

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

EXTRAORDINARY SESSION

March 1990

**Minutes**  
**Official Report of Debates**  
**Assembly Documents**

WEU

LUXEMBOURG



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WEU

LUXEMBOURG



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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
DERYCKE Erik	SP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. UYTENDAELE René	CVP

#### Substitutes

MM. CAUWENBERGHS Frans	CVP
COLLART Jacques	PS
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FILLON François	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
THYRAUD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	PC

#### Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BALLIGAND Jean-Pierre	Socialist
BARRAU Alain	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
ROGER Jean	RDE
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
EICH Tay	Die Grünen
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

#### Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mr. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
Mr. HÖFFKES Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. HOFFMANN Ingeborg	CDU/CSU
MM. KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans-Peter	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

### ITALY

#### Representatives

MM. BENASSI Ugo	PCI
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
INTINI Ugo	Socialist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes	
MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CANNATA Giuseppe	Communist
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
COLOMBO Vittorino	Chr. Dem.
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippa	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	Communist
PASQUINO Gianfranco	Ind. Left
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBNER Hans	SVP
SCOVACRICCHI Martino	PSDI
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TEODORI Riccardo	Radical
TRIGLIA Riccardo	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

Mr. GOERENS Charles	Dem.
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle	Soc. Chr.
Mr. REGENWETTER Jean	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. DIMMER Camille	Soc. Chr.
KOLLWELTER René	Soc. Workers
Mrs. POLFER Lydie	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
EVERSDIJK Huib	CDA
Mrs. HAAS-BERGER Regina Maria	PVDA
MM. NIJPELS Eduardus	VVD
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
van VELZEN Wim	CDA

Substitutes	
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
MM. DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob	CDA
EISMA Doeke	D66
VAN DER LINDEN Pierre	CDA
MARIS Pieter	CDA
VERBEEK Jan Willem	Liberal
Mrs. VERSPAGET Joséphine	Labour


UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. COLEMAN Donald	Labour
COX Thomas	Labour
EWING Harry	Labour
Dame Peggy FENNER	Conservative
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
MM. GARRETT Edward	Labour
HARDY Peter	Labour
HILL James	Conservative
JESSEL Toby	Conservative
Sir Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
MM. MORRIS Michael	Conservative
PARRY Robert	Labour
Sir William SHELTON	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr. SPEED Keith	Conservative
Sir John STOKES	Conservative
Mr. WILKINSON John	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David	Conservative
BANKS Tony	Labour
BOWDEN Andrew	Conservative
FAULDS Andrew	Labour
HOWELL Ralph	Conservative
Sir John HUNT	Conservative
Lord KIRKHILL	Labour
MM. LAMBIE David	Labour
LITHERLAND Robert	Labour
LORD Michael	Conservative
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. RATHBONE Tim	Conservative
REDMOND Martin	Labour
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
Mrs. ROE Marion	Conservative
MM. THOMPSON John	Labour
WARD John	Conservative





**I**

**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

# FIRST SITTING

Thursday, 22nd March 1990

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the extraordinary session.
2. Address by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg.
3. Examination of credentials.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session (Doc. 1215).
6. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (*Presentation of the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1216 and amendments).
7. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
8. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (*Debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1216 and amendments).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10.40 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### **1. Opening of the extraordinary session**

The President declared open the extraordinary session of the Assembly in accordance with Article III (b) of the Charter and Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure.

### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

### **3. Address by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg**

Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg, addressed the Assembly.

### **4. Examination of credentials**

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had been ratified by that Assembly.

### **5. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The President addressed the Assembly.

### **6. Observers**

The President welcomed the observers from Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

### **7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session**

(Doc. 1215)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business.

*Speaker:* Mr. Hardy.

The draft order of business for the extraordinary session was adopted.

### **8. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Eyskens answered questions put by MM. Ewing, De Decker and Baumel.

*Speaker (point of order):* Mr. Ewing.

**9. Establishment of a just,  
peaceful and secure order in Europe –  
prospects stemming from developments  
in Central and Eastern Europe**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report  
of the Political Committee,  
Doc. 1216 and amendments)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Caro, Soell and De Decker.

The debate was adjourned.

**10. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.*



## SECOND SITTING

Thursday, 22nd March 1990

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.
2. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments*).
3. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.
4. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
5. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. Address by Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland**

Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Skubiszewski answered questions put by MM. Jung, Baumel, Jessel, Klejdzinski, Rathbone and Morris.

#### **4. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee,  
Doc. 1216 and amendments)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speakers:* Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Klejdzinski and Sir Dudley Smith.

*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Kittelmann, Martino and Sir Russell Johnston.

*Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Stegagnini, Pieralli, Baumel, Wilkinson, Jung and Tummers.

The debate was adjourned.

#### **5. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg**

Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, addressed the Assembly.

#### **6. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy**

Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Poos answered a question put by Mr. Caro.

MM. Vitalone and Poos answered questions put by Mr. Jessel.

#### **7. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee,  
Doc. 1216 and amendments)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speaker:* Earl of Kinnoull.

*Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* Mr. Fioret, Mrs. Glumac-Levakov (*Observer from Yugoslavia*), MM. Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Biacs (*Observer from Hungary*), Fassino, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Pontillon (*Rapporteur*).

The debate was adjourned.

***8. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting***

The orders of the date for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Friday, 23rd March 1990, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 6.50 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. <i>Noerens</i> (Adriaensens) <i>Cauwenberghs</i> (Biefnot) Kempinaire <i>Eicher</i> (Pécriaux) Uyttendaele	MM. <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Antretter) <i>Bindig</i> (Holtz) Kittelmann Soell	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
		<b>Netherlands</b>
		Mrs. Haas-Berger MM. <i>Verbeek</i> (Nijpels) Stoffelen Tummers
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Baumel <i>Pistre</i> (Beix) Caro Durand <i>Hunault</i> (Fillon) <i>André</i> (Galley) Jung <i>Koehl</i> (Oehler) Pontillon Thyraud Vial-Massat	MM. <i>Rubner</i> (Caccia) <i>Fassino</i> (Filetti) Fioret <i>Stegagnini</i> (Gabbuggiani) Malfatti Martino Mezzapesa Parisi Pieralli Sarti <i>Scovacricchi</i> (Sinesio)	Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Rathbone</i> (Hill) Jessel Sir Russell Johnston Earl of Kinnoull MM. Morris Parry Sir Dudley Smith Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Speed) Mr. Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Eich Hitschler Irmer	<b>Luxembourg</b>
Mr. Derycke Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Mrs. Luuk MM. Müller Niegel Reddemann Scheer von Schmude Unland Wulff	Mr. Regenwetter
<b>France</b>		<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Bassinet Collette Forni Fourré Gouteyron Jeambrun Seitlinger	<b>Italy</b>	MM. Aarts Eversdijk van Velzen
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Benassi Intini Kessler Natali Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Ahrens Böhm Büchner		MM. Cox Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner MM. Garrett Hardy Sir William Shelton Sir John Stokes

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## THIRD SITTING

Friday, 23rd March 1990

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
2. Address by Mr. Falin, Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs.
3. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **2. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **3. Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany**

Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Genscher answered questions put by MM. Skubiszewski (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*), Tummers, Soell, Baumel and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

#### **4. Address by Mr. Falin, Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs**

Mr. Falin, Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Falin answered questions put by Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Soell and Büchner.

#### **5. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1216 and amendments)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speakers (points of order):* MM. Ahrens (*Chairman of the Political Committee*), Soell, Pieralli, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman; Mr. Malfatti.

*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Fourré, Mezzapesa and Sir William Shelton.

*Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

*Speakers:* Mrs. Beer, MM. Scovacricchi, Roseta (*Observer from Portugal*) and van Eekelen (*Secretary-General of WEU*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens, Chairman of the Political Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 479) <sup>1</sup>.

*Speakers (explanation of vote):* MM. De Decker and Tummers.

#### **6. Close of the extraordinary session**

The President declared the extraordinary session of the Assembly closed.

*The sitting was closed at 1.35 p.m.*

1. See page 16.



## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>De Decker</i> (Adriaensens) <i>Cauwenberghs</i> (Biefnot) <i>De Bondt</i> (Derycke) Kempinaire <i>Eicher</i> (Péciaux)	MM. Ahrens <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Antretter) Büchner Mrs. <i>Beer</i> (Eich) Mr. <i>Bindig</i> (Holtz) Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> (Mrs. Luuk) Mr. Soell	MM. <i>Eisma</i> (Aarts) Eversdijk Mrs. Haas-Berger MM. <i>Verbeek</i> (Nijpels) Stoffelen Tummers
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Uyttendaele		
	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>France</b>	MM. <i>Scovacricchi</i> (Caccia) Fioret <i>Stegagnini</i> (Gabbuggiani) <i>Fassino</i> (Intini) <i>Rubner</i> (Kessler) Malfatti Martino Mezzapesa Parisi Pieralli <i>Colombo</i> (Sinesio)	MM. Coleman Cox Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Lord <i>Kirkhill</i> (Hardy) Mr. Hill Lord <i>Newall</i> (Jessel) Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Lord <i>Rodney</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Mr. Morris Sir William Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Speed) Sir John Stokes
MM. Bassinet Baumel <i>Pistre</i> (Beix) Caro Durand <i>Hunault</i> (Fillon) Fourré <i>André</i> (Galley) Jeambrun <i>Koehl</i> (Oehler) Pontillon Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	<b>Luxembourg</b> Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	MM. Scheer von Schmude Unland Wulff	<b>Luxembourg</b> Mr. Regenwetter
MM. Collette Forni Gouteyron Jung		<b>Netherlands</b> Mr. van Velzen
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Böhm Hitschler Irmer Kittelmann Müller Niegel Reddemann	MM. Benassi Filetti Natali Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi Sarti	MM. Ewing Garrett Parry Wilkinson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 479*****on the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe –  
prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe***

The Assembly,

**I**

- (i) Welcoming the fact that the developments which started with the perestroïka movement in the USSR and continued in many Central and Eastern European countries in 1989 at last make it possible to consider establishing a new, peaceful order throughout Europe;
- (ii) Considering, nevertheless, that there is still much uncertainty about the future and stability of those countries;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the CFE negotiations and gratified that the countries concerned are considering starting further negotiations, shortly after a first agreement is signed, to reduce even further the level of forces and armaments in Europe;
- (iv) Welcoming also the convening of a conference of heads of state or of government in 1990 to give new scope to the CSCE process;
- (v) Noting the broad convergence between proposals by Eastern and Western European countries to give Europe as a whole economic, juridical and cultural structures designed to organise a new European order;
- (vi) Anxious, however, not to precipitate the premature disbandment of organisations which have so far ensured peace in Europe since this would make it more difficult to establish this new peaceful order and considering that the bases of European security should be maintained for as long an interim period as necessary;

**II**

- (i) Welcoming the progress made towards reuniting the German people in a single political system, which is one of the main aims that the WEU member countries set themselves in 1954;
- (ii) Considering that the attainment of this aim implies a negotiated agreement between the two German states and noting that it calls for an understanding on the status of unified Germany between the two states and the four responsible powers;
- (iii) Considering that the countries of Europe as a whole are concerned by the formation of a new German state at the heart of Europe;
- (iv) Considering that the permanency of the present frontiers of Germany must be confirmed by a prior undertaking by the two German states, together with one by the other European countries, for the creation of a German state not to jeopardise what has been gained in European integration nor to be an obstacle to the establishment of a new peaceful order in Europe;
- (v) Noting that many provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty apply, for fifty years at least, to the Federal Republic of Germany and that they cannot be infringed without a revision of the treaty;
- (vi) Recalling that the Council has decided to proceed with such a revision as soon as the accession of Portugal and Spain becomes effective;
- (vii) Considering that the geographical situation and strength of a unified German state make it undesirable to grant it neutral status;
- (viii) Noting also that the integration of the entire German territory in NATO seems unacceptable to many Central and Eastern European countries;
- (ix) Considering, however, that it is essential for the new German state to be integrated in a European collective security system with which the United States and Canada remain associated and constituting in itself the nucleus of an all-European security system;

## III

- (i) Noting that in a period of instability it is hardly desirable to add to the degree and variety of uncertainty and hence the maintenance of the alliances is a factor of peace and order in Europe as long as a new security order has not been organised throughout Europe;
- (ii) Considering that the reduction of armed forces stationed in Europe makes it necessary to conduct an immediate review of the deployment of NATO forces;
- (iii) Considering that the forces of the WEU countries will have a larger part to play in this new deployment than heretofore;
- (iv) Considering that all the western countries have to limit their military expenditure;
- (v) Considering, therefore, that closer co-operation between WEU member countries for their joint security is becoming essential;
- (vi) Considering that, for this reason, the European members of the alliance will have to exercise greater political responsibilities, particularly in regard to arms control, organising the collective security of Europe as a whole and defence against any threat from outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

## I

1. Draw without delay the first conclusions from the study it is conducting into the consequences of a CFE agreement for Europe's security and inform the Assembly accordingly;
2. Extend this study subsequently to cover all the consequences of the changes in Eastern Europe;
3. Prepare carefully a joint position for the WEU countries in regard to matters within its purview that are included in the agenda of the CSCE;

## II

1. Inform the Assembly whether the commitments entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany under the modified Brussels Treaty are also valid for a unified German state;
2. Before any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, analyse the consequences of a devolution of the Federal Republic of Germany's commitments to a unified German state for the application of the treaty and the platform adopted in The Hague, paying particular attention to:
  - (a) co-operation between WEU and NATO, provided for in Article IV of the treaty;
  - (b) implementation of military assistance in the conditions laid down in Article V and paragraph III.4 of the platform of The Hague, specifying on which frontiers member countries are now obliged to contribute to the defence of Germany;
  - (c) application to any state that succeeds the German Democratic Republic of Article VII according to which the high contracting parties will participate in no coalition directed against any of them;
  - (d) implementation of Article VIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, Protocols Nos. II, III and IV and, in particular, Annex I to Protocol No. III on determining the level of forces, renunciation of the production of certain armaments and control of the application of the relevant undertakings;
  - (e) respect for Article XII fixing the period after which each member country shall have the right to cease to be a party to the treaty;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of this analysis;
4. Ensure that the states participating in the conference that will define the status of Germany are duly and fully informed of these results so that they may take account of the guarantees offered by the modified Brussels Treaty for the security of both Germany and its neighbouring countries and for the establishment of a new peaceful and secure order in Europe;

## III

1. Explore forthwith the possibilities offered by WEU as a medium for assessing possible threats to member countries and for research into the prospects of an all-European security area for which it might eventually be an appropriate framework, in particular:
  - (a) for defining a sufficiency threshold in defence matters;
  - (b) for analysing the concept of shared security;
  - (c) for developing means of arbitration, confidence-building measures and disarmament;
2. Use WEU as a lever for a new European security order in which it might:
  - (a) guarantee the intangibility of its members' frontiers, including those resulting from the unification of the two German states;
  - (b) ensure respect for the commitments entered into by its members in the context of agreements limiting forces or armaments or the non-production of certain weapons;
3. Assess the level of forces that WEU countries should deploy for Europe's security and agree on a fair sharing of the efforts required;
4. Use the modified Brussels Treaty as the juridical basis for the presence of forces of member states on the territory of other member states insofar as their presence would help to strengthen a peaceful order in Europe;
5. Convene regular meetings of chiefs-of-staff of member countries to examine European armaments requirements, thus giving political impetus to the standardisation and joint production of such armaments;
6. Draw up a programme for the joint organisation of verification measures required for the application of the CFE agreements;
7. For this purpose, pursue further its study of the possibility of setting up a European observation satellite agency;
8. Have the WEU Institute for Security Studies organise a permanent exchange of information with the Eastern European countries on military deployment in Europe and the application of the CFE agreements;
9. Keep the public regularly informed of work carried out by its specialised groups to allow European public opinion to become aware of co-operation in the framework of WEU.

**II**

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES**

# FIRST SITTING

Thursday, 22nd March 1990

## SUMMARY

1. Opening of the extraordinary session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Address by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Address by the President of the Assembly.
6. Observers.
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session (Doc. 1215).  
*Speaker:* Mr. Hardy.
8. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.  
*Replies by Mr. Eyskens to questions put by:* Mr. Ewing, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Baumel; Mr. Ewing (point of order).
9. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Pontillon (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Caro, Mr. Soell, Mr. De Decker.
10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 10.40 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### **1. Opening of the extraordinary session**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (b) of the Charter and Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open this extraordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### **2. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### **3. Address by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before starting our work, I shall call Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg, whom I have particular pleasure in inviting to come to the rostrum of our Assembly.

Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES (*President of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, it gives

me great pleasure to welcome you to Luxembourg today, particularly since for five years I was myself a member of your parliamentary Assembly.

For the second time, your parliamentary Assembly is holding an extraordinary session in these premises. I thereby conclude that this chamber, the surrounding offices and Luxembourg hospitality have been favourable to you and have given you satisfaction. I hope that your stay in Luxembourg will also allow you to discover the advantages and the charm of a small country with a big heart.

Western European Union is meeting at a time – and this is the point of departure of this session – when events are gathering speed and overtaking each other in importance and rapidity. We were certainly not prepared to see such a precipitous collapse of cultures, barriers, walls and totalitarian régimes. We are not really prepared to come to grips with the new idea of a large common house. Nor is our economy immediately prepared to live without a large sector of production – the defence sector. Consequently, for that reason and for many others, talk of disarmament must include thoughts about economic conversion in both Eastern and Western Europe. These thoughts must also cover other important sectors such as justice and culture, which are equally decisive for organising a new European order.

In examining, today and tomorrow, the question of establishing a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe, you will be paving the

1. See page 10.

*Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges (continued)*

way, expressing wishes, showing directions and adopting recommendations. Do all that, ladies and gentlemen, with perspicacity and courage. There are many sides to peace and security in Europe. Defence is far from being their only corollary. There is also economic well-being, social security, convergence towards joint ideas.

Moreover, all the dangers have not been averted and, as your Rapporteur, Mr. Pontillon, has correctly emphasised, now is certainly not the time to abolish the systems of alliance. It is rather a question of seeking together, and your efforts in this direction are praiseworthy, the right course and reorganising them in order to meet the requirements of security in a changed and continually changing world.

The presence of so many eminent guests and observers, particularly from the eastern countries, in the Assembly of Western European Union enlarged with the presence of Portugal and Spain, makes me particularly confident and optimistic. To these sentiments is added my pride to see your Assembly chaired so competently by my fellow countryman and colleague, Charles Goerens.

Mr. President, your excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is my wish that your session in Luxembourg will enter the annals of Western European Union and occupy its due place in this thrilling period of history we are now experiencing. Welcome to Luxembourg and may your work be fruitful.

#### **4. Examination of credentials**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our Assembly's last part-session, whose names have been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Is there any objection to ratifying these credentials?...

The credentials are ratified by the Assembly.

I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues.

I am also able to inform the Assembly that all member states have now ratified the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain to Western European Union. On 12th March last, the Assembly of the Republic of Portugal adopted this text. However, as of today, I have no official notification from the Council regarding com-

pletion of the ratification procedure. Consequently, to my great regret, representatives from Portugal and Spain cannot yet sit as full members and they retain the status of observers.

#### **5. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It is a very special privilege for me to open, here in Luxembourg, the extraordinary session that our Assembly decided to organise this spring of 1990. It is therefore in my own country that we are holding the session which will terminate the presidency you entrusted to me almost three years ago. I thank you for this and also, on your behalf, I thank the Luxembourg authorities for receiving us. Special thanks are due to Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the Chamber of Deputies, who is a former colleague of ours in the WEU Assembly, and to Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is unable to be in our midst at this opening sitting but will speak tomorrow.

The decision to hold this session was taken at our last ordinary session at the beginning of December. Under urgent procedure, the Assembly adopted an order deciding to devote an extraordinary session to the organisation of a new peaceful, just and secure order in Europe. It was led to this by the succession of events in Eastern Europe in the last months of 1989 because it saw that the fast-moving changes then taking place in all the countries of the region were likely to transform radically the facts of the problem that is in the centre of our responsibilities and activities: European security.

There could be no question of waiting until June, when our ordinary session normally starts, for WEU to examine the consequences for this organisation of the changes in Eastern Europe. Our governments are compelled, for themselves and in the various bodies in which they are associated, to take decisions that are important for the future of Europe, and these decisions will inevitably have major repercussions for WEU. The reorientation of the Atlantic Alliance and its organisation is now on the agenda. The Council of Europe is about to welcome several Eastern European countries. The European Community has been given the task of organising western assistance to those countries. WEU, which considers itself to be both the European pillar of the alliance and the Western European security organisation, is directly concerned with these matters and cannot stand by in silence while decisions taken in other frameworks determine its fate.

In this connection, I wish to stress the convergence between the work of our Assembly and that of the Council as described by the Secretary-General in his information letter of 15th

*The President (continued)*

March which was distributed to you at the beginning of this session. In particular, he tells us that "future prospects are... being discussed jointly in the search for new solutions and in preparation for future decisions concerning the implementation of agreements for the reduction of armaments and the restructuring and redeployment of forces". This is just what we shall be doing here by examining the rôle WEU will have to play on the one hand to set about organising a new peaceful and secure order in Europe and on the other hand to make a contribution to this order once it has been established.

However, I see no reason why we have to choose, as is suggested in that letter, between structuring the CSCE, i.e. the common European house, extending, if not the responsibilities, at least the activities of European institutions empowered to deal with European security, i.e. principally WEU, as specified in the Single European Act, and strengthening the European pillar of an Atlantic Alliance which, by the force of circumstances, will no longer be what it used to be. I believe that it is by acting in all three directions that we shall be able, first, to prevent events in the East calling in question the security structures that already exist in Western Europe, then to extend eastwards the benefits we derive from this peaceful order and, finally, to associate our American allies and the Soviet Union with the new organisation. This is, in any event, the approach proposed in the report by the Political Committee that we are to debate. However, this approach also means asking the Council to enlarge its work, which cannot be limited to studying the consequences of the forthcoming CFE agreement but must, in the framework of strict application of the modified Brussels Treaty, cover all questions raised by the emergence of a new peaceful order in Europe.

The need to discuss these matters was particularly great because, since October, we have been faced with the question of what is known as German reunification, i.e. the union of the two German states born of the second world war and the cold war. In 1954, WEU was the instrument used to allow the Federal Republic to play a full part in a collective western security system. The reunification of Germany, in whatever form and whatever the procedure leading up to it, and the preparation of a new secure order in Europe raise in new terms questions which had then been solved in the light of the circumstances at that time. Born of the suspicion left by the second world war and by the cold war, WEU must rethink its rôle now that confrontation between Eastern and Western Europe is no longer the major aspect of our security problems and the Federal Republic is about to stop being what it was and make way for a German state of yet unknown form.

The prospect of the German states being reunited makes me recall one absolutely remarkable fact that I believe has not been sufficiently stressed: there was no opposition in any European country to the reunification of Germany once the will of the German people was able to express itself. This is a fact that our German friends must not forget. Whatever the fears, justified or not, reservations and conditions that may have been expressed here and there in recent months, in no case has any doubt been voiced of applying to Germany the right of peoples to self-determination. This fact alone is the sign of the deep change that has taken place in European minds and national reactions in the last forty years. There can be no doubt that this is the result of the considerable development of structured order and international co-operation in Western Europe. For us all, it is the reward for forty years of incessant efforts in which WEU has played a large part. We must therefore be careful that the structures set up in the past forty years are not jeopardised and that the results of our efforts will not be wasted.

Clearly this does not mean that the way the German states are united does not raise questions for their neighbours in both East and West and I am gratified that, for the first time in the history of WEU, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a member country of the Warsaw Pact has agreed to join us to speak about these questions. The fact that it is Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, the country most concerned by the consequences of German reunification, who is to address us at this session shows our will not to shirk the most delicate matters and to be fully informed of all opinions in order to conduct our debates in the most open manner possible. I wish to thank the Minister very particularly for having agreed not only to convey his message but also to attend the whole session, thus showing the value he attaches, like us, to a real, public dialogue on matters that are essential for his country as well as ours.

Our debates will obviously have to take full account of last Sunday's elections which will allow the German Democratic Republic to have political authorities legitimised by universal suffrage to tackle the negotiations that are to lead to reunification. I am convinced that they will be well aware that the German problem is not only an inter-German problem but one that concerns the whole of Europe. Tomorrow's visit by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was anxious to address us during the few hours available to him between a visit to Africa and the meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in Lisbon, and who has expressed the wish to answer all the questions we want to put to him, shows how aware he is of



*The President (continued)*

the European dimension of the German question. It is therefore for two reasons that I express our gratitude to him.

I must also emphasise the importance of the presence among us of Mr. Valentin Falin, Director of the International Relations Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He will address us tomorrow but wished to be present throughout the session and I wish to thank him for the interest his country has been showing for several years in our Assembly and for his contribution to our debates.

Apart from this governmental participation, the Assembly appreciates the fact that a particularly large number of delegations of observers representing parliaments of countries that are not members of WEU are attending this session. Their presence is a clear sign of the interest the matter we are to debate raises throughout Europe. We are grateful to all the parliaments which accepted our invitation and sent delegations which, it will be clear to everyone, are of a very high standard of competence and responsibility.

Since July 1989, the Kingdom of Belgium has had the chairmanship-in-office of the WEU Council and it is therefore its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mark Eyskens, who will open our debates by describing the progress of the Council's work on the subject that brings us together today.

We congratulate the Belgian chairmanship-in-office for the dynamism it has shown in guiding the work of the Council and in developing its dialogue with the Assembly. We share its regret that several of its initiatives have not yet received the response from other governments that we might have wished.

Our former colleague, Senator Vitalone, now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, also wishes to give his government's views.

Finally, I express our gratitude to the Assembly's Political Committee, its Chairman, Mr. Karl Ahrens, and its Rapporteur, Senator Robert Pontillon, who managed to prepare and adopt in a minimum of time a detailed report and recommendation for us to debate. Everyone will appreciate the firm approach of this document which should allow us to adopt a clear, measured position on what WEU can do in the years ahead. The number of amendments already tabled shows that the text has already been read and carefully studied.

One of the merits of Senator Pontillon's report is to place our thinking on two separate levels corresponding to the two stages that will have to be respected in order to achieve this new

peaceful, just and secure order to which we all aspire. The first stage concerns what we can and must do here and now in order not to lose, at this new juncture and in our present uncertainty about what Europe will become, the benefits of what we have been doing for forty years to organise peace and build up the part of Europe in which we can act. The second stage is the one we shall have to reach in order to achieve a new order in which this peaceful organisation will be able to extend to the whole of Europe.

The future of Europe will depend above all on how we act during the first stage. In several regions, we can already see the emergence, if not of threats to peace, at least of disturbing signs of the rebirth, now that ideological confrontations are dying down or disappearing, of national passions, traditional mistrust and claims which, if they were to determine the policies of states, would set us back half a century to that Europe of sacred egotism and permanent instability to which our continent owed two world wars and its relative loss of place in the world. Today, therefore, we must be on our guard against this danger and examine how to meet it. This will be the main purpose of our debate.

It is my wish that the Council will attach all due importance to the recommendation that we adopt. It will perhaps not be possible for it to give a detailed answer to all the questions put to it by the Assembly in time for our next ordinary session, but I do not want it to use this as a pretext for delaying its examination of the text as a whole nor giving the Assembly an answer to those points on which it is already able to give its opinion. It would be a good precedent for it to give a provisional answer, but not an answer without substance, in two months' time to those parts of the recommendation on which it has to defer a final answer. If it failed to adopt such an approach, there would be good reason to fear that, instead of a dialogue, the two WEU organs are conducting two parallel monologues having no influence on each other. This would be tantamount to renouncing the advantages of having a parliamentary organ in our organisation at the side of the ministerial organs.

In any event, the Council can but note that the Assembly has done its utmost to ensure that its share of the dialogue is conducted at the highest level. It is now for it to maintain the same standard in our exchanges.

On 13th March, the Portuguese Parliament ratified the act of accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. It was the last to do so and we can now consider that WEU has been enlarged to include these two countries. This gives me the privilege of welcoming to our midst, for the first time, delegations of full members of our Assembly formed by the Portuguese Parliament and the Spanish Cortès in accordance with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.

*The President (continued)*

I am well aware that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by which our Assembly has the same delegations as those from member countries' parliaments to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe does not meet the wishes of the parliaments of these two countries. It also raises delicate problems for several of the more longstanding members of WEU. But our Assembly has always upheld the scrupulous application of the treaty and cannot on this occasion deviate from a position that it has constantly endorsed. I can nevertheless tell you that, aware of the problem thus raised, its Presidential Committee has just asked the Political Committee to submit a report on the possibility of revising Article IX of the treaty with a view to separating the delegations that form our Assembly from those forming the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The time seems ripe to make such a request to the governments which, in any event, have undertaken to revise the treaty following the accession of Portugal and Spain. In any case, the problems raised by German reunification will compel member countries to review several provisions of the treaty. There is thus every reason to think that the Assembly will be able, next December, to make recommendations to the Council concerning this revision.

The brevity of this session, the number and rank of government speakers who are to take part, my wish to allow parliamentary observers to give their views and the importance of the subject we are to examine urge me to conclude my speech and invite you to start your debates immediately.

**6. Observers**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to welcome observers from Denmark, Norway and Turkey, together with those from Portugal and Spain who will sit as full members at our next session. Also attending our session for the first time are representatives from Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. I welcome them at the same time as the members of the Permanent Council attending this session.

**7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session***(Document 1215)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session, Document 1215.

Are there any objections to the draft order of business?...

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I should hate to appear ungracious or to appear in any way churlish, especially in view of the graceful way in which you presented your report as President, but you made a point in your remarks that we will have carefully read and studied the amendments – and some of them, as you will be aware, Mr. President, are amendments of very considerable importance and character. Now, we have not had an opportunity to study carefully the amendments. Some of us did not see them until 9.30 this morning and I really think that we ought to be very careful indeed before we make a decision on some of those amendments given the importance of their character. I do not want to say any more, except that I recognise that it is a meeting of the Assembly at one of the most historic moments in European history, but that historic moment does require a maturity of judgment and an exercise, when necessary, of caution. By all means let the pace of history proceed in a brisk manner, because that is very much in Europe's and the planet's interest, but for us to be hurrying to make a decision on amendments that we have not seen before until literally little more than an hour and a half ago does seem to me to be a rather dangerous practice and I would like to suggest that, unless the Assembly is of whole-hearted disposition to approve amendments with a degree of enthusiasm and unanimity, then it ought not to be put into a position where some of us might feel caution would be wiser.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Hardy. I see that you are not proposing any change to the draft order of business. I can assure you that we have taken account, insofar as possible, of your concerns and that is why we have already brought the beginning of our meeting forward by one hour in order to allow parliamentarians to air their views about the Pontillon report. The amendments will be discussed in full at the last sitting of this session, which will be started tomorrow afternoon.

Are there any objections to the draft order of business?...

*The draft order of business is adopted.*

The order of business for this brief extraordinary session is very full. Twenty-eight speakers have put their names down to speak on the report by Mr. Pontillon. Five ministers and a representative of the Soviet authorities are to give addresses which will most certainly be followed by questions. Seventeen amendments have already been tabled to the draft recommendation. In accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules

*The President (continued)*

of Procedure, I therefore propose that the Assembly limit all speeches to five minutes except for chairmen and rapporteurs of committees. I would recall that under the same rule, the Assembly has to vote on this proposal without debate.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided. I also propose that one observer per delegation be allowed to speak in the debate on the report by Mr. Pontillon.

Does the Assembly agree?...

It is so decided.

**8. Address by Mr. Eyskens,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium,  
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Minister, your previous speech to our Assembly last December just after the NATO summit meeting aroused considerable interest. I welcome you and thank you for again coming to this rostrum.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I should also like to say a few words in the language spoken by the majority of people in my country and in at least one other country of the European Community, which is also a member state of WEU.

I just want to emphasise, Mr. President, how fortunate it was that you took this initiative. This extraordinary part-session does indeed respond to extraordinary circumstances. I have often heard it said in recent months that political leaders are acting very nervously and hurriedly, frequently improvising. In fact, ladies and gentlemen, we have no choice. It is not the politicians who are being hasty: it is the events, and it is precisely because of the whirlwind of events in the last few years and especially the last few months that we need to reflect and to adopt a position. We may have only a few months to adopt a position and guide history down the right road.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

We are all witnessing, but are also involved in, truly historic events. History is back on course after a break of over forty years following the tragedy of the last world war. A page is now being turned, Europe is overcoming its divisions

and the reunification of Germany is also, in many respects, the reunification of Europe as a whole.

The elections just held in the German Democratic Republic and shortly to be held in other East European countries are tangible and eloquent proof that Europe – the whole of Europe – is regaining a common heritage founded on the rule of law and freedom.

Europe and its values are not confined to geographical Europe. Europe is above all a legacy and an act of faith in mankind. It is a democratic ideal without which nothing lasting can be achieved. History is there to remind us of the fact.

Today, everything is possible but, in some ways, everything remains to be done to build Europe in peace and freedom, respecting both the interests and the special character of each and all.

All Europeans are pan-Europeans by vocation but this ideal has failed us too often. We owe it to ourselves and to the generations coming after to analyse with absolute clarity what is at stake and what is to be done. Hence the value of this extraordinary session attended not only by elected representatives from the WEU member countries but also, as privileged observers and participants, representatives from what was called “the other Europe” until a very short time ago. The presence of my colleague Mr. Skubiszewski is eloquent testimony to the progress that has been achieved.

WEU was brought into being by a collective defence treaty, the modified Brussels Treaty, which, side by side with the Treaty of Washington, retains all its importance, because it is the only specifically European security instrument. WEU is not and has never been a military organisation. It has no intention of becoming one. It is above all the expression of a European solidarity through which the wartime divisions of Western Europe were healed. The treaty was an important step on the road to union, even though a number of its provisions have been translated into practical form not within WEU as such but in the framework of the European Community created by the Treaty of Rome. WEU has no intention of becoming a fortress looking in on itself. This would be contrary to its vocation. On the contrary, it intends to contribute, at its own level and as a separate but closely-associated entity, to the process of European integration and the establishment of an order combining peace, stability and co-operation throughout Europe.

Your Assembly is alone in possessing security and defence attributes. Now, security is at the heart of the debate now going on in Europe, whether the subject is Germany, the rôle of the alliances or the shape of Europe of tomorrow.

*Mr. Eyskens (continued)*

The thirty-five power summit scheduled for the end of the year will be largely devoted to all these questions. We must prepare for it together, all together, all thirty-five of us, but we must not forget our own Atlantic or European solidarity.

The aim is to lay the foundations of a Europe where everyone will have their place, where everyone's legitimate interests will be respected and where everyone's security will be guaranteed, which means that everyone must co-operate.

Myself, I shall try to contribute to the debate by suggesting a number of what seem to me to be essential directions to follow.

### *1. Security requirements*

There can be no real security without a balance between the various components which today still govern force relationships in Europe, which has to include the United States and Canada, and, of course, the USSR which is much more than a European power. We cannot therefore ignore the objective realities, while accepting that stability must be sought at the lowest possible level of forces. I shall come back to this later.

Whatever its present troubles, the USSR or Russia will unquestionably remain a super-power. This seems to me to be part of the natural order of things. It would moreover be not only paradoxical but ridiculous to deny it that historical status on the pretext that it will, as we hope, move towards democracy.

This means that, for the sake of this European equilibrium which must be strengthened, the United States must maintain its commitment on the continent of Europe, side by side with its allies; for the foreseeable future, therefore, an American military presence must be ensured in Europe, with both conventional and nuclear forces. Numbers will certainly be reduced as a consequence of arms control and a political situation with its firm emphasis on détente; but they will still be substantial if they are to have the desired effect.

Such a North American presence in Europe is inconceivable without the continued existence of a western alliance, the Atlantic Alliance. But it must adapt to the new security environment brought about by the reductions and the consequent restructuring or by the signs that two Europes opposing each other until recently are moving closer together politically. Changes within the alliance must also be expected and Europeans will, in consequence of the American reductions, be required to shoulder a bigger share – if only in relative terms – of responsibility for their own security. The alliance will

therefore have to Europeanise itself, which is not the same thing as creating a European pillar in the Atlantic Alliance as the stock phrase goes.

WEU certainly has a rôle to play in this change, not by becoming a substitute for the alliance but as an instrument for adapting it.

The question of the Warsaw Pact and its future is an entirely different problem. It is not for us, in the West, to pass judgment on its maintenance or on the far-reaching changes it will have to undergo in order to convert itself into what may be a political structure. Can there be a political structure without solidarity? Can such solidarity be established on new bases between the present members of the pact? That is the whole question. The very fact that it has to be asked emphasises that there is no common measure between the pact and the alliance.

The fact is that the USSR's influence in Central and Eastern Europe is going to decline for reasons connected with the force cuts and as a consequence of the democratisation of the former satellites. It is clear that the strategic void so created must not be filled by the alliance. That would be to sow the seed of new imbalances.

The incorporation of the present GDR into Germany clearly poses a problem which will have to be resolved. Incorporation must not upset the military balance but Germany must remain part of western solidarity and the European Community system in which WEU has its rôle. This is the nature of the German paradox which is not for solution by the two plus four on their own. The status of reunified Germany in Europe and in the alliance is a matter of direct interest to us Belgians, and to others of course, not because we are neighbours but because we are allies and partners.

There is no place in Europe for a neutral Germany. It now remains to convince the USSR and Germany's eastern neighbours that this is also in their interest. It must therefore be possible to give them the necessary guarantees which I will call a new kind of confidence-building measures with a political as well as a military content. Among others, I am thinking of measures to: confirm speedily and categorically that the frontiers and in particular the Oder-Neisse frontier are sacrosanct – no other solution is possible for this question; announce that NATO troops – and this has virtually been done already – will not be stationed on former GDR territory; spread the withdrawal of Soviet forces over a transitional period, the length of which could be discussed in close conjunction with the development of the CFE process; obviously, continue and extend the process of disarmament in parallel with the establishment of co-operative structures geared to the new European environment.

*Mr. Eyskens (continued)*

These constitute a whole set of questions which I shall later consider in more detail but for which we must find a solution without delay, in time for official recognition at the thirty-five nation end-of-year summit. This will call for intense consultation and co-operation from all concerned at all levels.

But confidence-building is not a one-way process. The progress towards democracy must be speeded up at the same time in the Soviet Union itself. To me this is of fundamental importance.

## *2. The future shape of Europe*

The alliances have preserved peace for us in disturbed times. They have played a useful rôle in the Vienna negotiations. They will quite certainly continue to do so by affording help with verification.

But, beyond this, Europe's future security calls for a more dynamic approach which amounts to more than the maintenance of the military blocs. Co-operative structures must be built up gradually so that all concerned, whether or not members of an alliance, can join in.

Clearly, Europe's security will have to be worked out by the Thirty-Five with the active participation of the United States, Canada and the USSR. It will, however, still be necessary to go forward a step at a time taking care not to upset the delicate balances on which stability is based and maintaining a cohesive line of action which will not water down the integration now going forward and in particular the advance towards European union or call in question the Atlantic solidarity whose vital importance I have already stressed.

At this stage, the problem of the CSCE is less that of setting up institutions, of which we hear so much, than of stepping up the dialogue between the Thirty-Five in order to work out a new European order together. The institutions to be set up will follow naturally from the order established and not vice-versa. We must not put the cart before the horse.

To be effective this dialogue must quickly be formalised at the level of heads of state and government, foreign ministers and experts. A small secretariat is no doubt a natural adjunct.

The aim is that the end-of-year summit should produce satisfactory answers to the external problems of German unification, starting with the frontier question which I mentioned earlier. Ethnic minorities will also have to be guaranteed their basic right to practise their religion and use their own language. Principles which must be acknowledged in appropriate form include political pluralism, the rule of law, the

separation of powers, the essential political and economic freedoms and social rights, the welfare market economy and environmental values – all principles which must be acted upon so that democracy can work on a lasting basis. In other words, an effort will have to be made to release the full potential of the final act of Helsinki, in the realisation that this work will have to be carried forward with its sights set on Helsinki II in 1992. The end-of-year summit is only a stage, however important it may be.

In this way we shall really go forward from détente to understanding and this implies common action based on shared values.

In the longer term, the ultimate aim is the question of new structures for co-operation between Europeans themselves in the framework of a security charter with which the North Americans and the Soviets would be associated by a set of mutual guarantees. A system in which Europe would be a partner in its own right. This Europe would not only be united but would be master of its destiny and in charge of its security, knowing its rights but also respecting those of others.

This Europe requires the creation of a federation which would itself be credible for the Central and East European partners, for the USSR and, of course, for the United States and Canada. It is with this prospect in view that integration of the Twelve must be carried forward and intensified. This federation would be open to other European applicants provided they are so inclined and fulfil the required conditions.

This vision of Europe is clearly the opposite of what I would call a kind of diluting pan-Europeanism under cover of which nation states would quickly re-emerge with all that implies, without any guarantee of real stability. Conversely, pan-Europeanism must not lead to the setting up of a *directoire*, must not give exorbitant powers to the superpowers and must not impose some kind of tutelage on the process of Community integration.

There is therefore no way of creating a really united Europe except through a process leading ultimately to federation, whatever the stages and the intermediate forms of association with those who by choice or necessity would at first be unable to endorse the ultimate objective or fall in with what the Community has already achieved.

## *3. Disarmament*

Quite clearly, the emergence of the new Europe will be a long and complex process. What is essential is to act so that the process can start and can succeed, which I repeat means maintaining the balance at all stages. This is really the crucial point.

*Mr. Eyskens (continued)*

The process must be accompanied by disarmament measures, not as an end in themselves but as an essential instrument for the development of co-operation.

For the immediate future, we must ensure that the CFE agreement, which is an indispensable first step, can be concluded as quickly as possible. There are some who argue that such an agreement is already out-dated by reason among other things of German unification. Some adaptation will be needed but it remains a fact that the process of disarmament in Europe will come to a sudden stop if it is not developed on a sound and undisputed basis.

Parity between the two existing alliances at a lower level of forces is therefore an absolute necessity. To cut out this stage on the pretext that it has been superseded would be to build on sand. That is in no one's interest.

As soon as CFE I has been agreed, an immediate start will have to be made on CFE II. After the reductions, the problem will be that of restructuring forces, which is vastly more complex because defence policies are involved. A great deal is heard about defensive defence. My own view is that we should also be talking of defensive, mutual deterrence, the conditions for which will have to be worked out jointly.

The whole question will clearly be to determine how to proceed, with whom and where, with thirty-five or twenty-three or, even more likely, twenty-two. All questions on which the present members of the Warsaw Pact and the neutral and non-aligned countries will want to have their say. All these questions must be settled before the summit if a break in the negotiations is to be avoided. It is essential that we take a firm line on the results and show the necessary flexibility as regards ways and means.

Disarmament is still much more than the CFE process, however vital these negotiations may be for Europe.

Beyond START and the banning of chemical weapons I am thinking in particular of the SNF negotiations which, in accordance with the global view, should begin as soon as the implementation of CFE I has started, that is in the course of next year. Here again, I note that the environment has changed. The problem is already no longer posed in the same terms as a year ago, especially as regard the modernisation of the Lance missile. But equally there can be no real deterrence without nuclear weapons. Having said this, the rôle of such weapons, not to speak of their number, will have to be reviewed in a post-CFE environment which we can already glimpse in outline.

There are a number of fundamental questions which you are debating at this extraordinary session and will have to be considered at the next ministerial Council in April, although it will be unable to give all the answers because some of the questions are not matters for us alone. The European world has been enriched but it has also become more complex and we cannot confine ourselves to set ideas.

I have tried to give you at least the elements of a vision of Europe of the future. I note that there is convergence on many points with the report presented by Mr. Pontillon which has identified what is at stake in a remarkable manner and has sketched out the proposals.

In particular, I am, like your Rapporteur, convinced that the way to the necessary opening to the East and the development of new structures for co-operation is through the consolidation and extension of the structures of Western Europe. We in the West certainly have no monopoly of the European identity but we have gradually provided ourselves with the means of adding to its content. A number of the draft recommendations before you take the same line. I welcome the fact. The Council will consider them with the greatest interest.

I began by saying that in Europe today everything is possible if we show the necessary vision. The history of the construction of Europe with the creation of WEU, the Rome Treaty, the Single Act and prospects for union, starting with the EMU, are all reasons for thinking that this Europe is truly capable of vision. We see in past achievements reasons for hoping that the attainments of the Community in the widest sense – I include WEU – will tomorrow provide the basis for a new Europe where all citizens, from the West, the Centre and the East, will be able to live in the peace and freedom, which should never have ceased to be their common destiny.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Three members have asked to put questions, Mr. Ewing, Mr. De Decker and Mr. Baumel.

I call Mr. Ewing to put the first question.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – Could I first of all say that I found the Minister's speech in parts rather worrying with its heavy emphasis on the need to obtain guarantees on human rights issues for ethnic minorities from the Soviet Union? I accept, and most people here would accept, that there are problems in relation to ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union, there are problems in relation to ethnic minorities in Western European countries as well and one of the things that worries me – and I hope the Min-

*Mr. Ewing (continued)*

ister will take this on board – is that the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, having made so much progress, at such a rapid pace, over the past few months, really ought not to be pushed, as we seem to be pushing them, beyond the limits of their ability to meet the demands that the Minister seems to be placing on the Soviet Union. The surest way to failure is to set demands that cannot be met in the timescale that is being set for these demands to be met. I hope that the Minister would reconsider that position.

On the question of German neutrality, most of us take the view that the idea of German neutrality is incomprehensible and beyond belief. But I think that we should tread warily here because there is a possibility of German neutrality and I hope, personally, that this whole question of where a united Germany would find its place in Europe will be one of the major issues in the Federal Republic's elections which are due later this year. I do not see any sign of opinion from the Federal Republic on this question of neutrality. Of course, there is also the whole question of the status of Berlin. Until the allied powers who control Berlin – the three allied powers in West Berlin and the Soviet Union in East Berlin – make clear their intentions in relation to the future of Berlin, I think the whole future of the unification of Germany and its rôle in Europe has a long way still to go and there has to be a great deal more discussion and consideration.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I do not believe I gave the impression that I am unduly impatient about the reforms in the Soviet Union. In truth, reforms already started five years ago. My personal feeling, and I do not ask anyone to share it, is that at economic level, for instance, the reforms are too slow and this leads to certain contradictions which Mr. Gorbachev has to face up to.

As to the problem of ethnic minorities and nationalities in the Soviet Union, we shall not interfere in the internal affairs of that great country, but I believe I should say that there are principles which transgress frontiers and if one defends pluralist, tolerant parliamentary democracy which respects human rights it cannot stop at certain frontiers. That is our message, otherwise we would be unworthy of being Europeans. I therefore regret that you gave the impression that certain countries should be erected as unassailable islands. No, we have responsibility, a task also, but we must avoid naivety. Time is Mr. Gorbachev's greatest enemy and also his greatest ally and we must help him to buy time so that all that can be done progressively.

Turning to your second question about the neutrality of Germany, I still believe that if we want a stable Europe and balance in Europe it is preferable for defence to be organised in a unilateral manner and I do not believe that a great country like reunified Germany with neutral status is the best way to achieve this. But I think I have understood what you are alluding to. In fact, you are in favour of a neutral, reunified Germany in a neutralised Europe. That is even worse. A sub-continent like ours, neutralised, would be bound hand and foot. It would be handed over body and soul to the influences of clearly stronger and greater powers than this neutralised Europe. I reject this with all my might. It would be a historical error and I can therefore only repeat that I am in no way in agreement with you on either of your two comments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Eyskens.

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I first wish to congratulate the Minister and Chairman-in-Office for his important and courageous speech and I suppose he will appreciate that praise even more since it comes from a parliamentarian who, in his own country, is in the opposition. I congratulate him on his speech because it has the merit of being clear, frank and firm on essential points.

First, you said there was no place in Europe for German neutrality and you are clearly right. Next, you explained that there was no means of planning final European political unity without a deterrent to cover Europe, which implies a nuclear component; I believe that had not been recalled for a long time. Finally, you were also very clear about the institutional visions of the present debate between countries and powers in regard to the CSCE in particular.

I wish to put to you a few questions about the logic of this approach. Regarding events, some have other institutional ideas. You were right to recall the growing importance of the Atlantic Alliance in future years. You also recalled the links between the alliance and WEU. My first question is therefore, does the Minister believe it is possible for WEU one day to be enlarged to include countries not members of the Atlantic Alliance?

Now my second question. The important problem you did not tackle is the applicability of the Brussels Treaty to reunified Germany. There is the whole legal problem of how to apply the Brussels Treaty to reunified Germany. Can the Minister enlighten us on the procedure envisaged in this respect?

My third and last question is that you think that ultimately the EEC and the Community institutions should take over problems of

*Mr. De Decker (continued)*

European security. What time frame do you envisage for this evolution?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before calling Mr. Eyskens, I wish to welcome among us Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, who has just entered the chamber and is now following our work. You are most welcome, Minister.

I call Mr. Eyskens.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. De Decker for his kind words. In Belgium he is in the opposition – I was about to say so little. We have always been on the best of terms and our views have often converged on essential matters. His first question was should WEU be enlarged to countries not belonging to the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance? I believe the answer to this question depends first on what Europe will do, and I am thinking mainly of Community Europe and its security problems. Will Europe take over its own security problems within the Community bodies or not? There is something of your last question in this, moreover.

Belgium is quite favourable to defence and security problems being the responsibility of European bodies but there are legal difficulties to be overcome to achieve this. For what may be quite a long time, we must therefore maintain and strengthen WEU. During that time, which will be decisive for our future and for our history, enlargement in conditions to be agreed – since one may be a member, observer, more or less associated or partners of various kinds – is not to be rejected a priori, if that can help to give a hearing in the major negotiations being prepared, to a coherent voice from twelve-power Europe or from the Atlantic Alliance or from both. My answer to your question is therefore nuanced, but positively nuanced.

Your second question, i.e. the impact on the Brussels Treaty of the reunification of Germany, is certainly a problem. We must first await the outcome of the two plus four negotiations and we know that the two plus four have agreed to associate other countries from the moment their interests are affected – I am thinking of Poland and the success of Polish diplomacy in obtaining this result. Moreover, I, like other European colleagues, have received a letter from the United States Secretary of State explaining that we too may be associated in one way or another with the negotiations from the moment questions concerning us are brought up in the two plus four discussions. We must therefore wait for the results and the outcome of these negotiations to

see exactly what is the legal context in which we shall operate – nor is it without importance to know what legal course the German authorities themselves will choose, the new government in the GDR and of course that of the FRG: will it be Article 23 or Article 146 of the Constitution? This is an important question. In any case, we shall have to prepare for 1998, i.e. the year in which the Brussels Treaty expires after fifty years, and for me that seems to be the final date before which we shall have to decide exactly how to revise the treaty.

Finally, Mr. De Decker asked how long it would take for the European institutions to be able to debate and adopt positions on questions of security and defence. My personal answer is very clear: it could be tomorrow. That is my wish, but we have to be realistic. This is not a simple matter. As a small country, we wish to insist on this but in no way can I fix the probable time. I still think it is a very desirable scenario, but to say that the chances are eighty, fifty or twenty per cent would be trying to quantify political attitudes which, by definition, are more qualitative and psychological than quantifiable. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

I now invite Mr. Baumel to put the last question.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – You have just made a very clear speech, very precise, lucid and full of proposals or ideas. If I may, I wish to ask you two questions: first you spoke at length of CSCE, its future rôle and, second, you mentioned different European bodies between which the respective weight and responsibility would have to be shared out. In this matter, what is your view of President Mitterrand's idea of a European confederation? How do you place it in relation to the Thirty-Five and present European institutions, particularly the EEC?

My second question is particularly important in that here today we have the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, and, as you know, Poland has proposed creating a European co-ordination body about which you have not spoken. I wish to know your opinion on this Polish proposal.

Finally, allow me to say that I am a little surprised, as a parliamentarian of the Council of Europe, that in your very important and very lucid speech you in no way referred to the rôle, responsibility and future of the Council of Europe at a time when its members are trying to determine what might be the future rôle of their organisation which has now received a few delegations from the liberated nations of the East. In this context, we believe very important structures can be foreseen since, of all the assemblies,



*Mr. Baumel (continued)*

the Council of Europe seems to be the one which attracts their sympathy and their attention today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Baumel.

I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – This idea, suggested amongst others by President Mitterrand, seems judicious and interesting. Moreover, we ourselves have already mentioned it six or seven months ago. Everything also depends on the content given to this confederation. It is clear that if the evolution is towards co-operation in greater Europe, this co-operation will have to be structured and, so far, all thinking in this direction is at the level of intergovernmental co-operation. I have heard no one defend the idea of supranational integration of all European countries. We are defending this idea at the twelve-power level and that is the great difference between the European federation we wish and the wider structure which will be one of intergovernmental co-operation, implying that each government maintains a veto right and a consensus has to be obtained. In that context, confederal type co-operation may be envisaged. That does not mean that confederation would need a president. There could quite well be a President-in-Office, a Council of Ministers and that is an interesting possibility. I would make two reservations, however. First, this greater European confederation should not become a super-structure over and above existing organisations, starting with the European Community. Second, this is a condition for me, if such an intergovernmental confederation is created, it would clearly be elementary for Community Europe of the Twelve, or perhaps of the Fourteen, to be part of it as a community and to speak with a single voice because otherwise we might permanently be in danger of diluting and dividing Europe from the moment the member countries of the Community had to take individual stands within the confederation.

The idea of a council of co-operation is perfectly reconcilable with the idea of a confederation. The council of co-operation can be the political instrument for confederal-type evolution. The Polish Government's idea of a council of co-operation can also be grafted on to the idea already expressed some twenty years ago by one of my predecessors, Mr. Harmel, for a European security management body, sometimes called a European security council. The latter title is perhaps not the best because it is too close to a body that exists already at the level of the United Nations which is a directorate of great powers with veto rights. Nevertheless I

see a fairly clear convergence between the confederal-type ideas and the ideas proposed by the Polish Government. It is therefore certainly a fruitful course to explore.

Third, Mr. Baumel, I spoke about the Council of Europe in my speech but perhaps not enough, in relation to the Europe of values. The Council of Europe is a very valuable instrument and essential for defending that Europe which can extend further than more limited structures such as twelve-power Europe. We shall be meeting in Lisbon tomorrow and on Saturday to talk about the enlargement of the Council of Europe. I share your point of view, although at the present juncture economic convergence is far more complex and far slower to achieve whereas convergence on values and fundamental options is a question of political determination. It can be achieved quickly and that is what we shall try to do in the Council of Europe whose importance today is far greater than five or ten years ago thanks to the historical times in which we are living.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ewing.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – I apologise for raising this point of order but I am sorry that the Minister chose to misrepresent my position on Germany. My position – made perfectly clear at our last Assembly in Paris – is that I am in favour of a united Germany as part of western institutions. The point that I was making – that the Minister obviously had great difficulty picking up – was that the people of a united Germany themselves may well decide to be neutral and no thought was being given to that. But I will not have my position misrepresented.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, but that was not a point of order. You have perhaps managed to elucidate something of a misunderstanding between yourself and the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council, but this brings us back to the task in hand.

I thank Mr. Eyskens, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for his excellent speech and for having so kindly answered questions.

***9. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe***

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on the establishment of a just, peaceful and

*The President (continued)*

secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe, Doc. 1216 and amendments.

I call Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Ministers, Secretary-General, ladies and gentlemen, above a certain threshold, quantitative changes call for qualitative reforms, the philosopher Gaston Berger liked to recall.

This is so for our problem today. The magnitude and gathering speed of developments in the international environment and particularly those affecting Europe require in-depth thinking, a kind of agonising appraisal and much creative imagination.

We are indeed witnessing the reshaping of the strategic landscape of the last forty years. This evolution must arouse neither excessive fear nor demobilising euphoria. The worst would be to wish to ignore present changes and cling to past situations.

So what are the place, rôle and responsibilities of Europe and of the part of Europe that is ours in this emerging order of security and peace?

This is the principal subject of this report and of the extraordinary session as our President just recalled. The Assembly had to make its own contribution to this collective thinking so that it could inform the governments of Europe's opinion on these matters and what it expects of the WEU Council. Furthermore, it was the Assembly's duty to do this, and to do it quickly, in any event before the new European order starts to emerge from the series of international conferences planned for the months ahead.

If I may make one further comment, our search must be seen in terms of time. There can be no logical concept of the future. The very notion of "foreseeable future" tends to diminish further every day. Yet in security terms the foreseeable future must necessarily include facts linked with bi- and multilateral disarmament negotiations, the progress of democratisation in Eastern Europe – in that they affect the coherence of the Warsaw Pact – and the process of unifying the two Germanys.

Where arms control is concerned, it seems difficult to hope for significant progress in implementing the process before the end of this year. But can thought be given to implementing a new European security system – assuming we have clear ideas on the subject and a coherent plan – even before an agreement is concluded in Vienna and its first effects felt? My feeling, therefore, is that we are condemned to a kind of compulsory status quo. In this connection, a British analyst spoke of a period of at least five years, a view apparently shared by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

I do not know whether this forecast will be confirmed. I would merely remark that this intermediary, or interim, period gives us plenty of time to examine – first among Europeans, then with our United States and Canadian allies and finally with the Central and Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union – ways and means of establishing a new security order.

I said we had plenty of time; I should say just time, for experience has shown that moments combining all the conditions for progress are always short and must be seized in time.

The report that I shall now present to you was examined twice by the Political Committee in very meaningful discussions which finally allowed the report to be adopted unanimously and without further amendment.

The first part deals with developments in Eastern Europe. It tries to be logical and objective. It is nevertheless clear that some questions are still without an answer, particularly in regard to relations between the Soviet Union and the parties in power in Eastern Europe, that is to say in regard to the influence that the Soviet Union exercised – and still may exercise – on the present reforms. This is not merely a matter of speculation since the answer may lead to different interpretations of the nature of Soviet intentions and Moscow's attitude towards organising a peaceful order in Europe.

This immediately raises the problem of the future of the pacts mentioned just now by Mr. Eyskens. For instance, some consider the Warsaw Pact no longer exists. I have a more measured view, although I hope Europe will emerge at last freed from the bipolar yoke. However, I think any such announcement is premature. The Warsaw Pact has certainly lost the federating link of ideology and communist organisation and is probably no longer the instrument of ideological and political oppression that it was and also the instrument of an offensive strategy, but it can still be the place for affirming the member countries' will for integrity and security in their relations with their neighbours, as in the case of Poland, and the most appropriate framework for managing their relations with the Soviet Union. As far as I know, neither Romania nor Bulgaria has shown any intention of leaving the pact, nor, moreover, have Hungary and Czechoslovakia, although they have called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In this sense, the Warsaw Pact remains an instrument of security and can therefore contribute to the organisation of peace and disarmament in Europe.

Just as a cloud brings the storm, as Jaurès said, by definition potential sources of tension are inherent in the movement. As we have said,

*Mr. Pontillon (continued)*

disarmament is a slow and laborious process; and, as Mr. Eyskens rightly said, it is not an end in itself, the end is peace; there is always a risk of accidents along the way.

The Eastern European nations' return to freedom is not necessarily a guarantee of balance and peace. The awakening of nationalist aspirations has become a serious threat to European order. We are reminded of this today by the incidents in Romania.

Nor can Europe ignore the threats emerging to the south and east of the Mediterranean and we cannot totally discard the hypothesis of a sort of swing in the risks, with North-South antagonism replacing East-West division.

Finally, what is true of the Warsaw Pact and the eastern system is also true of the Atlantic Pact. The Atlantic Alliance came into being before the Warsaw Pact. Together with its concern for security, it is an expression of transatlantic solidarity, which has never really been defaulted since the outset. However, it is clear that the alliance must evolve. The lowering of tension in Europe, the announced dismantling and foreseeable reduction of military systems, political developments and particularly the prospects offered by German unification justify reflection about new security requirements, the future of the alliances, their progressive decline and the new assessment of certain strategic concepts.

In fact, the problem can be summed up in these vital questions: how can a strategic balance be organised at a lower level of defence? How can we move from a fractured world in which the systems were rivals to a more open world in which the systems are complementary or interdependent?

The German question is at the heart of the problem of European security and the organisation of a new order in Europe because of the eighty-million population of the two German states; Germany's place in the European economy; Germany's geopolitical situation in the centre of Europe; the place of the two German states in the two alliance systems; the reactions and fears which memories of Nazism may still justifiably arouse in Europe.

Hence it is not enough for there to be understanding between the two German states to allow unification. There must also be agreement between the four powers given responsibility for the fate of German territory in 1945; agreement between all the countries taking part in the CSCE.

These agreements should include a guarantee of the intangibility of the frontiers of the new state; precise undertakings by that state in regard to limitations on its armaments and clari-

fication of the way the new state can participate in a collective security system.

However, it is equally clear that the new German state will also have to reach an understanding with the Federal Republic's partners in the various western institutions to determine how the treaties creating them will apply to Germany as a whole. This is foreseen for the EEC. It will be necessary for NATO and also WEU.

The neutralisation of Germany is unacceptable to the West and also several Eastern European countries. Its integration in the NATO military structures also seems difficult to accept for several Eastern European countries, particularly the Soviet Union, whose legitimate security requirements we cannot and must not ignore, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers just said.

A middle course must therefore be found, on the one hand to ensure a link between unified Germany and the western defence system and, on the other, that is acceptable to the Soviet Union and its allies. WEU might play this rôle, *inter alia* by giving an international guarantee of respect for Germany's undertakings not to produce or hold certain armaments; providing a juridical basis for the presence of forces of WEU member countries on German territory if the German state so wishes and, possibly, the presence of German forces on the territory of other member countries so as to retain the deterrent element that the presence of allied forces on its territory gives each country; in this connection, the suggestion by our Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, that the Franco-German concept be Europeanised seems a positive one; helping to guarantee the frontiers of member states and, consequently, those of their neighbours; finally, ensuring the link between WEU and NATO provided for in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty and, hence, between unified Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, whatever status the armed forces of the future German state may eventually have.

Furthermore, WEU must play an important rôle in two stages in establishing a new peaceful order in Europe, which can be organised only in the framework of the CSCE.

During the transitional period, the defence effort of the Western European countries will have to be organised, taking into account disarmament agreements; the reduction in the American military presence in Europe; pressure by European public opinion to reduce defence budgets.

This difficult task will imply no radical change in the course followed by WEU since 1985 but will probably require the Council to act more rigorously in areas where it has already set itself

*Mr. Pontillon (continued)*

the task of developing consultations between its members.

In order to prepare the longer term, the Council, with the assistance of the institute, should draw up the programme that the WEU countries intend to support and win acceptance for in the CSCE: for developing the threshold of sufficiency concept on which future disarmament agreements will be based; for establishing the elements of a broader notion of shared security as it should be defined by the CSCE; for developing confidence-building measures; for working out means of arbitration.

In the medium term, the new European security structures are not yet very clear. However, two directions and two kinds of evolution seem possible. One would favour a formula whereby both alliances would change from rival alliances into political alliances co-operating with each other, thus maintaining a system of bipolar structures. The other would be in the framework of the CSCE and lead to the creation of a multilateral system guaranteeing security for the whole of Europe.

These two possibilities leave room for a whole series of intermediary solutions, including the idea of a new European security system that would eventually take over from the old alliances.

What will be WEU's place in this development? We have tried to define a few possible courses. It would be premature, and probably too ambitious, to go any further since the military status of Germany is still uncertain, there may be some delay in the development of the European Economic Community and the idea of a European confederation is still viewed as a goal and not as a means of solving questions of security in Europe.

The confederation is a long-term aim which provides every opportunity for action by institutions like ours. We must seize this opportunity and nourish it with firm proposals by helping to promote new procedure for collective security.

In this context, is WEU to remain a purely western organisation or should it very soon be opened to eastern countries? I personally am inclined to see WEU's future in an all-European context, but everything will depend on the evolution of the military pacts, and NATO in particular, the settlement of the German question, the European Community's ability to apply a policy of opening towards the east, the establishment by the CSCE of a European security organisation guaranteeing stability at a lower level of armaments and on the basis, for instance, of minimum deterrence on both sides which might progressively take the place of the present alliance systems.

The recommendation submitted for your examination and debate aims to determine what can be done today to prepare a peaceful order for *tomorrow's Europe* while maintaining, as long as necessary, the structures which ensured peace in *yesterday's Europe*. It is a matter *neither* of rebuilding the world on the basis of perestroika *nor* of ignoring historical divisions. The rapid developments in Eastern Europe compel us to be open in regard to the future and responsible in our action today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Rapporteur.

The debate is open.

I first call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I convey my thanks and congratulations to the Political Committee and, in particular, Mr. Pontillon.

I shall limit myself to eight points, Mr. President, and the first is that the achievement of European union has become a major necessity. All the shilly-shallying shows how useful its existence would have been today. It does not exist, so it is urgent. My second point is that the governments of the member states must pursue an active and unequivocal policy to make the tasks of WEU and the European Community converge. Third, the European Community must speedily bring about the economic and monetary union. Fourth, Western European Union must quickly settle the institutional organisation of European security as the political and military pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Fifth, the Council of Europe must develop its eminent and institutional rôle of co-operation between European parliamentary democracies and guarantee of human rights. Sixth, the CSCE remains the framework for the peaceful and secure order in Europe in agreement with the United States and the Soviet Union. It cannot take the place of existing organisations and, in particular, the Council of Europe. Seventh, reunified Germany, faithful to the commitments of the Federal Republic of Germany to which the population of the GDR has just subscribed massively, must be an additional chance for the European union to accede quickly to the rank of world superpower. Finally, my eighth and last point, but this is perhaps just a beginning since it seems that the Warsaw Pact is no longer a subscriber, is it not our duty to erect a bridge in the direction of the European countries freed from totalitarianism which wish to be associated with European democracy for the indispensable dialogue on security?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Caro.

I now call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to thank the Rapporteur for his very comprehensive report. I agree with most of his assessments, but on some points I differ from him. One of these is paragraph 26, in which the position adopted by German Social Democrats with reference to the questions of bringing a united Germany into European security structures are not correctly described. In whatever way the majority of the population may vote on subjects such as neutrality or membership of the alliance, the great majority of the political forces in the Federal Republic are against the neutralisation of Germany, and this has always been the position of the SDP as well. We have said that not for a single moment must such a reunited Germany, as also the previous partial German states, be without ties to Europe and without compliance with international obligations. But there are ties which are unthinkable in the long term, and one such would be that one part of Germany, the Federal Republic, is a member of NATO and WEU whilst the other part belongs to the Warsaw Pact, and both alliances hold to their military confrontation, their military options. With events moving in the way they have been going since last year, the people would naturally consider it increasingly absurd for short-range nuclear missiles to be targeted either on Dresden or Berlin by the West or on western cities from the East. That applies not only to the Federal Republic; I maintain that it applies to all countries in the central area of Europe. And because of this there must be some fresh thinking. Of course this will not lead to an immediate dissolution of the alliances. There is not the slightest doubt about that, but if we are striving to establish a pan-European system of security, of which both the United States and Canada and also the USSR are members, then clearly we ought to try to set up this system, make a first step towards it, without the alliances being immediately dismantled.

As regards the situation of the alliances it has to be said that they will have to change their nature; they must be primarily organisations for implementing disarmament. They will nevertheless retain their political functions for a number of years, if one thinks about all the problems existing outside Europe, or about particular crisis spots which might influence developments in Europe. That is quite clear. But confrontations must be stood down and options regarded by one side or the other as offensive must also be discarded. In other words, the Helsinki 2 conference, which the Soviet President is trying to convene for the autumn of this year, must basically issue three mandates: always assuming that the Vienna negotiations on conventional troop reductions are successful, a mandate for a second phase of the Vienna negotiations with drastic reductions, which would

then in particular include the troops both of the present Federal Republic and of the GDR, a mandate for the elimination of nuclear short-range missiles from Central Europe and a third mandate, endeavouring to establish a security structure on the basis of the Conference on Security and Co-operation with the necessary substructure and with the political negotiating powers that are necessary for a pan-European security system as envisaged.

I would add, and I am sure I speak for colleagues belonging to other groups in the Federal Parliament as well: it is not only conceivable but very likely that for a number of years special security conditions will be placed upon a united Germany. This applies of course in particular to the extension of the ban on the production and use of A, B and C weapons. That is absolutely right. But it will be impossible in the long run to keep a united Germany in a completely special situation militarily. Not only is this likely to provoke nationalism within Germany; it would also contribute to the appearance of a de facto neutralisation, which all of us reject. And we do not want a return to the bilateral alliances of the interwar period. We want neither a Rapallo nor a renewal of the little ententes, as all these small alliances were called. What we want is to be bound into Europe, and we want to create a security structure covering the whole of Europe. Thank you for your attention and patience.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Soell.

I now call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to congratulate Mr. Pontillon for his report and particularly for the fact that on such a difficult and delicate subject, and moving if I may say so, he obtained unanimity in committee.

For the Liberal Group, I wish to say that we fully endorse the content of this report and in particular because, while basically welcoming the evolution in the East towards liberalisation and respect for human rights, the report recalls even so that there is still much uncertainty about the situation in Central Europe and in the world as a whole. In this respect, I believe it is important to bear in mind that disarmament, although growing closer each day, is progressing very slowly and we must never forget that, whatever happens and whatever may be the evolution in the Soviet Union, this country adjacent to our part of Europe is, and will always remain, a superpower. That is why we are happy that this report calls for the maintenance of the alliances – the Atlantic Alliance in particular and WEU which are fundamentally defensive organisa-

*Mr. De Decker (continued)*

tions – which, as Mr. Eyskens recalled, have ensured and can still ensure for many years to come stability and security in Europe. I believe the report is also right to welcome the reunification of Germany and to state clearly that we do not wish the German state to be neutralised. I believe the reunified Germany must remain in the alliance as a whole and in WEU. We must not show hegemony towards Germany and I believe it is in Germany's interest to remain a member of these alliances so as to remain also a full partner in Europe. Clearly, neutralisation of Germany would eventually lead to the dislocation of European unity because a European partner that no longer took part in the security policy of the European continent would very quickly no longer be a full European partner. The report also refers to the delicate question of the deployment of NATO forces in Europe and alludes to the fact that the Brussels Treaty might be the juridical basis for the presence of the forces of member states on the territory of other member states. The Rapporteur, Mr. Pontillon, mentioned the excellent idea, I believe, of the WEU Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, to take up the idea that had already existed at the time of the EDC to form multinational European units which would be deployed not only perhaps in Germany but in other countries, Benelux, Italy and elsewhere, and which would considerably strengthen the deterrent effect of our armed forces.

Then comes the delicate problem of the applicability of the Brussels Treaty to reunified Germany. This problem is obviously very complex and the report alludes in a very precise manner to the various questions that arise. I believe it is very important for the Chairmanship of the Council and the Assembly here to express the wish that the German Governments give us their views on this matter as quickly as possible. Does Germany wish this treaty to be applied and how can this be done juridically?

I shall conclude, Mr. President, by saying that the Liberal Group also thinks that the first priority is to strengthen European political union. Next, it is necessary to maintain and Europeanise the Atlantic Alliance. By this, I mean that when you speak of the difficulty today of modernising short-range nuclear weapons in view of the evolution of the countries of Central Europe which will perhaps tomorrow be our partners in the Council of Europe, this evolution of attitude is, I believe, necessary in the alliance. But at the same time a political Europe must keep nuclear deterrence.

That is why when one speaks of Europeanising the Atlantic Alliance, I believe it is important, and I have already said this in the Assembly in Paris, that particularly France and the United Kingdom together examine a European strategic nuclear deterrence which would be at the service, not of states, but of the European political structure.

WEU must then be strengthened and the Council of Europe opened to all states, which, day after day, struggle increasingly for human rights and democracy and finally, going further, the whole should be concerted in the CSCE.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. De Decker.

The debate is adjourned until after the speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland this afternoon.

#### *10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.
2. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.
4. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
5. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.)*

## SECOND SITTING

Thursday, 22nd March 1990

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.  
*Replies by Mr. Skubiszewski to questions put by: Mr. Jung, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Morris.*
4. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (*Resumed debate on the draft report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments*).  
*Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Klejdzinski, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Martino, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Jung, Mr. Tummers.*
5. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.
6. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.  
*Replies by Mr. Poos to questions put by: Mr. Caro, Mr. Jessel.*  
*Reply by Mr. Vitalone to a question put by: Mr. Jessel.*
7. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments*).  
*Speakers: The President, the Earl of Kinnoull, Mr. Fioret, Mrs. Glumac-Levakov (Observer from Yugoslavia), Mr. Cetin (Observer from Turkey), Mr. Biacs (Observer from Hungary), Mr. Fassino, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Pontillon (Rapporteur).*
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### 2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### 3. Address by Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the address by Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.

Minister, our Assembly is particularly happy to receive a member of the Polish Government for the first time. I welcome you on behalf of all the representatives and beg you to come to the rostrum.

Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*) (Translation). – Mr. President, thank you for your kind words and friendly welcome that I appreciate very much. With your permission, I shall now speak in English.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honour for me to address this Assembly and its distinguished members at the present extraordinary session.

Western European Union plays an important rôle in the political and security infrastructure of our continent. Our goal today is to lay foundations for a new system of European security. The process of the unification of Germany made that task particularly urgent, but we are faced by it irrespective of the fall of the Berlin wall. What was decisive was the political, economic and social change in Central and Eastern Europe. That change modified the political map of the continent. The beginning was made by the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1980.

1. See page 13.

*Mr. Skubiszewski (continued)*

In the task which lies ahead of us the Assembly of Western European Union has a significant function to fulfil. The Assembly facilitates the flow of ideas and exchange of views oriented at finding a new constitutional framework for European security. It is a goal Poland shares with you, and we shall try our best to contribute to its attainment.

My presence here is a sign of the disappearing division of Europe. It testifies to mutual opening and rapprochement between what formerly used to be the separated parts of one and the same continent.

Mr. President, I have referred to the changes in Central and Eastern Europe. They have set Europe in a dynamic motion. They have demonstrated the influence that freedom and democracy exercise on inter-state relations.

Politically, the modifications that have been brought about have opened up a possibility for rearranging the European system in accordance with the aspirations of all the nations of the continent. Born ten years ago in Poland, the idea of "Solidarity" fostered this process and added to it two essential values: first, the moral dimension, and second, the emphasis on moderation in reforms without detracting from their fundamental nature. Our approach is that of change in stability.

As a result, the traditional dichotomy of East-West relations, not to speak of division, has lost its validity.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, old structures usually outlive the circumstances that have led to their creation. The traditional security mechanisms and structures which have been inherited from the past are clearly not adequate to the challenges we face today. They are not relevant to our aspirations and to the new situation that arose in the heart of Europe. Yet the old structures are still in existence. We all want to move away from Yalta and are afraid to come back to Sarajevo. Nonetheless, the legitimate fear of instability should not prevent us from working out a concept of pan-European relations. Our effort must be accompanied by the necessity to preserve a stable framework for transition. That way of thinking is part of Polish foreign policy.

We do not reject the lessons of the past from which we draw several conclusions. But we must concentrate on the present and especially on the future. In building up the new system of security we must first base ourselves on the rule of international law. In particular, I would refer to the following principles governing the relations of states: prohibition of the threat or use of military force; prohibition of intervention; set-

tlement of disputes by peaceful means alone; equality before law and in the protection afforded by law; self-determination of peoples, including the right of a people to establish an independent state; respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all; integrity of state territory and inviolability of frontiers.

The latter principle is particularly important in the present transition in Europe. The unification of the two German states can take place only within their existing frontiers and it must be linked to the corroboration, in treaty form, of the German-Polish frontier. Such a treaty, which should have the status and effect of a peace settlement with Germany, will have as its purpose the elimination of any questioning of the Oder-Neisse frontier or any discussion on its revision at the start of unified Germany and thereafter. In the moment of German unification, which is part of the process of unifying our continent, European relations and especially Central European relations at a vital geostrategic point cannot and should not be burdened with a frontier issue of that dimension. The final settlement, arrived at now, lies in the interest of the whole of Europe and is an imperative of European statemanship.

Mr. President, from the Polish perspective, the new security system should reflect the concept of a single Europe and the values of democracy, pluralism and humanism. We want to close the chapter of the rule of force, political dictate and "limited sovereignty", we wish to overcome the syndrome of zones of influence and to banish the concept of security as a "zero-end" game.

The new system cannot, of course, limit itself to a mere negation of what was, until recently, wrong in Central and Eastern Europe. It should give everybody such a sense of security and stability as to render every alliance-like security arrangement no longer necessary.

The new system of European security will be based on the elimination of the domination by a state or states over another state or states. The prohibition of the use of force is an obvious element of the scheme. But we know all too well that respect for state sovereignty and equality does not automatically remove conflicts. The future system should contain crisis-management and conflict-prevention mechanisms.

The function of all alliances, and especially multilateral alliances, in Europe is another problem. Their rôle is changing. The Warsaw alliance, of which Poland is a member, has lost its ideological colour. It is no longer an instrument of political satellitism. It remains an agreement on collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In the process of building up



*Mr. Skubiszewski (continued)*

European unity it will lose much of its significance. It will be dissolved the moment an all-European system of security becomes a reality.

As to the other multilateral alliances, we believe that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Western European Union fulfil a stabilising function.

The alliances continue to exist but their nature is changing. Since their creation they have been regarded as mutually opposed. From our perspective we want them to lose that nature. We wish them to acquire a non-confrontational and co-operative character.

By remaining in the Warsaw alliance, Poland does not pursue any ideological or political objectives that could make it differ from the ideas represented by the members of NATO and Western European Union. We do not regard our membership of the Warsaw treaty as an obstacle to developing relations with the West. Sovereignty is the governing principle of our military doctrine and its practical implementation. That doctrine is not directed against any western alliance, but against any aggressor whoever he might be. In its history Poland knew aggressors, and aggressions, coming from different geographical directions. Our membership in the Warsaw alliance does not imply any involvement in the global big-power rivalry.

The multilateral alliances should become more transparent. They will thus emphasise that they have no hostile intentions with regard to each other.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, disarmament is the key element of the new security order in Europe. To be effective it has to be politically and conceptually in line with the vision of a united Europe.

We focus our attention on the Vienna conference and on the elaboration of a treaty on conventional forces. While we already know what the main elements of the treaty are, we still have to ask the question whether the treaty can meet everyone's expectations. That is a legitimate issue to raise as the treaty's concept was designed long before the present developments in Europe. My answer is that the on-going changes should not delay the conclusion of the treaty. The heart of the matter is deep and stabilising cuts and that requires no modification. Later on, there should be a follow-up and a second stage of negotiations. In any case, we press for the early conclusion of the treaty.

The treaty will not solve all the problems and, therefore, one should make it flexible enough to include additional arrangements. In particular, such arrangements may become necessary as a result of the unification of Germany.

We should start thinking about the agenda for Vienna II. It should bring deeper cuts, especially in all the sensitive areas of Europe. Reductions of new weapons and equipment should be considered. There is need for the restructuring of armed forces and putting them into a clearly defensive posture, and one should further limit the offensive capabilities by placing constraints on logistics and deployment of forces. Vienna II should solve the problem of the destabilising nature of new technologies and the qualitative arms race. It should create guarantees against rapid reconversion of the industrial potential to military purposes and mobilisation of resources for offensive purposes. It should further develop the sufficiency rule and deal with the problem of forces stationed on foreign territory. The next phase should be based on a negotiated settlement in which all states will act as fully sovereign and independent participants.

The first agreement reached in Vienna will provide, I hope, an impetus for other disarmament efforts which would strengthen its security-building effect. I am referring, first of all, to the problem of tactical nuclear weapons.

European security is also linked to the presence of the two superpowers. The Soviet rôle stems from its geopolitical position in Europe. The United States' involvement has proved to be of a stabilising nature and that rôle may increase with the unification of Germany.

Eurasia, and consequently Europe, has always constituted the central priority of the American-Soviet contest. American-Soviet relations seem now to evolve from contest to co-operation. This may have, we hope and wish, its effect on Europe in the sense of gradually decreasing the intensity of the collision of the superpower interests on our continent. That, in fact, should be one of the main goals of establishing a new system of security in Europe: we should all make an effort to turn the presence of the two superpowers in Europe into a factor that supports and fosters European security, while at the same time Europe should lose in importance as an area of superpower rivalry. President Mitterrand's idea of a European confederation has many facets, one of them being related, I think, to this aspect. The reduction of superpower contest in Europe and the transition to superpower co-operation is of primary importance for finding a solution to the most difficult problem of German unification, which is the political and military status of the unified German state. That state must be fully integrated into what now is called the new architecture of Europe. A segment of that architecture is the Council of European Co-operation proposed by Poland.

*Mr. Skubiszewski (continued)*

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Europe is now facing important decisions which will shape its image for a long time to come. If democracy is to be the cornerstone of European relations, the preparation of decisions must be based on democratic rules. Each state must have a say in the discussion of matters of common interest and of those concerning its particular interests. Poland attaches great importance to the CSCE summit to be held this year.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to repeat my sincere thanks for the opportunity to address the Assembly and to add my modest voice to this important debate on the political strategy of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. Would you agree to answer any questions that members of our Assembly may wish to put?

*(The Minister indicated his assent)*

I call Mr. Jung to put the first question.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – I wish to thank you for your speech and say how much we appreciated hearing your views. I am a friend of Poland, together with many others in this chamber. I admire the example the Polish people has given to the countries of the East.

If I may be frank, there is one problem, however, of concern to me. I am very impressed by the interest you attach to the treaties, to a frontier. I wish to ask you whether you do not believe that the evolution of the European Community for the joint defence of Europe is a much greater guarantee than certain treaties for I had the impression that in the last few weeks you were somewhat reticent about German unification which, since 1954, has been one of the strong points in the formal undertakings of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Personally, I have noted that, because of the evolution in Europe, the Rhine frontier between France and Germany almost no longer exists in practice and I hope that developments in Europe will also allow far less importance to be given to the frontier between Germany and Poland and will be an additional guarantee. Do you not believe that that is the true direction in which we must move and that we must all remain attached to this development in Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*) (Translation). – Thank you for your kind words about my country. Why is Poland insisting on a treaty? It is because of conventional arrangements reached, moreover,

without Poland's participation. It was the Potsdam agreement concluded by the three great powers that introduced the question of this frontier as a peace settlement and therefore a conventional settlement. Then there was the treaty between the three western powers and Federal Germany, the so-called "Deutschland Vertrag" of 1952, amended in 1954, which again reviewed the question of frontiers as a peace settlement. It is specifically in Federal Germany that it has always been emphasised that the question was not finally solved before the conclusion of a treaty. We are therefore responding to these requirements.

For us, the frontier question does not exist. It is a frontier established and recognised in Europe and practically the whole world. But since from time to time we are told that we must take this additional legal step and conclude a peace treaty or a peace settlement, we answer that we are prepared to do so. I fully agree with you that there are other far more stable and permanent guarantees and European integration is one of them. I believe one does not exclude the other, but at the start of unification we want this problem of frontiers to be removed from the discussions between Poland and Germany, since Poland wants the best possible relationship with unified Germany. I personally am a firm supporter of a Polish-German community of interests, but we must clear away this problem which from time to time preoccupies public opinion, although not so much in my country. Those are the reasons for my position.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, in your speech you said that the Warsaw Pact had lost its ideological and political value. Since, moreover, a number of countries have asked for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from their territory – Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, in your country, Mr. Walesa – and consequently the Warsaw Pact has lost much of its military value, I wish to ask you what you think will be the rôle of the Warsaw Pact tomorrow, in which the USSR will have six other partners who will no longer be communists in a few months' or a few years' time. This is a problem of great concern to us.

Furthermore, at the last consultative meeting of the seven Warsaw Pact countries in Prague, there were serious divergences and even major opposition between the members of the alliance over the status of the future Germany: some followed the USSR in favour of a policy of neutralisation, others, including your country, did not agree with this formula. I therefore wish to put a second question: what is your position and that of your government towards reunited Germany belonging to NATO?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*) (Translation). – On the first part of your question concerning the *raison d'être* of the Warsaw Pact, there is no doubt that this pact is experiencing a crisis, but it still exists: there is the joint command of the armed forces of this pact – with restricted responsibilities, moreover – which has the task of planning. You are right about political co-operation, however. It is a problem to be solved and I do not yet know the answer. We shall see in the near future if this pact can be a platform for political co-operation between the member countries. In any case, so far it has provided a platform for consultation and this was indeed the sense and aim of the last meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of the Warsaw Pact member countries in Prague on 17th March. I believe we had fruitful consultations and a good exchange of views in Prague on the German problem.

There were inevitably differences of opinion at a time when the pact lost its intervention rôle, its ideological rôle, its rôle in unifying the positions of the member countries, but in any case these countries have joint interests and so far – I do not know what will happen tomorrow – the pact offers a certain framework for this co-operation. I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of this framework for there are also other contacts between these countries. Personally I believe the bilateral contacts between Warsaw and Moscow are more important than the arrangements we have concluded with Moscow through this pact.

Now for your second question about Poland's views on unified Germany belonging to NATO. Like certain other countries of the Warsaw Pact, Poland does not accept the idea of neutrality or neutralisation for Germany. These two terms are used although each one means something else, but this is not important in our present debate. We are against neutralisation because we believe it contains dangers about the future development of unified Germany. Since these dangers are well known to this Assembly, there is no need to speak further about them.

By rejecting neutrality, one automatically accepts that this country may belong to an alliance. For unified Germany, its membership of NATO should, in my opinion, be accompanied by certain guarantees. I believe a balance is necessary in Europe. Certain guarantees are necessary since Eastern Germany is or will no longer be an ally of the Soviet Union, which thus loses the collaboration of Eastern Germany's armed forces which were fairly sizeable until quite recently.

We must find solutions to balance the situation. I feel there has not been sufficient intellectual and political effort in this direction and this problem must be studied. There has been mention of the possibility of limiting NATO's military presence in reunified Germany along the line which is now the frontier between the two Germanys. This is one solution, but I feel it is inadequate. Mention has also been made of the temporary presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Germany; temporary presence may also prove to be inadequate and in any case I believe the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Germany could lead to complications after reunification, and we wish to avoid all possible complications. We therefore have to seek other solutions.

Is it possible to disarm or demilitarise part of the territory of Eastern Germany? This has to be examined, but we also had the experience, after the first world war, of the demilitarisation of the left bank of the Rhine. This solution produced no results. Personally, I am looking towards more modest solutions, such as stationing, in Eastern Germany, units, yet to be created, of a German territorial army without offensive capability. Following the example of the Franco-German brigade, thought may also be given to creating such brigades on the eastern frontiers of Germany: German-Polish brigade, German-Czechoslovak brigade.

These are still vague ideas, but the most important thing is to create a new security system in Europe. That, I believe, is the solution. It is my conviction, Mr. President, that we are not doing enough to build this system. I believe we Europeans are not up to the mark in terms of ideas and from the intellectual point of view at a time when events in Germany are gathering speed and even going too quickly in certain respects, but they are facts that have to be accepted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, could I please ask the Foreign Minister of Poland if he minds if I ask him to enlarge still further on this question of the Warsaw Pact and security in Europe, because obviously the purpose of any pact is to protect the country or countries concerned from domination or invasion from any side and we are all very much aware in this Assembly of Poland's history of being invaded or dominated alternately from the East and from the West. In fact, my country, the United Kingdom, of course went to war on the occasion of the invasion of Poland from the West in 1939 and so could I ask him, as clearly the Warsaw Pact might or might not protect Poland from domination from the West, but that is what it would be there for, could he

*Mr. Jessel (continued)*

foresee some system by which Poland could be protected from domination or invasion either from the East or from the West and can he enlarge on how this might develop in the future?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*). – Thank you for your contribution. I do not think the question of domination over Poland is a problem for us today. Fortunately enough, perhaps I am an optimist by saying this, but we do not fear any domination from the West, even after unification of Germany, because we believe Germany will be integrated into the European system of various organisations and arrangements and this is why we insist on such involvement of unified Germany. As to the East, we have now stabilised our relations with the Soviet Union as relations between sovereign states, and on the basis of equality.

The phenomenon of “satellitism” which prevailed so long in Polish-Soviet relations after the second world war has now disappeared so domination is not our fear today. But perhaps I should follow you and not concentrate myself on today’s problems. Is domination for us and also for some other European countries a problem for tomorrow or for the day after tomorrow? That may be so. There is always the danger of a revival of the imperialist idea and this is why we all in this room and beyond it insist on the creation of a European security system. Not alliances but co-operation and integration are our goal and our best guarantee. With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to add that Poland, in its long-term policy, is interested in joining the European Community, if that is possible. For the time being we are concentrating on working out a treaty for our association with the Community, but in the long run we think of membership. Then I think our security will be fully guaranteed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, thank you very much for the very constructive way in which you have described the reunification of Germany and its integration into the pact systems. As a German, I must make this observation. May I just preface my question by saying that when the war finished I was eleven years old, that my mother comes from Allenstein, and that for me the Oder-Neisse border is the permanent border. But at the same time I often

have the impression that in 1945 Poland was shifted by a third to the West, and I would advance reasons of history for this. If now Poland’s western frontier comes under discussion, is its eastern frontier not also indirectly under discussion, or why is this not mentioned, or are there special sensibilities there which inhibit discussion?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*). (Translation). – Thank you. I would say that these two border problems, the western frontier and the eastern frontier, are quite separate problems. You were right to say that after the second world war the territory of Poland was shifted to the West. That happened as a result of the policies of the great powers. That is a situation, a fact, which we accept. I consider that the whole debate in recent months about the German-Polish border has been unnecessary, and has done much damage. But for me this debate was not an opening of the discussion of the course of our eastern frontier, i.e. our frontier with the Soviet Union. This frontier was altered after the second world war. In 1945 Poland ratified a treaty with the Soviet Union concerning the line of this frontier, and all that is now absolutely settled. And Poland is not interested in a revision of its eastern frontier. This frontier remains as it is, and so it should remain. We want to have good relations with the Soviet Union. We have no territorial problems with the Soviet Union. We want to have good relations with the nations that live together with us along the eastern frontier. I am thinking of the people of Lithuania, of the Byelorussian nation, of the Ukraine. There is no problem of the eastern frontier in Poland.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, like Mr. Jung, I speak as a friend of Poland and welcome the Minister here. I believe that we have heard a very important speech and had a very important discussion in this Assembly this afternoon. Could I extend further the questions put by my colleagues, Mr. Baumel and Mr. Jessel, and ask the Minister if he could conjecture further as to how he sees the relationship between the Warsaw Pact and Western European Union and NATO developing and whether he sees that as indicating a possibility of drawing them both together in order to provide mutual protection and security?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*). – Thank you for your friendly words as to the relationship between the Warsaw

*Mr. Skubiszewski (continued)*

Pact, on the one hand, and NATO and Western European Union on the other. I would say that relations now are practically non-existent. They are at an initial stage and they should develop. Of course, much depends on the future coherence of the Warsaw Pact because here you may face an asymmetrical relation, so I am not quite certain how these relationships will develop. First steps were made with regard to NATO. I, for one, paid a visit to the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation yesterday in Brussels and, as you know, this was not the first visit by the representative of a country which belongs to the Warsaw treaty.

Until now there were practically no relations with Western European Union. Today, we tried to take the first steps and this is why I am so happy to be here and I repeat my thanks to you, Mr. President, and to all the members of this Assembly for the invitation. As to the nature or countenance of the relationship, I would see much room for co-operation in disarmament matters, but not much room for creating a security system in Europe. That system I think should not be created by the existing alliances. They make a stabilising contribution, that is true, but the effort of creating a European system should be made by all the European states and this includes also countries which do not belong to any alliances, but disarmament is a good subject for discussion and activities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – Minister, I have a large and distinguished Polish community in Northampton and indeed a future mayor or burgomaster of Northampton will be a Pole. I think all of us here are aware that Solidarity was in many ways the catalyst for change in Eastern and Central Europe and yet, as we look at the news as it unfolds, we are aware that Eastern Germany looks in a sense to be saved by its integration with Western Germany, that Czechoslovakia and Hungary look to be able to stand on their own feet and one does wonder a little bit about Poland, the catalyst for change and yet probably the country that faces the greatest economic problems. I therefore wonder whether you would share with us your aspirations of how you see Poland five years from now, and particularly Poland within the context of the whole of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*). – Probably you asked me the

most difficult question I heard today because it requires the qualifications of a prophet whom I am not. What will Poland be like five years from now? Being an optimist, I think that in view of our political development we will become, much earlier than five years from now, a parliamentary democracy. There are already strong elements of such a political system in Poland today.

Let me refer to the municipal elections which will take place in Poland in a few weeks' time, exactly on 27th May, elections which will be totally free, open to all political groupings or parties, however weak and however bizarre, and have a look at the development in the Polish Diet, the lower chamber of our parliament to which elections were held last year. They were not fully free; only a certain percentage of seats was subject to free voting. The majority was, in a sense, divided among political groupings of the past communist régime. And yet, there was an evolution in that house, which was in favour of parliamentary democracy. Much change was brought about in a factual way, so I think within the next five years there should not be much difference between Poland and any other democratic Western European country.

The economic problem which you raised is much more difficult. We now have a radical programme of reform. I shall not discuss the details of it because we have not time for it, but during the present year, I would say by June or July, we will have the first proof of whether that programme is, or was, a working proposition or not. Already there are some positive signs such as freeing prices, beginning a free-market economy, abolishing monopolies, stabilising Polish currency, its internal convertibility, but there are also negative facts such as a drop in production by nationalised enterprises, various difficulties in re-privatisation. Re-privatisation is always a long process. The important fact in our economic development is that the present budget of the country is a balanced one. It is a budget which does not include any deficit. This was a very radical measure. That is why the programme is very difficult for the population. How long the population will be tolerant with us, that is, the government, it is difficult to say, but until now it was, and still is, because there is a general feeling in the country that there is no other economic road to be followed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for answering so many questions so clearly. To be quite frank, I was impressed by your linguistic abilities as much as by your political talent. Congratulations. I also thank you for staying for the continuation of our debate on the report by Mr. Pontillon.

**4. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is resumed.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I might start by saying “follow that act”. That was one of the most moving and stimulating speeches I have heard in any Assembly for very many years and we are most grateful to you for giving that facet which enables us to put into context the Pontillon report. Secondly, I would like to compliment Mr. Pontillon on his report.

I want to deal though with one issue in the Pontillon report and that is the future of the CSCE. It is at present a wholly undemocratic organisation. It is unaccountable to anyone other than ministers and it has no democratic parliamentary oversight. There was a choice of setting up a new permanent body which would be welcomed by the civil services in every one of the thirty-five countries. There will be a jockeying for the Secretary-Generalship, the Deputy Secretary-Generalship and the 740 other members of the staff, but that is not, I suggest, what we, as democrats, want, and, I venture to suggest, it is not what many of the foreign ministers want. The trouble with ministers – those of us who have been ministers know this – is that they are subjected to very strong advice from the civil service and they occasionally have to recognise that that advice may be slightly slanted towards their interests, rather than to anything else. In the matter of a career structure, it is understandable, but I want to say here that I believe that this parliamentary Assembly would want to say to its ministers in all its countries that that is not on. So, what is the choice, what is the alternative? The alternative is quite a simple one, in my view, provided we are prepared to say we want it, and that we do not say, oh, there are thirty-seven difficulties. Because there are difficulties, but again I can remember that, when I had one of the junior jobs in the “right to buy” legislation which we brought in in my country in 1979, on at least two occasions civil servants came to me and said: “Minister, we do not think that can be done.” and I said: “I did not ask you that, I asked you to say how it can be done.” And they came back and said how it could be done.

There are three baskets in the CSCE. The first is human rights and there is no place better suited for human rights than the Council of Europe. All the other organisations talking about

it really do not have the practical experience or the ability to do the job. We have the Court in Strasbourg, we have the Commission in Strasbourg, we have the organisation in Strasbourg, and we are European. So that is point one. Then there is the economic basket, and here again I believe that the probable basis for future use of the economic basket is OECD, and I will tell you why. Because OECD is subject to parliamentary scrutiny and debate by the Council of Europe. To those debates we invite Japan, America, Australia and others, all of whom are interested partners. So that is a possibility. Then there is the third basket, security. Now I say at once that there would be a need every two or three years for the umbrella of the CSCE to have a conference, but that does not mean the need for creating a permanent staff, one country can do it and the cost can be shared amongst the others. Perfectly simple for the conference, but the security aspects, the defence aspects, which are very important, can be covered by a form of association with this organisation, WEU. We were created to deal with what I would call at this stage the European pillar of the alliance and we now need to recognise that in the future we have to find a way of associating the Soviet Union, North America, Canada. They have to feel they have a voice and a place in which they can feel secure when they are seeing these issues actually debated.

So that, Mr. President, is my proposal and I believe it is one we have to recognise can be taken forward if we have the will, but it is up to us. We will not find it easy, as I have said, but I think that if we can raise these issues in our own parliaments, if we can talk to our own ministers, I believe that at this stage, before the proposals become set in concrete, it is possible.

Let me end by saying this. Again, colleagues will know this, we have a system in the United Kingdom called green papers, which are when the government floats an idea without saying what it necessarily approves. That is eventually translated into a white paper, and once it is a white paper it is very difficult to change. Let us treat this as the green paper stage, let us get the message home and I believe we can satisfy those in the East and the Soviet Union who are genuinely worrying about the future. It will help our friends in countries like Poland, Hungary, etc., who want a place within an organisation where they can feel at home and we can associate America and Canada which are our natural partners in this as well. That is what I believe we need to do, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, our colleague, Mr. Pontillon, has pre-

*Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)*

sented a wide-ranging report on the creation of a just and peaceful order in Europe, very accurate and very detailed in its treatment of the subject. He deserves thanks for it. The changes in the GDR and in Eastern Europe, as radical as they were unexpected, confront us with new questions. Questions about the organisation of our security, questions about co-operation, in economic matters as well, and here I should like to refer in particular to the Cocom list and the important question how we should support this progress of democratisation without at the same time adopting a patronising attitude.

The differing paths chosen by the two Germanys after the end of the war have led Germans living under different ideological systems to have different views on many an intellectual and moral standard. That has now to be corrected. Yet we have remained one nation, and are currently taking steps to regain our identity, an identity which we wish to be embedded in European unity. Certainly this is not the time to make fundamental changes in the system of alliances or the stationing of troops which for forty years have guaranteed the security of the West. But one thing is certain; the alliances must rethink and make changes to the confrontational and offensive elements in their strategic doctrine and military options, in order to serve the needs of all Europeans and of the USSR for security. To this extent I fully share the position of Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski that the alliances must change in such a way that confrontation is progressively removed and co-operative forms of security installed.

I have noted with great interest recommendation II (i) in the report, which states that one of the main objectives of the aims established in the WEU member countries in 1954 was to welcome the reunification of the German people in a unified political system. It is of course true that all countries are affected by the creation of a new state in the heart of Europe. We Germans should consciously take note of that and make strenuous efforts to take seriously the concern felt by all countries in Europe. However, the right of self-determination as a basic democratic right must also apply to us. Only the people of the Federal Republic and the GDR can decide in free elections or an equivalent democratic process, such as a referendum, whether a confederation or a more far-reaching union, such as the unification of the two states, is an appropriate solution. The determination of our national self-understanding must reflect contemporary political realities and must satisfy people's current value judgments.

I do not regard the frontier question, Poland's western border, as a subject for discussion. It is

one of the results of the second world war. In speaking about Germany's eastern frontier the Rapporteur made a very just and necessary observation, found in paragraphs 63 and 69 (ii). Anybody who discusses Poland's western frontier, and I mentioned this earlier in my question to the Polish Foreign Minister, should be aware that he is implicitly talking about Poland's eastern frontier, which affects the essential security interests of the Soviet Union.

I also share the view of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Eyskens, who spoke on this subject this morning. I also agree with him on one point when he touched on the problems of ethnic minorities in European countries. It is not right for language and cultural independence to be suppressed by administrative means – a judgment which applies in Western European countries as much as in Eastern European ones. The creation of a lasting peaceful order in Europe requires that all countries should be included as equal partners. This peaceful order must be a system which guarantees stability and internationality.

I share the concern of those who take the view that the geographical situation and the strength of a German state make it undesirable for this state to be neutral. All the same, the retention of options, such as the current nuclear option, even by individual members of WEU, does not make it any easier to find positions which both take account of the current security situation and give hope of future progress. That too is a reality. The continuance of military aid on the conditions laid down in Section III.4 of The Hague platform and the establishment of the frontiers which are binding upon member states for the future, in order to contribute to the defence of Germany, are only of value if in the event of the reuniting of the two German states even on a federative basis the external frontiers of those states are recognised. To that extent I emphasise the recommendation of the Rapporteur to the Council in part III.2 (a).

Most public discussion revolves around the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. I believe we should use WEU as an instrument, a nucleus, for a new security order in Europe. We Europeans must organise our security interests ourselves, and it is appropriate for the armed forces of member states to be stationed on the territory of other member states, insofar as their presence helps to strengthen the peaceful order. Transitional treaty arrangements should be provided for troops from the USSR, the United States and Canada, and the stationing of troops under this contractual solution should not be confined to just one WEU country. Obviously nobody has all the answers; there must be several possible solutions. I do not know all the answers, but I do

*Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)*

know that new challenges demand fresh responses. We should give a joint European answer, jointly formulated by equal partners.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, the discussion today and the admirable report of Robert Pontillon which we have been going into in the course of our examinations of the overall position should be set in the context of the last lap which we now have of a very turbulent century. A century, which I think we need to remind ourselves about, of two vicious and devastating world wars, the rise and the decline of fascism in that time, the earlier birth of a creed which was the very antithesis of all that we believe in in this Assembly, and indeed, in the free Europe, where freedom and the higher aspirations of man were banished. We have seen the departure of all these in our time, the death of the latter in the last twelve months and, of course, the emergence of a united Europe, a European Community which, despite the fact that it is bureaucratic, falls far short of what many of us would hope for. It is quite extraordinary in the overall context of what has happened in the course of the last century and still gives us great hope as to what might be achieved in the future.

Mr. President, in the helter-skelter of the last twelve months I think there are three points which arise for us, as members of Western European Union.

First, there is the instability which has been created in the course of the last six to twelve months, not least, I would remind the Assembly, in the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet Union is a system of republics which at the moment is undergoing enormous stress and trauma and which, if it is not handled properly, both internally and with the right kind of advice from outside, could cause the most enormous ructions in due course. We all of us, of course, welcome the departure of hard-line communism. We express great relief at the fact that we now have a situation where the nuclear threat has gone right off the boil. But the Soviet Socialist Republics remain in a state of flux and we need to observe them very carefully indeed in the immediate months ahead. In addition to that, with all our new friends who are emerging from Eastern Europe, one does remember that there are perhaps some old scores still to be settled going way back to the 1920s, or earlier at the turn of the century. Or are there going to be nationalistic moves in that direction in due course? Could there be something upsetting the apple-cart in that respect? I think it is entirely possible and again we need to be on our guard in that respect.

Second, and perhaps the most important point which has been mentioned today and which will be mentioned many times in the immediate future, is the German question. I support totally, as I suspect most of the people in Western European Union do, a united Germany but a Germany which is not of course isolationist. A Germany which is part of the European Community, a Germany which is part of NATO, and I say unequivocally, having been in politics for the last twenty-eight years, that I support Germany, I support and trust the German people and I think it is very insulting indeed to the German nation today, after all their achievements in the last thirty or forty years, to have so many questions raised about their ultimate integrity, whether they might still be expansionist in European terms and whether or not they can be trusted. I trust them, Mr. President, I think they have proved their case after two great follies in the earlier part of this century and I believe that it is very important indeed that they should be a leading and most impressive part of the European concept.

The third point that I want to make is that we should in fact be absolutely sure that there is a desperate need for a NATO and WEU framework in the new situation. The Soviets of course have to be reassured on the German question and that hangs on what I was just saying a moment ago, but I think that WEU and NATO have to be pragmatic and far more adaptable. As for the Council of Europe, which is now well open to membership from many of the Eastern and Central European countries, I believe that WEU and NATO as well must embrace many of those countries which have passed the test and can join in, because we are responsible, at the end of the day, for collective security. We have a collective responsibility – all for one and one for all, as the Polish Minister indicated in the course of his most impressive speech. I think that our theme, our aim of the future has to be peace without anxiety for the next fifty years. After the next fifty years, somebody else can take the strain of it.

(*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I am extremely grateful to the Rapporteur for his report and for the conclusions he drew, with which I am in full agreement. And I have listened with pleasure to what was said both by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and by the Polish Foreign Minister, because I observed that those speeches too struck the same note, and it is one with which we, the majority of politicians in Germany, can agree.



*Mr. Kittelmann (continued)*

May I also, as a German member of parliament, say how pleased I am that last weekend elections took place in the other part of Germany with a vote for democracy, and the current president was also present as an observer for the Council of Europe. These elections were a splendid demonstration of the maturity of a population which was taking part in its first free elections for fifty-two years. One would have to be eighty years old in East Germany to have taken part previously in a free election. At a time when week after week each sensation is swiftly followed by another, many people anticipated these elections with a certain fearfulness. For might there not have been, as we have for years been told, too many communists over there, because they had been indoctrinated from the cradle, at school and university?

This event has shown that such fears were unfounded; instead, the power of freedom and of human rights preserved carried the day – as was also shown, as the Polish Foreign Minister mentioned, by the power of Solidarity in Poland and the events in Hungary and elsewhere. Personally I often feel that we are not always sufficiently proud of the fact that in the last resort it was our political will, the will of the western democracies, that gave an example to the oppressed peoples who after the war had the misfortune to be the pawns in the partition of East and West. We managed to offer them an example of how democracy worked, and I think that the results of this example are now being seen in developments in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and, I venture to say, even if the Soviet Union is not yet ready to admit it, in that country as well. We in Germany have followed with interest the discussions about the Oder-Neisse border, and it is essential to realise that the great majority of all political parties in the Federal German Republic have declared unequivocally that the Oder-Neisse line should be recognised. After the elections in the GDR there is no longer any obstacle to the necessary resolutions being passed in the German Bundestag and the Volkskammer as a declaration of intent for a future all-German parliament. I therefore appreciate the reticence the Polish Foreign Minister has displayed on this question, because I believe that recent events have been artificially dramatised and made into issues.

Ladies and gentlemen, Germany does not wish to be neutral. Neither people in the GDR nor we in the West wish to be neutral. The vast majority of Germans want to be integrated into a united Europe and to belong to the NATO alliance which for more than forty years has ensured the freedom of Western Europe. NATO has never been an offensive alliance – always a defensive one. Therefore the discussion, also found in this report, that it is desired that

Germany should not be neutral, is not an issue with Germans. We Germans know where we belong. I am also sure that if Germany is united as we hope – the Christian Democrats and, as I also believe, the Liberals – under Article 23, and with all reservations we must work out in the two plus four meetings, this will prove to be the case. So I say deliberately that the policy of the Federal German Republic in the last thirty years was a personal task of sovereignty, in order to advance a common Europe, and we want to continue this policy with you too, together in a united Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to begin by repeating my approval previously expressed elsewhere and to urge the Assembly to recognise unanimously Mr. Pontillon's thorough, intelligent contribution. Thank you, Mr. Pontillon.

Mr. President, the peoples really seem to be moving well ahead of their institutions. Their political leaders involved in this work have not only swept away the legendary Berlin wall but are also creating problems for all the contractual structures which, after being laboriously put together for the sake of protecting peace and security, at the cost of painful sacrifices and limitations affecting sovereignty and independence, now have to be rethought and restructured in response to the historic changes of our century. This is perhaps a Copernican revolution on a world scale which has already recognised the changes, the developments and, in some cases, the disappearance of strategic defence systems, closer to and further from our countries, systems which have covered vast areas, sectors and zones of the world – including ANZUS, CENTO, SEATO and NATO itself. Everything has been or is now being severely tested and we may perhaps have to create new dimensions and restructure in various ways to meet the new circumstances which the future and our peoples really demand.

WEU is perhaps the institution most closely involved in the future of security and defence. Even some of its weaknesses, stemming from lack of institutions, unclear aims, some vagueness and its gradual growth, may fit it better to deal with the demands of European and world events. Mr. Pontillon's report is definitely a milestone on the road to be followed towards the goals of peace and security. As we know, problems regarding peace and security are emerging first in Germany but may possibly extend later to the countries of Eastern Europe and to some countries which from time to time and almost from day to day are urging their right to be included in WEU's security Europe. This is one of the directions WEU should set for itself and consider from all angles, without forgetting

*Mr. Martino (continued)*

that its own expansion, by the inclusion of Spain and Portugal, with Greece and Turkey still waiting in the wings, already sets out in the clearest terms the problems of peace, security and justice, in the countries of southern Europe, to the south of the WEU countries, which are already involved in the Mediterranean problem. Yugoslavia may also have realised this and be conscious therefore of a future fraught with questions to which we must give firm answers on the basis of what has seemed to be established fact up till now. Let us today approve Mr. Pontillon's report and the associated recommendations which form a serious and reasonable proposal for hard political work, involving duties and sacrifices of responsibility which, we all realise, we must curb and check the legitimate enthusiasm and pressing expectations.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I would first also add my congratulations to Mr. Pontillon for an excellent report which provides an admirable frame within which to conduct this wide-ranging debate. Five minutes only gives really very little time for the shortest comments, and I would wish to make four, from my British liberal and, I hope, European liberal standpoint.

First, even if the current negotiations between East and West are wholly successful, and things look good, we will still be left with the need to have some peaceful means of resolving border and minority disputes. Mr. Pontillon quotes Mr. Genscher's speech of 31st January on an agenda for the CSCE conference which will finalise things and I recommend this. Mr. Genscher, at point 2, refers to a European institution to guarantee human rights and, at point 10, a European centre for settling conflicts. Looking at events in Transylvania with horror, at events in Albania, in Yugoslavia and potentially in Czechoslovakia, I have no doubt that we will need some kind of court, like the existing court in Strasbourg which deals with individual human rights, to deal with communal rights, language, culture, education, employment, representation rights, and this in turn will require the backing of an integrated European security force, as the Polish Foreign Minister said, in the formation of which I am sure WEU will have a very important part, and that will have internal as well as external responsibilities.

Second, on the reunification of Germany, as my friend Armand De Decker has already said, liberals have not been troubled by reservations or doubts about this. The Federal Republic has an impeccably democratic record since its inception and now sets an example in many

fields to countries, even such as my own. The DDR election was well-conducted. The idea of a neutral Germany in my idea is old-fashioned nonsense. The other side of nationalism of which I spoke a moment ago, to which President Goerens also referred, is the development of a European identity, which I think in less than two generations would dramatically reduce the significance of nationalism in decision-making in Europe. The so-called German problem, the French problem, the British problem, will wither away and what Mr. Ahrens says, to take Karl Ahrens as an example, will relate much more to his being a socialist than to his being a German and what Louis Jung, who was just a moment ago sitting beside me, says will relate less to him being French than to him being a christian democrat.

It is in this connection, and this is my third point, that I lend the strongest support to Mr. Eyskens, the Foreign Minister of Belgium, in pressing strongly, as indeed has President Mitterrand, for much more vigour and urgency in pushing forward economic and monetary union in the European Community. In my opinion, the greatest assurance of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe is an integrated and united European Community with which the countries of the Council of Europe will develop a steady relationship and will provide a root which will give an opportunity for Eastern European countries to become easy in relations with Western European countries to which they were once opposed.

My fourth and last point is that this very much includes the Soviet Union itself. I believe that western countries must recognise that the logic that has led them to give help to Poland and Hungary and the DDR and the others must lead us in turn to help the USSR itself, not in the triumphalist way, but to make a contribution to Mr. Gorbachev for creating the circumstances which relieve us more and more of the need to defend ourselves against him. At the time of the French revolution, Wordsworth wrote: "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, but to be young was very heaven." 57 is still young enough, Mr. President, to feel the uplift and the excitement and the hope of these events. I feel honoured to have been enabled to make even a small contribution to this debate.

*(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too wish to congratulate Mr. Pontillon most warmly for his major report, introduced by a look at the history of our organisation, the events which led up to its creation and its past and possible future rôle.

*Mr. Stegagnini (continued)*

I should like to link Mr. Pontillon's report, and specifically the third paragraph of the recommendation, with the most excellent speech made by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs a short time ago. He urged us to go ahead and to take a more imaginative and understanding view of the likely future of peace in Europe, based on collaboration and understanding, and, in particular, to make a new contribution to the problem of German reunification.

To start with the third point of the recommendation, Mr. Pontillon urges that the modified Brussels Treaty be used as the legal basis for the stationing of member states' forces on the territory of other member states, thus helping to strengthen peace in Europe. In other words, Mr. Pontillon suggests that WEU might have forces capable of operating within the boundaries of the countries of our union in order to reinforce peace and enhance collaboration.

Following on from this important idea, I wondered whether it might not be possible to combine it with the request made by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the possibility of stationing various forces on the territory of the present GDR in order to ensure a stable presence, perhaps a more European presence, and not simply a separate presence of NATO or the Federal Republic of Germany alone. Some experts, and I believe the Secretary-General, think it might be possible to form European units to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance, as has been requested not only by the Americans but also, for example, by the French Defence Minister, Mr. Chevènement. Clearly, therefore, if a European force were available under WEU auspices, it could be stationed in the GDR, thus resolving the many problems which the absence of NATO forces or forces of other European countries would pose by guaranteeing the sovereignty of the GDR, the Atlantic Alliance and the western countries.

I think that this idea goes some way to meet the request made a short time ago, looking to the possibility that units from Czechoslovakia, Germany and other European countries might be stationed together with the existing Soviet forces in the GDR. As regards the other proposals in the recommendation, I am very pleased that Mr. Pontillon recalls the proposal in paragraph 7 of part III that WEU should commit itself to looking into the possibility of setting up a European satellite agency for arms control, observation and verification of disarmament. We shall undoubtedly be giving a great deal more consideration to these points in Rome next week and here again I feel that we must congratulate Mr. Pontillon on this initiative which he proposes should become a major feature of WEU's work in the coming months.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I first wish to congratulate Mr. Pontillon for his excellent report. The very few amendments my colleague, Mr. Benassi, and I myself have tabled must be considered as being additional and supplementary to a draft recommendation for which I have already voted in the Political Committee.

Central to future arrangements in Europe is the way in which the reunification of Germany will be achieved. The elections in the German Democratic Republic last Sunday with the victory of the christian democratic coalition were an unequivocal sign of the wish of the people to proceed as swiftly as possible with the process of reunification. I would add that I consider it extraordinary and positive that in a country emerging from more than forty years of so-called true socialism the left-wing parties obtained about 40% of the vote. That in itself is an expression of a need for social protection as the unknown consequences of the introduction of a market economy draw close. This concerns both the policy to be decided upon by the governments of Germany and the decisions of the European Community concerning the single market and the formation of the European union.

The acceleration of German reunification does not diminish, on the contrary, it increases the political requirement for the necessary contractual guarantees to ensure that the reunification of Germany will not be a subject of anxiety for any other European nation. We Italian communists have listed the necessary national guarantees in four points. First, final recognition in a peace treaty or in another document of equal value of the frontiers endorsed by the Helsinki agreements. Straightaway afterwards, the economic and political integration of a united Germany in the European Community and European union. Third, the establishment of the German armed forces in a purely defensive posture, totally excluding nuclear weapons in the framework of the progressive demilitarisation of intra-European relations. Finally, the collocation of Germany in a single, joint security system for the whole of Europe offering equal guarantees to all its states. The shape of the all-European security system will be the result of a gradual process but at its conclusion Germany will be neither neutral nor member of NATO.

All that will obviously take time and transitional solutions must be found immediately to avoid any destabilisation of existing balances. This excludes the neutralisation of Germany and the movement of NATO frontiers towards the East.

*Mr. Pieralli (continued)*

In the future, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe may become a permanent institution with a parliamentary assembly and be developed to the point where present military alliances are absorbed in the new all-European security system with the full participation of the United States and Canada.

For the time being, 1990, like 1989, must be unforgettable for the signing of American-Soviet-European agreements, for the reduction of all kinds of conventional and nuclear armaments, for banning the production of chemical weapons and for opening new negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

WEU can play an extraordinary rôle of promotion and political initiative to ensure a new, peaceful and secure order in Europe as set out in the report by Mr. Pontillon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, at this extraordinary session we are holding in Luxembourg, we must first ask ourselves one thing. Does this session, with its wealth of Mr. Eyskens's very remarkable speech this morning, the speech by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the excellent report by Mr. Pontillon, truly respond to the extraordinary and historical nature of the situation in Europe today? Do we feel we are offering an appropriate answer to this immense upheaval all round us? I do not think so and I must say that all that leaves us a little unsatisfied.

Admittedly, WEU has a long-standing tradition of modesty in its policy and in its decisions. It is unfortunately a too well-known phenomenon that WEU in the past has not been able to build this European security pillar everyone talks about but for which very few make an effort. Shall we continue in this vein at a time when absolutely everything around us gives WEU greater responsibility? I find it striking to note the fundamental contradiction between the main lines of Mr. Pontillon's report which defines the responsibilities, obligations and aims of WEU and, in conclusion, offers very few specific proposals. I must say, however, that he is in no way responsible for that. He presents and ponders over the situation facing us.

Since I do not wish to speak at too great length, I shall address myself to the Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, whose considerable ability and personal values we all know so well. We must try to find a few solutions and first and foremost to give this Assembly the feeling that it is not powerless. We are to vote on a report, our umpteenth, and it will probably end up in the same way as the others, in our respective

drawers. It will be received politely by the Council of Ministers, it will meet with glacial silence in the international press and will come to nought. I must say that we must really have a very sad view of ourselves.

Second, there has always been talk of Europeanising western defence and this is very necessary at a time when, one way or another, the indispensable American presence will be weakened. What are we proposing? Very appropriately, Mr. Pontillon speaks of various possible solutions. The follow-up of the platform of The Hague. What has become of the Rome declaration? What have we done since? Words, words, words. Admittedly, an institute has been created. A research institute which will be extremely useful, particularly since it will be directed by a very respectable person. Agreed, we are making proposals for a space agency, for using satellites, but we are advancing desperately slowly in a world being stirred up by an earthquake.

I therefore wish to make you concentrate on the responsibilities that can be given to WEU. It is the only European defence organisation. It offers a possibility for Europeans to assume their responsibilities in the framework of the alliance with greater strength and authority in matters that concern them directly.

I ask Mr. van Eekelen to make a real effort to improve our Assembly's relations with the Council of Ministers and with the administrations. A great deal must be done to inform public opinion. Our words are lost in the desert, no one listens to us although we perhaps obtained reactions from a few political or geopolitical experts or advisers and that is all. Even in our parliaments we obtain no serious response to our proposals or recommendations. I believe the situation is serious enough for us to examine what should be done.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, to his credit, Mr. Pontillon has created a magnum opus. A work in which there are scores of potential texts for a speech. We have had a timely debate, illumined by a most distinguished contribution by His Excellency, the Polish Foreign Minister. With him and his people, we share the common goal of laying the basis for European security.

In that regard, WEU is a critically important forum, in which we can concert, among the West European democracies, a common position. I am not myself, in my brief remarks, going to dig myself deep in the quicksands of political conjecture and futurology. I shall stick to the firm ground of established principle. That firm ground was well-enunciated in the platform at

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

The Hague in 1987. Defence of the borders, mutual security, and, of course, the criteria for enlargement were all laid down on that occasion.

I took heart, in particular, at the sanguine comments of the Polish Foreign Minister towards the possibility of his country and others developing fruitful relations with WEU. We are a free association of democratic states, bound together by common values. Spain and Portugal in recent days have set a precedent towards which I at least hope that genuine democracies in Central Europe can aspire. I hope, Mr. President, that Germany will achieve unification by implementation of Article 23 of the Federal Republic's constitution, whereby reconstituted Länder can accede physically to the Federal German Republic and, of course, to the concomitant alliances and treaty agreements of the Federal Republic such as the European Community, NATO and WEU.

Our clear goal in this organisation must be to provide the concerted diplomatic impetus to secure the total withdrawal of all Soviet troops from what is now the German Democratic Republic and, thereafter, not just from German soil, but from all other European nations which have expressed such a wish through their democratically-elected governments.

At this time, Sir, when the desire for freedom of the brave Lithuanian people is on our minds and on our consciences, I believe that we should boldly reiterate that self-determination should not end at the Oder-Neisse line nor the frontiers of the Soviet Union. Any security gains which we may achieve through such Soviet disengagement will of course have to be matched by willingness to reciprocate on our part and willingness to accommodate to the Soviet Union's own security considerations. This may in the process somewhat marginalise United States forces geographically, though not politically, in Europe and may necessitate imaginative redistributions of troops on our part. If so, well and good. WEU has a critical rôle to play in this process. Let us rise to the challenge and make our organisation work. Thank you, Sir.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I first wish to congratulate the Rapporteur, who has made an extraordinary effort at a very difficult time. I agree with Mr. Baumel that we must well realise that we are living in historical times and we must draw every possible conclusion while the whole of Europe is still in the process of change. I believe this report is of very great value and we must congratulate him on it.

I personally believe that we should have no illusions. From what I hear I sometimes fear that people believe the problems are solved when this is not at all the case. I am convinced that part of Europe is now on the move and no one can say what will be the situation tomorrow. We have a formal obligation and this is WEU's great responsibility. We must increase co-operation. We must make an even greater effort than before because the problems exist but are different. The whole strategic posture must be reviewed. There are problems and threats outside our continent and when I turn my gaze south and in other directions, I see the full extent of our obligations.

In my view, the reunification of Germany is something extraordinary. This is something we have been shouting for for years. We must not consider this as a problem, since I believe it is something natural, normal. Above all, however, in terms of military co-operation, we have a very great responsibility in the framework of WEU to co-operate in the teeth of all threats which may arise and, in particular, to guarantee the future because, with the changes in Europe and the problems we can discern in the south and certain other directions, in the east, for instance, I must emphasise that here we have responsibility. It is my wish that everyone and particularly our ministers should be well aware that co-operation must be increased and not the contrary.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I congratulate Mr. Pontillon on the tenor of his report. The most important part of this report begins with Chapter IV, "Towards a new European order". But I feel the review that precedes it should have included a section clearly indicating the two strategies under which the efforts to achieve peace and security after the second world war took shape and the relationship between these two strategies.

In chronological order there was Western European Union, which from the outset sought to focus on the problem of the possible threats to peace and security posed by disastrous socio-economic conditions. The parties to the treaty were also rightly intent on preventing a revival of militarism in any form. The section of the alliance treaties which concerned the principle of "anyone who attacks one of us will face us all" was included in the Brussels Treaty and given a wider social base, because it was realised that one of the factors that had led to the outbreak of war was the economic and cultural crisis of the 1930s.

The second instrument is NATO. This organisation took the view that security must be

*Mr. Tummers (continued)*

achieved through deterrence. Deterrence is bound to mean the renewal of the deterrent weapon and the production of new deterrent weapons. Otherwise it is impossible to maintain this deterrence. This again gives rise to the concept of the arms race, resulting in imbalance of the burdens and investments in the various national budgets, which, of course, cover more than just military expenditure.

The two treaties, which basically pursue the same objective, have become opposites. The burden of maintaining the strategy of deterrence affected the balanced structure of social provisions. In a structure of social provisions as referred to in the founding text of Western European Union, there is no place for the creation and preservation of a concept of an enemy or, therefore, for arms production which is geared to deterrence and so stimulates the arms race. In this mutual relationship between the two treaties, there was a need for change when the socio-economic and cultural spheres, for example, were transferred to the Council of Europe. The eroded WEU could then be slowly but surely NATO-ised, WEU as a pillar in itself in the façade of the old North Atlantic order.

I have not unfortunately come across this image in the outline of the new peaceful and secure order in Europe. Unfortunately. Why unfortunately? Because knowledge of this package is one of the vital premises for going down the road "towards a new European order". Is what we are experiencing now not very similar to the situation that inspired the establishment of Western European Union? What is more, if there was a threat that justified a strategy of deterrence, it has now diminished to such an extent that we can go right back to the concept of the original Western European Union, though brought up to date, of course.

The members of the delegation from the Supreme Soviet that visited our Assembly last summer showed that they had a far more accurate picture of the difference between NATO and Western European Union than quite a few of the WEU parliamentarians who had discussions with them on that occasion. I am therefore surprised that a Russian source recently hinted that the Soviet Union's political leaders are seriously thinking of joining NATO as a means of overcoming the old structures of the military power blocs. This settlement is undoubtedly an example of clear progress dialectics, but it also indicates that, with Soviet guests in our midst, we are just in time with this discussion on the best way to develop peace and security in Europe as a whole, against the background, of course, of the ideas set out in the original Western European Union treaties.

I hope, Mr. President, that the Institute for Security Studies has the financial and mental capacity to reconsider and update these original WEU ideas and to offer them for the implementation of a new policy of peace and security.

Chapter IV (b) of Mr. Pontillon's report is entitled "The European economic area". Would it not have been better if the Rapporteur had not confined himself to economic matters but also considered the relationship between Western European Union and the Council of Europe with respect to the tasks which were once transferred from Western European Union to the Council of Europe? Has anyone ever checked to see whether the Council of Europe has performed these tasks once in a while in a way that actively promotes peace and security? I say this, Mr. President, because I hope this speech will be taken into account if there is a "re-examination of its founding text". What is more, I hope the Rapporteur will help to bring this about.

Paragraph 135 says various things about verification. As I see it, there is more to verify than just arms reductions. The way to a new peaceful order is not just via an arsenal through the market and via the economy and the EEC house of twelve. No, this way surely leads to the common house, and that is a complete house, not a bunker with a letter-box for the EEC and an alarm system for NATO. Because of the time-limit, Mr. President, that is all I will say. But I expect what I have said makes it sufficiently clear what I think of other parts of the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

#### *5. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.

Minister, may I remind you that we recall with pleasure your Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council and I wish to take this opportunity to extend our thanks to your collaborators, Mr. Castle, Political Director, and our former colleague, Mr. Linster.

I now invite Mr. Poos to come to the rostrum and address the Assembly.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, what an upheaval since June 1987, when I last spoke to your Assembly!

Events in recent months have profoundly changed the political landscape of Central and Eastern Europe and shaken the order that

*Mr. Poos (continued)*

characterised post-war Europe. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania are striving to lay the moral, political and economic foundations of a new state structure.

In all the countries I have just mentioned, foreign policy matters, and even more so external security matters, have been overtaken by internal economic problems.

Indeed, in defence questions, the new leaders are often content to call for disarmament or even demilitarisation. They are insisting on the withdrawal of foreign troops from their territory and cutting their defence budgets.

The military alliances which are a feature of post-war history, sometimes even outside Europe, are of no great interest to them. They often see them merely as obstacles to democratisation and the restoration of their sovereignty.

Conversely, the Soviet Union, which dominated the eastern part of Europe in the last forty years, is far more cautious. As a great power, it fears the possible destabilising effects of a rapid disintegration of the politico-military structures of its sphere of influence in Europe.

These fears of instability are also to be found among most of the western actors. Fourteen Western European countries have managed to guarantee their security thanks to the alliance with the United States and Canada, to which they are still linked by common values and fundamental convictions. However, in Western Europe there is optimism because of the disappearance of the political and human barriers which they have steadfastly striven to remove and because of the prospects of co-operation at every economic and social level. Nevertheless, all the allies wish this new quality of life in Europe to be guaranteed by satisfactory political and strategic stability.

What rôle can Western European Union play in this context?

Before trying to offer a brief answer to this question, it is perhaps useful to glance backwards and see what WEU has accomplished since it was revitalised, or relaunched, and what is its present situation.

On its accomplishments, I will confine myself to quoting four: the platform of security interests, action in the Persian Gulf, enlargement to include the Iberian peninsula and the creation of an Institute for Security Studies.

I speak with particular pleasure of the platform adopted in The Hague in autumn 1988 because it was under Luxembourg chairmanship that most of the preparatory work was carried out. Some of you will perhaps recall the twelve

points summing up the fundamental security interests of Europeans that I had the privilege of describing to you in Paris in June 1987.

In any event, this platform started the definition of a European security identity. It is not at all surprising that key elements of the platform were taken up in NATO documents and statements such as the global concept. It thus served to bring viewpoints closer together and to consolidate links between the Atlantic partners. This is certainly not negligible. However, the evolution we have just witnessed has already made it necessary to revise certain aspects of the charter. It will therefore have to be reshaped.

The joint action in the Persian Gulf initiated by the Netherlands chairmanship proved that WEU can be of very great operational value, particularly in areas where the Atlantic Alliance cannot be active. This action helped to tone down many doubts about the reasons for our organisation's existence.

The enlargement of the organisation to include Portugal and Spain, which, like you, Luxembourg wanted to be completed as soon as possible, has now been achieved in spite of hesitations in most member states. Because of the strategic importance of the Mediterranean region, the presence of these two partners and allies is essential to the credibility of the organisation.

These achievements and accomplishments must not, however, conceal another reality: the European Community will be able to lead to a real European union only if it takes account of the security dimension. However, until such time as the Community reaches this future goal – and provided it is the wish of all its members – WEU has a valuable, even irreplaceable, rôle to play.

It is WEU which, in the immediate future, can provide Europeans with a framework for concerting their approach to the most delicate problems and those which are the most urgent for their security, and it is for WEU to seek that European consensus which must subsequently become an integral part of an Atlantic consensus.

The Twelve now have an adequate framework for conducting a regular political dialogue with the United States. This is due in particular to recent initiatives by the Irish Prime Minister, Mr. Haughey.

Furthermore, the Commission has close relations with the great transatlantic partner in trade and industrial policy.

There remains the security dimension: would it upset the harmonious operation of NATO to propose to our WEU partners, and to our

*Mr. Poos (continued)*

American ally, that the traditional dinner for four held prior to ministerial meetings of the Council of the alliance be enlarged to include all the members of our organisation? Now that we have to go beyond the question of burden-sharing in the alliance and address that of the future rôle to be assumed by the European and transatlantic allies, I believe such a dialogue structure is desirable.

Conversely, retaining a four-power dialogue, a legacy of the cold war, is no longer justified. It might, on the contrary, undermine the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the spirit of defence of the other members and could have repercussions on Atlantic solidarity.

So much for the immediate future.

Since WEU is a fairly flexible structure, it will have to give tangible form to its potential and inherent forces. The fact that it has always been far more political than military may serve it well in the future tasks that seem to be becoming primarily political in the situation today.

If WEU really wishes, eventually, to play this rôle in the organisation of Europe's security, it will not be able to confine itself to following and commenting on events but will have, on the contrary, to take the initiative, push ahead and lead the way.

In this context, I have proposed to the Belgian chairmanship and to our Secretary-General that they try to keep a watch on the new governments stemming from the elections which have been or are to be held in the next few weeks in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the past, your Assembly has unceasingly urged the Council to do its utmost to increase WEU's rôle and to make it a choice instrument for our security. It has never failed to support the executive in all its efforts in this sense.

In fact, it is not here, before you, honourable parliamentarians, that I have to affirm that it is now or never that WEU will have to justify its existence.

Mr. President, as I come to the conclusion of this brief address, allow me to convey to you all our appreciation for the exemplary manner in which you have carried out your tasks at the head of the Assembly.

Far more than the Council, very timorous moreover when it has to show itself on the political stage, the Assembly has, through your action during your mandate, reminded our former adversaries of the existence of WEU and its legitimate interest in the security of Europeans.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. Allow me to return the compliments you just made to me and all members of the

Assembly and of the Office of the Clerk who have assisted me most efficiently in the accomplishment of my duties. Thank you, too, for your words of encouragement and thoughts with which you have just enriched our debates. I hope the Council will draw inspiration from these new thoughts you have just developed in this Assembly. Thank you again.

#### **6. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

I now call Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

Mr. VITALONE (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the extraordinary times through which we are passing make meetings such as this essential in order to reach a common mind on how we are to respond to the great changes taking place continuously before our eyes.

This session of WEU is all the more significant because it is taking place immediately after the elections in the German Democratic Republic, which constitute not only a decisive step along the road to the unification of the two Germanys, but also a clear indication that reunification, if it is to satisfy aspirations too long stifled, must come about more quickly than we had anticipated.

It is useful to recall here that WEU came into being partly in order to involve a divided Germany in the heart of Europe in the western security system. And membership of WEU was one of the most important steps in the entry of the Federal Republic into the network of solidarity that was formed shortly after the second world war. The reunion of the two Germanys is bound to enhance the influence of Western Europe and its institutions, which already hold an important place in international life.

Today we are witnessing what amounts to the end of a conflict, even if victory has gone not to a military group but to a system of values, of rules for governing the economy and society, of which the members of WEU form the most homogeneous group, a fact which places special responsibilities upon them. The cold war has ended, as an ideological confrontation, as an armed peace between two systems in strategic balance. The threat which for more than forty years weakened the web of international relations is receding, with the prospect of drastic reductions in conventional arms in Europe; the superiority of the Warsaw Pact, with its



*Mr. Vitalone (continued)*

attendant risks of domination without occupation, of hegemony without annexation. The array of short-range missiles was the ultimate expression of a security based on recourse to armaments. Now that they have begun to be dismantled, we know that the trend has changed with far-reaching consequences.

I am quite sure that one factor – perhaps the most important one – leading to the collapse of so many despotisms in Eastern Europe has been precisely the attractiveness, not only of our pattern of social organisation, but also of the system of international links based on dialogue, consensus and standing together, beginning with WEU and the values it represents.

Thus a new era in international relations is beginning, an era which must determine the political, economic and strategic dispositions in response to the peaceful revolution that began in the second half of 1989 and which, following the significant election results in East Germany, will receive further sweeping endorsements in other elections shortly to be held. An era which must consolidate the achievement of democracy and of pluralism in a Europe freed from the thrall of distrust and confrontation and at last restored to the full responsibilities of free choice.

This then is the new part that our institutions now have to play: to act generously and wisely so that the great changes now under way in Eastern Europe, including the unification of Germany, do not in any way lead to destabilisation. This will call for a considerable effort of imagination, political will and economic commitment on the part of all of us. We are leaving behind a post-war situation marked by balances based upon mistrust, hostility and rigidly opposed positions; a peace that often seemed to be only a fragile truce. We have no wish to see the return of the misunderstandings that disfigured the climate of international relations in Europe in the inter-war period.

We believe that a new stability can be achieved only through clear choices in a harmonious plan for the integration of Europe, without allowing ourselves to be thrown or overtaken by events. The priority accorded to the processes of European integration, also involving the matter of security, is one of the fundamental choices of this strategy. For we believe that if during the next few years the integration of Western Europe (and by this I mean not only the single market but also political and military integration) does not proceed at a pace and intensity dictated by the new developments, we shall not have the instrument we need to master the difficult transitional phase.

It is the duty of WEU to put in hand a reconsideration by the Nine of the future political and

military balances, stability and disarmament. It is our duty to advance step by step our thinking about the new alignments in the security systems in a Europe which will from now on be so different from the Europe into which our organisation was born – and also so different from Europe as it was in the autumn of 1987 when we agreed the lines of a joint defence platform.

It is our duty to reflect on how our security needs can be met in areas other than Central Europe which for decades has borne the main weight of the threat, as far as Northern Europe and in general as far as the Mediterranean area whose “strength” is a vital interest of the whole continent.

All this, then, should lead us to engage in dialogue and reflection, unafraid of what is new, keeping pace with the rapid developments in the international situation, which are restoring to Europe the centrality which it had long since lost.

The Europe of the Nine must not only give thought to how it is to unify its own defences and how to co-ordinate this objective question of political union pursued in the wider context of the Twelve. This Europe must also contribute towards re-examining the rôle of the institution that, with the irreplaceable and indispensable contribution of the United States and of Canada, has guaranteed our security for more than forty years.

That is the question now being asked in Europe, especially in Western Europe, in the light of events in the East: the question about the tasks of the Atlantic Alliance and about what is going to happen in view of the possible fading away, or at any rate the lessening, of the military threat.

Our thinking on this subject must take account of a complex requirement: the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance in a changing environment not only with reference to the new situation but also to those that may finally emerge from the entire process of European security.

Were NATO to be dissolved or even were its political rôle to be weakened, this would not bring us nearer to a more stable and predictable world; on the contrary, it would distance us from such a world. In the new Europe the alliance must serve to keep the political and military transatlantic link with the United States and Canada in being and to strengthen it. The history of the conflicts of which Europe has been in this century the theatre and the victim warn against any rapprochement that is not at the same time a reduction of the strategic distances between the two shores of the Atlantic.

*Mr. Vitalone (continued)*

Today prospects of joint European defence or rather of a common security for Western Europe are once more emerging: this is something which in the past we were unable to achieve but which before long will be an indispensable achievement of political union. But we shall not be able to build the common European house or succeed in entering into constructive relationships with our former adversaries unless we keep our link with America strong. Europe must no longer be a place where rivalries flourish, or revert to instability.

Therefore the Nine have a duty to reflect not about disbanding the alliance, but about progressively adapting it to developments in Europe. Much thought has to be given to NATO's own strategy resulting from the force reductions and from the broadening of the military subjects under discussion at Vienna until a security system based on entirely new premises is achieved. WEU will play a more important part and bear increased responsibility, also because the requirements and views of our countries do not always entirely coincide. No real balance in Europe could emerge from reversion to national military policies by countries which, after all, will in future have to provide jointly for their own security. The strength of the European pillar of the alliance itself must be built on a growing convergence of the Nine regarding future arrangements in Europe, in particular security arrangements. Consultations will be needed on the political nature of the alliance, on the sharing of tasks within it, on its rôle within a security system which, through the CSCE, is bound to take on increasingly well-defined and indispensable characteristics in the context of the continent.

This is the third subject or, if you prefer, the largest of the concentric circles in which European security revolves, after WEU and NATO: it is the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Special thought needs to be given to this third dynamic too within the framework of WEU. For it is destined to be more important than might have been thought until yesterday, since it holds within itself the promise of what has already been called a single European security system, in other words the context within which economic, social and political integration at European level has to be built. This context will not cancel out the other two levels, those of Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance; indeed these must form integral, essential parts of it.

This Assembly must also play its part in strengthening security within the framework of the new Helsinki process, new as regards the process described in the Final Act and its continuation, namely a system of principles and

rules elaborated as a framework within which a Europe now divided and at odds can live together in security.

The conclusion of the Vienna military negotiations will lay the groundwork for starting a fresh round of negotiations between the Thirty-Five, beginning with the conference to be convened within the year, and this could include negotiations on security. With this timetable in mind, we should hold consultations in WEU about the possibility of moving towards truly defensive systems of security, with effective measures of verification and control. The convergence of the respective military doctrines, but above all transparency based on expenditure comparisons, will not only release considerable resources but will also increase mutual trust, in a continent until recently divided by a threatening line of confrontation.

During the phase of transition and rebuilding, the existing western groupings must be strengthened.

WEU will also be called upon to enhance the rôle of our countries and make Western Europe into the entity capable of influencing the future course of events not only in our continent. A cycle is closing which in the present century had made of Europe not only the theatre of unending conflict, locking up enormous energies, both material and moral, in a political and ideological confrontation in an atmosphere of mistrust and the threat of apocalyptic destruction. If this confrontation has ended, we do not want to return to a balance which is no more than just the temporary inability of one power to prevail over the other.

The experience of this post-war era teaches us that we should rather place our trust in the international instruments of dialogue, above all between countries giving allegiance to the same values of peace, freedom and democracy.

Within its own field WEU has acquitted itself of this exceedingly delicate task up to the present. Our wish is that it should continue to realise and defend our hopes no longer held asunder by conflicting utopias.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

Would you be prepared to answer any questions?...

*(The Minister indicated his assent)*

I call Mr. Caro who wishes to put a question to Mr. Poos.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I first wish to voice my pleasure at hearing two quite remarkable speeches from two

*Mr. Caro (continued)*

members of government of member states which I am convinced will continue to inspire our debates.

With your permission, I wish to put my question to Mr. Poos, whom I am happy to see amongst us, and I wish once again to pay tribute to the work he, together with the Luxembourg Government, accomplished so remarkably for the future of WEU and a clear concept of European security. This is the spirit in which I wish to put my question. It relates to the central part of the European pillar we are trying to build.

When we succeeded in having defence ministers in the Council of Ministers of WEU, we started to handle these questions seriously in an institutional manner. This excellent result corresponds to a very specific recommendation from the Assembly. If we finally become the pillar of European security in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance establishing, as I sincerely hope, this partnership in an institutional manner, i.e. a European-American bilateralism established by treaty, burden-sharing will no longer be a problem and perhaps very quickly the problem of responsibility-sharing in security matters will be solved too.

Insofar as there will be changes in the presence of American armed forces on the continent of Europe in view of the evolution and the needs of unification and European identity, could the Minister redefine and bring up to date WEU's European security doctrine and speak further about WEU's responsibility as a partner in the alliance and in military matters too, which would be tantamount to reverting to WEU's original task?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I thank Mr. Caro, particularly for his very positive and very flattering assessment of the work of the Luxembourg chairmanship during which the WEU charter was first outlined.

When we speak of WEU as a European pillar, we are obviously thinking of the strengthening of the political rôle of our organisation. The purpose of the proposal I have just made and which I will communicate to the other member states for preparing, on a nine-power basis, meetings to be held amongst the Sixteen, would be to bring out the political aspect of WEU and at the same time force it to reach a consensus among the Nine vis-à-vis their European and American partners.

I am thinking of WEU but also of the Community because in my mind the developments I

hope will take shape in the years to come will have to lead to the twelve-power Community dealing with overall defence and security problems. It is in this intermediary stage, i.e. pending political co-operation being extended to areas which it does not yet cover, that I see the rôle of WEU. I believe we should all, parliamentarians and we who have political responsibilities, work in the Community bodies of which we are also members for political co-operation to be strengthened and extended to security questions. I believe that corresponds to the wishes that your Assembly has expressed repeatedly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Poos.

I now invite Mr. Jessel to put a question to Mr. Vitalone.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I first congratulate Minister Poos and Minister Vitalone on really excellent and most informative and interesting speeches. My question to Signor Vitalone is this: he said the cold war is over, yet Mr. Pontillon in his report which we are debating wrote "the Soviet Union is, and will for a long time, be a very great military power with considerable conventional and nuclear means" – he means weapons – and in the light of that, can the Italian Minister say how we can prevent a dangerous complacency in the minds of the peoples of our countries?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. VITALONE (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I do not think it is in any way dangerous to recognise honestly what has really changed in the scenario of world security. We have, I believe, talked responsibly of the need to enhance the alliance's political rôle, we have stressed that the alliance must take a completely new look at itself, not forgetting what it has achieved over the last forty years in guaranteeing stability and peace in Europe and the rôle it still has to play in this extremely delicate transitional stage. Obviously, it will have to up-date its tasks appropriately as they can no longer be those which we defended so stubbornly and at such great cost at a different time when dialogue was confrontation, when disarmament was the logic of protecting military superiority, when security was military rather than political and when the guarantee of peace was linked with the threat of apocalyptic destruction.

We are not forgetting all this but we believe that it is now time to redefine security strategy and to set it in the wider context of the CSCE; to create a defence structure taking account of the expectations now emerging as facts in Europe which will involve far-reaching changes and

*Mr. Vitalone (continued)*

taking on and overcoming very difficult problems, such as some aspects of reunification in the two Germanys. I am sure that no one wishes to play down these facts.

I said a little earlier that anyone who thinks of surrendering the structures, resources and political strength of the Atlantic Alliance would certainly not be furthering the cause of peace and stability in Europe, but we cannot pretend that nothing has happened in the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, may I ask a brief supplementary question?

The PRESIDENT. – A very short question.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – As the Minister did not reply to my question, which is how we could avoid a dangerous complacency in the minds of the peoples of our countries, can he please now answer my question, or does he think the people are right to be complacent? Will he answer please?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. VITALONE (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I flatter myself, Mr. President, that I have given, if not a persuasive, at least a complete reply and, if not a convincing, at least a convinced answer. It is a matter not of suggesting scenarios to encourage a political choice or to influence judgments but rather of finding the right answer to problems concerning the redefinition of Atlantic Alliance strategies. I believe that we, in particular, must contribute by constructive proposals to redefining what the Atlantic Alliance's rôle should be, with forceful and decisive emphasis on its function as a focus of great political cohesion which has undoubtedly been a leading factor in the great process of attraction which, to echo the words of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has done a great deal to keep free Europe in the eye of the Germanys.

We know that in this context the Atlantic Alliance has played a vital part which we recall and reaffirm cannot be abandoned but I believe that it must be stressed that the Atlantic Alliance is called upon to define a new overall security strategy for Europe within the CSCE. When we speak of Helsinki II we must also look at this absolute priority. If this reference satisfies the curiosity underlying some courteous polemical pressure I shall not add further to my reply.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Do you wish to add anything, Mr. Poos?

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – If I may, Mr. President, I wish to emphasise that there is no contradiction between what the Minister of State said about the cold war being terminated, on the one hand, and Mr. Pontillon's affirmation that the Soviet Union is still a great military power. The first affirmation is true, the second also. Every day we see clear signs that the cold war is at an end. The destruction of the Berlin wall is the most spectacular sign. Democratic elections in the GDR, democratic elections in the next few weeks in other countries of the East, the slow disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and many other signals point in this direction.

On the other hand, we know, the ministers of defence and the sixteen know that the military arsenal of the Soviet Union as a great conventional and military power has remained practically intact. It is therefore for the negotiations now being held in Vienna and the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic weapons to reduce this potential as a consequence of the political events that have just occurred. I therefore see no contradiction in the two affirmations and we must now bring the present negotiations to a conclusion as quickly as possible so as to reap the rewards of détente at the level of forces and armaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This brings us to the conclusion of a very interesting debate. I thank very sincerely Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, and Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.

***7. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe***

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe, resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments.

The debate is resumed.

I call the Earl of Kinnoull.

The Earl of KINNOULL (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I am sure all colleagues will agree that this debate has been heightened by three notable interventions: the Foreign Secretary of Poland spoke with great clarity and, I believe, a

*The Earl of Kinnoull (continued)*

hopeful message from his point of view; the Foreign Secretary of Italy was equally supportive and, as ex-member delegate, his wise words were of a quality we would expect from an ex-member delegate; and, Mr. President, the Foreign Secretary of Belgium gave a strong clear message about the future rôle of WEU and, as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, his encouraging remarks will be a comfort to us and give us a spirit of confidence in our deliberations despite my colleague Mr. Baumel's feeling of disenchantment.

Mr. President, this debate on Mr. Pontillon's excellent report, and I would add my warmest congratulations to him, both on the report and the clarity with which he presented it this morning, comes obviously at a very timely moment in the challenging and historical chapter of our European history. The report describes vividly the frightening speed of events that took off last year like an Australian bush fire, and one which we all hope will not spread out of control.

Now the architect of the change in Eastern Europe, of course, is Mr. Gorbachev, and I am glad to see he was firmly readopted last week as the leader of the Soviet Union. He will need the wisdom of Solomon and the brave support of his colleagues if he is to keep his policies on the rails. A serious challenge has already confronted him, even this week, in Lithuania, as my colleague Mr. Wilkinson has said, and we will all be watching with some anxiety to see how the fiercely independent spirit of Lithuania and the policies of the Soviet Union can be settled without military force.

Mr. President, I would remind the Assembly of this only to demonstrate how fragile the climate of change is at present. Whilst we need to grasp the opportunities of creating the goal of pan-European unity, it will not happen overnight nor, indeed, will it happen without a lot of good work.

Our distinguished visitor, the Polish Foreign Secretary, spoke with refreshing clarity about the future unity of Europe, as seen from Poland. I was glad he also saw the value of WEU and indeed the future work of WEU. Perhaps it is not to his surprise that I do as well.

The Assembly has infallible maturity. As an Assembly, it has a potential beyond its present framework and I believe it needs a widened membership. Without a doubt, it needs to instigate policies, as the Foreign Secretary for Belgium has said, and not just comment on events. I am greatly encouraged by the Foreign Secretary of Belgium's comments on the future.

Mr. President, the great change and success, I believe, of what will happen in Europe in the

future is that at the present time we have this political will on all sides. The political will to achieve unity. That will was born from the dawn of hope of millions of Europeans over forty years ago and now it is becoming a dream that can be realised. But that dream will take time to become a secure reality. Time is needed to create the right framework and, equally important, the right trust. Mr. President, I have no doubt it will be achieved and when history is written, WEU will have proved to have played an important and rightful rôle in that achievement. Thank you, Mr. President.

*(Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Senator Fioret.

Mr. FIORET (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the extraordinary events now taking place in the eastern countries are described most excellently in Mr. Pontillon's report. It calls for a realistic overall assessment of the situation in order to establish a clear picture of the present and what is likely to happen in future. Assessment of the present position indicates that the changes in the eastern countries are shifting the security systems from a unilateral concession to a mutual, balanced security concession.

The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs acknowledged in his excellent speech a short time ago that stability had changed. A new basis for security will have to be established, bearing clearly in mind that, throughout the years of most acute tension, peace was safeguarded by the existence of an adequate western deterrent capability. If the outcome is a co-operative instead of an antagonistic security system, it will all be the result of the realisation that an unending arms race, particularly for sophisticated weapons, would further weaken the Soviet economy and that of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which is not the least cause of the present break-up of the Soviet bloc.

But even if the long-standing threat from the East is diminishing, this does not mean the disappearance of every threat. For all peoples and most especially for peace-loving peoples, security is a fact of life which ignores the mere probability of threats and regards it as a permanent deterrent to potential aggressors. The hoped-for development of the Atlantic Alliance towards more specifically political aims will require greater co-operation and cohesion in defence matters between Europeans and the future security system will have to become progressively more pan-European to prevent the re-emergence of old antagonisms and mistrust which we would like to think have gone for ever. In present circumstances, however, it would be

*Mr. Fioret (continued)*

wrong to expect any faster Europeanisation of defence.

The objectives to be pursued are still those set out in The Hague platform of 1987, which calls for gradual pragmatic measures designed to adapt the existing institutions to the new state of affairs. This common European security platform also provides for concerted action on the problems of outside areas so that I do not think it out of place in this discussion on the Pontillon report to point out the strategic link between the central and the southern region, seeing that Southern Europe and the Mediterranean are nerve centres of contact between Europe, Asia and Africa.

It is both urgent and necessary that WEU should formulate an overall concept of European security including the Mediterranean dimension. This is true both politically and from the standpoint of safeguarding peace, because the Mediterranean is now the area with the greatest inequalities of living standards in the world and risks becoming the most critical frontier in North-South confrontation. WEU can, therefore, adopt a package of measures directed to both East-West relations and North-South problems. Practical steps should be taken to adapt institutions faster with the consequent positive effect on the strengthening of the European pillar. To that end, WEU could encourage preventive stabilising measures and consider jointly with the Community institutions development aid policies for the emerging countries with a view to a more precise formulation of security objectives.

For lovers of peace like myself, it would be self-delusion to congratulate ourselves on the gradual disappearance of the threat from the East and be indifferent to the dangerous tensions building up for economic, demographic, ethnic, social and religious reasons around the Mediterranean, which will inevitably affect the security of the whole of Europe as Mr. Vitalone stressed in his speech. WEU has the opportunity to lead the way effectively in defusing these dangerous threats if it commits itself with the authority it enjoys from the fact of having been, ever since 1954, the organiser of peace and justice for peoples who want to control their own destiny.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mrs. Glumac Levakov, observer from Yugoslavia.

Mrs. GLUMAC LEVAKOV (*Observer from Yugoslavia*). – We consider our participation in this Assembly of European parliamentarians to be useful and we should like to thank our colleagues in the Assembly of Western European Union for their initiative which came at a most

propitious moment and which will certainly enhance the European dialogue which is so essential.

The processes that have taken the European continent by storm indicate that Europe is awakening and discovering its common all-European identity. These processes are characterised by the orientation towards integration, coexistence and interdependence. At the same time, these trends are attended by certain contradictions which are manifesting themselves in particular with respect to global, regional and sub-regional interests. Consequently, the European processes can no longer be viewed solely in terms of East-West relations but also in North-South terms, in the context of the peaceful development of the continent and the sustained growth of all the countries and regions belonging to it. In that sense, the present balance of forces in Europe needs to be replaced with a new balance – a balance of interests.

In the channelling of current trends in Europe, a key rôle, in our opinion, should be played by the Council of Europe and especially the CSCE which should evolve from a process into a system with a corresponding organisation and set-up to enable the intensified development of co-operation within each of the three baskets.

Let me now say a few words about Yugoslavia in the context of the report of Mr. Pontillon.

Yugoslavia is a multinational community in which none of the nations has the absolute majority in the overall country's population. Therefore, Yugoslavia is determined to carry out substantive reforms in society geared towards increasing economic efficiency and political democracy. A pluralism of ownership forms, political pluralism, the affirmation of human freedoms and civil rights and the constitution of a modern legal state that will enhance these processes provide the basis of the in-depth transformation of Yugoslavia into a country with a market economy, political pluralism and democracy.

The Assembly of Yugoslavia has started a procedure for changing the present constitution of Yugoslavia, with the objective of creating a democratic, legal state, the abolition of the political monopoly of the League of Communists and introducing the multi-party system of parliamentary democracy.

All these processes, about whose ultimate positive outcome we have no doubts, are evolving with some difficulty at this stage. A particularly grave problem is the attempt by the separatist movement in Kosovo – which does not enjoy the support of the majority in Kosovo or in Yugoslavia – to instigate ethnic strife and achieve ethnic Albanian purity in the region. Notwithstanding, there is no reason to doubt

*Mrs. Glumac-Levakov (continued)*

that those attempts will be thwarted with the affirmation and exercise of the rule of law, the legal state which will guarantee for each and every citizen in Kosovo, regardless of his nationality, religion or political convictions, peace, security and the necessary conditions for a democratic dialogue.

Yugoslavia has acceded to the important international acts in the field of human rights and freedoms. We are devoting special attention to the standards set by the convention on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Council of Europe as an acceptable model for the development and protection of human rights.

The policy orientations and aspirations of SFR Yugoslavia are geared towards Europe where we historically and culturally belong. Our intentions in that regard are contained in the recently adopted declaration of the Assembly on the further inclusion of Yugoslavia in the integration processes in Europe.

At the end, let me assure you that my country is ready to be an active participant in the historical endeavour to build a new European order of peace, security and co-operation. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Cetin, the observer from Turkey.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – Mr. President, I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation for your timely initiative to hold this extraordinary session of WEU.

The rapid developments of the last months in Eastern Europe indicate that we are going through a turning-point in the history of Europe and of the world. I am confident that your Assembly, which has never failed to contribute to the promotion of peace and security in Europe, will have an important word to say in this process. I would also like to join previous speakers in congratulating our Rapporteur for the excellent report he has prepared for this meeting.

Mr. President, before starting my comments on the main item of the agenda, I would like to draw your attention to two points: in paragraph 49 of the report dealing with the latest incidents in the Caucasus region of the USSR, the clashes between Azeris and Armenians are qualified as a "massacre of Armenians". I would like to remind the Assembly of the hundreds of Azeris who lost their lives both during the conflict and as a result of the intervention of the Soviet armed forces. Among those there were also many women and children. The developments in the region started with territorial and legally unjustified claims of the Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh and have reached a point

where Azeri blood has been shed. It is also hard to share the view expressed in paragraph 49 regarding the religious nature of the latest events. For instance, the People's Front is mainly composed of nationalist elements and only a very small portion of the Azeris are inclined towards an Iranian-style fundamentalism.

Secondly, I shall dwell on paragraph 35 where a reference has been made to the Bulgarians residing in Turkey and it is said that the Bulgarian Government rightly complains about the fate of these people. I think Mr. Pontillon here makes a reference to the Turkish minority which emigrated in hundreds of thousands last year to Turkey, fleeing the repressive régime of Mr. Jivkov. Apart from these ethnic Turks, if we leave out Bulgarian diplomatic mission personnel in our country, there are no resident Bulgarians in Turkey. And if the reference is made in the report to a Turkish minority, I shall content myself with reminding your esteemed Assembly of the reasons why and conditions in which these people had to leave their lands and take refuge in Turkey.

Mr. President, one-party régimes which have stayed in power for years are disappearing one after another. They are being replaced by parliamentary democracies based on plurality of parties, free elections and a mixed economy. It is to be hoped that the elections in Eastern European countries to be held this year will also lead to the consolidation of democracy and will improve respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

After observing the rapid changes in Eastern Europe, it may be said in a certain sense that it is now that world war II is coming to an end. Because it is only now, forty-five years after the surrender of Germany, after the Soviet Union withdrew its sovereignty over Eastern Europe, that a pattern similar to the one before the war is beginning to emerge.

The new pattern must, and we are sure will, preserve the new borders formed after the war. At the centre of this pattern will be the united Germany formed by the reunion of East and West Germany. German people are entitled to shape their own destiny. We are confident that they are of a political and social maturity and they will continue to be an asset for the community of nations, for peace, stability and prosperity in Europe and in the world. For years the Federal Republic of Germany has substantially contributed to the preservation of peace and stability in Europe.

Determining Europe's future architecture calls for creative and imaginative approaches. But the potential risk involved in a period of rapid political change and uncertainties about the

*Mr. Cetin (continued)*

future obliges us to be prepared to move ahead with caution. In shaping Europe's future, first there is the need to consider existing structures and re-evaluate their relevance with a view to responding effectively to the requirements of the time, particularly in relation to Europe's future security order. We have to remember that, thanks to existing western organisations and their ability to devise most appropriate policies, we have been witnessing the longest period of peace and stability in our continent.

Mr. President, as all distinguished members of the Assembly are perfectly aware, Turkey has played an important rôle in Western European defence. It has been taking an active part in all aspects of the European political, social and economic integration process as a member of NATO, the Council of Europe and the OECD. As all the honourable members will also agree with me, the European integration movement can only be achieved with the realisation of its security dimension. As a strong and stable ally in the southern region of the alliance, Turkey has a lot to offer in the creation of the future European security order. Accession of Turkey as a full member to Western European Union will certainly contribute to the strengthening process of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, I hope that Turkey will soon have the status that it deserves within Western European Union, commensurate with its past and present contributions to peace and stability in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Biacs, the observer from Hungary.

Mr. BIACS (*Observer from Hungary*). – There will be elections at the end of this week in Hungary. I am running in my constituency for re-election together with six new candidates of different parties from left to right, communists and socialists, liberals and christian democrats. This election will open a new era in the life of the country. At the same time it means that the new régime need not strive for continuity in foreign policy. This is justified of course by the realignments taking place in the world and particularly in Europe.

Chiefly because of the changes that have occurred within the two main blocs, the world will no longer be bipolar as written in Mr. Pontillon's report. In the past hierarchic structure, I am sure there was unity in both military blocs, cohesion being assured by the existence of external threats for each one. It is therefore natural that this division must stop in Europe, just as it has ended in Germany. The Eastern and Central European countries are becoming increasingly identified with the democratic values of the world. The strengthening of this trend is likely in the Soviet Union as well.

The development of parliamentary democracies built on a market economy is progressing and they are intensifying relations with the Council of Europe and the European Communities to which they wish to adhere. These countries do not hold that security is threatened from the West. It is a question of the consequences the above developments will have for the security of Europe and for our region of Central/Eastern Europe.

Minister Eyskens said today that real stability could be created only in very balanced conditions. The disarmament and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary is one indication of this necessary symmetry. Will there be a vacuum? Is there not a danger that nationalist tendencies might grow, giving rise to uncontrollable rivalry and to conflicts threatening war among the small and medium-sized countries? The tragic situation in Transylvania calls for close attention, where the greatest ethnic minority in Europe, three million Hungarians, are living.

In truth, only a collective system of European security could ensure the safety of the region. The series of meetings of security and co-operation in Europe offer the best possibility for achieving this. To realise it, the need must be seen for abolishing opposing military alliances. A system of accords on bilateral and multilateral security has to be formed in which the individual states guarantee each other's security and show their willingness to settle the problems arising between them democratically in an all-European framework. This presupposes the development of a multipolar Europe, the final phasing-out of the bloc approach, the unhampered course of the Helsinki process and closer European political ties.

I highly appreciated Minister Eyskens's message today when he said that "everyone has his own space in Europe, even ethnic minorities". The countries leading the eastern alliance system are weak economically, as well as militarily. They need time to consolidate a political system and market economy. Growing nationalism and conflicts between each other represent a real danger, not to speak of the social consequences of a possible economic collapse. Regionalist tendencies are sure to gain ground in compensation for advantages earlier gained from hegemonic alliances and now vanishing. But I was happy to hear today Minister Eyskens saying "young people are not nationalistic". This is a human factor in restructuring military forces which was accepted when the bill of defence in Hungary was amended in 1989, introducing civil service instead of service in armed forces as an alternative.

Let me emphasise that the Hungarian National Assembly has already taken a number



*Mr. Biacs (continued)*

of initiatives and measures for developing co-operation between parliamentary organisations in Western Europe. In our opinion, these organisations – Western European Union, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the North Atlantic Assembly – are playing an essential rôle in the organisation of multi-lateral parliamentary relations and the encouragement of the European security and co-operation process. The new Hungarian parliament will probably likewise be open and ready for continuing the dialogues as a result of which Hungary may soon become a fully-fledged member of a free, secure, peaceful and prosperous Europe.

In conclusion, please permit me to thank, on behalf of our delegation, the leadership of Western European Union for the invitation to this important conference and for the possibility of sharing with you some of our thoughts on the future of our common European homeland.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Senator Fassino.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – May I say straight away that I agree with Mr. Pontillon's excellent, detailed, well-documented and complete report and may I add that many people are also saying the same thing. A new order is emerging in Europe and, unlike its predecessors, this new order, after so many centuries, is being created without warfare. It is an order, ladies and gentlemen, born out of reason two hundred years after the French Revolution which made reason its watchword. Today, Europe is looking for itself in the sign of that reason afterwards lost, in the sign of what is for some a new democracy, but is in any case fresh and more widespread.

It is also a fact that the relaxation of military tension on both sides, of which we have heard much today, will be the basis for future political developments in our continent and new frontiers – NATO and the Warsaw Pact – involving the questions we are all asking ourselves, unfortunately without being able to give precise answers. But it is equally true that every relaxation of military tension is also based on the opening of frontiers between East and West, the dawning and certainly growing movement of people from East to West and, not only that, but also from South to North.

As a liberal, I must say that I believe in economic basics and particularly in the market economy. It certainly does not depend on us or WEU, but a market economy will be created and will be capable of involving all the eastern countries if they are brought into the orbit of rational and socially moderate capitalism, and if a European investment and incentives plan can be

launched for those countries which have suffered from decades of planning. So I believe that today, peace, justice and security in Europe will ultimately be established on sounder foundations. In a word, I believe that priority must be given to economic discussions which, however difficult, should spontaneously lead on to the political balance which is part of the lives of all of us here today.

Recently, in Turin, a leading economist stated the principle that shortages depend less on a lack of primary goods than on the distortions of economic systems incapable of guaranteeing a minimum of efficiency because they are authoritarian. If this analysis is accepted together with its comments, the various political freedoms which are the essence of a democratic state with regular elections, uncensored newspapers and freedom of speech must be regarded as being the real driving force for the elimination of the shortages. A free and enlightened public opinion is therefore emerging in the East and as time goes on the preconditions for real and lasting détente will also be created. I agree with the conclusions of the Pontillon report. No standing down of the alliance, no winding up of treaties, no automatic and premature extension of the Community at least until the establishment of democracy has been fully consolidated. But nothing should hold Western Europe back from giving priority to a far-reaching political and economic commitment to the eastern countries for the purpose of exporting to them the competitive, democratic and efficient model which guarantees well-being and therefore freedom and peace.

It is for WEU, the sole free and chosen expression of European solidarity, for WEU now reactivated as I have wanted for many years, it is for WEU to act as spokesman in dealings with those who can reach the necessary decisions. Beyond military techniques, therefore – and I am coming to my conclusion, Mr. President – and beyond the abstractions of politics, it is the level of earnings and international trade links which will be the surest guarantee of peace. Poor people are generally readier to accept the use of force; rich people are generally ready to negotiate and to show in politics the common sense which is the fundamental law of business. This then is the new order in Europe. In my opinion it can only be achieved by the extension of modern progressive liberalism to the eastern countries and by the triumph of our free culture over the culture of fear and inertia which the communist régimes have imposed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I am very surprised to be

*Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)*

given the floor, because I had asked to speak tomorrow, but I see you have completed your list of speakers, and I am perhaps doing you a favour by filling in time for you. All you will be getting from me are a few disconnected thoughts, because I had planned to sit down this evening and write out precisely what I wanted to say.

All the events in Eastern Europe last year, the wall coming down, the changes in the Soviet Union, make me think that this is an extremely exciting and interesting period in which to live. In the past, there have been moments when I thought I would have preferred to live earlier or later. But last year I found things exciting and interesting, and I am glad I was here to witness it all.

The changes that have occurred were probably not so welcome to people who call themselves experts on Eastern Europe, who are authorities on the Soviet Union. All at once they might as well throw all their interesting ideas, everything they have written in the wastepaper bin or take them to the library, because suddenly an authority on the Soviet Union is no longer an expert. And an expert on Europe, on Eastern Europe is suddenly no longer the expert he had hoped to go on being for years to come.

We now face – and I think this is one of the important matters we have come to discuss in this Assembly – the problem of not really knowing what form our future and the security of the world should take. I feel that Mr. Pontillon's report at least provides a good overview of the events that have occurred and of the things that are about to happen. I feel that, if only because the circumstances were bound to lead to something of a rushed job, his recommendations in particular present a short-term plan where the security concept for the near future is concerned. In one of his recommendations he says, for example, that he can imagine the European security concept should entail good relations with the United States and Canada in the near future, and I feel there should also have been a reference to another country, a veritable continent: the Soviet Union.

I can imagine that, not in the near future but in the more distant future, a European security system will emerge in one form or another, either in the form described by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg this afternoon or as reflected in the ideas that have been presented today by Mr. Skubiszewski, Poland's Foreign Minister. I believe there must be a form of European security in which there are close relations and co-operation with both sides, with the United States and with the Soviet Union. I feel it will help the security of Europe and security in the world if Europe becomes Greater Europe. A

security concept must therefore, as I see it, cover the whole of Europe, a strong Europe, with security extending to both sides and not just to those countries which are now our NATO allies. In a changed world, with the future in mind, I see a completely different image of security before me, and an image of security not only for Europe but for the rest of the world. Those were the few disjointed ideas I wanted to put forward. Not a proper speech, but I have at least tried to introduce some of my ideas into this debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Senator Pontillon.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am stimulated by the intelligent comments and charm of our senator from the Netherlands to answer immediately the question she raised. The Soviet Union is missing from the security system, but the reference we make several times to an all-European security system truly implies the participation of the Soviet Union. The reference in the report, in the recommendation and in the introduction this morning to a concept of shared security is effectively aimed at both parts of Europe. I have done my utmost to give you full satisfaction in this respect.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

#### *8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Friday, 23rd March 1990, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
2. Address by Mr. Falin, Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs.
3. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1216 and amendments*).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 6.50 p.m.)*

## THIRD SITTING

Friday, 23rd March 1990

### SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
*Replies by Mr. Genscher to questions put by: Mr. Skubiszewski (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland), Mr. Tummers, Mr. Soell, Mr. Baumel, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.*
4. Address by Mr. Falin, Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs.

*Replies by Mr. Falin to questions put by: Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Soell, Mr. Büchner.*

5. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1216 and amendments*).

*Speakers (points of order): Mr. Ahrens (Chairman of the committee), Mr. Soell, Mr. Pieralli, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman; Mr. Malfatti, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Mezzapesa, Sir William Shelton, Mrs. Beer, Mr. Scovacricchi, Mr. Roseta (Observer from Portugal), Mr. van Eekelen (Secretary-General of WEU), Mr. Pontillon (Rapporteur), Mr. Ahrens (Chairman of the committee); (explanation of vote): Mr. De Decker, Mr. Tummers.*

6. Close of the extraordinary session.

*The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### *2. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### *3. Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

On behalf of all representatives, I welcome the Minister to our Assembly and ask him to come to the rostrum.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Europe is experiencing fundamental changes. It is faced by great challenges and has tremendous opportunities. No longer are enduring peace and unity for our sorely tried continent mere fantasies. A just and peaceful order is a realistic aim and a chance within our grasp. Walls have fallen and barbed wire has been cut through. Human rights, plurality and democracy are coming into their own. Europe is again becoming conscious of itself, of its common history and culture and of its shared values.

The commitment to human rights and human dignity enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act is beginning to become a reality everywhere. The policy of openness both domestically and externally introduced by President Gorbachev, the restructuring of his country and the renunciation of an expansionary foreign policy have contributed to this profound change, a change which benefits all the nations of Europe.

The progressive democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe is a gain for the whole of Europe and it is in the interest of us all to create a strong framework for these processes of peaceful change. The menacing situation has fundamentally changed – for both sides. No longer do they have to regard each other as a

1. See page 15.

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

threat – even if the stockpiles of arms and the strengths of the armed forces have not so far been greatly influenced by the political changes.

This makes it all the more urgent to adopt an unequivocal policy of disarmament. The Soviet Union too has recognised that, as an alliance of democracies, the West has neither the intention nor the ability to attack the East. Hence the reason for Gorbachev's far-reaching policy of disarmament is by no means only economic pressures, as is often assumed in the West; it is a realistic analysis of the West's goals and political value judgments, and the expression of a new policy of the Soviet Union based on co-operation.

There is no doubt that both West and East have found common points of departure for shaping the future, and this opens up far-reaching opportunities for Europe-wide co-operation in all spheres. The Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel referred to the wide horizon of possible co-operation during the visit by Federal President von Weizsäcker to Prague on 15th March 1990 when he said:

“We can work together for a democratic Europe, a Europe with unity in diversity, a Europe that does not bring war to the world but instead radiates tolerance; a Europe that will no longer foul Europe with poisonous smoke and poisoned water.”

The new situation in Europe calls for fresh thinking and responsible action on all sides. Old questions are coming in fresh guises and new questions are arising. All countries owe it to the peaceful revolutions of freedom to see to it that the process of democratisation is not endangered by outdated thinking in terms of blocs, by outworn egoism of nation states or by the power politics of the past.

On 31st May 1989, the summit conference of the western alliance took the responsible, forward-looking decision not to modernise its nuclear short-range missiles. Is it conceivable that events in Central and Eastern Europe would have followed the same course if that decision had gone the other way? The changes in Europe are the natural result of the courageous decision to think responsibly and act for the future.

This makes it all the more indispensable to bring new thinking to bear on the coming phases in the structuring of a peaceful future for Europe. I am glad that the WEU Assembly is mindful of the changes in Europe in its political work. When, more than five years ago, I addressed you at the historic extraordinary session in Rome, our task was to redefine the rôle of WEU in Western Europe. Since then, WEU has become an important forum for

the discussion of matters currently affecting European security. It is a mark of fresh thinking that at your session in December 1989, impressed by the political changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, you resolved to convene another extraordinary session. This is an impressive confirmation of the important rôle of WEU.

In the last few days you have listened to speeches by representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland who are destined to play key rôles in the creation of the future structure of European security. By initiating exchange visits with leaders in the Soviet Union, the WEU Assembly has taken an early opportunity of stressing the importance of intensifying political contacts. Those are important steps towards the development of pan-European security structures.

The peaceful people's revolution for freedom in East Germany has signalled to the whole world the will of Germans to be reunited. The unification of Germany has always been on the agenda of history. On 18th March 1990, the Germans in East Germany left nobody in doubt that they were choosing freedom and unity, democracy and the social market economy, Europe and peace.

Back in 1967, the Harmel report correctly stated that a durable, stable settlement in Europe could not come about unless the German question were solved. Now we are about to solve that problem – not in isolation, but within a European framework. The Germans in the GDR are just as good Europeans as we are. It can now be truly said that we Germans want to serve the cause of world peace together and as a member of a united Europe on a basis of equality.

Our nation cherishes a deep longing for freedom and peace. Let the nations of Europe know that we Germans want nothing other than to live in freedom and peace with all our neighbours. German history has never belonged only to us Germans, neither will our future belong to us alone. The destiny of the German nation is indissolubly bound up with the destiny of Europe.

This places a great responsibility upon us Germans. Not only our history but also the weight of more than 75 million Germans in one state in the heart of Europe add to this responsibility. Ever since our state has existed, the policy of the Federal German Republic has been, in harmony with the meaning of our Basic Law, a policy of responsibility. That means renouncing the power politics of the past. The two German states wish to become the powerhouse of developments that will overcome the division of Europe.

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

Germans both in the West and the East have long been in agreement that "war must never again start on German soil; peace must radiate from that soil". We want German reunification to take place within the framework of the European Community, the CSCE process, a stabilising partnership between West and East, the building of the common European house and the creation of a peaceful order throughout Europe. We do not seek to walk alone or to tread a special German path. We want to travel on the European road. We seek a dynamic stability for the whole of Europe, and we call upon our neighbours in the West and the East to open up with us this prospect for Europe.

In such a framework of stability the process of German unification can take place without causing a power shift or destabilisation in Europe. There will be no German unity without Europe – and neither will Europe be united without Germany. Germans in the West and the East have committed themselves to Europe. The growing together of the Germans in a changing Europe is just as important for the stability of Europe as a stable framework for the revolutionary developments in Central and Eastern Europe.

The unification of the German states should contribute to stability in Europe. It is the successful outcome of a common western policy, which was designed from the start to overcome the tensions, to engage in dialogue and co-operation and to achieve a political balance. In the end the constructive response came in President Gorbachev's concept of political openness. What are the tasks now facing us? We have to press ahead with the unification of Europe in the European Community; this Community will increasingly become the stabilising anchor for the whole of Europe, and a beacon of hope for the peoples of Europe.

We must press on resolutely with integration. The single internal market is just as important as economic and monetary union. There must also be a conference of governments for decisive progress in the constitutional questions. The Economic Community is in need of greater dynamism in the interest of the whole of Europe. France and the Federal German Republic should view the dynamic integration of the European Community as an obligation arising from their unique partnership. It excludes nobody and it discriminates against nobody when I state that the partnership between Germany and France is one of the most valuable achievements of the post-war period – after all that has gone before.

Thomas Mann expressed the part Germany should play in the Europe of the future in 1952 when he said: "What we want is not a German

Europe, but a European Germany." This European Germany wants to confront the challenges of the future in the realms of politics, security, the economy, trade and ecology together with its neighbours in West and East. There is no question as to what has to be unified in the unification of Germany. What have to be unified are the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR and the whole of Berlin, and this within the existing frontiers, no less, but no more. Once this unification has been completed, the references in our constitution relating to unification will have been discharged. In its resolution passed on 8th March 1990, the German Federal Parliament advocated that as soon as possible after the elections in the GDR the two freely-elected German parliaments should issue a joint declaration in essentially the following terms:

"We affirm to the Polish people that their right to live within secure borders shall never again either now or in the future be called in question by us Germans with territorial claims."

We are aware that the inviolability of Poland's western border along the Oder and Neisse is a fundamental condition of peace in Europe. "We" means the people in both the German states. The two freely-elected German parliaments and the governments chosen by them will make a joint declaration to this effect.

We shall reach an agreement with our neighbours in Poland as to the form and guarantee of the inviolability of the border. Therefore it is only logical that Poland should take part when, under the auspices of the arrangements agreed in Ottawa, matters particularly affecting its borders are discussed. For us too it is beyond doubt that German unification must take account of the interests of all European countries in security.

In this connection there are a number of questions on which we are striving to show the utmost possible clarity in the interest of a credible and predictable foreign policy. By belonging to the western alliance, a united Germany will contribute to stability throughout Europe. In this process it should be possible to reach agreements in respect of the present GDR territory that will be acceptable to the Soviet Union and neighbouring countries. Much new thinking will be called for in this connection, thinking that transcends the West-East syndrome and the antagonism of the two systems which dominated the past.

We are aware of the vital importance of respecting the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union – which is now experiencing many changes – as well. We shall be mindful of the crucial importance of German-Soviet relations too when fashioning the future relationship of the united Germany to the Soviet Union. We have no wish to see the changes in Eastern

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

Europe or the process of German unification lead to a displacement of forces in security policy.

We do not wish to gain any one-sided advantages from the changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Security is indivisible; one side cannot be left at a disadvantage. If Germany were to be neutralised, this would mean that Germans would be detached from the European context. German neutrality would undermine the rôle which necessarily falls to the alliances in the creation of a durable, just and peaceful order. It would create insecurity and instability in Central Europe, which nobody wants.

A great deal of caution and statesmanship will be called for in dealing successfully with the security policy issues raised by German unification. It will be facilitated to the extent that the need for the alliances to make the change from an antagonistic and military stance to a political rôle in the creation of security is understood and accepted. When this happens, questions which still appear insoluble will become soluble. I should like to speak in more detail about the change in the rôles of the alliances.

The process of German reunification will raise complicated questions which concern others besides ourselves. We shall discuss the external aspects of this process in the talks which the two German states hold with the powers that are responsible for Germany as a whole. This framework was agreed in Ottawa.

We wish to carry on with our allies, partners and neighbours a continuing process of information and discussion of all the questions bound up with the process of German reunification. It goes without saying that this affects our allies in NATO and our partners in the EC and in WEU, and the same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the other participants in the CSCE process.

What we are striving for is that the six countries of the Ottawa process shall be able to present to the summit meeting of the thirty-five countries a result that is in harmony with the Helsinki Final Act and that will be seen to enhance stability throughout Europe. Over and above that, we Germans are in a position to make important contributions to stability: the two German states can commit themselves in a joint declaration to renounce the manufacture and possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

The discussion now taking place in the Federal German Republic on which article of the Basic Law is ultimately relevant to unification is a matter of domestic policy and does not affect the external aspects of the unification of Germany. The method adopted under consti-

titutional law to reunify Germany can neither resolve nor prejudice the questions bound up with the external aspects of unification. Only when these questions have been settled will German unification be implemented, irrespective of the method chosen under constitutional law.

We shall not present anybody with *faits accomplis*. Nothing will be done behind other people's backs. Even before unification takes place, the two German states can do many things which do not affect the external aspects of German unification. The growing together and the reticulation of the political, social and economic strengths is in full swing. Unity from below is on the way. It is the unity of practical steps. The governments of the two Germanys are faced with the task of reaching agreement on the creation of an economic, currency and social union and on complicated questions of the harmonisation of laws. Much effort will have to be devoted to protecting the environment.

Further, transport and telecommunications infrastructures will have to be built up capable of becoming the hub of such structures for the whole of Europe. The fresh start in the GDR offers advantages which should be exploited by others as well. Therefore our determination to work together closely with the GDR, and to give it assistance, which naturally arises from the efforts towards reunification, will not deflect us from co-operating with other Central and Eastern European countries and giving them assistance too.

Now that we are about to shape up the future structures for Europe, and especially the future security structures, we must work out clearly what part the alliances are to play. Already they are in the process of transition from confrontation to co-operation. Our security policy must recognise that we are dealing with Warsaw Pact countries which have started out on the road to democracy. Hence the democratic revolution in Central and Eastern Europe has prepared the ground for a new policy on security.

The challenge now facing us is to achieve security not in confrontation but in co-operation. It is the challenge of co-operative stability. As co-operation between their member states increases, so the alliances to which they belong can and must likewise change. Democratisation and the dismantling of threatening attitudes go hand in hand. Both alliances are called upon to define their rôles more and more in political terms and to become linked in the long term as an instrument of security-building co-operation.

Just now and also for the future our western alliance is designed to ensure peace and stability. It will become increasingly important to the process of disarmament. The alliances will play an increasingly important part in

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

confidence-building and verification. Measures for enhancing confidence and security will prove to play a crucial part in shaping the new political order in Europe.

Transparency, openness and the ability correctly to assess one another are just as important as reductions in armed forces and weapons. They are of the essence of our future policy on security. Confidence-building leads to a culture of living together which leaves no room for hegemony and threats, hate-figures or mistrust.

In future, the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances will have a special function of political guidance: first the military security which the alliances presently provide for the peoples of Europe must be strengthened by co-operative security structures. Then the co-operatively structured alliances must be transmuted into a joint collective security organisation. They are creating new structures of security in Europe, by which they are being increasingly overarched and in which they can finally be subsumed.

In this time of far-reaching change in Europe, let us muster the courage to take a long view of security policy. In 1967 we pledged ourselves in the Harmel report to the creation of a durable, peaceful order in Europe. Surely it is essential to the realisation of that vision that we be prepared in the long run to enter a system of joint collective security.

For this purpose the Basic Law of the Federal German Republic made provision for agreeing to the limitation of sovereign rights "which will bring about a peaceful and durable order in Europe and between the nations of the world, and make it secure". As enmity and tensions decrease, it becomes more urgently necessary to reduce the levels of weapons and armed forces to the absolute minima needed for defence. Unless this is done, the military potentials get in the way of political progress.

This being so, we must make preparations now for Vienna II. Disarmament is becoming the key question for the unification of Europe and for German reunification. The facts support this view: the gigantic stocks of weapons, particularly on German soil, are not the cause but the result of antagonisms and tensions. The conventional disarmament negotiations of Vienna I must be followed without delay by negotiations about Vienna II.

The same applies to the Vienna negotiations about confidence-building measures. If 1990 is to be the year of disarmament, we must have concluded both the Vienna I agreements by the time of the proposed CSCE summit conference in autumn of this year. The same thing applies to the worldwide ban on chemical weapons and

to the 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The armed forces of the occupying powers must also be included in the Vienna II negotiations. When implementation of Vienna I commences, the way will be clear for negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles. Nuclear artillery must also be included in disarmament. What functions should these weapons systems retain in the future?

Disarmament too must remain linked to political developments. Without resolute action on disarmament there will be no unity of Europe or of Germany. That is undeniable. One new task which both West and East must now tackle is to achieve a joint reduction in armed forces and weapons and also to address jointly the economic, social, technological and ecological challenges of disarmament.

The breathtaking pace of developments in Europe, not least in the relationship of the two Germanys, is causing many people to ask what are the basis and the framework for the developments in Europe. It is the Helsinki Final Act; the CSCE process must now produce its full effect. The CSCE process is providing the blueprint for an undivided Europe. The Helsinki Final Act has given participating states a code of behaviour for their peaceful coexistence. It has made it possible to master the East-West conflict and has mitigated its human consequences. Now the CSCE process must gain a new quality and a new dimension. Whereas in the first phase the task was to enable the two different systems in Europe to coexist and gradually to overcome the division, now it is time for laying the basis and structure of the single Europe.

The antagonism between East and West is losing its ideological basis as Central and Eastern Europe progress towards democracy, and losing its basis in power politics as disarmament moves ahead. Closer infrastructure links will bring Europe ever more closely together. After the antagonism and after the cautious rapprochement, the stage in which Europe discovers and shapes its unity is now beginning.

The CSCE summit conference in the autumn of 1990, at which the two "Vienna" disarmament treaties are to be signed, will form the beginning of a fresh chapter in European history. At the 1990 CSCE summit meeting the thirty-five states will no longer be facing one another as adversaries. This summit will make it possible to take specific steps towards a new and peaceful order in Europe and to create a sound framework for stability, a safety net for the foreseeable and unforeseeable developments on our continent.

The Soviet Union must not be excluded from this Europe; it belongs to it. Eastern Europe, not

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

Western Asia, begins at the Polish border. The United States and Canada have an equally important part to play in the future structure of Europe and its stability. The western alliance links the two North American democracies to their allies in Europe; both countries are participants in the CSCE process. But is that enough?

The two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, are in the process of creating a new co-operative relationship; they no longer look upon each other as a threat. And the Soviet Union is reshaping its relationship with the European Community as well. I believe it is time for the United States and the European Community to find a new definition of this relationship, one that will do justice to its strength, its special nature, its closeness, and to the shared values between them.

By solemnly reaffirming the principles of the Helsinki Final Act the CSCE summit conference can create fresh confidence. It can also contribute to a stable partnership by deepening the CSCE process and resolve upon steps towards institutionalising it.

These include developing pan-European institutions under the aegis of the CSCE. As measures of co-operation in security policy, the establishment of a European verification agency and the creation of a conflict centre will constitute a step forward in making peace more secure. In both institutions the alliances could take over important functions relating to their new political tasks. Furthermore, giving continuity to the CSCE process might lead to the setting up of a council of foreign ministers of CSCE governments, which would meet at regular intervals.

Let us create a peaceful order in Europe, based on confidence, in which there is no longer room for the abuse of power and power play, because power politics have been replaced by the politics of responsibility, and because reliable security structures and all-round co-operation leave no more room for attitudes which offend against the spirit of democracy and peace. Progress towards a better Europe must be made irreversible, and there must be new arrangements for ensuring that this progress cannot be negated. No longer will this be simply an affair between West and East on the former lines; it will be an interest and a task of the new Europe.

The summit conference of the CSCE should also reach a view on the future structure of Europe. Should Europe develop on confederal lines and should this confederate order lead to the development of a federal Europe in the long term? President Mitterrand's call for a European confederation is an important and constructive

contribution. The CSCE summit can be the starting point for a new chapter in European history. This requires thorough preparation, which must begin soon; it requires the deepening and institutionalisation of the CSCE process.

I call upon all countries to appreciate the importance of this matter and constructively to prepare for the summit. Of all the changes now occurring in Europe, the chance of peace is the most important. For the sake of our generation and of future generations, let us seize this opportunity of shaping a world which will be a friendly association of free peoples and democratic states, in which humanity and brotherhood shall drive out hatred and enmity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. May I thank you on behalf of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union for your personal contribution to more stability and accountability and to confidence-building measures.

Would you be prepared to answer questions from the Assembly?...

Mr. GENSCHER (*Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I am hurrying, so to say, from Europe to Europe – that is, from here to the European meeting in Lisbon, but I think it will be important to answer questions. May we agree that I leave your meeting at 11.15? That will give us twenty-five minutes and I hope we can answer most of the questions in that time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – May we perhaps group the questions we put for you to answer them jointly? Could that be done? Many thanks.

I call Mr. Skubiszewski to make a statement.

Mr. SKUBISZEWSKI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland*). – I am not obsessed about the border question, but I should like to express my satisfaction that you, Minister, have referred expressly to the Oder-Neisse line. The general phraseology used hitherto was not always satisfactory and led to a lack of clarity in our relations. Not between you and me, but between others. I wish to repeat, Mr. President, what I said yesterday in this august Assembly, namely that Poland is very interested in close co-operation with united Germany. Germany and Poland shared and still share a common destiny. Now we have to create a community of interests and together embody the unity of Europe.

Like you, Minister, I too hope that we shall together open up the European vision of which you have spoken so convincingly. I am convinced that not only Germany but all of Europe



*Mr. Skubiszewski (continued)*

as well needs a strong and independent Poland between Germany and Soviet Russia. What you said about the CSCE process is especially important. I wish the German people every success on its road to unification and unified statehood.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does Mr. Genscher wish to answer the declaration by Mr. Skubiszewski?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to express my thanks for my Polish colleague's remarks about the desire of Germans to live in a single state. After all that has happened in history, everybody will understand what that means to Germans, coming from a Pole. And I should like to add a hope to his words – the hope that we can create a Europe in which Germans no longer have the feeling that they live between Poles and Frenchmen, and Poles no longer have the feeling that they live between Germans and Russians, and Spaniards no longer have the feeling that they live between Portugal and France, but that we all feel that as Europeans we are at home in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the questions be grouped and I shall then invite Mr. Genscher to give a collective answer to the Assembly's questions.

I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, we talked about various European co-operative organisations yesterday and about their geographical range and political substance. Mr. Pontillon spoke of pan-Europe, but there is no real co-operation among the various European co-operative organisations, between the Twenty-three, the Twelve, the Nine and so on.

Does the Minister share my view that current developments entail a serious risk of cultural as well as political nationalism in Europe, that this nationalism is being discovered like a gap in the market of united Europe, and does he share my view that the time has come for a fresh initiative to be taken to consider at what time the various European co-operative organisations can cover the same geographical area and be so structured as to be more closely linked politically?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – A few weeks ago David Owen, a former British Foreign Minister, made a suggestion that might possibly make it more acceptable to the Soviet Union for a second Germany to remain within the western alliances.

His proposal was that, although Germany should remain a member of the alliances, it should leave the integrated military structure and the maintenance of American troops west of the present demarcation line should be governed by a bilateral agreement between Germany and the United States. He further proposed that the troops of other countries within WEU should remain on German soil on a reciprocal basis, with German troops correspondingly present on the territory of other WEU member countries. This proposal is of interest to us here in Western European Union. How do you view it?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – The Minister spoke at length on the problems of disarmament and the prospects of the CSCE. Clearly the new European architecture must include a European security wing in view of the weakening of the pacts, the withdrawal of Soviet troops in the East and reductions in American troops in the West. What rôle do you attribute to Europeans and in which framework do you think a strictly European security pillar is possible? In other words, should the alliance be Europeanised instead of dis-Europeanised and, in that context, how do you see WEU which, emerging at last from its long hibernation, might perhaps play a certain rôle? Again, outside WEU, can you see a western strategy and command structure to avoid Europe being a dangerous vacuum subject to outside influences?

My second question is very short. What is your opinion of the serious events which have been occurring in Lithuania for the last two days, how do you see this situation and how should one react in view of the dangers of confrontation?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On the question of unification, the Federal Republic has a very strong economic position. May we take it that the whole cost of unification will be met by the Federal Republic and that there will be no call on any other state in Europe to bear a financial burden and if not, why not?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before inviting you to answer, Mr. Genscher, I wish to welcome the presence of Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.

I call Mr. Genscher.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I will begin with the last question, because it is obviously about money. It seems to me that all the discussion about Europe, whether relating to military, economic or political

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

matters, is rather hampered by the constraints of outmoded thinking. People talk about what is going to happen in the European Community, how the Germans and the Spaniards and the British and the French are getting on in it. Do we not want to create a single internal market? At least, I thought so. Do we not want to create an economic and monetary union? I thought we did. So where are the interests that could be defined in terms of today's national state boundaries? Shall we not be talking about regions, adapting transnational structures? Shall we not be talking about ecological questions, about differing intensities of investment in different parts of Europe? In other words, the question whether, as it were, German reunification will be paid for by the Germans?

I might turn the question round. Does Britain want to gain from German reunification or does it not? I can tell you in advance that the unification of Germany with the present territory of the GDR will become the growth area in the European Community. Investors will be competing to invest in the GDR. So I would hesitate to ask whether there will be participation. Of course we shall bear these burdens when it comes to creating the monetary, economic and social unity of Germany. In fact, we do not regard it as a burden, rather as a gain, and we know that in the long term it will be a gain not only for the Germans in the GDR and the Germans in the Federal Republic, but for the whole European Community. So cost is the last aspect of the question of unification I would consider. Of course there will be costs to be borne.

Now I should like to deal with the possible cultural questions, the nationalisms that might surface and the task of the organisations that are in Europe. I think it is very creditable that in the Europe of the past many organisations of the most varied kinds – I am a guest of one of them today – have striven to promote and strengthen the European idea and to create structures, at least for those parts of Europe in which that could be done by the free decision of the peoples, their parliaments and governments. Now we shall have to set about bringing these organisations into some kind of harmony.

I forecast that the European Community will be one of the most important elements in that structure. And the European Community must be open to accept new members; I say that in full awareness of the fact that there will be others who see things differently. We cannot build an economic iron curtain across Europe; the European Community must be open to the accession of European democracies which are in a position to join, otherwise there would be a question mark over its name and its definition,

for it is called the European Community, not just the West European Community. That was the intention.

Furthermore, we shall have to pay much attention to the CSCE process, which I regard as the major pan-European framework for stability. It is in nobody's interest for a balkanisation of relationships between states to come about in parts of Europe. Nobody can wish us to regress to the 1913 era in Europe or parts of Europe; on the contrary, we must pursue European co-operation and retain what should be retained. So we have to extend and develop; and for that there is only one framework covering the whole of Europe – the CSCE framework. I repeat, we must now school ourselves to transcend West-East thinking – which was always a political concept, not a geographical one. And if now Central and Eastern Europe become democracies, the ideological reason for this partial understanding of Europe has disappeared, as has the power-political reason if disarmament is carried through. So let us proceed to create one Europe with the summit conference in the autumn – the CSCE summit conference.

I now come to the weakening of the alliances and to the question who should do what – the question of a European command structure. I believe that the western alliance has proved its worth as a structure. I would not say that the western alliance is weakening. Only somebody who has regarded the alliance as a purely military organisation could believe that its rôle was diminishing. Such reasoning would lead to the logically correct but factually incorrect conclusion that the more soldiers the alliance has the stronger it is, and vice versa. Rightly understood, however, the task of the alliance was to guarantee peace in Europe; that is what I have thought, and therefore we have always said that a defence capability, armaments control and disarmament were integral components of our alliance. Both of them! So the alliance cannot be said to be weakening when a greater degree of security is being brought about in Europe through a comprehensive process of disarmament. On the contrary it is becoming stronger, because it is able to fulfil its purpose of making peace secure even better than in the past. In other words, if the alliance plays a stronger part in the disarmament process, a more political rôle, it is playing a more significant part. And strength is not only military strength, it is economic strength, political strength, but pre-eminently in this tormented continent the peace-building power of organisation. That is how I would judge it. What does it do towards securing peace, democracy and freedom? That is the criterion of its power and importance.

Now I come to what my friend David Owen said. I have often thought about that during the

*Mr. Genscher (continued)*

last few days, because I was in Windhoek for Namibia's independence celebrations and he was a member of the contact group which drafted Resolution 435. I recalled our visit to Windhoek, attended then by David Owen in his capacity as Foreign Minister, and we had to engage in difficult discussions, for it was no easy matter. One thing I learned from that process that we can carry over to Europe, namely that confidence-building is the starting point for any attempt to legislate for the future. And confidence-building was an important part of the peace process. Now I come to his proposals. I believe the integration of the armed forces of the Federal German Republic into the western alliance to be an important stabilising factor in Europe. Therefore I should not wish to advocate disintegration, for I think that the integration of the German armed forces, after all that has gone before, represents an important confidence-building measure for all our neighbours. Nor do I believe that the presence of American troops, which in my opinion will continue to be essential to stability in Europe, should be enshrined in a treaty between Germany and America. We Germans have always been against regarding the western alliance as a German-American alliance in which others also had a small part. The western alliance is by its very nature an alliance of North American and West European democracies and this nature should remain unaltered. David Owen floated the idea of reciprocal stationing and, if I have correctly understood or correctly read in the press, my esteemed Polish colleague yesterday put forward similar ideas for certain parts of Europe.

Such questions merit consideration, but this is not primarily a question to us Germans; we pass it on to others. What we do not want is a special status for ourselves. We do not want the special status of neutralisation, nor do we want an opposite status.

I believe our thoughts must be turned towards how the security interests of the Soviet Union are looked after. I am pleased that the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union are being discussed in a western forum, because that is a sign of new thinking. It was not always thus; I can remember discussions that were dominated by the analysis of threats, and the question as to the security interests of the other side was more likely to be misinterpreted as a weakening of western positions. I welcome the fact that we understand there can be security only when everybody is secure. Security gained at the expense of others is a false security. So it is right for us to consider how the security of the Soviet Union can be safeguarded in the light of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe. In my opinion the Soviet Union must first of all have a say in the matter and let us know what it thinks.

That will be the subject-matter of the talks we are to hold. I was talking to Mr. Shevardnadze about it yesterday in Windhoek.

May I just interject something here. What happened in Windhoek yesterday shows how quickly events are moving. If just one year ago somebody had prophesied that the Soviet and German Foreign Ministers would meet in Windhoek on the occasion of Namibia's independence to discuss matters arising from the reunification of Germany, he would have been discredited for three different reasons, and that shows how very dramatic have been the developments to which we have to accommodate ourselves. It shows the pace of events.

I believe it is still true that disarmament is at the heart of the unity of Europe and of Germany. It is a complete illusion to imagine that Europe's security problems can be solved co-operatively with such a high level of armaments as exists today. Therefore Vienna II must be both dimensionally and qualitatively a new kind of disarmament agreement, one that really creates defensive structures all over Europe. That will then make it easier to answer the question as to the security interests of all participants in the process of German unification, the countries affected by that process, including the Germans themselves. I repeat, the disarmament process is the nub of the unification of Europe and of Germany. And the CSCE process is the indispensable framework for future developments in Europe. We must achieve that during this year. It is a gigantic programme of work facing us this year, because in 1990 we have to work out the guidelines for future developments in Europe, and then we have to go to the summit meeting in the autumn and reach agreement on these guidelines. That is how I answer this question. And I believe that much that seems unthinkable to us now will then be just as thinkable as the fact that I was talking to Mr. Shevardnadze about German unity in Windhoek yesterday.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Genscher. This concludes a very interesting debate. You will always be very welcome to our Assembly, perhaps in June or later.

**4. Address by Mr. Falin,  
Director of the International Department  
of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,  
Member of the Committee  
of the Supreme Soviet responsible  
for international affairs**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Falin, Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of

*The President (continued)*

the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs.

I call Mr. Falin.

Mr. FALIN (*Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs*) (Translation). — Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, so that it is clear what we are talking about, I should like to speak in German, especially since it will make our interpreters' job easier as I do not wish to put them in the difficult situation of having to interpret from Russian into one set of languages and relay them into others.

I should like to thank you above all for allowing me to talk to you informally and I am very pleased to have had the opportunity over the last two days of hearing diverse opinions and a wealth of different ideas expressed, even though I may disagree with much of what has been said, as was to be expected. Yet such an experience prompts us to reflect further, to analyse the difficult subject at issue, to convince ourselves anew about where we stand because today's decisions will determine what sort of Europe and what sort of world we shall all be living in tomorrow, as well as the conditions governing our bilateral and multilateral relations with various countries not only in this but in other continents as well.

I think the words of Mr. Eyskens and President Goerens, the tenor of the report by Mr. Pontillon and the views of many speakers here have given us sufficient food for further thought although, in a number of respects, they reflect the old school of ideas so closely that I have to ponder on additional questions that occur to me. It is a pity Mr. Genscher is no longer here as I would have liked to thank him. Having heard what he had to say, I am given to understand that it has been a great mistake in Soviet foreign policy over the last forty years for us not to have considered NATO as a particularly friendly organisation with an impressive concern for our security as this could certainly have spared us, had we known it at the right time, a great deal of effort and energy. Unfortunately, in the words of an Armenian poet, reality and dreams do not coincide, the difference between them being that reality lasts longer than a dream.

As I am speaking in German, I should like to say that we are in fact talking about the German question in its full context. True, my thoughts expressed in German may sound slightly more factual and abrupt than they would in the soft tones of Russian. But because the hour of truth has struck, because this is not the time to

exchange pleasantries but to identify what is actually possible in everybody's interest and not just in the interest of any one party, what should be done, what has been neglected in past decades, what has today become not only possible as a result of the qualitative change in the situation but vitally important, because of all these things we must be clear as to why everything happened as it did, why we find ourselves in a Europe bristling with dozens of times the number of weapons as the other continents, and also because life has been particularly dangerous up till now.

I would point out that this is not the first time Europe has had the chance to alter the course of events so that a stable peace does not become a mere dream.

Current events, however, bear the hallmark of a new quality. Nations have acquired a genuine right, that of making their views known and their voices heard. Sometimes, and not infrequently, it is precisely such a right that determines the content and pace of processes. Yet one question, and a disturbing one at that, keeps bothering me. In the end, will the results suit the conditions as they should or, as has already happened on several occasions, will we again be unable to see the wood for the trees? Is there not a danger that in the final analysis economic considerations will win the day over long-term arrangements and be given preference?

Hegel once said that to understand a subject or concept properly, it had to be tackled from the opposite direction. Yesterday and today we have heard many flattering things about NATO and much about the shortcomings and mistakes of the Warsaw Pact. Hegel was certainly not thinking about opposites of this type. If we follow that philosopher's advice and try to establish whether there was an inherent link between NATO and the division of Germany, the situation does in fact take on another dimension. This will provide yet more food for thought and some questions, which would appear to belong to history, will prove to be of great topical significance even now, forty years on. Let me remind you of a few facts and ask you to consider them according to Hegel's philosophy.

It was close on forty years ago that ideas and initiatives such as these were envisaged: first, re-establishment of Germany as a single state within the boundaries decided in Potsdam; second, Germany's self-imposed obligation not to join any coalition or military alliance working against any state that had deployed its armed forces in the war against Hitler's Germany; third, withdrawal of all occupying troops no later than one year after the entry into force of the peace treaty, with an all-German government participating in the preparations; fourth, Germany to be allowed to have its own

*Mr. Falin (continued)*

national army, air force and navy as necessary for its defence; fifth, organisation of arms production in Germany to provide weapons for these forces; sixth, no restrictions of any kind on peacetime economy, trade, navigation and access to world markets; seventh, freedom of action for democratic parties and organisations; and, finally, eighth, equal rights of participation for all former members of the army and for Nazis, except war criminals, in the construction of a peace-loving, democratic Germany.

These conditions were repeated subsequently with considerable additions and changes. Two or three years later came the proposal to hold free elections. But all this was turned down. It did not reach the point of serious discussion in which opposing views might not have deviated so greatly. However, in itself this unhappy chapter is not of particular interest. What I am interested in is what the train of thought was and how the politicians, who had little trouble in convincing themselves, came to the conclusion that a dead end was the best solution.

Allow me to read out, from what were at the time secret documents, the major arguments that are sometimes invoked even today not only by the parties involved then but by contemporaries as well. In short, and I would repeat that these were not papers intended for the general public, it is clear that they were analyses done in foreign ministries and government departments, etc., in the West.

Up till 1953-55, the United States and the United Kingdom and France even more so were strongly opposed to a reunified Germany. A confidential Foreign Office memorandum of 22nd June 1953 reads:

“Germany is a key to peace in Europe. A divided Europe means a divided Germany. The reunification of Germany, if feasible, is a dangerous prospect for everyone as long as Europe remains divided. This is why we all, Dr. Adenauer, the Russians, the Americans, the French and we ourselves, feel at the bottom of our hearts that a divided Germany is safer for the time being but none of us dares say so openly because of the repercussions this would have on public opinion in Germany. That is why we all support the idea of a united Germany in public because of its own conditions.”

Such were the words used by Selwyn Lloyd, the former British Foreign Secretary, to try to restrain Churchill in the line he was taking on the German question regarding which he was trying to be less insular than he had been previously. In early 1953, Churchill was arguing – and this is important – that the West’s concept of the German question should be considered

anew. He was the first within NATO to recognise in public the Soviet Union’s security interests and he referred to the Treaty of Locarno as a possible way of reaching understanding. In so doing, he did not exclude the possibility of a neutral, unified Germany as part of an overall settlement. The Foreign Office’s reaction was a categorical and emphatic “NO”. This is an extract from its document:

“A neutralised Germany, which is what the Soviet Union would like to see, would signify a fundamental change in the policy applied by the allies since 1947. Our long-term objective, as it stands at present and to which Adenauer has also said he subscribes, i.e. to create a bond between the Federal Republic – and subsequently a reunified Germany – and the West is incompatible with what was decided in Potsdam and since then publicly rejected by us, of the four powers having control over a neutralised Germany. The price we would have to pay for solving the German problem quickly with the Soviet Union would be the renunciation of our policy.”

In the same document written by the British Foreign Secretary, there is a reference to other risks:

“All foreign troops would have to be withdrawn from Germany and all bases shut down. NATO would have to abandon its plans because they are based first on a forward defence strategy using German territory and secondly on a German contribution to such defence. The withdrawal of all American troops to France or the Netherlands, if not out of Europe altogether, would have unforeseeable consequences for the future of NATO. A neutralised Germany would no longer be able to take part in the West’s unification policy and, worse still, in the end a Germany that had not rearmed or had been neutralised would not be subject to the very considerable economic, financial, manpower and other defence-related pressures which would consequently weigh more heavily on the United Kingdom and its allies. German economic competitiveness, which is already a major problem, would become a serious and increasing danger. On balance, rearmament of the Federal Republic, its integration in Western Europe, the joint defence strategy and the European unification movement are important parts of a comprehensive policy. The other option would be for Germany to lean towards the Soviet Union.”

I do not want to waste your time and quote further from similar documents. One thing is clear: what prevailed all those years ago was not the balance of legitimate interests but, as Dulles put it, a balancing act on a knife edge between war and peace, i.e. a power policy which accounted for everything that happened and

*Mr. Falin (continued)*

gave rise to all the difficult circumstances that we, you and other countries have had to contend with in these dark decades of European history.

What I want to know is what weight do these considerations, recorded so starkly almost forty years ago in internal documents of official western ministries, carry today? From some of what I have heard, I must infer that the philosophy that prevailed at that time is still not entirely alien in some quarters today although certain aspects of it have become more flexible and are not described in such provocative terms as they were then.

Now we hear talk of Europe's willingness to take the Soviet Union's legitimate interests into consideration and even, and this is a great improvement, the absence of any Soviet danger. The accent now is on avoiding the dangers which, you may believe, are inherent in the neutralisation, the military neutralisation, of Germany. If that is how the formal logic, which has become inevitable, goes, then, if such dangers cannot be avoided, we should opt for a lesser evil, less secure for the West and more secure for the Soviet Union. Today's copy of *Die Welt* has an interview with the German Federal President, Richard von Weizsäcker. At one point in answer to a question, he says very seriously:

"Without being dramatic, I would say that for the German people this comprehensive European security process is indivisibly bound up with our achieving unity as a state. The two things succeed together or not at all."

I can certainly go along with that last comment and would probably add something else the President said:

"The idea of bringing Germany into NATO must not be based on justified concern about misguided German ideas of going it alone, in other words there must be no doubt whatsoever about German predictability. It is the United States and the Soviet Union that are the main framework for the new security and co-operation arrangements and we Germans must show that a united Germany is the result and first direct proof of a changed system."

The Soviet Union's attitude on the question of reunification is very clear. We are in favour of settling the German issue once and for all, not tomorrow or the day after tomorrow but today. However, like a coin, there are two sides to the problem. The Germans must decide for themselves what type of state a united Germany is to be. They cannot avoid the issue and must fully respect the interests and rights of other countries. They must not bow to the temptation to present the community of nations with a fait accompli, for to do so in the modern world

would amount to the German nation running amok.

It is said, and we have heard it said today, that the Germans and Germany should not be placed in a special situation. I fully agree. And yet the German nation and the two German states actually are in a special situation. Do not let us forget that there is still no peace treaty and, as long as this is the case, the rights and obligations of the four powers are valid under international law. As long as there is no peace treaty, the Germans' right to self-determination is somewhat restricted. If the situation were not so, it would not conform to the law. In our view there should be a peace treaty. Without one, it would be virtually impossible to consider the second world war over and done with, and that is necessary, and it would also probably prove extremely difficult to do the same for the cold war, which in our opinion is one of the most important tasks.

Moreover, since the war we have created various provisional structures over the last forty or so years. Now we are at last faced with the task of thinking about building a durable – as far as anything in life can be durable – but in any case a long-term structure, providing greater security for us, for you and for Europe as a whole. Would it be possible, on the basis of the customary considerations, to set goals for achieving results? Do you not see a discrepancy between what is objective fact – the reality – and the arguments developed by politicians in order to circumvent reality again? What do I mean by that?

You and we know very well that the last war in Europe finished a long time ago. Another war in Europe, irrespective of whether conventional or nuclear weapons were used, would mean the end of Europe, for ever. If war is impossible, then why, I ask you, do we need so many weapons in Europe and dozens the number of weapons in Germany as is the case today? Against whom are these weapons to be deployed?

Back in the last century Bismarck said that one penny spent on an unused army was a waste of money. Today for an unused army, indeed for many unused armies, we are paying not just pennies but thousands of millions every year. What for? If these national defence arrangements have been overtaken by events, if all international defence structures are not allowed to and cannot play the rôle they probably played previously, then we can legitimately ask whether we could not perhaps live without them and replace them with pan-European systems in which the interests of each country, irrespective of its size, would be treated equally.

It is our view, and I think I can prove to you beyond any doubt, that in spite of what has been said here today, the division of Germany was

*Mr. Falin (continued)*

due to military considerations and we do not think that weapons arrived in Europe only after political confrontations following which the great powers were unable to find a common language. But let us reflect on this and ask ourselves: what is NATO? Is it a European organisation only or something more? Is it part of the balance of European power, of European interests or of international interests as a whole? If you are honest with yourselves, then you will answer this by saying that changes and movements in this respect would lead to shifts in the global balance of power, and the Soviet Union cannot ignore that.

Indeed, we put down proposals a long time ago and long before the dynamic events we are witnessing. Our proposal thirty or more years ago was that if we agreed to disband all blocs, we could set up a pan-European defence organisation. At that time this proved impossible. I agree that the necessary conditions were probably lacking. But now, when we are trying to separate what happened from what is to happen, it is probably better to look forward not back, develop more new ideas and try to come up with an arrangement that is not a gift or a guarantee from NATO as regards our security interests.

We shall not disregard your defence rights. Looking at things the other way round, why are you not in favour of a unified Germany becoming a member of the Warsaw Pact and giving guarantees to countries that belong to NATO? This would be no worse. You would regard that as totally unacceptable and when the matter is looked at from that angle, you can understand why we too are concerned.

If what we want is to allay concern that a unified Germany, a powerful state with powerful capabilities, will not pose a threat or make life uncomfortable for anyone, then could you explain to me why it is necessary, in a united Germany, to station nuclear weapons on the territory of what is currently the Federal Republic? Are you prepared to use these weapons against the Germans if they do not behave as you expect them to do? If we are not perfectly clear about all this and do not lay all our cards on the table, we shall continue to play the same old game and will not have the mutual understanding necessary for arriving at the best solution.

I can see that this is hardly possible to achieve overnight and that fairly lengthy transitional phases will most likely be necessary. Technical disarmament in Europe will take at least three to five years followed by a similar period for reshaping NATO and the Warsaw Pact and bringing the two organisations and their structures closer together. About the same time will also be needed to set up a new pan-European

defence organisation and new authorities but we must decide on a common objective towards which our own and your policies are to be directed. If we move closer to one another on ideas such as this, we shall be able to overcome much of the past as well as the present difficulties and we shall be in a position to ward off the dangers that might be threatening even now.

What is meant by the neutralisation of Germany? I should like to stress in particular that the issue is not about obtaining any special conditions for Germany or about its political and economic neutralisation. The only thing that matters is what was stipulated at Potsdam, namely that no new danger must be allowed to threaten other countries from German territory regardless of whether such danger stems from the Germans themselves or from other nations. No more, no less. Do you find that unacceptable? Is it unacceptable for non-European countries? If we really believe what we are saying, I think we are in a position to reach understanding on this point.

And something else – if we are thinking about setting up a pan-European defence system and if such a collective security arrangement is preferable to present arrangements, it would probably be a good idea for the two Germanys to set an example by showing how this matter can be resolved and what steps can be envisaged to that end. It is being realistic to suggest that Germany provide the impetus for a positive, creative and constructive continental development as it would mean that the attitude of all countries towards the Germans would be one of gratitude alone, leaving – I am sure – no room for suspicion and fears. This would not be discrimination against Germany but merely a sign of our confidence, our willingness to count on it during the process of change. I can for instance envisage that, on the basis of the German example, verification procedures could be completed and subsequently applied throughout the continent. Similarly, the Germans will apply verification procedures to us and, as we see it, it will probably be necessary for some such procedures to be applied not only to Germany but to other European countries as well.

Finally, the Soviet Union has made a considerable contribution to making the current changes in Europe possible. It has done everything to ensure that each country in Central and Eastern Europe exercises its right to make a choice according to its national character and historical traditions. It is our actions not our words that have demonstrated that we are willing to see a fresh start, a better Europe and a better world. But we also believe that co-operation between partners and mutual respect of the fundamental interests of all parties constitute the only possible way forward if we are to attain our objective, because the time for trial and error is over and none of us in Europe

*Mr. Falin (continued)*

and the rest of the world can afford to make any more mistakes.

I am sure that the opinions occasionally voiced here, according to which the Soviet Union's situation is such that it cannot exercise its rights and fulfil its obligations, are not seriously held views. They are in part provocative comments which should get no better answer than they deserve. One thing is clear: we consider ourselves to be part of Europe and would not want to be excluded from the processes which we ourselves, as I have said, have motivated and to which we have made such a huge contribution, only to become mere statistics as some politicians in certain quarters would wish. In fact that would be impossible. Yesterday it was stressed several times that the Soviet Union will remain an objective and influential party in international relations. The Soviet Union will do all it can to help find a constructive solution to all the problems facing Europe and the rest of the world. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Lentz-Cornette to put a question to Mr. Falin.

Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I should like to ask a question, Mr. Falin. You just said that the Soviet Union has demonstrated that it acknowledges the right of every nation to find and determine its own way. Mr. Gorbachev has often said that he is in favour of the right of self-determination for nations, and we are seeing what has been happening in the East. He has also said that an additional protocol regarding the Baltic states – an additional protocol to the Hitler-Stalin pact – was a mistake, if I remember correctly.

On 12th March I attended the opening of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, and I was surprised to hear Mr. Gorbachev say “I am alarmed”, according to the French translation, or “frightened”, in English, about the news he was receiving from Lithuania. I should like to ask you how it can be that we read every day on the front pages of our newspapers that Lithuania is exposed to threats, and that there are troop movements there. For us, and for all the countries represented here, the Baltic states have remained independent states for the last fifty years. How do you see events developing? Will Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as indicated by elections freely held there, also obtain independence and be able to realise their dream, which here and there is longer than life? You said earlier that dreams did not last as long as life; I think that the dream of freedom in the Baltic states is a long dream which has outlasted many lives.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Falin.

Mr. FALIN (*Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs*) (Translation). – I believe, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, that a distinction has to be made between international relations and internal affairs in any country. If that is so, several models are needed in order to settle problems that have arisen, and in the case of the Baltic states in the Soviet Union the procedures that prevail in our domestic affairs, or the laws that are being drafted, should be used.

It is stated in our constitution that every nation in the Soviet Union has the right to regulate its life on the basis of self-determination, and if it so wishes, to leave the federation. This choice has to be made in proper legal form and not in the way that many politicians and many populists in the Soviet Union are trying to do it. To effect it, many questions have to be solved and above all the true opinion of the majority has to be ascertained. Under the law that will be passed in the next few weeks it is provided that a referendum has to be held in any state that proposes to secede from the Soviet Union, and if a qualified majority, i.e. two thirds, votes for it, the secession procedure is initiated. During this process all the questions have to be settled, economic questions, defence questions, questions of a demographic nature and others, because the republics concerned were an integral part of the Soviet Union. The links in the various sectors are very strong and intensive. I do not know what will be the final decision in Lithuania.

The Sajudis, which is initiating these events in Lithuania, received 31 % of the vote at the last elections. And Sajudis is against a referendum, the opinion of the people has been ascertained through these elections and no further surveys or referenda are needed. The unfortunate fact is that through various manipulations of the votes, through cheating in polling districts, 31 % of the votes gave the Sajudis the majority in the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic. But that is no substitute for these procedures.

You should also bear in mind how Lithuania gained its independence at the time. This happened during the first world war in an agreement between the occupation troops of the German Reich and persons chosen and appointed by that Reich. It took place before the October revolution. This document was drawn up in 1915 and signed in September 1917, that is before the October revolution, and all documents that in 1918 and thereafter regulated questions of independence were based on these agreements between the High Command of the German Reich and this group of Lithuanian separatists. This and other agreements stipulated that Lithuania should be separated from Russia and should become a protectorate of the



*Mr. Falin (continued)*

German Reich and should perform military, economic and other services for the Reich.

At that time, as you know, there was a Brest-Litovsk peace treaty signed between us and the Germans, and the Germans compelled us to recognise this independence in that treaty. Later on the treaty was cancelled, after the November 1918 revolution in Germany, but some remnants of these arrangements remained, because there were German troops on the territories of these three republics until 1920. Even after that, the German troops were still there on the orders of the allies, i.e. Great Britain, France and the United States carried out their own special tasks there. And if you do not take that into account, you will not have an accurate view of what it was and will be about.

Finally, let me say that we lived through the year 1939. That was indeed a glorious chapter in our diplomacy and our politics as regards secret protocols. The language in which those protocols were couched was not peculiar to Russia; it was an imperialistic language adopted by Germany then, but there was no *de jure* connection between the contents of these protocols and the events of the year 1940 when these three republics became members of the Soviet Union. Indeed, after these republics had been incorporated into the Soviet Union, Hitler pondered whether to declare war on the Soviet Union in 1940. And this was just the pretext he wanted to use for war. There are authentic documents proving this.

I do not want to delve further into history, I would only say this: national questions like this have to be handled skilfully, and I can assure you that President Gorbachev and the government bring a large fund of goodwill to the matter, and we shall do everything in our power to avoid complications, but we too need goodwill from the politicians in Lithuania who are now taking unlawful decisions and are harming the security and other interests of the Soviet Union as a whole.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Falin, as a historian who has studied very intensively the history of international relations, and particularly those between Germany and Soviet Russia in the present century, I was of course very interested to hear what you said about Soviet efforts to bring about a restoration of German unity. I do not wish to go into detail about this; I would only add to Mr. Genscher's remarks that the dispute between West and East was not only a conflict of power policy but of course also a deep ideological one.

I am bound to add that concepts such as the restoration of a democratic, peaceful Germany are viewed with a degree of scepticism, because under Stalin – and not only in the decades after 1945 – a murderous conflict was waged with what was known as social democracy with the result that after 1945 the social democratic parties were suppressed in most East European countries. This was not only the work of the national communist parties locally, but precisely because of the fact that the Red Army had occupied those territories, and this is what caused the distrust.

If we lay our cards, historically as well, on the table, we cannot deny this. And there is something else too, connected with our present-day problems. The western powers, France, the Benelux countries and other countries in Western Europe, have also learned the lessons of the interwar period, that this Germany is not to be neutralised – irrespective of whether it is just the Federal Republic or a united Germany, so that it is not tempted to repeat the policy of the interwar period, right up to Rapallo. Proposals made by the social democrats in the 1950s had to take account of this point. We proposed a European security system then, long before the Soviet Union, a system to include all parts of Europe, and in which the reunited Germany should be embedded. So much by way of preamble.

Now to my question: since we still uphold this position and take the view that in the long run a common Europe must not be built without or against the Soviet Union, we naturally have to ask whether in practice we can integrate the Soviet Union to the Urals and beyond as far as Vladivostok, or how should integration of the Soviet Union in the different areas – I am now speaking of the long term – be effected? How do Soviet policymakers themselves see their membership of Europe? Should this be confined to the western republics, and does not this presuppose a true federalisation of the Soviet Union itself, not only at state level but on the level of political powers and social powers? That is my question.

Mr. FALIN (*Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs*) (Translation). – This is a question which is perhaps not altogether a question. I would reply as follows: first, as regards your observation about social democracy, there is material for a lengthy discussion, into which I do not wish to enter just now.

As regards your second observation as to how far the Soviet Union can be integrated into the European economic system, I note that you here in Europe already cook your meals with natural

*Mr. Falin (continued)*

gas from Siberia, and that is one sign of such economic integration. The Soviet Union as a unitary structure, especially in the economic sense, does not go as far as the Urals and then continue in another fashion beyond the Urals. Everything goes on in a more or less homogeneous way, and I hope that we are not the only ones who think there can be increased co-operation in the interest of all, and a more efficient usage of the natural resources here in Europe and in Asia, which would also be environmentally beneficial to Europe.

We think it not only possible but very desirable. It must, however, be remembered that such co-operation also requires large capital investments, because it costs approximately twice as much to build a house in Moscow as in Paris and, owing to climatic conditions, three times as much in Yakutsk as in Moscow. Consequently, much of what we produce in the East is more expensive from the outset than under better climatic conditions, say anywhere in Europe, Africa or Latin America. But we do it for ourselves. We are prepared to be less egoistic in this sphere as well. If there is economics-driven interest here in the West, that could be discussed on a basis of partnership, and I am sure that, once we have overcome our present problems, we shall be much more open to such desirable prospects than ever before.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Büchner.

Mr. BÜCHNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – You were right to ask, Mr. Falin, what have weapons and armies to do in Europe, now that there can be no more war, because that would be the end of our continent. You also said that if this realisation were to be translated into action, the mechanics of disarmament alone would take some three to five years, and the same period would be needed for restructuring the two pacts; and it would undoubtedly take just as long to build up an order of security in Europe. I also well understand the great emphasis you laid on the responsibility of the Four for the whole of Germany, and you called for a peace treaty that would finally draw a line under the past.

Well, elections were held in the GDR last Sunday, and whatever conclusions are drawn from the results of those elections there can surely be no doubt that most people there earnestly desire to see Germany reunited as soon as possible. So should the government that is formed following these elections take the decision on reunification, or should the Länder that are to be reconstituted later on in the GDR take that decision or should the two German states do so in a separate process? What validity

would such a decision have for the Soviet Union? And, Mr. Falin, how would such a decision relate to your call for a peace treaty? Do you consider a peace treaty to be the indispensable precondition of German unity or can German unity be consummated before a peace treaty is concluded?

Mr. FALIN (*Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs*) (Translation). – I believe we have here more apparent contradictions. As we understand the situation, there is a will to unite the two German states, as was again evidenced by the elections on 18th March. We recognise this will, and we approve these processes. We are in favour of voting in this meeting of the two plus four on the consequences that arise for the forms and content of this reunification, and our decisions are to be taken into account by the two German states in order that the legitimate interests of the other nations are not disregarded or neglected. I am sure that this two plus four instrument provides such an opportunity, that everything that happens is properly synchronised, and that we can formulate principles which can later be enshrined in a peace treaty which, as far as the Germans are concerned, will be signed by a government of all the Germans.

As regards frontier questions, these should be incorporated into a peace treaty, and not only the German-Polish frontier, but all the frontiers. As regards such obligations as the renunciation of ABC weapons, there are still a few important points which should receive legitimation in such a treaty, not in the conventional manner but in the light of the facts, and only then will the Soviet Union be prepared to renounce its rights which, I repeat, until today remain valid in international law.

I would particularly emphasise that we in the Soviet Union do not regard such a peace treaty with Germany as a document of the traditional kind, which punishes the loser in a war. That is not our intention. We understand such a peace as truly an invitation to a fresh start with qualitatively new relationships and therefore, as these words imply, the treaty should not discriminate against Germany or offend the feelings of the German nation. It should be a document for the distant future, a basis for co-operative, equal, good-neighbourly relations between Germans, the Soviet Union and other nations in Europe. That is the idea. Therefore the very expression "peace treaty", traditional though it may sound, should not be confused with our position. We understand that, in the forty-five years that have elapsed since the end of the war, many things have changed and this should be taken into account.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Falin. This concludes a very interesting debate.

**5. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1216 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee on the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe, Document 1216 and amendments.

We still have to hear one speaker on the report by Mr. Pontillon and the Secretary-General of WEU wishes to make a brief declaration. At the conclusion of the debate, we have to examine 18 amendments and I feel that it will not therefore be possible to terminate our session this morning as many members would wish. However, I believe the Chairman of the committee wishes to make a proposal.

I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I first on behalf of the committee thank the Rapporteur and the secretariat very warmly for producing this difficult report. The main difficulty was that events backstage were often developing more quickly than those on stage and hence we were not able to hold our final meeting until 12th March. Because of that, we have received a whole host of amendments, some as recently as yesterday morning, and for that reason I am unable to give you the committee's recommendations on the individual amendments. I would therefore propose, Mr. President, that those who have tabled amendments should agree to withdraw them and that we treat them as green papers and revert to them at the earliest opportunity. Events are in such a flux that in my opinion we would not help matters by voting on these amendments this afternoon, piecemeal at breakneck speed, with what majorities and which participants I know not.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, since I together with others, especially members of the German group, am the author of a number of these amendments and, as Sir Geoffrey Finsberg said yesterday during the debate, we are still at the

green paper stage, that is to say, in a situation in which many proposals have to be discussed simultaneously and nobody should insist dogmatically upon a proposal, for instance about pan-European security structures, I believe we should pass these amendments on to the Political Committee as material for further discussion, and apart from that put the draft recommendation, as passed by the Political Committee, unchanged to the vote here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Soell. Do you intend to maintain your amendments if other authors of amendments refuse to withdraw them?

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – On condition that other people withdraw their amendments as well, I am prepared to do so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the view of the authors of the other amendments?

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I accept Mr. Ahrens's proposal to withdraw the amendments provided everyone does likewise.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – If I have understood what Mr. Ahrens has said, he found that there has been no consultation with the bureau of the committee, which would have been the courteous thing, and that it is most unusual not to do so. What I want to make clear is that Mr. Soell actually misquoted me. I was not saying we should treat this document as a green paper. What I would suggest is that I support what Mr. Ahrens has said, together with what Mr. Soell said, that, if all the amendments are withdrawn, we may then put the report with its recommendation to the vote without the amendments and then there can be a second document in due course.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – The terms green paper and white paper were introduced here yesterday. From the last discussion I conclude that this has again given rise to a misunderstanding. May I ask you the following question in my own words, without using these terms? Amendments have been tabled. They were to have been put to the Assembly at 3 o'clock this afternoon. It is news to me that the sitting is not to continue at 3 o'clock. But that, it seems, is what has been agreed. You obviously intend to close the sitting now. And that means the amendments will not be discussed, partly because they have not been considered by the Political Committee. My objection to this is that this Assembly will be approving a document which might have been

*Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)*

open to at least some comments and some changes. Am I to understand from your proposal that, even if the document is approved by the Assembly, it will nonetheless be reconsidered by the Political Committee and that the amendments which have been tabled will then be taken into account?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think there is some misunderstanding. The document to be voted upon today will be a Western European Union document and if I understand correctly the proposals just made, this report will be brought up to date in another report later. I believe this is a wise proposal in view of the present evolution. If I called Mr. Ahrens to make this proposal, it is because I am responsible for organising the work and if the authors of the amendments are prepared to withdraw them it would allow me to close the session at the end of this morning. If the amendments are withdrawn, therefore, they will not have to be debated. I have not yet received Mr. De Decker's agreement, but I will ask for his opinion as soon as he comes into the chamber. In the meantime, I propose that the debate be continued.

I call Mr. Malfatti.

Mr. MALFATTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to thank Mr. Pontillon for his hard work.

Ladies and gentlemen, it would be paradoxical for anyone to conceive the European order that we all want to establish as an opportunity for the delayed implementation of Stalin's policy of the fifties, that is the neutralisation and not the reunification of Germany – or for the final application in practice of one of the silliest political slogans we ever heard in the past – “Yankees go home”.

Instead, the real problem is to use every opportunity offered by the extraordinary times in which we are living, following the end of the cold war and the division of Europe, to take serious action to build a better pan-European order to be achieved by dialogue and collaboration and not world confrontation. The opportunity is now here thanks in large measure to the brave political decisions taken by Mr. Gorbachev and the ending of the dictatorial régimes now in progress in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the few minutes available to me, I wish to stress the importance, at an early date, of further force reductions to the lowest possible level on both sides and to emphasise the strictly defensive nature of the forces deployed on either side – defensive defence as Mr. Eyskens said yesterday, with the appropriate addition of

defensive deterrence. We attach great importance to the negotiations on arms reductions and on further confidence-building measures and therefore to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and its follow-up, as the best place for enlarging, as we would like, all areas of co-operation between European countries and for negotiations on further force reductions. That conference, with the United States and Canada taking a full part, endorses the principle that for the foreseeable future an American presence, including armed forces, will be needed in Europe in order to maintain the balance.

As my third point, I should like to emphasise that there is no equivalence and can therefore be no parallel between the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance, so that it is untrue that the dissolution of the pact involves the disappearance of the alliance. I would add that the mistaken theory of parallelism limits to some extent the full freedom of judgment and action, which are the sole responsibility and free choice of the individual countries belonging to each alliance.

I think we all agree that the Atlantic Alliance, including unified Germany, is no obstacle at all to the creation of the new European order and is not contrary to the legitimate security needs of all European countries and first of all the Soviet Union. In my view, therefore, the rôle of the alliance in the present circumstances is not of an interim or transitional nature and I consider in fact that such ideas may give doubts among our peoples.

Moreover, we must in future be very careful not to further what I would look upon as the completely negative process of renationalising our military and security policies. The new European order is not an alternative to the alliance, nor is WEU, whose reactivation is still on the agenda. As for the European Community, it must strengthen its political dimension in the next few months. In the present circumstances, stagnation or any move back would be a disaster for everyone. And, finally, this stronger Community must open its doors for more vigorous and friendly collaboration with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that deserve our fullest support of which I should like to assure our German colleagues in the warmest terms at a time, started by the crumbling of the Berlin wall, of such significance for the history of Germany and Europe as a whole.

(*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Malfatti.

The next speaker is Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Recent events in Central Europe induced the

*Mr. Fourré (continued)*

West to reassess its co-operation and ponder on its responsibility. From this point of view, the Pontillon report comes at an appropriate time to examine together what can be done in the near future to meet the requirements created by this transformation. The examination, country by country, of this evolution in Central and Eastern Europe offers much hope for the future but also fears. For instance, the progress of these countries towards democracy must not make us forget the danger of local conflicts attributable mainly to nationalist movements. Above all, we must respond with specific solutions to create a new peaceful and secure order in Europe.

I believe this new European order must first be established on the need to maintain the alliances. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are still indispensable instruments for maintaining shared security, the corollary of which is the maintenance of a minimum threshold of security and deterrence. The maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance is still necessary today. Indeed, the alliance is a framework for negotiations on disarmament and security in Europe and on confidence-building measures. Above all, this new European order must be based on the strengthening of WEU.

Mr. Baker's proposal to extend the alliance action to political matters overlooks the fact that the Council of Europe or WEU would be in a better position to pursue this action, at least in certain fields. WEU has a rôle to play where the alliance's action is insufficient, in the Mediterranean, and for co-ordinating the action of member states outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. WEU has a rôle to play in verification. WEU is the only European organisation that can draw on the unique experience of its Agency for the Control of Armaments to secure the participation of the member states: data bank, processing of data, training of inspectors and, possibly, the use of satellites.

The Belgian proposal to create an early warning system in the event of emergencies linking the countries of Western and Eastern Europe must also be examined in this framework. WEU must respond to developments and new requirements and try to anticipate them by constant exchanges of views between its members.

In agreement with NATO, WEU must explain its position on possible requests to join made by truly democratic and independent countries of the East. Proposals may also be made to these countries since it is particularly important to integrate them in an international order at a time when, in the teeth of serious economic and political problems, they are at risk of reverting to dangerous nationalist positions. They can also

be associated with think-tanks examining the disarmament process and also new strategic data, verification, etc. WEU thus appears to be the only European body to examine defence matters. It is also normal for it to assume responsibilities vis-à-vis the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

On the question of the German Democratic Republic being reunited with the Federal Republic of Germany, the neutrality solution would raise major difficulties for the disarmament process. What solution then for this reunified Germany to reconcile its western solidarity, the necessary maintenance of the alliances and the strong expression of its people in favour of a position of neutrality? Several ideas have been put forward this morning. I would add one: as a first stage would it not be possible for reunified Germany to have a status similar to that of France, member of WEU and of the alliance, but not part of the NATO integrated command structure? This is the question I raise. The rôle of WEU in the verification process is to be reaffirmed. The proposed European satellite agency is also to be discussed in Rome. I am happy that my proposal will be part of a discussion on the verification of armaments. That may also be a means of introducing confidence-building measures and special measures of co-operation with the countries of the East which have shown proof of democratic progress in the western sense of the term.

In this way, Mr. President, in parallel with promoting confederation, WEU would play its rôle of opening to other European countries to strengthen co-operation in the same way as the Council of Europe would affirm its rôle of parliament for this European confederation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Fourré.

May I inform the Assembly that Mr. De Decker has agreed to withdraw his amendment so all the amendments will now not be taken?

The next speaker is Mr. Mezzapesa.

Mr. MEZZAPESA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Pontillon has produced an excellent report, which takes a detailed overall look at the new situation created in Europe by the startling changes in the East. Without the understandable emotion of the first days and without the quite legitimate expression of satisfaction by European democrats who have witnessed a swift succession of events resulting in moves towards democracy in countries so long under the heel of tyrannical régimes, the report, for which I too would like to thank Mr. Pontillon, helps us to take a very careful look at the radical changes now taking place, because it cannot yet be said that everything is clear, as some of this morning's speeches have shown.

*Mr. Mezzapesa (continued)*

Mr. Pontillon is right in saying that there are still many uncertainties about the future and about the stability of the eastern countries, although it cannot be denied that a clearly democratic and pluralistic tendency is gathering strength as confirmed by events after the drafting of the report, such as the very recent elections in East Germany.

The point to be stressed above all is that the main significance of the amazing changes in the East is that Europe has regained its central position, as has been recognised by many speakers, starting with Mr. Genscher.

The lure of a united Europe created the basic conditions for the changes, and encouraged them to a pace faster than even the greatest optimists could have imagined. It is clearly our duty to ensure that this attraction continues to act as a positive force.

Basically, it is the Europe of Helsinki which is producing its effects because Helsinki was the turning point towards a new overall European policy which gives equal importance to human rights, which are the cornerstone of the Council of Europe's political action, economic co-operation, which is the special province of the Community, and military security, which is the basic concern of our WEU. Helsinki saw the emergence and consolidation of the idea that, beyond geographical confines, the United States and Canada are also Europe, so that the presence of 300 000 American soldiers on European soil no longer means, as it did after the war, the presence of foreign occupiers but of troops doing the same job as European troops in safeguarding the peace.

Here, Europe has to convince itself that what is happening within its boundaries cannot be managed by others but has to be managed together with others. This is the purpose of the alliances and the need for them. Woe betide us if the disarmament negotiations were conducted by the individual countries and not by the alliances. I think back to the alarm expressed by the French newspaper *Le Monde* at the end of January, in response to some dangerous signs of a tendency towards unilateral disarmament. Referring to the Vienna negotiations, the article said that they remain the only means of managing the changes on the old continent and maintaining stability. This view is confirmed in Mr. Pontillon's report. The alliances are a factor for peace and order until such time as a new security order has been established and consolidated throughout Europe.

This is the background to the problem of the reunification of the German people into a single political system that was one of the basic aims which the signatories to the modified Brussels

Treaty set for themselves in 1954. Consequently, progress on the important political problem concerns not only the two existing German states plus the four occupying powers but also all the European countries, as Mr. Genscher acknowledged an hour ago, and in particular the members of NATO and WEU. As Mr. Pontillon noted, the WEU countries have the right to know whether or not united Germany will maintain the commitments entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany under the modified Brussels Treaty.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Mezzapesa.

The next speaker is Sir William Shelton.

Sir William SHELTON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President and colleagues. First, like everyone who has spoken, I wish to congratulate the Rapporteur out of sincerity and not just for form's sake and for two or three minutes I want to make three points.

The first one is this. Having read the report and listened to the distinguished Rapporteur the other day, I do not entirely agree with what he has said about the relevance of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. I do not regard them as alliances of equal stature. I think there is a significant difference between them. For instance, the Warsaw Pact is a Soviet-dominated, military organisation imposed on Eastern European countries against their will in many cases, while NATO is a free alliance of independent, democratic countries. Consequently, I would suggest it is not for us in the West to say that the Warsaw Pact should, or indeed should not, continue. It is not for us to give any support, tacit or otherwise, to the Warsaw Pact. It is for the East Europeans themselves to decide for themselves whether they wish it to continue or whether they wish to remain in it.

Secondly, a quick point. Paragraph 86 mentions the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. Hurd, in Bonn last February who is reported as saying that some of Germany's allies are not prepared to let a united Germany associate the present forces of the two states, nor to break away from the Federal Republic's renunciations in regard to armaments or the deployment of its forces. I am authorised to say that in fact this is not an accurate report of his discussions.

The third point I wish to make is the very interesting speech by the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher, when he spoke of a vision for European security and he spoke of a cutback in weapons and manpower to minimum levels. I would suggest, as I have suggested before, that first, before one can agree on European security and minimum levels, one must assess the level of threat and type of threat that might face us in Europe. I would suggest to colleagues that we

*Sir William Shelton (continued)*

cannot decide what should be a minimum level without first assessing what sort of attack may face us. For instance, terrorism. Yes, I expect that will continue to face us for too long. Secondly, Balkanisation has been mentioned. Civil unrest, war between European countries – I do not know, but I hope this is not possible. Thirdly, for instance, a rogue dictator in some country, not necessarily in Europe, who perhaps is producing germ warfare or perhaps has access to nuclear weapons. Well, that again would need to be considered before one could decide what are minimum levels. Consequently, I welcome very much part III, paragraph 1, of Mr. Pontillon's recommendation that we can explore the possibilities offered by WEU as a medium for assessing possible threats to member countries. This I welcome and I think that this could be a very important and useful rôle as a base on which one could decide what the security system should be for our great continent.

*(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mrs. Beer.

Mrs. BEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I too have read the very wide-ranging report with great interest, but I think that if justice is to be done to it, it is regrettable that proposed amendments to the final recommendation should be withdrawn in order to leave open the prospects of the current very rapid developments in Europe, for this demands that the facts as they are should be actually addressed, even if there are some differences of content.

I should like to refer to the debate we have held and to say something about neutrality, because of course we West Germans have a special responsibility in this matter. I agree with other speakers that neutrality cannot be a status for a reunited Germany, but I should like to add a further thought and to ask you, neutrality between whom? For neutrality implies the continued existence of two blocs, and I am convinced that the Warsaw Pact, which is still represented here as being equal, is no longer the same entity as before. That is abundantly clear from current events in Europe.

I should also like to say something about responsibility and about self-determination. I just want to put some questions to you, perhaps for your consideration. Is not the right of self-determination, which we accord to all, also the responsibility to allow this self-determination to increase? Is it not the right of a state which is still that of East Germany, which for forty years was unable to practise this right, to decide upon the course it will follow, participatively, with a

little more patience, a little more time? And does the confidence, for example, of this Assembly that it has always acted well and chosen the right option, confer the right to support such a rapid process, to emphasise its own importance and to justify it for the future?

I myself think that the European bodies as at present existing also merit much criticism and I believe, as does our Foreign Minister Genscher, that the CSCE is the only body that at the present time leaves enough democratic room for manoeuvre for building true participation and co-determination of all the European partners.

I should like to tell you why I am not alone, but one of very many in the Federal Republic, who view the existence and the consolidation of WEU with considerable scepticism, in the light of the thought advanced by Mr. Dregger in France. He says that France should make its nuclear strategy available within the European framework and for the strengthening of WEU. This policy arouses fresh fears; it could not command a majority in the Federal Republic and is an obstacle to what we want to achieve, which is the dissolution of the blocs in a gradual process in which all states are answerable.

In conclusion, I should just like to say that we hope that this Assembly, and the others as well, will succeed in formulating in the near future what is meant by this common, collective Europe. For my part I can only say that we are striving for a system of collective security, long term; that is not a new definition, but it implies demilitarisation. I believe that German history would make it very fitting for Germany to begin building confidence. We want the ideology of deterrence to be dismantled, because it is an obstacle to partnership with equality of rights. We want the Federal Republic, and reunited Germany, to set a good example to all countries by ceding its sovereignty to European bodies – something for which the CSCE could certainly form a basis. Above all we want a collective system of this kind, that will put an end to mutual threats, to come about through the linking together with equal status of the states now bound by pacts.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Scovacicchi.

Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am substantially in agreement with Mr. Pontillon's report and the line it takes, except for some up-dating which I would have liked to see, but this quite understandably means that events are moving faster than us and we can never keep up.

This is an extraordinary session of Western European Union which I believe provides very useful material for reflection on its rôle and *raison d'être*. I believe that many of us, of you,

*Mr. Scovacicchi (continued)*

have come to the conclusion that we must move ahead to new models and strategies to replace those which have been too unchanging and repetitive and must look further afield without of course dismantling defences until Europe is at peace, which I frankly do not yet believe to be the case.

But while we reinforce these political and military institutions, I believe that we must pay more attention to the Mediterranean. I think the Italian Minister of State, Mr. Vitalone, said the same thing yesterday when he stressed the size and importance of the Mediterranean in the new European picture because it harbours threats of potential dangers which must be watched very closely.

Today we are all worried about what is happening in the Baltic republics. I have to say frankly – perhaps I did not understand completely – that I cannot agree with everything said by the Soviet representative who made what was more than anything an officialese speech. We have expressed no official view on the matter but we would have the right to do so, because who, more than us, as a political and military alliance, should be concerned about what is happening in Baltic Europe, where we hope that the right to self-determination will prevail? There can be no doubt about that and my feeling watching television this morning was that we cannot say that Lithuania has been invaded by Soviet troops and tanks, but this threatening presence is certainly significant. We are fully aware that the atmosphere is tense and for all that Mr. Gorbachev has said that he has no intention of using force of arms and for all that America has called on him not to do so, we know that these things begin but we never know how they will finish and history is unfortunately full of warnings to that effect.

I should like to take away one meaningful and what I might call consoling thought from the speeches of Mr. Genscher and the Polish representative at this morning's sitting. They were speeches of great European inspiration, as Mr. Mezzapesa said earlier. From all this upheaval we have been witnessing in Europe, the issue to emerge most clearly – I might even say the trump card – appears to be Europe, the integration of Europe we have dreamed of for so long while always encountering unending difficulties on the way. From all sides there is a call for Europe and this is a favourable sign which we must gladly, positively and with great satisfaction take away from today's sitting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Roseta, observer from Portugal.

Mr. ROSETA (*Observer from Portugal*) (Translation). – I should like to begin by heartily congratulating Mr. Pontillon on his excellent

report. I think that the renewed importance of our organisation is the result both of the work done and the initiatives taken during recent years, and also of the re-emergence of politics, which is resuming its priority over mere economic management and the interminable discussion of quotas for this or that product. As our President reminded us, for very many years topics such as these appeared to dominate European life to excess.

It was the rapid developments in Central and Eastern Europe, the collapse of a system that proved to be obsolete, because it was unable to satisfy the aspirations of the people, that brought fundamental political questions to the fore, and the realisation that the political choices that had to be made are fundamentally important to the solution of all the questions, even the economic ones. This then is one of the reasons why organisations that are essentially political, such as WEU and the Council of Europe, have once again come increasingly into the limelight. That is why we are today discussing here the fundamental political concerns of present-day Europe, on the very day on which the Portuguese President has convened in Lisbon an extraordinary meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to discuss the problems of Central and Eastern Europe. I should like to underline some aspects of the concerns of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which are common to all of them, which were confirmed by the tour d'horizon of Minister João de Deus Pinheiro in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, and which are in the report of our colleague, Mr. Pontillon, but which I should like specially to emphasise.

All these countries wish to evolve towards a market economy, all of them appreciate the importance of pan-European co-operation in the field of security, and stress the importance to be attached to the CSCE process. All of them wish to come closer to the Council of Europe until they join it, and believe it to be the forum in which the question of human rights should be pursued. I therefore share the opinion of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg when he said yesterday that there is no need to create new organisations to discuss political questions relating to human rights and those of minorities. Only the Council of Europe has the experience and status to do this; another organisation would lack that status, and would be destined to fail.

As regards security, I am in agreement with what is stated in our report and is recommended by others as to the rôle of our organisation. WEU, being a political organisation, is bound to play an increased part in matters affecting the inviolability of frontiers and of the inalienable and undoubted right of the German people to self-determination, and hence its right to unifi-



*Mr. Roseta (continued)*

cation. What can Portugal contribute to WEU? Portugal's special position as an Atlantic country with special interests in the south of our world, particularly in Africa, is a factor to be borne in mind. Furthermore, our experience of a change of régimes is considered to be extremely useful for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Not only the transition from dictatorship to democracy which the Portuguese made peacefully sixteen years ago but also, which many people forget, the transition from an almost wholly collectivised system to a market economy, which we have completed over the last few years. I should also like to mention our commitment to strengthening the European pillar, and to state that this is compatible with our traditional Atlantic connection which, by the way, we like others would never dream of calling to question. We support the idea that the security of the whole world is indivisible and hence that the security of Europe is indissolubly connected with the security of the rest of the world. For this reason we shall have to give more attention in future to questions of security on the southern flank of Europe.

For all these reasons, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in speaking for the last time as Portuguese observer in this Assembly, I wish to pay tribute to the important work done by this Assembly on the occasion of the first enlargement of this organisation to include the two Iberian countries, without forgetting the part played by the President and all the other members, but also the two Portuguese observers who, over the years, have come and taken part in our work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call the last speaker, Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of our organisation.

Mr. van EEKELLEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – At the conclusion of your debates, I wish to remind you that the joint determination to proscribe warfare without sacrificing freedom is at the origin of the Brussels and Washington Treaties. This ambition is at the heart of all the efforts of our member states to guarantee their collective security and to promote co-operation in all areas while retaining a close link with our North American allies.

The opening of the Berlin wall precipitated a historic upheaval and – with one exception – a peaceful transition towards democracy. In this decisive phase the WEU countries have a duty to be in the first line in implementing a European Ostpolitik, the keywords of which are opening, solidarity, security. It is indeed fundamental for the new democratic régimes to be able to take root and gain strength. The adaptation, in certain cases even the reconstruction,

of the economies of Eastern Europe on the new bases of economic truth and the laws of the market will not be achieved without difficulty. The co-operation we must offer them should seek to accelerate reconversion while keeping watch on the effectiveness of our investments and keeping the social cost within bearable limits. In this evolution the European Community plays an eminent rôle as a model, as a reference and as an instrument of co-ordination. It will play this rôle the better in that it will be able to strengthen itself and progress towards the goal of European union clearly spelt out in the single act.

The most immediate ground for this co-operation is no doubt the GDR where everything began and which is today at the heart of the European security question.

German unity is happening before our very eyes. The unity of Germany is above all a victory of democracy over 56 years of dictatorship. It will be a victory of European integration and Atlantic solidarity, for democratic Germany will be built with due respect for the agreements and the treaties and all the principles defined in the Helsinki final act as explained in the declaration adopted by the European Council last December.

Bernard Shaw said that freedom implied responsibility which is why so many people are afraid of it. Germany, as a member of WEU and of the European Community, chose freedom at the cost of its division. East Germans are electing to join it to gain their freedom. This choice implies unity and new responsibilities. Let us share them with all Germans by turning towards the future rather than cultivating painful historical memories which are very largely anachronistic and sterile at the present juncture. To advance towards European integration, whether in its economic, monetary or security dimensions, we need the whole of Germany. We must therefore leave Germany alone with itself in its trials today and in face of the challenges of tomorrow.

The alliance, i.e. the link between the defence of Europe and that of America around the central and irreplaceable notion of nuclear deterrence, gave us forty years of peace. It must be maintained at all costs which means that all the European allies must assume a greater share of their defence. Now is the time to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance and to redefine the tasks of the American forces at our side. Failing this it would be difficult to count on the maintenance of an American presence albeit indispensable for maintaining the strategic balance on our continent, for Russia will remain a considerable continental power.

Our co-operation will be vital in the three areas of reduction, redeployment and verifi-

*Mr. van Eekelen (continued)*

cation if we wish to take full advantage of the dynamics of armaments control.

The reduction of forces should be done in a co-ordinated manner, taking into account the ways and means of redeploying American and Soviet forces. Inevitably, the problem of forces stationed in Germany, whatever their nationality or juridical régime, will be a subject of polemic. A possible solution in the direction of European unity would be to form major units on a multinational basis for our forces. It is for WEU to study the practicality of audacious and imaginative approaches leading to increased security for all the nations of Europe because they will show that recourse to military force in Europe will no longer ever be a purely national prerogative in the service of egoistic interests. We must also avoid solutions imposing special régimes for Germany. The idea of multilateral forces should be applied to other countries too.

Clearly, there will be no guaranteed European security without taking into account the specific interests of Russia in this matter. There we encounter the difficulty stemming from the impossibility of foreseeing what the evolution will be in the Soviet Union. Everyone knows the difficulties of perestroika. Everyone sees the rise of nationalisms around the periphery. The security interests of the USSR of yesterday are not the same as those of the Russian republics today. Quite obviously we must not aggravate Moscow's difficulties, but what is Mr. Gorbachev's "common European house" becoming in this context? The present state of the Soviet house hardly allows its leaders to propose any model for organising our continent. The countries of WEU have been creating the model for tens of years in the framework of the European Community.

For the application of this model to the other countries of Europe wishing to draw close to it, means of association must be found which will activate transitions. The CSCE will remain an important reference framework but for implementing its decisions we must turn to all the European institutions. Indeed, it is they that are the rallying-point and anchor for the new democracies of Eastern Europe.

WEU must be the instrument for developing security co-operation in Europe. Our countries must strengthen their cohesion in a spirit of opening without fearing to assume joint operational responsibilities when their forces are restructured and the CFE agreement or space co-operation are verified. This answers Mr. Baumel, who asked me this question yesterday afternoon. WEU can play an important rôle in the stabilisation of Europe as a privileged interlocutor for the new democracies in security questions in order to promote collective security

and shared security as appropriately proposed by Mr. Pontillon.

The success of the Franco-German fraternity shows us the way to be followed to create a true fraternity of European nations. In this approach we must not temporise nor seek to maintain control over any nation. United Europe implies equal rights and duties. National interests will be served the better in a European architecture in which each one verifies all the others and will be verified by all.

WEU will continue to work for the development of true solidarity which will take the place of former conflictual relations so as to become irreversible. Thus the progress of our European co-operation will take on a truly historic dimension.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General.

The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur to reply to the speakers.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – At this late hour and for the excellent reason that I feel the most important things have been said and well said by many of my colleagues, I shall certainly not reply to the speakers.

I am gratified by the general tone of the debate, the brilliant contributions made and almost general approval of the views of the Political Committee. There have no doubt been different approaches, feelings, in the course of the debate as is quite natural in a democratic parliament. They in no way call in question the tone and the substance, they merely portray differences of pace.

I shall not try to answer all the various comments. I would say, however, that I agree with Mr. De Decker on his suggestion that France and the United Kingdom be invited to get together to examine a joint nuclear guarantee. I have been fighting for an idea of this kind for years. I do not feel that it is my country that is the most reserved and susceptible but I am satisfied to record important progress in this area.

I shall not revert to the problems of the CSCE and the ensuing discussions regarding the course to be followed. As Mr. Eyskens said yesterday morning, I believe we must not add further complications. The CSCE, which has played an essential rôle and is the accelerator of the movement towards democracy in Eastern Europe, naturally remains the necessary framework for co-operation and the guarantees to be provided at international level, although it is not an operational structure. Here I agree with most of the reservations expressed by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and the need to revitalise the institu-

*Mr. Pontillon (continued)*

tions which are the natural bodies for European co-operation.

My special thanks go to our German colleagues who have voiced their refusal of neutralism. If I understood correctly Mr. Falin's comments just now, the debate is clearly not closed.

I likewise congratulate our Italian colleagues for their many and brilliant speeches which testify to the growing importance of the southern dimension of international relations and, more generally, the southern flank of our security. Our Turkish colleague needs no reassurance in this matter, since the place his country already occupies in western security seems to be in no way affected or reduced in the future. Quite the contrary.

A brief word to echo an idea put forward by Senator Jung in his question to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland suggesting going beyond the legal framework of formal frontiers and towards a broader European space. I find this an interesting idea which we could possibly explore further in the framework of our committee. I would say the same for the idea raised by my eminent colleague, Jean-Pierre Fourré, on the future military status of unified Germany, which might also be studied in greater detail in our committee.

My introductory remarks should rather appease Sir William Shelton's apprehensions. I did not suggest maintaining the pacts, particularly the Warsaw Pact. I merely noted that they were still there and that, as such, they could serve as a basis for dialogue.

Finally, I listened with pleasure to Mr. Roleta, the forerunner from the Iberian peninsula, who added several pertinent remarks to the debate. This testifies to the quality of the contribution that our Portuguese and Spanish colleagues will make to our future work.

Thank you, too, to our Secretary-General for sounding the final note by recalling the principles and common values which are the basis and inspiration for our European ambitions and our responsibilities.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, what can we conclude from all that? We have had a good, fruitful debate, a text on which unanimity has been achieved and that is all to the good. Perhaps it is difficult for us to imagine a world which escapes our simplifying visions. This is true for frontiers and there it is better to maintain the status quo than to open Pandora's box. It is true for the alliances, although if confidence returns in a lasting manner, the fear inherited from antagonistic blocs will cease and a new balance will progressively be imposed and the pacts in their present form will not resist. Starting with what now exists, we must find

what can help to prepare this different peaceful order. And as many speakers have said, the structures exist whose development, merger or extension can offer a propitious framework for the development of that Europe without boundaries of which François Perroux used to speak. The Council of Europe, the CSCE and WEU are amongst these structures. All we need now, ladies and gentlemen, is political determination. It has not been lacking here and, finally, I think this is the most fortunate conclusion for this debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In view of the time, I think I will secure the backing of my colleagues if I ask that the report be adopted. It was discussed in detail in committee. The situation is evolving and this is a view of the position today which will have to be kept under review, discussed further and brought up to date. I ask you to adopt the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – All the amendments having been withdrawn, we shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1216.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

Mr. De Decker and Mr. Tummens have asked to explain their votes.

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my explanation will be very brief in view of the excellent synthesis Mr. Pontillon has made and Secretary-General van Eekelen's remarkable statement which I fully endorse. I of course voted in favour of this report, but, as you have seen, I agreed to withdraw the amendment I had tabled to part II (*ix*) to leave out the paragraph of the preamble which reads:

“Considering, however, that it is essential for the new German state to be integrated in a European collective security system with which the United States and Canada remain associated and constituting in itself the nucleus of an all-European security system;”

1. See page 16.

*Mr. De Decker (continued)*

I proposed replacing this text by:

“ Considering, however, that it is essential for the new German state to be integrated in the collective security systems constituted by NATO and WEU; ”

I would have preferred these words which were more precise. But as Mr. Soell agreed to withdraw his amendments and the debate showed undeniably the very clear determination – I would say, almost unanimous – of our Assembly and of the Germans taking part in our work not to have Germany follow the road towards neutrality, since, furthermore, I believe the words I introduced were perhaps more limitative insofar as the security systems existing today are NATO and WEU but perhaps might tomorrow be the EEC, I believe it was useful to withdraw my amendment. But you will understand that I am doing this in a spirit far closer to that described in the speeches by Mr. Poos, Mr. van Eekelen or Mr. Eyskens than in certain considerations by Mr. Genscher who, although belonging to my political family, makes me feel that he wishes to some extent to dilute the effort for European unity in the CSCE effort.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. De Decker.

I call Mr. Tummers to explain his vote.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have complimented the Rapporteur on the tenor of his report. I feel I have clearly stated my views on the question we have been discussing here for two days. In my opinion, the procedural decision was taken on

this report when it was said that it would be referred back to the committee and the amendments would be withdrawn. I then felt it no longer necessary to vote for or against. The vote had in fact been taken, and I therefore refrained from voting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think, Mr. Tummers, there is some misunderstanding. The draft recommendation is a document of our Assembly addressed to the Council and there is nothing to prevent the appropriate committee proposing a new report bringing up to date the positions reached today in a changing context. There will therefore be reports on East-West relations at all our plenary sessions, i.e. other reports on this question. I hope I have thus cleared up any misunderstanding there may have been.

#### *6. Close of the extraordinary session*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we have thus reached the conclusion of this extraordinary session. Before declaring the session closed, I wish to extend my final thanks to the members of the Assembly, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and all those who have spoken from this rostrum. Finally, I should express our sincere appreciation of the representatives of the press and the permanent and temporary staff.

I declare closed the extraordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 1.35 p.m.)*

**III**  
**ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS**

**ORDER OF BUSINESS**  
**of the extraordinary session**  
**Luxembourg, 22nd and 23rd March 1990**

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**THURSDAY, 22nd MARCH**

**Morning 9.30 a.m.**

Meetings of political groups.

**10.30 a.m.**

1. Opening of the extraordinary session.
2. Welcoming address by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg.
3. Examination of credentials.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft order of business of the extraordinary session.
6. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the Political Committee.
7. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
8. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe:  
Debate.

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. Address by Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.
2. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe:  
Resumed debate.
3. Address by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.
4. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
5. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe:  
Resumed debate.

**FRIDAY, 23rd MARCH**

**Morning 10 a.m.**

1. Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
2. Address by Mr. Falin, Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet responsible for international affairs.

3. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe:

Resumed debate.

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe – prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe:

Resumed debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**CLOSE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION**

***Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe -  
prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe***

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the Political Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Ahrens* (Chairman); Sir *Geoffrey Finsberg*, Mr. *Martino* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Aarts* (Alternate: *Verbeek*), *Beix* (Alternate: *Baumel*), *Böhm*, *Caro* (Alternate: *Pontillon*), *Coleman*, *Collart* (Alternate: *De Bondt*), *Eich*, *Forni*, *Foschi*, *Hill*, *Hitschler* (Alternate: *Zywietz*), *Koehl* (Alternate: *Grussenmeyer*), *van der Linden*, *Lord Mackie of Benshie*, MM. *Müller*, *Natali*, *Pécriaux*, *Pieralli*, Mrs. *Polfer*, Mr. *Sarti*, Sir *William Shelton*, Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*, MM. *Stoffelen*, *Thyraud*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*



## APPENDIX

## Documentation on the international status of Germany:

1. Protocol between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin – 12th September 1944
2. Yalta Agreement – statement on the result of the Crimea conference – 4th-11th February 1945
3. Act of military surrender – 7th May 1945
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5. Communiqué issued in London, Washington and Moscow on the decisions reached at Potsdam – 2nd August 1945
6. The basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany – 23rd May 1949
7. Convention on relations between the three powers and the Federal Republic of Germany – Bonn, 26th May 1952
8. Agreement to end the occupation régime in the Federal Republic of Germany – amendments to the convention on relations between the three powers and the Federal Republic of Germany – 23rd October 1954
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***Draft Recommendation***

***on the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe -  
prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe***

The Assembly,

I

- (i) Welcoming the fact that the developments which started with the perestroika movement in the USSR and continued in many Central and Eastern European countries in 1989 at last make it possible to consider establishing a new, peaceful order throughout Europe;
- (ii) Considering, nevertheless, that there is still much uncertainty about the future and stability of those countries;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the CFE negotiations and gratified that the countries concerned are considering starting further negotiations, shortly after a first agreement is signed, to reduce even further the level of forces and armaments in Europe;
- (iv) Welcoming also the convening of a conference of heads of state or of government in 1990 to give new scope to the CSCE process;
- (v) Noting the broad convergence between proposals by Eastern and Western European countries to give Europe as a whole economic, juridical and cultural structures designed to organise a new European order;
- (vi) Anxious, however, not to precipitate the premature disbandment of organisations which have so far ensured peace in Europe since this would make it more difficult to establish this new peaceful order and considering that the bases of European security should be maintained for as long an interim period as necessary;

II

- (i) Welcoming the progress made towards reuniting the German people in a single political system, which is one of the main aims that the WEU member countries set themselves in 1954;
- (ii) Considering that the attainment of this aim implies a negotiated agreement between the two German states and noting that it calls for an understanding on the status of unified Germany between the two states and the four responsible powers;
- (iii) Considering that the countries of Europe as a whole are concerned by the formation of a new German state at the heart of Europe;
- (iv) Considering that the permanency of the present frontiers of Germany must be confirmed by a prior undertaking by the two German states, together with one by the other European countries, for the creation of a German state not to jeopardise what has been gained in European integration nor to be an obstacle to the establishment of a new peaceful order in Europe;
- (v) Noting that many provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty apply, for fifty years at least, to the Federal Republic of Germany and that they cannot be infringed without a revision of the treaty;
- (vi) Recalling that the Council has decided to proceed with such a revision as soon as the accession of Portugal and Spain becomes effective;
- (vii) Considering that the geographical situation and strength of a unified German state make it undesirable to grant it neutral status;
- (viii) Noting also that the integration of the entire German territory in NATO seems unacceptable to many Central and Eastern European countries;
- (ix) Considering, however, that it is essential for the new German state to be integrated in a European collective security system with which the United States and Canada remain associated and constituting in itself the nucleus of an all-European security system;

## III

- (i) Noting that in a period of instability it is hardly desirable to add to the degree and variety of uncertainty and hence the maintenance of the alliances is a factor of peace and order in Europe as long as a new security order has not been organised throughout Europe;
- (ii) Considering that the reduction of armed forces stationed in Europe makes it necessary to conduct an immediate review of the deployment of NATO forces;
- (iii) Considering that the forces of the WEU countries will have a larger part to play in this new deployment than heretofore;
- (iv) Considering that all the western countries have to limit their military expenditure;
- (v) Considering, therefore, that closer co-operation between WEU member countries for their joint security is becoming essential;
- (vi) Considering that, for this reason, the European members of the alliance will have to exercise greater political responsibilities, particularly in regard to arms control, organising the collective security of Europe as a whole and defence against any threat from outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

## I

1. Draw without delay the first conclusions from the study it is conducting into the consequences of a CFE agreement for Europe's security and inform the Assembly accordingly;
2. Extend this study subsequently to cover all the consequences of the changes in Eastern Europe;
3. Prepare carefully a joint position for the WEU countries in regard to matters within its purview that are included in the agenda of the CSCE;

## II

1. Inform the Assembly whether the commitments entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany under the modified Brussels Treaty are also valid for a unified German state;
2. Before any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, analyse the consequences of a devolution of the Federal Republic of Germany's commitments to a unified German state for the application of the treaty and the platform adopted in The Hague, paying particular attention to:
  - (a) co-operation between WEU and NATO, provided for in Article IV of the treaty;
  - (b) implementation of military assistance in the conditions laid down in Article V and paragraph III.4 of the platform of The Hague, specifying on which frontiers member countries are now obliged to contribute to the defence of Germany;
  - (c) application to any state that succeeds the German Democratic Republic of Article VII according to which the high contracting parties will participate in no coalition directed against any of them;
  - (d) implementation of Article VIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, Protocols Nos. II, III and IV and, in particular, Annex I to Protocol No. III on determining the level of forces, renunciation of the production of certain armaments and control of the application of the relevant undertakings;
  - (e) respect for Article XII fixing the period after which each member country shall have the right to cease to be a party to the treaty;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of this analysis;
4. Ensure that the states participating in the conference that will define the status of Germany are duly and fully informed of these results so that they may take account of the guarantees offered by the modified Brussels Treaty for the security of both Germany and its neighbouring countries and for the establishment of a new peaceful and secure order in Europe;

III

1. Explore forthwith the possibilities offered by WEU as a medium for assessing possible threats to member countries and for research into the prospects of an all-European security area for which it might eventually be an appropriate framework, in particular:
  - (a) for defining a sufficiency threshold in defence matters;
  - (b) for analysing the concept of shared security;
  - (c) for developing means of arbitration, confidence-building measures and disarmament;
2. Use WEU as a lever for a new European security order in which it might:
  - (a) guarantee the intangibility of its members' frontiers, including those resulting from the unification of the two German states;
  - (b) ensure respect for the commitments entered into by its members in the context of agreements limiting forces or armaments or the non-production of certain weapons;
3. Assess the level of forces that WEU countries should deploy for Europe's security and agree on a fair sharing of the efforts required;
4. Use the modified Brussels Treaty as the juridical basis for the presence of forces of member states on the territory of other member states insofar as their presence would help to strengthen a peaceful order in Europe;
5. Convene regular meetings of chiefs-of-staff of member countries to examine European armaments requirements, thus giving political impetus to the standardisation and joint production of such armaments;
6. Draw up a programme for the joint organisation of verification measures required for the application of the CFE agreements;
7. For this purpose, pursue further its study of the possibility of setting up a European observation satellite agency;
8. Have the WEU Institute for Security Studies organise a permanent exchange of information with the Eastern European countries on military deployment in Europe and the application of the CFE agreements;
9. Keep the public regularly informed of work carried out by its specialised groups to allow European public opinion to become aware of co-operation in the framework of WEU.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. Events in Central Europe in the last months of 1989 confirmed the decisive nature of the reforms that had been under way in the Soviet Union since 1985 and the changes in Poland and Hungary since 1988 in that they demonstrated that the whole of Central and Eastern Europe was rejecting the political and economic system imposed on it under the Stalin doctrine. One after the other, there were popular demonstrations in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria and, finally, Romania following which those countries' leaders had to relinquish power. In the first three of these countries, the change of government proceeded fairly smoothly in spite, or because, of the presence of the Red Army on the territory of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, as in Poland and Hungary. Only in Romania, where Mr. Ceausescu's régime had long been largely independent of the Soviet Union, did the political police offer strong resistance to the demonstrators, who triumphed mainly because the army turned against the party in power. Albania, where there was unrest in January 1990, has so far avoided this great movement for the emancipation of the people. Its isolation, the backwardness of its economy and its small population mean that it can in no way oppose the return of the rest of Central Europe to more democratic practices. Conversely, it is to be hoped that, one day or another, it will follow the movement. Finally, since mid-January Yugoslavia has been facing serious internal difficulties due to challenges to the monopoly of power held by the League of Communists and questions in several federated republics regarding the dominating rôle of Serbs.

2. In all the Central and Eastern European countries where there have been revolutionary transformations, it is the communist party's dictatorship that is being challenged. Some already have pluralist régimes. In others, the party has changed its name to show its will to break with the ideology which hitherto had kept it in power. In all of them, new, younger teams, more in touch with the realities of society and international life, have replaced leaders who had become hidebound by too much power, the absence of contestation, the maintenance of an obsolete ideology and, generally, corruption. But nowhere have free elections yet been held and it is only possible to guess what the real state of opinion is. Everywhere the new régimes are provisional and there is no guarantee that, even if they are truly free, forthcoming elections will produce a stable power.

3. These changes, as radical as they were sudden, place the West in an uncomfortable position. Its whole defence system was based on an analysis of the facts in Eastern Europe which no longer corresponds to the situation today. Faced with the deployment of large numbers of conventional forces with threatening offensive means close to its frontiers, NATO had deployed a vast defensive system designed to convince the Soviet Union and its allies that they could not hope to extend their influence towards the West by the use of force without clashing with nations determined to defend their freedom and, for this purpose, to use all the means at their disposal, including nuclear weapons.

4. That this policy of defence, designed to deter any aggressor and, consequently, to avoid another armed conflict in Europe, succeeded beyond all hopes is no reason to maintain such a system in full from the moment it is no longer necessary and may, on the contrary, become an obstacle to the organisation of peace on more stable foundations. The attitude adopted by the Soviet Union towards arms control since 1985, the changes in the deployment of Warsaw Pact forces to a defensive posture, changes in political régimes and acknowledgment of excesses committed in the last fifty years, the Soviet Union's difficulty in applying reforms, the awakening of nationalities on its territory and the Warsaw Pact countries' questioning of Soviet domination now make an attack on Western Europe highly unlikely. All these new facts therefore mean that Europe's security must be examined in new terms to take account of the diminishing threat and take advantage of the situation thus created to organise peace in Europe and the world on sounder foundations without, however, depriving Europe of the means to face up to new dangers now emerging.

5. This certainly does not mean that the time is now ripe to abolish the systems of alliance or the deployment of forces which have ensured the West's security for forty years but they should be reorganised to meet security requirements in a changed world. Thus, disarmament, or at least the preparation of duly-verified arms control agreements, so as to achieve a balance of forces at the lowest possible level, is becoming fundamental in order to ensure peace in Europe. Similarly, the success of the economic and political changes made by the Soviet Union and its allies is now a common aim for all those who seek to reorganise Europe on new bases. Finally, the establishment of a lasting peaceful order in Europe means placing states in the framework of

a stable, structured international system to prevent the maintenance of peace being at the mercy of states' internal developments or the re-emergence of national issues such as were a constant threat to peace in Europe from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries.

6. Certain western governments have therefore examined how to adapt the institutions which have ensured peace in recent decades to the new situation. The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, speaking in Berlin, thus proposed reorganising NATO to make it the basis for the new international order. For his part, Mr. Mitterrand, President of the French Republic, referred to the establishment of a European confederation associating eastern and western countries without replacing existing structures. But these are still only vague proposals and it seems hardly possible to go much further in thinking about the future of Europe. Only in the short term is it now possible to pursue this analysis more deeply. The specific purpose of the present document is to see what can be done in the near future to meet the needs created by the transformation of Eastern Europe.

## *II. Developments in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989*

7. From 1985 to 1988, the only repercussions in the people's democracies of the changes made by Mr. Gorbachev's government had been confined to Poland and Hungary, which had embarked upon what was then thought would be a slow evolution. In 1989 the changes extended to all the Central and Eastern European countries, with the sole exception of Albania. Furthermore, the governments the most hostile to liberal trends collapsed and were replaced by leaders determined to promote far-reaching reforms. In the presence of Soviet forces stationed on their territory, the governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria gave in, without serious resistance, to pressure from the people and made way for persons who, whether members of the communist party or not, were determined to apply radical economic and political reforms. The Romanian authorities, on the contrary, put up strong resistance and cruelly repressed the popular demonstrations but, isolated at home and without external support, they had to capitulate in December 1989. Yugoslavia tried to moderate political reforms and the repression of nationalist aspirations by the Albanian minority in the province of Kosovo.

8. There seem to be three causes for the disappearance of the régimes which had dominated these countries for more than forty years. First, the fact that the same group had remained in

power for such a long time had resulted in serious corruption in the communist parties. Those in positions of authority had progressively lost all contact with the people and dominated only by force. Secondly, the absence of a reaction from the Soviet authorities to events in Hungary and Poland indicated that Soviet forces would not intervene to support the régimes they had established and kept in place by the threat, and sometimes use, of violence in previous decades. They were therefore no longer feared and, thanks to perestroika, the Soviet Union was even seen as a model of reformist policy. Finally, the economic failure of the communist system became increasingly clear to the people, who could no longer be kept in ignorance of the thriving economies and standard of living of Western Europeans or the public and individual freedom they enjoyed and of which they had been deprived for so long.

9. The question is therefore to what extent the Soviet Union might have provoked the revolution that has just taken place in the Central and Eastern European countries in order to allow the communist parties to remain at the head of states or, at least, to continue to participate in governments. Whether this hypothesis is true or not, the abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine, according to which those countries' sovereignty was limited by the requirement to keep communism in power, ensured the success of national, popular movements which seem, in several cases, to go much further than the introduction of perestroika in the countries concerned. If free elections are effectively held in the first half of 1990, as planned in all the countries in which power has changed hands, there should at least be a significant reduction in the communist parties' share of power although, due to the speed of events, in most countries no organised political force apart from the communist party itself is prepared to take over now that control has slipped from the hands of the former leaders. Nor is anything definite known about the trends of public opinion, leaving much uncertainty about the true nature of régimes which have taken control or which will do so after elections.

### *(a) Poland*

10. Poland was the only Eastern European country to have had an overt opposition for the last ten years thanks to the emergence of a trade union-type organisation, Solidarity, whose legitimacy was, however, contested by the authorities. Moreover, the Catholic Church had far greater influence than any other organisation independent of the communist party in any other Eastern European country. Admittedly, after the widespread strikes in 1980, the appointment of General Jaruzelski as President

of the Republic and the proclamation of a state of war had led to Solidarity being banned in 1981, some of its leaders being arrested and repression, albeit moderate compared with that in the German Democratic Republic in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Doubtless this repression had been called for by the Soviet Union, anxious to retain control over Poland as a key area for the deployment of Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. However, the magnitude of the influence exercised by Solidarity, with the support of the Catholic Church, made it difficult to put down the opposition completely. Its ability to paralyse the economy of a country in which there was already a very serious crisis allowed it to wait for a more propitious time without being dissolved.

11. It was therefore possible for the Polish Government to negotiate the transformation of the régime with a more or less organised opposition once this became inevitable. Moreover, the opposition did not seek total victory and this allowed elections to be conducted freely, but with limited effects, on 4th and 18th June 1989. Meeting as from 6th February 1989, a round table associating the Catholic Church, Solidarity and the government managed, on 5th April, to conclude an agreement recognising the legality of Solidarity and defining ways and means for future elections. Solidarity obtained all the seats in the new Diet reserved for the opposition, i.e. 35%, but 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate, showing its real influence in the country.

12. Solidarity was therefore in a strong position to negotiate the formation of a government which was to be led by one of its leaders, Mr. Mazowiecki, but in which representatives of the communist party (the Polish Workers' Party) retained an important place. However, this was the first crack in the doctrine set out in the constitutions of most people's democracies that the party had permanently to exercise a leading rôle, although Mr. Jaruzelski remained President of the Republic.

13. The announcement that a new constitution is to be drawn up suggests that Poland is anxious to extricate itself from a situation that is based on such contradictory principles as the maintenance in power of the communist party and free elections, particularly as the Polish economy is completely ruined, the public debt enormous and inflation galloping, which would call for strong state authority based on a wide consensus. However, the compromise on which it is based is made possible by the Polish people's apparent keen awareness that the country's geographical situation does not allow it to break away from the eastern bloc. Solidarity does not contest Poland's membership of the Warsaw Pact or of Comecon, although it would like sweeping changes in the latter, as announced by

Mr. Swiecicki, the Minister of Finance, on the eve of the forty-fifth session of that organisation in Sofia on 9th and 10th January 1990. All those in power seem to wish to give priority to rebuilding the economy and well know that this is impossible without substantial western assistance and wide access to the free market.

14. This desire for an opening towards the West has been demonstrated by the development of relations between Poland and the Council of Europe, on the one hand, and the European Economic Community, on the other. This has allowed the Polish Government to accede to the European Cultural Convention, to receive financial assistance from the West and to obtain western investment to revive its economy thanks to a relaxation in internal legislation on joint ventures. On 30th January, Mr. Mazowiecki asked for Poland to join the Council of Europe. Poland has also asked the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces stationed in Poland in the near future. The Soviet Union agreed in principle but seems to be delaying implementation. Poland has expressed the wish to remain a member of the pact, moreover.

15. Finally, on 28th January 1990, the Polish United Workers' Party, probably in order to improve its chances in the forthcoming elections planned for June 1990, decided to change its name to Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, without however preventing a split with the most reform-minded elements of the PUWP, who set up a Social Democratic Union of the Republic of Poland. Some of the PUWP representatives in Congress and the majority of its deputies in the Diet have not yet made their choice known, thus leaving considerable uncertainty about the conditions in which the Polish parties will be able to tackle the June elections.

#### *(b) Hungary*

16. Unlike Poland, the geographical position of Hungary, in a state of deep shock after the repression following the 1956 uprising, helped it to acquire at least some economic independence, even when there was no question of contesting the communist party's monopoly of power. Even the leaders placed in office by the Red Army in 1956, such as Janos Kadar, managed to take advantage of the situation to allow a large co-operative sector to develop, avoiding burdensome state intervention and leading to a broad range of trade with countries outside the communist bloc, particularly neighbouring Austria, with which Hungary had a long historical tradition of association. They even showed growing tolerance for contacts maintained or re-established with emigrants who, since 1956, had included a large proportion of the Hungarian intelligentsia.

17. In 1988, the Hungarian opposition started to meet in an association, the Democratic Forum, that was clearly political but tolerated by the government, and there was more parliamentary activity in the Hungarian National Assembly than in any other Eastern European country thanks to active movements even within the communist party itself. On 11th January 1989, it passed a law making independent parties legal again. On 2nd May, the government restored freedom to cross the Austrian frontier for citizens of the two countries concerned and, during the summer, the relaxation of controls allowed many citizens of the German Democratic Republic to reach Austria and the Federal Republic. A crisis ensued in relations between the GDR and Hungary and, on 10th September, Hungary denounced the treaty by which it had declared it would not open its western frontiers to nationals of the GDR.

18. Furthermore, the evolution in the Hungarian Communist Party was particularly important since it offers hope that the forthcoming free elections will be held in the best possible conditions. It started by revising its own history, the culmination being the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy, the former Prime Minister, condemned to death and executed in 1958 in the reprisals that followed the 1956 uprising. It then replaced its leaders and those of the state by younger persons. On 7th October, it changed its name, abandoning the word communist and declaring itself to be social democrat. The new party programme provides for a peaceful, progressive move towards democratic socialism. On 23rd October, Hungary renounced the title of People's Republic and now calls itself merely a Republic. Finally, on 25th November, it was decided to hold free elections in March 1990.

19. Hungary therefore preceded the other Central European countries by means of the internal evolution of the leading party, allowing the opposition to prepare itself to participate in free elections and introducing certain economic freedoms. It was probably particularly successful because its foreign policy, while increasing approaches to and exchanges with Western European countries, allowing it to take part in the activities of the Council of Europe and showing its intention eventually to join the Community, ensured that it broke neither with the Soviet Union, nor with the Warsaw Pact, nor with Comecon. By refusing to consider these positions contradictory, although at first sight they are not very coherent, Hungary made a remarkable contribution to inducing the eastern and western countries to envisage a common future. Without any break, immediate at least, with structures inherited from the past, that it still seems to consider useful for its security, it was the first to raise the question of a European Community opening towards the East and to anticipate a future all-European organisation

associating East and West in a new peaceful order in Europe. In November 1989, it asked to join the Council of Europe.

(c) *German Democratic Republic*

20. The GDR is at one and the same time the most successful Warsaw Pact country economically and its weakest political link, quite simply because it is the only one not based on national sentiments. Forty years of laborious efforts to arouse East German national feelings proved a total failure once the GDR was no longer able to stop its citizens emigrating to the Federal Republic.

21. Unlike the people's democracies, the GDR had retained a multi-party régime, while ensuring that the Unified Socialist Party, the local offshoot of the communist party, remained permanently in power. It had had to exercise a particularly strict dictatorship because it was impossible for it to prevent the population remaining in constant contact with that of the Federal Republic. When the opening of the frontiers between Hungary and Austria in summer 1989 allowed the mass exit of its citizens towards the Federal Republic, the Pankow government thought it was still possible to react, probably because it was convinced that the Soviet Union would support its struggle to retain power, i.e. to keep Germany divided. The emigration of almost 200 000 persons in the last quarter of 1989, many of whom were high-level experts, alone created a serious threat to the survival of the state.

22. Nevertheless, when the popular demonstrations against the régime multiplied with greater backing at the beginning of October and it became evident that the Soviet Union would not support a policy of repression, the SED tried to put an end to the unrest by progressive concessions: Mr. Honecker was replaced at the head of the party by Mr. Egon Krenz, former head of the political police, the former leaders were indicted and their corruption denounced, certain freedoms were restored and, in particular, the ban on citizens of the GDR crossing the wall which had separated the two parts of Germany since 1961 was lifted and, finally, the wall was destroyed. These measures were intended to show that the GDR's policy had radically changed and was no longer opposed to the establishment of normal relations between the two sections of German society.

23. Under pressure from the people, and particularly as a result of the demonstrations of joy at the opening of the Berlin wall, Mr. Modrow formed a new government on 24th November in which the SED was associated with opposition parties and announced in the Volkskammer a reform policy that included abolition of the constitutional guarantee of the leading rôle of the



party, abolition of the reign of terror and the creation of a de jure state. The number of members of the political police, the Stasi, was symbolically reduced by 10%.

24. This first series of measures was not enough to halt demonstrations which were soon directed against the new government, accused of including too many people who had been involved in the former régime, wishing to keep the political police in place in a new guise and doing nothing to promote the reunification of the two German states. At a party conference on 7th and 8th December, Mr. Krenz was replaced by Mr. Gregor Gysi as President of the SED. Legal action was also started against the former state and party leaders. It is clear that the party has little chance of remaining in power once free elections can be held. According to opinion polls conducted early in January, it will receive only 10% of the votes and more than a million of its 2 300 000 members are reported to have terminated their party membership. Conversely, demonstrations throughout the GDR would seem increasingly hostile to the new authorities and the SED.

25. In spite of its economic lead over the other Eastern European countries, the German Democratic Republic has to come to grips with a serious crisis due to the decrepitude of its equipment and the brain drain to the West. A government that lacks the support of the great majority of the population can hardly launch the necessary reforms, particularly as it is constantly accused of not taking strong enough action to purge its predecessors now that the population has realised the extent of the corruption that prevailed during the Honecker era. Nor is it equipped to pursue the dynamic external policy expected by a population convinced that the question of German reunification is now at hand.

26. There were several new developments in January 1990: the date of the elections was brought forward from May to 18th March 1990, there was a further purge in the SED and its title was changed, links were established between the new SPD and the SPD in the Federal Republic, a coalition government was formed and, finally, the SPD adopted positions favourable to the reunification of Germany and to the withdrawal of the new German state from the alliances, a requirement that the Federal German Government immediately rejected.

27. However, while it was possible to justify bringing forward the date of the elections because of the weakness of the government coalition, it may catch the parties unprepared: they are too numerous, not well established and embarrassed when a clear position has to be adopted on the crucial problem of how to reunify Germany. By the time the Assembly debates the present report, the results of these

elections will be known. At the present juncture, it can but be hoped that they will be clearcut enough to produce an authority capable of negotiating the future status of Germany.

28. Thus, there were two successive peaceful revolutions in the GDR in November and December in the presence of Soviet forces and, in the first case at least, with the endorsement of Mr. Gorbachev who, attending the ceremonies to mark the fortieth anniversary of the GDR at the end of October, referred to the punishment that history inflicted on those who lagged behind and visibly urged Mr. Honecker to resign. However, the fundamental political problem has certainly not yet been solved, nor has a stable régime been achieved and this, for the time being, does not facilitate the search for a solution to the German problem.

#### *(d) Czechoslovakia*

29. Since the failure in 1968 of what is known as the Prague spring, Czechoslovakia had been led by a team that had little concern for reforms or sharing power, the opposition having been reduced to silence. Here, too, it was because the Soviet Union, whose armed forces were still present, made it plain that it would not intervene that the spread of demonstrations, as from 17th November, as massive as they were calm, led the Secretary-General of the Communist Party, Mr. Milos Jakos, to resign on 1st December, together with thirteen members of the Politburo and the Prime Minister, Mr. Adamek.

30. However, Czechoslovakia had the benefit of relatively favourable circumstances because many of the former party leaders who had played a part in the 1968 attempt at reforms, such as Mr. Dubcek, were still alive and were truly popular. Hence it was possible to call on reform-minded communists who had authority in the country. Moreover, various opposition factions managed, on 3rd December, to unite to set up the Democratic Forum which encouraged the continuation of street demonstrations until what it considered to be a satisfactory political solution was found. It set certain conditions for its participation in a new government, in particular the elimination of all who had taken part in the 1968 repression and the deletion of Article 4 of the constitution stipulating the requirement for the party to play a leading rôle. Finally, the Communist Party accepted these conditions and formed a government with the Democratic Forum. Mr. Vaclav Havel, leader of the Charter 77 association, was elected President of the Republic on 29th December 1989 and Mr. Dubcek, officially rehabilitated, became President of the Chamber of Deputies. The new twenty-one member government includes only ten communists, most of whom are known to be

in favour of serious reforms. One of the first steps taken by the new government was to destroy the barriers symbolising the iron curtain separating Czechoslovakia from Austria and to announce that free elections would be held in mid-1990. At the request of Mr. Havel, the oath of loyalty to socialism required of civil servants was also abolished.

31. Mr. Havel proclaimed clearly that he intended to exercise his duties on a provisional basis only and would leave power after the 1990 elections. The present régime therefore considers itself to be merely a transitional one and seems determined not to call for substantial changes in its relations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact apart from, like Hungary and Poland, the withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed on its territory. An agreement reached on 25th February 1990 specified the middle of 1991 for completion of this withdrawal. However, at the beginning of January 1990, Czechoslovakia was one of the strongest critics of Comecon and was the only one to have called for its abolition. At the session in Sofia, it strongly contested the planning aspect of that organisation and asked that it move resolutely towards free international trade and currency convertibility.

*(e) Bulgaria*

32. Bulgaria was probably the people's democracy that best accepted its dependence on the Soviet Union because this followed straight on from the protection exercised by Tsarist Russia to which the Bulgarians owed their independence from the Ottoman Empire following the 1878 San Stefano Treaty and the Berlin Congress. The communist régime set up in the aftermath of the second world war was not so contested as in the other Eastern European countries and the Secretary-General of the party, Mr. Todor Zhivkov, did not, until the last weeks of 1989, feel the need to introduce a reform policy.

33. It was the party that insisted on the departure of its leader and replaced him with a younger, more reform-minded man, Mr. Petur Mladenov, hitherto Minister for Foreign Affairs. However, the change of leader triggered off street demonstrations in Sofia, calling for democracy, free elections and the trial of Mr. Zhivkov, probably encouraged by a government that wished to promote meaningful reforms, since the national television showed the debates in the National Assembly during which Mr. Zhivkov's régime was accused.

34. Similarly it was Mr. Mladenov's government that took the initiative of adopting legislation to restore freedom of political opposition and proposed holding free elections. On 2nd December, the creation of three opposition

parties was announced: the Democratic Party and the Radical Democratic Party, banned since 1948, and an Independent Democratic Party stemming from an association of victims of political repression. Since then, eight other opposition groups have been formed. These various parties and movements have in common a call for the deletion of the article of the Bulgarian Constitution requiring that the Communist Party exercise a leading rôle. They still have to organise themselves before the elections that are to be held during the first half of 1990 so as to show that they can offer an effective opposition capable of exercising power if the communists are voted out.

35. However, it must be noted that behind the events in Bulgaria there is a national problem: the frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey does not correspond to the limits of the Bulgarian-speaking population of Orthodox religion and the Turkish-speaking population, who are Moslems. Not without sound reasons, the Bulgarians complain of the way Bulgarians living in Turkey are treated but, for their part, under Mr. Zhivkov's government, they forced Turks living in Bulgaria to adopt the Bulgarian language and change their names to Bulgarian ones. On 30th December 1989, the new government restored the right of the Bulgarian Turks to use their own names, but this measure provoked violent demonstrations by Bulgarians, probably moved far more by national feelings than by loyalty to the former régime.

36. Bulgaria's case is therefore likely to draw attention to one aspect of the problems raised by the abolition of communist régimes in Eastern Europe, i.e. the re-emergence of national feelings, which had been stifled by authoritarian régimes but remained alive and which might have deep repercussions on the internal evolution in these states towards greater democratic freedom and relations between them. This aspect must not be overlooked because it does not apply to Bulgaria alone.

*(f) Romania*

37. The Romanian régime's aloofness from the Soviet Union in the last twenty years made Romania a very special case. Under the increasingly autocratic dictatorship of the Ceausescu régime, the country, which was not occupied by the Red Army, hardly felt the influence of Mr. Gorbachev. At the start, the Romanian Government's independence had given Mr. Ceausescu some degree of popularity but, little by little, the pursuit of radical communism, the excesses of a police régime, the implementation of modernisation and socialisation plans that were sheer megalomania, the persecution of national minorities, in particular the Hungarians who, numbering 2 500 000 persons, represented almost

12% of the population, and a disastrous economic situation had deprived the Romanian dictator of all support apart from that of those who benefited from the régime and, in particular, the political police, the Securitate.

38. In spite of Romania's isolation, it was obviously events in other people's democracies that encouraged an uprising against the régime that started among the Hungarian minority in Timisoara on 18th December 1989 with a demonstration intended to oppose the eviction of a Protestant pastor. The movement swiftly spread to the western part of the country, where there is a large Hungarian minority, but it was cruelly repressed by the Securitate.

39. Only on 21st December, when the demonstrations spread to the Romanian-speaking population, particularly in Bucharest, was the maintenance of the régime really called in question. A public speech in which Mr. Ceausescu tried to justify his policy and accuse western secret services of stirring up unrest was interrupted by demonstrators and the police, followed by the army with tanks, intervened and fired on the crowd, causing many casualties.

40. In the end, it was an about-turn by the army, probably exasperated by the rôle the Romanian dictator made it play, that tipped the course of events in favour of the demonstrators, first of all in Timisoara and then in Bucharest. On 22nd December, after two days of real civil war between the army and Securitate, Mr. Ceausescu fled. Arrested with his wife, the couple was court martialled, condemned at the close of a summary trial and executed on 24th December. Securitate continued to oppose the people and the army with sporadic, but murderous, resistance for several more days.

41. During this bloody revolution, the only one in which those in power sent in armed resistance against street demonstrations, a National Salvation Front was formed consisting mainly of dissident communists and intellectuals who had protested at the excesses of the régime, such as Mr. Ion Iliescu and the former Romanian Representative to the United Nations, Mr. Dumitri Mazilu, who was in prison for having denounced the violations of human rights committed by his country. This committee immediately announced that Romania was to set up a democratic régime and hold free elections in April 1990. An intellectual known for his active opposition to Mr. Ceausescu's régime, Mr. Petre Roman, was appointed Prime Minister. The question has been raised as to the extent to which the formation of this National Salvation Front had been prepared, even before the events in Timisoara, by the Soviet Union, but no clear answer can be given.

42. In any event, the coming to power of the National Salvation Front was not enough to restore internal order, many people complaining

that it was composed of former communists. In January, many parties of all leanings were formed or reformed and the National Front had to negotiate with twenty-nine of them in order to reach agreement on 1st February on sharing power in a provisional Council of National Union between the Front, the opposition parties, representatives of national minorities and non-political bodies. The continuing confusion in the country indicates that the elections, which have been postponed until 20th May, may well not produce a firm basis for forming a stable government. In spite of being reduced to the status of a party like all the others, the National Salvation Front seems to have retained a strong influence among the workers and to be the main rampart of the social advantages acquired during the communist period in face of ill-structured and very conservative political formations in a country that lacks democratic traditions and experience.

43. Indeed, it must be noted that Mr. Ceausescu's régime was particularly repressive, especially in recent years. It left its opponents no possibility of grouping and organising themselves, with the result that one may wonder in what conditions the Romanian people will tackle the May elections and whether a majority will emerge that is capable of running the country, whereas those nostalgic for the former régime seem organised and determined to defend the advantages they enjoyed. Furthermore, Mr. Ceausescu's régime, under the pretext of maintaining the country's independence, had accepted no foreign loans for many years, thus depriving itself of the means to invest. Although the country is not in debt, like Poland and Hungary, it is in a state of extreme need and will be unable to reactivate its economy without large-scale external assistance and not for some time, which suggests that Romania is still far from having a stable political and economic régime.

*(g) Soviet Union*

44. Since the Assembly had an opportunity, in June 1989, to consider developments in the Soviet Union since 1985, your Rapporteur will merely make a few remarks here about events in the second half of 1989 and the Soviet attitude towards the changes in Eastern Europe.

45. In the first case, what seems most important is the radicalisation of national claims by the Baltic nations whose three republics have abandoned the principle of the party's monopoly of power on their territory. Pro-independence demonstrations have proliferated and the communist parties in the three republics have proclaimed their independence of the Soviet Union's party so as to uphold national claims more effectively. The most serious secessionary attempts have been made in

Estonia where the superiority of national legislation over the Soviet Union's legislation was proclaimed, "Soviet immigrants" lost their national citizenship and, in short, elements of true independence were introduced. At the same time, the legitimacy of the annexation of the Baltic republics was vigorously questioned and direct relations between the republics and Finland developed post-haste.

46. The affair of the Baltic republics is serious for the Soviet Union due to local and more general considerations. The Baltic region is one of the most prosperous in the Soviet Union and one in which the training of managerial staff is most developed, but above all it commands Russia's access to the Baltic Sea, making it particularly important for the security of the Soviet Union and its access to the high seas. Moreover, it would be difficult to refuse other republics whatever the Soviet Union might allow in the Baltic republics and there is little doubt that any concession to separatism would bring grist to the mill of Mr. Gorbachev's enemies in Russia itself.

47. Soviet policy towards the Baltic republics has therefore been to grant them a maximum of autonomy and satisfaction at national level without allowing their membership of the Soviet Union to be questioned. Thus, on 24th December 1989, the Supreme Soviet denounced the Ribbentrop-Molotov protocol of 23rd August 1939 which allowed the Soviet Union to annex the Baltic states but which was not a duly legal instrument. Conversely, Moscow adheres firmly to the principle of maintaining the frontiers defined and ratified by international treaties, a principle confirmed in the CSCE final act in Helsinki in 1975, and has not agreed to re-examine the 1940 annexation of the Baltic states. Soviet doctrine was defined as follows by Mr. Valentin Falin on 21st August 1989: "Anyone who persists in wishing to divide what cannot be divided and remodeling countries and frontiers without paying attention to the life and safety of people is heading for disaster." Similarly, Moscow was tolerant about the appearance of non-communist parties in the Baltic republics and the success of their candidates in several cases against the local communist parties' candidates. It did not agree, however, to these communist parties being independent of the CPSU. "Accountable autonomy" has been granted to the Baltic republics, but no independence, whereas on 25th February 1990 elections in Lithuania gave supporters of independence a majority. On 11th March, the Lithuanian Parliament voted a proclamation of independence by a very large majority.

48. It should be recalled that the western countries have never recognised the Soviet Union's annexation of the Baltic states and, when members of the Assembly met Soviet

leaders, the latter agreed that the citizens of those republics should be invited to vote by referendum on whether their countries should remain in the union. When Mr. Gorbachev toured those countries in January 1990, he restricted himself to proposals on autonomy which obviously failed to satisfy part of the population. At that time, the Soviet Union was admittedly faced with other, more serious, national problems in the Caucasus and its intervention to restore order there might have been even more difficult if it had acceded to Baltic claims.

49. The nationality question is indeed acute in the Caucasus, where the permanent conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis has not been solved, in spite of efforts by the central government. In January 1990, the massacre of Armenians in Baku, at a number of points along the frontier between Armenia and Azerbaijan and in the Armenian enclave of Nagorny Karabakh was so serious that the central authorities had to bring in the army to protect the people threatened, restore order and prevent frontiers being crossed between the two republics and between the latter and Turkey or Iran. This unrest, followed since 10th February by demonstrations and military repression in Tadjik and, several days later, Uzbekistan, revealed the considerable influence acquired by fundamentalist groups among Moslem inhabitants of the Soviet Union and Iran's assistance to these nationalist movements. The western powers had assured the government in Moscow that they would do nothing to prevent it restoring order in the Caucasus. Clearly, however, the army was ill-prepared to carry out the task of keeping order, nor were the Russian people very willing to become involved in such operations. For the first time, therefore, it seems that the Soviet Union, a third of whose population is Moslem, is threatened by powerful disintegrating forces due to the awakening of national aspirations, that it had not realised the extent of the danger and that it is hardly equipped to handle it.

50. Furthermore, events in Romania seem to have provoked a further outbreak of claims by the Moldavians, at least in terms of cultural autonomy, since their national language is Romanian. Finally, Moscow has actively sought to improve its relations with the Vatican to try to calm down the religious claims of the Ukrainian Uniate, who are opposed to their church being incorporated in the Russian Orthodox Church.

51. At the beginning of 1990, the Soviet Government appears to be giving priority to these various domestic concerns. Presumably it will be particularly firm about any infringement of the principle of the inviolability of frontiers in Europe and at the same time it will probably do

its utmost to prevent renewed nationalism in Europe. It will therefore foster the speedy establishment of a peaceful organisation of European security based inter alia on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

52. This was the Soviet Union's attitude towards the changes in the people's democracies. Nowhere, even when it was there, did the Red Army intervene and, while the Soviet Union seems to have been in favour of communist party leaders in those countries being replaced, it was discreet and left the local forces to act alone. Probably wishing to promote perestroika in the European countries with communist régimes, it did not object to the recognition of new parties by the authorities in all these countries or to non-communist forces such as Solidarity in Poland assuming positions of responsibility. Conversely, it rejected calls for it to intervene in the civil war in Romania and to terminate Mr. Ceausescu's régime, for which it had no sympathy.

(h) *Yugoslavia*

53. This country which, since the end of the second world war, has a communist régime which emerged from its internal resistance movement, has not been occupied by the Red Army and has never been part of the military system set up by the Soviet Union. Under the leadership of Marshal Tito, it conducted several economic and social experiments which led to a break with Moscow but with mediocre results. Nevertheless, the authority of Marshal Tito, who was a Croat, allowed order to be maintained within a country which has always been torn by national rivalries since a large number of minorities cohabit alongside a Serbian majority.

54. Since Tito's death, the Serbian element seems to have taken control of the League of Communists and the central authorities, leading to constant rebellions by Albanians who are in the majority in the autonomous region of Kosovo and discontent among Croats and Slovenians. Events in the other communist countries at the end of 1989 first led to the Slovenian Communist Party breaking away from the federal league, followed in February 1990 by the Croat Party, and then a further wave of unrest in Kosovo, where the government in Belgrade, after restricting the province's autonomy in March 1989, had to send in the army on 1st February 1990. Nor do the political reforms embarked upon by the federal government seem to have put an end to unrest throughout the country's non-Serbian provinces. Calls for the régime to be reformed are closely linked to national reactions vis-à-vis a League of Communists that has remained conservative.

55. The re-emergence of nationalist aspirations in Yugoslavia is particularly serious

because it jeopardises the survival of a country which has always lacked national cohesion and because several minorities can claim kinship with neighbouring countries to obtain political or military support. In the circumstances, if nationalist unrest in Yugoslavia were to worsen, it might again endanger peace in the Balkan Peninsula and hence throughout Europe.

(i) *Conclusions*

56. Thus, events in Eastern Europe in the last months of 1989 allow a far clearer picture to be obtained of the reality of changes in Soviet external policy. It is now evident that it no longer considers it essential to maintain docile communist parties in power in the Central and Eastern European countries. The Comecon session in Sofia on 8th and 9th January 1990 suggests that the Soviet Union does not intend to continue the economic domination of the region that led these countries to bankruptcy, although there seems to be no question of Comecon not being maintained. Conversely, whether it wishes to keep the Warsaw Pact structures intact is an open question.

57. If we now look at the other Eastern European countries, several factors seem worthy of mention and, first of all, their moderate reactions to the Soviet Union, Comecon and the Warsaw Pact. Nowhere have the governments and people been aggressive towards the Soviet Union. Even when Hungary and Czechoslovakia asked it to withdraw its forces from their territory, they negotiated the time-table. In no case, except in Romania, where the Soviet Union was not involved, was the break between the old and the new régimes radical and no irreversible situation has been created from the point of view of relations between Mr. Gorbachev's Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries.

58. However, two aspects of the situation are still disturbing. On the one hand, none of the régimes set up in 1989 seems likely to last, but, except perhaps in Hungary where events did not move so fast, the prospect of holding free elections in no way guarantees the creation of régimes capable of governing the countries concerned, except perhaps in Hungary where the evolution was slower, the parties capable of struggling for power being unable to express the views of the nation. It is not therefore out of the question that, in certain countries at least, the former leading parties, even if they have changed their names as in Hungary, may be able to take advantage of the disorganised opposition and the imminence of the elections to retain a de facto leading rôle, the principle of which they have renounced. Moreover, the re-emergence of nationalism has become a threat for the maintenance of international order in Eastern Europe. Until now, the problem has been brought into

the open only in regard to the Turks in Bulgaria, the Albanians in Yugoslavia's Kosovo and the Azerbaijanis and Balts in the Soviet Union, but the part played by the Hungarian minority in Romania in the revolt against Mr. Ceausescu's tyranny suggests that it will ask for a status that the Romanians will probably not unanimously wish to grant it. The national aspect of claims by the people of the GDR is also clear and raises a question which deserves to be examined separately.

### *III. The German problem*

59. To go to the heart of the matter means examining the problem raised by the fate of Germany as a separate question, not so much because of its extremely complex juridical aspects but because of the existence, at the centre of Europe, of a German nation grouping about 80 million persons that quite naturally wishes to recover its unity. Because of the size of the population, the economic strength of the two German states, the crimes committed by the Nazi régime and the deep wounds they left throughout Europe, the rôle played by Germany in the two world wars and the place of the German states in the two present systems of alliance, the German problem concerns all Europe, and the stability of a new European order will depend largely on how it is solved. Any organisation of Europe that failed to satisfy the underlying feelings of the Germans would inevitably be precarious. On the other hand, the reunification of Germany or, more accurately, grouping the two German states in a single political entity, since there is no question of reconstituting a state which claims a return to 1937 frontiers, might revive a variety of fears among Europeans and jeopardise the new European order if not accompanied by satisfactory guarantees for the other nations of Europe, particularly Poland. It is not just an inter-German matter; it concerns the whole of Europe. This is one of the reasons why, alone, the simple application of Article 23 of the Basic Law which allows any German Land so wishing to be incorporated into the Federal Republic is unacceptable in present circumstances.

60. It should first be recalled that there were two separate reasons for the division of Germany and Berlin. The first, the juridical basis of the German problem and its historical origin, was the occupation of the entire territory of Germany within its 1937 frontiers by the victors of 1945, the division of the major part of this territory into four zones shared between the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, the creation of a special Berlin area occupied jointly by these four powers and – subject to a final settlement of territorial questions in a peace treaty – the handing over of another part of this territory to Poland and the

Soviet Union. The second, of a political nature, was the division of Europe into two camps which prevented a four-party agreement on the treatment of all the zones of occupation and the conclusion of a peace treaty for Germany as provided for at the Potsdam conference. Consequently, the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the three western powers, on the other, went their separate ways in settling their relations with their respective zones. Thus, two different German states were created without this affecting quadripartite responsibilities towards Germany as a whole, and the four powers still exercise these responsibilities directly in Berlin.

61. In regard to the specifically German aspect of the problem, it should be recalled that, after the victors took over supreme power in Germany, no central German authority remained in the aftermath of the war. Attempts by German authorities, established by the allies at regional level, to safeguard German unity failed. It was possible to hold free elections only in the three western zones. In these zones, they were the basis of a new democratic order, considered to be transitional until the final settlement of the German problem. The essential elements of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany thus created and the three western powers were laid down in the 1954 agreements, which included:

- an undertaking by the Federal Republic to become integrated in the European edifice, join the Atlantic Alliance and contribute to European defence under the supervision of Western European Union;
- an undertaking by the three powers to guarantee the freedom and security of the western sectors of Berlin and to support the common aim of rebuilding a unified, free and democratic Germany on the basis of a peace settlement for Germany as a whole.

62. The second German state, the German Democratic Republic, established under the protection of the Soviet Union and integrated in the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, had difficulty in obtaining recognition by the international community outside the Warsaw Pact for lack of an endorsement by its population. Only the conclusion of the inter-German treaty in 1972 led to international recognition of the GDR and the accession of both German states to the United Nations and the Helsinki final act. One of its aims was to improve the situation of the German people in both states in spite of their conflicting positions on basic matters.

63. The responsibility of the four 1945 occupying powers for the entire German territory as long as a peace treaty or equivalent international

act has not set up a single German state is exercised in a particular manner in the case of Berlin. The agreement of the four powers is necessary for any change in the present status of the German states, and of Berlin, and any change in the frontiers between the German states and any other European state.

64. The division of Europe into two camps is becoming less marked thanks to changes in the Soviet Union and most Central and Eastern European countries. Developments in the German Democratic Republic in the last months of 1989 have allowed the demarcation line between the two German states to be opened to the free movement of persons, the movement of goods having been regulated, since 1972, to grant it a major rôle in the economies of both states. The opening of the Berlin wall and the accompanying or ensuing demonstrations showed that the belief of the two sections of the German people that they belong to the same national community had remained very strong.

65. The unification of Germany has been a topical matter since the end of 1989 but it remains to be seen how it must be achieved. For the reasons set out above, while the will expressed by East German crowds and, in a different manner, by West German citizens may compel the four powers to embark upon a process leading to reunification, they have their word to say about how this should be done and the commitments a reunified Germany will have to enter into to reassure its partners. This is particularly important since the problem concerns all European countries, particularly those co-operating, in the framework of the CSCE process, in the establishment of a stable, peaceful order in Europe based on the right of nations to self-determination. It is in the interests of no one for the popular enthusiasm stemming from the destruction of the Berlin wall to lead to an uncontrolled situation. Nor would it be acceptable to arouse a feeling of helplessness and revolt among Germans by not acting on these demonstrations. Moreover, the treaty concluded between the Federal Republic and the western occupying powers in 1954 leaves the latter no choice but to do their utmost to bring about reunification.

66. Events in the German Democratic Republic are moving so fast that the parties concerned must reach very early agreement on a programme for the reunification of Germany if reunification is to be achieved in an orderly manner, avoiding all the drawbacks that would result from an uncontrolled development of the situation in Germany for the establishment of a stable, peaceful order in Europe. The emigration of citizens from the GDR to the West is accelerating. Since the beginning of 1990, it has been proceeding at a rate of 2 000 persons a day,

which is tolerable neither for the GDR, which is losing the pick of its population, nor for the Federal Republic, which has to house them. The Deutschmark is already starting to replace the East German Mark in stimulating economic activity in the GDR. Economic assistance from the Federal Republic and investments by West German firms are becoming essential for the economic recovery of the GDR. State officials, whether party members or not, are concerned about their future and hesitate to serve a state which seems doomed and is already contested and powerless, and there have been numerous desertions from the army and among its officers. In short, the state is threatened with complete collapse. Already very shaken by the economic crisis in the GDR, the nation may be even more disrupted by the monetary reunification which will be effected inevitably in favour of the West German mark.

67. The prospect of such a collapse made the leaders of the GDR seek arrangements with the Federal Republic, including financial assistance, but, at the meeting between Mr. Kohl and Mr. Modrow on 13th February, the Federal Chancellor insisted that monetary unification, i.e. using the Deutschmark throughout Germany, must be organised beforehand. A parity committee was set up to arrange for this aspect of reunification even before the elections to be held in the GDR on 18th March.

68. The march towards the reunification of the two German states is therefore now under way. It is inevitable because of the dislocation of the state and the economic crisis in the GDR and most leaders in the countries particularly concerned by the German question have, in one way or another, given their views on reunification. In particular, this was so for Chancellor Kohl, speaking in the Bundestag on 28th November 1989 and in Paris on 17th January 1990, Mr. Shevardnadze, whose clearest comments were made to the Political Committee of the European Parliament in December 1989, Mr. Baker, in his Berlin address on 18th December, Mr. Mitterrand, speaking as Chairman-in-Office of the European Community, during his meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Kiev on 6th December, in Berlin on 22nd December and on several other occasions early in 1990, Mr. Gysi, the new Chairman of the SED Party, on 7th January, Mr. Mazowiecki, Polish Prime Minister, addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 30th January and, finally, Mr. Genscher, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Tutzing on 31st January. There are certainly differences between their words but it must first be stressed that they agree on the main course, i.e. that there must be reunification but that it must remain under government control and come about progressively in line with the establishment of a new European order with which it is closely linked.

69. In January 1990, the various countries concerned managed to define three levels of negotiations on German reunification:

- (i) after the elections on 18th March 1990, negotiations between the governments of the two German states with the purpose of defining the stages in their rapprochement, first of all in a confederal-type association, so as to safeguard the interests of the populations of the two states;
- (ii) negotiations between the two German states and the four powers responsible for the territory that remained German in 1945, to fix and guarantee the frontiers of the new state and specify what commitments it will have to enter into vis-à-vis its partners. Some countries have objected to these restricted, so-called "2 plus 4" negotiations, either, as in the case of Poland, because of its vital interest in the fixing of the eastern frontiers of the new German state, or, as in the case of certain western countries, because they are afraid of a European directorate being formed from which they would be excluded. It seems inevitable, however, for legal reasons and in order to find an early, generally-acceptable solution, to abide by this procedure which is obviously based only on the 1945 situation and will not need to be perpetuated once the four powers have handed over to a unified German state full sovereignty over its territory;
- (iii) negotiations open to all the thirty-five countries taking part in the CSCE to arrange for the inclusion of the new state in a new peaceful order in Europe. These negotiations are to start in autumn 1990 with a meeting of heads of state or of government.

70. Finally, it is inevitable that bringing the two German states together will lead to changes in the international organisations to which they belong. There are already plans for a meeting of heads of state or of government of the EEC countries in Dublin in April. The question of the membership of the future German state and the limits to the stationing of foreign forces on its territory have arisen, and the answer to these questions will lead the members of the Atlantic Alliance to determine the organisation of the alliance. Finally, application of the modified Brussels Treaty to a reunified Germany will also raise a number of questions that the WEU Council will have to tackle.

*(a) Understanding between  
the two German states*

71. The German Democratic Republic is now recognised at international level. This implies that the state must be maintained as long as an international act has not handed over its rights to another state, whatever may be the opinion of its people about its continued existence. The creation of such a state is provided for in the latter's Basic Law, Article 146 of which specifies that it "shall cease to be in force on the day on which a constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into force". However, this requires prior agreement between the two German states on the establishment of an all-German political system, be it a matter of creating a confederation or, as proposed by Mr. Gysi on 7th January 1990 in a document entitled "Model of security 2 000", establishing an inter-German community in the framework of a European confederation in which the two states would remain. Admittedly, Mr. Gysi's proposals seem unsatisfactory because they do not take due account of the wishes still being expressed every day by the people of the GDR, and it will be necessary to wait for the free elections to be held in the GDR on 18th March 1990 before having a sufficiently representative government which can really negotiate on behalf of the GDR. It would, moreover, be sound democratic practice for the parties that are to present candidates at the May elections to state clearly their views on German reunification in order to help the citizens to vote on this vital question.

72. The ten-point programme presented by Chancellor Kohl on 28th November 1989 – although it was a pity the Federal Republic's allies were not informed beforehand – is a progressive one, the first stage of which resembles the confederation referred to by Mr. Gysi but what the former sees to be one step in a gradual process is apparently the final aim of the second. Chancellor Kohl's fourth and fifth points set out his views on the future of inter-German relations as follows:

"4. (East German) Prime Minister Modrow spoke in his governmental declaration of a 'contractual community'. We are prepared to accept these thoughts... This co-operation will also increasingly demand common institutions... It goes without saying that Berlin will be fully included in these co-operative efforts...

5. We are also prepared to take a further decisive step, namely to develop confederative structures between the two states in Germany with the goal of creating a federation, a federal state order in Germany. A legitimate democratic government within the GDR is an unrelinquishable prerequisite.



We can envisage that after free elections the following institutions be formed: a common governmental committee for permanent consultation and political harmonisation; common technical committees; a common parliamentary body... Such a coming together is in the interest of the continuation of German history. State organisations within Germany are always confederations or federations... Nobody knows how a reunified Germany will look. I am however sure that unity will come, if it is wanted by the German nation."

73. It is now certain that, after the elections on 18th March, there will be negotiations between the two states and they will probably deal first with their mutual relations in the framework, suggested both by Mr. Modrow and by Chancellor Kohl, of a "contractual community" designed to become a confederation, but only the result of the elections in the GDR will decide whether the subsequent stage, i.e. a federation, can be envisaged immediately. Its achievement will very probably also depend on the decisions adopted at the so-called 2 plus 4 negotiations.

*(b) Reunification and the European Community*

74. The seventh point of Chancellor Kohl's programme refers to the rôle that the European Community might play in the reunification process:

"7. The powers of attraction and the aura of the European Community is and remains a constant feature in the pan-European development. We want to strengthen this further...

We understand the process leading to the recovery of German unity to be of European concern. It must, therefore, be considered together with European integration. In keeping with this, the European Community must remain open to a democratic GDR and to other democratic countries from Central and South-Eastern Europe. The EC must not end on the Elbe...

Only in this way is it possible for the EC to become the foundation for truly comprehensive European unity."

75. There is no major economic obstacle to this proposal since inter-German trade is already considered to be internal Community trade under the protocol to the Rome Treaty which specifies that the Community makes no distinction between the part of German territory subject to the Basic Law and the part which is not. However, it raises a number of quite different questions and, in particular, who will take

part in the management of the Community: both states or the confederal body? Will the GDR take part in the activities of the European Council? What consequences would that have for defining a common European policy in areas where it exists? Finally, the approaching establishment of the single European market in January 1993 and progress towards economic and monetary union make one wonder how monetary union will be introduced between the two German states, what will be the consequences for the Deutschmark, which will inevitably have to become the common currency of unified Germany, and what will be the ensuing burden for the Community, of which one member at least, the United Kingdom, has clearly voiced its opposition to taking a share.

*(c) Reunification and the alliances*

76. The fact that the Federal Republic is part of the Atlantic Alliance and the GDR of the Warsaw Pact raises problems that are far more serious insofar as these two organisations are major frameworks for maintaining peace in Europe and pursuing the various disarmament negotiations. At the present juncture, it would be dangerous to touch either the Warsaw Pact or the Atlantic Alliance and, however much good will the Federal Republic's partners may have, they cannot risk destroying the balance on which peace in Europe is based in order to accelerate a solution of the German problem.

77. Admittedly, as Chancellor Kohl says in the ninth point of his programme:

"9. The surmounting of the separation of Europe and the division of Germany demands far-reaching and speedy steps pertaining to disarmament and arms control..."

78. Moreover, as Mr. Shevardnadze made clear in his address to the Political Committee of the European Parliament, it is the Federal Republic's participation in the NATO integrated military structures that the Soviet Union and certainly most of its allies, too, consider to be the major obstacle to the reunification of Germany. It is perfectly understandable that the Soviet Union should do its utmost to avoid the establishment in the centre of Europe of a strong state whose army would be at the service of an organisation designed inherently to ensure western security. Nor can NATO continue its work, which has in fact paved the way for the reunification of Germany, without the participation of the Federal Republic. It therefore has to be concluded that, at least in a first stage, as the two German states come closer together, the possibility must be safeguarded for each of them to remain in the alliance of which it is now a member.

79. The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union reached in February 1990 to limit to 195 000 men their military presence in the Federal Republic, in the case of the former, and in the other members of the Warsaw Pact, in the case of the latter, shows how the two countries view this first stage: maintaining a smaller force, limited by joint agreement, on the territory of each of the two present states. Such a solution, possible for only a relatively brief period, can obviously not last, since it is hard to imagine a reunified, independent country on whose territory forces from two different alliances would be stationed. Furthermore, keeping Soviet forces on the territory of the present GDR, if not strictly limited in time, might risk incidents with the population, which might lead to serious difficulties in the peaceful move towards German reunification. Similarly, the idea of keeping the territory of the GDR demilitarised, or deploying only non-integrated territorial forces there, while the territory of the Federal Republic and part of the German army would be integrated in NATO seems possible for only a limited period. However this might be, as Mr. Genscher underlined in his speech in Tutzing, the idea that the part of Germany now forming the GDR might be included in NATO military structures would block the way to rapprochement between the two Germanys.

80. Mr. Gysi made proposals for a bilateral disarmament agreement between the two German states including:

- (i) renunciation of the modernisation of weapons;
- (ii) renunciation of low-altitude flying;
- (iii) renunciation of submarines;
- (iv) renunciation of landing craft;
- (v) progressive withdrawal of allied troops before 1991;
- (vi) return of regular servicemen to civilian life;
- (vii) reduction of military service to twelve months;
- (viii) banning the stationing of units less than 50 or 80 km on each side of the joint frontier;
- (ix) 50% reduction in troop levels in both armies;
- (x) reduction in the production and procurement of armaments.

81. In fact, such an agreement would mean the Federal Republic withdrawing from NATO and the GDR from the Warsaw Pact resulting in the de facto neutralisation of Germany. Moreover, Mr. Gysi hardly disguised this when he said: "If there are people who cannot imagine Europe without NATO, our view of

Germanys' future in a united Europe is more peaceful and friendly. The alliances should be dissolved in such a Europe." Two themes of the propaganda spread by the Soviet Union and its allies since Khrushchev's time are to be found in these proposals: the neutralisation of Germany and the dissolution of the pacts. The end result is almost the same since the territory of the Federal Republic is essential for the credible deployment of NATO forces.

82. The proposal made by Admiral Theodor Hoffmann in East Berlin on 22nd February derives from the same concept: the armies of the two German states would be merged in a single Bundeswehr with about 150 000 troops. In the first stage, Soviet and American forces would remain in the two German states but would be progressively reduced with a view to the early disbandment of the alliances.

83. It is quite natural for Mr. Gysi to reject the proposal made by President Bush in November 1989 for Germany to be reunified in the framework of NATO. Mr. Gysi said: "The SED-PDS refuses a united Germany in NATO. It does not want a Fourth Reich that would be capable of strengthening NATO, destroying the European balance and frightening its neighbours." However, it is not acceptable for the dissolution of the alliances to be made a prior condition for understanding between the two German states since to disband them would destroy this very balance of forces in Europe. Only when disarmament in Europe has made substantial progress and a peaceful structure has acquired sufficient authority will it be possible to consider dissolving present structures.

84. Although the pre-electoral situation in the GDR lessens the weight of much of its leaders' ideas, it is nevertheless clear that, on this point, Mr. Gysi was expressing views shared by the Soviet Union - Mr. Falin confirmed this moreover - and, probably, by other Eastern European countries. So, in however weak a position the Soviet Union may have been placed in negotiations on German unification because of the will expressed by the people of the GDR, there can be no such unification without its agreement and this largely depends on how its security interests are taken into account. The utmost attention should therefore be paid to these interests if German reunification is to be achieved in the framework of a reunification of Europe, the only real guarantee of long-term peace. That is why, at the beginning of February, Mr. Genscher proposed forbidding NATO to extend its deployment further East. This proposal was well received by both Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Baker, the Secretary of State, when they met in Moscow on 8th February, and it was taken up by Mr. Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO, in a speech in Hamburg on 9th February. It is the basis of the agreement

reached between President Bush and Chancellor Kohl on 24th February and of the present negotiations on a reunified Germany's place in the organisation of European security.

85. In fact, everything indicates that the proposal taken up by Mr. Shevardnadze to neutralise reunified Germany was made only to allow the negotiations to be started. Some of the Soviet Union's allies, such as Poland, have announced that they are hostile to this solution which they believe to have the disadvantage of allowing a German national military power to be built up on their frontiers. They seem to prefer an integrated German army to German national power. The Soviet Union itself very probably does not want such neutralisation, unless limits and controls are imposed that Germany could hardly accept. However, it also appears that the Soviet Union, for understandable reasons, is not prepared to admit that the reunification of Germany will bring NATO's integrated military system 250 km eastwards.

86. Furthermore, as Mr. Hurd emphasised in Bonn in February, some of Germany's western allies are not prepared to let a united Germany associate the present forces of the two states nor to break away from the Federal Republic's renunciations in regard to armaments or the deployment of its forces.

87. A solution to the problem raised by the reunification of Germany must be sought on the basis of these two considerations. It may be deduced that neither the new state's membership of the alliance nor the presence of allied forces, in numbers limited by international agreement, are necessarily unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Possibly then, Germany, while remaining a member of the alliance, might withdraw from the integrated military structures and the maintenance of American forces west of the demarcation line could perhaps be governed by a bilateral agreement between Germany and the United States. Otherwise, as Mr. David Owen said on 31st January, the other European members of the alliance would have to accommodate the American forces that were to be kept in Europe. Conversely, forces from WEU countries might remain on German territory on a reciprocal basis, i.e. German forces would be stationed on the territory of other WEU countries, so as to safeguard an essential element of deterrence, i.e. the unambiguous allied concept that any attack on a WEU member country will be met jointly by all its members. The INF agreements should preclude any nuclear weapons being kept on German territory, particularly if the CFE agreement is to be quickly followed by negotiations to eliminate very short-range nuclear weapons.

88. In any event, the modified Brussels Treaty is to be revised in the coming years following the accession of Portugal and Spain. This

revision will obviously have to take account of Germany's new status and the decisions taken by the 2 plus 4 conference on the external consequences of reunification. At the present stage of the negotiations, WEU should be able to play a major rôle in settling the military aspect of the problem and, as in 1954, allowing Germany to play an essential part in the European security system, for there can be no security in Europe without Germany participating fully and on an equal footing.

*(d) Reunification of Germany and reunification of Europe*

89. Like Chancellor Kohl, Mr. Gysi stressed that any reunification of Germany must be placed in a European context. This point of view was also defended by Mr. Mitterrand, Chairman-in-Office of the European Community, when he visited East Berlin on 22nd December and then at his meeting with Chancellor Kohl, when they both said that the establishment of a confederation between the states of the two parts of Europe was their common aim.

90. In his reunification programme, Chancellor Kohl referred to two aspects of this question. On the one hand, in the sixth point, he said that:

“ 6. The development of inner-German relations remains bedded in the pan-European process and in East-West relations. The future structure of Germany must fit into the future architecture of Europe as a whole...”

Again, in the eighth point, he expressed his views on procedure to be followed to set up this confederation:

“ 8. The CSCE process is and remains a crucial part of the total European architecture and must be further advanced.”

91. However, publication of this programme gave rise, among some of Germany's partners, in both East and West, to the remark that it contained no reference to the maintenance of present frontiers. The Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Mazowiecki, supported by Mr. Shevardnadze, is calling for a solemn declaration by the Federal Government on the intangibility of those frontiers. Yet it is quite clear that reunification cannot concern only the two German states, with Berlin, but that claims to other territories that belonged to Germany in 1937 might destabilise the whole of Europe and be a setback to any reunification process. While it is true that Chancellor Kohl's proposals concerned only future relations between the two German states, it is equally true that any uncertainty about the attitude of the Germans in this connection may have dangerous consequences.

92. Over the years, the Federal Republic of Germany, either in its 1970 treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland (the German-Polish declaration issued after Chancellor Kohl's visit to Poland in November 1989 specifically refers to them) or in recent statements by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and resolutions adopted by the Bundestag, has shown clearly that it does not intend to call in question the Oder-Neisse line separating the GDR from Poland. Understandably, the federal authorities hesitate to take the initiative in statements which would make them lose any advantage they might derive from the absence of a peace treaty. Juridically speaking, one might say that only the government of a reunified Germany can ratify changes made by treaty to Germany's 1937 frontiers. However, now is probably the time, if we really want a reunification of Germany acceptable to Europe as a whole, to renounce verbal reservations which might suggest that, after reunification has been achieved, Germany might resume claims which the Federal Republic had renounced. Quite rightly, the Federal Government is very vigilant about the legal aspects of questions relating to the future of a Germany whose status still lacks adequate foundations. Furthermore, the United States, France and the United Kingdom, in their joint declaration in the final act of the London conference of 3rd October 1954, after taking note that the Federal Republic had undertaken never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany, asserted that "a peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement".

93. After the elections on 18th March, negotiations will be started between the two German states, although they have in fact already begun on monetary unification. It will then be possible for the parliaments of the two states representing Germany as a whole to make a joint undertaking not to call in question Germany's eastern frontier. Nevertheless, a prior declaration by the two governments would be a useful contribution to the process of reunification because it would reassure Poland and also many other Europeans by specifying that reunification as understood by the Germans is indeed the reunification that other Europeans are prepared to accept and support. There is every reason to welcome the fact that, in an article in the *Augsburger Allgemeine* of 24th February, Mr. Genscher proposed that such a step be taken in the near future. Finally, it might help to appease their fears if other European countries were associated with the negotiations which concern them directly.

*(e) Conclusions*

94. All the peoples of Europe are now convinced that a new peaceful and stable order requires reunification to which no opposition is being expressed, although it has caused understandable concern among some people because of the past and also because of geographical, demographic, economic and monetary realities that will inevitably ensure that Germany, reunified in one form or another, will play a leading part in the Europe of tomorrow. Germans must therefore recognise these concerns and ensure that reunification is achieved with Europe and not against it. This means that reunification, whose principle is now accepted in accordance with the right of each nation to self-determination, must take account of the feelings of neighbouring countries, respect the international acts which recognise the existence of the two German states and ensure maintenance of the structures of a European organisation that already exists in Western Europe with the Atlantic Alliance, the Community and WEU, in Eastern Europe with the Warsaw Pact and in Europe as a whole with the CSCE. These structures are the best guarantee that the reunification of Germany will coincide with the reunification of Europe. However, if they are maintained, this means that the solution of the German problem does not depend only on agreement between the two German states. Their *raison d'être* will disappear only when a European confederation has acquired sufficient authority to guarantee effectively the security of all. At present, the CSCE seems to be the most appropriate framework for ensuring that the rapprochement between the two German states is accomplished with the consent of the whole of Europe.

95. This requirement means that the reunification of Germany must be progressive and not the result of a simple understanding between the two German states. It also requires close consultation between the Federal Government and the other members of the Community, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance so that the West stands united in such a delicate matter. Finally, it means that Germany once reunified, like the two German states until then, will have to maintain its renunciation of nuclear weapons, since otherwise fears might be revived that the new German state might use this weapon to defend national interests that none of the partners of either German state is prepared to endorse.

96. The reunification process is a side-effect of perestroika and was triggered off by the people of the GDR, the very great majority of whom in any case could apparently no longer stand their political and economic régime. It may be thought that the elections on 18th March will confirm its will to proceed swiftly to the uni-

fication of the two German states. In fact, steps have already been taken in this direction, e.g. in the monetary field. The external conditions for such an association must therefore be settled as soon as possible and the stages fixed if there is not to be de facto reunification making it far more difficult to hold subsequent negotiations in which other countries are to participate. A time-table has already been worked out for these negotiations, the main steps being planned to be taken in 1990. However, everyone knows that it is essential for the broad lines of a settlement to be drawn up even before the actual negotiations start. It is therefore essential to prepare an outline settlement quickly, at least for the most important aspects, the main one now being the place of reunified Germany in the organisation of European security. This is why the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, on the one hand, and the members of WEU, on the other, must reach early agreement on this point with the Soviet Union and its allies. There is already some degree of convergence on excluding the neutralisation of Germany and on the unreversed participation of reunified Germany in the NATO integrated military system. However, it is essential for further progress to be made quickly so that a first compromise can be worked out and everything indicates that in this respect WEU can contribute to a solution. As far as your Rapporteur knows, the Council seems to have done little so far to help the search for such a solution.

97. It is also tempting to look ahead to a time when peace, guaranteed by radical disarmament, is firmly established in Europe, thus rendering vain any measures to set the reunification of Germany in the framework of present security systems. But it should be recalled that, far from ensuring such a development in the near future, events in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 have increased the causes of instability, for the next few years at least. Hence the settlement of the German question cannot be based on an over-optimistic view of a future that is far from sure. The principles set out in the platform of The Hague still meet Western Europe's security requirements and will probably do so for some years. There can be no question of renouncing their application in the name of an admittedly enticing vision of the organisation of a peaceful order in Europe, but which is still remote from present-day realities.

#### *IV. Towards a new European order*

98. In the last forty years, there has been a considerable growth in inter-state organisations working in many different areas in Europe. This has led, on the one hand, to limits if not on the sovereignty at least on the freedom of action of national states and, on the other, to the emergence of a feeling of security that Europeans had

not known for more than a century. The fear of armed conflicts between neighbours has disappeared from Western Europe, economic solidarity has become a reality in the Common Market countries and commitments entered into in the Council of Europe or the CSCE have done much to remove dictatorial or totalitarian inclinations. However, this organisation of peace in Europe has been limited by the division of the continent into two camps. Two military alliance systems and two economic co-operation organisations have maintained permanent tension in the centre of Europe and have significantly curbed the feeling of security arising from the disappearance of traditional antagonisms.

99. Events in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 suggest that this division no longer corresponds to the realities of the Europe of tomorrow, if not today, and that henceforth a peaceful order can be built that is truly European. The question therefore is whether we are to build a common house that will be something entirely new and whether it is desirable to destroy the system that was developed after the war or whether it is preferable to base the new order on relations between existing organisations, which will merely have to adapt their activities to the new circumstances.

100. As a consequence of this situation, both sides have accepted new concepts, as Mr. Pierre Harmel most aptly indicated in his paper at the Florence colloquy in April 1989, i.e. the concept of shared security whose corollary is the maintenance of a minimum threshold of security and deterrence, based on the notion of sufficiency, a concept to which the Soviet Union is no longer opposed, if Mr. Shevardnadze is to be believed.

101. The Atlantic Alliance, on the one hand, and the Warsaw Pact, on the other, are now the essential instruments for maintaining this shared security and defining together the minimum threshold of security to be ensured. Together, they have to achieve a balance of security which still can be defined only as a balance of forces between two opposing military systems. In addition, NATO has to handle transatlantic relations which are being called in question by the evolution of the external threat. However, although both systems are facing crises, the position is far more acute in the Warsaw Pact, which has just witnessed the collapse of the system of values that it claimed to uphold and whose existence is in jeopardy, than in the Atlantic Alliance, whose success is clear, since it has managed to ensure peace in Europe without renouncing any of the values it had the task of defending. It is probably this success that led the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, to propose extending the alliance's action to political questions, without taking due account of the fact that other organisations, such as the Council of Europe and WEU, were

probably better placed to pursue such action, in certain areas at least. It is obviously not very desirable to create new international institutions, and it should therefore be determined more clearly, as far as possible, in which areas each one can help to establish a new European order.

(a) *The alliances*

102. The question of maintaining the existing alliances – the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance with WEU – is obviously the most acute since they are often accused, wrongly rather than rightly, of bearing responsibility for the long East-West confrontation. In fact, they probably made a major contribution to preventing confrontation, of which they were a result rather than the cause, from degenerating and at the same time they ensured peace within each camp. Clearly, the question must be solved at one and the same time and in the same manner for NATO and the Warsaw Pact since it is out of the question for one of these organisations to become the instrument of all-European security. Moreover, the dissolution of the pacts may, in the short term, be a goal for countries wishing to free themselves quickly from everything that was part of the Soviet grip and may appear, even to a section of western public opinion, to be an obvious implication of détente.

103. Faced with the transformation of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the development of disarmament negotiations, the first question is therefore whether Western Europe still needs a defensive system. As matters now stand, there is no doubt that it does, for several reasons:

104. (i) The Soviet Union is and will for a long time be a very great military power with considerable conventional and nuclear means. In its own words, it needs some ten years to achieve a significant reduction in its conventional weapons, seven years to destroy its chemical weapons and time to reorganise its military system. Moreover, the redeployment of Soviet forces to prove that its offensive strategy has been abandoned has not yet been effected and, in any event, the situation will remain precarious. No one can guarantee the pursuit of the policy started by Mr. Gorbachev, although it seems to conform clearly to the interests of the Soviet Union. There can be no question of assessing the threat a state may exercise on the basis of intentions, even if they are assumed to be sincere, but only on the basis of the means available for threatening peace. The Soviet Union still has such means. Disarmament in the West must therefore be gradual and proportional, as agreed by the Vienna negotiators, moreover.

105. (ii) The very fact that disarmament is the subject of negotiated agreements makes unilateral measures by one side or the other undesirable as they would detract from the importance of the negotiations and the bartering values of the negotiators which are fundamental in negotiations.

106. (iii) The tremor that hit the Eastern European régimes has left all these countries in a weak political situation where no development can be excluded and certainly not a resurrection of national claims supported by large sections of public opinion. Faced with these dangers, the Warsaw Pact and the presence of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe help to maintain some degree of stability and avert real dangers. There is therefore no question of speeding up the dissolution of the pact. But similarly Western Europe must retain a defensive and deterrent capability and military cohesion that will give the necessary political weight to any action it may take and protect it from the effects of crises that may arise from a re-emergence of nationalism.

107. (iv) In the last ten years, some countries close to Europe, particularly along its Mediterranean shores, have procured sophisticated, powerful weapons which oblige Western Europe to remain on its guard.

108. Hence, it appears that in future years Europe must retain a military system adequate to meet the requirements of defence and deterrence as defined in the platform of The Hague.

109. It is more difficult to solve the question of how to ensure defence and deterrence. A key factor will quite obviously continue to be the cohesion of the western world as guaranteed by the Atlantic Alliance and the presence of American forces in Europe. But if this presence is called in question, which sooner or later seems inevitable, Western Europe may find itself solely responsible for western military deployment in Europe, which would mean increasing its military expenditure. The United States has already undertaken to reduce the number of its troops stationed in Europe to 225 000, but its government is under strong pressure to make further cuts. If, as it may be supposed, negotiations on shorter-range nuclear weapons are opened and lead to an agreement for their total withdrawal, it is most unlikely that the United States will keep troops on European territory that are too few to be able to defend themselves. It is therefore possible that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance may, for a time, have to disarm more slowly than their partners and retain strategic, and perhaps prestrategic, nuclear weapons which are the essential instrument of deterrence. Furthermore, even if the military link between Europe and the United States is maintained in full, as firmly asserted by Mr. Baker during his tour of Europe in December, this will nevertheless imply a

stronger organisation of Europe in the alliance, which should be one of the key rôles of WEU. Finally, the reduction of American forces and armaments in Europe will make it necessary to improve the protection of air routes and sea lanes across the North Atlantic to allow reinforcements and weapons to be brought in rapidly in the event of a serious crisis.

110. The second rôle of the Atlantic Alliance is already, and will continue to be, to organise western participation in negotiations on disarmament, European security and confidence-building measures and to ensure continuing consultations between the Americans and their allies to ensure that Western Europe's security is not jeopardised by agreements between the two great powers in which Europe did not take part. NATO has just shown its ability to play this rôle by adopting, on 15th December 1989, the draft treaty on conventional forces in Europe that it is to submit to the Vienna conference, and the Warsaw Pact has done likewise. At the ministerial meeting in Ottawa from 12th to 14th February, it managed to come to an agreement with the Warsaw Pact countries on the broad lines of an "open skies" agreement for a system of reciprocal overflying of the respective territories of members of the two alliances in order to verify application of arms control agreements and consolidate mutual confidence. However, the more forces the United States withdraws from Europe, the more the latter will have to shoulder its responsibilities in the limitation of armaments and in defence matters and, to this end, WEU will also have to play a greater rôle.

111. Finally, it must be borne in mind that the action of the Atlantic Alliance is still insufficient to ensure the defence of the southern flank of its area, i.e. the Mediterranean. Under the Washington Treaty, it was given no deterrent capability beyond an area limited in the south by the Mediterranean. If Europe is to take action to safeguard lines of communication and the transport of vital supplies such as oil, it must have the political and military means essential for tasks such as its mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf in 1988. WEU, although not used enough for this purpose, is still the sole instrument for co-ordinating member states' action in this area.

112. It will admittedly be difficult to maintain a military system that is adequate to ensure these duties. Dissolution of the alliances and denuclearisation of Europe are still at the top of the list of the Eastern European countries' claims, although the Soviet Union seems more cautious than before on these questions now that doubts about communist régimes is making the Warsaw Pact a more important factor in maintaining some degree of cohesion in Eastern Europe. Addressing the Political Committee of the European Parliament in December 1989,

Mr. Shevardnadze said clearly that the Soviet Union had taken note of the western point of view on the need to maintain minimum deterrence. However, western public opinion will probably be receptive to arguments such as those used by Mr. Gysi when proposing the disarmament of the two German states and, on the other hand, will call for a reduction in defence budgets, which will seem less necessary, to cut public expenditure or to divert it to areas of more direct benefit to the community. A considerable effort will therefore have to be made to explain to everyone the requirements of a European security policy. The governments showed they realised that this was necessary when they decided to reactivate WEU in 1984 and it is one of the aims they have assigned to the new WEU Institute for Security Studies. They now have to guide the work of the institute in that direction and give it the wherewithal for the studies it prepares to have the desired impact on the public. Nor is there any doubt that our Assembly will willingly play this rôle, as it has already been doing to the best of its ability for several years.

113. While it is still necessary to maintain the alliances and their progressively slimmer military systems, to intensify international co-operation in the framework of these alliances, in particular on disarmament, and to develop exchanges of information on the projects planned by either side, following the example of Mr. Shevardnadze when he met the Secretary-General and permanent representatives of the NATO member countries in Brussels on 18th December, it does not seem very realistic or desirable to extend NATO's activities in areas not within the purview of the North Atlantic Treaty. In this connection, the address by Mr. Baker, United States Secretary of State, in Berlin on 12th December 1989, when he gave his views on "a new architecture for this new era" that should be designed, attributed to the alliance activities far exceeding the responsibilities it is now recognised as having. By referring to a reunified Germany as a member of the organisation, he admittedly solved the German problem but in terms that were rejected by both Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Gysi. By proposing that NATO also consider new initiatives to be taken by the West, in particular through the CSCE process, in order to create economic and political links with the East, he was assuming that the western security organisation was empowered to express its views in areas that member countries have never yet accepted or even seriously considered assigning to it. It is hardly probable that the Eastern European countries will accept NATO as a valid or desirable interlocutor in such areas.

114. Conversely, Mr. Baker's proposals relating to the wider rôle that might be exercised by NATO by exchanging - at the same time as WEU - information on all questions raised by

arms control and verification of related agreements, even if this should remain a national responsibility, seem to correspond to the natural vocation of the western security organisation now that disarmament ought to be one of its main preoccupations. Rather than working out a "new Atlanticism", the purpose would be to guide the necessary alliance between Western Europe and the United States towards the solution of problems now raised by the maintenance of security.

115. However, the reduction in the level of American troops in Europe, the new trend in the Atlantic Alliance towards the political aspects of security and, consequently, the larger part that will have to be played by the European members of the alliance in the joint military system and political action should result in their being given a more important rôle in the alliance, thus meaning that WEU will exercise more responsibilities. This seems to be the principal conclusion drawn from the Wehrkunde colloquy held in Munich on 3rd and 4th February 1990, which was particularly outstanding because of the presence of most European defence ministers. Nor did they mince their words, in that they had to complain about not having been informed until the last minute of President Bush's decision to reduce the American presence in Central Europe to 195 000 men. While Mr. Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO, said the alliance needed its European members to play a larger, "more coherent" part, Mr. Stoltenberg, Federal German Minister of Defence, suggested that Eurogroup or WEU should play a greater rôle in all the NATO structures and General Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's National Security Adviser, underlined the rôle WEU would have to play and said: "It is time for a European pillar to be built in the security field." However, it was the French Minister of Defence, Mr. Chevènement, who was most specific on this point:

"Deterrence is the only strategic concept that meets Europe's first concern, which is to prevent war and not to win it. I think that the Western European countries can reach an agreement concerning this kind of deterrent power which, if in close contact with the American potential, could be used as a pivot by the European defensive bulwark which France hopes to see.

If such a structure is to see the light of day, it needs the backing of the principal Western European countries and must accompany progress in the European Economic Community in strengthening common political institutions. The Community institutions – European Council, European Parliament – can now provide a sound, democratic basis for the major debates that influence our security.

However, it is not yet time for them to handle purely military matters. WEU is probably the most appropriate place for doing so and has proved its ability to shape strong ideas such as the Charter. It is in present circumstances that its rôle as a forum for discussion on strengthening European security is becoming essential. The idea of a bulwark to the west of Europe would not weaken the alliance: on the contrary, it would re-establish a balance."

*(b) The European economic area*

116. While the economic difficulties of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries prompted the idea of perestroika and the revolt of the people against the established régimes, if they were to continue the stability of power in those countries and the introduction of a new peaceful order in Europe would be jeopardised. It therefore seems essential for the West to provide as much assistance as possible, first to allow the people to survive in the coming months, particularly in Romania and Poland where there are alarming shortages, then to foster the recovery and reorganisation of the economies of all the Central and Eastern European countries and, finally, to develop exchanges and co-operation between the two parts of Europe so that peace can be given new and sounder bases.

117. It seems clear today that the European Community is better prepared than any other organisation to undertake this long-term task because it has the means and unrivalled experience of economic co-operation. It was given a clear mandate at the Paris summit meeting in July and at the meeting of the European Council in Strasbourg in December 1989. In his Berlin address, Mr. Baker, the Secretary of State, proposed that it play this rôle and the Eastern European countries certainly consider it to be a model that they would like to follow and a real centre of attraction with which some wish to be associated or even join. Since 1988, special agreements have already been signed between the Community and the Soviet Union and several Eastern European countries, and the German Democratic Republic has privileged status in the Common Market. The reunification of Germany will obviously imply its accession and it will be difficult to defer an answer to Austria's candidature, which will accompany that of Hungary, until after 1992.

118. Without prejudging the situation in the more distant future, it can be affirmed that the present economic situation in the eastern countries and uncertainty about the nature, scale and effects of their economic restructuring do not allow them to join the Community. This uncer-



tainty was demonstrated very clearly at the Comecon meeting in Sofia in January 1990 when three countries – Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland – wished to move quickly towards liberalisation of their external trade, while others were far more hesitant. Furthermore, the opening of the GDR's frontiers with the West has already made the Deutschmark a far more sought-after currency than the eastern Mark and an incomparable economic stimulus. Mr. Shevardnadze's proposal in Brussels on 18th December 1989 to build European economic co-operation on three pillars – the Community, EFTA and Comecon – therefore seems to have little connection with economic realities. As for the CSCE, it is obviously an excellent forum for associating eastern and western governments for defining common aims and concluding co-operation agreements, but it has no facilities for research and implementation and can therefore not compete with the Community in practising effective co-operation.

119. Yet so far the Community has not managed to take swift, effective action in areas for which it is responsible to promote such co-operation, while the Soviet Union and the United States seem to be hampered in such areas by political considerations that prevent them from tackling problems realistically. This is, in any event, the impression given by both Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze in Brussels in December. At the Paris summit meeting in July 1989, the Community was instructed to co-ordinate assistance by the twenty-four OECD countries to Poland and Hungary, and developments in the other Eastern European countries should naturally mean this being extended to include the entire region. There seem to be regrettable delays in carrying out this programme, however. So far, no means of agricultural production seem to have been supplied, investment has not been encouraged and no assistance given for modernising infrastructure. The Commission has not yet set up offices in Budapest and Warsaw that it would need to carry out the task assigned to it. On the other hand, at the Strasbourg meeting of the European Council on 9th November it was decided to set up a European bank for reconstruction and development to promote productive, competitive investment in Central and Eastern Europe, to facilitate the transition to a more market-oriented economy, to reduce risks and to speed up the necessary structural adjustments.

120. Yet it just seems as if events in Eastern Europe had caught the Commission of the Community on the wrong foot at a time when it was starting to assume a number of responsibilities in regard to security, defence and armaments for which it had received no clear mandate from the governments. It is obviously aware that, if it advances in this sector, it may find that the Soviet Union and certain eastern countries will

question its ability to become the instrument of the reunification of Europe in the economic sector. This would explain its hesitation to which it should put an end. It has no choice but to opt for co-operation with Eastern Europe, which means that it should let the Western European governments agree in WEU on matters within the purview of that organisation, as proposed by Mr. Genscher in his "programme for Germany" of 1st October 1989. If it does not do this soon, it might well lose its generally agreed responsibilities in the first sector with little chance of gaining authority in the latter area.

121. Admittedly, if the Community is not to disintegrate in this co-operation and lose its truly Community vocation – now the very reason why it has the necessary authority to play a crucial driving rôle in reunification – it must strengthen its structures and develop means of action in all areas for which it is explicitly responsible. The Single European Act gave it a framework, the single market is to be established within the prescribed time limits and the measures adopted by the European Council in Strasbourg are to be completed so that the economic and monetary union can be achieved without delay. The opening to the East makes it more than ever necessary for the Community to adopt a social policy so as not to appear to its new partners to be the instrument of capitalism, ignoring the needs of society. The speedy achievement of this programme is necessary if the Community is to remain a pole of attraction for the eastern countries and the changes in Europe are not to jeopardise the planned European union of which the Community is the strongest part.

*(c) The common house*

122. All the political leaders who have considered co-operation between the Western and Eastern European countries have stressed the essential rôle played by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in the last fifteen years and how it has helped to restore mutual confidence, promote the success of freedoms in Eastern Europe and start co-operation between the two parts of Europe. As Mr. Gorbachev usefully recalled when addressing the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 6th July 1989, it also has the advantage of associating the United States and Canada with its work and does not leave a Europe divided into small states face to face with the Soviet giant.

123. Since the signing of the Helsinki final act, which was the first undertaking by the Eastern European countries to reform their internal régimes, the conference has developed its activities significantly in various directions, and, at

its meeting in Vienna which ended in 1989, plans were made to hold several specialised conferences covering almost all areas in which it is possible to develop co-operation, including conventional disarmament, since that is the framework in which the CFE negotiations are being held. We can share the idea expressed by Mr. Shevardnadze, when speaking to the Political Committee of the European Parliament, that the CSCE has already established certain aspects of a European juridical area.

124. However, whatever the merits of the procedures it offers, that intergovernmental body is a cumbersome, slow way of working and its meetings are too infrequent for it to be able to meet the needs of a Europe which is now evolving so quickly. It has no organisation of its own to give constant impetus to its work and ensure that its decisions are implemented, nor has it any parliamentary body. There is every reason to be gratified that it was the Soviet Minister who proposed the creation of "committees or centres comprising groups of highly competent experts. Such bodies could later assume consultative functions and perhaps even become supranational in nature, if all thirty-five CSCE countries so decide". He also proposed holding an annual summit meeting, setting up a committee of ministers for foreign affairs and permanent missions to the CSCE and "the implementation of projects such as the centre for reducing the risk of war and preventing surprise attack, the centre for emergency ecological assistance, the European human rights institute".

125. It should be stressed that Mr. Baker, Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand all emphasised the need to develop the procedure offered by the CSCE and it is probable and desirable that the summit meeting of all its members to be held in the second half of 1990 will not be just to sign the CFE agreement but will also tackle the repercussions for collective security of events in Eastern Europe and take the first steps to create a permanent organisation for security and co-operation in Europe covering three dimensions: security, economic co-operation and the definition of European law. In this connection, the increasingly active part played in meetings by the Soviet Union and several Eastern European countries and their scrutiny of conventions concluded in the framework of the Council of Europe with a view to possible accession suggest that it may be possible to make considerable progress in the very near future.

126. Speaking in Tutzing on 31st January, Mr. Genscher proposed a programme for the CSCE summit meeting designed to give the conference a large number of permanent institutions to provide useful structures for a peaceful order in Europe:

1. An institution for East-West economic co-operation. The European Development Bank must also be considered from this point of view.
2. An all-European institution to guarantee human rights. The Council of Europe's Human Rights Convention will soon be applied to the whole of Europe.
3. A centre for establishing a European juridical area with a view to standardising law.
4. A European ecological agency.
5. Extension of co-operation in Eureka to the whole of Europe.
6. Co-operation between ESA and corresponding institutions in the East.
7. A centre for developing a European communications network.
8. A centre for developing a European transport policy and infrastructure.
9. A European verification centre.
10. A European centre for settling conflicts."

These proposals, or some of them, are worthy of the closest attention because they demonstrate what can now be envisaged at all-European level and, at the same time, what must remain in the hands of truly western organisations.

127. President Mitterrand was obviously thinking of such developments when, on 31st December 1989, he proposed the establishment of a European confederation, an idea endorsed by Chancellor Kohl in his Latché interview on 4th January. The purpose was obviously not for this confederation to replace the European Community, which France and the Federal Republic intend, on the contrary, to consolidate, but to give meaning and an aim to the process started by the CSCE and the follow-up action proposed by Mr. Shevardnadze. A confederation is an association of states which pool the exercise of part of their sovereignty but retain sovereignty. While, generally speaking, external and defence policy have, historically, been the first to be exercised by confederal authorities, this is not a necessity and today it would be logical for confederal authority to be exercised rather in the areas mentioned by Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Genscher.

*(d) WEU in the new circumstances*

128. WEU is fortunate that the events in 1989 precede its agreed re-examination of its founding text, the modified Brussels Treaty, once the act of accession of Portugal and Spain has been ratified by all member countries, which should

be completed in March 1990, with Portugal's ratification. Revision of the treaty will thus be included in the Council's agenda during the year now starting and this will obviously be an opportunity to examine, not, as was hitherto thought, its adaptation to the post-1985 circumstances but the post-1990 situation. This is not without significance since, in the former case, it was mainly planned to delete provisions relating to the control of armaments among member countries. The disbanding of the Standing Armaments Committee, decided upon in November 1989, and the limitation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments since 1989 to verifying the non-production of chemical weapons by the Federal Republic, were more or less taken for granted. It may now be wondered whether these duties that were considered as having lost interest are not assuming new importance.

129. However, rather than speculating about the institution, it seems preferable to ponder on Western Europe's needs in security-related areas by considering what can be done by each of the institutions working in these areas. Thus, it can quite normally be seen that relations between the United States and Western Europe, defence planning for the area covered by the Atlantic Alliance and crisis management are the responsibility of NATO, whereas the implementation of the CFE agreements, the application of confidence-building measures, the prevention of certain types of crisis, gathering information and the development of exchanges with the East are matters for WEU which should also redefine the respective rôles of the Community, the IEPG and WEU for everything relating to research, studies and the joint production of armaments.

130. On this basis, consideration can be given to present problems, which may be divided into three groups:

131. (i) WEU's main vocation is obviously to guarantee the security of member countries in the face of any form of threat from any direction by ensuring cohesion in their military deployment and foreign policy, while respecting state sovereignty. However, requirements in the deployment of forces and armaments will be changed by factors outside WEU – the withdrawal of American forces and the CFE agreements – and by factors within member states – the reduction in the proportion of their GNP that they earmark for defence. This reduction will make each country increasingly dependent on the community, as was well demonstrated by the Belgian Chief-of-Staff, General Charlier, when he briefed the Assembly's Defence Committee on Belgium's programme for organising its forces adopted in 1989. He summed it up as being to strengthen ourselves where we are the strongest and to rely on our allies for the rest. This should allow Belgium to use its military

investments to best avail for joint defence purposes, but make it wholly dependent on those whose forces are complementary to its own. For a country firmly committed to a collective security system, it seems a reasonable solution to a problem that cannot be solved by other means.

132. The larger countries, such as France, have so far managed to limit their defence budgets or even reduce them in real terms without giving up any part of their defensive systems, but have managed to do so only at the cost of extending the period of arms procurement programmes. One may wonder whether this is wise if it means keeping obsolescent equipment in service for too long at the expense of the security of personnel and the efficiency of the armed forces. They, too, will probably have to resign themselves in the near future to making more significant cuts in their armaments programmes.

133. There is certainly a link between the Belgian decision to adopt the Charlier plan and the steps taken by the Belgian presidency to induce member countries' chiefs-of-staff to meet in the framework of WEU. The policy inaugurated by Belgium requires closer agreement between military headquarters to organise the use of their forces and plan their arms procurement policy, taking into account the stronger and weaker points of their partners' capabilities. It is therefore to be deplored that the governments have not yet managed to agree to follow up the Belgian proposal. WEU has never yet made a serious effort to carry out the task it set itself of giving political impetus to the joint production of armaments. The time seems ripe to do so.

134. (ii) Requirements stemming from the forthcoming conclusion of the CFE agreements have rightly led the Council to study the situation that will emerge from these agreements, with particular regard to common action by its members to prepare for the implementation by member countries of the verification measures they believe to be necessary. It is indeed impossible for each individual country to train verification teams that are qualified at both technical and diplomatic level. In order to play an effective part in the verification they consider necessary, it is in everyone's interest to have a vast amount of information, staff with very wide-ranging qualifications and structures for updating and comparing information received from a wide variety of sources. On the basis of the experience – unique in the world – acquired by its Agency for the Control of Armaments, WEU is the only European organisation in a position to arrange the participation of member countries: data banks, studies of these data, training of inspectors and, if necessary, the use of satellites would be the main elements.

135. The Assembly is therefore gratified that the Council has started to follow up its recommendation for the creation of a European space agency and the joint development of observation satellites. It can but deplore the slowness of the Council's progress – if it is possible to speak of progress – in its deliberations in view of the fast-approaching time-limit for solving the verification question.

136. (iii) The establishment of a peaceful order in Europe also concerns WEU and is likely to guide its work in new directions. In this context, Belgium, following the crash of a Soviet military aircraft on its territory in July 1989, made an interesting proposal for the future: to create an early warning system, in case of need, linking Eastern and Western European countries to allow them to take immediate steps in the event of unforeseen threats. This is part of the confidence-building measures that are on the agenda of the CSCE, but WEU might, by following up the Belgian proposal, be the instigator. The Council seems to have done little to advance in this direction.

137. The terms of the modified Brussels Treaty make WEU an organisation that aims to establish confidence as well as being a defensive alliance. It has managed to do so in Western Europe but might do more today by giving the Eastern European countries a guarantee that each of its members will respect its undertakings in all disarmament agreements, be it the CFE agreements or agreements on banning chemical weapons and on non-proliferation and giving firm content to the concept of shared security.

138. Generally speaking, the new peaceful order will require confidence that can be based only on each country having an in-depth knowledge of each other's military system and capabilities. East-West exchanges of information are already being developed and will have to increase. Meetings are being held between representatives of eastern and western military headquarters on strategy and the use of forces. Western Europe will need an instrument to organise these exchanges and collect and study the information. The Council's November 1989 decision to set up a WEU Institute for Security Studies is a first step in this direction and the Assembly will follow the activation of this institute with interest and hopes it will fulfil the rôle described here. However, the very limited resources that it is planned to give it will certainly not allow it to carry out this task and, if the Council wishes to use the institute for that purpose, it will have to give it explicit instructions and the funds necessary to carry out such tasks.

139. The Council's activities should also include informing the public, without which Europe's work in security matters will lack a sound basis. Your Rapporteur has often had the

opportunity to emphasise how inadequate the Council's efforts in this area have so far been.

140. These various guidelines for WEU's activities do not necessarily mean revising the modified Brussels Treaty, Article VIII of which gives the Council legal bases for a very wide range of action. Other considerations linked with the accession of Portugal and Spain or the international status of unified Germany may lead to this. However, the prospect of such a revision should encourage it to examine Western Europe's security requirements more closely now that Europe is in the process of changing. It would thus contribute to the necessary consolidation of Western European structures now that the latter is going to have to consider the building of the common house with the Eastern European countries. Even if this should include a collective security organisation, which seems evident, a truly European, truly western structure will remain essential for a long time to come. This does not mean, however, that it will not be in WEU's interest, or in any event that of its Assembly and institute, to encourage and develop their exchanges with partners from the Soviet Union or other Central and Eastern European countries who are determined to pool their concerns in security matters.

## V. Conclusions

141. From these various considerations, it is apparent that, because of events in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, Europe must embark upon a vast operation to organise a new international order and it must act very quickly because of the nature and speed of the upheavals. The new authorities in the GDR and Romania, unable to keep pace with popular demonstrations, are already bending under their pressure and losing control of the situation; in Bulgaria, very strong nationalist feelings are surfacing, Yugoslavia is threatened by the awakening of nationalities, while Poland and Romania have very serious food shortages and are having the utmost difficulty in setting their economies in motion again. Comecon and the Warsaw Pact are starting to be contested. There is no guarantee that it will be possible to hold completely free elections in some of these countries nor that the results of such elections will allow a government to be formed that can be sure of the stability and popular support necessary for restoring a democratic order and reviving the economy. If the West, and Western Europe in particular, do not come quickly to their assistance, Eastern Europe may soon fall prey to serious troubles that could be overcome only by authoritarian régimes.

142. Yet the opening to the East must not weaken the structures that ensure peace and prosperity in Western Europe. One way or

another, those that exist must be maintained and strengthened and at the same time new measures must associate the two parts of Europe more closely and permanently. In this connection, the most recent Soviet proposals tally well with western views. There is no longer any

question of the immediate dissolution of the pacts or of the premature extension of the Community but of reasonable development of co-operation in appropriate frameworks. The common house has certainly become a clearer, more realistic goal than it was in spring 1989.

## APPENDIX

*Documentation on the international status of Germany****1. Protocol between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin****12th September 1944*

.....

1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on 31st December 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the three powers.

2. ....

The Berlin area (by which expression is understood the territory of Greater Berlin as defined by the Law of 27th April 1920) will be jointly occupied by armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, assigned by the respective Commanders-in-Chief. For this purpose the territory of Greater Berlin will be divided into the following three parts...

.....

5. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Kommandatura) consisting of three commandants, appointed by their respective commanders-in-chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the Greater Berlin area.

.....

***2. Yalta Agreement – statement on the result of the Crimea conference****4th-11th February 1945*

.....

***Occupation and control***

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany is accomplished. Under the agreed plans the forces of the three powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Co-ordinated administration and control has been provided for through a Central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the three powers, with

headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the three powers, if she should so desire, to take a zone of occupation, and to participate as fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

.....

***Poland***

.....

The three heads of government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of 5-8 kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions, and that the final delimitations of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

.....

***3. Act of military surrender****7th May 1945*

1. We the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command all forces on land, sea, and in the air who are at this date under German control.

2. The German High Command will at once issue orders to all German military, naval and air authorities and to all forces under German control to cease active operations at 23.01 hours Central European time on 8th May and to remain in the positions occupied at that time. No ship, vessel, or aircraft is to be scuttled, or any damage done to their hull, machinery or equipment.

3. The German High Command will at once issue to the appropriate commanders, and ensure the carrying out of any further orders issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and by the Soviet High Command.

4. This act of military surrender is without prejudice to, and will be superseded by any

general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to Germany and the German armed forces as a whole.

5. In the event of the German High Command or any of the forces under their control failing to act in accordance with this Act of Surrender, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and the Soviet High Command will take such punitive or other action as they deem appropriate.

Signed at Reims, France, on 7th May 1945.

**4. Joint declaration of the members  
of the Allied Control Commission for Germany**

*5th June 1945*

The German armed forces on land, at sea, and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally, and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious powers. The unconditional surrender of Germany has thereby been effected, and Germany has become subject to such requirements as may now or hereafter be imposed upon her.

There is no central government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country, and compliance with the requirements of the victorious powers. It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent decisions that may be taken respecting Germany, to make provision for the cessation of any further hostilities on the part of the German armed forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany, and for the administration of the country, and to announce the immediate requirements with which Germany must comply.

The representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the USSR, and the French Republic, hereinafter called the "allied representatives", acting by authority of their respective governments and in the interests of the United Nations, accordingly make the following declaration:

"The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command, and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated

above, of the said authority and powers does not affect the annexation of Germany. The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the USSR, and the French Provisional Government, will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof, and the status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory".

.....

**5. Communiqué issued in London,  
Washington and Moscow  
on the decisions reached at Potsdam**

*2nd August 1945*

.....

*Political and economic principles governing the  
treatment of Germany in the initial period of  
allied control*

*Political principles*

.....

9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralisation of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

- (i) Local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles, and, in particular, through elective councils, as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation.
- (ii) All democratic political parties with rights of assembly and public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany.
- (iii) Representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial, and state administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government.
- (iv) For the time being no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by state secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade, and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

.....

The conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government that, pending the final

determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the USSR which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting-point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic, and East Prussia.

The conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Königsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above, subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

.....

*Provisional Polish western frontier on Oder-Neisse line*

.....

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference, the three heads of government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government have been received at the conference and have fully presented their views. The three heads of government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three heads of government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder river to the confluence of the western Neisse river, and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the USSR, and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish state, and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

.....

**6. The basic law  
of the Federal Republic of Germany**

*23rd May 1949*

.....

*Article 23*

For the time being, this basic law shall apply in the territory of the Laender of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg,

Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Wuerttemberg-Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern. In other parts of Germany it shall be put into force on their accession.

.....

*Article 146*

This basic law shall cease to be in force on the day on which a constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into force.

**7. Convention on relations  
between the three powers  
and the Federal Republic of Germany**

*Bonn, 26th May 1952*

.....

*Article 1<sup>1</sup>*

1. The Federal Republic would have full authority over its internal and external affairs, except as provided in the present convention.
2. The three powers would revoke the occupation statute, and abolish the Allied High Commission and the offices of the land commissioners, upon the entry into force of the present convention and the conventions listed in Article 8 (hereinafter referred to as "the related conventions").
3. The three powers would henceforth conduct their relations with the Federal Republic through ambassadors, who would act jointly in matters which the three powers considered of common concern under the present convention and the related conventions.

*Article 2<sup>1</sup>*

1. In view of the international situation, the three powers would retain the rights hitherto held by them relating to
  - (a) the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security,
  - (b) Berlin, and
  - (c) Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement.

2. The Federal Republic would refrain from any action prejudicial to these rights and would co-operate with the three powers to facilitate their exercise.

*Article 3*

1. The Federal Republic agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the aims defined in the Statute of the Council of Europe.

1. These two articles did not come into force. They were amended by the Paris Agreements of 23rd October 1954. The amended text is given in Document 8 hereafter.



2. The Federal Republic affirmed its intention to associate itself fully with the community of free nations through membership in international organisations contributing to the common aims of the free world. The three powers would support applications for such membership by the Federal Republic at appropriate times.

3. In their negotiations with states with which the Federal Republic maintained no relations, the three powers would consult with the Federal Republic in respect of matters directly involving its political interests.

4. At the request of the Federal Government, the three powers would represent the interests of the Federal Republic in relations with other states, and in certain international organisations or conferences, whenever the Federal Republic was not in a position to do so itself.

.....

*Article 7*

1. The three powers and the Federal Republic were agreed that an essential aim of their common policy was a peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation for a lasting peace. They further agreed that the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.

2. Pending the peace settlement, the three powers and the Federal Republic would cooperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a unified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic, and integrated within the European community.

.....

4. The three powers would consult with the Federal Republic on all other matters involving the exercise of their rights relating to Germany as a whole.

.....

***8. Agreement to end the occupation régime in the Federal Republic of Germany – amendments to the convention on relations between the three powers and the Federal Republic of Germany***

*23rd October 1954*

.....

*Article 1*

Substitute:

*Article 1*

1. On the entry into force of the present convention the United States of America, the

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic (hereinafter and in the related conventions sometimes referred to as 'the Three Powers') will terminate the Occupation régime in the Federal Republic, revoke the Occupation Statute and abolish the Allied High Commission and the Offices of the Land Commissioners in the Federal Republic.

2. The Federal Republic shall have accordingly the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs.

*Article 2*

Substitute:

*Article 2*

In view of the international situation, which has so far prevented the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement, the Three Powers retain the rights and the responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement. The rights and responsibilities retained by the Three Powers relating to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security are dealt with in Articles 4 and 5 of the present convention.

***9. Final act of the nine-power conference held in London between 28th September and 3rd October 1954***

.....

*I. GERMANY*

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that their policy is to end the occupation régime in the Federal Republic as soon as possible, to revoke the occupation statute and to abolish the Allied High Commission. The three governments will continue to discharge certain responsibilities in Germany arising out of the international situation.

It is intended to conclude, and to bring into force as soon as the necessary parliamentary procedures have been completed, the appropriate instruments for these purposes. General agreement has already been reached on the content of these instruments, and representatives of the four governments will meet in the very near future to complete the final texts. The agreed arrangements may be put into effect either before or simultaneously with the arrangements for the German defence contribution.

As these arrangements will take a little time to complete, the three governments have in the meantime issued the following declaration of intent:

“ Recognising that this great country can no longer be deprived of the rights properly belonging to a free and democratic people; and

Desiring to associate the Federal Republic of Germany on a footing of equality with their efforts for peace and security;

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America desire to end the occupation régime as soon as possible.

.....”

.....

***V. DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND JOINT DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA***

.....

*Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany*

The Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter.

Upon her accession to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany declares that she will refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the two treaties. In particular the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other states.

*Declaration by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France*

.....

Take note that the Federal Republic of Germany has by a declaration dated the third of October, nineteen hundred and fifty-four accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other states;

Declare that

1. They consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted

and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs.

2. In their relations with the Federal Republic they will follow the principles set out in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.

3. A peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.

4. The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy.

5. The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the three powers there are regarded by the three powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

6. They will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter threatens the integrity and unity of the Atlantic Alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event of any such action, the three governments, for their part, will consider the offending government as having forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its protocols. They will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to taking other measures which may be appropriate.

7. They will invite the association of other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation with this declaration.

.....

***10. Final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe***

*Helsinki, 1st August 1975*

***I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty***

The participating states will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every state to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each

other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.

Within the framework of international law, all the participating states have equal rights and duties. They will respect each other's right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other states in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.

.....

### *III. Inviolability of frontiers*

The participating states regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all states in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating state.

### *IV. Territorial integrity of states*

The participating states will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating states.

Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating state, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.

The participating states will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognised as legal.

*Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe –  
prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe*

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AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Soell*

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1. In part II, paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “reuniting the German people in a single political system” and insert “reuniting the two parts of Germany in a federalist state”.
2. In part II, paragraph (ix), second line, of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “European” and insert “future all-European”.
3. In part II, paragraph (ix), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “with which the United States and Canada remain associated” and insert “with which the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union are also associated”.
4. In part II, paragraph (ix), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “and constituting” to the end of the paragraph.
5. In part III, paragraph (i), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “peace and order in Europe” add “, particularly”.
6. In part III, paragraph (i), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, at the end of the paragraph, add “if the alliances eliminate the confrontation and offensive elements from their strategic doctrines and their military options”.
7. At the end of part I of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:  
“Take account of the proposal by the Chairman of the WEU Council of Ministers to conclude a non-aggression pact between the western and eastern alliance systems;”
8. At the end of part I of the draft recommendation proper, add a second new paragraph as follows:  
“Develop the CSCE as the future framework for an all-European security system, providing it with a stable organisational structure (council of ministers, parliamentary assembly, secretariat-general, arms control agency) and appropriate possibilities for taking operational action;”
9. In part II, paragraph 1, of the draft recommendation proper, after “Inform the Assembly whether” add “and to what extent”.
10. In part III, paragraph 1 (b), of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “shared security” and insert “joint security”.
11. In part III, paragraph 2, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “lever for” and insert “first stage in”.
12. In part III, paragraph 2, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “in which it might” and insert “which might”.
13. In part III, paragraph 2 (a), of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “including those resulting from the unification of the two German states” and insert “including the frontier between a future unified Germany and the Republic of Poland”.

*Signed: Soell*

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1. See 3rd sitting, 23rd March 1990 (amendments withdrawn).

*Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe –  
prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe*

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AMENDMENTS 14, 15, 16 and 17 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Pieralli and Mr. Benassi*

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14. After part III, paragraph (iii), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Considering that further negotiations must address the question of tactical nuclear weapons and short-range missiles stationed in Europe; ”

15. In part III, paragraph (i), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “ alliances ” add “ and their political collaboration ”.

16. At the end of part III of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Considering that the new all-European security order must be discussed and decided upon at the next meeting of heads of state or of government of the CSCE and achieved gradually through collaboration between existing alliances and organisations in Europe, including WEU, ”

17. In part III of the draft recommendation proper, redraft paragraph 2 as follows:

“ Use WEU as a lever for a new European security order that must guarantee the intangibility of its members’ frontiers, including those resulting from the unification of the two German states, and WEU must ensure respect for the commitments entered into by its members in the context of agreements limiting forces or armaments or the non-production of certain weapons; ”

*Signed: Pieralli, Benassi*

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1. See 3rd sitting, 23rd March 1990 (amendments withdrawn).

*Establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe –  
prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe*

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AMENDMENT 18 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. De Decker and Mr. Baumel*

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18. In part II, paragraph (ix), of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ a European collective security system with which the United States and Canada remain associated and constituting in itself the nucleus of an all-European security system ” and insert “ the collective security systems constituted by NATO and WEU ”.

*Signed: De Decker, Baumel*

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1. See 3rd sitting, 23rd March 1990 (amendment withdrawn).

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