



**Assembly of Western European Union**

# **PROCEEDINGS**

**FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION**

**THIRD PART**

**June 1995**

**VI**

**Minutes  
Official Report of Debates**

**WEU**

**PARIS**

782.4W





**Assembly of Western European Union**

# **PROCEEDINGS**

**FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION**

**THIRD PART**

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**VI**

**Minutes  
Official Report of Debates**

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The proceedings of the third part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume V: Assembly documents.

Volume VI: Orders of the days and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.



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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
KELCHTERMANS Lambert	CVP
KEMPINAIRE André	VLD
Van der MAELEN Dirk	SP
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
SARENS Freddy	CVP
SEEUWS Willy	SP

#### Substitutes

MM. De DECKER Armand	PRL
GHEQUIÈRE Ferdinand	CVP
LAVERGE Jacques	PVV
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
THISSEN René	PSC
WEYTS Johan	CVP
WINTGENS Pierre	PSC

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOUCHERON Jean-Michel	Socialist
COLOMBIER Georges	UDF
COUVEINHES René	RPR
DUMONT Jean	Ind. Rep.
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GEOFFROY Aloys	UDF
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JACQUAT Denis	UDF
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KASPEREIT Gabriel	RPR
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
SCHREINER Bernard	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

#### Substitutes

MM. BONREPAUX Augustin	Socialist
BRANGER Jean-Guy	UDF
BRIANE Jean	UDF
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DANIEL Christian	RPR
DECAGNY Jean-Claude	UDF
DENIAU Xavier	RPR
Mrs. DURRIEU Josette	Socialist
MM. EHRMANN Charles	UDF
HUNAULT Michel	RPR
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LE JEUNE Edouard	UCDP
de LIPKOWSKI Jean	RPR
MASSON Jean-Louis	RPR
MIGNON Jean-Claude	RPR
PRORIOL Jean	UDF
ROGER Jean	RDE
VINÇON Serge	RPR

### GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM. ANTRETTTER Robert	SPD
BEHRENDT Wolfgang	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
ERLER Gernot	SPD
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
Mr. HAACK Karl-Herman	SPD

MM. IRMER Ulrich	FDP
JUNGHANNS Ulrich	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
MARTEN Günter	CDU/CSU
MICHELIS Meinolf	CDU/CSU
POPPE Gerd	BÜ90/GR
PROBST Albert	CDU/CSU
SCHLOTEN Dieter	SPD
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
Mrs. TERBORG Margitta	SPD
Mr. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

#### Substitutes

Mr. ANDRES Gerd	SPD
Mrs. BEER Angelika	BÜ90/GR
MM. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. HOFFMANN Jelena	SPD
MM. HORN Erwin	SPD
HORNUNG Siegfried	CDU/CSU
KELLER Peter	CDU/CSU
KOSCHYK Hartmut	CDU/CSU
KOSSENDEY Thomas	CDU/CSU
KRIEDNER Arnulf	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUCYGA Christine	SPD
MM. LUMMER Heinrich	CDU/CSU
MAASS Erich	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHLUCKEBIER Günter	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
SIEBERT Bernd	CDU/CSU

### GREECE

#### Representatives

MM. KAPSIS Ionnis	PASOK
KASTANIDIS Charalambos	PASOK
LIAPIS Michael	ND
MAGGINAS Vassilios	ND
Mrs. PAPANDREOU Vasso	PASOK
MM. PAVLIDIS Aristotelis	ND
VRETTOS Konstantinos	PASOK

#### Substitutes

MM. ANOMERITIS Georgios	PASOK
CONSTANTINIDIS Paschalis	ND
KORAHAS Vassilios	ND
KORAKAS Efstratios	PC
KOTSONIS Theodoros	PASOK
Mrs. MACHAIRA Maria	Pol. Spring
Mr. SOFOULIS Konstantinos	PASOK

### ITALY

#### Representatives

MM. ARATA Paolo	Forza Italia
BENVENUTI Roberto	PDS
BIANCHI Vincenzo	Forza Italia
BRUGGER Siegfried	Pact for Italy
CIONI Graziano	Progr. Alliance
DIONISI Angelo	Rif.-Com.-Progr.
FASSINO Piero	Progr. Alliance
LA LOGGIA Enrico	Forza Italia
LA RUSSA Vincenzo	Chr. Dem. Centre
LATRONICO Fedè	Northern League
MATTINA Vincenzo	Progr. Alliance
MITOLO Pietro	AN-MSI
PARISI Francesco	Italian Popular Party
PETRUCCIOLI Claudio	Progr. Alliance
POZZO Cesare	AN-MSI
SELVA Gustavo	AN-MSI
SERRA Enrico	Northern League
SPERONI	Northern League



**Substitutes**

MM.	CARCARINO Antonio	Rif-Com.-Progr.
	COVIELLO Romualdo	Italian Popular Party
	FRONZUTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem. Centre
Mrs.	GAJOTTI de BIASE Paola	Progr. Alliance
MM.	GHIGO Enzo	Forza Italia
	GUIDI Galileo	Progr. Alliance
	LAURICELLA Angelo	Progr. Alliance
	LORENZI Luciano	Northern League
	MAZZONE Antonio	AN-MSI
Mrs.	MELANDRI Giovanna	Progr. Alliance
Mrs.	PRESTIGIACOMO Stefania	Forza Italia
Mr.	RAGNO Salvatore	AN-MSI
Mrs.	RIVELLI Nicola	AN-MSI
MM.	RODEGHIERO Flavio	Northern League
	SCAGLIOSO Cosimo	Progr. Alliance
Mrs.	SCOPELLITI Francesca	Forza Italia
MM.	SOLDANI Mario	Pact for Italy
	TABLADINI Francesco	Northern League

**LUXEMBOURG****Representatives**

Mrs.	BRASSEUR Anne	Dem.
Mrs.	ERR Lydie	Soc. Workers
Mrs.	LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle	Soc. Chr.

**Substitutes**

MM.	KOLLWELTER René	Soc. Workers
	RIPPINGER Jean-Paul	Dem.
	THEIS Alphonse	Soc. Chr.

**NETHERLANDS****Representatives**

Mrs.	BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
Mr.	DEES Dick	VVD
Mrs.	GELDERBLUM-LANKHOUT Hanneke	D66
MM.	van der LINDEN René	CDA
	VERBEEK Jan Willem	VVD
	WOLTJER Eisso	Labour
	ZIJLSTRA Rinse	CDA

**Substitutes**

MM.	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	VVD
	van den BOS Bob	D66
	EVERSDIJK Huib	CDA
	LEERS Gerd	CDA
Mrs.	van NIEUWENHOVEN Jeltje	Labour
Mrs.	SOUTENDIJK van APPELDOORN Marian	CDA
Mrs.	VERSPAGET Josephine	Labour

**PORTUGAL****Representatives**

MM.	AMARAL Fernando	Soc. Dem.
	BRITO Raul Fernando	Socialist
	CANDAL Carlos	Socialist
	FERNANDES MARQUES Joaquim	Soc. Dem.
	MACHETE Rui Manuel	Soc. Dem.
	PINTO Carlos	Soc. Dem.
	ROSETA Pedro	Soc. Dem.

**Substitutes**

Mrs.	AGUIAR Maria Manuela	Soc. Dem.
MM.	ALEGRE Manuel	Socialist
	CURTO Abilio Aleixo	Socialist
	MARTINS Alberto de Sousa	Socialist
	POÇAS SANTOS João Alvaro	Soc. Dem.

MM.	REIS LEITE José Guilherme	Soc. Dem.
	RODRIGUES Miguel Urbano	PCP

**SPAIN****Representatives**

MM.	ÁLVAREZ Francisco	People's Party
	CUCÓ Alfons	Socialist
Mrs.	GUIRADO Ana	Socialist
MM.	LÓPEZ HENARES José Luis	People's Party
	LÓPEZ VALDIVIELSO Santiago	People's Party
	MARTÍNEZ Miguel Angel	Socialist
	PUCHE RODRIGUEZ Gabino	People's Party
	de PUIG Lluís Maria	Socialist
	RECODER Lluís	C.i.U.
	SAINZ GARCIA José Luis	People's Party
	SOLE TURA Jordi	Socialist
	VÁZQUEZ Narcis	United Left

**Substitutes**

MM.	BOLINAGA Imanol	Basque Nat.
	CABALLERO Abel	Socialist
Mrs.	FERNANDEZ RAMIRO Inmaculada	Socialist
Mrs.	FERNANDEZ SANZ Matilde	Socialist
MM.	GRAU I BULDU Pere	C.i.U.
	GUÍA MARQUES Carlos	Socialist
	HERRERO MEREDIZ José	Socialist
	OLARTE Lorenzo	C. Canarien
	PALACIOS Marcelo	Socialist
	RAMIREZ PERI Carlos	People's Party
	ROBLES FRAGA José	People's Party
	ROBLES OROZCO Gonzalo	People's Party

**UNITED KINGDOM****Representatives**

MM.	ATKINSON David	Conservative
	BANKS Tony	Labour
	COX Thomas	Labour
Sir	Anthony DURANT	Conservative
Dame	Peggy FENNER	Conservative
Lord	FINSBERG	Conservative
Mr.	HARDY Peter	Labour
Sir	John HUNT	Conservative
Sir	Russell JOHNSTON	SLD
Lord	KIRKHILL	Labour
Mr.	LITHERLAND Robert	Labour
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	RATHBONE Tim	Conservative
	REDMOND Martin	Labour
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Sir	Keith SPEED	Conservative
Sir	Donald THOMPSON	Conservative
Mr.	THOMPSON John	Labour

**Substitutes**

Mr.	ALEXANDER Richard	Conservative
Sir	Andrew BOWDEN	Conservative
MM.	CUMMINGS John	Labour
	CUNLIFFE Lawrence	Labour
	DAVIS Terry	Labour
Earl	of DUNDEE	Conservative
Mr.	DUNNACHIE Jimmy	Labour
Sir	Peter FRY	Conservative
Mr.	GODMAN Norman	Labour
Baroness	GOULD of POTTERNEWTON	Labour
Baroness	HOOVER	Conservative
MM.	HOWELL Ralph	Conservative
	HUGHES Roy	Labour
Lord	MACKIE of BENSHEIE	SLD
Mr.	MARSHALL Jim	Labour
Sir	Irvine PATNICK	Conservative
MM.	TOWNEND John	Conservative
	WRAY James	Labour



**I**

**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

# THIRTEENTH SITTING

Monday, 19th June 1995

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the third part of the fortieth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft order of business for the third part of the fortieth ordinary session (Doc. 1452).
6. Address by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (*Presentation of the second part of the fortieth annual report of the Council*, Doc. 1453); Address by Mr. Durão Barroso, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
8. Address by Mr. Figueiredo Lopes, Minister of Defence of Portugal.
9. Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany.
10. Replies by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU, to questions put by members of the Assembly.
11. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1458 and amendments).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### **1. Resumption of the session**

The President declared the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.

### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

### **3. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

### **4. Examination of credentials**

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letters from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes had been ratified by that Assembly, with the exception of those listed in Notice No. 13.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of the above.

### **5. Observers**

The President welcomed the associate members and the permanent delegations of parliamentary observers.

He welcomed the observers from Croatia, the Russian Federation, Malta, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia and Ukraine.

### **6. Tribute to a former President of the Assembly**

The President notified the Assembly of the death of Lord Mulley, a former President of the Assembly.

The Assembly paid tribute to his memory by observing silence.

### **7. Address by the President of the Assembly**

Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, addressed the Assembly.

### **8. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

Two candidates were proposed for two posts of Vice-President, namely, Mr. Antretter and Mrs. Papandreou.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mr. Antretter and Mrs. Papandreou were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

*Speaker:* Mrs. Papandreou.

### **9. Changes in the membership of committees**

In accordance with Rule 41 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

#### *Standing Committee*

##### *Italy*

- Mr. Speroni as a titular member and Mr. Dionisi as an alternate member.

#### *Defence Committee*

##### *Italy*

- Mr. Speroni as a titular member and Mr. Lorenzi as an alternate member.

#### *Technological and Aerospace Committee*

##### *France*

- Mrs. Durrieu as a titular member;

##### *Italy*

- Mr. Serra as an alternate member.

#### *Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

##### *France*

- Mr. Roger as a titular member.

#### *Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*

##### *Italy*

- Mr. Tabladini as a titular member and Mr. Speroni as an alternate member.

### **10. Adoption of the draft order of business of the third part of the fortieth ordinary session**

(Doc. 1452)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the third part of the session.

*Speakers:* MM. Speroni, Hardy, Martínez, Cox, Speroni and Lord Finsberg.

The draft order of business for the third part of the session was adopted.

### **11. Address by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU**

Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

### **12. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council**

*(Presentation of the second part of the fortieth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1453)*

#### **Address by Mr. Durão Barroso, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Chairman-in Office of the Council**

Mr. Durão Barroso, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

### **13. Address by Mr. Figueiredo Lopes, Minister of Defence of Portugal**

Mr. Figueiredo Lopes, Minister of Defence of Portugal, addressed the Assembly.

M. Durão Barroso answered questions put by MM. Rodrigues, Roseta and Davis.

### **14. Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany**

Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Kinkel answered questions put by Mr. Antretter, Mrs. Blunck, Mrs. Papandreou, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. López Henares, Valleix and De Decker.

### **15. Replies by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU, to questions put by members of the Assembly**

Mr. Cutileiro answered questions put by MM. Baumel, Rathbone, de Lipkowski, Rodrigues and Cox.

### **16. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1458 and amendments)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mrs. Aguiar, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Benvenuti, Antretter, Pastusiak (Poland, associate partner), Mrs. Furubjelke (Sweden, observer) and Mr. Latronico.

The debate was adjourned.

**17. Resumption of French nuclear tests  
in the Pacific**

*(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure,  
Doc. 1473)*

The President announced that Mr. de Puig, on behalf of the Socialist Group, had tabled a motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 45 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided to examine this request for urgent procedure at the start of the next sitting.

**18. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 20th June 1995, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	Mr. Liapis	MM. <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal)
MM. <i>De Decker</i> (Biefnot)	Mrs. <i>Machaira</i> (Magginas)	Fernandes Marques
Seeuws	Mrs. Papandreou	Machete
	MM. Pavlidis	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Pinto)
	Vrettos	Mr. Roseta
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Spain</b>
MM. Baumel	MM. Arata	Mr. Cucó
<i>Briane</i> (Birraux)	Benvenuti	Mrs. Guirado
Dumont	Bianchi	MM. López Henares
<i>Ehrmann</i> (Jeambrun)	<i>Guidi</i> (Cioni)	Martínez
Jung	Fassino	Puche Rodriguez
<i>de Lipkowski</i> (Schreiner)	Latronico	de Puig
Valleix	<i>Coviello</i> (Parisi)	<i>Herrero Merediz</i>
	<i>Lauricella</i> (Petruccioli)	(Sole Tura)
<b>Germany</b>	Selva	
MM. Antretter	<i>Lorenzi</i> (Serra)	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Behrendt	Speroni	MM. Atkinson
Mrs. Blunck		<i>Davis</i> (Banks)
MM. <i>Schluckebier</i> (Erler)	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Cox
<i>Siebert</i> (Mrs. Fischer)	Mrs. Brasseur	<i>Townend</i> (Dame Peggy
Haack	Mrs. Lentz Cornette	Fenner)
<i>Hornung</i> (Junghanns)		Lord Finsberg
Lenzer	<b>Netherlands</b>	Mr. Hardy
Marten	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman	Sir John Hunt
Probst	MM. Dees	Sir Russell Johnston
Schloten	Van der Linden	Lady <i>Gould of Potternewton</i>
<i>Maass</i> (von Schmude)	Woltjer	(Lord Kirkhill)
Mrs. <i>Lucyga</i> (Mrs. Terborg)		MM. <i>Cummings</i> (Litherland)
Mr. Zierer	<b>Portugal</b>	<i>Alexander</i> (Lord Newall)
	MM. <i>Reis Leite</i> (Amaral)	Rathbone
	Brito	<i>Marshall</i> (Redmond)
<b>Greece</b>		Sir Dudley Smith
MM. <i>Korakas</i> (Kapsis)		Sir Keith Speed
Kastanidis		Mr. Thompson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Couveinhes	MM. Michels
MM. Kelchtermans	Galley	Poppe
Kempinaire	Geoffroy	
Van der Maelen	Gouteyron	<b>Italy</b>
Pécriaux	Jacquat	MM. Brugger
Sarens	Kaspereit	Dionisi
	Masseret	La Loggia
	Seitlinger	La Russa
<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	Mattina
MM. Alloncle	MM. Bühler	Mitolo
Boucheron	Irmer	Pozzo
Colombier		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**Luxembourg**

Mrs. Err

**Netherlands**Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout  
Mr. Verbeek

Mr. Zijlstra

**Spain**MM. Alvarez  
López Valdivielso  
RecoderMM. Sainz Garcia  
Vazquez**United Kingdom**Sir Anthony Durant  
Sir Donald Thompson



# FOURTEENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 20th June 1995

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific (*Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure*, Docs. 1472 and 1473).
2. Address by Professor Dr. Ciller, Prime Minister of Turkey.
3. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1458 and amendments).
4. Changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to accommodating associate members and associate partners of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision*, Doc. 1461 and amendments).
5. Address by Mr. Millon, Minister of Defence of France.

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

*Speaker:* Mr. Rathbone (point of order).

*The sitting was suspended at 10.05 a.m. and resumed at 10.10 a.m.*

### **3. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific**

*(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Docs. 1472 and 1473)*

In accordance with Rule 45 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for an order on the resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific.

*Speakers:* MM. de Puig, Valleix, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (*Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee*) and Mr. Cox (point of order).

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 42 votes to 27; 6 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote.

It was agreed to refer the motion for an order to the Defence Committee, and to debate the text on Thursday, 22nd June.

*The sitting was suspended at 10.35 a.m. and resumed at 10.50 a.m.*

### **4. Address by Professor Dr. Ciller, Prime Minister of Turkey**

Professor Dr. Ciller, Prime Minister of Turkey, addressed the Assembly.

Professor Dr. Ciller answered questions put by Mr. Valleix, Mrs. Papandreou, MM. Pavlidis, Schloten, Cox, Rodrigues, Speroni and Korakas.

*The sitting was suspended at 12.25 p.m. and resumed at 12.30 p.m.*

### **5. Points of order**

*Speakers:* The President and Lord Finsberg.

### **6. Address by Mr. Millon, Minister of Defence of France**

Mr. Millon, Minister of Defence of France, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Millon answered questions put by MM. Davis, Naess (*Norway, associate member*), Rathbone, Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Cox and Mrs. Guirado.

**7. Changes in the membership of committees**

In accordance with Rule 41 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the Spanish Delegation:

*Committee on Budgetary Affairs  
and Administration*

- Mr. Herrero Merediz as an alternate member in place of Mr. Román.

*Committee for Parliamentary  
and Public Relations*

- Mr. Herrero Merediz as an alternate member in place of Mr. Román.

**8. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day, at 3 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.*

## APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the attendance register <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Liapis <i>Korakas</i> (Magginas)	MM. <i>Curto</i> (Fernandes Marques) Pinto Roseta
MM. <i>De Decker</i> (Biefnot) Kempinaire <i>Ghesquière</i> (Sarens)	Mrs. Papandreou MM. Pavlidis Vrettos	
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Spain</b>
MM. <i>Briane</i> (Birraux) Colombier Dumont <i>Vinçon</i> (Galley) Geoffroy <i>de Lipkowski</i> (Gouteyron) <i>Proriol</i> (Jacquat) <i>Ehrmann</i> (Jeambrun) Kaspereit Schreiner Seitlinger Valleix	MM. <i>Arata</i> Benvenuti Bianchi <i>Soldani</i> (Brugger) Fassino Latronico <i>Guidi</i> (Mattina) <i>Coviello</i> (Parisi) <i>Lauricella</i> (Petruccioli) Serra Speroni	MM. Álvarez Cucó Mrs. Guirado MM. López Henares Martínez Puche Rodriguez de Puig <i>Bolinaga</i> (Recoder) <i>Robles Orozco</i> (Sainz-Garcia) <i>Herrero Merediz</i> (Sole Tura) Vazquez
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Antretter Behrendt Mrs. Blunck MM. Bühler <i>Schluckebier</i> (Erler) <i>Maass</i> (Mrs. Fischer) Haack <i>Horn</i> (Irmer) <i>Hornung</i> (Junghanns) Lenzer Marten Probst Schloten <i>Siebert</i> (von Schmude) Mrs. <i>Lucyga</i> (Mrs. Terborg) Mr. Zierer	Mrs. Brasseur Mrs. Err Mr. <i>Theis</i> (Mrs. Lentz-Cornette)	MM. <i>Alexander</i> (Atkinson) <i>Davis</i> (Banks) Cox <i>Townend</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir John Hunt Sir Russell Johnston Lady <i>Gould of Potternewton</i> (Lord Kirkhill) Mr. <i>Marshall</i> (Litherland) Lord Newall MM. Rathbone <i>Cummings</i> (Redmond) Sir Dudley Smith Sir Keith Speed Sir <i>Irvine Patnick</i> (Sir Donald Thompson) Mr. Thompson
<b>Greece</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	
Mrs. <i>Machaira</i> (Kapsis) Mr. Kastanidis	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. Dees <i>van den Bos</i> (Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout) <i>van der Linden</i> Woltjer <i>Eversdijk</i> (Zijlstra)	
	<b>Portugal</b>	
	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Amaral) MM. Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>France</b>	MM. Jung Masseret
MM. Kelchtermans Van der Maelen Pécriaux Seeuws	MM. Alloncle Baumel Boucheron Couveinhes	<b>Germany</b> MM. Michels Poppe

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**Italy**

MM. Cioni  
Dionisi  
La Loggia  
La Russa  
Mitolo

MM. Pozzo  
Selva

**Netherlands**

Mr. Verbeek

**Portugal**

Mr. Machete

**Spain**

Mr. López Valdivielso

**United Kingdom**

Sir Anthony Durant

## APPENDIX II

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the request for urgent procedure tabled by the Socialist Group concerning the resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific and the motion for an order tabled by Mr. de Puig <sup>1</sup>.

Ayes .....	42
Noes .....	27
Abstentions .....	0

*Ayes*

Mr. Antretter	MM. Haack	Mrs. Papandreou
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman	Hardy	MM. Pavlidis
MM. <i>Davis</i> (Banks)	<i>Horn</i> (Irmer)	<i>Lauricella</i> (Petruccioli)
Behrendt	Sir Russell Johnston	Puche Rodriguez
Benvenuti	Mrs. <i>Machaira</i> (Kapsis)	de Puig
Mrs. Blunck	Mr. Kastanidis	<i>Cummings</i> (Redmond)
MM. <i>Soldani</i> (Brugger)	Lady <i>Gould of Potternewton</i>	Schloten
Cox	(Lord Kirkhill)	Serra
Cucó	MM. <i>Theis</i> (Mrs. Lentz-	Speroni
Dees	Cornette)	Mrs. <i>Lucyga</i> (Mrs. Terborg)
<i>Schluckebier</i> (Erler)	Liapis	MM. Thompson
Mrs. Err	<i>Marshall</i> (Litherland)	Vázquez
MM. <i>van den Bos</i> (Gelder-	<i>Korakas</i> (Magginas)	Vrettos
blom-Lankhout)	Martínez	Woltjer
Mrs. Guirado	<i>Guidi</i> (Mattina)	Zierer

*Noes*

MM. <i>Alexander</i> (Atkinson)	Sir John Hunt	MM. Probst
Bianchi	MM. <i>Ehrmann</i> (Jeambrun)	Rathbone
Mrs. Brasseur	<i>Hornung</i> (Junghanns)	<i>Robles Orozco</i> (Sainz-
MM. Bühler	Kempinaire	Garcia)
Dumont	Latronico	<i>Ghesquière</i> (Sarens)
<i>Townend</i> (Dame Peggy	Lenzer	<i>Siebert</i> (von Schmude)
Fenner)	van der Linden	Sir Keith Speed
Lord Finsberg	López Henares	Sir <i>Irvine Patnick</i> (Sir
MM. <i>Vinçon</i> (Galley)	Marten	Donald Thompson)
Geoffroy	Lord Newall	Mr. Valleix

*Abstentions*

0

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## FIFTEENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 20th June 1995

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1458 and amendments).
2. Changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to accommodating associate members and associate partners of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision*, Doc. 1461 and amendments).
3. Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1456).
4. Address by Mr. Gligorov, President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
5. Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1456).
6. Towards a European space-based observation system (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1454 and amendments).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Antretter, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1458 and amendments)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speakers:* MM. Cox (point of order), Coviello, Valleix, Bianchi, Philipov (*Bulgaria, associate partner*).

*Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

The debate was adjourned.

#### **4. Address by Mr. Gligorov, President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**

Mr. Gligorov, President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Gligorov answered questions put by Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Fassino, Schloten, Kastanidis and Pavlidis.

#### **5. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1458 and amendments)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speakers:* MM. Roseta, Godal (*Norway, associate member*) and Pahor (*Slovenia, observer*).

The debate was closed.

Mrs. Aguiar, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Puig, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 14) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

14. In paragraph I (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "Taking into account the persistence" and insert "Wishing for settlement".

*Speakers:* MM. Benvenuti and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 15) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

15. In paragraph I (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the main goal of WEU's contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental conference must be" and insert "among the main goals of WEU's contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental conference must be progressive integration of the two organisations and".

*Speaker:* Mr. Benvenuti.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

1. Leave out paragraph I (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Stressing nevertheless that there are several ways of advancing European integration, progressive integration of WEU into the European Union being one that must be considered;"

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 16) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

16. In paragraph I (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "of which" to the end of the paragraph and insert: "but that all should lead to strengthening the process of progressive convergence and integration of the various European organisations;"

*Speakers:* Mr. Benvenuti and Lord Finsberg.

An oral amendment to the amendment was moved by Lord Finsberg, to leave out "progressive" and "and integration".

*Speaker:* Sir Russell Johnston.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

Thus amended, the amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 17) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti.

17. At the end of paragraph I (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add "but nevertheless welcoming the signature by the Russian Federation of agreements with NATO in the framework of the partnership for peace;"

*Speakers:* MM. Benvenuti and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

2. Leave out paragraph I (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Believing that it would be feasible to use the 1996 intergovernmental conference to assess the functioning of WEU as an instrument of European defence and the European pillar of NATO;"

*Speakers:* MM. Coviello and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 18) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

18. Leave out paragraph I (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Judging that the 1996 intergovernmental conference might be used to test the functioning of WEU as an instrument of European defence, while retaining its function as the European pillar of NATO;"

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 28) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

28. Leave out paragraph I (x) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Convinced that, given its specific character and its complexity, the implementation of a common defence policy involves a lengthy process of integration and that it seems useful, for a transitional period, to maintain an intergovernmental decision-making process;"

The amendment was moved in an amended form, inserting "at least" between "for" and "a transitional period".

*Speakers:* MM. Latronico, de Puig and Mrs. Aguiar.

Thus amended, the amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 29) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

29. In paragraph I (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Convinced in this connection" insert ", until such time as the desired integration can be achieved,"

The amendment was moved in an amended form, leaving out "the desired integration can be achieved" and inserting "the integration takes place".

*Speakers:* MM. Latronico, de Puig and Mrs. Aguiar.

Thus amended, the amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

3. In paragraph I (*xi*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "exclusively".

*Speakers:* MM. Coviello and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

4. After paragraph I (*xi*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Wishing, in the context of any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, that it may be possible to arrive at a different wording of Article IX allowing parliamentarians of member countries to appoint parliamentarians to the Assembly of WEU who are also members of their respective specialist bodies on Community affairs;"

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 30) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

30. In paragraph I (*xii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "impossible" and insert "difficult".

The amendment was moved in an amended form, leaving out "difficult" and inserting "until now impossible".

*Speakers:* Mr. Latronico and Mrs. Aguiar.

Thus amended, the amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

5. In paragraph I (*xiii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "cannot be some form of merger between the two institutions, but".

*Speakers:* MM. Coviello and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 19) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

19. In paragraph I (*xiii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "cannot be some form of merger between the two institutions but,".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 31) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

31. In paragraph I (*xiii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "so that democratic supervision in Europe may be exercised by bodies that are truly representative and efficient".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

6. Leave out paragraph I (*xiv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Wishing gradual evolution towards an identical membership of WEU and the European Union to lead to progressive integration of the two organisations, and for WEU's rôle as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance at the same time to be preserved as the essential foundation of our collective defence and transatlantic ties;"

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 32) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

32. In paragraph I (*xiv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "fully operational" and insert "viable".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 20) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

20. In paragraph I (*xiv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "desirable or feasible" and insert "feasible, but that this does not, however, prevent a start being made on a process of progressive convergence and integration of WEU and the European Union, for the time being acknowledging their respective powers".

The amendment was moved in an amended form, leaving out "progressive convergence and integration" and inserting "convergence".

*Speakers:* MM. Benvenuti and de Puig.

Thus amended, the amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 33) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

33. In paragraph I (*xv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "have not proved successful" to the end of the paragraph and insert "have proved difficult and careful note should be taken of this fact in relation to defence matters;".

*Speakers:* MM. Latronico and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

7. In paragraph I (*xv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "hence the more reason for avoiding them in defence matters" and insert "hence should be the more determinedly pursued".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 21) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:



21. In paragraph I (*xvi*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "instead of disturbing them with the prospect of their possibly being put in a minority position".

*Speakers:* MM. Benvenuti and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

8. Leave out paragraph I (*xviii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 34) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

34. Leave out paragraph I (*xviii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

*Speakers:* Mr. Latronico, Lord Finsberg, Mr. de Puig and Mrs. Aguiar.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

9. In paragraph I (*xix*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "however".

*Speakers:* MM. Coviello and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 22) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

22. In paragraph I (*xix*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "however".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 35) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

35. In paragraph I (*xx*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "– as the United Kingdom Government memorandum of 1st March 1995 proposes –".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 36) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

36. In paragraph I (*xxi*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "unreservedly the United Kingdom" and insert "the".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 37) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

37. In paragraph II (*ii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "preparing to conclude" and insert "taking note of".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 10) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

10. Leave out paragraph I.3 of the draft recommendation proper.

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 46) was tabled by Mrs. Aguiar:

46. In paragraph 1.3 of the draft recommendation proper, after "30th March 1995" insert "the communication of the Italian Government to parliament, dated 24th May 1995,".

*Speakers:* Mrs. Aguiar and Mr. de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 38) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

38. Leave out paragraph I.3 of the draft recommendation proper.

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 23) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

23. In paragraph I.4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "exclusively by the signatory countries of that treaty and its protocols" and insert: "taking account of WEU positions".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 39) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

39. Leave out paragraph I.7 of the draft recommendation proper.

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 40) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

40. In paragraph I.8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "European level".

*Speaker:* Mr. Latronico.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 11) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

11. After paragraph I.8 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Study, with a view to the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, a different wording of Article IX allowing parliaments of member countries to appoint parliamentarians to the Assembly of WEU other than those appointed to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;"

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 24) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

24. Leave out paragraph I.9 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ Not compromise, as matters now stand, the close co-operation between WEU and NATO and the European Union but maintain the procedure for reciprocal exchange of information on their respective activities; ”

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 43) was tabled by Mrs. Aguiar:

43. Leave out paragraph I.9 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ Ensure that no measure leading to the convergence of WEU and the European Union shall compromise the close co-operation between WEU and NATO; ”

An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

12. In paragraph I.9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out: “ by opening hastily WEU’s doors to organs of the European Union ”.

*Speakers:* Mrs. Aguiar, MM. Coviello, de Puig and Coviello.

Amendment 12 was withdrawn.

Amendment 43 was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 25) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

25. In paragraph I.10 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ is the sole ” and insert: “ was the first ”.

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 41) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

41. In paragraph I.11 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ in particular ” leave out “ the right to convene the Council of Ministers and ”.

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 26) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

26. At the end of paragraph I.11 of the draft recommendation proper, add: “ with a view to progressive functional integration of the CFSP and WEU secretariats ”.

*Speakers:* Mr. Benvenuti, Mrs. Aguiar and Mr. de Puig.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 45) was tabled by Mrs. Aguiar:

45. At the end of paragraph I.11 of the draft recommendation proper, add: “ with a view to progressive co-operation towards convergence between the CFSP and WEU secretariats ”.

*Speaker:* Mrs. Aguiar.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 42) was tabled by Mr. Latronico:

42. In paragraph II.1 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ Slovenia ” insert “ , when the time is ripe, ”.

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 13) was tabled by MM. Coviello and Fronzuti:

13. Leave out paragraph II.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ Invite the European members of NATO that are not members of the European Union and the European Union to re-examine carefully the obstacles preventing the accession of their respective countries to the European Union, confirming that full membership of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance remains an essential condition of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty; ”

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 44) was tabled by Mrs. Aguiar:

44. Leave out paragraph II.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ Take the measures necessary to ensure that the 1996 intergovernmental conference leads to a deepening of the articles of the Maastricht Treaty so as to enable the member countries of WEU, the European Union and the European countries members of NATO gradually, over time, to become one and the same; ”

An amendment (No. 27) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti:

27. Leave out paragraph II.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ Undertake all appropriate diplomatic measures so that the member countries of WEU, the European Union and the European countries, members of NATO, gradually, over time, become one and the same; ”

*Speakers:* Mrs. Aguiar, MM. de Puig and Benvenuti.

Amendment 27 was withdrawn.

Amendment 44 was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 575) <sup>1</sup>.

*Speaker* (point of order): Sir Russell Johnston.

**6. Changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to accommodating associate members and associate partners of WEU**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1461 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers*: MM. Speroni, Liapis, Vacaru (*Romania, associate partner*), Skarpheoinsson (*Iceland, associate member*), Paasio (*Finland, observer*).

The debate was closed.

Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur, and Mr. Thompson, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft decision.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Speroni:

1. In the draft decision proper, leave out paragraph I.

*Speakers*: Mr. Speroni, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Martínez (point of order).

The Rapporteur having withdrawn paragraph I of the draft decision, the amendment was withdrawn.

Amendments 2, 3, 4 and 5 were tabled by Mr. Speroni:

2. In the draft decision proper, leave out paragraph II.1.

3. In the draft decision proper, after paragraph II.1, add:

“ In Rule 17, leave out paragraph (d). ”

4. In the draft decision proper, after paragraph II.1, add:

“ In Rule 17, leave out paragraph (e) and insert:

(e) Rules 31 on motions, 32 on amendments, 33 on the right to speak, 34 on procedural motions, 35 on the organisation of debates, 37 on majorities and 43 on procedure in com-

1. See page 31.

mittees – with the exception of provisions concerning the election of the bureaux of committees and voting rights in committee – and 44 on reports of committees shall apply to representatives of associate member states, unless the Presidential Committee shall decide otherwise. ”

5. In the draft decision proper, after paragraph II.1 add:

“ In Rule 17, leave out paragraph (f) and insert:

Rule 36 on methods of voting shall not apply to the representatives of associate member states. The Presidential Committee may decide not to apply this paragraph to discussion of texts concerning operations, activities or functions of WEU in which associate members participate on the same basis as full members under the terms of the document on associate membership of WEU, signed in Rome on 20th November 1992. ”

The amendments were withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft decision.

The amended draft decision was agreed to unanimously. (This decision will be published as No. 12) <sup>2</sup>.

**7. Towards a European space-based observation system**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1454 and amendments)*

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Lenzer, co-Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers*: MM. Alexander and Lorenzi.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Valleix, co-Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Two amendments (Nos. 1 and 2) were tabled by Mr. López Henares:

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Considering the interest of making public opinion in WEU member countries aware of the

2. See page 35.

existence of this centre and of its contribution to building a European defence identity, ”

2. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Organise one, or, preferably, several visits to present the activities of the Torrejón Satellite Centre to representatives of the European and international press. ”

*Speaker:* Mr. López Henares.

The amendments were agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 576)<sup>3</sup>.

***8. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 21st June 1995, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.*

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3. See page 36.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Bianchi	MM. López Henares
Mr. <i>Ghesquière</i> (Seeuws)	Fassino	Martínez
	Latronico	de Puig
<b>France</b>	<i>Guidi</i> (Mattina)	<i>Herrero Merediz</i>
MM. Alloncle	<i>Coviello</i> (Parisi)	(Sole Tura)
Dumont	<i>Lorenzi</i> (Serra)	Vázquez
Valleix	Speroni	
		<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	MM. <i>Alexander</i> (Atkinson)
MM. Antretter	Mr. <i>Theis</i> (Mrs. Lentz-	<i>Davis</i> (Banks)
<i>Schluckebier</i> (Erler)	Cornette)	Cox
<i>Maass</i> (Mrs. Fischer)		Lord <i>Dundee</i> (Sir Anthony
Haack	<b>Netherlands</b>	Durant)
Marten	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman	Mr. <i>Townend</i> (Dame Peggy
Probst	Mr. Woltjer	Fenner)
Schloten		Lord Finsberg
Mrs. <i>Lucyga</i> (Mrs. Terborg)		Mr. Hardy
		Sir John Hunt
<b>Greece</b>		Sir Russell Johnston
Mrs. <i>Machaira</i> (Kapsis)	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Amaral)	Lady <i>Gould of Potternewton</i>
MM. Kastanidis	MM. Brijto	(Lord Kirkhill)
Liapis	<i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal)	Mr. <i>Marshall</i> (Litherland)
Magginas	Fernandes Marques	Lord Newall
Mrs. Papandreou	Pinto	MM. Rathbone
Mr. Pavlidis	Roseta	<i>Cummings</i> (Redmond)
		Sir Dudley Smith
		Sir Keith Speed
<b>Italy</b>	<b>Spain</b>	Sir <i>Irvine Patnick</i> (Sir
MM. <i>Rodegheiro</i> (Arata)	Mr. Cucó	Donald Thompson)
Benvenuti	Mrs. Guirado	Mr. Thompson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Jacquat	MM. von Schmude
MM. Biefnot	Jeambrun	Zierer
Kelchtermans	Jung	
Kempinaire	Kaspereit	<b>Greece</b>
Van der Maelen	Masseret	Mr. Vrettos
Pécriaux	Schreiner	
Sarens	Seitlinger	<b>Italy</b>
		MM. Brugger
<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	Cioni
MM. Baumel	Mr. Behrendt	Dionisi
Birraux	Mrs. Blunck	La Loggia
Boucheron	MM. Bühler	La Russa
Colombier	Irmer	Mitolo
Couveinhes	Junghanns	Petruccioli
Galley	Lenzer	Pozzo
Geoffroy	Michels	Selva
Gouteyron	Poppe	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**Luxembourg**

Mrs. Brasseur  
Mrs. Err

**Netherlands**

Mr. Dees  
Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout

MM. van der Linden  
Verbeek  
Zijlstra

**Portugal**

Mr. Machete

**Spain**

MM. Álvarez  
López Valdivielso  
Puche Rodriguez  
Recoder  
Sainz Garcia

## RECOMMENDATION 575

*on the future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II—  
reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

## I

- (i) Emphasising the crucial importance of WEU's contribution which must give the 1996 intergovernmental conference clear and coherent guidelines on the place of security and defence questions in European and transatlantic relations;
- (ii) Convinced therefore that the Council's contribution cannot be limited to a re-examination of the declaration on Western European Union annexed to the Maastricht Treaty but must include an in-depth assessment of its experience regarding the application of Article J.4, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Maastricht Treaty and its repercussions on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and conclusions to be drawn from this;
- (iii) Wishing for settlement of major differences over the political goals of an enlarged Europe and the place it should occupy in international relations;
- (iv) Consequently believing that among the main goals of WEU's contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental conference must be progressive integration of the two organisations and to strengthen and improve the European structures involved in the area of defence policy in order to enable them to guarantee security more effectively, more democratically and with greater transparency;
- (v) Affirming furthermore that the Assembly remains attached to the effective implementation of the commitment entered into in the modified Brussels Treaty by all WEU member countries which agree to "promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe";
- (vi) Stressing nevertheless that there are several ways of advancing European integration, but that all should lead to strengthening the process of convergence of the various European organisations;
- (vii) Noting in particular that the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference is being pursued in a context of growing divergence between the West and Russia on a large number of questions that concern European security, but nevertheless welcoming the signature by the Russian Federation of agreements with NATO in the framework of the partnership for peace;
- (viii) Believing moreover that the deterioration of the conflict in the Balkans and the problems raised by maintaining peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean region will continue to preoccupy American and European allies;
- (ix) Believing that it would be feasible to use the 1996 intergovernmental conference to assess the functioning of WEU as an instrument of European defence and the European pillar of NATO;
- (x) Convinced that given its specific character and its complexity, the implementation of a common defence policy involves a lengthy process of integration and that it seems useful, for at least a transitional period, to maintain an intergovernmental decision-making process;
- (xi) Convinced in this connection, until such time as the integration takes place, that parliamentary supervision of the European defence policy, which is based on decisions taken by the member states, must be guaranteed by a parliamentary Assembly composed of delegations of the national parliaments of the member states;
- (xii) Recalling that closer co-operation between the Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament, as encouraged by the Council, has proved until now impossible because of the European Parliament's refusal to base such co-operation on the principle of reciprocity, respect of the responsibilities of both and recognition of the WEU Assembly as an integral part of the development of the European Union;
- (xiii) Believing that the aim of possible co-operation between the Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament should lead to a precise definition and recognition of their respective powers and responsibilities which, far from being in conflict with one another, are complementary, so that democratic supervision in Europe may be exercised by bodies that are truly representative and efficient;
- (xiv) Believing furthermore that for as long as the member countries of WEU and the European Union and the European members of the Atlantic Alliance are not identical and WEU is not fully operational, no merger of any kind between WEU and the European Union will be feasible but that this does not, how-

ever, prevent a start being made on a process of convergence of WEU and the European Union, for the time being acknowledging their respective powers ”;

(xv) Believing also that all attempts so far in the framework of the Maastricht Treaty to amalgamate the responsibilities of community and intergovernmental institutions in the area of the CFSP have proved difficult and careful note should be taken of this fact in relation to defence matters;

(xvi) Convinced, on the other hand, that everything must be done to facilitate consensus between member states in defence matters;

(xvii) Wishing therefore that the drafting of the white paper on European security will serve mainly to bring closer together the points of view and interests of the member countries and achieve fuller European integration in these areas;

(xviii) Regretting the “ wait and see ” attitude prevailing generally in WEU arising from the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty stipulating that any initiative in foreign policy and security matters with defence implications must emanate from the European Union, an institution which includes five non-member countries of WEU and which has less experience than WEU in this area;

(xix) Recalling that the variable configuration of the Council of WEU allows the points of view of all associate members, associate partners and observers to be taken into account, without the latter being able to block any consensus that may have been reached by the ten full members;

(xx) Wishing therefore – as the United Kingdom Government memorandum of 1st March 1995 proposes “ that future European defence arrangements should be based on ... WEU ” and for the latter thus to become capable of providing the necessary political impetus to the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;

(xxi) Furthermore supporting unreservedly the United Kingdom proposal that the heads of state and of government meet regularly in the framework of WEU to establish general guidelines concerning collective military action envisaged by Europeans;

(xxii) Believing that the Chairmanship-in-Office should not be the sole authority for giving impetus to the work of the Council and recalling in this connection its various recommendations for strengthening the functions and power of the Secretary-General of WEU and the participation of the Assembly;

## II

(i) Welcoming the conclusion of a stability pact in Europe with the aim of facilitating the progressive rapprochement between the Central European countries on the one hand and the European Union and WEU on the other;

(ii) Welcoming also the fact that the European Union is preparing to conclude Europe agreements with the three Baltic countries and with Slovenia;

(iii) Wishing WEU to strengthen the working relationship it has established with the associate partner countries as a whole and to create the same kind of relationship with Slovenia;

(iv) Expressing astonishment at the terms of paragraph 6 of the Council’s reply to Recommendation 565 which states that “ The question of granting Slovenia associate partner status will be kept under review as Slovenia’s relationship with the European Union develops ”, whereas the Council fixed no similar condition for granting this status to the nine countries mentioned previously;

## III

(i) Noting with interest the content of the two parts of the fortieth annual report of the Council to the Assembly, especially the detailed information it gives on the activities of the various working groups of the Council;

(ii) Regretting nonetheless the lack of political direction of this report which is the essential basis for the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly;

(iii) Noting furthermore that the annual report provides no information on the Council’s experience regarding the implementation of a working relationship between the subsidiary organs of the Council on the one hand and, on the other hand, the CFSP institutions and the European Commission or on procedures adopted in this connection;

(iv) Wishing, in the face of the new risks threatening European security and the problems raised by the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference, for a considerable improvement in co-operation, co-ordination and reciprocal exchange of information between the Council and the Assembly;



- (v) Deeply regretting therefore that the Council has decided to organise an important conference in Washington in June in the context of its transatlantic publicity relations activities, with a wide participation of WEU ministers, at exactly the same time as the Assembly is holding the third part of its fortieth ordinary session and expressing surprise that the Council of Ministers, at its meeting in Lisbon, did not take this opportunity to express its regret regarding this clash of events;
- (vi) Finding it intolerable that certain documents produced by the WEU ministerial organs are not transmitted to the Assembly, whereas they are published by the services of the European Parliament;
- (vii) Astonished that the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) is not included in the organogram of the ministerial organs as this was transmitted to the Assembly in 1994, and that the annual report makes no reference to the tasks and activities of the Verification Group referred to in that organogram,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

## I

1. Between now and the end of 1995, make:
  - (a) an assessment of its experience regarding the implementation of the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty concerning WEU and its repercussions on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty,
  - (b) an assessment of its experience concerning relations between WEU and NATO;
2. Prepare from these assessments a concept for developing its relations with the European Union and NATO, paying particular attention to its future relations with the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance which have now become associate members of WEU and transmit such assessment to the Assembly for early comment;
3. Take into account the memorandum on the United Kingdom Government's approach to the treatment of European defence issues at the 1996 intergovernmental conference, dated 1st March 1995, as well as that of the Netherlands Government on the CFSP, dated 30th March 1995, the communication of the Italian Government to parliament, dated 24th May 1995, or proposals of other member governments to develop a common position of WEU countries in the framework of the preparation of this conference;
4. Arrange to be represented on the group of experts established by the European Council and ensure that all questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty are dealt with exclusively by the signatory countries of that treaty and its protocols;
5. Ensure that the 1996 intergovernmental conference results in WEU being recognised as an organisation authorised to act on behalf of the European Union in security and defence matters and that member countries of the European Union which are not members of WEU cannot block consensus achieved within WEU in this area;
6. On the basis of the white paper on European security, develop a medium-term concept of the criteria, procedures and even the stages that should be adopted for placing the common defence policy on a new legal and institutional basis subsequently enabling defence questions to be set in the framework of the European Union;
7. Agree that such an undertaking should be achieved within approximately ten years and use this period to examine how far the modified Brussels Treaty should be revised and adapted to the new situation with a view to presenting proposals to another intergovernmental conference which might be convened at the end of the period mentioned above;
8. Include in this medium-term concept provisions providing for more representative parliamentary supervision at European level, in particular by transforming the existing WEU Assembly into a second chamber, alongside the European Parliament thus confirming the rôle of delegations from national parliaments, with responsibilities that are different from and complementary to those of the European Parliament;
9. Ensure that no measure leading to the convergence of WEU and the European Union shall compromise the close co-operation between WEU and NATO;
10. Manifest more clearly its will to meet its obligations under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty and leave no doubt, in its relations with other European and Atlantic authorities, about the fact that the WEU Assembly is the sole Assembly with responsibility in security and defence matters in accordance with an international treaty;

11. Take the necessary steps to give the Secretary-General of WEU the right of initiative, in particular the right to convene the Council of Ministers and the right to participate in meetings of the Council of the European Union and the European Council, when the latter examine questions connected with the CFSP with a view to progressive co-operation towards convergence between the CFSP and WEU Secretariats;
12. Hold more frequent meetings, particularly before the meetings of ministers responsible for the CFSP, in order to give them the necessary impetus;
13. Take up the United Kingdom proposal to organise WEU summit meetings on the occasion of meetings of the European Council;
14. Accelerate efforts to make WEU fully operational;

## II

1. Offer Slovenia the same status as that enjoyed by WEU associate partner countries;
2. Strengthen relations both with the associate partner countries as a whole and with Slovenia by taking the measures that are required to enable them to participate fully in developing a European security system;
3. Take the measures necessary to ensure that the 1996 intergovernmental conference leads to a deepening of the articles of the Maastricht Treaty so as to enable the member countries of WEU, the European Union and the European countries members of NATO gradually, over time, to become one and the same;

## III

1. Ensure that henceforth the annual reports of the Council contain more political substance and also set out the nature of the difficulties that the Council is having in achieving its objectives, with a view to stimulating fruitful dialogue with the Assembly;
2. Fulfil the undertaking it gave in its reply to Recommendation 565 to ensure that it keeps the Assembly informed as a matter of priority through its annual report on the areas and substance of its co-operation with the European Union and NATO;
3. Explain upon which provision of the modified Brussels Treaty is based the decision of the Mediterranean Group, as set out in the second part of the fortieth annual report, to "continue to make clear to its Maghreb and Egyptian interlocutors that in the dialogue between these countries and WEU, WEU was competent to address only politico-military and defence questions, the other issues coming within the purview of institutions such as the CSCE (now OSCE) and the European Union";
4. Inform the Assembly of the content of the document prepared by the European Union authorities on the implications of the situation in the Mediterranean for European security, to which the Permanent Council of WEU contributed, as it emerges from the reply of the Council to Recommendation 565;
5. Ensure in future that the organs mentioned in the organogram of the ministerial organs transmitted to the Assembly correspond to those on which the Council informs the Assembly in its annual report;
6. Inform the Assembly of the tasks and activities of:
  - (a) the Verification Group;
  - (b) the military delegates group;
7. Take the appropriate measures to improve co-ordination of its activities with those of the Assembly and transmit to the Assembly its documents which are unclassified.

**DECISION 12*****on changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to accommodating associate members and associate partners of WEU***

The Assembly,

- (i) Having taken note of the arrangements agreed between the WEU Council and associate members of this organisation on the one hand and between the Council and associate partners on the other;
- (ii) Anxious to receive in appropriate conditions representatives of associate member and associate partners of WEU and to take account of the wishes expressed in this respect by the Council on 9th May 1994;
- (iii) Recalling that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty empowers the Assembly, composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the (Parliamentary) Assembly of the Council of Europe to examine the annual report on the WEU Council's activities;
- (iv) Considering that the representatives of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance must have a more favourable status than that of countries which are not members of that alliance,

DECIDES

To amend its Rules of Procedure as follows:

1. In Rule 17, add a new paragraph (*h*) to read as follows:  
“ Rules 50 and 51 on budgetary questions shall not apply to representatives of associate member countries. ”  
Former paragraph (*h*) becomes paragraph (*i*).
2. In Rule 41, paragraph 2, delete “ fourth ”. After “ the United Kingdom (5) ” add a new sentence to read as follows: “ The fourth permanent committee shall be composed of 28 members divided as follows: Belgium (2), France (4), Germany (4), Greece (2), Italy (4), Luxembourg (1), the Netherlands (2), Portugal (2), Spain (3), United Kingdom (4). ”
3. In Rule 18 on observers, number the existing paragraph (*a*) and add two new paragraphs as follows:  
“ (*b*) Representatives of parliaments of WEU observer and associate partner countries to the Assembly shall have permanent observer status.  
(*c*) Permanent observers of associate partner countries shall sit in committees without voting rights. The Presidential Committee shall fix the number of their representatives in sessions and in committees and the way they shall participate in the activities of the Assembly. ”

**RECOMMENDATION 576*****on a European space-based observation system***

The Assembly,

- (i) Taking account of the fundamental importance of space in a global strategic concept of security in Europe;
- (ii) Stressing that space-based observation means are an essential and indispensable part of the European security and defence policy;
- (iii) Believing therefore that Europe must equip itself as soon as possible with a space-based observation system that is both autonomous and interdependent;
- (iv) Believing that Europe has the necessary technological and industrial capability to establish such a system;
- (v) Considering that the military use of space-based means is a global operation, the various parts of which cannot remain separated;
- (vi) Renewing its congratulations to the industrial consortium for its feasibility studies of the main system and the study management team for assessing these studies;
- (vii) Congratulating also the space research institutes of the various member countries of WEU on their outstanding contribution to these studies;
- (viii) Taking account, nevertheless, of the difficulties that will inevitably be encountered in creating this system, connected mainly with the cost, implementation and use;
- (ix) Taking into consideration the various options available in deciding to create this system, which may be summarised as follows:
  - (a) an independent WEU system;
  - (b) a system based on work already carried out (Helios I);
  - (c) the continuation, pure and simple, of the present work of the Satellite Centre in image acquisition and interpretation;
- (x) Considering that the first of these solutions is technologically achievable but very costly, and that the third in no way meets Europe's need to have independent space-based information means, which are essential for its security and defence and, in consequence, for the exercise of its sovereignty;
- (xi) Considering that the second solution seems to be the most pragmatic and easiest to implement, since it will draw on efforts already made and experience gained from co-operation which has proved viable and fruitful (Helios I) and is, additionally, the least costly;
- (xii) Welcoming the prospects for a significant participation in the Helios II programme by Germany, Italy and Spain, alongside France;
- (xiii) Conscious nevertheless of the many difficulties linked to participation in the financing and industrial production of the system and its use which must be resolved in order to develop, produce and exploit the system;
- (xiv) Recognising, moreover, that discussions should be started with the United States and possibly other countries on the possibility of co-operation in early warning and antimissile defence systems;
- (xv) Taking account of the overriding need for the Torrejón Satellite Centre to be given permanent status;
- (xvi) Considering the interest of making public opinion in WEU member countries aware of the existence of this centre and of its contribution to building a European defence identity,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Immediately take the measures necessary to make the Torrejón Satellite Centre permanent and make provision for the budgetary means necessary for making use of the most satisfactory satellite images;

2. Seek agreement with the countries deciding to participate in the Helios and Osiris programmes for facilitating implementation of these programmes and associating other member countries, integrating them progressively into WEU's activities and, to this end, requesting participant countries to open up these programmes to their WEU partners;
3. Task the Space Group with studying the integration of these programmes into WEU's activities and invite the intelligence section of the Planning Cell, as soon as it is set up, to give its opinion on problems connected with the use of the system;
4. Conduct the necessary studies on a European early warning and antimissile defence system and foster co-operation with the United States and, as necessary, with other partners pursuing aims similar to those of WEU in these areas;
5. Organise one, or, preferably, several visits to present the activities of the Torrejón Satellite Centre to representatives of the European and international press.

## SIXTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 21st June 1995

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1456*).
2. European armed forces (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1468 and amendments*).
3. New trends in North American countries' foreign policy and their implications for transatlantic co-operation in security and defence matters, with particular reference to the United States (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1457*).
4. The Eastern Mediterranean (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1465 and amendments*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. Communication from the Turkish Delegation**

The President informed the Assembly of a communication from the Turkish Delegation regarding the report by Mr. Cucó on the Eastern Mediterranean submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee.

#### **4. Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1456)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers: MM. Rodrigues, Weyts, Paasio (Finland, observer) and Tusek (Austria, observer).*

The debate was closed.

Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Puig, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 577) <sup>1</sup>.

#### **5. European armed forces**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1468 and amendments)*

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. Baumel, Chairman of the committee, on behalf of Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speaker: Mr. Hardy.*

The debate was closed.

Mr. Baumel, Chairman, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Guidi:

1. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

<sup>1</sup> See page 42.

3. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add "except where a member state is unable to provide its proper contribution to international security".

*Speakers:* MM. Guidi, Hardy, López Henares and Baumel.

Amendment 1 was negatived.

Amendment 3 was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. López Henares:

2. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Study the inclusion, and overall framework, of the various partial or regional initiatives such as EUROFOR, the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force, the ARRC, and other similar initiatives in a general European defence system, in order to provide coherence and a global vision of the European defence identity;"

*Speakers:* MM. López Henares and Baumel.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 578) <sup>2</sup>.

**6. *New trends in North American countries' foreign policy and their implications for transatlantic co-operation in security and defence matters, with particular reference to the United States***

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1457)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* Mr. Pastusiak (*Poland, associate partner*) and Lord Mackie of Benshie.

The debate was closed.

Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Puig, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 579) <sup>3</sup>.

**7. *The Eastern Mediterranean***

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1465 and amendments)*

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. Cucó, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Liapis, Cox, Kastanidis, Jeszenszky (*Hungary, associate partner*) and Korakas.

The debate was closed.

**8. *Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day, at 3 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.*

2. See page 44.

3. See page 46.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Spain</b>
MM. Kempinaire <i>Weyts</i> (Pécriaux) <i>Ghesquière</i> (Sarens)	MM. <i>Rodegheiro</i> (Arata) Benvenuti Bianchi Fassino Latronico <i>Guidi</i> (Mattina) Mitolo <i>Lauricella</i> (Petruccioli) <i>Lorenzi</i> (Serra) Speroni	MM. <i>Bolinaga</i> (Alvarez) Cucó <i>Herrero Merediz</i> (Mrs. Guirado) López Henares Martínez Puche Rodríguez de Puig Mrs. <i>Fernandes Ramiro</i> (Sole Tura)
<b>France</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Baumel Schreiner Valleix	Mrs. Brasseur Mrs. Err	MM. <i>Townend</i> (Atkinson) <i>Davis</i> (Banks) Cox Dame Peggy Fenner Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Lady <i>Hooper</i> (Sir John Hunt) Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) MM. <i>Dunnachie</i> (Lord Kirkhill) <i>Marshall</i> (Litherland) Lord Newall MM. Rathbone <i>Cummings</i> (Redmond) Sir Dudley Smith Sir <i>Irvine Patnick</i> (Sir Donald Thompson)
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	
MM. Antretter Bühler <i>Horn</i> (Erler) <i>Maass</i> (Mrs. Fischer) Junghanns Lenzer Marten Probst Schloten Mrs. <i>Lucyga</i> (Mrs. Terborg)	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman Mr. Dees Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout MM. Woltjer <i>Eversdijk</i> (Zijlstra)	
<b>Greece</b>	<b>Portugal</b>	
Mrs. <i>Machaira</i> (Kapsis) MM. Kastanidis Liapis <i>Korakas</i> (Magginas) Mrs. Papandreou Mr. Pavlidis	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Amaral) MM. Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal) Roseta	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Gouteyron Jacquat Jeambrun Jung Kaspereit Masseret Seitlinger	Mr. Zierer
MM. Biefnot Kelchtermans Van der Maelen Seeuws		<b>Greece</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	Mr. Vrettos
MM. Alloncle Birraux Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Dumont Galley Geoffroy	Mr. Behrendt Mrs. Blunck MM. Haack Irmer Michels Poppe von Schmude	<b>Italy</b>
		MM. Brugger Cioni Dionisi La Loggia La Russa Parisi Pozzo Selva

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.



**Luxembourg**

Mrs. Lentz-Cornette

**Netherlands**MM. van der Linden  
Verbeek**Portugal**MM. Fernandes Marques  
Machete  
Pinto**Spain**MM. López Valdivielso  
RecoderMM. Sainz García  
Vázquez**United Kingdom**Sir Anthony Durant  
Sir Keith Speed  
Mr. Thompson

**RECOMMENDATION 577*****on Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Disturbed by the fact that the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the United Nations is also the year in which the highest number of armed regional conflicts has been recorded throughout the world, although the United Nations is involved by means of preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and peace-making operations with a view to re-establishing peace and security in the areas concerned;
- (ii) Considering that most of today's armed conflicts causing the worst destruction and human casualties are not taking place between but within member states of the United Nations;
- (iii) Condemning Russia's military operations against the civilian population of Chechnya where basic human rights, as recognised in the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of the OSCE, continue to be violated;
- (iv) Stressing that in combating terrorist activities such as those pursued by the Kurdish PKK it is necessary to respect the appropriate proportion of means and the fundamental principles of internationally recognised human rights;
- (v) Firmly convinced that a continuous political dialogue with the religious movements, of increasing importance particularly in the Islamic world, in a spirit of tolerance and mutual understanding is still crucial in order to avoid mutual misunderstanding and growing discontent turning religious movements into political and even terrorist violence;
- (vi) Convinced that the United Nations can come to grips with the new challenges stemming from the changing nature of armed conflicts only if its member countries are prepared:
  - (a) to give the United Nations their full support as the only existing universal organisation devoted to the maintenance of international peace and security;
  - (b) to agree to substantial changes in the United Nations Charter in order to provide the organisation with the necessary means, organisational effectiveness and authority;
  - (c) to work out practical concepts for the division of labour between the United Nations and regional organisations in peace-keeping and crisis-management;
- (vii) Concerned, however, that the growing difficulties of the United Nations to carry out its steadily-increasing duties while lacking the necessary means and organisational professionalism might prompt certain leading member countries, particularly the United States, to question the usefulness of the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining peace;
- (viii) Convinced therefore that all the member countries of Western European Union, together with associate members, associate partners and observers, have an important responsibility in overcoming these dangerous trends and, in close co-operation with the United States, jointly taking the necessary steps to reform the United Nations in every possible way;
- (ix) Consequently deploring that the European Union has so far failed to agree on joint action for reforming the United Nations in questions of peace-keeping and crisis-management, nor has it asked WEU, on the basis of Article J.4, paragraph 2, of the Maastricht Treaty, to elaborate a comprehensive European contribution in this matter;
- (x) Deploring also that neither the WEU Noordwijk declaration nor the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy published by the WEU Council on 14th November 1994 contain a chapter on relations between WEU and the United Nations;
- (xi) Expressing firmly the wish that WEU's new tasks set out in the Petersberg declaration should extend beyond the planning stage in a foreseeable future;
- (xii) Welcoming in this context the Italian proposal for the creation of a WEU multinational task force for emergency humanitarian intervention;
- (xiii) Recalling the persisting dangers for international peace and security stemming from:
  - (a) international terrorism;
  - (b) problems of mass migration;

- (c) uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile technology;
- (xiv) Wishing the positive effect of the unlimited extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to be completed by the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and the further agreed reduction of the nuclear arsenals which still exist to be pursued;
- (xv) Recalling the importance of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations and in force since 1951;
- (xvi) Recalling the importance of an early ratification of the chemical weapons convention and of the 1972 biological weapons convention;
- (xvii) Anxious that increasing differences between NATO member countries and Russia in important issues regarding European security might jeopardise the effectiveness of the CFE Treaty;
- (xviii) Stressing the importance of making a clearer definition of the rôle of the OSCE as a regional organisation in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Establish, possibly in the framework of the elaboration of a white paper on European security, a comprehensive European contribution to reforming the United Nations Charter in peace-keeping and crisis-management with the aim of allowing the Security Council to authorise action in certain situations within countries if the human rights of people in the relevant country are so severely violated as to require an international response on humanitarian grounds and introduce such an initiative in the United Nations;
2. Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to strengthen the efficiency and operability of United Nations forces, increase their means of action and ensure better conduct of their humanitarian and peace-keeping missions;
3. Take steps in the United Nations to examine the possible need to strengthen the application of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations;
4. Propose a comprehensive concept on the tasks WEU should assume in regard to operations under the mandate of the United Nations and the OSCE;
5. Seek agreement with the OSCE and NATO on a division of labour between the OSCE, NATO and WEU in peace-keeping, crisis-management and crisis-prevention;
6. For this purpose, accelerate its efforts to make WEU fully operational so as to be able to carry out at least the missions envisaged in the Petersberg declaration including those of a WEU multilateral task force for emergency humanitarian interventions as proposed by Italy;
7. Inform the Assembly of the tasks of combat forces in crisis-management elaborated by the Planning Cell and the plans for setting up operational WEU structures for international observer missions;
8. Urge all member countries, associate members, associate partners and observer countries which have not yet ratified the chemical weapons convention and the 1972 biological weapons convention, to accelerate the ratification process;
9. Ask France and the United Kingdom to take an initiative among nuclear weapon states to agree on the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and to consider, together with all nuclear weapon states, further substantial reductions of nuclear arsenals, priority being given to those countries which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, and further ensure that, in the export of nuclear technology, care is taken not to allow the emergence of new nuclear weapon states;
10. Agree on a joint initiative in regard to the September 1995 review conference of the 1980 United Nations Conference on excessively dangerous conventional weapons in order to adopt rules limiting the development of certain such weapons including non-lethal and anti-personnel laser weapons;
11. Maintain a dialogue with the Maghreb countries, Egypt and other countries of the Islamic world in order to promote the widest possible co-operation with these countries;
12. Ensure that WEU is regularly represented, together with the European Union, in consultations in the ASEAN regional security forum.

**RECOMMENDATION 578*****on European armed forces***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the NATO Council's declared full support for the development of a European security and defence identity and the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance through WEU;
- (ii) Noting that, according to the NATO Council's decision, the alliance's organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this process;
- (iii) Believing, however, that in more than eighteen months since the endorsement of the CJTF concept at NATO's summit meeting in January 1994, no significant progress has been made in the implementation of this concept, even though it is almost a year ago now, on 29th June 1994, that WEU presented to NATO its report on criteria and modalities for the effective use of the CJTF;
- (iv) Noting that there is an ever more urgent need for WEU to identify clearly those assets and capabilities which WEU will need in possible future operations and to define its views on ways and means for the use of such assets and capabilities which the alliance could make available to WEU;
- (v) Recognising and calling upon the Council to demonstrate its own recognition that WEU member states will have to procure, through multinational co-operative programmes, those assets and capabilities which the alliance cannot make available to WEU;
- (vi) Emphasising that the European allies cannot afford to delay the establishment of appropriate operational capabilities and command structures for whatever European contingency operations in which NATO may choose not to act;
- (vii) Welcoming the decisions taken at the WEU ministerial meeting in Lisbon on 15th May 1995 regarding the development of WEU operational capabilities;
- (viii) Taking note of the increasing reluctance of the United States to commit ground troops to any operation on European soil which is not based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (ix) Recognising that on either side of the Atlantic there might be different perceptions of the threats to European security and the political and military means to handle them;
- (x) Welcoming the fact that, with the approval of a document identifying their common interests as well as potential risks to European security, the 27 WEU nations have taken the first steps towards joint thinking on the new European security conditions which should result in the publication of a white paper on European security;
- (xi) Welcoming the recent decision by France, Italy and Spain to establish a land force (EUROFOR) and a maritime force (EUROMARFOR) in both of which Portugal will participate and which will be declared forces answerable to WEU;
- (xii) Somewhat surprised that, whenever European multinational forces are established, NATO insists on its right to use them, while at the same time it seems increasingly reluctant to mount operations in the new type of post-cold war contingencies which are threatening Europe's security;
- (xiii) Welcoming the decision to establish the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón as a permanent WEU body;
- (xiv) In doubt whether the establishment in the near future of a WEU humanitarian intervention force would be an adequate solution for the hazardous and often hostile environments in which such a force would have to operate both on European soil and elsewhere in the world;
- (xv) Considering that the United Nations' lack of an appropriate command, control, communications and intelligence structure calls into question its ability to command humanitarian, peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations which are taking place in hazardous circumstances;
- (xvi) Expressing the wish that the WEU Permanent Council's examination of peace-keeping and conflict-prevention, combined with the initiative taken by France and the United Kingdom, will produce early and tangible results;
- (xvii) Emphasising that recent developments in the Bosnian conflict have clearly demonstrated the urgent need for exclusively European rapid reaction forces for all WEU operations mentioned in the Petersberg declaration;

(xviii) Noting that geostrategic developments and reductions in the means European states are allocating to their defence are encouraging them to opt increasingly for multinational co-operation but that such co-operation is haphazard,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Invite WEU member states to stop reducing their defence expenditure, except where a member state is unable to provide its proper contribution to international security;
2. Organise a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member countries in the first half of 1996 at the latest to examine European security and more particularly the need to co-ordinate means, policies and multinational co-operation in order to organise effective joint defence;
3. Devote its every effort to urge NATO to implement the CJTF concept by the end of 1995;
4. However this may be, by the end of 1995 at the latest, identify clearly those assets and capabilities which WEU will need in possible future operations and, in addition, as mentioned in the Lisbon declaration, define views on ways and means of using such assets and capabilities which the alliance should make available to WEU;
5. Study the inclusion, and overall framework, of the various partial or regional initiatives such as EUROFOR, the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force, the ARRC, and other similar initiatives in a general European defence system, in order to provide coherence and a global vision of the European defence identity;
6. In parallel, identify those assets and capabilities which WEU should possess in its own right and which its member states will have to procure urgently through multinational co-operative programmes or otherwise;
7. Promote forthwith the establishment of permanent exclusively European rapid reaction forces, including headquarters and political-military command structures, for all WEU operations mentioned in the Petersberg declaration;
8. Refrain from accepting, or appearing to accept, further obligations or commitments where there is a lack of capacity or a will to fulfil them.

**RECOMMENDATION 579*****on new trends in North American countries' foreign policy  
and their implications for transatlantic co-operation in security and defence  
matters, with particular reference to the United States***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact left the United States the primary superpower in the world;
- (ii) Considering that the Democratic President of the United States, President Clinton, has proclaimed his first priority in his political objectives, to be the settling of America's urgent internal problems in the field of necessary reforms in the social health, educational and budgetary system as well as in the fight against criminality and terrorism;
- (iii) Recalling also that the new United States priorities in foreign and security policy are concentrated on the creation of a new kind of Asian Pacific community, containing nuclear proliferation in countries such as North Korea, China and Russia and reducing the American anti-missile defence programme following a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty;
- (iv) Observing however that the freedom of action of the United States President has been considerably curtailed by the sweeping victory of the Republican Party in the congressional elections on 8th November 1994 which appeared to weaken the policy of a bipartisan approach;
- (v) Noting that the new Congress, which is still working out its policy direction, has started trying to impose restrictions on the American executive regarding, in particular, its foreign, security and defence policy, by drafting new legislation such as the "Peace Power Act" and the "National Security Revitalisation Act";
- (vi) Noting with satisfaction that United States foreign policy has been successful in finalising the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the support of the Canadian Parliament, revitalising Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and co-operating in the ASEAN Regional Security Forum, thus contributing to enhancing economic stability and security in the regions concerned;
- (vii) Noting uneasily, however, that the various signals emanating from the United States Government and Congress and the steps they are taking regarding relations with Europe, the future of the Atlantic Alliance and its enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries, relations with Russia and the rôle of the United Nations are not always consistent, nor does the United States consult on these questions sufficiently with its European allies and partners;
- (viii) Worried about the serious differences between the United States and most of its European allies over the ways of settling the conflict in former Yugoslavia;
- (ix) Further angered that the decisions reached at the NATO summit meeting in January 1994 to make collective assets of the alliance available for WEU operations are still not being carried into effect, because of remaining Euro-American differences over the procedure to follow;
- (x) Having a strong impression that the question of whether and how Euro-American relations should be renewed and founded on a new and enlarged contractual basis are being discussed far more by European than by American politicians;
- (xi) Deploring the incredible difficulties in establishing a regular parliamentary dialogue between the Assembly of Western European Union and the Congress of the United States;
- (xii) Reiterating the importance of making full use of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty for establishing closer links with the United States Government through WEU's co-operation with NATO,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Translate into active policy its intention voiced in its Noordwijk declaration "to continue to work together in close association with the North American allies. The security of the alliance and of Europe as a whole is indivisible. The transatlantic partnership rests on a shared foundation of values and interests. Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, independent and increasingly more united Europe will contribute to the security of North America";

2. Devote a special chapter to the future rôle of the United States in regard to European security and the question of reforming transatlantic relations in the white paper now being prepared on European security;
3. Transform the working group on Transatlantic Publicity Activities into a true political forum with which ministers of WEU member countries can establish an enhanced dialogue with United States politicians in order to strengthen their interest in and knowledge of WEU's work in the European and transatlantic framework and ensure that members of the Assembly can participate in this dialogue or in a new North American/European Parliamentary Assembly based on the WEU and North Atlantic Assemblies.

## SEVENTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 21st June 1995

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The Eastern Mediterranean (*Resumed debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1465 and amendments*).
2. The situation in former Yugoslavia (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1467 and amendments*).
3. Address by Mr. Arsenis, Minister of Defence of Greece.
4. The situation in former Yugoslavia (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1467 and amendments*).
5. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 – Opinion of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1462*).
6. Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts, Docs. 1441, 1470 and 1471*).
7. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1995 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1463*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

*The sitting was suspended at 3.07 p.m. and resumed at 3.45 p.m.*

#### **3. The Eastern Mediterranean**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1465 and amendments)*

Mr. Cucó, Rapporteur, and Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Kastanidis and Mr. Pavlidis:

2. Leave out paragraph (xii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Concerned that the continuation of the crisis existing between Greece and FYROM does not contribute positively to the development of stability in the region, while hoping the two coun-

tries will start immediate negotiations in the framework of the United Nations;”

*Speakers:* Mr. Kastanidis, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Cucó and Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Schloten:

1. Leave out paragraph (xx) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Aware that the absence of political solution in the ‘security zone’ in northern Iraq has created a security vacuum in that region which is encouraging external political movements and neighbouring countries to settle their differences;”

*Speakers:* MM. Schloten and Cucó.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 580) <sup>1</sup>.

#### **4. Address by Mr. Arsenis, Minister of Defence of Greece**

Mr. Arsenis, Minister of Defence of Greece, addressed the Assembly.

<sup>1</sup> See page 53.



*The sitting was suspended at 4.15 p.m. and resumed at 4.30 p.m.*

Mr. Arsenis resumed his address.

Mr. Arsenis answered questions put by Lord Finsberg, MM. López Henares, Hardy, Korakas and Ruzin (*Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, observer*).

### 5. Interpretation system of the Assembly

*(Motions for orders with requests for urgent procedure, Docs. 1474 and 1475)*

The President announced that Lord Finsberg and Mr. Hardy had each tabled a motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 45 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided to examine these requests for urgent procedure at the start of the next sitting.

### 6. The situation in former Yugoslavia

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1467 and amendments)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Fassino, Rapporteur.

*Mrs. Papandreou, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Rodrigues, Nasev (*Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, observer*), Hardy, Ruzin (*Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, observer*), Davis, Sir Russell Johnston, Count Eltz (*Croatia, observer*), MM. Korakas, Tusek (*Austria, observer*) and Benvenuti.

*Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Philipov (*Bulgaria, associate partner*) and Antretter.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Fassino, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Puig, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Fassino:

7. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Resolutely call upon the Bosnian Serbs to refrain from any action against the blue berets and to guarantee them freedom of movement and free access to ‘safe areas’;”

*Speakers:* MM. Fassino and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

1. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “presence and” insert “to clarify the purpose and capacity to take”.

*Speakers:* MM. Hardy and Fassino (*Rapporteur*).

An oral amendment to the amendment was moved by Mr. Fassino, at the end to add “in accordance with Resolution 836 of the Security Council”.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

Thus amended, the amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Fassino:

3. At the beginning of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “Transform the rapid reaction force into a European multinational unit” and insert “Verify with the countries which established the rapid reaction force that that force is”.

*Speakers:* MM. Fassino and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Fassino:

4. Leave out paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Ask the United States Government not to act on the proposal to participate no longer in the embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina;”

*Speakers:* MM. Fassino and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Fassino:

5. Leave out paragraph 14 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Request the governments of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to open negotiations and, in that framework, ask Greece to lift the trade embargo it has imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;”

*Speaker:* Mr. Fassino.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Benvenuti and Mr. Martínez:

8. Leave out paragraph 14 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ Request the governments of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to open negotiations on the basis of United Nations resolutions and ask Greece to lift the trade embargo it has imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; ”

*Speakers:* MM. Benvenuti, Fassino and de Puig.  
The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

2. At the end of paragraph 16 of the draft recommendation proper, add “ but notes that the member states which have been heavily involved have also borne substantial cost ”.

*Speakers:* MM. Hardy, Fassino and de Puig.  
The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. Antretter:

9. Leave out paragraph 17 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ Ask the Croatian Government not to undertake further military action against areas controlled by Serb forces since these areas, which belong to the Republic of Croatia, must be integrated peacefully and given autonomy, on the basis of the Z-4 group proposal; ”

*Speakers:* MM. Antretter and Fassino.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Fassino:

6. Leave out paragraph 21 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ Make any suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) conditional upon recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its international borders; ”

*Speaker:* Mr. Fassino.

The amendment was withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 581)<sup>2</sup>.

**7. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 – Opinion of the Council**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1462)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

2. See page 55.

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Lord Mackie of Benshie.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft budget.

The draft budget was agreed to unanimously.

**8. Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995**

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts, Docs. 1441, 1470 and 1471)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The previous question (Document 1471) was moved by Mr. Rathbone.

The previous question was agreed to and, in accordance with Rule 34 (1) (a) of the Rules of Procedure, the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was withdrawn from the agenda and the register of the Assembly.

**9. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1995**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1463)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 582)<sup>3</sup>.

**10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 22nd June 1995, at 9.30 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 7.35 p.m.*

3. See page 58.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Spain</b>
MM. <i>Weyts</i> ( <i>Pécriaux</i> ) <i>Ghesquière</i> ( <i>Sarens</i> )	MM. <i>Rodegheiro</i> ( <i>Arata</i> ) Benvenuti Bianchi Fassino Latronico Mitolo <i>Lauricella</i> ( <i>Petruccioli</i> ) <i>Lorenzi</i> ( <i>Selva</i> )	MM. Cucó López Henares Martínez de Puig <i>Herrero Merediz</i> ( <i>Sole Tura</i> )
<b>France</b>		<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Seitlinger Valleix		MM. <i>Davis</i> ( <i>Banks</i> ) <i>Dunnachie</i> ( <i>Cox</i> ) Lord <i>Dundee</i> ( <i>Sir Anthony</i> <i>Durant</i> ) Dame <i>Peggy Fenner</i> Lord <i>Finsberg</i> Mr. <i>Hardy</i> Lady <i>Hooper</i> ( <i>Sir John Hunt</i> ) Sir <i>Russell Johnston</i> MM. <i>Wray</i> ( <i>Lord Kirkhill</i> ) <i>Marshall</i> ( <i>Litherland</i> ) Lord <i>Newall</i> MM. <i>Rathbone</i> <i>Cummings</i> ( <i>Redmond</i> ) Sir <i>Dudley Smith</i> Sir <i>Irvine Patnick</i> ( <i>Sir Donald Thompson</i> )
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
MM. Antretter Junghanns Marten Schloten Mrs. <i>Lucyga</i> ( <i>Mrs. Terborg</i> )	Mrs. Err	
<b>Greece</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	
Mrs. <i>Machaira</i> ( <i>Kapsis</i> ) MM. <i>Kastanidis</i> <i>Liapis</i> <i>Magginas</i> Mrs. <i>Papandreou</i> Mr. <i>Korakas</i> ( <i>Vrettos</i> )	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> Mrs. <i>Gelderblom-Lankhout</i> Mr. <i>Woltjer</i>	
	<b>Portugal</b>	
	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> ( <i>Amaral</i> ) MM. <i>Brito</i> <i>Rodrigues</i> ( <i>Candal</i> ) <i>Roseta</i>	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Jacquat</i> <i>Jeambrun</i> <i>Jung</i> <i>Kaspereit</i> <i>Masseret</i> <i>Schreiner</i>	MM. <i>Poppe</i> <i>Probst</i> <i>von Schmude</i> <i>Zierer</i>
MM. <i>Biefnot</i> <i>Kelchtermans</i> <i>Kempinaire</i> <i>Van der Maelen</i> <i>Seeuws</i>		<b>Greece</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	Mr. <i>Pavlidis</i>
MM. <i>Alloncle</i> <i>Baumel</i> <i>Birraux</i> <i>Boucheron</i> <i>Colombier</i> <i>Couveinhes</i> <i>Dumont</i> <i>Galley</i> <i>Geoffroy</i> <i>Gouteyron</i>	Mr. <i>Behrendt</i> Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> MM. <i>Bühler</i> <i>Erler</i> Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> MM. <i>Haack</i> <i>Irmer</i> <i>Lenzer</i> <i>Michels</i>	<b>Italy</b>
		MM. <i>Brugger</i> <i>Cioni</i> <i>Dionisi</i> <i>La Loggia</i> <i>La Russa</i> <i>Mattina</i> <i>Parisi</i> <i>Pozzo</i>

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

MM. Serra  
Speroni

**Luxembourg**

Mrs. Brasseur  
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette

**Netherlands**

MM. Dees  
van der Linden

MM. Verbeek  
Zijlstra

**Portugal**

MM. Fernandes Marques  
Machete  
Pinto

**Spain**

Mr. Álvarez  
Mrs. Guirado

MM. López Valdivielso  
Puche Rodríguez  
Recoder  
Sainz García  
Vázquez

**United Kingdom**

Mr. Atkinson  
Sir Keith Speed  
Mr. Thompson

**RECOMMENDATION 580*****on the Eastern Mediterranean***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the accession of Greece to WEU as a full member and the concomitant entry into force of Turkey's associate membership of WEU on 6th March 1995;
- (ii) Concerned, however, that the many unsolved disputes between Greece and Turkey constitute a permanent threat to peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and stand in the way of an effective European security and defence policy in the region;
- (iii) Stressing that the only realistic means of achieving a global settlement of all disputes between Greece and Turkey would be to stop revanchist ideas once and for all in respect of past history and to follow the example of France and Germany in acknowledging that there is no longer any question of looking back, but of preparing for the future;
- (iv) Noting that a breakthrough in negotiations between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus could be the key to a much-needed improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey;
- (v) Approving the course set by the United Nations, whose initiatives to solve the Cyprus question provide first for the introduction of confidence-building measures and subsequently for a global agreement on the basis of ideas leading to the creation of a two-zone federal state, founded on equality between the Greek and Turkish communities;
- (vi) Stressing that confidence-building measures can only be implemented in parallel with a progressive withdrawal of Turkish armed forces from northern Cyprus and their replacement by United Nations peace-keeping forces with a view to a future demilitarisation of the whole island;
- (vii) Noting that negotiations should be accompanied by a full census of the population of the island of Cyprus by the European Population Committee (CDPO), as proposed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in order to solve the problem of settlers;
- (viii) Welcoming the decision of the Permanent Council of WEU to engage in a dialogue with Cyprus that will evolve with the development of links between Cyprus and the European Union, but regretting that Turkey has dissociated itself from that decision;
- (ix) Stressing that a continued massive presence of Turkish armed forces is one of the important issues standing in the way of a solution of the Cyprus question;
- (x) Noting with concern that the FYROM is still not a member of the OSCE, an organisation to which the WEU Council attaches great importance in its Lisbon declaration, particularly on account of its potential as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict-prevention and crisis-management, as well as in promoting the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights;
- (xi) Noting that the FYROM has already amended its constitution in order to satisfy European Union conditions for its recognition as a state and that Greece acknowledges that the FYROM does not constitute a military threat;
- (xii) Concerned that the continuation of Greece's trade embargo against the FYROM is jeopardising the much-needed development of the FYROM's economy which could easily result in further destabilisation of the situation in that country and, subsequently, in the region;
- (xiii) Welcoming existing good relations between Greece and Bulgaria and the recent improvement in relations between Greece and Albania;
- (xiv) Convinced that Turkey has long ago made the basic choice to be a secular state respecting human rights and the rules of democracy, but, at the same time, noting that it still has problems carrying these principles into effect;
- (xv) Condemning all forms of terrorism, even if used as a means of attaining political objectives;
- (xvi) Stressing that a clear distinction should be drawn between the intolerable terrorism practised by the PKK on the one hand and the legitimate aspiration of the Kurdish people freely to express its cultural identity within the Turkish state on the other;

(xvii) Welcoming the withdrawal of all Turkish troops from Iraqi territory in accordance with Turkey's engagements towards the European Union's troika on 23rd March 1995, but concerned by statements by the Turkish President, Suleyman Demirel, who, if need be, does not rule out the possibility of further military operations on Iraqi territory;

(xviii) Stressing the importance of respecting the territorial integrity of all states in the region;

(xix) Noting that a satisfactory global solution can be found to the claims of Kurdish nationalists in the region only if all the states concerned accept a more pluralist and more decentralised system of government allowing their citizens free enjoyment of a cultural identity that is rightfully theirs;

(xx) Aware that the absence of political solution in the "security zone" in northern Iraq has created a security vacuum in that region which is encouraging external political movements and neighbouring countries to settle their differences;

(xxi) Aware that an early reintegration of Iraq as a normally functioning state in the region, providing full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, together with an evolution of state institutions towards a more democratic system, would greatly contribute to stability in the border area between Turkey and Iraq;

(xxii) Stressing that the Kurdish question, if not solved properly by granting the Kurds some rights of cultural self-expression and a form of political and administrative autonomy that does not impinge upon the territorial integrity of the Turkish state, will continue to threaten security and stability in Turkey, limiting the government's possibilities of conducting a balanced security and defence policy and being integrated into Europe's intergovernmental and supranational structures;

(xxiii) Noting the importance of all European allies having a co-ordinated policy in the present conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

(xxiv) Concerned by the violation of the CFE Treaty represented by Russia's announcement of the creation and build-up of the 58th Russian Army in the northern Caucasus and the threat it thus brings to bear on stability in the region,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Place the promotion of a settlement of existing disputes between Greece and Turkey high on its agenda, knowing that the continuation of these disputes will prevent the establishment of an effective European security and defence policy in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean;
2. Remind both Greece and Turkey that, according to the Petersberg declaration, their mutual relations should be based on the fundamental principles of settlement of their differences by peaceful means and refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force;
3. Remind Greece of the importance the WEU Council attaches to the place of the OSCE in the European security architecture and urge this WEU member state to stop vetoing the FYROM's accession to the OSCE;
4. Use the dialogue now started with Cyprus to promote, as a matter of urgency, a solution of the Cyprus question following the course set by the United Nations;
5. In the dialogue with Russia, state clearly that no decision which might lead to a violation of the CFE Treaty can be tolerated and that possible modifications to this treaty can be discussed only at the 1996 CFE Treaty review conference;
6. Remind Turkey that a progressive withdrawal of the Turkish military occupation forces from the northern part of Cyprus – which is to start negotiations on accession to the European Union six months after the 1996 intergovernmental conference, logically to be followed by accession to WEU – will be inevitable in view of the obligations under Part III of the Petersberg declaration to refrain from resorting to the threat or use of force in relations between member states and associate member states; the above withdrawal being followed by a reduction in forces and equipment throughout Cyprus leading to a demilitarised island.

**RECOMMENDATION 581***on the situation in former Yugoslavia*

The Assembly,

- (i) Profoundly shocked by the ease with which the Bosnian Serbs were able to seize United Nations blue berets, hold them hostage and steal armaments and equipment guarded by United Nations personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- (ii) Dismayed by the apparent powerlessness of the international community to prevent Bosnian Serbs from continuing to massacre civilians in safe areas, particularly in Tuzla, on 25th May 1995, with a toll of more than 76 dead and 150 wounded, surrounding and shelling the town of Sarajevo and disrupting the provision of United Nations humanitarian aid to the civilian population;
- (iii) Noting also the powerlessness of the international community to prevent Croatian forces from resuming hostilities against the Krajina region, in violation of the cease-fire agreed in respect of Croatia on 29th March 1994, and despite present negotiations to find an acceptable political arrangement concerning the status of Krajina;
- (iv) Convinced that the time has come either to take vigorous measures to put an end to action by the Bosnian Serbs, two of whose political leaders are accused of war crimes before the International Court in The Hague, who are continuing to humiliate the United Nations and the entire international community, or to withdraw United Nations forces from the region;
- (v) Recalling that the Presidential Committee, on 23rd September 1991, asked the WEU Council "to invite the United Nations Security Council to set up an effective United Nations force to secure a cease-fire in Yugoslavia" and stated that "WEU stands ready to play its full part in any such proposal";
- (vi) Recalling that Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) gave a wide mandate to UNPROFOR allowing it to resort to force in order to give effective protection to safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- (vii) Recalling therefore paragraphs 2 and 3 of Recommendation 541 inviting the WEU Council to "ensure the strict application of Resolution 836 ... adopted by the Security Council on 4th June 1993" and "in particular help the adjustment and reinforcement of forces of WEU countries that may be required by the implementation of Resolution 836" and "consider assigning some of these forces to the support of units responsible for protecting security areas";
- (viii) Considering in consequence that the decision to create a rapid reaction force for former Yugoslavia taken in Paris on 3rd June 1995 is an appropriate – if belated – measure falling within the framework of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 836, but regretting that the mission and status of this force are somewhat ambiguous;
- (ix) Deeply regretting, nevertheless, the WEU Council's total absence of initiative, despite the undertaking on crisis-management given by member governments in their Petersberg declaration;
- (x) Astounded that, despite operation Deny Flight, the United Nations authorities have recorded, up to the month of April 1995, over 4 290 violations of the ban on military flights in the air space over Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- (xi) Dismayed, moreover, by the blatant contradiction between the WEU Council's affirmation of "the successful results accomplished by the WEU police and customs mission on the Danube" and "the continued positive results achieved in the joint WEU-NATO operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic" and reports of large quantities of fuel being smuggled into the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) through Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and also through the territory of neighbouring countries;
- (xii) Considering that the trade embargo Greece has imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is placing this country in such a difficult economic situation that, in order to survive, it is forced to maintain some commercial relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in violation of United Nations sanctions against the latter;
- (xiii) Still convinced that the effectiveness of the embargo banning arms supplies to the whole of the territory of former Yugoslavia continues to be one of the essential conditions for achieving a peaceful settlement of the conflict in that region;
- (xiv) Disturbed by the contradictory declarations of United States political leaders regarding the policy and rôle of the United States in the conflict in the Balkans;

(xv) Concerned also that the lack of clarity regarding Russia's rôle in its relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) raises problems, but welcoming the meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia and the new European Union negotiator, Mr. Carl Bildt, which will hopefully clarify the situation and lead to a more coherent approach within the contact group and the Z-4 group;

(xvi) Convinced that a peaceful settlement of the conflict in former Yugoslavia is possible only if all international organisations and countries participate in efforts to this end, agreeing on a joint strategy and refraining from isolated and unco-ordinated initiatives;

(xvii) Recalling that the danger of the Yugoslav conflict spreading and escalating into a wider regional conflict is still present,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Resolutely call upon the Bosnian Serbs to refrain from any action against the blue berets and to guarantee them freedom of movement and free access to " safe areas ";
2. Appeal to all parties concerned to abandon once and for all the illusion of a military solution and rather work to achieve a political solution based on fair negotiations through which the rights of all ethnic and religious communities can be guaranteed;
3. Ask all international organisations, the European Union and all countries involved in the peace efforts – and above all the members of the contact group – to strengthen their cohesion by adopting a joint strategy and to refrain from isolated and unco-ordinated initiatives;
4. Ask the United Nations to strengthen the presence and to clarify the purpose and capacity to take, in accordance with Resolution 836 of the Security Council, action of the blue berets and request all governments to make the necessary manpower, resources and means available to the United Nations;
5. Strengthen the operability of the rapid reaction force created on the initiative of France and the United Kingdom by giving its command responsibility for on the spot initiatives required in certain situations that endanger the safety and lives of UNPROFOR troops or of some of its own members;
6. Verify with the countries which established the rapid reaction force that that force is placed under the authority of WEU in accordance with the arrangements decided at Petersberg and invite all WEU member countries to participate;
7. Take steps in the United Nations to obtain a mandate from the Security Council for WEU to elaborate and implement the tasks of this multinational force within the framework of the guidelines issued by the Security Council;
8. Urge the Security Council to ensure that the task of the European multinational force is to facilitate the implementation of the missions of the blue berets in former Yugoslavia and not to prepare for their withdrawal;
9. Ask the Security Council to provide all the means necessary for supervising more effectively the domestic and international borders of the successor republics of former Yugoslavia, the better to monitor the effectiveness of the arms embargo;
10. Ask the United States Government not to act on the proposal to participate no longer in the embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina;
11. Ask the Government of Russia to use its influence in conformity with the proposals of the contact group and with the agreement of its member countries;
12. In co-ordination with NATO, take the necessary measures to prevent any further violation of the flight exclusion zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina;
13. Take appropriate measures to prevent any violation of the embargo on arms supplies to the territory of former Yugoslavia and inform the Assembly of all proven cases of sanctions-breaking;
14. Request the Governments of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to open negotiations on the basis of United Nations resolutions and ask Greece to lift the trade embargo it has imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
15. Provide the Assembly with more accurate and detailed information regarding the effectiveness of operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard and the monitoring of shipping on the Danube;



16. Ask the United Nations and the European Union to offer compensation to neighbouring countries whose economies have been weakened by their participation in the embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but notes that the member states which have been heavily involved have also borne substantial cost;
17. Ask the Croatian Government not to undertake further military action against areas controlled by Serb forces since these areas, which belong to the Republic of Croatia, must be integrated peacefully and given autonomy, on the basis of the Z-4 group proposal;
18. Ask the Government in Belgrade to bring all possible pressure to bear on Bosnian Serb leaders to persuade them to accept the proposals of the contact group;
19. Furthermore ask the Government in Belgrade to recognise the borders of Croatia and, explicitly, Bosnia's right to exist as a sovereign state within its present borders, given that the constitutional framework and territorial organisation of the Bosnian state are to be established by consensus in negotiations on the basis of the proposals made by the contact group;
20. Call on the Government in Belgrade to restore autonomous structures to Kosovo and Vojvodina and review its arrangements for minorities in the Sandjak and elsewhere;
21. Oppose any suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) until such time as it recognises Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as defined by their international borders;
22. Actively support the resumption of the political dialogue with a view to:
  - achieving a lasting cease-fire over the whole of the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
  - reaching a peaceful and political settlement of the conflict as a whole on the basis of the peace plans drawn up by the contact group and the Z-4 group;
  - avoiding the conflict escalating into a wider regional conflict;
  - convening, at the appropriate time, a peace conference with the participation of the political leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
23. While recognising the many contributions made by the international community, ask all governments to step up their efforts in the area of humanitarian aid for civilians and refugees;
24. Ask all governments to support the work of the International War Crimes Tribunal.

**RECOMMENDATION 582*****on the budgets of the ministerial organs  
of Western European Union  
for the financial year 1995***

The Assembly,

Considering:

- (a) that the Council has communicated to the Assembly the budgets of the ministerial organs for the financial year 1995;
- (b) that the budget of the Secretariat-General comprises five sections, of which section D relates to medium- and long-term studies on space and has seemingly been left in suspense;
- (c) that the budget documents do not contain full information on the various cost-sharing formulae for calculating contributions by states;
- (d) that on 15th May 1995 the Council of Ministers took decisions on the future of the Torrejón Satellite Centre, giving it permanent status as an organ of the Council;
- (e) that the Council of Ministers agreed on the creation of a situation centre and an intelligence section within the Planning Cell;
- (f) that the Council intends to allocate WEAG an operating budget for the financial year 1995 in accordance with the normal procedure and that this budget should be financed by thirteen countries;
- (g) that the Council has approved an operating budget for transatlantic publicity activities (TPA) and that this budget should be financed by thirteen countries;
- (h) that the Council has approved the budget for the financial year 1995 for WEU's police operation in Mostar;
- (i) that examination of the question of the budget for operation Sharp Guard is being continued;
- (j) that the Council has frozen a sum of BF 2 500 000 for financing the start of possible unforeseen operations;
- (k) that the Council has still not started the study for introducing a private health insurance scheme instead of the French social security scheme, as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendations 550 and 563 and envisaged by the Council in its reply to the latter recommendation,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Inform it just as soon as possible of the result of the discussions on all the cost-sharing formulae for financing the various WEU budgets;
2. Communicate to it swiftly the decisions that are taken regarding the Torrejón Satellite Centre now that the Ministers have agreed to give it permanent status;
3. Communicate to it all measures, especially budgetary measures, directed towards rapid implementation of the decision taken by the Ministers to create a situation centre and an intelligence section within the Planning Cell;
4. Communicate to it the result of the "Medium- and long-term studies on space" and the decisions taken on the 1995 budget concerning section D;
5. Communicate to it the decisions that are taken concerning the WEAG and operation Sharp Guard budgets;
6. Inform it of any criteria for the use, financing and subsequent developments concerning the use of the frozen credit of BF 2 500 000 earmarked for financing the start of possible unforeseen operations;
7. Urgently take the measures necessary for implementing its own intentions as stated in its reply to Recommendation 563 to enable WEU personnel in Paris to be affiliated to a private health insurance scheme after cancellation of the convention now in force with the health insurance branch of the French social security scheme;
8. Maintain the closest relationship and communication with the Assembly so that Ministers, secretariat and Assembly appreciate better, and can meet, the budgetary requirements of WEU's expanding, higher profile rôle, and so that each can make their own most positive and constructive contribution to those future developments.

## EIGHTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 22nd June 1995

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The Assembly's interpretation system (*Motions for orders with requests for urgent procedure*, Docs. 1474 and 1475).
2. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific (*Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Defence Committee and vote on the motion for a resolution*, Doc. 1476 and amendment).
3. Ukraine and European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1464 and amendment).
4. Address by Mr. Brazauskas, President of the Republic of Lithuania.
5. The Baltic Assembly (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order*, Doc. 1460).
6. National parliaments, European security and defence and the road to the 1996 intergovernmental conference (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution*, Doc. 1459).
7. Close of the session.

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. The Assembly's interpretation system**

*(Motions for orders with requests for urgent procedure, Docs. 1474 and 1475)*

In accordance with Rule 45 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the requests for urgent procedure on the motions of Lord Finsberg and Mr. Hardy for orders on the Assembly's interpretation system.

*Speakers:* Lord Finsberg, MM. Hardy, Valleix, Davis (point of order) and Valleix.

The President invited Mr. Burgelin, Clerk of the Assembly, to make a statement, and to answer questions put by MM. Alexander, Baumel, Lord Finsberg, Sir Keith Speed, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Skarpheoinsson (*Iceland, associate member*), Valleix and Lorenzi.

The requests for urgent procedure were agreed to.

It was agreed to refer the motions for orders to the Presidential Committee.

#### **4. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific**

*(Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1476 and amendment)*

*Speaker:* Lord Finsberg (point of order).

The oral report of the Defence Committee was presented by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Rodrigues, Lorenzi, Hardy, Bianchi, Korakas, Naess (*Norway, associate member*), de Lipkowski, Korakas (point of order), Schloten, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Valleix and Lord Finsberg.

The debate was adjourned.

#### **5. Address by Mr. Brazauskas, President of the Republic of Lithuania**

Mr. Brazauskas, President of the Republic of Lithuania, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Brazauskas answered questions put by MM. Pastusiak (*Poland, associate partner*), Schloten and Alexander.

### **6. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific**

*(Resumed debate on the oral report of the Defence Committee, and vote on the motion for a resolution, Doc. 1476 and amendment)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speaker:* Mr. de Puig.

The debate was closed.

Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur, and Mr. Baumel, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the motion for a resolution.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Lord Finsberg and Dame Peggy Fenner:

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the motion for a resolution.

*Speaker:* Lord Finsberg.

A vote by roll-call was requested by Mr. Valleix in accordance with Rule 36 (2).

*Speakers* (points of order): Mr. Lorenzi and Sir Russell Johnston.

Fewer than half the representatives or their substitutes having signed the register of attendance, the vote was postponed in accordance with Rule 38 (3).

### **7. Ukraine and European security**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1464 and amendment)*

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Mukhin (*Ukraine, observer*), Rockenbauer (*Hungary, associate partner*), Piskounov (*Russia, observer*) and Jeszenszky (*Hungary, associate partner*).

The debate was closed.

Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur, and Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Sir Russell Johnston and Mr. Eörsi:

1. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Noting that enlargement of NATO should be accompanied by a special arrangement between

NATO and Russia in order to provide stability in Europe and to avoid transforming Ukraine into a buffer state between East and West;”

*Speaker:* Sir Russell Johnston.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 583) <sup>1</sup>.

### **8. The Baltic Assembly**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1460)*

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Masseret, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mr. Pastusiak (*Poland, associate partner*).

*Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Ruutel (*Estonia, associate partner*), Gričius (*Lithuania, associate partner*), Neljas (*Estonia, associate partner*), Sinka (*Latvia, associate partner*), Skarpheoinsson (*Iceland, associate member*) and Naess (*Norway, associate member*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Masseret, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 96) <sup>2</sup>.

### **9. Change in the orders of the day**

The last order of the day: National parliaments, European security and defence and the road to the 1996 intergovernmental conference, was deferred until the next session.

### **10. Close of the session**

The President declared the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

*The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.*

1. See page 63.

2. See page 64.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Greece</b>	<b>Spain</b>
MM. <i>Weyts</i> (Pécriaux) <i>Ghesquière</i> (Seeuws)	MM. <i>Korakas</i> (Kapsis) Liapis	Mr. Cucó Mrs. Guirado MM. Puche Rodriguez de Puig <i>Herrero Merediz</i> (Sole Tura)
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Alloncle Baumel Galley <i>de Lipkowski</i> (Geoffroy) Gouteyron Kaspereit Masseret Seitlinger Valleix	MM. Bianchi Latronico <i>Lauricella</i> (Petruccioli) <i>Lorenzi</i> (Serra) Speroni	Lady <i>Hooper</i> (Atkinson) MM. <i>Davis</i> (Banks) <i>Alexander</i> (Sir Anthony Durant)
<b>Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Dame Peggy Fenner Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir John Hunt Sir Russell Johnston MM. <i>Wray</i> (Lord Kirkhill) <i>Marshall</i> (Litherland) Lord Newall Sir Dudley Smith Sir Keith Speed Sir <i>Ralph Howell</i> (Sir Donald Thompson)
MM. Antretter Behrendt Junghanns Schloten	Mrs. Err	
	<b>Netherlands</b>	
	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout	
	<b>Portugal</b>	
	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Amaral) Mr. <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	Mr. Erler Mrs. Fischer MM. Haack Irmer Lenzer Marten Michels Poppe Probst von Schmude Mrs. Terborg Mr. Zierer	<b>Italy</b>
MM. Biefnot Kelchtermans Kempinaire Van der Maelen Sarens		MM. Arata Benvenuti Brugger Cioni Dionisi Fassino La Loggia La Russa Mattina Mitolo Parisi Pozzo Selva
<b>France</b>	<b>Greece</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Birraux Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Dumont Jacquat Jeambrun Jung Schreiner	MM. Kastanidis Magginas Mrs. Papandreou MM. Pavlidis Vrettos	Mrs. Brasseur Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
<b>Germany</b>		<b>Netherlands</b>
Mrs. Blunck Mr. Bühler		Mr. Dees

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

MM. van der Linden  
Verbeek  
Woltjer  
Zijlstra

**Portugal**

MM. Brito  
Fernandes Marques

MM. Machete  
Pinto  
Roseta

**Spain**

MM. Álvarez  
López Henares  
López Valdivielso  
Martínez

MM. Recoder  
Sainz Garcia  
Vázquez

**United Kingdom**

MM. Cox  
Rathbone  
Redmond  
Thompson

**RECOMMENDATION 583*****on Ukraine and European security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of Ukraine's positive contribution to security and stability in Europe through the implementation of the trilateral declaration of January 1994 to dispose of all nuclear weapons on its territory and through its decision to accede to the non-proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear state;
- (ii) Noting that the continued existence of Ukraine as an independent state and its ability to make further progress in transforming its economy and society depends greatly on international support and co-operation;
- (iii) Aware that the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty of friendship and co-operation between Russia and Ukraine is of vital importance for the independence and security of Ukraine as well as for the stability of the region;
- (iv) Noting that in recent months Russia has apparently not been forthcoming in the negotiations preparing the abovementioned treaty;
- (v) Aware that Ukraine will not be able to restructure and reorganise its armed forces and the defence of its territory until a final agreement on the division of the Black Sea fleet and its infrastructure has been concluded with Russia;
- (vi) Deploring Russia's unilateral decision to extend its armed forces in northern Caucasus with the newly-created 58th army in violation of the CFE Treaty;
- (vii) Noting that any suggestions to modify the CFE Treaty should be discussed exclusively in the framework of the 1996 review conference;
- (viii) Regretting the continued presence of the Russian 14th army in the Trans-Dniestr region, far beyond the borders of Russian territory;
- (ix) Noting that enlargement of NATO should be accompanied by a special arrangement between NATO and Russia in order to provide stability in Europe and to avoid transforming Ukraine into a buffer state between East and West;
- (x) Noting that in view of WEU's status as part of the process of European integration, closer links between Ukraine and WEU cannot be considered as threatening any third country in Europe;
- (xi) Aware that the WEU Council of Ministers attaches particular importance to appropriate relationships with Russia and Ukraine;
- (xii) Welcoming the decision of the Permanent Council of WEU on the organisation of the dialogue with Russia and Ukraine, which will allow for exchanges of information on issues of common interest;
- (xiii) Stressing, however, that, compared with Russia, Ukraine since its independence has shown a far more positive attitude in its active policy towards building security in Europe,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Continue to intensify the security dialogue with Ukraine, paying attention in particular to its specific rôle in the European security architecture;
2. Make clear in its security dialogue with Russia that the early conclusion of a treaty of friendship and co-operation between Russia and Ukraine is of vital importance for security in Europe.

**ORDER 96*****on the Baltic Assembly***

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The Assembly,

- (i) Noting with interest the progress achieved by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in interstate and inter-parliamentary co-operation with a view to joining European and transatlantic co-operative structures;
- (ii) Welcoming the driving rôle played by the Baltic Assembly in this area in fostering a rapprochement between the three states and between their peoples and their full participation in establishing a system of security and stability in Europe;
- (iii) Emphasising the progress made in pursuing the process of reforming their economic and security structures with a view to their rapprochement with the European Union, NATO and WEU;
- (iv) Welcoming the signing of association agreements between the three Baltic states and the European Union as an important step towards their integration in the Union;
- (v) Noting the fears expressed by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania regarding their security;
- (vi) Welcoming initiatives taken by the three countries in co-operation in security and defence matters and the formation of a Baltic states joint battalion for United Nations operations;
- (vii) Stressing the importance of aid from NATO and WEU countries for developing such co-operation and strengthening the joint security of the three states and of Europe as a whole;
- (viii) Recalling Order 90 affirming that “ more intensive co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the Central European parliaments constitutes an important element in the process of integration of these countries in the structures of European political and defence co-operation ”,

**I. INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE**

1. To ensure development of close co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the Baltic Assembly in security and defence matters;
2. To promote contacts between like committees of the two Assemblies;
3. To envisage the possibility of receiving officials of the Baltic Assembly in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly for a period and according to arrangements to be defined between the two institutions, with a view to training them in the procedures and working methods of the WEU Assembly;

**II. REQUESTS ITS COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION**

To include in the Assembly's budget for the 1996 financial year, in accordance with Order 90, a provision for setting up an Assembly support fund for parliamentary co-operation with the parliaments of associate partner countries.



**II**

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES**

# THIRTEENTH SITTING

Monday, 19th June 1995

## SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Adoption of the minutes.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Observers.
6. Tribute to a former President of the Assembly.
7. Address by the President of the Assembly.
8. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.  
*Speaker:* Mrs. Papandreou.
9. Changes in the membership of committees.
10. Adoption of the draft order of business of the third part of the fortieth ordinary session (Doc. 1452).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Speroni, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Martínez, Mr. Cox, Mr. Speroni, Lord Finsberg.
11. Address by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU.
12. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (*Presentation of the second part of the fortieth annual report of the Council*, Doc. 1453); Address by Mr. Durão Barroso, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
13. Address by Mr. Figueiredo Lopes, Minister of Defence of Portugal.  
*Replies by Mr. Durão Barroso to questions put by:* Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Roseta, Mr. Davis.
14. Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany.  
*Replies by Mr. Kinkel to questions put by:* Mr. Antretter, Mrs. Blunck, Mrs. Papandreou, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. López Henares, Mr. Valleix, Mr. De Decker.
15. Replies by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU, to questions put by members of the Assembly.  
*Replies by Mr. Cutileiro to questions put by:* Mr. Baumel, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. de Lipkowski, Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Cox.
16. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1458 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* Mrs. Aguiar (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Benvenuti, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Pastusiak (*Poland, associate partner*), Mrs. Furubjelke (*Sweden, observer*), Mr. Latronico.
17. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific (*Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1473).  
*Speaker:* The President.
18. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### **1. Resumption of the session**

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

In accordance with the decision of the Presidential Committee of 20th December 1994, I declare open the third part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### **2. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 15.

### **3. Adoption of the minutes**

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

### **4. Examination of credentials**

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of new representatives and substitutes nominated since the Assembly last met.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the credentials of representatives and substitutes have been attested by a statement of ratification from the Parliamentary Assembly of

*The President (continued)*

the Council of Europe and formally communicated by the President of that Assembly, with the exception of those representatives and substitutes who are listed in Notice No. 13.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, I invite the Assembly to ratify these credentials, subject to conformity with the subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

If the Assembly is unanimous, we can proceed to ratify these credentials without prior reference to a credentials committee.

Is there any objection?...

The credentials are accordingly ratified subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I warmly welcome our new colleagues to the Assembly.

**5. Observers**

The PRESIDENT. – I should also like to welcome the associate members, the permanent delegations of parliamentary observers from those countries to which this status has been accorded.

I also welcome parliamentary observers from Croatia, the Russian Federation, Malta, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia and Ukraine.

We have invited a number of other special guests this week and I am delighted to see Mr. Arnold Ruutel, President of the Baltic Assembly, here today. I extend a very warm welcome to him.

In welcoming all of the new members to our debates, together with members of the Permanent Council who are present at this session, I wish them an interesting afternoon and a fulfilling parliamentary session.

**6. Tribute to a former President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to a small but important and sad task. It was with sorrow that many of us who knew or knew of Lord Mulley learned of his death in March. He was a distinguished former President of this Assembly.

Fred Mulley, as he was then, virtually witnessed the creation of the WEU Assembly having joined its United Kingdom Delegation in 1958. He was appointed a member of the Defence Committee and was several times its Rapporteur before being elected Vice-President of the Assembly in May 1960.

Between leaving the delegation in 1961 and returning almost twenty years later, Lord Mulley led an extremely distinguished political career holding several ministerial posts, including that of Secretary of State for Defence.

When he rejoined the Assembly's United Kingdom Delegation in 1979, he was elected President of the Assembly in June of the following year and remained in office until 1983. During that time he guided the Assembly's work with the talent and wisdom befitting the statesman that he was. I knew him well personally. Although he was of a different political persuasion from me, we were very good friends. I regard it as being a distinct privilege to have known him.

In his memory and as a mark of respect, may I ask members of the Assembly to rise for a moment's silence?

*(The Assembly stood in silence)*

**7. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. – We have made a prompt start. As members will probably have appreciated before now, I always try to get things moving quickly – but never more so than in this plenary session because we have an extremely heavy agenda.

This session presents a number of interesting changes, developments and challenges. For the first time, we welcome Greece as a full member of Western European Union, as well as Iceland, Norway and Turkey as associate members. They are all represented here today and I am delighted to welcome their permanent delegations to the Assembly. I say to each and every one of them that I hope they will enjoy their association with us. We very much look forward to their contributions in pursuing the cause of Western European Union.

With the enlargement of the European Union, the three new observer states – Austria, Finland and Sweden – have consolidated their relationship with Western European Union and are already proving very active.

I would submit, therefore, that the Assembly's decision to increase the number of European stars in our logo from nine directly to twelve was more than justified. Members can see the revised version displayed on the podium. I urge the Council to follow our example without delay and to adopt the twelve stars in a spirit of European solidarity.

Most of the other changes have been at the initiative of our presidential country, Portugal, and I pay special tribute to our enthusiastic Portuguese ministers – led today by their foreign minister – and their permanent delegation for what has been

*The President (continued)*

achieved under their hard-working auspices. WEU's capabilities have been reinforced considerably over recent months with the decision to create a situation centre and an intelligence cell in Brussels. The Satellite Centre at Torrejón has reached the end of the experimental phase and has now been established as a component part of the organisation, as recommended by the Assembly from the beginning.

WEU ministers, meeting in Lisbon last month, decided also to keep all their options open with regard to the procurement of a European space-based observation system. The Assembly's contribution to that decision was the highly successful colloquy on the subject organised by the Technological and Aerospace Committee at the end of March. Decisions on the way ahead should be taken at the autumn ministerial meeting scheduled for 14th November – a date that I am hardly likely to forget as it is my birthday. Those measures are all eminently practical and will give WEU specific capabilities. Other parallel developments are gradually equipping us to carry out, at the very least, what are termed Petersberg-type missions. The Chairman-in-Office has made a start on trying to define WEU's contribution to the future shape of European security and defence. I was pleased, at the seminar two weeks ago that he organised near Lisbon on WEU's contribution to the future European security and defence architecture, to put down a number of markers in our Assembly's name. Mrs. Aguiar's excellent report for the Political Committee on the future of European security is central to those deliberations and is scheduled for debate later today or tomorrow. We must make certain that our voice is heard in the wider discussions that are gradually gaining momentum. Otherwise there is a danger – and I use a topical rugby term – that we will be kicked into touch. There are signs that may already be the trend. For example, I was conscious that when the Bosnian Serbs took our people hostage in the last week of May, mine was the only voice raised on behalf of WEU to demand their immediate release.

Likewise, when NATO and European Union ministers of defence met in Paris, I was disappointed that little account was taken of WEU's pivotal rôle. I said as much to the press and wrote to the Chairman-in-Office requesting him to take various initiatives. Perhaps it matters little in some ways which of the so-called interlocking institutions take the lead over Bosnia. There is obviously no military solution to present difficulties in that part of the world. A political agreement is the only way out but the protagonists are not yet weary enough to recognise realities. It is obvious also that we must act as Europeans to protect our contingents in UNPROFOR. NATO, per se, is

paralysed while the United States continues its present contradictory policies and cannot participate on the ground.

At Maastricht, the European Union entrusted WEU with action as its operational arm. On the principle that one does not keep a dog and do one's own barking, the European Union should not try to control and co-ordinate military operations. That is our job and it is essential that WEU assumes its responsibilities. We must be the hard core of European security, grouping as we do those countries that are most dedicated to strong defence. We must make absolutely certain that our ideals are not watered down or compromised during the course of the 1996 intergovernmental conference.

I emphasised that principle at the brainstorming session at Sintra near Lisbon and another important aspect. I said: "As national parliamentarians we in the WEU Assembly are more in touch with the electorates of our respective countries than is any other body. We are well aware of the security and defence priorities our people will support and of how far they are prepared to go towards the goal of achieving a common European defence system. Those of you present from countries such as my own that have held referenda on European issues in the past will be swift to acknowledge the importance of recognising and respecting public opinion."

We must take every opportunity over the next year and a half to ensure that our vision of a sound European security system prevails. To that end, Mr. Chairman-in-Office, we need you and your successors not only to speak up loud and clear on behalf of WEU but to seize every occasion to propose specific action. You, Mr. Secretary-General, with great respect, need to be out and about – I am sure that you realise this – fighting WEU's corner at every opportunity. These are not days for quiet diplomacy – we must have action and initiative.

The draft recommendations we shall be debating this week and, I hope, adopting, reflect our desire for a WEU that is much more of an extrovert. All the rapporteurs have taken care to ensure that the recommendations are eminently sensible, practical and wholly realisable, given the necessary political will in our various countries. The subjects treated are topical and of serious consequence. I should add for those of you who are joining us for the first time today that, as a result of our Assembly's status under the modified Brussels Treaty, the recommendations are forwarded to the Council of Ministers, which has a statutory duty to reply. Of late, the quality and thoroughness of those replies have been obvious and I congratulate the Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary-General on their constructive attitude. The eminent people addressing us this week also demonstrate the increasing importance of being

*The President (continued)*

attached to WEU. The Presidents of Lithuania and of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia represent very differing parts of Europe but both countries are in need of the kind of lasting solidarity that we should offer.

Turkey has long demonstrated that solidarity. The presence of the Turkish Prime Minister tomorrow morning is a milestone in our relationship. I hope that Turkey will be able to help to resolve a number of the problems of the Mediterranean area highlighted in Mr. Cucó's long, detailed and constructive report. Exceptionally, four of our ministers have invoked the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly and asked to address us on this occasion. The subjects that they will introduce are very apposite in differing ways and what they have to say will certainly enhance our debates.

I am fully aware of your concern that the session is overloaded. Ideally, we should tell all ministers who invite themselves that the only available slot is Thursday morning, but we have to be practical about that. It would be taken as something of a snub if we did this. That is why the Presidential Committee decided on the arrangements as they stand, but I am always able to talk to colleagues about that situation and how it will apply in future.

Before I give the floor to the joint Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary-General I should like very briefly to underline three distinct areas of interest for the Assembly. First, I must report that the relationship between WEU and the associate partners is flourishing. We have been heartened by a series of initiatives in the past few months. The gatherings that they organise are invaluable in helping the integration process. A particularly constructive step forward has been the active participation of associate partners in the work of our major committees. Many parliamentarians and permanent representatives from the associate partner countries have told me how much they appreciate the regular and frequent consultations and discussions that take place under WEU's auspices, both in the Assembly and the Council. We are the only security organisation that has opened its doors wide to such practical effect. The results are becoming evident and range from the Danube operations with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania via former Yugoslavia, where Estonian and Lithuanian platoons now serve with the Danes in the embryo of the Baltic battalion. They join Poles, Czechs and Slovaks in supporting the United Nations.

Further afield, Hungarians are linking up with Austrians in Cyprus as well as helping the Camp David process in Sinai. Time does not permit me to elaborate. I hope that further details will emerge

during our debates this week. I am especially pleased that the preparatory document for the draft white paper on new European security conditions is being elaborated with all our twenty-seven nations contributing. This common reflection is timely and welcome and shows how the consultation process is really beginning to work.

Second, I should like to mention an aspect which concerns those countries that joined the WEU family of nations at the beginning of the year and are now official observers – Austria, Finland and Sweden.

All three have considerable experience of what are termed the Petersberg missions, as defined by WEU. They therefore have a great deal to offer. I am delighted that, as a result of discussions with President Klestil when I was in Vienna in January, Austria is supporting WEU operations in Mostar and is being joined there by Finland and Sweden.

This is exactly the sort of co-operation some of us had been forecasting. I am sorry therefore that these countries, as well as Ireland, are likely to be affected by the new, as yet unwritten, rule regarding full membership status in WEU.

In our declaration at Maastricht in 1992, WEU offered full membership or, failing that, observer status to European Union members under conditions to be determined.

Certain of our countries are now saying that those conditions, of course, include full membership of NATO.

In the context of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty backed up by the practical guarantees of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, I can understand the logic of linking WEU with NATO membership.

However, if there is a consensus for such a rule it must be made explicit so that all our observer countries, some of whom were potentially full members of WEU, but certainly not of NATO, know where they stand. The situation must be clarified before next year's intergovernmental conference begins.

There is however a serious knock-on effect in linking WEU membership to NATO enlargement as well as to that of the European Union. In practical terms, WEU enlargement and indeed the development of a European defence identity will become subject to a United States veto. We must therefore ask ourselves whether we are prepared to accept such a situation, especially given the present low ebb in transatlantic relations. Those who are pushing for the absorption of WEU lock, stock and barrel, into the European Union, should beware of likely United States intransigence. We are in danger of making our own enlargement

*The President (continued)*

effectively hostage to ratification by the United States Congress – a Congress which some feel is increasingly out of touch with Europe.

Last week's overwhelming vote in Congress on lifting the arms embargo in Bosnia shows scant regard for our largely European forces on the ground there and the considerable sacrifices some of our countries are making to support humanitarian assistance and the United Nations. I applaud the initiative to create a rapid reaction force, which is now being set up by WEU member states, at a time when both the United Nations and NATO have proved how much traditional command structures need overhauling for the modern context. Such a force was first suggested by this Assembly as long ago as 1989. It could prove an excellent complement for the two other forces announced at WEU's Lisbon ministerial meeting, EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR.

If Europe continues to rationalise its military assets in this way, with light and flexible command structures tailored for WEU's Petersberg missions then we may no longer need the infamous combined joint task forces which NATO is finding so difficult to agree and establish.

Third, I am also pleased to welcome a delegation of observers from the European Parliament. For many years now we have been trying to establish a *modus vivendi* with our European brethren, but sadly so far to little avail. With a newly elected parliament in Strasbourg we are making fresh overtures and I have invited President Hansch to attend our session this week. We really must put our relationship on an even and reciprocal footing without delay. Recent summonses to the WEU presidency, our Secretary-General and the director of the Planning Cell, to give evidence to committees and sub-committees of the European Parliament have been interpreted by certain colleagues purely and simply as take-over bids. There is an urgent need to underline our respective competences. I have therefore asked our Political Committee to explore a practical way ahead through what is a potential minefield and report progress to the Presidential Committee.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have dwelt on some of these subjects at length because they are extremely important and various strands of them will emerge during our debates this week. This is a critical time for planning the future shape of European defence and security. In the interests of the people we represent, we must get it right. I think that Western European Union can be the catalyst for the changes that are needed and I suspect that many of you think the same. Thank you very much.

**8. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure provides that proposals for candidatures for Vice-Presidents shall each be sponsored in writing by three or more representatives. Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

Also, Rule 7(1) lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

I have received the nominations of Mr. Robert Antretter and Mrs. Vasso Papandreou for the two vacant vice-presidential places.

The nominations have been properly made and in the form prescribed by the rules.

I propose that these nominations be approved by the Assembly by acclamation.

Is there any objection to the election of these Vice-Presidents by acclamation?...

I believe the Assembly is unanimous.

I accordingly declare the following elected Vice-Presidents in this order of precedence: Mr. Antretter, Mrs. Papandreou.

I understand that Mrs. Papandreou would like to say a few words. It is a lady's privilege.

Mrs. PAPANDREOU (*Greece*). – As a new member of this institution, I want to say a few words on behalf of the Greek Delegation and to express our satisfaction that Greece has at last become a full member. We are looking forward to working closely with all the other delegations to strengthen the rôle and the effectiveness of this organisation.

Peace and security is much needed in Europe and we have an important rôle to play. So it is important to discuss and decide on the future architecture of Europe and co-operation and the relationship between the different nations of Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Papandreou. As I said, you and your delegation are most welcome here.

**9. Changes in the membership of committees**

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 41 (6) of the Rules of Procedure I invite the Assembly to agree to the proposed changes in membership of committees contained in Notice No. 13, which has already been distributed.

*The President (continued)*

Is there any opposition?...

*The changes are agreed to.*

**10. Adoption of the draft order of business of the third part of the fortieth ordinary session**

(Doc. 1452)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the third part of the fortieth session, Document 1452.

I call Mr. Speroni.

Mr. SPERONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I think the President is referring to the Assembly's order of business; he mentioned notice numbers which I do not have. It is precisely concerning the Assembly's agenda and order of business that I wish to speak.

I have found that none of the documents needed for our work are available; I thought we would be able to get them from the offices.

Having said this, I cannot agree that a representative of the Turkish Government should be allowed to speak today or tomorrow; that government has been incriminated and censured by the Council of Europe for its measures against the Kurdish people. It would seem to me completely inappropriate that the Turkish Government should be allowed to speak here through its representative before this question has been resolved.

I therefore request that the Assembly be asked to reject the inclusion of this item on the order of business.

The PRESIDENT. – The decision to invite the Turkish Prime Minister was made democratically by our Presidential Committee, which is represented by all strands of political opinion and countries. As far as I know, no other objections have been raised. It is far too late to object now and it would be extremely discourteous now to say that the Turkish Prime Minister could not come because nothing of which I am aware has occurred since our invitation was made which would rule out that invitation. I must therefore rule you out of order on that matter, Sir. You will have a chance to comment during the questions or later debates in the session.

Mr. Hardy has given me notice of his intention to raise a point of order.

Is there any objection to the draft order of business contained in Document 1452?...

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. You have touched on this matter in your address but we need to pursue it a little further. You may recall that some years ago

in two or three successive Assemblies I complained about the inordinate amount of time for which the Assembly was sitting when we had to hear ministers and sometimes have an opportunity to ask questions. I accept that a number of invitations are essential but this week there are an excessive number – ten of them – and you have rightly recognised the important subjects that we must debate. It is argued that we can learn a great deal from ministers who come to talk to us and answer our questions. That is so, but this is not a university seminar; it is an assembly for democratic debate above all. Perhaps we can learn something from ministers but many people here already have informed opinions on the basis of substantial knowledge and fewer of them will be able to address the Assembly to convey their opinion because we have ten speakers.

It is too late to withdraw the invitations and I understand that ministers can come whether we like it or not. However, we should take seriously the point that you made that if ministers insist on coming and they do not form part of the leadership of the Assembly at that time, serious consideration should be given to setting aside half a day for them to speak. It is offputting when an important debate is stopped so that a minister may speak about something that may not be relevant to the debate under way. The message should be that ten speakers at one session is far too many, and that number should not be repeated.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Hardy. I have much sympathy with what you say. I am a poacher turned gamekeeper because, in the old days, I used to support Mr. Hardy strongly on that cause, even on the Presidential Committee, as I felt that it was wrong to have so many speakers. But having sat in the chair, I also recognise the other side of the problem. Five of the speakers in this session were invited by the Presidential Committee, and they are quality speakers. It reflects the growing interest in WEU that we have so many important people – men and women – prepared to speak to us. But unless we went ahead and invited those people to come, we might have been left in the position where we had no speakers at all, in which case we would have relied on the ministers who may not have responded. I am afraid that we have an embarrassment of riches. Ministers are fully entitled to come, particularly those in office with WEU, and we cannot turn them away. It would be impractical to suggest that they all came on Thursday morning. It shows the interest in our Assembly, and we are glad of that. It is far better than having to get on our knees to get people to come, but I take Mr. Hardy's point. It is irritating to members when there are so many speakers and it interrupts debates. There are no easy solutions but I guarantee that this issue will be raised again at the Presidential Committee. Mr. Hardy floated one idea but if he has any others

*The President (continued)*

perhaps he will present a short paper for consideration and I shall report back to him.

Mr. MARTÍNEZ (*Spain*). – For the sake of the ministers and to shorten our debate, may I give a further opinion on this? With respect to what Mr. Hardy said, I stress that in my opinion and that of a number of my colleagues, we have invited some top personalities on the European scene to speak on matters of concern about security and defence in Europe. That is tremendously important for the professionals that we are. We are the only members of our respective parliaments who have the privilege to listen to and question, agree and disagree, with those personalities. We can then take our experience back home to our colleagues in our national parliaments because those speakers do not address our national parliaments about security and defence in Europe. I believe that it is an essential part of our work and we are privileged to be here. Discussing, making resolutions and debating are important but have no immediate effect on what happens in Europe and perhaps we should sometimes just listen.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Martínez. It is always helpful to have support. Nonetheless, I adhere to what I said to Mr. Hardy although I am glad to know that there are different views on this.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – As we are now discussing the draft order of business, I rise on a point of clarification, which goes back to a point of order that was raised this afternoon. As you said, Mr. President, tomorrow morning we will be addressed by the Prime Minister of Turkey. Like you, I welcome her presence. It will be a first-class opportunity for many of us who wish to raise important questions with the head of the Turkish Government. I have two points for clarification. On the draft order of business, although there is an address by the Prime Minister of Turkey, there is no reference to the fact that she will take questions. I should like to have some clarification as to whether she will be taking questions from the Assembly.

I realise that my second point may be a little delicate, but I hope that it will be made known to the Prime Minister of Turkey that, while welcoming her presence here, we would also welcome the opportunity to put questions that she might not like. I hope that you, Mr. President, or some senior official of the Assembly, will gently make it known to her that it will not be her decision whether she answers questions. Sadly, that has sometimes happened. Therefore, the two points on which I require clarification are that, first, we shall have the opportunity to put questions to her and, second, that she will respond to them.

The PRESIDENT. – I can assure you, Mr. Cox, that the Prime Minister will be answering ques-

tions. I shall acquaint her with the fact that some will be hostile, but you are a seasoned politician and know that most politicians revel in hostile questions – it puts them on their mettle. I do not yet know the lady personally, but we may see an example of that. I remember the occasion when her predecessor, Mr. Özal, spoke here and did extremely well. Whatever one's political views, one could only say that he acquitted himself admirably. I hope that, for the sake of the Assembly, something similar will happen tomorrow. However, I appreciate your raising this important point, Mr. Cox.

Mr. Speroni has asked to make a further point. I hope that it is not exactly the same point as his previous one.

Mr. SPERONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I made specific reference to the Rules of Procedure and your answer was that my question was simply a matter of courtesy. I do not believe that the situation can be described in those terms; this is not a girls' boarding school but a political Assembly with precise Rules of Procedure which have to be obeyed. I agree that it is the Presidential Committee, of which I am not a member, which fixes the agenda but the Assembly, under the combined terms of Rule 20 and paragraph 1 (a) of Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, can change it and that is what I asked for. I would also point out that the order of business provides not for a debate but simply for an address by the Turkish Prime Minister. As the presidency has explained to me that the representative of the Turkish Government will be able to answer our questions, I withdraw my proposal though I still believe that it is inappropriate to invite the Turkish Minister to come here. I repeat, however, my view that authority to decide and amend the agenda does not lie exclusively with the Presidential Committee but with the Assembly, as laid down in our Rules of Procedure.

The PRESIDENT. – There will always be somebody who objects to a person who has been invited to speak, and that has always been the case. We are a democratic body. We elect bureaux and presidential committees to carry out these tasks. If we do not like what they do, we replace them, or table motions of censure. I understand from the rules – I have not yet had a chance to look at them in detail – that the agenda can be changed if that is the will of the Assembly but, judging from the reaction when you first raised your point, Mr. Speroni, the Assembly does not have an overwhelming desire to go along with your proposal. I think that it would be ludicrous – disastrous – for the Assembly, having invited an important head of state – whatever one might think of the person or that country – then to say that it did not want that person to come. We would lose all credibility. I am glad that you have shown good sense and said that you will withdraw your proposal given that,



*The President (continued)*

in my answer to Mr. Cox, I made it clear that members of the Assembly can ask questions. I shall do my very best to see that you can do so.

Every guest speaker will be under pressure because so many people want to ask questions, but we must use good sense and try to get in as many people as possible.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am glad that Mr. Cox has raised this issue. It would have saved so much trouble if the Clerk and those organising matters had done what we do in Strasbourg. It is not only in the case of Dr. Ciller that we did not know whether questions were to be answered; the same is true of every other guest speaker, except our excellent Secretary-General, who said from the start that he would do so. Can we do what we do in Strasbourg, where it always says “Address: questions will be answered”?

The PRESIDENT. – That is a good point, and I think that we shall do that in future. Since I have been President, guest speakers have always answered questions unless they specifically say that they will not. I am hopeful that, in this session, all who are to give addresses will also answer questions.

We were to have ten speakers, as Mr. Hardy said, but he may be relieved to know that there will be one fewer as the Defence Minister of Spain has called off today because of the political and parliamentary trouble at home. I understand all the remaining speakers will be prepared to answer questions.

Does anybody wish to make any other points on the draft order of business?...

*The draft order of business is agreed to.*

We have a particularly full programme for this part-session.

I therefore propose to the Assembly, in accordance with Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, that in all our debates there should be a time-limit of five minutes for each speaker, apart from chairmen and rapporteurs of committees.

May I remind you that, in accordance with the same rule, this proposal must be decided by the Assembly without debate.

Is there any objection?...

*The time-limit is agreed to.*

On the question of guest speakers, I have one point to make about how members are allowed to speak. It may sound silly to old hands, but we have a large number of new members, particularly from the associate partner countries. If members wish to speak in a debate, will they – with the maximum amount of notice – go to the table out-

side where members register when they come in and write down their name and their seat numbers? They can put down their names in the book, showing in which debate they wish to speak. That will be recorded, and the lists drawn up.

The lists are provided adjacent to the register of speakers for members who wish to put questions to any of our guest speakers. If members have not placed their names on the list, will they indicate to me or to one of the clerks that they would like to ask a question? Let me again make the plea, particularly in this session, that colleagues ask brief questions and not triple-headed ones.

I have to try to limit the number of questions for each guest speaker to six. It may be that in some cases, they will not have their full quota and in others – we have heard about tomorrow morning – more than six will want to ask questions. You must leave it to the Chair to try, impartially and fairly, to bring in as many people as possible.

Is that agreed to?...

*It is agreed to.*

### *11. Address by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU. We welcome him. He has been before and we are pleased that he is with us again today. You made a point of coming to address our Assembly, Mr. Cutileiro, despite the obligations that compel you to leave us tomorrow to attend important functions in Washington. I thank you for doing so. It is important that the Assembly should hear the Secretary-General of WEU present his views of the development of the organisation over the last half-year. We also thank you for agreeing to answer any questions – we have already heard that you will do that.

In order to allow us to hear three ministers speak during the course of the afternoon, you have kindly agreed to postpone answering questions from members of the Assembly until the end of the afternoon. I estimate that your turn will come at around 5.15 p.m. Meanwhile, we shall listen with interest to your speech. Will you come to the tribune?

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Thank you, Sir Dudley, for your welcoming, kind and stimulating words. I shall try to be brief because I know that there are great constraints on time.

It is a great pleasure to be here today, only seven months after becoming Secretary-General of WEU. During this time, Greece has become the

*Mr. Cutileiro (continued)*

tenth full member. I begin by welcoming her representatives, whether they are sitting on the Council bench or elsewhere in the hemicycle.

In the time between the Noordwijk and Lisbon declarations, WEU has made significant strides forward in its development. The importance of the work done in recent months by the Portuguese presidency – to which I pay tribute – and of the results obtained in Lisbon in both the operational development and the preparation of a possible white paper on European security, are acknowledged by all. The growing interest in WEU by a number of third countries is evidence of that. I am sure that those activities will continue unabated under the Spanish presidency, which will also be leading the discussions on WEU's contribution to the forthcoming intergovernmental conference.

The reports that the Assembly will be discussing at this session are consonant with the activities of the WEU Permanent Council. That is especially true of the approach to the problems of regional security on the periphery of Europe, of the thinking on the facts of European security and in the preparation for the 1996 intergovernmental conference. A dialogue of ideas is developing between the Assembly and the Council, which I believe is just as important as the institutional dialogue.

Our prime objective must be to make the organisation capable of carrying out, rapidly and efficiently, the missions that ministers assigned to it at Petersberg exactly three years ago. The first measure of WEU's enhanced profile is the strengthening of its operational capabilities. By building on the solid foundations laid by the Netherlands presidency, the Portuguese presidency has successfully implemented the Noordwijk mandate. The Council will benefit from the support of a politico-military group which has been set up this week. The rôle of the Council's military delegates group has been clarified and the secretariat is to be strengthened. With the establishment of a situation centre and an intelligence section within the Planning Cell, the Council is giving itself the means effectively to monitor crisis situations and, if necessary, WEU operations. A temporary formula has been agreed for the financing arrangements for such operations. Lastly, the Satellite Centre is now a permanent WEU body.

The new mechanisms obviously will have to be tested and that will require a dynamic exercise policy. I shall leave it to the Portuguese foreign and defence ministers who will follow me to the podium in a few minutes to give the Assembly a more detailed account of the progress that has been made under the Portuguese presidency.

WEU remains the only European forum in which substantive work of this kind can be carried out. But it is also the only organisation in which all the member states of the European Union, the European members of NATO and the nine countries of Central Europe aspiring to join our institutions sit around the same table. The Lisbon meeting has illustrated the vital importance of the associate partners' participation in the work of WEU. Their presence alongside the member states of the European Union and the alliance is one of the strengths of our organisation, and one that gives a specific character to its contribution to the strengthening of European Union.

With the active support of the twenty-seven nations, three months of intensive work have resulted in a document that identifies their common interests and represents a blueprint for one of the parts of a possible white paper on European security. Work on the second part of that document – dealing with the responses to the security threats, risks and challenges facing us – is soon to start. It will have to be convincing in its substance and intelligible to public opinion in its presentation. At members' request, the document is now in their possession. I have no doubt that members will comment on it in their debates.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

(Translation). – I was very much interested to note the fruitful convergence between the questions and proposals in several of your reports and the Council's debates on our joint thinking about the new conditions for security in Europe. I give two examples. First, the ideas about how work might be divided between the United Nations, OSCE and NATO, and the rôle which might fall to WEU in this context in the field of crisis prevention and management. Here – not for the first time – you have made more headway than the Council.

This aspect of affairs will in fact be dealt with at the second stage of our joint thinking when we look at how challenges to security should be met. The modified Brussels Treaty and the Petersberg declaration clearly mark out the land: the implementation of Article V – as indicated in Article IV – is the responsibility of the Atlantic Alliance. Action possible under Article VIII, paragraph 3, may take the form of operations of varying force ranging from humanitarian assistance to combat missions. Lastly, the concept of the CJTF, however difficult to define in concrete terms, fully covers Europe's needs in the way of any sizeable armed intervention in which the Americans would not wish to take part.

The second example is WEU's contribution to strengthening transatlantic ties. As you are aware, in 1994 WEU inherited transatlantic public relations activities from the Eurogroup. The United Kingdom presidency now coming to an end will

*Mr. Cutileiro (continued)*

culminate in a high-level conference to be held in Washington the day after tomorrow. I feel it my duty to attend, though it means I cannot at the same time be with you. The point is that I believe it vital for WEU as a defence organisation to continue to develop an active and specific information policy in both the United States and Canada. May I, Mr. President, welcome your contribution to the Brussels European seminar, and Lord Finsberg's report on his working visit to the other side of the Atlantic, both of which demonstrate the Assembly's commitment to this ongoing two-way exchange of information. Even so, I share your main conclusion: WEU must clearly do more.

Recent decisions by the Council go a long way to explaining why WEU is attracting more and more interest among third countries, an interest impacting directly on your Assembly in the many requests it gets to receive delegations of observers, in some cases even ministers, at its sittings. The Assembly has frequently enabled dialogue to begin between these countries and the Council. As regards Russia and Ukraine, in accordance with the wishes expressed by ministers at the Noordwijk meeting of the Council, the existing dialogue based on the two-way flow of information is developing with all the necessary flexibility. The President of Ukraine recently came to see me when in Brussels, as did the Russian Ambassador and the Ukrainian chargé d'affaires in order to discuss the results of the Lisbon meeting. A decision has been taken on the principle of dialogue with Cyprus and Malta which officially began at the end of last week. Lastly, WEU's dialogue with non-member Mediterranean countries now includes Israel. Your reports on the Baltic countries, Ukraine and the Eastern Mediterranean enable these contacts, which are fully justified by the fact that WEU is part and parcel of the development of the European Union, to be seen in a wider context.

As regards the Yugoslav crisis, the situation there, though appalling, can only prompt us to persevere in our support for all the efforts made to limit the bloodshed and find a political solution. The WEU Council has been kept regularly informed of developments by the President of the European Union. It has done its best to monitor what is happening in the three areas where WEU is involved as such: the Adriatic, the Danube and Mostar.

I now turn to WEU's contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental conference. If I may first comment generally, our experience in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty showed how vital it was that public opinion in our countries should understand and support the steps to be taken in the construc-

tion of Europe. This will be particularly the case in such sensitive fields as security and defence. National members of parliaments have therefore a key rôle to play in this respect.

Spain, which on 1st July of this year takes over the presidency of both the Council of the European Union and the WEU Council, makes WEU's contribution to the intergovernmental conference one of its priorities. While not closing my eyes to the substantial differences between member states on this subject, it is my view that the seminar organised by the Portuguese President early this month in Sintra – where, incidentally, you spoke Mr. President – brought forth some points where all were agreed. First, no one wishes the status quo to continue; everyone recognises that Article J4 of the Maastricht Treaty points the right way to go. Second, it is clear that defence will continue to be an intergovernmental issue. Third, transatlantic links will also remain of vital importance.

Whatever decisions are taken in the institutional field, we must not lose sight of the political and military reality. Militarily, the development of our operational capability, taking particular care to close some major gaps in Europe in the fields of intelligence, strategic transport and communications, and to maintain and possibly further develop a solid base in the armaments field, remains a key objective whose achievement will call for considerable budgetary effort by our governments. Politically, we have to consider our allies' views and not present them with faits accomplis.

After slightly more than six months as Secretary-General of WEU, it is my belief that we are on the right road. For the immediate future, my concern is to see Europe, in defence terms, equipped with as effective a capability as possible, bearing in mind member states' choices and the resources available. The road ahead is difficult, long and complicated. In overcoming the difficulties and succeeding in this enterprise, which is decisive for our future, I assure you, ladies and gentlemen, your aid will be invaluable, not only in this forum or institutionally in your relations with the Council, but above all because you are the representatives of national parliaments vis-à-vis your governments. WEU will do no more and no less than what the governments of member states want it to do.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for being brief, Mr. Secretary-General, as you promised. Your speech was none the worse for that and you set a good example to others. As I said, questions to the Secretary-General will be taken after the address by Mr. Kinkel. Thank you for your remarks, Mr. Secretary-General, which were extremely helpful.

## 12. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council

*(Presentation of the second part  
of the fortieth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1453)*

**Address by Mr. Durão Barroso,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal,  
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of the second part of the fortieth annual report of the Council by Mr. Durão Barroso, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal and Chairman-in-Office of the Council. Before I call Mr. Durão Barroso to present his report, I remind the Assembly that it will be followed by an address by Mr. Figueiredo Lopes, Minister of Defence of Portugal. At the end of his address, both Ministers will answer questions.

Before I ask Mr. Durão Barroso to take the tribune, I remind the Assembly that the Portuguese presidency is nearing its close and the presentation that Mr. Durão Barroso is about to give is in large measure an assessment of that presidency's achievements. The Assembly, for its part, is most appreciative of the presidency's efforts to keep the Assembly as fully informed as possible of the Council's activities. I drew attention to that in my own speech a few minutes ago.

Earlier this year, Mr. Durão Barroso, you transmitted to us the programme that you had drawn up for the presidency and on 16th May, when you received the Presidential Committee and two other committees, we were able to ascertain that the programme had largely been carried out. All in all we are most happy. We thank you, Mr. Durão Barroso, for postponing by twenty-four hours your visit to Washington to attend today and I invite you to take the floor.

Mr. DURÃO BARROSO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Chairman-in Office of the Council*). – Mr. President and distinguished members of the Assembly, it is a great honour to address you. This is the first time that Portugal has taken part in a session of the Assembly during its presidency. I pay tribute to the contribution that the Assembly is making to the quality of debate and to an understanding of European affairs in the framework of WEU. The Assembly has established itself as an indispensable forum for the examination of WEU issues and as an important stimulus for Council action.

As we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of peace in Europe we are again facing a war on our continent. The conflict in former Yugoslavia continues to be a matter of deep concern to us all. Old tensions and threats reappear. Security in Europe is still fraught with risks – not the global threat of the cold war but risks more difficult to

prevent, fight or contain. Somewhat controversially, those risks are sometimes defined as low-level threats. They deserve our close attention. Security is indivisible and we must tackle our problems together.

As I said in the closing session of the WEU presidency seminar at Sintra, the task before us is to adapt and to reshape existing institutions to the new European and transatlantic political and security environment by redefining rôles, vocations and responsibilities. WEU has a rôle to play in that evolving process, which is why, six months ago, we looked forward to a pragmatic, efficient and issue-oriented programme. We tried to combine concrete proposals for the development of WEU's operational capabilities with a more reflective dimension. One illustration of that was the common reflection of the new European security conditions, which shows that WEU can contribute to the shaping of a European security and defence identity.

I will concentrate on the main achievements of the Portuguese presidency. At the institutional level Greece acceded to WEU as a full member. Consequently, associate member and associate partner status have entered into force. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined as observers, following their accession to the European Union. As to dialogue with third countries, I stress that the mechanisms for the relationship with Russia and Ukraine have been clarified and there is now a framework for dialogue with those countries as well as for an exchange of information on issues of common interest.

As to non-WEU Mediterranean countries, ministers approved recommendations for the enhancement of present contacts. That dialogue was enlarged to include Israel. In relation to Cyprus and Malta, the dialogue will be launched in line with the development of those two countries' links with the European Union. At political and conceptual level, the first phase of the common reflection on the new security conditions – an exercise conducted at 27 – was approved at the Lisbon ministerial meeting. It was the first study conducted by all WEU countries aimed at identifying security risks facing European countries and defining common interests, and at launching the basis for the identification of adequate resources for those challenges. That will constitute the second phase of the exercise, which will be conducted under the Spanish presidency. The outcome will eventually result in a white paper on European security.

At the Lisbon ministerial meeting, an initial exchange of views was held on WEU input for the 1996 European Union intergovernmental conference. WEU will prepare reports to be submitted to the next ministerial meeting in Madrid.

*Mr. Durão Barroso (continued)*

In that context, the Portuguese presidency organised a seminar on WEU's contribution to the future European security and defence architecture, which took place in Sintra on 3rd and 4th June 1995. The discussion focused mainly on the topic generally regarded as having a bearing on the future of our organisation: the evolution of the relationship between WEU and NATO. I believe that this was particularly useful as we approach the 1996 intergovernmental conference.

Finally, let me address the operational and structural level. The development of WEU's operational capabilities was our main priority. The reinforcement of WEU's operational rôle, decided in Lisbon, neither modified the intergovernmental character of WEU nor created an integrated military structure. The Lisbon Council of Ministers agreed on new mechanisms that should enable WEU to become an effective, coherent and consistent politico-military instrument, allowing the organisation to fulfil the tasks set out at Petersberg without changing its nature.

New decision-making mechanisms and structures were established to enable the organisation better to handle possible involvement in crisis-management situations. A politico-military working group to support the Council was set up and its relationship with a new military delegates group and the Planning Cell was defined. A situation centre and an intelligence section in the Planning Cell were also created. Provisions for the financial support of WEU operations for the next two years were agreed. The Satellite Centre was established as a WEU permanent body.

The mechanisms for the identification of forces answerable to WEU – FAWEU – were refined. In that context, ministers noted the availability, as FAWEU for Petersberg missions, of the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, with the participation of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

A document on the principles and modalities for establishing a WEU humanitarian task force and on the use of military assets in humanitarian crises was also endorsed by the ministers. My colleague, the Minister of Defence, will go into further detail on the operational achievements.

In my view, the decisions taken in Lisbon were important steps to assert the identity of our organisation and to strengthen its operational capabilities. They will also enable WEU to become an effective European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and to be better prepared to take advantage of the capabilities existing in NATO for Petersberg missions. Transparency, co-operation and close co-ordination between WEU and NATO are more important now than ever before.

In this perspective, the Portuguese presidency attaches a great deal of interest to progress in the field of WEU-NATO relations. When preparing for our presidency, our consultations made clear that chances for a breakthrough in the implementation of the CJTF concept were still very remote.

We chose to concentrate on measures that would ensure the necessary improvement of transparency between the work of the two organisations. In this framework a decision was approved on practical links between NATO and WEU, including joint councils and co-operation between secretariats. WEU identified assets and capabilities that it will need in its future operations and defined its views on the mechanisms and procedures for the use of assets and capabilities that the alliance could make available to WEU. NATO comments on this work are now expected.

Finally, an institutional dialogue has started to develop the CJTF concept further, including joint meetings of WEU and NATO relevant politico-military groups and attendance of the Planning Cell as well as cross-representation of secretariats at these meetings.

My colleague will mention WEU operations. I would like, however, to say a few words on this subject. Since the beginning of our presidency we have attached a great deal of importance to the current three WEU operations. For us these operations are a concrete expression of what WEU can and should accomplish.

Our presence in Mostar represents a study case as far as institutional and practical co-operation between WEU and the European Union is concerned. On the Danube and in the Adriatic it shows the usefulness of WEU and demonstrates, in a very clear way, that it possesses the will and the ability to play an active rôle in the wider context of the European security architecture.

As an illustration of the importance we attach to WEU operations, we have conducted two evaluation missions to Mostar and one to the Danube mission. I had the opportunity to visit both operations and my colleague the Minister of Defence visited operation Sharp Guard.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to say that in spite of the achievements that I just mentioned, we are perfectly aware that WEU's present situation is not yet satisfactory. WEU still mainly suffers from an operational deficit. It still does not have all the necessary capabilities to undertake military operations in all the areas identified in the Petersberg declaration. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that WEU has made substantial progress over the past six months. Our presidency has tried to provide a firm foundation for WEU operational decision-making.

*Mr. Durão Barroso (continued)*

We have to recognise that WEU has attained a new degree of maturity which should enable it better to perform the double rôle that member states have assigned to it in Maastricht: to become the defence component of the European Union and, simultaneously, to reinforce the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister, for that enlightening and constructive speech, which you delivered in a short space of time. We are eternally grateful for that.

### **13. Address by Mr. Figueiredo Lopes, Minister of Defence of Portugal**

The PRESIDENT. – Without further ado, I call your colleague, Mr. Figueiredo Lopes, Minister of Defence of Portugal. I commented earlier on Portugal's approach to its presidency. That approach is clearly due to you as well, Mr. Lopes. You have been constantly at Mr. Barroso's side during the past six months, as I have seen on many occasions. The various bodies of the Assembly have had the opportunity to welcome you and to talk with you. We are very grateful indeed and we now ask you to address us.

Mr. FIGUEIREDO LOPES (*Minister of Defence of Portugal*). – As you are aware, the development of WEU's operational capacities was the first priority of the Portuguese presidency. That was due to the fact that it was the unanimous opinion of all member states that WEU did not have the necessary capacity to carry out military operations in keeping with the missions defined by the Petersberg declaration, and that it was urgent that that state of affairs be put right.

The first measure therefore was to rationalise the decision-making process at politico-military level through the creation of the POL-MIL group and to define its relationship with the Council, the military delegates group and the Planning Cell. Conditions have also been created to provide more efficient management of crisis situations through the establishment of a situation centre and an intelligence section in the Planning Cell, which will inevitably contribute to the reinforcement of that body's rôle.

The procedures and objectives aimed at identifying the forces available to WEU in the future have been refined, and progress has been made in identifying the capacities which WEU will require in future operations. In that context, a report has been submitted by the organisation's Secretary-General on the need to strengthen the secretariat in the politico-military area and it is expected that a decision to that effect will be taken at the next meeting of the Ministerial Council of WEU.

Progress has also been made in the working relations between WEU and NATO, which have been developed on the basis of the principles of transparency and close co-ordination. Joint sessions of the Councils of both organisations have therefore begun and co-operation between their secretariats has been intensified.

Co-operation and institutional dialogue between WEU and NATO, particularly with a view to developing and implementing the CJTF concept, have been intensified during our presidency, and joint meetings have been held by the politico-military groups of both organisations, the POL-MIL of WEU and the NATO Provisional Policy Co-ordination Group. Members of the Planning Cell and the secretariat of both organisations have been present at those meetings.

A provisional agreement of two years' duration has also been reached in respect of financing the organisation's operations. That will provide it with a certain autonomy and will consolidate the approved operational package.

We therefore consider that the decisions taken in that area constitute decisive steps towards allowing this organisation to play an essential rôle in strengthening the European identity of security and defence, despite the fact that WEU is not yet in possession of all the resources required to fulfil the missions with which it may be entrusted. Further efforts are required in that field.

During the Portuguese presidency, France, Italy and Spain decided to set up two new forces – the EUROFOR and the EUROMARFOR – which are open to all WEU members. Portugal has decided to join those forces as soon as they are created and the documents constituting them were signed in Lisbon on 15th May last. Those forces will be declared available to WEU and will be used as a priority within that framework, although they may also be employed in a NATO context with a view to reinforcing the European pillar of the alliance.

Progress has also been achieved in space activities. Thus, the Torrejón Satellite Centre is now a permanent body of the organisation and the space working group will proceed with its work with a view to determining the best possible method of developing WEU's capacity to use satellite images with the aim of increasing security.

Our involvement in the efforts made by the international community to contain and put an end to the conflict in former Yugoslavia has demonstrated that the organisation can play a useful and active rôle in the wider context of the architecture of European security. The presence of WEU in Mostar, on the Danube and in the Adriatic, has contributed to the increased visibility of the organisation. It is a concrete expression of the rôle which WEU will be able to play in the future in

*Mr. Figueiredo Lopes (continued)*

terms of the missions with which it may be entrusted, particularly in crisis-management and humanitarian problems.

I had an opportunity, during our presidency, to visit operation Sharp Guard last April. I saw that the Adriatic was being efficiently patrolled and monitored by both organisations and is no longer used as a route to violate the embargo. Operation Sharp Guard clearly demonstrates that WEU and NATO can operate jointly in an exemplary fashion.

As my colleague, Mr. Durão Barroso, said, two assessment missions were made to Mostar in February and June. He was able to visit the region and evaluate the situation in loco last May.

The WEU police force stationed in Mostar has contributed to stabilisation in the region and to the progress that has been made so far in setting up the future unified police of Mostar. Implementation of the first stage of the creation of that police force, envisaged for the period of the Portuguese presidency, has now almost been concluded and the WEU police contingent will be completed with the participation of Greece, Austria and Sweden, which we welcome with satisfaction.

The presidency also had the opportunity to note the positive results that have been achieved in recent months in the Danube operation. My colleague, Mr. Durão Barroso, visited the region last month and confirmed not only the commitment of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to the application of sanctions, but the efficacy with which that operation is being carried out.

To sum up, we consider that, during the past few months, WEU has taken significant steps to correct its operational and political deficits and has achieved an operational development and a maturity at politico-military level, enabling the organisation not only to face the new challenges of security in Europe but significantly to develop the new European identity of security and defence.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Lopes, for your brevity and your interesting comment.

Mr. Barroso and Mr. Lopes will now jointly answer questions from members of the Assembly. Three questions have been tabled. I ask speakers to be brief, just as our ministers have been kind enough to keep their speeches brief.

I call Mr. Rodrigues to ask the first question.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Foreign Minister, in Sintra recently you drew attention to the fact that the situation in Bosnia can have no military solution, be it through the European Union, NATO or WEU. And you added:

“NATO was not set up to resolve internal conflicts in countries outside the sphere of the organisation but rather to defend member countries from external aggression”. I am in complete agreement with you on this.

My question is the following: do you agree that NATO should not be asked – especially since everything points to it having a negative effect – to intervene operationally again in Bosnia?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. DURÃO BARROSO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I am going to answer Mr. Rodrigues's question by saying that of course I maintain what I said at the time. As regards the NATO presence in the conflict in former Yugoslavia, this is to help in the effort to find a political and diplomatic solution; I do not think a solution to the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be imposed by force from the outside.

That said, I continue to believe that it is essential for NATO and also for WEU to maintain a presence there and that is what we ought to be discussing here today. As stated earlier, I have been to Mostar myself and seen the excellent work being done by WEU. Both the Bosnian and Croatian Presidents told me that were it not for the WEU presence, the war in Mostar would still be going on. And again, last week, I was in the operations centre of the Danube mission in Calafate.

So whilst I think that an external presence is important, I continue to believe that the solution lies in internal agreement and that the presence of NATO and WEU is justified both on humanitarian grounds and also, through the use of pressure, as a means towards finding a political solution for the region.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. The next question is from another Portuguese, Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to thank Mr. Durão Barroso for his tribute to the Assembly's contribution to the development of WEU, and also, in particular, the Portuguese presidency for the pragmatic, efficient and down to earth programme, dealing with real issues, that it has carried out.

Highlights in it have been the preparation of WEU's contribution to the 1996 conference, the priority given to strengthening the operational capacity of our organisation to enable it to play a more active rôle and the intensification of contacts with Mediterranean countries.

I have two brief questions: first, how far does Mr. Durão Barroso believe it is possible to go in the co-operation with countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean?

*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

Second and more generally: do you not think that, in security and defence matters, the safest and most effective way forward is realism, rather than dallying with theoretical constructs which, however brilliant, come to nothing and only create divisions between WEU member states?

I should be very grateful for your views on these two questions.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Durão Barroso.

Mr. DURÃO BARROSO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I shall reply in French, since a short time ago I spoke in English, and I have not yet had an opportunity of speaking another WEU official language.

Mr. Roseta's first question relates to the Mediterranean. The Council is now in dialogue with every one of the southern Mediterranean countries. During the last half-year meetings have taken place between the permanent representative of the presidency and the WEU Secretary-General, Mr. Cutileiro and the ambassadors in Brussels of these Mediterranean countries, namely Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Egypt. The discussions were on security conditions in the Mediterranean. Since 26th May, Israel has been included in this group of countries. We think that the contacts should continue and that we should make an effort to dispel any possible misunderstandings and explain the reason for the setting up of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR. So you see, Mr. Roseta, that we attach very great importance to this dialogue with the Mediterranean countries.

The second question is of a more philosophical nature and concerns how we should operate. I agree with Mr. Roseta that we should be pragmatic. I was in Messina a few days ago with my WEU colleagues for the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the Messina declaration. It would be a good idea to read this declaration again. For those who were then involved or have studied the declaration, it was a setback for the European defence community. This would have been a serious blow to our idea of Europe, but a number of governments got together to give new and more pragmatic life to the same objective, i.e. closer union among all the peoples of Europe. I believe this is our objective, but how can we attain it? Personally I do not think that it will be by setting up vast systems, models or constructions, but by having an objective which is very clear and unambiguous: European union, a stronger European union having a real European security and defence identity. To achieve this we must proceed step by step and create more operational structures, as we have already done. We have made our contribution and we are sure that others will do

the same. This objective will be furthered and more rapidly achieved if we proceed pragmatically and gradually, never departing from our goal, nor getting involved in high-flown academic discussion about institutions. Institutions are instruments, not an object in themselves.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I will now call someone who is not a Portuguese, but from the United Kingdom, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS (*United Kingdom*). – WEU is responsible for enforcing the embargo on trade with Serbia. It is widely reported that Greek and Italian oil companies are breaking the embargo by providing Serbia with oil through Albania. Will the representatives of the Council of Ministers take this opportunity to identify those oil companies, and if not, why not?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. DURÃO BARROSO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I will be happy to do so if the distinguished member could give me clear evidence of his allegations. If he does so, I will have no problem in asking my colleagues from the member countries to do that. So far, the presidency has not received evidence to back up those allegations, which I know exist. I cannot say much more than that. If I have clear evidence there will be no difficulty in discussing the matter with my colleagues.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. In conclusion, I thank both Ministers for their kindness in coming here today, for their frankness, and for their real interest in this matter. Let me once more say how much we appreciate the way in which Portugal has performed in the past six months. That is a great credit to your country. Let me also be totally irregular by thanking not just the two Ministers but their ambassador to WEU and NATO, Ambassador Martins da Cruz. He has been a pillar of strength for WEU and particularly helpful to me in my presidency for the past six months. Thank you, gentlemen, you have our appreciation.

#### *14. Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany*

The PRESIDENT. – I wish now to introduce Mr. Kinkel, the Deputy Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany. The wish of Mr. Kinkel to speak today is particularly welcome, three years after he addressed our Assembly at WEU, then as Chairman of the Council.

Mr. KINKEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, exactly three years ago today, on 19th June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers met under German



*Mr. Kinkel (continued)*

chairmanship at Petersberg near Bonn. On that occasion, only three days after I took office as Foreign Minister, WEU began to adjust to the new challenges in Europe. The foreign and defence ministers of the Central and Eastern European countries participated for the first time. They are now associate partners of WEU and I would like to extend a particularly warm welcome to their parliamentary representatives. Their presence is a sign that Europe is growing together.

During the last few months we have vigorously and successfully continued the development of WEU's operational capabilities. I would like to thank the Portuguese presidency for resolutely pushing ahead with this process.

We have a clear goal which we share with all those who looked back on the end of the second world war on 8th May: we want a Europe in which wars are once and for all a thing of the past. We are faced with the strategic task of extending Western Europe's stable peaceful order to the whole of Europe. The revolutions which liberated the eastern part of our continent have brought us a good deal closer to realising this vision. It is less than five years since we drew a final line under the era of confrontation and division in Europe here in Paris with the Charter for a New Europe. This is what we recognised.

Security must in future be defined in broader terms and organised in co-operation rather than in competition with one another. This was the central strategic idea behind the establishment of the ECSC and the ensuing integration in Western Europe. Our task for the twenty-first century is to firmly anchor in the whole continent this most innovative security concept of twentieth century Europe.

The concept of a co-operative architecture of security for Europe leaves no room for ideas of supremacy or for spheres of influence, from whatever side. We want to extend and tighten the bonds of the network of stability and security in Europe, which rests on four corner posts.

The EU is developing into the core of stability for the whole of Europe. It must redeem its pledge to allow the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to accede as soon as they have fulfilled the prerequisites for membership.

WEU must take on the double rôle assigned to it as the defence component of the EU and as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and provide the EU's common foreign and security policy with the urgently needed operational capabilities.

NATO anchors the American presence in Europe and thus remains the key guarantor of our

security and of stability in Europe. It must further elaborate its partnership for peace initiative, open up to new members and develop a strategic partnership with Russia. The NATO meeting of foreign ministers which took place in the Netherlands two weeks ago set down important markers for this, and Russia has – at last, one could say – underwritten the partnership for peace.

The OSCE must evolve into an efficient instrument of preventive diplomacy. As the only pan-European organisation it offers the ideal framework for co-operative security structures which encompass Russia as well as the United States and, of course, Canada. With its numerous missions it is already making an indispensable contribution towards stability and peace throughout Europe.

Co-operative rather than competitive security means, above all, granting Russia its legitimate place. Russia's integration does not imply a right to vote or indeed a veto in the internal affairs of the EU, WEU or NATO, or on questions of accession. Rather, it implies a strategic partnership, dialogue and co-operation in the hope and on condition that Russia observes the Charter for a New Europe, i.e. the house rules of the European house, which it solemnly signed.

That is why it is so important that we talk frankly to Moscow about the brutal events in Chechnya, as we have just done once again, clearly and plainly, in Halifax. We expect Boris Yeltsin to create peace in Chechnya. We want him to tell us that the Russian Government has remained democratic, that it will grant autonomy there in the framework of the Russian constitution, which allows for that.

It would be an illusion to believe that stability and security in Europe could be guaranteed in the long run if Russia were to be excluded from our security planning in military or political terms. We need a long-term policy towards Russia, a strategically based policy, which must not oscillate on the point of the Chechnyan needle, but must tell Russia clearly and plainly that we want it to know that this kind of strategic partnership is a two-way street, not a one-way street.

In the OSCE Russia has been an equal partner of particular importance for some time now. Our offer to Russia comprises, firstly, a security partnership with NATO. In my view, following the dialogue that has now begun in the Netherlands, this could lead to a charter in which we define certain consultation mechanisms with Russia, in which we resolve questions of disarmament and renunciation of the use of force with Russia, and in which we could for example also make joint preparations, or define the procedures for preparing peace-keeping measures by the United Nations troops.

*Mr. Kinkel (continued)*

Second, we offer Russia a political and, above all, an economic partnership with the European Union. In fact an agreement on such a partnership has now been drawn up. The French presidency, together with Spain and myself, recently told President Yeltsin clearly and plainly in Russia that this agreement is actually ready for signing, but that we are not signing it because of the situation in Chechnya. We have made four or five demands which we believe must be met before we sign the agreement. This was repeated last Monday in Luxembourg, on the part of the fifteen European foreign ministers.

Lastly, our offer to Russia is a political partnership within the G-7. We reiterated and confirmed that offer in Halifax last weekend.

WEU is also called upon to take action. It will begin a dialogue with Russia in the course of its further development as the EU's security and defence component. It is important, in my view, that we consider a similar process with regard to Ukraine.

A Europe which is growing together politically needs to develop its own foreign and security identity within the European Union. European military operational capabilities are imperative for an effective European security policy. If the EU really intends to play an independent rôle in the sphere of foreign and security policy it must be able to commit its own military resources if necessary. When Europe is called upon to contribute to crisis-management, peace-keeping measures or humanitarian missions we cannot keep looking to the United States. In particular, the recent discussion on strengthening and financing UNPROFOR shows the limits which America itself has set on its involvement in Europe, as we also saw in Halifax last weekend. Yes, Europe must develop a greater capacity to act. This also applies when the lives of European citizens are at risk anywhere in the world.

In future Europe will have to assume greater responsibility for collective security and defence within the Atlantic Alliance. By combining and interlinking Europe's military forces we are strengthening the European pillar of the transatlantic security alliance. WEU is the appropriate instrument for this.

NATO and WEU must work closely together and complement each other, especially during crises in Europe. One thing is clear, however: our collective defence is one of NATO's core functions and remains the task of the alliance.

We have achieved a great deal together in WEU since the Petersberg meeting three years ago. WEU has made significant progress towards increasing its operational capability. Proofs of this

are the embargo-monitoring operation in the Adriatic and on the Danube, as well as the assignment of a large police contingent to the EU administration in Mostar.

The member states have designated units for action on behalf of WEU; the WEU Planning Cell can thus put together forces tailored to emergency requirements.

The European Corps, the first large-scale military formation available to both WEU and NATO, will be brought up to full operational readiness by October. Other contributions are either already available or have been announced.

The EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR multinational standby units, which were introduced by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain during the last Ministerial Council meeting, will further enhance WEU's operational rôle.

Co-operation between WEU and the Central and Eastern European countries has also been intensified: with the active participation of our associate partners we have prepared a joint study on the new security situation in Europe.

Thus Europe is also taking on its security rôle. But there is still a great deal to be done. I would like to mention three aspects in particular.

First, we must continue to strengthen WEU's operational capability. A real breakthrough will only be achieved if NATO and WEU can make reciprocal use of existing structures. We must redouble our efforts in order to resolve swiftly the problems connected with the combined joint task forces concept. This must be a priority in our endeavours to strengthen WEU's operational rôle over the coming months.

Second, WEU needs more effective means of communication, and a separate, modern reconnaissance system. Early and reliable information on emerging international crises is the prerequisite for tackling them. Without its own information base Europe's foreign and security policy would be a fragile structure. Therefore our aim must be to create a European reconnaissance satellite system. A start has already been made: the WEU Satellite Centre has been operating successfully in Madrid for the last two years. France, Italy and Spain have jointly built Helios I, the first European reconnaissance satellite, which will be launched shortly. I advocate that the next generation of satellites be sponsored jointly by all WEU states.

Third, a common security policy requires a sound base in the defence industry. Today's situation gives cause for concern because more and more capacity is being lost for lack of an adequate framework. Action must be taken urgently. What we need is a Europeanisation of our hitherto strictly national markets. The aim is to create a common armaments market. A European arma-

*Mr. Kinkel (continued)*

ments agency could help in this. A European armaments policy naturally also requires a joint armaments export policy. Germany advocates that Europe pursue a joint course on this issue.

A European Union which sees itself as a community sharing a common destiny calls not only for a common currency but also for a commitment by all members to its most essential element, the security of all its members. This is why we need more European integration – in foreign and security policy and eventually also in defence. In the longer term, we must therefore put a stop to the parallel existence of EU and WEU. In the interests of Europe's efficiency and operational capacity, we should speak out in favour of integrating WEU into the EU as its security and defence component.

At the 1996 intergovernmental conference we must summon the courage to take forward-looking decisions and to set the right course. For 1996 this means taking a pragmatic approach which links the necessary and the possible with the vision of Maastricht.

We should include WEU in the European Council's authority to set policy guidelines. This would lay the foundation for joint European action on security policy. Following that, the alliance between WEU and the EU should first be strengthened in the field of crisis-reaction. This could be achieved by linking the activities of the two organisations more closely, for example by using joint analysis and planning capacities in monitoring and managing crises. It is also necessary to align the schedules for EU and WEU ministerial meetings with a view to progressive interlocking, and to seek the broadest possible practical co-operation at all levels. These are specific objectives which should be attained at the intergovernmental conference.

I repeat, our aim should be to integrate the WEU and EU institutions in the long term, from the ministerial councils down to the working groups. We have already successfully pursued a similar line in the case of the EEC, ECSC and EURATOM.

Of course, special procedures will have to be followed in dealing with defence issues in the EU. Merely adopting existing Community rules is out of the question. The deployment of armed forces uniquely affects the rights and interests of member states. No member state can be forced to deploy its own forces against its will, which means that such deployment cannot be decided on a majority vote. I think this is a most important point. On the other hand, solidarity demands that in such cases individual member states do not prevent a majority from taking joint action.

Germany is committed to co-operating in the opening of a new chapter in Europe's security and defence policy. None of our countries could on its own maintain peace and stability on our continent. Only if Europe acts jointly and resolutely will it be able to assume its due share of responsibility for peace in the world, and of course in Europe itself. I would like to ask all representatives at this WEU Assembly for their vigorous support in this important task. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister, for your wide-ranging and important speech, especially your conclusions on likely developments during the next year or so. It is a great pity that we do not have longer to ask you a plethora of questions about that. Before the session started, you informed us that you have to be away before 5.15 p.m. and it is not your fault that we are running at least forty minutes late. I therefore ask those who are especially keen to ask questions to keep them extremely brief. I propose that you should go on as long as you can, Minister and, hopefully, we will get through most of the questions.

First, I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – At the beginning of this month the European Union set up a reflection group to review the EU Treaty. However much we welcome the presence of members of the European Parliament in this group, a number of people are wondering why the WEU parliamentary Assembly does not form part of it. I would like to hear your views on that.

I also wanted to ask you whether you regard the revised Brussels Treaty adopted by our Assembly in June 1991 as a suitable basis for adjusting the treaty to the new challenges facing security and integration policy?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KINKEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany*) (Translation). – In answer to the first question, I would very much welcome this but I do not think it is possible. Nor would there be any point in my trying to pretend otherwise. We have two representatives in the European Parliament's reflection group. WEU is – still, I might add – other. That is why I do not think it will be possible. It would simply be unfair if I tried to pretend otherwise.

On the second question, I know that there is much to be criticised in the treaty. I too find much to criticise in it. But I feel we must consider very carefully whether we should embark on a basic revision at this particular time. We must consider whether, in view of what I have described as necessary and, I hope, imminent, namely the integration of EU and WEU, we are not taking on too much. I believe that we as a body would probably be taking on too much if we moved towards a

*Mr. Kinkel (continued)*

revision of the treaty. I realise that it is necessary in principle. I am aware of the difficulties and the inadequacies. But there too, I think it would be unrealistic to move towards something which will probably become superfluous in the foreseeable future, namely when what I hope we all envisage actually takes place.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Blunck.

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Kinkel, what is the Federal Government's opinion of the nuclear tests planned by the French Government in the South Pacific, given the recently expressed worldwide commitment to nuclear disarmament? Was the Federal Government consulted or informed in advance and, if so, what was its response?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KINKEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany*) (Translation). – We were informed in advance. I was in Warsaw at the time. I too was informed, before the announcement, by President Chirac. The Federal Government's position is clear. We have been calling for an absolute ban on tests for a long time. For my part, I have set out the Federal Government's position in a ten-point document on disarmament. In the presence of some deputies who are here in this chamber I restated the position of the Federal Government clearly and plainly at the United Nations meeting in New York.

That is our position, and that was also the official position of the Federal Government.

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mrs. Papanreou.

Mrs. PAPANREOU (*Greece*) (Translation). – Minister, you gave us a picture of the Europe of the future as you wish it to be and I personally agree with you on many aspects. Certainly, Europe should achieve its own common foreign policy and its own common defence, and with this in view I agree that Western European Union should evolve towards integration with the European Union. However, whereas at the time, the Maastricht Treaty aroused reactions on the part of the people, today we are facing reactions from several national parliaments. Many here, in this very organisation, hold a very different view of what Western European Union's rôle should be.

Hence my question: if governments do not discuss Europe's future with their own national parliaments, how do you expect to respond to the challenge, not just of the common citizen, but of parliamentarians as well?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KINKEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany*) (Translation). I discussed the integration of the EU and WEU in my address. It is desirable. It is very clear to us just now that Europe's common foreign and security policy still leaves much to be desired, especially in former Yugoslavia, where barbarity in the truest sense of the word has returned to Europe and where we Europeans are unable to deal with what is actually a European problem.

On the road to Maastricht we quite certainly did not all manage to win over the hearts and minds of the people of Europe. In our preparations for the 1996 intergovernmental conference we must try to win them over, so that it is not just an arrangement by the bureaucrats. What it must transmit to the people of the various countries is a sense of closer European integration. During the preparations for the intergovernmental conference – which began in Messina with the reflection group – a crucial question must be: "How are we to design the common foreign and security policy in future, how shall we ensure that we can really speak of a common foreign and security policy?" I can only hope, with you, that we will manage this together. I am convinced we will succeed, especially since there are a few other areas where we are lagging much further behind; we need only think of the whole area of internal affairs and justice, where we are lagging far behind compared with the level of economic and legal integration and compared with the common foreign and security policy.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I now call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – It is part of the mythology of the conflict in former Yugoslavia that the Federal Republic of Germany made matters worse by pressurising the European Community partners into premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. That is not an analysis that I accept. I think that recognition was necessary and right and that its effect on the conflict was neutral. Given that the view that recognition was wrong is pretty widely held, including in this Assembly, I should be grateful if Mr. Kinkel would take the opportunity – with the authority of the Foreign Ministry of Germany – to tell us clearly why it should be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KINKEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany*) (Translation). – Why such an accusation has been made is something I cannot tell you either. But I am thankful that you quite obviously do not endorse it and have rejected it. Otherwise I would have had to do so. If you ask me, I would even go so far as to say the accusation is absolutely inappropriate. In my view, it would actually have been better to do it even sooner. That is why I cannot support the allegations that keep being made.

*Mr. Kinkel (continued)*

If you look at the situation in Slovenia and Croatia today you will find that we in Europe were right. If the problems with Italy did not exist, Slovenia would in the meantime have become far and away the most developed country and, to use a rather slangy expression, would be standing right outside the European door. When I look at Croatia, I find there too that in spite of its problems, Croatia has developed quite markedly. Really we can only be glad that Slovenia and Croatia have to a large extent been excluded from the experiences elsewhere in the area. I can only say that in retrospect what was done was right, and has been confirmed. But in fact I do not have to justify this at all, since you have rejected the accusation.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. López Henares.

Mr. LÓPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I congratulate you, Minister, on your speech. Naturally you referred to Russia, Russia being a vital component of European security, and you also spoke about the war in Chechnya. You said that we must leave the question to Mr. Yeltsin in the hope that he will solve it.

What is the position of the German Government? Does it consider that the question should be left entirely to the discretion of the Government of the Russian Federation, on the grounds that this is a domestic problem, or is he of the view that dialogue should be encouraged so as to put an end as soon as possible to all the bloodshed?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KINKEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany*) (Translation). – If I remember rightly I was the first Foreign Minister to call for the OSCE to be brought in, and thank God it is involved in Chechnya. We always said that the OSCE's function there could not be simply as an observer, but that it has constructive work to do: preparing for an election which, we hope, will be held one day, preparing reconstruction measures, and so on and so forth. As a headliner in the OSCE, Hungary is currently playing a very decisive and positive rôle in this area.

The situation in Chechnya is of course primarily an internal Russian affair, but naturally it does and must concern us very much. We must use every means available to us to influence Russia and say clearly and plainly: not that way! And we have done so. The same thing has now happened in Halifax. Yeltsin and Kosyrev have again been told quite clearly what we think of this conflict. In the context of a political G-8 involvement, Russia was solidly opposed to a passage on Chechnya appearing in the final communiqué. But in agreement with the other heads of government, the Canadian prime minister expressed a very definite opinion on the matter at the press conference. At that particular time, of

course, the situation for Russia was also affected by the taking of hostages in Chechnya. In Halifax, Yeltsin stated very firmly and clearly that this showed they were dealing with a terrorist régime, and how right he had always been to describe the régime as he had, and that there was no other way to deal with such a régime. Of course we tried to distinguish between two things: Chechnya from Russia's point of view and from ours, and the hostage situation. I received a message just now which you too have probably received, that the hostage-taking is over. However, it took a terrible toll.

As far as Russia is concerned, let me repeat that we must of course pursue a long-term policy, for without the inclusion of Russia, there can be no political, economic or security order in Europe. Without the inclusion of Russia, there can be no new architecture of Europe. Let me repeat: that does not mean a veto where the EU, WEU or NATO are concerned. That is our decision. As for involvement in security, it is up to the countries that want to join NATO to say where they think their security needs will be best satisfied. At least that is how I see the situation.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, you said that WEU should draw closer to the European Union, even to the extent that you advocate their merging together. In my view you are going too fast and personally I do not share your opinion.

In any case, WEU and European Union procedures are very different. To take the example of your country, I note that the Karlsruhe Court considers that the German Parliament should be asked for its view if Germany were ever required to commit troops abroad. Here there is a difference in viewpoints, and I am surprised that you can go so far as to speak of merging. I do not think that the 1996 intergovernmental conference envisages such a possibility.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KINKEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany*) (Translation). – You take a different view. I cannot prevent you from doing so. But conversely you cannot prevent me from having my view.

You referred to the Federal Supreme Court. I think you mean the Federal Constitutional Court. As former minister of justice, I have read the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court very carefully. What I proposed in my statement does not go against the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court but can certainly be subsumed under it.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. De DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Please allow me, Minister, to add to the question asked by my friend Mr. Valleix.

*Mr. De Decker (continued)*

You want WEU to be integrated with the European Union. I can perfectly well understand this aim in principle. However, we have to see how realistic it is, since the European Union is going to become even larger and some of the countries which have recently joined have a tradition of neutrality.

I should like to ask you, Minister, specifically what are the contacts you have had with governments which make you think that it would be possible to adapt decision-making procedures in the European Union so as to develop a common and foreign security policy, without the risk of vetoes and blocked machinery which would make Europe entirely powerless in these fields.

How do you see new procedures being adopted? What contacts have you had with governments of member countries which make you think that this is a realistic aim?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KINKEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany*) (Translation). – It would be desirable to have a situation in which every EU country was also a member of WEU. As things look at present, that will of course not be the case in future either, although, if I am judging the situation correctly, some neutral countries might very well consider joining WEU in future after all. It will probably not be possible in future for NATO membership and WEU membership to diverge. Let me say that at the outset.

In reply to your question, we have held a great number of talks. I will be going straight from here to meet the new French foreign minister for the third or fourth time in the space of a few weeks. I am sure we will be discussing the relationship between the EU and WEU again. I know there are some differences of view on this too.

The discussions we have been holding in Bonn and also with our partners are tending in the direction that the integration of the EU and WEU is a possibility, even if not all EU countries belong to WEU. Of course I am well aware of the problems that enlargement to include the Central and Eastern European countries could entail. Yet we must not let ourselves be deflected from our aim.

In preparation for the 1996 intergovernmental conference we have prepared documents within our government dealing with this subject in depth. I hope you will not take it amiss if I cannot go into this in detail on this occasion. But you may assume that we have already given the matter quite some thought.

For the rest, let me tell you, too, that I accept and respect the fact that you take a different view,

yet I maintain that this is the goal we want to aim at. Let us wait and see which view wins through, yours or mine!

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Kinkel. You have been extremely generous in sitting through and answering all the questions with admirable brevity. You set a good example not only to other ministers, but to members. I also thank the questioners for co-operating, because that has enabled us to have a useful session. I thank you, Mr. Kinkel, for your interesting, and at times, provocative speech. While I do not agree – I know that many others also do not – with the philosophy that you have been expounding, we admire your frankness and we know these matters are up for most serious discussion and decision, and that is why we particularly welcome the fact that you were able to come here today.

**15. Replies by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU, to questions put by members of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is replies by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU, to questions put by members of the Assembly.

I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Before putting my question, I would like to tell you what I felt as I listened to what has been said, particularly by the last few speakers.

I remember when I was a child listening to sermons in church, the priest always had good advice for us on the problems of the world and had the right answers, too. The reality, of course, was quite different. I wonder whether here, in WEU, we have not become a sort of university lecture room where celebrities present intellectual discourses on certain subjects. Are we still a political assembly?

What purpose is served by the ministers' speeches we have already heard or are going to hear during the week if they are nothing more than good intentions – and the best of good intentions I readily admit, Mr. Secretary-General – with no real effectiveness. That, unfortunately, is the conclusion we can but reach.

Where is the clout in all this? Do we have to go on working like this with such bad methods? No one in this chamber is deceived: we are living in a shadow theatre; we produce reports which gather dust in drawers; we pretend we are playing a rôle, with everyone trying to do his bit with varying degrees of success but that is no future for WEU. I am not the only one to see that we are far from achieving what we have been told for the last year about steps forward and progress. With that kind of progress, I do not know where WEU will be in

*Mr. Baumel (continued)*

a few years' time, Mr. Secretary-General, but I can see now that unfortunately WEU is wasting a great deal of time and quite unable to find the practical solutions that are needed. Listening here in polite silence to some of these diplomatic speeches I find it hard to forget that, beyond these walls, is the sound of people fighting in many parts of Europe and, in particular, a vast apprehension about the risks and threats hovering over us.

Mr. President, I have the impression that WEU has become a Palace of the Winds, like that wonderful monument in Jaipur in India, where a rather romantic maharajah built a magnificent pink facade, with nothing behind it. WEU reminds me of that famous Palace of the Winds.

Mr. Secretary-General, stop telling us about the CJTF and trying to persuade us some progress will be made. You know perfectly well that there is none and that empty words will do nothing to reinforce your authority. You know that in this vital issue we have made no progress for months and that we are up against American determination – which I understand perfectly well – not to have American headquarters, forces or officers under the orders of non-American authorities. We also know that the United States fears, above all else, being drawn into an adventure with these terrible Europeans which would be against American national interests. So let us be honest and please do not tell us that solutions are being sought, we are inching forward and heading towards certain possibilities. It is not true. Another answer has to be found, but unfortunately we are at an impasse.

The Secretary-General of this organisation has to be more than just someone required to report to us; he is a politician, who has to assert his authority, and being more than a bystander or spectator; he has to have greater authority and influence. Mr. Secretary-General, you have no right to accept the present situation without vigorous reaction and we expect of you a little more force and authority in the context of your duties and powers though they, I admit, are limited.

My three questions are as follows: first, as regards the CJTF, how far has it got, what are we doing? Second, can Western European Union be really operational or not? Are we going to progress beyond that ersatz headquarters, the Planning Cell? Are we really going to have an effective headquarters, capable of taking on the responsibilities of command? Third, are we going to acquire the essential tools for effectiveness, namely the logistics we are without? The European corps has none, and we have to have the courage to say so. We have been to the satellite centre you spoke about; it works so well that documents mailed to it take days to arrive and two months to interpret. Is

that a satellite information centre? Let us be serious – all this is one enormous joke. I really believe that the time has come for different answers from speeches like this, which are about as substantial as herbal tea. The situation in Europe demands something else.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I do not know whether I should answer because Mr. Baumel said that we had nothing to report. He is right to say that there are great difficulties but the information that we have is that we have not arrived at a final impasse. We expect further discussions in the autumn among those involved in the framework of NATO, which is not WEU. We shall then see where things are. I am not as pessimistic as he is but neither am I particularly optimistic at this stage. The process of the discussion is not yet closed.

It is true that the operational realities of WEU, as Mr. Baumel knows better than I because he has been around for longer, were small and are still small; they were dormant but are now waking up. I do not have to repeat them all, but some efforts have been made to reinforce WEU's operations. That is the reality and it will go on.

As to logistics, again we have no logistics secretariat, no airlift and no great capacity for big transports. We have several deficiencies, but I remind Mr. Baumel that he should perhaps address his remarks not to WEU or to the Secretary-General.

He has been a member of government; he is a national parliamentarian. The problems of WEU relate to the political will of member states. WEU will be what those countries want – not more – and if it has a proper Secretary-General, not less. However, the secretariat cannot invent what is not within its realm.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I am glad to follow my colleague, Mr. Baumel, with a question along similar lines to his. Is it not the case that WEU is slowly but surely building a greater operational capacity? As that proceeds, will it not become more and more the case that new members will want to be admitted to WEU to meet their own security requirements, rather than their present expressed desire to be admitted to NATO? In other words, does the Secretary-General believe that WEU will become the doorway to NATO rather than NATO being the doorway to WEU?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Thank you, Mr. Rathbone. I agree on the first point. We reinforce each other's views. If there is

*Mr. Cutiliero (continued)*

the political will among member states, in a relatively short time we will reach a point where we will be able to take care of the political and military control and the proper co-ordination of the Petersberg operation.

The second part of the question contained a number of points. For a variety of well-known political reasons, I do not envisage WEU being an antechamber for NATO, nor NATO being an antechamber for WEU. That is not how things work. Under Articles 4 and 5 of our treaty, it would be politically improbable to have full WEU members that were not also members of NATO. That is the political reality, although it is not written anywhere and it is not my personal opinion.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Lipkowski.

Mr. de LIPKOWSKI (*France*) (Translation). – We read in the press, Mr. Secretary-General, that at the end of May you went to present the results of the Lisbon Council of Ministers meeting to the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy. Let me tell you I was more than a little surprised to hear this. I would draw your attention to the institutional repercussions such meetings could have were they to become a regular occurrence.

Do I need to remind you that, by virtue of the Brussels Treaty, the Assembly of WEU is the only European parliamentary body with competence in defence matters? As you know, its members are national elected representatives who alone are entitled to vote on and control the defence budgets in our respective parliaments. In such circumstances, the absolutely inadmissible claim of the European Parliament which seeks purely and simply to absorb the WEU Assembly is altogether at variance with the terms of treaties which give it no competence whatsoever in defence matters.

We are currently making preparations for the 1996 intergovernmental conference. It would be unfortunate if the executive of WEU, through initiatives such as yours, gave the impression that the results of the conference had already been prejudged, since the conference cannot, in our view, question WEU's foundations, namely the modified Brussels Treaty, and Article V in particular.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I do not know if that was a question, but I can throw some light on this matter.

In the first place, I did not attend the meeting of the European Parliament committee to report on the Lisbon meeting. Shortly after my arrival in Brussels, I was invited to appear before the committee. I would have liked this to have been at a later date, but it so happens that in Brussels they

are interested in what we are doing. I did not go there to present a report, but to talk to the members of that committee, who had heard of our activities within WEU. There is no institutional link between me and the European Parliament committee. That was clear in the question; it is also clear in the answer. I do not think that the results of the intergovernmental conference have been prejudged in any way.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your reply. Mr. de Lipkowski raised an interesting point.

I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Today we have discussed at great length the creation in Lisbon in May of two new forces, EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, designed to strengthen security on the southern front in Europe. Two days after this initiative was made public – and I say this because I take the opposite view from Mr. Baumel and see any operational reinforcement of WEU as a source of anxiety – at a seminar also held in Lisbon, Professor Seimi, a very conservative Moroccan intellectual, made a comment which gave me cause for thought. He said that if, in relations between the north and south Mediterranean, measures of this kind were taken, they would not be perceived as a contribution to security. On the contrary, he said, the peoples on the southern shores would in general consider such action as a threat and their response would be negative. He was not speaking for himself personally, but was reflecting opinion in the countries of the Maghreb.

Secretary-General, would you please say whether you consider that the creation of EURO-MARFOR and EUROFOR is likely to contribute to healthy dialogue between the north and south Mediterranean.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – In the first place, these forces were set up by four countries. They have been put at the disposal of WEU and, if required, NATO. They are not WEU creations.

Second, I am not Moroccan, nor am I from the south and I did not hear what Professor Seimi said. So I do not know what he meant.

Third, I consider that all the efforts European countries are making to set up multinational, sometimes multi-weapon forces, are fundamental for our security. This corresponds to a facet of Europe which so far has not been covered by this kind of uniquely European initiative.

Finally, I do not believe that a degree of cohesion in our approach and closer co-operation among our defence and military authorities can harm the interests of the countries of the southern



*Mr. Cutileiro (continued)*

Mediterranean in any way. So I do not share the view of your friend, Professor Seimi.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – The Secretary-General referred to public support for defence policy and the rôle that we as parliamentarians play in that. I do not dispute that, but I would like him to tell me and other members of the Assembly – elected members of our respective parliaments – how he expects us to sell that policy against the background of the recent announcement that France is to resume nuclear testing. The Secretary-General has already heard the response of the German Foreign Minister to that.

This is a crucial issue. How are we to argue the case in other countries in the world that have nuclear weapons and want to test them or in those countries that possibly wish to develop them – and we have a good idea of who they may be? Has the issue yet been discussed in WEU? If not, will it be discussed at the next meeting? I cannot believe that an issue of such importance can be ignored by WEU, without it even making a statement, in view of the repercussions that the testing of nuclear weapons by France could have throughout the world and on mankind.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – The issue has not been discussed in WEU. If any member state wants to bring it before the Council, it will be discussed.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand that we may hear more about that matter later in the session, or so my spies tell me. I do not have any official knowledge.

I thank the Secretary-General for bearing with us and answering our questions. As I said earlier, we are always pleased to see him. He may not always give us the answers that we want, but like a true left-hander, he always has a go. I hope that he understands the meaning of that remark. We are grateful for his assistance not only during the Assembly but at other times. We wish him good luck on his visit to Washington.

**16. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II - reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1458 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the presentation of and debate on the report tabled by Mrs. Aguiar on behalf of the Political Committee on the future of European security and the preparation of

Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council, Document 1458 and amendments.

I ask Mrs. Aguiar to be good enough to present her report.

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I begin by reminding you that as an organisation, WEU is a pioneer, the Brussels Treaty being the first after the war to urge its signatory states to promote Europe's gradual integration in the economic, social and cultural fields and the field of legitimate collective defence – which is only too often overlooked.

WEU, which is continually demonstrating its European spirit and whose purpose is the defence and security of its member countries and also, increasingly, that of Europe as a whole, needs to make its voice heard now that arrangements are being made to assess and review the Maastricht Treaty and, maybe at the same time or maybe not, the modified Brussels Treaty. There is not, in Portugal's view, any 1998 deadline or 2005 deadline, since there is no automatic provision for the treaty to come to an end but the future of WEU is certain to be on the negotiating table at the 1996 intergovernmental conference.

Clearly WEU's future cannot be decided without us, since only the countries that have signed the modified Brussels Treaty are empowered to take decisions concerning the fate of the treaty and its provisions, in particular with a view to making WEU an integral part of the development of the European Union, an aim which I think we all share.

We want to see progress in a European project in the basic field of security and defence that, with the adoption of agreed positions, will create a genuine European pillar of the alliance and, at the same time, strengthen transatlantic links, offer new forms of co-operation and guarantees to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are now democracies again and enable dialogue to continue with Russia without weakening the obligations of mutual assistance provided for in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, which is more binding than Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

In the Noordwijk declaration the WEU Council recognised our Assembly's constructive contribution to the strengthening of European security. We therefore hope that the Council will ensure that our ideas are given a hearing and are defended during the 1996 negotiations, and that we shall be able to go on affording Europe the benefit of this constructive work after 1998. Mr. Soell's report was intended as an Assembly contribution to the 1996 conference, and is on its way in that direction, as the WEU Council has so rightly said. This report, which contains the views of those who took an active part in the meetings of the Political Committee, to whom I am very grateful, is put forward as a follow-up to Mr. Soell's.

*Mrs. Aguiar (continued)*

I should also give special thanks to Mr. Burchard, political counsellor, for the splendid help he gave me in the preparation of this report, particularly when it came to drawing up a programme of discussions with the WEU Secretary-General and with the Commission of the European Union in Brussels. He kindly accompanied me at those talks, which proved highly useful.

This being said, let us move on to questions of substance.

We have no intention of basing a plea for WEU's survival on any other reason than its ability to give political drive to co-operation in the European security and defence field.

The important question is whether it will be possible to bring about genuine progress in the construction of a real defence community in Europe more rapidly and more easily in the framework of the European Union of the 15 – either as a so-called community pillar or as an intergovernmental pillar – or rather in the more homogeneous circle of the ten-member WEU.

The European Union consists of ten full WEU members and five other countries which, for the time being, do not wish to be bound by the mutual defence obligation laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty. Of these five countries, only one is a NATO member, the other four thus being excluded from the defence guarantee in the Treaty of Washington.

In addition to its ten full-member countries, WEU has admitted, under differing sets of rules, three European NATO countries as associates, nine European countries that have applied to join the European Union and NATO as associate partners, and five European Union countries asking for observer status.

This variety of status has no parallel in the European Union, and enables WEU to present itself as both the hard core in defence terms and as an organisation which is open, co-operative and truly European in nature. A defence community based on two-fold membership of the Brussels and Washington Treaties does not, we regret, coincide with the European Union group. As long as this is so, it is unreal to seek to merge WEU and the European Union. If the political will does not exist there is no way of merging the two by virtue of some theoretical cohesion or an ideological vision. So long as there are European Union members – one-third of the present total membership – that are not ready to integrate with WEU, WEU's independence will be a key asset for the construction of Europe as a defence organisation, thanks to its unique institutional ability to adapt to the wide range of specific situations across the European continent.

As Mr. de Puig, Chairman of the Political Committee, said: "if WEU did not exist, it would have to be invented".

The institutional independence of WEU also guarantees resistance to the temptation for defence commitments to weaken and become diluted in a framework where consensus is more difficult. We consider that we shall not get anywhere with reforms based on ideas detached from the real world. Any solution proposing to "communitarise" defence policy or to merge WEU with the CFSP as an intergovernmental pillar in which decisions could be taken by qualified majority, would be wholly utopian so long as states refuse to give up their sovereignty, with no state willing to commit its army or sacrifice its troops on the basis of a majority vote. Given these insurmountable differences the only way to integrate WEU would be to create a fourth intergovernmental institution in which WEU would retain all its present functions. The re-drafting or incorporation of the treaty presents enormous problems and fails to solve the biggest represented by the fact that there are European Union countries which are not members of WEU and NATO.

The way forward is not through legislation, but through understanding among states. We believe that the possibilities of progress through intergovernmental activity are not properly realised. WEU should propose that it become the driving force of European security and defence policy. For too long the organisation has failed to convert thought into action. The treaty is only just beginning to bear fruit now that the signatory countries have at last decided to make use of it. The situation has become more positive now with the conclusion of the Maastricht negotiations; in five or ten years' time we may hope for favourable results with WEU able to offer the European Union a valuable tool.

We all know the difficulties that WEU countries have in agreeing on shared definitions and objectives and in allocating the resources to make it operational, but things would certainly be worse still in the group of European Union countries. By reserving to the Union the right of initiative, Title V, Article 4G of the Maastricht Treaty has, in fact, acted as a brake on the political impetus which a restricted nucleus could have provided. So, with a view to making real progress along these lines we propose that the revised Maastricht Treaty should make WEU an integral part of the development of the European Union, with the power to formulate and implement Union decisions and actions with implications in the defence field. WEU would thus have the general remit to act on the European Union's behalf in the defence field. This might be reviewed in a few years' time at a second intergovernmental conference, and on the basis of progress made and problems met further steps could then be taken towards more radical reform.

*Mrs. Aguiar (continued)*

The European Strategic Group, we see, agrees on a 2005 deadline for the drafting of agreements, the setting of objectives and the preparation of institutional reforms that are, of course, extremely complicated. Even Commissioner van den Broek recently came out in favour of a separate WEU as a way of simplifying the formation of the defence component.

In our view, the top priorities should be to enhance the security of Europe's citizens and states and to strengthen the democratic principle in Europe.

The first aim would be to promote greater European solidarity by extending it to countries not covered by the guarantees in the Brussels and Washington Treaties; this might be done, for example, pending the enlargement of the European Union, NATO and WEU, by providing other kinds of political guarantees.

The ideal solution, of course, would be to simultaneously join all three organisations. Otherwise, there would be no way that WEU could grant contracting party status to countries which are non-European Union member states apart from the European partners included in the European pillar of the alliance. The Maastricht Treaty needs to be revised to correct this situation.

As regards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, we think we could go as far as giving them associate member status whether or not they are in NATO or the European Union. It would not, however, be reasonable to admit them as full members until they joined NATO, since WEU relies extensively on the alliance for the guaranteed provision of mutual assistance.

Strengthening the democratic principle is another basic objective to be pursued in the field of security and defence policy. To quote Mr. Matutes, a member of the European Parliament, to be efficient, democratic control must be exercised at the same level as the source of power.

Even if we do not agree on a clear distinction between community fields which come under the control of the European Parliament, and intergovernmental fields under the control of the representatives of the national parliaments, we would need to plan for a second chamber consisting of national members of parliament.

To round off the parliamentary dimension of European architecture, it would not suffice to have the powers of the European Parliament increased. After all, it is not the only authority capable of preventing a return to nationalism.

Take the WEU Assembly as an example. We should not forget that it is the only institution with defence responsibilities, as set out in Article IX of

the modified Brussels Treaty. In our opinion the WEU Council's annual report needs to contain more policy statements and thus to prompt basically political dialogue with the Assembly. This would be one of the best ways of deepening the parliamentary dimension in the area we are considering.

Lastly I would stress the importance we attach to building up the powers of the WEU Secretary-General and holding regular summit meetings of heads of state and government, twinned with the meetings of the European Council but preferably organised to take place so that WEU is in a position to submit proposals to the wider group of the European Union fifteen.

Our aim would always be to obtain results by pragmatic means and strengthening existing machinery, with a genuinely operational WEU able to cope with the radical changes and challenges of our time.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Aguiar.

We will now start the debate. I remind members of our decision earlier this afternoon that all speeches will be limited to five minutes, apart from those of the Rapporteur and Chairman of the committee.

I call Mr. Benvenuti.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. I must thank Mrs. Aguiar for the effort she has made to bring into focus the present state of such a complex subject, which forms part of the forward movement of European integration towards the establishment of a European security and defence system designed not only to satisfy the principles of democracy and transparency but also to present the degree of efficiency we all want.

I also feel that the call for realism made with great insistence by Mrs. Aguiar on some points needs to be stressed. There can be no doubt that in dealing with this subject we have to be very realistic because it is an extremely sensitive issue involving the security of the continent.

On this point, therefore, I should like to stress that we should perhaps look more fully than the report and recommendation now before us into the questions stemming from the Maastricht Treaty. That treaty is not a mere statement of intention or a Utopia but a fact and a political instrument which has been adopted and has produced effects, on which Europe is now working prior to the intergovernmental conference with a view to possible developments and amendments.

I should like to recall that the question of integration of the various institutions of the Union, particularly in Europe, was anticipated by the 1992 Treaty of Union (Article 92) which refers to

*Mr. Benvenuti (continued)*

the concept of integration and the action WEU should take in order to advance and establish a harmonious security pattern.

I should also like to mention the resolution which was recently adopted by the European Parliament after a long debate and which we need to discuss among ourselves and respond to positively.

I believe that, if we start from these reference points, together with those correctly recalled by Mrs. Aguiar on the constitutional principles of the Union, we shall be able to hold a discussion without setting our Assembly against other institutions or taking opposing stands regarding the specific independent duties of WEU and to have constructive talks with those organisations. In this way a positive contribution would be made to the process of European integration and to the establishment of a European defence and security system.

The purpose of the amendments tabled by myself and other members of the Italian Delegation is not to find fault with the main structure of Mrs. Aguiar's report but to try to bring in all the elements capable of furthering and helping the process of integration which has run into so many difficulties. Consequently, our Assembly, which was not born yesterday but has all the experience and competence that to some extent it is seeking to defend in the relationship between economy and functions, should send out a clear and unequivocal signal, in the knowledge that all this will have to take its place in a process which is neither easy nor linear and will meet strong opposition although it must be the right direction to take.

It is not our intention, moreover, to bury Mrs. Aguiar's report under our very numerous amendments; rather we are prepared to withdraw a good part, provided a common thread can be restored to a statement which I would like to be developed in more detail at this session with the same Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Benvenuti. Thank you also for keeping to the speaking time.

I now call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in view of our recent historical experience I can only welcome Mrs. Aguiar's thoughtful report. There is no doubt that today we are experiencing a profound change in our international environment. The nuclear and conventional threat from the Soviet Union that loomed over us for decades has gone. But at the same time we are witnessing the return of war to Europe. The atrocities, the ethnic clean-

sing and the senseless bloodbath in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union clearly show how urgent it is to restore peace to this troubled area. It has now become a commonplace to say that the western community of states has failed to meet these new challenges, that we – EU and WEU – have not yet managed to find an adequate answer through our instruments.

Our approach fluctuates between two extremes, between we have to do something, and being, so to speak, paralysed with shock, at the sight of the war crimes and inhuman acts of cruelty that have been committed. It will take more time than some of us might believe to find our way to a common foreign and security policy and a common defence policy. In particular, following the debacle of western diplomacy in former Yugoslavia, we must call for WEU to be equipped with structures that enable it to be operational, without using up its stock of options too soon by expecting too much. Frantic activity and some kind of plan for a step by step merger of the EU and WEU will not get us anywhere. First we must carry out a joint assessment of the risks to stability in our area and formulate the appropriate strategies. Only then can we embark on the appropriate institutional adjustments.

That is why the proposal to develop this concept over a period of ten years is realistic. However, I cannot quite accept the fact that the white paper on European security policy is not being drafted jointly by the contracting parties who signed the modified Brussels Treaty, but by the group of twenty-seven states that are linked to WEU in one way or another. The security policy risks can only be evaluated by those who fully respect Article V of the Brussels Treaty, on the unconditional obligation to afford assistance, and regard the territory of the WEU states as an area of common, collective security.

Let me raise a few basic questions in the context of our joint consideration of the matter.

First, the EU's decision-making procedures, with the Commission's right of initiative, the unanimity requirement if the Council wants to amend the Commission proposal and the qualified majority voting in the Council for certain proposed amendments, were developed for an economic community. They are geared to the mutual opening up of markets. They might make it possible to overturn national rules on the purity of particular sorts of beer or types of noodles on the grounds that they are an obstacle to the common internal market. But I think we in this Assembly are agreed that we cannot decide to send off armed forces to one crisis area or another on the basis of that model. The decision to do that is and must remain reserved to the national parliaments, in particular – and I am saying this specifically as a German parliamentarian – because our national

*Mr. Antretter (continued)*

parliaments have far-reaching powers of control over the executive in this area. Quite a lot of water is likely to flow down the Rhine, the Seine and the Thames before the European Parliament ever acquires such powers. That is why I think it is worth considering the British proposal to create an autonomous defence pillar in the European Union on the basis of a newly modified Brussels Treaty.

Second, we must at last improve the division of labour between the EU, WEU and NATO. There is no doubt in my mind or that of many of my political friends that NATO with its military integration must remain the basis of our common security and defence. The planning of the employment of forces under WEU auspices and the creation of a military Planning Cell must not weaken the military integration of NATO or the presence of our American allies in Europe. That is why the co-operation between the WEU Secretariat-General and SHAPE should perhaps be improved. The European Union's powers and ability to act in the field of preventive diplomacy must, after all, be strengthened. That is why in 1996 all the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty that give the member states special national rights, for instance in the field of common controls over arms exports and the imposition of embargo measures, must be tested. If the fifteen EU member states could agree to abolish or amend Articles 223 and 224 of the EC Treaty, which provide for exceptions in the case of essential national security interests, that would be a major step forward – but not if WEU and its treaty are endangered by a kind of seizing the bull by the horns.

Third, let us be realistic! For the EU the priority is to consolidate the Maastricht Treaty and achieve economic and monetary union. If progress is made in this area it will be a question of whether we want a hard-core Europe or a Europe à la carte. NATO must formulate a coherent plan for its enlargement eastward and perhaps also define the structures for creating a new European pillar in a new Atlantic treaty.

As a bridge, as the defence component of the EU and as the European pillar of NATO, WEU would be affected equally by both trends. Only when we know whether EU is capable of a co-ordinated and consistent procedure for political crisis-management will we be able to have any debate at all on the rôle WEU could then play in implementing these measures while safeguarding the powers of the national parliaments and constitutions. Only when we know whether NATO's military integration will be reorganised in the event of enlargement eastward will we be able to sharpen the profile of WEU as the European pillar of NATO.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I now call Mr. Pastusiak.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Poland, associate partner*). – It was with attention and deep interest that I read the report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mrs. Aguiar. The matters taken up in the report, the future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II, are indeed of great importance. With deep satisfaction I note that Mrs. Aguiar has presented in her report an objective and well-balanced analysis of the complex problems.

In this Assembly I represent Poland, a country that is not yet a full member of WEU, of the European Union or of NATO. In each of those organisations, Poland has a special status that, in spite of the different wording used by each of them, might be described as associate membership. It is our declared goal to change, as soon as possible, that associate status into full membership in those European and Euro-Atlantic organisations. Therefore, the future of those organisations – their rôle, their structure and the relations between them – is not a matter of indifference to us.

From our Polish perspective, the suggestion to merge mechanically the European Parliament with the WEU Assembly is not a desirable solution. Each of the two institutions has its own responsibilities, which are complementary. I agree with Mrs. Aguiar's analysis. Although all the proposals are now in an early phase of drafting and do not yet have concrete shapes, I am of the opinion that they will produce more problems than they can solve. I shall stress only a few of the potential problems.

According to the best information that I have, the decision on the future model of the European Union is not yet decided. The EU has not decided whether it will build a united states of Europe, in which the European Commission will play the rôle of a federal government and a European Parliament will serve as the major legislative body. The rôles of national governments and parliaments would be rather limited. I am not sure that that is what we are dreaming about.

After all, the wide, open and public debate on the question of the future model of the European Union has not yet taken place. The proposal that the organs of the EU should take over the task of the WEU organs means that we support the idea of the united states of Europe. However, from our parliamentary perspective, it will be difficult to reconcile that take-over of rôle and task with the principle of supervision by national parliaments over national armed forces. Last but not least, from the point of view of a representative of an associate partner of WEU, I feel that adoption of the draft proposal would make it necessary to redefine and renegotiate agreements regulating

*Mr. Pastusiak (continued)*

our position within the framework of the security and defence system of the European Union.

I am of the opinion that WEU and its Assembly should find their own place in the new European security and defence order. Both those organisations have to fulfil important tasks in realising their obligations and tasks. WEU and its Assembly should not be replaced by the European Commission and the European Parliament. The suggestion presented by Mrs. Aguiar in a draft resolution is to transform the existing WEU Assembly into a second chamber of the European Parliament. I understand that that is a possible compromise, which could guarantee the WEU Assembly its necessary independence and allow it to fulfil its obligations.

The report clearly shows how much we need a wide, open and public debate on the future of the European security and defence system. Poland understands that need. One and a half months ago, from 5th to 6th May this year, the Polish Parliament organised in Warsaw an international conference entitled "Competence and responsibility of international organisations for European security: parliamentary point of view". Representatives of the WEU Assembly, the North Atlantic Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE – the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe – were invited. We were able to discuss questions connected with the future rôle of each of the organisations concerned in the new security order in Europe.

Interesting contributions were made to our debates by Mr. de Puig, who represented the WEU Assembly, and by Vice-Admiral Michel d'Oléon, Deputy Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies. I am sure that meetings like the Warsaw one, and dialogue between representatives of organisations responsible for European security are to our great mutual interest, and could lead to greater co-ordination of all the efforts of all the institutions, both governmental and parliamentary, in shaping the new European security order.

Mrs. Aguiar also takes into consideration the question of the enlargement of the Western European area of security and stability. I can only agree with almost all she said in the explanatory memorandum. I agree that the enlargement of NATO and WEU should not create new, artificial borders on our continent. We want to extend the area of stability to the eastern part of the continent. In our opinion, that should not threaten anybody. In particular, Poland wants to serve, as it has many times before in our history, as a bridge connecting, not dividing, West and East.

I think that Mrs. Aguiar is right to recommend that the Council of WEU should seriously consi-

der granting associate partner countries the status of associate members, here and now. I am convinced that that would be a step in a good direction, as well as a signal showing that our western partners are truly open to the idea of the enlargement of European and Euro-Atlantic security, defence, economic and political structures.

Today, practically all European and Euro-Atlantic international organisations that are active in the field of security and defence are trying to describe their rôles and divide their areas of influence and responsibility in what has become, since 1989, a changed international environment. I believe that WEU and its Assembly have already found their place and their responsibilities in the new security order in our old continent.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Furubjelke.

Mrs. FURUBJELKE (*Sweden, observer*). – Rather than an intervention in the debate, I am making a brief presentation of the Swedish observership in WEU, as it relates to the Maastricht Treaty. I want to take this opportunity to express gratitude for the kind words of welcome from you, Mr. President, and other speakers.

It is indeed a great honour to have the opportunity to address this distinguished Assembly. It is its first session since Sweden joined the European Union and, at the same time, was granted permanent observership in WEU – at governmental level as well as here, in the Assembly. I and my colleague from the Swedish parliament, Mr. Anders Björck, have been appointed by our parliament to follow the work of the Assembly closely and regularly – and we will do that actively.

When, after the referendum, the Swedish Parliament took its decision to join the European Union, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs stated clearly in its report that, in relation to WEU, it was important for Sweden to have access to an arrangement that would enable our country to have insight into and access to the security policy discussions in Europe that are under way in the enlarged circle of WEU countries. That committee also emphasised that it shared the government's view that observer status in WEU was compatible with Sweden's non-participation in military alliances and that such status would provide the necessary degree of insight.

Sweden has a long tradition of peace-keeping and preventative diplomacy. Currently, it has about 1 200 peace-keeping troops in former Yugoslavia. Its humanitarian aid is approaching US\$ 100 million and it has received more than 120 000 refugees from former Yugoslavia – a number equal to more than 1% of Sweden's population.

Sweden is, in many ways, actively participating in the work for peace in Europe. Recently, our for-

*Mrs. Furubjelke (continued)*

mer Prime Minister – Carl Bildt – started his important work as a mediator in former Yugoslavia. It is our deep and sincere wish that he will be successful in his work, so that the terrible war can be brought to an end.

WEU of today is, above all, a broad forum for dialogue and prevention of conflict, with a gradually increasing capacity to organise and manage peace-keeping, humanitarian and rescue operations.

When Sweden joined the European Union, a main reason for doing so was our conviction that peace is indivisible, that security is common to all of us and that, consequently, we must tackle our problems together. It is only through a long-term commitment and an understanding of our interdependence that we can build a new Europe. Tolerance, solidarity and responsibility are the key words. Within an enlarged European Union we can address many of the issues that we face. In parallel with the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, Partnership for Peace and the European Union, WEU can make an important contribution to that end. That is why we are happy to be here.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Latronico.

Mr. LATRONICO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report before us is of fundamental importance and it is right that we should be asking ourselves questions about the future of European security particularly at this time when Europe is being severely tested by the hostilities in Bosnia, the risks stemming from other unstable situations in the Balkans, the renewed friction in the Aegean and the explosive hotbeds of Islamic fundamentalism along the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

In seeking a way to introduce elements of greater security on a coherent basis and with consensus the method of a common policy cannot be rejected out of hand.

It is unthinkable that what we have called the problem of problems, namely the problem of common security, should be set aside when Europe is called upon to move forward together towards the alignment of national legislation in many sectors and in particular to converge closely in the economic field towards a single currency. That is why we must make an effort not to move away from each other and to avoid making replies which today may appear to be the most obvious and easiest, but which in future might have serious adverse consequences for the integration of the European continent.

Mrs. Aguiar, who is entitled to congratulations for the hard work she has done on the report, said

in the debate in the Political Committee that we cannot now run away from the need to display realism if we want the idea of European security to move decisively forward.

I ask myself and everyone here, is it truly realistic, having regard to the terms of the Maastricht Treaty and its desirable improvement, to imagine the prospect of arriving at a European security policy, with WEU and the European Union moving along two separate tracks never coming together because they are parallel?

Do we really want to reduce the CFSP to an academic gathering where small talk is interspersed with the drinking of tea in front of a map of Europe showing several areas of conflict in various places?

That is why the Italian Delegation believes that this report needs to be amended. In view of the present difficulties of a dialogue between WEU and the European Union, due to the hardening of positions on both sides because each believes itself to be and is the only legitimate organisation, patient, diplomatic action is needed with the ultimate goal of strengthening European security through all available instruments. These instruments must move in unambiguous directions which in turn must be determined by the methods of democratic consensus on which our countries are based.

That is why the Italian Delegation has tabled a number of amendments to the text under discussion and with further polishing these have been reduced to the essential. May I remind you, ladies and gentlemen, that in our country a referendum on the construction of Europe produced an almost 90% yes vote for a united, democratic and economically close-knit Europe. Is it conceivable that such a Europe, side by side with the transatlantic commitments of the individual member states, should delegate to others the right to set limits to the questions concerning its security? To me and the Italian Delegation the answer seems to be no and in saying this I do not believe that I am indulging in an exercise of sterile lack of political realism.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. I apologise to Mr. Coviello. I was going to call him to speak but he will have a bigger and better audience tomorrow morning. I will call him first in tomorrow morning's debate.

I will now adjourn the debate. It will be resumed at our next sitting, following the address by the Prime Minister of Turkey, Dr. Ciller.

### ***17. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific***

*(Motion for an order with a request  
for urgent procedure, Doc. 1473)*

The PRESIDENT. – We have received a request from the Socialist Group for urgent procedure on

*The President (continued)*

the subject of the resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific. The relevant text will be distributed. I will invite the Assembly to decide on that request at the beginning of tomorrow morning's sitting. That will be raised as first business, despite the importance of our guest speaker.

**18. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 20th June 1995, at 10 a.m., with the following orders of the day.

1. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific (Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Documents 1472 and 1473).
2. Address by Professor Dr. Ciller, Prime Minister of Turkey.

3. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1458 and amendments).
4. Changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to accommodating associate members and associate partners of WEU (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Document 1461 and amendments).
5. Address by Mr. Millon, Minister of Defence of France.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)*



## FOURTEENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 20th June 1995

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
  2. Adoption of the minutes.  
*Speaker* (point of order): Mr. Rathbone.
  3. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific (*Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure*, Docs. 1472 and 1473).  
*Speakers*: Mr. de Puig, Mr. Valleix, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (*Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee*), Mr. Cox (point of order).
  4. Address by Professor Dr. Ciller, Prime Minister of Turkey.
5. Points of order.  
*Speakers*: The President, Lord Finsberg.
  6. Address by Mr. Millon, Minister of Defence of France.  
*Replies by Mr. Millon to questions put by*: Mr. Davis, Mr. Naess (*Norway, associate member*), Mr. Rathbone, Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Cox, Mrs. Guirado.
  7. Changes in the membership of committees.
  8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### *2. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I do not want to delay matters but I draw to your attention the fact that, although the Council benches are attractively filled, they are only half full. There is a shortage of seating in the Assembly – something with which we are struggling. I wonder whether it would be possible to make available one row of Council seats, most particularly to the observers – whom you can see crammed in behind me, trying to obtain a seat to follow today's proceedings. That would mean the Council giving up thirteen

seats. Judging by today's attendance, it could do so with equanimity.

The PRESIDENT. – That request is unusual, and it is not one on which I should pronounce without giving it thought because various interests are involved. Overall responsibility rests with the Clerk. I will consult him and report to the Assembly later this morning.

#### *3. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific*

*(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Docs. 1472 and 1473)*

The PRESIDENT. – We will now consider the request for urgent procedure for a motion for an order relating to the resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific, Documents 1472 and 1473. I understand that the relevant documents have been circulated.

I remind the Assembly that the following only may be heard – one speaker for the request, one speaker against if there is one, the chairman of the committee concerned and one representative of the Bureau speaking in its name. Under Rule 33(7), speaking time is limited to five minutes.

A motion has been tabled by Mr. de Puig. It reads:

“ The Assembly,

Considering that the decision taken by the French Government to resume nuclear testing concerns the security of the whole of Europe,

1. See page 19.

*The President (continued)*

## DECIDES

To require the relevant committee urgently to present to the Assembly an operative text on this question."

That motion is supported by another motion signed by ten of Mr. de Puig's colleagues, so it is relevant and in order.

*(Due to a breakdown in the interpretation system, the sitting was suspended at 10.05 a.m. and resumed at 10.10 a.m.)*

There will be one speaker in favour and one against – if there is a speaker against – and the chairman of the committee will be asked to speak, each for a maximum of five minutes. Mr. de Puig's motion has been circulated and no doubt he will refer to it in detail in his speech. The motion is supported by ten of his colleagues, who have also tabled a motion on the subject.

I invite Mr. de Puig to move the motion in his name.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Yesterday, in Mr. Pécriaux's absence, I took the Chair at the Socialist Group's meeting. It was unanimously decided to request a debate with urgent procedure on France's decision to resume nuclear testing. As several colleagues had presented this request and the Rules of Procedure require a motion for an order to be tabled, I took it upon myself, on behalf of the Socialist Group, to present the following draft:

"The Assembly,

Considering that the decision taken by the French Government to resume nuclear testing concerns the security of the whole of Europe,

## DECIDES

To require the relevant committee urgently to present to the Assembly an operative text on this question."

We therefore request you, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, to decide that an urgent debate be held on a document to be presented by the committee concerned.

Why this request for urgent debate? To me it is quite clear. The French decision has undeniable political implications and taken as it has been immediately after the adoption of the final enlargement of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in New York, it has even more significance. For a number of countries that have recently signed the treaty, France's decision is not a welcome present. These countries, having decided to join the club of those opposed to the proliferation of nuclear wea-

pons, are really surprised at the news whose political importance is unquestionable.

The decision is of concern to all European countries, since France is a very important European country, is a member of all the European institutions and is one of the major signatory countries of the military alliances. So clearly the decision concerns us.

While we are all prepared to accept France's sovereign right to take this or any other decision, and while we respect France's sovereign rights, there is nothing to stop us making known our opinion.

And that opinion is against this decision, because it is an invitation to other countries having nuclear weapons to continue testing and resume the nuclear test race, contrary to Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty, which recommends the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. France's action is thus contrary to the principles of Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty.

But there are also other reasons. A nuclear test has certain effects. It has environmental effects on the area of the world in which it takes place. It has effects on the population of that part of the world that may be affected by testing on this scale.

Many WEU member countries are opposed to the decision. It is not in accordance with our ideas of peace, dialogue and security or our ideas on the need for confidence-building measures. Such a decision runs counter to the whole notion of confidence-building measures.

The report by Mr. Marshall which we are shortly to consider invites us, on the contrary, to vote for a complete ban on nuclear testing.

Mr. President, these are the reasons why I ask all members to approve this motion for an order.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

I have been advised that Mr. Valleix wishes to oppose the motion.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I should have preferred my colleague, Mr. Baumel, Chairman of the Defence Committee, who I hope will soon be with us, to answer instead of me, since this is more his field than mine. However, I am very willing to tell you the French point of view which, as Mr. de Puig has said, is no surprise to anyone since, to coin a phrase, we have all read the papers.

That our WEU Assembly should be discussing this question is interesting. Not that I am very surprised, but I am in no way pleased because it seems to me, after top-level contacts in recent days with countries also involved in nuclear testing and having nuclear weapons, that talking about the non-proliferation treaty is one thing,

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

whereas bringing nuclear development to a halt is quite another. By this I mean that it would first be up to the countries with a nuclear capability, when the time came, to come to an agreement among themselves.

France, which no one today can accuse of being an aggressive, imperialist or colonialist country, has a programme for modernising its nuclear weapons for the simple reason that these are technically highly sophisticated weapons which, if they cease to be tested, no longer develop and become, more than any other weapons system, completely out of date and of course obsolete.

France has therefore chosen, so long as there is no worldwide renunciation of nuclear weapons and the means of supervising it, to maintain the capability it has and, in order to avoid the risk of obsolescence, to continue testing for a very limited period of time. This we have said. That no reference has been made to it has surprised me, because I should like to see some recognition of this French commitment which, like all France's commitments, is meant to be honoured.

In the same way, I should like it also to be known that France has embarked on a programme for simulating nuclear tests. This is something with which I am very familiar, since the techniques are going to be used not only in the Paris region, but also in Aquitaine. This nuclear test simulation programme, known as PALEN, will be set in motion in the next few months and a preliminary presentation will be held in Aquitaine in the next few weeks.

Once such a subject is discussed publicly in a forum such as ours and among Europeans, I should have appreciated an opportunity for information on nuclear simulation to be provided, particularly since it has been available for some time and France is not the first country to try it out. But since, as we admit, we were not as quick off the mark as other countries in the field of simulated testing – I am thinking of the United States – France wishes to keep going with real testing in a few specific cases before switching over to simulation. This, as I say, is the commitment entered into, and the scientific and military policy pursued, by France.

France is unquestionably the country making the greatest military, and therefore defence effort, for Europe as well as for itself. I would point out that France's commitments in present European conflicts are by no means negligible, not to say greater, than any other country's. I therefore regret that on this specific point which requires detailed knowledge, the debate has been launched less out of a wish for information than in a spirit of condemnation.

Let us get things clear: we are still separate countries independent of each other though seeking to improve their relations. France therefore wants to limit both the number and the duration of its tests. You know this as well as I do; the President of the Republic himself has said so.

Given that the problem exists, I should prefer its discussion not to take the form of a debate with urgent procedure. On the contrary – and we were talking about this a short while ago in the Technological and Aerospace Committee – I should prefer the subject to be considered and discussed in the normal way by the appropriate committees. This is in my view the most obviously logical way of dealing with it.

This having been said, if you wish to have an early debate with urgent procedure, you will very shortly, from noon onwards to be precise, be able to put questions to Mr. Charles Millon, the French Minister of Defence. But I do hope that discussion will be at a higher level than tub-thumping, if you will pardon the expression. We have real work to do, and the subject deserves a real debate. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

I understand that the Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, would like to speak.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*). – Should the Assembly adopt the proposal of Mr. de Puig and his colleagues, the Defence Committee will consider this question at its meeting at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning and put its proposals to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. Thank you also for being so admirably brief.

We shall now proceed to vote on the question of urgent procedure proposed by Mr. de Puig.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. Earlier this morning I gave notice to the Clerk that I would request that a roll-call vote now be called on this issue. I so move.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand that it was mentioned only informally and was not a definite request, but I am happy to grant that request.

If ten members support the request for a roll call, will they please stand?

As there are sufficient members, we shall proceed to a roll-call vote. Under Rule 38 of the Rules of Procedure, no roll-call vote may be taken unless more than half the representatives or substitutes have signed the register of attendance. I am advised that more than half the representatives or substitutes have signed the attendance register and we can therefore proceed with a vote by roll-call.

*The President (continued)*

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Mitolo.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows:

Number of votes cast .....	69
Ayes .....	42
Noes .....	27
Abstentions .....	0

*The urgent procedure is agreed to.*

The motion for an order is referred to the Defence Committee.

I propose that the Assembly should discuss the substance of the text on Thursday.

Is there any objection?...

That is agreed to.

The sitting is suspended.

*(The sitting was suspended at 10.35 a.m. and resumed at 10.50 a.m.)*

#### **4. Address by Professor Dr. Ciller, Prime Minister of Turkey**

The PRESIDENT. – We will now resume the proceedings, and I am grateful to our distinguished guest for delaying her arrival because of the urgent business that we had to transact. It is fairly unique still, in this advanced age, to have women prime ministers. It is even more important when they are as unique as Dr. Ciller, Prime Minister of Turkey. Turkey is an extremely important country, as all of us recognise. Its position on the borders of Europe, the Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent States means that Turkey has always been a determining factor in European security. Turkey's point of view on questions debated here is essential.

We have received visits from distinguished parliamentarians from Turkey in the past, and we are truly delighted that Dr. Ciller has spare time to address us today. She knows, because – with respect – she is a practical woman, that some of the questions put to her by members may not be over-friendly, but I know that Dr. Ciller, being a true politician, will want to respond. We look forward to your address, Prime Minister, and I invite you to the tribune.

Professor Dr. CILLER (*Prime Minister of Turkey*). – Mr. President, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. It is a great privilege to address you today. During recent years, Western European Union and the Assembly have gained increasing prominence while taking their rightful place in the security architecture of Europe. That is a welcome development. My country, from the beginning, has supported a European security and defence identity.

While today's world may not have large armies massed against each other, we still face serious risks. Radical nationalism, xenophobia and extremism are on the rise in some areas. At the same time, human rights and democracy are playing an ever more important rôle in international relations. We join you in applauding that movement towards the ideals shared by all civilised nations, yet we must recognise that expanding human rights can involve complex issues. We must be careful not to oversimplify matters, look at problems out of context or gloss over explanations that are not fashionable.

Today I want to explain Turkey – our progress, our challenges and our hopes for the future. I am proud of the achievements of the Turkish Republic since its establishment seventy years ago – even more so because they were achieved in a region not conducive to such reform. I want to emphasise that. However, in recent years there has been a lot of criticism of Turkey from European sources.

The main accusation has been that Turkey fails to meet the minimum standards of a western democracy. What are the minimum standards of a democracy? Many of us would agree on certain principles. They are open and free elections, an orderly transition of power, an independent legislature, an independent judiciary operating under the rule of law, a free and vibrant press that is free to criticise the government, and religious freedom.

Each of those important criteria is firmly established in Turkey. We have an open political system with a full range of parties of the left and right, which compete vigorously. Our elections are hotly contested and honestly run. Our legislature, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, is the ultimate repository of national sovereignty. We have an independent judiciary with a fully developed legal system based on the European model. Our press is vibrant – anyone who visits Turkey knows that neither the Prime Minister nor the government are immune from attack on personal or official grounds. I have the scars to prove it!

We also have a long-standing tradition of religious freedom, welcoming many who have fled from oppression elsewhere in Europe. Against that background, perhaps you can better under-

*Professor Dr. Ciller (continued)*

stand the confusion of the Turkish people at the broad attacks on our system that have been coming from Europe. Ironically, if you look closely you will see that some of those complaints are actually caused by the very complexities of our democratic process.

Some critics wonder why it is taking us so long to change our constitution, yet that is the responsibility of our parliament. Like all democratically-elected legislatures, it has its own rules to ensure full debate and to protect against hasty, ill-considered changes in the nation's structure. I am certain that these same critics readily understand the deliberative process and frustrating delays of their own parliaments, yet they refuse to accord that same respect to Turkey's legislature.

Some critics complain about our failure to modify quickly our anti-terrorism law, but again that decision must be made by our parliament. As to the complex issue of balancing the right of free speech against the advocacy of violence and terrorism, there are deep and passionate divisions not just within the opposition parties but within my own party as well. I am certain that those critics would be more understanding if the debate were in their own country.

Some critics express indignation at the restrictions imposed by our anti-terrorism law on certain types of speech, but they fail to acknowledge that in each of their own countries, special laws restrict speech relating to violence, terrorism or group defamation. Not all of those European laws are neat and sensible and not all of Europe's recent history enforcing those laws and combating terrorism has been exemplary.

Finally, some critics romanticise the activities of the PKK. Its members are sometimes called guerrillas, implying that they are involved in some heroic struggle, but those critics ignore the thousands – yes, thousands – of innocent civilians brutally murdered by PKK terrorists. They ignore the fact that most of the victims are of Kurdish origin, including many women and children, and they ignore the fact that among those targeted by the PKK have been teachers and village leaders, solely because they refuse to support PKK terrorism.

This is not romantic. It is not heroic. It is vicious, cowardly terrorism and it should be seen as such by every civilised nation. If there is one thing of which I am certain, it is that any European state faced with a similar terrorist threat to its people and a similar effort to divide its own nation through violence and intimidation would respond as we are doing.

Some people hold that more democratic rights are, per se, an antidote to terrorism. Nothing is further from the truth. Even in a perfected demo-

cracy, if such were attainable, human dignity can be placed at risk by terrorism. Indeed, countries deemed most democratic all too often experience terrorism at its worst. Acts of terrorism in Europe, Tokyo or Oklahoma City correlate not at all with the conditions and degree of democracy present. Whatever else the various terrorist movements have as their root causes, dedication to strengthening the democratic ideal is never among them.

This, then, is our deep frustration – when we measure our system against these minimum standards of democracy, we see that Turkey has established a strong, vibrant democracy with powerful democratic institutions. Indeed, we have done so in a region that has too often been characterised by political and social instability and repression. Few democracies have survived here. Indeed, of the world's fifty-two Muslim nations, we are its only true secular democracy. Our challenges have been enormous and our record, by any objective standard of twentieth century history, has been outstanding.

That is not to say our democracy is perfect. Of course it is not. That is not to say that progress in our democracy is not needed. Of course it is. And no one knows that better than the people of Turkey. We are working on these reforms literally as we speak.

We are struggling with solemn questions about the delicate balance of conflicting rights – the rights of individuals to speak freely versus the right of society to protect its citizens.

I submit that this very debate now taking place in Turkey is the hallmark of a democracy. Our difficulty, our uncertainty, our conflict on this issue is what separates us from authoritarian régimes.

Let me describe to you our main initiatives for democratic reform. First, there are changes in twenty-one articles of our constitution which have been agreed by the main parties in parliament. These changes will encourage greater participation in the democratic process. The amendments to our constitution are now before parliament – in fact, I will be going straight back to Ankara as soon as I leave Paris. The voting will be secret and a two-thirds majority, namely three hundred votes, is needed.

The second change is the devolution of more powers to local authorities. We are moving away – I firmly believe in this – from a long-standing tradition of centralised government whose concentrated power has frustrated and alienated citizens in all regions. By bringing democracy down to the grass roots, we will allow all our citizens to participate more fully in local decision-making.

The third change involves freedom of expression. We must modify our anti-terrorism law, by abolishing or changing Article 8 under which

*Professor Dr. Ciller (continued)*

highly publicised prosecutions have been brought against writers, journalists and academics.

These judicial proceedings have been a growing source of contention both at home and abroad. They must and will end. We are striving for a consensus on a carefully crafted provision that conforms to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights so that the non-violent expression of ideas will be protected.

Each of our nations has, at different times, debated the limits to be placed on individual speech in order to protect public safety and national security. Today, as the Turkish public grapples with this issue, we do so in the midst of a murderous terrorist campaign. This bloodletting has caused understandable anxiety among our citizens and has complicated our task but I am, nonetheless, certain that these fundamental reforms will be enacted in the months ahead. I will personally lead the fight in our National Assembly, just as I did last year with the passage of our historic privatisation legislation.

My position has now been strengthened by the support of other parties, including my coalition partner, the newly merged Republican Peoples' Party. Democratisation is my first priority and the essential principle of our coalition government.

If anything can be said of a common attitude among Turks, it is that we are optimistic, moderate, individualistic, yet social and dynamic. One place that this is most obviously reflected today is in our media. I want you all to listen very carefully now. When I became Prime Minister, I initiated the opening of electronic media to privatisation by saying, "I want my radio". The resulting diversity has been astonishing. Today, Turkey has fifteen national television stations, 360 local television stations and over 1,500 local radio stations – compare that with the situation in your own countries. I wish that all of you could tune in and listen, at least for two hours on any one night of your choice; it is truly democracy in action. Our airwaves are filled with a vigorous and lively national debate as our citizens assess for themselves the risks and benefits of these democratic reforms.

We are in the midst of a reform process. No prime minister in a parliamentary democracy has a magic wand to eliminate dissent, especially not on the very question of dissent. While I am passionately committed to these reforms, I have no unilateral powers. In a parliament where no party has a majority, we can succeed only by persuasion. The democratic process is sometimes long and slow, but it cannot be forsaken – even in the name of further democratisation.

Let me now dwell on some of the problems that we face in Turkey, which are sometimes dealt

with in a simplistic manner by our critics – perhaps the most misunderstood, misreported and misinterpreted is the so-called Kurdish problem.

Officially, in Turkey there are three minorities – Greek and Armenian Christians and Jews. This official minority status is a legal legacy of the 1923 treaty of Lausanne which viewed Muslims in the newly-formed Turkish Republic as a whole, and defined minority status strictly to protect the religious rights of these three groups. But as a unitary nation state built from more than twenty ethnic backgrounds, who have completely intermingled, no special privileges have ever been attached to any group because of ethnic background, race or geographic location. We are all first-class citizens.

Among these groups are Kurds, full citizens of the Republic, active in every walk of life, living in every region, and fully integrated publicly, privately and politically. The PKK terrorist campaign for separatism cannot relate to their needs or aspirations. Indeed, they continue to be the greatest victims of PKK brutality.

Our goal is greater liberty for each and every individual. For each local administration, greater authority. For each person, the right to cultural self-expression.

We are committed to safeguarding and expanding individual rights without undermining the territorial integrity of our nation. Like each of your nations, we have a unique cultural and political history. Our legendary founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, built our nation by joining together people of different backgrounds through a unity of purpose, one language and a common commitment to progress and freedom. In Turkey, we will fight to expand individual rights within. The two must and will go together.

Let me also address the issue of the convicted DEP parliamentarians, on which many of our friends here today seem to focus. It has been suggested on a number of occasions that the Turkish Government should free the DEP parliamentarians who have been tried and sentenced to various prison terms. Let me be direct: if the Government of Turkey had such authority, Turkey would no longer be a parliamentary democracy. It would undermine and politicise our independent judiciary and the rule of law – which are the foundation of a democratic state. Instead, we will strictly honour their right to appeal, not only in Turkey, but also in Strasbourg. Let me emphasise that, according to the decision of the courts, they have not been jailed on account of the ideas they expressed but due to their proven affiliations with, and actions supporting, a terrorist organisation.

Some of the DEP parliamentarians are themselves confessing it in Europe in front of the European press. Indeed, one of the leaders said the fol-

*Professor Dr. Ciller (continued)*

lowing, and I quote: "The movement which is carrying out the armed struggle is developing its own diplomacy. We particularly are carrying out these activities. The PKK movement has a diplomacy on behalf of the party. We are performing this diplomacy."

The Chairman of the Democracy Party, which has been closed down, said the following in Vienna on 7th June in front of the European free press: "We are the PKK."

Let me also point out that Turkey is not the only European country where the immunity of parliamentarians has been lifted and where parliamentarians have been tried and sentenced for illegal activities. I need not list the cases. They can easily be found. But it does seem that when it happens in Turkey, the clamour is great. When it happened in another European country, there was accommodating silence.

We are all imperfect societies. For each of us, the environment and the neighbourhood have a special bearing on the pace of development of our own political system. Unfortunately, Turkey is not blessed, as is Spain, with a friendly neighbouring country such as France to help her in the fight against terrorism. On the contrary, in Turkey's case, the nature of the régimes surrounding us, and the goals of fundamentalists in the region have added fuel to terrorism. Turkey's alliance with the West during the Gulf war is another reason for encouraging terrorism by outsiders. In that context, the Turkish incursion into Iraq to stem terrorism has ended as I promised a while ago.

We share our frontiers with eight countries which extend from the Mediterranean to the Black sea and to the Persian Gulf. This is a rough neighbourhood. The one solid rock at the centre is Turkey – stable, democratic, tolerant and modern. The map vividly demonstrates why the survival of Turkish democracy is so remarkable.

There are reasons why Turkey is the only secular democracy among the world's fifty-two Muslim states. Turkey's democracy is not an aberration or an accident. It is rooted in a long-standing tradition of openness and diversity. For hundreds of years Turkey has welcomed people fleeing religious persecution and wars. It was therefore only natural that, when Western Europe was expelling the Jewish community 500 years ago – and again fifty years ago – Turkey opened its doors. While the West was debating women's rights, Turkey acted decisively. Six decades ago we were one of the first to grant suffrage to women. And in our struggle for democracy, our bond with the West and the nations of Europe has been special and long-standing.

Let me say a few words on our relations with Greece. The problems between Turkey and Greece

essentially relate to the status quo in the Aegean. We are for the delicate balance of rights and interests between the two countries as established by the Treaty of Lausanne. Greece wants to change it unilaterally in ways that would adversely affect Turkey's vital interests. We cannot accept that yet I believe that if Greece reciprocates our good will and political will, we can find solutions through mutual accommodation. We as a nation bear no enmity towards Greece. On the contrary, we believe that if our two countries co-operate, it will greatly benefit both our countries and enhance the security and stability of the entire region – indeed, all of Europe. A historic reconciliation is needed. We must end these age-old disputes. Turks stand ready for a comprehensive dialogue.

I know that, for many of you, the problem of Cyprus is of particular interest. I will not try here to summarise the historical background, except to note that its origins precede 1974 by more than a decade. The principles for a fair and durable solution have been established, accepted in the past by both sides, and continue to be accepted by the Turkish Cypriots. Yet lately it seems that the Greek Cypriots have seen membership in the European Union as a substitute for a solution. I believe that this approach is unacceptable. Unfortunately, Greek Cypriots may have been encouraged to pay less attention to an overall solution by last-minute accommodations within the European Union. That would be unacceptable and contrary to the basic agreement on Cyprus. Both sides must now move toward a fair and final resolution. We are prepared to do our part.

Later this year, the customs union will be before the European Parliament. I want to say this to my friends in the European Parliament: I know of no precise formula or measurement to weigh the changes and improvements in Turkey. This is an on-going process for us as it is in all countries. In making this judgement, you must also weigh the alternatives: if the customs union is approved, it will unquestionably accelerate further change in Turkey. It will strengthen the forces of reform and encourage the large majority of Turks who want integration with Europe.

But you must understand that a "no" vote is bound to strengthen the hands of the rejectionists and fundamentalists who tell our citizens that European bigotry and prejudice against Turks will prevail regardless of what we do and that Turkey's aspiration of integration will be rejected in any case.

Europe should also consider the impact of this historic decision on its own future. Consider what Turkey has done for European stability and security in the past, and what we can do for European prosperity and economic strength, as well as for its stability and security, in the years and decades ahead. Over the past decade, we have had, on ave-

*Professor Dr. Ciller (continued)*

rage, one of the fastest growing economies in the OECD. And with 60 million people, and access to the Black Sea, the Middle East, the Caucasus and central Asia, we are poised to be one of the world's ten big emerging markets at the beginning of the next century.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has left a security vacuum throughout this region. There is the danger that the very complex ethnic, cultural and religious mosaic straddling this area may be beset with strife and violence. We have seen the traumatic consequences of this even in the heart of Europe in Bosnia.

This situation has produced a new type of security dilemma. It cannot be addressed with orthodox defence or military structures from without. The problem must be tackled from within.

Our challenge together is to bring peace, prosperity and security to those areas threatened by a continuation of the ethnic, religious and cultural conflicts and passions of the past. The solution, we know, must lie in a policy mix of economic co-operation and political and security alliances.

Turkey's unique location, our economic strength, our historic diversity and our political and social stability can help Europe to respond to these challenges.

Turkey has stood by her allies during times of trial – be it in Korea or the Cuban missiles crisis – be it in the Gulf war or now in the Balkans. The economic burden of the aftermath of the Gulf war has been heavy for Turkey: \$ 20 billion. We have stood with you for peace and stability for more than half a century, bringing the strength and diversity to NATO that helped to achieve victory in the cold war.

Now is a fateful time for Europe to decide if it will expand on that success and include Turkey's strength and diversity in the economic affairs of Europe and, ultimately, in its full political and social life.

We believe that we will bring a special perspective to your endeavours. Unlike others in our region, Turkey promotes hope and partnership. By reaching out to peoples of different ethnic backgrounds, races, cultures and religions, we have been able to play a pivotal rôle for peace in the area.

We vigorously support the Middle East peace process and we are one of the few nations with solid ties to all three parties. We were the first Muslim nation to recognise Israel in 1949. We maintain good relations with Arab states, and we are providing over \$ 50 million in aid for the struggling Palestinians.

We initiated the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Council bringing together eleven countries with 320 million people, often at odds, to find common ground. Turkey is also backed by a hinterland of 200 million Turkish-speaking peoples, besides her own 60 million people; that makes close to 300 million, which is more than in the French-speaking world.

We have helped to encourage talks between Armenians and Azeris, two historic antagonists, locked in a tragic conflict.

We are providing aid to newly independent Asian republics, including \$ 4 billion in private investment, \$ 900 million in Eximbank and other bank credits and supplies and over \$ 600 million in trade. That, I have to admit, is more than the G-7 provided to Russia after disintegration.

All these efforts seek to replace historic antagonisms with open dialogue and joint endeavours. They demonstrate how Turkey accepts responsibility to exercise a leadership rôle in our region. Looking forward, we see dramatic opportunities for regional economic co-operation.

We are planning for an oil and gas pipeline from the Caspian basin of Azerbaijan and central Asia, across Turkey to the Mediterranean; that has also been the official policy of the United States. That pipeline would expand world oil supplies, reducing European reliance on existing sources. It would protect the fragile Bosphorus from lurking environmental catastrophe and it would bring together old antagonists in common prosperity.

To achieve this ambitious agenda, we look to our partners in the West for moral support and partnership. Turkey has demonstrated time and again its willingness to take risks for its partners and to sacrifice for the principles of freedom.

Turkey's integration with Europe will be a major step for world peace. But failure to include the world's only secular Muslim democracy in the new European club would send the wrong message to the whole Muslim world and it would send the wrong signal to those engaged in the struggle between secularism and fundamentalism; between moderation and extremism.

We are committed to going forward with WEU, based on our common values; our commitment to openness, tolerance and diversity; our commitment to the rule of law, freedom and democracy; our commitment to the firm separation of politics and religion; and our abiding belief that, even as ancient hatreds stalk the world, men and women of good will can carry forward the age-old search for justice and the improvement of the human condition.

Such are the stakes for both Europe and Turkey that the coming century will be full of challenges that can be met only by unity in Europe. If the



*Professor Dr. Ciller (continued)*

house of Europe be divided against itself, that house cannot meet those challenges. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Madam Prime Minister, you will note from the reception you have just received that everyone recognises that you managed to overcome the unpredictable interpretation facilities of this Assembly and carried on – I was going to say in a manly way, but that is not appropriate – splendidly with your speech. On behalf of the Assembly, I thank you for a most instructive, clear and frank address, which is appreciated.

Eleven members have put their names down to ask questions. I would like to get them all in, but that can be achieved only if the questions are short. I ask members for their full co-operation because otherwise some colleagues will not be able to get in. There must be a limit.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – May I, Prime Minister, express my gratitude and admiration for the quality and detail of your speech. In the points it makes we are reminded of Turkey's importance, something most of us fully realise and recognise.

I should like to ask you how you see Turkey, the first Muslim country to go democratic and secular, spreading and transmitting its democratic and human qualities – I was going to say virtues – to the Islamic republics that are its partners and neighbours in the former USSR. The stability of all this part of the European continent in its broad definition depends on peaceful conditions, to which you can surely contribute. The question is, how?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Professor Dr. CILLER (*Prime Minister of Turkey*). – Do I answer questions separately, Mr. President, or do I answer them all at the end?

The PRESIDENT. – It is entirely up to you. Would you like to answer questions individually or in groups?

Professor Dr. CILLER (*Prime Minister of Turkey*). – I shall answer each question separately.

Mr. Valleix asked a good question and his point is well taken. It is crucial that we recognise that the old Soviet Union has disintegrated and that the newly emerging countries that have gained their independence are looking for a model. We have close ties with those countries – whether Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan or wherever. There are many Turkish-speaking people in that part of the world. They are also Muslims and they have just gained their independence.

Turkey has made a great sacrifice, even during the economic crisis. The economic burden of the

Gulf war was tremendous and Turkey had to cut down its trade and its pipelines. However, even in the midst of that economic crisis we extended credits to our neighbours. We gave food, in particular wheat, without discrimination to Azerbaijan, Armenia and all those countries that have recently gained their independence. Now, in that part of the world there is a search for a model to follow. The choice is between two models.

The first is the secular, democratic model of Turkey, which has an open market economy. I must underline the fact that Turkey's openness is not just political, it is economic. We lived up to the rules of a market economy long before the Eastern European countries did so. We are one of the most liberal economies in the world in terms of trade, movement of capital, infrastructure and so on. So, as I said, the first choice is the secular, open model of Turkey – one that is not based on fundamentalist principles. The second choice is the fundamentalist model of Iran. The competition is both great and vital and it is going on even at this moment. A choice must be made.

Turkey stands for partnership with Europe. There is a tremendous potential for mutual benefit for the newly emerging countries, for Turkey and for Europe. Turkey's integration into Europe will provide a gateway to accomplish our aims, both economic and for peace – something that will be vital in the coming years.

I want to make one last point. The decision being made by our European friends is not just whether Turkey is or is not to be integrated into Europe – it is about the future of Europe and whether there will be peace in the region; it is about whether Europe will have a stable neighbouring region. Turkey is the only country that is stable, independent, always open and always democratic. It is the only country that can provide the model that should be followed.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Papandreou.

Mrs. PAPANDREOU (*Greece*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, in a recent motion, the Turkish National Assembly formulated threats against Greece, in no uncertain terms, should the latter exercise its legal rights embodied in international law and, in particular, in the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Greece is threatened with recourse to force if it exercises a right common to all members of the United Nations. I would like to know whether this is endorsed by the Turkish Government.

Prime Minister, I would furthermore like, as a politician and a woman politician at that, to express my satisfaction at Turkey's having a woman as Prime Minister: however, I would expect of her, indeed, of any woman Prime Minister, a little more sensitivity on matters concerning women politicians. In fact, I would have expected

*Mrs. Papandreou (continued)*

a more drastic reaction to one of her Cabinet member's description of three outstanding women, members of the European Parliament, as whores. I would believe that women politicians should show more solidarity.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Professor Dr. CILLER (*Prime Minister of Turkey*). – I thank Mrs. Papandreou for her solidarity. The matter of the extension of Greek territorial waters was spelt out by my colleague. We must view the situation as it exists. From the shores of the Aegean, we enjoy views of the Greek islands – we can see into the living rooms of houses on them. We enjoy that neighbourhood and scenery. However, if Greece simply changes the status quo and extends her territorial waters beyond the six-mile zone – and incidentally, the waters of the Aegean and of the Mediterranean are among the cleanest in Europe – it would mean that a boat or yacht sailing from one port in Turkey to another in Turkey would have to obtain the permission of Greece, because the Greek islands are so close to our shores.

That would be the case also for other countries in the area. Vessels would no longer be able to move through international waters. We do not want to own those waters – that is not the case at all. We want some international water so that we can pass through. It is as simple as that. The same is true of the United States or any other country whose vessels travel through the same region. That is why we cannot and will never accept a change to the status quo. That would not be feasible. Greece has a big responsibility to ensure a special place for Turkey in those waters.

As to Mrs. Papandreou's second question, the three European parliamentarians, whom I met in Turkey are friends of mine. I spent hours with them, trying to explain the problems of my country. It is not clear whether the incident to which Mrs. Papandreou referred actually occurred but the Turkish Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and myself as Prime Minister immediately responded, saying that the remark in question did not reflect official views or inclinations.

As a woman Prime Minister, I feel great closeness to all women parliamentarians. The moment that I entered this hemicycle, the first thing that I did was to look around to see the women parliamentarians, with whom I feel great solidarity. There is no way that my government would adopt the attitude to which Mrs. Papandreou referred, but sometimes misunderstandings arise. In such circumstances, my government responds officially – as we did – and says, "We love you."

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pavlidis.

Mr. PAVLIDIS (*Greece*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, I would like to congratulate you on the picture you gave us of the situation in your country. In truth, I say, you merit our warmest congratulations, despite the fact that we all know exactly what is happening in Turkey. Besides, nothing is secret any longer in our world today. The picture you gave us conveys optimism about the chances of the democratisation process, which I personally welcome. My country, Greece, has facilitated the way towards the goal you strive for by consenting to the customs union and this is something I beg my parliamentary colleagues to note.

Yes, indeed, we are for Turkey's pro-western orientation. However, we are worried about certain declarations made outside this forum, declarations such as the one referred to by Mrs. Papandreou; that is, should Greece exercise its legal right – a right, please note, conferred on it by the new Law of the Sea, of which 165 countries are signatories, but not Turkey; further, one that most of them, surely all those bordering on the Mediterranean, have already put into effect and that even Turkey, though not a signatory, is applying, having extended its territorial waters to twelve miles in the Black Sea and off its southern coast – should Greece exercise this legitimate right, would this constitute for you, Dr. Ciller, a *casus belli*, a cause for war? As I heard you today, I had the impression that there must be some kind of misunderstanding, and I would be very glad if that were so. Indeed, you asked the Assembly whether a pleasure boat needs a permit to cross Hellenic territorial waters.

Dr. Ciller, I represent an insular region, indeed, I represent eighteen islands lying off the beautiful Turkish coast. When a yacht leaves Bodrum in Turkey to cross to my home island, Cos, it does not need a permit. When our merchantmen, whether Turkish or Greek, when warships, American or any other, transit through Greek waters, they do not need any permit, in the latter case due to the right of innocent passage. Even Turkish warships, going about their lawful purposes in peacetime, need no such permit in Greek waters. The new Law of the Sea guarantees freedom of navigation and we, as a major maritime nation, defend this freedom. There must be a misunderstanding, for no permit is needed. Therefore, if this is at the root of your declarations about waging war against Greece, should it exercise its legal rights then, please, Dr. Ciller, do seize this felicitous opportunity and make clear where you stand on the *casus belli* issue.

You mentioned Greece which, I truly say, is a friendly country; for my part, I have many friends and colleagues in Turkey. I therefore feel I must congratulate you on the picture you gave us of Turkey; but, pray, do make clear your stand on the twelve-mile limit.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Professor Dr. CILLER (*Prime Minister of Turkey*). – I repeat that if the territorial waters are extended, they would not be international waters but Greek waters. Turkey would be unable to breathe. It is as simple as that.

The Greek islands are so close to the Turkish shores. It is clear that those waters would no longer be international but would be Greek. That is why we feel that international waters are a must, not only for Turkey but so that other countries in the area can pass through them. We are not saying that the waters should be Turkish. We feel that they should remain international waters. That is a must for Turkey and we cannot accept anything other than that.

As for democracy in Turkey, I am glad for the support that Greece is extending us on that matter. We live in a very close world. In Greece, however, according to Article 19 of the nationality law, one third of all Greek land is restricted to Greek citizens and cannot be freely given or left by Greek citizens. I point that out because we are always trying to find out what Turkey lacks. We do have deficiencies but that does not mean that all the other countries with representatives in this room do not also have deficiencies. We should try to make corrections and be productive, not counter-productive.

The key to the relationship between Greece and Turkey is that we have been cut off from dialogue. If we sit down and talk about the issues with other people the truth will come out. It is as simple as that. We should not shy away from dialogue. After all, there are no secrets left in the world today – not with all the media, communications and new agreements to which we adhere. Everyone is in on everything. It is not merely a question of governments but of civilian organisations and non-governmental organisations. Everyone is collecting information in all fields. I do not think that we have secrets. We need to learn to use the information and I am providing some of the facts for this audience.

The PRESIDENT. – I hate to interrupt, but the last questioner took four minutes and has effectively cut out at least one other questioner. I must therefore ask members to co-operate and not to be selfish. People feel strongly and want to get burning issues off their chests, but we have to consider our colleagues.

I call Mr. Schloten.

Mr. SCHLOTEN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, in your impressive address you gave a great deal of space to the reforms in Turkey, especially the constitutional reforms. These reforms are a major prerequisite for the further integration of Turkey into the European institu-

tions. That is why I would like to ask you – with all respect for the parliamentary deliberations which we know from our own experience – whether you can give us an approximate timescale for the completion of the reforms, especially as regards freedom of speech and of the press, local self-administration and cultural autonomy?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Professor Dr. CILLER (*Prime Minister of Turkey*). – Democracy is at work in Turkey even at this very moment. I will be flying back to Ankara tonight and as soon as I get back we will be working on the amendments to the constitution. We initiated them last week. There are twenty-one articles, all of which are under debate.

I shall say a few words on the procedure. We need 300 votes on the changes to the twenty-one articles. Last week, we got 298 votes, which is very close. We got 270 votes for each amendment to the articles and we were able to vote on two of them last week, which means that the process has been initiated but it will probably take a couple of weeks before parliament finds out whether it can come up with the 300 votes. If it cannot, but there are 270 votes for, we can go to the people in a referendum, and I will take it to the people.

The changes to the constitution will form the basis for further changes to our laws and therefore they are a must. I am leading on the issue. Last year, when I was determined about the law on privatisation, I spent three consecutive nights in parliament without any break. However, as a coalition government we cannot achieve the changes alone because our maximum vote is less than 250 and we need 300 for a full amendment and 270 to be able to take it to the people. That means that we will have a couple more weeks of work on the amendments to the constitution.

Before parliament goes into recess I am hoping that it will approve – by a simple majority this time – the seventh five-year plan, which would give more rights to municipalities and local administrations. We will be considering the five-year plan straight after voting on the changes to the constitution and the amendments. That plan will give local administrations more rights so that people can participate locally in the decision-making that relates to their own local problems.

Our coalition government is still working on the third set of changes. While we stress the territorial integrity of our country, which is a must, we must on the other hand allow the individual more freedom of expression. We do not stand for rights given on the basis of regional or ethnic background. That may lead to micro-states. Even in Europe that is a debate that we need to develop. We stand for more individual rights for everyone, including freedom of thought and speech and we will work on that as a third step.

*Professor Dr. Ciller (continued)*

We have taken some steps in the right direction, but we need to do further work. I would say that it will take a couple of weeks for us to amend the constitution, to say the least, as it requires 300 votes. Then we will need a simple majority to give more rights to local government, which will follow on from that. Then we will start work on what is a very sensitive issue in Turkey – freedom of thought and of speech for everyone on an individual basis.

The PRESIDENT:- Thank you. I now call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I listened with great interest to your comments on Cyprus, Dr. Ciller, because, as you know, the United Kingdom, along with your country and Greece, is one of the guarantor powers for the island of Cyprus. I think that your interpretation of present events is not borne out by the facts. You must be aware of the comments of the Secretary-General, when he tried to promote discussions on Cyprus and said that, sadly, the problem was due to the lack of willingness on the part of Mr. Denktash. You are recorded as saying in Washington in April this year, “The problem of Cyprus will be resolved when Turkey joins the European Union.” Do you really believe that?

After twenty-one years in which both Turkish and Greek Cypriots have suffered because of the events of 1974, when the economy in the north of Cyprus is on its knees, your country, the United Kingdom and Greece should do everything that we can to support Cyprus’s membership of the European Union for the benefit of Cyprus and its people, be they Greek or Turkish.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Professor Dr. CILLER (*Prime Minister of Turkey*). – The Secretary-General has also criticised Mr. Clerides, and the European Union as well. But we must recognise the fact that we have been dwelling on the confidence-building measures in Cyprus for some time now. All the parties involved said, about a year ago, that that was what we needed to do. They said that we needed to accept the confidence-building measures in Cyprus as that was the solution. Basically, the rejection came from Mr. Denktash about a year ago. Now, the Turkish side – Mr. Denktash – has declared that it accepts the confidence-building measures formally and totally and has taken steps to go beyond them. However, Mr. Clerides has said no to that. That is a fact and we cannot change it.

Why has this come about? We all agreed a year ago that, if we accepted the confidence-building measures as stated, that would be the solution, but the Turkish side was blocking them because of Mr. Denktash’s rejection. In the past year, Mr.

Denktash finally said “yes” and went beyond that confidence-building programme, but this time Mr. Clerides will not even sit down and talk about it. Why?

That is the point that I was making here today and it reflects the fact that the Greek side has interpreted it such that, if Greece becomes a full member of the European Union, a solution in Cyprus is not needed. But that cannot be. We need a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal solution in Cyprus, otherwise the problem will be in Europe’s hands. That is not something that we can accept, either. We need to ensure that we come up with a fair solution in Cyprus which will promote the partnership of both Turkey and Cyprus in the European Union. That would be a way out.

I feel that many of the animosities that exist between Greece and Turkey can be resolved within the boundaries of Europe when everyone is free to move from one part of Cyprus to another and when the basic problems are solved in terms of the free movement of everything, be it capital, labour or whatever, within Cyprus, when both Turkey and Cyprus become full members of EU. It is the absolute solution. It is the final, fundamental solution. But I am not taking that up as an issue today. I am pointing to the fact that this time, when Mr. Denktash has finally agreed, it is Mr. Clerides who has rejected. We should not be counter-productive by making the Greek side accept full membership before achieving a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution, as we, as an international community, had all agreed.

The PRESIDENT. – The next question is from Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – You have, Prime Minister, spoken with great skill and feeling, like a modern knight of the Round Table.

You have presented Turkey as a model, a champion of democracy and of the endless struggle for human rights and freedom in which we are all concerned. You say that your country is a victim of situations of fierce nationalism that are misunderstood and distorted, particularly abroad, but at home as well, and the target of xenophobia and racism: these are the reasons that prevent your achieving the goal of modern democracy.

Why is it that Turkey, whose goal you depict as a democracy little short of paradise, fails to respect the rights of a minority of eleven million people who are not, I admit, grouped together in just one part of Turkey and are not, contrary to what you have said, in favour of separatism? The fact is – and we have read the documents – no movement in Turkey, not even the PKK, is demanding independence. The Kurds only want to live together in an undivided Turkey with the right to their own language and access to televi-

*Mr. Rodrigues (continued)*

sion and radio and where the elementary rights you mentioned will be granted them.

Why are the rights of minorities, which are recognised everywhere else, not recognised in your country, Prime Minister? Why is it that you always speak in a general way of terrorists? This is a people which goes back to the beginnings of history. Your own ancestors came down from the great Siberian rivers and made a great contribution to the history of mankind. Why, belying this heritage, do you pursue a wholly negative, unacceptable, and criminal policy towards the Kurdish people?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Professor Dr. CILLER (*Prime Minister of Turkey*). – I have to reject that question totally and give the facts as they are. You must then decide whether those facts are facts or not. I shall spell out the precise issues.

We are a democratic country. Are not we the only country out of the fifty-two Muslim countries with a democracy? The answer is “yes”. Of those fifty-two Muslim countries, are we not the only country in the area that has opened up and stood for democratic values in the Middle East? The answer is “yes”. Are we not the only model for the integrated or disintegrated countries which have gained their independence in the area? Is the model to be followed the secular model of Turkey or some other fundamentalist model? Those are the issues in that area.

Is there any party or organisation in Turkey which asks for the cultural rights of a so-called minority? If you answer “yes”, you must specify the name, because there is none. What we have is the PKK, which says it is a democratic group. It says it stands up for the democratic rights of the Kurdish people. But what it does is kill and then come in disguise to countries in Europe which have a fertile democracy and say, “We are the party”. The parliamentarians say, “We are the PKK”. The PKK has murdered and killed babies. That is not romantic. I have seen it. They have killed babies, women and teachers. That is the PKK and the party. No other party or organisation in Turkey asks for rights – cultural rights.

Turkey has twenty ethnic backgrounds, all intermingled. If we do not have one language to unite them, there will be no communication. That is why Ataturk ensured that we had one language to unite Turkey. And that is why we must hold the people together and no one in Turkey has a right as a Turk or as a Kurd; rather, they all have rights as Turkish citizens. It is as simple as that.

We have about sixty million people in Turkey and ten million of Kurdish origin. After all the

questions posed by our friends in the West, we looked at the ratios in parliament and the government. Do you know how many parliamentarians we have? We have more than 150 Kurdish parliamentarians – more than one third. That is because we do not have discrimination. That is because we do not elect parliamentarians on their ethnic background, and we should not. What we should do is look at their capabilities and their ideas, and vote accordingly.

These are the facts in Turkey. I think it is about time people learnt about these facts, and that is why I am here. If there is a fact that differs from what I have said, specify the name, specify the organisation. We in Europe have to decide whether we want unitary states and, at the same time, to promote individual rights. We want to promote all rights on an individual basis, not on ethnic background. There will be a time in Europe when we have to discuss that matter further, to see what we will end up with if we look at all other ethnic backgrounds and nationalities, leading eventually to micro-states.

This is the situation in Turkey and I am very proud of it. I am very proud that no citizen in Turkey elects parliamentarians based on ethnic background. I am very proud of the fact that our Kurdish-origin citizens live in Istanbul, Ankara and other places. I am proud of the fact that all of them fight against the PKK because they are Turkish citizens. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Ciller.

I call Mr. Speroni.

Mr. SPERONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Professor that she is, the Turkish Prime Minister has explained to us what democracy should be. She has, to say the least, subjective ideas when she talks about terrorism and admits at the same time having paid \$50 million to the Palestinians. Some look upon the Palestinians as terrorists, others as patriots and yet others as guerrillas; here again, it is a matter of opinion. Now the Turkish Prime Minister comes here to teach us democracy; for example, she tells us that in Italy we are wrong to allow people in the south Tyrol to speak German and people in the Val d’Aosta to speak French. Perhaps it is wrong to allow the Flemings to speak Dutch or, in Belgium, Flemish and of course Spain is also wrong in allowing a measure of autonomy to the Basques! However, we appreciate these lessons in democracy.

As the Turkish Prime Minister has told us that everything reported by the press and the media is false I would like to ask her if it will be possible for us members of Western European Union to go to Kurdistan and find out for ourselves what the Kurds, other than the PKK, want. Above all, we would like to know whether it will be possible to hold a referendum to determine whether or not the

*Mr. Speroni (continued)*

Kurds within Turkey really mean to change the destiny of their region, granting that it exists and seeing that everybody talks about it except the Prime Minister.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Professor Dr. CILLER (*Prime Minister of Turkey*). – Not many states would allow a certain separatist group to separate a country and, meanwhile, murder people. Are there any parliamentarians in this room who can stand up and say, for their own country, that they would allow that? Would they allow a separatist group just to come up and say, "This is the part of the nation I want and the way I am going to do it is by killing you, killing innocent people."? How many parliamentarians in this very room would say that they would allow that for their own country?

We have to recognise the fact that the terrorism we have in the form of the PKK is not based just on ethnic background or lack of democracy. You have to look at the region, look at why terrorism from outside is being exported to us. Look at the geography of Turkey, at the borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria. Why did we have terrorism from Iraq? Because Turkey stood by European friends in the Gulf crisis and Saddam does not like it. He promotes terrorism. It is as simple as that.

Why do we get fundamentalists fuelled from outside? The terrorists are fuelled by fundamentalism. Why? It is not as simple as many people feel it is. It is not that we do not have democracy in Turkey. All you have to do is come to live in Turkey and turn on the television channels. We do not have a lack of freedom of speech, either; it is just that we have some laws that look as if that is the case. Look at what is happening in practice: there are fifteen private channels, more than 350 local channels – all private, all talking, all saying anything they want. That is the situation.

We have to recognise the facts as they are. Sometimes, the truth of life is not as simple as it looks. No other Prime Minister in my country or I would allow a separatist group to say, "All right, this is the portion of the country we want for ourselves" and kill for it. That is not the way to get things done, not in Europe and not in my country either. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I call Mr. Korakas.

Mr. KORAKAS (*Greece*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, please allow me to seize the opportunity of your presence here, to express my deepest esteem and solidarity to our brothers, the people of Turkey; I will go further, to say that the tension between our two countries is mostly artificial. For it is not due to any intrinsic feelings they are har-

bouring, but rather the result of interference by our ostensible foreign friends, for their own reasons. Our nations have much to build on together and nothing substantial to divide them. I was really impressed, Prime Minister, by the straightforward delivery – I will not say cynicism – of your exposé on Turkish policy and in particular by your reminder of your country's participation in various imperialist interventions in Korea, Cuba and now Yugoslavia. Well, you were probably trying to remind them that you expect to cash in on those investments, saying that "as we stood by you then, so we expect you to stand by the policy we are pursuing in Turkey now".

You spoke of democracy, yet, in the same breath, you admitted to the undemocratic nature of your constitution and laws and said you have to modify them, which would only be right. You also spoke of human rights, at which point I would like to make a reference to the Kurdish problem. To start with, the PKK is indeed not the only representative of the Kurdish nation; as you know full well, there are other political formations, other parties, legal parties in fact, such as HADEP, and the latter is the target of regular terrorist attacks, most recently the bombing of their Ankara bureau. I need not dwell on this.

With all due respect, tell us, Prime Minister, can a man freely say in Turkey "I am a Kurd"? Are Kurdish children taught in their mother tongue at school? In France, whose soil we now tread, if there are more than ten Turkish pupils in a school they have the right to lessons in Turkish. Kurdish children do not have this right in their own land. Can a man freely assert his own cultural Kurdish identity in your country? These are elementary rights, Prime Minister, and surely you will want to enlighten us on the means these people should resort to in order to secure these rights.

You spoke of the victims in this conflict. However there are not only Turkish deaths, there are many more, by far, on the Kurdish side. There is no worse form of warfare than civil war.

The matter at hand therefore, is not the letter of the law itself, when it comes to the rights of the Kurds, or the imprisonment of the DEP deputies; for the latter were first stripped of their immunity by act of parliament, in good and due form. So it was really by your will that they were sent to court. Which brings us to the crux of the problem: when will you actually and sincerely reform your constitution and liberalise your legislation? Will human rights be respected in Turkey, for Turk and non-Turk alike?

About the invasion and occupation of Cyprus: will your occupation forces retire, to make place for United Nations troops?

Finally, on the extension of our territorial waters to twelve miles, you know full well this in no way

*Mr. Korakas (continued)*

impinges on the rights of any neighbouring country, nor does it curtail the right of passage. So why do you really abstain from signing the new international convention on the Law of the Sea?

The PRESIDENT. – I apologise to you, Madam Prime Minister. Perhaps you would be good enough to reply to Mr. Korakas and then I shall conclude the proceedings.

Professor Dr. CILLER (*Prime Minister of Turkey*). – I did not look at history with cynicism; on the contrary, I looked at the facts. I said that Europe needs Turkey as much as Turkey needs Europe. My reason for saying that stems from history. Turkey is the only stable, dependable country in the region. It is always there when needed, be it for NATO, the Gulf crisis, the fight against communism – and even other crises, such as that in Bosnia. I said that Turkey is always secure, dependable and democratic; that it always shares the values of freedom. To say that was not looking at history with cynicism; it was looking at the facts. Europe and Turkey need each other to fill a security vacuum which still exists, even after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union.

On the point about citizens of Kurdish origin, they can speak any language they want. Indeed, anybody can speak any language they want. Mr. Korakas should come to the villages of Turkey and see that for himself. Children and mothers speak any language they want to speak, including Kurdish. What is not permitted is the use of Kurdish or, indeed, any language other than Turkish, in the schools. That is because there are twenty ethnic backgrounds. Ataturk, the founder of Turkey, gave us one language to unify the land. It is part of the unification process in Anatolia.

I am not saying that we do not need to continue raising our standards of democracy. We believe that we need to move further in that direction. However, we do not have citizenship based on ethnic background, as is the case in Greece. Article 19 of the Greek nationality law defines the citizenship of ethnic backgrounds and reserves one third of Greek territory for Greek citizens. The citizenship is based on ethnic definition. Turkey does not do that.

In Turkey, Turks or people of Kurdish origin do not have any rights – none whatsoever – but they all have rights as Turkish citizens. There are fewer than ten million citizens of Kurdish origin, but more than 150 of the 450 parliamentarians are of Kurdish origin. That shows that we do not discriminate in our democratic election process. Anybody can go anywhere and do anything. He or she can be in parliament. Any differentiation is based not on ethnic background, but on capability. We do not build our democracy on differentiating bet-

ween our citizens based on their ethnic backgrounds. We give freedom for all, on an individual basis. We believe that that is the right attitude. That is the way in which we will progress with democracy and territorial integrity, in line with our history.

The PRESIDENT. – Madam Prime Minister, in the United Kingdom there is a famous horse race meeting that runs over several days – it is called Royal Ascot. It is an up-market affair. On the Wednesday of that meeting, there is what is known as Ladies' Day. We have had Ladies' Day in the WEU Assembly today, not only because of your presence, which is very welcome as you are the principal guest, but because of, as you said in your relevant and interesting reference, the number of lady members of the Assembly and the part that they are increasingly playing not only here, but in their respective parliaments.

I am sure that we all agree that this has been a refreshing and challenging session – not unremarkable in many respects, and in particular the questions. Whatever the views of various members, I thought that you, Dr. Ciller, handled them magnificently. You gave us good value for money. Although, as you well recognise, opinions are divided on certain sensitive issues, no one in this Assembly could fail to recognise that you have a complex and dangerous job, which you are tackling with enormous spirit.

We thank you very much for coming here today and we wish you well for the future.

*(The sitting was suspended at 12.25 p.m. and resumed at 12.30 p.m.)*

### 5. Points of order

The PRESIDENT. – Before I introduce Mr. Millon, I remind members that this morning, Mr. Rathbone raised a point of order concerning the distribution of seats for government delegates. Full inquiries have been made and I can tell members that thirty-two seats are available – one for each national delegation to the Assembly, numbering twenty-seven, and five for ministers and their staff. Three are allocated for the Secretariat-General if all seats are not occupied. Mr. Rathbone would have noticed, as I did this morning, that four seats at most were vacant throughout the proceedings. It would seem difficult to allocate fewer seats to the Council but the Assembly could take the decision to allocate to Council members reserved seats in the public gallery. It would probably be difficult for the Council to accept such a solution. We must investigate that matter in more detail, so I suggest that we ask the Presidential Committee to do so. As Mr. Rathbone is a member of that com-

*The President (continued)*

mittee, no doubt he will be a major contributor to that discussion.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I believe that I have the unanimous support of Assembly members when I say that today – not for the first, second or third time – the translation equipment has proved abysmal. It was bad at the last sitting, yesterday and today. I ask not for the Clerk to arrange for technicians to attend to the system but for you, Mr. President, to summon the managing director of SATI, to hear from you that the equipment is not acceptable to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – I have already given the staff a rocket and demanded to know what is being done. I will take note of your comments, Lord Finsberg, and I will decide whether such action is necessary. The problem has arisen before and I am determined to see that it is solved. We have been let down again and we will certainly have the equipment put right.

**6. Address by Mr. Millon,  
Minister of Defence of France**

The PRESIDENT. – We welcome the new Minister of Defence of France, Mr. Millon. His many distinguished predecessors in that rôle were regular visitors to the Assembly, and they were most welcome. We are particularly keen to hear your remarks, Mr. Millon, because many current events affect French defence – not least the problems in former Yugoslavia and the decision by France and my country, which I welcome as a British member of parliament, concerning the rapid reaction force. All those matters are of considerable concern to us all. As we are running late, I invite Mr. Millon to address us without further ado.

Mr. MILLON (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, “the military presence of France in Bosnia is based on one simple, dominant idea: the security of Europe is at stake in this region. France will not accept the return of ethnic hatred and barbarism on this continent”. These words, spoken by the President of the Republic in solemn tribute to the French members of the United Nations forces killed in Bosnia, impart all their significance to the decisions recently taken by France in consultation with its main allies.

Your Assembly is especially qualified to measure the importance of the policies decided on and the issues at stake in the efforts that are being made not only by France, but also by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium and

Italy, and most of the European countries which are also members of WEU. The contingents from our countries constitute the majority of the United Nations forces in Bosnia.

Because of the grave deterioration in the situation as of 27th May, France’s reaction was both swift and strong. Let me remind you of what happened: violent shelling by the Serbs of both the Bosnian capital and the eastern enclaves and the region of Tuzla, where 76 people were killed; the encirclement or capture of nearly four hundred United Nations peace-keeping forces and observers as hostages by the Bosnian Serbs; the blockade of all humanitarian and UNPROFOR convoys.

On the initiative of the President of the Republic, the French, European and allied governments all agreed on a firm response.

Our first objective was military, i.e. to minimise the vulnerability of the peace-keeping forces, reinforce UNPROFOR resources and stop the humiliation of our soldiers, in particular by giving local commanders what they had so often asked for in terms of the means to respond and make themselves respected.

This military objective was inseparable from a diplomatic objective, namely the reason for the presence of our forces in Bosnia and Croatia, i.e. to re-launch the efforts to find a political solution, with the support of the powers in the contact group and the countries of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance.

This two-fold approach took concrete form on 3rd June at the meeting held at my invitation of the ministers of defence of those European Union and Atlantic Alliance countries which are participating in action by the United Nations forces in Bosnia. The WEU Secretary-General, who was represented at the conference, took part in all that was done. The ministers reaffirmed there could be no military solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, we defined specific objectives for UNPROFOR in Bosnia and, lastly, we proposed the creation of a rapid reaction force consisting of two brigades, one British and the other multinational under French command.

The creation of this force, designed to act under United Nations authority and help UNPROFOR to perform its task, was authorised by the Security Council in Resolution 998, adopted on 16th June last.

The force has three key missions: first to provide protection for UNPROFOR units which are isolated or threatened, second to facilitate the regrouping or redeployment of United Nations peace-keeping forces and third to ensure freedom of movement for UNPROFOR in performing its mandate. The force consists of combat-ready



*Mr. Millon (continued)*

mobile units, which therefore keep their national uniforms, while flying the United Nations flag and bearing its distinctive mark. I would emphasise that the initiative for creating this force is entirely, or almost entirely, European as is the composition of its units.

The multinational brigade under French command is a further example of the European military co-operation we are seeking to develop in response to the challenges to general European security.

The understanding between French, British and Netherlands forces and also Spanish, German and, perhaps in future, Czech forces, will, I hope, set an example in Bosnia.

Though WEU is not as such involved in the constitution of the rapid reaction force, our joint enterprise supplements WEU's specific efforts in former Yugoslavia in, as you will recall, the following three areas: WEU participation in monitoring the embargo in the Adriatic; monitoring compliance with economic sanctions on the Danube, and the WEU contribution to the European administration for the policing of the district of Mostar in central Bosnia.

So far these actions are on a modest scale. The initiative taken by France and the United Kingdom on 3rd June last is perhaps a prelude to more ambitious operations. The mere fact of having brought together the European Union and Atlantic Alliance ministers of defence concerned in Paris was unprecedented.

I see in this a determination on the part of Europeans to take over crisis-management where their security is directly concerned. It also shows preliminary signs of the new relations we wish to see established between the two groups – the North Atlantic and Western Europe – in other words between the two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance, whose destinies have been closely linked ever since the Washington Treaty was signed.

In actual fact, much remains to be done to give real substance to the European pillar. It is one of the aims of the President of the French Republic and of the French Government and it is going to be a priority task for me in the coming months.

We are now at a critical stage as regards the future of the conflict in Bosnia.

By Sunday, all the hostages had been freed and all the UNPROFOR units pinned down and encircled in Sarajevo had regrouped. This was achieved by the unwavering firmness of our governments, restated at the Halifax meeting of the Group of Seven.

Today, a large contingent of the French part of the rapid reaction force leaves from Toulon. The

plan, in co-operation with our British and Netherlands friends, is to deploy these units rapidly in Bosnia and have them operational at the earliest possible moment.

But, as you know, the only way to peace is to speed up the political dialogue. Mr. Carl Bildt, the new negotiator appointed by the European Union and the contact group, has the job of re-opening dialogue between the parties, smoothing the way towards a general cessation of military activities and getting negotiations between the belligerents going again on the basis of their acceptance of the contact group's peace plan.

Last Friday, the Bosnian Government launched a military operation which it stated was designed to relieve pressure on Sarajevo. Naturally the French, who were the first, in the summer of 1992, to send a contingent to Sarajevo, are only too keenly aware of the distress felt in the city and the anxiety of the authorities.

We are determined to ensure that supplies get through to Sarajevo and that the ring around it is broken. This is precisely what the orders to stay firm given by the President of the Republic mean and it is the reason why we have so far resisted any temptation to withdraw our forces.

Even so, the Bosnian Government must understand, however difficult it is for them to do so, that engaging in further military action is no answer.

To conclude, I would emphasise how urgent it is for the question of access to the Bosnian enclaves and to Sarajevo to be resolved both in political terms and in fact.

I call on all parties, and first among them the Bosnian Serbs, to recognise that UNPROFOR's free access to safe areas and the resumption of supply convoys to these areas, are an essential prerequisite for the peace process to continue. It is unacceptable that armed factions should hold peace-keeping forces and civilian populations under threat.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, you have all understood that our mission, both in Bosnia and in Croatia, is to keep the peace; this is our sole aim. I hope that the action the Europeans have decided to take will revive hope in Bosnia and former Yugoslavia.

I call on this Assembly to endorse what we are doing and to join with us in sending this message of firmness, determination and solidarity to the peoples of former Yugoslavia.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much for being commendably brief and to the point, Minister. We are desperately short of time so may we have brief questions please? I am trying to give priority to members who have not already asked questions. The first is Mr. Terry Davis.

Mr. DAVIS (*United Kingdom*). – Given the Serb refusal to accept the internationally-agreed plan for a settlement in Bosnia and the inability of international forces to prevent people from being killed in Sarajevo, does the French Government not have a great deal of sympathy for the Bosnian Government, which seems to have decided that the only way to achieve justice is through its own military forces?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Naess.

Mr. NAESS (*Norway, associate member*). – Being concerned with the security of Western Europe, perhaps I should applaud the French Government's decision to resume nuclear testing in the southern Pacific, as far away from France as possible. That decision has the additional advantage of confining radiation and fallout damage to areas that are already polluted by previous French tests. The decision could also be considered a wise one from the environmental point of view and the people of the southern Pacific should perhaps be sympathetic to the problems of middle-sized countries lacking convenient areas for nuclear tests in their own territories.

Seriously, however, do you feel that the French decision to resume nuclear testing is in accordance with the European Union's statement that the Union is convinced that the strengthening of the global nuclear non-proliferation régime can only be achieved through indefinite and unconditional extension of, as well as universal accession to, the treaty?

And is it in accordance with the Lisbon declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, which welcomed the decision to extend the nuclear non-proliferation treaty for an indefinite period?

The PRESIDENT. – The third of this group of questions is from Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – This is a purely domestic question. The Minister kindly and generously asked for the Assembly's support for his efforts, and I am sure that we shall give that. May we, in turn, ask for his support in our efforts to overcome domestic difficulties such as heating and electronic technicalities, which were referred to at the beginning of the session while he was sitting here and which it is in the hands of the new French Government to help the Assembly solve?

The PRESIDENT. – At least you have variety in those questions, Minister. Would you care to respond, please?

Mr. MILLON (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I shall begin by answering the last question. I shall pass on Mr. Rathbone's request and ask the French authorities to see what they can do to improve conditions in the hemicycle. You may be

sure that I shall do everything I can to see that the Assembly has all the facilities it needs to operate efficiently.

Of the other two questions, the first concerns Bosnia. Let me assure the honourable member that there is no question of the French Government taking sides. On the other hand, we do have an opinion about what is done and what it is permissible to do.

We know that acts of terrorism and barbarism were committed by the Bosnian Serbs some weeks ago. Those acts were the taking of hostages, the shelling of the civilian population and the surrounding of peace-keeping forces making it impossible for them to fulfil their mission. The French Government condemns this type of action and such acts without qualification.

At the same time, we turn to the Bosnian Government to request it in all seriousness to think twice before launching other military operations since, as I said at the start, we do not think that military action, today, can help bring about a peaceful solution.

Now that the hostages have been freed, the peace-keeping forces are no longer encircled and in principle – I repeat, in principle – the safe areas can now be supplied again, we hope that Mr. Carl Bildt, the negotiator appointed by the European Union and confirmed by the Group of Five will be able to enter into negotiations with all the parties. We also hope that, on the basis of the plan put forward in Geneva for the division of territory between the Bosnians, Serbs and Croats, discussions and, we hope, agreement will be possible.

That is the position of the French Government. I repeat that we have our opinion on what is done, but we are not in former Yugoslavia to take sides in a conflict which unfortunately looks only too often like civil war.

As regards the nuclear tests, I appreciate the humour of Mr. Naess of Norway. My answer to him is that for us, the resumption of nuclear testing is consistent with the peace-oriented approach which France pursues in its foreign and nuclear policy.

The President of the Republic wishes France to sign the final nuclear test-ban treaty in late 1996, the discussions on which will enter their final stage in June-July 1996.

This does not mean that the President of the Republic and the French Government are prepared to give up the principle of deterrence, which is the very foundation of French defence policy. The fact is that our nuclear arsenal will probably become obsolete by 2010-2015 unless France is able to carry out a limited number of nuclear tests today.

*Mr. Millon (continued)*

Their purpose is not to try out new weapons or even to modernise the existing arsenal, but simply to gather scientific data for subsequent use in laboratory simulations.

This is what the President of the Republic and the French Government have decided to do. Rest assured that we are ensuring this approach is in harmony with the non-proliferation treaty, which we have signed, and also with the future test ban treaty, which we wish to see drawn up and put into effect.

In conclusion, I repeat that our sole objective is to check the reliability and credibility of our deterrent, and that there is no question of any harm being caused to the environment. France is all the surer of this in that the French Government has already invited international and national scientific delegations to the test sites on several occasions after nuclear tests in the past to check that neither fauna nor flora had been contaminated. These international and national committees all agreed there was no major disturbance. This needed to be said.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are the comments I wished to make on the questions you asked me.

The PRESIDENT. – The first of the final three members to ask questions is Mrs. Blunck.

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Millon, I would like to add a supplementary to the question by my Norwegian colleague. I will not ask if your comment on the destruction of the environment was also meant to be humorous. It can scarcely have been meant seriously.

I would like to know why the American nuclear tests already carried out in the same technical field that you now want to investigate are not sufficient and not transferable to the French army and the needs of French defence policy?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Blunck.

I now call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – British parliamentarians express their deepest sympathy to you, Minister, and to France for the murder of your peace-keepers by what I would describe as the thugs who now control parts of former Yugoslavia.

On nuclear testing, you have now opened the door for any country in the world that wishes to do what France intends to do. As we have heard repeatedly, it is a matter of co-operation and friendship. With whom did France discuss the proposed testing of nuclear weapons? Was it with WEU? Was it with NATO? Was it with the United Nations? In particular, were the countries in the region that will be affected – Australia, New Zea-

land and others – informed of your proposal and their views sought?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Finally, I call Mrs. Guirado.

Mrs. GUIRADO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Minister, today is a special day because we have just approved a proposal to debate in depth the new position of the French Government on nuclear weapons; as you talked we all had the impression of having entered a new era, which came as no surprise to some of us, given the nature of the French Government at the present time. However, as some of the representatives here have pointed out, you are in the European Union, you are in WEU, you are in NATO, and yet you do not appear to be prepared to discuss your position, and fundamentally your position on nuclear testing, with your fellow members and allies.

It seems that nuclear tests are not a welcome subject; we have been known to debate minor ecological issues, yet an issue as significant as that of nuclear testing passes unnoticed.

You have just given us some extremely disturbing news; you said, “in 1996 we will definitely sign the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”. Does this mean that until 1996 you are going to drop, or test or remove from store all the nuclear weapons you hold at the moment? Or as one representative said this morning, “many agreements are signed but not implemented”, just as in the Spanish saying: between said and done there is a long way to run.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I call the Minister.

Mr. MILLON (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I shall answer the three questions which have just been asked on nuclear testing.

France signed the non-proliferation treaty and wants it to be complied with. As regards the end of 1996, I was referring not to that treaty but to the final test ban treaty. There are some countries which today have nuclear weapons; this is part of history and defence policy, and we do indeed wish to prevent proliferation for the good of mankind in general. However, while we wish to be one of the signatories of the final test ban treaty, to be adopted at the end of 1996, we also want to preserve the reliability of our nuclear arsenal and safeguard the foundations of French defence policy, based as it is on deterrence.

Two members asked me whether we had discussed our decision with NATO, the United Nations, WEU, and the countries of the South Pacific among others. I would point out that this decision was taken in the context of a policy of national sovereignty and independence, and that though

*Mr. Millon (continued)*

we gave notification of and discussed the decision taken by the French Government and above all by the President of the Republic, we were under no obligation to consult anyone in advance. I contacted a number of my European colleagues to inform them of the decision of the President of the Republic and to explain the conditions in which this decision – a decision which, I repeat, is a matter of national independence and sovereignty – would be implemented. This is why we do not consider it possible to rely on simulations whose technical findings would be held by another country, whether it be the United States or any other friendly or very friendly country, since our policy of national independence and our policy on defence would then no longer accord with the wishes of the French Government and the President of the Republic.

In the nuclear field, our approach is entirely scientific; our aim is not to modernise or produce or develop new weapons. We therefore announced in advance that there would be only eight firings, that the tests would all be over by 31st May 1996 and that we would take an active part in drawing up the final test ban treaty. This is a matter of national independence, a question of checking, or rather improving, the reliability of our nuclear arsenal; it is a scientific measure and there is nothing new about it. I would incidentally remind you that in 1992 the then President of the Republic did not halt but suspended nuclear tests. It was a moratorium. We shall go further, since at the end of 1996 we shall not suspend tests but bring them to an end when we have signed the treaty.

I thank the member of parliament of the United Kingdom for his kind expression of sympathy with France. Thirty-nine soldiers had already given their lives in Bosnia in the defence of peace and honour and now, unfortunately, there have been two further deaths, at the Verbagna bridge and the Jewish cemetery. We thank the many countries who have expressed their sympathy with France, and we are deeply touched by these marks of friendship.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Minister. You come to us on what is probably the hottest day of the year. There has been a controversial first session and a very crowded agenda. You acquitted yourself admirably with a most interesting and expert view on matters. We have been delighted to hear not only your address but your frank answers to questions. I am sure that, with good luck, we will see you here many times in the future. We certainly hope so, because we value the contact of meeting the Defence Minister of France in the home city of this Assembly. Thank you very much, Sir.

### **7. Changes in the membership of committees**

The PRESIDENT. – The Spanish Delegation proposes the following changes in the membership of committees of the Assembly in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Procedure: Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration: Mr. Herrero Merediz as an alternate member in place of Mr. Román; Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations: Mr. Herrero Merediz as an alternate member in place of Mr. Román.

Is there any opposition? ...

*The changes are agreed to.*

### **8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1458 and amendments).
2. Changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to accommodating associate members and associate partners of WEU (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Document 1461 and amendments).
3. Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1456).
4. Address by Mr. Gligorov, President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
5. Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1456).
6. Towards a European space-based observation system (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1454 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)*

## FIFTEENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 20th June 1995

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1458 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Cox (point of order), Mr. Coviello, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Bianchi, Mr. Philipov (*Bulgaria, associate partner*).
4. Address by Mr. Gligorov, President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  
*Replies by Mr. Gligorov to questions put by:* Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Fassino, Mr. Schloten, Mr. Kastanidis, Mr. Pavlidis.
5. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1458 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Roseta, Mr. Godal (*Norway, associate member*), Mr. Pahor (*Slovenia, observer*), Mrs. Aguiar (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Puig (*Chairman*), Mr. Benvenuti, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Benvenuti, Lord Finsberg, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Benvenuti, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Coviello, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Latronico, Mr. de Puig, Mrs. Aguiar, Mr. Latronico, Mr. de Puig, Mrs. Aguiar, Mr. Coviello, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Latronico, Mrs. Aguiar, Mr. Coviello, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Benvenuti, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Latronico, Lord Finsberg, Mr. de Puig, Mrs. Aguiar, Mr. Coviello, Mr. de Puig, Mrs. Aguiar, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Benvenuti, Sir Russell Johnston (point of order).
6. Changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to accommodating associate members and associate partners of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1461 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Lord Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Speroni, Mr. Liapis, Mr. Vacaru (*Romania, associate partner*), Skarphedinsson (*Iceland, associate member*), Mr. Paasio (*Finland, observer*), Lord Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Thompson (*Chairman*), Mr. Speroni, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Martínez (point of order).
7. Towards a European space-based observation system (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1454 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Lenzer (*co-Rapporteur*), Mr. Alexander, Mr. Lorenzi, Mr. Valleix (*co-Rapporteur*), Mr. López Henares (*Chairman*).
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Antretter, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

### **1. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

1. See page 29.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

### **3. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1458 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee on the future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council, debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1458 and amendments.

*The President (continued)*

The debate is resumed.

I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I have a brief point of order, Mr. President. I am sure that you will have heard my colleague, Mr. Rathbone, comment this morning on the lack of seating facilities. The President said that he would look into that matter. I want to raise the intolerable working conditions of some members of staff, who are our colleagues from the various parliaments. This is an opportunity for that whole matter to be considered, together with the point raised by Mr. Rathbone.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think it would be best, Mr. Cox, that we take this matter up and I pass on your comments to the President. Do you agree to that procedure? That appears to be the case. Thank you.

I call Mr. Coviello.

Mr. COVIELLO (*Italy*) (Translation). – In my view, Mrs. Aguiar's report is a sound contribution to the debate on the revision of the treaty and its proposals are both highly interesting and valuable as a reference for thought in the run-up to the 1996 intergovernmental conference. I agree in particular with the Rapporteur's view that driving hard for full monetary union without at the same time reaching a clear understanding on foreign, security and defence policy was one of the shortcomings of the treaty.

This duality has resulted in disharmony in the construction of policies and institutions. The resultant difficulties prompt us to conclude that no sector policy and in particular no monetary policy can achieve full success without far-sighted policies being vigorously pursued in the other sectors, i.e. justice, defence and security.

The architecture of European union defined at Maastricht was achieved by difficult compromise; substantially, there was a clash of two different concepts which are still opposed to each other today, one being full Community authority and the other the doctrine that the area of supra-nationality should not be extended.

The coexistence of these two opposing principles has meant that the architecture still appears weak and out of balance.

Though it would be wrong to say that the common foreign and security policy has failed in projecting Europe outwards and has fallen backwards as compared with European political co-operation (EPC) in its earlier form, it has made possible the first communal action and has opened up fresh prospects for using WEU. Not all the stated objectives have been achieved, particularly as regards cohesion, capacity for initiative and transparency.

The intergovernmental character of the treaty and the prolonged consultations and negotiations on activities in the sector have had an adverse effect and these limitations will continue to have their effect in the new world scenario where the common foreign and security policy will be called upon to operate.

Pressures are at work on our continent causing disintegration and upheaval as a result of economic imbalance and the renewed surge of religious fundamentalism; Europe is the scene of worrying phenomena of nationalism, protectionist and corporative tendencies and old and new intolerances as the Turkish Prime Minister reminded us this morning.

These temptations must be resisted with renewed pressure for unification in Europe abandoning technical and procedural artifice and giving the political plan pride of place so that we make sure that Europe does not become a new Gulliver pinned to the ground by a multitude of bonds created by nationalism.

We must get back to the line of pressure recently rediscovered at Messina when the reflection group for the 1996 intergovernmental conference was set up. We intend to call on all the old and new member countries taking part in the European adventure to look at the revision and extension of the treaties in a spirit of unity in flexibility.

In Italy, parliament has debated the methods and additions needed to enable Europe to extend the functions of its institutions and to deal together with the problems of enlarging the community. We have unanimously agreed the ideas which the Italian representative will be submitting to the reflection group and which I now summarise.

We want to maintain the present basis of the common foreign and security policy which was arrived at by striking a difficult balance between the arguments for integration and those for respecting national sensitivities deeply rooted as they are in the history of the different countries, depositories of precious experience which must not be lost.

But the problems facing us require that as we go forward with the organisational integration of our institutions we must not fall into the temptation of diluting what is already working. The content of the Maastricht Treaty must be beamed towards gradual unification not as a matter of ideological choice but in order to develop security and democratic control in Europe while at the same time strengthening the pressures for transparency and operational efficiency.

We also intend to direct our efforts towards an immediate improvement in the efficiency of the individual sectors while respecting the institutional foundations.

*Mr. Coviello (continued)*

In the matter of common security and defence we are well aware of the special relationship between the European Union and WEU and between WEU and NATO. Europe's defence must continue to be guaranteed jointly by the Atlantic Alliance and we believe that the instruments for co-ordination between the European Union and WEU must be strengthened, WEU being the instrument for implementing common foreign and security policy decisions.

Italy believes that certain adjustments are necessary to the institutions in order to achieve the objectives of full planning capacity and incisive and continuous external action.

First, for foreign policy, a permanent organ is needed with powers of foreign representation, adequate structures and facilities for analysing, drafting, proposing and implementing Council decisions. If this principle is accepted it will be necessary to set up a general secretariat responsible for giving the Union a recognisable image and rendering its action more continuous, credible and transparent.

Second, foreign policy must have an effective instrument for security and defence. This has to be WEU whose gradual merging with the Union must go on.

Third, some other institutional changes will be needed, such as gradual progress towards identical membership of the Union and WEU and the harmonisation of presidential terms of office. The phased practical introduction of these changes could give WEU a more visible capability to draft and implement decisions of importance for security and defence. WEU would retain its position as the catalyst of European union within the Atlantic Alliance and be confirmed as the pillar as regards our collective defence and links with the United States. In this spirit of unity and flexibility we have tabled a number of amendments to the Rapporteur's final recommendation. Some have been accepted, some have been accepted subject to certain additions and some have been rejected. Taking the balanced view characteristic of our country which, overall, is favourable to the final proposal we shall vote for the document.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mrs. Aguiar, I am glad that despite the reshuffling of the order of business, there is fortunately a reasonably large number of members present this afternoon to discuss this report, since it concerns the adoption of a very important stance in the run-up to this intergovernmental meeting. As I agree with the substance of your arguments, I shall confine myself, to begin with, to noting the key points.

We should not forget that in defence matters decisions are matters of national sovereignty and will probably remain so for some time to come. The idea of "communitarisation", sometimes put forward, is therefore in my view both unrealistic and a breach of basic principle. We should size up the limits of the Maastricht Treaty and those of the European Union quite simply and without any kind of aggressiveness. It is obvious, as is to be seen in the problems unfortunately experienced today by Yugoslavia, that collegial decisions do not make Europe a government or decision-making body with the power to commit states and their peoples to military action, even for peace-keeping purposes. It is therefore impossible for WEU to be the military arm of a kind of headless body, pardon me the expression. The well-known Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty contains commitments which are not comparable to, and are more specific than, those of the Atlantic Alliance. We must realise that our states still have to learn how to work together in the long run, and that this will probably take a long time yet.

On another subject, I would note that the opening up of WEU is a very attractive idea, but we must have some kind of political rule. We might say that a country belonging to the European Union is entitled to accede to WEU or that membership of NATO gives access to WEU, but our mission remains that of defending our countries, applying Article V and speeding to the assistance of those who are threatened. If we extend membership to countries, however like-minded, which have no armed forces and/or military budget, we shall not be entirely consistent with ourselves. This is one of the responsibilities we must not forget. I should also like to remind you of the way our institutions overlap, in this field of many and varied activities, not to say jungle, this disorder; there is WEU, NATO, OSCE, the pact on stability in Europe and so on frequently causing confusion, so that we mix up security and defence. In security matters we can go faster. In defence matters, this becomes much more difficult for we have to commit funds, costly material and, above all, human lives. All these problems are borne in mind very responsibly in the report for which Mrs. Aguiar deserves our congratulations.

Lastly, as regards the problem of parliamentary control, we are making progress in this field too, but sometimes in conflicting directions. Some call for greater national control, and others for greater powers for the Assembly, which would become a kind of supervisory senate. It is very complicated and we need to go carefully.

To conclude, may I say that while Maastricht was probably a step forward, I am not sure that it was entirely in the right direction. Putting currency, finance and banking before economics and economics before human beings, does not exactly

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

fit the kind of approach I, with my philosophy, hoped for. In fact, to me it seems the wrong way round. Above all, all I found about diplomacy and defence were paragraph headings. In the run-up to the 1996 intergovernmental conference I hope that we shall flesh out these paragraphs and even have chapters on the subjects of defence and diplomacy. Real progress in Europe will be by virtue of diplomacy and defence. This is yet a further reason for recalling that WEU has a special mission in this area. It is first and foremost political and does not merely consist of fitting it into some existing wording. I should like us to vote on Mrs. Aguiar's report without adding amendments that could water it down. I believe that this morning she made a great effort in the way of dialogue and understanding. I should therefore be glad if we could vote for the report in the spirit in which she, as Rapporteur, has tabled it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianchi.

Mr. BIANCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, while it is true that such a difficult subject as the one we are discussing today calls for very detailed scrutiny, it is equally true that without some positive changes to the text there is no possibility of defining the position of the WEU Assembly unambiguously. The fact is that account must be taken of a number of differences on certain major points.

Fortunately, Mrs. Aguiar allowed for this and with great intelligence and good sense has accepted a number of changes which the Italian Delegation – alone – decided to propose.

The central point of disagreement is what I regard as the basic proposal in Mrs. Aguiar's report, i.e. the need for a second chamber made up of national parliamentary delegations to strengthen the European parliamentary dimension. In the clearest terms, it proposes that the WEU Assembly should become a European second chamber with powers separate from those of the European Parliament and specialising in security and defence. Well, I do not think that this should be the preferred solution as it is to be hoped that in the less immediate future the member countries of the European Union will produce a genuine common defence and security policy in line with the terms of the Maastricht Treaty which should be defended by every signatory state resolved to keep faith with the commitments entered into at that time.

Another major point concerns the possible outcome of the 1996 intergovernmental conference. Here, Mrs. Aguiar proposes in her report that the conference should recognise WEU as the organisation authorised to act for the European Union in matters of security and defence and at the same

time should prevent Union countries which are not members of WEU from blocking consensus reached in WEU on the subject.

On this point also I think that any basic ambiguities must be removed; it must be understood whether the Assembly feels it is right for the conference definitely to approve of WEU and the European Union moving ahead along two roads destined to remain apart forever. In my view this can only happen in the short to medium term; in the long run the ultimate goal must be complete integration.

After making these points I should like to say in conclusion that I am not fully in agreement with Mrs. Aguiar's report but I do not think that anyone is at the moment fully convinced regarding its contents. Also if the Assembly decides to approve a number of important amendments aimed at striking a better balance in the document, I shall certainly vote in favour.

Finally, I should like to repeat that at such a difficult time for Europe, it is essential to find a wide convergence of view making it possible to approve a solution aimed at reconciling realism with political ideals on the complex issue of European security. Furthermore, because of the delicate nature of the subjects covered, such an agreement must be arrived at in full awareness of the importance of what is at stake, so as to ensure the calmest possible assessment of these problems which present one of the greatest challenges for the next century.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Philipov.

Mr. PHILIPOV (*Bulgaria, associate partner*). – Thank you. Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we are glad that the Bulgarian Delegation is back at WEU sessions and we are sorry that we missed the last session because of preliminary parliamentary elections in Bulgaria. Now we have three newcomers and I hope that all three will be able to make their maiden contributions in their maiden session. We are ready to participate in all committees to which we are invited, especially those at which the problems of the Bulgars and Bulgaria will be discussed.

We all admire the report. Today, a firm consensus exists in the Bulgarian Parliament. There is no alternative to our integration with all European organisations. Only three months ago we institutionalised for the first time our relations with Europe, by establishing two new government bodies – the Government Committee for European Integration, which includes the Prime Minister and nine important ministers, and a working group called the Government Committee, which will deal with all European problems on a working level.

We note with satisfaction that the first session of the Council for the Association of the European



*Mr. Philipov (continued)*

Union and Bulgaria took place on 29th May in Brussels. We all know that our region, the Balkans, is historically heavily loaded with hostilities and a lack of mutual trust. The existing long-lasting crisis in former Yugoslavia is a bleeding wound – the most painful place on the map of Europe. Bulgaria, its parliament and its government are trying to make our modest contribution to the cessation of hostilities and the return to normal co-operation and understanding.

Only last week, in Sofia, with the kind assistance of NATO, we organised, for the first time, an event with parliamentarians from NATO and European Union countries. It was entitled “Regional stability and security – the Bulgarian view”. Instead of giving our assessments of the results of the discussions and of my country’s rôle in the Balkans, I prefer to quote the Chairman of the NATO Assembly, Mr. Karsten Voigt, who said in his speech at the Bulgarian National Assembly, “Through its policy to its neighbours – Turkey, Greece, Romania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Bulgaria has become an exporter of the policy of stability. If other nations had been so far-seeing and cautious, today there would not be a war on the territory of former Yugoslavia”. We hope that that was not said only as a political and diplomatic politeness.

Our parliament and members of the Bulgarian Delegation in particular will be glad if a similar event is organised in the not too distant future in Sofia with the sponsorship of WEU.

In conclusion, when we speak and when we work for the future of European security, all of us must remember that our integration should not be based on common fears, but on common goals. Perhaps for the first time you have twenty-seven flags behind you, Mr. President, and at the beginning of this session there were two overcrowded back benches. Let us hope that the number of flags will always increase and never decrease.

*(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – I well remember sitting near the front in the Bulgarian Assembly when I had the honour to address it. It was a very stimulating and interesting occasion. Thank you for coming here and for your speech.

I now adjourn this debate.

#### ***4. Address by Mr. Gligorov, President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia***

The PRESIDENT. – It gives me great pleasure to welcome Mr. Gligorov, the President of Macedonia who has come to talk to us today for a brief

while. He says that he would welcome questions at the end of his speech, so I am sure that those of you who wish to ask questions and have not yet put your names down will wish to do so.

We all know the tragedy of former Yugoslavia and the real problems that have arisen as a result of the splitting up of that unhappy country. Only Slovenia and, to a lesser extent, Croatia, have made it so far. Croatia is also fighting for its own identity, having gained its independence. Macedonia, not without tremendous problems, is endeavouring to do exactly the same. It is seeking friends and trying to influence people in an admirable and direct way, which is why we are lucky to have its President with us this afternoon. I was fortunate to be able to talk to him over lunch when he explained to me that he regards his rôle not only as being the President of that country but as an ambassador at large, going round telling people about the problems as Macedonia sees them, and what help Macedonia requires to enable it to take its place as a democratic member of Europe. It is extremely keen on being closely associated with WEU.

Therefore, without further ado, I ask President Gligorov whether he will be kind enough to come to the tribune and make his speech. If he would return to his seat afterwards, we shall then ask questions. The floor is yours, Sir.

Mr. GLIGOROV (*President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*). – It is an honour for me to address the Assembly of the oldest and most significant European integration – Western European Union. In post-war Europe, that integration played the rôle of procreator of the new European architecture of peace, co-operation and pan-European progress. Yet it is also an integration with new perspectives at the threshold of the 21st century, proclaimed as the century of the common European home.

In this last decade of the 20th century, Europe has gone through many dramatic political and security changes. The fall of socialism and of European bi-polarity has marked a new historic phase in the development of the continent. Fortunately for the European people, the era of totalitarianism in a significant number of European countries has ended. It is fortunate for Europe that bloc divisions no longer separate her living tissue.

However, those major historic events did not in themselves resolve the problem. On the contrary, they created a range of new substantial strategic and pan-European problems. In short, a new era of post-bipolarity in Europe has begun. The countries of the former Eastern Europe are currently going through a dramatic process of transition from socialist, economic and totalitarian régimes towards market economies and democratic societies. Objectively, that has increased the security

*Mr. Gligorov (continued)*

risks in those countries due to the rise of nationalism and inter-ethnic conflicts. They are the result of the past as well as of the changes in the political, economic and social ambience and the great tensions caused or strengthened by the difficult social problems. They are a factor of internal instability in those countries, but also of new European security risks.

From an objective European outlook, post-bipolarity is now identified with the momentary existence of two different European worlds. One is labelled as the Europe of peace and co-operation, prosperity and progress – the European Union and the wider region of the developed European north and west; the other is the world of post-socialism and the European south-east, convulsing in the efforts to escape from social poverty and a lack of economic perspectives to escape from the bastion of non-freedom into the kingdom of human dignity and rights. Fortunately, those are no longer two parallel and mutually exclusive worlds. On the contrary, their connection and interdependence is more than evident. The inevitable interconnecting and integration are on the way, although it is happening slowly for some.

The general European understanding is that economic, political and security unity of the continent are of general and common interest for all European nations. It is the only possible perspective and even the fate of the countries of the European Union and countries in transition, regardless of their geographical location and experience. Indeed, all of us here today face the imposing necessity of seeking a new pan-European strategy for the 21st century. That strategy has already revealed its starting points.

European integration is the most secure, efficient and economically and politically sound way for the continent to become a truly common home for all its peoples and nations. The experience of the European Union is irrefutable proof of that fact. However, commitment to that end is not a sure solution. That will be a long and painful course for the countries that have yet to approach the common European home. In practice, it means their transformation into countries with a market economy, a legal state and a democratic society – processes that depend on the specific traditions and experiences as well as their current political concepts and democratic practices. It will therefore transpire incongruously in different post-communist regions and countries. Those that stride forward at a faster pace should have the chance of a speedier integration.

Nonetheless, those radical and badly needed steps depend and will depend to a large measure on the support and economic and political assistance from the countries of the developed West.

Most encouraging is the prevalent political understanding in the majority of the developed European countries that such assistance is effectively a concept of self-assistance, because the common fate of the continent is practically indivisible. That is also revealed by an analysis of the most potent problems and security risks in Europe today: uncontrolled and illegal migration; organised crime; illegal arms trade; and so on. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is costing Europe not only an enormous amount in terms of finances and security risks but also a tragic amount of human victims. Military conflicts, international conflicts and social poverty do not leave the European man's conscience at peace.

The conclusion is therefore indubitable. It is far more reasonable and efficient to protect peace and security in a preventive manner through economic and political mechanisms and through integration in various European organisations and associations than it is to put out the fires of war, to recreate peace and permit the destruction of enormous material wealth and the senseless death of people and even whole nations on the continent.

The collective mechanisms of European peace and security – WEU, the OSCE and NATO – have an important rôle to play in the new European strategy, together with the rôle played by the organisation of the United Nations. It is a fact that they are all facing the test of determining the new conditions of peace and security in Europe and the world. Europe must identify its interests, but also its contribution to the new world order of peace and security in Europe and in the world. In past decades, the collective security systems revolving around the European Union have attained their true function. WEU has played an exceptionally important rôle, while the establishing of a common foreign and security policy compatible with the transatlantic connection has shown all the advantages of NATO. In that context, the establishment of the OSCE has opened a truly pan-European and wider international framework for the resolution of the issues pertaining to peace, security and co-operation in Europe.

It is also evident that the quest for the new strategy of collective security systems contains some important points. Of special importance is NATO's partnership for peace project. It provides possibilities for surmounting the residues of post-bipolar Europe, the complexities created by the so-called "among worlds and ideologies". This project not only provides the possibility of introducing European standards in the defence policies and military structures of the former socialist countries and especially those of the former Warsaw Pact. It is also a project for preparing those countries to participate in the collective European defence and security policy and structure. It is

*Mr. Gligorov (continued)*

therefore very significant that the Russian Federation has joined that project.

Today's discussions evidently show the important contribution of WEU to the construction of the new order of security and peace in Europe and the world. I am convinced that it needs to open its membership to new European states.

Of specific significance is the further realisation of the rôle of the OSCE, and especially the elimination of the danger of this organisation becoming merely the conscience of European security. Instead, and above that, it is an organisation that will fulfil its preventive function by contributing to peace and co-operation in Europe.

The end of the 20th century will regrettably be marked by a dark blemish in European history – the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina – which will be seen as the most radical expression of the tensions of the most turbulent European region – the Balkans.

The Balkans today are daunted by a senseless and highly tragic inter-ethnic war in the former Yugoslav regions. The Balkans are still under the pressure of extant options and relations among some states, characteristic of the cold war, and are a real threat in terms of the revival of various bipolar concepts and possible divisions in the region. These are all sufficiently serious and difficult problems, which arouse great concerns in the international community and especially in Europe.

In fact, the situation in the Balkans today is Europe's greatest absurdity. Yet the Balkans are also one of the key issues that will put to the test the future of the common European security architecture and defence policy. That architecture strives to be founded on principles that have no alternative: indivisibility on the issue of oneness of European security; the construction and functioning of the systems of security and co-operation in Europe, as well as further co-operation in Europe; and further advancement of the European order of peace and security based on legal instruments.

Is a Balkan turn-around possible? Not only is it possible, it is above all essential, as is the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is one of the most complex issues for world peace at the present political moment. Regrettably, the efforts of the international community, especially those of the contact group, have not so far given results. In principle, the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be based on long-term solutions, which means protection of the principles and documents of the international community, and above all not allowing changes to borders by force and legalisation of ethnic cleansing.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown all the horrors of inter-ethnic war. The consequences of this war will be long felt in the region and on the continent. That is further supported by the evident tensions that are present among the other states that comprise former Yugoslavia. They, too, are in essence based on inter-ethnic conflicts. While ambitions are alive for appropriating territories and for creating ethnic states rather than open borders and a European option, conflicts will be inevitable. That is why the strengthening of the peace and stability in the Balkans must have a new Balkans political reality as its starting point. Former Yugoslavia dissolved as a result of being an artificial creation; the newly emerged and internationally recognised states are independent and sovereign states with internationally established borders. All six former members of the federation equally succeed to legal continuity and are successors of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. No new experiments are possible by imposing or forcibly creating a new state entity in the region; on the contrary, the only solution is to support the independence of those countries and their speedy integration into European economic, political and military structures. That is the only way in which the European powder keg – the Balkans – will advance from being a mere geographic entity into a stable and secure European region.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have addressed these general European and Balkan aspects in an attempt to present to you the essence of the present situation in the Republic of Macedonia. These are major issues, which engross the Republic of Macedonia in full weight. In the four years following its independence, the Republic of Macedonia has attempted to find and define the answers in the principles of its own domestic and foreign policy, as a political concept and orientation, but also as attested practice and a solution that will lead to the creation of the so-called Macedonian model of peace and security in the Balkans. In the interest of the wider significance of these principles for the region, allow me to elaborate on them.

The Republic of Macedonia attained its independence following the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in a peaceful and legitimate manner. It refused to become involved in the senseless war in the former Yugoslav regions and, by way of referendum and by adopting a new constitution, it proclaimed its independence. In such a way, not only were the centuries-old aspirations of the Macedonian people for an independent state realised, but it showed that on the threshold of the 21st century it is possible to realise the right to self-determination and statehood without bloodshed. That was possible due to a number of important preconditions.

*Mr. Gligorov (continued)*

First, on an internal political level, the Republic of Macedonia opted for a peaceful dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, not for a military conflict. The former Yugoslav army left the Republic of Macedonia by agreement.

The Republic of Macedonia proclaimed its independence and statehood, within existing borders, as internationally recognised borders. Not only did Macedonia not opt for the pursuit of territorial claims and an attempt forcibly to change borders, we have constantly pointed out that in the ethnically intermixed Balkans that would be a basic cause for war in the next hundred years. Taking into account the typical Balkan surroundings, the Republic of Macedonia wrote down in its constitution that it had no territorial claims towards any of its neighbours, which is quite uncommon in European practice. Today, in practice, the Republic of Macedonia does not have a single border dispute with its neighbours.

The Republic of Macedonia opted for swift and radical economic reforms and for a consistent transformation towards a market economy. Despite the resulting social costs, the difficult problems caused by the United Nations sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and the illogical Greek embargo on the Republic of Macedonia, the understanding prevailed that this is the only possible way towards economic progress and prosperity.

The Republic of Macedonia opted to be a modern European legal state, with parliamentary democracy and with the high constitutional standards of a civil society. As far back as 1991, the Badinter Commission of the European Union assessed the constitution of the Republic of Macedonia as a modern European constitution and recommended its speedy recognition.

The Republic of Macedonia opted for inter-ethnic understanding and tolerance and for the achievement of the rights of the nationalities in the Republic of Macedonia. That is a model that is founded on the standards of international law and practice in the sphere. It has confirmed the Republic of Macedonia as an atypical Balkan country in times when ethnic cleansing and genocide, stifled ethnic rights and religious and ethnic discrimination are a Balkan reality and one of the greatest security risks in Europe.

Second, on a foreign policy level the Republic of Macedonia fully opted for the European option of integration and co-operation. The long-term aim and basic political philosophy of my country is to join the European Union, NATO and other European associations and institutions. We are convinced that that is the only life-giving option

for the whole region of the Balkans; the only way to protect the dignity of independent states and peoples and to make the borders between them formal – open for the free flow of people, goods and ideas.

The basis of our Balkans policy lies in good neighbourliness, founded on the principles of inviolability of borders, non-interference in internal matters and developed economic, political and cultural co-operation. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that there is no single Balkan state without members of national minorities from a neighbouring country, we firmly uphold the position that the rights of national minorities are issues to be dealt with by the OSCE and relevant European and national institutions. Because those issues involve internal democratic development and the implementation of human rights and freedoms in each Balkan country, the Republic of Macedonia has set an example through co-operation with the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the international conference on former Yugoslavia, whose missions are operating in the Republic of Macedonia.

The Republic of Macedonia clearly views its international position as an equal member of the family of European nations and of the United Nations. Regrettably, and despite all the fundamental orientations, the Republic of Macedonia – not in any way of its own fault – still cannot take its equal place in an organisation such as the OSCE. That fact is, above all, damaging to the OSCE because the Republic of Macedonia is the only European country that is not a member of that organisation even though it fulfils all the membership criteria. The reason for that is quite well known, so on this occasion I simply want to remind you of that absurdity, which is damaging to overall European security. There is an identical reason for the Republic of Macedonia not being able to join the partnership for peace project.

The fact that peace and security in the Republic of Macedonia are in the interests of the wider international community is confirmed by the deployment of UNPREDEP forces in our country. The preventive diplomacy of the peace-keeping forces of the United Nations has, in this case, had a true effect. In that context, I want to underline the rôle of the United States contingent within the framework of UNPREDEP.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am certain that I do not have to convince you of how important it is for Europe to preserve and protect the peace and stability of the Republic of Macedonia – first, because of its central position in the south of the Balkans, a crossing point throughout the history of east and west, peace and war and peoples and cultures; and second and very importantly, because in this dark Balkan decade our peaceful policy, European option and democratic orientation have

*Mr. Gligorov (continued)*

proved to be a model that can lead the way out of the Balkan crisis. Thus, I am convinced that on the next such occasion as this, when we meet in this very same Assembly, it will be as a member country of the OSCE and partnership for peace – a country that has commenced negotiations on association with the European Union and a country whose borders are not burdened by the sound of rattling sabres, economic blockades and quiet isolation.

Thank you for your attention. I remain at your disposal for any questions that you might have.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. President. Seven members have put down their names to ask questions. I appeal to them to be brief because of the enormous backlog in our work.

The first question is from Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate President Gligorov, not just on the balanced speech that he has made, but on the wise and restrained leadership which, in very difficult times, he has given to his country.

I want to ask a simple and brief question. What does he estimate has been the cost to the Republic of Macedonia of the Greek economic embargo?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Gligorov.

Mr. GLIGOROV (*President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*). – The cost is enormous. We have lost \$50 million a month for the seventeen months that the embargo has been in place. We want to see the issue taken off the agenda as soon as possible, which would open the way for friendly and neighbourly talks that would enable long-lasting co-operation and friendship between Macedonia and Greece.

The PRESIDENT. – The next question will be from Mr. Fassino.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I too wish to thank President Gligorov and at the same time ask him two questions.

In recent months there have been problems with the Albanian minority living in Macedonia particularly in the city of Tetovo. I should like to know from the President how the Macedonian authorities intend to resolve the question in the light of what he said in his speech.

He, as I greatly appreciated, defended the multi-ethnic character of the Republic of Macedonia and the specific need to defend ethnic variety, which by contrast in a context like Yugoslavia has been dramatically highlighted by ethnic cleansing and the fighting between communities of different ethnic origin and from different regions.

My first question is how it is planned to guarantee Albanians in Macedonia recognition of their rights as an ethnic and cultural community.

My second is on relations with Greece. The President said a moment ago that it is hoped negotiations can be started. For the Republic of Macedonia what are the minimum conditions required for them to begin?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Gligorov.

Mr. GLIGOROV (*President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*). – As for minorities, Macedonia has the long-term objectives of dialogue, tolerance, mutual understanding and cohabitation, with equal rights for all citizens of Macedonia regardless of religious or cultural differences. In Macedonia, it is possible for minorities to establish their own political parties. They have participated and are participating in the country's political life, took part in the two elections held in Macedonia and are represented in parliament. One of Macedonia's largest minority parties is part of the coalition government.

In Macedonia, minorities are allowed complete primary and secondary education in their native language. Shortly, the senate of the university of Skopje will be opening two faculties to offer higher education. The university also has a department concerned with studying the languages and cultures of different nationalities. The national television service daily broadcasts three hours of programmes in the Albanian language and there is an adequate number of programmes for other nationalities. There are also eight and a half hours of radio broadcasts daily. In city areas where members of the minorities form the majority, they have their own private television and radio stations that broadcast without restriction.

Gradually, the number of minority employees in the state administration and other institutions is increasing. That will continue as a permanent orientation, together with ensuring adequate education. That applies to the diplomatic service, army and all other government institutions. In view of the fact that this Assembly is meeting in Paris, perhaps I may also point out that our ambassador to France is an Albanian.

Skopje also has a theatre of the minorities, a daily newspaper in the Albanian language, two weekly magazines and a range of periodicals for other nationalities. I could continue giving other examples but perhaps those are sufficient to illustrate Macedonia's permanent orientation. Peace and stability in Macedonia depend, among other things, on good inter-ethnic relations. We are prepared to respect and implement all international standards and conventions in that sphere. If the minorities in any other Balkan country enjoy greater rights than in Macedonia, we would be prepared immediately to implement those rights.

*Mr. Gligorov (continued)*

Since the very beginning of this misunderstanding, we have supported the initiation of bilateral talks to seek permanent and long-lasting solutions that will enable good co-operation and open relations. Regrettably, that has not as yet happened, but we hope that it soon will. I believe, however, that what is at issue between Greece and Macedonia has no realistic base. Sufficient evidence for that is the fact that neither we nor, I believe, Greece have any claim or pretensions towards the other party. That is why I believe that the efforts of Mr. Cyrus Vance, as the mediator appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, will yield results, with good will and a willingness to compromise from both sides, and that all these efforts will lead to a solution that can help the peace and stability of the Balkans.

We want and we are open to equal negotiations without any preconditions, except that, before sitting down at the table, we want the embargo to be lifted, which will enable us to take an equal position in the negotiations.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Schloten.

Mr. SCHLOTEN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you said your state and other Balkan states wanted to co-operate with the Western European organisations and eventually to be integrated into them.

I would like to ask you, first, what your reaction is to the assertion by a number of western politicians that a political solution to the manifold ethnic, religious and social problems in the Balkans is not possible?

Second, what do you think of the possibility of stationing German soldiers in your country within the United Nations force as a possible contribution to stability in the region?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Gligorov.

Mr. GLIGOROV (*President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*). – First, I must inform you of our view of the Balkan situation – that no change of borders or in the present disposition of territory should be allowed by force. Second, we feel that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be maintained as an entity. Since the peoples of and in Bosnia had to live together through the Ottoman and the Hungarian empires and within former Yugoslavia, I remain deeply convinced that, despite all the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, it will remain a mixed society. I do not see this war as having a winner and we will all incur great losses, both in people and economically and culturally. That is why, understandably, a solution can be reached only through political means.

As for the participation of German troops in the United Nations peace-keeping force, we view

Germany as a democratic country – a country that has achieved great progress in its development, is oriented towards Europe and maintains a leading position in European orientation. We therefore see no obstacles to German forces joining United Nations forces – just the opposite, it is a step that we would welcome.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. We now have two Greek questioners and, unless they object, I propose to call one after the other. You might like to answer them jointly, Mr. President, as I am sure that the questions will be on similar themes. Please let me know if there is any objection.

I call Mr. Kastanidis.

Mr. KASTANIDIS (*Greece*). – Thank you, Mr. President. Please allow me to speak in the Greek language.

*(The speaker continued in Greek)*

(Translation). – I would like to welcome President Gligorov and his optimistic assertion that the initiatives of Mr. Vance will bear positive results. Of course, no one is entitled to dispute a country's right to exist in freedom and to strive for progress. I trust that the same feeling prevails on FYROM's side of the border and that no one there challenges the need for peace in our region. Therefore, I must point out that in FYROM's constitution reference is made to the Eli movement insurgency. Now, the political forces that claimed they belonged to this movement were aiming at the annexation of Bulgarian and Greek territory by ex-Yugoslavia. In fact, for some time now, school textbooks and maps published in FYROM and often sent abroad represent these territories as being part of FYROM. So I wonder whether the FYROM Government approves of all this.

The PRESIDENT. – The other questioner from Greece is Mr. Pavlidis.

Mr. PAVLIDIS (*Greece*) (Translation). – Mr. President, like my colleague Mr. Kastanidis, I can only express my satisfaction at President Gligorov's willingness to put an end to his country's dispute with Greece, at least in the present circumstances. The truth is that Greece has not the slightest claim on FYROM. It is also true that the countermeasures we were forced to take are doing harm to both FYROM and Greece.

You have said, Mr. President, you are ready to enter into negotiations, disregarding the countermeasures issue. Are you ready to do so, should the international arbitrators call upon the two governments to resume talks, tomorrow if necessary, on what you have termed a misunderstanding?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Gligorov.

Mr. GLIGOROV (*President of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*). – First, I must point out my conviction that the existence of an

*Mr. Gligorov (continued)*

independent and sovereign Macedonia is in the long-term interests of Greece. In Macedonia today, regardless of all the disputes and damages that have occurred as a result of the embargo, there are no ill feelings or animosity towards the Greek people.

Not a single meeting was held in Macedonia propagating nationalistic slogans and ill-feeling towards our neighbour. When Greece introduced the embargo against Macedonia, we told the Greek side that it was free to pass through Macedonia, which is how the situation stands at present. For us, the border is hermetically closed, while Greek people, trucks and vehicles are free to pass through Macedonia.

In that context, we changed the constitution and stated in it that we had no territorial pretensions towards any of our neighbours. We propose that an agreement be signed immediately guaranteeing the permanency and inviolability of our borders.

As there was some mention of maps, may I assure you that no such map has been issued by the Macedonian Government, state institution or state-controlled agency of Macedonia.

In the interests of the favourable atmosphere of co-operation that exists in this Assembly, I would not mention the million-strong massive meetings that were held in Greece, which influenced the atmosphere and, probably, the Greek Government's approach to equal and common negotiations.

As to whether we are willing to approach negotiations with Greece, my response is that we were willing to hold negotiations two years ago and we are willing to do so now. It was not we who imposed preconditions; it was always the other side that did so. All that we want is good neighbourly and friendly negotiations between us. Those are our only conditions and, under such circumstances – perhaps not without mediators – we could even sit directly and discuss matters eye to eye.

Resolving those negotiations can only bring good to Greece, Macedonia, the Balkans and Europe as a whole. As Greece is the only member of the European Union, NATO and now WEU, it is called upon to promote the European ideas on the Balkans and to guarantee that it will prevail on the Balkans. We shall join such activities and actions, and I believe that we can act together on that matter.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your kindness in coming here to talk to us today. We are all well aware that the Balkans is an area of considerable trouble and you have shed light on some of the less well-known

aspects. The Assembly is indebted to you for your consideration and trouble.

The ethnic mixture in your small country was well illustrated by some of the examples that you gave us. If I may say so, I had the impression that both you and your country are remarkably resilient and certainly lack animosity. Given the amount of contention that exists, it would be understandable if some animosity were shown. There are always two sides to every question. I learnt long ago in politics never to jump to conclusions and say that black is black or white is white as there is always a grey area in the middle. I know that many people are anxious about your country and its future and we have all noted that you are anxious to become involved with European institutions, from the European Union downwards – or perhaps upwards – which includes our august organisation, Western European Union. Personally speaking, I would welcome a closer association with your country, as I would with many other countries, because the more cohesive Europe is in its defence and security appropriations, the better it will be for all of us because we are all Europeans at heart and we need to live and work together.

It does nothing but good to have distinguished people like yourself coming to us to spread your message, talk to us and answer questions so willingly and frankly. On behalf of the Assembly, I thank you very much.

### ***5. The future of European security and the preparation of Maastricht II – reply to the fortieth annual report of the Council***

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee  
and vote on the draft recommendation,  
Doc. 1458 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – After that useful interlude, we shall carry on with the debate on Mrs. Aguiar's report. We are still running desperately short of time.

The next speaker is Mr. Roseta of Portugal.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to offer my hearty congratulations to Mrs. Manuela Aguiar on her excellent report. This is a report covering a vast and extremely difficult subject on which the positions of the member states of this organisation still do not coincide.

Clearly we all want to see progress in a European project in this fundamental area of security and defence: decades ago, the principal objective of the founders of the construction of Europe was to guarantee peace.

*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

As this Assembly is the only body with competence to debate matters of security and defence on a European scale, it is up to us to make proposals on this with a view to the 1996 conference, mindful of the significance of WEU as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

I think that the report and the draft recommendation show great realism. What is more, if we accept various proposed amendments, some of those from our Italian colleagues, for instance, the recommendation provides an opening for those who wish to highlight progressive convergence over a period of time between the European Union and WEU. But I am convinced that the Assembly, like the Political Committee today, will only accept proposals for amendments which do not prejudice the coherence of the recommendation as a whole. We would gain nothing from a recommendation which was contradictory.

The truth is that convergence is one thing, but the possibility of the two organisations integrating or even merging is something altogether different. The problem lies not only in the fact that there is no similarity between the member states of the European Union and of WEU, but more particularly, let us be honest, because the issue of European security and defence is not an institutional issue of knowing whether it is the responsibility of one organisation or the other. It is a matter above all of lack of political will.

By virtue of its long experience, WEU is clearly the organisation most capable of dealing with such matters. Its autonomy in relation to other organisations is very good, and will continue to be so, enabling it to adapt to the wide range of actual situations which we have had to face in the past and may still have to face in the future.

As the Rapporteur said, it is WEU's autonomy which guarantees its resistance to the watering down of defence commitments. In addition, it is this autonomy which prevents decisions on defence matters being taken by simple majority vote – which neither the countries nor the national parliaments are prepared to accept in such matters, which pertain to the sovereignty of the nations.

Only an autonomous WEU will be able to bring about the emergence of a European defence policy. It is paradoxical that those who claim to support such a policy do not take account of this fact and run the risk of finding untried theoretical solutions which will undermine the credibility of what they themselves want.

I do not think that national parliaments will want to lose control or decision-making powers in such matters. In the long term, the possibility of creating a second chamber in the European Union, composed of representatives of national

parliaments, should be studied. This is an interesting possibility, but it calls for further reflection. For the moment, what we need to do is to increase the powers of the Secretary-General of WEU and, in particular, to proceed immediately to establish at least two regular annual summits of heads of state and of government, to be held before the regular summits of the Fifteen. I am in complete agreement with the Rapporteur's proposal and I think that in taking such a step, which I believe is one more step forward, we will be progressing in the right direction, as indicated in this recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Godal.

Mr. GODAL (*Norway, associate member*). – On behalf of the Norwegian Delegation, I begin by expressing our gratitude for your warm words of welcome, Mr. President, to our country as an associate member of WEU. Secondly, I congratulate Mrs. Aguiar on the excellent way in which she has charted the waters ahead of us and thereby made it easier to find the right course in the important topic of security structures in Europe.

In Norway, we are keen supporters of keeping strong ties across the Atlantic and we are glad that there seems to be full agreement in the Assembly on that point. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the United States neither will be, nor should be, expected to take full responsibility for European stability and security. That is a task that we Europeans must primarily face together. We simply must establish a European capacity to act on our own and, not least, we must develop a European capacity to lead. One of the most urgent tasks ahead of us is to include our associate partners in a collective security arrangement. To fail to do so would be to invite trouble. That is one of the most important aspects of Mrs. Aguiar's report.

In that connection, I should like to draw attention to northern Europe. That is where we find those of our associate partners who will be most exposed to danger if things turn for the worse in Europe. Strange as it may seem, that is also the part of our continent where the tradition of co-operation and solidarity in security is weakest. I am extremely glad, for the first time, to sit together with my Swedish and Finnish brothers in an Assembly such as this, to discuss common security problems. However, let me also express my impatience. If we really are to stabilise the situation in the Baltic sea region, it would be an immense advantage if all the countries concerned moved ahead to full membership of WEU as soon as possible.

Such membership is not directed against anybody. For instance, when we Norwegians want to continue our membership of NATO and to join WEU, it is not because we are against any nation. It is simply because we believe that peace and sta-



*Mr. Godal (continued)*

bility can best be achieved if peace-loving democratic nations join hands and support each other in collective security arrangements.

We now have ahead of us the historic task of building a Europe that is safe for all countries – large and small. It is my sincere hope that, in particular, all Nordic nations will move ahead fast and become full players in this great endeavour.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Godal.

I now call Mr. Pahor

Mr. PAHOR (*Slovenia, observer*). – I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity to participate in the debate. I begin by expressing my pleasure, that, in its report, the Assembly of WEU refers to the possibility of Slovenia acquiring the status of associate partner soon. I should like to take this opportunity to inform the Assembly that negotiations for our European agreement are drawing to a close. We desire the conclusion of an agreement at the earliest possible time, not least because the official request by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for associate membership of WEU would then clearly be on the agenda.

It is important that we are involved in the debate on the future system of European security. I reiterate that Slovenia wishes to be a part of the European Union and that, in that sense, it also wishes to assume duties and responsibilities in the area of security. We believe that the status of associate partner would enable us, together with other Central European countries, to contribute as much as we are able to the consolidation of peace and stability in Europe.

In addition, it is worth noting that the Republic of Slovenia has no issues of contention with its neighbours that cannot be resolved through talks, on an equal basis and with mutual respect. Slovenia consequently fulfils the expectation of WEU of it being a factor for stability in its region. The future closer co-operation between Slovenia and WEU will be to our mutual benefit and to the benefit of international peace and progress.

It is clear that the new European security system is emerging slowly and that, to a great extent, it is dependent on the interests of Washington and Moscow. If we can say that Western European countries, members of WEU and NATO, are at this moment searching intensively for an answer to their rôle in the creation of the new security infrastructure, we can recognise that the majority of Central European countries may only passively observe how much their desires for co-operation in WEU and NATO will be considered or otherwise.

We can no longer say that the Central European countries are seriously threatened, either in security or in direct military terms, yet we cannot

overlook the desire for an early conclusion to this transitional period, during which those countries are participating merely as observers or associates in the debate on the new European security.

Amendment 42, tabled by Mr. Latronico, suggests that WEU should offer Slovenia a new status when the time is ripe. I very much hope that today the Assembly will agree that the ripe time has come.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pahor.

The debate is now closed.

I call the Rapporteur to reply and the Chairman of the committee to intervene if he so wishes.

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. Benvenuti and his colleagues in the Italian Delegation have tabled over forty amendments. The committee took the trouble to discuss them and, as far as possible, take them into account. To a large extent, its efforts may be regarded as a success.

May I point out that it is not by wanting the impossible that one achieves the possible. Some people may be more ambitious than others, but we are all inspired by the determination to equip ourselves with the necessary machinery to operate a genuine European security and defence policy.

When people talk of integration, what exactly is meant? In the first part of our report – to which no amendments have been proposed – we state that no merger between WEU and the European Union will be possible so long as the member states of WEU, the European Union and the European members of NATO are not the same. On this point the object of our report is to bring about the greatest possible convergence between European positions and so we propose that, politically, WEU should be the driving force so as to make it easier to achieve the objectives of all the WEU countries.

Some speakers said that we were trying to lay down parallel paths for future development. Not so. It is precisely because we are not looking for solutions on separate lines that the report proposes WEU be given a general mandate enabling it to act on behalf of the European Union. The ten WEU member countries have reached compromises on collective defence issues, whereas five countries of the European Union have not yet managed to do so. It is at these countries that this comment should be aimed, not a report urging the Ten to form the nucleus of a real defence policy, and to help all the other countries find a path they can share. This is the guiding thread running through the report.

To Mr. Antretter I would reply that there is great similarity in our views. We entirely agree that the time has not yet come for WEU to merge. There is

*Mrs. Aguiar (continued)*

no way we can impose readiness to accept majority decisions on the different states. That is something they will have to cultivate. So long as this is not the case, it would be utopian to seek a merger in the immediate future. This is precisely the meaning of paragraph (xiv) of the preamble. We propose that developments be assessed over a period of ten years and we also agree that the content of a white paper on European security should be discussed by twenty-seven countries. It is, however, at the decision-making level that the Ten should have precedence in order that initiatives may be taken which other countries would have no right to veto but could take part in.

As regards unanimity voting, it is with nation states that progress has to be sought since the source of control has to be at that level. Nation states' decisions have to be taken by bodies with sovereign power, namely the individual parliaments.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

Mr. Pastusiak, our colleague from Poland, said that his country is interested in becoming a full member of the main European organisations. That is also our intention. He recognised that our proposal that Eastern and Central European countries should be accepted as associate partners was a sign of our will that they should join our organisations and participate as fully as possible in the processes of decision-making.

I agree with my Swedish colleague and look forward, together with our Norwegian colleague, to the Nordic countries playing an increasingly important rôle in the European area of security and defence.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

(Translation). – Mr. Latronico's questions were very similar to those by Mr. Benvenuti and Mr. Coviello. Here again this is a question of the Maastricht Treaty and the future of WEU, and they seem to have found an inclination in the report to go our own way.

I repeat this is not the case. We need to be realistic and consider what outcome Title V, Article 4G of the Maastricht Treaty has had. Has giving the European Union a right of initiative produced any result? The answer, I think, is no. We therefore propose that convergence and integration be encouraged but, conversely, that WEU be given a more active and dynamic rôle, that of catalyst, to use Mr. Coviello's word, or as a bridge between the European Union and NATO. Here we are in agreement again. This is exactly what we want: the integration of our organisation, our Assembly, with the help of WEU. Where is the disagreement on this basic point? I really do not see why we

cannot agree on this idea. Our proposal is, in my view, very pro-European. We want to strengthen WEU, the powers of the Secretary-General and those of the Assembly, so as to serve European goals and, ultimately, the European Union.

As regards Mr. Valleix's comments, I entirely share his view on the specific problem arising today with regard to national sovereignty. We cannot really change a state's political will by our speeches or declarations. I also agree that we should establish very realistic membership criteria for the three organisations: NATO, WEU and the European Union. We know that Maastricht does not allow us to consider as full members the European members, forming the European pillar of NATO, that are not members of WEU, such as Norway, for example. We therefore propose that when the Maastricht Treaty is reviewed at the 1996 conference, this point should be clearly made. As regards parliamentary control, we consider that logic, in an area where we have to have the assistance of nation states for our efforts, requires a second chamber consisting of delegations from national parliaments, as in the case of the Assembly. Maybe this is ambitious. But nothing ventured nothing won. All European projects involve boldly leaving behind the status quo. I suggest we boldly envisage the creation of a second chamber.

As regards Mr. Bianchi's comments on this second chamber, we, the WEU Assembly, are, in accordance with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, the only institution, the only parliamentary assembly, with the right to act as spokesman with the WEU Council, and we think that, as such, we can do excellent work.

As regards what he calls the basic ambiguity, i.e. separate paths, I repeat what I have said to other Italian members, which is that, no amendment to the first part of paragraph (xiv) of the preamble having been tabled, a merger will have to await the day when the three major organisations, the European Union, WEU, and NATO, or rather the European pillar of NATO, all have the same countries as members.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

In common with Mr. Philipov, we are much in favour of welcoming new members to WEU and giving them associate partner status.

*(The speaker continued in Portuguese)*

(Translation). – I agree with my colleague Pedro Roseta, particularly when he says that the supporters of a European defence policy must use the appropriate means to achieve their aim. We believe that the whole report is very pragmatic and very realistic when it comes to finding practical solutions which will lead to a better operational capability for Western European Union and,

*Mrs. Aguiar (continued)*

consequently to the strengthening of a common European position in defence matters.

I am pleased that Mr. Roseta is prepared to accept the hypothesis of a second chamber, increased powers for the Secretary-General and the holding of summits which, as is also proposed in the recommendation, should give general political guidance. That is one way of making progress in the area of European defence as set out in paragraph (xxi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

I am in full agreement with Mr. Godal's proposal, of giving full membership to European countries that are already members of the European defence community under the Washington Treaty. As to the remarks of Mr. Pahor of Slovenia, the report makes the point that we are certainly in favour of welcoming his country into WEU membership and believe that now is the time.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Aguiar.

I now call Mr. de Puig, the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – I shall be brief, since consideration of this important report is going to take a lot of time. May I first congratulate Mrs. Aguiar, our Rapporteur, and the committee's secretariat. In my sixteen years in parliament I have never seen a committee have to deal with so many amendments. Work began in Lisbon with the tabling of all these amendments. This week, yesterday and this morning, further hard work went into them – forty-six, no less – finally making it possible to agree on a balanced recommendation. So the Political Committee and its Rapporteur have done a great job. The report is important because it sets out the WEU Assembly's position on the 1996 intergovernmental conference. May I remind you that there will have to be statements of other WEU positions and that a report could well be up for adoption during December on the subjects to be examined by the conference. We shall, of course, know the positions of the Council but for these to point the way we want the Assembly will have to say how it stands. This is what we have tried to do with Mrs. Aguiar's report which gives our viewpoint on Maastricht and the revision of the treaty, the purpose of the intergovernmental conference.

That explains the significance and political importance of the draft recommendation. In other words, we have to state our position on the Maastricht Treaty which, let us not forget, makes WEU responsible for defining common defence policy, long-term common defence policy. With this mandate from Maastricht, therefore, it is our res-

ponsibility to take the initiative and put our policy proposals to the European Union after presenting them to the WEU Council for the intergovernmental conference.

There are, I agree, different philosophies and ideas about the integration process and the construction of Europe. Simplifying to the extreme, one could even say there is a fundamentalist position aimed at the high-speed integration of WEU in the European Union and, at the other end of the scale, a position which would prefer the merger or integration never to take place.

I would remind you that integration does not necessarily mean communitarisation. There is a risk of confusion here, since any form of integration would be an intergovernmental pillar or formula that would be more acceptable for most of our governments, unlike communitarisation, which means something quite different, more difficult and even, in my view, impossible to achieve in the short term.

Be this as it may, Mr. President, we have tried to put forward a balanced position aimed at defending WEU's rôle and the rôle of this Assembly over the time we have to fulfil our Maastricht mandate, which is to define a common defence policy and set it in place. We have defended WEU's rôle, the broadening of WEU operations, its capabilities and its operational development. As the Rapporteur has said, we have also been bold enough to make a few institutional proposals for the future.

We have kept throughout within the context of the Maastricht mandate, but we have also, and rightly, defended our Assembly's position and rôle in the framework of the intergovernmental conference.

I shall end here, Mr. President, as we are now moving on to the amendments. I thank the Rapporteur for her open attitude as we go on to consider and vote upon them. I also congratulate those of my colleagues who tabled amendments and kindly agreed to withdraw a large number. Thank you for all this work, which has been hard but, I think I can say, successful.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

We have about forty-six amendments before us, although I understand that some have been withdrawn – we shall discover those as we move on.

Amendment 14, which has been tabled by Mr. Benvenuti, reads:

14. In paragraph I (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "Taking into account the persistence" and insert "Wishing for settlement".

I call Mr. Benvenuti to move the amendment.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if other members present have no special problems, I will consider that I have moved Amendment 14.

This amendment seeks to resolve two persistent differences within our various countries. Consequently, instead of having a proposal which notes and gives a snapshot of the present situation, we are hoping to resolve the differences.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for being so brief. I hope and believe that that will set the pattern for the other speeches.

Does anyone want to oppose this amendment?...

Does the Rapporteur or the Chairman wish to comment?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – This amendment was approved by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now put Amendment 14 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 14 is agreed to.*

We now come to amendment 15, which reads:

15. In paragraph I (*iv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “the main goal of WEU’s contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental conference must be” and insert “among the main goals of WEU’s contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental conference must be progressive integration of the two organisations and”.

I call Mr. Benvenuti to move the amendment.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The purpose of Amendment 15 is also to emphasise that the idea of integration and convergence should be one of the main goals for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty; we therefore offer this as an element which should be included side by side with the others described in the report before us.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I now put Amendment 15 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 15 is agreed to.*

As Amendment 1 is withdrawn, we now come to Amendment 16, which has been tabled by Mr. Benvenuti. It reads:

16. In paragraph I (*vi*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “of which” to the end of the paragraph and insert: “but that all should lead to strengthening the process of pro-

gressive convergence and integration of the various European organisations;”.

I call Mr. Benvenuti to move the amendment.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Again, with Amendment 16, we emphasise that the efforts to be made should tend towards strengthening the process of convergence and integration of the various European organisations. It underlines the text submitted.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment? ...

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am a trifle puzzled because in committee we accepted some amendments to several of the amendments and I see no reference to those. For example, the committee agreed to take out the words “progressive” and “integration” so that it would read “strengthening the convergence of various organisations”. I am sure that the Chairman will confirm that. I want to know why some amendments that were passed in committee to this amendment and others have not appeared before the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand that they were not formally handed in. An informal copy was given to the Clerk but they have not been processed. I am advised that it would be acceptable to vote on those amendments now if the Assembly agrees. If you, Lord Finsberg, will repeat that amendment, I shall be happy to put it to the vote.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – It was agreed in committee to delete the words “progressive” and “integration” so that the amendment will read “should lead to strengthening the various European organisations”.

The PRESIDENT. – I assume that the mover of the amendment is happy with that.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – With great respect to Lord Finsberg, I think that what he meant to say was “strengthening the process of convergence of the various European organisations”. The words “progressive” and “integration” are being deleted rather than the word “convergence”.

The PRESIDENT. – That alteration is agreed. Thank you, Sir Russell.

I now put Amendment 16 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 16, as amended, is agreed to.*

Amendment 17, which has been tabled by Mr. Benvenuti, reads:

17. At the end of paragraph I (*vii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add “but nevertheless welcoming the signature by the Russian

*The President (continued)*

Federation of agreements with NATO in the framework of the partnership for peace;”.

I call Mr. Benvenuti to move the amendment.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – With Amendment 17, without denying the statement that problems naturally exist for the 1996 intergovernmental conference regarding relations between the West and Russia, we are trying to point out that very substantial progress has nevertheless been made. This fact deserves to be mentioned and I believe that it is in the spirit of our Assembly. In particular, reference is made to the signature of the partnership for peace by the Russian Federation. I would add, in view of very recent developments, that G-7 and G-8 and Russia's participation in Halifax have strengthened this process all the more so that there is even greater reason and need to recall these positive developments.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to point out for inclusion in the minutes that this amendment and the three previous ones were signed by Mr. Latronico, Mr. Coviello, Mr. Bianchi and Mr. Fronzuti as well as myself.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Benvenuti. Does anyone wish to oppose that amendment?...

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – The committee approved this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I am grateful to you, Mr. de Puig.

I now put Amendment 17 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 17 is agreed to.*

Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr. Coviello and Mr. Fronzuti, reads:

2. Leave out paragraph I (*ix*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Believing that it would be feasible to use the 1996 intergovernmental conference to assess the functioning of WEU as an instrument of European defence and the European pillar of NATO;”

I call Mr. Coviello to move the amendment.

Mr. COVIELLO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have withdrawn all the amendments not accepted by the committee and in so doing have contributed positively to resolving the problems under consideration. In particular, with Amendment 2, I stress that it would be feasible to use the intergovernmental conference to assess the functioning of WEU as an instrument of defence and the pillar of NATO.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly is grateful to you, Sir. It is agreed that that amendment should be withdrawn.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – The Political Committee has accepted this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I understood that the amendment was withdrawn. If you say that you do not withdraw it, that is fair enough. Is it true that the committee accepted it?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Amendment 2 has been supported by the Political Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – In that case, that is fine.

I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

Amendment 28, tabled by Mr. Latronico, reads:

28. Leave out paragraph I (*x*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Convinced that, given its specific character and its complexity, the implementation of a common defence policy involves a lengthy process of integration and that it seems useful, for a transitional period, to maintain an intergovernmental decision-making process;”

I call Mr. Latronico to move the amendment.

Mr. LATRONICO (*Italy*) (Translation). – When the committee examined the amendments this morning the wording of Amendment 28 was modified. Amendment 28 was accepted by the committee with this change which is in the spirit of all the other amendments tabled by the Italian Delegation. May I ask whether the Chairman of the committee intends to speak on this point?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anybody wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – An amendment has been accepted by the Political Committee, in the penultimate line to insert “at least” after the word “for”.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Latronico tells me that he is prepared to accept that, but I see that the Rapporteur now wishes to speak.

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*) (Translation). – The reason the committee approved this amendment – and this comment applies to all the other amendments it approved – is that we considered it did not change the basic meaning of the report. The expression “transitional period” has to be seen in the context of paragraph (*xiv*). We consider that there will be a transitional period until the time that WEU and European Union member states and the European NATO member countries, are all identical. This is our understanding of “transi-

*Mrs. Aguiar (continued)*

tional period". This is why we were able to approve a large number of amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – It is possible to vote against an amendment and say that you object to it. It has now been moved with a sub-amendment.

I now put Amendment 28 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 28 is agreed to.*

Amendment 29, tabled by Mr. Latronico, reads:

29. In paragraph I (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Convinced in this connection" insert " , until such time as the desired integration can be achieved, ".

I call Mr. Latronico to move the amendment.

Mr. LATRONICO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Also with reference to Amendment 29, the committee decided this morning to delete the word "desired". The intention behind this amendment is the achievement of European integration.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anybody wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – This amendment was approved by the committee subject to the deletion of the words "the desired" in the last line.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Rapporteur go along with that? I see that she does.

I now put Amendment 29 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 29, as amended, is agreed to.*

Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr. Coviello and Mr. Fronzuti, reads:

3. In paragraph I (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "exclusively".

That was accepted by the committee and so unless anyone wants to speak against it, I shall take it formally.

I now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 3 is agreed to.*

Amendment 30, which has been tabled by Mr. Latronico, reads:

30. In paragraph I (xii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "impossible" and insert "difficult".

I call Mr. Latronico to move the amendment.

Mr. LATRONICO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Unfortunately, Amendment 30 has also been modified with a change accepted by both the committee and the Rapporteur. This amendment proposes the replacement of the word "impossible" by "difficult" in order not to exclude what may be possible in future.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose it?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*) (Translation). – We approved this amendment by adding the words "so far" before "proved impossible" which records the fact that so far it has been impossible to have relations on an equal footing with the European Parliament.

The PRESIDENT. – Are you happy with that Mr. Latronico? He shows that he is by giving me the thumbs up sign – always a good sign.

I now put Amendment 30 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 30, as amended, is agreed to.*

Amendment 5, which has been tabled by Mr. Coviello and Mr. Fronzuti, reads:

5. In paragraph I (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "cannot be some form of merger between the two institutions, but".

I call Mr. Coviello to move the amendment.

Mr. COVIELLO (*Italy*) (Translation). – We propose the deletion of a clause in order to facilitate relations between the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament and to uphold the diplomacy of the two organisations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anyone wish to speak against? ...

I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*). – The committee agreed to the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – That is helpful.

I now put Amendment 5 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 5 is agreed to.*

Amendments 19, 31, 6 and 32 are withdrawn.

Amendment 20, which has been tabled by Mr. Benvenuti, reads:

20. In paragraph I (xiv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "desirable or feasible" and insert "feasible, but that this does

*The President (continued)*

not, however, prevent a start being made on a process of progressive convergence and integration of WEU and the European Union, for the time being acknowledging their respective powers ”.

I call Mr. Benvenuti to move the amendment.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – With this amendment we propose that the words “ desirable or feasible ” be replaced by “ feasible but that this does not have to prevent a start being made on a process ”. The text of Amendment 20 also includes the words “ of progressive convergence and integration ” which were however deleted by the committee at its meeting this morning. Therefore, after the words “ process of convergence ” add “ of WEU and the European Union for the time being acknowledging their respective powers ”.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Are there any objections? ...

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – The amendment was agreed to, as its author has just said, with the deletion of the words “ and gradual integration ”.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now put Amendment 20, as amended, to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 20, as amended, is agreed to.*

Amendment 33, which has been tabled by Mr. Latronico, reads:

33. In paragraph I (*xv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “ have not proved successful ” to the end of the paragraph and insert “ have proved difficult and careful note should be taken of this fact in relation to defence matters; ”.

I call Mr. Latronico to move the amendment.

Mr. LATRONICO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Amendment 33 replaces the words “ have not proved successful ” by a complete sentence which expresses our intention better.

Mr. PRESIDENT. – Thank you. What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*). – The committee agreed to the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now put Amendment 33 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 33 is agreed to.*

Amendment 21, which has been tabled by Mr. Benvenuti, reads:

21. In paragraph I (*xvi*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ instead of disturbing them with the prospect of their possibly being put in a minority position ”.

I call Mr. Benvenuti to move the amendment.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – With Amendment 21, we propose deletion of the words “ instead of disturbing them with the prospect of them possibly being put in a minority position ” (in the French text the last word is “ defence ”). This tones down the text and stresses the idea of consensus between member states.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anyone wish to speak against? ...

What is the view of the committee?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*). – The committee agreed to the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now put Amendment 21 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 21 is agreed to.*

Amendment 34, which has been tabled by Mr. Latronico reads:

34. Leave out paragraph I (*xviii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Latronico to move the amendment.

Mr. LATRONICO (*Italy*) (Translation). – The purpose of this amendment is to shorten the wording.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment? ...

Lord FINBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I oppose the amendment. What the document says is clear. Mrs. Aguiar has clearly got the flavour of what we want and that was carried through by the committee which did not accept the amendment. I hope that the Assembly will reject it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. What is the committee's view?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – The Rapporteur was against this amendment, and the committee rejected it.

The PRESIDENT. – I see that Mrs. Aguiar agrees with you.

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*). – No, I do not agree with the amendment. I agree with Lord Finsberg.

The PRESIDENT. – Fine. Well we know where we stand on that.

*The President (continued)*

I now put Amendment 34 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 34 is negated.*

Amendment 9, which has been tabled by Mr. Coviello and Mr. Fronzuti, reads:

9. In paragraph I (*xix*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "however".

I call Mr. Coviello to move the amendment.

Mr. COVIELLO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Amendment 9 proposes the deletion of one word so that this paragraph does not contradict earlier ones.

The PRESIDENT. – What is the thinking of the committee on that?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*). – The committee agreed to it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now put Amendment 9 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 9 is agreed to.*

Amendments 22, 25, 35, 36 and 10 are withdrawn.

Amendment 46, which has been tabled by Mrs. Aguiar, reads:

46. In paragraph 1.3 of the draft recommendation proper, after "30th March 1995" insert "the communication of the Italian Government to parliament, dated 24th May 1995,".

I call Mrs. Aguiar to move the amendment.

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*) (Translation). – This amendment follows on from Amendment 38, tabled by our Italian colleagues. We propose that "the communication of the Italian Government to parliament, dated 24th May 1995" be inserted after the words "30th March 1995". The purpose of this amendment is to include mention of the position of the Italian Government in the same way as the positions of other governments in this paragraph of the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – I assume that the committee agrees with the amendment.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*). – It was agreed by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – In that case, and as no one wants to speak against the amendment, I shall put Amendment 46 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 46 is agreed to.*

Amendment 40, tabled by Mr. Latronico, reads:

40. In paragraph I.8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "European level".

I call Mr. Latronico to move the amendment.

Mr. LATRONICO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, given the excellent way work progressed in committee this morning, I also withdraw Amendment 40.

The PRESIDENT. – That is generous, thank you.

Amendment 43, tabled by Mrs. Aguiar, reads:

43. Leave out paragraph I.9 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"Ensure that no measure leading to the convergence of WEU and the European Union shall compromise the close co-operation between WEU and NATO;"

Amendment 12, tabled by Mr. Coviello and Mr. Fronzuti, reads:

12. In paragraph I.9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out: "by opening hastily WEU's doors to organs of the European Union".

I call Mrs. Aguiar to move her amendment.

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*) (Translation). – This amendment also represents a compromise solution. With the deletion of the words "and gradual integration", paragraph I.9 of the draft recommendation would read as follows: "Ensure that no measure leading to the convergence of WEU and the European Union shall compromise the close co-operation between WEU and NATO".

The PRESIDENT. – As Amendment 12 is being taken with Amendment 43, does Mr. Coviello want to speak to his amendment?

Mr. COVIELLO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Amendment 12 proposes the deletion of an interlocutory sentence concerning paragraph I.9 which would not help co-operative relations between WEU and NATO; instead the amendment allows more emphasis to rest on the reciprocal relationship between the activities of WEU and NATO.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – As just stated by Mrs. Aguiar, this amendment represents a compromise and absorbs Amendment 12 tabled by Mr. Coviello. I think he is in agreement since he has changed its wording. The amendment was approved by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Coviello.

Mr. COVIELLO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I withdraw the amendment as I have accepted the Rapporteur's sub-amendment.



The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Coviello. If Amendment 43 is carried, Amendment 12 falls. However, we all agree on the situation.

I now put Amendment 43 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 43 is agreed to.*

Amendment 26, which has been tabled by Mr. Benvenuti, reads:

26. At the end of paragraph I.11 of the draft recommendation proper, add: “with a view to progressive functional integration of the CFSP and WEU secretariats”.

Amendment 45, which has been tabled by Mrs. Aguiar, reads:

45. At the end of paragraph I.11 of the draft recommendation proper, add: “with a view to progressive co-operation towards convergence between the CFSP and WEU secretariats”.

I call Mr. Benvenuti to move the amendment.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I withdraw this amendment as it has been replaced by Amendment 45 tabled by Mrs. Aguiar and agreed by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Aguiar.

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*) (Translation). – This amendment is also a compromise solution. We approved this wording, which I assume you have before you, by replacing the words “future integration” with the word “convergence”. The end of paragraph I would then read: “with a view to progressive co-operation leading to future convergence between the CFSP and WEU secretariats”. It would, indeed, be most useful for these secretariats to find ways of working together.

The PRESIDENT. – Amendment 26 has been withdrawn.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – The amendment was approved in the wording just read out by Mrs. Aguiar.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 45 to the vote by a show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 45 is agreed to.*

Amendment 44, which has been tabled by Mrs. Aguiar, reads:

44. Leave out paragraph II.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Take the measures necessary to ensure that the 1996 intergovernmental conference leads to a deepening of the articles of the Maastricht Treaty so as to enable the member countries of

WEU, the European Union and the European countries members of NATO gradually, over time, to become one and the same;”

Amendment 27, tabled by Mr. Benvenuti, reads:

27. Leave out paragraph II.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Undertake all appropriate diplomatic measures so that the member countries of WEU, the European Union and the European countries, members of NATO, gradually, over time, become one and the same;”

I call Mrs. Aguiar to move the amendment.

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*) (Translation). – This, again, is a compromise solution. The new wording reads: “Take the measures necessary to ensure that the 1996 intergovernmental conference leads to a deepening of the articles of the Maastricht Treaty so as to enable the member countries of WEU, the European Union and the European countries members of NATO gradually, over time, to become one and the same”.

The phraseology is different but we wish to convey much the same thing as Mr. Benvenuti. The countries which belong to the European defence pillar and therefore to NATO, must be able to become full WEU members.

The PRESIDENT. – Does Mr. de Puig wish to speak?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – The committee approved the amendment in the form read out by Mrs. Aguiar.

The PRESIDENT. – I am most grateful. As no one wants to oppose the amendment, I now put Amendment 44 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 44 is agreed to.*

Amendment 27 falls, but perhaps Mr. Benvenuti would like to say a word or two.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – As I have accepted Amendment 44 tabled by Mrs. Aguiar, Amendment 27 on the same subject is no longer necessary.

Now that we have completed the discussion of the amendments I would like, speaking for my Italian colleagues and myself, to thank in particular Mrs. Aguiar with whom I have been in open disagreement; she is a lady with very firm ideas and convictions and personally I do not think that I am any different. Being frank with each other has allowed, I repeat, an open disagreement and this text contains some of our ideas. I should also like to thank the Chairman of the Political Committee and fellow members who had the patience to follow our work which probably may have seemed unduly long but was necessary.

*Mr. Benvenuti (continued)*

We have made every effort to cut down the amendments to an acceptable number. The concern of our political party is that some important concepts be included in the text.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Benvenuti. You have virtually taken the words out of my mouth. I was going to thank members of the Assembly for their excellent co-operation in getting through this massive list of amendments on what has been a difficult day. We have been very short of time, but we have made a great deal of progress. Of course, we are still a long way behind, but the proceedings have been conducted in the right spirit and with excellent co-operation.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1458, as amended.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation, as amended, is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

I offer my congratulations to the Rapporteur and to the committee.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. You referred to our voting cards, and it is the case that each morning and afternoon during the session we are given cards of a different colour. As I am not as well disciplined as your admirable self, Mr. President, I invariably find that I have a card of the wrong colour in my possession when the crucial moment of voting arrives. It occurs to me that the voting cards are absolutely worthless. Their only practical use this afternoon has been to cool down members of the Assembly in this hot, airless atmosphere. Unless we are held in an arm lock by some Parisian printer until the end of the century, I suggest that we do away with voting cards altogether.

The PRESIDENT. – That is a good point. The colour of a voting card is unlikely to be contentious, unless there is a needle vote involving great animosity, when someone might challenge the colour of a voting card used. We could well amend that convention. I will ensure that the matter is considered by the next Presidential Committee and a decision made. I will communicate the outcome to you, Sir Russell.

## **6. Changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to accommodating associate members and associate partners of WEU**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1461 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Lord Finsberg of the report on changes to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to accommodating associate members and associate partners of WEU submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, debate and vote on the draft decision, Document 1461 and amendments.

I invite Lord Finsberg to present his report.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – In presenting this report and draft decision, I ask the Assembly to consider what the debate is about. It is not about who should be full members. It is not about who should be associate members. Neither is it about who should be associate partners. That has been decided over our heads, without consultation, by our masters the ministers – whose benches are again notably empty this afternoon. We have only one task to perform, which is to find the way to fit those three categories of membership into our structure.

The Assembly has twice voted in favour of the proposals of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges but in one case there was no quorum, and in the other there was an insufficient majority to amend the statutes of the charter. I make that plain because one or two colleagues have said that the Assembly had not been in favour. Logic must come into this, and that must mean that our task is simple. Full members must have full rights. Associate members must have fewer rights. Associate partners, therefore, must have even fewer rights. That is how the recommendation has been structured.

This afternoon, there have been consultations, and I am prepared to withdraw the first decision – that affecting the charter, which proposes some form of voting rights in plenary sessions, which is the basis of Mr. Speroni's amendment. He has told me that if I will withdraw that decision, he will withdraw his other amendments. That is progress – and on a hot afternoon in the most appalling chamber in which any parliamentarians are ever asked to sit, it is the way forward. I recommend that approach to colleagues and move accordingly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your remarks, Lord Finsberg, and for your admirable brevity.

1. See page 31.

*The President (continued)*

I call Mr. Speroni, and remind him that speeches are limited to five minutes.

Mr. SPERONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I agree with the Rapporteur but would like clarification on one point; associate members are entitled to vote in committees but not in the Assembly or the Standing Committee which, as we are all aware, performs virtually the same functions as the Assembly during the interval between sessions.

I would therefore like to ask the Rapporteur to say which part of the text under discussion he intends to delete so that I can make the necessary adjustments.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call next Mr. Liapis.

Mr. LIAPIS (*Greece*) (Translation). – It was with great interest that I read Lord Finsberg's report, for he is an experienced member of parliament who has taken it upon himself to present to us an issue that looks simple, but in truth is so complicated that three times our Assembly has tried and failed to solve it.

So why has the Assembly not adopted Lord Finsberg's report?

With your permission I shall comment on both this question and the report itself.

Firstly, am I wrong in my impression that the Assembly, by rejecting the report three times in a row, has in fact, stated its position indirectly yet clearly upon it? And yet, though the Assembly has rejected the committee's proposals three times, here we are today, trying to give associate members even greater prerogatives than those we already refused them as recently as last November. At the time, only the right to a consultative vote was discussed and, of course, it was rejected.

My second comment is as follows: Lord Finsberg agrees that associate members should be entitled to fewer rights than full ones. Quite correct, but how fewer? As his Lordship puts it, not that fewer, I fear, for as his report stands, he is in fact attempting to equate associate status with full membership. Is this what we want? The two exceptions provided for in the report are really so trivial as to be of no political significance whatsoever. How many times, Mr. President, have we not found ourselves discussing our budget in this Assembly, before empty seats?

Conversely, by granting associate members full voting rights in the committees, we are in fact surrendering all, absolutely all, prerogatives pertaining to full members, since it is in the committees, rather than in the Assembly, that WEU policy is formulated.

To put it crudely, we will be granting them full powers within WEU, without ever having accepted them as full members. What a contradiction! Are we not thus bypassing the procedure laid down for the accession of new members by the Brussels Treaty itself? Should this report be adopted, will there really be any difference between full membership and associate status, when the crucial issue is that of the vote? Decision-making is all that this is about and we are now faced with a unique situation, a world first in fact, where non-members of an international organisation will be contributing to its decision-making process on an equal footing with full members. Will not this privilege, extended to countries that are still far from even contemplating immediate accession to the European Union, subvert both the spirit and the letter of the Maastricht Treaty? Would this not, Mr. President, be overthrowing the equilibrium established among member countries and political groups? Are we not disrupting the balance within both the committees and the Assembly? Is this what we want? Is this what our governments want? Is this what a united Europe wants, since most EU member states have already made it clear that they want to incorporate WEU into the Union, once its founding treaty has expired in 1998?

I shall conclude, Mr. President, by questioning whether there is any precedent of a report being rejected three times by the Assembly and yet still finding supporters willing to foist it on the rest of us. Is this not a matter for reflection, especially since the report is not a juridical or, still less, procedural text, but one of an eminently political nature and should be treated as such?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now call Mr. Vacaru.

Mr. VACARU (*Romania, associate partner*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me to have this opportunity to speak to you on behalf of the Romanian Permanent Delegation to the WEU Assembly, an enlarged delegation since I have beside me Mr. Ion Diaconescu, deputy, member of the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party, whom you all know well, and two new members, Mr. Attila Verestoy, senator, member of the Romanian Party of the Democratic Union of Magyars, and Mr. Mircea Cretu, deputy, member of the Romanian National Unity Party.

I congratulate Lord Finsberg on his splendid report for the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Romania is directly concerned by the report, since it is one of the Central and Eastern European countries privileged to be associate partners of Western European Union.

*Mr. Vacaru (continued)*

Since the Essen Council, Romania has advanced further, to become an associate member of the European Union.

I have pleasure in informing you that in Paris on 22nd June next, the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs will transmit Romania's official application to join the European Union to his French counterpart. This will require a major effort on the part of the Romanian Parliament, which will have to harmonise national legislation with Community legislation.

I should add that Romania was the first Central European country to sign the partnership for peace, thus demonstrating its availability for co-operation in both political and operational fields.

The Romanian Parliament and Government have stressed that there is a national political consensus in favour of integrating Romania in the Euro-Atlantic structures. It is in this framework that we intend to make a significant contribution to the building of peace in Europe and to Europe's economic development and social stability. We are convinced of the basic rôle that falls to WEU in defining Europe's identity and its security and we welcome the measures taken to enlarge WEU's operational dimension.

My country has been following recent WEU initiatives with a view to the creation of new operational structures such as EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR very closely, and we have confirmed our interest in the European corps. Lastly, at the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Lisbon, Romania clearly expressed its political will and availability to participate in missions of the Petersberg type under WEU authority.

Referring to just a few of recent Romanian parliamentary initiatives, there was the inauguration of the WEU Information and Documentation Office in Bucharest, in November 1994 where we were very much honoured by your presence, Mr. President; and the national symposium held in Bucharest on 9th June, attended by a large number of senators and deputies, secretaries of state, representatives of the majority and opposition political parties, and journalists.

In this context, and noting that the preamble to the draft decision before us refers only to the Atlantic Alliance, may I ask the members of the Assembly to consider the possibility of adding a paragraph (v), which might be drafted as follows: "(v) Also recalling that WEU is an integral part of the development of the European Union, and that the associate partners of WEU enjoying the status of associate members of the European Union are destined to become full members of both organisations".

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Skarpheoinsson.

Mr. SKARPHEOINSSON (*Iceland, associate member*). – I will try to be brief, Mr. President, as I know that we are running late, and I will start by congratulating Lord Finsberg on his superb and very concise report. I must also express my great disappointment, however, at his decision to withdraw that part of his proposal that relates to Article 2 of the Assembly's Charter and I shall try to explain why.

I speak as a newcomer – I am a member of parliament from one of the nations that has just been granted associate member status. My country is, perhaps, the odd one out in this distinguished gathering because we have no army, we never have had and we probably never will. We became founding members of NATO due to our strategic position between Europe and America. As founding members, it was natural for us to establish our allegiance to WEU, as the European pillar of the transatlantic link. We fully supported the revival of WEU and we also regard it as a very important organ in the future security of Europe.

Although we are members of NATO, we do not have full membership of the European Union. As members of the European Free Trade Association, however, we have a special treaty – the European Economic Area Agreement – with the EU. For that reason, we have not sought to become full members of WEU, but we want to participate as fully as possible in all aspects of it and of this assembly. That is reflected by the fact that this is the first time that there has been an Icelandic Delegation to this distinguished Assembly.

Understandably, it is our desire – with other associate members – to influence the decisions of this Assembly as much as possible. How can we do so? By being granted the right to vote, of course. I thought that, by accepting Lord Finsberg's proposals in full, you would grant us this right, but he has now decided to withdraw that part of his proposals. I really would have liked the Assembly to vote on that matter.

This is a matter of great importance to us. We do not know WEU's future. It does not yet know its future identity and has yet to carve out its political rôle alongside other international organisations such as the United Nations, with its changing rôle in the future, and NATO, which is not certain where it is heading. I should therefore have thought that it would be good for WEU to encourage the active participation of everyone present, including associate members.

I was therefore very much in favour of Lord Finsberg's original proposal and again wish to express my dissatisfaction with the withdrawal of the first part of it.

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Paasio to make a brief contribution.

Mr. PAASIO (*Finland, observer*). – I, too, wish to express my disappointment. I do not challenge Lord Finsberg's impeccable logic that full members should have full rights, but I draw your attention to paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c), which read: "Representatives of parliaments of WEU observer and associate partner countries to the Assembly shall have permanent observer status." According to my logic, that means that those two categories of countries have the same status in this Assembly. But paragraph 4(c) then says: "Permanent observers of associate partner countries shall sit in committees without voting rights". Nothing is said about observers.

Observers, which are member states of the European Union but not members of WEU, are thus excluded from observing the preparatory work in committees. Why is that? If it cannot be corrected here, I appeal to the Presidential Committee to reconsider the matter because we have been sending parliamentary observers here for many years and should like to continue to do so in the future. It is easier to observe if we can observe the committees' work. If it appears to be necessary to exclude us, for whatever reason, that can be ruled without difficulty in committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does the Rapporteur wish to sum up?

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – First, I thank and welcome our Romanian colleagues. I have noted carefully the points that they raised and will have those borne in mind.

My Icelandic friend will forgive me for being unable to pronounce his name. I shall therefore call him my Icelandic friend. The first rule that I learnt in politics was the art of the possible. I must tell him that it would not have been possible this afternoon to secure a majority for the items that I have withdrawn. If the Assembly accepts the rest of the report, my Icelandic friend will have voting rights in committee and will be able to ask committees to look at the issue again. That is a positive point.

The point about observers from Finland is left in the hands of the Presidential Committee because there are many varieties of observer and it was impossible for us to consider how to graduate their rights. The Presidential Committee is currently dealing with that problem. If it passes it back to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges we shall have to consider it.

I find the remarks of our Greek colleague utterly incomprehensible. I said in my report that the Assembly had twice accepted the committee's report. He repeated what he said in committee – that it had been negated. It has

not been negated; it was accepted but did not have the requisite majority. In the English language, that means that a majority accepted it but it was not a sufficient majority. He asked whether there is a precedent. I do not know, but I find it difficult to be lectured by somebody who turned up at the committee for the first time and tried to tell us that everything that we were trying to do was wrong. That was unacceptable. I therefore accept nothing that our Greek colleague had to say.

There is now a great change for associate members. They will not be able to vote in the Assembly or the Standing Committee, which makes quite a difference between them and full members. So the answer to Mr. Speroni is that we have covered that important point. Associate members will be able to take part in the deliberations of the Standing Committee but will not be allowed to vote.

With those brief remarks, I hope that we can now dispose of this report and at least give less full rights to associate members so that we leave them in limbo no longer.

The PRESIDENT. – Would the Chairman of the committee like to speak?

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to make one or two brief comments.

When the Assembly asked the committee to embark on this exercise in 1993, I thought that it would deal with the issue from a technical point of view, drafting rules to suit the Assembly's needs. Lord Finsberg, who took on the rôle of Rapporteur at that time, probably thought the same. Fortunately since then, Lord Finsberg has covered the point fairly well. We have had a long trawl through the whole exercise and the committee has discussed the issue time and again. Its conclusions formed the foundation of Lord Finsberg's report.

What saddens me about the whole exercise – it has been reflected in other areas of the Assembly, particularly today – is that, on such a technical issue, there have been political overtones. One of the associate members has challenged us but the other two must not be forgotten. I am pleased that our colleague from Iceland contributed to the debate because he made us recognise that there are not just one or two associate countries but three, and the issue must be considered on that basis.

I regret that we have had to modify the proposals in Lord Finsberg's report, but I hope that, at some time in the future, members of the Assembly will come up with a solution and we shall have, along with the Council of Ministers, a change in pattern when members who are now associate members and even associate partners will be

*Mr. Thompson (continued)*

more closely integrated in the Council of Ministers and this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. There are five amendments. Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Speroni, reads:

1. In the draft decision proper, leave out paragraph I.

Lord Finsberg has said that he accepts the first amendment, so I ask Mr. Speroni formally to move it so that we may vote on it.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order. I have withdrawn that piece of text so there is no need to deal with it as it is no longer before us. That is the promise that I gave Mr. Speroni and he said that he would withdraw the other four amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – I am advised that we must go formally through the motions according to the rules. Will you, Mr. Speroni, move the amendments formally?

Mr. SPERONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – As the President has called for a vote, the procedure might possibly be as follows. I will withdraw my amendments and a vote will be taken only on the part which the Rapporteur wishes to maintain, that is without paragraph I Roman and without 1 Arabic in paragraph II Roman. The vote would be taken on points 2, 3 and 4 Arabic only, if I have correctly understood the Rapporteur's intentions. I do not know what the formal procedure should then be. Perhaps the vote can be taken on each part separately.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am sorry but I checked this matter with the Clerk of the Assembly and said that I proposed to withdraw that item to avoid problems. He did not tell me that I could not do so. I now gather that he advises you, Mr. President, differently. If advice that was given to me is now overturned, we have an example of how we cannot proceed.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – On a point of order. I wish to agree with Lord Finsberg. We cannot vote on an amendment of a text that has been withdrawn by the Rapporteur, because that text no longer exists. As soon as a rapporteur has withdrawn a text, the text becomes a non-text and it is impossible to amend a non-text. Therefore, the text does not exist. Mr. Speroni has withdrawn all the other amendments and issues. Therefore, we have here a text that has not been amended, but which has been cut down by the Rapporteur. He has removed the first paragraph, which does not exist any more.

The PRESIDENT. – Despite the advice that I have been given, I shall rule in favour of the Rapporteur, with the agreement of the Assembly. It seems to make sense. Therefore, I recommend that we vote accordingly. I see that the Assembly agrees. In that case, the other amendments have been withdrawn.

We shall now vote on the draft decision contained in Document 1461.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft decision.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The amended draft decision is adopted unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

I congratulate the Rapporteur on at last getting this report through.

### **7. Towards a European space-based observation system**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1454 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the report by Mr. Lenzer and Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Document 1454. This was originally to be held tomorrow morning, but there have had to be changes, not only because of procedural and time difficulties but for the convenience of members. Mr. Marshall's debate, which was scheduled to be held now, has been postponed until tomorrow morning and we shall make some progress in the debate on the European space-based observation system.

I call Mr. Lenzer to present the report. If he would like to speak from the bench, he should feel free to do so.

Mr. LENZER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if I may I will speak from my seat.

As time is running very short, I will confine myself to a few brief comments. I have agreed with Mr. Valleix, the co-Rapporteur, that he will add further remarks.

Today we are once again presenting an initiative concerning a space-based information and obser-

1. See page 35.

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

vation system. We have considered this subject on many different occasions in this house and especially in the committee responsible. We regard the question of space as one of the central aspects of WEU's activities. We take the view that this involves subjects that are not just of technical and scientific interest but are also extremely important to foreign policy.

We ought to hold an in-depth debate on the various technical aspects and on the strategic background to the whole question. Of course this would also include careful consideration of the industrial base. In the end financing plays a decisive rôle; we have known for quite some time that all this is far from cheap. We have also considered this subject at several colloquies in order to mobilise outside expertise, for the problems are indeed very complex.

Let me add a few words on the strategic needs. We have seen on several occasions that the collapse of the bi-polar world, which was fairly easy to understand and in which, to put it succinctly, the concept of an enemy still applied, has not reduced the threats. On the contrary, a large number of local and regional conflicts have arisen. That is why it is very important to obtain precise information, and as early as possible, on such developments. Of course it would be most desirable for us to have our own information system, integrated in the WEU structures.

Third, when we drafted our report we considered the various options open to us. One could be to set up an independent system integrated into the WEU structure. But the report makes it quite clear that this would probably be unrealistic because it could not be financed. That is why we examined another option. That would involve participation in what one of our member states, France, has already been pursuing for quite some time: the development of a Helios I reconnaissance satellite. It means participation in Helios II within a structure of appropriate international co-operation. This system would have to be supplemented by an all-weather radar satellite, which is being discussed under the working title of Osiris. Lastly, it would be possible to obtain the various data on the international market and then process it in our Torrejón satellite interpretation and evaluation centre. But this would make us dependent on outside information sources – I think that is self-evident. That is why the draft recommendation quite definitely gives preference to the second option. It means participating in the French activities, which are already well advanced, in the framework of international co-operation.

Fourth, we were happy to find that good progress has been made. Let me quote, for the record, from the Lisbon declaration of 15th May 1995:

“Ministers also examined progress made in the field of WEU space activities. They approved a decision on the establishment of the Satellite Centre as a permanent WEU body. They also approved a decision tasking the Space Group to continue its activities, concentrating on the study of the three proposed approaches to developing WEU's capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes, namely the establishment of a WEU satellite system, participation in a developing multinational programme or procurement of imagery with the aim of presenting a proposal to their autumn 1995 ministerial meeting.”

So we are happy to note that good progress has also been made on an important aspect of our report. Let me add at once that this was also the aim of the two amendments tabled by Mr. López Henares, our committee Chairman, and to which of course we have no objections.

In conclusion let me say that the statements made before this Assembly yesterday by my Bundestag colleague, Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister, were very encouraging. He also referred quite clearly to the need for this kind of satellite system and voiced the hope that – this is the gist of what he said – such an institution would be created with the participation of all the member states.

My sincere thanks to my old friend and colleague Jean Valleix for his excellent co-operation. This is not the first time we have dealt with this subject; I think we may say without presumption that we are quite familiar with it.

I also want to thank my committee Chairman, Mr. López Henares, for his excellent support, and not least our committee secretary Mr. Pedregosa.

I enjoyed being able to present this report. It was subsequently adopted unanimously. I ask you to endorse it.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Alexander.

Mr. ALEXANDER (*United Kingdom*). – This is an important report, which I hope the Assembly will welcome. Europe must be in the lead in using the available technology, and not just for defence purposes. The technology we are discussing has uses in agriculture, weather forecasting and crime prevention – in particular, drug-related crime.

Many of us have followed the development of the centre at Torrejón. We are participants among those who are interested and who feel it important that Europe should be at the front in having an independent satellite surveillance system.

The May ministerial meeting marked an important stage – one which many people felt probably would not be reached – namely, the decision that the centre should be established permanently as a

*Mr. Alexander (continued)*

subsidiary body of WEU. I understand that at that May ministerial meeting a number of deficiencies in the operation of the centre itself were outlined. I think that those of us who support the centre in principle should be told in more detail by the ministerial team what those deficiencies are, so that the committee can consider them, take them on board and help to improve the way that the centre works – and in turn make it more acceptable to the ministers of the countries that, after all, pay the bills and help to support its continuance over the years.

I want to comment briefly on the statement at paragraph 36 of the report, claiming that a country is blocking progress on the system. I shall read out the relevant part. It states: “one country, without entirely closing the door on the creation of a system of observation by satellite, is opening it so little as virtually to prevent its establishment”.

It may be that that paragraph refers to my country, the United Kingdom. If so, I hope that Britain's insistence – with, no doubt, other countries – that the costs and the merits of all the systems should be understood before a final decision is made, is shared by all colleagues here today. To take a decision that has implications for all the taxpayers in all our respective countries without such an analysis would be foolish indeed. I suggest to my colleagues on the committee, and in particular the Rapporteur, that such a view is not a blocking position.

I am sure that we all hope that at the November ministerial meeting the proposed satellite system will be confirmed and decided upon. Once again, Britain appeared to have been unable positively to support such a system, but I believe that its position on the matter is as I have just outlined. Britain wants to play a part in the decision, but on the basis of a full analysis of the costs and benefits of the system chosen. It is a commonsense position for any country to take and it is a proper use of taxpayers' money. I fully expect all countries to argue for precisely that.

Finally, the work of the centre and its importance are not very widely known, especially outside the Assembly and even by many parliamentarians. There are two amendments before us, which I believe will be helpful in that regard. They are an important addition to the report and to the work of the Rapporteur and I warmly welcome them.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lorenzi.

Mr. LORENZI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I had planned to speak tomorrow but we have got ahead so fast with discussion of the other items on the order of business that we can now look at what is undoubtedly an important subject in what remains of the sitting.

Speaking for my country, I must first welcome this important step we are taking which involves not only the military aspect with all that stems from it but also the civilian aspect with the extension of space activity and therefore greater general awareness of space. I can therefore endorse the report and would at the same time like to comment briefly on what is undoubtedly a highly topical question.

Space observation is important in various ways not only for earth but also for outer space. Now we are once more faced with the nuclear problem. I would like to remind members that so long as we continue to think about pursuing all our activities on our planet we shall always come up against enormous problems. We must remember that space has unlimited resources and that we shall only succeed in resolving many problems by moving out into space with experiments which until very recently we considered to be impossible or psychologically inconceivable.

I should have other points on which I shall be speaking tomorrow morning during the extraordinary meeting which has been fixed.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Lorenzi.

The debate is closed.

I now call Mr. Valleix to reply to the speakers.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Accustomed to working together on this absorbing subject, Mr. Lenzer and I are fully in agreement.

I thank our colleagues for being still with us towards the end of a sitting, and a day, which have been very busy, but the subject is an important one. I shall not revert to it, since Mr. Lenzer has outlined the essentials and indicated the background to the report.

Mr. Alexander commented on his statement in paragraph 36, explaining that the United Kingdom's sole desire was to be in a position to do more, which we all welcome. This is moreover one of the points made in the report. The problem is, in fact, posed in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation, which states that the aim is “associating other member countries, integrating them progressively into WEU's activities and, to this end, requesting participant countries to open up these programmes to their WEU partners”.

Since we can envisage associating a greater number of countries with the implementation of these programmes, we also welcome the possibility of sharing with them both advantages and costs. I would, however, point out to Mr. Alexander that while this co-operation is not spectacular, it has nevertheless begun and deserves thinking about. I would also remind him that when we came to the stage of equipping the Torrejón Satellite Centre, the supplier chosen was Marcol, a Bri-



*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

tish firm! This is a step forward in co-operation, which we welcome and hope will develop.

Mr. Lorenzi, whom I thank for endorsing the report, raised the question of earth and space observation now widened to include the nuclear problem. This was extensively discussed this morning and we shall be speaking about it this evening and again at the end of the session. It is a subject in which progress to come will be both politically reassuring and scientifically clearly defined. As was said in the Technological and Aerospace Committee at the prompting of our German colleagues, it is clear that these subjects require both a technical and a technological approach before moving on to political horizons.

May I remind you all that in this high-tech area, we are in a very special year. There are the satellites, but there are also the launchers and Europe, with Arianespace, will be launching its much talked-of Ariane 5, an outstanding event at a time when competition in the launcher market is very fierce again. As you know, China has the necessary technology though not a large market, reliability not yet being all it needs to be. To get the address of the Chinese aerospace industry all you have to do is write to the Company of the Great Wall. The Japanese and the Americans too are in the race. So these are developments Europe needs to watch.

Finally, I would draw your attention to the paragraph in the preamble to our draft recommendation, which recognises the need for co-operation in early-warning and antimissile defence systems. All our efforts, including the Helios II operation, are designed to develop and enlarge this European co-operation to Europe's advantage, making it possible for us to set ourselves far more ambitious targets in these spearhead areas.

With the scientific data at our command and the contribution from the committee which played a part in the setting up of Arianespace, we have to work, this time with the support of the Council of Ministers, towards a European defence system that will be especially effective by virtue of these satellite developments. For all these reasons, we ask you to approve the report by the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

There are two amendments. Both are in the name of the Chairman of the committee, Mr. López Henares, so they should not cause much of a problem.

Amendment 1 reads:

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Considering the interest of making public opinion in WEU member countries aware of the existence of this centre and of its contribution to building a European defence identity, ”

Amendment 2 reads:

2. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Organise one, or, preferably, several visits to present the activities of the Torrejón Satellite Centre to representatives of the European and international press. ”

I call Mr. López Henares.

Mr. LÓPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I shall speak to both amendments at once since they are interrelated. The one cannot be approved without the other. I shall briefly set out for the Assembly the reasons behind these amendments.

It has just been said by, among others, Mr. Alexander – whose opinion I share – that in many cases little is known about the work of our organisation. As it is a defence organisation, some discretion is normal about both the organisation itself and what it does. But while this should rightly apply to the information or data available to an organisation of this kind, such as that from the Satellite Centre, in overall and general terms the public should be aware of its activities. At a time like this, defence-related activities need the support of public opinion, not just psychological support for political reasons, but because all such activities cost money and are a heavy burden on the public purse. We must therefore keep public opinion informed. That is why I have tabled these two amendments, which amount in fact to only one, since one part concerns the preamble and the other the recommendations, requesting the Council of Ministers to organise one or, preferably, several visits to present the activities of the Torrejón Satellite Centre to representatives of the European and international press. It is a fact that neither members of parliament nor the media are sufficiently aware of these activities. We do not want this to happen through any lack of foresight on our part. This is exactly the reason for these amendments. Incidentally, I think that the Rapporteurs agree with the wording which was agreed this morning in committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. López Henares was good enough to move his two amendments together because they are interrelated, but I will put them consecutively. I presume that the Rapporteur is in favour of both amendments.

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

*The President (continued)*

I now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

The report was well presented and wound up, with the help of the Chairman of the committee.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation, as amended, contained in Document 1454.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation, as amended, is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

I congratulate the committee on a swift and effective job.

**8. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I have to inform you that the visit of the Spanish Defence Minister, alas, has been cancelled because he had to withdraw due to urgent reasons at home.

I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 21st June 1995, at 10 a.m., with the following orders of the day.

1. Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1456).
2. European armed forces (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1468 and amendments).
3. New trends in North American countries' foreign policy and their implications for transatlantic co-operation in security and defence matters, with particular reference to the United States (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1457).
4. The Eastern Mediterranean (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1465 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.)*

1. See page 36.

## SIXTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 21st June 1995

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes
3. Communication from the Turkish Delegation.
4. Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1456*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Marshall (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Weyts, Mr. Paasio (*Finland, observer*), Mr. Tusek (*Austria, observer*), Mr. Marshall (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Puig (*Chairman*).
5. European armed forces (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1468 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Baumel (*Chairman, for Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Baumel (*Chairman*), Mr. Guidi, Mr. Hardy, Mr. López Henares, Mr. Baumel, Mr. López Henares, Mr. Baumel.
6. New trends in North American countries' foreign policy and their implications for transatlantic co-operation in security and defence matters, with particular reference to the United States (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1457*).  
*Speakers:* Lord Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pastusiak (*Poland, associate partner*), Lord Mackie of Benshie, Lord Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Puig (*Chairman*).
7. The Eastern Mediterranean (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1465 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Cucó (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Liapis, Mr. Cox, Mr. Kastanidis, Mr. Jeszenszky (*Hungary, associate partner*), Mr. Korakas.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. — The sitting is open.

#### *1. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### *2. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### *3. Communication from the Turkish Delegation*

The PRESIDENT. — I have received a letter from Mr. Mimaroglu, leader of the Turkish Delegation, explaining that its members have had to

return to Turkey because of urgent parliamentary business and requesting that the debate and vote on Mr. Cucó's report be deferred until a subsequent part-session so that Turkish members may be present for the proceedings.

I am sorry that our Turkish friends cannot be with us this morning, but I think that we should stick to the business as agreed by the Assembly on Monday and hold the debate on Mr. Cucó's report this morning as planned. I hope that that decision has the general support of the Assembly. Sometimes things are extremely inconvenient for us, either individually or collectively, but the overall interests of the majority must be preserved, so we should proceed as planned.

#### *4. Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security*

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1456)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Marshall of the report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee, Document 1456, with a debate and possibly a vote at the end.

1. See page 40.

*The President (continued)*

Would Mr. Marshall be kind enough to address the Assembly?

Mr. MARSHALL (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President and fellow members of the Assembly, I intend to try to assist you by being as brief as possible so that we can perhaps make more rapid progress today than we have done on previous days.

By way of introduction may I thank the Political Committee for entrusting this task to me? It has again been a great pleasure to act as a rapporteur on behalf of the committee and I would like to thank the Chairman and all the other committee members for their assistance during the writing of the report. While I am thanking people, I must also thank the secretariat for their assistance and the generous way that they have given of their time while the report has been in progress. The Political Committee has produced a number of reports in the past six months and everyone has been under a great deal of pressure of work, so I would like to thank the people involved.

Having thanked my colleagues on the Political Committee and the secretariat, I must point out that I accept the responsibility for any residual errors in the report, be they factual or whatever. I remind those people who have not read the report fully that at least two errors still remain.

The first error is in paragraph 17 of the explanatory memorandum, which lists a number of members of ASEAN, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, who are not members of the forum. The second error is in paragraph 57. It is not a factual error but, because of how the typing has been set out, there is some confusion between chemical weapons convention and biological weapons convention. Those two errors are still in the report.

I do not intend to cover all the points discussed in the report because, as members of the Assembly will realise, the report touches on a broad range of issues relating to international peace and security. In that context, it argues that WEU at the present time plays only a marginal rôle in promoting worldwide stability and peace and it stresses the need to enhance the position of WEU in the future. Everyone realises that, when the canvas is so wide, detail will inevitably be lacking, but I hope that the report at least assists in the continuing debate on the rôle and responsibility of the various organisations involved in security and defence.

The most important point in the report is its emphasis on the unique position of the United Nations as the only legitimate agency available to deal with inter- and intra-state disputes. It highlights the present weaknesses of the United Nations and suggests some steps that might be

taken to overcome those difficulties. In that regard, it invites the European Union to agree on joint action in two areas: first, on the reform of the United Nations; and second, on the development of policies on the United Nations in terms of peace-keeping and crisis-management. Most important, however, is its emphasis on the necessity of maintaining the United States' involvement in the United Nations and it suggests that that places a responsibility on all member states of the European Union and other states involved in security organisations in Europe as a whole to seek to counteract the dangerous trend developing among some politicians in the United States towards isolationism and withdrawal from some United Nations activities. We therefore urge member states of WEU to seek to influence American political and public opinion on the continuing need of American involvement in United Nations affairs and operations.

The report also calls for clarification of the division of labour between the United Nations and regional organisations like the OSCE on the one hand and, on the other, a clearer division between the OSCE, NATO and WEU, particularly in peace-keeping and crisis-management and prevention. It also criticises the Council of Ministers for its failure to accelerate its efforts to develop a fully operational rôle for WEU, particularly in the field of emergency humanitarian intervention. The committee decided on those conclusions at its meeting in Lisbon on 15th May, which was the same day as ministers met in Lisbon, so its criticism should now be abated to a degree by the decisions taken in Lisbon on that day, particularly the ministers' endorsement of a document setting out the principles for using military assets in humanitarian crises. So instead of strong criticism, perhaps we should offer a mild pat on the back.

Finally the report calls for further controls in weapons development and further reductions in nuclear arsenals, which is an apposite recommendation in view of the controversy in the Assembly this week. It does that in three areas. First, it urges all member states, associate partners and observers to sign the chemical weapons convention and biological weapons convention. Second, it seeks to limit the further development of certain classes of conventional weapons, such as anti-personnel laser weapons. Third, it asks the United Kingdom and France to take two initiatives. The first is on the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Despite the furore that arose over the French decision and how the French Minister of Defence answered questions yesterday, it was at least reassuring to hear the French Minister of Defence say that the French intended to seek to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by 1996. Second, in terms of nuclear weapons, the report asks the United Kingdom and France to

*Mr. Marshall (continued)*

seek to bring about further reductions in existing stocks of nuclear weapons.

I could mention many other points but shall not do so. With those few remarks, I commend the report and recommendations to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Marshall, for your interesting speech, which was helpfully brief.

We now have a debate on the report and I have five speakers on the list, the first of whom is Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. Marshall is one of our members to whom I feel closest in ideas despite some major differences. We share the same concern about the present and future of mankind. I look upon him as a humanist. Mr. Marshall understands that the civilisations created by mankind cannot go on for ever without a change in direction; an end must be put to the irresponsible selfishness of a minority who on the eve of the 21st century are pushing mankind towards the abyss. He detests the neo-colonialist mentality and does not believe that peace and security can be guaranteed by recourse to arms.

Quite naturally, Mr Marshall's keen mind and progressive views are reflected in his report. The fact is, however, that we do not approve reports but draft recommendations and I cannot agree with the recommendation submitted to us. Please excuse me when I say that this is a poor summary of what is largely a positive piece of work.

It must be remembered that we are living in a one superpower world. The Rapporteur recognises that the ideas proclaimed in the United Nations Charter are far from being achieved. Quite the reverse, as Mr. Marshall stresses "increasing parts of the world are faced by disorder amidst increasing numbers of regional conflicts or tensions".

The Rapporteur accepts, however, that Europe's overall contribution to reform of the United Nations Charter can be of great importance for resolving the present impasse regarding peace-keeping and crisis-management. This is true in theory. It should not be forgotten, however, that reform of the United Nations Charter, which is clearly urgent, will not of itself provide a magic remedy for the problems resulting from the present absolute hegemony of one power throughout the world.

Mr. Marshall also reminds us that the United States is not "prepared to participate in United Nations peace-keeping operations unless conducted under American command". We also know that the Defense Department is opposed to any participation by American troops in WEU spon-

sored under European command. This contradiction however does not appear in the recommendation to the Council. It is not enough to say that the United Nations has not fulfilled its rôle as it should have. The recommendation fails to mention that as a result of one-power hegemony the United Nations operates increasingly as the instrument of that power. Major resolutions approved by the Security Council under pressure from Washington at critical moments have reflected the strategic interests of the United States, which does not respect resolutions of no interest to it.

Quite clearly, the United Nations has lost the prestige it used to have. For example, the effects of sanctions on the well-being of the Serb people are frightening.

Mr. Marshall recognises in his report that in Somalia "the United States changed the aim from peace-keeping to trying to destroy the warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed".

Ladies and gentlemen, in view of these precedents how can we defend with conviction a policy of so-called humanitarian intervention? In these operations where is the line drawn between humanitarian, political and military?

My personal view is that WEU is making the wrong choice by trying to resolve the uncertainties and ambiguities in its relations with NATO by following the same road as the Atlantic Alliance. The tragedy in Bosnia is a warning. The transformation of WEU into a military arm will not advance real security in Europe. The security of our continent cannot be achieved by replacing one type of militarisation by another.

Inevitably Europe will one day set up its own security system. American protection is a moment of history. Nevertheless, the way to Europe's desirable independence in security is not via a new strategy for militarising the continent. NATO should have disappeared with the end of the Warsaw treaty. However that may be, the solution is not to transform WEU into a caricature of NATO. Yet this dream is carrying WEU further and further away from the objectives laid down in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly the reaffirmation of faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and value of the human person and in other ideals proclaimed by the Charter of the United Nations.

I shall vote against the draft recommendation accompanying the report. My decision does not however mean I do not regret there are not more men like Mr. Marshall in our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rodrigues.

I call Mr. Weyts.

Mr. WEYTS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – We have been greatly interested by Mr. Marshall's

*Mr. Weys (continued)*

excellent report on Europe and the establishment of a new world order for peace and security and can give it our full support.

I should like to draw the attention of both the Rapporteur and the Assembly to the need for a joint initiative in regard to the September 1995 review conference of the 1980 United Nations Conference on excessively dangerous conventional weapons in order to adopt rules limiting the development of certain such weapons including non-lethal and anti-personnel laser weapons as mentioned in paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation.

Early this year, the Belgian Parliament showed the way by adopting legislation banning the manufacture, sale and distribution of anti-personnel mines and the import/export and transit of all technology relating to this "coward's weapon" to use the words of one of my Belgian colleagues.

The authors of the bill laid stress on the special nature of anti-personnel mines which are a light, cheap and easily deployed weapon designed to serve as a maximum obstruction to the enemy but also injuring huge numbers of innocent people and closing off very wide areas.

According to estimates made by the United Nations and the American State Department, some 100 million anti-personnel mines are scattered over sixty-two countries and a further 100 million are held in manufacturers' stocks. Overall, between five and ten million mines are produced annually by ninety-six manufacturers in forty-eight countries, including, until very recently, Belgium. In Cambodia, Afghanistan and above all in Africa, these mines have killed or horribly mutilated an incalculable number of victims. They are just left and from then on are a permanent menace particularly as the cost of clearing them is prohibitive, amounting to some \$1 000 for one mine, which costs only a few dollars to make.

Furthermore, clearance is a very dangerous operation. The international community must therefore take immediate steps to have the marking of dangerous areas, the clearance of mines and publicity among peoples at risk recognised as matters of humanitarian urgency.

While the international community has gradually become aware of the problem, the temporary bans introduced by various countries are nevertheless inadequate and allow the indirect continuation of exports of these weapons.

It might possibly be sufficient to improve the 1980 United Nations convention. Unfortunately, this convention applies only to international and

not to internal conflicts. It has been ratified by about forty countries and half of the producing countries have not signed.

There is therefore good reason why UNICEF is calling for a total world ban on the production, stockholding, use, sale and export of these mines.

Mr. President, the Rapporteur should therefore, in paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation, lay greater stress on the humanitarian aspect of the problem and the urgent need for common European initiatives for the straightforward purpose of banning anti-personnel mines from the world.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Weys.

I call next Mr. Paasio.

Mr. PAASIO (*Finland, observer*). – As this is the first time that Finnish members are present in this august Assembly with Finland as a full member of the European Union and having the status of official observer to WEU, I thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words of welcome in your opening speech. However, as you will know, the Finnish Parliament has sent representatives here for many years. Even before membership negotiations with the EU had started, we were coming here, so the Assembly is a familiar place to us. Now, we have been granted official status and we are grateful for that.

It is somewhat astonishing for us to see how many times the word neutrality is used in the European context when Finland no longer uses that word when defining its foreign and political doctrine or line. It was easy to define the concept of neutrality in the circumstances of the cold war, antagonistic superpowers, military alliances, ideologies and such things. We were looking for neutral status in the European peace process and, in my opinion, we did it rather successfully.

Now, when there are no longer antagonistic military alliances, it is much harder to define what neutrality is all about. That is why official reports of the Finnish Government no longer define our foreign and political status as neutral. That does not mean that Finland has given up her principle of non-alignment. That is much easier to define. Either one is a member of a military alliance or one is not.

We appreciate your warm invitation to become a full member of WEU, and we aim at close co-operation with the organisation in years to come, but it is a fact that when Finland joined the European Union, the EU got a common border with the Soviet Union of 1 300 kilometres. I am being a bit old fashioned – I should say Russia, as there is no Soviet Union any more. Finland knows that better than most. Finland aims at pursuing a policy best serving the interests of low tension in the northern part of the world and on the common border between the European Union and Russia. That means

*Mr. Paasio (continued)*

that any radical change – in our judgment – will not serve the best interest of keeping the current low level of tension on the border.

That is why Finland intends, for the foreseeable future, to maintain its policy of non-alignment. That policy was supported by 63% of the people of Finland in a recent opinion poll. That same opinion poll showed that the Finnish people support close co-operation in the movement for peace. As is well known, Finland has been and still is, to some extent, a superpower in peace-keeping operations and we are now reforming our legislation so that we can better co-operate with the United Nations, OSCE and WEU in their peace-keeping efforts. We have signed the partnership for peace treaty with NATO and we are looking forward to participating fully in that.

I want to conclude by expressing our satisfaction with our observer status at this Assembly. It is our intention to send the chairmen of our foreign affairs and defence committees to these meetings in the years to come.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Paasio, for your interesting exposition of Finland's post-neutral, post-Soviet Union position, which we all found fascinating. I know that you are a distinguished chairman of your parliament's foreign affairs committee and you are most welcome here.

I call Mr. Tusek.

Mr. TUSEK (*Austria, observer*) (Translation). – Thank you. Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, like the previous speaker from Finland, may I too say that it is a great honour and pleasure to attend this Assembly as an observer and to set out the fundamental positions of the Austrian Parliament on this subject and this report at today's meeting.

The Austrian Parliament is following with great interest the developments in the field of European security and defence policy, which is of special importance to our country, given that it too is situated on the edge of an area of upheaval. Austria sees the security policy dimension of the continuing process of unification as a broadly-based concept that must do justice to the economic, social, ecological, political and military dimensions of the problems facing us today. The need for this kind of concept does not stem primarily from any external military threat to the European security zone, but from the fact that the Europeans must be provided with viable ways and means of defending the common values and interests arising from the European process of unification.

Austria believes that in the long term this kind of comprehensive concept can only be ensured and used in the best possible way through the co-

operation and potential of the appropriate institutions, in particular Western European Union. As I said earlier, we take a very positive view of the opportunity to participate in WEU as observers since the beginning of this year. We welcome the efforts made under the Portuguese presidency to prepare the way for drafting a WEU white paper.

In our view, though the likelihood of a global military conflict has greatly decreased with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, yet new risks and uncertainties have arisen, which represent an enormous danger to us. For we in Austria are particularly concerned about the military conflicts that have persisted for more than four years in former Yugoslavia, that is to say in our immediate vicinity, and are shocked that aggression is once again being used as an instrument of politics.

The fact that a collective security system is not functioning is a daily illustration of the great importance of having new, efficient structures to counteract potential crises and create effective stability in Europe as well as in the neighbouring regions.

Austria is prepared to play its part in this new development. The work within WEU may be new to us, but we can look back to a tradition of more than thirty years' participation in peace-keeping measures within the United Nations. I am thinking in particular of the United Nations on-going military operations in Cyprus and the Middle East.

We also want to make an active contribution in WEU, and here I would mention participation in the WEU police contingent in Mostar, to which I am happy to say the President, Sir Dudley Smith, referred in his opening speech on Monday. We are also prepared to support the plan to create a humanitarian task force and we are similarly prepared to take part in the Petersberg missions. With a view to the 1996 intergovernmental conference, Austria hopes to take part as a full member in a comprehensive security system.

To conclude, Mr. President, we support the operational development of WEU and welcome the fact that Western European Union has become the forum for planning a European security strategy – in the knowledge that Austria's security is inseparable from that of Europe as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Tusek. We are delighted to see you here and glad that Austria is now represented at this Assembly.

The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL (*United Kingdom*). – I thank the four speakers for keeping to the time limit and, in the case of Mr. Rodrigues, for paying me his usual compliments. During my short time in this

*Mr. Marshall (continued)*

Assembly I have enjoyed my association with him. I am sure that I speak on behalf of all members of the Assembly in saying that I will be extremely disappointed when he retires from active politics at the next Portuguese general election. However, I know that he is looking forward to spending more time with his wife and grandchildren in Brazil. I hope that he lives a long time so that he can enjoy those continuing relationships.

Despite our friendship, Mr. Rodrigues knows that there is a political divide between us. I share some of his concerns, but not his fundamental belief that the current United States hegemony in world affairs is a bad thing. On the whole, I believe that the United States position is a positive one that can be used for the good of the world.

When I visited the United States recently with other members of the Political Committee, of most dismay to me was the feeling among some American politicians that they have no further responsibility for world leadership, which is wrong. All of us who share common democratic values have that responsibility. I referred to states but as individual democratic politicians we have a responsibility to convince American politicians and public opinion in particular that the United States is the sole remaining leader in world affairs. With leadership goes responsibility, and we must convince America of the need to accept that responsibility – which has other consequences in terms of money and personnel.

I am sorry that, at what is probably the last meeting of this forum, you, Mr. Rodrigues, will be voting against the report. I hope, for the sake of friendship, that, on your last attendance here, you do not find yourself in a minority of one. However, knowing you I suspect that has not been an unusual position in which to find yourself during the course of your long political life.

I share Mr. Weyts' view of anti-personnel mines and regret that they were not specifically mentioned in the recommendation. Initially, I thought that he was referring to recommendation 10, which makes mention of non-lethal weapons. Clearly, anti-personnel mines are not non-lethal. I share also Mr. Weyts' concern and commend the Belgian Parliament for taking the initiative that it did. I and other British parliamentarians have been pressing the British Government for an assurance that there will be no further export of anti-personnel mines. Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to convince it of the need for that policy. As the recommendation urges the French and British Governments to take that initiative, perhaps I may ask you, Mr. Weyts, to persuade the Belgian Government to take the initiative in obtaining consent to that policy among member states of Western European Union and European Union.

Mr. Paasio of Finland and Mr. Tusek of Austria, from their different perspectives, said how pleased they were to be in partnership with WEU and other institutions throughout Europe. They emphasised the experience that they bring to this organisation from events in their countries over the past fifty years. Mr. Paasio's comments in particular interested me because, clearly, neutrality never applied to Finland. Many of us in Western Europe tend to forget that over the past seventy years, Finland has possessed sophisticated armaments and a large army to deter aggression from the East. One reason that Finland remained independent throughout that period was that the then Soviet Union realised that although, perhaps, it could overrun Finland, the effort in terms of manpower and fatalities would not have made that worthwhile, in view of the strength of the Finnish armed forces. Finland brings specific if not unique experience to WEU and the European Union.

Finland brings also experience of involvement in peace-keeping. It was encouraging to hear the positive way in which that rôle was presented, in terms of the work of WEU and other organisations. Listening to Mr. Paasio and Mr. Tusek, my mind went back to one of our close neighbours in the United Kingdom – the Republic of Ireland, which also has great experience of peace-keeping in United Nations operations throughout the world. Observer, associate and associate partner countries are all bringing new experience that will be of great benefit to WEU's future.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for that interesting summing-up. Perhaps the Chairman of the committee would like to make a contribution.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – I would like to say a few brief words to congratulate Mr. Marshall on the report he has presented. I think it would be a mistake to let this report and the recommendations it contains go without comment, because they are of both general and immediate relevance, as I shall try to show.

When we in the Political Committee were considering producing a report on the new world order for peace and security, we knew we were taking a risk, because writing a report on the subject could be a work of encyclopaedic proportions; something which would never be finished. To reduce it to the proportions of a report to our Assembly was a risk. Nevertheless, with sound political judgement and flexibility, Mr. Marshall has succeeded in offering us a general overview – reduced or summarised, we could say – of the process of creating a new world order for peace and security and, at the same time, a draft recommendation which in my view is very pertinent and timely. It is necessary, so it seems to us, for WEU to set out its views on the new order for peace and security.



*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

In past years we have spent a lot of time talking about this, too much time perhaps, to the point where many people are tired of hearing us talk of this new order which still cannot be seen or touched, which still has not materialised. It was necessary for our organisation, WEU, to set out its views on the practical steps that can be taken now to proceed with the actual construction of a new order for peace and security. To this effect, Mr. Marshall puts forward three ideas which seem to me to be fundamental.

First, in relation to the rôle of the different institutions which have to operate the new order, there is the question of the United Nations, and the need to progress to finalise the urgent reform of the United Nations. This is essential, and Mr. Marshall's draft recommendation says so. It is essential that the United Nations should be able to play the rôle we want it to play, a rôle demanded by the present situation and present-day challenges. However, we know that the position of the United Nations is difficult and that reform is also very difficult. Some of the representatives present here – I can see Mr. Baumel in the chamber – had the opportunity in connection with the Council of Europe of visiting the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York, and were able to see the enormous problems in the United Nations, where the situation is almost one of chaos. It reminded me, if I may be allowed a joke, of the Marx brothers' film when, in a chaotic situation, Groucho Marx appeared and said "Gentlemen, the situation's not serious, it's desperate". I think this applies to the situation in the United Nations. It is not just serious, it is desperate, and the necessary steps towards reform are not being taken. Mr. Marshall proposes that we in Europe should put forward some ideas or proposals for a reform of the United Nations Charter. I think this is an important contribution.

Second, it also refers to the development of a comprehensive concept in relation to WEU operations under the mandate of the United Nations. Clearly this is necessary, because at the present time there is confusion about what the rôle of WEU might be in what we call Petersberg activities. We must clarify the situation and spell things out – this is Mr. Marshall's proposal.

Third, it seems to me that one very important element of the contribution made by this report and its recommendation is the reference to nuclear weapons. There are two proposals here, the first of which is for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Mr. Marshall's proposal is very timely, because that is exactly what we are going to debate tomorrow in this chamber, and there is also the matter of events since France's

decision to recommence nuclear testing. His second proposal refers to achieving substantial reductions of nuclear arsenals, starting of course with the largest, which is the most logical approach, and proceeding, as Article 6 of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty recommends, to the reduction, and possibly one day, with all the problems this implies, the total elimination of such weapons.

These are some of Mr. Marshall's proposals, put forward with the generosity we all observed in our work in the committee, as he agreed to different amendments and proposals from representatives. The result was a unanimous vote in committee, and no amendments to his recommendation today. I think there is general agreement that this report and its recommendations are very positive, and I ask you all to vote in favour.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

There are no amendments, which is delightful from the administrative point of view, so we shall now proceed to a vote.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1456. After Sir Russell Johnston's intervention yesterday I must point out that it does not matter about the colour of your cards.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

### **5. European armed forces**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1468 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Baumel, Chairman of the Defence Committee, of the report on European armed forces submitted by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Political Committee, debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1468 and amendments.

Would you be kind enough to address us, Mr. Baumel?

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my first duty is to convey Mr. De

1. See page 42.

*Mr. Baumel (continued)*

Decker's apologies: he has other imperative commitments at home and has asked me to take his place and present his excellent report.

I will begin by describing this as a significant report given present circumstances. The fact that the WEU Assembly is tackling this highly topical problem should be a matter for satisfaction.

What is, in fact, the issue?

It is a question of defining how a new European defence identity could develop on the basis of the rapid reaction or intervention forces, the number of which has grown fast over the last few years.

A glance at this strategic picture reveals the great variety and quantity of these forces. Without taking too much of the Assembly's time I would just say that some of these forces come directly under NATO and are operational units for service under NATO command, others have been formed with a view to general European defence as, for example, the European Corps which already exists and is a welcome initiative but is still short on operational quality – it even has no statutory basis which is paradoxical in present circumstances – and others have been set up by bilateral agreement between certain countries.

As our colleague, Mr. De Decker, urges in his report, the actions and operations of these different forces need to be better co-ordinated.

The fact is that Europe has not been involved in defence problems for many years. It naturally relied on the only effective organisation there has been for the last forty years, namely, NATO which has proved its worth. Today it is clear that the strategic and political upheavals which have been taking place over the last four years, the uncertainties we are now witnessing in American policy, if only over Bosnia, and the disturbing revival of a new kind of Russian imperial policy now compel us to supplement the protection given by NATO with additional guarantees constituted by Europeans through their own efforts.

The problem of the emergence of a new European entity is clear. When it does come into the world will it have to be wholly included within a NATO which would in any case have to be modified to cope with these new missions or will it be allowed to exist outside NATO?

Will WEU continue to be subordinate to the alliance as it is now or will it have a minimum degree of autonomy? This is the paramount problem which faces us and which, it must be admitted, has been holding us up for many months.

Either WEU, representing the emergence of European defence – because that is what is really involved – will exist purely on paper or it will be

a reality to be reckoned with. This is the essence of the debate. We have to recognise that on this point there is a dialogue of the deaf between partners who are trying to understand each other better but are kept apart by fundamental differences.

The basic problem is to know whether European defence will be able to act in specific cases even where NATO is unable or unwilling to intervene. The great value of this report is that it contains a catalogue of these various European defence forces and what they do.

One essential point is the important decision taken at the Brussels summit meeting on 11th January 1993 authorising the creation of what were then called "the separable but not separate forces" – CJTF in English, GFIM in French. This was an extremely important initiative which half-opened the door to a possible European defence. It has unfortunately to be said that since that declaration was made little has happened and that the practical and material conditions for setting up the CJTF are frozen.

There are three variants in the minds of people referring to the CJTF. Some consider they should be under NATO command. This is the idea of the military men, particularly of the American establishment. Others consider that they should belong to NATO, on the NATO-plus basis including forces from countries not necessarily members of NATO. The third variant sees the CJTF wholly under WEU authority, a concept opposed, of course, by the NATO, and essentially American, authorities.

It is heartbreaking that this argument should be paralysing the formation of these new forces. And yet the creation of the CJTF would have many advantages. I will name just three, the first being the opportunity they would provide to revamp certain command structures to suit the new missions called for by the new strategic picture of Europe.

Everything was different when the problem was to defend the West against the possibility of massive aggression from the East, which required combined general staffs and extensive integration of forces. Today, things are completely changed; there is no global threat. What we have today are tensions which can trigger crises within or on the borders of Europe. Quite clearly, in these conditions, structures, chains of command and doctrines concerning use have to be modified to suit.

The second advantage of the CJTF is that they strengthen Europe's defence identity while avoiding certain rivalries and waste and proclaiming Europe's determination to act with NATO support, in other words with the possibility of using NATO forces, general staffs and troops to manage various crises in which the Americans, for understandable reasons, do not wish to become involved. The fact is that the Americans believe that their

*Mr. Baumel (continued)*

duty is to defend their own national interests: when these interests are not predominant they see no reason to become involved in the internal problems of us poor Europeans. I would add that we often find America's leaders are afraid of becoming involved indirectly in conflicts or disputes they want to stay out of and of being drawn into things against their will.

The third advantage of the CJTF is that operations become possible in conjunction with participating countries even outside the alliance. Our present enlargement of WEU clearly shows the value and reality of this possibility.

The stalemate we have reached has to be a source of regret. Instead of giving no ground, I believe that it would be better to change the area of debate completely. It is obvious that on both sides we have come to a standstill. Some solution must be found and this can only be done with NATO agreement. Ideas are needed which will enable European defence and the European defence identity to express itself. What kind of ideas are needed?

First of all negotiations on a different basis.

Next the strengthening of Europe's own resources. Since we cannot obtain the necessary resources from our friends in the Atlantic Alliance, we have to obtain them by our own methods. First, European defence must be more operational. For example the European Corps must have its own set of rules – which it has not – and must be able to take action. I would remind you that 400 kilometres from its garrisons the European Corps is powerless because it lacks all three key elements of any strategic success on the ground – logistics, intelligence particularly under the space heading and high-speed, long-distance transport. As long as the European Corps lacks these resources, there will be no way we can make use of this means of action which could otherwise be first class. Its use would be limited. This has been demonstrated, moreover, because we have been forced to set up a Franco-British rapid reaction force, with Netherlands involvement, to try to protect UNPROFOR whereas this work could be done by WEU if the political will were there.

The report prompts another idea which Mr. De Decker could have set out much better than I. Apart from the problem of the creation of the CJTF and the need for WEU, ultimately, to have its own strategic resources, military transport capacity, satellite observation system and a real general staff – not an imitation like our charming Planning Cell which looks like the general staff of the principality of Gerolstein – it would be better to plan for European preference in all contracts aimed at strengthening Europe. Here,

the situation is clear. The Netherlands has said it prefers the American Apache helicopter to the European machine. It now depends largely on the United Kingdom to take this fundamental decision for the future of the European defence industry and therefore for European defence. The choice of helicopter which that country will shortly be making is of very great importance for the future.

In his report, Mr. De Decker also refers to United Nations operations. The example of United Nations interventions in Bosnia is truly horrific. The same applies to Rwanda and Somalia. These examples clearly show that the manner in which the United Nations command hierarchy operates cannot possibly succeed. It is pointless to ask the United Nations, which is a peace organisation, to become a military defence system. Everybody must play his part. It is difficult to see what officials or diplomats can do in the way of military operations. For the last few months the results of what the United Nations has been doing have been clear. None of the problems arising during the last few weeks have been resolved in any way. The United Nations forces mandated to implement Security Council decisions are completely powerless: their tanks, as happened three days ago, are captured and turned against them, they lift the guard on heavy weapons which are then taken back by one or other of the belligerents and the members of UNPROFOR have to look helplessly on while snipers kill women and children.

This demonstration of helplessness and ineffectiveness must give us food for thought. I consider that if European units and in particular the rapid reaction force become engaged, their chains of command must be different from those in use at present. Of course, there must be United Nations authority to act because it is obvious it is only through the United Nations that the great powers can intervene. This is the great diplomatic change of the end of this century. Even action in the Gulf war, which involved a coalition led by a great power, the United States, had the backing of the United Nations. Just as it is normal to secure this backing, it is equally necessary that everyone should play their own part and the military authorities be left to assess the situation on the ground and to act accordingly.

In conclusion, I would stress that the proposals in Mr. De Decker's report need a sequel. He asked me to say that if the Assembly approved his report, which in my view is an excellent reference document and an accurate analysis covering every possibility for European intervention forces, he thought that a further paper was needed because of the developments now taking place. He proposes to you that this study of European armed forces be continued, in the light of events and reactions prompted by present problems.

*Mr. Baumel (continued)*

This concludes the presentation of Mr. De Decker's report which I have kept brief in order to save time; I will be glad, however, to answer any speakers and to speak on any amendments submitted.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel. Thank you also for substituting so effectively for Mr. De Decker.

We have only one speaker, Mr. Peter Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I find it regrettable that a report that is of great importance to the Assembly will be debated for such a short time, because I will be the only speaker, and I shall be making a speech that will probably be very unpopular. I make no apologies for that. Today's forces need not be huge but they need to be possessed of considerable and ever-extended ranges of skills. Those skills need to be adequately rehearsed with regular practice. The quality of training needs to be high. Those servicemen need to be adequately motivated. They need to be aware that their countries and alliances hold them in esteem, but that esteem has also to be earned.

Those requirements extend across the services. There are fewer warships, but each modern warship is a concentrated, complex container of high technological capacity. If such warships sail only occasionally from their ports, when the sea is still and the weather is clear, the prospects of them being useful at times of hostility or intense crisis may be limited.

On land, we have fewer soldiers, but they each possess a destructive capacity that goes far beyond the rifle and bayonet that may have been the principal weaponry of armies in the lifetime of many members of this Assembly. Those soldiers have increasingly complex duties, which require maturity and patience, as they exercise the rôle of policemen in areas that are troubled, as so many areas are today. That may require greater provision of, and concern for, training than ever was the case before.

As for our air forces, my report last December, which the Assembly approved, more than recognised the deficiencies that exist in many of the air forces of our member states. We have a substantial strike capacity during the day when the weather is fine, the sun is shining and the air is still. There is a grossly inadequate capacity for reconnaissance, for identification, for in-flight refuelling and for flying in bad weather and at night. In many of our member states, air forces are not allowed to train properly, so they do not possess current capacity. There are many aircrafts, with a wide disparity of types, but I wonder how many of them are serviceable at any given moment.

If we do not possess the equipment or services, if our servicemen are not trained, if those needs remain, then our countries can offer as many declarations as they like but the politicians responsible for such declarations are acting no better than strutting and vainglorious peacocks. I approve of having unity of purpose in making such declarations, but if we have that, our respective countries must also have the will to provide the capacity to make it possible to maintain the obligation and fulfil the commitment. If we do not, we should hesitate before entering into commitments.

I said that I would not be making a popular speech; I shall remind the Assembly of one fact. I have 65 000 electors in my constituency, which has a population of about 83 000. That is a relatively modest size, but my constituency – this can be said of many other constituencies in Britain – has probably sent three times more people to serve in former Yugoslavia than have half the member states of the Assembly. However, when we have a debate here or in Strasbourg, members queue up to offer solutions. Many member states have endorsed the humanitarian rôle and the peace-keeping rôle – not peace-making, that would be stretching it too far. I was shocked to find, when I worked it out, that half our member states have sent to former Yugoslavia an average of two lorries, four traffic policemen and five stretcher bearers. In such circumstances, one is entitled to make an occasional unpopular speech and to speak bluntly.

My mind goes back to another occasion. At the end of the debate on the Gulf war, in this horrid hall – it is a horrid hall when the weather is hot – members from our respective countries queued to put down their names to a debate that rejoiced in triumphalism and victory. I said something unpopular then and I say it again, because it is still relevant. They sent more parliamentarians to rejoice in triumph at the end of the Gulf war than they sent personnel to serve in the United Nations forces.

Will the same thing happen in the crisis that might command the rapid reaction force? Will we see our member states living up to the promises they make and the commitments that they offer? I have real doubts about that, unless there is a remarkable change of mind over either increasing provision or not applying dogma to Her Majesty's forces in the United Kingdom, where they are seen more as a subject for privatisation or private profit than providing for the defence of the realm. Priorities have to change in a number of countries, although I accept that Britain and France, and one or two other countries, are more than pulling their weight in terms of matching ability to the commitments that they offer.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy. No one could ever accuse you of not being blunt. We

*The President (continued)*

all listened with great interest to your speech. You made a series of points about the need for co-operation and intervention from certain countries.

The debate is now closed.

Does the Chairman of the Defence Committee wish to say a word or two?

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – I have listened with great interest to what Mr. Hardy had to say. Possibly unpopularity always accompanies the wish to tell the truth. It is unfortunately one of the consequences of political life; you have to be prepared to be unpopular if you want to keep faith with certain values.

I will speak on Mr. Hardy's amendment when it is presented.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel.

We now come to the three amendments that have been tabled and I shall take them in the order 1, 3 and 2. Mr. Guidi has tabled Amendment 1 and Mr. Hardy Amendment 3, to which Mr. Baumel referred. We shall take them together. If Amendment 1 succeeds, Amendment 3 falls.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mr. Guidi, reads:

1. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Guidi to move the amendment.

Mr. GUIDI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my amendment proposes the deletion of paragraph 1 of the recommendation. Because I neglected to put my name down I did not speak during the debate, so I thank the President for allowing me to move my amendment which I regard as particularly important.

The European security plan cannot be the mere sum of the assets available to the various countries although the report shows, unfortunately, that it still is.

What is needed is an overall plan involving the WEU countries and specifying the priorities and economic resources needed for its implementation, which could exceed those at present earmarked by the individual countries.

Paragraph 1 of the recommendation calls on the individual countries to allocate more funds to military expenditure before such an order of priorities has been set. My view is that, in taking such a decision, Europe risks giving the signal for a renewed recourse to arms which in the current world situation would be a political error.

The PRESIDENT. – Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr. Hardy, reads:

3. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add "except where a member state is unable to provide its proper contribution to international security".

I call Mr. Hardy to speak to the amendment.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Some people might find it difficult to understand my amendment, but it has two purposes. First, the report tells member countries to stop reducing defence expenditure or to ensure that it remains at a stable level. With some countries, such a policy would not be at all helpful. For example, if there were to be a rapid reaction force – and a structure for one is set out on the back pages of the report – one unit could come from a member state that has acted responsibly and it would be adequately trained and equipped to be sent as part of the force to deal with a crisis. However, some of the units – from other member states – with which that unit would serve might be inadequately trained and equipped, putting that unit at risk.

Therefore, we should not be asking those member states merely to stabilise their defence expenditure – they should instead be bringing their expenditure nearer to that of the countries that provide the properly trained and equipped units. The United Kingdom is one such country. I see no reason why other member states should stabilise their defence expenditure and continue to spend a great deal less per head or as a share of gross domestic product when they have to fulfil the same responsibilities that are borne by Britain and some other countries.

Second, if those member states continue to decrease or stabilise their defence expenditure, we might as well tell them not to bother spending anything at all because their arrangements are so inadequate and the resources that they devote so meagre that they are worse than useless. Because of that, we should not say that we depend on those countries – which makes the report's recommendation irrelevant. Indeed, the blanket approach adopted by Mr. De Decker in paragraph 1 is not really relevant, would perpetuate injustice and would scarcely assist the maintenance of a proper and meaningful military rôle.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

I call Mr. López Henares, who wishes to oppose the amendments.

Mr. LÓPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I am against Mr. Guidi's amendment because the deletion he suggests would considerably weaken the draft recommendation. Here, we are sitting in the Assembly of a defence organisation and we must act from reason rather than emotion. Now bipolarity has ceased to exist there has been a tendency over the last few years to reduce military expenditure. Nevertheless, as has been said here

*Mr. López Henares (continued)*

several times and is repeated in the report presented so well by Mr. Baumel, the defence of Europe requires organisation, expenditure and of course, an economic effort.

In its draft recommendation, the committee is very cautious because it calls on the member states of WEU to stop reducing their defence expenditure; any accentuation of this tendency would ultimately lead to the situation correctly described by Mr. Hardy. A cheaper army is not more economical because costs have to be seen in terms of performance. Reducing expenditure would ultimately mean having no defence at all, everything spent then being a complete waste.

The effort must therefore be maintained. An excellent example is the level of defence maintained by countries like France, to which we pay tribute as our ally.

WEU's new tasks set by the Petersberg declaration mean that our forces have to be trained within an operational structure to be able to carry out their humanitarian, peace-keeping and if necessary crisis-management missions. At the moment, some defence and armed forces ministers are responsible for units which are not given the continuous training required in order to act effectively. This is a clear example of a grave weakness.

It would be regrettable and even contradictory for the assembly of a defence organisation to set limits on such expenditure. The major threats to Europe have, of course, receded but there are still risks. Today, a number of conflicts are not merely local: their spin-off could affect Europe. I am thinking particularly of present events in the Caucasus and of the crisis in former Yugoslavia.

For these reasons, I think it essential that the committee's draft be maintained.

I should like to have the Rapporteur's opinion concerning Mr. Hardy's amendment which is less categorical, and on Mr. Guidi's, to which I am totally opposed.

Counting only the member countries of WEU, Europe has a population of 366 million. With the associate members and associate partners the number is of course much higher. We are at the centre of the world and it must be realised that 52% of all trade takes place there. Europe's security, therefore, requires a much more reliable defence system than it has at the moment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I understand that Mr. López Henares primarily opposes Amendment 1. In fairness, I must ask whether any member wants to oppose Mr. Hardy's Amendment 3. As that is not the case, I invite the Rapporteur to comment on both amendments.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Starting with Mr. Guidi's Amendment 1, I shall add nothing to what has been said – and very well said – already. I would point out to Mr. Guidi that the proposal is not to increase expenditure but to stop it being reduced. I wonder if he realises the basic contradiction between what he proposes and his own government's intentions, because I believe that the Italian Government is proposing new humanitarian missions in Europe with additional funds. Obviously, these missions can only be undertaken with an adequate budget. I do not understand the dialectic here. Finally, I think I can say for the Rapporteur and myself that the Assembly should vote against Amendment 1.

Turning to the amendment tabled by Mr. Hardy, the approach is different, as he explained. We are, however, a defence organisation and the first fact of life for defence is to have budgets which allow operations to be mounted and defence structures set in peace. It would therefore seem wisest to keep the Rapporteur's draft as it is including the paragraph in question.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1 is negatived.*

I now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 3 is agreed to.*

I invite Mr. López Henares to move Amendment 2, which reads:

2. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Study the inclusion, and overall framework, of the various partial or regional initiatives such as EUROFOR, the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force, the ARRC, and other similar initiatives in a general European defence system, in order to provide coherence and a global vision of the European defence identity; ”

Mr. LÓPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – The purpose of Amendment 2 is to insert ideas already put forward by the committee Rapporteur into the draft recommendation. They relate to the need for various partial and sometimes regional elements like EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, the European Corps and the Anglo-Netherlands amphibious force to be incorporated in an overall system so that the European defence identity is seen in global terms. In many ways, this is the variable geometry idea. It is a pragmatic approach designed to overcome the difficulties. Furthermore, the idea represents a far from cartesian

*Mr. López Henares (continued)*

approach. In order to be coherent, all these elements should be incorporated into a general system.

At the start of his splendid speech, Mr. Hardy rightly observed that the Anglo-Netherlands amphibious force should, of course, be associated with the regional forces and organisations in order to provide mutual aid as and when necessary.

My proposal, therefore, is that these different types of defence measures which are already partial should be incorporated into an overall approach in order to arrive at a general European identity. I would add that the Rapporteur was well disposed when I told the committee that I wished to table an amendment of this nature which I believe to be very reasonable. I hope you will approve it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does anyone wish to oppose that amendment? ...

Does the Rapporteur want to comment?

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Both the Rapporteur and the Chairman are in favour.

The PRESIDENT. – The overwhelming duality of the Rapporteur and of the Chairman is impressive.

I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

I congratulate Mr. Baumel on taking over from Mr. De Decker.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation, as amended, contained in Document 1468.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation, as amended, is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

1. See page 44.

**6. New trends in North American countries' foreign policy and their implications for transatlantic co-operation in security and defence matters, with particular reference to the United States**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1457)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Lord Finsberg of the report on new trends in North American countries' foreign policy and their implications for transatlantic co-operation in security and defence matters, with particular reference to the United States submitted on behalf of the Political Committee, debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1457.

I invite Lord Finsberg to address the Assembly.

Lord FINBERG (*United Kingdom*). – This report was interesting to prepare. My colleagues and I made a fascinating visit to Canada and the United States – fascinating in some of the things that we were not able to find out, and interesting in some of the impressions that we were able to gain.

First, I must thank Mr. Burchard, the committee Clerk, for his assistance in preparing the background information.

I will divide my remarks into two parts. We started in Canada and met a variety of members of the Canadian Parliament together with officials from their ministries. There was a strange atmosphere because, on the one hand, the Canadians have made it clear that they want to remain in support of NATO and, on the other, their defence programme seems to militate very much against those commitments. For example, they very much believe in the need for a rapid reaction force, but disbanded it the day before we arrived. You may remember that there were certain scandals in the Canadian Parachute Regiment – sad, but I am merely reporting the facts. That could mean that any reaction would take one or two months and, even in the most modern version of the Oxford English Dictionary, rapid does not stretch to two months.

To sum up, the Canadian part of the visit was a mixture of depression and realism. I believe that, if the chips were down, there would be no doubt about the Canadian commitment and willingness to assist. They are doing a lot for peace-keeping through the United Nations – there is no quarrel about that – but I am less optimistic about what they could contribute in an emergency.

We then went to America and had what has been the frequent experience of many committees from this organisation and the Council of Europe, which is that there is a strange absence of American congressmen for one to meet and a strange reluctance to keep appointments that have been made and confirmed. One wonders how one can

*Lord Finsberg (continued)*

get the co-operation that is so important between European and American parliamentarians.

I will mention the views of current congressmen in a moment but, basically, they appear to be less European-minded than their predecessors, but they make it clear that they strongly support NATO. That respected body, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, produced a very interesting series of public opinion polls on foreign relations, which put the question: does the United States have a vital interest in European countries? In 1978, 28% agreed that it did, but in 1994 the figure was 66%, which shows that, during the next series of elections, the American Congress might pay more attention to what their voters are saying. The people of America appear to believe that the United States has a vital interest.

In a recent speech reported in the International Herald Tribune on 8th June, Warren Christopher said, "In the absence of a single unifying threat, and at a time of understandable focus on domestic concerns, some argue that the ties that bind us are fraying, and that America and Europe will inevitably drift apart. I reject that view. From world war two to our strong support for German unification, the United States and Europe have shared a common destiny. But we must not take this relationship for granted. It cannot be sustained by nostalgia." That is one reason why the Political Committee went to America – to try to see how we could put that very important need into a modern context.

There are enormous apparent – I must stress the apparent – differences between the United States Government – and within it – the Congress and the variety of think-tanks in the United States of America. We had conflicting advice and evidence from the Defence and State Departments, which did not seem able to agree on common issues. Both expressed good will towards Europe, which was at least encouraging. Congress, with its new Republican majority, reiterated to us that it strongly supported NATO, but you will see from the report, and you will know, that some of its ideas for expanding it are rather less practical than they might have been.

I am not sure what is going to happen about that. As Mr. Baumel said, we find difficulty in such things as the combined joint task force in getting agreement between NATO and WEU. If other countries are added to NATO, and one must consider Article V of the Brussels Treaty and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, I am not so certain. We might find that that proposition is kicked into touch for the time.

As many of us know, in the United States the important thing is not necessarily the membership

of congressional committees but the staffers who, in many cases, are there much longer, although there has been an enormous turnover among staffers in the House on this occasion. Many of those serving the new Republican majority were not there when they were in opposition, although some were.

I had the opportunity of a long meeting with the head of Jesse Helms's staff, Admiral Nance, which was extremely useful. Some of the things that we shall see in the States will be constructive for European-American relations. Having said that, we must ask ourselves whether there is not more that we can do, even in the face of the disappointments that we have suffered over the years, to find a way to talk with our American counterparts. It is true that, at this precise moment in Washington, a publicity campaign is being carried out on behalf of WEU. A child of seven might have looked at the diaries to check that that did not occur at the same time as the parliamentary Assembly of WEU but perhaps that is ascribing too much common sense to those who allowed the clash of dates to occur when our dates were known twelve months ago. Nonetheless, I hope that it achieves something.

I certainly believe that it is right that this body, whether its Defence Committee, the Presidential Committee or the Political Committee, should visit the United States more frequently and should have the full co-operation – I must make it clear that they do have such co-operation – of the embassies and the Chairmanship-in-Office. I cannot pay a high enough tribute to the work of the Portuguese embassy in Washington. It was outstanding and if all other embassies did as well when the time came we would have nothing to grumble about.

I hope that we shall have that help because ultimately the embassies and their staff can unlock doors in so many cases. They had unlocked the doors to a meeting with the Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees. We had a time and a day, but that was cancelled for no reason whatever. However, that is not the embassy's fault.

We also need to work on some of the minorities in America because Congress is susceptible to the need to get votes and if the Hispanic minority were to say to those congressmen who represent their interests, "You must see these Europeans" and if that were applied to the Greek, Italians and any other nationality with large populations in America – some of our Baltic friends have a lot of congressional constituents – we might begin to get more opportunity of meeting them. I confess that that angle had not occurred to me until I was there on that occasion. We need to look at that for the future.



*Lord Finsberg (continued)*

That is probably all that I need to say on this report. I am delighted that the report was passed unanimously and that my good friend, Mr. Rodrigues, who is clearly refreshing himself at the moment, found it possible to support it. I am not suspicious about that; he was convinced by what the report and committee said. I commend the report to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Lord Finsberg. Thank you also for emphasising the real need for this Assembly to keep contacts with the United States and to persevere with endeavours to find meeting points with it.

There are two speakers in the debate. The first is Mr. Pastusiak.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Poland, associate partner*). — It is commonly recognised that Americans today are facing at least two fundamental challenges: one abroad and another at home. Abroad, they must respond to a sharply different world. The end of the cold war as a form of rivalry and confrontation between East and West did not make the world a more stable or more secure place. Some even say that the end of the cold war resulted in more instability, more challenges for security and more hotbeds of international conflict. The feeling of fear and hope dominant in the cold war has only been replaced by a feeling of hope and fear.

Thanks to changes that have taken place in the past five years we can now claim to have a new world, a new Europe, but certainly neither a new world nor a new European order. So the challenge for the United States is not only how to readjust to the new situation but how to contribute to the creation of a new world order. Nobody, particularly a great power like the United States, can afford to see the world drifting in an uncontrolled way.

The second challenge for the Americans today is at home. It is how to build a consensus on foreign policy in the post-cold war world among an increasingly sceptical American public. When the cold war ended many Americans imagined that the United States could turn away from foreign affairs and finally concentrate attention on domestic problems: the budget deficit, the loss of jobs, decaying cities, polarised race relations, spiralling health costs, the scourge of drugs, non-performing public schools and so on. But reality soon intervened. There is a growing awareness that such problems have now spread across borders, and that the fate of the United States and its people is tied to actions in other countries, as well as what Americans do at home.

The line separating foreign from domestic policy has become so blurred that much of the United States domestic success now rides on internatio-

nal affairs. Under these circumstances, genuine public participation in setting a new American international agenda is both a growing reality and an increasing necessity. Yet a rigid distinction between foreign and domestic policies still dominates United States institutions, habits and practices. It underlies the notion that Americans can somehow shift their attention from foreign policy to domestic priorities when in fact the two are inextricably intertwined. While this merging of two policy arenas and the public's need to be involved undeniably complicate matters, it also offers opportunities to advance the quality of American democracy.

During the cold war the world was seemingly a more dangerous but simpler place. Americans had an enemy, and United States policy was to contain that enemy. That enemy has collapsed, and Americans have lost the unifying framework on which United States foreign policy was based. Now there is only a vacuum. The Americans must forge a new framework that addresses the question of why and how much they want to be involved in trying to shape the larger world order.

The end of the cold war has also changed the main concerns of United States policy. Before 1990, they were largely political and military; in the future, they will include economic, humanitarian and environmental concerns.

Since the late 1940s, American foreign policy has been formulated and executed from the top down by a foreign policy élite that functioned largely independently of the concerns and opinions of the public. Today, foreign policy is more influenced than ever before by the spontaneous and unco-ordinated actions of citizen groups. If foreign policy could ever have been insulated from the hurly-burly of normal domestic politics, it cannot any longer. The defence budget, for example, now faces new competition for money for everything from social services to deficit reduction.

But it is not only the collapse of the Soviet Union that has put Americans in a new world. The United States has become an integral part of a new global economy. There is an international quest for investment, jobs, and new markets for goods and services.

Lord Finsberg in his excellent report calls our attention to the possible implications of the new shape of Congress after the election last autumn. Republican plans to cut funding for foreign aid, peace-keeping operations and the United Nations were called by the Clinton Administration back-door isolationism that risks frittering away our victory in the cold war.

A recent survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations also indicated that American society is increasingly more inward-looking. For

*Mr. Pastusiak (continued)*

instance interest in news about local affairs has gone up by 10% in the past four years, while interest in other countries and in United States' relations with those countries has fallen.

I fully support the recommendations in Lord Finsberg's report. The security in the Atlantic region is indivisible. There is no alternative to a Euro-Atlantic partnership. We should not be discouraged by problems that may arise. We have mechanisms and should use them to resolve effectively any problems, including new ones, that might arise between Europe and North America.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. The next speaker is Lord Mackie of Benshie, whom we are pleased to see back with us after his recent surgical intervention.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (United Kingdom). – Thank you, Mr. President, for your good wishes.

The masterly analysis by the Polish member rather shakes me as I approach my speech. My noble friend Lord Finsberg – if I may call him my noble friend in this Assembly – has produced a report with his customary thoroughness. Like his opposite number, Mr. Hardy, he has not shrunk from making unpopular and frank remarks. That is necessary, given the state of the world – and the alliance – today.

I am no longer on the Political Committee but I remember a very similar experience to the one that the committee had on this occasion, when we went to Washington and found ourselves more or less in the position of a suppliant group from a faraway Anglo-Saxon land going to imperial Rome to put a point. We were treated courteously, but appointments were not kept and so on. Washington is an imperial capital courted by people from all over the world. During the sitting of Congress, congressmen are inclined to treat important delegations such as this as a bit of a nuisance in the normal hurly-burly of their work, as they rush around being courted by everyone.

At that time, we were talking of trying to get going personal relationships with influential members of both the Congress and the Senate and to get them over here at a time when they were not sitting, so that they could talk seriously, and enjoy a visit to Europe. Americans are always quite willing to come to Paris. That idea might still be helpful.

The Clinton Administration is having a difficult time. The recent experience of Congress simply saying that it would not provide the money, with the result that Clinton had to back out of a promise, shows how difficult it is. In his excellent report, Lord Finsberg concentrated on the Ameri-

can situation, but we need to look at the effect of Europe's attitude on American thinking. If they look at our total failure over Bosnia, they must be saying to themselves, "For goodness sake, why can't Europe get its act together?" We have to look back at the Bosnian situation and the failure, in spite of great efforts and sacrifices by our troops and volunteers, to resolve the situation after three years.

Now, we are talking of a rapid reaction force – a force that can act in case of need – perhaps by opening the road to Sarajevo. It looks as though the Serbs are going to talk and if that happens, let us not draw back from sending the rapid reaction force there. It is vital that we firm up our attitude.

If Europe could get together its attitude to NATO and if Britain, France and Germany, and particularly France, could produce a reasonable attitude towards NATO and the new set-up in NATO, and a combined European operation, the American Government and Congress would have a great deal more respect for any mission that we sent to Bosnia. Let me be slightly facetious. The happy day when Mr. Baumel can embrace President Clinton with a love light in his eye, is the day that we might be getting somewhere in transforming NATO and its European arm into a really useful force for peace both in Europe and in the rest of the world.

In the middle of the excellent analysis of American difficulties and their curious actions, we should look at the example that we set. I commend the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Mackie.

That ends the debate.

Does the Rapporteur wish to say a word?

Lord FINSBERG (United Kingdom). – I thank our Polish colleague for what he said. In an Assembly such as this we must always remember the sacrifices that Poland has made in the cause of democracy. We have to ensure that, whatever world order we create, Poland does not, yet again, disappear from the map. She is a gallant nation; she deserves our support and understanding. That is why I always pay particular attention to what my Polish friends have to say.

I can give a certain amount of comfort. Mr. Pastusiak spoke about the views of the Americans and perhaps I might quote other figures from the Chicago Institute. There is little difference between the public and the leadership on gathering intelligence information about other countries, defence spending and the space programme. There is a big difference on economic aid to other nations. The public want a substantial cut in that, and the leadership wants a smaller one. On military aid to other nations, where cuts are identical, something like two thirds of the nation agree. We

*Lord Finsberg (continued)*

have to recognise that on many of these matters, the public are in line with leadership. In others – for example, where Europe is concerned – they are ahead of the leadership.

My friend Lord Mackie produced his usual dose of common sense. I could disagree with very little in his analysis. One of the problems that we have – we had it in the old OSCE and have it now in the OSCE – is that the only time that that body can have its annual assembly is the one week at the beginning of July when the American Congress is not sitting. Congress has not adopted the idea of pairing; I commend it warmly to Congress members. They would find that it would make their lives somewhat easier, and it would enable them to meet many more of their parliamentary colleagues.

Lord Mackie spoke of Bosnia and the American view of Europe. That has basically become a United Nations problem – I make no comment on that. The United States is a major member of the United Nations and a major, if sometimes non-paying, contributor. As we all know, there are signs that it wants to reduce much further its additional contributions to peace-keeping. That applies not merely to what is happening in Bosnia but to virtually every problem. We have to try to keep the Americans on side on this one, because we cannot afford to have the largest democracy in the world drawing back from the United Nations.

However, I did disagree with Lord Mackie's point about NATO. I believe that the European members of NATO have got their act together. That came out clearly in what Mr. Baumel said to us. I am sorry that he is not here. I would have loved to have watched his face when Lord Mackie made his comments about Mr. Baumel embracing Mr. Clinton with a love light in his eyes. Both what Mr. Baumel said in Mr. De Decker's report and what we know show that, somehow, we have to help NATO adapt to the changed situation.

As our Polish friend said, life appeared to be safer in the days when the Warsaw Pact and NATO faced each other because although each possessed the power to destroy the other, we knew that they would not do so. Now, the Warsaw Pact has disappeared, NATO is looking for a new rôle and life is less certain. I hope that NATO will find its new rôle quickly. I also hope that that new rôle will encompass North America as strongly as did the old rôle, in which North America was so vital; without that rôle, many of us would not be sitting here today.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – I would like to congratulate Lord Finsberg on his draft recommendation which, as he told us, was approved unanimously in the Political Committee. My

parliament's calendar unfortunately prevented me from accompanying the committee when it travelled to the United States and Canada.

Be that as it may, I think that the visit was very positive judging from its results, by which I mean the presentation of this report and its draft recommendation. We cannot say that there were no problems, there always are, but perhaps this time there were fewer than on other occasions, and I would like to highlight, with Lord Finsberg, the outstanding work done by the Portuguese embassy to facilitate matters on this visit.

This report is evidence of the concern we all feel about the rôle of the United States as regards world peace and also European peace, as we said earlier, in connection with Mr. Marshall's report. We are concerned about the position of the United States because there are certain ambiguities and some decisions by its institutions which perhaps we do not feel able to share. We think that the rôle of the United States is not only very important for security but is undoubtedly the most important, both for world peace and for stability in Europe. However, we cannot simply accept all the positions of the United States or of its government. I would like to underline, Mr. President, Lord Finsberg's wisdom in presenting us with the facts in favour of the great rôle which the United States must play, but with a certain sense of criticism. At times we reproach our British friends for their inability to criticise the United States. We sometimes think – indeed I sometimes think so myself – that our English friends are always in favour, and only in favour, of their American friends. I respect Lord Finsberg's ability to criticise and I believe that it constitutes an important element of his contribution.

From the tribune, Lord Finsberg wondered what we could do. He made a number of proposals along with his criticisms: criticism of NATO, where there has been some reluctance to transfer to WEU certain powers in the context of sharing some elements of collective security; criticism of the need to renew the relationship between Europe and the United States in line with the current situation, where there is evidence of a much greater willingness on the part of the Europeans than on the part of the Americans. And he also criticised some problems and some confusion which had arisen. He proposes we continue to promote a close relationship with the Americans as a starting point. Then he proposes a new chapter in the white paper on the rôle of the United States and on transatlantic relations, and increased dialogue and co-operation, and he even makes what I consider to be a rather daring, but interesting suggestion that it might be possible to arrive at an assembly which would be something between the WEU Assembly and the North Atlantic Assembly, to favour this parliamentary co-operation between European and American representatives.

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

I think this is an interesting report, which has been effective; indeed it has been miraculously effective if it is true that Lord Finsberg has succeeded in convincing Mr. Rodrigues. And if it really is true that Lord Finsberg has succeeded in convincing Mr. Rodrigues, then I think we should not despair, and I would say to Lord Mackie: perhaps the day will come when we shall once again see Mr. Baumel embracing Mr. Clinton.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

I sense a feeling of unanimity on this report.

As no amendments have been tabled, we shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1457.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is agreed to*<sup>1</sup>.

The recommendation has been well and truly carried and I congratulate the Rapporteur and the committee.

### **7. The Eastern Mediterranean**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1465 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Cucó of the report on the Eastern Mediterranean submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee, debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1465 and amendments.

I call Mr. Cucó to present the report.

Mr. CUCÓ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I will try to be brief in view of the time and our very full timetable. However, first of all let me stress that the recent accession to Western European Union of both Greece as a full member and Turkey as an associate member, leads WEU into uncharted waters, into a region where there is considerable tension and where latent and often open conflict are not difficult to find.

1. See page 46.

As far as I am concerned, this new horizon should provide all those of us who are interested in collective peace and security in Europe with new elements for reflection, in addition to those which I modestly contributed in this report on the Eastern Mediterranean.

As I see it, conflict in the region is the result of a unique historical development quite different from the experience of Western Europe. Let me quote just one example which I think is highly relevant: the great western colonial empires, along with their sometimes extremely painful consequences, were generally thousands of kilometres from their respective metropolis. But the national emancipation of the various Balkan peoples, a consequence of the rapid decline of the Ottoman empire, is taking place in adjacent territories against the background of a colourful ethnic mosaic of national identities, languages, cultures and religions.

In this context, each country has claimed to have a long-standing ambition: to create homogeneous political structures which would include all their compatriots and often only their compatriots. Almost all the countries of the region have been guided by similar principles: the "megali idea" in the case of the Greeks, the "nascertanje" for the Serbs, and similar projects such as the plans for a great Bulgaria, a great Romania or a great Albania. Many of these principles have now been abandoned, but we are left with some of their consequences.

In Western Europe, although the countries were established by different processes, the most recent cases, such as the unification of Germany or the Italian "risorgimento" were also times of tremendous conflict. I will cite only the long and persistent violent conflicts which set the French and Germans against one another over, amongst other things, the disputed region of Alsace-Lorraine. However, these old conflicts have now been completely overcome and Franco-German friendship has become the driving force behind the construction of Europe, where Strasbourg, that old source of discord, is today the symbol of the new Europe for everyone.

On the other hand, animosity between Greece and Turkey, which also stems from a stormy past, persists and even increases: it affects matters such as the limits of territorial waters, rights over the continental shelf, over air space and, in particular, the question of Cyprus.

Mr. President, resolution of the Cyprus question is vital if we want to see old, festering wounds healed and view the question of collective peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean with new eyes. From where we stand, we can only encourage the dialogue proposed by the United Nations, which presupposes each party accepting

*Mr. Cucó (continued)*

a genuine spirit of negotiation, establishing a climate of trust and as a result, in order to make this possible, the progressive substitution of Turkish troops by a United Nations peace-keeping force. All this, naturally, with a view to reducing the military presence throughout the island and leading to the demilitarisation of Cyprus.

Ladies and gentlemen, many decades ago Atatürk's new Turkey made a decisive political choice: a secular state and respect for democratic values. This choice was the start of an increasing closeness to the countries of Western Europe, which I believe has been of benefit to both.

However, it is well known that some of these principles have not been put fully into practice. I will not repeat here and now our view of the human rights situation in Turkey, because this has already been done quite unequivocally in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It is very similar to the view expressed almost simultaneously by the European Parliament. In my capacity as Rapporteur, I have expressed opinions which also coincide with resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the European Parliament.

It seems obvious to state here that such a worrying situation has much to do with the tragic development of the Kurdish question. This is a delicate matter where, in my opinion, respect for Turkish territorial integrity must be reconciled with the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people, their cultural and linguistic identity, and certain forms of administrative and political autonomy. The Kurdish question must be resolved peacefully, by means of dialogue, vigorously rejecting terrorist violence whatever its origin, and putting into practice the basic principles of international law and human rights.

On another matter, Mr. President, I would also like to record from this rostrum, the importance the WEU Council attaches to the place of the OSCE in the European security architecture. In my view, the continuing Greek veto on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's membership of the OSCE does as little to promote our collective security as the prolonged economic embargo imposed on Skopje by Athens. I am not seeking in this short speech to make a catalogue of problems in this region, nor to provide a magic recipe for solving them. I would be satisfied if the text of my report helped us all to understand a political and geographical area which is physically nearby, but not always very close, so that ultimately no one can invoke the short-sighted view expressed by Neville Chamberlain after the 1938 Munich Conference when, referring to the Czechoslovaks, he said "they are a distant people about whom we know almost nothing".

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cucó, for that excellent explanatory statement.

The debate is open.

I call first Mr. Liapis.

Mr. LIAPIS (*Greece*) (Translation). – Mr. President, please allow me first to congratulate Mr. Cucó for his exhaustive and surely considerable work. His scientific background and deep knowledge of history have helped him prepare an in-depth report in which he has striven to keep an even perspective and adopt an objective approach to the problems encountered in the relations between the countries of the region.

Certainly, much could be said about a paper running to ninety-three pages for we all tend to see a given situation from a different angle. There is no doubt one might have many reservations and even criticise many points made in the report. However, Mr. President, good faith – and lack of time – require us to make our remarks short and to the point. To start with, I do not intend to go into the chapter on Turkey, in order to avoid giving the erroneous impression that Greece is wielding the advantage of its full membership in order to implicate this organisation in its differences with its neighbour. In fact, I have precisely the opposite intention. Anyway, all of you here who are also serving on the Council of Europe are familiar with the numerous resolutions adopted by the international bodies, with a view to convincing Turkey to comply with the principles and concepts of the civilised countries of Europe.

So, please allow me to make just a few remarks on the chapter concerning my country.

First, and I think this is rather serious, when the Muslim minority in Greece is referred to in the second chapter, it is under the title "the Turkish minority". This, Mr. Cucó, is not exact. The correct form is, indeed, "the Muslim minority", for this is what the international treaty, that is still in force, calls them. We must not violate this treaty, the peace treaty of Lausanne, which refers only to a religious minority. Anyway, later in the report, Mr. Cucó himself divides them, quite correctly, into Muslims of Turkish origin, Pomaks and gypsies. It is our duty, Mr. President, to respect international treaties, particularly since international legality is what this Assembly is supposed to uphold.

Second, to give a more detailed and precise picture of the situation of minorities in Greece and Turkey, Mr. Cucó could have reported in paragraph 431, that of the 200 000 Greeks who were living in Istanbul and Imbros and the Tenedos islands not many years ago, only 3 000 remain today.

Third, in order to update the report and enhance its reliability, one would have to refer to an inci-

*Mr. Liapis (continued)*

dent that took place after Mr. Cucó had finished his report. About two months ago, Mr. Aktuna, Turkish minister to the Cabinet, on a long and leisurely tour in Greek Thrace, saw fit to attack the host country with several statements that could in no way be deemed either proper or conciliatory. In spite of it all, Athens chose to calm down the public's reaction to this unseemly insult, keep cool and do what it could to prevent any aggravation.

A fourth and final point. In the draft recommendation, FYROM is mentioned twice, once on the embargo issue and again with reference to Greece's veto on the entry of this country to the OSCE. It would be best, Mr. Cucó, either to eliminate these two references or to amend them, as the Hellenic Delegation has already suggested, in order to tone down criticism against my country. These are difficult times, with both countries seriously undertaking to get closer to each other and to resolve their differences. Verbal pressure, applied unilaterally, will only aggravate the situation and harm the positive climate needed to promote a final compromise.

I will conclude by saying, once again, that in general terms, Mr. Cucó's attempt at describing the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is accurate. This area is indeed beset by problems of great complexity, however, this is such a geopolitical position of great importance and we must all do our utmost for peace and stability therein.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Liapis.

Next, I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – Like Mr. Liapis, I warmly congratulate the Rapporteur. Over the years, he has presented a number of reports to this Assembly and, indeed, to the Council of Europe. We know all about the thoroughness of his preparation and presentation.

The report highlights an important issue – one over which there is still ongoing tension – and comments on three countries, which, as any United Kingdom member of this Assembly knows, inter-relate. Cyprus is one of the major reasons for the tension. Most delegates here are also delegates at the Council of Europe and, as we know, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey send delegates to the Council.

In part three on Cyprus, the Rapporteur very fairly outlined the problems that undoubtedly existed in the past. The report refers to the events of 1974, when Cyprus was invaded; it was divided and it still is some twenty years later. Members of this Assembly should ask themselves why no real progress has been made and why no meaningful dialogue has taken place between Greece and Turkey. Cyprus is the reason and that is one of the important issues today.

I am the Chairman of the Cyprus Group in the British Parliament. I and my colleagues, irrespective of party, have always argued for a settlement that will benefit both Greek and Turkish Cypriots who live in Cyprus. We know about all the efforts over the years. Last month in London, high-level talks were held between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Sadly, they got nowhere.

We all know about the Secretary-General's comments on the lack of progress following his long-standing efforts. The blame was clearly put on Mr. Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots. Sadly, we have clear evidence of the problems that now exist in northern Cyprus – the state of the economy, the enormously high inflation and the fact that the tourist trade is in decline. I do not want those to continue. Ordinary men and women and their families will suffer because of the decline in the economy of that part of Cyprus.

We know the background and I suggest that we make it clear that, despite all that Mr. Denktash says, ten years have gone by since he set up his supposedly independent state and only one country has ever recognised him.

Yesterday, we were privileged to have the Prime Minister of Turkey here. In her address, she mentioned Cyprus and her relationship with Greece. She spoke of the hand of friendship and I welcome that. The test will be whether the Prime Minister of Turkey and Turkey itself extend that hand of friendship. Both Greece and Turkey are now involved with this Assembly, which presents us with great opportunities. I hope that their involvement will be more beneficial than some of the relations at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. I also hope that our friends from Greece and Turkey will use the opportunity of their membership of this organisation to work together on these crucial issues.

I am sure that we all support paragraph (iii) of the draft recommendation, which talks about preparing for the future. I would certainly welcome that. The recommendations contain six proposals and I fully support every one. They relate to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and are fair and realistic. I hope that the two major countries involved – Greece and Turkey – will now really co-operate. We have had discussions. This report contains much information about the problems in the Aegean. It really is time that our friends got together and resolved that problem.

The report outlines clearly and fairly issues that are of great importance in that part of the world. I really hope that we can look forward to something happening in the very near future to the benefit of all the communities. As the Rapporteur said, let us forget the past and build for the future, as other countries have successfully started to do. Cyprus can do the same, if both sides are willing.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cox.

I call Mr. Kastanidis.

Mr. KASTANIDIS (*Greece*). — Mr. Cucó has worked in a positive way and I congratulate him on his informative and interesting report. I shall give it my positive vote and keep my objections to myself.

I have two remarks to make. First, we cannot change international law and treaties. The Lausanne Treaty, which refers to citizens belonging to the minority in Greece, calls them Muslims and not Turks.

My second remark concerns paragraph (xii) of the draft recommendation. We cannot discuss the Greek economic counter-measures without taking into account the fact that a trial on that matter is pending before the European Court. I emphasise that the judge responsible has undertaken to make a proposal so that the court can shape an opinion and come to a decision. He has been clear and decisive in saying that Greece has acted absolutely legally in protecting its crucial national interests and its actions are in complete accordance with articles of the establishing treaty of the European Community. It is entirely possible that the European Court will adopt that view.

In conclusion, it is not correct to discuss the Greek economic counter-measures while expecting initiatives to be taken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and while a trial is pending before the European Court. Mr. Cucó should change paragraph (xii) of the draft recommendation and I shall find an opportunity to support an amendment I have tabled with my colleague Mr. Pavlidis.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. I now call Mr. Jeszenszky, the distinguished former Foreign Minister of Hungary.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Hungary, associate partner*). — We should look beyond the specific problem of minorities in Turkey and Greece. In considering how my colleagues from Western Europe would think when reading this excellent report, I wondered whether some of you would think that the Eastern Mediterranean would be too problematic and vast to tackle and that the issues are so complex that it would be better to leave them aside and consider them as being outside Europe. Although that attitude may linger in many people's minds, I am glad that it has not been adopted by the Assembly.

It is wise not only to think of the Eastern Mediterranean as the cradle of our civilisation but as a region where our traditional European values should prevail. Indeed, those values must prevail beyond the region that is sometimes called the near East and prevail also in the Caucasian and Balkan regions.

Fortunately, we do not have the same prejudices in Central Europe as we are witnessing in so many areas on the fringes of Europe. But we must think how to prevent those problems from emerging in Central Europe and deal with them in the Mediterranean. What emerges from the report is that the solutions exist. It makes specific proposals on principles and I shall reiterate some of those principles, which should be valid not only in Western Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean but throughout Europe. The principles include the notion of a secular state. Although religion should not interfere with politics, I remind members that nationalism, meaning the extremist version of it, is sometimes described as a religion. Extremist nationalism may lead to conflict, which we have unfortunately witnessed in the Eastern Mediterranean.

A concomitant principle is that most states in Eastern Europe and the fringes of Europe do not contain just one ethnic group and the solution, whether we are discussing Cyprus or the Caucasian region, is that each distinctive national group, whether it has a so-called mother nation or not, must be able to survive and maintain its culture and national identity. That idea should prevail in practical politics.

I do not propose that all states should be federal but when a state such as Switzerland has several communities, the federal solution or elements of it should be considered. Many Western European countries are becoming decentralised. While we are far from that in Central and Eastern Europe, in Hungary we have, fortunately, moved towards that.

I do not want to go on about those principles. The problem is not that we do not have enough good principles but that we do not have the means to implement them. We parliamentarians may be proud that in this and so many other reports we have proposed sane, good solutions but the question is how to implement them. Few people are willing to act as a judge and even fewer are willing to enforce those judgments. The solution is to urge our governments to comply with those sane recommendations and create a home base for them. The home base should be changed because parliamentarians and governments are more willing to accept the recommendations, but their home background is often lacking, so it is important to educate the people using the mass media.

As the famous thinker, the Earl of Bolingbroke said, history is a philosophy which teaches through examples. But examples in politics should also teach. I hope that examples along the lines proposed in the report, of a solution to the problems in the Eastern Mediterranean, will prevent new conflicts and tensions in other parts of Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. The final speaker is Mr. Korakas.

Mr. KORAKAS (*Greece*) (Translation). – Let me begin by saying that Mr. Cucó's report deals with a most sensitive area of our planet, the Mediterranean, the cradle of the great civilisations of the world and the arena where they developed and intermingled. It is still important in the world today. The report is very full and refers to much that I can agree with. On the other hand, many significant aspects are missing, even some I believe to be crucial to developments in the Mediterranean. Can we ignore the presence, around its coasts, of tens, or even hundreds, of foreign military installations, American or other, some of which contain nuclear weapons? It is the unanimous demand of the Mediterranean nations that these installations be dismantled, nuclear weapons evacuated and huge warships, many of them nuclear, prohibited from navigating this body of water.

If there is something that this report should be stressing, I believe it is the vital necessity for a commitment to make the Mediterranean a sea of peace and friendship among nations and, naturally, being members of parliament we all know that a commitment will not suffice and that concrete decisions are necessary.

Since I come from an island – my constituency is in fact very near Turkey – I would like to say something about these Greek-Turkish relations mentioned in the report. I believe they stem from abroad and are mainly artificial, designed to promote arms sales. It is common knowledge that, among NATO nations, Greece spends the largest percentage of GNP on armaments, with Turkey close behind. Tensions are fanned for such a climate serves the ends of the major powers helping them play the rôle of arbitrators and, possibly, overlords. They are used to deflect public opinion from real problems and interest it in events abroad, so as to oppress the working classes into submission and impose unpopular policies, all the while blaming the threat from without.

I shall not dwell on the Cyprus question. I shall only say here there has been invasion and military occupation; it is therefore imperative that Turkish troops be immediately withdrawn and replaced by United Nations forces. I shall leave it there, as Mr. Cox has been quite clear and has already covered this ground.

A few words now on the Kurdish question, about which much is said in the report. We are in fact being unfair to a whole nation, the Kurds, who have for many decades now been striving for the right to exist. It is unfair to be so sanctimonious about the activities of a particular Kurdish party or organisation, irrespective of whether we agree or not with their aims and means, and to

turn a blind eye to the fact that for decades, or rather centuries, these people have been persecuted and even hunted down by a government that insists they do not even exist on its territory. Yet they are not an obscure minority; they are in fact a second nation, whose home is that same land. Fifteen to twenty million in a total population of fifty to sixty million are not just a minority. So we must show some comprehension, when faced with their struggle and understand that a people, when driven to despair, may have no alternative but whatever comes to hand, whatever this may be. This does not mean, I repeat, that we have to condone the PKK's actions – but neither should we condemn them out of hand. What we are dealing with is full-scale war, with villages razed to the ground by the hundred, townships sacked and people persecuted. They must be given back their rights. And I think that Turkey's Prime Minister is wrong, when she claims that restoring human rights to the Kurds will not put an end to terrorism. I sincerely believe that if Turkey grants these rights and stands by them, it would then be right for us to condemn any terrorist group outright. But we should not make villains of the victims or vice versa.

A final word on Yugoslavia. The situation there has reached a climax and there is a real risk of the crisis overflowing into the Mediterranean area and Europe. But since Mr. Fassino's report is coming up next, I will rest my case for now.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The debate is closed.

### *8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day.

1. The Eastern Mediterranean (Resumed debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1465 and amendments).
2. The situation in former Yugoslavia (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1467 and amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Arsenis, Minister of Defence of Greece.
4. The situation in former Yugoslavia (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1467 and amendments).
5. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 – Opinion of the Council (Presentation of and



*The President (continued)*

debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 1462).

6. Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts, Documents 1441, 1470 and 1471).

7. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the

financial year 1995 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1463).

Are there any objections? ...

The orders of the day for the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.)*

## SEVENTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 21st June 1995

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. The Eastern Mediterranean (*Resumed debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1465 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Cucó (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (*Vice-Chairman*), Mr. Kastanidis, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Cucó, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Schloten, Mr. Cucó.
4. Address by Mr. Arsenis, Minister of Defence of Greece.  
*Replies by Mr. Arsenis to questions put by:* Lord Finsberg, Mr. López Henares, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Korakas, Mr. Ruzin (*Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, observer*).
5. Interpretation system of the Assembly (*Motions for orders with requests for urgent procedure, Docs. 1474 and 1475*).  
*Speaker:* The President.
6. The situation in former Yugoslavia (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1467 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Fassino (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Nasev (*Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, observer*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Ruzin (*Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, observer*), Mr. Davis, Sir Russell Johnston, Count Eltz (*Croatia, observer*), Mr. Korakas, Mr. Tusek (*Austria, observer*), Mr. Benvenuti, Mr. Philipov (*Bulgaria, associate partner*), Mr. Antretter, Mr. Fassino (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Puig (*Chairman*), Mr. Fassino, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Fassino, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Fassino, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Fassino, Mr. Benvenuti, Mr. Fassino, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Fassino, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Fassino.
7. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 – Opinion of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1462*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Rathbone (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Lord Mackie of Benshie.
8. Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts, Docs. 1441, 1470 and 1471*).  
*Speaker:* Mr. Rathbone (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
9. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1995 (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1463*).  
*Speaker:* Mr. Rathbone (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

### 1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

1. See page 51.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

### 3. The Eastern Mediterranean

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1465 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report tabled by Mr. Cucó on behalf of the Defence Committee, Document 1465, and vote on the draft recommendation and amendments.

Before I call the first speaker, I want to take this opportunity to welcome an old friend of many of us, Mr. Karsten Voigt, the President of the NATO Assembly. It is good to see him here.

*The President (continued)*

I am being told that there is no French translation.

*(Due to a breakdown in the interpretation system, the sitting was suspended at 3.07 p.m. and resumed at 3.45 p.m.)*

Ladies and gentlemen, I will not apologise to you, because what happened is too bad for that. It is inexcusable. The fullest inquiry will be made and I will have a very definite response. I understand that two motions have been tabled on this subject. I welcome them, because I well understand the frustration and anger of members.

I was in the early stages of welcoming Mr. Karsten Voigt. I apologise to him for the discourtesy that the Assembly has shown him. He has come here as President of the North Atlantic Assembly. I was going to say to you, Mr. Voigt – before I was interrupted because of the lack of interpretation services – that the North Atlantic Assembly has been a good friend of WEU in recent years, particularly while you were, first, Chairman of the Defence Committee and, since then, President.

We hold a number of joint meetings, to mutual advantage. We hope that we can develop some of the initiatives that have developed in recent months. You are very welcome, Mr. Voigt. I should like to call you to say a few words a little later in the proceedings, if we begin to catch up. Thank you very much.

First, we must wind up the debate. We will then consider the amendments.

I ask the Rapporteur, Mr. Cucó, whether he will be good enough to summarise the debate.

Mr. CUCÓ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it would be appropriate to begin with a phrase from the great sixteenth-century poet, Fray Luis de León, who started a well-known speech with the words “Yesterday we were saying”, because it seems as long ago as yesterday that we had this debate.

So, first, I would like to thank all the speakers, whether they have been complimentary, as in the great majority of cases, or even a little critical. It has been a calm debate, I think, much calmer than the atmosphere surrounding this report at one time outside the chamber.

Be that as it may, I would first like to thank both Mr. Cox and Mr. Jeszenszky, both of whom I feel made very pertinent comments on this situation. I would like to concentrate on an expression Mr. Jeszenszky used concerning the word “federation” and “federal state”, because I feel this is a very important issue. As you know, ladies and gentlemen, the word “federal” stems from the latin “fedus”, which means quite specifically “pact”,

and I am all in favour of pacts. I think that many difficult situations could be avoided, there would be less blood-letting, as we say, if we had more of a “pact culture”. Well, that is the origin of the word federal.

Then I would like make some comments to three of our Greek colleagues, Mr. Liapis, Mr. Kastinidis and Mr. Korakas, almost all of whom highlighted the same issues; on the one hand, the controversial state of the concept of minorities, a concept which has been discussed both here and in committee. I would like to say to my Greek colleagues and friends, with great respect, that I feel there is a need to revise the old concept of minorities originally contained in the Treaty of Lausanne.

The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 was a historic and very important treaty, but it has been in existence for many years and it is time parts of it were revised, in particular where it refers to minorities. As you are aware, the Treaty of Lausanne refers exclusively to religious minorities. In my view the issue of minorities as we understand it today covers much more than religious minorities. In Strasbourg recently we drew up a framework agreement for national minorities which has already been approved in some countries and ratified by their parliaments. My own parliament ratified it only a few weeks ago. I think this is a much more modern framework in which to approach the problem of national minorities than the old, and in my view obsolete, concept contained in the Treaty of Lausanne. It is because of this that in Greece we are still arguing about whether we are speaking of Turkish minorities or Muslim minorities. With regard to Turkey, this exclusive concept of a religious minority is what is preventing the Kurds, who are also Muslims, from being seen as a national minority, although they are in fact a national and not a religious minority. I invite all representatives to make an effort to modernise our political vocabulary, because if we keep the same concepts that we have had for seventy years, we will not make much progress.

Other speakers, including Mr. Liapis, Mr. Kastanidis and Mr. Korakas, have referred to the issue of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. I have one or two brief comments to make on this. I may have an opportunity to say more later, because there is an amendment relating to this, but for the moment I would like to make a suggestion.

I think that where relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are concerned, we also need to move forward, in the same way as with the issue of minorities. Yesterday in this chamber we were listening to its President, in a speech which I thought was balanced and pacific. Macedonia is situated at the very heart of the Balkans and is an especially sensitive area. The stability of the whole region will be dependent on the stability of Macedonia on a very important flank

*Mr. Cucó (continued)*

of European security policy. I think that anything which helps to stabilise the region is good and we should support it. This is why I think the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ought to be a member of the OSCE and ought to aim for maximum economic development. It is in a very serious economic condition. The information note about Macedonia provided by the parliamentary Assembly means that I need not enter into details. It has the highest unemployment rate of any country in Europe. It is in a frankly worrying state of under-development. Its army threatens no one; it has only ten thousand men. Where is the danger in Macedonia? The danger is that we might destabilise a region of such strategic importance in the Balkans. I therefore think we have a duty to prevent anything which could contribute to destabilising this area.

This is why I am now appealing for a serious effort to reflect on this issue; I know our Greek friends have already made a start, and I know it is not something which can be done overnight, but I would like to see the new development in relations between Athens and Skopje continue, progress even further, and inspire others to seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to any problems which might exist.

That is all, Mr. President, I have no further comments, although I am reserving some time to respond to the two amendments which I imagine you will put before us for discussion later.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cucó, for an admirable summing-up. I am only sorry that you had such a long delay. Does the Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee want to say a few words?

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*). – Thank you, Mr. President. I shall be brief.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

(Translation). – Mr. President, there is no need to repeat everything Mr. Cucó wrote in his report and said this morning. I want to emphasise that there was a very lively discussion on this report in the Defence Committee. After making a few minor changes, the committee adopted the report unanimously. That shows that Mr. Cucó has produced a very balanced report. When he introduced the report this morning, you too, Mr. President, heard how well-informed he is on the subject. That also explains why he was able to submit this draft recommendation to the Assembly in its present form.

I entirely agree with what Mr. Cucó said this morning, namely that certain matters need to be resolved if there is to be security in the Eastern Mediterranean area and therefore in Europe as well.

The most important part of the recommendation is paragraph 2, which states that Greece and Tur-

key should try to settle their differences. These countries must realise, with a view to the future and because they are both members of alliances, that their continuing dispute affects both their own security and that of Europe. This dispute must therefore be resolved. This will benefit not only our security but also the atmosphere in Western European Union and the Council of Europe. Mr. President, you know from years of experience that the tensions between these two countries have also led to tensions in Western European Union and in the Council of Europe. In terms of the atmosphere in these international organisations, it would be a great advantage and a blessing if we could finally resolve them.

I therefore strongly commend all Mr. Cucó's recommendations, including the ones on this issue, to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Two amendments have been tabled and I propose to take them in the order in which they relate to the text of the report. I invite Mr. Pavlidis or Mr. Kastanidis to move Amendment 2. It reads:

2. Leave out paragraph (*xii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“ Concerned that the continuation of the crisis existing between Greece and FYROM does not contribute positively to the development of stability in the region, while hoping the two countries will start immediate negotiations in the framework of the United Nations; ”

Mr. KASTANIDIS (*Greece*) (Translation). – It is precisely because we totally agree with President Gligorov that FYROM must live and prosper and that steps must be taken towards a peaceful solution of our differences. The United Nations Secretary-General has taken the appropriate initiatives, already welcomed by Greece, for all the above and I have to say we support the amendment to paragraph (*xii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation that we signed together with our colleague Mr. Pavlidis. This amendment specifically mentions the peaceful resolution of international problems. Please allow me to read it out: “ Concerned that the continuation of the crisis existing between Greece and FYROM does not contribute positively to the development of stability in the region, while hoping the two countries will start immediately negotiations, in the framework of the United Nations ”.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anyone wish to oppose Amendment 2?

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I oppose the amendment for a variety of reasons. It will put the victim and the aggressor on the same basis, which cannot be acceptable. I remind the Assembly that the European Union and the Council of Europe, and now WEU, are asking Greece to stop

*Lord Finsberg (continued)*

the immoral and disgraceful blockade of Macedonia. Yesterday, we heard from the President of Macedonia how much that blockade is costing his country. In the interests of democracy, it ought to be lifted as soon as possible.

Paragraph (xi) of Mr. Cucó's excellent document states: "Noting that the FYROM has already amended its constitution in order to satisfy European Union conditions for its recognition as a state and that Greece acknowledges that the FYROM does not constitute a military threat". Why does not Greece withdraw its blockade? It is perfectly clear the FYROM and Macedonia have done all that can be expected of them. I hope that we will not accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Rapporteur wish to comment?

Mr. CUCÓ (*Spain*) (Translation). – I must say I appreciate the spirit of the amendment tabled by Mr. Kastanidis and Mr. Pavlidis which I see as progress compared with the previous situation, because I detect in the amendment a spirit of negotiation; this is a positive step and I would like to thank them for it. In any event, as I see it such negotiations are practically impossible to conduct under present conditions. I think the embargo ought to be lifted because this would be a confidence-building measure and it is my wish therefore that the text of paragraph (xii) of the preamble to my draft recommendation be retained in its present form.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman of the committee wish to comment?

Mrs. BAARVELD SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*). – As the Defence Committee had to discuss the recommendation for urgent procedure this morning, it did not have time to consider Amendments 1 and 2, so the committee has no opinion on them.

The PRESIDENT. – In the circumstances, that is totally understandable.

I now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is negated.*

I invite Mr. Schloten to propose Amendment 1, which reads:

1. Leave out paragraph (xx) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Aware that the absence of political solution in the 'security zone' in northern Iraq has created a security vacuum in that region which is encouraging external political movements and neighbouring countries to settle their differences;"

I call Mr. Schloten to move the amendment.

Mr. SCHLOTEN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I just want to table one amendment. The existing text contains a statement. We are concerned to try to resolve the problem. That is why we say, we are aware of the fact that a political solution must be found in this area. Following the events that have occurred in this security zone, we do not take the view that there has been political chaos there but we believe that the PKK was responsible for terrorism in that zone. We know the result: invasion by Turkish troops. We are, therefore, convinced that a security vacuum must not continue to exist there. That is why we have tabled this amendment to the effect that this security vacuum must be removed, because it actually tempts countries and groups to settle their differences there. This amendment is aimed at clarification.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anyone wish to oppose Amendment 1? ...

If not, does the Rapporteur wish to comment?

Mr. CUCÓ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. Schloten's amendment does not differ substantially from my own text, but I think it is more clearly expressed. Consequently, I have no objection to it.

The PRESIDENT. – I appreciate that the committee was unable to discuss that amendment but presumably it concurs.

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation, as amended.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation, as amended, is adopted unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

Congratulations are due to Mr. Cucó and to the committee on their excellent and comprehensive report.

<sup>1</sup> See page 53.

**4. Address by Mr. Arsenis,  
Minister of Defence of Greece**

The PRESIDENT. – Ladies and gentlemen, on your behalf I welcome the Greek Minister of Defence, Mr. Arsenis. I must apologise to him unreservedly for the fact that an unforgivable internal administrative defect has kept him waiting so long. We are sorry about that. We usually treat our visitors far more graciously. We have kept you waiting in your hotel room like some heavyweight boxer waiting to be summoned to the ring. I know that you are a seasoned politician and that you will not hold it against us.

Mr. Arsenis is a politician of considerable repute in his own country. He is an economist and when I was talking to him earlier I said that one of the problems in politics is that doctors do not make the best ministers of health. He countered immediately saying, "No, and nor do economists make the best ministers of finance." He came to defence as someone who had not been connected with it. But, with respect, he has mastered his subject extremely well and is well-known in European circles as one of the prominent and important defence ministers.

It is particularly appropriate that Mr. Arsenis should be here today because in the past two days, as we all know, Greece has acceded to WEU. We welcome you, Sir, as we welcomed the delegation from your parliament. Like all our countries you have your difficulties and problems but you have great responsibilities in the scheme of things, not only through NATO and the other European organisations but as an active member of WEU. You are therefore most welcome here. You kindly agreed to answer questions afterwards. Will you come to the tribune to give us your address?

Mr. ARSENIS (*Minister of Defence of Greece*). – Thank you very much for your welcoming remarks. Modern technology and uncertainty go together and we have to live with both. Mr. President and distinguished members of the parliamentary Assembly, it is a great honour for me to address this Assembly, which is the only European parliamentary body with treaty powers in security and defence matters.

Recently, the Assembly has widened its areas of responsibility to all major issues relating to security and defence. The Maastricht Treaty and the decisions on CFSP mean that the Assembly must assert its rightful place within the new structures of Europe. Thus it is necessary to consider the reforms that will be needed to enable the Assembly to play its full part as the parliamentary component of the European defence system. At the same time, we must consider improvements in the quality of the relationship between the Assembly and the Council.

Since this is the first time that I address the Assembly since my country's accession to WEU as a full member I wish to spell out some ideas as a contribution to the dialogue about the major tasks before us, namely, the establishment of a European defence and security policy. First I shall refer to European security and defence issues and then I will turn to Europe's security in relation to the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Finally, I will say a few words about Europe's security and eastward expansion.

A European defence policy and, even more so, a European defence, is dependent on the achievement of a European security policy based on a joint perception of risks and threats to European security, and a joint concept of the ways in which this security should be guaranteed, including institutional issues.

Public debate on methods for reaching agreement on a common concept for organising European security involve both the basic substance of security policy and fundamental institutional questions.

On matters of substance, three main concepts present themselves. The first is the concept of a collective security system according to which crisis-management and prevention are based on rules of co-operation between all the participants in the system. The second approach is to ensure security by defensive alliances such as WEU and NATO, while the third suggests security through integration of a group of states, as proposed in the case of the European Union. In practice, these three concepts may be complementary rather than competing in the evolutionary process that we shall follow by necessity.

I am inclined to believe that we should take the same pragmatic and evolutionary approach to institutional issues. Indeed, it would seem wise to deal with the new problems as well as Europe's new responsibilities in a strategic environment through appropriate evolution of the institutions that served us so well in the past. Both the expansion of co-operation between NATO and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe within the framework of the partnership for peace, as well as the co-operation of WEU with the same countries as associate partners or observers, demonstrate our collective will to proceed firmly and in a pragmatic manner.

We all share the common goal of a politically stable and prosperous Europe. It is, indeed, European integration that will reinforce solidarity on the basis of common principles and goals. In this context, let me stress that solidarity will be real and effective, if and only if, both execution of duties as well as the assertion of rights are based on the principle of equality. With this in mind, we welcome the positive results of the conference on

*Mr. Arsenis (continued)*

the stability pact that took place several weeks ago in Paris.

The determination of WEU's relations with NATO is the key to the most effective promotion of our common goal, which is the security of the European continent.

After Maastricht, WEU is not simply the European pillar of NATO but also the defence component of the European Union.

I am sure that we all wish the defence policy of Europe to be determined within the framework of the European Union. We believe that this approach is consistent with our NATO obligations. However, until this is done, we recognise the importance of WEU in the promotion of European defence interests, whether it acts on its own or in the context of decisions by the EU.

The PRESIDENT. — I have been informed that there is no translation into French. In those circumstances there is no point in proceeding if people cannot hear. I must apologise, Minister and ask you to suspend your address.

*(The sitting was suspended at 4.15 p.m. and resumed at 4.30 p.m.)*

The PRESIDENT. — Minister, may I ask you to resume your address? I am told that the system is working again. If there is another break, I shall suspend the sitting for the rest of the day. I do not believe that people should be put to the intolerable trouble of going in and out of the Chamber all the time. That is not fair to anyone, most of all to our speaker, Mr. Arsenis. Please come to the podium, Mr. Arsenis.

Mr. ARSENIS (*Minister of Defence of Greece*). — Before the interruption, I was referring to the new architecture of the European security system. I was saying that we all agree that Europe's defence policy should be determined within the framework of the European Union. We believe that that approach is consistent with our NATO obligations. However, until that is done, we recognise the importance of WEU in the promotion of European defence interests, whether it acts on its own or in the context of decisions by the European Union.

To be sure, WEU does not have the military infrastructure to operate effectively. In cases where Europeans would like to undertake military operations in which the alliance does not wish to take part, Europeans have to use NATO's infrastructure. In this context, Greece supports the development of the combined joint task forces concept and awaits the completion of the studies regarding its implementation. The establishment of the CJTF could provide NATO with mobile, multinational headquarters, which could be deta-

ched from existing command structures for operation under WEU. This approach would help to avoid, in the near future, the development of separate, wholly European, military structures.

The rôle of WEU should enable it to act as a more effective European pillar of NATO in the alliance. The strengthening of WEU crucially depends on NATO's strength which, in turn, guarantees Europe's stability with transatlantic links.

Of course, the maintenance of transatlantic ties should not be a deterrent to WEU in developing its own operational forces. This is expressed in the Treaty on European Union, which demands WEU "to elaborate and implement decisions and action of the Union which have defence implications". Without unnecessary duplication of systems that exist in NATO, WEU could strengthen its capacity to organise and mount operations and to develop intelligence-handling capabilities.

Regarding the operational rôle of WEU, we must emphasise the need for transparency and complementarity with the alliance's structures. I believe that both organisations would benefit from a balanced sharing of risks, responsibilities and burdens.

In this context, the decision by the alliance's summit on 10th January 1994 to make available to WEU its collective assets for operations undertaken by WEU on the basis of consultations with NATO was crucial in strengthening the operational rôle of WEU.

The development of a common defence policy within WEU should be embedded institutionally within the overall framework of European and transatlantic operations. This policy should lead to an increased involvement of Europe in collective security and to a new sharing of responsibilities, which will be harmonised with NATO's defence policy. Transatlantic and European defence should thus not be regarded as separate issues; they should instead be developed jointly and in a co-ordinated fashion.

In NATO, national armies are grouped under a joint command structure. On the other hand, a European army in the future at least could become truly supranational. Thus, a European army has a rôle to play, next to the alliance, as a permanent feature of security in our continent as well as an important vehicle underpinning European integration. An important decision of WEU towards this direction is the development of multinational structures, starting with the creation of the European corps and the existing prospect for the creation of additional ones.

Let me turn briefly to another key issue on European security, the Mediterranean and the Balkans. The internal stability that characterises the European Union countries is in sharp contrast with the situation witnessed in the periphery of

*Mr. Arsenis (continued)*

Europe, especially in countries in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans. In many of those countries, the population explosion, the inability of governments to adjust their economies to world markets and Islamic fundamentalism have led to internal instability which has shown a tendency to export itself to neighbouring countries.

Those new sources of instability create an atmosphere of uncertainty along the external frontiers of the European Union. It is worth noting that, more and more, the view is gaining ground that the threat to Europe comes no longer from the East but from the South. We in Greece are extremely sensitive to those prospects because we would be among the first to be confronted with the consequences of such developments. It is for that reason that Greece supports the evolution of a common European defence policy that will tackle those complex issues.

The current crisis of Yugoslavia could have been avoided if Europe had had in place a co-ordinated policy to deal in a timely and effective way with those new sources of instability. In the event, we are obliged to deal with the effects of the crisis and to make an effort to contain it. In that respect, WEU is engaged in the enforcement of the sanctions régime imposed by the United Nations, both in the mission on the Danube and through its participation, together with NATO, in operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic. WEU is also committed to the EU administration of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina where, at the request of the EU, it has deployed a police element with the objective of establishing a united police force of Mostar. Greece is participating, as you know, in that police contingent.

Regarding the Mediterranean, the dialogue in progress between WEU and Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Egypt underlines the pivotal importance that WEU attaches to the stability and security in the Mediterranean as an issue of concern for European security. The EU is working on a renewed and expanded policy towards the region as a whole. It includes setting out guidelines for co-operation between countries in the area into the next century, as well as a permanent dialogue on all questions of common interest. In that context, a Euro-Mediterranean conference will be held next November in Barcelona. Furthermore, the EU plays a significant rôle in the Middle East peace process, which has a profound impact on the political situation in the Mediterranean basin as a whole. At this point I would like to say that Greece is willing to participate in EUROMARFOR, joining France, Italy, Spain and Portugal.

The maintenance of political, economic and military stability in the region, as well as a free

flow of traffic through and into the Mediterranean, remain priority objectives. The progress made within the framework of the Arab-Israeli peace process has reduced security risks in the area. The countries involved do not present a direct military threat to Europe.

The beginning of a dialogue with Cyprus and Malta expands the range of WEU coverage in the Eastern Mediterranean and it is a very positive element for the promotion of stability in the area. With world attention focused on the current Bosnian crisis, little is known of the impressive efforts by countries in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean to develop networks of defence agreements.

Indeed, what we are experiencing today is the rapid development of bilateral, as well as multilateral, defence and co-operation agreements between countries that are members of NATO and countries that used to be members of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, in the Balkan area we are currently experiencing the development of a series of agreements between the countries that participate in the partnership for peace. Greece, for example, has recently undertaken important new initiatives towards consolidating its network of defence and co-operation agreements with other Balkan countries. Therefore, we have signed defence agreements with Bulgaria and Romania and we have established programmes of military co-operation with those countries within the context of the partnership for peace.

One of the outcomes of those initiatives was a joint military exercise, which took place in Greece in May. It was the first time that troops from Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and the United States of America, as well as observers from NATO countries, had participated in joint military exercises. In addition, Greece has also undertaken similar initiatives with other countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. In that context, defence co-operation agreements have been signed with Egypt and, recently, with Israel, while common military exercises with each of those countries will take place in the near future. Yesterday, we had consultations with Syria on defence matters.

I refer to those developments to emphasise the emerging tendencies of neighbouring countries to consolidate defence agreements in order to deal more effectively with the new problems emanating from the post-cold-war era. The result of such agreements will, I am sure, be the gradual creation of open partnership sub-systems of regional collective security in both the Balkan area and the Eastern Mediterranean.

As I mentioned earlier, Greece maintains excellent relations with Bulgaria, Romania, the leadership of the Serbs and Albania. With regard to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, we have



*Mr. Arsenis (continued)*

repeatedly stated that we stand ready to help that state gain its viability, provided that certain conditions, which are required for good-neighbourly relations, are met. We sincerely hope that the political leadership of that state will respond positively to the efforts of the United Nations mediator so that the process of normalisation of relations can begin.

We are closely following the adverse developments in Turkey. We are concerned that elements of internal instability may spill over into the area of the EU. We have made a gesture to Turkey by lifting our objection to her joining the customs union in the expectation that that might help her to come closer to Europe. However, Turkey must understand that that process entails a series of obligations, including adherence to the rules of international law and treaties and respect for human rights.

Turkey's threat to declare war against a country that may make use of a provision in an international treaty – the Law of the Sea – constitutes an act that violates elementary rules of international law and order, especially Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter on the use or threat of violence. It also negates Turkey's wish to come closer to Europe. Greece reserves to herself the right to put in effect the twelve-mile limit when she deems fit, in accordance with the Law of the Sea. Anyway, in peace time no obstruction can result from that either to warship or to merchantmen – in the former case I refer to the principle of innocent passage.

On the Yugoslav crisis itself, we believe that a resolution is not as far off as it may appear at the moment. However, any lasting solution cannot but involve all sides. We have helped to keep open communications with Belgrade, which cannot but be a central partner in any lasting peace. That is now widely recognised, so the contact group is concentrating its efforts on Belgrade's participation in the prospective plans to end the crisis.

As a country directly neighbouring former Yugoslavia, Greece is vitally concerned in a stable and lasting resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and is prepared to offer her good offices in any way that may constructively promote that objective. We have been active in that spirit already. Most recently, we undertook a mediation effort in Palestine that helped to secure the release of the United Nations peace-keepers who were taken captive by Bosnian Serb forces at the end of May. We are fully prepared to play a larger mediation rôle, should that be useful in contributing to the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.

Greece is in favour of the presence of UNPROFOR and believes that the rapid reaction force

could contribute to peace-keeping efforts, provided that it remains within the United Nations mandate and under United Nations command. I believe that the WEU Assembly could also send representatives to acquire a first-hand view of the situation. That would certainly promote mutual understanding and political dialogue, thus increasing the prospects for a peace settlement in the area.

Finally, I come to an issue that looms large, but is rarely discussed – namely, Russia and Europe's eastward security. I want to refer to some possible developments that might disturb European security in the foreseeable future.

The first is the renewal of antagonisms between Russia and the West over influence and control in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia, at the moment, is co-operative towards the West, in spite of some friction over the issue of NATO enlargement. Russia's first priority undoubtedly is domestic restructuring – a task so gigantic as to absorb all efforts of the leadership and people. But there is no doubt that Russia would wish to maintain its present position in world affairs and not to slide further. It is also conceivable that under a different leadership foreign assertiveness will be pursued more aggressively than at present. That would be profoundly destabilising for the large areas that separate Russia from the member states of NATO and the European Union. Efforts must be undertaken to convince Russia that its power status is secure, and that the eastward expansion of Europe's security arrangements would not be taken without dialogue with it. Russia is also an active participant in the Middle East peace process. It has an even larger rôle to play in the Caucasus and central Asia. The West would be wise to encourage Russian influence in those areas. Russia has the potential capability to act as a great stabilising force in the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union. It should be encouraged to exert regional leadership there, in a constructive way.

The second potential source of instability is some spread of Yugoslavia-style collapses. So far, warfare and ethnic conflict have broken out only in parts of former Yugoslavia and the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union. Other states in Central and Eastern Europe also have problems giving rise to political friction. The possibility of new outbreaks of ethnic violence cannot be discounted. Our efforts towards European stability should focus as much on crisis-prevention as on crisis-management and crisis-resolution. We must create structural conditions that will promote stability and deter behaviour that results in the escalation of violence. The United Nations and the OSCE are important frameworks for co-operation and consultation across Europe. They have also served to mitigate the human tragedy of the cur-

*Mr. Arsenis (continued)*

rent crisis in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, but in themselves, those two organisations are not sufficient to guarantee European security.

EU enlargement policy towards Central Europe is a significant stabilising factor. For the six Central and East European countries that have signed Europe agreements – the Visegrad four, plus Romania and Bulgaria – the prospect of accession to the European Union acts as a powerful inducement for democratic and free market reform. The alliance's enlargement should proceed in a way that avoids the creation of a variable geometry in Europe at security level. Thus, the future enlargement of NATO must not take place in the context of a limited geographic zone but must also consider the geopolitical criteria in conjunction with the particular country concerned and the broader political implications for the whole region. Within that framework, I reiterate the importance that we attach to a balanced approach with regard to the future enlargement of the alliance, including the enlargement towards the south. In parallel with the process of enlargement of the European Union, the balanced expansion of the alliance will promote the completion of community values and the extension and overall strengthening of European stability and security.

In particular, NATO enlargement with Romania and Bulgaria – and in the long run, prospectively also with other eligible Balkan states – demonstrates our engagement in Balkan stability. We hope to work more closely with our partners in the European Union and the alliance to enhance the stability and the western orientation of Balkan states that have remained outside the Yugoslav compound of conflict.

Only one year and a few months remain before the intergovernmental conference of 1996 and we must all work hard within the international organisations that deal with European defence to define the best and most effective ways to guarantee the security of the European continent. Although the balance of terror does not exist any more on our planet, new challenges have emerged arising from instabilities, conflicts in the periphery, demographic explosion and religious fundamentalism. Those new security problems should affect our way of thinking. I am sure that with a high sense of responsibility for the importance of that task, we will all strive together to develop a successful common European defence policy.

Let us not forget that we are not going to build a brand new security system from scratch. We must adapt existing institutions to the new political European environment. Let us do that step by step, to avoid tensions, and be realistic. Above all,

the European construction is an evolutionary process that should be done in an open way and reflect changes as they happen in Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your address and for being so patient. There are a number of questions.

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I thank the Minister of Defence for his interesting speech, and I offer on behalf of all members of the Assembly deepest sympathy in respect of the terrible earthquakes that have occurred in Greece.

I would like to ask Mr. Arsenis a question about NATO. In view of the state of the Greek economy, does he believe that he can afford to spend as much on Greek defence forces as he thinks should be spent to keep up commitments to NATO?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ARSENIS (*Minister of Defence of Greece*). – Thank you, Lord Finsberg, for your kind remarks and for your reference to earthquake victims in Greece.

The Greek economy is improving dramatically. We have achieved single-digit inflation for the first time in twenty-five years, and we expect inflation to fall to 7% by the end of the year. Fiscal deficits are declining and the Greek economy is growing. In the context of NATO and of the security situation in the area, we would have liked security considerations to be more favourable – so that less defence expenditure was required. Nevertheless, we have managed to improve our defence capability with less as a result of the ratio of defence expenditure to gross domestic product, which has fallen from a figure of 7% in the past to 4.5% to 5%. That is my difficult task, but Greece can manage by modernising her armed forces to improve defence capability with less money.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I call Mr. López Henares.

Mr. LÓPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Minister, let me begin by offering you my congratulations on two matters; first, on this being the first time that a Greek Minister of Defence has been able to speak as a full member. We are all delighted to see that a country as important as Greece to European culture is now a full member of our organisation.

Secondly, I would also like to compliment you on your splendid speech in which you introduced so many ideas. Mr. President, my question is this: the Minister made repeated reference to the need for a joint reaction to many of the conflicts which arise. He also referred to the need for the rapid development of multinational solutions. The question is this: many members of this Assembly think that we should try to find a multinational

*Mr. López Henares (continued)*

model for joint action so that, as with the European Corps initiative, we could have at our disposal forces to which all member states would contribute; such forces cannot be improvised, but must be organised in advance, and would be an expression of our European defence identity. Of course, this does not imply a loss of national sovereignty, a matter to which we are very sensitive, but, I repeat, would mean making a reaction available at multinational level with joint forces adequately prepared for this purpose. I reiterate, the model already exists in the preliminary organisation of the European Corps. The real question is this: would Greece, which I see has decided to take part in EUROMARFOR, also be prepared to participate in a corps of this nature, if one were organised, to which human, financial and material resources will be contributed in proportion, of course, to the financial means of each country?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ARSENIS (*Minister of Defence of Greece*). – This is one of the most difficult tasks ahead of us. As I said in my statement let us start with where we want to end up. We have a vision of European political union and in the long run, we should end up with a supranational European army. We are not there yet. We have a long way to go and we must evolve in that direction pragmatically, step by step. The European Corps is one such step. I propose movements of that type in the context and spirit of open partnership if you want defence arrangements within WEU to be à la carte. All the Mediterranean countries are concerned about security arrangements – Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece – and we have a convergence of views about security issues in that area. It would follow, therefore, that it would be much easier to get together and to provide the nucleus of a combined task force so that those countries share financial resources and troops to meet the common objective. That is the challenge before us. I dare say that, if we start pragmatically with the other countries on a voluntary basis and in an open partnership, we will reach our financial objective in a few years. Other countries outside WEU have started such open partnerships and à la carte defence arrangements, working closely with us on specific defence issues. If we share common objectives and appreciate that we have the same needs, we will find our way through. In the long run, I am optimistic.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. The next questioner is Mr. Peter Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Our guest was kind enough to refer to the potential problem in the Aegean and to the Law of the Sea. He may care to comment on the fact that the Law of the Sea was initially designed to prevent conflict, dif-

ficulty and problems, rather than to give rise to them. Whatever the rights or wrongs of the issue, would it not be in the interests of the international community in general and the alliance in particular if we had more discussions to resolve the problem? One accepts that Turkey may have greatly overreacted to the proposal, but do you accept that there has to be a peaceful and, one hopes, cordial and co-operative development to resolve a potential problem that could add strain to our alliance and to arrangements in Europe, which would best be avoided?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ARSENIS (*Minister of Defence of Greece*). – I agree that Turkey overreacted and in so doing moved against the climate of our times and the elementary rules of international law and order – I referred to some of them. The twelve-mile limit that is described in the Law of the Sea Treaty is a stipulation that all countries that signed the treaty accepted – I remind the Assembly that all WEU and European Union countries have signed that treaty. In the long discussions that preceded the signing of the treaty, it was felt that the twelve-mile limit would minimise frictions among countries, rather than maximise them. There is a myth about the limit. I read carefully the statement by the Prime Minister of Turkey yesterday. The interesting thing is that adherence to the Law of the Sea improves mobility in the seas and makes the passage of warships and merchant ships easier than under the previous régime. The twelve-mile limit does not prevent a country from crossing national waters because there is a safe passage stipulation. So Turkey overreacted and I agree that it should reconsider its stance because it is unacceptable to Greece and to all the other signatories to the Law of the Sea Treaty.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Mr. Korakas is the next questioner.

Mr. KORAKAS (*Greece*) (Translation). – May I thank you, Minister, for your interesting address and ask you a question about our region, the Balkans.

In the debates here and in other bodies, the question increasingly arises of the need for a WEU strike force, increased WEU operational capabilities and, above all, humanitarian action in former Yugoslavia.

In view of the commitment undertaken by Greece three years ago at the meeting of the four political party leaders with the President of the Greek Republic, when Greece stated that it was opposed to such intervention in former Yugoslavia since it considered that this type of action was unlikely to contribute to finding a viable peace settlement in the interests of the peoples of former Yugoslavia and the region, and in view of recent declarations by the Greek Government, I should like to know

*Mr. Korakas (continued)*

your opinion on the attitude that Greece would adopt in the event of such action. Would Greece contribute to the forces carrying it out?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ARSENIS (*Minister of Defence of Greece*). – I think that there has been a misunderstanding and we must choose the terms that we use carefully. All member states of WEU, the European Union and NATO have agreed that the problem in ex-Yugoslavia in general and Bosnia in particular should be solved through diplomatic initiatives and political negotiations. We all agree that military intervention in ex-Yugoslavia would be a catastrophe for all. The question that arises is: what is the rôle of peace-keeping – not peace-making – forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina? It is generally agreed that UNPROFOR should stay there because it performs a useful peace-keeping rôle in the context of decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council.

Greece is right to say that it will not participate in UNPROFOR, not because we object to its rôle but because we believe that countries that are close to the conflict area should not send troops as peace-keeping forces. We are of course prepared to participate in United Nations forces outside the broader area, as we have done in the case of Somalia.

A problem that has arisen recently is the creation of rapid reaction forces, not to act as an independent power in Bosnia but simply to underpin the peace-keeping operations of UNPROFOR. As I said in my statement, Greece is in favour of sending rapid reaction forces to Bosnia only if they operate under the United Nations mandate and command to protect UNPROFOR's peace-keeping but not peace-enforcement operations. I hope that that has clarified the question that was raised.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I now call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*). – My question was along the lines of Mr. Hardy's question, which the Minister has already answered. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – I am much obliged to you. The final question is from Mr. Nano Ruzin.

Mr. RUZIN (*Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, observer*) (Translation). – May I first congratulate you, Minister, on Greece's accession to this distinguished organisation, WEU, and also on your address to us.

May I also express my deep sympathy with your country on the disaster caused by the earthquake. I come from a town where, more than thirty years ago, an earthquake caused over two thousand

deaths. At the time, my town received moving expressions of fellowship from all over the world. If there were no disagreement between our two countries, we would no doubt see how strong solidarity between neighbours can be in the face of such disasters.

The Greek blockade of Macedonia, which is continuing, is paradoxically more rigid than that applied by the United Nations to the former Yugoslav countries. In addition, Greece uses its veto in debates concerning Greece in different international organisations. Do you not think, Minister, that this blockade and these vetoes could destabilise the area of Macedonia?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ARSENIS (*Minister of Defence of Greece*). – I thank you for your kind words about the victims of the earthquake in Greece. Our two countries face a common challenge from nature and nothing would make me happier in the future than to work together to meet that challenge.

Let me turn your question round and ask you, if the embargo is of such major concern to you, why your country does not take the natural step of responding to the suggestions made by the United Nations moderator and meet the items on the agenda, discuss the issues and meet some of the minimum requirements, which will open the road to normalising relations between our two countries?

We did not impose the embargo for pleasure. We did not want to do that. First, let me emphasise that the embargo does not affect goods and services that affect the civilian population. It must be known that, basically, the embargo is restricted to energy and petroleum products. Secondly, the embargo was, unfortunately, a last resort. It is a political instrument to bring countries to the negotiating table. As you know, the European Court has so far agreed that it is a legitimate political weapon. We certainly do not want to prolong this story. You know very well what the issues are. Let us hope that your leadership will consider the issues and be prepared to sit down and discuss them, which will result in, among other things, lifting the embargo.

As I said in my statement, Greece is – I say this frankly – one of the few countries in the area with an interest in supporting and maintaining the viability of your country. So please reconsider your position and consider Greece as a close friend and ally. In order to do so, you must respect our history, our frontiers and our people.

The PRESIDENT. – It only remains for me to thank you, Mr. Arsenis, very much – this is not an empty gesture – for coming here and addressing us so interestingly and for your courtesy, forbearance and patience in view of everything that has happened.

*The President (continued)*

We are all well-travelled people here. We go around the world, particularly Europe, but no one travels more than ministers, as I know from my country, and we know what an enormous strain it is and how schedules need to be kept. Yesterday you were in Syria talking to the president of that country and today you have been here sampling the modern technology of the WEU Assembly in Paris. We are extremely pleased that you have been able to come because of the accession of Greece. We wish you well and I am sure that we shall see you again in the future. We thank you for your speech and for answering questions so well.

May I take this opportunity to welcome the President of the European Parliament, Mr. Klaus Hänsch, who has just joined us. As I said in my opening speech on Monday, there have been a number of misunderstandings between our institutions in the past. But I hope, Sir, that your presence here today marks a new beginning and I look forward to discussions that we shall have shortly. You are most welcome here.

**5. Interpretation system of the Assembly**

*(Motions for orders with requests for urgent procedure, Docs. 1474 and 1475)*

The PRESIDENT. — I have received from Lord Finsberg and others a motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure on the state of the Assembly's interpretation and microphone system and from Mr. Hardy and others a motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure on the failure of the Assembly's interpretation system.

I am advised that both requests are in order. They will be decided by the Assembly at the start of tomorrow's sitting.

**6. The situation in former Yugoslavia**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1467 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on the situation in former Yugoslavia and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1467 and amendments.

I ask Mr. Fassino to be good enough to come to the tribune.

Mr. FASSINO *(Italy)* (Translation). — I should like to begin by extending my greetings to the President of the European Parliament.

In the light of the tragic and bloody events in former Yugoslavia over the last four years and of

what is happening now every day, it is a very complex and difficult task to introduce the report on the situation in that country.

Over the last few weeks, the war has flared up again on all fronts; during the last few weeks since the breakdown of the truce we have witnessed many terrible events; I am thinking of the Croatian offensive in Slavonia, the massacre at Tuzla, the taking hostage of blue berets and the resumption of fighting around Sarajevo. It is the universal view that we are back in a situation of full-scale war and in my opinion what is happening confirms something which we recognised during earlier stages of this tragedy; all the belligerents are betting much more on a military than on a political solution. Of course, there are varying degrees of responsibility and the international community has quite rightly been severe in its denunciation of the Serbs, which I reiterate here. More generally, I think that what must be noted is that all the parties involved in the fighting find it difficult to have any real belief in negotiations. Rather I have the impression that they all look upon negotiations as a means of confirming what has been won by arms on the ground and not a way of really arriving at a peace agreement.

I start by making these points, because I believe that we must confirm here the statement made a short time ago by the Greek Minister of Defence to the effect that there is no military solution; if there is any solution it can only be political.

To progress towards such a solution we must concentrate our action on two priorities, the first being to secure a halt to the fighting. If the war continues on all fronts as is now the case, it is very difficult to imagine that the opposing parties will sit down with any credibility around a negotiating table. The minimum condition for a resumption of negotiations is a cease-fire and a halt to the fighting.

The second priority is the creation of conditions for a resumption of negotiations so that they do not meet the same fate as earlier rounds which have failed to produce results.

In order to achieve this dual objective, the international community must act with greater cohesion. I do not think that I am being unfair or ungenerous in arguing that the lack of cohesion which has frequently characterised that community's action, has worked in favour of those in the theatre of war who did not believe in negotiations and gambled more on arms.

Like all of us I am well aware that peace is primarily an internal matter; if the belligerents do not believe that they must accept peace it is hardly likely that peace can be imposed from outside. It is also true, however, that the international context in which fighting is taking place and the ability of the international community to act with determi-

*Mr. Fassino (continued)*

nation and be heard as a single voice can be significant and decisive factors in persuading the warring countries to call a halt.

In recent years, the international community has too often found it difficult to speak with a single voice. I am thinking of the European Union and of all involved in the agreement between the European Union and the United States of America. The contact group has had other difficulties in speaking with a single voice.

At the present time a vital element in seeking to exert greater and significant influence is the ability to create conditions in which the various institutions of the international community and in particular the European Union and the contact group can arrive at a single position and uphold it with determination.

The objectives which we must set ourselves to implement the two priorities I have mentioned are as follows. First of all, as I say, we must call on all the belligerents to agree to a cease-fire; this means asking Croatia not to launch any further offensives towards the Krajina areas occupied by the Serbs which, it must be reiterated, belong to Croatia. This solution, however, cannot be left to force of arms, it has to be brought about by the proposals of the Z-4 group. Amongst other things a cease-fire means requiring the Bosnian Serbs to guarantee free access for the blue berets throughout the safe areas; it also means requiring the Serbs to lift the siege of Sarajevo and calling on the Bosnians to halt the offensive they have started.

Of course, the belligerents have to respond in different ways: thus the request for the cease-fire is for those who are at the moment besieging Sarajevo and are often preventing the blue berets from operating – I am talking about the Serbs. More generally, it must also go to all the opposing parties.

A second question concerns reinforcement of the blue berets; we must say in the clearest terms that any withdrawal or reduction of those forces would be catastrophic. Many arguments can, of course, be advanced criticising the United Nations action on the Yugoslav chequerboard in recent years, but the situation would certainly be worse if they had not intervened; in my opinion, the situation would certainly have been much more dramatic and serious if the blue berets had not tried to act to put a brake on the fighting. In any case, I believe that nothing good or positive would be achieved today by withdrawing the blue berets; it would mean leaving the field free for those who wish to resolve the Yugoslav problem by fighting; if this happened, the conflict would become even less controllable and the international communi-

ty's capacity to intervene would be reduced. Instead, the reinforcement of the blue berets would first and foremost involve clear endorsement of their mandate. Over the last few weeks it has been widely discussed and the words "extending the mandate" have often been heard. Personally I am not sure that this is the right expression but I know that in January 1993 the United Nations approved a resolution authorising the blue berets to defend themselves in the execution of their peace-keeping duties whenever they were impeded by external attack. The problem is not one of extending the mandate but of ensuring implementation of Resolution 836 and, if necessary, of endorsing and interpreting the mandate so that the resolution is not merely formal but is applied in practice.

The second way of reinforcing the blue berets is to protect their action; over the last few days under various items on the Assembly's agenda, reference has been made to the rapid reaction force, the formation of which was approved at the meeting of NATO and European Union defence ministers actually here in Paris.

It is easy to understand the reasons which led France and the United Kingdom in particular to propose the creation of such a force as they have many troops involved and, understandably, have to give a clear explanation of their duties to their own general public. At the same time, I think it is fair to express a few doubts concerning the action of one or more individual countries in the confused situation in Yugoslavia. In recent years we have found that failure to speak with a single voice on intervention by the European Union has weakened the capacity of the international community to take action. Thus the formation of a rapid reaction force, whose purpose can moreover be generally agreed, is to protect and cover the blue berets in their actions and above all, to respond to requests from the United Nations for action. In our view, intervention by such a force would be more operationally effective and more legitimate from the political standpoint, if it were taken under the authority of a supranational body. That is why the recommendation asks all the countries involved in the rapid reaction force to consider the possibility of its being placed under the authority of WEU in conjunction with the United Nations.

The embargo is still a vital instrument for bringing pressure to bear on the belligerents and persuading them to act reasonably; but it is only effective if put into effect. The report submitted fully documents how the embargo has been repeatedly breached by many countries over the last few years, just as the deny flight zone has been violated to a very significant extent. Our sources speak of more than 4 000 violations of the air space in very few years which means that the embargo, sanctions, and the interruption of flights

*Mr. Fassino (continued)*

planned and undertaken by the international community have not been effected by the international community itself and by the very members who took the decision. This does not of course mean to say that these measures are pointless but it does mean that all the countries concerned must be asked to work substantially together with their formal commitments and to put the embargo and sanctions into practical effect. This means increased surveillance of communication routes, the deployment in accordance with the United Nations resolution of 30th March last of more men and observers along the boundaries of the belligerent countries and the setting up of control and surveillance posts making it more difficult to break the embargo.

If we want to be genuinely realistic and have real influence on the embargo and decisions, the international community must consider the problem of compensation for those countries, and firstly countries bordering the theatre of war, whose economies are hit by the application of the embargo, as was recalled yesterday by the President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Gligorov.

The fourth question I want to put to you today is a more directly political question of a practical nature, that is the need for every possible kind of political action to influence the way Belgrade is behaving. There can be no doubt about the Serbian Government's responsibility for this tragic situation, and since we are referring once again to this responsibility, we must demand with equal determination from Milosevic that he shoulder it and take clear decisions ending all hesitation and ambiguity. This means we have to ask him explicitly and clearly to stop all help for Karadzic and the self-proclaimed government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia. And it is particularly important to make this demand now because in recent months political cracks have for the first time appeared in Pale, the most unyielding point in the conflict.

In the Pale assembly, the independent parliamentary group is openly opposing Karadzic's policy and proclaiming the need to make peace on the basis of the contact group's proposals. This means that pressure on Belgrade and Milosevic, with more determination and vigour than before urging him to break off all relations with Karadzic and Pale may be better received than previously.

The second explicit demand we need to put to Milosevic is for his clear and unhesitating recognition of the right of Bosnia to exist as a sovereign state within its existing boundaries. When this question is raised with the authorities in Belgrade, as I myself found when I went there, they reply that they have already resolved it and have no territorial claims. In my view, this form of words is

disingenuous, ambiguous and inadequate. Belgrade must be strongly pressed for explicit recognition of Bosnia's right to exist as such. As for Bosnia's constitutional status and territorial make-up, this is a problem which will have to be resolved by negotiation but if there is no recognition of the principle that Bosnia has a right to exist, it is hard to see how this can be resolved by negotiation.

We are therefore calling on Belgrade to clear away all ambiguity and cease giving the impression, as it was quite legitimate to believe, that Belgrade, in fact, wants there to be no Bosnia; we are demanding that this ambiguity be removed by an explicit and unequivocal declaration on Bosnia's right to exist as such, leaving the practicality of how the Bosnian state will have to be organised to negotiation.

If both these steps are taken and if relations with Karadzic are broken off and Bosnia's right to exist as such is explicitly recognised, I think it would be both reasonable and wise for the international community to consider the possibility of moving towards the lifting of sanctions on Belgrade.

If we follow this scenario, it would then not appear to be frivolous – if there are subsequent advantages and in particular the one I have just mentioned – to suggest the possible convening of a new peace conference to be attended by the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia and the Yugoslav federation so that their presence around the same negotiating table could constitute a kind of mutual recognition and demonstrating of essential support for negotiations.

All this requires that there should be no fresh stoking of the Yugoslav fire. I am thinking in particular of two problems which I submit for your attention. The first is the problem of Kosovo, unresolved for a long, long time and with danger of its worsening with every day that passes.

Recently, in Belgrade, I spoke with the Albanian authorities who were greatly concerned that it was precisely the failure to recognise in any way the Kosovo people's demands for autonomy which was responsible for the pressure for complete independence. All of us here are well aware of the difference between autonomy and independence and of how complicated an international problem the independence of Kosovo could be. To prevent this drive for independence gaining ground and winning the support of a majority of Albanians and people in Kosovo, the Serbian authorities must be asked to give a clear signal and to recognise that the demands for autonomy, which, while keeping Kosovo within the present boundaries of the present Yugoslav federation, would recognise the Albanians' national identity in respect of language, culture and social structures. On the Yugoslav chequerboard, this could be a reasonable and useful solution.

*Mr. Fassino (continued)*

The second problem is Macedonia. This was referred to yesterday and again today in connection with the excellent report tabled by Mr. Cucó.

Some points have to be reiterated. Negotiations must be started as soon as possible between Macedonia and Greece on the basis of the proposals made by the United Nations; the Greek Government must lift the embargo on Macedonia, both because this would relax tension between the two countries and because it would further comply with the embargo on Serbia.

At the same time, as we said during the discussion with President Gligorov, the Macedonian authorities, in line with the multi-ethnic spirit which has characterised their action, must be able to find a positive political solution to the problem of relations with the Albanian community presently living in Macedonia.

Finally, I turn to the problems which concern our organisation, WEU, more particularly. I believe that it can be said taking a balanced view and without appearing offensive that in recent years our organisation has had a secondary rôle compared with other organisations in the efforts to bring peace to the tragic circumstances in Yugoslavia. Our organisation has been commissioned to monitor the application of the embargo along the Danube and in the Adriatic and to staff and equip a European police force to support the mayor of Mostar, Mr. Koschnik. These are important tasks but are very limited in terms of the scale of the Yugoslav tragedy. From this standpoint we need to call on the Council and the foreign and defence ministers of the member countries of WEU to look more closely into the rôle which our organisation might play.

I turn now to an earlier question put to members concerning the idea of verifying with member countries which have set up the rapid reaction force at Tuzla the possibility that it might be put under the authority of WEU; if this idea were adopted, it could help to ensure our organisation were given a more substantial rôle with greater involvement in the solution of the Yugoslav crisis and the force itself greater political legitimacy as a symbol of European unity – something which would do no harm in a situation where Europe has often had difficulty in speaking the same language.

These are the main points I would like to submit for your attention; they are reasoned in detail in the report and recalled in the recommendations which I have submitted to the Assembly.

I would like to conclude by thanking the Chairman and officials of the committee for their help in submitting this report to you.

*(Mrs. Papandreou, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is now open.

I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Allow me to congratulate you, Mrs. Papandreou, on being the first Greek to preside over this Assembly.

Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, events have made it necessary for Mr. Fassino to re-write his report several times. The taking of peace-keepers as hostages by the Bosnian Serbs has been unanimously declared a criminal act. Yet the unconditional condemnation of such barbaric methods does not prevent us recognising that the great powers have once again helped to aggravate the crisis in the Balkans. The facts show that whenever NATO is called on to take military action in Bosnia, the consequences are disastrous. It happened in Gorazde, in Bihac and, a few weeks ago, once again.

We know the intransigence of the Bosnian Serb forces supporting Karadzic – and I must again emphasise my disapproval of these reckless tactics – but we should not forget the other side. The fact is that while admonitions are always being levelled at the Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs, the former – the Croats – are in practice always treated as friends, and the latter, Belgrade included, as enemies.

The attack by the Croatian army in western Slavonia after 1st May invited a return to violence and the Krajina Serbs hit back by attacking Zagreb.

In view of the tendency to lay sole responsibility for the worsening of the situation on the Serbs in the area, I think it should be remembered that, throughout the winter, vast quantities of American weapons reached Tuzla, and arms from Turkey arrived in Sarajevo.

Mr. Izetbegovic is no angel. Immediately the cease-fire ended, the Muslim troops launched offensives in the Pale region. In the last few days, a large-scale offensive has flared up along the Sarajevo front. Mr. Izetbegovic ignored the appeal by President Chirac.

The facts have confirmed that the political and military consequences of the NATO bombings of Gorazde and Bihac belied the forecasts by governments and chiefs of staff. Yet action continued, with the results we all know.

Mr. Fassino reminds us that the division of responsibilities between the United Nations and NATO is far from clear. The United States gives the impression of wishing to distance itself from the crisis in Bosnia and yet it suggests that operational control be transferred from the United



*Mr. Rodrigues continued)*

Nations to NATO. Mr. Fassino also reminds us that in Munich the NATO Secretary-General and the American and German ministers of defence concluded that in future NATO should accept a United Nations mandate only if it had complete freedom in the execution of that mandate.

For his part, President Clinton has taken unilateral initiatives including negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs, thus ignoring the Security Council and the proposal to Belgrade that sanctions might be suspended in exchange for recognition of Croatia and Bosnia within their present frontiers.

Our Assembly agrees on two points: first, in this conflict no military solution is possible, there can only be a political solution; second, the presence of the peace-keeping forces is necessary.

In practice, however, things are very different. Over at least two years now, the military nature of events has been escalating. In reality, it all looks as though a political solution could be the natural outcome of a strategy imposed by arms from outside. The contradiction becomes absurd with the United Nations, in the name of lofty principles and universal values, defending the integrity of a state which is often a figment of the imagination and has never really existed historically and where the different peoples living on its territory refuse to live together, witness the massacres in Bosnia.

At every new stage in the crisis, the conclusions reiterated by the governments of the powers involved are false. I think that Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was right when he said to the paper *Der Spiegel* that the United Nations had no other choice than to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs in the framework of a new London conference which would be more understanding of the interests of all parties in reaching a settlement.

On another score, the consequences of the creation and local deployment of a French-British-Netherlands rapid reaction force, hailed by the European Union governments as a very positive event, cannot be assessed for the time being. We shall have to wait, but the ambiguous nature of the status of this force in itself gives cause for alarm. Mr. Fassino suggests that we recommend to the Council that this rapid reaction force be converted into a multinational unit under WEU authority, in accordance with the procedures decided in Petersberg, and that we invite all WEU member countries to take part in it. Allow me to say unequivocally that any such solution would be extremely dangerous and negative. Fortunately, it is utopian. The dream of making WEU the military arm of NATO in Europe could only contribute to a new kind of militarisation of the continent.

In conclusion, I repeat that the solution in Bosnia can only be political and has to be found by

negotiation, to the exclusion of any type of action by the leading United Nations, NATO or WEU powers. I therefore have no alternative but to vote against the recommendation in Mr. Fassino's report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call next Mr. Nasev.

Mr. NASEV (*Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, observer*) (Translation). – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, in the name of the Parliament of the Macedonian Republic and in my own name, may I thank you for allowing me to take part in the activities of this organisation. I hope this will mark the start of permanent co-operation, which is of mutual interest to everyone in Europe.

In spite of all events, past and present, there were and still are major opportunities in Europe to develop co-operation between our countries in all areas. The links that have been established over a period of many years – ethnic, cultural and territorial – form the basis for promoting economic and cultural, security and defence co-operation, and the other types of co-operation.

The European countries are an inescapable reality. Hence the need for mutual co-operation and solidarity, to which further impetus should be given. That means first and foremost removing the barriers and impediments created by a variety of obstacles, which are particularly apparent in certain neighbouring countries, and secondly, co-operative action, which is of mutual interest.

The Assembly of the Macedonian Republic supports direct co-operation, mutual respect between peoples and countries, and understanding and mutual assistance in the economic, cultural and social fields. That is the basis for developing stable relations and for the further Europeanisation of the continent.

This means making greater use of all the factors likely to create closer convergence and inclusion of the continental countries in European integration processes and organisations. All this will help to strengthen the stability of the region and to overcome the conflicts that still exist and are clearly apparent in these areas.

Unfortunately, these conflicts lead to ever-increasing economic problems. Unemployment and social tensions are growing, and this is linked to the emergence of a variety of forms of nationalism that could impede any kind of co-operation and communication. They could divert us from our efforts to achieve greater European co-operation – and from our desire for the free and safe movement of people, capital, ideas, cultures etc. in these areas.

The security interests of the countries of Europe coincide, which is why peace and prosperity in

*Mr. Nasev (continued)*

each individual country means peace and prosperity for Europe as a whole. The destabilisation of certain regions would certainly also mean the total destabilisation of Europe. We would draw attention to this vital inter-relationship and emphasise the need to seek closer co-operation in all areas, especially in the sector of security and defence, which the Macedonian Assembly also supports. Macedonian participation in all international forums, especially in the field of security and defence, such as the OSCE, the European Union, NATO, partnership for peace, etc., forms the basis for creating lasting stability in this part of the Balkans and in Europe.

The proposals on means of overcoming the divisions and enmities and for initiating co-operation, which are based on the European standards and institutions, deserve support. In this context stimulus should also be given to the preparation of joint projects for closer links between the European countries in the fields of transport, communications, security and defence and other infrastructures, and the financing of these projects. That would help to promote stable and more rapid economic growth, build confidence and identify the essential requirements, and also to resolve the problems in question, in order to safeguard peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. That is our common future, the reality in which we live, and in which future generations also want to live in peace and prosperity.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

I now call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). – There is much of interest, value and relevance in this report, but there are occasional imprecisions that could lead to confusion and uncertainty. I draw the attention of the Assembly to paragraphs 4, 7 and 8. Paragraph 4 asks the United Nations “to strengthen the presence and action of the blue berets”. Paragraph 7 talks about the need for WEU “to elaborate and implement the tasks of this multinational force”. And paragraph 8 urges the Security Council to ensure that blue beret missions are implemented. What missions had the Rapporteur and the Political Committee in mind? Are they speaking of peace-making, peace-keeping, or merely riding shotgun occasionally on certain convoys?

If we are to peace-make – it might have been a good idea if that had been tried at the beginning, instead of piecemeal involvement – it requires many more skilled, armed personnel than anyone has so far suggested. If we are to peace-keep, the present complement of United Nations forces is not enough, as we saw with the capture of prisoners – the hostages – recently. Small numbers of personnel from Britain and elsewhere were left in

an extremely exposed position. Are we going to do anything about changing the present rules of engagement? We owe a great deal to the small number of servicemen from Britain and elsewhere, often in isolated positions, who have been placed at great risk, but have conducted themselves with training and discipline – something that politicians in Europe might well have emulated.

There is a lack of clarity and it is dangerous. For example, it has been suggested that reinforcements must not be sent for a withdrawal, but if a member state has troops engaged in former Yugoslavia and immature decisions – to put it politely – are made in Washington, we might well have to send troops to ensure that those already serving there can be extricated safely. A couple of years ago, in a debate here, I expressed my irritation at the fact that the Yorkshire Regiment was supposed to be guarding a convoy, but had to stand by as regular troops looted it and kidnapped some of the drivers. They had to obey the rules and could not lift a finger to stop it.

Let us think back to the westerns that we all watched in our childhood and perhaps still watch when they appear on television for the fifteenth time. What would happen if the man riding with his shotgun after the stagecoach were allowed to defend the stagecoach only if the Red Indians were wearing headdresses? That compares to the situation that has faced many British and French troops in former Yugoslavia.

Then there is the reference to the no-fly zone. It has been remarkably successful, as there have scarcely been any fixed-wing incursions. But if the troops are to shoot down helicopters, they must have much more advanced and expensive traffic control and the capacity to fly for many more hours. I was astonished the other day when I saw the thousands of additional flying hours that the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy and the French Air Force have had to fly to reach the present position. If members are not satisfied with that, they might like to fund a great deal more activity. Helicopters often make quick, low-level, short-range flights. What would happen if a pilot were to shoot down a helicopter taking a soldier home on compassionate leave or taking someone to see a doctor? What would happen if such a helicopter were destroyed?

I have a great deal of sympathy with those countries that have suffered economic disadvantage as a result of the embargo. I also have considerable sympathy for countries that have expended enormous resources. I mentioned the thousands of flying hours, which is not a cheap business. One thinks of the enormous activity of those of our neighbours that have operated, as last year's report by Sir Keith Speed demonstrated, with skilled and effective dedication in operating a maritime embargo. I hope that those who want

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

compensation for the economic disadvantages that they have suffered will recognise the enormous cost, not merely financial but in terms of family and anxiety, of those of us who have sent people to serve in former Yugoslavia.

We must ensure that the Americans are persuaded to act in concert with Europe and in an intelligent manner. We are entitled to ask that this Assembly speaks with clarity and precision. I regret that I cannot describe the report in those terms.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Ruzin.

Mr. RUZIN (*Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, observer*) (Translation). – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour and pleasure for me to speak to this eminent European forum on behalf of the parliament of the Republic of Macedonia.

It often happens that we in the Balkans and in Macedonia are led to wonder whether the world, Europe or even the Balkans understand our region. I think there are at least three levels of interpretation of the bizarre chemistry of the Balkans. There are those who pretend to understand, those who understand but are deliberately awkward, and those who understand nothing, and say so.

What are the Balkans in 1995, five years after the fall of communism?

First, after the changes which some have called the velvet revolution, the revolution without revolutionaries or even the “refolution” – a sort of symbiosis between reform and revolution – there appears to be a harking back to earlier times. For the first time in the history of the Balkans, the number of nations is exactly the same as the number of states. Of course, as in other parts of the world, ethnic boundaries do not coincide with political boundaries; this gives rise to the problem of minorities. But it is only after this social upheaval that the people of the Balkans will finally be able to overcome long-standing frustrations associated with a loss of national and cultural identity.

In this context it is entirely understandable that we Macedonians should respect our country, our peace and prosperity, our sovereignty – values our ancestors dreamed of for centuries. In parallel with that, we respect the values and the identity of national minorities, seeking an equitable path to peaceful coexistence, making every effort to share the consequences of a difficult social and economic situation.

Unfortunately, Edmund Stelman’s statement that “the experience of the Balkan region shows us that things founder, break up and are bound together again” is still true today. When we think

of the Balkans we still think of the heroes of ancient tragedies, characterised by a marked resistance to the strongest, often at the cost of their own destiny.

So far, Macedonia has managed to avoid the apocalyptic fate of the war which has been, and is still, taking place in former Yugoslavia. Time and again we have appealed to European values and principles such as dialogue, negotiation and tolerance.

In my capacity as a citizen of Macedonia and elected representative of that small country which is happy to call itself simply Macedonia, with no aspirations to be Great Macedonia, I would like to remind you of the Frenchman, Paul Valéry, and the Swiss, André Reszler, who considered the influence of Athens, Rome and Jerusalem to be the behavioural force of the European idea, not forgetting the influence of the Celtic, Germanic, Slav and Arab civilisations and culture. The influence of all these is more or less present in our mentality and in the areas in which we live.

This is why, for all Europeans, “the greatest pleasure is to sense that we are individuals and free men”, in the words of François Guizot. We are citizens of a country whose right to belong to the great European family, uniting all the other countries in transition, is withheld by the unilateral will of one country with its selfish and outmoded principles of the right of veto.

We are seeking a road to Europe, even though initially it may be only a trunk road. What we can offer Europe in return is a motorway through the Balkans via Macedonia, to Greece and beyond.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS (*United Kingdom*). – First, I congratulate Mr. Fassino on his excellent report. Mr. Hardy rightly criticised some of the recommendations for imprecision, but that is not Mr. Fassino’s fault. The recommendations were written in committee under great difficulties as a result of the number of amendments that were tabled by some colleagues. We all understand that, so it is not surprising that there are some imprecisions in the recommendations. The report, which is Mr. Fassino’s responsibility, is admirably clear and I think that it is excellent.

I wish to follow Mr. Fassino’s example by making my position absolutely clear. I am not automatically unsympathetic to the people of Serbia or the Bosnian Serbs. In my view, the Bosnian Serbs, Mr. Karadzic and his supporters are entitled to say that they want a separate state. If they so wish, they are entitled to argue for union with Serbia, to advocate their point of view, to campaign for it, to publish articles in newspapers in support of it, to make speeches, to organise meetings to support their view, and to stand for election on the

*Mr. Davis (continued)*

basis of that view. But Mr. Karadzic and his supporters among the Bosnian Serbs are not entitled to harass their neighbours who disagree with them. They are not entitled to bully and intimidate their neighbours or to expel their neighbours from their homes. They are not entitled to rape and kill their neighbours or take rifles and pick off innocent men, women and children in Sarajevo. They are not entitled to take heavy guns and fire shells into the safe haven of Tuzla.

Yesterday, Mr. Millon, the French Minister of Defence, described those acts as barbarism. We all agreed with him, but many of us disagreed with him when he said that our attitude should be neutral. When there is a war between barbarism and civilisation, we cannot remain neutral but must take the side of civilisation. When there is a war between the fascists and racists on one side and a democratic government on the other, we must take the side of the democratic government. Surely we learnt that sixty years ago, and our parents' generation learnt that in Spain. When there is an aggression, we cannot remain neutral between the aggressor and the victim, but must take the side of the victim.

In truth, WEU is not neutral in this war. As Mr. Fassino reminded us, the United Nations has imposed trade sanctions on Serbia. WEU is responsible for enforcing them. We cannot pretend that we are neutral. It is our responsibility to enforce those sanctions. We know that, and Mr. Fassino has reminded us of it.

Mr. Fassino has clearly drawn attention in his report to the fact that the sanctions are being broken. He has drawn attention particularly to the fact that oil companies from Greece and Italy, without the approval of their governments, are supplying Serbia with oil through Albania. We cannot close our eyes to what is happening. WEU has a responsibility to enforce those sanctions.

When on Monday we asked Mr. Durão Barroso, the Portuguese Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, about these breaches of sanctions, he said that he did not know about them and asked us to provide evidence. We all know that there have been eye-witness reports in newspapers the length and breadth of Western Europe from journalists who have seen the oil sanctions being broken. Such reports are published in British newspapers and, I believe, in French, German, Spanish and Italian newspapers. Such reports were certainly published in the International Herald Tribune, but Mr. Durão Barroso asked us to believe, on behalf of the Council of Ministers, that the secretariat and the Council of Ministers did not read them.

When many of us went to the satellite monitoring station at Torrejón, we were shown the way in

which the monitors interpret the photographs taken by satellite. We were tremendously impressed with their skills in deciphering the photographs: they could decipher objects just a few metres long. But Mr. Durão Barroso asks us to believe that the people of Torrejón cannot see the oil tankers running from Greece into Macedonia and Albania and running from Albania and Greece into Serbia. He asks us to believe that such activities cannot be deciphered and seen.

Like many of us, I have a copy of a report published by the Commission of the European Union. That report identified sanctions-breaking and was published two years ago. It strains our credulity that Mr. Durão Barroso can claim that that is not known to ministers who sit with a different hat on in the European Union. He asks us to provide the evidence. I suggest that we send him Mr. Fassino's excellent report, particularly paragraph 53, which lists the ways in which oil sanctions are broken. Many of us will ask what the new Chairman-in-Office from Spain has done about it.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Fassino has done a very good job. He has looked into the swirling fog of accusation and counter-accusation, of complex argument and vile atrocity, and produced a clear and balanced report for us. I think that, when the historians of the future make their evaluation, this assembly of parliamentarians from different countries and speaking across the spectrum of political attitudes will be shown to have maintained a constructive posture and shown greater capacity for achieving agreement than the governments of the states from which we are drawn and, in so doing, to have done lasting service to the cause of pluralist democracy.

Having prepared a report on former Yugoslavia for the Defence Committee and having visited the place often and met the principal personalities, I think that I understand how fiendishly difficult the whole matter is.

Our speeches must be short, Madam President, so I shall simply make six particular points which I feel are important. First, if the United Nations is to be able to develop an effective worldwide peacekeeping capacity, which I believe the great majority of our people want, we cannot back out. We have to see this through. That also means making declared embargoes and no-fly zones actually work. I take the point that has been made that the blue berets have been marvellous. The cease-fire has been marvellous, but it must work.

Secondly, let me be blunt: a peaceful solution will not be achieved – I take the point made by Mr. Davis – without recognising and addressing the hopes and fears of the major aggressors, the Serbs. One could, of course, have a non-peaceful

*Sir Russell Johnston (continued)*

solution that blitzes the Serbs, justified by utter abhorrence of the way in which they have behaved: the ethnic cleansing, the cruel treatment of the Muslims, the ruthless shelling of defenceless cities. One could justify that easily: Vukovar, Osijek, Dubrovnik and Sarajevo, the barbarity of the Tuzla shelling to which Mr. Davis referred. But it could not last. One would get into vendetta country, with the sins of one generation visited on the next. Our anger against the Serbian leadership must not blind us to their wish to live together.

In making my third point, I am not deserting Bosnia. I much prefer the multi-ethnic approach, but it may have to be smaller and exclude the Serbs if it is to be supportable.

Fourthly, our governments in their desperate pursuit of a solution in Bosnia must not abandon the Albanians in Kosovo, the Hungarians in Vojvodina or the Muslims in the Sandjak. There should be no gifts to the Serbs without clear arrangements in those respects. The same goes for the Croats in the Krajina.

Fifthly, our Greek friends must stop this purposeless, mad embargo against Macedonia. Madam President, I say this to you directly: Greece gave us democracy – the concept, the word. Last night, we celebrated Greece's entry into WEU. This is a very good moment, Madam President, for a new and generous initiative by Greece.

Sixthly, there is the issue of compensation to the weak economies hit by the embargo. The British Delegation is given guidance notes on what the government thinks it should say. I do not know whether that applies to other delegations – I suspect that it probably does. Our guidance notes say, "Don't worry. This is already under way. The IMF is considering it." That is not good enough. Nothing has been done about compensation. No declarations have been made. No commitments have been entered into. That ought to be an urgent priority. It is totally unfair of the international community to place the financial burden on Greece, Macedonia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the states round about.

I again thank Mr. Fassino and the hard-working clerk to the Political Committee, Mr. Burchard, who is modest and says little. We are lucky with our permanent staff and I think that we credit them insufficiently. I welcome the report.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Count Eltz.

Count ELTZ (*Croatia, observer*). – Mr. Fassino has indeed provided this Assembly with an ample, highly informative and very up-to-date report on this unhappy region, part of which I have the honour to represent as an observer from Croatia. I am glad to support strongly practically all the

report's recommendations and the conclusions on which they are based. There are, however, some points that have been omitted or points stated that need to be mentioned and, if possible, corrected to give even greater import to this admirable paper.

One omission is in the rather marginal treatment of Serbia's rôle in the origins of this sorry affair. After losing its hegemonical domination over the newly independent republics of former Yugoslavia, Milosevic resorted to an ancient, well-established and carefully prepared plan, the forming of a Greater Serbia, which was to include nearly all of Bosnia, half of Croatia and all of Macedonia.

Milosevic therefore launched not a religious, not a civil, but an aggressive war against first Slovenia, then Croatia and finally Bosnia to make his dream come true. To do so, he used the totally Serb-dominated people's army of Yugoslavia and instrumentalised Serbs living in some parts of Croatia and Bosnia to do his dirty work of insurrection and genocide, politely referred to as ethnic cleansing. The plan misfired in Slovenia and, to some extent, in Croatia, while largely succeeding in Bosnia. Believe it or not, to this very day Serb activities in Bosnia and Croatia are still planned, armed, financed and frequently manned by Belgrade – all declarations to the contrary notwithstanding.

Milosevic, therefore, is no agent for a peaceful solution. Now, he has only two major interests – staying in power and the lifting of the sanctions that are crippling his economy. Again, he will lie and promise anything to achieve both those interests. Alas, his objectives once achieved he will cheerfully resume his attempt to realise the greater Serbian dream. I do not have to remind the Assembly that aggressors have rarely been stopped by negotiation or loving kindness. I also believe that it is a serious mistake to think that the arms embargo on Yugoslavia has done any good. It was grossly unfair to begin with and has been circumvented ever since.

Recommendation 17 seems to be beside the point. There have never been safe areas in Croatia and, since the new United Nations mandate – correctly described by the Rapporteur – neither are there any protected areas. Another point is that the Constitutional Court ruling described in paragraph 42 found unconstitutional only the manner in which the articles in question had been passed, not the minority rights they contained and which remain uncontested. The conclusions drawn by the Rapporteur are therefore erroneous. That the irredenta faction would use the occasion to stir up trouble was to be expected.

The very limited police action taken in Western Slavonia, described rather fancifully as an offensive, was triggered by a number of terrorist outrages – even highway robbery and murder by local

*Count Eltz (continued)*

Serbs. Like any other sovereign country, Croatia reserves the right to deal with terrorism or crime, at the time and in the manner necessary.

Finally, a political solution to the Krajina problem is out of Croatia's reach for as long as Milosevic does not recognise Croatia in its present borders and orders the extremist Krajina leadership, Mr. Martić and men of that ilk, to opt for, instead of bloodshed, an autonomy more comprehensive than any granted to any minority in Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Korakas.

Mr. KORAKAS (*Greece*) (Translation). – We were able to conclude from Mr. Fassino's speech that his intentions are good but, for reasons unknown to me, he felt obliged to make references in his report and in the draft recommendation which in my view are inadmissible. I will mention one or two of them.

When considering the question of Yugoslavia, it is essential to bear in mind the historical facts. The principal factors in the continuing crisis in former Yugoslavia are, in the first place, foreign intervention under the pretext of a conflict created by an explosion of nationalism, itself encouraged by forces intent on the principle of divide and rule. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the overthrow of the socialist system in Europe these forces threw themselves into hostile rivalry for markets and areas of influence. Clear proof of this is the hasty acknowledgement of the dismantling of Yugoslavia, starting with recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. At that time, we had warned that such a decision would lead to a situation which could only degenerate. No one believed us. Four years on, everyone knows what happened. Everyone closed their eyes to all their responsibilities and were happy to blame the Serbs for all the crimes committed. Even the main reasons – or pretexts – advanced for imposing an embargo on the new Yugoslavia have been forgotten. Let us not forget that we once asked the new Yugoslavia to put a stop to military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When it did so, we demanded that it abandon the Bosnian Serbs. It did so, and we are now asking it in this report to recognise Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to have the sanctions suspended. Such demands are inadmissible. From the very beginning, the embargo was a mistake, an inhuman and horrible act which cost the lives of thousands of young Serbs. I can speak with confidence, because I have been there. This embargo has nothing to do with the embargo imposed by Greece on FYROM. Were we wrong to say that there were two weights and two measures? That paragraph must be deleted.

As far as compensation is concerned, it is true that some countries – including Greece – have

suffered damage and loss as a result of this embargo. But that is not the issue. The question is to find ways of helping to bring peace to the region.

As regards the embargo on Macedonia to which our friends from FYROM referred, the party to which I belong did not agree to the imposition of the embargo, but I cannot help being angry at the hypocrisy of those who protest against the embargo on oil and energy and say nothing about lifting the embargo against the new Yugoslavia.

With regard to Kosovo, the committee requests the new Yugoslavia to accept its autonomy. But that has already been granted! You should keep up to date. The Kosovites want separation and independence and if you are interested I can let you have the business card of the representatives of the government of Kosovo. They have been before the migration and refugee committee.

I think that we must reach agreement, because the situation in former Yugoslavia is extremely delicate. It is a time-bomb which could explode and set fire not only to the region but to Europe. We must put a stop to all military intervention, especially foreign military intervention. We are agreed on this. And yet, at the same time, the report calls for the use of a strike force on humanitarian grounds. We all know what that means. The facts prove that this foreign intervention leads nowhere. We must agree that the only way we can help the new Yugoslavia is to allow the peoples of former Yugoslavia to come together. I approve the proposal to convene a conference, subject to expanding it into a Balkan conference which would bring people together and lead the parties present to undertake to respect the rights of minorities, to resolve their differences by peaceful means, and to recognise frontiers.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Tusek.

Mr. TUSEK (*Austria, observer*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by thanking Mr. Fassino for his excellent report; I can fully support nearly all his points.

It is not only the government and parliament of Austria that are following the conflict in former Yugoslavia with great concern; the entire Austrian nation is appalled at the events of the past four years. This conflict touches us very personally because of our geographical closeness and the large number of refugees who have come to us.

We are aware that the protection of the people concerned must be UNPROFOR's main task and this main task is in fact being fulfilled. That is why Austria supports the continued presence of UNPROFOR, although with a suitably strengthened mandate and better equipment, so that it can carry out its humanitarian tasks and protect the safe areas. In my view it would still be legitimate

*Mr. Tusek (continued)*

in principle to suspend the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this should be deferred in favour of the continuing presence of UNPROFOR.

At the same time we must continue to seek a negotiated settlement. If such a settlement is to be lasting, it must be based on the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Paris Charter for a new Europe, the London Conference and the Security Council resolutions on former Yugoslavia. That implies non-recognition of border changes imposed by force, or the results of ethnic cleansing, together with respect for human rights and the punishment of all war criminals.

The dialogue with President Milosevic as virtually the only interlocutor should be continued in principle. But economic sanctions must be dependent on genuine concessions by Belgrade. These include in particular Serbian recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia and effective supervision of the border between Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia.

As the preceding speaker from Croatia said very plainly, it would be naive to believe that Milosevic had abandoned his original aims and that such an agreement would signify immediate peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But it could represent a major step towards further isolating Pale and Karadzic. At the same time, the alternative democratic forces on the Serbian side deserve greater international attention and support.

In Bosnia, Austria supports the creation of the Bosnian-Croatian Federation as a crucial factor in restoring normality in large parts of the country, and is taking an active part in the European Union administration of Mostar. Since summer 1994 Austria has provided two leading members of the European Union administration, namely the official in charge of education and culture and the mayor's press spokesman. Austria will shortly be assigning ten policemen as its contribution to the WEU-organised United Police Forces of Mostar.

Austria supports the rapid extension of the European stability zone beyond Slovenia and Croatia. It would therefore be welcome if the negotiations on the trade and co-operation agreement between the European Union and Croatia were completed without delay. That, together with the recent extension of the PHARE programme to Croatia, would both promote the process of normalisation of economic relations between Zagreb and the Knin Serbs which is supported by the European Union, and improve the prospects of peace for Croatia.

In my view, there can be no lasting solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia unless a generous settlement is found for the Albanian minority in Kosovo.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am coming to the end. As we see it, the situation in former Yugoslavia is so deeply marked by the events of recent years that it will take a long time to find a genuine peaceful settlement. All the parties involved will have to show that they are willing not only to compromise but also to forgive one another.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Tusek.

The next speaker will be Mr. Benvenuti.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too would like to congratulate Mr. Fassino on his efforts. In my view, he has provided us with a framework of reference and a sound analysis of the available information which he has used to define objectives set out very clearly in the report, putting an end to certain diplomatic twisting and turning. I believe this to be essential.

What should we now be saying to the international community concerning the tragedy of this war? More to the point, what should we be saying to ourselves as the international community? Should we perhaps repeat a line from long ago of the world-famous poet Dante Alighieri – what use will your nobility be here? Either the international community and WEU within it, will succeed, by a combination of analyses, proposals and instruments, in putting an end to this tragedy by finding a political solution or none of us will be able to tell what its future consequences will be. We are all well aware of the background to this conflict and I have certainly no need to stress its importance here. The events that are taking place, from former Yugoslavia to Turkey and from the Middle East to the shores of Africa, have been discussed by us during this session and the facts have been spelled out time and time again.

It is, in my mind, perfectly right to call loudly for cohesion in the international community and for pressure on attitudes in Belgrade. In this latter connection we need to press for a change in these attitudes but also for consistent behaviour from everyone involved. The Rapporteur himself drew our attention to the way in which Croatia has dealt with some specific problems which also arise.

The recognition of Bosnia must therefore be the basis for any political solution. I believe that is the direction we need to take.

I will conclude with one or two further points. The first is the importance of the fact that the international community has gradually come to recognise that, to exert pressure on Belgrade, Russia must be increasingly involved. We must therefore lay more and more stress on Russia's rôle and responsibility in the peace process. A second concerns the presence of the blue berets in these areas. I am aware of all the limitations and all the contradictions but I am not one of those who criticise the United Nations indiscriminately for the presence of the blue berets, just as I am not automatically

*Mr. Benvenuti (continued)*

against the way in which the embargo and sanctions policy have been applied. I repeat that these have been and still are major problems but meanwhile, as the Rapporteur pointed out, stressing defects and contradictions should not make us abandon the struggle. Instead, if need be, it should encourage us to lay a new foundation for the presence of the United Nations and the blue berets and for a correct sanctions and embargo policy.

If the United Nations presence and the sanctions policy had proved completely ineffective we should now very probably be facing much farther-reaching and wider-ranging problems which means that, with all their limitations, these policies have had some effect and are producing results. We should now bring all this together in a fresh common resolve and convergence of effort by Europe and the international community. In my view, Mr. Fassino's report, which will be approved by the Assembly, represents an excellent WEU contribution to the relaunching of the peace process and to the achievement of a proper rôle for WEU in resolving this terrible conflict.

*(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I call Mr. Philipov of Bulgaria, an associate partner.

Mr. PHILIPOV (*Bulgaria, associate partner*). – Regrettably, former Yugoslavia has been one of the hottest issues for this Assembly for the past three years. We have had a very good report, which gives us up-to-date information, but everyone feels that something is missing. Things are very unpredictable in former Yugoslavia and no one knows what will happen tomorrow.

I have taken the floor because Bulgaria has been asking this Assembly to take a strong stand on the five countries around former Yugoslavia which are suffering most. I am grateful to the Rapporteur and to Mr. Davis and Sir Russell Johnston for supporting the Rapporteur on recommendation 16, which is, "Ask the United Nations and the European Union to offer compensation to countries whose economies have been weakened by their participation in the embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia". For the time being, we can say: "Thank you gentlemen". Perhaps, when we get the results, we will be able to say: "Grazie. We are most grateful."

I shall give the Assembly two figures. Bulgaria has suffered \$6 billion in indirect losses and \$2 billion in direct losses, which amounts to about 25% of gross national product. Please remember the map. Bulgaria's western border with Yugoslavia is 321 kilometres and the northern border is 371 kilometres – one bridge and two ferries. How can we trade and how can our economy recover?

Once more I must confirm that our position on the Yugoslav crisis is clear. The crisis can be solved only through peaceful means, not by widening the conflict. The way in which the conflict was handled caused great losses in many fields. Political discussions at all levels are necessary for peace, as well as the gradual reduction of the embargo. It is our opinion that no neighbouring country can play a part directly or indirectly in Yugoslavia because we all have to live in the Balkan peninsula. Bulgaria, with its small population, is trying to co-operate with the Balkan countries on equal terms.

This was a very active week for Bulgarian diplomacy. On Monday and Tuesday, our Minister for Foreign Affairs was in Belgrade and Slovenia and our Prime Minister was in Greece. Next week, we expect a visit from the President and the Foreign Minister of Turkey. Good bilateral relations with all countries in our region are one of the best ways forward.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. The last speaker will be Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, first I would like to congratulate the Rapporteur on his excellent work – and not just because it is customary to do so. It rounds off the series of reports drawn up by this Assembly, and to which our Bulgarian colleague has just referred, in an impressive and competent manner. So congratulations, Mr. Fassino!

There are a few points, which I will not go into in depth because other colleagues – my neighbour Mr. Benvenuti, our Austrian colleague and our Bulgarian colleague – have discussed them in detail. But I want to emphasise them.

First, I think it would be negligent and dangerous to attempt to marginalise Russia in this area too. There will be no lasting stability on our continent and no peace in this country if we believe this can be attained without Russia, or bypassing Russia.

Second, I want to say that we have certainly expected too much of those states which, although the embargo was not directed against them, were nevertheless affected by it. The whole of organised, political Europe – although this does not just apply to us, and least of all to WEU – has done far too little to relieve the strain on them. I actually remember that both here in this Assembly and in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg we passed resolutions asking the European Union to lend a stronger helping hand to the countries particularly hard hit by the embargo.

Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to say a few words on some other points. By creating a rapid reaction force, with the participation primarily of



*Mr. Antretter (continued)*

France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, with other European nations, the western community of nations has made what may be the last attempt for the present to strengthen the position of UNPROFOR with respect to the mandate assigned to it by the United Nations. The hostage-taking of nearly four hundred United Nations soldiers and observers, the blockade of the UNPROFOR humanitarian aid convoys and the criminal hostage-taking by the Bosnian Serbs, contrary to all the rules of international law, could not be tolerated any longer. So I can only welcome the creation of this rapid reaction force. In this connection, let me also express the hope that this will pave the way for a lasting political settlement of the conflict, because the use of military force – and I think everyone here agrees – will not pacify this region in the long term.

Let me now speak primarily as a German parliamentarian and leader of my delegation. I do not think I am revealing any secrets here in saying that we in Germany are currently holding an extremely difficult debate and one that affects us very deeply because of our historical burden of guilt, on the possible participation of German troops in this multinational rapid reaction force. I think you will all agree with me that the active involvement of German soldiers in this region would lend a different colour to the intervention of the western community of nations. Here we are not concerned only with the question of the technical means at our disposal for supporting our western partners in NATO. If we make this contribution, we want to ensure that the conflict de-escalates and that we are not encouraging further escalation. That aside, I want to emphasise very clearly in this forum that we can only make progress on the road to a common foreign and security policy and to strengthening the European defence identity if all partners take part on the basis of the principles of equal rights and duties.

I am, therefore, grateful that an internal report drawn up here is to be corrected, for it gives the impression that Germany is not making any contribution. I am not, I believe, normally regarded as one of those who always attach special value to their own country's achievements. But in this connection I would venture to say that in so far as our Basic Law and our constitution allow, we are playing an appropriate part – I mentioned the difficult debate we are conducting. We are participating in the monitoring of the embargo measures on the Danube and in Sharp Guard; we have provided German crew members for NATO's AWACS monitoring planes. I think I may make special mention of the reconciliation services performed by Mr. Koschnick in Mostar. The transport planes have flown over 1 300 missions taking 10 000 tonnes of aid to the threatened and besie-

ged areas. I want to say this in conclusion, so as not to leave the impression that we are quite unaware of our responsibilities.

The PRESIDENT. – I now call the Rapporteur to wind up the debate.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall try to be very brief. I should first like to thank members for the many points they have made which I share to a large extent because they complement my report. In particular, I should like our Croatian and Greek members to understand that it was not my intention to produce a report on the history of the war in Yugoslavia. Among other sources, I used the report by Sir Russell Johnston to help in drafting my own on the situation that has developed in former Yugoslavia in recent years and I have left things at that.

Confirming the difficulties involved in considering this problem we have heard here speeches from colleagues who have argued completely opposite cases. For the Croatian representative, responsibility for what has happened lies with the Serbs and Milosevic who cannot be trusted in any way. By contrast, the Greek representative says the whole fault lies with eruptions of nationalist sentiment in the area. Lastly, Mr. Rodrigues maintains that Bosnia has never existed.

I do not intend to engage in an argument on each of these views which I quote simply to confirm the fact that the interpretation of events in Yugoslavia is particularly difficult. This does not mean we should not interpret the facts and I have sought in my report to give the Assembly a balanced but not neutral assessment.

Our analysis identifies the differing responsibilities involved in the Yugoslav crisis. There can be no doubt that responsibility lies predominantly with the Serbs but that does not mean disregarding that of other countries. However, it is not up to us to make judgments but, on the basis of our analysis, to decide on the action we need to take to put an end to the tragedy.

I should like to thank other members for their contribution and in particular Mr. Davis, many of whose views I share. I also appreciate many other requests and suggestions but I would say to Mr. Hardy that most certainly there are many problems concerning the mandate of the blue berets and its implementation. I believe, however, that we too should help to define the mandate better, the first need being to clarify the United Nations peace-keeping rôle. Unquestionably, for many problems, there have been and still are difficulties of interpretation and I should like to say quite specifically that it would be politically disastrous to reduce or withdraw the blue berets. Instead, the problem is to strengthen the mandate politically and also operationally and as regards equipment so that they can fulfil their peace-keeping duties.

*Mr. Fassino (continued)*

To our Croatian friend I would say that the problem is not one of trust, which has little point in politics. Here we do not have to decide whether or not to trust Milosevic, who is one of those responsible for the war, the crisis and the tragedy of Yugoslavia. Responsibilities are clear and it is obvious that Milosevic is at the head of one of the countries at war and that his action is therefore decisive in resolving the tragedy. Whilst in no way relieving Milosevic of his responsibility, we have to apply a political strategy which will force him to behave differently and change his attitude to one which will advance the peace process.

I agree with members who argue that Russia has a decisive part to play in this affair. I also agree with the urgings of Mr. Benvenuti and other members, who maintain that no stability and peace can be achieved in the Balkans and in Europe without Russia's full involvement. My view is that we must say clearly to the United States of America and to Russia that it would be a mistake to fall into bi-polar politics again when bi-polarism no longer exists. On the contrary, the problem is to act in such a way that close cohesion is established between the European Union, the United States of America and Russia – something we have never had before – by means of a common strategy designed to force the belligerents to find a negotiated solution.

Finally, I would like to say to our Greek colleague that the view expressed in my report on the question of Kosovo is that if pressures for independence emerge in that area they will be dangerous. I think, in fact, that the best and in fact the only possible way of preventing such pressures from gaining ground among the people of Kosovo leading to a majority demand for complete independence, is to say yes to the demand for autonomy: the surest way to encourage demands for independence is to smother any form of autonomy. If the drive for independence is to be defeated a guarantee must be given that the autonomy of Kosovo will be respected within the present constitutional and territorial configuration of the Federal Republic of Serbia. It is unrealistic to believe that the demand for independence can be frustrated by smothering that for autonomy because creating obstacles only creates the conditions in which even more of the people of Kosovo will get the idea that only by demanding independence will they get their rights respected. We know how dangerous it could be if an independence movement came to be established. It would be catastrophic.

I concur, however, with many of the proposals and suggestions put forward by speakers. There are a number of amendments which will, no doubt, improve the text of the recommendation

and I will accept them. In conclusion, I believe that it will be possible to adopt a good recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Could you please be brief, Mr. de Puig, as we are running very late?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – This is the fourth report the Political Committee has presented. I imagine that you will have some idea of the volume of work in which the Political Committee has recently been involved when you see how dense and significant this fourth report is. If it were possible to arrange it, the members of this committee and, of course, those servicing it ought to be given a salary increase, because the work we were doing was, one might say in my country, piecework.

Be that as it may, Mr. President, when it was decided to produce a report on this subject doubts were expressed as to its pertinence and timeliness. I think that the facts have shown that it was necessary to present a report of this nature.

In the first place, the events of recent weeks demanded a serious and rigorous response from the Assembly, of relevance to what is happening. This plenary meeting could not go by without an opinion from the WEU Assembly.

Second, the proposals contained in Mr. Fassino's report seem to me to be particularly timely and appropriate to the present situation. I must congratulate him on his work, in my own name and that of all the members of the Political Committee; he travelled to places in the area where he might find good contacts, he studied all the material, he made contacts with many different people and changed the report whenever sudden and unexpected situations arose, such as those of the last few hours. Yet in spite of this pressure, he has succeeded in presenting us with a lucid report, a very realistic analysis, a pragmatic political approach, which nevertheless has an important message.

I am in complete agreement with Mr. Fassino's proposals and the committee feels the same. I would like to make just two points: first, this is a report where yet again we say that we do not believe in a military solution, that there can only be a political solution, a peaceful solution, obviously, with the necessary pressure to make a political agreement possible – and if there is no pressure there will be no political agreement. Second, more than one party is responsible for what has happened in former Yugoslavia. But there is no doubt that the main culprits, and those responsible for the most serious acts, are the Serbs, and the Bosnian Serbs in particular. If anyone has sullied the name of the Serbs it is undoubtedly Mr. Karadzic.

Finally, Mr. President, I will conclude by saying this: we must not be neutral. We cannot be neutral. We do not want to be neutral.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

Nine amendments have been tabled. They will be taken in the following order: 7, 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 2, 9 and 6.

Amendment 7, which has been tabled by Mr. Fassino, reads:

7. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ Resolutely call upon the Bosnian Serbs to refrain from any action against the blue berets and to guarantee them freedom of movement and free access to ‘safe areas’; ”

I call Mr. Fassino to support his amendment.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – The amendment on releasing the blue berets serves no further purpose because all the hostages were freed over the last seventy-two hours. On the other hand, it does make sense to call on the Bosnian Serbs to refrain from any further action which might lead to more United Nations troops being taken hostage. United Nations forces should be guaranteed freedom of movement and access to the safe areas.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment? ...

Does the Chairman wish to give his opinion?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – This amendment was not discussed in committee because it was received late.

The PRESIDENT. – That is understood. There has been no opposition to the amendment.

I now put Amendment 7 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 7 is agreed to.*

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mr. Hardy, reads:

1. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ presence and ” insert “ to clarify the purpose and capacity to take ”.

I ask Mr. Hardy to move the amendment.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I trust that the Rapporteur will accept the amendment. If the United Nations is to strengthen the presence and actions of the blue berets, greater clarity will be necessary.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment? ...

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I accept Mr. Hardy’s amendment with the addition of the words “ in application of Resolution 836 of the Security Council ”.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Yes.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. de Puig, do you agree with Mr. Hardy?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*). – The amendment was adopted by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now put Amendment 1 as amended to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 1 as amended is agreed to unanimously.*

Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr. Fassino, reads:

3. At the beginning of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out: “ Transform the rapid reaction force into a European multinational unit ” and insert “ Verify with the countries which established the rapid reaction force that that force is ”.

I call Mr. Fassino.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Amendment 3 explains the previous text which included the words: “ Transform the rapid reaction force into a European multinational unit placed under WEU authority ”. Clearly this idea can only be put into effect if agreement is reached between the French and British who set up the rapid reaction force.

I would suggest as a more formally correct wording: “ verify with the countries which established the rapid reaction force that that force is placed under WEU authority ”.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment? ...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*). – The amendment was adopted by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 3 is agreed to unanimously.*

Amendment 4, which has been tabled by Mr. Fassino, reads:

4. Leave out paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ Ask the United States Government not to act on the proposal to participate no longer in the embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina; ”

*The President (continued)*

I call Mr. Fassino to move the amendment.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I have an important additional point to make concerning Amendment 4. The United States must be asked to revoke its decision not to participate in the embargo. It has been correctly pointed out that this is really a proposal from Congress and not from the United States Government. I have proposed a formally more correct wording as follows: “ Ask the United States Government not to act on the proposal to participate no longer in the embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina ”.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*). – The amendment is accepted but has not been discussed by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 4 is agreed to unanimously.*

Amendment 5 is withdrawn.

Amendment 8, which has been tabled by Mr. Benvenuti and Mr. Martínez, reads:

8. Leave out paragraph 14 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ Request the governments of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to open negotiations on the basis of United Nations resolutions and ask Greece to lift the trade embargo it has imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; ”

I call Mr. Benvenuti to support the amendment.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Regarding Amendment 8, we first of all wish to take an optimistic view of what we heard yesterday from the President of Macedonia and the representative of the Greek Delegation.

At the same time, we renew the firm request to Greece to lift the trade embargo on Macedonia not only for its own sake but also as a counterweight to the embargo on Serbia which must be maintained and strengthened.

Lastly, if we want the embargo on Serbia to be effective, we must help the neighbouring countries to put up with and support the action. I am thinking of Macedonia, Romania and the other neighbouring countries. This is another vital element for resolving the Yugoslav tragedy.

The PRESIDENT. – What is the view of the Rapporteur and the committee?

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I accept Amendment 8.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*). – The amendment was not discussed in the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 8 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 8 is agreed to unanimously.*

Amendment 2, which was tabled by Mr. Hardy, reads:

2. At the end of paragraph 16 of the draft recommendation proper, add “ but notes that the member states which have been heavily involved have also borne substantial cost ”.

I call Mr. Hardy to move the amendment.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that this amendment will be accepted. Indeed, it would be inequitable if the Assembly did not accept it because there needs to be a recognition that, although people and administrations in some neighbouring countries have suffered financial disadvantage, a number of member states have borne substantial costs. I believe that that fact should have equal recognition.

The PRESIDENT. – What is the view of the Rapporteur and the committee?

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I accept Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Hardy.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*). – The amendment was adopted by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to unanimously.*

Amendment 9, which was tabled by Mr. Antretter, reads:

9. Leave out paragraph 17 of the recommendation proper and insert:

“ Ask the Croatian Government not to undertake further military action against areas controlled by Serb forces since these areas, which belong to the Republic of Croatia, must be integrated peacefully and given autonomy, on the basis of the Z-4 group proposal; ”

I call Mr. Antretter to move the amendment.

Mr. ANTRETTNER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think we can deal with this very quickly, since it is not a question of a political

*Mr. Antretter (continued)*

difference of opinion but of a factual correction that I would like to make.

Basically, it concerns the fact that there are no safe areas in Croatia but only in Bosnia, where there are five safe areas. The second part, which gives the impression that this is a binding proposal, results from that. These two parts together make up my amendment, and I would be grateful if Mr. Fassino could agree to it.

The PRESIDENT. – What is the view of the Rapporteur and the committee?

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I accept Amendment 9.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*). – The amendment was not discussed by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 9 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 9 is agreed to unanimously.*

Amendment 6 is withdrawn.

We have come to the end of the amendments and I thank members for their co-operation.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation, as amended, contained in Document 1467.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The amended draft recommendation is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

I offer my congratulations on a good job of work.

### **7. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 – Opinion of the Council**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1462)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Rathbone of the report

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995, Document 1462, debate and vote on the draft budget.

I call Mr. Rathbone to present his report.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – Without more ado, I shall go directly into my speech on the report.

It was in 1991 that I first became involved in the struggle for money for the Assembly. That, Mr. President, was under your predecessor, Mr. Pontillon, who led the delegation to meet the Secretary-General and representatives of the Permanent Council in London. There was a major threat to the Assembly's activities and the direction then proposed by the Assembly representatives and agreed by the Council still holds true today – keeping an open door for Central and Eastern European countries and building contact with them; keeping watch on the Middle East and Mediterranean dimension; and expanding relations with other European bodies in the framework of European security, especially the European Union, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Parliamentary Assembly.

At that time, it was generally agreed that the Council and the Assembly should work in a complementary way and I believe that I can report to the Assembly that that has been improving year on year. It was accepted that the WEU Assembly provided a unique parliamentary overview of European security, representing a forum of members from national parliaments, elected by each of our own peoples. It is therefore only through the Assembly that WEU can avoid the democratic deficit that nowadays seems always to threaten European institutions. That may be a statement of the obvious, but even at this late hour it is worth restating when we are talking about such an urgent matter as our budget.

I want to accentuate those points of near history for two reasons. First, the points made five years ago still hold true today. Second, the work of the Assembly continues to be motivated in the same way now as it was then. Inevitably, that has a budgetary as well as a functional bearing on the Assembly's work today. At this point I must extend to you, Mr. President, the Assembly's thanks for your efforts, for the energy that you have applied to the budgetary process, and for the aptitude you have shown in dealing with the Council and other people and bodies in this troublesome area of our personal administration.

Colleagues will remember that at our Assembly meeting in December 1994, it was not possible to agree a budget for the current year because the Council had not given its agreement. A motion for an order to the Presidential Committee was pro-

1. See page 55.

*Mr. Rathbone (continued)*

posed, requesting that agreement to the budget should be struck by that committee on behalf of the Assembly. You did that most ably, Mr. President, not least by contacting the Chairman-in-Office designate, the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister, just before he took up his post. It is worth mentioning that he and his permanent representative have been extremely helpful in resolving budgetary problems – which I believe you mentioned, Mr. President, earlier this week when the Portuguese Foreign Minister was in our midst.

The Budget and Organisation Committee of the Secretariat eventually approved the budget on 13th January, although it reduced it by eliminating two important new posts intended to cater for expanded membership and expanded workload – one for the English translation service and one for the press and information service. Full details of that are provided in the report. The reduced budget was subsequently approved by the Council.

Despite the reduction, the budget represents an improvement over some past years, when final approval had not even been obtained at this time of the year for the current year's budget. That was a ridiculous circumstance and we have advanced since then. The approved budget for this year is an increase of 6.2%, which represents only slightly more than local inflation plus the additional costs of accommodating our newest member, Greece, and its representatives. That, again, is an improvement over the days when we had to give such a bad welcome to Spain and Portugal because of the lack of administrative preparation for their arrival.

I must point out that the Council has studiously avoided a positive response to the broader issues of enlargement and the costs entailed in an era post-Maastricht and post the declarations of Kirchberg and, most recently, Lisbon – and, of course, the extra work that we have to do leading up to the intergovernmental conference next year. In particular, that has to do with accommodating and looking after properly a membership of all sorts from twenty-seven countries. I will refer to that aspect again when we discuss the supplementary draft budget.

It is with gratitude for better understanding, greater speed of review and agreement from the Council that I present the report, but also with awareness of a governmental attitude that all too often does not deem financial support for parliamentary assemblies an important budget item. That attitude can lead to the deficit in democratic membership to which I referred earlier. Nowhere is that assembly more important than in the area of national and international security that is the remit of this Assembly. I beg to move.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rathbone. I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (United Kingdom). – As I am to be the only other speaker, I could take up a good deal of time – but perhaps I would not be popular if I did so. Being chairman or permanent secretary of the Budget Committee is a thankless task. It involves a lot of work, much of it dull. One has to master a lot of detail, and our Chairman has achieved that. He has done extraordinarily well and has made a great improvement with the Council. I accompanied him when he met the Council at its glorious and lush new headquarters in Brussels. It was a sight to see, Mr. Rathbone making members of the Council more and more uncomfortable as they were made aware of our conditions – and doing so with great charm. Mr. Rathbone has been an admirable Chairman and may he continue to exert his charm until the Council becomes reasonable. It is an excellent report and we have a very good Chairman.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Mackie. I presume that the Chairman does not wish to speak again.

Mr. RATHBONE (United Kingdom). – I agree absolutely.

The PRESIDENT. – I imagine that you, Mr. Rathbone, are in accord with everything said by Lord Mackie. I will put the motion to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft budget is agreed to.*

### **8. Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995**

*(Presentation of the report of the  
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration  
and votes on the draft texts, Docs. 1441, 1470 and 1471)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Rathbone of the report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995, debate and vote on the draft texts, Documents 1441, 1470 and 1471.

Mr. Rathbone has, on behalf of his committee, also tabled a motion for a recommendation on the draft budget, Document 1470.

Mr. Rathbone has also tabled a previous question on this draft budget on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration which has been distributed as Document 1471.

*The President (continued)*

If the Assembly agrees to Mr. Rathbone's motion the subject of debate will be removed from the agenda and from the register of the Assembly.

Rule 34 (1) of the Rules of Procedure requires that the previous question be put to the vote immediately after the presentation of the relevant committee report.

I therefore propose that Mr. Rathbone present his report formally and I suggest that he then should speak to his motion for the previous question, Document 1471.

Under Rule 34, only the proposer of the previous question and one speaker against the motion may speak; and the time available to each speaker is five minutes.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I formally move.

The PRESIDENT. – Well done. That is excellent. Is anyone against? In that case, I will put the motion to the vote.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I formally moved the report, Mr. President, but would like to speak to the previous question. I am sorry to postpone the adjournment of this sitting for a few moments, but this subject touches on a supplementary budget that is nebulous but affects how we run the Assembly.

I will give some background but will not go back to 1991 – only to the supplementary draft budget for 1995, which was prepared last autumn to identify the requirements of the accession of Greece to WEU as its newest member and to adapt and improve the Chamber to accommodate all categories of member – full, associate, associate partner and observer, totalling twenty-seven in all, and to enable the Assembly to run sessions for 289 members and 135 substitutes in a Chamber that accommodates only 228 persons.

The draft supplementary budget was further supported by Assembly Recommendation 568 on the evolution of logistical requirements for the Assembly, to take account of enlargement. I will refer to that later. It is interesting that the supplementary budget was specifically requested by the Secretary-General's Budget and Organisation Committee to cover the two specific matters already mentioned, even though previous supplementary budgets in similar circumstances were criticised by that same committee. The Assembly was instructed to incorporate such cost estimates in its normal annual budget submission. It is interesting also that the budget items in the supplementary submission bearing upon the costs of Greece's accession were plucked from the supplementary budget and added to our regular annual budget, as already reported. Those somewhat idiosyncratic

changes of signal by the Budget and Organisation Committee acting as ministers' representatives cause the Assembly, its committees and staff considerable extra work and inconvenience – but that is nothing compared with the lack of positive reaction to the budget requests.

Logistically, improvements have been made. We are grateful to the Deputy Secretary-General for allowing his offices on the second floor of the building to be converted for use by a parliamentary delegation during Assembly meetings. It is good to report more effective use being made by delegations of what used to be the telephone exchange rooms, meeting rooms and library of the Institute. We are grateful to the Institute for making that possible, planning the refurbishment of Room A to accommodate larger meetings and paying for most if not all the refurbishment costs.

The interpreters are now working happily from air-conditioned booths in meeting rooms C and B with projected pictures of the Assembly to which to refer. As you can see, Mr. President, the gallery has been cleared of interpreters' booths and can now be used by increasing numbers of visitors, who are always most welcome.

Pressing budgetary requirements remain, including the improvement of facilities in the Chamber. Yesterday and today you, Mr. President, drew attention to the need for enhanced communication facilities in the Chamber by the use of improved sound systems. There are orders on the table from Lord Finsberg, Mr. Hardy and others that touch specifically on that subject.

There are also budgetary requirements to make it possible to seat delegates properly and for the Chair to know who is where and how they wish to vote, with the growing pressure of more and more people in a fixed number of seats. That was the reason that we suggested a partial and temporary solution, by transferring some of the Council seats – the third row back from the front – for temporary delegates' use this time. I am glad that your committee is considering that, Chairman.

This has to be done and it has to be done with the help of the Clerk and the Clerk Assistant planning co-operation with the Economic and Social Council and with the help of our colleague Mr. Valleix, together with the Clerk and Clerk Assistant, dealing with the office of the new French Prime Minister.

There have been positive talks with Mr. Matteoli, the President of the Economic and Social Council and talks with his officers have been progressing positively. There have been improvements to the electronics – believe it or not – and talks with SATI have already started, but will be started again. Only yesterday, Mr. Millon, the French Minister of Defence, promised us support for our efforts to obtain a special contribution from the

*Mr. Rathbone (continued)*

French Government towards the costs of improvements in our Chamber. We should be especially grateful for that offer of help because – inevitably, I suppose, but very frustratingly – there seems to have been a less than perfect handover of records, including those of previous discussions, from the offices and officers of the previous French Prime Minister to those of the present incumbent.

We have not as yet obtained the Council's positive reactions to our outstanding supplementary budget request, however. What does that add up to? I am told that the costs of improvements in facilities for increasing the number of delegates is in the region of F 3 million. It is hoped that the French Government will make a substantial special allocation to that amount or, more precisely, will allow an allocation to be made by the Economic and Social Council. On that basis, I ask the Assembly to approve the recommendations standing in my name, but supported unanimously by our Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. As we cannot debate a budget because it does not exist that motion should be carried and the previous question should be put and supported.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Rathbone. I will put your motion to the vote.

*(A vote was taken by a show of hands)*

*The previous question is agreed to.*

As the previous question has been agreed to, the subject of the draft supplementary budget for the financial year 1995 has been removed from the agenda and the register of the Assembly.

***9. Opinion on the budgets  
of the ministerial organs  
of Western European Union  
for the financial year 1995***

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee  
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration  
and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1463)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the next order of the day, which is the presentation by Mr. Rathbone of the report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1463.

I call Mr. Rathbone to present his report.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be brief. Yes, the Council has granted increases in the budgets of the Secretariat-General and the ministerial organs, which seem, however, to fall short of the requirements considering the substantially increased political and military rôle of this organisation, about which we have heard so much this week.

Yes, the Council appears to have failed to address the broader issues relating to the enlargement and revitalisation of WEU and, in particular, how to increase its operational capability. Important decisions on the future of the satellite centre, the creation of a situation room and an intelligence section and the strengthening of the politico-military structures had either been delayed, as in the case of the centre, or run the risk when finally taken – as in the case of the intelligence section and situation room – of seeing implementation delayed because budgetary means are not available at the time that the decisions are taken. Decisions taken by ministers in May 1995 had not been anticipated in the 1995 budget.

The Council has yet to give detailed information to the Assembly on the Western European Armaments Group and the Sharp Guard budgets. While welcoming the creation of a frozen fund of Belgian francs 2.5 million for financing of possible unforeseen operations and recognising the importance of the political signal implied, no precise information has yet been given on the conditions for unfreezing that sum.

Lastly, the Council has failed to give even an indication of its intentions, expressed in its reply to last year's recommendation by this Assembly on this very report, to implement plans to introduce an appropriate private health insurance scheme for WEU staff working in Paris, as is already the case for WEU staff working elsewhere.

I must draw my colleagues' attention to recommendation 8. In the introduction to the explanatory memorandum, I attempted succinctly to put the activities of the ministerial organs of WEU into the context of this Assembly's activities and to link the two. In paragraph 7, I attempted to draw those previous points in the introduction together in terms of funding intentions.

With those few comments I beg to move that we approve this report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rathbone.

Does anyone wish to oppose the report?...

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1463.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*



*The President (continued)*

*The draft recommendation is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

That concludes our business for this afternoon, or this evening as it now is.

**10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 22nd June 1995, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The Assembly's interpretation system (Motions for an order with requests for urgent procedure, Documents 1474 and 1475).
2. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific (Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1476 and amendment).
3. Ukraine and European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence

Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1464 and amendment.

4. Address by Mr. Brazauskas, President of the Republic of Lithuania.
5. The Baltic Assembly (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Document 1460).
6. National parliaments, European security and defence and the road to the 1996 intergovernmental conference (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1459).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 7.35 p.m.)*

1. See page 58.

## EIGHTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 22nd June 1995

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. The Assembly's interpretation system (*Motions for orders with requests for urgent procedure*, Docs. 1474 and 1475).  
*Speakers:* Lord Finsberg, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Davis (point of order), Mr. Valleix.  
*Statement by Mr. Burgelin, Clerk of the Assembly, and replies to questions put by:* Mr. Alexander, Mr. Baumel, Lord Finsberg, Sir Keith Speed, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Skarpheoinsson (*Iceland, associate member*), Mr. Valleix, Mr. Lorenzi.
4. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific (*Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Defence Committee*, Doc. 1476 and amendment).  
*Speakers:* Lord Finsberg (point of order), Sir Russell Johnston (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Lorenzi, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Bianchi, Mr. Korakas, Mr. Naess (*Norway, associate member*), Mr. de Lipkowski, Mr. Korakas (point of order), Mr. Schloten, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Valleix, Lord Finsberg.
5. Address by Mr. Brazauskas, President of the Republic of Lithuania.  
*Replies by Mr. Brazauskas to questions put by:* Mr. Pastusiak (*Poland, associate partner*), Mr. Schloten, Mr. Alexander.
6. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific (*Resumed debate on the oral report of the Defence Committee and vote on the motion for a resolution*, Doc. 1476 and amendment).  
*Speakers:* Mr. de Puig, Sir Russell Johnston (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Baumel (*Chairman*), Lord Finsberg; (points of order): Mr. Lorenzi, Sir Russell Johnston.
7. Ukraine and European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1464 and amendment).  
*Speakers:* Sir Russell Johnston (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Mukhin (*Ukraine, observer*), Mr. Rockenbauer (*Hungary, associate partner*), Mr. Piskounov (*Russia, observer*), Mr. Jeszenszky (*Hungary, associate partner*), Sir Russell Johnston (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (*Vice-Chairman*), Sir Russell Johnston.
8. The Baltic Assembly (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order*, Doc. 1460).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Masseret (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Pastusiak (*Poland, associate partner*), Mr. Ruutel (*Estonia, associate partner*), Mr. Gricius (*Lithuania, associate partner*), Mr. Neljas (*Estonia, associate partner*), Mr. Sinka (*Latvia, associate partner*), Mr. Skarpheoinsson (*Iceland, associate member*), Mr. Naess (*Norway, associate member*), Mr. Masseret (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
9. Change in the orders of the day.
10. Close of the session.

*The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

#### 1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### 2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

1. See page 61.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### 3. The Assembly's interpretation system

*(Motions for orders with requests for urgent procedure, Docs. 1474 and 1475)*

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now consider the request for urgent procedure for motions for orders relating to the state of the Assembly's interpretation and microphone system, Documents 1474 and 1475.

I remind the Assembly that the following only may be heard: one speaker for the request, one speaker against, and, on this occasion, as there are two motions, in the interests of time and common sense, I shall ask for those who tabled the motions

*The President (continued)*

to speak. If anyone wishes to speak against, so be it. I shall call them. As we have two motions, if someone opposes one or the other, I shall call that person but I intend to call the two people who have tabled the actual motions.

Under Rule 33 (7), speaking time is limited to five minutes.

The motion for an order which has been tabled by Lord Finsberg and others with a request for a debate under the urgent procedure reads:

“ The Assembly,

Placing on record its total anger at the repeated failure of the interpretation and microphone system,

DEMANDS THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY

Urgently summon the Managing Director of the suppliers, SATI of Paris, in order that he may apologise on behalf of SATI for the failures and guarantee that there will be no further problems. ”

I call Lord Finsberg to speak in favour of the request.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am pleased that my colleague and friend, Peter Hardy, had a similar thought. There are many issues on which he and I agree. I hope that I shall not embarrass him, as this is not the British Parliament.

If the failures that occurred yesterday had occurred for the first time, nobody could complain. But this is at least the third session in which we have had such problems. This time, it was highly embarrassing as we had one Prime Minister and one Defence Minister due to speak to us. Will you, Mr. President, ensure that the head of the press and information service, Mr. Robins, informs the press of this matter and it is not allowed to disappear quietly into the archives, because the insult to our distinguished visitors needs to be brought out in the French press? In a way, I am only sorry that the system did not break down during the visit of a French minister – perhaps the minister responsible for technology. Nonetheless, we need to talk about it.

It is not only that the microphone and interpretation system – not the interpreters but the system – are useless; the whole building is impossible. I shall write to you, Mr. President, to say that if we must still meet here in June next year, we should hire at least four mobile air-conditioning units, as most normal organisations would do in order to get a decent temperature here. Something also needs to be done about the lighting. My old friend Mr. Rodrigues asked me to mention that. The arc lights give us a headache if we sit here for the whole day and something must be done. Perhaps

we should consider moving our meetings to the excellent hemicycle in the city of Luxembourg. It is up to the Presidential Committee. Unlike Strasbourg, ministers cannot stop us meeting outside Paris.

It is just a thought which I leave with you, Mr. President. I return to the motion. It is essential, not that the technical director or technicians must do something, but that the managing director must apologise and give some sort of guarantee that we shall not have this trouble in future.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Finsberg.

The motion for an order tabled by Mr. Hardy and others with a request for a debate under the urgent procedure, reads:

“ The Assembly,

Considering the confounded nuisance arising from the farce revealed by the inability to provide it with properly functioning interpretation facilities,

1. SUGGESTS TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

That these sporadic suspensions caused by equipment failure should lead to a decision not to call any further sessions until a reliable arrangement can be guaranteed in the hemicycle or alternative premises are found, and

2. REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY

To issue a full report in explanation of the breakdowns of the interpretation facilities on 21st June 1995. ”

I now call Mr. Hardy to move his motion.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – France is one of the great countries of the world and it has so much to commend it. It has set so many examples. It has many achievements in diplomacy, cuisine and the arts and in many areas of science, but clearly certain aspects of communications are not areas of French excellence. That probably explains why we had this appalling experience in this Assembly. This may be relevant to a debate that we shall have later with regard to the capacity to carry out consultations. The fact remains that, as Lord Finsberg rightly said, the experience is unsatisfactory when one adds to it the fact that this is an unsuitable hall. In a speech to the Assembly yesterday, I described it as a horrid hall. To have this horrid hall and inadequate interpretation facilities is not the mark of a civilised country. I therefore suggest that we advise those responsible that, if these problems continue, members will have to vote with their feet and either not come or demand that we meet elsewhere. I trust that the firm words that Lord Finsberg rightly uttered will be echoed throughout the Assembly and that action will follow so that this week's farce will not be repeated.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

Does anyone wish to speak against the motions? ...

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am not going to speak against the motions, but I should like the President to fill in some details for me.

We have here a problem of technical organisation. You can find all the interpretation facilities you need in Paris and many other places in France. Mr. Galley will certainly not deny this.

I should like to have a progress report on the work required to improve the mechanics of this chamber.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I call Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. There was no interpretation into English, although it has now resumed.

The PRESIDENT. – The interpreter is advising me that she is constantly being cut off and that the English interpretation is spasmodic. I apologise.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I can hear your apologies and those of the technical staff perfectly. The situation is dramatic.

Now I should like the President, or the Assembly secretariat – since Mr. Loutz is responsible for several of the problems before us – to give us some information on this subject. I fully agree with our colleagues' raising the problem of the Assembly's interpretation system, which is a real problem here at this sitting. I ask you, Mr. President, to arrange for us to be informed of present developments in this field, because we are determined to find a solution to all these problems.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Although this is a special procedure, I shall bend the rules a bit, because I think that it is in the interests of the Assembly. First, I have already instructed the Presidential Committee to have on its agenda for its meeting next month all aspects of the points that were touched on by Lord Finsberg – not merely the interpretation facilities, which are catastrophic, but the provision of air-conditioners, the conditions in this horrific room which we have experienced this week, and a number of other different aspects that need urgent attention. Those matters will be considered, and I am demanding reports from Mr. Burgelin and his staff.

Last night, I asked Mr. Burgelin if he would be good enough to talk to us for a few moments about this, to give an explanation from the professional staff's point of view. Without extending

proceedings too long, if some members would like to ask him questions at the end, I am sure that he will endeavour to answer them.

Mr. BURGELIN (*Clerk of the Assembly*) (Translation). – I shall not drown you in technical detail. The Assembly has no equipment of its own, and from its inception WEU has had to rely on SATI, a commercial supplier, which has for many years provided satisfactory services.

As noted by Lord Finsberg, we have been having difficulties for several sessions now, apparently due to the fact that we had to modify the technical facilities when installing the interpreters' booths in the committee rooms, which made the system somewhat more complicated.

The services provided by SATI include some that are unusual. For example, it accepts the constraints involved in our sharing the building with its owner, the Economic and Social Council. The Council insists we do not begin to install our equipment until its own proceedings are over. Usually this gives us two working days, that is to say, the Thursday and Friday before the part-session. On 15th June the Economic and Social Council received Mr. Alain Juppé, Prime Minister of France so that SATI was left with only one day. It accepted this further constraint, forcing it to operate in greater haste than it would have liked. It is by no means certain that some other company would have agreed to do so.

Next, SATI provides the equipment under a hire contract, which saves us buying equipment which rapidly becomes out of date and takes responsibility for its maintenance, something we do not have the necessary technical resources for.

Thus our occupation of the same building as the Economic and Social Council creates difficult constraints and rules out the possible use of permanent facilities which would obviously be much more reliable than the equipment that has to be assembled within the time-frame I have stated and stripped down the day after each of our part-sessions.

SATI worked all night trying to remedy the breakdowns which occurred yesterday. We have seen for ourselves this morning that they were not wholly successful. SATI did not, by the way, guarantee that they would be. They propose to send their equipment back to the works at the end of the part-session for laboratory tests, and to get more satisfactory equipment ready in time for the next part-session.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Would anyone like to ask any questions?

Mr. ALEXANDER (*United Kingdom*). – Lord Finsberg suggested that the Assembly might meet elsewhere – elsewhere in the city or elsewhere in Europe. Are there any constraints that Mr. Burgelin

*Mr. Alexander (continued)*

knows of that prevent such a procedure being adopted, even on an experimental basis?

The PRESIDENT. – I think that I can help you, Mr. Alexander. The rules say: "Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at the seat of the Assembly unless the Presidential Committee of the Assembly decides otherwise." I mentioned the package of matters that I wanted the Presidential Committee to discuss, and one of them will be removing the Assembly sittings to Luxembourg or Brussels.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you are right in hoping that the Presidential Committee will discuss this matter, because I should not like to see a minor mechanical accident blown up into a political manoeuvre to have the Assembly move away from Paris. The strings being pulled behind this suggestion are only too visible.

On behalf of the French Delegation and in agreement with Mr. Valleix, I have to state that we would take a very poor view were the malfunctioning of the microphone and interpretation facilities to be made the reason, as appears to have been suggested, for a debate on the choice of meeting place for the WEU Assembly.

At the risk of repeating myself, you are entirely right, Mr. President, in proposing that this matter be referred to the Presidential Committee and that there be no debate on it today.

The PRESIDENT. – Of course we shall put it on the agenda, but I must say that, as far as I am concerned, there has been no political manoeuvring whatever. It has been plain to anybody who has been here in the past twenty-four hours that it has been sheer hell trying to run a session. I should know – I have to sit up here and try to mollify people and keep the show on the road. I very much hope that Paris can remain the seat of the Assembly. However, it is plain that we cannot run a session in these conditions. One cannot have constant breaks. Yesterday afternoon, I was within a hair's breadth of adjourning the sitting for the rest of the day because people could not hear. It is important that we do something.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – This is a question of the organisation of the secretariat!

The PRESIDENT. – The secretariat hears what you say, Mr. Baume; that is why the committee has to approach the matter in great detail.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am sorry that Mr. Baumel said what he did. He was not here to hear my opening remarks. Had he been here, he would have known that there was no manoeuvre to move away from Paris. I adore Paris, but no self-respecting assembly can conti-

nue to meet in such conditions. Had he been here, Mr. Baumel would have heard the Assembly's overwhelming support of that point. If the problem can be cured, I am delighted and I am sure that my wife will be as well, but there is no ulterior motive. I hope that my friend Mr. Baumel will wish to withdraw his unfair accusations.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Keith Speed.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – Will Mr. Burgelin comment on the fact that, for some considerable time – this is not the first time – there have been complaints about the meeting in June? I have myself complained about the lack of air-conditioning and the stifling atmosphere. What have the Clerk and his colleagues done to investigate the provision of portable air-conditioners, as Lord Finsberg suggested, and other improvements, to ensure that we can not only hear people speak, but remain awake?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Burgelin.

Mr. BURGELIN (*Clerk of the Assembly*) (Translation). – We have asked the Economic and Social Council to put in air-conditioning on several occasions. The Council has no intention of doing so for its own use. This being the case, we would be obliged, as is already the case with interpretation, to install a temporary system for each part-session in operating conditions which are not ideal in a chamber of this size. We have therefore judged so far that it would be unrealistic to install air-conditioning for the June four-day part-session.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlamman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, to prevent this from being a purely British affair, it seems a good idea for me to say something too. I signed the motion. In fact, it was tabled on my initiative.

The first signatory of this motion is Lord Finsberg, because he wrote the text. But once again, it was my initiative.

We did not do this as an affront to our guest speakers. The Prime Minister of Turkey was the first victim, followed by the Greek Minister of Defence. However, my initiative was primarily for ourselves. Those who are actively involved in this Assembly, which after all a number of us are, are operating under working conditions you would not want for your staff. We spend nearly the whole day here. The same applies to you, Mr. President. You should put the labour inspectors onto this. Then we would be forbidden to go on working.

We want to do something about the conditions. We want to support you in your efforts to improve them at the next sitting, especially for the people working in the Assembly. Here I am thinking pri-

*Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)*

marily of the interpreters. I have been informed that this is a particularly difficult working week for the interpreters. It would not be surprising if they went on strike.

So I think that in future we must organise things sensibly for ourselves and for the staff of the Assembly. I know that the Presidential Committee will be looking into the matter at a meeting this week.

The present motion has no other purpose than to change the working conditions for ourselves and the staff. There is absolutely no political motivation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your comments, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, and for your support. You were right to say that this is not just a British venture – it involves a number of our colleagues. Indeed, several came to see me yesterday and said that they felt physically ill and had headaches because of the atrocious conditions in the hemicycle.

The interpreters told me yesterday evening that they were worried because they thought that they might be getting the blame – not just for the total breakdown, but for the constant interruptions in the flow of their interpretation, something that we experienced again this morning.

This is a matter of great urgency and I am meeting the director of SATI at 3.30 this afternoon. He is coming to these offices and we shall give him a big grilling. However, we all know that what has happened is tied in with many other things and I intend to probe the whole affair very deeply indeed.

Even though it will cost money, if necessary we will have to have a new interpretation system installed in the Assembly – whether or not other items of expenditure have to be cut to accommodate that. It is a basic fact that we cannot run this Assembly without interpretation for those who do not speak English or French.

Mr. SKARPHEOINSSON (*Iceland, associate member*). – I wholeheartedly agree with everything that has been said about the air-conditioning and the interpretation system. However, I urge you to consider a further point, Mr. President, at the next meeting of the Presidential Committee. The working conditions of the associate members, associate partners and observers are virtually non-existent. The accommodation provided for us in the outer corridor would not be allowed in my country. In addition, we have no access to computers and other such facilities. I hope that those points will be considered at the forthcoming meeting.

The PRESIDENT. – I think that before we get to computers, we need a little fresh air and the abili-

ty for our speeches to be translated without being cut off. However, I take the point and thank you for commenting. I will take questions from one or two more members, but then we must bring our debate to a close.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – All I wanted to do was to widen the debate. The problems noted, whatever their nature, affect all delegations. I would simply state that I have, as it were, lobbed the ball back to the Assembly secretariat, whose responsibility such things are. I also said that Mr. Loutz in particular was responsible for these matters, just as the French Delegation is doing what it ought to do when it endorses a request for an improvement in our working conditions.

I and my French colleagues, therefore, acknowledge receipt in the most official manner of notice of these complaints, which we do not contest. Addressing myself to the Assembly secretariat, and first and foremost the Presidential Committee, which will lay down procedure, I wish it to be noted that this matter shall be dealt with at the level of the Assembly secretariat and the French Government. This is my undertaking and it is my wish that the Presidential Committee should give reasonable guidance enabling these improvements to be carried out without delay.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lorenzi.

Mr. LORENZI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it would certainly not be a disaster for the WEU Assembly to meet in another country; I would not, however, like a discussion on the lack of air-conditioning equipment to take time away from consideration of such a vitally important subject as the second item on the order of business for today, concerning the resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Lorenzi. This is a very important matter. Indeed, it is fundamental. We cannot have any debates on urgent procedure or anything else unless we can hear what is being said.

I get the clear message from the Assembly that members want something to be done. If Lord Finsberg and Mr. Hardy agree, we can vote on the two motions together.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a motion for an order.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

*The President (continued)*

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The motions are agreed to.*

These matters will now be referred to the Presidential Committee. It will be an important meeting and we will analyse not only the matters referred to in the motions but all the other points raised by various speakers this morning. I thank members for their co-operation.

#### **4. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific**

*(Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1476 and amendment)*

The PRESIDENT. — At its sitting on Tuesday, the Assembly agreed to a request for urgent procedure. Last night, after the end of the sitting, the Defence Committee agreed a motion for a resolution on the resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific. This has been distributed as Document 1476.

The debate this morning on this topic will therefore now take place on this text on which the Assembly will have an opportunity to vote.

Lord FINSBERG. — On a point of order, Mr. President. We have only just seen that document. How can anyone table an amendment to it? It now refers to the United Kingdom whereas none of our discussion on urgent procedure mentioned it. Can I now move an amendment to delete paragraph 2?

The PRESIDENT. — Although it is not normal to accept manuscript amendments, I shall have every sympathy if members wish to present manuscript amendments, as the document has only just been published.

I now ask Sir Russell to address us.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). — This is an important debate but I stress at the beginning that it is limited. Nuclear questions arouse deep emotions in people — rightly, because of the awesome destructive power of nuclear devices, but that is not the subject of this debate. Yesterday, the Assembly voted on the right of members of WEU, of which France is one, to consider and to express an opinion on France's unilateral decision to undertake further nuclear tests. It is important to record that Jacques Baumel, the distinguished Chairman of our Defence Committee, in no way disputed that right when the committee discussed the issue yesterday morning. He strongly and robustly defended France's action, more or less on the lines of his article in *Le Figaro*, but did not argue that the Assembly was not entitled to debate and express a view on France's decision. As the Rapporteur appointed by the

Defence Committee, likewise I do not contest in the recommendations that I lay before the Assembly the right of France to make the decision that it did. I do not contest that it is within France's sovereign power.

By the way, perhaps I may correct something that you said, Mr. President. Because of pressures of time and, perhaps because of the exhaustion that is beginning to affect us all, the committee did not actually approve the motion but gave me the responsibility of drawing it up — the wording is my responsibility entirely. I would not want it thought that the Defence Committee took a decision that it did not take. Yesterday morning, the committee had an extended debate on the question but, although the wording reflects that debate to some degree, it is my responsibility entirely.

I most strongly contest France's failure to make the decision that it did within the alliance. I refer in paragraph (x) to Recommendation 564, which was passed unanimously, as I recall, by the Assembly on 16th June 1994. I remind the Assembly of some of those recommendations. That report on the rôle and future of nuclear weapons had as its Rapporteur, Armand De Decker. Paragraph (xiv) stated: "Noting that it would be totally illogical to start the implementation of a European common foreign and security policy (CFSP) including the framing by WEU of a common defence policy 'which might in time lead to a common defence' without closely examining the rôle of the French and British nuclear forces in the definition of a common defence policy of the European union".

Paragraph (xxi) stated: "Noting that, in regard to the common security policy of the European Union and in the framework of WEU, a study should be made on what France and the United Kingdom consider to be their vital interests which are protected by their nuclear means."

Finally, recommendation 1 to the Council was to establish a strategic study group within WEU "to examine the rôle and future of nuclear weapons for European security including the different aspects of intra-European extended nuclear deterrence; to examine the rôle all the WEU member states might play in defining a future European nuclear strategy".

Lord Finsberg complained at the reference to the United Kingdom. I said that was my responsibility, and I do not seek to shuffle off blame on the Defence Committee. I argue, however, that my wording is completely in line with the report that the Assembly passed more than one year ago and on which, I am afraid, no action has been taken of which I am aware. In fact, we ought not to respond to the French decision by itself — to hedge it around. When debating nuclear issues, we should consider them in respect of both countries

*Sir Russell Johnston (continued)*

in WEU that have a nuclear capacity. I make it clear in the introduction that I wholly understand the French arguments, which I have attempted to set out as fairly as possible, in paragraphs 1 to 4. I am not going to argue about the environmental effects. They will in any event be relatively limited, but I am not an expert. We have not had time to make a proper assessment.

One or two committee members asked yesterday morning for as much information as possible, particularly Sir Keith – but we do not have the resources in the short time available. As I say in the draft resolution, few people – even in France – understand the technical arguments for and against. The information on which President Chirac acted was based on the recommendations of a highly specialised committee numbering only fifteen people. The same goes for most nuclear decisions. The politicians are left in a situation in which it is difficult and sometimes impossible to understand the technical arguments. Nevertheless, we must live with the political conclusions or effects. That is the essence of my argument – that the political consequence is wrong, that the message sent to other countries is wrong and that the lack of consultation within the alliance is to be deplored. On that basis, I invite the Assembly to support the motion.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Russell.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – President Chirac's decision to resume nuclear testing cannot be regarded as the concern of just one country or one continent. In the times we are living in, on the eve of the third millennium, what he proposes to do concerns the whole of mankind.

That can be seen from the reactions. The French President's decision has caused great and legitimate concern throughout the world.

In the Pacific area, the strength of feeling and opposition has been very strong indeed, for the people of that region feel directly threatened. Speaking in Paris, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs voiced the fears and indignation of the Pacific Forum countries. If these tests are harmless to people and environment, why, he asked, does France not choose to conduct its nuclear tests in the Massif Central, where the geological conditions are fairly similar to those in Mururoa?

We know the reply. If nuclear tests were carried out on French soil, the French people and the people of Europe in general would rise up in protest.

Writing in yesterday's *Le Figaro*, Mr. Jacques Baumel claimed that France was at least ten years behind the United States in the field of nuclear testing and argued that Russia still had more than 25 000 nuclear warheads not yet dismantled.

We are not spectators at some nuclear tournament, we are all dwellers on this earth, this fragile planet that is our communal home. The debate on the modernity and size of the nuclear arsenals is absurd, not to say inhuman.

What is the point of a series of tests whose object is to enhance the French arsenal? Just one of the so-called obsolete nuclear weapons stored in France would be sufficient to destroy entire towns, kill hundreds of millions of people and poison the skies of Europe. So what is their point?

Now that the cold war is over, the debate on deterrence has become absurd, especially the talk about mythical dangers emanating from the third world.

France is a highly civilised country. I look upon it as my second home. But it is also regarded as the modern cradle of democracy, freedom and the struggle for human rights. An event such as the one prompting this debate, therefore, takes us all by surprise. Just when the destruction of nuclear arsenals is being demanded on every side, the French President decides to resume nuclear testing. This decision contradicts the non-proliferation treaty and will poison the Geneva negotiations on the final ban on nuclear testing.

Yet, ladies and gentlemen, I am happy to see that presented with the challenge of President Chirac and the generals, the French have taken the initiative and are leading the worldwide fight against the resumption of tests in Mururoa.

The twenty thousand demonstrators at the Bastille on Tuesday firmly expressed the feelings and resolve of those – the vast majority of the world's population – who want an end to the use of force.

To be consistent, our Assembly, which has just debated security questions in Europe and expressed its hopes for the creation of a new world order of real and universal peace, has to join the movement of worldwide protest against the policy of nuclear tests.

Lastly, listening to Sir Russell Johnston, I understood the enormous difficulties he had in producing the report he has submitted to us, for I know of his strong opposition to all kinds of nuclear testing. I think he has done his best but I still regard the text as inadequate. In other circumstances I believe it could have been better, but as you have quite rightly said, our debate has to be very limited.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Next, I call Mr. Lorenzi.



Mr. LORENZI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, first let me thank Mr. Guidi for being the first to sign the motion allowing me to speak this morning on this sensitive subject, which I trust will be given the serious attention it demands.

I should also like to thank Sir Russell Johnston, because his document is extremely important; if its proposals were implemented that would be enough.

In addition, though speaking as an Italian representative, I should also like to be heard as a European because we are not here to represent our separate countries in competition but to defend the interests of Europe.

I should also like to comment on what was said in the Technological and Aerospace Committee on Tuesday morning, because during the international debate which followed, Australia called on France to carry out its nuclear tests somewhere else; there are, in fact, alternatives which I shall look at later.

I mentioned outer space, far from the earth, but in the time I am allowed, I should like to make a number of other points arguing that it is not possible to belong to a military alliance and then behave in such a manner.

I should like to add that the opinions expressed concerning several countries are completely unjustified. Every country has its own dignity and Italy in particular which as the home of Enrico Fermi and the school of via Panisperna, may possibly have something to say. If my country, Italy, was bright enough to discover nuclear energy maybe it is bright enough to give some useful advice.

Moreover, scientific pretexts cannot be advanced when the point at issue is quite different. Let us leave science out; we already disturb it too much, generating too much confusion among the general public by calling something science which is not science. In absolute terms science is good. Unfortunately it is man that fails to put it to good use.

The problem of the resumption of French nuclear tests has consequences at two levels, the one technical and the other strategic. I should like to make a proposal regarding the technical level but my main emphasis will be on the strategic aspect. Indeed, even were this decision to be accepted as being vitally important for the security of Europe as a whole, strategically it could very well be wrong to take it and I challenge the brains who decide on these matters not to believe that they are infallible.

A future war could be quite different from what might be imagined, as we have already seen from what happened in the Tokyo metro, from the firing

of intercontinental missiles which travel to when they strike to a premeditated war planned but not declared and with terrorist features; just think what a single average lorry can carry in a city. So, as the pattern of a future war will perhaps differ from the present one, as we all have good reason to believe, there is nothing to say that it is essential to move in that direction.

What is to be done? Of course, we now have nuclear energy which we must use and unquestionably control. A statement to that effect is made in Sir Russell Johnston's report.

The PRESIDENT. – I must ask the speaker to come to a rapid conclusion.

Mr. LORENZI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. I will conclude quickly by commenting on the committee's proposal.

In a few words, the earth is limited but space is limitless.

Today we have the technology needed to carry out tests away from the earth despite the fact that this is banned in practice by the 1967 treaty. One day we shall reach the point of being able to carry out such tests far from the earth in a highly eccentric orbit round the sun on launchers with heads carrying a nuclear device which could be used and observed throughout the tests without any damage to our planet.

It would be extremely useful to think of proceeding in a manner more worthy of our planet in view of the fact that no damage of any kind can be caused to outer space.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Peter Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – In a restrained and responsible speech, Sir Russell Johnston pointed out that this is not a debate about nuclear weapons. Some people will try to suggest that it is a debate between the antis and the pros. I was never an independent unilateral disarmer and I never joined in marches on any sites. I may not have been part of the prevailing political fashion, but no one can argue that I am speaking as a unilateral nuclear disarmer because I never was one.

I would have marched and been strongly in favour of multilateral disarmament, which is the position that successive elections have shown that the British people want and which is what most of Europe wants – a position that even the French might want. This is not an argument about that, but an argument about whether the world should remain civilised. Heavens above, France, which has accommodated the Council of Europe, Western European Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, is the country above all others that would seek to promote consultation – in the past few years France

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

has been the host to the restructuring of Europe – but now the French Government is saying that it will not consult, and it is not good enough. It sets a bad example and, at the very time when the world is seeking an end to nuclear weapons, with multilateral disarmament – one would expect it to continue to seek that – and non-proliferation, France, of all countries, has decided to disregard mankind and to carry out an arrogant exercise, thinking that the South Pacific does not matter. As a British member of parliament it is right for me to point out that our friends in Australia and New Zealand are entitled to resent that view. Think of New Zealand. In the second world war, the New Zealand people suffered more casualties in the cause of freedom than France or England. Its young men flocked across the seas in defence of democracy and as part of the civilised international community. What is crossing the seas in the reverse direction now?

We are entitled to demand that France, of all countries, lives up to its reputation and acts as part of an international and civilised community. If it is not harmful, let France recognise that exporting poison to another part of the globe is not helpful. Mr. Rodrigues may be right: if it does not do much harm, why must New Zealand and the surrounding area receive the poison? Is not there enough poison already, and is not this example likely to extend it further?

I hope that this report will be accepted and that our French friends will think again.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy. And thank you for keeping within the time.

I now call Mr. Bianchi.

Mr. BIANCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, on 17th May last, President Chirac solemnly reaffirmed the importance of the nuclear deterrent as the basic element in France's defence and gave an undertaking to maintain it at "the required level for sufficiency and credibility".

He was keeping a promise made during the election campaign.

At the time, many people hoped that this was just one of many statements made during the election campaign by political leaders at the prompting of media and opinion poll wizards to win over more of the electorate. As we know, the public likes populist declarations with a nationalist flavour and likes leaders who can demonstrate their determination.

Once elected, it is then for the leader, the true leader, to distinguish what is essential from what is not and to adopt a more balanced and reasonable political attitude, more in line with national sentiment and interests.

In this particular case, however, President Chirac has repeated that the resumption of nuclear tests is an absolute necessity if the rest of the world is not to conclude that France's nuclear arsenal, being largely obsolete, is a kind of paper tiger.

It would appear, in fact, that mastery of the computer-based simulation procedures used in connection with the bomb is necessary and that this requires the explosion of devastating power below ground. I am not a technician and I could even be able to accept this necessity, but I am bound to say that this leads to a series of consequences that cannot be ignored.

First of all, the French decision has been taken at a time when signature of the non-proliferation treaty has been refused or delayed in the case of a number of countries that also advance the principle of the need to defend supreme national interests. This being so, the decision taken does not help towards the conclusion and ratification of this fundamental treaty.

Second, the nuclear tests would take place not on French metropolitan territory but in an area bordering on nations and countries which quite rightly have protested, for it is one thing to locate such explosions in an area where the foreseeable fall-out or "fall-up" affects the French population, who quite rightly are called on to meet the cost of the operation in every sense and quite another to carry out tests on the backs of other people.

Third, we know that officially there are four nuclear powers; what would the French say if all four scrapped the moratorium dating from 1992 and resumed nuclear explosions for the sole purpose of a technological update of their arsenals?

What would the rest of the world say? What would it say about the idea of these technological updatings becoming an annual event? Ladies and gentlemen, I had hoped that over the last few years sound common sense had led all leaders to take the action needed to eliminate the risk of a nuclear holocaust and to restore the faith of rising generations in the survival of humanity and human life.

But when I see, yet again, that probably in order to send coded signals to friends, satisfy the armed forces and fulfil a policy of the appearance of strength instead of a policy of strong ideas, there has been no hesitation in sacrificing the rights of peoples and individuals, I can only express my profound bewilderment.

So, let my modest voice too be lined up against the political arguments behind the French decision: a great centre party like that headed by President Chirac, which has the admiration of my own party, should be sending out signals of balance, moderation, sound reasoning and respect for

*Mr. Bianchi (continued)*

the rules; it should not, consumed with national pride, be indulging in flag-waving to advance its own security and defence policy – a policy which, given the present system of alliances, should be restrained and above all consistent.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Bianchi.

The next speaker is Mr. Korakas.

Mr. KORAKAS (*Greece*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the nations of this world have long looked forward not only to a complete ban on nuclear tests and a halt to the expansion of nuclear arsenals, but even to a phased reduction process, leading to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Their existence, as that of all other instruments of mass destruction, is a contradiction in itself, denying as it does the very idea of life, human or other.

Thus, the recent decision by the President of France is harmful to the interests of both the French people and the other nations of Europe. We have heard the arguments put forward by the new French President and the political forces he represents and read about them in the press. The truth, however, is that France is breaking the moratorium on nuclear testing and effectively undermining the non-proliferation treaty, recently renewed by the United Nations. The French act is really an encouragement to all those countries that would like to have nuclear weapons. The fact that the United States, or other nuclear powers, are themselves modernising their nuclear capability or testing their weapons is not a valid excuse. It is the classic argument for an arms race. In our resolution today, therefore, we must call upon these countries to honour their commitments and listen to the voice of the world of today. What humanity needs is for these weapons to be destroyed in their totality, each and every one of them, surely not their further development and deployment.

I am convinced that the President of France will eventually choose this path, in response to the aspirations and hopes of the people of his country and everyone on this earth. What people hope has been made clear enough by the initial reactions to his decision and I trust we have yet to see the end of them.

Therefore, I must say, gentlemen, that I find the draft resolution put forward in this Assembly rather timid and out of scale with the seriousness of the matter. I even sense an attempt at justifying France's decision.

I believe a firmer and clearer stand is called for.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Your track record is improving, Mr. Korakas, on the time and the speed of your delivery. We are most grateful.

The next speaker is Mr. Naess.

Mr. NAESS (*Norway, associate member*). – In the words of the Norwegian Government, which I support on this issue: “Norway strongly deplores the French decision to resume nuclear testing, which will put a strain on the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty at the disarmament conference in Geneva. The decision to resume nuclear testing represents a set-back in relation to the progress that has been made in disarmament efforts in recent years. The French decision will complicate efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and will not contribute to efforts to establish an international community in which the rôle of nuclear weapons is significantly reduced. The Norwegian authorities thus urge the French authorities to reverse their decision.”

The decision of the French Government is dangerous and harmful to the efforts effectively to ban the testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons. France has no moral right to resume nuclear testing. If eight tests for France are acceptable, then how many will it be for the United States? What would we expect for Russia or China? Could India or Pakistan, or any other country possibly capable of becoming a nuclear power, be expected to refrain from performing the tests that they would consider desirable?

As has been said, France has effectively opened the door to any country wishing to start or resume nuclear testing. That is the seriousness of the condition. In that situation, what is the value of an alliance if any country may follow what it perceives as its own interests, regardless of the opinions of its fellow members? Why do we gather to discuss a common security and defence policy if any country may do just what it feels like anyway?

If the Assembly does not support this moderate resolution, it will demonstrate a disastrous degree of impotence. We might as well go home and stay at home, where at least we have tolerable working conditions, with room for our legs, with air-conditioning and with microphones that function.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Next is Mr. de Lipkowski.

Mr. de LIPKOWSKI (*France*) (Translation). – While a number of the paragraphs in the draft resolution are acceptable, except for the two or three about which Mr. Baumel will speak, I find what I have just heard in this Assembly quite unacceptable and shocking. In the words of a French saying: the greater the exaggeration the less the significance.

Which means I have heard a lot of empty words this morning, mainly from Mr. Hardy, Mr. Bianchi and Mr. Korakas such as: we are not a civilised

*Mr. de Lipkowski (continued)*

country – we are endangering the survival of mankind – we are exporting our poison to Australia and New Zealand – we are condemning these countries to death – our sole motive is national pride. None of this will have the slightest effect on the French Government. I tell you at once that this sort of excessive language will not affect our determination.

Our purpose is clear. We have taken on a number of commitments to the international community and we have agreed with the other nuclear powers to conclude a total test ban treaty at the end of 1996. In May we accepted a recommendation by the NPT conference to conclude negotiations on this ban. In the meantime, after consulting our experts, we are obliged to conduct these tests in order to keep our word, i.e. to move on to the simulation phase by the end of 1996, when tests will be banned. We are not yet ready technically but we will be once these tests have enabled us to settle the simulation problem. These tests are also necessary to obtain the technical information we need to ensure that our nuclear weapons are reliable, i.e. to ensure that these weapons, whose average life-span is twenty years, do not become obsolete and to maintain our nuclear capability in a world that will remain nuclear for a long time to come. Now, our capability affects the security of Europe, since our nuclear weapons are at Europe's disposal. So I am very surprised that some members of this Assembly want to deprive themselves of this deterrent by telling us we should not keep it serviceable. The President of the French Republic would have been totally irresponsible if he had refused to follow our experts' advice.

Nor must we forget that the political, strategic and technological situation of the nuclear powers differs widely. The number of tests carried out in earlier years by the United States and Russia is very large, over 1 000 in the case of the United States and 700 in Russia's case. Thanks to these tests, they gained a considerable advantage in terms of the functioning of their nuclear weapons as compared with France which only carried out 192 tests. To my knowledge, no one and none of the high-minded speakers in this Assembly ever protested against these tests. So there are two sets of weights and measures: on the one hand these totally safe and innocent tests conducted by Russia and the United States and, on the other, the tests condemned because they are carried out by France. What is more, the two superpowers have a highly diversified nuclear arsenal, which makes the maintenance of their deterrent that much easier.

China, for its part, is still running a programme of very high-powered nuclear tests but I have never heard a word of criticism of them in this Assembly.

Again, we have two weights and measures: on the one hand, an entirely acceptable and proper Chinese bomb, on the other, a wicked French bomb that wreaks mayhem on the environment.

As I said, France has to carry out this modernisation very quickly, otherwise its deterrent capability could become obsolete and might quite simply cease to be, which is not in Europe's interest. This is a limited campaign, as you know, it is not aimed at designing new weapons. So we are not embarked on an arms race and our level of deterrence is governed by the principle of strict sufficiency. Unlike the other nuclear powers whom you have never criticised, we have never developed to the overkill level, as it is called in English.

We keep our European partners informed of our intentions but we do not have to consult them. In that respect, paragraph (viii) of the motion for a resolution is quite unacceptable. There is no agreement that requires us to consult our partners. Furthermore, you know full well that in the nuclear field, consultation is a false concept. This is a weapon that cannot be shared, that requires rapid decision-making, making consultation impossible. The best guarantee for European defence is to have a Franco-British nuclear arm, the importance of which, incidentally, was recognised at the 1991 Rome summit of heads of state and government.

After these tests, we will have checks made to put an end to all that I have heard in the chamber this morning, which would be laughable were it not so shocking. For example, Mr. Hardy said we were going to export poison to Australia and New Zealand. Let me simply inform him ...

The PRESIDENT. – I am sorry to interrupt you, Mr. de Lipkowski, especially as you are the first speaker on the other side, but I should be glad if you would bring your remarks to a close.

Mr. de LIPKOWSKI (*France*) (Translation). – There have been three investigations. The first was carried out in 1982 by Mr. Haroun Tazieff, the well-known scientist, who agreed there were no toxic gases in the atmosphere. You know that these tests are done at a depth of 600 metres in the earth plus 300 metres in basalt rock, totalling 900 metres. Next there was an Australian-New Zealand mission under Mr. Atkinson, whose report I would very much like Mr. Hardy to read. After visiting the site, it found there were no noxious substances in the atmosphere. I will send you that report, Mr. Hardy, it will stop you making wholly irresponsible statements in this Assembly. Finally, in 1988, an investigation by Commander Cousteau also found there were no emanations of toxic gas.

I would also remind you that the Chinese are conducting experiments far closer to Australia and New Zealand than ours in Mururoa.

*Mr. de Lipkowski (continued)*

That is all I have to say, Mr. President. We have already had reasons for deploring WEU's ineffectiveness. If we add to that a ban on Europe having its own nuclear protection, there is no point meeting together in this chamber. Let us just call ourselves an Assembly of philosophers and moralists, but Europe cannot deprive itself of a nuclear defence of which France is an essential component.

Mr. KORAKAS (*Greece*) (Translation). – I would like to correct something, due possibly to a problem of interpretation ... I did not say that France was not a civilised country. I said that the decision of the President of France was contrary to the sentiments and aspirations of the French people ...

Mr. de LIPKOWSKI (*France*) (Translation). – You are not the judge of the French people!

Mr. KORAKAS (*Greece*) (Translation). – I can express an opinion! I am not judging France. I have a lot of respect for the French people and for their country's history.

The PRESIDENT. – We cannot have such exchanges across the hemicycle. We are all responsible for what we say. If we challenge someone to disagree, there are other ways to deal with any response.

I call Mr. Schloten.

Mr. SCHLOTEN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, although I am not an expert in this field I would like to make a few basic comments from the German point of view.

Let me say that the French decision to resume nuclear tests will not impair Franco-German friendship. But friends must be allowed to exchange views, to speak openly with each other and also to express concern. I intend to do this by making three points.

First, let me say that we were and are fully aware of the importance both of the French and of the British and American nuclear weapons to security in Europe. But I must also say that we would not regard our security as in any way impaired if France did not conduct any further nuclear weapons tests.

Second, let me point out that we in the European Union and in Western European Union have adopted a common approach, which we successfully maintained in New York. Do the tests announced really mean that France is going it alone? The Germans are often accused of being in danger of going it alone. That is not so in our case, but we are certainly entitled to ask whether France really does want to do that. Was it not President Mitter-

rand who suspended the last series of tests because he took the view that in the long run France should not go it alone?

Lastly, I want to express my concern that if these tests are carried out they will cause considerable damage. It may be that Mr. Baumel will go swimming near the nuclear test site in the Pacific a second time, as he said yesterday morning in committee. We hope he enjoys it. But whether the fish or other sea food from this area will still be edible, whether they will make people ill – all these questions remain open and unanswered. We must bear them in mind. But I regard the resultant political damage as much more serious. It has been referred to by several speakers today. Presumably there will be a knock-on effect. We have already heard that the United States may want to resume nuclear weapons testing. Others will probably follow. If this should prompt India, Pakistan and possibly threshold countries in the Middle East to conduct nuclear weapons tests, then I think that would lead not only to terrible environmental damage in our world but also to political instability, which would have devastating consequences for the security order we all want in our world.

In conclusion, let me emphasise again that this sovereign decision by France will not affect the friendship and partnership between Germany and France. But at the same time I would appeal to our friends to reconsider this project in the interests of that friendship, in the interests of European partnership and in the interests of the consequences worldwide.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, when the non-proliferation treaty was signed in New York a few weeks ago, it was a great satisfaction to the international world, in terms of security and defence. The disappointment was great when China tested a nuclear bomb a few days later. I am well aware that the non-proliferation treaty is not specifically concerned with the testing of nuclear bombs, but we all know that there is of course a connection.

Mr. de Lipkowski has just said in his statement that he heard no protests following the Chinese tests. That is not true. Anyone in the international world who is at all concerned with this matter knows that there were protests against the Chinese tests everywhere. The fact that action was not immediately taken here, in particular in the Defence Committee of Western European Union, to protest against the Chinese tests, seems to me to be only natural, just as it is only natural that we are protesting in this case. For France is a member of the Western European security organisation,

*Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)*

which China is not. When the matter concerns one of the countries in our own organisation, it is only natural for us to take action when we feel we must do so.

Yesterday the Chairman of the Defence Committee, Mr. Baumel, said that he was rather surprised that the socialists had now tabled a motion protesting against the French nuclear tests. He also said that this was a political gesture, because in the past, when there was a different government in France, the socialists did not protest. Mr. Baumel, that is not true! Perhaps it can be explained by the fact that the socialists in France have always taken a different approach from the socialists in the part of Europe we then called Western Europe. The Scandinavian countries are certainly part of it. In that respect I am happy with the speech we have just heard from my Norwegian colleague. Western Europe and the Nordic countries have always taken a consistent stand, at least in socialist circles, against nuclear weapons tests. So it is not true, certainly not in this case, that a political gesture is being made in the Assembly because France now has a government that is not made up of socialists.

The disappointment at the French tests – as other colleagues have also said – is extremely deep, especially because we thought we were making positive progress with a common European security policy, at least as far as consultation is concerned. It is a disappointment as regards co-operation. It is a disappointment that the partners in this organisation were not consulted or informed. Of course we recognise that every country has the right – I would demand the same right for my own country – to decide what happens there, and that includes the field of defence but in this case a common European security policy requires that you take your partners seriously, that you do not go it alone and head towards confrontation with your partners. I am very glad that France is going to sign the comprehensive test ban treaty anyway. We have heard that optimistic note not just today but in the past few days too. So we are certainly counting on that. In any case we hope that as partners of France in the European security system we will be spared any further surprises such as the one we had a few days ago with the French nuclear test.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, I ask speakers to observe the flashing light, otherwise, given our heavy agenda, we will not complete our business till late afternoon.

I next call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – As Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman was just saying, we are here to promote a common European defence

policy. Well, we have to have the means. The cold war may be over, but the world has not been transformed into a paradise and even in Europe everyday life is not one long, calm river.

Where technology is concerned – and after my colleague Mr. de Lipkowski's speech, I extracted the essential elements from the sometimes heated debate, this being a subject which often arouses more passion than rational behaviour – where technology is concerned, we need to beware of chancing our luck. The day before yesterday, in the Technological and Aerospace Committee, we were discussing the possible processing, or liquidation, of the atom by dumping it in space in some way. We have not yet reached that stage. No one understands what they are talking about when such ideas are put forward. Indeed, I read that nuclear tests could be carried out in Corrèze! What a nice, amusing idea. But seriously, when the United States carry out tests in Nevada, it is because the United States is twenty times bigger than France. When these tests are carried out in the atolls of the Pacific, their consequences are virtually non-existent in terms of human life and actual damage to the environment.

Mr. Lorenzi was speaking earlier about this perfectly good science and the bad use man makes of it. I would like to point out that on this subject we are not mad. I am still waiting for someone to quote me one incident, one nuclear exercise for which French experts can be blamed, be they scientists or military personnel. I understand that after hearing my speech on Monday evening, some people were astonished. What we want is to be able to carry out certain nuclear tests so that we can move on to simulated tests, while maintaining a strategically reliable weapon. And that is where we come to the political problem, the strategic problem.

Without wanting to upset our friend from Norway, I would say that respecting treaties is one thing, I am all in favour of that, but we are not saving whales here. Let us not confuse the issue, let us have a consistent approach. I recall that when Chamberlain returned from Munich in 1938, public opinion in Britain and in France applauded him. We are responsible for defending and protecting public opinion – against itself, if need be. We must have the means to protect ourselves and carry out our responsibilities where public opinion is concerned. In this respect, was the Star Wars concept simply a fantasy? Would it have come to an end had the Americans not taken all the risks involved? We Europeans must also have the wherewithal to protect ourselves without sheltering under the American umbrella, and equip ourselves with weapons which will still be effective in the future. It is on this idea of defence that I would like us all to be in agreement. France is in a position to talk about it. Our budget is one

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

of the highest and is not dedicated solely to making atomic bombs. Because we believe that defence is part of the national identity and dignity of a country we share the same sentiments, but France is making a big effort. You can rest assured she has not acted in a fanciful and reckless manner in deciding to resume nuclear testing.

I will conclude on a very political note. I would point out to our Australian friends that when British tests were carried out in that country there was neither public reaction nor incident, still less any damage to life or the environment.

When Mr. Clinton meets Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, they take note of their differing views without making a *casus belli* of them. France – and presently Jacques Baumel will certainly be saying this better than I can – will respect its commitment to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty at the end of 1996, as planned.

I am grateful to Mr. Schloten for showing moderation, realism and a sense of responsibility in his speech. Indeed, Chancellor Kohl fully recognised that this was an internal matter for France.

I would not want this debate to be divisive. It is in the common European interest that we should have a deterrent. Taking into account the opinion of the British, the French and many more of you, let us respect the dates and the commitments we have made for 1996. This debate, which we wanted to conduct in depth, must result in a very measured acceptance of responsibility, very positive and realistic in relation to the future.

The PRESIDENT. – As our guest of honour has arrived I will have to interrupt the debate in a few minutes. I will take one more speaker before we hear from the President of Lithuania.

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – The Rapporteur, Sir Russell, is an old friend and colleague and a man in whom the Defence Committee, understandably, places total trust. I do the same. I query, however whether the committee is permitted to do so under the rules, which make it clear that the committee must present a text. Sir Russell has not presented a text passed by the committee. Nothing in the rules permits delegation to Sir Russell.

I raise that matter in the hope that the President will ask the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to look into it. I do not intend to press the matter today and ask for a decision because this debate is very important, but we must not have such ambiguity in the future.

If I can cover the substance of my amendment within my five minutes, I will move it formally

when the time comes, but if we are to take a decision on this text we need to be certain that we are taking it in the light of facts – not media suppositions, or public opinion, but facts.

Above all, we need a comprehensive test ban treaty as soon as possible. The French Government's commitment to CTBT is well known and President Chirac reaffirmed it when he announced the resumption of testing. There is no reason why a limited programme of the sort that the French Government announced should affect what we all want, which is the successful conclusion of the comprehensive test ban treaty. It is important that we are not deflected from that aim.

I am not sure whether the resolution in front of us is likely to help persuade the French Government one way or the other. I certainly believe it to be very counter-productive and that is why, unless I can be convinced otherwise by later stages of this debate, I cannot support it and will vote against.

On the substance of my amendment, this urgent procedure has enabled us to discuss the resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific, but paragraph 2 of Sir Russell's motion has absolutely nothing to do with that. It speaks of starting a discussion with the British Government on nuclear force co-operation and integrating those forces into a common European security and defence policy. That is muddying the waters and the paragraph ought not to be in the document. For that, if for no other reason, I would vote against. The paragraph is wholly unacceptable and I believe that my British conservative colleagues will certainly take that view. I hope that all the British delegates might find the paragraph unacceptable in this document, which is the point. In a document dealing with nuclear matters in full, it would have been fine. This document is limited and permission was given for the debate to deal only with French nuclear tests.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Finsberg, and thank you for keeping within time.

The debate is adjourned.

##### *5. Address by Mr. Brazauskas, President of the Republic of Lithuania*

The PRESIDENT. – I have great pleasure in welcoming Mr. Brazauskas, the President of the Republic of Lithuania. The Baltic states have been well represented here this week and it is a great pleasure that you are able to address us this morning.

I see from my research that you are a civil engineer by original training. We could have done with your services this week because of the complexities of our interpretation system. Be that as it

*The President (continued)*

may, you have had a distinguished public career in your country and you are playing a leading part in the emergence of the Baltic states.

Lithuania has considerable contacts with our Assembly, which began in 1992. Lithuanian members and delegates play a significant part in our activities and we are encouraging them to do so.

I paid a very useful visit to Lithuania last September, where the need for liaison with the Baltic Assembly was established, as well as with the three countries generally and that is a priority for WEU.

Lithuania has a key rôle to play, not only geographically, but in Europe in general. That is why we are grateful to you for coming here and happy that you will be able to address us. Please come to the forum to speak.

Mr. BRAZAUSKAS (*President of the Republic of Lithuania*). – Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to express my gratitude for the opportunity to represent at this forum the state of Lithuania and its nation, the identity of which, though temporarily suppressed, was never erased from the map of western civilisation. It is both an honour and responsibility.

The current strategy of Lithuania's geopolitical reappearance in Europe is based on the following four elements. First, to maintain internal political and social stability under the conditions of energetic and extensive democratic changes and market reforms. Second, to maintain businesslike and friendly bilateral relations with our neighbours and other states. Third, to expand regional co-operation. Fourth, to develop and broaden co-operation with western integration structures: the European Union, Western European Union and NATO, until we gain membership. This is a decisive and especially important direction for Lithuania.

I would like to give a brief characterisation of each direction. I can state with full responsibility that the situation in Lithuania is stable. Political and economic stability against the background of resolute reforms, constitutes the basis of Lithuania's integration in Europe. The principal signs of economic recovery are noted. Lithuania neither experiences dangerous political or social tension nor has any problems with its ethnic minorities. The progress achieved by Lithuania in the fields of democracy and economy is no less impressive than that in the other Central European states.

In recent years, particularly good results were achieved in establishing friendly bilateral relations with other states. It is important to note that not a single neighbouring state threatens Lithuania directly. Lithuania does not consider any state

to be its enemy and makes no territorial claims upon anyone. Bilateral agreements on good neighbourliness that were signed with Russia, Poland and Belarus established a good basis for the further development of relations with these countries. This fact is of particular importance, because the history of our relations with Russia and Poland was rather complicated. At present we are successfully developing overall co-operation with Poland, which is of significance to the entire Central European region. We expect that Poland will become a good and co-operative partner in the areas of peace-keeping and airspace control. The policy that Lithuania has selected towards its neighbours corresponds to the ideas expressed in the European pact on stability. The example of Lithuania demonstrates that the wave of reconciliation between nations, which was initiated by France and Germany, is successfully heading east. These words being spoken here in Paris, on the day when the second world war broke out in Lithuania fifty-four years ago, have a symbolic meaning.

For political, economic and security reasons, we need a feeling of solidarity in the region. In my opinion, the regions of both the Baltic states and the Baltic Sea states have good prospects. Co-operation between the three Baltic countries and the five Nordic states is important. Relations with the Visegrad group as well as with Central Europe as a whole are getting stronger.

The European Agreement, which was signed with Lithuania and other Baltic states in Luxembourg ten days ago, creates a new geopolitical situation in Europe. Having signed the agreement, Lithuania became of equal importance within the political region of Central Europe.

Like other Central European states, Lithuania cannot ensure its security by itself. Our choice is clear. Having expressed its wish to become a member of NATO and WEU, Lithuania seeks to join common European efforts directed at ensuring peace and security within the region and Europe. We are convinced that a carefully considered expansion of WEU, NATO and the EU will not establish new lines of division in Europe. On the contrary, it will eliminate zones of uncertainty and divisions that still exist since the cold war.

At present, Western European Union is becoming increasingly firmly established as the European structure of collective defence. The Union is becoming noticeably stronger, in both a political and military sense. Associate partner status enables Lithuania to integrate gradually into the political structures of WEU. Lithuania supports the decisions which the Council of Ministers adopted in Lisbon last month, which encourage the effectiveness of WEU. Along with the other twenty-six countries, Lithuania works on the further development of the white paper on European



*Mr. Brazauskas (continued)*

security. We should like to see the status of associate partners of WEU become stronger and broader. In this respect we have a concrete proposal: the knowledge and experience of Lithuanian scientists could be used in scientific and technological co-operation in the field of defence within the framework of WEU.

Undoubtedly, the security of associate partners has increased in certain respects. Military relations are developing alongside a political dialogue. At present, the military forces of Lithuania are being adapted to carry out WEU humanitarian, evacuation, peace-keeping and peace-making operations. We have already gained certain experience of peace-keeping missions. Lithuanian soldiers participate in peace-keeping operations in Croatia within the structure of a Danish military unit. Lithuania is determined to use actively the opportunities offered by the Planning Cell of WEU. We also wish to participate in the establishment of the European Corps. In order to strengthen both the rôle played by WEU in Central Europe and our relations with the Union, we propose that a military unit subordinate to WEU be established by the states of the region. To this end, the experience of Lithuania, Denmark and Poland in setting up a joint peace-keeping battalion might be useful. The intergovernmental conference that is to take place in 1996 should solve common problems of security in a way that would essentially strengthen WEU as a European pillar in support of NATO. According to the individual partnership programme with NATO, Lithuania will participate in more than 160 joint events, including six exercises under the PFP programme.

The summit meeting in Cannes presents us with another opportunity to discuss the interests of Lithuania within the strategy of the creation of Europe. It is the first time that Lithuania will participate in an EU meeting at the highest level, which will be carried out according to the formula of fifteen full members and eleven associate members.

I have no doubt that the voice of associate members of the EU will also be heard at the intergovernmental conference in 1996. We hope that the conference will speak for a more rapid expansion of the European Union and for the acceleration and strengthening of integration.

As realistic optimists, we expect to become members of the EU around the year 2000. Not only will membership of the EU be beneficial to Lithuania economically but it will serve as a guarantee of security, particularly if defence policy, while increasing the mandate of WEU, could be ascribed to EU competence. Lithuania recognises the same common values as the entire NATO

community. They are the basis for our rapprochement. All this is also inter-related with the concept of economic security, because large investments and trade relations equal defence potential and protection.

May I emphasise one of the main aspects of Lithuania's security? A situation in which the Baltic states, in the context of their relations with the EU, WEU and NATO, were separated from the other Central and Eastern European states, would in my opinion be unfortunate for both the Baltic countries and the West. All democratic Central European states that seek membership of NATO should be granted equal political opportunities.

Through its active participation in the PFP programme, Lithuania strives to achieve a necessary level of interoperability with NATO military forces. I stress that Lithuanian military forces participated in all three peace-keeping exercises under the PFP programme in the second half of 1994. We have been observing with pleasure the close co-operation between NATO and WEU in operations on the Adriatic sea and the Persian gulf, aimed at ensuring the implementation of sanctions introduced by the United Nations Security Council. We set great store by the efforts of both organisations to develop the concept of a combined joint task force. NATO remains the most effective guarantee of European security and defence. We do not doubt the necessity of United States participation in European defence.

Lithuania employs a very clear strategy in the field of defence. First, it includes the establishment of a security and defence system that has required and will require in future a considerable amount of finance, which will be forthcoming from our budget. At present, the Parliament of Lithuania is deliberating the draft concept of national security.

First, the concept emphasises Lithuania's determination to integrate into the structures of WEU and NATO. Second, it provides for participation in joint European operations in the line of conflict-prevention and crisis-management, as well as affiliation to NATO political and military structures. Finally, as was stressed previously, it provides full membership in the alliance.

One cannot ignore the rôle of Russia within the context of European security and stability. The fact that Lithuania and Russia do not experience in their relationship any serious problems in connection with ethnic minorities, state borders or the like, is a significant achievement of both these countries.

A special security agreement between the western states and Russia, discussed for a long time, is one of the ways to avoid Russia's isolation within the context of NATO expansion. Strategic

*Mr. Brazauskas (continued)*

partnership between NATO and Russia should be fortified by economic partnership between the EU and Russia.

Lithuania has no significant experience in the work of international organisations. Moreover, the search for common solutions that would correspond to the interest of small and big states is both effort- and time-consuming. However, we understand well that there is no other way. Disappointment is an alien feeling to us. We cherish a democratic way of problem-solving and are ready to perfect it through joint efforts.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have a common goal, as Europeans, to establish the system of European security. There is no other alternative for the integration of Europe. The unification of Europe is a historic occasion, which provides the opportunity to preserve and ensure the continuation of European civilisation for an unlimited time in this dynamically changing world.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. If you would be good enough to return to your seat, we have some questions.

I call Mr. Pastusiak.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Poland, associate partner*). – During your visit several months ago to Poland, in your excellent speech in the Polish Parliament, you suggested a number of ideas to strengthen Polish-Lithuanian co-operation in defence and security. I am happy to note that many of the ideas that you presented to the Polish Parliament are now being implemented. One is the joint system of air traffic control and another is the project that you mentioned today – the joint training of Polish and Lithuanian forces for peace-keeping operations.

My question concerns the air defence and air traffic control system. Such a system will be more effective if more countries join Lithuania. What is the policy of Lithuania in this respect? What chances are there of extending or broadening co-operation, particularly with Western European countries, in such a system?

Mr. BRAZAUSKAS (*President of the Republic of Lithuania*) (Translation). – Recently, after the restoration of the independence of Lithuania, we encountered the serious problem of airspace control. That issue is of particular importance to both Poland and Lithuania, and especially Lithuania as it is surrounded on two sides by Russia and Belarus. Everybody is aware of the fact that both in the district of Kaliningrad as well as Belarus, considerable air forces are deployed.

Bearing in mind what I said before, I proposed in Warsaw this year the establishment of a joint airspace control, which has been successfully

implemented by both the countries in question. I also proposed to expand the number of partners in the joint airspace control system, in particular to include the other two Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, and perhaps even further, Hungary. I believe that that is one of the successful ways of co-operation.

I also hope that the strong industrial states, as well as your respected organisation, and perhaps even NATO, will give us support in this respect.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I call next Mr. Schloten.

Mr. SCHLOTEN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have recently heard several reports that Russian frontier troops are stationed on the border between Poland and Belarus, and yesterday I heard that the same is happening again on the Kazakhstan border. I want to ask you whether Russian frontier troops are also deployed on the border between Lithuania and Belarus.

In this context, I would also like to ask whether you think France's resumption of nuclear tests will strengthen the security of your country.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Brazauskas.

Mr. BRAZAUSKAS (*President of the Republic of Lithuania*) (Translation). – The border between Lithuania and Belarus stretches over 600 kilometres and, for the first time this century, we have managed to regulate the issue of the state border between our two countries, and we signed an agreement on that. The activity undertaken on behalf of the Government of Belarus recently has aroused much debate and, for the first time, the debate has arisen in Lithuania. According to my information, the border between Belarus and Lithuania is being guarded by Belarus border troops. However, as regards customs, we have noticed the reappearance of the first Russian customs employees on the Belarus border with Lithuania.

As to relations within the CIS countries, especially in the economy and in the military sector, Belarus is a member of that CIS union and is strongly connected with those countries, especially in economic terms. However, I cannot make the same statement about the military sector. Lithuania and Belarus signed an agreement, at presidential level, on the state border between the two countries. We can only hope that the Parliament of Belarus will ratify it.

On the second question, about the resumption of nuclear testing, that issue has aroused much discussion and reaction in Europe. However, during the few minutes after the question was asked, I could not figure out the direct effect on Lithuania. The relations that are established in Europe, in particular between the democratic states, give us

*Mr. Brazauskas (continued)*

hope and belief that nuclear tests, as well as the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons, will be stopped once and for all.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Alexander.

Mr. ALEXANDER (*United Kingdom*). – Over the years, WEU has enjoyed contributions from your representatives, Mr. President, in the activities and discussions of WEU. As you know, at present your country only has associate partnership with WEU. Full membership would, of course, involve accepting mutual security guarantees. In view of the history of your country and what has happened to it, would your country wish to take the step of seeking full membership of WEU, which would involve accepting mutual security guarantees? Would such a step be acceptable to the majority of your people?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Brazauskas.

Mr. BRAZAUSKAS (*President of the Republic of Lithuania*) (Translation). – The Lithuanian position is quite clear and I emphasised it in my speech. Our security can be considered only within the framework of European security, and under the European security umbrella. Therefore, our determination to become a member of WEU and NATO is well understood. That wish was clearly expressed in a letter sent to the NATO authorities in January 1994. That wish for the direction in which we want Lithuania to go is supported by practically all the political parties in Lithuania, as well as by the entire nation.

This is an especially sensitive issue, bearing in mind Lithuania's specific geographical position as it relates to her neighbours. Russia's reaction to Lithuania and other neighbours is understandable. As I said in my speech, we believe that the European defence structures would give a security guarantee to Lithuania, but our affiliation to those European defence structures does not mean that there would be any confrontation with Russia. Indeed, we are in favour of Russia's affiliation to and more active participation in European defence structures.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your excellent address and your very frank answers to questions, Mr. President. I am sure that the Assembly well understands Lithuania's delicate and sometimes difficult relationships with its neighbours from the old Soviet Union because of your geographical position – something to which you have just referred. The balance must be carefully maintained. So far, the three Baltic states have handled the situation robustly and sensibly and we hope that that will continue.

I make no bones about the fact that I personally believe that there should be one class, and one

class only, of WEU membership. Of course, there can still be observer status for those who have a neutralist tinge to their reckoning. However, if we are to have a successful European strategy for defence and security, it is inevitable that we must also have a general membership for all those countries of good will that wish to participate – not only as part of the umbrella that is available to all such countries, but to make their own real contributions to matters that arise from time to time in the greater Europe.

It is a great help and reassurance when distinguished people like you, Mr. President, come here to talk to us. You are one of four or five Presidents who have visited us in recent sessions. It underlines the seriousness of your associate partnership and your great interest in WEU, which is well supported by your delegates – and, of course, the delegates from all nine countries that joined us so successfully a year ago.

Again, I thank you very much, Mr. President. I hope that you will excuse me for not escorting you from the hemicycle. I know that you will understand the need to deal with the next business before the end of the session. I look forward to seeing you later.

## 6. Resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific

(Resumed debate on the oral report of the Defence Committee and vote on the motion for a resolution, Doc. 1476 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT. – We will now resume the debate.

I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – When presenting his motion, Sir Russell Johnston reminded us that this was a limited debate. He is right. In this Assembly we cannot take any direct decisions concerning France's intention to resume nuclear testing; we have no authority to prevent it. All we can do is to make known our disapproval of the fact that France has taken the decision it has and to request, as we do very cautiously – and I would like to emphasise the caution and balance with which Sir Russell Johnston has presented this motion – to request the French President to re-examine his decision and to change it, if he believes that to be appropriate, as we do.

It is true that it is very difficult to discuss a scientific matter about which some scientists hold one opinion, and others hold another. I have had the opportunity of hearing debates on French television where French scientists were saying that it was right to carry out these tests, that there was no possibility of negative consequences from the ecological viewpoint and other scientists were saying

*Mr. de Puig (continued)*

exactly the opposite. But it should not be a scientific decision. It should be a political decision. Faced with the political decision France has taken, we say we believe this is a mistake. And it has political consequences; political consequences relating to the criticism France has received – and it has received many and will receive more – from governments, parties, institutions and personalities, for taking this decision. This was a risk France was prepared to take, a risk it has taken and whatever happens it will be criticised. It is also a political error because we have just approved the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in New York. For years we have been asking some countries which were not in this club to sign it, to agree with us, to carry out effective control, as it says in Article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, to progress towards the ideal situation which would be the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We have asked such countries to join this club, to sign the indefinite establishment of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and now France gives them this image of nuclear tests, an image which does not seem to me to be positively political, although France may have its reasons.

Obviously we are going to respect France's right to take this decision, and I believe that we have to say so: this action is bound up with its independence and sovereignty. We are not going to say anything against that, and yet as allies of France, as Europeans who participate alongside France in many international institutions, we believe that this is a false step and that it would have been much better for France and for Europe if this decision had not been taken. It is asking a lot to believe that if it is possible to carry out simulations of nuclear tests in the laboratory this cannot be done on the basis of the knowledge we have now, and that eight further tests have to be carried out in order to be able to carry out simulations. And obviously I do not think it is a good argument to say that the United States or China have also been carrying out nuclear tests. If they have behaved badly, that is no justification for France to do so now.

In any event, talking of the non-existent ecological consequences, the claim that there will be no ecological damage, yesterday I was listening to Mr. Baumel when he told us that he had been swimming in the waters of the Nevada after a nuclear experiment. I ask nothing more from life than to be able to bathe in the sea at Mururoa after the nuclear experiments, if I can be in as good form as Mr. Baumel when I am his age. Be that as it may, I am still opposed to the French tests. I would prefer the President of France to re-examine his decision and change it. Although I appreciate the French gesture in wishing to sign the comprehensive test ban treaty immediately after

the tests, I would have preferred France to do this without carrying out the tests.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

The debate is closed.

I invite the Rapporteur to respond.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – In view of the considerable time restraints to which you referred, Mr. President, I will not comment on every speech. This has been a good debate, in which the range of opinion has been clearly rehearsed. Consequently, it will be straightforward for members to make a decision on the report and in particular on the two requests with which it concludes.

I want to bring to the attention of members a small mistake in paragraph (*iii*) of the motion for a resolution, which refers to “ the international nuclear test ban treaty ” rather than “ the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty ” – for which I apologise. I am sure that error can be rectified.

As to our specific proposals for requests to be made of the French Government, the first of them is straightforward and concerns the suspension of tests, which is the subject of this debate. Lord Finsberg took exception to the second request. He has tabled an amendment and indicated that he may formally move it later, if he cannot be persuaded otherwise. I note that Lord Finsberg is looking uncharacteristically benign, so there is still a chance.

In my introductory remarks, I quoted Mr. De Decker's report of 19th May 1994 on the rôle and future of nuclear weapons, because the resolution does not say anything that is new to the Assembly. It embodies the same propositions, in slightly different language, that were contained in the draft recommendations that the Assembly passed, and for which Lord Finsberg presumably voted, on 16th June 1994. I remind the Assembly that recommendation 1 was to establish a strategic study group within WEU “ to examine the rôle and future of nuclear weapons for European security including the different aspects of intra-European extended nuclear deterrence ”. There are references to Britain and France in other places. In other words, the request is a repetition of what is already the Assembly's formal position.

Furthermore, in considering the proposed additional French nuclear tests, we inevitably move to the argument about consultation. The two are inseparable. One asks oneself: “ If that can happen without consultation, what can we do to prevent it happening again? ” That is the point of paragraph 2, and I should have thought that it would be acceptable to the Assembly. It does not break any significant new ground and, occasionally, it is not a bad thing to repeat yourself.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Sir Russell.

I call Mr. Baumel, the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). — I should first of all like to endorse the Rapporteur's comments regarding the usefulness of this debate in the Assembly. Far from opposing a debate in the Defence Committee, we are among those who wanted one. This is an important issue and it is only normal that each parliamentarian should give his opinion.

I also thank Sir Russell Johnston most heartily for the difficult task he has carried out. I have admired him greatly for a long time and, here, once again, he was working in very difficult conditions.

May I ask Lord Finsberg to excuse the conditions under which we are actually tabling this motion. I was guided by the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. I do not think, however, that we could postpone this debate and have the committee meet to vote on a written report. We also relied on Sir Russell Johnston to make an oral report, for which I am most grateful; he has made the very most of what was said in committee yesterday morning.

I also thank those who spoke for observing the moderation and seriousness required, in particular my friend Mr. de Puig, and our German colleague. Their comments were highly relevant. In this very difficult debate we have to avoid any kind of excess.

I shall not refer to those comments that went too far. It is not for me, as Chairman, to enter into polemics with other members. I shall confine myself in this debate to two irrefutable points.

First, I would urge those of you not always aware of the subtleties of diplomatic and strategic dossiers, to make the important distinction between the non-proliferation treaty, the nuclear test ban treaty and the agreements on eliminating nuclear weapons throughout the world. These are three entirely different issues.

I have re-read the non-proliferation treaty adopted by the United Nations carefully line by line. The main purpose of the treaty was to attract the greatest possible number of signatures in particular in the third world, in order to limit proliferation. It did not challenge the status of the five nuclear powers which emerged from the war, though that status was regarded by a number of countries as unfair, and made no provision regarding the banning of any tests these powers might wish to carry out.

It is well known that with the exception of China, these powers, which include France, have observed a moratorium.

In explanation of the few tests that France is going to carry out, I have to tell the Assembly that the interruption of the series of tests decided on three years ago by the then President of the Republic was premature. If, three years ago, this series had been continued with a few further tests, followed by a moratorium, we would have been in the same situation as the United States, which had completed its test programme before bringing in the moratorium. This obviously enabled the United States, with these tests behind it, to commit itself to a lengthy moratorium. France should have done the same thing. It did not do so.

I wish moreover to confirm, and I am sure that no one can doubt France's word, that France has every intention to negotiate and sign the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in 1996. It therefore seeks to organise, very rapidly, a few small tests in the order of 150 kilotonnes, to round off the experimentation necessary before moving on to the laboratory simulations which will be continued, as is happening, incidentally, in other countries, including the United States.

The second point I wish to make, since it has given rise to some very impassioned and in my view somewhat exaggerated statements is that France has no intention whatsoever of exporting poison. There is no poison.

Many people still live with the terrifying image of the atomic cloud, shown on television or in photos, caused by testing above ground. Today, tests are carried out one kilometre below ground, in a granite or basalt stratum, which prevents any external effects.

May I say to my Italian colleague that the proposal he has just made for testing in outer space is most unexpected and surprising. On the contrary, what we must do is to ban definitely not only these tests, but also the tests above ground which were possible before the ban. Our tests are carried out underground, and there is no environmental impact whatsoever.

On-site scientific missions have taken place. I have read their report. I myself visited the site immediately after the explosion. I can say to our colleague that fish and shellfish were not affected by the explosion which was deep under ground, more than a kilometre below the surface.

So let us not hear too much talk about serious consequences, for one thing because these tests will take place four thousand kilometres away from Australia. As has just been said, the Australians did not react about British nuclear tests four hundred kilometres — I repeat four hundred, not four thousand! — away from their cities. At that time, there was no violent protest from Australian circles. Yet the great majority of these were tests above ground. The same applied to the United States tests in Nevada, on which I shall not dwell.

*Mr. Baumel (continued)*

Let us try to stick to facts. France considers these tests necessary for its security and the reliability of its weapons, not for producing new weapons, as has been claimed, and not with any new nuclear doctrine in mind to replace its traditional doctrine of strict sufficiency and no more.

In the face of the terrifying arsenals still held throughout the world, we confine ourselves to a position of pure security, which not only concerns France, but – as we are vain enough to believe – also contributes to a certain extent to the security of Europe.

I have great admiration for the Scandinavians, who are always teaching us lessons. Unfortunately, I am like Pascal: I only believe the witnesses killed at the barricades. I am waiting for the Scandinavians to make the kind of defence effort that will entitle them to lecture others, those who have been through war after war in order to ensure the security and freedom of Europe, including the Scandinavian countries.

We now have to consider this motion. In the circumstances it is the best we can expect. I thank Sir Russell Johnston for avoiding any kind of exaggeration and keeping to the facts.

Naturally, as regards the last two paragraphs, the French deputies and myself will be voicing our quiet opposition.

The first of these paragraphs asks the French Government to review its decision. You realise that before taking their decision, the French Government and its President, the head of state, took the advice of all possible experts. They have taken the decision on France's behalf and, as Mr. Chirac said, the decision is irrevocable.

The second paragraph asks the French Government to: "Initiate discussions with the British Government with a view to enabling co-operation on their nuclear forces ...". My reply to the Rapporteur and our British friends is that this is precisely the situation in which we are at present. I do not know the substance of the conversations which have been taking place for a long time between the British and French Governments, but I imagine that this question has come up on several occasions.

I would add that the last President of the Republic, Mr. Mitterrand, stated publicly that sometime or other it would be necessary to discuss the question of nuclear deterrence in the defence of Europe. The problem will have to be settled one day. We cannot, on the one hand, base our European defence on purely conventional weapons as we do today and plan to do for a long time to come and, on the other, have a nuclear defence capability on this scale.

Generally speaking, the motion on the table reflects, as is customary, the positions of part of this Assembly. As Chairman of the committee, I thank the Rapporteur and all those who have taken part in the debate. In my capacity as French representative, I shall naturally stand by the position of the French Delegation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Lord Finsberg and Dame Peggy Fenner, reads:

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft resolution proper.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I should like to speak briefly and very prudently.

After this debate, which has been widely receptive to the positions taken by the various speakers and the comments by the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the committee – which will moreover be forwarded to the President of the Republic and the French Government – I consider, Mr. President, that a vote by roll-call should be held in accordance with Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure. This is my specific request.

The PRESIDENT. – You are a little in advance, Mr. Valleix. I had been notified that you intended to ask for a roll-call vote but we need to deal with procedure first and we shall then consider whether we can have a roll-call vote.

First, I ask Lord Finsberg to move the amendment.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I move the amendment formally. I thought that the roll-call applied to the amendment as well, if we so wished.

The PRESIDENT. – I confirm that Mr. Valleix asks for a roll-call vote on the amendment.

Has he the support of ten members?

According to Rule 38, no decision by roll-call may be taken until half the representatives of the Assembly or their substitutes have signed the register of attendance.

I shall ask the Clerk to check the latest number on the register so that we can ascertain whether half the members have signed it. I ask members to bear with us because this must be done at the last moment.

Mr. LORENZI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we are, of course, operating within the rules but against all logic and against all political morality.

I must in any case compliment those who have conducted this meeting, especially the French members who have managed to take up almost all the available time.

The PRESIDENT. – I am afraid that we can have no more speeches at this stage as we are in the middle of deciding whether we can hold a roll-call vote.

Mr. LORENZI (*Italy*) (Translation). – There is only time for the French and Lord Finsberg.

The PRESIDENT. – I must inform the Assembly that only forty-one members have signed the register of attendance. As a consequence, the vote is postponed.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. You say that the vote has been postponed. Until when has it been postponed?

The PRESIDENT. – Under Rule 38(3), the vote may be taken at any time once there is a quorum. If it is not possible to vote before the end of this part session as a result of the absence of a quorum, the motion for a resolution will be referred to the Presidential Committee. Despite the objections and anxieties that have been expressed – I understand those frustrations – we must operate by the rules. If we do not, we are as nothing. I am afraid, therefore, that we must move on to the next item on the agenda.

## 7. Ukraine and European security

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1464 and amendment)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Sir Russell Johnston of the report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee on Ukraine and European security, debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1464 and amendment.

I call Sir Russell Johnston to present his report.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – This report arises from a visit made by the Defence Committee to Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, at the beginning of April this year. Before dealing with the text, I wish to record the committee's appreciation for the hospitality, generosity and friendliness shown to us by our Ukrainian hosts. I also warmly thank Mr. Floris de Gou, the Secretary of the committee, on whom fell the main responsibility for amassing and ordering the information that makes up the major part of my report. May I suggest that the report has a value as a reference work on the position of Ukraine at the present time and the political problems that it faces. Time moves on and things change and, since the preparation of the report, President Clinton has visited Ukraine. His visit has led to a clearer statement of the foreign affairs position of Ukraine. Secondly, there has been a much more dramatic

agreement, although not a complete agreement, on the Black Sea fleet, a matter that would have been a running sore between Russia and Ukraine. Nevertheless, it must be put on record that, at least in my opinion, the position of Sebastopol remains unclear and I hope that that issue will be quickly resolved between Ukraine and Russia.

We emphasise throughout the report the importance of comprehensive co-operation between Ukraine and Russia. The reality of Ukraine's position is that it does not want to be some sort of buffer state between Russia and the West. Indeed, even to talk in those terms is unacceptable because we all hope that the old bloc way of thinking, whereby we regarded Russia and the rest of the Soviet Union as being opposed to NATO and the western alliance, will not reappear. We hope that that way of thinking no longer exists, but vestiges of it remain. I have no doubt that Russia's concern about a possible extension of NATO, which it has made known quite often, stems from a view that belongs in the past.

That is a view from the past that continues to influence even official diplomatic thinking in Russia and therefore, inevitably, the thinking of people in Ukraine. There was no doubt in our mind that Ukraine was anxious to make links with WEU, with western organisations in general, but did not want to do it in a way that would involve any reduction in good feeling between Ukraine and Russia. After all, Russia is not only the country allowing Ukraine large-scale credit; it is also on Russia that Ukraine depends for the bulk of its energy supplies.

The West, and Europe in particular, has been slow to give Ukraine the kind of political and economic support that it deserves. Europe understandably put pressure on Ukraine for the early closure of the Chernobyl power station. Reasonably enough, Ukraine responds by pointing out that Chernobyl provides between 5% and 7% of its energy requirements. It is not opposed in principle to the closure of Chernobyl, but something must replace it.

It is ironic that some of the energy produced by Chernobyl is sold to Austria, thereby giving Ukraine a hard currency supply. I do not think that our moral and financial support has been as strong and definite as it should have been. We were told several times that, while people were anxious to promise that help would come, so far, not much has been delivered.

It may be advanced as a criticism of this report that the recommendations are not exactly considerable. It was the view of the committee – not just mine – that the reason for that was that, at the moment, there was nothing much more that we could recommend. However, two points are fundamental. First, that we should intensify the secu-

*Sir Russell Johnston (continued)*

think that this should be done not through WEU but through partnership for peace. I do not accept that. WEU can help in the process of giving to Ukraine an increased understanding that there are European countries that are anxious and careful for the future of Ukraine. Therefore, it is a positive thing to maintain the dialogue, which will contribute to a feeling of security in Ukraine.

Second, we must recognise that it is of the utmost importance that Ukraine and Russia develop a mutually confident relationship. In that regard, it is our view that our governments should be pressed to, in turn, press Russia to recognise that fact, in so far as they have influence.

Ukraine is an important part of Europe. We were there for only a short time, so I am reluctant to make generalisations but it is definitely set on a democratic path and is trying very hard. Indeed, when we were there, the government fell as the result of a vote in parliament. It has already replaced one president with another. It is running into the old traditional problems of democracy that most of us here have experienced. It is a new democracy. It is trying hard. It requires all the friendship, help and support that we can give it. I recommend the report to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Russell, both for that speech and for being admirably brief.

I have five speakers on the list, the first of whom is Mr. Mukhin from Ukraine. We are delighted to see him here. He was one of the excellent hosts of the Defence Committee when it visited Ukraine and we know of his interest in the WEU Assembly. You are most welcome here, Sir.

Mr. MUKHIN (*Ukraine, observer*). – I would like to thank the Assembly of Western European Union and in particular Sir Dudley Smith, the Defence Committee and its Chairman, Mr. Baumel and Rapporteur, Sir Russell Johnston, for their interest in Ukraine, shown in the report on Ukraine and European security, which we are debating now.

We carefully examined the text of this important document and we consider that, on the whole, in an objective manner it reflects the realities of the present day in respect of European security and the place of Ukraine in it. We are glad to note that the committee has appropriately evaluated the positive contribution of Ukraine to the security and stability of Europe by the historic step taken by our state. Having inherited nuclear weapons as a result of the known circumstances, we renounced them and signed a treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a non-nuclear state. All that was done under circumstances in which the safety of Ukraine was very fragile.

The efforts of the Ukrainian Government aimed at reforming our economy and ensuring political stability in the country are also reflected in the report of the committee as well as the difficult moments in Russian-Ukrainian relations. At the same time, we should like to make some remarks and point out certain inaccuracies. The wording of paragraph 26 corresponds more to our position than that of paragraph 25, which says that Ukraine “is not in favour of enlargement of NATO to include certain Central European states”.

We cannot accept the wording of paragraph 125, which implies that Ukraine has supposedly expanded its territory at the expense of other states. The Ukrainians are not to be blamed for the fact that the second world war brought to an end the Treaty of Versailles system, which had artificially created from different pieces of land several states – Yugoslavia is the most visible example – while at the same time dividing the ethnic territory of the Ukrainian people among four states. The events of the second world war gave the Ukrainian people the chance to unite on their own ethnic territory. The transfer of the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine took place in full accordance with the then law of the Soviet Union.

We agree with paragraph 129. The political and economic situation in Russia makes us justifiably anxious. We are interested in the stabilisation of the situation in Russia as soon as possible and we are trying to develop just and good neighbourly relations with the Soviet federation. At the same time, we consider that, in its conclusions, the relations of Ukraine with WEU are too much preconditioned by the state of Russian-Ukrainian relations, and in particular by the fact of signing, or not signing, a treaty of friendship and co-operation, or by NATO-Russian relations.

Ukraine is an independent state and we do not think that negotiations with a third party regarding this or that subject should influence the development of our state's co-operation with WEU – all the more so as Ukraine, as stated in paragraph 154, has an active political activity that turns it into “an active participant in the process of building security in Europe”.

Our position on participation in the CIS system of collective security is well known. We do not participate in the 1992 Tashkent Treaty as we do not want to promote a new division of Europe into blocs. Ukraine is against the CIS co-ordinating inter-state organs into supranational bodies or making the CIS the subject of international law. We consider the CIS as an instrument for the development of bilateral relations. Ukraine has a specific place in the CIS system – it did not sign the CIS charter and it is not a member of the CIS parliamentary assembly. Ukraine has associate member status of the Economic Union.



*Mr. Mukhin (continued)*

We want to propose two amendments to the draft recommendation. The first is to insert a new paragraph into the preamble as follows: "Reaffirming full support for Ukraine's efforts aimed at preserving its territorial integrity in accordance with the United Nations Charter and with the OSCE principles." The second amendment is to the first recommendation – after the words "security dialogue with Ukraine", add "including institutionalisation of formal WEU-Ukraine relations".

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rockenbauer.

Mr. ROCKENBAUER (*Hungary, associate partner*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I thank Sir Russell Johnston for his valuable report on the situation in Ukraine. I find it particularly interesting, since Ukraine is of special importance to Hungary.

Our two countries have developed excellent diplomatic relations and in 1992, shortly after it became independent, Ukraine signed a general agreement of friendship and co-operation with Hungary, the first document of its kind. This provided a satisfactory response to a number of questions, including the sensitive one of ethnic minorities. Relations between Hungary and Ukraine thus bear the seal of reciprocal respect and trust.

In addition to these bilateral relations, Ukraine plays a major rôle from the point of view of security in Central Europe, and indeed the continent as a whole. For these reasons, it is highly desirable that Ukraine should remain stable and fully recognised as an independent country.

The draft recommendation and the report tabled nevertheless contain a sensitive issue on which I should like to comment.

As a representative of a Central and Eastern European country, I cannot share the opinion that an early enlargement of NATO could transform Ukraine into a buffer state. This would, in fact, mean assuming that NATO represents a danger to Russia and that on these grounds the countries of Central and Eastern Europe constitute a buffer zone today. While it is difficult to accept that Ukraine might be transformed into a buffer state, it is equally difficult to accept that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe occupy this rôle at present. For our part, we do not consider that NATO constitutes a threat to Russia.

In my view it is more important to remember that any enlargement of NATO meets the need to establish an institutional defence system. This need has, moreover, been clearly expressed by the Hungarian Parliament and by other Central and Eastern European countries. Accordingly, any such reinforcement could only consolidate stabil-

ity and security on our continent. This is particularly true since NATO might at the same time propose solutions to Russia and Ukraine designed to strengthen their security.

I therefore consider that the Assembly should adopt Amendment 1, tabled by Sir Russell Johnston and Mr. Eörsi, which would be a positive amendment to paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Rockenbauer.

Before I call the next speaker, I want to make an announcement. Owing to the considerable pressure on time and the fact that we have this debate to complete and another immediately following, it has been decided that the debate entitled: National parliaments, European security and defence and the road to the 1996 intergovernmental conference, on the report tabled by Sir John Hunt on behalf of the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations, Document 1459, will be postponed – with Sir John's agreement – either to the next session or to the Standing Committee. We will advise on that at an early stage. I make that announcement now as I do not want to detain any members or others in the hemicycle who are waiting specifically for that debate.

I call Mr. Piskounov.

Mr. PISKOUNOV (*Russia, observer*) (Translation). – I have read the report on Ukraine and European security with great interest. It might even have been entitled Russia and European security. The matters discussed will be assessed in due course by the public and political forces in Russia. The establishment of relations of friendship and co-operation between Russia and Ukraine as independent states depends on certain difficult problems being settled first, including the Black Sea fleet and the debt for fuel, but I am convinced it will be possible to find a solution which will be satisfactory for both sides.

I believe Russia will be able to solve its various problems successfully. Already this year there have been seven important agreements between Russia and Ukraine and it should be possible to resolve other areas of discussion successfully in the course of dialogue with WEU, NATO and the United States.

To return to the report and draft recommendation, however, certain parts might be advantageously brought up to date.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Piskounov, and we are pleased to see you here. Thank you for contributing.

I call Mr. Jeszenszky.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Hungary, associate partner*). – I fully support the comments of my col-

*Mr. Jeszenszky (continued)*

league, Mr. Rockenbauer, and would like to add something to the motion. We have heard many terrible horror stories about intolerant and recalcitrant governments and parties that do not exhibit the correct attitude towards their own citizens. It is our duty to acknowledge Ukraine as an exception, and I hope that its approach will be the rule in Eastern and Central Europe soon. Ukraine has established good relations with all her neighbours who are ready to do so. It also has a tradition of multinational and multicultural coexistence. Places such as Kiev, Lvov and Lemberg all exhibit remnants of Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish culture. That is one more reason why the report's comments about the treatment of minorities, including the 200 000 Hungarians living next to Hungary, deserve to be commended. The report is excellent, and I welcome also Sir Russell's remarks. I fully support the report's adoption by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The debate is closed.

I invite the Rapporteur to respond.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I will not delay the Assembly. Mr. Mukhin from Ukraine wanted to add a couple of paragraphs. I am not sure of the procedure but Mr. Burgelin is shaking his head, which is a bad sign. I would not have objected, but from the look of the presidium, I doubt that any change is possible. I assure Mr. Mukhin that in any revision, such a statement as he proposed would certainly be favourably considered.

Mr. Mukhin complained that paragraph 125 of the report suggested that Ukraine expanded in a belligerent way, but that is not what we meant. That paragraph simply describes how the territory of Ukraine has changed over the years, having enlarged with Eastern Galicia and so on. It is simply a geographical description and is not meant as any sort of political statement.

I acknowledge the points made by Mr. Rockenbauer about blocs and buffer states, and I welcome his belief that the amendment that I tabled in association with Mr. Eörsi might dispel a certain impression. When I spoke earlier, I said that we do not believe in blocs. They are part of the old thinking, which I think will fade with time.

Mr. Piskounov spoke encouragingly about the resolution of such outstanding problems as remain between Ukraine and Russia. I hope that his remarks will come to pass soon. I repeat that we do not look upon Russia as an opponent, enemy or anything like that. That is yesterday's thinking. We will welcome increasing contacts with Russia and the establishment of a greater feeling of security between us. I am grateful to Mr.

Jeszenszky for his remarks about the report's references to minorities and their treatment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Russell.

Would the Vice-Chairman of the committee like to comment?

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*). – This important report is one sign that WEU is maintaining, as it should, close contacts with countries that were not formally associated with WEU. The visit by the Defence Committee to Ukraine proved that it is useful for WEU to look to not only its own member states but other countries in the area. The report was unanimously adopted by the Defence Committee, and I hope that the Assembly will vote the same way.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. One amendment has been tabled by Sir Russell in association with Mr. Eörsi. It reads:

1. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“ Noting that enlargement of NATO should be accompanied by a special arrangement between NATO and Russia in order to provide stability in Europe and to avoid transforming Ukraine into a buffer state between East and West; ”

Would Sir Russell like to speak to the amendment?

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – As I referred to the amendment in my earlier speech, I formally move.

The PRESIDENT. – If no one wishes to oppose the amendment, I will put it to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

I will put the draft recommendation, as amended, to the vote.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*The draft recommendation, as amended, is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

I congratulate all concerned on an important report on a country in which we are most interested and that we welcome to the Assembly.

1. See page 63.

### 8. The Baltic Assembly

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1460)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Document 1460.

I call Mr. Masseret.

Mr. MASSERET (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in May 1994, barely two years after it was constituted, the Baltic Assembly launched an appeal to Western European Union, signed by the Presidents of the Parliaments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, to the effect that in addition to the status of associate partner granted to each of these states, links might be established with the WEU Assembly.

You know how much I am attached, as also, I hope, is the great majority of our colleagues, to the parliamentary dimension of co-operation in security and defence matters. Following the visit I paid last November to the Baltic Assembly, meeting for its fifth twice-yearly session, I was able to see for myself that the conditions had now been met for developing co-operation between assemblies.

I therefore propose that we respond to the appeal launched by our colleagues in the Baltic Assembly by adopting an order laying down objectives and procedures for such co-operation.

You will find in my report a brief study of interstate co-operation, and in particular of the Baltic Council created in 1990; this co-operation contributes to peace and stability in this important region of Europe and holds out encouraging and positive prospects. Another part of the report dealing with the Baltic Assembly discusses interparliamentary co-operation. The Baltic Assembly is paying increasing attention to military co-operation among the three countries. Security and defence are two priority issues for all three states.

You will also find in appendices to my report the texts of several agreements concluded between the Baltic Assembly and other organisations for multilateral co-operation, such as the Nordic Council and Benelux.

It is, in fact, a wise move to balance recognition of sovereign entities with regional integration which promotes all kinds of economic, legislative and, of course, political co-operation.

Under the draft order I have tabled for adoption, our Assembly would promote regional integration by developing links with the Baltic Assembly, for example through contacts between like committees in the two assemblies or by exchanges of officials.

This is the sense of the text I propose, which would thus be an additional contribution to the Association of the Baltic States, which are especially sensitive to a guarantee of their security, with one of the major structures of European co-operation, namely Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

I call Mr. Pastusiak.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Poland, associate partner*). – I asked to speak on Mr. Masseret's report for three reasons. First, I want to use this occasion to salute the three Baltic nations – small in size, but great in achievements – for the determination with which they fought for centuries for the preservation of their national and cultural identities.

Second, my election district is Gdansk, which is one of the great ports on the Baltic Sea, so I have a great interest in all issues affecting the Baltic Sea region. I have a third reason for wanting to speak, however. Mr. Masseret presented an excellent and very informative report and I congratulate him, but as WEU is particularly concerned with security issues, we should also consider the Baltic Sea region from the security perspective.

The Baltic Sea is a relatively small basin, comprising 427 square kilometres and embracing nine countries. The present geostrategic situation in the region is a consequence of deep political, military and economic changes – the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, the reappearance of the independent Baltic republics and the appearance in the Kaliningrad region of a specific geostrategic situation.

The new situation in the region creates unprecedented changes and threats. The sizeable military potential concentrated in the Baltic Sea has not yet been limited or reduced and the treaty on conventional forces in Europe does not mention naval forces – attempts to include them in the disarmament negotiations, or into confidence-building measures, have so far failed. Moreover, there are no signs that the issue will be taken up in the near future. Naval forces in the Baltic, just as in any other sea, are for the moment outside any controls.

Although we may assume that the present military situation in the Baltic Sea region does not pose any direct threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the coastal states, military stability and a sense of security there are nevertheless based on a rather fragile foundation.

What can we do to strengthen the stability of the Baltic Sea region? There are at least five priorities. The first is the introduction of proper confidence and security-building measures. To be more specific, those should include: hot lines and regular meetings for the chiefs-of-staff of the fleets to

*Mr. Pastusiak (continued)*

communicate with one another; a multilateral agreement for the prevention of incidents in the Baltic Sea and in Baltic airspace; the exchange of information on planned activities at sea; the prohibition of military exercises in fishing zones and areas with heavy ship traffic; inviting observers for joint manoeuvres; the joint training of navy officers; joint training courses and exercises in sea rescue and combating ecological disasters at sea. Those are a number of confidence-building measures that could be introduced.

Other security priorities in the Baltic Sea area are: the structural transformation of naval forces; the elimination of nuclear arms and the elimination of chemical weapons abandoned on the sea bed. Other serious issues, affecting ecological security, are nuclear waste that has been dumped in the Baltic Sea and the potential threat from unsafe technology used in the nuclear power plants in the former Soviet Union.

I congratulate Mr. Masseret on his report. I was glad to learn that, yesterday, the Defence Committee decided to prepare a report for the next session on security issues in the Baltic Sea region. After all, we often say that the security of Europe is indivisible.

*(Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ruutel.

Mr. RUUTEL (*Estonia, associate partner*). – First, I must thank the Rapporteur, Mr. Masseret, for his most favourable report on the Baltic Assembly. After the period of Soviet occupation, the Baltic nations are happy to be back among the nations of Western Europe, where, due to our language, culture and way of life, we belong.

As the President of the Baltic Assembly, the interparliamentary organisation uniting the three Baltic states, I must express my deep appreciation to Western European Union for its efforts to maintain stability and security in Europe.

The Baltic nations are well aware of the value of national sovereignty and independence, and of the anguish of being under the control of other powers. That is why we are prepared to make the maximum effort to maintain peace and security in Europe. We are prepared to do everything that we can to ensure that all small nations have the right to decide their own destiny.

Again, I thank you and the WEU Assembly for making it possible for us to come here and work for the stability of the world. Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians have a long experience in withstanding chauvinism and state-backed terrorism. You can rely on our experiences in that respect.

Finally, I refer to the well-known fact that, so long as the Baltic countries do not feel secure, the rest of Europe cannot be sure about its security. The Baltic nations are in Europe to stay.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gricius.

Mr. GRICIUS (*Lithuania, associate partner*). – First, I congratulate Mr. Masseret on his excellent report.

The Baltic Assembly is a consultative body of parliamentarians from the three Baltic states. It has no legislative or decision-making powers but it helps us to discuss important issues and gives us an opportunity to exchange views on topics of common interest. It is a good school of democracy where we search for a consensus in different areas of co-operation. Contacts between WEU and the Baltic Assembly give us an opportunity to learn more about problems of security and stability in our continent, and the report gives our western partners additional information about our states.

I wish to make a short but important remark about paragraph 47 of the explanatory memorandum. The last sentence of that paragraph says that “Lithuania, like Estonia, is also in dispute with the Russian Federation over the implementation of the 1920 peace treaty”. It is not true. Lithuania signed an inter-state treaty with Russia in 1991, which was ratified by the parliaments of both countries. As our President mentioned today, we have no border problems with Russia, Belarus or Poland, which is why I ask the Assembly to delete the part of paragraph 47 that I mentioned.

May I again express my gratitude to the honourable members of this Assembly for finding time during this busy and difficult session to discuss this issue, which is important for not only the Baltic states but the entire Baltic Sea area and Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Neljas.

Mr. NELJAS (*Estonia, associate partner*). – First, I thank the Rapporteur for his report on the Baltic Assembly. Due to the swiftness of events, the report still contains some mistakes. As members of the Assembly know, Estonia, alongside Latvia and Lithuania, has already signed association agreements with the European Union on 12th June. We regard that step as being of great importance to Estonia and hope that it will open new possibilities of co-operation in security and defence.

Our final goal is, of course, full membership of both the European Union and Western European Union, as well as of the western alliance, if it is so decided. We understand that that goal can be reached only once we have taken many intermediate

*Mr. Neljas (continued)*

steps and improved our democratic system and economic and defence capabilities.

Being a small country, regional co-operation is of great importance to Estonia. Many things could be done better in co-operation with the Baltic states. Our security risks are similar, which makes co-operation between the three Baltic states a natural choice. That co-operation takes place within the Baltic Assembly and is not directed against any other country. On the contrary, the first success in that field has been reached in co-operation with the Nordic countries and several NATO countries, namely creating a joint peace-keeping battalion, the first units of which are already stationed in Croatia's Krajina. We hope that that peace-keeping project will continue to receive support from all the countries of the West and the Western European Union parliamentary Assembly.

We hope that the establishment of interparliamentary co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the Baltic Assembly will lead to increased awareness about the problems of the Baltic among western parliamentarians and make it easier for Baltic parliamentarians to understand the general European security framework. Hopefully, a mutual understanding of the fragility of Europe's stability will lead us through common action to create a Europe where security, prosperity and stability are common to all parts of the continent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sinka.

Mr. SINKA (*Latvia, associate partner*). – As a representative of the Baltic Assembly, I am here to represent not only Latvia but Estonia and Lithuania. My Lithuanian and Estonian colleagues accept me as such, whatever I might say. I have taken part in committee work and one or two creases in the original report have been ironed out. I would have mentioned one more point, but Mr. Gricius has already covered it. Apart from that, Mr. Masseret must be praised for his highly commendable report.

I hope that members will forgive me for expressing little wishes, but I wish that we did not have trouble with the interpretation system and air-conditioning, or with French nuclear testing, because we could then, almost, have called this day a Baltic day, with the presence of Mr. Brazauskas, the President of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Vice-President of the Estonian Parliament, who is also the President of the Baltic Assembly. I am a little sad, however, that so few members are here. But the main thing is that we can be here and make our voices heard.

My Estonian colleague referred to the fact that the signing of associate membership of the EU

has already taken place, but the report uses the future tense. At the time of the report, we had not yet signed the agreement. However, since we have signed the associate membership agreement, it would be a nice gesture of this august Assembly to grant us voting rights in the committees, perhaps as a kind of bonus. I am sure that the three Baltic states would greatly appreciate that.

I hope that the full members and anybody else here will read the report, with all the addenda, which will illustrate how far we are advanced in co-operation. We have got a little further than the infancy mentioned in one paragraph. Our co-operation has been extensive, although there are always shortcomings, and we hope that it will be extended. Our co-operation must be seen within the wider context not only of Europe but of the Nordic Council, whose meeting next year will be held in Vilnius. The Nordic Council is already among us and that is important. Before you know it, we will be among you here as well.

I want to read the last paragraph of the report, which I find important and gratifying. If people do not have time to read the rest of the report, at least they will have heard this. It says: "the Baltic Assembly is an encouraging example of parliamentary co-operation, owing to its aims and taking into account the practical results obtained in a short time. The development of co-operation between the three Baltic states in economic, political and security matters is in large part due to the work undertaken by the Assembly through its resolutions and their practical follow-up. It contributes to the rapprochement of the three countries and to strengthening their awareness of their common destiny, an essential factor for their successful integration into European and transatlantic organisations. In this perspective, one can but wish for close co-operation to be established with the WEU Assembly, the parliamentary component of European defence, with the common aim of strengthening security and stability in Central Europe and throughout the entire continent, given the extent to which interests in this area are now shared by all."

We have no axe to grind with the draft order on the Baltic Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Skarpheoinsson.

Mr. SKARPHEOINSSON (*Iceland, associate member*). – Like all the previous speakers, let me start by complimenting Mr. Masseret on his fine review of the state of the Baltic Assembly and its development. The three states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania have a special place in the hearts of my nation. I am proud of having been a member of the government that broke the ice by becoming the first government that officially recognised the

*Mr. Skarpheoinsson (continued)*

sovereignty of the Baltic states.

The Nordic countries as a whole feel a strong affinity towards the three Baltic states. That is reflected by the fact that their status and imminent future is regularly discussed at the biannual meetings of the parliamentary assembly of the Nordic Council which, as most members will know, comprises the five Nordic countries.

The Nordic countries also place strong emphasis on trying to assist the Baltic states to strengthen their ties with international organisations such as NATO, WEU and the European Union – for reasons that are obvious to everyone. The Nordic Council has instigated a successful co-operation agreement at parliamentary level between the council and the Baltic Assembly, with priority given to such matters as security.

The Nordic countries have also established co-operation with the Baltic states at ministerial level, covering a range of topics. I feel that it is important that WEU puts effort into strengthening the Baltic Assembly by encouraging wider participation of its partners in international forums, not least WEU and NATO.

A strong assembly could prove crucial in solving conflicts that might arise between the three states in difficult times. I talk from experience; the Nordic Council has proved invaluable in solving problems between Nordic states that otherwise would have been difficult to resolve. The Nordic Council has also given us a common identity in the international arena and power that extends far beyond the actual size of our nations.

That is what the Baltic states need right now – a stronger common identity as a political force which, on the example of the Nordic experience, would enable them to wield more influence in the murky waters of international diplomacy.

As the report rightly points out, the three states are quite different in terms of language, culture and economy. All that they have in common is their geographical position on the borders of a powerful neighbour that has a history of aggression. To that we can add, to quote Mr. Masseret, “ a common history under Soviet occupation ”. Unfortunately, history has a nasty habit of repeating itself.

One way of preventing history being repeated for the three Baltic states is to assist them to consolidate their newly formed common platform, the Baltic Council and its parliamentary assembly. That will serve to diminish the divergent factors caused by different linguistics, cultures and economies, which undoubtedly played a rôle in their terrible fate in 1940. We live in exciting, turbulent times. We are all aware of the poli-

tical situation in Russia. We know of the large Russian minorities in some of the Baltic states and of Mr. Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister of Russia and his relatively recent statements on that particular subject. In view of this, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, as well as their friends, have every reason to be concerned about their future security.

All three have the status of associate partners of WEU. All three consider accession to full membership as a major objective of their foreign policy. All three have weak armies that fall short of being a deterrent to foreign aggressors. Full membership of WEU would provide them with security guarantees. WEU should seriously consider doing that in the very near future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Naess.

Mr. NAESS (*Norway, associate member*). – Like the member from Iceland, I should like to make it clear that the people of the Nordic countries feel particularly close to their neighbours in the Baltic countries. I have twice had the opportunity to visit that region. Last year, I participated in the first Nordic-Baltic conference on infectious diseases, and earlier this year I had the pleasure of leading the group of parliamentarians from the OSCE that was observing the elections in Estonia, which I am happy to say were conducted in an admirable manner.

The different purposes of my two visits illustrate the different forms of contact that we hope to further with the Baltic countries. We want to establish a network of relations, not only political and official but through non-governmental organisations, private companies, institutions and so on. I believe that the sum of the strength of all such networks on different levels will be the decisive factor in our efforts to include the Baltic countries in a European system of stability and security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Masseret, Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee, to answer the different speakers.

Mr. MASSERET (*France*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. Ruutel for having done us the honour to be with us, and for his very encouraging address.

In reply to the various speakers, I shall distinguish between three types of comment. Our Polish colleague raised the general question of security in the Baltic sea. The Defence Committee has included a report on this item in its order of business and a few days ago, appointed Mr. Martins as Rapporteur. Our Polish colleague can therefore be satisfied that we shall study this question.

The comments by our Icelandic and Norwegian colleagues underscored the great value of co-operation in this region of Europe, and in particular the important part played by the Nordic Council in its relations with its Baltic neighbours.

*Mr. Masseret (continued)*

I shall now answer the three parliamentarians from the Baltic countries. Obviously, the error noted by Mr. Gričius will be corrected in the final version. The mistakes pointed out by our Estonian colleague were put right by a corrigendum published on 12th June of this month.

To Mr. Sinka, I would say that the issues of principle he raises are important. But above all, I should like to point out to him how determined we are that this draft order – which I hope will be adopted – should actually be applied, so that genuine co-operation between the WEU parliamentary Assembly and the parliamentary Assembly of the Baltic countries becomes an established reality – one that is concerned with security problems, since security is in our common interest. These are the few comments I wished to make at the end of this debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

We shall now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1460.

Under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft order.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call? ...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft order is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

### ***9. Change in the orders of the day***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As we have been informed by the President of the Assembly, the last item on the agenda, namely, National parliaments, European security and defence and the road to the 1996 intergovernmental conference, has been postponed to the next session.

### ***10. Close of the session***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We have reached the end of the third part of the session. I thank our colleagues for their attentiveness.

Does any member wish to speak? ...

I declare the third part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union closed.

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.)*

1. See page 64.





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