strengthen its solidarity? What extra responsibilities should the member countries of WEU take on for the defence of Europe?

– Are NATO's strategic concepts still valid? How will the concept of defence at the borders evolve given the continued political commitment to territorial integrity? What would be the political and military utility of multinational forces in Europe?

– How can co-operation between Eastern and Western Europe be promoted whilst at the same time working to strengthen European institutions on the basis of the commitments linking WEU countries to each other and to their North American allies?

The Enlarged Council undertook a detailed examination of a preliminary draft communiqué which was to be issued to the public after the ministerial meeting.

The Enlarged Council also approved two chapters of the report on the European security environment and a report on co-operation of WEU countries in the verification of a CFE agreement, all of which were to be forwarded to the Council of Ministers. The Secretary-General's oral reports on the activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group and the ad hoc Sub Group on Space were also submitted to that meeting. All these documents were the fruit of the Special Working Group meetings on 13th and 27th March, the latter being a joint meeting with the Defence Representatives Group.

The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space held its eighth meeting on 20th March and continued its assessment of requirements with a view to identifying capabilities needed for a European satellite observation system. Delegations exchanged information on the possibilities for short-term co-operation between the member countries and on the contribution of satellite observation systems in verifying conventional arms control agreements and in relation to out-of-area threats.

To improve the Permanent Council's working methods by relieving it of routine tasks and helping with the preparation of certain decisions, the Group of Deputies to the Permanent Representa-

tives held its first two meetings on 12th and 26th March with a view to the Council meetings to be held on the following days. On 29th March, the Permanent Council ratified this new working arrangement by approving the mandate for the Group:

“...The Council instructs the Group of Deputies to Permanent Representatives – which shall be known as the ‘Council Working Group’ – to prepare its decisions. The ‘Council Working Group’ shall also deal with other questions entrusted to it by the Council, including those within the competence of the Institutional Working Group.

The ordinary Council Working Group is therefore wound up.”

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The Ministerial Council meeting on 23rd April provided an opportunity for a particularly useful debate on the likely future rôle for WEU, the only organisation with competence for European co-operation on matters of security, in a radically altered European context.

WEU has undeniable advantages which derive from its threefold vocation:

- as an organisation in which the European members of the alliance may come together and discuss their security concerns as well as the necessary adaptation of this alliance to the changing situation;
- as the only specifically European organisation whose members are committed by treaty to come to each other’s assistance if their frontiers are under attack;
- as an organisation representing governments resolved to include a defence and security dimension in the process of building a future European union.

The events of late 1989 and early this year have merely strengthened the urgent need and obligation for member states to achieve the co-operation objectives which were at the origin of WEU’s reactivation and are restated in the Hague platform. Those events, however, are posing new problems, in particular WEU’s rôle in respect of Eastern European countries, in view of the interest evinced by some of those countries in the organisation and its two-part structure. The Ministerial Council has reviewed these questions and publicly arrived at certain conclusions.

The ministerial resolutions may be summarised as follows: Ministers discussed the implications of the new European security environment for the continuance of the arms control and reduction process, the maintenance of effective deterrence, developments in defence doctrines and finally a European security and defence identity in the framework of increasing pan-European co-operation.

Having agreed on the need to conclude a CFE agreement without delay on the basis of the proposals already tabled, “with the prospect of a 35-nation summit at the end of the year”, Ministers discussed the various arrangements that might be considered for the next stage of these negotiations.

In order further to coordinate the views of member states, the ministerial organs will continue their discussions on the definition of a security system suited to the needs of Europe in the future, a definition of the objectives of, and procedures for, post-CFE negotiations, the rôle of Europeans in the Atlantic Alliance and multinational military co-operation.

Ministers also expressed the hope that the Special Working Group would be the forum for concertation among member states in preparing for the Atlantic Alliance summit and the CSCE summit (communiqué, paragraph 9).

The Defence Representatives Group will be concentrating on the adaptation of the alliance’s military functions and the specific responsibilities to be shouldered by the Europeans. It will study the feasibility of setting up a European centre for conflict management which might be established under the CSCE framework. Ministers have endorsed the group’s proposals concerning co-operation among member states on the verification of a CFE agreement:

- drawing up a programme of trial inspections between member countries;
- the opening of national inspection teams to participation by inspectors from other member countries;
- the opening of inspector training courses to nationals of other member countries.

Having noted the oral report on the activities of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space, Ministers asked the group to continue with its detailed study of the potential for European co-operation in this field. The completion of this work would now depend on the realisation of technical studies to be carried out by member states. The group was also asked to examine the possibility of establishing an agency for the exploitation of satellite images.

The problems of the Mediterranean have also been discussed and the mandate of the Mediterranean Sub-Group has been confirmed.

For the first time since the adoption of the Hague platform by the Ministerial Council on 27th October 1987, Ministers decided to issue a public communiqué, evidence of their desire to define a common strategy on European security. The Brussels communiqué is in a way an extension of the Hague platform, which has lost none of its relevance. A few commentators mistakenly thought they could discern some hesitation, even the seeds of division, among member states, for example on the subject of deterrence. In fact, Ministers thought it would be sufficient to refer to previous WEU and alliance texts without repeating them word for word, since they were still the basis on which they operated.

There are two points that should be stressed. In the first place, the very firm stance in favour of maintaining the forces of the United States and Canada in Europe. In this respect, member states will have to take the initiative in submitting concrete proposals to their North American partners as soon as possible. It is in this context too that thought should be given to the value of multinational units, whose organisation might facilitate tactical co-operation with North American forces. The planned division-level trial involving German, British and Dutch troops in the Northern Army Group, together with the lessons learned from the creation of the Franco-German brigade, provide a useful basis for more detailed thinking.

Secondly, Ministers have taken note of the need to give active support to the process of democratisation in Eastern Europe by strengthening the political dialogue at every level. They have welcomed the initiatives taken by the Assembly in this respect. The incoming French Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the Secretary-General will draw up a plan of action over the next few weeks so that this dialogue can be initiated at the appropriate level on behalf of the Nine.

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Since the ministerial meeting, the *Permanent Council* has met on 9th May to organise the programme for its working groups and to make further implementing arrangements for the WEU Institute for Security Studies. Its Director, Mr. John Roper, took up his post on 1st April. Experts are now being recruited and there is every reason to believe that the institute will be operational by 1st July next. Mr Roper has already made a number of contacts with the Clerk of the Assembly and its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to lay the foundations for fruitful co-operation between the Assembly and the institute.

The *ad hoc Sub-Group on Space* met on 3rd May. It gave preliminary thought to the proposal made to the Council of Ministers to set up an agency for the exploitation of satellite images within WEU, as well as continuing its work on the assessment of requirements and accessible data with a view to reporting on the parameters of a future European satellite observation system.

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With regard to relations between the Council and Assembly, the Council forwarded on 11th April the second part of its 35th annual report to the Assembly. The Council's replies to the recommendations adopted by the Assembly during the second part of its 35th ordinary session were all forwarded to the Assembly between 20th February and 6th April.

On 11th April, in accordance with the decision taken a year ago by the United Kingdom Presidency of the Council to keep the Assembly regularly informed of IEPG activities, I sent an information letter to the Office of the Clerk. In future, IEPG information letters will be sent to you as an annex to my information letter on the activities of the ministerial organs.

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* *

On 4th and 5th April, I paid an official visit to Spain accompanied by Mr. E. Destefanis, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

I was honoured to be received by His Majesty the King in the presence of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry and the Spanish Ambassador to London.

I was received by the Prime Minister at the Moncloa Palace for talks which lasted more than 45 minutes.

During this meeting, I was struck by the strength of Mr. González's European commitment and his wide-ranging ideas on the future European union. The Prime Minister believed that the events in Central and Eastern Europe would result in a rapid transformation of the military structures of the Atlantic Alliance. Mr. González advocated a reshaping of the American presence in Europe but was convinced that this presence should be maintained. The Prime Minister hoped that the European Community, and in particular European political co-operation, would be able to play a rôle in the field of defence and security. It was for that reason that he envisaged WEU ultimately being incorporated in the political co-operation structures of the future European union.

Turning to the Mediterranean, the Prime Minister was convinced that the United States and the Soviet Union would maintain an active presence in that region. The Mediterranean was set to become extremely important for European security. Mr. González was worried that demographic, social, economic and religious factors would ultimately lead to North-South confrontation. Consequently, he hoped that WEU would continue to reflect on the problems of the Mediterranean and that this would lead to a clear long-term European strategy for the Mediterranean basin as a whole.

As regards the Soviet Union, Mr. González was convinced that Moscow would seek to place greater emphasis on defensive nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical) and that, in its new defensive security concept, the Soviet Union might abandon the doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons.

The talks with the Foreign Minister Mr. D. F. Fernandez Ordoñez and the Defence Minister Mr. N. Serra focused on the agenda topics of the ministerial meeting.

During my talks with the President of the Senate and with the President of the Chamber of Deputies, they stressed Spain's European vocation and its willingness to play a dynamic rôle in a European security system.

Finally, I met a number of Spanish parliamentarians who would be participating in the forthcoming Assembly session in Paris.

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* *

In the field of public relations and information on the rôle and tasks of WEU, my colleagues and I took part in the following events:

- from 14th to 16th March, I attended the conference organised by the "Deutsche Strategie Forum" in Bad-Godesberg and spoke about the new European frameworks for co-operation in the field of security;
- from 17th to 20th March, I paid a visit to the United States during which I gave two talks, the first to the Defence System Management College of the United States Department of Defence and the second to the Atlantic Council;
- on 29th March in London, I took part, together with several of my colleagues, in the joint meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly's Special Committee on nuclear strategy and arms control and the Sub-Committee on the future of the armed forces; the purpose was to brief parliamentarians on WEU thinking on the conventional arms control negotiations and on the adaptation of member countries' armed forces to the changing circumstances of European security;
- on 30th March, I took part in a meeting of the Sligting Group in The Hague;
- on 31st March in Athens, I gave a paper at the conference on European security policy organised by the Hans Seidel Stiftung;
- on 1st and 3rd April I took part in a conference organised by the Rand Corporation on NATO crisis management in a changing Europe;
- on 2nd April, at the invitation of General Rogers, I joined several members of the Permanent Council in a visit to SHAPE at Casteaux to hear a series of talks on the politico-military problems of the alliance;
- on 5th April, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented the Secretariat-General at the NATO annual economic symposium on East European economies in the 1990s: prospects and constraints;
- let me here just remind you that, from 25th to 30th April, I visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet CSCE Committee;
- on 7th May, I addressed the Praestes PR support in The Hague;

- on 10th May, finally, I gave a speech at Newcastle University on the problems of European security;
- Ambassador Holthoff represented the Secretariat-General at the European Community/ United States conference held from 10th to 12th May under the auspices of the CEPS and the American Assembly on the subject: old relationship: new agenda.

Throughout this period, and more especially around the time of the WEU Ministerial Council, I have maintained frequent contact with the media to explain the current direction of WEU activities, the place of our organisation among the European institutions and its invaluable contribution to the forging of a European security identity, a key element along the path to European union.

*Written Question 285 and letter from Mr. van Eekelen,
Secretary-General of WEU, to Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public relations*

QUESTION 285

*put to the Council by Mr. Pontillon
on 16th January 1990*

Can the Council say:

1. how it intends to improve its public relations effort following the WEU seminar on changes in public perceptions of European defence;
2. what proposals the Secretary-General has made in this connection;
3. whether it is prepared to include the problem of WEU's information policy in its agenda as a matter of urgency with a view to examining specific initiatives, e.g.:
 - (a) publishing guidelines for the press at the close of meetings of the Permanent Council;
 - (b) preparing and publishing easy-to-understand basic information documents for widespread circulation in all member countries;
 - (c) creating a WEU periodical in the official languages of all member countries for the dissemination of articles, communiqués and news about WEU activities;
 - (d) establishing WEU information offices in the European member countries of the alliance and, in particular, in the United States and Canada;
 - (e) inviting member governments to release more information about WEU;
 - (f) defining methods of organising opinion polls at European level;
 - (g) strengthening co-operation with groups, associations and private institutes in order to enhance the interest aroused by studies on Western European security matters;
 - (h) strengthening co-operation, discussions and exchanges of views with industrial associations, trades unions, cultural associations, educational establishments and universities;
 - (i) using television as a means of presenting WEU;

4. in the light of the abovementioned considerations, whether it is prepared to grant the financial means WEU needs to pursue a public information policy;

5. whether it is prepared to follow up my proposal to set up a WEU public relations committee composed of representatives of both the Assembly and the Council?

*Letter from Mr. van Eekelen,
Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the Committee
for Parliamentary and Public Relations*

London, 6th March 1990

.....

It was with the greatest interest that I took cognisance of the written question you put to the Council on 16th January 1990 on WEU's information policy and the WEU ministerial organs' public relations effort. I therefore wish the Permanent Council to be fully able to give your question and the suggestions it contains as detailed and precise an answer as possible describing a future programme of action rather than merely reflecting a situation that is becoming outdated.

For the time being at least, we are faced with a twofold difficulty. On the one hand, the Council of Ministers has attributed tasks in this area to the future WEU Institute for Security Studies and will grant it adequate means for carrying them out. In this connection, the Director of the institute will have to make proposals in the very first weeks after taking office. These proposals should be an important part of the Council's reply to your question. On the other hand, the WEU secretariat will have to be expanded and adapt itself to the new tasks arising from the progress of work in the Council's working groups. This should be a second new element of which the Council will wish to keep the WEU parliamentary Assembly informed.

At the present juncture, the information policy of the ministerial organs is marked by continuity in the types of activities and in the framework of the working structures excellently described by my predecessor, H.E. Ambassador Alfred Cahen, in his letter to President Goerens

dated 16th December 1987, circulated by the Office of the Clerk as Document 1132. Since August 1988, the Assembly has been exhaustively informed by Ambassador Cahen and then by me of all the public relations activities of the ministerial organs.

In this context, I believe it expedient to propose to the Permanent Council that it give a substantial answer to your question in the weeks preceding the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of your Assembly at the beginning of December 1990. I wished to warn you of this here and now.

Your question gives the Permanent Council an opportunity to discuss WEU's public relations, and I trust the matter will be on the agenda of one or more of its meetings in the months ahead.

You may be sure that, like you, I attach the greatest importance to WEU's public relations and to co-operation between the Assembly and the Council in this area. I am fully at your disposal to discuss these matters if you feel this desirable.

.....

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 474 to 479

RECOMMENDATION 474¹

*on WEU in the single European market –
reply to the half-yearly report of the Council²*

I

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the Single European Act is in harmony with the principles and aims set out in the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly in its preamble and Articles I and II, and considering that the respective responsibilities of WEU and the European Community are complementary;
- (ii) Considering that the creation of a single European market raises problems of security for the WEU member countries to which they will have to find concerted solutions;
- (iii) Noting that the European Commission has set up a service to deal with security and defence questions but that the prospect of the development of relations between the European Community and several neutral countries or non-members of the Atlantic Alliance should deter the Community from handling such matters which, in any case, fall within the competence of WEU under the modified Brussels Treaty which has not been superseded and which are of greater importance because of recent political developments in Europe;
- (iv) Considering that the Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of European security but that the rôle played by Europe in the alliance should be re-examined,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Instruct a working group to conduct, in consultation with the European Commission, a detailed study of the problems that will arise for the security of member states when frontier controls are abolished and report to the Assembly on its conclusions;
2. Study carefully the disparities that will arise in the single European market due to the present difference between the burdens imposed on member states by their defence policies with a view to finding a remedy;
3. With the European Commission, set up a joint working group to prepare a list of products and technologies which, if released to third countries, might jeopardise world peace, the aim being to ban any such action by member countries, and endeavour to promote the same rules among other exporting countries;
4. Seek better methods so that, wherever possible, specifications and requirements may be harmonised and agreed in joint programmes, thus facilitating an effective co-ordinated European approach;
5. Examine procedures in the various member countries for placing orders for the armed forces with industrial firms with a view to achieving a unified approach;
6. In the same context, examine the obligations of staff employed by industries manufacturing partly or solely for defence purposes.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1989 during the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (9th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1201).

II

Furthermore, the Assembly,

- (i)* Considering with regret that the Council does not make sufficient use of its statutory means of pursuing a dialogue with the Assembly;
- (ii)* Considering in particular the delay in replying to Recommendation 467;
- (iii)* Noting with satisfaction that, in its reply to Recommendation 472, the Council renewed its undertaking to report to the Assembly on all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when this is done in other forums, but noting that it has given no information about the activities of the European Commission in defence matters;
- (iv)* Welcoming the fact that the Secretary-General's address in Brussels on 21st September 1989 provided interesting information on the state of the reactivation of WEU, but regretting that the Assembly has not yet received an official communication of the same standard;
- (v)* Considering that the Council's requirements in respect of the management of the Assembly's supplementary budget would, if carried into effect, be detrimental to the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy and the responsibilities of the President of the Assembly as defined in the Financial Regulations;
- (vi)* Welcoming the steps taken by the Council in 1989 to allow more in-depth thinking by the administration of member countries on keeping the public informed and on artificial intelligence and the pursuit of European sessions of defence studies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Use its statutory means to give the Assembly precise, full information on its structures, work and plans so as to allow a true dialogue;
2. Give priority to the Assembly when communicating such information;
3. Enable the Assembly to take part in its thinking on the tasks to be attributed to the future institute;
4. Take no measures that may involve relations between the new institute and the Assembly without securing the latter's prior agreement;
5. Respect the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy in the conditions that the Council itself laid down in 1987;
6. Inform the Assembly of the measures taken in the European Community to allow the European Commission to study security and defence questions;
7. Continue to associate the Assembly with the seminars and colloquies that it organises;
8. Examine in what conditions and in which framework a European centre for preventing military risks might be set up and inform the Assembly of the conclusions of its study.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 474***

1. The Council shares the Assembly's view that the principles and aims set out in the modified Brussels Treaty and reiterated in The Hague platform, in particular the desire to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe, are concordant with the spirit of the Single European Act.
2. The Council notes that Article 30, paragraph 6, of the Single European Act stresses the importance of closer co-operation within the Twelve on questions of European security but limits the co-ordination of positions to the political and economic aspects of security. The same article refers to closer co-operation in the field of security between certain member states of the Twelve, notably within the framework of WEU.
3. The Council considers that both the modified Brussels Treaty and the Single European Act specify with sufficient clarity the respective responsibilities of the WEU organs and the institutions of the European Communities.
4. The Council has made a preliminary study of, and continues to keep on its agenda, the question of the implications for the security of WEU member states of the measures taken in connection with the creation of a large unified European market.
5. The Council considers that the setting-up of working groups jointly or in consultation with the European Commission to address questions of security and defence cannot be contemplated for the time being.
6. The member states consult together concerning the budgetary burden of their defence policies.
7. The harmonisation of technical specifications and standards regarding defence equipment and the possibilities for joint programmes are studied within the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). As stated by the United Kingdom Defence Secretary, Mr. Younger, in his address to the WEU Assembly in June 1989, the member states represented in the IEPG were moving ahead with the development of a more open and competitive European defence equipment market.
8. The Council endeavours to maintain a regular dialogue with the Assembly on all matters coming within the purview of the organisation. The Permanent Council follows with keen interest the activities of the Assembly.

The information on the Council's activities and structures given in the annual report of the Council to the Assembly are supplemented by the Secretary-General's information letters to the President of the Assembly. The meetings between the Assembly's Presidential Committee – accompanied once a year by the Political and Defence Committees – and the Council presidency are also an opportunity to apprise the Assembly of the progress of work being done by the Council and its working groups and to have an exchange of views on their future programme.

In his speech to the Assembly at its December 1989 session, the Secretary-General stated that, if it was the Assembly's wish, he was prepared to address its committees or national delegations.

The member states are fully aware of the importance of involving the Assembly closely in the seminars and colloquia they organise, just as they are themselves interested in being invited to the colloquia organised by the Assembly.

9. As the Council has already noted in its reply to Recommendation 467, it has, during its discussions on the practical arrangements for establishing a WEU Institute for Security Studies, taken account of the Assembly's point of view, as expressed in that recommendation, on the tasks to be assigned to this institute.

Dialogue between the Assembly and the Council regarding the tasks to be carried out by the institute is desirable in that the institute's work will be widely available to the public and that its thinking will naturally complement the Assembly's discussions. This is, moreover, why it is planned that the Assembly will, with the Council's agreement, be able to assign to the institute studies relating to the Assembly's own activities.

10. The regular contacts between the Secretary-General and the President of the Assembly have cleared the way for the implementation of the supplementary Assembly budget for 1989.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 11th April 1990 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 17th April 1990.

RECOMMENDATION 475 ¹*on European security and events in the Near and Middle East* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendations 349 and 403;
- (ii) Considering that Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty gives the WEU Council competence to examine threats to international peace in the Near and Middle East;
- (iii) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 472 which reaffirms its intention to report on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when this is carried out in a framework other than WEU, in accordance with Article II of the treaty;
- (iv) Recalling the action taken by WEU in 1988 to restore freedom of navigation in the Gulf;
- (v) Expressing its satisfaction at:
 - (a) the continuation of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq;
 - (b) the suspension of fighting in Beirut;
- (vi) Aware of the important consequences of the meeting of sixty-two members of the Lebanese Parliament on the initiative of the committee formed by Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia to:
 - (a) work out a political and institutional solution allowing the various communities to cohabit peacefully;
 - (b) assert the integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Lebanese state, freed of interference and foreign military presence;
- (vii) Condemning unreservedly the assassination of President René Moawad of Lebanon;
- (viii) Condemning the taking of hostages, their detention and terrorism in all its forms;
- (ix) Expressing the strongest concern that no general peace process has yet been started in the Middle East in spite of the action that the international community has been taking for a long time through:
 - (a) United Nations resolutions;
 - (b) recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;
 - (c) European Community declarations;
 - (d) diplomatic action by the superpowers;
 - (e) the good will shown by the Arab countries at their recent summit meeting in Casablanca;
- (x) Strongly disapproving the new impetus given to the arms race by states in the region, particularly in regard to long-range aircraft, medium-range missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons:
 - (a) by firms, banks and experts from European Community countries;
 - (b) by agreements with and arms deliveries and military assistance from certain Western European countries, the Soviet Union, the United States and China,

which are obviously contrary to the search for peaceful solutions to the conflicts causing bloodshed in the region;

- (xi) Gratified that the European Council has taken a major step to prevent its members contributing to the production of chemical weapons by countries in the region but regretting that the Western European countries have taken no collective steps to avoid the proliferation of other types of armaments such as medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear weapons;
- (xii) Endorsing unreservedly the United Nations' decision to convene an international conference on peace in the Middle East;
- (xiii) Considering that, to ensure peace and stability in the region, it is essential to seek a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that guarantees the security of the state of Israel and the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland and to self-determination in the Gaza Strip and West Bank;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1989 during the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (9th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pieralli on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1202).

(xiv) Recognising the will of the Palestinian people who for two years have been demonstrating, with the intifada movement, their refusal to accept the prolongation of the Israeli military occupation that started in 1967,

and condemning repression, attacks and any action that violates human rights and international conventions;

(xv) Considering that the start of a general peace process, and hence the convocation of an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations, calls for a dialogue between the parties involved as a first step,

and assessing positively:

(a) the decisions taken by the Palestinian National Council in Algiers;

(b) the rejection of terrorism by the PLO;

(c) the PLO's explicit recognition of the state of Israel;

(d) the decisions taken at the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca;

(xvi) Considering further that the Israeli Government's plan for elections in the occupied territories, if accompanied by the necessary international guarantees and negotiated between all the parties involved, might provide an opportunity to start a dialogue which cannot be held without the PLO, which manifestly has the sympathy and support of the people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,

and expressing its disappointment at the Israeli Government's rejection of the ten points completing the Shamir plan presented by Mr. Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt;

(xvii) Wishing constructive negotiations to be started without delay between a representative and credible Palestinian delegation and the Israeli Government,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I

1. Confirm that it is fully prepared:
 - (a) to respond to any request aimed at encouraging the consolidation of the military truce, the resumption of civilian life and normal air and sea traffic in Lebanon;
 - (b) to support the action taken by Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia;
 - (c) to support current efforts in Lebanon to:
 - restore peaceful cohabitation among the communities;
 - reform the institutions;
 - re-establish state authority;
 - enable all foreign troops to be withdrawn;
 - guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon;
2. Take immediate steps to halt the arms race in the Middle East, particularly in regard to chemical and nuclear weapons, missiles and long-range aircraft and to this end:
 - (a) stop the implementation of contracts for supplies of arms and take various measures, co-ordinated between governments, to prevent firms, banks and research centres from evading control, as has already been the case;
 - (b) propose that all states, in particular the Soviet Union, China, the United States, South Africa and Brazil, adopt a similar approach;
 - (c) exert pressure on the Arab states and Israel to accept a freeze on and verification of their military potential and the progressive elimination of chemical and nuclear weapons with a view to the international conference on peace in the Middle East which will have to consider special negotiations on the reduction of armaments following the political agreements reached and as an essential guarantee of the security of all states in the region;
3. Draw up a list of products and technologies which member countries would undertake not to deliver to any Near or Middle East country and seek the endorsement of the other arms exporting countries for such a decision;

4. Ensure in particular that member states do not authorise the export to any country in the region of:
 - (a) chemical products on the list given in the European Council regulation of 20th February 1989;
 - (b) technology necessary for the development of medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missiles;
5. Reaffirm its resolve to preserve freedom of navigation on all seas;
6. Announce here and now that member countries are prepared to co-ordinate the action of their armed forces:
 - (a) for humanitarian operations and international police duties at the request of the United Nations;
 - (b) with the agreement of the parties directly concerned, for guaranteeing the implementation of bi- or multilateral agreements concluded by the international conference on peace in the Middle East, or even earlier through direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict;

II

Urge member states to take action in the European Council to ensure acceptance of United Nations resolutions on Palestine and Lebanon and:

- (a) Intensify diplomatic action to promote peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq based on the full acceptance of United Nations Resolution 598;
- (b) Follow up the Assembly's earlier recommendation to give substantial assistance to Kurdish refugees and insist on respect for human rights and recognition of the cultural and administrative independence of the Kurdish people in the various states in which they live;
- (c) Recommend that member states increase, directly or in the framework of the European Community, their humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people of the Gaza Strip and West Bank whose living conditions are deteriorating from day to day;
- (d) Persevere with approaches to each state capable of exercising influence to bring about the release of all the hostages taken on Lebanese territory and the international fight against all forms of terrorism;
- (e) In any event, promote the meeting of the international conference on peace in the Middle East which only Israel and Iran are now refusing and, to this end:
 - (i) ask the Soviet Union to renew normal diplomatic relations with Israel;
 - (ii) ask the United States to raise the level of their contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organisation;
 - (iii) ask the United Nations General Assembly to stop equating Zionism with racism as approved in one of its resolutions;
 - (iv) ask the United Nations Security Council to adopt a resolution in favour of the Palestinians' right to self-determination;
- (f) Ask the Israeli Government:
 - (i) to stop its repressive action in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which has already caused several hundred deaths;
 - (ii) to abandon all practices that are prejudicial to human rights;
 - (iii) to respect the property of the population of the occupied territories;
 - (iv) to allow Palestinian universities to be reopened;
- (g) Ask the Israeli Government to agree to a dialogue with the PLO and negotiations with a credible and representative Palestinian delegation with a view to holding free elections in the occupied territories;
- (h) Ask Israel's neighbouring Arab states and the PLO to exercise their influence and vigilance in halting infiltrations of armed groups into Israeli territory;

- (i)* Together with the Council of Europe and the European Community – which can place at the service of peace in the Middle East its great economic potential and vast wealth of supranational experience – take the necessary steps to define a truly Western European peace initiative with a view to:
- (i)* backing up the diplomatic effort by the United States and the Soviet Union;
 - (ii)* helping to terminate the present dangerous status quo;
 - (iii)* fostering an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 475***

1. The questions raised by the Assembly in Recommendation 475 are essentially a matter for European political co-operation.

2. Concerning the problems posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons, more particularly technologies associated with the development of medium- and long-range missiles, WEU Council Working Groups have discussed in depth the potential security implications of this situation for member states.

Export controls over chemical products that might contribute to the proliferation of this type of weapon are a matter of national responsibility of member states which, within the context of EPC, are in close consultation on these questions. Together with their partners in the Twelve, they have also formulated a system of controls relating to eight products identified as presenting a known risk.

As regards missiles, the question has been raised within WEU as to whether member states which have not yet done so should join the system set up by the Seven in 1987.

3. Co-ordination of the action of armed forces of WEU countries, to which reference is made in paragraph I.6, can certainly be envisaged under the auspices of WEU. The operations in the Gulf have set an example of useful co-operation among member states. Nevertheless, the provision of contingents for humanitarian or peacekeeping operations is a matter to be decided nationally by these countries. It is not WEU's responsibility to announce in advance that member states are prepared to co-ordinate such action. Any national decisions to commit forces should be taken with due regard for the overall political context which is in fact a matter for EPC.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th April 1990 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 9th April 1990.

RECOMMENDATION 476 ¹*on force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) –
reply to the annual report of the Council* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the signing of the INF treaty in 1987 brought about a change in East-West relations, particularly in regard to the arms limitation process, which encourages the adoption of further disarmament measures;
- (ii) Welcoming the fact that the INF agreement generally improved the East-West atmosphere, thus making a decisive contribution to establishing confidence between the great powers;
- (iii) Aware that this agreement provides, in the form of inspections, for the most searching and extensive verification measures that have ever existed and that experience thus gained might make a valuable contribution to the conclusion of future agreements on other types of armaments;
- (iv) Considering that it is essential for the arms limitation and disarmament process to be continued step by step in Europe and worldwide;
- (v) Considering that the dynamism generated by the INF treaty should be exploited with determination to achieve the control of armaments and further reductions;
- (vi) Stressing the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union in the conclusion of a convention on a global ban on chemical weapons and of a START agreement providing for a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons;
- (vii) Welcoming the announcement by Secretary-General Gorbachev in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 7th December 1988 that unilateral arms reductions would be made, subsequent to which the other Warsaw Pact countries (with the exception of Romania) also announced that they would unilaterally reduce forces and arms in the next two years;
- (viii) Endorsing unreservedly President Bush's disarmament initiative at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 29th May 1989 which is likely to lead to decisive progress in the conventional disarmament process;
- (ix) Supporting in particular the inclusion of combat aircraft and helicopters in the first series of negotiations on conventional disarmament and the West's offer to reduce troop levels significantly;
- (x) Considering that the series of proposals made by the NATO member countries in Vienna on 22nd September 1989, completing important aspects of the western proposals of 13th July 1989, is particularly likely to foster the establishment of a peaceful order in Europe based on mutual confidence and joint security;
- (xi) Concerned that the problem of short-range (less than 500 km) missiles, particularly important for Western Europe because of the deployment, range and numerical superiority of Soviet missiles, is not yet the subject of negotiations;
- (xii) Considering that the WEU member countries' security interests can be defended only in the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance but that in future they must be harmonised more consistently;
- (xiii) Welcoming the French Prime Minister's proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU should start a specific programme of immediate co-operation with regard to verification and disarmament;
- (xiv) Pleased that the Council in its reply to Recommendation 470 is considering a WEU contribution to the CFE verification system, emphasising "the exploitation of European capabilities and the pooling of member states' assets",

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th December 1989 during the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (11th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Steiner on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1204).

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strongly insist on a change in the alliance's priorities as defined by the NATO ministers for foreign affairs in Reykjavik in June 1987, i.e. in particular:

- (a) a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons;
- (b) a worldwide ban on chemical weapons;
- (c) the establishment of a stable global conventional balance through the elimination of inequalities and reductions in troop levels and arms;
- (d) significant, verifiable reductions in United States and Soviet shorter-range land-based nuclear forces;

and to act in this manner whenever possible;

2. Take up the proposal made by the French Prime Minister on 7th September 1989 and prepare a WEU programme for purposeful verification and disarmament co-operation;

3. Take appropriate initiatives to exert pressure for results to be achieved quickly in the CFE negotiations so as to allow the immediate resumption of the SNF negotiations;

4. Work out here and now the prior conditions necessary in the conceptual field for SNF negotiations to be resumed without delay after the implementation of the first CFE agreement;

5. In the framework of the CFE negotiations, take steps to obtain a verified halt in the production of new generations of conventional weapons;

6. In view of the favourable progress in the CFE negotiations, endeavour to halt the development and stationing of new nuclear weapons in Europe;

7. Seek at least a verified ban on chemical weapons in Europe if the agreement proposed by President Bush at the United Nations General Assembly on 25th September 1989 on the conclusion of an international treaty banning chemical weapons is not concluded by 1990.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹to Recommendation 476

The Council continues to subscribe to the alliance's priorities as defined in the comprehensive concept of 30th May 1989.

A change in these priorities in relation to the negotiations on conventional forces, as proposed by the Assembly in point 1 (c), would not be without problems, for it would amount to changing the approach adopted in Vienna by all the participating countries. The Soviet Union and countries of Central and Eastern Europe have subscribed to the priority of eliminating inequalities, as set out in the western proposals. With the exception of the level of American and Soviet stationed forces, it is essentially armaments which will be subject to a ceiling following asymmetric reductions.

Except in the case of aircraft, the positions have come considerably closer.

Any change in approach with a view to making greater reductions or taking into account troops as such would call into question the prospect of a rapid conclusion now taking shape. Since this conclusion is highly desirable – as confirmed by the Assembly in point 3 of the same recommendation – the Council is of the opinion that no basic change to the western approach in the negotiations is required and that the line taken in the initial western proposal of 6th March 1989 should still be followed, i.e. that the allies are prepared to envisage additional reductions and limitations together with the restructuring of armed forces “in the longer term, and in the light of the implementation of the proposed measures”. It is with this prospect in mind that the member states and their other western partners envisage pursuing negotiations as soon as a CFE-1 agreement is concluded.

2. Co-operation in the verification of a CFE agreement is being examined in depth by the Council's Working Groups. Firm proposals will be submitted to Ministers at their meeting on 23rd April.

3. All participants in the CFE negotiations were in agreement in noting, in the declaration adopted in the margins of the open skies meeting in Ottawa on 13th February, that the main elements of an agreement were now on the table. At this stage, the need is to give, through constant effort in Vienna, practical expression to these elements of agreement so that a conclusion may be reached in the course of the year.

4. The WEU countries concerned are taking an active part, within the various alliance groups (HLG, NPG), in the process of reflection on the rôle and structure of theatre nuclear forces. This reflection will help to define the alliance's objectives in the matter of SNF negotiations with the Soviet Union.

5. The CFE agreement that the 23 participants hope to conclude this year is conceived in terms of quantitative limitations. It appears unlikely that, in this phase, the qualitative elements might be made subject to a control régime. The concept of freezing the production of new generations of weapons raises more particularly a problem of their definition and distinction from the inevitable, legitimate modernisation of military capabilities. These should be maintained at their present level, even if they are adapted to the lowest possible parity level compatible with the security of WEU member states.

6. The question of the deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe will be considered within the Atlantic Alliance in due course, having regard to the terms of the comprehensive concept approved at the alliance summit meeting on 30th May 1989.

7. On the subject of chemical weapons, the agreement now being negotiated at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament is for a complete and verifiable worldwide ban. Most WEU member states are directly participating in these negotiations and all of them subscribe to the objective of a worldwide ban. The Council is of the opinion that a ban limited to Europe would not be in the interest of Europeans. In the meanwhile, the United States and the Soviet Union, the main holders of chemical weapons, have already agreed to a drastic reduction in their arsenals. It is therefore planned to repatriate all stocks of chemical weapons stored on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. This development is an important step towards an agreement on a total ban, which all WEU countries consider should be concluded as soon as possible.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 11th April 1990 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 17th April 1990.

RECOMMENDATION 477 ¹*on the future of the Co-ordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom)* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that the technology gap between the western alliance and the Soviet bloc in sophisticated weaponry has narrowed in recent years;
- (ii) Confirming the continued need to protect advanced western defence technology through Cocom until arms control and reduction, confidence-building and enhanced security over a reasonable period of time justify that need being reviewed;
- (iii) Concerned at past violations of Cocom rules which have led to a serious transfer of strategic technology to proscribed countries, thus enhancing Soviet offensive capability in vital areas at the expense of western security;
- (iv) Concerned at variations in methods of enforcing export controls between Cocom member states;
- (v) Noting the concern of WEU member states at United States extra-territorial claims which effectively discourage exports of non-sensitive technology;
- (vi) Acknowledging the complaints of western high-technology companies that Cocom rules prevent them from taking advantage of valuable trading opportunities, including joint ventures in the Soviet bloc;
- (vii) Welcoming the improvements in Cocom review procedures in recent years, which have reduced the list of sensitive items, but fearing that they may still not be keeping up with the pace of progress in technology;
- (viii) Aware of President Gorbachev's appeal to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 6th July 1989 to rescind the Cocom rules;
- (ix) Noting requests to grant exceptions to Cocom rules for Hungary and Poland and the Soviet request for closer co-operation with the West on the development of new technologies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call for

1. A fundamental reassessment of the current state of Soviet technology;
2. A complete review of the Cocom lists in the light of this reassessment, with a view to encouraging maximum opportunities for trade and for worldwide co-operation in preventing the supply of munitions and of industrial goods with military applications to terrorist groups;
3. Common export and re-export controls and common enforcement policies in the Cocom member countries;
4. Negotiations with proscribed countries for the introduction of on-site verification procedures to accompany all future sales of western strategic technology where appropriate in return for the further liberalisation of the Cocom list;
5. The forthcoming conference on economic co-operation in Europe, to be held in Bonn from 19th March to 11th April 1990, to be used for a discussion of high-technology trade between East and West and the rôle of Cocom in that framework;
6. The establishment of a committee of experts within the CSCE framework which should make recommendations for the sharing of high technology between East and West.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th December 1989 during the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (12th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1207).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 477

The Council shares the Assembly's concerns on the subject of controls over exports of defence technologies; in particular those concerning the need to achieve a proper balance between two conflicting approaches: one designed to protect sensitive defence technologies; the other designed to promote trade in order to take advantage of the markets opening up in Eastern Europe, and to contribute towards the modernisation of the economies on which the success of the political reforms being introduced in the countries of Eastern Europe will to a great extent depend.

The Council is also aware of the need to adjust Cocom's export policy to the changing political situation in these countries.

The Council has taken note of the Assembly's recommendations on this subject.

At present, however, this question is not being discussed by the WEU Council.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 11th April 1990 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 17th April 1990.

RECOMMENDATION 478 ¹*on Western European security: defence implications of the
People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the inalienable right of the Chinese Government and people to conduct their own internal affairs but nevertheless considerably shocked and saddened by the events in Beijing and other major cities in May and June 1989, as well as by subsequent violations of human rights and pointing out that all member states of the United Nations, by their membership of that organisation, have solemnly committed themselves before the international community to respect in the conduct of their internal affairs the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- (ii) Noting the rôle played by China in maintaining a world balance and contributing to peaceful international relations;
- (iii) Considering that, insofar as the interests of China and of Western Europe converge in many areas, they should therefore continue to be developed independently of ideological and institutional differences, provided human rights are respected;
- (iv) Considering that the essential aim of the Chinese Government is still the country's economic and social development;
- (v) Welcoming the development of the Chinese economy and of exchanges of all kinds between China and Western Europe, while regretting the absence of a parallel improvement in the political situation;
- (vi) Welcoming the convergence between diplomatic action by Western European countries and by China to seek a solution to ensure Cambodian independence;
- (vii) Noting that events in China have caused concern among the residents of Hong Kong and Macau about their future, and noting also that the Chinese Government has undertaken to guarantee their rights and safety;
- (viii) Noting that for many years the Chinese have occupied Tibet and denied the Tibetan people their human rights,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Request the Chinese Government to accede to the two Human Rights Covenants of the United Nations, i.e. the International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
2. Ensure that member countries continue firmly to express their disapproval of the measures of repression and restriction of freedom taken by China in 1989, possibly resuming regular consultations with the Government of the People's Republic of China on matters relating to the maintenance of world peace;
3. Invite member governments, in time, given the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, to proceed to develop political, technological, economic, commercial and cultural relations with the People's Republic of China;
4. Take the necessary initiatives to seek a convergence of views between member countries and the People's Republic of China on arms control and disarmament, particularly by ensuring that the negotiations on arms limitations in Europe do not lead to an increase in forces and arms deployed in Asia;
5. Pursue among member governments the possibility of concerting a policy designed to lay the foundations for lasting peace in Eastern Asia in order to maintain the independence of Cambodia in accordance with the objectives fixed at the time of the Paris conference in August 1989.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th December 1989 during the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (12th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Cox on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1203).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 478

1. The questions raised by the Assembly in Recommendation 478 are essentially a matter for European political co-operation.
2. The Council is of the opinion that, as regards arms control and disarmament, it would not be appropriate to take initiatives vis-à-vis China which were outside the framework of the general policy towards this country which has been agreed by the Twelve, with more particular regard to the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, the non-circumvention measures envisaged for the CFE agreement should provide complete assurance that the agreed measures do not lead to an increase in the forces and arms deployed in Asia. It was, moreover, with this aim in mind that the western participants demanded that the reductions provided for by the agreement should take the form of destruction.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th April 1990 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 9th April 1990.

RECOMMENDATION 479 ¹*on the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe* ²

The Assembly,

I

- (i) Welcoming the fact that the developments which started with the perestroika movement in the USSR and continued in many Central and Eastern European countries in 1989 at last make it possible to consider establishing a new, peaceful order throughout Europe;
- (ii) Considering, nevertheless, that there is still much uncertainty about the future and stability of those countries;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the CFE negotiations and gratified that the countries concerned are considering starting further negotiations, shortly after a first agreement is signed, to reduce even further the level of forces and armaments in Europe;
- (iv) Welcoming also the convening of a conference of heads of state or of government in 1990 to give new scope to the CSCE process;
- (v) Noting the broad convergence between proposals by Eastern and Western European countries to give Europe as a whole economic, juridical and cultural structures designed to organise a new European order;
- (vi) Anxious, however, not to precipitate the premature disbandment of organisations which have so far ensured peace in Europe since this would make it more difficult to establish this new peaceful order and considering that the bases of European security should be maintained for as long an interim period as necessary;

II

- (i) Welcoming the progress made towards reuniting the German people in a single political system, which is one of the main aims that the WEU member countries set themselves in 1954;
- (ii) Considering that the attainment of this aim implies a negotiated agreement between the two German states and noting that it calls for an understanding on the status of unified Germany between the two states and the four responsible powers;
- (iii) Considering that the countries of Europe as a whole are concerned by the formation of a new German state at the heart of Europe;
- (iv) Considering that the permanency of the present frontiers of Germany must be confirmed by a prior undertaking by the two German states, together with one by the other European countries, for the creation of a German state not to jeopardise what has been gained in European integration nor to be an obstacle to the establishment of a new peaceful order in Europe;
- (v) Noting that many provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty apply, for fifty years at least, to the Federal Republic of Germany and that they cannot be infringed without a revision of the treaty;
- (vi) Recalling that the Council has decided to proceed with such a revision as soon as the accession of Portugal and Spain becomes effective;
- (vii) Considering that the geographical situation and strength of a unified German state make it undesirable to grant it neutral status;
- (viii) Noting also that the integration of the entire German territory in NATO seems unacceptable to many Central and Eastern European countries;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd March 1990 during the extraordinary session (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1216).

(ix) Considering, however, that it is essential for the new German state to be integrated in a European collective security system with which the United States and Canada remain associated and constituting in itself the nucleus of an all-European security system;

III

(i) Noting that in a period of instability it is hardly desirable to add to the degree and variety of uncertainty and hence the maintenance of the alliances is a factor of peace and order in Europe as long as a new security order has not been organised throughout Europe;

(ii) Considering that the reduction of armed forces stationed in Europe makes it necessary to conduct an immediate review of the deployment of NATO forces;

(iii) Considering that the forces of the WEU countries will have a larger part to play in this new deployment than heretofore;

(iv) Considering that all the western countries have to limit their military expenditure;

(v) Considering, therefore, that closer co-operation between WEU member countries for their joint security is becoming essential;

(vi) Considering that, for this reason, the European members of the alliance will have to exercise greater political responsibilities, particularly in regard to arms control, organising the collective security of Europe as a whole and defence against any threat from outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I

1. Draw without delay the first conclusions from the study it is conducting into the consequences of a CFE agreement for Europe's security and inform the Assembly accordingly;
2. Extend this study subsequently to cover all the consequences of the changes in Eastern Europe;
3. Prepare carefully a joint position for the WEU countries in regard to matters within its purview that are included in the agenda of the CSCE;

II

1. Inform the Assembly whether the commitments entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany under the modified Brussels Treaty are also valid for a unified German state;
2. Before any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, analyse the consequences of a devolution of the Federal Republic of Germany's commitments to a unified German state for the application of the treaty and the platform adopted in The Hague, paying particular attention to:
 - (a) co-operation between WEU and NATO, provided for in Article IV of the treaty;
 - (b) implementation of military assistance in the conditions laid down in Article V and paragraph III.4 of the platform of The Hague, specifying on which frontiers member countries are now obliged to contribute to the defence of Germany;
 - (c) application to any state that succeeds the German Democratic Republic of Article VII according to which the high contracting parties will participate in no coalition directed against any of them;
 - (d) implementation of Article VIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, Protocols Nos. II, III and IV and, in particular, Annex I to Protocol No. III on determining the level of forces, renunciation of the production of certain armaments and control of the application of the relevant undertakings;
 - (e) respect for Article XII fixing the period after which each member country shall have the right to cease to be a party to the treaty;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of this analysis;

4. Ensure that the states participating in the conference that will define the status of Germany are duly and fully informed of these results so that they may take account of the guarantees offered by the modified Brussels Treaty for the security of both Germany and its neighbouring countries and for the establishment of a new peaceful and secure order in Europe;

III

1. Explore forthwith the possibilities offered by WEU as a medium for assessing possible threats to member countries and for research into the prospects of an all-European security area for which it might eventually be an appropriate framework, in particular:

- (a) for defining a sufficiency threshold in defence matters;
- (b) for analysing the concept of shared security;
- (c) for developing means of arbitration, confidence-building measures and disarmament;

2. Use WEU as a lever for a new European security order in which it might:

- (a) guarantee the intangibility of its members' frontiers, including those resulting from the unification of the two German states;
- (b) ensure respect for the commitments entered into by its members in the context of agreements limiting forces or armaments or the non-production of certain weapons;

3. Assess the level of forces that WEU countries should deploy for Europe's security and agree on a fair sharing of the efforts required;

4. Use the modified Brussels Treaty as the juridical basis for the presence of forces of member states on the territory of other member states insofar as their presence would help to strengthen a peaceful order in Europe;

5. Convene regular meetings of chiefs-of-staff of member countries to examine European armaments requirements, thus giving political impetus to the standardisation and joint production of such armaments;

6. Draw up a programme for the joint organisation of verification measures required for the application of the CFE agreements;

7. For this purpose, pursue further its study of the possibility of setting up a European observation satellite agency;


8. Have the WEU Institute for Security Studies organise a permanent exchange of information with the Eastern European countries on military deployment in Europe and the application of the CFE agreements;

9. Keep the public regularly informed of work carried out by its specialised groups to allow European public opinion to become aware of co-operation in the framework of WEU.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

to Recommendation 479

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

IMPRIMERIE  ALENÇONNAISE
Rue Édouard-Belin : 3^e trimestre 1990
N^o d'ordre : 14676

PRINTED IN FRANCE

