



Assembly of Western European Union

PROCEEDINGS

FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November-December 1994

IV

**Minutes
Official Report of Debates**

WEU

PARIS



Assembly of Western European Union

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FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

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
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The proceedings of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.




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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
KELCHTERMANS Lambert	CVP
KEMPINAIRE André	VLD
Van der MAELEN Dirk	SP
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
SARENS Freddy	CVP
SEEUWS Willy	SP

Substitutes

MM. De DECKER Armand	PRL
GHESEQUIÈRE Ferdinand	CVP
LAVERGE Jacques	PVV
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
OTTENBOURGH Yvan	CVP
THISSEN René	PSC
WINTGENS Pierre	PSC

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOUCHERON Jean-Michel	Socialist
COLOMBIER Georges	UDF
COUVEINHES René	RPR
DUMONT Jean	Ind. Rep.
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GEOFFROY Aloys	UDF
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JACQUAT Denis	UDF
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KASPEREIT Gabriel	RPR
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
SCHREINER Bernard	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. BONREPAUX Augustin	Socialist
BRANGER Jean-Guy	UDF
BRIANE Jean	UDF
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DANIEL Christian	RPR
DECAGNY Jean-Claude	UDF
DENIAU Xavier	RPR
Mrs. DURRIEU Josette	Socialist
MM. EHRMANN Charles	UDF
HUNAULT Michel	RPR
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LE JEUNE Edouard	UCDP
de LIPKOWSKI Jean	RPR
MASSON Jean-Louis	RPR
MIGNON Jean-Claude	RPR
PROPRIOL Jean	UDF
ROGER Jean	RDE
VINÇON Serge	RPR

GERMANY

Representatives

Mr. ANTRETTET Robert	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
Mr. BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU

MM. BÜCHLER Hans	SPD
BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MEYER zu BENTRUP Reinhard	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TERBORG Margitta	SPD
MM. VOGEL Friedrich	CDU/CSU
WOLFGRAMM Torsten	FDP

Substitutes

MM. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. JUNGHANNS Ulrich	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUCYGA Christine	SPD
MM. LUMMER Heinrich	CDU/CSU
MAASS Erich	CDU/CSU
MARTEN Günter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. MASCHER Ulrike	SPD
MM. MICHELS Meinolf	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
PROBST Albert	CDU/CSU
REIMANN Manfred	SPD
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHLUCKEBIER Günter	SPD
Mrs. von TEICHMAN Cornelia	FDP
Mr. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. ARATA Paolo	Forza Italia
BENVENUTI Roberto	PDS
BIANCHI Vincenzo	Forza Italia
BRUGGER Siegfried	Pact for Italy
DIONISI Angelo	Rif-Com.-Progr.
FASSINO Piero	Progr. Alliance
LA LOGGIA Enrico	Forza Italia
LA RUSSA Vincenzo	Chr. Dem. Centre
LATRONICO Fede	Northern League
MATTINA Vincenzo	Progr. Alliance
MITOLO Pietro	AN-MSI
PARISI Francesco	Italian Popular Party
PETRUCCIOLI Claudio	Progr. Alliance
POZZO Cesare	AN-MSI
SALVI Cesare	Progr. Alliance
SELVA Gustavo	AN-MSI
SERRA Enrico	Northern League
TABLADINI Francesco	Northern League

Substitutes

MM. CARCARINO Antonio	Rif. Com.-Progr.
COVIELLO Romualdo	Italian Popular Party
DEL GAUDIO Michele	Progr. Alliance
DOLAZZA Massimo	Northern League
FRONZUTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem. Centre
Mrs. GAIOTTI de BIASE Paola	Progr. Alliance
MM. GHIGO Enzo	Forza Italia
LAURICELLA Angelo	Progr. Alliance
LORENZI Luciano	Northern League
MAZZONE Antonio	AN-MSI

Mrs. MELANDRI Giovanna	Progr. Alliance		
Mrs. PRESTIGIACOMO Stefania	Forza Italia		
Mr. RAGNO Salvatore	AN-MSI		
Mrs. RIVELLI Nicola	AN-MSI		
MM. RODEGHIERO Flavio	Northern League		
SCAGLIOSO Cosimo	Progr. Alliance		
Mrs. SCOPELLITI Francesca	Forza Italia		
Mr. SOLDANI Mario	Pact for Italy		
LUXEMBOURG			
Representatives			
Mrs. ERR Lydie	Soc. Workers		
Mr. GOERENS Charles	Dem.		
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle	Soc. Chr.		
Substitutes			
Mrs. BRASSEUR Anne	Dem.		
MM. REGENWETTER Jean	Soc. Workers		
THEIS Alphonse	Soc. Chr.		
NETHERLANDS			
Representatives			
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour		
Mr. DEES Dick	VVD		
Mrs. GELDERBLOM-LANKHOUT Hanneke	D66		
MM. van der LINDEN René	CDA		
VERBEEK Jan Willem	VVD		
WOLTJER Eisso	Labour		
ZIJLSTRA Rinse	CDA		
Substitutes			
MM. BLAAUW Jan Dirk	VVD		
van den BOS Bob	D66		
EVERSDIJK Huib	CDA		
LEERS Gerd	CDA		
Mrs. van NIEUWENHOVEN Jeltje	Labour		
Mrs. SOUTENDIJK van APPELDOORN Marian	CDA		
Mrs. VERSPAGET Josephine	Labour		
PORTUGAL			
Representatives			
MM. AMARAL Fernando	Soc. Dem.		
BRITO Raul Fernando	Socialist		
CANDAL Carlos	Socialist		
FERNANDES MARQUES Joaquim	Soc. Dem.		
MACHETE Rui Manuel	Soc. Dem.		
PINTO Carlos	Soc. Dem.		
ROSETA Pedro	Soc. Dem.		
Substitutes			
Mrs. AGUIAR Maria Manuela	Soc. Dem.		
MM. ALEGRE Manuel	Socialist		
CURTO Abilio Aleixo	Socialist		
MARTINS Alberto de Sousa	Socialist		
POÇAS SANTOS João Alvaro	Soc. Dem.		
REIS LEITE José Guilherme	Soc. Dem.		
RODRIGUES Miguel Urbano	PCP		
SPAIN			
Representatives			
MM. ALVAREZ Francisco		People's Party	
CUCO Alfons		Socialist	
HOMS I FERRET Francesc		C.i.U.	
LÓPEZ HENARES José Luis		People's Party	
LÓPEZ VALDIVIELSO Santiago		People's Party	
MARTÍNEZ Miguel Angel		Socialist	
PUCHE RODRIGUEZ Gabino		People's Party	
de PUIG Lluís Maria		Socialist	
ROMAN Rafael		Socialist	
SAINZ GARCIA José Luis		People's Party	
SOLE TURA Jordi		Socialist	
VAZQUEZ Narcis		United Left	
Substitutes			
MM. BOLINAGA Imanol		Basque Nat.	
BORDERAS Augusto		Socialist	
CABALLERO Abel		Socialist	
GRAU I BULDU Pere		C.i.U.	
Mrs. GUIRADO Ana		Socialist	
Mrs. MORENO Carmen		Socialist	
MM. OLARTE Lorenzo		C. Canarian	
PALACIOS Marcelo		Socialist	
RAMÍREZ PERI Carlos		People's Party	
ROBLES FRAGA José		People's Party	
ROBLES OROZCO Gonzalo		People's Party	
Mrs. SANCHEZ DE MIGUEL Ana		Socialist	
UNITED KINGDOM			
Representatives			
MM. ATKINSON David		Conservative	
BANKS Tony		Labour	
COX Thomas		Labour	
Sir Anthony DURANT		Conservative	
Dame Peggy FENNER		Conservative	
Lord FINSBERG		Conservative	
Mr. HARDY Peter		Labour	
Sir John HUNT		Conservative	
Sir Russell JOHNSTON		SLD	
Lord KIRKHILL		Labour	
Mr. LITHERLAND Robert		Labour	
Lord NEWALL		Conservative	
MM. RATHBONE Tim		Conservative	
REDMOND Martin		Labour	
Sir Dudley SMITH		Conservative	
Sir Keith SPEED		Conservative	
Sir Donald THOMPSON		Conservative	
Mr. THOMPSON John		Labour	
Substitutes			
Mr. ALEXANDER Richard		Conservative	
Sir Andrew BOWDEN		Conservative	
MM. CUMMINGS John		Labour	
CUNLIFFE Lawrence		Labour	
DAVIS Terry		Labour	
DICKS Terry		Conservative	
Earl of DUNDEE		Conservative	
Mr. DUNNACHIE Jimmy		Labour	
Sir Peter FRY		Conservative	
Dr. GODMAN Norman		Labour	
Baroness GOULD of POTTERNEWTON		Labour	
Baroness HOOPER		Conservative	
MM. HOWELL Ralph		Conservative	
HUGHES Roy		Labour	
Lord MACKIE of BENSHEIE		SLD	
Mr. MARSHALL Jim		Labour	
Sir Irvine PATNICK		Conservative	
Mr. TOWNEND John		Conservative	



I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 28th November 1994

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly.
4. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the fortieth ordinary session (Doc. 1427).
6. Address by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member (*Vote on the draft decision in the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*, Doc. 1416).
8. A European security policy (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1439 and amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The President declared the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letters from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 7 had been ratified by that Assembly.

5. Observers

The President welcomed the permanent delegations of parliamentary observers.

He welcomed the observers from Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Malta, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden and Ukraine.

6. Address by Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly

Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, addressed the Assembly.

7. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Three candidates were proposed for three posts of Vice-President, namely, Mrs. Err, Mr. Fassino and Mr. Martinez.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mr. Martinez, Mrs. Err and Mr. Fassino were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

8. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 40 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

Standing Committee

Belgium

- Mr. Kempinaire as a titular member;

Spain

- MM. Cuco, Homs I Ferret et Puche Rodriguez as titular members;
- MM. Borderas, Robles Fraga and Vazquez as alternate members;

United Kingdom

- Sir Keith Speed as a titular member.

*Political Committee**Netherlands*

- Mr. Zijlstra as a titular member;

United Kingdom

- Sir Keith Speed as a titular member;
- Sir Peter Fry as an alternate member.

*Committee on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration**Netherlands*

- Mr. Zijlstra as an alternate member.

*Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges**Netherlands*

- Mr. Zijlstra as a titular member;

United Kingdom

- Sir Irvine Patnick as a titular member.

**9. Adoption of the draft order of business for
the second part of the fortieth ordinary session***(Doc. 1427)*

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session.

Speaker: Mr. Rodrigues.

The draft order of business for the second part of the session was adopted.

10. The situation in Bihac*(Motion for a recommendation with a request for
urgent procedure, Doc. 1446)*

The President announced that Mr. De Decker, on behalf of the Liberal Group, had tabled a motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 44 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided to examine this request for urgent procedure after the vote on the draft decision on amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member.

**11. Address by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General
of WEU**

Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Cutileiro answered questions put by Mr. Pécriaux, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Roseta, López Henares, De Decker, Martinez and Rodrigues.

**12. Amendments to the Charter and Rules
of Procedure of the Assembly in view
of the creation of a status of associate member***(Vote on the draft decision in the report
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges,
Doc. 1416)*

Speakers: The President, Lord Finsberg (point of order).

Mr. Latronico, in accordance with Rule 32 (1) (d) of the Rules of Procedure, proposed that the report be referred back to the committee.

Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur, opposed the motion.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the reference back to the committee.

The motion for reference back was disagreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote by roll-call on the draft decision.

The draft decision was not agreed to, in the absence of an absolute majority of 55 (see Appendix II) by 33 votes to 11 with 4 abstentions; 14 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote.

13. The situation in Bihac*(Motion for a recommendation with a request for
urgent procedure, Doc. 1446)*

In accordance with Rule 44 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on the situation in Bihac.

Speakers: MM. De Decker, de Puig (*Chairman of the Political Committee*), Martinez (*Vice-President of the Assembly*), de Puig and Blaauw (point of order).

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

Speakers: Mr. Rodrigues (explanation of vote) and Lord Mackie of Benshie (point of order).

The debate would take place on Wednesday, 30th November, as the first item of business.

14. A European security policy

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1439 and amendments)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Rodrigues, Bianchi and Blaauw.

Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Antretter, Pastusiak (*Observer from Poland*), Fassino, Lord Finsberg, MM. Pahor (*Observer from Slovenia*) and Roseta.

The debate was adjourned.

15. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 29th November 1994, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6 p.m.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. <i>Poças Santos</i> (Pinto) Roseta
MM. <i>Ghesquière</i> (Biefnot) Kelchtermans <i>De Decker</i> (Van der Maelen) Pécriaux Sarens Seeuws	MM. Arata Benvenuti Bianchi Fassino Latronico Mitolo Parisi Mrs. <i>Gaiotti de Biase</i> (Salvi) MM. <i>Ragno</i> (Selva) <i>Rodeghiero</i> (Tabladini)	Spain MM. <i>Ramirez Peri</i> (Alvarez) Cuco Mrs. <i>Guirado</i> (Homs I Ferret) MM. López Henares Martinez Puche Rodriguez de Puig Roman Sainz Garcia Mrs. <i>Moreno</i> (Sole Tura) Mr. <i>Borderas</i> (Vazquez)
France	Luxembourg	
MM. <i>Mignon</i> (Couveinhas) <i>de Lipkowski</i> (Galley) Masseret Valleix	Mr. <i>Regenwetter</i> (Mrs. Err) Mrs. <i>Brasseur</i> (Goerens) Mr. <i>Theis</i> (Mrs. Lentz-Cornette)	
Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Mr. Antretter Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Böhm) Mrs. <i>Lucyga</i> (Büchler) MM. Bühler <i>Reimann</i> (Holtz) <i>Feldmann</i> (Irmer) Müller <i>Marten</i> (von Schmude) Soell Sprung Steiner Mrs. Terborg MM. Vogel Wolfgramm	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman Mr. Dees Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout MM. van der Linden Verbeek <i>Blaauw</i> (Woltjer) Zijlstra	Mr. <i>Marshall</i> (Banks) Lady <i>Gould of Potternewton</i> (Cox) Lord <i>Dundee</i> (Sir Anthony Durant) Lady <i>Hooper</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Lord Finsberg Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Lord Kirkhill Lord Newall
	Portugal	
	MM. <i>Reis Leite</i> (Amaral) Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal) Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Machete)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Schreiner Seitlinger	Portugal
Mr. Kempinaire		Mr. Fernandes Marques
France	Germany	Spain
MM. Alloncle Baumel Birraux Boucheron Colombier Dumont Geoffroy Gouteyron Jacquat Jeambrun Jung Kaspereit	Mrs. Blunck MM. Kittelmann Meyer zu Bentrup Reddemann	Mr. López Valdivielso
	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Brugger Dionisi La Loggia La Russa Mattina Petruccioli Pozzo Serra	MM. Atkinson Hardy Sir John Hunt MM. Litherland Rathbone Redmond Sir Dudley Smith Sir Keith Speed Sir Donald Thompson Mr. Thompson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the draft decision on the revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to the creation of a status of associate member¹ :

Ayes	33
Noes	11
Abstentions	4

Ayes

MM. <i>Ramirez Peri</i> (Alvarez)	MM. <i>Reimann</i> (Holtz)	Mrs. <i>Gaiotti de Biase</i> (Salvi)
Arata	<i>Feldmann</i> (Irmer)	MM. Sarens
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman	Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i>	Soell
Mr. Bianchi	(Sir Russell Johnston)	Sprung
Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Böhm)	MM. Kelchtermans	Steiner
Mrs. <i>Lucyga</i> (Büchler)	<i>Theis</i>	<i>Rodeghiero</i> (Tabladini)
Mr. Bühler	(Mrs. Lentz-Cornette)	Mrs. Terborg
Lady <i>Gould of Potternewton</i>	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Machete)	MM. <i>Borderas</i> (Vazquez)
(Cox)	MM. <i>De Decker</i> (Van der Maelen)	Verbeek
Lady <i>Hooper</i>	Müller	<i>Blaauw</i> (Woltjer)
(Dame Peggy Fenner)	Lord Newall	Zijlstra
Lord Finsberg	MM. <i>Poças Santos</i> (Pinto)	
Mrs. <i>Brasseur</i> (Goerens)	Roseta	

Noes

MM. Benvenuti	MM. Martinez
Brito	Masseret
<i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal)	Pécriaux
Cuco	de Puig
Mrs. <i>Guirado</i>	Seeuws
(Homs I Ferret)	<i>Ragno</i> (Selva)

Abstentions

MM. Antretter
Latronico
López Henares
Mitolo

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1994

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly.
2. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (*Presentation of the first part of the fortieth annual report of the Council*, Doc. 1433); Address by Mr. van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
3. A European defence policy (*Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee*, Doc. 1445 and amendments).
4. A European security policy; A European defence policy (*Joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee*, Docs. 1439 and amendments and 1445 and amendments).
5. Address by Mr. Kucan, President of Slovenia.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of the proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 40 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the Italian Delegation:

Political Committee

- Mr. Pozzo as a titular member in place of Mr. Selva.

Technological and Aerospace Committee

- Mr. Mitolo as a titular member in place of Mr. Pozzo.

Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

- Mr. Selva as a titular member in place of Mr. Mitolo.

4. Address by Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

5. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council

(Presentation of the first part of the fortieth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1433)

**Address by Mr. van Mierlo,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

Mr. van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Mierlo answered questions put by MM. de Puig, Davis and Valleix.

Speakers (points of order): Lord Finsberg and Mr. Baumel.

6. A European defence policy

(Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1445 and amendments)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur.

7. A European security policy

A European defence policy

(Joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee, Docs. 1439 and amendments and 1445 and amendments)

The joint debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Martinez.

Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Buteiko (Observer from Ukraine) and van der Linden.

Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

The joint debate was adjourned.

8. Address by Mr. Kucan, President of Slovenia

Mr. Kucan, President of Slovenia, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Kucan answered questions put by MM. Magginas (*Observer from Greece*), Antretter, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Fassino, Roman, Jeszenszky (*Observer from Hungary*) and Mitolo.

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. <i>Poças Santos</i> (Pinto) Roseta
MM. Kelchtermans Kempinaire <i>De Decker</i> (Van der Maelen) Péciaux Sarens	MM. Arata Benvenuti Bianchi Fassino Latronico Mitolo Parisi Petruccioli <i>Ragno</i> (Pozzo) <i>Rodeghiero</i> (Tabladini)	Spain
France	Luxembourg	MM. <i>Ramirez Peri</i> (Alvarez) Cuco Grau I Buldu López Henares <i>Robles Orozco</i> (López Valdivielso) Martinez Puche Rodriguez de Puig Roman Sainz Garcia Mrs. <i>Moreno</i> (Sole Tura) Mr. <i>Borderas</i> (Vazquez)
MM. Baumel Galley <i>de Lipkowski</i> (Gouteyron) Masseret Valleix	Mr. <i>Regenwetter</i> (Mrs. Err) Mrs. <i>Brasseur</i> (Goerens) Mr. <i>Theis</i> (Mrs. Lentz-Cornette)	United Kingdom
Germany	Netherlands	Mr. Cox Lady <i>Hooper</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Lord Kirkhill Lady <i>Gould of Potternewton</i> (Litherland) Lord Newall MM. Rathbone <i>Davis</i> (Redmond) Sir Dudley Smith
Mr. Antretter Mrs. Blunck Mr. Böhm Mrs. <i>Lucyga</i> (Büchler) MM. <i>Pfuhl</i> (Bühler) Holtz <i>Feldmann</i> (Irmer) <i>Junghanns</i> (Kittelmann) Meyer zu Bentrup Müller Reddemann <i>Marten</i> (von Schmude) Soell Sprung Steiner Mrs. Terborg MM. Vogel Wolfgramm	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman Mr. Dees Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout MM. van der Linden Verbeek <i>Blaauw</i> (Woltjer) Zijlstra	
	Portugal	
	MM. <i>Curto</i> (Amaral) Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal) Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Fernandes Marques)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Jung Kaspereit Schreiner Seitlinger	Portugal Mr. Machete
MM. Biefnot Seeuus		
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Alloncle Birraux Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Dumont Geoffroy Jacquat Jeambrun	MM. Brugger Dionisi La Loggia La Russa Mattina Salvi Selva Serra	MM. Atkinson Banks Sir Anthony Durant Sir John Hunt Sir Keith Speed Sir Donald Thompson Mr. Thompson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1994

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Iliescu, President of Romania.
2. A European security policy; A European defence policy (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations and draft order, Docs. 1439 and amendments and 1445 and amendments*).
3. The future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1437*).
4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1429*).
5. Evolution of the Assembly's logistical requirements to take account of enlargement (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1438*).
6. Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft supplementary budget, Doc. 1441*).
7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1428 and addendum*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Iliescu, President of Romania

Mr. Iliescu, President of Romania, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Iliescu answered questions put by MM. Pavlidis (*Observer from Greece*), Atkinson, Korakas (*Observer from Greece*), Lord Finsberg, Mr. Eorsi (*Observer from Hungary*), Lord Newall and Mr. Mitolo.

Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

4. A European security policy

A European defence policy

(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations and draft order, Docs. 1439 and amendments and 1445 and amendments)

The joint debate was resumed.

Speaker: Mr. Tusek (Observer from Austria).

Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Liapis (Observer from Greece), López Henares, Cuco, Brito, Korakas (Observer from Greece), Müller, Jeszszky (Observer from Hungary), Godal (Observer from Norway), Prokes (Observer from Slovakia), Parisi, Borderas, Necas (Observer from the Czech Republic) and Hardy.

The joint debate was closed.

Mr. Soell, Rapporteur, Mr. de Puig, Chairman of the Political Committee, and Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur of the Defence Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation on a European security policy.

An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. De Decker:

9. Leave out paragraph (xv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers: Mr. De Decker, Lord Finsberg, MM. Pastusiak (Observer from Poland), Soell and de Puig.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "countries" to the end of the paragraph and insert "taking into account the progress made on the way to EU membership;"

Speakers: MM. Blaauw and Soell.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

4. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: Mr. Blaauw, Lord Finsberg and Mr. Soell.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. de Puig and others:

1. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 6 and insert:

"Make arrangements without further delay for granting Slovenia associate partner status;"

Speakers: MM. Benvenuti, Mitolo and Soell.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

5. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, after "European security" insert "in connection with the Noordwijk preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy".

Speakers: MM. Blaauw and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

6. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the success of the conference on the" and insert "a meaningful".

Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Hardy and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

7. In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "arrange" to the end of the paragraph and insert "for WEU members to act in a more co-ordinated fashion in the Security Council of that organisation;"

Speakers: MM. Blaauw and de Puig.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Soell:

2. In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, before "WEU" insert "the member states of".

Amendment 7 having been agreed to, Amendment 2 fell.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

8. Leave out paragraph 13 of the draft recommendation proper.

The amendment was withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 565)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order on a European security policy.

The draft order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 91)².

Speaker (explanation of vote): Lord Finsberg.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation on a European defence policy.

Amendments (Nos. 1 and 2) were tabled by Mr. Borderas:

1. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after "under a United Nations mandate" insert "in agreement with the Organisation of African Unity".

2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "readily available multinational European humanitarian intervention force" and insert "readily available multinational European force which would protect the humanitarian organisations on the ground and".

The President announced that Amendments 1 and 2 had been withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase:

3. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (x) and insert:

"Noting that European armed forces are increasingly called upon to perform humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks and, however, that defence budgets of European countries should consequently provide for a sufficient level of armed forces to carry out these tasks;"

Speakers: Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase and Mr. Baumel.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. López Henares:

1. See page 24.

2. See page 27.

4. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Give further thought to common security and defence policy, leading subsequently to the drafting of a white paper" and insert "Give further thought as soon as possible to a common security and defence policy, so that a white paper may be drafted forthwith".

Speakers: MM. López Henares and Baumel.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 566)³.

5. The future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1437)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. López Henares, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mrs. Guirado.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 567)⁴.

6. Change in the orders of the day

The President proposed that the remaining orders of the day be postponed to the next sitting.

The proposal was agreed to.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 30th November 1994, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.

3. See page 29.

4. See page 31.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Latronico Mitolo Parisi	MM. <i>Robles Orozco</i> (López Valdivielso) Martinez Puche Rodriguez de Puig Roman Sainz Garcia <i>Borderas</i> (Sole Tura)
MM. Kelchtermans Kempinaire <i>De Decker</i> (Van der Maelen) Pécriaux	Mrs. <i>Gaiotti de Biase</i> (Salvi) Mr. <i>Rodeghiero</i> (Tabladini)	
France	Luxembourg	
MM. Baumel Galley Mrs. <i>Durrieu</i> (Masseret)	Mrs. <i>Brasseur</i> (Goerens)	
Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
MM. Antretter Böhm <i>Pfuhl</i> (Büchler) Holtz <i>Junghanns</i> (Kittelmann) Meyer zu Bentrup Müller <i>Marten</i> (von Schmude) Soell Sprung Steiner <i>Bindig</i> (Mrs. Terborg) Wolfgramm	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout MM. <i>Leers</i> (Verbeek) <i>Blaauw</i> (Woltjer)	MM. Atkinson <i>Marshall</i> (Banks) Lord <i>Dundee</i> (Sir Anthony Durant) Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir John Hunt Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Lord Kirkhill Mr. <i>Davis</i> (Litherland) Lord Newall Mr. Rathbone Lady <i>Gould of Potternewton</i> (Redmond) Sir Dudley Smith Sir Keith Speed Mr. Thompson
Italy	Portugal	
MM. Benvenuti Bianchi Fassino	Mr. Brito Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Fernandes Marques) MM. Machete <i>Poças Santos</i> (Pinto) Roseta	
	Spain	
	MM. <i>Ramirez Peri</i> (Alvarez) Cuco <i>Grau I Buldu</i> (Homs I Ferret) López Henares	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Seitlinger Valleix	Luxembourg
MM. Biefnot Sarens Seeuws	Germany	Mrs. Err Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
France	Mrs. Blunck MM. Bühler Irmer Reddemann Vogel	Netherlands
MM. Alloncle Birraux Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Dumont Geoffroy Gouteyron Jacquat Jeambrun Jung Kaspereit Schreiner	Italy	MM. Dees van der Linden Zijlstra
	MM. Arata Brugger Dionisi La Loggia La Russa Mattina Petruccioli Pozzo Selva Serra	Portugal
		MM. Amaral Candal
		Spain
		Mr. Vazquez
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Cox Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Donald Thompson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 565***on a European security policy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing that the aim of WEU is to achieve the effective strengthening of European security and that institutional concerns must in no case weaken efforts to this end;
- (ii) Recalling that the modified Brussels Treaty is one of the essential bases for ensuring this security;
- (iii) Regretting, therefore, that the Council has failed to take advantage of the opportunity of the fortieth anniversary of the treaty, which also coincided with that of the tenth anniversary of the reactivation of WEU, to draw the attention of the public at large to progress achieved by WEU since 1984;
- (iv) Convinced that the development of a European defence policy by the Council of WEU is conditional upon the achievement of a European security policy based on a common perception of risks and dangers and on a joint concept regarding the means of countering them;
- (v) Deploring the lack of information from the Council regarding its co-operation and contribution in this respect in the framework of the CFSP and NATO;
- (vi) Recalling Recommendations 556, 558 and 559;
- (vii) Rejecting paragraph 3 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 559, in which the latter refuses to provide the Assembly with information on work undertaken in the framework of the CFSP on questions relating to the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (viii) Voicing its protest that the Council transmitted to the Assembly the first part of the fortieth annual report on its activities only on 9th November 1994 and deploring that the WEU Secretary-General no longer sends the Assembly his information letter;
- (ix) Aware that it is crucial to settle the substantive issues relating to the development of a European security and defence policy and that the Council seems to be giving priority to studying these questions;
- (x) Convinced nevertheless that the Council should not defer discussion of institutional problems in this connection until 1996, leaving the initiative in the interim to other European institutions;
- (xi) Recalling the decision of the European Council to create a study group in preparation for the 1996 intergovernmental conference which is to start work in June 1995 with the participation of two members of the European Parliament;
- (xii) Reaffirming that the supervision of security and defence policy in Europe is a prerogative of the national parliaments;
- (xiii) Insisting therefore that the WEU Assembly should participate fully in the preparations for WEU's planned review of the present provisions of the Maastricht Treaty concerning the common foreign and security policy, in accordance with declaration ID8 of the WEU member countries annexed to the Maastricht Treaty;
- (xiv) Fearing that the refusal of certain countries participating in the CFSP to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty might diminish the effectiveness of co-operation between the CFSP and WEU;
- (xv) Fearing also that the refusal of the WEU Council to admit all the European NATO member countries to full membership of WEU may complicate the implementation of WEU's rôle as the European pillar of NATO;
- (xvi) Wishing WEU to act as a political driving force vis-à-vis the authorities of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance and not consider that its main task is to carry out decisions taken by these two organisations;
- (xvii) Recalling nevertheless that since the Council has promised the European Union to provide assistance in policing the town of Mostar, it is of the utmost importance for the latter to honour its commitments in full;

(*xviii*) Deploring that meetings of the WEU Council are divided into four different categories of participant countries – full members, associate members, associate partners, observers – which raises the problem of multi-speed co-operation within WEU and the attendant risk of its political action being paralysed by institutional infighting, as was the case over the issue of Rwanda;

(*xix*) Wishing WEU to examine subsequent accession by its associate partners by basing itself essentially on the criteria of the modified Brussels Treaty;

(*xx*) Stressing that it is WEU's primary responsibility to ensure that, in the framework of harmonising procedures with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance for linking these countries with Euro-Atlantic structures, security considerations are a means of speeding up this process and not a pretext for holding it back;

(*xxi*) Recalling that the Assembly cannot grant associate member and associate partner delegations rights which exceed the status the Council has granted them;

(*xxii*) Stressing that the enlargement of WEU towards the East is intended to reinforce the security and stability of Europe as a whole and not to create new divisions;

(*xxiii*) Recalling in consequence the importance of strengthening the collective security system in the framework of the CSCE and of establishing a stable partnership with Russia and the other members of the CIS;

(*xxiv*) Wishing the problems raised by the harmonisation of the presidencies of WEU and the European Union to be settled quickly in order to ensure the continuity of WEU's political action;

(*xxv*) Recalling the important rôle of its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in reinforcing the impact of the work of the Assembly with parliaments, public opinion and the governments of the member countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In accordance with its declaration ID8 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, create a special working group tasked with studying institutional questions relating to the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference;
2. Decide that this working group will begin work in early 1995 and that the Assembly will be associated with it;
3. Play the rôle of a political driving force vis-à-vis the authorities of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance with a view to developing guidelines for linking the Central and Eastern European countries with Euro-Atlantic structures;
4. Open up real prospects of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty for associate partner countries, irrespective of whether or not they belong to other European organisations;
5. In so doing, ensure that any future enlargement of WEU does not weaken the scope of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty;
6. Make arrangements without further delay for granting Slovenia associate partner status;
7. Include in its present studies the French Prime Minister's proposal for drafting a white paper on European security in connection with the Noordwijk preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy and ensure that the outcome of its examination of the development of a European defence policy provides the main source of inspiration for the thinking process to be conducted in the framework of the CFSP and NATO;
8. Inform the Assembly of the areas and the content of its co-operation with the CFSP and NATO;
9. Contribute actively to a meaningful stability pact in Europe;
10. Work out a joint position with a view to its contribution to the CSCE ministerial conference in Budapest and inform the Assembly of the action taken to follow up its declared intention of 9th May 1994 of strengthening the CSCE "to avoid the emergence of new divisions" and to work for "a reasonable division of labour with the CSCE";
11. Make its views known in a more convincing and visible manner in the United Nations and arrange for WEU members to act in a more co-ordinated fashion in the Security Council of that organisation;
12. Follow closely the problems of security in the Mediterranean and inform the Assembly of the action it has taken on Recommendation 538 as it undertook to do in its reply to that recommendation;

13. Inform the Assembly of the results of studies undertaken by the Council on unresolved questions relating to the harmonisation of the presidencies of WEU and the European Union;
14. Avoid the effectiveness of WEU's action being jeopardised by the development of work conducted with different forms of participation within the organisation and at different speeds in specific areas;
15. Study the conditions in which the WEU Council might meet as a European security and defence council, either as necessary or on the occasion of meetings of the European Council;
16. Organise a regular exchange of senior civil servants between "WEU" departments established in ministries for foreign affairs and defence and in the private offices of the heads of government of member states;
17. Comply immediately with its obligations under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty by submitting its annual report to the Assembly so that the latter can reply before the report loses its topicality, account being taken of the fact that this is not the first time that the report has arrived very late;
18. Continue to inform the Assembly of all activities under the modified Brussels Treaty, even if exercised in other European or transatlantic bodies.

ORDER 91***on a European security policy***

The Assembly,

(i) Considering:

(a) the document on a status of association of WEU with the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic;

(b) the declaration further to the document on associate membership of WEU of 20th November 1992,

which texts were transmitted by the Council to the Assembly following the ministerial meeting held at Kirchberg, Luxembourg, on 9th May 1994;

(ii) Considering that the declaration referred to in paragraph (b) above states that it “does not entail any changes to the document on associate membership adopted in Rome on 20th November 1992”;

(iii) Taking the view therefore that this declaration does not contain elements requiring a re-examination of the measures drawn up by the Assembly for the participation of delegations of associate member countries;

(iv) Recalling nevertheless its Recommendation 558;

(v) Recalling also Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty which states that the WEU Assembly is composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;

(vi) Noting that the “document on the modalities”, dated 3rd May 1994, stipulates that:

“The provisions of this document apply as from today.

The status will formally be achieved when:

– the Hellenic Republic, currently an active observer, becomes a member of WEU and the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey, currently active observers, become associate members of WEU;

– the associate partner has signed a Europe Agreement with the European Union.

In the meantime the associate partners will be considered as active observers to WEU with respect to the provisions of their new status.”;

(vii) Recalling the decision taken by the Presidential Committee on 18th October 1994 to enlarge the permanent observer delegations of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia from two to four members and to invite the nine associate partner countries each to appoint one observer to the Political, Defence and Technological and Aerospace Committees and to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations without prejudging the eventual adoption of a status for the delegations of these countries;

(viii) Considering the brief assigned by the Presidential Committee to the Political Committee to propose a substantive text on the adoption of an appropriate status for the delegations of countries that became associate partners prior to the question being placed before the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges;

(ix) Recalling its Order 85 on the enlargement of WEU and in particular paragraph (vii) of the preamble drawing attention to the fact that “any reasonable enlargement of the number of parliamentary delegations participating in the Assembly will be impossible without major adjustments of the Assembly’s accommodation and budget”;

(x) Noting with surprise that, despite its repeated approaches to the Council, the latter has not taken action on the pressing demands formulated by the Assembly in this respect;

- (xi) Regretting also that the Council has not provided any information on the arrangements for financial contributions by the associate partners to WEU's budget;
- (xii) Stressing the need nevertheless to avoid any further delay in making official participation of parliamentarians from states which have become associate partners of WEU,

INVITES ITS COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES

To study the creation of a specific "associate partner" status for the representatives of associate partner states.

RECOMMENDATION 566***on a European defence policy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the Council's initiative in starting to formulate a common European defence policy as announced in the declaration on Western European Union attached to the Maastricht Treaty;
- (ii) Having taken note of both the Noordwijk declaration and the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy of 14th November 1994;
- (iii) Noting that WEU's inability to react quickly to crisis situations as in Bosnia or Rwanda is due not only to a lack of political will, but also to the fact that joint European interests have not yet been identified clearly enough and that mechanisms for making and implementing decisions rapidly have not yet been developed;
- (iv) Stressing that the operational rôle of WEU urgently needs to be strengthened in order to match the ambitions set out in the Maastricht Treaty and repeatedly expressed by the Council, while recognising that the lack of progress in developing WEU's operational rôle is due partly to the lack of political guidance from a common European defence policy on which it should be based;
- (v) Stressing that the transformation of NATO, and especially the implementation of decisions taken at NATO's 1994 Brussels summit meeting, is of vital importance for the reinforcement of WEU;
- (vi) Recognising that WEU's reinforcement must be founded partly in NATO and not replace a failing NATO;
- (vii) Surprised that the reinforcement of the European pillar of NATO is accompanied by a reduction in WEU member states' share of defence expenditures in the Atlantic Alliance;
- (viii) Recalling that the possibility of making NATO's collective assets available to WEU cannot relieve European states of their obligation to make a specific effort in those key defence areas where the alliance has no collective assets while being dependent on the national assets of the United States, specifically in the area of satellite intelligence and logistic capacity;
- (ix) Recalling that the massive airlift capacity now available in the United States armed forces inventory may considerably diminish in size by the turn of this century, making it necessary for European armed forces to assume their own responsibility in this field;
- (x) Noting that European armed forces are increasingly called upon to perform humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks and, however, that defence budgets of countries should consequently provide for a sufficient level of armed forces to carry out these tasks;
- (xi) Insisting that co-operation between European national armed forces must be intensified, also through the formation of multinational forces, in order to make the most effective use of diminishing defence budgets and smaller armed forces;
- (xii) Noting that the status of associate partner has provided significant opportunities for the countries concerned to help shape a future European defence policy and to co-operate closely with WEU in possible future WEU operations of all kinds;
- (xiii) Welcoming the first meetings of WEU's Mediterranean Group with government experts from Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, but at the same time stressing that WEU should pay closer attention to the situation in the southern Mediterranean extending beyond the present diplomatic dialogue;
- (xiv) Recognising that the situation in the former republics of the Soviet Union, in particular Russia, should be continuously followed by WEU, inter alia through regular contacts at both political and military level with the objective of fostering mutual confidence and understanding;
- (xv) Considering that lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia would be an incentive for the parties concerned to escalate the conflict, further endanger the civilian population and cause unacceptable risks for the United Nations forces on the ground;
- (xvi) Regretting the decision of the United States Government, taken unilaterally and without appropriate prior consultation with the other states participating in the combined WEU/NATO operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, to stop policing the United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia;

(xvii) Stressing that the October 1994 crisis in Iraq and the decision of the United States to stop policing the arms embargo against Bosnia in the framework of operation Sharp Guard have provided compelling evidence that Europe needs to have its own independent intelligence policy, including a fully-fledged satellite system,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strengthen the rôle of the Secretary-General, while at the same time defining clearly WEU's responsibilities compared with those of the European Union and NATO;
2. Reinforce the operational rôle of the Planning Cell, duly enlarging its staff and providing it with the appropriate equipment and technical resources for data processing and communications;
3. Give liaison officers from associate partners a more active rôle in the Planning Cell, in particular by drafting a list of forces of associate partners available to WEU and by including units from these countries in force packages for contingency plans;
4. Actively support the creation of a multinational African peace-keeping force which should be able to act rapidly under a United Nations mandate, by encouraging WEU member states to preposition equipment on the African continent and to take responsibility to train African units for such tasks;
5. Help in creating a readily available multinational European humanitarian intervention force to be included among the forces answerable to WEU;
6. Give further thought as soon as possible to a common security and defence policy, so that a white paper may be drafted forthwith on European security as proposed by the French Prime Minister specifying the rôle, tasks, joint command structures and political/military interface procedures of WEU for approval at a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member states in 1996 at the latest;
7. Accelerate the creation of a European armaments agency to manage multinational co-operative programmes, drawing on experience gained from the Franco-German armaments agency now being established;
8. Continue to pursue actively the establishment of a European satellite system which will be a vital part of Europe's defence identity;
9. Notwithstanding the United States' unilateral decision to end enforcement of the United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia, maintain its determination to continue to implement fully the enforcement of all existing embargoes against the different parts of former Yugoslavia, including the arms embargo against Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION 567***on the future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the fact that the WEU satellite centre has achieved its logistical targets;
- (ii) Congratulating the Spanish authorities responsible for building the centre for having provided it with the means of operating effectively;
- (iii) Recalling that this centre is unique as a result of international co-operation and has been designed to contribute to peace-keeping and international security;
- (iv) Congratulating the Director and the staff of the centre on the very substantial sterling work they have done there;
- (v) Judging very favourably the number and nature of the treaty verification and crisis-monitoring tasks assigned to the centre;
- (vi) Regretting, however, that environmental monitoring tasks assigned to the centre are few and far between;
- (vii) Noting that so far certain member states have not tasked the centre at all and wondering about the reasons for their not doing so;
- (viii) Believing that the period for assessing the work of the centre is not long enough for the assessment to be entirely fair and valid;
- (ix) Considering that there is a risk of the satellite centre's present temporary status being prolonged and that it might not therefore be able to carry out its work in the optimum conditions for achieving its aims;
- (x) Considering moreover that the Centre, although in its infancy, is an important example of measures to be taken for the progressive creation of a European defence identity;
- (xi) Taking account moreover of the fact that the centre will be able to have the benefit of Helios satellite images only after summer 1995 at best;
- (xii) Reaffirming that the Torrejón Satellite Centre must be the cornerstone of a complete European space-based system covering intelligence, early warning and defence;
- (xiii) Believing in any event that the future of the centre should not be indissolubly linked to that of a European space-based observation system;
- (xiv) Insisting on the urgent need for the centre to be as widely supported as possible by public opinion if it wishes to attain its goals of providing Europe with a useful security instrument in the widest possible meaning of the term,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take a decision as soon as possible that will guarantee the continuity of the satellite centre by making it permanent, so as to avoid a temporary situation being maintained to the detriment of its work;
2. Establish a method for continuously assessing the work done by the centre so as to optimise its capabilities at all times;
3. Keep the Assembly informed of the practical details for implementing the memorandum of understanding on the Helios satellite signed by WEU and the governments of France, Italy and Spain;
4. Encourage the member states to avail themselves of the services of the centre, especially those which have not yet done so;
5. Urge member countries to make use of the services of the centre more regularly, in particular by giving it environmental monitoring tasks (disaster relief, control of water supplies, population movement, hazardous activities, control of nature of terrain, control of illicit movements);

6. Establish relations with the European Space Agency in order to determine possibilities for co-operation between the two organisations in space-based observation;
7. Study the possibilities of technical and commercial space co-operation with the CIS countries in order to allow the technical and human resources of those countries to be used for preventive and peaceful purposes;
8. Inform public opinion in Europe of the tasks and work undertaken by the Torrejón Satellite Centre in order to promote a better understanding of such tasks among the citizens of the European countries and to obtain their support for the aims of the centre.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 30th November 1994

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget*, Doc. 1429).
2. Evolution of the Assembly's logistical requirements to take account of enlargement (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1438).
3. Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft supplementary budget*, Doc. 1441).
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts*, Doc. 1428 and addendum).
5. The situation in Bihac and the need to strengthen WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1450).
6. The development of a European space-based observation system – Part III (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1436).
7. Co-operation between European space research institutes (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft resolution*, Doc. 1434 and amendment).
8. Address by Mr. Caputo, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 40 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of a committee proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation:

Political Committee

- Mr. Davis as an alternate member in place of Dr. Godman.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995

Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995

(Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts, Docs. 1429, 1441, 1447 and 1448)

The reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration were presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The previous question (Document 1447) and a motion for an order (Document 1448) were moved by Mr. Rathbone.

The previous question was agreed to unanimously and, in accordance with Rule 33 (1) (a) of the Rules of Procedure, the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration were withdrawn from the agenda and the register of the Assembly.

The motion for an order was agreed to unanimously (This order will be published as No. 92)¹

1. See page 36.

5. Evolution of the Assembly's logistical requirements to take account of enlargement

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1438)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Lord Mackie of Benshie.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 568)².

6. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1428 and addendum)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.

The motion was agreed to unanimously.

7. The situation in Bihac and the need to strengthen WEU

(Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1450)

The sitting was suspended at 10.35 a.m. and resumed at 10.40 a.m.

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Lord Finsberg, Mr. Rodrigues, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Baumel, Korakas (*Observer from Greece*), De Decker, Domljan (*Observer from Croatia*), Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout, MM. de Lipkowski, Mitolo, Martinez, Péciaux and Lord Mackie of Benshie (point of order).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Puig, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 569)³.

Speakers (explanation of vote): MM. Soell, Hardy and Rodrigues.

8. Address by Mr. Caputo, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy

Mr. Caputo, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Caputo answered questions put by MM. Pahor (*Observer from Slovenia*), Davis, Lord Finsberg, MM. Latronico, Benvenuti, Sole Tura, Tusek (*Observer from Austria*) and Parisi.

9. Change in the orders of the day

The President proposed that the remaining orders of the day be postponed to the next sitting.

The proposal was agreed to.

10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day, at 3.30 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.25 p.m.

2. See page 37.

3. See page 38.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Pinto) Mr. Roseta
MM. Kempinaire <i>De Decker</i> (Van der Maelen) Pécriaux	MM. Arata Benvenuti Bianchi Latronico Mattina Mitolo Parisi Petruccioli <i>Ragno</i> (Pozzo) Mrs. <i>Gaiotti de Biase</i> (Salvi) Mr. <i>Rodeghiero</i> (Tabladini)	Spain
France	Luxembourg	MM. <i>Ramirez Peri</i> (Alvarez) Cuco <i>Grau I Buldu</i> (Homs I Ferret) López Valdivielso Martinez Puche Rodriguez de Puig Roman Sole Tura <i>Borderas</i> (Vazquez)
MM. Baumel <i>de Lipkowski</i> (Birraux) Dumont Galley Kaspereit Valleix	Mr. <i>Regenwetter</i> (Mrs. Err) Mrs. <i>Brasseur</i> (Goerens) Mr. <i>Theis</i> (Mrs. Lentz-Cornette)	United Kingdom
Germany	Netherlands	MM. Atkinson <i>Marshall</i> (Banks) Sir <i>Irvine Patnick</i> (Sir Anthony Durant) Mr. <i>Alexander</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir John Hunt Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Lord Newall MM. Rathbone <i>Davis</i> (Redmond) Sir Dudley Smith Sir Donald Thompson Mr. Thompson
Mr. Antretter Mrs. Blunck Mr. Böhm Mrs. <i>Lucyga</i> (Büchler) MM. <i>Schluckebier</i> (Holtz) <i>Feldmann</i> (Irmer) <i>Junghanns</i> (Kittelmann) Meyer zu Bentrup Müller <i>Marten</i> (von Schmude) Soell <i>Lenzer</i> (Sprung) Steiner Mrs. Terborg MM. <i>Zierer</i> (Vogel) Wolfgramm	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman Mr. Dees Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout MM. van der Linden Verbeek <i>Blaauw</i> (Woltjer) Zijlstra	
	Portugal	
	MM. <i>Reis Leite</i> (Amaral) Brito <i>Curto</i> (Candal) <i>Poças Santos</i> (Fernandes Marques) Machete	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Jeambrun Jung Masseret Schreiner Seitlinger	MM. La Loggia La Russa Selva Serra
France	Germany	Spain
MM. Alloncle Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Geoffroy Gouteyron Jacquat	MM. Bühler Reddemann	MM. López Henares Sainz Garcia
	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Brugger Dionisi Fassino	Mr. Cox Lord Kirkhill Mr. Litherland Sir Keith Speed

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ORDER 92***on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995
and on the draft supplementary budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1995***

The Assembly,

- (i) Having heard the report by the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;
- (ii) Noting the absence of the opinion of the Council on the draft budget and draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 1995;
- (iii) Noting that this is the first time since the year 1985 that the Assembly has not received the opinion of the Council on its draft budgets in time for consideration at its autumn session;
- (iv) Noting that preliminary views expressed by delegates in the Council Budget and Organisation Committee were unsupportive of the Assembly's plans to meet satisfactorily the requirement of expanded membership including guest members and observers;
- (v) Considering that the Council had, in its Kirchberg declaration, invited the Assembly to welcome new members and to adjust its rules accordingly;
- (vi) Regretting efforts by budgetary experts to curtail the establishment and maintenance of parliamentary contacts according to the Kirchberg declaration and its intentions;
- (vii) Reiterates its support for the outlined plans to meet the logistics of the Assembly in the foreseeable future, in particular the requirement to accommodate over 400 members in a chamber conceived to seat 228;
- (viii) Expresses its disappointment at the Council's delay in giving its opinion on the draft budgets of the Assembly,

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. To negotiate urgently with the Council for the Assembly to be granted adequate financial means to allow it to play its rôle in a reactivated WEU, taking into account in particular the Kirchberg declaration and its requirements;
2. In application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, to take the necessary measures to finalise the Assembly's draft budgets for 1995 to fulfil that rôle as speedily as possible.

RECOMMENDATION 568***on the evolution of the logistical requirements of the Assembly to take account of enlargement***

The Assembly,

Considering:

- (i) That present and foreseeable Assembly requirements now necessitate measures to make it possible to accommodate in the chamber of the Economic and Social Council the parliamentarians of the member countries, associate member countries, associate partner countries, observer countries and of other countries invited by the Council to attend Assembly debates, also members of the WEU Council and Secretariat-General and the secretaries of the national delegations and political groups;
- (ii) That for Greek to be adopted as an official language simultaneous interpretation facilities must be supplemented by further interpretation facilities once the ratification process has been completed;
- (iii) That, even after the interpretation facilities for sessions have been transferred to the meeting rooms in the Wilson wing, the limited number of seats in the official gallery makes it necessary to continue to use and improve the television area installed in the lobby of the French Economic and Social Council in order to achieve better television coverage of all Assembly speeches, votes and procedures;
- (iv) That the meeting rooms cannot accommodate more than 40 participants, they will be too small once representatives of all participating countries are present and that it would be necessary to resort to the hire of meeting rooms elsewhere in Paris;
- (v) That offices need to be allocated to all new parliamentary delegations and that this will be possible only if the remaining offices on the second floor and all the offices on the third floor can be made available to the Assembly in the immediate future for use during sessions and committee meetings;
- (vi) That in the foreseeable future the Assembly will no longer be able to operate properly in its present location and it will soon become essential to provide the Assembly with new premises;
- (vii) Welcoming the progress made on reaching agreement on provisional solutions aimed at alleviating pressing immediate needs arising from enlargement,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take note of this report including in particular Appendix V;
2. Press ahead with the implementation of the measures referred to in Appendix V, in particular :
 - (a) Take the required action to release the remaining office on the second floor in time to accommodate the new Greek Delegation;
 - (b) Authorise the Institute for Security Studies, in close consultation and agreement with the Assembly, to proceed expeditiously with the proposed refurbishing of Room A, thus enabling the Assembly to use this room for meetings larger than those that can be accommodated in Rooms B and C;
 - (c) Approve the funds required by the Assembly to proceed with the work necessary to accommodate parliamentary delegations in the facilities relinquished finally or temporarily and with the other proposals contained in Appendix V and concerning in particular the "electronic office" intended specifically to make more efficient and flexible use of insufficient seating capacity of the ESC Chamber;
3. Support the Assembly and its President in their efforts to promote a comprehensive plan to meet the future requirements of the Assembly, in particular :
 - (a) Reach agreement with the French Government for the transfer of the Institute for Security Studies to alternative premises nearby, thereby releasing the offices on the third floor for the use of parliamentary delegations, in all categories;
 - (b) Alternatively, reach agreement now with the French Government for the Assembly to be installed in new premises suitable for foreseeable future needs;
4. In any case, be prepared to start consultations with the President of the Assembly and the French Government on a relocation plan for execution immediately following the 1996 review of all European institutions, in anticipation of new members in various categories joining in that and subsequent years.

RECOMMENDATION 569***on the situation in Bihac and the need to strengthen WEU***

The Assembly,

- (i) Anxious for all the security zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina defined by the Security Council to be scrupulously respected;
- (ii) Noting nevertheless that the fact that Bosnian Serb forces have penetrated the safe area around Bihac shows the difficulties encountered by UNPROFOR in implementing Security Council resolutions authorising it inter alia:
 - to deter attacks against the safe areas,
 - and to take the necessary retaliatory measures, including recourse to force, against bombing of the safe areas by either side, armed incursions or any obstacle to free movement by UNPROFOR;
- (iii) Fearing an escalation of the conflict and intensification of the fighting that might endanger the UNPROFOR troops now deployed and which are insufficiently armed.
- (iv) Disturbed that profound differences have emerged between the United States and its European allies regarding the measures to be taken to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions and to restore peace in the regions concerned;
- (v) Convinced that the lifting of the embargo on Bosnia is not an appropriate means of facilitating the resolution of the conflict in the region in question;
- (vi) Regretting nevertheless that neither the United States nor the countries of Europe have been prepared to send in a buffer force that is large enough and equipped to be able to put an end to hostilities;
- (vii) Noting also that the contact group's efforts to achieve a cease-fire that is complied with and a political solution to the conflict have so far failed;
- (viii) Determined to do everything possible to prevent a further massacre occurring on former Yugoslav territory;
- (ix) Still convinced that, to avoid escalation, efforts to find a political solution to the conflict acceptable to all parties concerned must not be relaxed;
- (x) Recalling nevertheless that, for such a solution not to remain a dead letter, the parties concerned must be convinced that its implementation will be guaranteed by effective measures of enforcement,

URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Immediately hold an urgent joint meeting with the North Atlantic Council with a view to:
 - (a) appealing to all governments and all competent international organisations to make a new effort to find a political solution to the conflict, in view of the negotiations in progress on the basis of the proposals of the contact group, and demonstrate the responsible attitude of the international community by opposing with great determination and firmness those responsible for prolonging an unjustifiable and nonsensical war;
 - (b) considering the timeliness of using all appropriate means to prevent further massacres and to end the fighting in Bihac;
 - (c) ensuring that the unilateral decision of the United States Government no longer to participate in monitoring the embargo on Bosnia cannot affect NATO's commitment nor its operational capabilities in the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
2. Accelerate the process of strengthening Western European Union by providing it with satellite intelligence means and strategic transport and units of combined forces.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday 30th November 1994

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The development of a European space-based observation system – Part III (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1436).
2. Co-operation between European space research institutes (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft resolution*, Doc. 1434 and amendment).
3. Transatlantic co-operation on European anti-missile defence (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1435).
4. The readiness and capabilities of airforces in WEU member states (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order*, Doc. 1444).
5. The WEU Institute for Security Studies (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1430).
6. Western European Union (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order*, Doc. 1431).
7. Address by Mr. Balladur, Prime Minister of France.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.30 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. The development of a European space-based observation system – Part III

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1436)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. Pécriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speaker: Mr. Alexander.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Borderas, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 570)¹.

4. Co-operation between European space research institutes

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1434 and amendment)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Galley, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase and Mr. Lenzer.

The sitting was suspended at 4.30 p.m. and resumed at 4.45 p.m.

Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Lenzer and Buteiko (*Observer from Ukraine*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Galley, Rapporteur, and Mr. Borderas, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft resolution.

1. See page 42.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase:

1. In the draft resolution proper, leave out paragraph (e) and insert:

“take account, in developing Europe’s autonomy in defence matters, of the fact that military applications of space in large measure coincide with civil applications;”

Speakers: Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase and Mr. Galley.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An oral amendment was proposed by Mr. Galley.

In the draft resolution proper, in paragraph (e), leave out “priority” and insert “priorities”.

Speakers: Mr. Galley and Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase.

The oral amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft resolution.

The amended draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 93)².

5. Transatlantic co-operation on European anti-missile defence

(Presentation of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1435)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 571)³.

6. The readiness and capabilities of airforces in WEU member states

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1444)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Lord Newall, Mr. Borderas and Lord Mackie of Benshie.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur, and Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously (This recommendation will be published as No. 572)⁴.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Mitolo.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously (This order will be published as No. 93)⁵.

The sitting was suspended at 5.50 p.m. and resumed at 6 p.m.

7. Address by Mr. Balladur, Prime Minister of France

Mr. Balladur, Prime Minister of France, addressed the Assembly.

8. Change in the orders of the day

The President proposed that the remaining orders of the day be postponed to the next sitting.

The proposal was agreed to.

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 1st December 1994, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.50 p.m.

2. See page 43.

3. See page 45.

4. See page 47.

5. See page 48.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Mr. Soell Mrs. Terborg	Spain
MM. <i>De Decker</i> (Van der Maelen) Sarens	Italy	MM. <i>Ramirez Peri</i> (Alvarez) Cuco <i>Grau I Buldu</i> (Homs I Ferret) López Valdivielso Martinez de Puig Roman Sole Tura <i>Borderas</i> (Vazquez)
France	MM. Latronico Mattina Mitolo <i>Coviello</i> (Parisi) Mrs. <i>Gaiotti de Biase</i> (Salvi)	United Kingdom
MM. Baumel <i>Briane</i> (Birraux) Dumont Galley <i>de Lipkowski</i> (Geoffroy) <i>Hunault</i> (Jacquat) Kaspereit Masseret Schreiner Seitlinger Valleix	Luxembourg	MM. Atkinson <i>Marshall</i> (Banks) Sir <i>Irvine Patnick</i> (Sir Anthony Durant) Mr. <i>Alexander</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir John Hunt Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Lord Newall <i>Davis</i> (Redmond) Sir Dudley Smith Sir Keith Speed Sir Donald Thompson Mr. Thompson
Germany	MM. <i>Regenwetter</i> (Mrs. Err) <i>Theis</i> (Mrs. Lentz-Cornette)	
MM. Antretter Böhm Büchler <i>Lenzer</i> (Bühler) Mrs. <i>Lucyga</i> (Holtz) Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Kittelmann) MM. Meyer zu Bentrup Müller Reddemann	Netherlands	
	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout MM. van der Linden <i>Leers</i> (Woltjer)	
	Portugal	
	MM. Brito <i>Poças Santos</i> (Fernandes Marques) Pinto Roseta	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Steiner Vogel Wolfgramm	Netherlands
MM. Biefnot Kelchtermans Kempinaire Péciaux Seeuws	Italy	MM. Dees Verbeek Zijlstra
France	MM. Arata Benvenuti Bianchi Brugger Dionisi Fassino La Loggia La Russa Petruccioli Pozzo Selva Serra Tabladini	Portugal
MM. Alloncle Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung	Luxembourg	MM. Amaral Candal Machete
Germany	Mr. Goerens	Spain
Mrs. Blunck MM. Irmer von Schmude Sprung		MM. López Henares Puche Rodriguez Sainz Garcia
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Cox Lord Kirkhill MM. Litherland Rathbone

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 570***on the development of a European space-based observation system – Part III***

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing the importance of control over space beyond the earth's atmosphere in the global management of crises;
- (ii) Noting that Europe still does not have operational means of observation and detection by satellite with the military capabilities necessary for strengthening its defence;
- (iii) Stressing the need for the WEU countries to equip themselves with independent space-based means of observation and detection in order to be able to take appropriate measures in the event of crises affecting Europe's interests;
- (iv) Concerned over the future implications for European security of the proliferation of ballistics technology in the Mediterranean region;
- (v) Recalling Recommendations 410, 482, 523, 533 and 555 in which the Assembly requests that the Council:
 - (a) set clear European space policy objectives and priorities;
 - (b) reach decisions on further steps for establishing a full-scale European verification satellite system;
 - (c) design the planned system in such a way as to contribute to the security of WEU member countries and to be useful to other organisations with a European, Atlantic or international vocation;
 - (d) assess without delay the risks to Europe stemming from the proliferation of ballistic and nuclear technology;
 - (e) take appropriate decisions to avoid the slowing-down or paralysis of activities entrusted to the study management team and the industrial consortium commissioned to design WEU's main observation system;
- (vi) Stressing the importance of equipping Europe with early-warning and navigational satellite systems necessary for the efficient operation of a European anti-missile defence system;
- (vii) Aware of the high cost of space-based systems and the need for close co-operation between states, industry and scientific circles for these projects to succeed;
- (viii) Noting with regret the absence of consensus in the Council over the necessary development of the work of the Satellite Centre and starting the programme for the main observation system;
- (ix) Deploring that the Council provides so little and such inadequate information on WEU's space policy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Commence examination of a European space defence policy, taking all aspects of the problem into account;
2. Take the decisions necessary for the development of the Satellite Centre and for starting work on the main observation system, on the basis of a strategic analysis of what is at stake in the medium and long term;
3. Instruct its Space Group to begin a study of a European space-based defence system, paying particular attention to the need for communications, early-warning and navigational satellites and their protection;
4. Develop its contacts with the space industries of the member countries and with ESA in order to obtain information on current programmes and technologies that might be useful for implementing a European space-based defence system;
5. Foster co-operation in early-warning and navigational satellites with the United States and Russia on a basis of reciprocity and without jeopardising the independence of European systems;
6. Examine the expediency of creating a European space defence agency in WEU with responsibility in this area;
7. Keep the Assembly better informed of its decisions on WEU's space policy.

RESOLUTION 93***on co-operation between European space research institutes***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that space research is essential for meeting the challenges of guaranteeing the scientific standing, economic competitiveness and political autonomy of Europe;
- (ii) Reaffirming that only an integrated Europe will be able to take up the challenge of space;
- (iii) Considering that European co-operation in certain sectors of space is an example of the achievements to which our countries can aspire by uniting their efforts;
- (iv) Noting with satisfaction that space research has enabled our continent to attain a high level of technology and goals which were almost inconceivable quite recently;
- (v) Believing that this considerable progress is largely due to the existence and the rôle of the European Space Agency;
- (vi) Welcoming likewise the remarkable work done by the national space research institutes;
- (vii) Noting the present need for ever more investment, which is increasingly difficult for states to meet in isolation, is encountering ever tighter budgets;
- (viii) Noting furthermore that the absence of an overall strategy on a European scale is leading to the duplication of efforts by the various countries;
- (ix) Considering that this dispersion is leading to competition, excess capacity and overlapping programmes and infrastructures;
- (x) Believing that WEU member states must co-ordinate their research policies if they wish to use available funds more efficiently, thus avoiding their dispersal and contributing to the creation of new synergies;
- (xi) Considering that Europe is lagging behind to some extent in the military uses of space as compared with the United States;
- (xii) Taking account of the fact that there is insufficient co-operation at present in military space research and that such co-operation is essential for the security and political independence of Europe;
- (xiii) Believing that it is essential to exploit existing synergies between the civil and military sectors of space in order to give impetus to the technological and industrial development of space applications;
- (xiv) Welcoming moreover the major contribution of national space research institutes to following up and evaluating feasibility studies for the future European space-based observation system;
- (xv) Warmly appreciative of the initiative of the various European space research institutes in moving towards a convergence of their work on aeronautics,

INVITES THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES

1. To create a study group composed of representatives of governments and national space research institutes with the following aims:
 - (a) lay the foundations for an overall European space strategy;
 - (b) promote a more rational use of available resources, be they economic, technological, human or infrastructure, in order to avoid as far as possible excess capacity, competition, and, in short, duplication of effort and expenditure;
 - (c) establish the bases for close co-operation between national space research institutes similar to that already existing between them in the aeronautics sector;

- (d) foster greater harmonisation between the national space research institutes and ESA so as to achieve greater coherence in existing programmes and derive optimum advantage from closer co-operation between these institutes;
- (e) give priorities to the military space sector in order to develop European independence in space matters and also to take account of the fact that military applications of space in large measure coincide with civil applications;
- (f) study the possibility and expediency of amending the ESA Convention so as to enable ESA also to devote its efforts to certain very specific areas of the military space sector;
- (g) reflect on the need to establish a co-ordinated strategy for the national space research institutes, ESA, the European Union, WEU and other organisations concerned with space in order to achieve a more efficient use of available resources;
- (h) take steps to ensure that the national space research institutes develop closer working relationships with establishments working in related or complementary branches and that they maintain the same type of relationship with industry in order to enable the results of their research to be transferred and applied;
- (i) invite WEU associate member countries, associate partners and observers to participate in this study group.

RECOMMENDATION 571***on transatlantic co-operation on European anti-missile defence***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the need for Europe to determine the risks for its security of the proliferation of ballistic technologies in the countries of the third world and in particular in the Mediterranean and the Middle East;
- (ii) Recalling the need for the discussion already started in WEU to be taken further in order to contribute to identifying these risks and their effects on Europe and for giving this discussion real impetus;
- (iii) Taking into consideration the need for European countries to reach a joint position on anti-missile defence, in order to avoid a dangerous delay in relation to the evolution of the threat;
- (iv) Recalling its earlier conclusions on the need to envisage a system of protection which takes account of European needs and also of work done in this area by the United States;
- (v) Considering the many advantages that co-operation in the widest sense and based on equality between the transatlantic partners could obtain for the two sides in the area of anti-missile defence;
- (vi) Considering however that certain programmes launched by the United States, such as THAAD, have reached a very advanced stage, which precludes co-operation from the outset;
- (vii) Recalling moreover that the missile technology control régime provides for the signatory countries to strengthen the principles upheld by that agreement through their respective legislations;
- (viii) Taking into account the differences now separating countries that used to be members of Cocom in identifying the countries which constitute a strategic threat to their security;
- (ix) Considering that the countries which are at present establishing the bases of the new Cocom must reach a consensus, particularly with regard to prohibition of certain transactions with given countries or for a specific purpose;
- (x) Considering that the system which is to succeed Cocom must have as its main objective to prevent the countries constituting a true proliferation risk and a real threat to regional stability from procuring conventional armaments and associated technology;
- (xi) Judging necessary that agreements directed to this end should be concluded as quickly as possible;
- (xii) Emphasising the importance for WEU to define a joint policy for the exportation of armaments;
- (xiii) Taking account of the need to take the necessary steps as soon as possible for preparing a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM),

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Give the Assembly precise information about progress made in the study being conducted by the Special Working Group on European anti-missile defence;
2. Let the Assembly know whether a meeting of experts has been held in order to prepare an analysis of risks and, if so, what conclusions were drawn from that meeting;
3. Ask member countries to strengthen in their respective legislations the principles upheld by the MTCR;
4. Encourage the adoption in member countries of a joint position on the definition of the countries that constitute a strategic threat to their security;
5. Seek a consensus among member countries on the bases of the régime to replace Cocom;
6. Promote among member countries the introduction in the very near future of a joint policy towards the exportation of armaments to third countries;
7. Speed up examination of the development of a European space-based observation system and the taking of decisions in that respect;

8. Create a study group on a European early warning system;
9. Discuss the possibilities of co-operation between the United States and Europe on anti-missile defence; such co-operation should be on a basis of equal partnership in development and production and might cover the following areas:
 - (a) programmes on an endo-atmospheric system currently under study in Europe and the United States and which might possibly lead to joint implementation of a single programme;
 - (b) exo-atmospheric systems;
 - (c) airborne systems, adapted in any event, to European Rafale and Eurofighter combat aircraft;
 - (d) study of the possibility for Europe to adopt a joint position on the possible procurement of the American THAAD programme;
10. Reach a joint position on the various possibilities described above in the interests of Europe and our transatlantic allies;
11. Establish contacts between WEU and the BMDO for discussion on the problems already described.

RECOMMENDATION 572***on the readiness and capabilities of airforces in WEU member states***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that WEU member states should review the national capability of their airforces to meet their obligations within the alliance and to provide a proper contribution to the exercise of international authority and humanitarian obligations;
- (ii) Recalling that, for member states, it is not enough to possess appropriate numbers of military aircraft since such numbers are of little use if the aircrews are not capable of current operational activity or if the aircraft themselves are not maintained in serviceable condition;
- (iii) Expressing concern about the quality and relevance of flight training and stressing that low-level flight training is necessary to sustain the possibility of operational survival;
- (iv) Drawing attention to the absence of, or inadequacy of, low-level flight training in a number of member states which fails to provide reasonable assurances that the nature and the scale of flight training in their airforces meets the standards to which they are committed;
- (v) Regretting possible shortcomings in logistic support capacity and the reliance upon civilian transport aircraft for military purposes especially where pursuit of peace in the service of humanitarian causes may require both aircrew and aircraft to be prepared to face a hostile environment, which testifies to the need, in the long term, to build a European military transport aircraft;
- (vi) Considering existing anxieties about the need for adequate air defence, in particular in terms of all-weather capability, air-to-air refuelling and reconnaissance and early warning in airforces of WEU member states;
- (vii) Considering that the aircraft in service in several member states are obsolescent thus extending the considerable range and variety of different types, there being, for instance, some thirteen different types of strike aircraft;
- (viii) Considering that rather more attention should be paid to making provision for adequate air-to-air refuelling in view of the increased capacity this might provide;
- (ix) Noting that the airforce exercise Purple Nova held in November 1994 under WEU auspices is an interesting development and trusting that further similar exercises will be held in order to assist co-operation between airforces of member states to enable them to develop further co-operative capacity in response to crises and international need,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Remind member states that more attention should be paid to the provision of sufficient military aircraft and aircrews capable of operations in support of international need and to ensuring that sufficient personnel are trained and employed to maintain the numbers of military aircraft which their commitment to the alliance requires;
2. Urge member states to recognise that whilst their services need to be operated efficiently, the defence of their realms and their obligation to both the alliance and the international community require the retention of a sufficient number of uniformed personnel to ensure that support as well as operational requirements can be permanently secured;
3. Pay close attention to the success of the recent airforce exercise Purple Nova with a view to extending such arrangements on a regular basis.

ORDER 93***on the readiness and capabilities of airforces in WEU member states***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that, in the near future, further budget reductions in WEU member states may have a negative influence on their ability to respond to threats to European security;
- (ii) Stressing that WEU member states will increasingly need to support international stability or sustain the humanitarian cause for which they must have available the appropriate aircraft and personnel;
- (iii) Considering that opposition to training at low altitudes is at present leading to its prevention or inhibition and, as a consequence, to the diminishing quality of aircrew training,

INSTRUCTS ITS DEFENCE COMMITTEE

1. To meet representatives of the WEU Planning Cell in order to consider these matters and to provide an analysis of the conditions in airforces of WEU member states during 1996;
2. To monitor the response to the present report and to inform the Assembly of the state of national airforces during 1996.

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 1st December 1994

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The WEU Institute for Security Studies (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1430).
2. Western European Union (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order*, Doc. 1431).
3. WEU's relations with Russia (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1440).
4. Address by Mr. Kozyrev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia.
5. WEU's relations with Russia (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order*, Doc. 1440).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. The WEU Institute for Security Studies

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1430)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Roman, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Pastusiak (*Observer from Poland*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Masseret, Chairman, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 573)¹.

1. See page 52.

4. Western European Union

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1431)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Masseret, Chairman, on behalf of Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Sinka (*Observer from Latvia*), Tusek (*Observer from Austria*) and Paasio (*Observer from Finland*).

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 94)².

5. WEU's relations with Russia

(Presentation of the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1440)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur.

6. Address by Mr. Kozyrev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia

Mr. Kozyrev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia, addressed the Assembly.

2. See page 54.

Mr. Kozyrev answered questions put by MM. Atkinson, Jeszenszky (*Observer from Hungary*), de Lipkowski, Rodrigues, Sir Keith Speed, Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout, MM. Sole Tura, Pastusiak (*Observer from Poland*), Antretter, Baumel, de Puig and De Decker.

Mr. van der Linden, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

7. WEU's relations with Russia

(Debate on the report of the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1440)

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Rodrigues, Buteiko (*Observer from Ukraine*) and Böhm.

Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Averchev (*Observer from Russia*), Mrs. Fischer, MM. Sinka (*Observer from Latvia*) and Sole Tura.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Puig, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 574)³.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 95)⁴.

8. Close of the session

The President declared the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.

3. See page 55.

4. See page 57.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal) Pinto
Mr. <i>De Decker</i> (Van der Maelen)	MM. Bianchi Latronico Mattina Mitolo <i>Coviello</i> (Parisi) Petruccioli	Spain
France	Luxembourg	MM. <i>Ramirez Peri</i> (Alvarez) Cuco de Puig Roman Sole Tura <i>Borderas</i> (Vazquez)
MM. Alloncle Baumel <i>de Lipkowski</i> (Galley) Kaspereit Masseret Seitlinger Valleix	MM. <i>Regenwetter</i> (Mrs. Err) Goerens <i>Theis</i> (Mrs. Lentz-Cornette)	United Kingdom
Germany	Netherlands	Mr. Atkinson Sir <i>Irvine Patnick</i> (Sir Anthony Durant) Mr. <i>Alexander</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir John Hunt Sir Russell Johnston Sir Dudley Smith Sir Keith Speed Sir Donald Thompson
MM. Antretter Böhm Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler) MM. Müller Reddemann Soell <i>Pfuhl</i> (Steiner) Mrs. Terborg	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout MM. van der Linden Verbeek	
	Portugal	
	Mr. Brito	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Kittelmann Meyer zu Bentrup von Schmude Sprung Vogel Wolfgramm	Portugal
MM. Biefnot Kelchtermans Kempinaire Pécriaux Sarens Seeuws	Italy	MM. Amaral Fernandes Marques Machete Roseta
France	MM. Arata Benvenuti Brugger Dionisi Fassino La Loggia La Russa Pozzo Salvi Selva Serra Tabladini	Spain
MM. Birraux Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Dumont Geoffroy Gouteyron Jacquat Jeambrun Jung Schreiner	Netherlands	MM. Homs I Ferret López Henares López Valdivielso Martinez Puche Rodriguez Sainz Garcia
Germany	MM. Dees Woltjer Zijlstra	United Kingdom
-Mrs. Blunck MM. Büchler Holtz Irmer		MM. Banks Cox Lord Kirkhill Mr. Litherland Lord Newall MM. Rathbone Redmond Thompson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 573***on the WEU Institute for Security Studies***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting with satisfaction that the WEU Institute for Security Studies has successfully accomplished the tasks assigned to it since its creation;
- (ii) Stressing the importance of the activities of the Institute for the emergence of a European awareness of security and defence questions;
- (iii) Welcoming the vital rôle played by the Institute in the development of relations with the Central and Eastern European countries, associate partners of WEU;
- (iv) Noting with interest the initiatives taken by the Institute to make WEU and other European organisations aware of the problems of the Mediterranean and the Maghreb;
- (v) Welcoming the fact that the Institute's expertise was called upon in the context of the International Conference on Peace in former Yugoslavia, thus demonstrating the reputation enjoyed by the Institute among European research institutes;
- (vi) Stressing the Institute's active policy of openness towards European countries seeking membership of the European Union and WEU;
- (vii) Noting that the enlargement of WEU entails an increase in the Institute's responsibilities towards new members, associate members, associate partners and observers, but that there has been no adjustment of the Institute's means to meet this new situation;
- (viii) Noting that the present structure of the Institute is not such as to be able to meet all expectations arising from enlargement and from the emergence of a new European security and defence identity;
- (ix) Recalling the declaration of the WEU member countries, annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, in which the Council undertook to study "the transformation of the WEU Institute into a European security and defence academy";
- (x) Recalling Recommendation 474, requesting the Council to "take no measures that may involve relations between the new institute and the Assembly without securing the latter's prior agreement";
- (xi) Regretting that the Assembly may not always be in a position to take advantage of closer and more direct co-operation with the Institute, to their mutual benefit,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Consider forthwith the Institute's transformation into a European security and defence academy, in accordance with the Council's own wishes as expressed in 1991;
2. Encourage member countries to resume holding advanced European defence study sessions, with the support of the Institute, and to ensure the continuity of such sessions;
3. Provide the Institute with appropriate means for handling the increase in its requirements and activities stemming from the enlargement of WEU and the development of relations with countries seeking membership of the European Union and with the Mediterranean countries;
4. Redefine, as necessary, the tasks of the Institute assigned to it at the time of its creation and adapt them to the new European situation in view of whatever changes may result from the 1996 intergovernmental conference;
5. Permit the development of co-operation between the Institute and the Assembly, without the former having to request the permission of the Council on each occasion in order to respond to a request for information or collaboration from the Assembly;

6. Ask the Institute to make declassified versions of its studies available to the Assembly and ensure that, in its work, it takes account of the Assembly's point of view on topics of common interest;
7. Associate the Assembly with the process of examining the transformation of the Institute into an academy, and, if necessary, establish procedures for close co-operation between the latter and the Assembly with a view to achieving the openness and transparency necessary for fostering European awareness of security and defence matters.

ORDER 94***on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Orders 75 and 84;
- (ii) Noting the information report on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union submitted by its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations;
- (iii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians and the wider public in member, associate member, associate partner and observer countries,

INVITES ITS COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. To ensure that, with the aid of national delegations, a booklet on the report submitted is published in the languages of the WEU member states, associate members, associate partners and observers;
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet is brought up to date regularly and in the event of major developments in WEU prior to its publication.

RECOMMENDATION 574***on WEU's relations with Russia***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the importance of the Russian Federation, the main successor to the Soviet Union as a world power, for the management of international relations and in particular for the establishment of an order of stability, security and peace at world and European level;
- (ii) Gratified that Russia is no longer a threat to the security of Western Europe, but recalling nevertheless that, in terms of conventional and nuclear armaments, it is still the greatest military power in Europe and still has the largest army and the highest defence budget of all the countries of Europe;
- (iii) Recalling that after the withdrawal of the last military units from the states of Central Europe, Russia still maintains troops in at least ten member countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS);
- (iv) Considering that the Russian Federation is, on the one hand, at a difficult juncture in the consolidation of its internal political, economic and social situation and, on the other hand, at a stage where it is defining its rôle in the world with particular regard to its place in a new security architecture in Europe;
- (v) Convinced that such a security architecture in Europe is inconceivable without the participation of the Russian Federation in the process of concerting approaches in the various international bodies destined to strengthen confidence, stability and collective security, particularly in the framework of the CSCE, NACC and the partnership for peace;
- (vi) Also convinced that the improvement in the domestic economic situation in Russia is an important factor for strengthening political stability and security on the Eurasian continent;
- (vii) Believing it essential to consolidate democracy and respect for human rights in Russia;
- (viii) Calling consequently for the conditions to be created without delay for Russia to be associated with the work of the appropriate international organisations for economic and financial co-operation;
- (ix) Wishing relations between the Russian Federation and European authorities and countries participating in the process of European integration to be governed by the principle of partnership and co-operation;
- (x) Welcoming, therefore, the conclusion of an agreement of partnership and co-operation between the European Union and Russia;
- (xi) Believing that WEU as defence component of the European Union and European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance must also improve its relations with the Russian Federation;
- (xii) Convinced that the new relations with Russia should result in a permanent system for information, dialogue and consultation and also co-operation in specific areas of mutual interest;
- (xiii) Emphasising the importance of establishing contacts and dialogue between the WEU Assembly and the two chambers of the Russian parliament;
- (xiv) Consequently welcoming the re-establishment of a regular interparliamentary dialogue in the framework of these new relations;
- (xv) Stressing the importance of the controlled dismantlement of nuclear and chemical armaments on Russian territory and that of the CIS in conformity with the international treaties in force;
- (xvi) Concerned at the dangers that might stem from possible shortcomings in the control of Russian nuclear arms and the clandestine traffic of Russian nuclear material abroad;
- (xvii) Insisting that all activities in crisis-management and the maintenance and re-establishment of peace in crisis areas in the territory of the CIS should be conducted in conformity with the rules fixed by the United Nations and the CSCE and in co-ordination with those bodies;
- (xviii) Also wishing the appropriate western organisations and their member countries to show greater readiness in providing assistance in maintaining or re-establishing peace in the crisis areas mentioned above;

(xix) Calling the attention of the Council in particular to the consequences of present developments in the Caucasus and in the Turkish-speaking republics of the CIS for the future evolution of relations between Russia and Turkey;

(xx) Wishing WEU to start a specific dialogue with the Russian Federation for harmonising their respective concepts concerning the future development of the CSCE, particularly in the light of the summit meeting that organisation is preparing to hold in Budapest;

(xxi) Emphasising that outstanding questions between Russia and Ukraine should be settled to the satisfaction of both sides, respecting the sovereignty and independence of each one;

(xxii) Wishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to continue to develop in such a way as to become a factor of security and stability from which all its member countries might benefit;

(xxiii) Wishing all the problems of neighbourliness between Russia and the countries that have become associate partners of WEU to be resolved with due respect for the principles of international law and to the satisfaction of all the partners concerned in such a way as to increase security and stability in the regions in question;

(xxiv) Convinced that co-operation between WEU and Russia in the framework of the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty should be a prelude to the enlargement of this co-operation to other specific areas;

(xxv) Emphasising the importance of establishing close relations between the appropriate Russian research institutes in security and defence and the WEU Institute for Security Studies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Offer the Russian Federation permanent co-operation including a regular system for information, dialogue and political consultation at ministerial level and at that of the chairmanship-in-office, the Secretary-General and senior officials of the ministerial organs of WEU;
2. Determine, in co-ordination with the Russian authorities, the specific areas in which WEU might offer the Russian Federation practical co-operation that might include questions within the purview of WEAG and possibly space questions;
3. Offer its good offices to the Russian Federation:
 - (a) in its struggle against the clandestine proliferation of Russian nuclear material by creating a joint WEU-Russia monitoring committee;
 - (b) for implementing the destruction of Russian arsenals of chemical weapons;
4. Offer, in co-ordination with the CSCE and using the framework of the conference on the security pact, its good offices for facilitating the settlement of all problems of neighbourliness remaining between the Russian Federation and certain countries that have become associate partners of WEU and which might jeopardise security in the regions in question;
5. Encourage its Institute for Security Studies to increase its contacts and co-operation with the appropriate Russian research institutes in the field of security policy;
6. Establish with Ukraine and Belarus similar relations to those proposed in paragraphs 1 and 2.

ORDER 95***on WEU's relations with Russia***

The Assembly,

(i) Emphasising the importance of establishing a regular dialogue between the WEU Assembly and the two chambers of the Russian Parliament in the framework of increasing relations between WEU and Russia;

(ii) Consequently, wishing the contacts established between the WEU Assembly and the Russian Parliament on the occasion of the visit by a delegation from this parliament to Paris from 17th to 19th October 1994 and the visit by the Political Committee to Moscow from 24th to 29th October to be followed by the establishment of regular meetings outside plenary sessions of the Assembly,

INVITES ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. To take a decision allowing the exchange of views started with the two chambers of the Russian Parliament to be pursued on the basis of regular meetings, specifying the regularity and ways and means of the participation of the committees of the Assembly in such meetings;
2. To ask the President of the Assembly to transmit appropriate proposals to the Presidents of the two chambers of the Russian Parliament;
3. To study the possibilities of establishing a similar dialogue with:
 - (a) the parliamentary Assembly of the CIS;
 - (b) the Parliament of Ukraine;
 - (c) the Parliament of Belarus.



II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 28th November 1994

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Adoption of the minutes.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Observers.
6. Address by Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly.
7. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
8. Changes in the membership of committees.
9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1427).
Speaker: Mr. Rodrigues.
10. The situation in Bihac (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1446).
11. Address by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU.
Replies by Mr. Cutileiro to questions put by: Mr. Péciaux, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Roseta, Mr. López Henares, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Rodrigues.
12. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member (*Vote on the draft decision in the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*, Doc. 1416).
Speakers: Lord Finsberg (point of order), Mr. Latronico, Lord Finsberg (*Rapporteur*).
13. The situation in Bihac (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1446).
Speakers: Mr. De Decker, Mr. de Puig (*Chairman of the Political Committee*), Mr. Martinez (*Vice-President of the Assembly*), Mr. de Puig, Mr. Blaauw (point of order), Mr. Rodrigues (explanation of vote), Lord Mackie of Benshie (point of order).
14. A European security policy (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1439, and amendments).
Speakers: Mr. Soell (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Bianchi, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Pastusiak (*Observer from Poland*), Mr. Fassino, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Pahor (*Observer from Slovenia*), Mr. Roseta.
15. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on 16th June 1994 at the end of the sixth sitting.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

1. See page 15.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of credentials.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the credentials of representatives and substitutes have been attested by a statement of ratification from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and formally communicated by the President of that Assembly.

I welcome our new colleagues to the session.

5. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I should now like to welcome the permanent delegations of parliamentary observers from those countries to which this status has been accorded.

The President (continued)

I also welcome parliamentary observers from Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malta, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden and Ukraine.

I welcome them to our debates, together with members of the Permanent Council who are present at this part-session.

**6. Address by Mr. Valleix,
Vice-President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Secretary-General, to whom, as our new host, I present my special respects, and ladies and gentlemen. Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, has been detained in the House of Commons in London for what, in France, we would call a vote of confidence, and the importance of which, both for Europe and for the United Kingdom we all recognise. He will be with us tomorrow, but has asked me to open the session in his stead, which I am very happy to do.

I will leave it to him, when he arrives, to give the address which traditionally opens each part-session, however I very much wish today to welcome among us the new Secretary-General, Mr. Cutileiro, to whom I offer, on all our behalf, our warmest congratulations on his appointment to the office just entrusted to him. We also wish him every success at this extremely important time for WEU and Europe.

I am also taking advantage of this opportunity to thank his predecessor, Mr. van Eekelen, whom we remember with great esteem, friendship and recognition for the intense work he did in the last few years guiding WEU along difficult paths and shouldering particularly dedicated responsibilities. We have all appreciated his successful handling of WEU's rôle and missions, involving its complete transformation, in these difficult times. It is his work that enables us to take on our responsibilities today.

I should also like to welcome the delegations of observers, of whom, we are pleased to note, there is a greater number than usual.

Apart from the present nine members, fifteen countries are now associated with WEU in different ways and the number of members of six of them has been doubled – an immediate indication of the Assembly's intention to open wide its doors to the new associate partners, even before having been able to adopt a status for them.

We have also invited Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Slovenia, Malta and the three countries which have just decided to join the European Union to be represented here. We are delighted that all have

accepted the principle and we welcome their delegations.

The enlargement of the Assembly, as I have said, raises a number of logistical difficulties and presents certain physical problems of adjustment. I would ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to bear with the inconveniences they cause. We have tried to release a few offices for observer delegations. You may be sure that considerable improvements will soon be made.

Without wishing to encroach on the speech to be made by our President, Sir Dudley Smith, tomorrow morning, I should quickly like to make three points which I feel are fundamental in this connection.

The first relates to what I shall call the speculation which abounds today over what has come to be known as the European security architecture. This is, as we are all aware, an extremely complex construction, since it involves a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in juxtaposition with a proposed stability pact, a NATO of what are, in some cases, uncertain boundaries and responsibilities, a WEU still seeking to find and establish its way and an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral regional agreements containing a wide variety of provisions.

I feel that these convoluted arrangements are becoming extremely dangerous for peace in Europe and the security of our continent as they constantly give rise to confusion – to say nothing of the incomprehension of the man in the street – between two fundamental and, in my opinion, frighteningly confusing notions, that of security and that, scarcely mentionable now, of defence and yet the two are profoundly different. However given the position as regards forces and armaments in the world today, particularly on the southern and eastern fringes of Europe, we cannot sweep aside the concern that has dominated our history over the last half century – i.e. to have a defence system effective against all forms of aggression.

WEU and NATO have, each in their own way, been the instruments of our co-operation in defence matters and must remain so, since they alone are founded on treaties binding their signatories to participation in a joint defence.

Obviously, a stability pact would constitute a major guarantee of the security of Europe as a whole.

The CSCE has proved to be a useful instrument for détente, understanding and co-operation between Eastern and Western European countries and can play a leading rôle in establishing a collective security system. However neither is able, at present, to take the place of the defensive alliances, any more than the latter ought to be

The President (continued)

watered down by vague references to security that ill conceal the powerlessness to which they would be reduced in the event of a crisis.

Drawing on these considerations, I would like to make a second point. We are enthusiastically wrapped up – and a good thing that is, too, for the years ahead – in the prospects of enlargement now opening up to WEU and other European organisations. An overly institutional vision of the infinite complexity of the situation in Europe today and an excessively geometric conception of Europe's future, might lead some to favour either NATO members or those of the European Union, when it comes to opening up WEU's doors to them and shutting those same doors to countries which, for reasons unrelated to joint defence are not called upon to join either NATO or the European Community in the near future. In other words these institutional preferences have little to do with strategic, military or even budgetary aspects.

Let us not forget that the Maastricht Treaty has done nothing to jeopardise WEU's autonomy. Our organisation is fully independent and its missions are clearly defined in defence matters. Let us look more closely at WEU's specific responsibilities and then let us consider the rôle that each country can and wishes to play in a European defence if called upon to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty, the place it occupies on the strategic map of Europe, the means it has at its disposal for participating in a collective defence and the will it demonstrates to defend itself and in doing so also to defend its neighbours. These are, I think, the essential criteria when considering candidates for a defensive alliance. Any other considerations are likely to lead us towards dividing rather than uniting Europe, towards weakening rather than building peace, towards compromising joint security instead of guaranteeing it.

This point leads on to a third. All of our countries demonstrate in varying degrees an immoderate propensity to cash in – this must be reflected in all our countries – on the dividends produced by peace and détente by reducing their defence budgets in large and at times drastic measure. We can see this across all our countries, the exceptions are very rare. It would be legitimate if such reductions did not jeopardise the maintenance of an adequate defence capability. Yet many countries have now crossed the critical threshold beyond which modern defence is no longer achievable. Europe should enable us to pool our strengths – such at any rate is the aim the WEU countries have set themselves. However it must not become the means of compounding weaknesses, of watering down responsibilities, of disguising the weakness of each. It is essential, in order for WEU to play its rightful rôle, that all

member countries take advantage of the dawning economic recovery, difficult though this may be in terms of public opinion, to acquire the means of enabling them to comply with the commitment they undertook in signing Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and maintain the necessary armed forces and equipment to enable them to participate effectively in a collective defence.

I put these thoughts before you ladies and gentlemen before our President goes more deeply into his own tomorrow. I very much wished to make these few points to you at the opening of a session during which the problems raised by the enlargement of WEU and the establishment of a European security system will be discussed at length; they constitute the main thrust of our agenda. I hope clarity will be the hall-mark of their discussion.

Because, ladies and gentlemen, the use of a European institution and in particular WEU, our specifically defence institution, must be targeted beyond the calmer world of today and its appearances of peace and keep us in a position to ensure the real defence of each of our countries taken individually and of Europe understood in the enlarged and democratic sense. That is what I have been trying to say and that is the direction in which the work we are now to do should be aimed.

7. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure provides that proposals for candidatures for Vice-Presidents shall each be sponsored in writing by three or more representatives. Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

Also, Rule 7(1) lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

Three candidates have been properly sponsored.

In alphabetical order they are: Mrs. Err, Mr. Fassino and Mr. Miguel Angel Martinez.

I propose that these nominations be approved by the Assembly by acclamation.

Is there any objection to the election of these Vice-Presidents by acclamation?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I accordingly declare the following elected Vice-Presidents, in this order of precedence: Mr. Martinez, Mrs. Err, Mr. Fassino.

8. *Changes in the membership of committees*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 40(6) of the Rules of Procedure I invite the Assembly to agree to the proposed changes in membership of committees contained in Notice No. 7, which has already been distributed.

Is there any opposition? ...

The changes are agreed to.

9. *Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the fortieth ordinary session*

(Doc. 1427)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly, Document 1427.

Is there any opposition to this draft order of business?...

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – I have something to say about the draft order of business. I was surprised to see that it does not contain a request for urgent debate on the situation in Bosnia. At previous sessions important issues have been included for urgent debate, and I thought the draft order of business would have included such a debate on the situation in Bosnia. Just a glance at this week's newspapers in all the capitals of Europe is enough reason to find it surprising for our organisation, the Assembly of WEU, concerned as it is with security in Europe, not to be addressing so serious a matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for speaking, Mr. Rodrigues. You are slightly ahead of me, since I shall soon be submitting a request for urgent procedure relating to this subject to the Assembly. May I, with your permission, go on with our present business and deal with this request for urgent procedure for a debate on the situation in former Yugoslavia after the next order of the day.

Is there no further objection to the draft order of business?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

We have a particularly full programme of business for this part-session. I therefore propose to the Assembly, in accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, that in all our debates there should be a time-limit of five minutes for each speaker, apart from the chairmen and rapporteurs of committees.

May I remind you that, in accordance with the same rule, this proposal must be decided by the Assembly without debate.

Is there any objection?...

The time-limit is agreed to.

10. *The situation in Bihac*

(*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1446*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. De Decker, on behalf of the Liberal Group, has tabled a motion for a recommendation on the situation in Bihac, with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1446. This motion has been distributed.

In accordance with Rule 44(2) of the Rules of Procedure, I propose that the Assembly consider this request immediately after the vote on the draft decision on amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member.

Is there any objection? ...

That is agreed to.

11. *Address by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Cutileiro who has succeeded Mr. van Eekelen as Secretary-General of WEU.

Before I welcome Mr. Cutileiro and give him the floor, may I draw colleagues' attention to the fact that later this afternoon we must hold a roll-call vote on a proposal to amend the Assembly's Charter. A roll-call vote cannot take place unless more than half the representatives or substitutes have signed the attendance register.

I therefore urge members to sign the register.

I shall now address a few brief words on behalf of you all to our Secretary-General.

For obvious reasons, Secretary-General, this is your first occasion to speak to the Assembly. I am especially glad to welcome you, exactly one fortnight after your appointment, on which we heartily congratulate you. I hope that your arrival here will usher in a new period of cordial and fruitful relations between the Council and the Assembly of WEU.

Above everything else your task will be to prepare and implement the decision that the intergovernmental conference will be taking in 1996, in the fields that are the responsibility of our organisation. This means defining the rôle of WEU and its new relationship with both the European Union and NATO, which will not be easy to do – but it will be an exciting mission.

The President (continued)

You are especially well groomed for such a task by virtue of your professional experience, which has led you – I do not think I am betraying any confidences – from teaching social anthropology in the most famous British universities to a diplomatic career which brought you in 1986 to the political leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of your country, Portugal.

After serving as ambassador in Pretoria, you were responsible for co-ordinating the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia, chaired by Lord Carrington which initiated you into all the difficult secrets of one of the most serious matters ever dealt with by WEU and one which unfortunately is likely to remain central to its activities for a long time to come. You then headed the analysis and forecasting department of your ministry, at the same time acting as special adviser to your minister.

Thus, and I am speaking now to you, ladies and gentlemen, there is every reason to hope that the arrival of Mr. Cutileiro as Secretary-General will see the beginning of a new period in the history of WEU that will help Europe to strengthen its rôle and to assume greater responsibility both in the field of its own defence – and therefore its dignity and the protection of democracy – and in the field of collective security in Europe, and at the same time assist WEU to acquire the resources it needs to do all this.

It is therefore with great and friendly interest that we shall listen, Secretary-General, to what you have to say.

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, members of the Assembly of Western European Union, members of the Permanent Council, ladies and gentlemen, allow me first to thank the President for his kind words. It is a great honour for me to be asked to address your Assembly as the successor to Mr. van Eekelen, to whom, Mr. President, I shall be delighted to pass on your friendly message.

I find myself – albeit rather suddenly – reaping the fruits of the firm resolve shown by your predecessors to enlarge Western European Union to the Iberian Peninsula. Perhaps too, it is an unexpected consequence of the mission given to me at the time by the Portuguese Government to negotiate my country's accession to the modified Brussels Treaty.

Now that I am Secretary-General of an organisation whose successful reactivation was due in large part to the remarkable political astuteness and unfailing dedication of Ambassador Cahen and Mr. van Eekelen, I shall have the privilege of being one of your spokesmen in the institutional dialogue between the Council and the Assembly.

Let me assure you that I am fully aware of my responsibilities towards you, the elected representatives of the peoples of Europe. In your national parliaments, you give your views on the direction and resourcing of your country's national defence policies. In other words, you play a key rôle in determining their contribution to the major task of constructing Europe's defence dimension.

In the years preceding the decision to reactivate WEU, it was the WEU Assembly which kept alive the debate on European security and defence. At each stage of this reactivation, your Assembly explored and analysed in depth key subjects such as armaments co-operation, observation satellites and anti-missile defence. You have deliberated at length on the future of European security and on the development of its structures.

You have opened the way for dialogue with Central and Eastern Europe. You will shortly have to determine what status is to be given to the associate partners within your Assembly. I hope that it will be similar to that of the associate members, on which you will soon be voting. This session also illustrates the importance of your input to the dialogue with Russia. Moreover, you have initiated proposals through your recommendations which have often stimulated the Council's discussions.

Our task, therefore, is to continue along this road, to co-operate and to bring as much clarity as possible to the debate on political and operational objectives, based on the texts adopted in Noordwijk. We must also be mindful of the complementary nature of our initiatives when it comes to informing public opinion and the media.

Our geographical proximity will facilitate meetings in Brussels, at the invitation of the Permanent Council, or in Paris if you so wish. I think it will be beneficial to hold joint meetings between your committees and the Permanent Council on clearly defined topics. As 1996 beckons, this surely makes sense. Like my predecessors, I am at your rapporteurs' disposal to help them in their work and I am ready to attend any hearings which your committees might wish to convene. The many subjects which you are to debate this week testify to the synergy that already exists and I firmly believe that we can develop it even further. Parliamentary dialogue on all aspects of European security is vital if we are to generate true grass-roots support for the common European defence project.

(The speaker continued in English)

The adoption by the Council of the Noordwijk declaration of 14th November is a new step forward in that respect. The year 1995 will be a crucial one for WEU in that respect. The preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy represent the basis for

Mr. Cutileiro (continued)

further elaboration of the concept of security and defence which the European Union needs. That concept will endow the CFSP, the common foreign and security policy, with a military potential and thus enhance the credibility of the Union's preventive diplomacy, as well as its joint initiatives.

On that basis, WEU is expected to contribute to the preparation for the 1996 intergovernmental conference a comprehensive statement of a common European defence policy and conclusions of an institutional nature based on the review of WEU itself. In parallel, the Council "at 24" will have to reflect on the changing conditions of European security. A satisfactory outcome of this substantive work might be endorsed at the highest political level before the intergovernmental conference starts its proceedings.

These broad tasks for the future operations in which WEU is now involved reflect both the achievements and the shortcomings of the present stage in the development of its operational rôle. Operation Sharp Guard symbolises the will to co-operate fully with NATO to reinforce the principle of complementarity, while avoiding unnecessary duplication and futile institutional competition. Like you, Mr. President, I hope that the Europeans will strive together to resolve the present difficulties facing these operations.

The convening of a joint WEU-NATO Council in Brussels next week is a positive sign, which I welcome. We shall also have to draw all the conclusions from that episode, as it clearly impacts on the collective definition of our future operational needs.

The Danube operation, based on three memoranda of understanding between WEU, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, shows that there is much scope for innovative forms of co-operation with the associate partners, especially as regards the missions defined in the Petersberg declaration. It illustrates our common goal of security through participation in the definition of the emerging European security policy.

Finally, Mostar is the first instance of a mandate being given by the European Union to WEU, and for that reason it is essential to carry it out to the full without delay. WEU is developing its operational dimension beyond purely defensive requirements. It must prove its efficiency across the board.

Although some may describe the Mostar and Danube operations as micro-operations, they have exercised to the full the existing operational mechanisms of WEU and its Planning Cell. The lessons are drawn every day. Given the political will, WEU could readily increase its capabilities on that basis in the very near future without cal-

ling for the allocation of excessive financial and human resources.

WEU's priority for the next two years is to continue tirelessly to develop its operational rôle. Both the European Union and the alliance need a strong WEU. Recent developments in former Yugoslavia have reinforced the point.

Another priority for WEU will be to address the issue of our relations with the new members of the European Union and how to renew the invitation contained in the Maastricht declaration to their advantage.

The third aspect of our joint efforts is needed both in this hemicycle and around the Council table in Brussels. The Council will continue to pay great attention to its peripheral diplomacy vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine to the east and North Africa to the south.

Finally, I shall endeavour to strengthen the Secretariat and Planning Cell as the main support bodies for the Council and to ensure the operational future of the Torrejón Satellite Centre. As regards the Institute for Security Studies, we shall be faced with the challenge preparing for its gradual transition to a European security and defence academy.

In conclusion, I should like to express the wish that the work of your Assembly committees will focus on the form and content of the European defence policy and the specific rôle that the Assembly should and could play in the future.

I look forward to following your session and to working with you in the coming years to promote the process of European construction in the field of security and defence.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). – In accordance with longstanding tradition, the Secretary-General must now answer your questions. You will understand that, having been in my new post for barely a week, I will not be able to go into too much technical detail. But this exchange does provide an excellent opportunity to initiate the dialogue between us and, for my part, to gain a better insight into your main concerns.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Secretary-General, we shall certainly be asking you questions.

May I begin by thanking you for your address, which you had very little time to prepare, having taken up office only very recently. You said, if we understood rightly, that you are assuming your responsibilities straightaway, taking us as we are, with all our problems, projects and ambitions. You mentioned a number of our current programmes and policies saying you have the firm intention of developing them.

The President (continued)

So we thank you for bending so energetically and quickly to the task – we sense your perfect readiness to do so – and we are delighted to have the benefit of your well-known strength of character. It will help the WEU executive and us, the parliamentary Assembly, to pull together not just where good intentions are concerned but also in political will. This will be absolutely vital in the years ahead. If Europe wishes to maintain its dignity and command respect, it must be strong and organised, with defence being one facet of its dignity. We count on you to help us so that, all together, we are able to achieve our common resolve. I am sure you realise what that resolve is.

Thank you, Secretary-General, for being kind enough to answer questions from the floor. This will give us the benefit, not necessarily of the fruit of your imagination, but of your knowledge of the problems involved. It will certainly be enlightening.

I call Mr. Pécriaux.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, on behalf of my colleagues in the Socialist Group of which I have the honour to be Chairman, may I say that we have taken good note of your wish for dialogue and for direct involvement in the study of the many projects before us at a time when everything is changing. Please be assured you have the co-operation and participation of all my colleagues.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for this statement, which accurately conveys our sense of responsibility.

I call Lord Mackie of Benshie.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (*United Kingdom*). – Secretary-General, first let me congratulate you on your appointment and, secondly, let me sympathise with you, because you have an enormous task and I know that you will carry it out as best you can. I trust and hope that you will have more political will behind you than has been evident in the past from some or all the governments in WEU. My question bears heavily on the present appalling situation we are to discuss later. How many of the troops that General Rose asked for when he was appointed have actually been delivered? If I remember rightly, he first asked for 20 000 troops and then was forced to scale down his request to 9 000. How many have been delivered to him, of what quality are they, and where do they come from?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – As far as I am concerned, your logic is simple. I do not know; you had better ask the United Nations as I have no precise figures to give you. If

I may make a small comment, I wonder whether the numbers matter very much in any case.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall, of course, have an opportunity to talk about this again.

I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – First I would like to congratulate the Secretary-General on his election, not only because he is the first of my compatriots to be elected secretary-general of a European organisation, but also because he is a person of great intelligence and competence, with wide experience over many years, much of which was highlighted by our President, Mr. Valleix, in his opening speech.

Clearly on this occasion it would be difficult for him, so soon after taking up his post, to speak on a wide range of matters, but I am confident that we will soon be hearing his views in committees and in the plenary session.

However I must say that in his speech the Secretary-General has already touched upon questions of fundamental importance for our organisation, demonstrating, it must be said, a great political will for dialogue with this Assembly and its committees.

Finally, I would like to say that in my view it is important that matters relating to the South, by which I mean security in the Mediterranean, should be dealt with on the same footing as matters affecting our security in other areas of Europe.

Consequently I would like the Secretary-General to expand on the reference he made in his speech and confirm, if such be the case, his interest in, and willingness to deal with, matters of security in the Mediterranean from a global, rather than a purely military perspective, as reflected in reports and recommendations approved by this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I shall not speak in Portuguese, because I could not answer in all the languages spoken in this Assembly. I shall just keep to the two official languages.

Security policy in the Mediterranean is an important issue, referred to in the Noordwijk declaration. We shall continue to consider it one of the key aspects of European security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. López Henares.

Mr. LÓPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – May I, Secretary-General, warmly congratulate you on your election and join in the words of welcome addressed to you.

Mr. López Henares (continued)

In your speech, you quoted individual, but very specific, examples of joint WEU action. If we really wish to make Western European Union the instrument of European defence, we will naturally have to make it a far more ambitious organisation. You said yourself that its capabilities needed to be increased. Here the 1996 intergovernmental conference sets a major challenge because it is there that the future will be decided. As Secretary-General, is it your intention to put a secretariat team immediately to work on a study of all the problems facing WEU with an eye to making its action far more ambitious as a joint European defence organisation?

Do you envisage a body with a joint and general standpoint, not just that of one or two countries? Your secretariat is ideal for the purpose. Is it your immediate intention to set up a unit to study and propose conscientiously, with the necessary documents in support, the possibilities in terms of a common defence for WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Thank you for your kind words, Mr. López Henares.

This is work that is being done all the time; the political leaders are currently working on these security and defence problems. However, we do not for the moment envisage setting up a special unit. My answer is therefore that we are studying this matter now, in all its complexity. You can rely on us – I cannot speak for the Council – and you can be sure that the secretariat is currently dealing with the matter and will continue to look for a solution. But as for a special unit to try to solve it, I do not think so – not for the moment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. De DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – On behalf of the Liberal Group I should like to welcome you, Mr. Cutileiro, to this Assembly in your new capacity. Your reputation has gone before you. First there was your rôle in Portugal's accession to WEU, and then the remarkable job you did alongside Lord Carrington when the distressing Yugoslav crisis broke out.

I have no questions to ask you. We do however count on you to make the best possible preparations for the 1996 conference. There is too little time between now and then to build up any experience of a common foreign and security policy as decided at Maastricht, which is now only in its very beginnings.

We also count on you to ensure consistency in WEU's enlargement policy. For the time being,

we see too great an enthusiasm for, and also great disorder in, enlargement policies, whether in WEU, the Atlantic Alliance or the European Union. We have a kind of feeling that enlargement policies are replacing policies for deepening the construction of Europe. It is, of course, an easy line to take vis-à-vis public opinion. However, as far as we are concerned, as politicians, rest assured that we shall be alert and not taken in.

Lastly, we count on you to ensure that WEU is effective in the action it takes. It is now five years since the removal of the iron curtain; Europe is in disorder, and many countries of the European, Asian and even African continents are in crisis. We have to show we are effective. We have had enough talking; now we want things done.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Do you wish to speak, Secretary-General?

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – No, Mr. President. I simply wished to thank Mr. De Decker.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – I welcome the Secretary-General in my capacity as Chairman of the Spanish Delegation on behalf of all members of that delegation. As everyone knows, there was a Spanish candidate for that function, who would also have made a very good Secretary-General, but the appointment has now been made and we are happy to receive among us a Secretary-General whom I regard as both an Iberian compatriot and a European compatriot.

We have known Mr. Cutileiro not only in the capacity that has been mentioned but also as a very able Portuguese ambassador to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Both there and here, people know him as a committed European who favours human rights, by which I mean the values which our project should identify in terms of security. That is why I want to assure him of the Spanish Delegation's full support.

Finally, I stress what Mr. De Decker said. I believe that it is important to deepen and consolidate the European construction process in terms of security and defence, but that cannot be done at the cost of enlarging it. Like the Spaniards, the Portuguese have benefited from enlargement. We know what it is like to be outside and to wish to be accepted as members. All the countries and peoples of Europe should enjoy that right. Having known what it is like to be outside and to join and therefore benefit from the security which others can grant, the Secretary-General will also be sensitive to that problem and will thus contribute to enlargement of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I simply thank the head of the Spanish Delegation for his warm words.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – I would like to say how gratifying it is to have Mr. Cutileiro here as Secretary-General of WEU.

I have had the honour of knowing him for almost half a century; I have followed his career, I am aware of his capabilities and I am conscious of his potential.

His action in the crisis in former Yugoslavia, not at the very beginning, but in the very early stages, arouses in us the hope that in the infinitely more difficult tasks he will have to face – Herculean tasks I might say – the Secretary-General will be as successful as the Greek hero himself.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CUTILEIRO (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I should like to thank Mr. Rodrigues for his very kind words.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There are no more members down to speak.

Thank you, Secretary-General, for answering the questions raised by those who spoke following your address. You will have observed the Assembly's impatience to start work with you on this important topic of the defence of free Europe, a Europe which needs to rally together and at the same time preserve its will, spirit and capacity to defend itself.

12. Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member

(Vote on the draft decision in the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Doc. 1416)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft decision contained in the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure in view of the creation of a status of associate member, Document 1416.

The Assembly will recall that we debated this report, presented by Lord Finsberg, during the last part-session, on the afternoon of Wednesday 15th June. The draft decision contained in the report proposes an amendment to the Charter of the Assembly and, therefore, under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, an absolute majority of the Assembly's membership is required. A roll-call vote was therefore necessary.

Under Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure, no decision by roll-call can be taken unless more than half the representatives or substitutes have signed the register of attendance. Unfortunately, the necessary quorum of 55 was not present on the two occasions when this draft decision was considered by the Assembly during the last part-session.

As a result, according to the rules, the matter stood referred to the Presidential Committee, which decided that the text should be put to the vote at this part-session.

As the matter has already been debated, we proceed straight to the vote on the draft decision to which no amendments have been tabled.

However, Mr. Latronico from the Italian Delegation has asked leave to refer the report on amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member, Document 1416, back to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. Under Rules 33(1) and 32(7), he has a prior right to speak for five minutes in support of his motion. Debate on the main question will be suspended while we discuss Mr. Latronico's motion. If the motion is agreed to, the Assembly will immediately proceed to the next item on the agenda. In the debate on the motion to refer the report back to the committee, after the mover I may call only one speaker against and then the chairman or rapporteur of any committee concerned, in accordance with Rule 33(3); and each speaker is limited to five minutes.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order. I should like to submit to you, Mr. President, that we cannot proceed in this way. There are two rules that make that clear. First, colleagues should look at Rule 14. I want to be as precise as I can because the translation of what I am saying is extremely important. Paragraph 2 of Rule 14 states: "In between sessions or part-sessions and subject to subsequent ratification by the Assembly, the Presidential Committee shall take all such measures as it considers necessary for the activities of the Assembly to be properly carried on."

That covers all eventualities not catered for in the existing rules – it is a generality.

However, Rule 37(3) states: "Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to committee."

It states: "which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote". That covers a specific matter. It is not possible for that to be referred

Lord Finsberg (continued)

back to the committee – the time for that was when we concluded the debate. We have already tried to vote twice. Under the rules it is not possible for the matter to be referred back.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This debate is something of a case as a doctor or a lawyer would say, but our Rules of Procedure are there to be applied. We do not contest the debate which is to be held today and which is properly included in the orders of the day. Let me, however, say two things.

In the first place, it must be understood that the Presidential Committee acts solely on behalf of the parliamentary Assembly as its delegate. If any objection is raised its decisions must be approved by the Assembly.

In the second place, under the Rules of Procedure, the motion to refer back to committee is normal and has priority. Thus it has no effect on the procedure for the vote to be held in our debate. That, Lord Finsberg, is why I do not see any reason not to express our views on this motion.

The prior right to speak is granted to the representative who requests that the matter be referred to a committee. The previous question must be notified to the President of the Assembly before the opening of the sitting, and put to the vote immediately after the presentation of the relevant committee report. No procedural motion may be moved more than once during the course of a debate. The motion for referral is therefore subject to normal procedure. That is why, Lord Finsberg, I have difficulty in seeing how I could do other than submit it to our Assembly.

I call Lord Finsberg on a point of order.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order. I have a firm rule. I never argue with the occupant of the Chair. Even though I dissent from your ruling, Mr. President, I shall respect it. That is how I proceed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have no desire to abuse the right of interpretation. I hope that my analysis and reading of the Rules of Procedure is correct. I thank Lord Finsberg for his attitude, which is exemplary in every way and worthy of his rôle as Chairman of the committee.

May I remind the Assembly that in the debate on the presentation of the motion the only members entitled to speak are its proposer, one speaker against and the Rapporteur or Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

I therefore call Mr. Latronico to speak to the motion for reference back to committee.

Mr. LATRONICO (*Italy*) (Translation). – The draft decision amending the Charter and Rules of Procedure to allow in particular three NATO

member countries – Iceland, Norway and Turkey – to acquire the status of associate members of WEU is based on the terms of Order 85 of the WEU Assembly which invited the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges “to examine the creation of a specific associate member status giving the new countries full participating and voting rights in committees and the right to participate in plenary sessions with membership of delegations on the same basis as the present Council of Europe arrangements”. Following this order, the Assembly adopted Decision 11 providing for amendment of the Charter and Rules of Procedure but subordinating implementation of the amendments to the final introduction of associate member status. Furthermore, this decision was approved with two amendments which radically changed its character as it denied parliamentarians from the countries concerned voting rights in plenary session.

As a result, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges is now called upon, by the draft decision, to amend the Charter and Rules of Procedure again, in accordance with Decision 11. The new draft decision, produced by Lord Finsberg, is designed, first, to introduce the principle that delegations from associate countries are granted the prerogatives appropriate to the participation of those states in the activities of WEU “without voting rights in the Assembly”. It also provides, on the other hand, that representatives from such countries may attend meetings of the Standing Committee with the right to vote. Finally there is provision for a complicated procedure allowing associate members to express their opinion on texts adopted by the Assembly and committees by a vote which may be cast only after the result of voting in the Assembly or the committees is announced.

In consequence, the draft decision introduced by Lord Finsberg calls for very detailed study, in order to assess whether a declaration should be made of willingness in principle to allow the associate countries to exercise full voting rights in the Assembly and committees so that they can be fully integrated into WEU’s European defence system.

In the light of the terms of Order 85 and of more general considerations indicating that WEU’s action should not be directed almost exclusively towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but that the dialogue with the Mediterranean countries should also be stepped up, the Italian Delegation regards Lord Finsberg’s preliminary draft as the minimum condition for guaranteeing the associate countries greater representativeness in the WEU Assembly on a different basis.

The Noordwijk declaration included security and stability in the Mediterranean among the subjects which the member countries of WEU will

Mr. Latronico (continued)

have to study in defining new conditions for European security. Hence the special rôle of Turkey.

Now, the final draft of Lord Finsberg's report has introduced a clause which makes the original draft weaker still: new paragraph (d) stipulates that opinions expressed on any text adopted by the Assembly shall not even be indicative.

Turkey is a very important country in this key area and must unquestionably be helped to establish closer relations with our Assembly. Turkey will find us like-minded in maintaining its right to participate in our parliamentary work with voting rights; we also expect that Turkey itself will move steadily closer to the group of WEU member countries by taking courageous steps to bring its political order and practice into line with the principles of not formal but substantial democracy, particularly by first recognising minorities' rights and civil and political rights as such.

For these reasons it is our view that the text now tabled does not reflect in full the positions of a wide political line-up. It would be preferable to propose reference back to the committee under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, for further study of the document.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Is there a speaker against?...

I call the Rapporteur and Chairman of the committee.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I had not expected to have to go through this again. I believe that our Italian colleagues were not present when we discussed this last time; and I remind all colleagues, including them, that in that debate no one spoke against this idea. I also remind them that this report is before us because the Assembly, through its Standing Committee, voted to reject the decision that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges originally put to it, which was to give full voting rights – with one or two exceptions – to associate members.

That is why we are here again. It was not what I originally wanted, but what I wanted was out-voted; and as I am a democrat I of course agreed to look at the matter again.

It would be ludicrous to say that there should be no distinction between the voting rights of full members and associate members. If that were so, there would be no point in distinguishing between them in their titles. Associate members have full speaking rights and are entitled to a consultative vote to show us what their views would be.

Our Italian colleague spoke about the differences between the Council of Europe and here. I remind him that there is in fact no difference: he is

talking about Council of Europe guest members who do not have a vote – not even a consultative vote. Now it is being suggested that these three associate members be given a consultative vote. That seems the right way to proceed.

I remind colleagues, too, that there is also a problem which is not of our making. I remind the Deputy Secretary-General, who was around at the time, that it was the Assembly's wish that both Greece and Turkey be admitted as full members at the same time. However, owing to a certain amount of blackmail in other places, that did not happen. Thus, if anyone is to blame it is the governments, not the Assembly. We have gone as far as we possibly can here.

I therefore urge my colleagues to reject the proposal for a referral. There is no other way forward – unless it is being suggested that associate members enjoy rights identical to those of full members. That would not be democracy. I hope that when it comes to the vote on my report we will do what I thought we should do last time – no one opposed it then – and it will go through.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – While the President is constitutionally prevented from taking part in the debate, it is nevertheless my view that given the obvious importance of the subject, its examination cannot be indefinitely postponed. This would be the worst possible service to render our prospective partners.

I therefore ask the Assembly to vote on the motion to refer the matter back to committee.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on the motion.

Does anyone wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The motion is not agreed to.

We now resume our consideration of the order of the day, i.e. the vote on the draft decision contained in the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on amendments to the Charter and the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of a status of associate member, Document 1416.

As I have already explained, we cannot vote unless more than half the representatives or substitutes have signed the register of attendance.

I declare that more than half the representatives or substitutes have signed the attendance register and that we can therefore proceed to a vote by roll-call.

The President (continued)

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Müller.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote? ...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	48
Ayes	33
Noes	11
Abstentions	4

In the absence of an absolute majority of 55, the draft decision is, therefore, not agreed to.

13. The situation in Bihac

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1446)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now consider the request for urgent procedure for the motion for a recommendation on the situation in Bihac, Document 1446.

In accordance with Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure, this request has been presented by ten or more representatives.

I remind the Assembly that the following only may be heard: one speaker for the request, one speaker against, the chairman of the committee concerned and one representative of the Bureau speaking on its behalf.

Under Rule 32(7), speaking time is limited to five minutes.

I call Mr. De Decker to speak in favour of the request.

Mr. De DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The Liberal Group decided to submit this motion so that during this difficult period our Assembly should respond and propose a solution for the tragic situation now unfolding in former Yugoslavia, and particularly in Bihac, now under ruthless attack in violation of the United Nations Security Council resolution declaring Bihac a safe haven. The purpose of the proposers of the motion is to provoke discussion with a view to proposing to the Council of Ministers that we intervene. We cannot let the Serbs act in this way, in total violation not only of human rights but also of international law as defined by the United Nations Security Council. The entire credibility of the United

Nations, the Atlantic Alliance and WEU is challenged by these events.

I am not asking for our text to be adopted immediately. What I should like is that the principle of urgency should be recognised by the Assembly, and that this document should be referred to the Defence Committee or the Political Committee for discussion and, as appropriate, amendment. What we seek as far as humanly possible is a vote on a text approved, if not unanimously, by a very large majority of the Assembly. That we should be holding this sitting at the same time as the tragic events now making this part of the world a blood-bath, demands a response from us.

I shall not address the substance of the matter any further, since in my view a debate in greater depth is needed in committee. I do, however, ask all of you to accept the principle of urgency. If we do not, our Assembly would be evading its most elementary responsibilities.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the proposal?...

No one.

I call the Chairman of the Political Committee.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Although my committee did not meet to discuss this matter, I can agree with Mr. De Decker's proposal since urgency is vital. We are all overwhelmed by the present situation in Bihac and in Bosnia in general. As Chairman of the Political Committee I think I can say on behalf of all my colleagues that we are prepared to consider this motion at the end of the plenary sitting this afternoon. We could even prepare a preliminary report for urgent submission to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We thank your committee for kindly playing the game and keeping itself at the disposal of the Assembly, which will come to a decision.

In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, the next speaker is Mr. Martinez, representing the Bureau of the Assembly.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – I approve the proposal submitted to us, as the Bureau too would doubtless do. To put Mr. De Decker and Mr. de Puig on the same wavelength, I would simply make it clear that it is not a question of the Political Committee working on a report: we just cannot leave Paris this week without having a text approved by the Assembly. No subject has greater priority than this. The committee is meeting today and there is no question of producing a long report or drafting a long resolution. Mr. De Decker's motion can perfectly well be used as something to start with. The debate which could begin in committee, will certainly suffice, since the situation is serious enough for

1. See page 16.

Mr. Martinez (continued)

consensus to be reached on the essential points. The best thing would be for us to look at this text as soon as possible; tomorrow's order of business is especially heavy but I am sure we could find time to consider the motion. The degree of urgency is absolute. If the Political Committee met for one hour at the end of this sitting, it should be possible to begin with this motion early tomorrow morning as a matter of priority. In this way our Assembly would be responding to the concerns of our peoples and parliaments.

This is what the Bureau of the Assembly would like to happen and I would draw the attention of the members of the Political Committee to the fact that, to achieve this, we need to decide tomorrow on a reasonable, precise and concise wording on which a short debate will suffice to give expression to what seems to be the unanimous will of our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – When I said that our committee was prepared to examine this motion, I was naturally thinking of doing this without delay, so as to present a report in the plenary sitting as soon as possible. There was no question in my mind of drawing up the usual kind of report. We are faced with an emergency and we should act accordingly.

However, tomorrow morning seems to me to give too little time to draft a text. I should prefer we schedule its presentation for tomorrow afternoon or Wednesday which, I hasten to add, in no way means we want to hold things up. I simply want my committee not to rush things and to take the requisite care.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think that we are all agreed, as the vote will no doubt confirm.

The debate is closed.

After the vote we shall deal with the points made by Mr. Martinez and Mr. de Puig.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I wish to speak on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – A point of order just before a vote is not very good procedure. However, I give you the floor while asking you to bear this in mind.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – On a point of order, Mr. President, the people of Bihac and the casques bleus who are now in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs are not waiting for a report that has been written by the Political Committee or the Defence Committee in forty-eight hours. What they want from this Assembly is action. I do not ask committees to draft a report,

even a short report. We should draft an urgent recommendation to tell our governments what we think of the situation and what we want done. We do not want an analysis of the situation. We know everything that is going on.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen I agree with you. It is not just a question of pleasing ourselves, as I am sure you will agree. We have to arrive at a proposal that our governments will approve. This, i.e. drawing up a text for this purpose, calls for careful thought.

I put the request for urgent procedure to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The request for urgent procedure is agreed to.

I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I abstained because this is not just a matter of voting on a text by the Political Committee but of making sure we have enough time for the Assembly itself to consider the wording given the importance of the subject. It is not just a question of voting on a good text tomorrow or the day after but of providing for a wide-ranging debate on the wording submitted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of information, Mr. President. Having voted and heard the views of the Chairman of the Political Committee, I assume that he and his committee can take on board the unanimous wish of the Assembly that they should proceed at high speed. There is no need for a long report. We simply want an expression of the feeling of the Assembly, and we want it tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As I have said, the text the Assembly will be voting on is one it must be possible for us to put before our governments and our publics, because we are answerable to both.

We have just agreed to urgent procedure. Given this recognition of urgency, which I can tell applies to all of you, and the rules that the Assembly works to and which are our responsibility, I suggest that we debate this subject after the Political Committee has met – as its Chairman has just said, it will meet this evening – at the opening of the Assembly's sitting on Wednesday morning.

This will mean deferring the debate on the two reports planned for Wednesday morning until after the urgent debate on the Political Committee's report. So that debate will be held first thing Wednesday morning and will, I add, continue as long as necessary. I think that this proposal will allow serious work to be done so that, in addition

The President (continued)

to what is said, we may present proposals which will appear practical both to our governments and to our publics. WEU's official position will then be clear for all to know.

I hope that we shall have the imagination, will, compassion and intelligence to come up with positive proposals; this was the thrust of Mr. De Decker's speech.

I think I have your agreement on my proposal to put this item at the opening of business on Wednesday morning.

Are there any objections? ...

It is so decided.

14. A European security policy

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1439 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on a European security policy, Document 1439 and amendments.

I call Mr. Soell to present his report.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this report is based on the assumption that a common perception, where at all possible, is the prerequisite for common concepts and actions in the field of security and defence policy. I began by trying to identify the obstacles in the way of this kind of common perception of common security interests. I considered the white papers of three member states, which certainly did not mean that I was deliberately neglecting other countries. But I tried to show by the example of the white papers published by France, the United Kingdom and Germany how far these three countries' white papers converge or diverge.

To bring the various views down to a very simplified denominator, it could be said that the French white paper steers a middle course between ad hoc coalitions in the security field and an integrated military organisation. The United Kingdom's white paper lays more emphasis on the multilateral context and of course on the special relationship with the United States, i.e., on consolidating important bilateral relations within this multilateral context. The German white paper is more reticent, in view of the major changes in eastern and south-eastern Europe; it assesses the opportunities and risks and lays special emphasis on the further development of the process of European integration. The states of eastern Central Europe should of course be included as quickly as possible

– according to the German white paper – although it should always be remembered that Germany is still particularly reliant on the effectiveness of western alliances.

Against that background I have tried to take up and develop the idea put forward by Mr. Balladur, the French Prime Minister, a few weeks ago, of drafting a European white paper. The objections to this by experts from the WEU Institute for Security Studies are correct – I am referring to paragraph 19 of the report. They say that the WEU Council's contribution so far to this subject, which is basically the enumeration of certain risks and opportunities, is of little use to the preliminary consideration of a common European white paper.

If you look at the organisations currently involved in collective security in Europe you will see that we have three different concepts, and at times also types of organisation, in relation to collective security and conflict settlement – at least on paper. We have the United Nations, which plays a very central part in ensuring collective security, although it was seriously handicapped until 1989 by the fact that because of the political and ideological split in the world, the basic concept of collective security never acquired much significance, or if it did, this was merely in peripheral areas and not in relation to central questions of collective security. Since 1989 we have noted that in a number of security areas the basic idea of the United Nations ensuring collective security is beginning to gain ground.

Secondly, we have the CSCE, which used to be mainly a forum for dialogue – this was important in the 1970s and 1980s in the field of human rights, but also of confidence-building measures – but which hopes to become a regional United Nations organisation in future and which has to some extent begun to move towards preventive diplomacy, although here again rather more in peripheral than in central areas.

Thirdly, of course, we have NATO and Western European Union – closely linked in the history of their origins – which are both alliances of collective self-defence and systems of collective security, namely of the members belonging to these alliances.

The last type is the European Union, which combines a number of these elements. It is both a system of mutual collective security and, of course, an attempt to establish the idea of a European federation. I am avoiding the terms that cause particular offence in some member states, such as the term federal state or even union, in favour of the looser term European Union which, as I said, takes in the federal idea.

Of course there are still differing ideas about the European Union. There are proposals about moving at different speeds. There are proposals to

Mr. Soell (continued)

develop the Union in concentric circles around a nucleus. On this subject I would say – and here I ask members to peruse the terms I set out in paragraph 38 of the report – that it is not useful to create an exclusive club. Rather, it is most important where possible to define jointly the criteria for further steps towards integration and then also to take the appropriate steps jointly; for one thing is of course clear: if there is to be co-operation across a broader spectrum, that co-operation will be at different degrees of intensity.

It is of quite decisive importance to bring these networks together, to ensure that they converge rather than differ.

It should be understood that those countries that neither take part in defining common criteria nor in these networks of intensive co-operation will have no right to decide from outside. So long as they remain outside, they cannot take part in decision-making.

Finally it will be most important – not just for our Assembly but also for the development of the European constitution – to include the national parliaments in this co-operation in due form and to keep them informed at an early stage. In particular, this applies to what I have said in various other contexts about the preparations for the treaty review conference in 1996.

And we must always remember that Western European Union itself forms a kind of hard core, and must take great care to ensure that central elements of the modified Brussels Treaty, especially the automatic mutual assistance obligations under Article V, are not further weakened.

It is clear that the Maastricht Treaty has gone beyond the stage of inter-state co-operation in several fields. The Commission has described common areas in a number of fields – right of initiative and right of participation – and two and a half years ago in Lisbon the Commission of the European Union also described common areas of foreign and security policy. Some of these areas are currently being analysed by an EU joint working party on foreign and security policy. Unfortunately our Assembly has still not been allowed to see the results of these activities. That too is mentioned in my report.

The mutual information and cross-participation of members of the secretariats of WEU and the European Union referred to in paragraph 51 of the report cannot resolve the main difficulty, although this does represent a useful step. In preparation for the review conference in 1996 to which I referred earlier, it will be important for WEU to obtain broader overall operational powers and become capable of political action. At the same time it must safeguard its autonomy of action.

When I look at the most recent decisions of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council – on 18th November 1994 they were communicated to the Assembly as Document 1443 – and especially at the provisional conclusions on a common European foreign and security policy, I must say that it becomes much clearer than we would have wished that Western European Union is seen in a sense merely as the executive organ for the military-political aspect of European Union policy. Clearly that is the basis on which further analyses are being carried out. I do not consider that sufficient; for in view of the very different structures of the European Union member states – structures that will become even more diverse with the accession of formerly neutral countries from 1st January 1995 – we will not be able to formulate a common foreign and security policy at all for a whole range of basic preliminary decisions.

Moreover, Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty makes no reference to the relationship between Western European Union and NATO, which we still regard as central.

In recent months there have been a number of discussions on the options open to the various organisations – NATO, WEU, European Union – as regards the further process of rapprochement between Western Europe and the central Eastern European states. These options were discussed at the foreign ministers' conference on 11th September 1994 in the context of guidelines. The various governments within WEU take very different views – we must not conceal that fact – as of course do WEU as a whole and the American Government, on the speed at which this process should be promoted.

We regard it as important for the policies of the three organisations to be co-ordinated. That is why we say that a special WEU working group ought to be set up, with the Assembly ensuring that its preparatory work also covers political aspects, i.e., goes beyond the operational level, and let me point out here that co-operation at this level is a particularly important condition. Section V, paragraphs 96 et seq., sets out a few practical considerations, although still in very general terms.

As for the level of these activities, it has been proposed that officials should be exchanged not only bilaterally between foreign ministries and defence ministries, or between the secretariats of the various European institutions, but that it would also be appropriate to establish cross-frontier co-operation within the networks of the problem areas, co-operation which could, for instance, lead to exchanges between officials from three countries. I do not want to give figures here. It is far more important from a regional point of view that this should create a certain European spirit, which would lead from consideration of the individual European problem regions to a joint assessment.

Mr. Soell (continued)

I think it is probable, and to some extent useful, that additional areas of friction will appear here and there, because in that way new members in particular, who form themselves into specific, regional, informal groups and make joint assessments, can assert their common interests more strongly. At least I believe that is a point to which these countries should devote some attention.

Let me make a few critical comments on some of the ideas we have heard from Russian foreign policy representatives over the past few months. On Thursday we will have the opportunity to question the foreign minister, Mr Kozyrev. The Political Committee held a number of talks in Moscow. Mr. Baumel – and in this respect the debate on the subject scheduled for tomorrow morning is extremely useful – will give us an account of them. A number of recommendations will also be submitted to the Assembly.

At any rate, I note in the report – and I want to emphasise this here – that it will not be possible for Russia to have a kind of veto position, once it has made moves towards closer co-operation eventually leading to membership of the European Union and Western European Union. I can understand why countries such as Hungary, Poland and others have shown some scepticism about obtaining a kind of security guarantee from America and Russia as a substitute for eventual membership. In any case, we should make it quite clear now that we sympathise with and support the attitude of Hungary and Poland.

On the other side, we must of course realise that even if we, like the German Foreign Minister Mr. Kinkel a few weeks ago, say that in principle all those countries in favour of closer relations with Western European Union and the European Union can also be members of NATO, in actual fact we will have to continue to pursue this process in very close co-ordination with the Americans. On the one hand we will not tolerate any form of American veto on the accession of these countries to the European Union, but on the other hand we know that history and practice have created extremely close links between Western European Union and NATO, with the security guarantees that are involved on either side.

Lastly it has been proposed – and here I am coming back to the conference of presidents of the national parliaments in Bonn in September 1994; I have discussed that in paragraphs 119, 120, 121 and 122 – that co-decision by the national parliaments should in future be safeguarded institutionally. That is most important. It certainly does not apply only to the rather narrow field of security and defence policy, although it is particularly necessary there; for everyone knows that the European Parliament will not have the same direct access to

control and initiative in the next few years that the national parliaments have acquired on the basis of their enshrined rights – be it the Committee on Defence, the Foreign Affairs Committee or the Committee on Budgets. Because of this close involvement in practical questions, it is important that we manage to consolidate the powers of the national parliaments institutionally at European level.

Looking forward to this stronger institutional consolidation of the national parliaments' powers, at present we, as the WEU Assembly, are acting as a kind of bridge, since the member countries of WEU are after all also members of the national parliaments. At least we should manage to consolidate them in sensitive areas. In the long run, the fact of our existence and in a sense our method of debate will not in themselves be enough to ensure closer integration of foreign policy, security policy and also defence policy in the stricter sense. That is why I think that the activities of our Assembly – in preparation for the 1996 review conference as well – should include consideration of those constitutional elements of the institutions that would strengthen the national parliaments and their rights.

Against the background of what some colleagues have said during the urgent debate, let me conclude: there will have to be far more intensive co-operation between the Council and the Assembly in the coming few years. The Assembly must be informed and involved in individual deliberations and planning steps early on, at the initial drafting stage. Mr. Poos, the last Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Luxembourg Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, assured us of that in June this year.

Without wanting to sound unnecessarily polemical, that is precisely why I must say that I greatly regret that we received the Council of Ministers' report very late, indeed not until after the Political Committee had virtually completed its preliminary work on this report, the resolution and the directive. This kind of conduct, for which there may well be reasons, is an obstacle to prompt information, which is the precondition for this close dialogue.

That is my introduction to this report. I look forward to the debate and thank you very much for your attention and patience.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your well-documented statement. We can now debate the subject in the greatest clarity.

The debate is open.

I remind you that we agreed that all speeches be limited to five minutes.

I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the report before us is Mr. Soell's

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

last contribution to the work of an assembly in which his participation over the years has enhanced WEU's prestige.

Hartmut Soell is one of a dwindling number of humanist intellectuals, a threatened species. He is a historian by training, profession and liking.

Born on the banks of the Rhine on the other side from Strasbourg, he has been deeply marked by his homeland, a favoured region where the gradual merging of cultures after the clash between Ariovistus and Caesar has for two thousand years made a unique contribution to the progress of mankind.

Mr. Soell has accustomed us to calm, passionless analysis, that of a master of the history in depth that Lucien Febvre talks about, and I would stress there is no conflict between my admiration for him and the fact that I do not agree with some of his views on the way Europe is developing at the end of this century. I am increasingly pessimistic about the effects of the United States' political, ideological and military domination over Europe and the world in general. A unipolar world seems to me a dangerous prospect.

The decision of the United States Congress to end the ban on the sale of arms to Bosnia has sharply confirmed that the United States is taking more and more unilateral measures affecting the future of Europe without any concern for their allies' opinions. At a time when NATO, in other words the United States, assumes the right to bomb targets in Bosnia without prior warning, I am increasingly convinced that the only way towards real peace and security in Europe lies not in agreements and decisions leading to air attacks on our continent, but in dialogue between people.

One may well ask what can be hoped for from an organisation in which situations such as those described in the report are frequently found. For example, and I quote, the Council fails to inform the Assembly regarding its co-operation with NATO; the Council refuses to provide the Assembly with information on work undertaken in the framework of the CFSP on questions relating to the modified Brussels Treaty; it was only on 9th November 1994 that the Council transmitted to the Assembly the first part of the fortieth annual report on its activities; the last WEU Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, did not deem it necessary to send the Assembly his information letter; despite urgent requests by the Assembly, the Council makes no reply to the questions arising because of the increase in the number of parliamentary delegations participating in the work of the Assembly; finally, the Council fails to provide information on the financial contributions made by associate partners to the WEU budget.

If the Council of an organisation with such ambitious aims ignores the existence of that organisation's parliamentary assembly in every possible way, there are legitimate grounds for not expecting any great results.

A comparison of white papers on defence published by the three key WEU countries, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, shows up contradictions which suggest that we should be more humble as regards a common European security policy in the framework of the European Union. To reach this conclusion all you need to do is read Mr. Soell's report.

I was at the colloquy in Paris where Mr. Léotard, the French Minister of Defence, said he wished to see WEU have greater political credibility and effectiveness. In his view that credibility is tied up with the efforts being made to make WEU fully operational. But what I fear most is, precisely, a WEU with a bias towards the resolution of conflicts by force, a WEU whose strategy would take its cue from that of NATO, despite the contradictions between them.

If the Western European countries fail to agree on how to manage the crisis in former Yugoslavia, and if the United States becomes the virtual arbiter of all the seething conflicts in the Balkans, the gulf between the aims of WEU and the rôle it really plays, will be even deeper and more apparent.

The debates on WEU and NATO enlargement policies set us down at the entrance to a dark labyrinth. Add to this the United States tendency, as noted by the Rapporteur, to want to settle worldwide strategic issues bilaterally with Russia at the expense of Western Europe, and we have a clearer view of the gap between words and reality as regards the adoption of a European security policy.

In this brief and wonderful adventure of life, there are people we meet whose knowledge enriches us all, even if our views are far apart. Mr. Soell is one.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianchi.

Mr. BIANCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to look at what seem to me the three main themes of Mr. Soell's excellent report. In my view, there are basically three subjects to which the Assembly's attention should be drawn.

The focal point of the report is the identification of WEU's rôle within the overall European security system. That being so, I would stress that for the future European defence system it is essential that WEU should play the rôle of a political driving force vis-à-vis the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance itself, with a view to developing guidelines for the organisation of European defence. In the same connection I also feel that unconditional support should be forthcoming for

Mr. Bianchi (continued)

the suggestion in the draft recommendation that decisive backing be given to the French Prime Minister's recent proposal for drafting a white paper on European security which could set out the guidelines for the European Union on the subject in conjunction with WEU and NATO.

Another major point in the report is the problem of the enlargement of WEU. Earlier, in 1993, working on the basis of Mr. Ward's interesting report, the WEU Assembly looked at the question of possible enlargement. Today, Mr. Soell's report goes into the subject in detail and seeks to advance the debate on enlargement. In particular the Rapporteur demands in clear terms that the associate countries be offered real prospects of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty. Here, as the Rapporteur points out, the real problem is the position of Slovenia. In my opinion, the recent disputes between Italy and Slovenia should unquestionably be speedily resolved, so that they do not have an adverse effect on security matters. Moreover, as an Italian, I am bound to stress that a solution for the problems currently involving Italy and Slovenia is a prize to be sought after. I must only emphasise, however, that in handling this dispute, Italy has never sought a position of supremacy as some people would seek to make the world at large believe.

Having looked at these points, I should now like to consider the problem of preparations for the intergovernmental conference of the European Union scheduled for 1996. In particular, I agree with the suggestion made in Mr. Soell's report regarding the fact that the Council of WEU should create a special working group to study institutional questions relating to the preparation of the conference. I attach particular importance to the principle that participation by the parliamentary Assembly of WEU should be assured on the lines approved in Corfu by the European Union.

In conclusion, I would like to repeat that, at such a difficult time for Europe and in particular for the Danubian and Balkan countries, work to assess more fully the principles set out in Title V of the Maastricht Treaty takes on particular importance in terms of establishing whether the preconditions are present for the creation of an overall European defence system giving practical effect to the terms of the treaty itself.

Furthermore, the complexity of the subjects covered by the report confirms the weighty nature of the problems which exist within WEU's area of influence and also in sectors which are not properly included in that area. While it is true that it is not the purpose of an address to analyse everything in the report in every detail, it is equally true that, in the few points I have made, I have sought to make it clear that my contribution is not intended to be purely formal but also to bear witness to

my own personal interest and that of my group, Forza Italia, in these vital subjects.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you know from the past what a close interest I take in European security. For years I had the honour of drafting reports on it and making recommendations to the Assembly. That is why I want to thank Mr. Soell very warmly for his in-depth report, which discusses many of the developments that have occurred over the past twelve months. However, even his report has been overtaken by events. What is the future of security in Europe and our relations with our Atlantic partners, especially the USA and Canada, within NATO after the results of the United States elections? We can confirm that there is very probably a trend towards further dissociation from Europe and less concern with the problems arising in Europe, in which they are less willing to become involved.

We must counteract the process of dissociation between Europe and the United States. We still regard NATO as a cornerstone of security policy. That is why the need for a European defence identity must certainly be seen in relation to the Atlantic defence identity. That means that we must develop the Maastricht Treaty in the direction of a European defence identity, by whatever name it is called, as a real pillar of the Maastricht Treaty and also as the completion of the European pillar within NATO. In this context I am thinking of a European contribution to international security. We want to add our contribution to what is being done through the United Nations, which is now in difficulties because of the situation in former Yugoslavia.

The report discussed future enlargement at length. Actually the vote we have just had on the position of, in particular, the Turks is an indication of how difficult we in the Assembly and in the committees all find it to look at enlargement and at the functions which certain levels of enlargement have to fulfil. I have not even spoken of full voting rights.

Many problems still need to be resolved, but there is not much time, because the next intergovernmental conference will take place in 1996 and by then our vision of the future of Europe in the context of WEU must be ready. Much still remains to be done in this respect.

At present things do not look too good for WEU. Of course we can hold many conferences and meet in committees everywhere, but it will still be very difficult to achieve full representation of the member states so that they can be involved in the administration of Mostar, and in particular the police force that has been promised in order to ensure that life in Mostar can return to normal. We have had problems with the naval command in the

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

Adriatic over the squadrons on the spot. As regards participation in the embargo on the Danube, things have not always gone smoothly either. In this respect we still have much to learn. Most important of all, however, is the situation in Bihac. It is extremely urgent that we should determine our attitude towards the position of the people in that town and our people in former Yugoslavia who are now part of the United Nations forces. I hope we will be able to discuss that tomorrow.

In conclusion, Mr. President, on behalf of the Liberal Group I have tabled a number of amendments to Mr. Soell's recommendations. I hope these can be presented at a later stage.

(Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the report by Hartmut Soell identifies the most important strategic challenges at a decisive stage of the framing of a European security policy and also shows evidence of a realistic and moderate approach to the 1996 intergovernmental conference. If we are to believe the omens, we should not expect too much from that conference. Although what we need is a qualitative leap towards a political union, especially in connection with monetary union, I am sceptical as to whether we can achieve this bold objective at this stage given that our most recent experience shows that we have a limited margin for foreign policy action. This makes it all the more important that the report sets out pragmatic steps for strengthening WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the European pillar of NATO.

The enumeration of the risks that weaken WEU as a whole is especially impressive. They include above all an overhasty enlargement by the accession of new member states, which puts in question Article V, i.e., the automatic obligation to provide mutual assistance that is a core element of WEU. After all, even with a strategy of small steps it is possible to lose the way, if one can no longer see where one is going. It is rather difficult at present to determine where the much-invoked political objective of the European Union, which may soon consist of sixteen member states, including neutrals, is to lie. But the political contours within WEU are also becoming increasingly blurred. At any rate, I detect a certain tendency to look back to the practical foreign-policy influence of individual member states and their potential in terms of power politics.

I think the creation of the Bosnia contact group reflects that tendency. We should not close our

eyes to it, any more than to the bilateral military co-operation of which France and the United Kingdom set an example at the recent Chartres summit. I am referring to the creation of a military planning cell for the air forces of both these member countries, although I am not sure how this can fit in with WEU's military Planning Cell.

We also note with concern that old ways of thinking have reappeared in national risk assessments and geopolitical spheres of interest, undermining our power of action. Deep-seated historical ties and supposed mutual interests in certain areas have unfortunately clouded the view of the party responsible for mass murder and war crimes. This applies both to the Balkans and unfortunately also to the WEU Council's deliberations in view of the increasingly critical situation in Rwanda. Instead of waiting for ever and letting events take their course, we should have taken earlier and more resolute action, especially in the case of the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

Our colleague Hartmut Soell is particularly aware of that. His plea in June 1992 for the establishment of an internationally guaranteed safe area went unheard.

Today, the disaster of subsequent United Nations and NATO policy can be seen in all its brutality in the United Nations safe area of Bihac. The failure of the international community of states and unfortunately also of the European Union can be traced back to totally inadequate decision-making procedures, which enabled the warring parties in the Balkans to play off our governments one against the other.

We must urgently consider what to do about this, with a view to the review conferences. In cases where all the member states have common foreign-policy interests, the decision-making procedures must be framed in such a way as to make obligatory action a common duty in these fields. Only in that way can a preventive security policy vis-à-vis third countries acquire the necessary credibility. Clearly, this is being discussed in European Union circles, but unfortunately the public is once again excluded.

We need a co-ordinated package of embargo measures, and of incentives for ending the conflict and settling disputes peacefully. Of course national governments will continue to have the right to mobilise their troops. That is why any plans to merge WEU and the European Union are unrealistic at this time.

Hartmut Soell's report shows what is in fact feasible. We should now consistently follow the strategy of small steps he indicated and safeguard it by improving the co-ordination between WEU and the European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pastusiak.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Observer from Poland*). – Poland's strategic goal is to be integrated within European political, economic and military structures in both governmental and interparliamentary dimensions of co-operation. Of course, that includes Western European Union. In that respect, we received with great satisfaction the decision by the Presidential Committee, which enabled us to be involved in the activities of the Assembly to a much greater extent than has hitherto been possible. It is especially important that we permanent observers have a chance to participate in the work of committees of the Assembly.

We consider the Presidential Committee's decision to be a step in the right direction, but we understand that it is not a last step in developing relations between this Assembly and the parliaments of associate partners. We are looking forward to the next steps, which will enable us to be not only permanent observers but also active participants in other bodies of this distinguished and highly respected Assembly.

I also hope that, as a result of the Presidential Committee's decision, representatives of the parliaments of associated partners have the right to move motions and amendments to draft resolutions presented to the Assembly. That will not diminish the rights of full members of the Assembly, as permanent observers have no right to vote. It will simply give us a possibility to inform the Assembly about our opinions in a more formalised way than is possible today.

I hope that the rights of full and associate members will not be diminished if the Assembly decides to grant representatives of associate partner countries the right to present special reports to committees. Incidentally, associate delegates to the North Atlantic Assembly are now entitled to do so. I share the view expressed in Mr. Soell's excellent report that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges should work out the details of our status.

Poland aspires to WEU and NATO membership not because we feel threatened but because, on the contrary, we see no conflict in which Poland could be involved in the foreseeable future. We have concluded treaties on co-operation and good neighbour relations with all seven of our neighbouring countries. As a future member of WEU and NATO, Poland will be not only a consumer of security; as a stabilising factor in the region, an extension of the western European security zone and a relatively large country that still has substantial military potential, Poland should and will be a security provider.

Enlargement of any organisation, especially one that deals with military and political questions, is

a very difficult and delicate process. We understand that WEU and NATO must take account of the political consequences of enlargement, and we should avoid creating new curtains, new walls and new dividing lines. Our common goal should be to expand the area of security of Europe as a whole and avoid petrification of the so-called grey zones in East and Central Europe.

Unfortunately, Mr. Soell was right to say that the discussion about models or options of accession to the European Union, WEU or NATO is at a very early stage. I hope that it will not remain at that early stage for a long time because we shall lose the momentum. Russia opposes the enlargement of NATO but I understand that it does not oppose the admission of Central European states to the European Union and WEU. So the two organisations should not wait until NATO resolves its enlargement problems.

Various methods of establishing a European security system can be envisaged. One would be the universalisation of NATO or WEU and a gradual enlargement of the alliances. Another would be general agreement by Euro-Atlantic countries on the institutionalisation of the CSCE. There is also a modest way, which could be called an island approach to security. Various regional or subregional security organisations could work out a security model. Those organisations include the Baltic states Visegrad group, Balkan countries, the Black Sea security zone and the Central European initiative. The problem is that those subregional organisations do not deal with security. However, once they become involved in security arrangements and create islands of security, those islands could gradually merge with all the European security systems, thus creating a whole continent of security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fassino.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, thank you for giving me the floor. I was greatly interested by Mr. Soell's report which I consider to be a major platform for security policy and a contribution towards advancing our debate which in my view is by no means purely academic. Events in Bosnia tell us that the question of security is an absolutely priority item on our agenda and that Europe must forge the instruments to prevent any repetition of such tragedies.

Agreeing with the main thrust of the report, I should like to speak in particular about the question of relations between WEU and the Central European countries. I think our starting point must be the idea that now a common European security policy is not a military but a political necessity. The Central European countries which have asked to join NATO and are seeking to join WEU are making this request not in order to join

Mr. Fassino (continued)

a military organisation but because they see in their accession a way of consolidating democracy in their countries, because they see in that context a possible solution for the problem of minorities before they degenerate into nationalism and because they see their accession to a common alliance as a way of securing stable frontiers.

The countries concerned are seeking to join the military alliances because they can assist in consolidating political stability. This is the basic reason why suddenly after 1989 all the countries of Central Europe asked to join NATO. We are well aware that enlarging NATO to include the Central European countries is a complex and difficult process, the reasons being that Russia has grounds for doubts and a fear of being encircled and that it cannot accept the construction of a security system in which it would have the same rôle and function as other countries: Russia still claims a position of privilege.

I have no wish to say whether this is right or wrong and I personally seriously question the reasoning but these are the motives which make the enlargement of NATO to include the Central European countries a complex and difficult matter, true as it is that the partnership for peace was devised specifically to solve the problem. It is in fact a solution which could satisfy Budapest and Warsaw without annoying Moscow and probably one which in the short term will allow the two requirements to be moderated. Nevertheless I believe that, in fact, this limitation on NATO's strategy towards the Central European countries opens up a political opportunity for WEU; to coin a phrase, WEU reaches places that NATO cannot reach. This being so, I believe that we should look at the question of a policy of closer association between the Central European countries and WEU, thus creating side-by-side with NATO's partnership for peace a second security umbrella to reinforce the factors of stability in Central Europe, give further reassurances to the countries there and, as association becomes ever closer, take more and more heat out of the problem of the relationship between Central Europe and NATO because Central European security policy would no longer rely solely upon it.

I therefore agree that it is wise to call for a step-by-step strategy, as emphasised by Mr. Soell, provided the steps are continuous and constant. It is only with small steps that so many can be taken, perhaps winning the race; however, for the reasons which I have tried to indicate, a step-by-step approach must also mean stronger determination and greater conviction on the part of WEU and its agencies to build up a steadily closer association between the countries of Central Europe and WEU.

The second point I would like to make concerns Mediterranean policy. Quite rightly, the report pays considerable attention to the subject and in this case also that there is a wider political opportunity for WEU than it has previously had. Events round the Mediterranean have a direct effect on Europe and its policies; very powerful economic demographic, political and social pressures are at work throughout the Mediterranean basin and we know very well that in the next few years events across the Mediterranean will have a direct impact on our countries' policies. I believe, therefore, that closer strategic attention to the Mediterranean by WEU is now a vital priority for our organisation. I therefore support the proposals put to us which I believe should be implemented very quickly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I start by complimenting Mr. Soell on his report, which lives up to the standard of all the reports that he has produced in the years that most of us have been in the Assembly. We shall miss him very much. I hope that he is as successful in his future historical work as he has been with us.

I want to concentrate on the fourth section of his report, about which I shall be blunt. Over the years this Assembly has produced some extremely good reports, but they have often been ignored by the Council of Ministers or treated with a lack of interest. As an Assembly, we are rather like the children of Israel – Moses brings down the tablets of stone, at which stage we are allowed to hear what ministers have decided. That is not good enough. In their home parliaments ministers are responsible to us as members of parliament. It would be pleasant if they decided to consult us before taking decisions that land us in a mess.

Ministers' stupidity over not giving full membership to Turkey caused us immense problems. They decided, without proper consultation, to invite the associate partners. I am delighted at the invitation, but where are the partners to have their offices? The ambassadors have comfortable, large offices in Brussels. Where will our new colleagues be based? Who will pay for the extra work that we will have to do? All those decisions were taken by ministers without proper consultation with parliamentarians.

I noted the remarks of the new Secretary-General and, as he is from Britain's oldest ally, I took some comfort from his words, but we must go much further. We have had one or two joint meetings with the ambassadors of WEU. They have not been frequent and have seldom been productive, for the simple reason that their instructions are too tight.

Lord Finsberg (continued)

Our activities in the Council of Europe are much more effective. We have regular joint meetings with ambassadors, and can talk freely and frankly. Twice a year the ministers – I do not see any ministers or many ambassadors present – sit and talk with us for one or two hours. I have heard from ministers and ambassadors of many countries who find those meetings with parliamentarians extremely valuable.

On occasions we have saved them from making one or two mistakes. The brilliance of the idea of guest membership came from parliamentarians, not ministers, who have said that if it did not exist they would have to invent it. Perhaps this Assembly might occasionally be given a little credit for ideas and ministers might decide that they could, with good results, talk with us. That is why I am delighted that Mr. Soell refers to that in his documents.

Failing that, nothing will happen. We can tell how much ambassadors are interested in coming here from the fact that they are absent. All we can hope for is that the Secretary-General and his extremely able deputy will convey the strength of feeling of parliamentarians on this very point. I hope that something will happen – I am happy to leave it there for now. We shall see what has happened when we meet again in six months' time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pahor, the observer from Slovenia.

Mr. PAHOR (*Observer from Slovenia*). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen. I have had the pleasure and privilege of addressing your Assembly several times, telling you that Slovenia wants to be part of the European Union and Western European Union.

At your June session in Paris, I informed the Assembly that Slovenia wanted associate partner status. I very much hope that the Assembly will today accept Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. de Puig and others, and stating that it is necessary to "make arrangements without further delay for granting Slovenia associate partner status".

As you know very well, Slovenia is politically and socially stable, and behaves in all respects in a normal fashion. It is not involved in the Balkan conflict and it is doing its utmost to open up its doors to integration with Europe – not only economic and political co-operation but security co-operation. We see the only way forward in security as joining WEU and NATO.

I am particularly glad to note that Mr. Fassino and Mr. Benvenuti have signed the amendment; that may be the very first sign that Italy will support Slovenia on its journey towards union with Western Europe and WEU. The amendment is important to our delegation, to the Slovenia Par-

liament and to Slovenian public opinion. If the Assembly accepts it, that will be a recognition of the fact that Slovenians have the political will to move towards European Union and WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – I would like to refer to the last report presented by Mr. Hartmut Soell, who has presided very skilfully over this Assembly, endowing it with much of his own prestige. Indeed, we have become accustomed to the calm, in-depth and thorough analyses by this great historian and humanist. Consequently, the quality of his excellent report came as no surprise to me, coming shortly after our organisation's Standing Committee had received, in Luxembourg last May, a mandate to start work on defining a European security and defence policy, underlining WEU's increasingly important rôle in the defence and security system in close collaboration with NATO, which I believe no one would dispute.

However excellent the studies which have been, or are to be, carried out, there is still a need for political will. We are starting from a new world situation of imperfect multipolarity, from a new fluid and changing order, in which the absolute certainties which existed before the fall of the communist régimes in 1989-90 no longer exist. The increasingly unrealistic utopian dreams of the so-called end of history were abandoned long ago.

Nothing can be taken for granted; democracy, like defence and security, requires unstinting effort and is never a definitive and irreversible achievement on a European scale and even less so on a world scale.

Since then, therefore, contrary to the hopes of the utopians, there has been a resurgence of the possibility of further widespread and multiple threats and ethnically-based nationalism, with too much emphasis on ethnic and at times religious links between states in the choice of external alliances and political priorities; the result is that at times we fear, at least as far as language is concerned, a return to times we thought long buried in history or more appropriate to the period before the second world war, or even the belle époque. Indeed, some of the speeches appear to be a resurgence of the myths of those times.

I would like to refer to matters of world importance. One of the few reservations I have concerning this report on European security policy is that it has not brought out the world picture a little: the emergence of powers in eastern Asia, the aggravation of problems of under-development or inappropriate development outside Europe which are in part the cause of serious frustration and differing types of fundamentalism, especially in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. This is a perspective which I would like to see developed a little more.

Mr. Roseta (continued)

Returning to our own countries, each has its different interests, its historic links, some of which are very old – I am thinking of the links enjoyed by Portugal, the United Kingdom, Spain and France with certain Atlantic or African countries. The question is whether it is possible to harmonise all of this, whether it is possible to have a policy which goes beyond general interests and general declarations to define some common security interests – for instance, in certain regions such as Central Europe, the East, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the near East, or the whole of Africa.

As regards peace-keeping I am aware that other organisations also promote peace, those which promote development for instance, because development and improving the standing of living and well-being of others, some of whom are our close neighbours, are important in peace-keeping. However, as the European pillar of NATO and the defence component of Europe, WEU has an essential rôle to play, because it is the only organisation with competence in defence matters. For this reason it is WEU's responsibility to attempt to define a system of joint security in association with NATO.

In this unfocused, changing context, with no clearly-defined positions, the rôle of this Assembly is becoming much more important than it was during the cold war. This is why the Council must pay more attention to the Assembly and, as Mr. Soell has said, not be so late in submitting its annual report for consideration, that is to say, after our own report has been prepared in the committee. Such delays are inadmissible and will not, I hope, be repeated.

Obviously, I have great hopes of the Portuguese presidency which will direct the work of the Council from 1st January next. Equally, however, I shall not cease to be both vigilant and exigent vis-à-vis any of my compatriots who come to assume the presidency.

I would like to comment on the preparations for the 1996 intergovernmental conference, which, in my view, cannot be implemented simply by groups of experts, followed by governmental discussions.

I think that particular method of proceeding with the construction of policies for Europe, which can be extremely dangerous, was exhausted after the Maastricht Treaty. There are those who believe that it is possible to continue to present people with ready-made policies; however, I believe that if it takes place this time without members of national parliaments participating in the preparation of the conference, there will be some unpleasant surprises.

In addition to this, I would like to tell Mr. Soell that it seems to me difficult to claim, as the report does in paragraph 108, that according to information in the press, the British, Dutch and Portuguese have a minimalist view of WEU. Clearly, it is not for the press to define the positions of the different countries. What does it mean to be minimalist? It is an adjective that could mean anything ... I think we ought to forget that paragraph, because the media do not know what these countries or their representatives really feel.

I shall conclude by saying that Mr. Soell has once again honoured this Assembly, and I hope that he will continue, in whatever capacity, be it as historian, friend or emeritus deputy, to be prepared to come to our assistance with his wise words and investigative powers which I believe we shall always benefit by considering and acting upon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

15. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 29th November 1994, at 10 a.m., with the following orders of the day.

1. Address by Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly.
2. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (Presentation of the first part of the fortieth annual report of the Council, Document 1433); Address by Mr. van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
3. A European defence policy (Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee, Document 1445 and amendments).
4. A European security policy; A European defence policy (Joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee, Documents 1439 and amendments and 1445 and amendments).
5. Address by Mr. Kucan, President of Slovenia.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak? ...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6 p.m.)

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1994

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Changes in the membership of committees.
4. Address by Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly.
5. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (*Presentation of the first part of the fortieth annual report of the Council*, Doc. 1433); Address by Mr. van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Replies by Mr. van Mierlo to questions put by: Mr. de Puig, Mr. Davis, Mr. Valleix.
6. A European defence policy (*Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee*, Doc. 1445 and amendments).
Speaker: Mr. Baumel (Rapporteur).
7. A European security policy; A European defence policy (*Joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee*, Docs. 1439 and amendments and 1445 and amendments).
Speakers: Mr. Martinez, Mr. Buteiko (Observer from Ukraine), Mr. van der Linden.
8. Address by Mr. Kucan, President of Slovenia.
Replies by Mr. Kucan to questions put by: Mr. Magginas (Observer from Greece), Mr. Antretter, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Fassino, Mr. Roman, Mr. Jeszenszky (Observer from Hungary), Mr. Mitolo.
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments? ...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT. – The Italian Delegation proposes the following changes in the membership of committees of the Assembly in accordance with Rule 40 (6) of the Rules of Procedure:

1. See page 19.

Political Committee: Senator Pozzo as a member in place of Mr. Selva.

Technological and Aerospace Committee: Mr. Mitolo as a member in place of Senator Pozzo.

Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations: Mr. Selva in place of Mr. Mitolo.

Is there any opposition? ...

The changes are agreed to.

4. Address by Sir Dudley Smith President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – I was told when I first started making speeches in public life that one should never begin a speech with an apology. I shall break that rule today and apologise to you for not being present yesterday for the opening of the session as I should have been. As most of you will have realised, there was a vote of confidence in the British Parliament and, quite apart from anything else, it is vital for any member of parliament to be present in those circumstances, be he on the government side, as I was, or on the opposition. It is something of a hanging offence not to be present.

I should like to thank my good colleagues, Mr. Valleix and Mr. Martinez for their kindness in pre-

The President (continued)

siding during yesterday's sitting. I was sorry not to be here to welcome those who have joined national delegations since the last plenary session in June and also those parliamentary observers who are coming to us for the first time, especially the parliamentarians from Kazakhstan which has not been represented here before.

I particularly regret not being in the Chair to welcome our new Secretary-General, Ambassador José Cutileiro, whom I had the pleasure of meeting a few moments ago – I do so now. Secretary-General, you take office at a time when Western European Union has an increasing and vital rôle to play and faces new challenges. I much look forward to our co-operation.

You may certainly count on the Assembly to continue to incite the Council to further action in developing our organisation. We shall also support any initiative you may take to increase transparency in the Council's proceedings and to improve the information flow to the Assembly.

I have of course written to your predecessor as Secretary-General, Dr. Willem van Eekelen, to thank him for his dedication to Western European Union and his achievements during the five years of his mandate, and to wish him well for the future. I shall be presenting the medal of the Assembly to him tomorrow.

Wim van Eekelen has played an important rôle in opening up WEU to Central Europe and the Baltic States. So much so, in fact, that for once our Council is at present one step ahead of the Assembly in its relationship with the associate partners.

Altering the complex rules and regulations of the Assembly to create a new status of associate member and associate partner is taking more time than was originally envisaged. This is more as a consequence of our Assembly's legal standing as a component part of the modified Brussels Treaty, rather than through any lack of will on the part of member parliamentarians.

While waiting for ratification of Greek membership of WEU, we had already implemented an interim arrangement for Greece and the three new associate members.

Pending the adoption of a formal status for associate partner countries, my colleagues and I on the Presidential Committee have offered them an interim arrangement which allows the bigger countries to be represented by up to four parliamentarians in our plenary sessions and all countries to send one observer to each of the four main committees: Defence, Political, Technological and Aerospace and Parliamentary and Public Relations. I am delighted to say that this arrange-

ment has found favour with all the countries concerned.

I have now completed the planned series of official visits to all nine Central European and Baltic states. These visits have convinced me that we are moving in the right direction in our relationship. All are signed up as members of the Council of Europe, our guide over a stable democratic system and for acceptable human rights standards. All will take part in NATO's partnership for peace. All are taking responsibility in one way or another on the international scene, supporting United Nations operations, for example, in Bosnia or Croatia or on the Danube.

The Presidential Committee and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations recently visited WEU headquarters for Danube operations at Calafat in Romania. We were very impressed with the high level of co-operation both between the contingents from our various countries and with the local authorities – something which had also been evident on earlier visits to Mohacs in Hungary and Roussé in Bulgaria.

We are about to enter into an increased relationship with three other countries which are now joining the European Union: Austria, Finland and Sweden. Well done, indeed to them! All are likely to become full observers in WEU early next year and will therefore have a similar status with us as do Denmark and Ireland. In due course, one or other of these countries may wish to become full members of WEU although such a move could have wide ramifications, not least for our relations with NATO.

As a result of yesterday's referendum, Norway will, sadly, not be joining the European Union. We may comfort ourselves however with the fact that our Norwegian friends are already very active associate members of WEU.

For a full analysis of the implications of these moves, I would commend the reports submitted by Mr. Baumel and Professor Soell, for the Defence and Political Committees respectively, which will be debated later today.

The other reports scheduled for the remaining three days of this session highlight a whole range of issues currently confronting European security in general and WEU in particular.

Recent events have underlined the growing need for Europe to have an autonomous capability for satellite observation. We already have a centre, at Torrejón near Madrid, to analyse satellite imagery in support of WEU interests. I visited the centre for the second time last Wednesday together with colleagues. We were extremely impressed, for example, by the latest pictures of various areas of the former Yugoslav territory.

The President (continued)

This imagery is of considerable value in connection with current operations there and could be vital for not only WEU, but also the United Nations and even NATO, should certain other facilities be withdrawn.

Sadly many of those who are to decide the future of the Centre next year have never been near the place. My advice to them is therefore to go and see just how much has been achieved in such a short time – to the great credit of the Director, Barry Blaydes, and his enthusiastic and very professional staff. I was somewhat reassured by the Secretary-General's comments about Torrejón yesterday. We can all take heart from them. Unfortunately, our remit does not run to making the decision ourselves, but Assembly members who have been to the Centre have been very impressed by it.

Our Assembly intends to organise a seminar early next year to weigh the pros and cons of a WEU observation satellite programme. The aim is to concentrate minds before vital decisions are taken by our Council of Ministers.

One of our more parochial reports, to be presented this afternoon by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, deserves particular attention. The solutions proposed in terms of equipment, notably for this hemicycle, could allow us to continue functioning in our Paris headquarters for the foreseeable future.

I trust that the Council will agree that the costs involved are minimal, compared with those which would be incurred if we had to relocate or hold sessions in other places.

Complementing our debates this week is a galaxy of speakers and the Assembly is extremely pleased at the real interest shown in our work.

In a moment the Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council will give us an account of the decisions taken at the ministerial meeting at Noordwijk in the Netherlands on 14th November.

The Noordwijk declaration, together with the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy, are substantial and far-reaching documents which need careful study. The Chairman-in-Office's commentary will therefore be of considerable value to us.

Foreign Minister van Mierlo will be followed by the Presidents of Slovenia and Romania who do us a signal honour in addressing us – a first, I think, for a single day.

Slovenia is the first country I have visited officially other than our associate partner countries and I was much impressed with what I saw there as well as by those I met.

The Romanian authorities have recently inaugurated an information and documentation centre on European security and defence – an initiative which we applaud in particular.

Tomorrow's first speaker is Mr. Caputo, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, representing Mr. Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy who is currently Chairman-in-Office of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The summit meeting of that organisation, scheduled for next week in Budapest, may bring some change to the standing of the CSCE and have a side effect on our own rôle.

Many members of the WEU Assembly are members of national delegations to the CSCE Assembly and our Assembly has observer status there. I hope that it may be possible in the future further to co-ordinate WEU influence within the CSCE, counting on the goodwill of our double-hatted members.

Russia has long been an advocate of strengthening the CSCE as the pan-European institution par excellence and it will be very interesting on Thursday morning to have the views of the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Kozyrev. He is the author of a number of proposals which will be examined at the CSCE gathering on 5th and 6th December and which were debated at length and good-spiritedly when our Assembly received a special delegation from the Russian Parliament in October.

Closer to home, the address at the end of tomorrow afternoon by Mr. Balladur will be the first by the Prime Minister of France since 1986. It comes at a most interesting time, given current events, and will probably complement and expand on the ideas expressed by the French Defence Minister, Mr. Léotard, at our very successful colloquy last month, "Organising our security".

The colloquy was the first of its kind, bringing together as it did the chairmen of foreign affairs and defence committees of national parliaments to discuss the ways and means of organising European security for the turn of the century.

Our own member countries and Greece were present, of course, together with parliamentarians from our associate member, associate partner and observer nations as well as Austria, Finland and Sweden, plus the Russian Federation – 28 countries in all. It was an outstanding success.

The printed proceedings of the colloquy are available and I hope will help nurture the debate on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty, which should come to a head in 1996. The aim of the colloquy was to put down a few helpful markers, guidelines for our various governments, as they seek consensus on the way ahead.

The President (continued)

I say the way ahead, for I am amazed to hear comments from some of those who should know better to the effect that WEU per se has no future. They say that it is already obvious that we shall abandon our rôle as the European pillar of NATO and be absorbed lock, stock and barrel into the European Union under some bureaucratic Commissioner for defence in Brussels.

One or two chancelleries, no doubt to escape the scrutiny of their national parliaments, are already poised to recommend defence as a subject for the European Parliament – even though the last European Parliament was never able to advance any coherent foreign and security policy.

A number of former senior members have now joined the new European Parliament and I hope therefore that some practical and sensible progress will be possible in that body.

Meanwhile, I should like to warn against various moves which I see as very premature. No doubt I shall be described by some as a reactionary, although those who know me realise that as President of the Assembly, and for four years previously as Chairman of the Defence Committee, I have fought far and wide to advance the ideal of European co-operation in terms of security and defence in their most practical forms.

We are currently in the process of creating a viable and strong operational Western European Union. We are expanding our membership and giving our new associates a better deal than any other similar body.

We say yes to a great many initiatives in the domain of European security and defence: yes to the European corps as a force answerable to WEU; yes to a WEU humanitarian rapid action force; yes to a WEU observation satellite programme as a component part of an intelligence-gathering network; yes to WEU co-operation in setting up a European Armaments Agency for joint procurement projects such as the future large aircraft.

I could go on, for the list of initiatives our countries are bringing to WEU increases month by month.

I hope however that as the WEU Assembly we shall say a resounding no to handing over the political and parliamentary control of our defence to an inexperienced and still far from popular forum.

It is most interesting to note that not one of the national parliamentarians present at the colloquy on 17th October suggested such a move.

Our electorates are currently convinced that the threat of war has disappeared and that consequently spending on defence may be safely diverted to other more pressing needs.

That same electorate, however, is not ready to abandon national prerogatives in defence. Those who are prepared to push in that direction should be aware that they are courting a monumental row in 1996-97 which would make the unhappy Maastricht ratification debate of 1992-93 look like a vicarage tea party. I speak with feeling, as someone who experienced some of the overtones of Maastricht in the vote in the House of Commons last night.

I give notice that this particular Assembly is most unlikely to take such medicine lying down. Ideally we would wish to be part of the WEU Council's consultation process, with a place at the Council table to help elaborate a joint approach on the review of WEU's declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty.

We shall certainly engage in constructive discussion in 1995. I shall probably be suggesting to colleagues that the Assembly should hold public assizes on European security and defence arrangements early in 1996. Throughout the process we shall continue to work with national foreign affairs and defence committees.

Ladies and gentlemen, I must bring these remarks to a close, but before doing so, it would be very remiss of me not to mention a particular event which may have long-term implications for us all. I am referring of course to the United States' decision, on 11th November, to cease applying the United Nations sanctioned embargo on arms for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It so happened that I was in Washington on your behalf the following week, attending the autumn session of the North Atlantic Assembly, which body, I am happy to report, has voted to give our Assembly, in a spirit of transparency, the official status of parliamentary observer.

Our American colleagues seemed amazed at European reactions to President Clinton's actions over the embargo. I pointed out that the headlines in nearly all European newspapers over the weekend of 12th-13th November reflected almost universal dismay at what was perceived as a real chink in what had been the armour of NATO transatlantic solidarity.

By the end of the week, after my calls in the Pentagon, the National Security Council and the Vice-President's office, there was some realisation on the United States side that matters might have been handled a little differently.

Of course the removal of two ships and one or two aircraft from the heart of the NATO/WEU operation in the Adriatic is not critical to the continuing success of the embargo at sea. More disturbing is the potential change in military dispositions in Bosnia which could still have a disastrous effect on the European contingents serving

The President (continued)

there, mainly from WEU and WEU-associated and observer nations.

This was the gist of the letters I sent on behalf of the Assembly on 11th November to the Dutch Foreign and Defence Ministers. I asked them to take the matter very seriously and to address the problem with their colleagues during the ministerial meeting which was held on 14th November.

We look forward to hearing exactly what was discussed and decided in this context and also to having the Chairman-in-Office's assessment of the longer-term effect of such unilateral action by the United States on NATO solidarity and consequently on European security.

On the current *débat* over Bihac, I should add that I was very grateful that colleagues yesterday tabled a motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure and that the Political Committee has responded so promptly.

This comes as a particular test of our resolve.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your attention.

5. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council

(Presentation of the first part of the fortieth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1433)

Address by Mr. van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and presentation of the fortieth annual report of the Council, Document 1443.

Minister, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the Assembly this morning. This is the first occasion on which we shall see and hear you – and also, sadly, the last, given that the new six-month presidencies are all too short.

Some of us, however, have been fortunate enough to hear your co-Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Voorhoeve on a number of occasions. He, as Minister of Defence, and you, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, have been instrumental in taking WEU quite a step forward in these months.

The Dutch presidency of WEU has proved very positive and the Noordwijk declaration is a substantial and encouraging document. The preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy is a very convincing first stab at what may become a European white paper. We look forward to hearing your perspective on

the way ahead. I understand that Mr. van Mierlo has also agreed to answer some brief questions at the end of his address.

I call Mr. van Mierlo.

Mr. van MIERLO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words to myself and to the Dutch chairmanship. I want to talk about what happened during the past six months and I am grateful for the opportunity to address you on developments concerning WEU during the period of the Netherlands presidency. As our presidency expires at the turn of the year, I suppose it is not unfair to say that the greater substantive part of our term of office is already behind us. At Noordwijk, we endorsed a number of decisions that marked our presidency, while on the same occasion Portugal indicated a number of ideas which are to be taken further during its forthcoming presidency. Today, therefore, is an excellent opportunity to reflect on the recent past and to look ahead to the near future.

Mr. President, I propose to do that as follows: first, I will consider the matters we have dealt with and what we have achieved during our presidency, roughly since the Kirchberg Ministerial Council. Secondly, I would like to share with you some thoughts on the broader aspects of European security, a theme which, I know, is high on your agenda these days and will also, no doubt, be high on Europe's agenda for the months and years to come.

As members of this Assembly and of national parliaments you have a definite desire – as I know from my own experience – to be informed of the way we have handled our presidency, and you have every right to do so. As you will recall, the Netherlands took over from Luxemburg on 1st July, shortly after the important meeting at Kirchberg in May this year. At Kirchberg, WEU decided to make a contribution to the integration of Central and Eastern European countries in Western institutions, very much along the lines of similar developments in NATO and the European Union. We moved away from the Forum of Consultation, which had previously defined our relations with these countries, to give them a status within WEU: the status of associate partner. In this way we made it possible for them to participate to a very large extent in our activities.

It was up to the Netherlands presidency to give substance to this new status in practical terms. I believe that, within what is a relatively short period of time, we have made significant progress. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe now take part in the deliberations of the Permanent Council on a bi-weekly basis. Furthermore, enlarged sessions of the special working group, when appropriate, and twenty-four-strong meetings of

Mr. van Mierlo (continued)

the Council working group now take place, providing the Central and Eastern European countries with an opportunity to make a substantial contribution to our common security agendas.

This is only a beginning, however. Clearly, there is room for further improvement. Broader-based participation in WEU operations, also by associate members, observers and associate partners, has yet to materialise. The current operations – Sharp Guard jointly with NATO in the Adriatic, the Danube mission and WEU police operation in Mostar – are performed only by the nine full members. I see every reason to consider wider participation, so that offers of personnel and material would be assessed one by one on the basis of the merits and operational value of the offers, and not on the basis of the level of attachment to or formal status in WEU. We must not forget that practically all of us are involved in peace-keeping operations in different regions of the world, in a wide variety of configurations. We co-operate with Central and Eastern European countries in the context of the United Nations in former Yugoslavia, we exercise with them in the framework of NATO's partnership for peace and, presumably, we will work with these countries again in a possible CSCE peace-keeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. I, therefore, see no political reason in principle to exclude others from participation in WEU operations. On the contrary, I think we can enhance WEU's operational rôle by letting them in on a case-by-case basis and allowing their troops to alternate with our own personnel in the field, as conditions require.

In fact, Mr. President, this is nothing more than applying in practice the principle of co-operative security, to which we all subscribe. It will no doubt lead to stronger ties between our countries and thus to the strengthening of European security in a wider sense.

At Noordwijk we had the opportunity to listen to Dr. Hans Koschnick, the administrator on behalf of the European Union of the city of Mostar. He emphasised the need for rapid full deployment of a WEU police contingent, not only in order to create a safe environment for the people and administration of Mostar, but also in order to make headway with the integration of the two local – Muslim and Bosnian-Croat – police forces. The plan for the Unified Police Force of Mostar should be implemented as soon as possible. We have appealed to the WEU member states in question to provide in the coming weeks the personnel and material they have pledged. What is at stake here is not only the success of the Mostar operation, but the credibility of WEU in current and future operations. This is all the more important since WEU is breaking new ground by

setting up arrangements for a humanitarian task force and others for evacuation planning.

This brings me to a brief observation about an issue that, according to the press, dominated our Council meeting in Noordwijk. We had an hour and half long discussion about the combined WEU/NATO operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, in the light of the American decision to withdraw from certain supervision tasks related to the United Nations arms embargo. We considered that the military consequences of the American step might require some technical operational adjustments, which could be fairly easily resolved in consultation with the allies. The continued effectiveness of the operation was never in question. We took the view that the political ramifications of the American decision would have to be dealt with in the appropriate fora, such as the contact group. The declaration of Noordwijk reflects these points. In short, the American step was unwelcome, not so much because of its – limited – military consequences, but mainly because of the political consequences subsequent steps might have for resolving the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

This brings me to a second issue that has marked our presidency, namely the document on a common European defence policy. It was, as you know, endorsed in Noordwijk by ministers. This document, too, is only a beginning. It seeks to provide a basis for further work in shaping a European defence policy. The paper sets out in a balanced way the scope and objectives of such a policy. It enumerates a number of elements of a CEDP – the "acquis", as it were – that had already been developed in WEU, the European Union and NATO. From this stepping stone, we have tried to identify a number of areas which should be developed with some urgency in order to build WEU into a flexible and operational organisation, capable of rapid response. I see the recommendations in the document not as a menu from which we can pick and choose, but rather as a coherent programme of immediate action to be pursued in its entirety.

We can carry out part of this programme ourselves in WEU. I refer to the recommendations on strengthening the Planning Cell and setting up appropriate information and consultation mechanisms for swift and appropriate responses to emerging crises, such as the proposed political and military support for the Permanent Council. However, there is also a part that we cannot do on our own and that is to strengthen WEU's operational rôle through the use of combined joint task forces. The CEDP document recognises this concept as a very promising way of enhancing WEU's operational abilities. The main argument – even apart from political considerations – is that using the capabilities already available in NATO saves time and money and avoids unnecessary

Mr. van Mierlo (continued)

duplication. However, we obviously need the full co-operation of NATO, which launched the concept in its January summit declaration. As you will be aware, last June WEU sent its position on the idea of CJTFs to NATO for its response. NATO is at present working on defining and elaborating the concept. We expect NATO's results in the coming months, as I would see them as a test case for WEU/NATO relations and the operational potential of WEU.

Another subject I would like to raise in this overview of our presidency relates to a point I mentioned earlier when I spoke of the importance of strengthening security in Europe as a whole. At Noordwijk we were able to launch a discussion on the broader aspects of European security, or, in the words of paragraph 6 of the Noordwijk declaration: "Ministers considered that WEU member countries, associate members, associate partners and observers should now reflect in common on the new European security conditions, with due regard for the work already undertaken, in order to arrive at a common analysis of the problems, including those related to the security and stability of the Mediterranean basin, with which they are faced and to reach agreement as to the appropriate responses. Ministers asked the Permanent Council to initiate reflection in this area, including the proposal put forward by France to draft a white paper on European security."

I am very much looking forward to this reflection, which I think has come not a day too soon. In the present historical context it is inevitable and even desirable that we discuss European security with our new partners. The modalities of this reflection have yet to be developed, but we can expect the Permanent Council to take the first steps soon in order to ensure that the discussion is in full swing next year. I invite your Assembly to make its contribution to this reflection at an appropriate time. I would also expect the WEU Institute for Security Studies to provide us with its ideas.

As we can also see in other international fora, the process of widening our security must go hand in hand with a process of deepening of our core structures. I refer here to the intergovernmental conference in 1996, which will be of the utmost importance to WEU as well as the European Union and our transatlantic relations. Our document on a common European defence policy can be seen as an initial contribution to the WEU review of its Maastricht declaration as far as the substance of such a common policy is concerned. I believe we acted wisely in not including institutional aspects in this document. Otherwise, no doubt, it would not have been ready today. But that does not mean that we should not examine, at this point, institutional aspects relating to the IGC

and the review of the WEU declaration of Maastricht in 1996. Or, in the words of paragraph 7 of the Noordwijk declaration: "Ministers agreed to consider the possibility of holding a WEU meeting at summit level before the IGC in order to finalise its political input to the conference."

I think it was your Assembly that at some point recommended holding a summit of this kind. We should make an early start on preparing the political input. We have suggested that an expert group, such as the Special Working Group, begin preparations, building on the CEDP paper, by drawing up an initial report as guidance for further deliberations.

Here too, I would be glad to see your Assembly and the Institute play an active rôle at some point in helping keep this discussion on track. No doubt your Assembly, as part of the European institutional framework, will feel a direct interest in taking part in the discussion.

At this juncture, may I throw in some preliminary questions – to which I am seeking the answers – concerning our European security architecture? As you will be aware, we are creating a new architecture now that the issue of expansion of western security organisations is high on the agenda. Later this week, NATO will discuss the general question of modalities for membership for the Central and Eastern European countries which are active in the partnership for peace. NATO is gradually moving from the question "if" to the questions "when and how" and, as a first step, the question of "how" in particular.

We should recognise that peace and stability in the countries of which I am speaking cannot be attained solely by means of NATO membership. Economic, social and political stability are probably even more important, and perhaps also more difficult, when it comes to achieving that security in the strict sense of the word. Stability in the wider sense can be achieved only by the combination of integration into the European Union, WEU and NATO. As a result, I believe that the processes of integration of these countries into NATO and the European Union should, in principle and ideally, be parallel processes.

Related to this issue is the question whether expansion should take place in one Central European country at a time, in smaller groups in succession or even simultaneously for the entire group. I leave this question to be answered in the light of the political and security situation at the time.

Another question is how we can ensure that expansion satisfies not merely the security interests of the candidate countries, but those of Europe as a whole. I am referring to the need to develop appropriate relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Those are countries that may feel left out

Mr. van Mierlo (continued)

or perceive themselves to be on the wrong side of an imaginary dividing line in Europe. It will undoubtedly be crucial for security and stability in Europe at large for such feelings to be eliminated. We should not deny or ignore the existence of dividing lines, but we should remember that those lines are not fixed. We should see it as our task to make the countries in question aware that such lines represent merely different shades of integration. They do not preclude closer contacts and co-operation now nor do they exclude closer future arrangements.

To this end, Mr. President, we should use the available potential in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to promote mutual confidence and transparency. We should make more use of the regional and sub-regional approaches that the CSCE can offer. Commendable efforts in related fields are already being made in the framework of the stability pact. We should begin to determine our position on a new or altered arms control régime in Europe, on the basis of the present treaty on conventional forces in Europe.

Such a multilateral approach should be complemented by others at bilateral level. We here in Western Europe should continue to improve our efforts to support political and economic reform in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. That will serve the interests of all involved. But a special responsibility rests on the shoulders of the Central and Eastern European countries to forge strong economic, political and security ties with these three neighbouring countries. The thin dotted lines will be there not to divide, but to provide new windows of opportunity, bilaterally as well as in a regional setting.

Where does this leave WEU? WEU membership is the link in the membership of the European Union and NATO. Expansion of WEU will therefore automatically follow from the parallel integration processes of these organisations. That is not to imply that WEU can sit back and wait for things to happen. WEU must prepare itself in order to be ready to accept these countries when the time comes. In the meantime, WEU should give full implementation to the associate partner status of the countries involved. Furthermore, WEU can do its part to strengthen ties with Russia and Ukraine. Proposals to that end are currently being discussed by the Permanent Council.

In conclusion, I hope that the Netherlands presidency will be remembered as a good beginning for a number of important processes that will require further development over the next few years.

Noordwijk set the stage for a coherent approach of a common European defence policy in WEU

and possibly also in the European Union. We have produced an initial substantive document, providing for an action programme with a view to enhancing the operational abilities of WEU. It also marked the beginning of an institutional debate that should prepare us for the IGC and the review of our Maastricht declaration in 1996.

Moreover, Noordwijk initiated a wide-ranging reflection on broader aspects of European security, involving WEU members, associate members, observers and associate partners. The WEU police operation has been set in motion and is now well under way. In the past few months we have created the conditions that will make it possible for a humanitarian task force to be set up and for WEU to play a rôle in evacuation.

I believe that this limited list is as good as it can be given the short duration of our presidency. I look back with satisfaction on the recent past as I look forward to the interesting but complicated times ahead of us. I have taken the liberty today of presenting you with some of the questions that will need answers over the coming months and years. I trust that we can count on contributions from your Assembly, Mr. President, in the further shaping of security in Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister, for that interesting summary. We have a large number of questions and must try to do the best that we can in the time available. Therefore, without further ado, I shall first call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, I am taking the floor as President of the Political Committee of this Assembly.

Yesterday afternoon, this plenary session took the decision to request the Political Committee to draw up a draft recommendation quickly on the situation in Bosnia and more specifically in Bihac. You will understand that we, as representatives of the citizens of Europe, are equally horrified by events in Bosnia. We feel shame and indignation at what is happening there.

Events such as those in Bihac – the continuing disaster and the impunity with which the Bosnian Serbs are acting – serve to demonstrate that we are not making any progress towards peace; the attitude of the United States does not contribute to a resolution of the problem and the obvious failure up to now of the contact group, which has not succeeded in concluding peace negotiations, also concerns us. As elected representatives we cannot remain silent in the face of all this.

Of course we know that we have always taken a negative stance with regard to military intervention; we know that military intervention is no solution. We always believed that there would not be a military solution. We also know that our governments and the citizens of our countries are

Mr. de Puig (continued)

not very willing to send troops to a war, the outcome of which no one can predict. However, at the same time we know that if no pressure at all is brought to bear on the Bosnian Serbs, no dissuasion attempted, or threats made, then they are never going to negotiate a peace.

This is the problem and there are those who believe, as was demonstrated in this Assembly yesterday, that NATO may not yet have exhausted its powers of dissuasion and threat. Some of us believe that WEU and its Council have equally not yet exhausted the possibilities of taking more firm and forceful decisions. For all these reasons, and in order that we can prepare the text of the recommendation which we will discuss here tomorrow, we would like to know – and your reply is of great importance to us – how far the Council of WEU is able to go.

Would it be in a position to take a decision to send an intervention force immediately?

Would it be in a position to request NATO to carry out systematic and continuous deterrent action until the conditions were in place for a political settlement?

Would the Council, if requested by the Assembly, be prepared to take a decision in this sense?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. van MIERLO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I entirely agree with everything the distinguished delegate has said. Yesterday over lunch the General Council discussed the Yugoslav situation at a meeting in Brussels, and all ministers present were quite firm in their intention to continue with European policy as it is. That means that, for the moment, we are not talking about specific military answers. We felt that we were in no position to do that, given that NATO is about to meet in Brussels this Thursday and Friday.

Of course we were all horrified by what happened in Bihac, but, speaking for myself, I see no possibility at present of sending troops there – either to intervene or to act as a buffer.

The ministers expressed their resolve to step up the political pressure on all the participants to accept the plan drawn up by the contact group. We should like to find ways of making more effective use of the instruments that NATO has, but we agree that the possibilities are limited. For instance, the only instruments we have in Bihac are aeroplanes, and they are not very useful. The fighting is going on in the streets, and the use of planes would involve huge collateral damage.

That is not to say that NATO cannot come up with more substantive answers for other parts of

the country; they will be discussed in the coming days. Thereafter the contact group will meet on Friday evening, and I believe that NATO will have some strong advice for the contact group.

The Assembly can be sure that ministers feel the utmost concern and will do everything to come up with the right answers.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – The irony of it! The shame!

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS (*United Kingdom*). – But, Minister, it is a fact, is it not, that the Serbs started this war? Why should they be allowed to enjoy the fruits of their aggression?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. van MIERLO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Certainly they should not. We do what we can; but if you are trying to describe a certain feeling of impotence about this civil war, which is of a type that we are unaccustomed to, then you are quite right. The Serbs are taking advantage of the situation – that is undeniable – but that was never the purpose of our actions. We are doing everything to try to increase the pressure on the Serbs and to make them get out, stop fighting and accept the plan.

As long as our means are limited, however, there will be an unavoidable feeling of impotence about all this. Perhaps the answer is to be found in making better use of the instruments available to NATO. There is no question of giving the Serbs the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of aggression. That is not our goal: it is just the temporary result of what has happened. We shall do our best to change it, but we have not been very successful thus far. We all feel shame about this, but that does not help those who are suffering. We must try to find other means of ending the conflict, and we must never despair. It is our task to go on even in the current very difficult circumstances. We will do everything possible politically and militarily. We will do what we can.

The PRESIDENT. – The next question comes from Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Chairman-in-Office, I find in your highly interesting comments, for which we thank you, an echo of the Council's recent work in which in-depth thought was given to European security and when consideration was also given to France's proposal of a white paper. All of this is certainly progress in the right direction.

My question is this. The defence budgets in our member countries are melting like snow in the sun. Where are we going to stand, do you think, in 1996 with the good intentions you assure us of but

Mr. Valleix (continued)

when we shall have even less – not to say completely inadequate – resources to meet our obligations? This financial aspect, too, has to be borne in mind. What is your view?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. van MIERLO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I thank Mr. Valleix, who makes a good point. The military budget is shrinking in every country. At the same time, we have to face our own impotence in dealing with problems such as those we face in former Yugoslavia.

But there is a real reason for concern. The changed situation is that we are no longer obliged to take positions in a cold war while facing the threat of a very hot war – the hottest you can think of – and that will give us room in our budgets, of course.

However, at the same time, we must realise that we have to restructure in all our countries because of the different tasks we have and because security will have a different meaning and will demand a different military organisation. For that reason, we need budgetary capacity to reshape our military forces. All WEU countries should be careful about reducing defence budgets too quickly. I therefore share Mr. Valleix's vision, and it is a crucial point in all the nations – certainly in my own.

We discuss this in depth these days, and it is one of the reasons why I have to leave this audience. I am limited by a slot at the airport at 12 o'clock, so I must leave, I am afraid, in forty-five minutes. I ask your permission to do so, while thanking this audience for its attention to my words and for its questions. I wish you a very fruitful meeting.

The PRESIDENT. – We are very sorry, because there are a number of members with pressing questions to ask. Is it possible to get a couple more in if they are short?

Mr. van MIERLO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – If I am not at the airport at 12 o'clock, I would have to stay for hours. Then, of course, I would have plenty of time to answer all the questions. But I have to go.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – What a nerve! I don't believe it.

The PRESIDENT. – We are in your hands, Minister, and we cannot force you to stay; but we are disappointed, because I have a list of at least six other people who wanted to ask material questions. But thank you very much for coming and for addressing us this morning.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order. The date of this meeting was known six months ago. Why did not the Minis-

ter's staff arrange sufficient time for him to make a speech and then do the courteous thing by answering questions from a democratic assembly?

Mr. van MIERLO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I apologise for having to bring this up, but we are having the budget discussions tomorrow in our assembly and that forces me to go back. I informed your organisation beforehand that I could take a few questions, but then I heard this morning that my time is limited by having to be at the airport by 12 o'clock. I am sorry that it is like this, but I am afraid that it is not totally my fault.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I can only support Lord Finsberg's protest. In my view, it is a particularly regrettable lack of consideration. Here is our Assembly meeting at plenary level in the tragic situation we have today and we are told our questions cannot be answered because of a plane leaving at midday. With respect may I tell you, Minister, that in your position you can have an aircraft when you want. If you like, I can telephone Mr. Balladur, the French Prime Minister, and get you a plane at 1 or 2 p.m.

Mr. van MIERLO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Thank you for the offer. I am sorry I cannot take it. If I could have travelled later I would not have needed your Prime Minister's help, I would have done it myself. As a member of parliament I have every respect for your Assembly but there is no way round it, I have to go. I renew my apologies.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard what the Minister has said and what I said just now. There is no way that we can insist that he remains. I must say, in fairness to members, that I feel that we are being treated discourteously by the Council in this respect.

We try to do our best and show that we count for something, and this is the one occasion when we have the Chairman-in-Office here. No one wants to carry these things on too long, but, at a particularly busy time, when many things are happening, there are many questions that people want answering.

I am very sorry about this, and it is a matter that we shall have to take up with the Council.

Thank you, Minister.

6. A European defence policy

(*Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1445 and amendments*)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is perhaps on a less contentious item – the presentation by Mr. Baumel of the report of the Defence

The President (continued)

Committee on a European defence policy, Document 1445, which is being debated jointly with a report on a European security policy, presented yesterday by Mr. Soell.

I call Mr. Baumel to present his report.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you will readily understand that, having to present a report on European defence, I am prompted to say a few additional words about the questions raised a moment ago.

There is a surrealistic touch to today's debate on the defence of Europe in the peaceful atmosphere of this Assembly whereas, only two hours away, events of extreme gravity are taking place with the loss of human lives, the bombing of hospitals and the besieging of a town as you all know. It really touches our hearts to witness these dreadful events and to be able to do no more than propose solutions that cannot work.

It is not just the Bosnian army being defeated at Bihac, once again it is the United Nations, the conscience of international law, being scandalously humiliated and NATO showing how incapable it is of acting as one might have thought it could. How do you think that the representatives present here today of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe with their serious problems of insecurity in the unsafe vacuum in Central Europe – how do you think these representatives here listening to us can still have any faith in the security and defence organisations of Western Europe and the Atlantic world when NATO, the biggest coalition of modern times, designed to halt two hundred Soviet divisions only a few years ago, is incapable of knocking out three tanks near a besieged township because of the fog?

How is it possible that such an organisation could be so paralysed? And how can one imagine that WEU of which we are all members could be satisfied in the present conditions with a few declarations like the statement we have just heard from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands or those issued after meetings of ambassadors or other officials?

But since that is the way things are, let me make a proposal: turn NATO into a Salvation Army brigade, at least it might be more effective.

The indignation we feel should make us do some deep thinking. Let these tragic moments pass, but let us try to see what we have to do now. Today it is very clear that if Europeans do not take their destiny into their own hands and if they fail to shoulder greater responsibilities by setting up a European pole of security they will be placing themselves in an uncertain situation for the future.

True, NATO is still a useful organisation today and true, too, NATO should change and add to what was its agreed mission in the past new responsibilities in the way of maintaining and restoring peace. But who cannot see that NATO, in the most blatant fashion, is wholly in the hands of one of the great powers that are its members? When that great power, for its own reasons which it is not perhaps for us to judge, refuses to allow NATO to act, apart from bowing in defeat and humiliation, it is up to us as Europeans to take on board our own defence problems.

That states WEU's problem. It identifies the difficulty we have in trying to develop its responsibilities so that the house of cards it has been for years past now becomes a polygon of security.

To get to that point there are a number of questions that have to be answered.

Between you and me, are we really sure that all WEU's members want to go in for joint thinking on security problems? Are we really sure that all WEU's members are in favour of the effective and significant strengthening of WEU? Perusal of a number of reports of parliaments, councils and councils of ministers seems to suggest, on the contrary, that some of them would prefer a policy of maximum caution as regards the progress that WEU might make. Are we really agreed that the Secretary-General should be given other duties than just being our organisation's administrator and law clerk?

Might it not be thought that a secretary-general should be a politician endowed with full authority so as to make the voice of WEU heard where it should be heard instead of simply being a participant at a few meetings?

I am taking advantage of the fact that we have had the honour to receive the new WEU Secretary-General today to say this. Very serious responsibilities are about to come your way, Secretary-General. We have confidence in you but you really have to enforce around you, there where you are, the reforms that are so necessary for our organisation.

Are we sure that the Council of Ministers is not a kind of unobtrusive recording studio for government use and that it is really performing what should be its rôle?

Are we sure that this kind of artificial "Canada Dry" headquarters which we call a Planning Cell is playing its real part? It looks like a Planning Cell but I am afraid that really it is just an orderly room for a phantom army. There, too, spectacular and far-reaching changes are needed.

The Planning Cell needs to be given greater authority and more responsibility. It is not right that officers seconded to this Planning Cell should depend on the whim of a secretary-general or this

Mr. Baumel (continued)

or that member to have the right to make plans or draft reports which, in any case, end up in most cases at the bottom of a drawer.

Is it right that WEU should be so weak that it cannot command the three functions essential, as any expert will tell you, for strategic effectiveness, i.e. logistic support, transport and intelligence? We have the European corps. Well done! It, at least, is a relatively effective unit. Unfortunately, even today, it does not – did you know – have any legal status.

Again unfortunately, the European corps has seventeen different models of weapon, just when we need to introduce some measure of harmonisation and make its action effective. The European corps cannot move farther than five hundred kilometres. It has no transport.

We shall say nothing about action at a distance. It has no high speed, large-capacity air transport facilities. Neither does any of our countries themselves incidentally. This is why the European FLA (future large aircraft) project is so essential for the future. Not only does WEU not have logistic support or transport facilities, it has no intelligence capability. When the rather unpleasant American decision was taken to withdraw its ships from the blockade in the Adriatic, which naturally prompted certain actions, do you know that the threat was made to cut off the intelligence channels essential for the operation of our defence institutions in Europe?

Is that something we can accept? Can we go on living alongside those deaf to our needs and dependent entirely on the goodwill of a non-European power? Do you not recognise that Europe has to equip itself with the weapons consistent with its strength as quickly as possible?

There is constant talk of the absence of political will in WEU and other European circles. What is more serious than the lack of political will is not wanting to show our strength. We do not want to use our power. The wild talkers have no idea of the harm they are doing to the cause that we ought to be defending.

This is why we have to propose measures that are beyond mere exhortation and more than the reports that end up, like all those we have been producing for the last ten years, in the bottom of a drawer. Far-reaching reforms are needed and now is the time for them. If WEU fails to seize the historic occasion presented by today's events, we shall be missing one of the great opportunities of history. So it is with the utmost seriousness that I would remind all of you, ladies and gentlemen, representative of the Council of Ministers with us today and our new Secretary-General, that within a very short time not only do we have to agree on

platforms like the Noordwijk or The Hague declarations and the protocols issued after Council of Ministers' meetings but also to embark on a scheme of swift reforms based on simple but vital principles. Complimentary things have just been said about the Torrejón Satellite Centre. I know this goes against the current – I am used to it – but I think this centre is particularly disappointing and holds no promise of a great European space policy. It urgently needs to be given the resources it lacks and to have some of its staff replaced that have too blinkered a view of their jobs. We certainly have to change its status. There will be an opportunity for this in the next few months and we have to take it.

Similarly we must try, as soon as we can, to organise an intervention force for the Mediterranean, Europe's soft flank and underbelly, because, sad to say, as well as the East today there is also the South. I do not think that the Tramontana experiment, that some people are so pleased about, has advanced this problem very far. We urgently need a joint Spanish, Italian and French rapid intervention force including sea, land and air components. It should not of course be limited to these three northern Mediterranean countries. We need, at the same time, to work on a partnership for peace in the south, associating representatives of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritania and even Algeria in this rapid intervention force as soon as possible, failing which, like it or not, it will look like an operation with political connotations which it should not have.

We also urgently need a force for humanitarian intervention in Europe. The Rwanda disaster showed only too clearly that the Planning Cell could not play the part it ought to have done. We mounted this operation in the utmost disorder with very poor results. In former Yugoslavia we are still reeling from the destructive bombardment of Bihac but we should not forget the 500 000 victims of events in Rwanda – 500 000 deaths because of the helplessness of the international community and the impossibility of getting the OAU and the United Nations to agree. In spite of the involvement of some, but not many, WEU member countries in this operation we were not really able to bring this carnage, this shame on mankind, to a halt. So let us not just make speeches and approve recommendations like this one that we are proposing if it is going to end in inaction with no practical result. The problem is not at the level of this parliamentary Assembly. I am one of its oldest members and I follow its activities assiduously so I can say that it has had the courage and the merit to take a stand at all the important stages in WEU's life. It made the preparations for the summit meetings in Rome and elsewhere. It has advised the Council of Ministers and the Secretary-General. But what has become of it all? Too little, unfortunately. This is why an intense and urgent effort is required.

Mr. Baumel (continued)

Let me take the example of the European Armaments Agency. How can one envisage European defence unaccompanied by harmonised programmes which, incidentally, mean better use of the budgetary resources that have now been so radically reduced? How can European defence be imagined without a European defence industry, currently facing the powerful competition of the giant American groups? How can there be a real common will to advance in European security if there is not, first of all, an intergovernmental agreement on this point? Pardon my frankness, but progress under this heading is so minimal that two of the dynamic members of our alliance – France and Germany – felt reduced to setting up their own Franco-German agency. Other countries, Great Britain included, will no doubt join. This is an unwanted development. It would have been better if all the member countries of WEU had, at one and the same time, accepted to lay the foundations of the real agency we need.

There are plenty of other proposals I could make. For one thing an important need is for a European white paper, as the French Prime Minister proposed, based on joint thinking on defence and security problems with the participation of our associate partners of East Europe whom we should increasingly involve in our work. There is a French white paper, a German white paper and a British white paper, but thirty years have gone by and there is still no European defence white paper. It should be prepared not for this or that organisation or a Council of Ministers with whose extraordinary efficiency and speed of execution we are so familiar, but for a summit meeting of heads of state or governments. There was such a meeting for the Council of Europe and there will be another in Budapest on the CSCE in a few days' time, and there has also been for other institutions. Why should we not have a summit meeting of heads of state of the European nations on the future and security of our continent? This seems to be all the more important in that unfortunately our hopes of a peace dividend are slowly fading like this autumn's leaves.

It is on this basis that the report presented by the Defence Committee should be approved. Above all it is the basis of what should be our careful and responsible thinking about everything that is in store and everything that needs to be done to safeguard peace and stability in Europe, as proposed by the French Government's plan for stability and security in Europe. Through co-ordinated, firm and resolute action by all concerned we will thus be able to overcome the countless obstacles along the way and leave behind us the tragedies and butchery of Bihac.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel, for that typically spirited contribution.

7. A European security policy

A European defence policy

(Joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee, Docs. 1439 and amendments and 1445 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now start the joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee, Documents 1439 and amendments and 1445 and amendments.

I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – When I put down my name to speak yesterday it was because I was anxious to take the opportunity of congratulating our colleague Mr. Soell on his latest report, which is excellent, and also because I wished to record my agreement with the proposals he has made. However, having heard Mr. Baumel's report, I must add that I also agree with the proposals made by him in his speech today. I would just like to add three general comments to clarify our view of the debate at the present time.

My first comment is to reiterate the need to include matters concerning European security and defence in a global policy for the construction of Europe, because this is something which I believe is forgotten at times. This is a project whose purpose is European unity; clearly it is a project which is linked to the European Union, but it is not linked exclusively to the European Union, nor is it limited to the European Union. It goes far beyond the territory of even an enlarged Union. It is a project which involves different institutions, and all of these, including WEU, must be involved in it together, in a co-ordinated manner. It is a project which hinges on solidarity, which has solidarity as its cornerstone as regards both its internal operation and the way it projects itself to the rest of the world.

My second comment is that the security and defence aspect is a fundamental element of this project of continental unification. I mean that without the security and defence dimension the project is neither viable nor credible. After what we have heard this morning, and in accordance with what Mr. Baumel said, I believe that we are losing credibility quite dramatically in the situation in which we find ourselves; we lose credibility when the President of the Council of Ministers tells us that the Council, faced with the events taking place in Bihac, has neither discussed them nor taken any decision, believing that this was not the appropriate forum, and that the appropriate forum was the NATO meeting which is to be held in a few days' time, when there may be nothing left of Bihac. How can we not lose credibility, when a few days ago NATO was bombing the airfield from which aircraft loaded with napalm were

Mr. Martinez (continued)

taking off and yet great care was being taken not to touch those planes! Bomb the runways, yes, but for heaven's sake don't anyone touch the planes! How can we possibly have any credibility in such a situation! What is more, it is my view that this aspect, the security aspect, the security volet, as the French would say, of the construction of Europe, is probably the area where solidarity plays the most important rôle; solidarity in order to feel secure, and solidarity in order to live in safety. So I think that the countries and people of Eastern and Central Europe, who are recovering their voice and their freedom, and drawing closer to Europe – and closer to the plan for the construction of Europe – are making their association a priority precisely in this dimension of security, and again Mr. Baumel's report is decisive on that matter.

In my view these Central and Eastern European countries are embracing the sentiments of Willy Brandt, who said "security is not everything, but without security nothing is possible". Security is a prior condition, a condition without which we cannot even begin to think of the rest of our project.

My third comment is that every country on the map has its place in the project for Europe. This must be so. They are all entitled to participate, but when they do so, when they exercise that right, let there be no doubt that they must participate fully. As I see it, there can be no à la carte participation which excludes joint responsibility for security and defence.

Before I conclude I would like to touch upon a matter with which I am sure both Mr. Soell and Mr. Baumel will agree. The consolidation of the project for Europe and the consolidation of WEU are not incompatible with the enlargement of either the project or WEU. It is a mistake to say that we must first consolidate and then enlarge, just as it would be a mistake to say that we must first enlarge and then consolidate. The link between enlargement and consolidation of WEU or the whole of the project for Europe must be a rational link between the two concepts; each one can progress while being supported by the other. So let us not consider it to be reasonable, coherent or possible to isolate or marginalise any country, particularly one such as Slovenia, which is leading the reforms and is an exemplary member both of the Council of Europe and NATO'S partnership for peace. It is on this basis that we are presenting the amendment which we hope will be approved in the plenary session today, as it was approved in the committee yesterday, so that the President of the Assembly can set in motion the necessary procedures to assure Slovenia's association with WEU as soon as possible.

I would like to conclude by thanking both Mr. Soell and Mr. Baumel; and Mr. Soell in particular for so many things, because he is leaving us; there is no doubt that he has been a great thinker, a great president, a great parliamentarian, a great European, a great friend and, for those of us who have had the privilege of working in the same political group, a great companion. I hope that, having taken leave of us, he will continue to view matters in the same way as he has throughout the years during which he has been with us in this Assembly and in that of the Council of Europe.

(Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Buteiko from Ukraine.

Mr. BUTEIKO (*Observer from Ukraine*). – I should like to take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. President, for inviting our country to participate in this meeting. I should also like to join those who have expressed their congratulations to the newly elected Secretary-General Mr. Cutileiro. We hope that during his term of office our country will become an associate member. I should also like to thank Mr. Soell and Mr. Baumel, the Rapporteurs, for submitting their reports.

My delegation would like to stress that we are in favour of constructing an all-European security system and establishing an architecture that will not revitalise a new two-block structure. If such a structure were re-established Western European countries would be forced to use resources, both human and financial by far exceeding those required for building one effective all-European security system. It would be better to support an all-European security system in which WEU and NATO played an important rôle.

We are also against the creation of a new system dividing the spheres of influence. Certainly that new system should be built without discrimination. We should like to stress that no nation has the right to deprive any other nation of active participation in an effective new security system.

We carefully examined both these reports. Among the challenges that the European continent faces are not just nationalism – that in itself is a sound feeling that can enable a nation to develop its own possibilities in an independent state – but the wish for domination that is at work in certain political forces. It is to be found in southern Europe, in Bosnia, in Nagorno-Karabakh and in other regions. Another feature undermining our security system is the interest that certain groups have in exporting weapons. When watching television reports I always ask myself what those people are fighting with. Who supplied the weaponry to Bosnia, Nagorno-Karabakh and other regions? Nagorno-Karabakh has been at war for many years, and one would like to know who sup-

Mr. Buteiko (continued)

plied parties to the conflict. It seems to me that if the suppliers stopped providing weapons there would be no more destruction.

We believe that WEU should adopt a more active approach to other European states, including Ukraine, when it comes to building a new security system. We would not like to have the front line of the new European security system stopped at the western border of Ukraine. We want to be a part of such a new system. The fact that Ukraine has given up its nuclear potential should be properly evaluated, and we should be rendered every assistance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Linden.

Mr. van der LINDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this week we are discussing two important reports. First, my special compliments to both my colleagues, Mr. Soell and Mr. Baumel, on the content of their reports. These reports are major contributions to today's debate here, but also to the preparations for the 1996 intergovernmental conference. Like Mr. Baumel, I have a strong feeling that we are discussing a European defence policy at a time when the balloon is being further deflated day by day in former Yugoslavia. The member states are unable to fulfil their obligations. Even in the national parliaments we are not doing our utmost to force our governments to take common action in former Yugoslavia or in other places where we assume common obligations. Some member states are not yet in a position to play their part in the common actions. That seriously damages the credibility of the European Union and Western European Union, and indeed of Western Europe as a whole. I would ask you to look at this report in the framework of the discussions on the 1996 intergovernmental conference, so that the third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty can become a major component of the European process of integration. It cannot be given substance on a purely uncommitted basis.

I am extremely impressed by the contributions made by Mr. Schäuble and Mr. Lamers in their report on this point. It is an outstanding report in terms of its analysis and also of the conclusions it draws. I would like the two reports on the agenda to be looked at against the background of the content of the report by Mr. Schäuble and Mr. Lamers.

Mr. President, let me conclude with a remark on European defence policy as a whole. Some people look at it in relation to the Atlantic. We in our country have also seen two trends. One trend sees any development in Europe as a threat to Atlantic co-operation. The other trend, mainly

apparent in France, sees any Atlantic co-operation as an actual obstacle to European integration. We must see the two trends in conjunction with one another. One thing is becoming clearer by the day: Europe must assume its own responsibility for security in this continent. That this must take place in an Atlantic framework is clear to everyone. We must assume our own responsibilities. I want to endorse what Mr. Baumel said in his introductory words. If we are not capable of this, we will make a shameful impression on our citizens at every turn. Then we should not adopt any more declarations either, for that merely makes the behaviour of our member states and ourselves look ridiculous.

(*Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT. – The joint debate is adjourned.

8. Address by Mr. Kucan, President of Slovenia

The PRESIDENT. – I have the great pleasure to welcome the President of Slovenia, Mr. Milan Kucan.

You, sir, are the first president of a country not officially linked with WEU to do us the honour of coming to Paris to address us. But you are not the first Slovene, because we have regularly invited parliamentarians of your country to attend our plenary sessions, and they have participated to the full.

I submit that, in the furore that is going on in former Yugoslavia and amid the tragedies that have emerged there, there is one major success story – one glimmer of hope. It is, of course, Slovenia. I am sure that my sentiments are echoed by colleagues in the Assembly and by all who have been to your country.

Slovenia fully satisfies the criteria, as a stable democracy, and it is active as a thriving member of the Council of Europe. Moreover, the Slovene economy is flourishing and there is probably no valid economic reason why it should not be accepted for association with the European Union as soon as possible.

In military terms, the Slovene forces, as I saw on an interesting visit to the country a few months ago, are highly competent, and Slovenia has already signed up for NATO's partnership for peace.

All this is largely the result of Mr. Kucan's efforts. He has sought the highest possible degree of consensus between all the political parties in his country and among his fellow citizens. His experience as a constitutional lawyer has been used to particular effect since he entered politics thirty years ago.

The President (continued)

Mr. President, many of us in this hemicycle have a great admiration for what you and your fellow countrymen have achieved in a very short time. As I said, when I visited your country some time ago I was able to see these things for myself. Other agencies have seen this too, during visits to Slovenia.

Without further ado, I will ask you, Mr. President, to address us. The President has kindly said that he will answer questions after his address.

Mr. KUCAN (*President of Slovenia*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for this opportunity to give you my views on security in Europe and on the future of WEU.

I am sure you will understand my using this occasion to base these views on my country's thoughts about the issues of European integration and co-operation between European Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. I have already had one opportunity to speak on this subject in June this year – and I am delighted to see so many familiar faces amongst you today – before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. I will therefore confine myself to certain key points in the problems of European security which it is my firm conviction are basically problems of European co-operation. Without successful co-operation and integration there can be no European security – only security and defence of individual parts of Europe which may come to an understanding or may not.

Life in Europe of today comprises new realities and new relationships. The Europe divided into a political East and West with life governed by the logic of the blocs and the balance of arms and fear is no more. There remains however the economic division between developed West and underdeveloped East. Disparities in economic and technological development, ecological awareness and protection of human rights, not to forget the particularly intense social tensions in Eastern Europe suggest that it is in the East that Europe's fate will be decided.

The great hope of seeing a new world of co-operation with an end to all ideological contradictions has come up against reality. The fall of the Berlin wall failed to bring an answer to all of Europe's problems. In many places, dreams were replaced by frustration and fundamentalism, as a kind of protest against poverty and unemployment and a reaction to moral decay, anxiety and impotence, and social and civil insecurity but also as the consequence of populist political theory which leads to violence, intolerance, anarchy, xenophobia and chaos. So we are faced with a whole set of new questions.

One of these is, precisely, the question of what kind of Europe we want. Proof that this question

has no answer as yet is clear: from the questions that the European Union itself is asking about its own future. Must it necessarily expand and if so how far? Should it be as big as Europe? Can it in any way be smaller than Europe? And what is Europe today, where are its borders? At the Union's present borders or at the frontier between the former political East and West of Europe, between the former political and military blocs or at the border with Russia?

It is easier to say what the European Union does not want to be. It does not want to be simply a European common market or a free trade area. It wants much deeper relations – in the economic, monetary, foreign policy, defence and security fields – as was the clear and unequivocal message from Maastricht. It also wants these relations to go deeper so that it can expand as well. This is a process requiring greater internal flexibility and greater flexibility towards the countries outside the Union. It requires subsidiary, decision-making solidarity and responsibility. There is no danger that the Union will break up by enlarging because enlargement is in its interest and an objective necessity. It will not fall to a lower degree of integration than that already achieved nor will it refuse to become a political union, a confederation of states, a federal state or a common European home. For the substance is more important than the form.

Currently the conditions for joining the European Union are far stricter because the level of integration in the Union rises. They require that member states voluntarily relinquish some of their sovereignty. This is the price that has to be paid for membership. But it is less than the price the countries waiting for acceptance would have to pay if they remained isolated and if the Union adopted a separatist approach to them. It is no longer a question of whether Europe will integrate, but how. Will the principle be equality among the states that join, albeit each in its own way, according to its own circumstances and following its own timetable but with the guarantee that they will all become full and equal members of full European integration? Or will the principle be that of some states being more equal than others? This would mean recognising the existence of one, two or even three Europes, with one level of quality represented by the members of the European Union, a second level being a kind of buffer zone or reserve, a not-quite Europe represented by the countries of the former political East of Europe, and lastly a third European level, i.e. Russia as a kind of para-Europe. Clearly, relations between Europe and Russia are likely to be critically important though at the moment there is no answer to the question of just how critical these relations will be.

In spite of its internal differences the European continent has for centuries been one single,

Mr. Kucan (continued)

though complex, interdependent economic, political, spiritual and cultural entity. Any essentially important event in one part of Europe had decisive consequences for the rest of the continent. Whenever equilibrium was lost Europe always found a new balance – generally the balance of power, with the victor generally dictating to the vanquished. The centuries of war in Europe are in fact processes whereby an equilibrium was established which held until the historical circumstances of the time changed and until peace and the existence of one and all were again at threat. The history of Europe and its wars is in fact the history of its tragic attempts to integrate.

Once again, Europe now faces two alternatives. One is to establish equilibrium by the logic of strength and the other is to reach an understanding for the sake of our shared life in this area that has been allotted to us and to find a kind of equilibrium that will give us the assurance of peace, tolerance, development and co-operation based on equality and equivalence, while we draw closer together at the bidding of our own free will.

The keystone of the Balkan crisis is a national issue and mainly Serb. It is legitimate. But even then its solution confers no right that legitimate answers to complex national questions should be sought by other than legitimate means, like those defined in the Helsinki Final Act. Solutions imposed by force can be neither legitimate nor acceptable and a policy which foresees the end of a war on the assumption that all those involved must at some time become exhausted and drained cannot bring proper results either. Among possible solutions we might be advised to consider the direct opening up of the prospect of Europeanising all the countries that exist or come into being in the Balkans under specific and universally binding general conditions following a specific timetable. Their isolation and the feeling that the path to Europe is closed to them will only push them further away from Europe and jeopardise not only the search for peace but, more particularly, the long-term stability of the Balkans.

The military atrocities in Bosnia justify the concern about the situation as regards European security. Although a little time may still be left to us to create a common European home and to consider how the EU should expand and how we should build a united Europe or even united states of Europe we are already running out of time for the creation of a European security and defence system which, basically, derives from the idea of European integration. In spite of the efforts of the European community within the concept of collective security in the United Nations those of the countries of the northern hemisphere within the framework of the Conference on Security and

Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), those of the NATO pact and those of the European Union to have a common defence policy through Western European Union we are faced with certain relentless facts that show the inadequacy of all these structures, the reasons being conflicts of interest, contradictory defence policies and incomplete and ill-designed defence and security doctrine. Up to now none of these mechanisms or resolutions has succeeded in bringing to an end the armed conflict in Bosnia or even in that part of south-east Europe that used to be part of the Soviet Union. Tolerating the violence of Serb policy and permitting the use of every possible means to absorb putative Serbian territory in other countries could tempt others to do the same.

There are, however, possibilities for new, sound and more lasting foundations for European security. For this, however, Europe requires a clear security strategy and greater effectiveness in its security mechanisms, at least in preventing armed conflict for the real guarantee of peace and security is economic and social development, democracy, protection of human rights, an efficient economy and social security. Preventive diplomacy remains for the moment more or less just an idea – and the partnership for peace offered to Eastern and Central European states cannot of itself be a solution which would eliminate the feeling of threat.

It is this feeling of threat that is felt by the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and those emerging in the area of former Yugoslavia as a result of the unstable conditions in the former Soviet Union and the war in the Balkans. This feeling underscores the importance of the military defence complex. At the same time, these countries are young democracies that have not yet managed to set machinery for controlling this complex in place. It is precisely because of the aspect of the development of democracy that co-operation in the partnership for peace with its emphasis on the principles of transparency of defence budgets, the non-political nature of the army and parliamentary control over the military has such vital importance.

On the basis of these few considerations on the security situation in Europe we can draw at least the following conclusions.

First, the end of the cold war and the collapse of the communist régimes, in spite of the obvious possibility of a different kind of life, has thrown up new causes of instability, tension and conflict, confirming the suspicion that the key international institutions and mechanisms formed during the period of bloc polarisation were insufficiently prepared to deal successfully with the challenges and sources of threat to peace and security in Europe which appeared after the changes and when Europe began to live by a new logic, i.e. that of co-operation instead of confrontation.

Mr. Kucan (continued)

Second, in the new order prevailing in Europe after the cold war a global conception of modern security began to take root in most European countries, bringing together economic, social, political, ecological, spiritual and military dimensions. Modern security is internationalised and has to allow for the interdependence of all parts of the world and all sectors of global society. Alongside the development of individualisation as one of the world's social processes globalisation advances inexorably as another in the field of security.

Third, the danger of the outbreak of war between East and West has more or less vanished. Instead we are faced with ethnic conflicts, local and civil war, dangerous mass migration, ecological disasters, international organised crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. To this list we now have to add organised international smuggling of radioactive substances and nuclear raw materials.

Fourth, the new security conditions in Europe present international security institutions with new challenges. These bodies too – I have in mind primarily NATO, WEU, and CSCE – have to alter the perceptions justifying their rôle during the bipolar period of the cold war and redefine their platforms as part of the strategy of European unification in which their task is the security of Europe as a whole – West, East, North and South – not just that of a select group of countries, with a clear guarantee to all that, in this defence and security strategy, they will not be forgotten.

For the reasons I have just given, the Republic of Slovenia follows the activities of WEU and its bodies including its Assembly with great attention. The strengthening of links between the Republic of Slovenia and WEU is based on firm foundations and on the general agreement between WEU's objectives and the international and domestic policies of the Republic of Slovenia. Slovenia's official representatives have expressed their country's desire to develop these relations on several occasions and raise them to a higher institutional level.

This would be in keeping with WEU's mission in the development of relations between Western European integration and the Central European "in transition" countries. Yet the Republic of Slovenia has been consistently excluded from all these important developments since October 1992 when the WEU Forum of Consultation was set up and co-operation strengthened between groups of parliamentarians from certain Central European countries in the WEU Assembly right up until this year's agreement in the WEU Council of Ministers granting the status of WEU associate partner to nine Central and Eastern European countries. Slovenia is a full and firm member of the Council

of Europe and NATO'S partnership for peace. So it is all the more extraordinary and contradictory for Slovenia not to have been included in the mechanisms set up expressly to determine a common European security and defence policy. It is therefore with great pleasure and gratitude, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, that I hear that your Assembly is recommending the WEU Council of Ministers to take the necessary measures to grant my country associate partner status. I hope the Council will take a favourable decision.

I will be quite frank. The Republic of Slovenia has already encountered such treatment several times. Given the results achieved by Slovenia in its difficult phase of political and economic transition and the way it has asserted its right to self-determination, not encroaching on any other nation's equal rights and given that Slovenia is already a respected member of the United Nations, the CSCE and the Council of Europe and an associate member of the North Atlantic Assembly, this treatment is not justified. Surely it is an example of the application of double standards which runs counter to the declared principles and views of WEU, the long-term interests of European security and the interests of the WEU members themselves? I am also thinking of the long-term interests of that member of WEU which is preventing – I imagine in your organisation too – the extension and intensification of relations between the countries of Western Europe and Slovenia.

A month ago we met with this policy of obstruction at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Union. Unfortunately, the pursuit of this policy is also preventing our coming closer to WEU. As you know, a decision on the part of the European Union to accord Slovenia associate member status has not yet been taken.

Even more important than our larger neighbour Italy's adoption of this position and more important than its being tolerated in the Western European integration process is the fact that it challenges the principles declared on the signing of the Brussels and Paris agreements and confirmed in numerous declarations and other WEU and EU documents. All this throws doubt on the proclaimed image of Europe which should be founded on the principles of equality, equivalence, fellowship and justice.

Slovenia cannot accept a policy which forces unilateral priorities on others and resurrects the spirit of revanchism and discrimination – and not simply for Slovenia's own sake but also for the very future of our common European home. I am convinced – this after all was our experience with former Yugoslavia – that the common future of Europe cannot be built on such principles or practices.

Mr. Kucan (continued)

It is not true to suggest that Slovenia's difficulties with its neighbour, a WEU member state, are simply a minor bilateral problem or a lack of goodwill on Slovenia's part and a matter of a few hundred properties once owned by Italian citizens who opted to live in Italy under the London memorandum of 1954. Declarations from influential people, and a series of official petitions and actions on the part of our neighbour show this to be an attempt to revise the outcome of the second world war and the anti-fascist struggle by our own and many other European nations at the expense of a member of the former anti-fascist coalition. What other explanation is there for the denial of the validity of the Ossimo agreements, which define and regulate all border property and other issues between Slovenia and Italy on the pretext that they were signed in 1975 with a totalitarian state? Does this mean, then, that the similar agreements with the former Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc. are no longer legally valid? Denying the general validity of the Ossimo agreements, reopening the question of the maritime border between Slovenia and Italy, Italy's readiness to make a mass handout of Italian citizenship to the inhabitants of parts of Slovenian ethnic territory falling to Slovenia and Yugoslavia under the Paris peace treaty and the unwillingness to provide fair protection and equality for the Slovenian minority in Italy – all these factors lead to such a conclusion.

Slovenia would regard it as a historic injustice and unwarranted discrimination if the doors of WEU remained closed to it. We also regard as an injustice Italy's persistent blocking of negotiations on associate membership between Slovenia and the European Union. Italy is making these multilateral negotiations conditional on the resolution of certain bilateral issues. The question is, does it really serve the interests of the European Union that one of its countries should show its strength and influence by preventing Slovenia or any other country from joining and setting, as an indispensable condition, the prior resolution of what in its view is a disputed question in bilateral relations. It would mean that the European Union accepts the legitimacy of forcing unilateral priorities on others and that solidarity within the EU is built on this foundation. It could also mean an early end to any thinking about expanding the EU. Bilateral relations should never constitute grounds for imposing conditions and so far they have not been so used for anyone.

Slovenia draws a distinction between negotiations on the fulfilment of conditions for co-operation with and membership of the EU, which are the same for all, and the resolving of bilateral issues. Such issues, in the case of our relations with Italy, are resolved by the bilateral agree-

ments in force and these agreements are the legal basis for dealing with any questions that may arise – but in a dialogue founded on principles of equality, mutual respect, justice, good faith and reciprocal benefit. This applies to all treaties. Their validity is a necessary prerequisite for stability in Europe. Should a country believe that it is more powerful in the new historical circumstances and that, for this reason, it can coerce others into new agreements bringing it greater benefit than earlier agreements, then this is the beginning of the destabilisation of Europe. It would mean that all who feel hard done by or insufficiently compensated in the agreements after the second world war could demand a revision, as if the war had not ended.

Life in the European Union is that of countries which have voluntarily placed themselves under the same principles, the same standards of legal protection and the same rules of behaviour. It makes it possible to solve mutual problems. Slovenia wishes to bring its own legislation into line with that of the European Union. It has said so. This is why it proposes the application of these principles and procedures in a patient dialogue and in the search for solutions to those problems deemed by agreement as being unresolved or for which existing solutions have become untenable. In the negotiations to which Slovenia submitted, even before being able to apply these principles, procedures and mechanisms, it is possible to detect certain tendencies towards different relations and towards the imposition of solutions by a large nation and unilateral priorities authorised by that country's position. Here it is not even clear who in fact is being coerced.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am firmly convinced that stronger, unimpeded co-operation between Slovenia and the European bodies would not only be in the interests of Italy and its economy and citizens, but would also accelerate the process of bridging the gap between the western and eastern halves of Europe and help to broaden European awareness.

We cannot ignore the fact that in development and achievements, Slovenia has shown that it meets the conditions for closer integration with European Union. Nor can Slovenia's progress in political and economic change be denied. We are about to finalise a project for the complete institutional adjustment of our political system to European standards of multi-party parliamentary democracy, protection of human rights and more particularly a high level of protection for the rights of ethnic minorities. The first stage in the process of ownership reform is coming to an end. Economic indicators are good. After several years of stagnation we have surpassed the pre-1991 level of the development cycle. This year growth in industry shows positive shifts. International

Mr. Kucan (continued)

financial institutions accept the tolar for external convertibility because of our \$US 2.6 billion in foreign exchange reserves, enough for four months of imports. This year's growth in GDP is forecast at 4% and 1995's is put at 4.5% based on data on exports and investments. Total public debt is 30% while the public sector deficit stands at 0.9%. Inflation in 1995 is expected to be 15% while this year it should be 17%. Slovenia generates \$US 6 200 of GDP per capita and \$US 3 350 per capita in exports. It exports almost 60% of its GDP. Total Slovenian exports of goods grew in the first nine months of this year by 8.1% compared with the same period last year and imports also rose by 8.1%, exports to the advanced countries climbing by 11.8% and imports from those countries by 15.4%. The European Union's share of Slovenian exports is 59.5% or, if Austria is included, over two-thirds. EFTA countries account for 7.4% of Slovenian exports. Compared with the same period last year our goods exports to most of our more important trading partners among the advanced countries (Germany, Italy, France and Austria) went up by over 10%.

With its experience and knowledge Slovenia wishes to contribute to the more effective operation of those organisations to which it belongs, i.e. the United Nations, CSCE, the Council of Europe and the partnership for peace – and, one day too, those with which it does not yet enjoy institutional ties. That includes WEU. We do not view the EU or WEU from a static or passive position. We are following their necessary developments very closely and the development of NATO in the new geopolitical landscape following the end of the cold war. With all our strength we shall strive to make a creative contribution to the vitality of the European institutions and the development of their democratic content. As both a central European and a Mediterranean country the Republic of Slovenia desires that international security and security be guaranteed in these areas and that Slovenia no longer be associated with the Balkan powder keg.

For this reason too we oppose the injustice of the arms embargo which is still applied to Slovenia as one of the measures taken against former Yugoslavia. It runs counter to the principle of the equality of United Nations member states and to the right of United Nations members to individual and collective self-defence and does not accord with the Republic of Slovenia's membership of the partnership for peace. The continuation of the embargo is causing us economic harm and prevents us from organising our defence. We are surprised at the imposition of models to resolve the Balkan crisis that involve proposals to restore or maintain Yugoslavia. This shows no more than a lack of ideas and ignorance of the laws of history.

The Republic of Slovenia's wish for close co-operation with the EU and WEU is based on our close mutual economic, technological and cultural ties. It does not stem from a sense of military threat, internal instability or fear of the restoration of the former division of Europe. We understand very well that WEU is not a charity organisation. The maturing of our co-operation with EU and WEU and its elevation to a higher level of quality requires time and an awareness on both sides of mutual interests and benefits. We do not see these relations as a one-sided benefit. The satisfaction of common interests implies considerable obligations which we are prepared to accept and fulfil. The Republic of Slovenia is a successful country in transition with no major internal or external problems. We see no one as our enemy and we desire co-operation with all peace-loving states. We are a small country but I believe that through our example we can make a real contribution to the expansion of the area of stability and security in Europe. We were never part of the Warsaw Pact, indeed our previous experience with non-alignment ruled it out. Thus there is no obstacle in international or constitutional law, no barrier in traditional policy to our closer co-operation with WEU. It is our belief that this future co-operation will contribute substantially to the new political and security order as we enter the third millennium.

Thank you, Mr. President and ladies and gentlemen, for making it possible for me to address you.

THE PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. President, for being so frank and for presenting such a convincing case on behalf of your country – something that every president should do. If they did it as well as you, there would not be too much room for dissension.

Without seeking to go into too much detail, may I say that I thoroughly support – as I am sure does the Assembly – your concept that Europe should be based on a common heritage. We do not want various divisions like football leagues, with the premier league and the first and second divisions. Despite the differences between our countries, we have a common heritage and we need to build on it. I am sure that we can do so, particularly with organisations such as WEU. I was impressed with one of your phrases, "Solutions forced through war cannot be legitimate". If only more politicians and statesmen realised that, the world would be a happier and saner place.

There are a number of questioners and, in the interests of brevity and fairness, I would ask them to be fairly brief.

I call Mr. Magginas of Greece.

MR. MAGGINAS (Observer from Greece). – President Kucan, I listened to your speech with great attention. We Greeks appreciate your great

Mr. Magginas (continued)

efforts, which resulted in you keeping your country of Slovenia away from the Yugoslav crisis. Could you give your opinion on the future of relations between Serbs, Muslims and Croats? I should specifically like to hear your view on the acceptance of the French plan recognising equal rights for the Bosnian Serbs and the tripartite conference uniting Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milosevic under the condition of mutual recognition.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Kucan.

Mr. KUCAN (*President of Slovenia*) (Translation). – May I begin by thanking you, Mr. Magginas, for your kind appreciation of the efforts made by my country, Slovenia. As regards the future of relations between Serbs, Croats and Muslims, it is my view that these peoples have no alternative but to live together on the territory of Slovenia, as they have no way of leaving it. The question is whether they will succeed in organising life in common and governing their relations with each other in accordance with the principles of co-operation in Europe as spelled out in the Helsinki Final Act. In this respect, I am firmly convinced that Lord Carrington's general plan, proposed at the time of the European conference on Yugoslavia, was the one best calculated to provide a territorial solution for former Yugoslavia. It was based on the findings of the arbitration committee headed by Mr. Badinter, and recommended the recognition of internal frontiers, human rights and the rights of minorities, and co-operation among all the states involved in accordance with European rules.

The French plan was to a certain extent based on the same principle, and also recommended mutual recognition. Recognition obviously first requires recognition of minorities, and secondly full promotion of their rights and specific protection. Recognition also presupposes the maintenance of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state within its existing frontiers and consisting of three equal population components: the Serbs of Bosnia, the Croats of Bosnia and the Muslims of Bosnia. Without safeguards for the state of Bosnia, I do not think either plan will achieve the desired result.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. The next question is from Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, many of us are observing the tensions between your country and your neighbour Italy with a certain anxiety. We believe it is of the utmost importance to stability in the region for a compromise satisfactory to both sides, which will ease Slovenia's entry into the European Union, to be found on all questions under dispute. Many

people found it encouraging that the Aquileia agreement came into being with the active participation of the European Commission. In view of the deadlock, how do you, Mr. President, envisage renewed participation by the European Union or other organisations in the attempt to resolve the questions still at issue?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Kucan.

Mr. KUCAN (*President of Slovenia*) (Translation). – On this question, I can obviously give no other reply than to say that there is no doubt whatsoever of my country's interest in joining the European Union, it is vital for us. Slovenia wants to adapt its legislation to the legal situation in force in the Union and will do so knowing this to be a prerequisite for its accession to the Union. It intends to resolve disputes – should Slovenia and Italy agree jointly that disputes exist – on the basis of European legislation and in the institutional framework of the European Union. Slovenia therefore considers that the question of its accession, and the mandate for the opening of negotiations on a treaty of association, should depend, as for all other countries, solely on whether Slovenia complies with the criteria for negotiations to begin. I am firmly convinced that this is the case, and I think that this question should be treated separately from that of bilateral relations between Slovenia and Italy. I hope that the European Union will share this point of view, in which case fresh initiatives should be taken.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. The next question comes from Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (*United Kingdom*). – The problem that most of us have in our minds is Bihac. Your country is on the border, Mr. President, and you have great experience of the area. What do you think NATO, WEU and the United Nations should do? What arguments would stop the slaughter and bring the Serbs to the negotiating table? Should NATO use air-power?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Kucan.

Mr. KUCAN (*President of Slovenia*) (Translation). – On this subject, it is my view that a great number of opportunities have been missed, for a number of reasons on which I shall not dwell here. However, at the present time we need to adopt a firm position which holds that violence, war, military force and atrocities of any kind are not legitimate ways of satisfying national interests in this area; also that the results obtained by military action and violence will not be recognised. Adopting such a position would, in my view, be far more effective than NATO military action, though I do not rule it out altogether. Here the question clearly is: who should the message be addressed to? In my view, the keys to the problem are not to be found in Bosnia-Herzegovina; neither the

Mr. Kucan (continued)

Serbs, nor the Croats, nor the Muslims of Bosnia hold them. On the other hand, the message should be directed at Belgrade, Zagreb and the Bosnian Muslims. From this point of view, it seems to me that the French plan could be a step forward in the search for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Fassino.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for your kind consideration and extending greetings to you from that part of Italy which I believe to represent a majority and which looks at Slovenia with very great sympathy. I share your approach to the problem of security and stability in Europe and particularly as regards the idea that integration and interdependence are the key to lasting stability. For that reason, I agree with you that the integration of the Central European countries into the European institutions is in the interests not only of the countries concerned but also of the countries of Western Europe. I am therefore convinced that Slovenia should join the European institutions and that any postponement would be a mistake. This being so, I and a number of colleagues have tabled an amendment which I hope the Assembly will adopt seeking to promote the inception of procedures to give Slovenia the status of associate partner in WEU.

In my view no bilateral negotiations – this applies to Italy and Slovenia but would also apply to any other country – can claim to stand in the way of multilateral interests and negotiations. That is why I have tabled my amendment. I favour the integration of Slovenia into the European institutions and I have missed no opportunity of saying so. As you can see, this is a clear position inspired by a sympathetic attitude to Slovenia, with the aim of its becoming a member of our institution as quickly as possible.

Precisely because my position is as I have just outlined – I am a friend of Slovenia and want it to become part of our institutions – I, in that spirit and as an Italian parliamentarian, would like to ask you a question, Mr. President.

The Osimo treaty is unquestionably valid and anyone wanting to question it is wrong, there can be no concessions and no irredentism and here again, we are in agreement: the boundaries set after the second world war are definite, clear and inalterable particularly as the present problem is not one of drawing new boundaries but of making them more open and unnecessary. It is also true that one of the decisive factors for security and stability is a policy of interdependence and integration between neighbouring countries.

In the same spirit of friendship in which I support Slovenia's early access to the European insti-

tutions, I would therefore like to ask you, Mr. President, how your government thinks the present difficulties in the bilateral relationship with Italy can be resolved, not because this should in any way block the multilateral negotiations, as I have already said, but because, in any case, when Slovenia joins WEU the problem of relations with its principal neighbour will still be vital. It would therefore be helpful to know what the intention is in this respect: it would be of interest not only to Italians but also, I believe, to Slovenia and the whole of Europe, which is why everyone concerned should display the greatest willingness to resolve all the difficulties.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Kucan.

Mr. KUCAN (*President of Slovenia*) (Translation). – Mr. Fassino, I have nothing substantive to add to your perception of the situation, which I accept; your question is clear, and I consider that my answer emerges just as clearly from all that I have just said. When Slovenia is a member of the European Union, or even during the process of drawing closer to the European Union, it will seek to settle all the problems of its position and relations with member states in general, and with its neighbours in particular, in the European legal framework, making use of the procedures and institutions set up by the Union, for the specific purpose of resolving such difficulties, ensuring stability and avoiding conflicts in this part of our continent.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. We are running short of time, but I shall try to take two more questions.

I call Mr. Roman.

Mr. ROMAN (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, having learned today that Norway has freely rejected joining the Union, it is gratifying to hear someone speaking in favour of the European Union.

Mr. President, you have expressed a desire for collaboration with the European institutions, but what steps has your country taken to adapt all aspects of its legislation to European legislation?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Kucan.

Mr. KUCAN (*President of Slovenia*) (Translation). – Let me begin by saying that Slovenia is a young country, with a constitution, written only two years ago, which embodies the principles of constitutional law currently applicable in countries where western civilisation is the norm, by which I mean western democracy. When the constitution was adopted, circumstances at that time made it impossible to foresee what would be the fate of Slovenia in relation to the war in the Balkans and also in relation to the process of European integration which is why some of its provisions, and consequently the laws arising out

Mr. Kucan (continued)

of these provisions, are not in accordance with European legislation. I am thinking in particular of the well-known clause under which foreign nationals, i.e. anyone not a citizen of the Republic of Slovenia, may not own property in our country. This has proved to be a considerable obstacle to economic development, because it spoils the attraction for international capital and impedes foreign investment, not to mention other harmful consequences. For these reasons the Slovenian Government decided to issue a special declaration on the subject, which was adopted on 30th September 1994, to the effect that it was submitting a constitutional amendment to parliament on this point, as a result of which a process adapting all Slovenian legislation to conform with the rules in force within the European Union would be set in motion.

The PRESIDENT. – The next questioner is Mr. Jeszenszky, a former Hungarian Foreign Minister, whom we are pleased to have with us.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Observer from Hungary*). – As a representative of Hungary, a neighbouring state, I am happy to see you here, Mr. President. The relations between Slovenia and Hungary are an example of good neighbourly relations. That relationship has been reinforced by a special treaty on the mutual protection of Hungarians in Slovenia and Slovenes in Hungary.

My question is this. I understand that there are plans for a new administrative division of Slovenia. Are you or your government planning to take account of the wishes of the inhabitants, particularly the Hungarians and the Slovenes in that region which connects the two countries – a region where people are very happy to open border crossings which were closed during the communist period?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Kucan.

Mr. KUCAN (*President of Slovenia*) (Translation). – First I must say that the provisions of the constitution and of the law with regard to the protection of minorities – there are two indigenous minorities, Hungarian and Italian, living in Slovenia – are, in my view, exemplary. One of the provisions of our constitution concerning the special protection and rights of minorities gives them double voting rights, that is to say they have a general right to vote, as citizens, in the parliamentary elections and a special right, as members of a minority, permitting them to appoint their own representative, the deputy for the minority, to parliament where two seats are reserved especially for the Italian and Hungarian minorities. The two representatives have a right of veto, guaranteed by the constitution, which can be used to block any parliamentary decision or any law which, in their

view, could prejudice the interests, infringe the constitutional rights or adversely affect the protection of minorities. The provision also applies at local level, in the communes. A reform of local administration is currently under way; this Sunday, municipal elections will be held in accordance with the new law, although it is not yet definitive. The Constitutional Court will, over the next few months, have an opportunity to hear complaints from individuals about the new distribution of communes. At that time, it will also consider the wish of members of the Hungarian community to constitute a separate commune in the territory occupied exclusively by Hungarians. I cannot predict what the court's decision will be, but in my opinion the danger of having such an enclave within what would be its own administrative unit could have unforeseen consequences calling for careful study.

The PRESIDENT. – We have time for only one more question. I ask Mr. Mitolo to be reasonably brief.

Mr. MITOLO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have listened with great interest to the remarks of President Kucan, whom I also had the pleasure of hearing a few months ago in the Strasbourg Assembly. In particular, it seems to me that his attitude on the Italian question has hardened slightly. I have no wish to comment at length on President Kucan's address as did Mr. Fassino, whose views I do not share. I should simply like to mention certain aspects. He said that the problem involves a few hundred houses to be handed back or valued; the figures in our possession, however, show that twenty-one enterprises, 6 855 hectares of farmland, three hundred hectares of building land and 7 172 buildings are involved in the dispute and still at issue.

Not sharing the view that bilateral questions cannot have the effect of blocking claims from one of the disputants, particularly when the intention is to join organisations of which one of the two is an active member, I would like to ask you, President Kucan, whether Slovenia intends to make up its mind to amend its constitution, bringing it into line with European law on respect for private property and acceptance of the basic principle of freedom and non-discrimination as regards both access to the property market and restitution to the rightful owners of what was expropriated from them by the communist régime.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Kucan.

Mr. KUCAN (*President of Slovenia*) (Translation). – I can only repeat that it is in Slovenia's interests to harmonise its internal legal system with the system in the European Union, and to change its constitution; of that there is no doubt. The question is whether or not the alleged diffe-

Mr. Kucan (continued)

rences between Slovenia and Italy ought to be settled once Slovenia has access to European legislation and can have recourse to its institutions and procedures. As regards what Mr. Mitolo calls the dossier concerning property, houses and related matters, I really must stress that this is part of Italian and Slovenian history, which is highly complicated and which goes back beyond 1945 to 1918, and the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Then there were the Rapallo agreements, the rise of Mussolini in Italy, the second world war and the occupation of much of Slovenian territory and then the post-war period. In my view it is impossible to resolve these problems by looking back; if, on the other hand, we have our eyes firmly fixed on a different future for Europe, and for this part of Europe in particular, which is in all our interests, then I believe that we can find a solution even to these problems.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, President Kucan. You will have recognised from the number and variety of questions just how interested the Assembly has been in your visit this morning, and you have not jibbed at answering controversial questions from our Italian colleagues. We are extremely grateful for your kindness in coming here and cementing the already good bond that we have with Slovenia. We look forward to taking it much further in due course. On behalf of the Assembly, I thank you very much indeed.

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes our business for this morning.

I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Iliescu, President of Romania.
2. A European security policy; a European defence policy (Resumed joint debate on the

reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations and the draft order, Documents 1439 and amendments and 1445 and amendments).

3. The future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1437).
4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 1429).
5. Evolution of the Assembly's logistical requirements to take account of enlargement (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1438).
6. Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft supplementary budget, Document 1441).
7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1428 and addendum).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 29th November 1994

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Iliescu, President of Romania.
Replies by Mr. Iliescu to questions put by: Mr. Pavlidis (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Korakas (*Observer from Greece*), Lord Finsberg, Mr. Eorsi (*Observer from Hungary*), Lord Newall, Mr. Mitolo.
from the Czech Republic), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Soell (*Rapporteur of the Political Committee*), Mr. de Puig (*Chairman of the Political Committee*), Mr. Baumel (*Rapporteur of the Defence Committee*), Mr. De Decker, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Pastusiak (*Observer from Poland*), Mr. Soell, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Soell, Mr. Blaauw, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Soell, Mr. Benvenuti, Mr. Mitolo, Mr. Soell, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Hardy, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. de Puig, Lord Finsberg (explanation of vote), Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase, Mr. Baumel, Mr. López Henares, Mr. Baumel.
4. A European security policy; A European defence policy (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations and draft order*, Docs. 1439 and amendments and 1445 and amendments).
Speakers: Mr. Tusek (*Observer from Austria*), Mr. Liapis (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. López Henares, Mr. Cuco, Mr. Brito, Mr. Korakas (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Müller, Mr. Jeszenszky (*Observer from Hungary*), Mr. Godal (*Observer from Norway*), Mr. Prokes (*Observer from Slovakia*), Mr. Parisi, Mr. Borderas, Mr. Necas (*Observer*
5. The future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1437).
Speakers: Mr. López Henares (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Guirado.
6. Change in the orders of the day.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments? ...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Iliescu, President of Romania

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Iliescu, President of Romania.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have much pleasure in welcoming Mr. Iliescu to this Assembly. Romania plays a key rôle in the growing relationship between WEU and the associate partners of Central Europe. Indeed, one of the very first ministers from a Central European country to address the WEU Assembly was, sir, your Foreign Minister, Teodor Melescanu, my old friend, whom I am delighted to see accompanying you today and whom we consistently see around Europe.

The Romanian Parliament has also been particularly active in furthering the relationship and only three weeks ago it hosted an interesting seminar in Bucharest on Central Europe in a European security system. Both the Presidential Committee and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations were present, together with many representatives from our associate partner countries.

The parliamentarians who make up the Romanian Delegation to the Assembly have supported a number of special initiatives where WEU is concerned. In conjunction with the seminar earlier this month, President Iliescu inaugurated an information and documentation centre on WEU in Bucharest. That is a first and an example which could usefully be followed closer to home in many other countries.

1. See page 23.

The President (continued)

Another example is even more striking. Two years ago, it was Romania which, with the full support of this Assembly, first requested help from WEU in applying the United Nations embargo on the Danube. That has been one of the most successful embargo operations of recent times and it has been carried out in spite of considerable financial sacrifice by the countries concerned, Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as Romania. That matter has not gone unrecognised by politicians who travel around Europe taking cognisance of such issues.

All this demonstrates Romania's wish to be to the fore in terms of European security – to demonstrate a willingness to accept international responsibility and respond to the various challenges that face us, about which we have already heard today and, I believe, yesterday.

We are looking forward to hearing you, Mr. President, and I understand that you will be happy to answer questions. Your own rôle in the process has been essential and it is a great honour that you should come and address our Assembly. May I invite you to the tribune to address us.

Mr. ILIESCU (*President of Romania*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I begin by thanking the President of the Assembly, Sir Dudley Smith, and its members for inviting me to address them.

I am especially moved that Romania is given the opportunity to express its views at this session, which marks the Assembly's fortieth anniversary. I would also like to take this occasion to confirm again our great esteem for the WEU Assembly's exceptional contribution to furthering the spirit of Europe in national parliaments and among the public and developing relations with the states of Central Europe.

For Romania, the month of November this year has been an extremely fruitful period in the development of its relations with WEU. I recall with pleasure my meetings in Bucharest early this month with the Assembly delegation which was involved in the official opening of the first WEU Bureau of Information and Documentation in a Central European country and took part in the work of the international seminar on "Central Europe in a European security system" and the visit to the Co-ordination and Assistance Centre of the WEU mission in Romania.

All these activities, including the Romanian representatives' attendance at the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Noordwijk and the positions there adopted, re-emphasise Romania's resolve to be a partner worthy of the confidence of WEU and to build up practical and real collaboration with Romania's complete integration into WEU the aim.

For Romania, where our continent's major geo-strategic axes meet, ensuring peace and stability throughout Europe is a matter of vital interest. The central plank of Romanian foreign policy is therefore based on the strategic resolution adopted on the very first day of the Romanian revolution and supported then and now by all the political forces in the country, namely full integration in the political, economic and security structures of democratic Europe. This was a natural policy decision, since by its civilisation, culture, history and geographical position, Romania has always been an inseparable part of European culture and civilisation. For us the 1989 revolution was the beginning of Romania's recovery and of the growth, in new conditions, of its traditional relationships with other European nations.

In this context Romania is building up extensive and swiftly growing co-operation with WEU, the European Union and NATO. We are most gratified that, once the last ratification has taken place, and this will be very soon, the association agreement with the European Union will enter into force. Conditions will then be right for speeding up the necessary preparations for Romania's accession to membership of this organisation, which, as we are well aware, will not be easy. In the same spirit we welcomed the proposed partnership for peace from the outset and signed the individual programme of partnership between Romania and NATO, the actions laid down in which we have already begun.

For Romania, as for the other Central European countries, the strengthening of co-operation with WEU in its twofold rôle, i.e. security and defence dimension of European integration, and European pillar of NATO, is a vital factor of security.

The launch of official dialogue between WEU and the Central European countries at the Petersberg meeting in 1992, and the setting up of the WEU Forum of Consultation, respond to our basic aim of security and at the same time the need for a united Europe.

Romania especially appreciated the WEU decision, in the context of the Maastricht Treaty, to institutionalise relations with countries seeking to accede to the European Union.

The effort being made by WEU countries to meet entirely new and highly complex situations in Europe, brought about among other things by the irruption of conflicts, deserves praise. Romania is not only on the side of these countries, but has also worked and continues to work for the constant promotion of peaceful preventive solutions.

From this point of view the complex situation of conflict which has come about in former Yugoslavia has really tested WEU, as it has other international bodies responsible for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The way events have developed has highlighted the fact that we have not succee-

Mr. Iliescu (continued)

ded in adapting sufficiently quickly to the specific conditions and problems of the aftermath of the cold war and to the new dynamics of the security problems following the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. In these new conditions both the planning and the implementation of security measures, based on the model of force or retaliation, have proved inadequate. Developments in the Yugoslav conflict have shown clearly that recourse to force can only complicate and aggravate problems, making the process of restoring peace more difficult still.

Recent events again show that the situation in former Yugoslavia still hosts the seeds of a general conflict which might have wider repercussions at both Balkan and European level. We are firmly convinced that there is no military solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia and that our duty, the duty of the international community, is to promote communication and understanding among those seated at the negotiation table and to encourage all bodies and all countries seeking to open up a path towards a peaceful solution.

We welcome the results of the recent WEU ministerial meeting in Noordwijk, which constitute an important step towards the conceptual and operational consolidation of WEU as the security and defence component in the construction of Europe in close association with the European Union, and towards a stronger pronouncement of the need to intensify co-operation with associate partners in Central Europe.

Given the forthcoming entry into force of the association agreement and the beginning of the preparatory stage for Romania's accession to the European Union, intensification of its relations with WEU in the political, military, parliamentary and scientific fields, at all levels, becomes extremely important and constitutes one of our foreign policy priorities.

Here we welcome the WEU decision concerning the participation of associate partner states in the formulation of a common European defence policy and the forthcoming production of a white paper on European security which will look forward to the creation of a common security and defence space in Europe. This implicitly recognises the fact that the security and stability of the European continent can only be ensured in the form of a shared space.

With this in mind it is our intention to build up Romania's operational potential to participate in humanitarian and peace-keeping activities.

It is our aim to find an effective solution to our security problems in the framework of a coherent European system. Learning from the experience of the post-war period, when NATO was clearly

the main institution truly capable of providing the political and security guarantees required for the democratic and prosperous development of its member countries, we consider that Romania's choice to apply for full membership of NATO is entirely natural. This is particularly true now that the North Atlantic Alliance has found how to renew its structure by laying down terms for a relationship of dialogue and co-operation with Central Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States – institutionalised by the North Atlantic Co-operation Council – and launching the partnership for peace initiative, both significant contributions to the strengthening of European and worldwide security.

For us, Romania's participation in the partnership for peace programme is a half-way house on the way to full membership of the alliance. Our clear choice is based on Romania's fundamental interest in enjoying the security guarantees provided by NATO, knowing that this will maintain and consolidate stability in Romania.

It is with the same end in view that we approach our relations with WEU, regarded as the European pillar of NATO and as a structure that can provide a framework for the framing and implementation of a single European Union policy in the field of security and defence.

We very much welcome the fact that relations between WEU and Central Europe have been started from the very outset, in non-discriminatory forms. In opening its doors to the associate partners of Central Europe, WEU has become a key component of European security.

It goes without saying that this policy adopted spontaneously by Romania is not directed against any one. It has been fashioned in the light of the structural changes which have taken place at the political level in Europe and throughout the world, and which have been endorsed in this city by the Charter of Paris, drawn up at the command of the heads of state or government of the CSCE countries, containing the solemn declaration that all participating states are friends not foes, thus putting an end to a long period of confrontation.

We also support the efforts now being made to define more precisely the special place and rôle of the CSCE in the new European architecture.

At the practical level, Romania's security concerns are additionally addressed by a range of measures in the form of a two-level construction. The first is a matter of promoting good relations with neighbouring countries. Romania pursues a policy of neighbourliness and broad co-operation and full normalisation of its relations with all its neighbours and other states in the region; this includes the conclusion of bilateral political treaties in accordance with the principles of international law. In this connection, we hailed the Euro-

Mr. Iliescu (continued)

pean Union initiative for a stability pact and have made known our readiness to co-operate with other interested states in order to achieve its aims. The second is in our view to be found at the sub-regional level, which plays an important part in our economic progress on the way to European integration. Hence Romania's active interest in the co-operation programmes in Central Europe, the Danube basin and the Black Sea. These projects are not, and should not be, regarded as alternative solutions to European integration. On the contrary, they may turn out to be important steps towards stability and development, which are essential for European integration.

Similarly, when a settlement has been reached in the conflict in former Yugoslavia, we hope we will also be able to give a European dimension to multilateral co-operation in the Balkans.

As regards domestic policy, ladies and gentlemen, our two central concerns have been, and continue to be, firstly the development and consolidation of the normative, legislative and institutional framework of a law-based state and the normal functioning of the institutions specific to a modern democratic society and, secondly, the transition to a market economy.

As regards the transition to a market economy and economic restructuring, we can say that we are past the worst days of the post-revolution period. This year the decline in industrial production has been halted; the figures show it has even gone up slightly, a sign that the country may be on its way to economic recovery. Agriculture is over the crisis of recent years. With our monetary and fiscal policy, we have brought down inflation considerably and stabilised both national currency and the exchange rate. We have also taken major steps to bring external trade into balance and rebuild the country's hard currency reserves. All this is helping to increase confidence in the future potential of the Romanian economy and prompting foreign investors to show more interest.

Socio-economically Romania is currently in a phase of large-scale privatisation affecting more than six thousand state enterprises. Measures proposed by the government to speed up this process are now before parliament. We hope that these measures will stimulate reform and economic restructuring by attracting not only domestic funds and investment but also foreign capital and lending, which will ultimately have a positive effect on the quality of life and living conditions in Romania.

Last October, too, in Strasbourg, Romania signed the European Social Charter. This we did in the conviction that the over-riding purpose of all the political and economic reforms we have

launched must be to improve the living conditions of each member of society.

Mr. President, now that the Central European countries have taken over civil control of their armed forces and introduced parliamentary democracy, the transition towards a market economy and relations between countries are improving; our countries are becoming not only consumers but also producers of security. This gives greater stability to the whole of Central Europe and naturally a better guarantee of security for the states of Western Europe.

I should like you to agree with me that at the present time the new dimension of European security has to include the nine associate partners of Central Europe as a vital component. They are in a position to play a major rôle in the new security structure now being set up.

These countries plan to align their policies on a more comprehensive approach to security in Europe. I am naturally thinking also of the economic aspect which is, of course, the guarantee of security. Through some historical good fortune a long time ago or more recently that countries like Romania did not have, the western countries were able to apply their energy to economic and technological development and improve standards of living. At the same time they set up strong well-structured organisations whose operation has stood the test of time decade after decade. Hence their feeling of belonging to a more stable and secure context than their Central European neighbours.

In their wish to enjoy the same feeling, the Central European countries have turned to the European Union and concluded Europe Agreements which, over and above their economic aspects, provide references of stability and security for both Central and Western Europe.

In a word, the involvement of the Central European countries in the economic and security structures of the European Union, even in the forms it takes at the moment – which we all agree are at only an intermediate stage – signifies that these countries' views are already taken into account or allowed for in the definition of the general lines of European foreign policy, the security framework and European security priorities in the widest sense. This is a necessary stage on the way to accession to the European Union, and is the result of a deliberate effort by both Central and Western European countries to adapt to present-day conditions which is in everyone's interest.

Romania, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, which is increasingly taking its place as a contributor to equilibrium and continuity in the region to which it belongs, intends to make its own investment of stability and security in its relations with western structures.

Mr. Iliescu (continued)

May I at the same time assure the parliamentary Assembly that Romania is prepared, alongside its WEU partners, to contribute to the long-term construction of a genuine European security identity, and to do what it can to see that our old continent becomes a leading influence for stability, security and peace in the world.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. President, for those wise words about former Yugoslavia. We appreciate the right approach that your country is adopting to the Western European structure. We were most interested to hear what you had to say.

I should like to ask questioners to be reasonably brief; Mr. Iliescu has kindly said that he will answer questions.

I call first Mr. Pavlidis.

Mr. PAVLIDIS (*Observer from Greece*). – I welcome you, Mr. Iliescu, to the WEU headquarters, just as we welcomed you to Strasbourg recently. Once again I was impressed by your speech, and I noted your deep concern for peace in the Balkans. I noted, too, what you said about bringing about a peaceful solution. That is why I seek your opinion on the idea of all the Balkan countries signing an agreement recognising existing borders and thus implementing a preventive measure that might afford a solution.

In a second stage, countries such as Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia would enter into the agreement in order to form a stable security system that would eventually guarantee peace in the Balkans.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Iliescu.

Mr. ILIESCU (*President of Romania*). – I would have no reservations about accepting such a proposal for the Balkan countries, especially if it would assure co-operation between them and stability. Of course, the idea does not constitute a solution right now for the Bosnian conflict, but it might help generally. I agree with what you have said; with the solution of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the Balkans could be developed as a zone of stability and co-operation in Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I wish to ask about your country's policy towards the continued presence of the 14th Russian army in your neighbour, Moldova.

Do you consider the recent agreement allowing such forces to remain in Moldova for a further three years to have been freely and voluntarily entered into by Moldova; or are you looking to next week's summit of the CSCE in Budapest to propose that the CSCE peace-keeping forces should replace or supplement those of the Russian

peace-keeping forces in Moldova, the Caucasus and elsewhere?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Iliescu.

Mr. ILIESCU (*President of Romania*). – On the first part of the question, the status of the 14th army is that it is a former 14th Soviet army controlling the south-east area, including the Balkans. After the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent states, that 14th army, which is now the Russian 14th army, became a foreign army on the territory of the independent state of Moldova. It is not on the frontier of Russia; it is separated from Russia by Ukraine.

This army is therefore in a very strange situation, and I consider that its presence encourages the conservative forces in Trans-Dniestr to start a military conflict. For this reason, we consider the withdrawal of the 14th army a precondition for the stability of the newly-independent state of Moldova, and for peace in that zone.

However, the newly-independent state of Moldova is the juridical object in all these negotiations, and we had a positive approach concerning the offer of Moldova to reach an agreement with Russia for the withdrawal of this army. I shall not enlarge on my considerations on the rightness of this withdrawal, but I think that it is a necessity.

I do not even think that it is necessary for other forces to be put in place: it is necessary only to withdraw any foreign army from the territory of this newly-independent state.

The PRESIDENT. – The next question is from Mr. Korakas from Greece.

Mr. KORAKAS (*Observer from Greece*) (*Translation*). – Mr. President, everyone here knows, as you made even clearer in your speech, that Romania has always worked for peace and co-operation in the Balkans, and particularly in Europe. However, I just want to say something about the Balkans.

Speakers yesterday and this morning referred to the need for tougher military intervention in the conflict in former Yugoslavia and more particularly in Bosnia. As we have seen over the last few years, armed intervention has done nothing for peace but has rather added fuel to the flames. With the situation we have today, would you kindly tell us in more concrete terms exactly what action and initiatives Romania intends to take in order to end this foreign interference in the peninsula, particularly in former Yugoslavia, and to promote understanding between the Balkan states. One way would be to reactivate the procedures of the Balkan conference held in 1989 at the level of foreign ministers. No summit has yet been organised. Are you planning something on those lines? What do your country, your government and you

Mr. Korakas (continued)

yourself think about the possibility of a Balkan conference to bring peace and co-operation to the region without foreign intervention?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Iliescu.

Mr. ILIESCU (*President of Romania*) (Translation). – In my view the most difficult problem is the conflict in former Yugoslavia and in Bosnia. Under present conditions a Balkan conference without the states of former Yugoslavia would not be feasible. There first has to be a political resolution of the dispute and in particular the armed conflict in Bosnia. I have already given my view that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Bosnia.

The conflict is not properly understood. The phrase used is ethnic conflict and even ethnic cleansing. What ethnic cleansing? The people fighting are related. The Muslims do not represent another nationality, they are Serbs too. No Bosnian nationality exists. In Bosnia there are Serbs and Croats – Muslim or Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats, who have long lived together and have a common history. History separated them, the Croats under the Austro-Hungarian occupation and the Serbs under the Ottoman occupation. Occupation created differences between the Serbs who remained Orthodox, particularly in the rural areas of Bosnia and the Muslim Serbs who live for the most part in urban areas. Hence the concentration of Muslims in urban areas and the scattering of Orthodox Serbs over the territory as a whole, but they are all Serbs, and in the same families.

In Bucharest I asked the Bosnian Minister for Foreign Affairs what he was. "I am a Serb" he replied indignantly. "I have a sister living in Belgrade who is married to a Serb". In Zagreb I knew mixed Serbo-Croat families. This is a tragedy, a fratricidal civil war between Serbs. It is not even a religious war. It is a real tragedy. I do not think the problems can be solved by military intervention. Instead we must urge all the forces concerned to meet, discuss and negotiate possible conditions acceptable to all sides. No one can tell what the solution will be. In my view, the only possible basis is the contact group's proposal of a peace programme, which is far from ideal, but which all parties appear ready to accept, notwithstanding its lack of common sense and logic. I also think that the international community failed to react in the right way and quickly enough in favour of the existing political authorities in Bosnia and former Yugoslavia and guide events in this direction. I hope, even so, that a solution can be found by purely political means. That is our opinion.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – When we met in Bucharest and again in your speech today, you spoke about the work that you are undertaking in your country on the rule of law and human rights. You have much legislation in force from the time of Mrs. Pauker and from 1947 onwards that you are repealing.

You will have noticed that the Russian Federation has undone some of the damage inflicted by the Soviet Government, who removed the nationality and citizenship of certain of its citizens. When do you propose to restore the full freedoms of ex-King Michael and his family?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Iliescu.

Mr. ILIESCU (*President of Romania*) (Translation). – As in the case of other nations, this is a matter of national history. In an historical process, the citizens of Romania chose, after the December revolution, to set up a republican state. This is enshrined in the new constitution.

Constitutionally there is no restriction in law on anyone wishing to obtain Romanian citizenship. However, ex-King Michael wants to come to Romania as its king and sovereign. This does not comply with the way our country is organised, or with the provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, he has already visited Romania as a private citizen, and could do so again, but after giving a clear and firm undertaking not to create social unrest in the country. This means that he must clearly declare he is a normal citizen and fully respects the constitution. This is a normal requirement, which has to be met in all European countries.

In France, the Bourbons were excluded from the national territory for a century. In Italy, after the adoption of the new constitution in 1947, it was decided to prohibit the king from entering the country. The same applies in Greece and in other countries. From this point of view therefore we are more liberal in what is allowed in ex-King Michael's case. However, there must be no confusion about his relations with the state and with the constitution. This is normal and democratic. The choice of the country's citizens has to be respected.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

We now turn to Mr. Eorsi, the observer from Hungary.

Mr. EORSI (*Observer from Hungary*). – Mr. President, let me return to the Moldovan question. Our colleague, Mr. Atkinson, put his question from the Russian military point of view. Let me return to the Romanian point of view.

I truly appreciated the words at the end of your speech saying that Romania is ready to contribute and co-operate with the European organisations, but I hold in my hand a report submitted to WEU

Mr. Eorsi (continued)

about WEU's relations with Russia. Paragraph 46 states that the Moldovan Government refers to the Romanian declaration denying the existence of Moldovan nationality and claiming that Moldova was part of Romania.

I am grateful to you and your colleagues that, on page 168 of your book entitled, "Romania in Europe and in the World" that has been distributed among the participants to help bring us closer to your political views, I read something completely different. To be frank it does not speak the same language as the report, although I cannot say that it is totally different. It states, "we have recognised the independent status of Moldova. We consider it as a second Romanian state".

Would you be so kind as to elaborate on that? How should we understand it and how do you foresee the future of Moldova?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Iliescu.

Mr. ILIESCU (*President of Romania*). – There are two different questions: the problems of the state and state organisations and the problem of nationality and language of one population.

Moldova is a state. It is a former part of Romania and, historically, part of the province of Moldova, half of which was in Romania and half of which was occupied by the Russians in 1812. It was occupied by Russia for one century. After the first world war, with the self-determination of the European nations, all the Romanian provinces under the Austro-Hungarian occupation or under the Russian occupation were united into a unique national state. That was also the case for Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other states which disappeared after the first world war.

In the 1940s, measures were implemented with no juridical or historical base. Under the agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union known as the Ribbentrop/Molotov document, it was decided to occupy other territories included in the Soviet Union. One part became the Soviet Moldovan republic and the other became part of Ukraine, which complicated the history of all these problems. The population however, remained Romanian. The people speak the same language as we do – Romanian. The history is that of Romanians living in Moldova.

A new political situation arose with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the formation of new states. The Baltic countries, Ukraine and the Caucasus republics appeared, as did the state of Moldova. Romania was the first country to recognise the existence of the new independent state of Moldavi, but we stress that 65% of the population there are Moldovan. The territories proclaim the emergence of a new nation – the Moldovan one –

which could be other than Romanian, and that the Moldovan language is something other than Romanian. I know that there was also a theory that a new German nation appeared: a socialist Germany. But the German population had another approach to that problem, and Germany united thereafter.

So we do not discuss the existence of the state of Moldova. It is up to the citizens of that state to decide how it will develop. We are open, and we want to develop normal relations of co-operation between our two states. However, there is a question of the approach to nationality. We do not agree with the theory that Moldova is another nation. But if there is opposition to that state formation, we can argue that in Europe, different states speak the same German language but live in different state formations. That is a historical fact and those of us in politics take a political approach: to consider the existing borders in Europe. It is a precondition to take into consideration the existing position in Europe to maintain peace there.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Iliescu.

Last but not least, I call Lord Newall.

Lord NEWALL (*United Kingdom*). – I hasten to add that I have a simpler question than the last one. You mentioned in your speech that troops would be used for humanitarian purposes. I fully understand, as many of us do, the difficulties of reorganising your army. When might a battalion-strength of your troops be ready for humanitarian and peace-keeping purposes anywhere that you might send them?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Iliescu.

Mr. ILIESCU (*President of Romania*). – We have already discussed that issue with the NATO leadership and we already have representatives in the Planning Cell in Mons. We have discussed our national plan for the partnership for peace and we have made a concrete proposal to prepare a Romanian brigade, taking account of all the conditions and criteria of NATO, to be able to participate in such actions. There is now a demand in connection with Angola, for instance, and negotiations concerning the preparation of such a military formation with humanitarian purposes to maintain peace and enter into co-operation with NATO.

The PRESIDENT. – I see that Mr. Mitolo wishes to ask a question. We should not really add to the list of questioners, but I am a kind man so I shall allow him to ask his question.

Mr. MITOLO (*Italy*) (*Translation*). – Mr. President, I have listened with great interest to President Iliescu's address and especially to his replies to the various questions put to him. I note, however, that nobody has asked for information about the minorities living in Romania and in particular the Hungarian and German minorities.

Mr. Mitolo (continued)

I would, therefore, like to ask you, President Iliescu, whether there are any plans to give those minorities greater autonomy in Romania and to afford greater protection for their national identities.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Iliescu.

Mr. ILIESCU, (*President of Romania*). – Our constitution is fully in agreement with the general European ruling on national minorities in connection with the general rights of the citizen. From that point of view, we have the legislative bases on which to ensure their identity and their full rights. Hungarians are the main minority in our country, representing 7% of the population of Romania and 1.7 million people. They form a majority in two central districts of the country. They are also represented politically. We are the only country in Europe with representatives of all the national minorities in our national parliament. The Hungarians have thirty-nine elected representatives in the national parliament but even minor groups such as the Greeks, Turks, Armenians and Jews – even Italians – are represented in the national parliament. They are also represented on all local councils. For Hungarians, there is a full network of schools using their own mother language: primary, secondary and university education. They have their own papers, radio stations, television stations, theatres and other cultural institutions.

But, as in all such problems, there are discussions on how to perfect those provisions. All minorities want their own organisations to promote their interests. The government has created a council of minority groups, which is in permanent dialogue with the government, discussing concrete problems on that issue. So we have made a lot of progress during the past five years to develop a judicial and legislative basis and to promote that problem.

But those are genuine problems. If we strengthen our democracy and economy, we will have a material possibility of solving the social problems for all our citizens, including minority groups.

The PRESIDENT. – This has been a significant visit that you have made to Paris today and we thank you sincerely, not only for the wise words in your speech but also for the frankness with which you have answered questions and been prepared to take on all-comers. At lunchtime, you were telling me of the enormous amount of travelling that you have been doing on behalf of your country, getting it better known and speaking the gospel as it is and as you see it. It is inevitable, in that situation, that you will have critics and there are bound to be difficulties. But we remember the state of your nation even a decade ago. Remarkable things have happened. It is a great tribute, not only to

you but to your colleagues, some of whom are around you today, that you have made such efforts to bring Romania towards democracy, playing a full and important part in the conduct of Europe, where we are concerned on the defence and security side. Security is something for which we all crave and which we all need.

On behalf of the Assembly, I thank you very much for coming here. It is appreciated. We look forward to seeing you on further occasions.

(*Mr. Martinez, Vice President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

4. A European security policy

A European defence policy

(*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and of the Defence Committee, and votes on the draft recommendations and draft order, Docs. 1439 and amendments and 1445 and amendments*)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the resumed joint debate on the report on European security policy presented by Mr. Soell on behalf of the Political Committee, Document 1439, and the report on European defence policy presented by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Defence Committee, Document 1445.

When the debate has been concluded, we will vote first on the draft recommendation on a European security policy set out in Document 1439 and the amendments which have been tabled thereto. We will then vote on the draft order on a European security policy set out in the same document. Finally, we will vote on the draft recommendation on a European defence policy set out in Document 1445 and the amendments which have been tabled thereto.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Tusek.

Mr. TUSEK (*Observer from Austria*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour and pleasure for me to be able to take part in this ordinary autumn session of the WEU Assembly as a representative of the Austrian Parliament and observer. I have followed the discussions so far with great interest and I am convinced that on the basis of both the reports we are debating we can and indeed must further consolidate and intensify co-operation in Europe in the field of security and defence policy. I would like to take this opportunity to make a few comments from the viewpoint of an Austrian member of parliament.

As you know, on 12th June this year the Austrian people voted in favour of Austria's accession to the European Union by an impressive 66.6%

Mr. Tusek (continued)

majority. This clear vote in favour of Europe was also a clear vote in favour of Austria's unreserved participation in the further development of the European Union, as defined in the Maastricht Treaty. It was a clear vote in favour of a policy of solidarity with our future partners in the European Union and a clear rejection of a policy of exclusion and isolation.

By their vote on 12th June, the Austrian people have restored to our country, which had always played an important rôle in Europe and had been involved in large, supranational structures over more than nine hundred of its nearly a thousand years of history, a definite European vocation.

As has been repeatedly pointed out in this Assembly, the security policy situation in Europe has changed radically since 1989. The communist régime collapsed and the states and peoples of Eastern and Central Europe now share our faith in democracy, freedom and the market economy. However, this enormous process of readjustment also gives rise to a number of difficult problems. Many ethnic and national conflicts that had remained hidden in past decades turned virulent and resulted in the eastern and south-eastern part of our continent becoming an area of insecurity and instability. We Austrians know very well what we are talking about in this context, since brute force was once again used as a political instrument in our immediate south-eastern neighbourhood – a force that undermines all the principles that have governed the co-existence of states since the end of the second world war.

Geopolitically, Austria is situated on the edge of what has been described as an earthquake zone, and is fully aware of its tasks and responsibilities as a new member of the European Union. We also know that Austria's security is bound up with European security and we are convinced that we will be able to master the new challenges only if we pursue a policy of solidarity with our EU partners. That is why Austria is resolved to co-operate actively and on a basis of solidarity in building up an effective joint foreign and security policy, as defined in the Maastricht Treaty.

Mr. President, I am coming to a close. It is our wish that the objectives in the field of security and defence policy defined in the Maastricht Treaty will be successfully achieved. For only then can we respond to the security policy challenges facing us in Europe now and in the future.

(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. May I ask speakers to co-operate by speaking for five minutes at most, preferably for a shorter time?

The next speaker is Mr. Liapis, the observer from Greece.

Mr. LIAPIS (*Observer from Greece*). – Dear colleagues, Mr. Baumel's report is one of the best that I have ever seen, and is detailed, realistic and moderate. It would be idle to try to improve it or even to commend it. I shall take this opportunity merely to comment on aspects of the report that are important to the future of our organisation.

When talking about the European defence and security policy, we have to ask ourselves some fundamental questions. Do we have the political will to create the mechanism that will enable WEU to take autonomous decisions independently of NATO and our transatlantic allies? Will our national parliaments and governments offer part of their state budget to fulfil the operational needs of WEU and transform it into an efficient body in the face of action? Will we finally develop security guarantees, even sacrificing part of our national welfare policies to strengthen the rôle of our organisation and give it the military ability to act alone with its own forces? Every time that we gather here – every six months – we hear the same complaint: we talk more and do less. The time has at last come to take some radical decisions and transform WEU into an integrated military organisation.

If we remain in a state of apathy and do not dare to take some initiatives now, we shall face the risk, in the intergovernmental conference in 1996, which is not far away, of losing another big opportunity to take European matters into our own hands and co-ordinate successful security and defence policies within the European Union. We shall lose for ever the opportunity to reinforce WEU's operational capabilities and to develop it into a decision-making centre.

If we continue to fear taking responsibility for our own continent, and if we continue to depend absolutely on NATO and the American forces, we will have limited our own organisation to being useless and inactive. In my opinion, performance and efficiency are the key words.

Last but not least, if we agree that the security and defence of Europe are mainly our responsibility and that we must join forces to counter common risks and dangers, we must also agree that enlarging the European Union and WEU is not just a top priority but a historical necessity. Europeans must take control of their own security, to meet the challenges of the future and to ensure that Europe can act in a crisis such as that in former Yugoslavia. So let us do it: let us go ahead. Let us convince our electorates, and let us press our governments to contribute, with all the means at their disposal, to the preparation for the review of the Maastricht Treaty. Let us build a Europe that will make Europeans safe and proud.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. López Henares.

Mr. LÓPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, although it is always appropriate to discuss defence matters in this Assembly, there can have been few occasions when such discussions were more urgent or necessary than today.

We find ourselves discussing Mr. Baumel's report and draft recommendation on a very sombre and sad day, when events in former Yugoslavia have aroused in us a deep sense of frustration, which recent events have served only to aggravate.

In addition I have to say, although this is a domestic matter, that the intervention of the President of the Council of Ministers was so disappointing, both as to what he said and as to what he did, that this naturally only adds to the need for the kind of comments Mr. Baumel made in his report and in his draft recommendation. We fully support everything he says and therefore what I am going to say should be obvious, although I am not going to make a long speech, not only in response to your kind request, but also because Mr. Baumel has said it all so succinctly in his report and draft recommendation. I have tabled just one amendment, which I know Mr. Baumel kindly dealt with this morning in the committee, concerning the urgency of applications made there.

We are pleased that in its Noordwijk declaration the Council of Ministers recently agreed on the need for serious reflection in drawing up this white paper proposed by France, which is absolutely necessary, but we insist, and I hope that this will be reflected in the resolution and the recommendation, that it is urgent.

This morning I asked the Secretary-General if he was going to create some kind of unity and his answer was no. It may be that unity is not necessary in preparing the 1996 conference, but what I would like to see is priority given to the need to prepare for this with a unified vision, and the urgent need to take account of the proposals contained in Mr. Baumel's recommendation, so that at the earliest possible opportunity we have the framework for a security and defence policy, something which, as has already been said, we are at present lacking. Provision is made for this in the treaty on European Union, but we do not have a common defence policy and this is the great failure and the great weakness we are facing now.

We urgently need a doctrine for European defence and a general staff; the Planning Cell needs to be converted into a real general staff and given the necessary means and resources to enable us to break through, once for all, the deadlock which seems to exist in all our debates between a perfectly respectable attitude towards maintaining national structures – I repeat, this is

perfectly respectable – and another much more ambitious attitude in our progress towards integration. It may be that the way forward, and this is one of the objectives of the white paper, is to find a middle way where we have European bodies, not only in theory, but organic and positive bodies which can act together, and as quickly and effectively as possible, in future crises. Although logically we can attribute responsibility to the United Nations, I believe that in our heart of hearts the lesson of former Yugoslavia leaves us Europeans feeling deeply frustrated.

Mr. President, it would be a mistake to salve our consciences or to say, as one would take a sleeping pill to enable one to sleep more easily, that we wanted a political solution. Of course we want a political solution, but we have to have the means to exert pressure in order to achieve a political solution.

Furthermore, Mr. President, the time has come to stop blaming the Americans. We must stop using this option in our dealings with our ally. If, as we are always saying, the European Union is, and has to be, the European pillar of Atlantic defence, then if this is not so the responsibility is exclusively ours, and that, Mr. President, is the task we have before us.

Consequently, I believe and I repeat that Mr. Baumel's report is extremely opportune in its forcefulness, clarity and farsightedness, and I believe we should give it our enthusiastic support.

I will conclude now, Mr. President, because we are also debating Mr. Soell's report. I am in complete agreement with everything in Mr. Soell's report and, sadly, it only remains for me to say goodbye to the eminent professor who has been our colleague and whom it has been a real privilege to count as one of our number. We will not forget him, and this is a hopeful sign, Mr. President, because I speak from a different political group. The fact that different political groups, very important groups in the context of what Europe represents, can share a common view and understand one another in matters as important as security and defence is the best possible hope of finding the solutions we need in the very near future.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Next is Mr. Cucco.

Mr. CUCO (*Spain*) (Translation). – I will restrict myself to one or two brief comments, because it is not possible to go into the whole report in detail and given the time-limits the President has stressed in view of the considerable number of questions raised by Mr. Baumel's report on a European defence policy.

First, I think we have to recognise that both the common foreign policy of the member states of

Mr. Cuco (continued)

the European Union and the corollary to it, namely a common defence policy, are still at a very early stage. We have scarcely gone beyond dealing with general considerations such as those formulated by the Maastricht Treaty or the preliminary conclusions set out in the Noordwijk declaration.

Mr. President, in my view there is still a need for serious political debate to develop the technical aspects and subsequently put into operation the many details and also the major decisions which in my opinion are needed before we can speak with any justification of a common foreign policy and a common defence policy.

It will not be easy. I do not think I am being overbold in saying that there are still many historical legacies and age-old national prejudices which do little to facilitate a unanimous design for a common European foreign and defence policy. While this process is under way by means of the white paper referred to previously by many colleagues, we have to acknowledge, as Mr. Baumel has quite justifiably pointed out, that we are witnessing the obvious incapacity of WEU, and the decisions arising out of that incapacity, when faced with acute and devastating crises such as Rwanda or the long drawn-out war in former Yugoslavia, a war with many new aspects, which rages while we stand by powerless.

The conflict in former Yugoslavia is, we all know, typical of the post-cold war period of inter-ethnic conflicts to which the European Union has been unable to react, as Mr. Baumel has so eloquently acknowledged in paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation. This is due not only to a lack of political will, but also to the fact that joint European interests have not yet been identified clearly enough, making it impossible to develop mechanisms for implementing projects and decisions.

Among the risks and threats to European security, interethnic conflicts have a very high profile. Most of the sixteen pages of section VII of Mr. Baumel's report, paragraphs 147 to 220, are taken up with discussing this pressing problem, in evidence from the Balkans to the Caucasus. And yet there is no reference to this type of conflict, nor to its possible repercussions on European defence policy in the corresponding draft recommendation. I think, as I said in the committee, that we ought to look more deeply into the causal origins of these conflicts and their complex internal mechanisms and into the countless repercussions they could have for the future of European security.

As things stand I do not think we have made enough effort to understand these conflicts in

their entirety. In this context I believe that collaboration and joint discussion with other specialist bodies, and here I am thinking of the CSCE's committee for national minorities, could be very fruitful. Although it seems that some colleagues believe it is difficult to fit such methods into the normal procedures of this Assembly, I am of the opinion that international relations in the contemporary world, and I would include defence matters in that, are so complex and interdependent that they require a global, integrated approach. European defence policy is dependent on many, very different factors. Mr. Baumel's report gives us much information providing food for thought in the future, none of which, Mr. President, should be neglected or underestimated.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Mr. Brito.

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: never in the post-World War II period has there been such a need for Europe to formulate a common security and defence policy. I say this for three reasons: first because Europe, as the great economic power it is, must have a voice with which to affirm its identity, defend the values in which it believes and protect its interests; secondly, because threats exist which the countries of Europe are not capable of dealing with in isolation; and thirdly because it is inevitable that American protective action in Europe will be reduced.

It is clear, therefore, that Europe must find its own means of defence, regardless of its budgetary constraints and technological limitations.

The events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Gulf crisis and the withdrawal of American troops from the European theatre are three situations which clearly illustrate the reasons advanced above.

However, there are other situations within Europe itself which ought to be a matter of concern to Europeans, because they pose a potential threat to its security.

First, there is the Russian nuclear threat; then there is the wave of nationalism, and finally, there is an upsurge of fundamentalism, and we do not know to what point it might be converted into widespread conflict.

In this context, we applaud the proposal for a white paper on a European security policy because, in our view, not only will this provide an opportunity for serious reflection on a common security and defence policy, but it will also define the joint rôle, tasks and command structures of WEU and the procedures for political and military interaction, conditions regarded as indispensable if Europe is to assume its responsibilities in the present political framework.

Mr. Brito (continued)

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the inevitability of a common European security and defence policy must not mean distancing ourselves from the Europe of NATO. In the coming years, Europe will not be in a position to formulate an effective common defence policy on its own. Indeed, the countries of Europe, either individually or together, do not have the strategic transport capacity, nor the capacity for satellite monitoring, nor the necessary elements of operational command, control and intelligence and even less the means of supplying remote forces. So when we support the need for Europe to build a European defence strategy, we are not thinking of ending the alliance between Europe and the United States; far from it. That would be a serious political and strategic error. NATO is an alliance of necessity. NATO is an alliance of destiny.

What we intend and wish to do, therefore, is to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and prepare ourselves for the possibility of periods of intervention in areas which, while being in the strategic interests of Europe, may not be so for the United States of America.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to thank our Rapporteurs, Mr. Baumel and Mr. Soell, for the excellent reports they have presented to this Assembly, and confidently await acceptance of their proposals, so that Europe can continue to be a place of security and peace.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Mr. Korakas, observer from Greece.

Mr. KORAKAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – I should first like to thank Mr. Baumel for his very interesting report and then to put a different point of view from those we have heard so far. I shall speak in French for which I beg your indulgence: there being no interpreter I cannot speak in my mother tongue.

As Mr. Baumel said this morning, the debate on the rôle of WEU is opened. There are two opposing viewpoints. The first sees WEU taking military action in the rôle of international policeman in association with or without NATO. The second viewpoint, which I share and which would ensure that WEU has a future, sees WEU as a mediator, promoting understanding and co-operation between peoples as a constructive contribution to a collective security system in Europe. Since Mr. Baumel's report frequently refers to common defence, we have to ask ourselves what the threat is and how it can be clearly defined. Only a few years ago, the answer would have been the threat from the eastern countries, the Soviet Union and its allies. Where does the threat come from today? We have to define it, without any hidden meanings.

From one point of view I agree with Mr. Baumel on the subject of the United States. We cannot accept that the United States should appear and behave as though it were the master of the world. Listening to Mr. Baumel, I even wondered whether he had not become an anti-American or anti-imperialist. Unfortunately, his subsequent proposal disappointed me, being to replace NATO by another political-cum-military body, whose aims would be the same as those for which we now criticise the United States. Actually, Mr. Baumel is trying to reconcile the irreconcilable: armed intervention and humanism, a rapid action French-Spanish-Italian force and a peace-making rôle and, more generally, a European peace-keeping and security force in Europe without any transparency or equality between member states, these being divided into two or three categories with different types of relationship with WEU. We must not fall into the trap of inter-bloc competition so that we can divide up markets and zones of influence between ourselves. The challenge facing WEU is this: can it become a force for reconciliation and rapprochement between peoples, fiercely opposed to foreign intervention, since, as we have seen in recent years, all these interventions have done is to add fuel to the flames?

We have to go back not only to the CSCE and the Charter of Paris, but to the Helsinki Final Act, a highly relevant historical document, and use it to set a collective system of security in place in Europe. However, for this we must have equality and sincerity between members, and there must not be different categories. Even with equality, we are not certain to be able to obtain this collective system; we also have to make sure it functions transparently.

I therefore believe we must once again think hard about the present situation in Europe and in the world, and the possible rôle of a European Union not of the West, but embracing all Europe and operating a collective security system.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Korakas.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Soell and Mr. Baumel have presented two reports that excellently describe the problems we are considering here in the Assembly. And I am glad we are discussing them together. But sadly I have to say that I took part in a debate in this Assembly twenty-seven years ago during which we raised and discussed similar problems, and that in spite of the political changes that have occurred in the world meanwhile, in practice nothing much has changed as far as WEU's work is concerned.

We are now discovering that the Council of Ministers says it has no competence as regards events in the Balkans, events in a United Nations

Mr. Müller (continued)

safe area, where the United Nations are indeed competent, but has proved to be just as much of a paper tiger. We find that the United Nations cannot meet their responsibilities in other parts of the world, either. Mr. Baumel has reminded us of the 500 000 victims in Rwanda. We could just as well cite Angola in Africa, or other areas.

We find that planes are dropping napalm on civilian populations right in the middle of Europe, although there is a ban on flights. We also find – and this is what surprises me most – that all those demonstrators who used to take to the streets when the Americans intervened anywhere in the world – as in Vietnam – have disappeared, and that there are hardly any massive street protests against the kind of violations of human rights we see day after day in the Balkans, for instance.

That is a very sad situation, and we parliamentarians should really be blushing with shame. We talk and we talk, while in the outside world, indeed right outside our door or, as Mr. Baumel put it, two hours away, people are being abused and killed and human rights are being infringed. This is not even the normal kind of shooting war we know from the history books; what is happening here is a massacre.

At the same time we are considering how to develop the European Union further in 1996. We want to plan a white paper on defence questions. We go on talking, without really having the courage to tackle the problems involved. For here we are dealing with the very core of European policy. That applies not just to WEU, but also to the European Union and of course to NATO as well. We are facing what I might call the original sin of European integration policy: that we could not complete what we set out quite reasonably to do, and then evaded the issue by moving on to secondary theatres of war, with no real results.

You all know that in the beginning was the European Defence Community, which failed in 1954. Because we did not make any headway with a common foreign and security policy, we then embarked on the road of the European Economic Community, where we have now reached the point where, though fire brigade uniforms have to look the same in all the European Union countries, and have to meet the same requirements, yet, as Mr. Baumel rightly said, the European corps actually has nineteen different types of weapons. Basically, that shows up the whole dilemma in which Europe now finds itself.

After all, the United States of America is also a conglomerate of a great number of individual states. In many areas, the differences in the United States are greater than those between the countries of the European Union, the EU Twelve, in tax

policy, or whether they say yes or no to the death penalty. I do not want to go into detail here. But in questions of foreign and defence policy the United States of North America speak with one voice, have a common arms policy, and also have common forces with which to defend themselves. We have not managed anything like that in Europe so far.

We will not make progress in Europe – of that I am deeply convinced, however many standard requirements we lay down for fire-brigade uniforms or hygiene in butchers' shops – unless we manage genuinely to decide on a common European foreign and defence policy.

One last comment: the Political Committee recently visited Moscow. We held talks there. The question arose: are we back in Yalta again? No, we have gone beyond Yalta. – Are we back in Versailles? No, we have gone beyond Versailles. In Europe we are in fact at the point we reached at the end of the Vienna Congress in the last century. If we want reforms in Europe in 1996, we must realise that we should not begin by making small change, but must finally mint one big coin, called the common European foreign and defence policy.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now call Mr. Jeszenszky, the observer from Hungary.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Observer from Hungary*). – We are here exactly five years after 1989, the *annus mirabilis*, when the political transformation of Poland and Hungary led to the fall of the other Communist dominoes and the danger of a nuclear war in Europe was largely averted. That brought me and other intellectuals among my colleagues into politics.

I came here in June 1990 to address this Assembly. At that time, I proposed the creation of an associate status for newcomers. Fewer than four years later, my proposal has become possible but neither the members of WEU nor those seeking membership in it can feel really secure today. However, I am happy to see the spirit shown in the two reports that we are discussing and in many of the statements and speeches this morning. They give me modest hope that we can feel secure and WEU can contribute to that security.

People sometimes speak of both WEU and NATO as an umbrella under which the fortunate ones can take cover. People also speak of a nuclear shield. For me, those institutions look rather like a port – a safe haven where those coming in from the cold of communism can find respite from the storms of history and cast anchor. We feel that we need more than one anchor. Today we still have none and we are about to be provided with one. Membership of WEU may be the first anchor available to us.

Mr. Jeszenszky (continued)

Morally, we are in a good position because the associate partners are rightly asking for immediate admission. It was not our decision, let alone our fault, that the Central and Eastern European countries did not accede to the Brussels Treaty of 1948, the Washington Treaty of 1949 or the Treaty of Rome of 1957. We could not because of Soviet domination.

Historically, Central Europe has always been part of Europe. With Latin and Christian traditions, we are members of the same civilisation. We also have a tradition of enlightenment. But we must be realistic and see what advantage there may be for WEU if Central and Eastern European countries become full members. Refusals are made on various pretexts, but they simply punish us for a second time. It was enough punishment to be subjected to Soviet domination against our will, which meant that we are now not fully compatible with European institutions. But by expanding Western Europe eastwards, WEU could not only enhance the security of Central Europe tremendously, but make Western Europe safer and stronger. In that way, the core regions of Europe would be better protected if the border region and trouble spots were further away. We already act as a shield for Western Europe against migration, crime and infectious diseases, many of which we thought had disappeared from Europe, and against pollution. But we cannot hold out in that function in a front-line position without secure supply lines and without being regarded as one of you. I am particularly afraid when people speak of the possibility of a new grand alliance between NATO and Russia as an alternative to expansion. I cannot accept the idea of creating an umbrella held by two, under which Hungary and her neighbours must find cover. Such an alliance can come only after our accession to those institutions.

The European Union is sometimes compared to the Roman empire or the Carolingian empire and there is a desire to have a modern version of *pax romana*. But those empires, or the community of medieval Europe, was larger than the present European Union or WEU. It comprised most of today's Central Europe. By expanding eastward, we can have *pax democratica* or *pax Europica*, but not by any policy of appeasement. In order to achieve peace, we must remember another Latin wisdom: "Hannibal, you know how to win but you don't know how to utilise victory".

Please tell your governments how to utilise the great victory which our principles and our values won in 1989.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Godal, the observer from Norway.

Mr. GODAL (*Observer from Norway*). – Yesterday, the Norwegian people voted against membership of the European Union, thereby also preventing full membership of WEU. I deeply regret the outcome of that referendum, which means that a majority of the Norwegian people were not prepared to take their full share of responsibility and participate in the historic task of building a new, closely co-operating Europe. Norway will, of course, continue to be a full member of NATO and an associate member of WEU. It is a most regrettable fact that after the Norwegian no there will be no full Nordic representation in WEU. In the coming crucial period for that organisation of European security, we can now only hope and encourage Sweden and Finland to make their application to WEU as soon as possible so that at least some members of the Nordic family are full players in security on the European scene during that period.

I congratulate Mr. Soell and Mr. Baumel on their excellent reports. It is now highly desirable that the European Union, as a matter of urgency, develops its security side in such a way that all European countries that so wish can satisfy their basic need for security, by becoming members of the European Union and WEU. That is of special importance for the small nations of Central Europe, as the last speaker pointed out. They always suffered most when things went wrong in Europe. There can be no stability in our part of the world until those countries are firmly integrated in a strong security system. Membership of the European Union and WEU is the only realistic alternative. To stabilise Central Europe is of paramount importance to all, East and West, and should therefore not be opposed by anyone.

The practical aspects should be worked out now so that proper decisions can be made in 1996 and implemented as soon as possible. In that process, the Baltic states should be dealt with on equal terms and in parallel with others. The events in former Yugoslavia show that it is high time for Europe to organise itself in such a way that we act efficiently and with determination in areas of conflict. We Europeans must at least be able to police our own part of the world. The United Nations is obviously not up to standard and we cannot forever rely on the Americans to do the difficult jobs for us.

Allow me to add that the United Nations engagement in former Yugoslavia now seems about to end in miserable failure in the ruins of the so-called safe area of Bihac. I shall not go into the many obvious mistakes and lost opportunities that have led to that regrettable situation, but let it be a strong reminder to all Europeans that it is absolutely necessary for us now to organise our security in a manner which may help prevent conflict. We must establish a strong and efficient apparatus to handle conflicts, should they nevertheless occur. I

Mr. Godal (continued)

assure you that we Norwegians will do whatever we can in that respect from the sideline position that we have now let ourselves in for.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Prokes, the observer from Slovakia.

Mr. PROKES (*Observer from Slovakia*). – Distinguished President and dear colleagues, it is a great honour for me to have this opportunity to make some observations at this meeting.

Although it has only been a short time since Slovakia, one of the nine countries of Central and Eastern Europe, became an associate partner of WEU, real progress has been achieved in implementing that enhanced status. The aim of the Slovak Republic is to contribute to the formation of a more secure and prosperous Europe.

The Slovak Republic will contribute to European security at both regional and continental level. At the regional level we shall strive to enhance the good relations, friendship and co-operation between all our neighbours. At the continental level we wish to participate actively in the process of creating a new European security architecture. The core element of the future security construction in Europe should lie in an appropriate model of interaction between WEU, NATO and CSCE.

WEU and NATO are the two most important elements of European security. We have defined the basic direction of Slovakia's security orientation as our effort to become a member of both organisations. The orientation towards Western security structures is based on political consensus among all our relevant political subjects and is backed by wide public support.

We have declared that we assume the democratic rules and principles for ever. The Slovak Republic is ready to be committed to the principles of solidarity in Western Europe and the transatlantic security area based on full membership of WEU. We strongly believe that we are able to fulfil the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and the modified Brussels Treaty, and to contribute to security in Europe. We therefore welcome the progress in further strengthening our status in relation to WEU on both levels – intergovernmental and parliamentary.

We noted with satisfaction the offer to redouble our parliamentary assistance at the plenary meetings of the WEU Assembly. We consider our observer status – which has been extended to four of the most prestigious subsidiary organisations of the Assembly – an undoubted sign of an approach towards our associate member status being provided very soon. Thank you very much for your attention.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Prokes, for being commendably brief.

I call Mr. Parisi.

Mr. PARISI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to start by saying politely that I am annoyed, because although I was down to speak fourth this morning, I find myself twelfth on the list of speakers for this afternoon. I mention this first because I cannot understand why, and second because I would be grateful to have a few extra minutes, as it is far from easy to deal with such a complicated question in so short a time.

Having said this, I should like to express a number of doubts. Before doing so, I would like to say how much I appreciate the excellent, soundly-argued report produced by Mr. Soell whom we shall be sorry to lose and who has made an authoritative and effective contribution to WEU's work. Looking back over his period of office I would recall the relations he established with the representatives of all member countries and in particular his well-remembered visit to Italy. I should also like to thank Mr. Baumel for his report.

In his report, Mr. Soell rightly observes that there is much talk of a common European security and defence policy. In fact, as is clear from a glance at the defence white papers produced by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, European defence is not a high priority for any of those three countries – the biggest and most powerful states in Western Europe. Quite rightly, Mr. Soell argues that something is not working somewhere when, according to the Maastricht Treaty, these three countries, together with others, should very shortly be moving ahead with a common European defence and security policy.

Mr. Soell observes that the frequently canvassed solution is that the intergovernmental level should be passed over by the creation of common institutions capable of working out a common European policy in that sector. But there are many obstacles to this: differences in membership of the various organisations involved, the difficulty of agreeing on where the common strategy should be worked out and that of co-ordinating the various agencies.

In this context, the enlargement of WEU to include the Central and Eastern European countries is a special problem; the draft order therefore proposes enlargement by the formula of associate partnership – as has been done for NATO through the partnership for peace – which would allow participation at least in some of WEU's activities.

I lack the time to review the whole document, but what appears to me to be the most interesting feature of Mr. Soell's report is paragraph 1 of the recommendation, which calls for the creation of a

Mr. Parisi (continued)

special working group in accordance with the Council declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, tasked with studying institutional questions relating to the preparation of the 1996 inter-governmental conference. In addition, paragraph 11 includes what I regard as an important request that the Council make its views known in a more convincing and visible manner in the United Nations and arrange for WEU to speak with one voice in the Security Council of that organisation.

To sum up, my impression is that, despite its reactivation in 1984, WEU is still looking for an identity and the Rapporteur is quite right in demanding out loud that the Council should take action to find that identity. I still have doubts, however, about the outcome of such a search. Clearly its rôle as defence arm of the European Union is the easiest to target in the short term. The problem arises from the fact that the European Union itself does not know which way to go, divided as it is between Germany, apparently always followed by France which sees in that country the political and institutional reflection of its own economic supremacy, and the United Kingdom together now with Italy, but with some difference of emphasis, which are more concerned with Atlantic solidarity than a priority axis with Berlin. This state of affairs naturally affects in particular the questions with which WEU is concerned.

In the short time available, I cannot say anything about the more recent crisis in relations between the United States and Europe and I feel that in a debate which must be as brief as possible it is not possible to dwell on the very acute causes of disagreement which have surfaced in the last few days.

I think, therefore, that the Rapporteur is well advised when, if I understand him correctly, he invites the Council of WEU to reclaim a central rôle in action relating to the common European defence and security policy, even though some points are clearly contradicted by the facts as, for example – I repeat – the statement in paragraph 11 of the recommendation to the effect that WEU should speak with one voice in the Security Council of the United Nations; but when have France and the United Kingdom ever regarded their membership of WEU as a major factor in their decisions in the Security Council? And then just try to imagine them sharing their strategy with other WEU states which happened to become non-permanent members of that Council!

In reality, what is most likely to happen is that everything will dissolve into a series of inter-governmental agencies with a very wide membership like the CSCE at present, which suits quite a number of countries that fear rather than desire an ever more dominant rôle for Germany in Europe.

It would be worth asking the Rapporteur whether he does not think that it would be more practical to aim decisively at a series of agreements within the CSCE partnership, rather than make the objective WEU as the defence arm of the European Union. A report in the context of a debate which should be resumed with the United Nations could certainly not be ignored.

I feel it might be interesting to tell non-Italians here present that this morning a leading Italian newspaper, the *Corriere della Sera*, published an interview with Dominique Moisi, whose concluding remark, on the subject of the current difficulties, was: "it is certainly a scandal that the aggressors' gains should not be contested. But if this should not happen the worst is to be feared". In the same interview, Moisi says: "this crisis should prompt Europeans to give serious thought to a strong and independent European security policy".

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – I would like to join other colleagues in congratulating our colleagues and friends Mr. Soell and Mr. Baumel on the report we are discussing. We all agree that it is an absolutely essential and timely report and that it deals with the principal preoccupation of this Assembly, namely the need to have an adequate common European defence policy.

I will limit myself to the philosophy behind the two amendments which I have to say I have withdrawn from this debate, which basically concerned what the Rapporteur, and in particular Mr. Baumel, was saying in paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper concerning "the creation of a multinational African peace-keeping force" and the implications of such an inter-African force, as this is something of which we are all aware; namely the continuing drama of the African continent, afflicted by fundamentalism, huge public debt, tribal warfare, population explosion, political corruption, a lamentable health situation, especially with regard to AIDS throughout Central Africa, and very slow economic and cultural development etc.

In this respect we felt it appropriate to strengthen the responsibility of the African organisations, and in particular the Organisation for African Unity, always under a United Nations mandate, because the commitment, support and strengthening of the rôle and prestige of the African institutions is the way to increase self-respect and the conviction that these institutions ought to have greater moral authority in their own continent.

The second point to which I referred in the withdrawn amendments was the reference in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper to European forces, in reality European armed

Mr. Borderas (continued)

forces, which are giving special assistance in humanitarian interventions. The armed forces have always had a protective rôle to play. This very week we – this parliamentarian who is addressing you now, and also the President of this Assembly, and other parliamentarians and officials of the Assembly of Western European Union – have witnessed the Tramontana manoeuvres in Spain, involving nothing but the problem of evacuating civilians in a mock military manoeuvre which took place in parts of southern Spain. This serves to demonstrate the relevance of this subject as regards the action of the armed forces, but there have been many other precedents, such as the Berlin airlift or more recent action in favour of the Kurds, or in Bosnia, Rwanda, Central America, Somalia, etc.

I believe that the rôle of the armed forces is basically to use arms to defend reason, democracy and peace and to provide protection. The armed forces protect us with their weapons and their strength and for that reason they are respected and feared, and this in turn enables them to ensure that political non-governmental, medical and other aid institutions are able to carry out their humanitarian and peace-keeping rôle.

I think the Rapporteur has understood this and shares these concerns with this member of parliament, and I am grateful to Mr. Baumel for the interest he has shown in these ideas, and to you for the forbearance you have shown in listening to me.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Next is Mr. Nečas, an observer from the Czech Republic.

Mr. NECAS (*Observer from the Czech Republic*). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to thank you for the opportunity to address this distinguished Assembly. I greatly admire the report by Mr. Baumel, which is remarkable for its brilliant analysis.

We find it very useful that you are giving liaison officers from associate partner countries a more active rôle in the Planning Cell, in particular by drafting a list of the forces of associate partners available to WEU and by including units from those countries in force packages for contingency plans. That could be our first contribution to WEU's main operational tasks.

The Czech Republic has been prepared to take part in WEU operations – especially humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks. As you know, we have had our battalion in UNPROFOR – it numbers almost 1 100 men and women. We have also run a field hospital in former Yugoslavia; a Czech general has been one of the sector commanders in Croatia; and we set up the training centre for Uni-

ted Nations forces in the area. We are one of the central European countries already to have signed the partnership programme within the framework of partnership for peace.

Our response to the demands of the new security situation in Europe is to establish a rapid reaction force. The fourth army brigade, with logistic support, consists of several battalions, combining paratroop and light infantry elements.

A major step forward on the road to the creation of WEU operational capability was the instigation of the combined joint task forces idea, planned for out-of-area operations without resort to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The framework document of PFP is not based on Article 5 either. I think that we should try to find closer connections between the CJTF idea and the PFP and WEU's associate partnership countries.

I am convinced that stronger military co-operation would help associate partners to come closer to full membership of WEU.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Both Rapporteurs deserve our commendation for presenting matters of enormous importance to the Assembly. Their comments are of historic significance. Over the next decade, sittings of this Assembly will have to serve principally as monitoring agencies of the process to which these reports point. Our duty will be to provide a continuing assessment of developments and needs. At the same time, attention must be devoted to inadequacies.

We should also look searchingly at growing interest in the eastern countries. But we should also accept that those countries which seek, as many of us hope they will, to end separation and division in Europe, look to WEU, whether we like it or not, as providing a security guarantee for themselves and for Europe as a whole. This Assembly would be deluding itself if it felt that such security guarantees have any real meaning.

I was unable to be here yesterday, Mr. President – I think that you were in the same position – but the reason that I finally decided to speak in this debate, although arriving only this evening, is the answer that I read to a question by one of my colleagues to the Secretary-General.

My colleague asked about the number of troops in Bosnia. I was astonished – I do not know whether Lord Mackie was astonished as well – by the Secretary-General's response: that he could not tell him the numbers and that my colleague should get them from the United Nations – and in any case, what did numbers matter?

Mr. Hardy (continued)

Numbers have mattered an enormous amount in Bosnia, and they may matter in other crises which – God forbid – may occur in Europe. I think that we were entitled to a proper response, considering the questions that were asked yesterday about European territory, about horrors in Europe for which Europe as a whole must bear responsibility.

There has been failure. There has been a failure in the perception of crisis; a failure in the response to crisis; and a failure in Europe to sustain and stand by European judgments, which may well cost us dear as the cruel and harsh months of winter descend upon that unhappy area. However, that is a matter to which the Assembly will have to return.

This report comes at the same time as the Noordwijk declaration. It is an interesting and very welcome declaration, but it stands in a logical progression from similar gatherings and pronouncements over a decade or more, and some of those statements of the past have been of little more value than sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal, and have been seen merely as historical curiosities. If the declaration is not followed by a determined acceptance of European responsibility, it will deserve the same dismissal.

It is odd that Europe has still not learned the lessons that we should have perceived at the time of the Rome gathering. Members who were present then will recall the claims that were made about WEU having woken up. "Europe's sleeping giant awakes" was the kind of headline that appeared in several of our newspapers. The sleeping giant may have awoken, but it then turned over and went back to sleep.

The critical situation in Europe today does not allow of somnolence. It is time that Europe developed its own capacities and its own determination to see that security is established on the continent – and not only established, but maintained. That will require a rather more determined approach from some member states and a more vigorous and active approach from within this organisation.

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the debate.

Do the Rapporteurs wish to comment briefly?

I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, there were many approving voices in yesterday's and today's debate, so I do not want to prolong the debate much further now. But I would like to take up a few of the statements, because I think that they have advanced the discussion, if only here in the Assembly.

When discussing the problems between Italy and Slovenia, Mr. Bianchi rightly said that these

problems must be resolved in a constructive manner as quickly as possible. Let me add – and here I am also referring to the statements by other Italian members – that in my view the problems lay not only in Rome but to some extent also in Ljubljana; that is still the case today. In any case, the misunderstandings are not all on one side.

Mr. Antretter has once again referred to Article V of the Treaty, which is also referred to in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation, on which there is an amendment. Its underlying idea – which can also be found in the explanatory memorandum – is as follows: we cannot allow the scope of Article V to be weakened, particularly in view of the at times very confused, indeed chaotic situation in the Balkans. So this is especially true with regard to new members who have problems with neighbours and have obviously not yet shown themselves willing to settle their problems peacefully in all cases. That is the intention of Article V. If that intention is understood, then I think we have at least a basis here.

Lord Finsberg rightly criticised the Council of Ministers for evidently finding it difficult to keep us informed in a number of areas. He was particularly critical – rightly again – of the fact that we have still not been told how far, if at all, the Council of Ministers is able to take account of the financial implications of enlargement for the Assembly.

Mr. Pahor stood up strongly for Slovenia again, especially as regards the adoption of Mr. Puig's amendment. I will be voting for that amendment; I want to announce that now. But let me come back to my introductory remark, that the Slovenian side should also take the kind of constructive approach that is needed to resolve the problems.

Mr. Roseta took the view that the report did not deal adequately with global problems, i.e., problems outside the rather narrow confines of Europe. We have tried to respond to this complaint and have also placed special emphasis on the need for co-operation in the Mediterranean. The report has been expanded to include these areas.

In this context, let me, however, point out that in the summer of this year Mr. Puig submitted a very careful report on problems outside Europe and on the question of how the Council of Ministers proposes to react to these problems. In its answer to Recommendation 559, the Council of Ministers said – to put it in simpler terms – that it was prepared for every problem, every problem was discussed at the relevant meetings. Let me point out that there are examples – which also appear in my report, such as Rwanda – where this has obviously not been done on an adequate scale.

At any rate, what some of the observers, especially those from Central and Eastern Europe, have said – and here I am quoting the Ukrainian observer – namely that where possible there

Mr. Soell (continued)

should be no new divisions in the European security area, is a desire shared by the Assembly, even though we know that it will take a number of years before we have a security architecture in Europe that can to some extent also formally guarantee equal security for everybody. But what is quite clear, at least in this Assembly – and it is reflected in the reports by its members including, in my view, the report by Mr. Baumel and the one I submitted – is that any serious security problems in Central and Eastern Europe are also bound to have very serious implications for Western Europe, and to create a very serious threat to the security of Western Europe. The Assembly is aware of this.

Let me now discuss what the Slovenian President Mr. Kucan said about the problems in former Yugoslavia, which we will be addressing again during the urgent debate tomorrow. If we were to follow the model of the policy pursued by a certain group in Belgrade, and also in Pale in recent years, of combining demands for ethnic homogeneity with what might be termed the old historical claims to certain territories, if that were to become a kind of model for future European policy, it would be like opening Pandora's box. We must do our utmost to prevent that. For then new generations in every country – not excepting my own – who had no historical sense of guilt would suddenly feel the urge to assert these claims.

In conclusion, let me thank all those members who have wished me well in my future career. I am not one of those who consider themselves irreplaceable, not in this Assembly either. But it did me good to receive a round of compliments here that made it clear to me at any rate that in many areas, right across the political spectrum represented here, we have managed to reach a common perception of the problems facing us, and common conclusions. That will be one of the most valuable experiences of these ten years that I will carry with me in my future career.

Thank you very much for your attention and your patience.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Soell, for those encouraging remarks.

Does the Chairman of the Political Committee wish to say something?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – I would like to comment on the unfortunate incident involving the Dutch Minister, who is Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Today, when we are presenting two exceptionally important reports, which demonstrate how, with application and thoroughness, this Assembly is capable of presenting the Council of Ministers

and the international community with meticulous and responsible ideas, analyses and projects, we have been obliged to witness the deplorable behaviour of a minister neither answering the questions put to him, nor being prepared to answer any further questions. I imagine that what we experienced this morning will give rise to more serious protests than the one I am making now, but I wish to draw attention to it, because the contrast between today's events involving the representative of the Council of Ministers and what we are now undertaking in this Assembly – adopting reports of the utmost importance – seems to me to be enormous.

The two reports which we are presenting here this afternoon, Mr. President, represent a qualitative leap forward of the first order. This is the design for a method of setting up a European defence system. It is still a design, not a complete project, but this is the time for clear ideas about the direction we need to take. The two Rapporteurs are exceptionally competent. Let me say that all of us here in this Assembly, myself included, are eminent parliamentarians and there can be no doubt that if we had had to choose the two most capable representatives, we could not have done better than we did in choosing Mr. Baumel and Mr. Soell.

The combination of subject matter, the exceptional political situation in Europe at present, and the competence of the Rapporteurs have come together in these two reports to define the present framework with great precision, setting out the challenges of the future and the urgent and necessary action required to transform the present situation in the area of defence. This is an extraordinary contribution to the process upon which we have embarked to define a common defence policy and out of that common defence to create a new geostrategic order in Europe and with the rest of the world; I believe the contribution of the Assembly is important to the Political Committee. There was great unanimity with regard to Mr. Soell's and the Defence Committee's report in supporting Mr. Baumel's proposals.

We do not have much time, Mr. President, but I would simply like to put down four ideas which I believe are important and which are contained in the two reports.

First there is the institutional question. It is clear, as the Rapporteurs indicate, that the rôle of WEU must obviously be as a link, as the defence arm of the European Union, and at the same time as the European pillar of NATO. Neither one without the other. WEU must, in any case, be that pillar and that European union in the area of defence.

There appears to me to be no option, and here the Rapporteurs show us the way. When the sub-

Mr. de Puig (continued)

ject of enlarging WEU is raised, which is another important institutional theme, we are told that in no circumstances can this enlargement mean a weakening of WEU, but rather a reinforcement and, what is more, we are given an indication of the significance which a future WEU could have even when full integration has been achieved in the context of the European Union in defence matters. This is something on which we will have to reflect in the future, but these ideas are there in these reports.

Another point for consideration is what Mr. Baumel said this morning when he was talking about responsibilities beyond Europe. This does not mean that WEU is thinking in terms of excessive ambition, of a desire to expand, of imperialism. Not at all. It is simply that if we are truly aware of the geostrategic position today, we must know that peace is a global issue. We are aware of the interdependence which exists in all areas of society and also, of course, in matters relating to peace and peaceful coexistence between nations; and we are aware of interdependence in more directly geostrategic matters. When we speak of the future of WEU, therefore, we must think of it in a world context, even though its actual base is in Europe. We need to think about what WEU can achieve beyond its territory, that is to say beyond its European limits.

Finally, another element which seems important to me is the idea of conferring real operational capability on the European defence policy. I had the opportunity of referring to this at the Paris colloquy. If we are not capable of defining an institutional framework and political direction at one and the same time, if we are not capable of meeting the technological challenge of creating a European defence strategy, if we are not capable of understanding that however many speeches we make, however many institutions we create, however many political directions we declare, if we are not capable of having armed forces able to carry out the operations in our speeches and our definitions, then there is little point in talking about WEU and a European defence policy.

This is a very important challenge, because it is a matter of knowing whether we want to continue to be dependent on technology, which also means politics, or whether Europe wants to play more than a marginal rôle on the world scene, not independently of others, but with its own capability denoting a position in the world. The technological challenges are very great. Most conventional weapons are obsolete. We need to make changes in the armed forces in our own countries and in general. We must make progress in communications, in the complex matter of electronics. We have made some progress in WEU. We have the

Torrejón centre, but we have to go much further, and in addition to decisions on institutions and definitions, we have to make decisions of an operational nature. In this respect I attach great importance to what Mr. Baumel said this morning and to the substance of the reports.

Mr. President, I would like to conclude by recalling, as other colleagues have done before me, that Mr. Soell is leaving us and that this is his last report. As Chairman of the committee I will say what any of my colleagues would say: we are proud to have been able to work alongside Mr. Soell in the committee. We are proud to have had him as President of the Assembly. We are grateful for all we have learned from him, from his political skill and his intellectual ability, and we have very much appreciated his personal attitude as a man with whom one can discuss and co-operate – in short, a friend.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I am in a dilemma. I have had more than one complaint from different sources about the length of speeches and questions. The Chair is placed in a difficult position when trying to maintain a balance without being draconian or too indulgent. The problem is not simply that people get upset while they are waiting, but the business is put well out of kilter.

I am advised that we must finish at 6.30 p.m. tonight and we must reach the report of Mr. López Henares as he will not be here tomorrow. That is why I request your co-operation in trying to finish this business as soon as possible.

I believe that Mr. Baumel wishes to speak as Chairman of the Defence Committee.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall be glad to meet your request and be as brief as possible but you will agree that it is only normal for me to thank the speakers in this debate. They have made very useful contributions which fill out certain passages in my report. I was pleased to note that all tended in the same direction i.e., of course, greater responsibility for WEU, in other words the defence of Europe. I shall not go back over what they all said, from Vice-President Martinez to Mr. Hardy. I also thank the observers from the Central and Eastern European countries who rightly spoke in the debate. To hear the voices of representatives of countries that have broken out of their once totalitarian systems and are now concerned as they should be to ensure their stability and security in the framework of a greater Europe is a great event.

This debate is not meant solely for the members of our Assembly. It covers a number of positive and original proposals addressed to the WEU authorities: on the one hand the Council of Ministers, which will, I hope, try to bear them in mind, and on the other, to the Secretary-General, who is

Mr. Baumel (continued)

with us today and whose task it will be to put into practice the suggestions we have made. We are well aware that, with the difficulties there are, he will not be able to act immediately on the many and varied ideas we have introduced in this debate. The report, my speech and all the speeches you have made, contain a very rich store of ideas of which we must try to make the best possible use in WEU's interest.

Tomorrow we shall have a debate of major political importance, and we were right to take this decision. I shall then make a very clear statement at another level.

May I add three constructive ideas to the in-depth debate we have had on defence problems.

We cannot close our eyes to nuclear proliferation. In Europe in addition to the British and French nuclear capabilities, there are two terrifying arsenals which continue to be massive threats to our security. The Russian arsenal is obviously one, but so, and we should not forget this, is the Ukrainian arsenal, which though being dismantled still exists in disquieting conditions. I congratulate the Ukrainian Government on having signed the non-proliferation treaty. So what we need, Secretary-General, is to set up a body in the form of a committee under the authority of WEU, to study and monitor the problems of avoiding nuclear proliferation in Europe, which we cannot afford to ignore.

The second is that we must, as soon as possible, try to acquire a central intelligence unit for the information we so desperately lack. As WEU is at present organised, there is no real system for making use of information. In addition to the space information provided by the Torrejón station, WEU needs a real centre for the co-ordination and use of intelligence.

We cannot ignore one of the new variants of future strategy – a very relevant report has been submitted on the subject – which is no longer the need to counter an attack by hundreds of nuclear missiles, but to deal with the blackmail which our towns and countries might be subject to from certain countries in the southern Mediterranean in possession of rudimentary and highly dangerous missiles; such blackmail might have a very serious impact on our populations. In other words, we must start work on designing, producing and developing an anti-missile policy. This will be one of the major factors of security from the year 2000 onwards.

May I, as Chairman and Rapporteur of the Defence Committee, and above all one of the most senior members of our Assembly, convey to my friend, Professor Soell, my best wishes for a happy and successful return to private life. With the wisdom of Cincinnatus, he is giving up politics to

return to the study of history at the university. He is a great scholar and sets us a good example.

The PRESIDENT. – The Political Committee has tabled in Document 1439 a draft recommendation to which nine amendments have been tabled.

The amendments will be taken in the order in which they relate to the text, that is, 9, 3, 4, 1, 5, 6, 7, 2, 8.

Amendment 9, which has been tabled by Mr. De Decker, reads:

9. Leave out paragraph (xv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. De Decker to move the amendment.

Mr. De DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Paragraph (xv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation in the excellent report by Mr. Soell reads: "Fearing also that the refusal of the WEU Council to admit all the European NATO member countries to full membership of WEU may complicate the implementation of WEU's rôle as the European pillar of NATO;"

It is sometimes appropriate to criticise the Council, but I do not make it my rule, and sometimes we criticise it wrongly. This sentence is neither right nor useful, because in fact it is untrue. From the institutional point of view, since the Maastricht Treaty it has been clear that to be a member of WEU, a country must logically be a member of the European Union, for the reason that WEU is going to be its military arm. Again following the logic of Maastricht and, in parallel, of the Atlantic Alliance, of which WEU is to be the European pillar, it would be better – and in my view necessary – for the WEU member countries to be members of the Atlantic Alliance as well. It is wrong to suggest that refusing to allow into WEU Atlantic Alliance member countries that are not members of the European Union is an obstacle. I therefore ask the Assembly to drop this paragraph, which adds nothing and leads us into error.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment? ...

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – This goes to the heart of the Assembly's decisions over many years. The Assembly was in the forefront of saying that it believed that both Greece and Turkey, for example, should be admitted to WEU. Although the Council of Ministers was blackmailed into refusing to allow Turkey to join, we have never gone back on what we said.

Given yesterday's decision in Norway and having listened to our Norwegian observer, are we really going to say that those loyal members of NATO, who either do not wish to become or are not allowed to become members of the European Union may not become full members of WEU? If

Lord Finsberg (continued)

ministers want to pursue that crazy policy, let them. We are simply accepting their policy plus a bit more because we are the defence component of the European Union but also the European pillar of NATO. If we are to believe in both of those – we do, because they are part of our set-up – we should not accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Finsberg.

It is normal to have only one speech against, but it appears that Mr. Pastusiak wants to say something about the amendment.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Observer from Poland*). – As the amendment also directly affects the future membership of Eastern European countries to WEU, I want to express the views of our region. I am sure that I am expressing the views of all my colleagues from Central Europe and the associate partner countries. We believe that the amendment will slow down prospects for future membership and probably be viewed by associate partners as raising the threshold of membership of integrated institutions. If the Assembly accepts the amendment, it will send the wrong signal to Central European countries and affect their hopes of becoming members of the integrated institutions. In a way, it would also create an interlocking mechanism.

The PRESIDENT. – I am advised that, contrary to advice that I received on the matter, only one response should be allowed. But in view of the fact that Mr. Pastusiak felt strongly that he needed to put the Eastern European view, I allowed him to do so.

Does the Rapporteur wish to comment on the amendment?

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Because this amendment was so to speak the last one, the Political Committee did not have a chance to consider it in political terms. Following the arguments put forward by Lord Finsberg and other arguments which were raised and which may in effect be based on some misunderstanding, I believe that the Assembly should adhere to its position and that we should retain the version chosen by the Political Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Chairman of the Political Committee.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – The Political Committee has not had the opportunity to study this amendment so it best be put to the vote.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 9 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 9 is negatived.

Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Liberal Group, reads:

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “countries” to the end of the paragraph and insert “taking into account the progress made on the way to EU membership”.

I call Mr. Blaauw, whom we are pleased to see back in our midst, to move the amendment.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – On behalf of the Liberal Group, I move Amendment 3, which has been distributed on time and discussed in the Political Committee.

The original text of Mr. Soell’s draft recommendation is not in line with the ideas expressed in the Maastricht Treaty, which says that countries becoming members of the European Union should then become members of WEU. Nevertheless, I do not wish to couple those too closely. A country that is already in the process of becoming a WEU member could already be in the process of becoming a member of the European Union. It is not a case of reducing the original text, but that is the meaning of this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does anyone want to oppose the amendment?...

Mr. Soell wishes to take the floor.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not want to hold up the debate. But the Political Committee has rejected this amendment, using the same argument that the Polish observer used this morning in a different connection. There are different speeds with regard to the general accession to the European Union and the security requirements. At best we may attain the same speed. But there can simply be different speeds. The original version drafted by the Political Committee takes that into account. That is why I would ask you to reject this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Soell.

You have opposed the amendment on behalf of the committee.

I now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

Amendment 4, which has been tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Liberal Group, reads:

4. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Blaauw to move the amendment.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation refers to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. To the Liberal Group, Article V of that treaty is sacrosanct, so we do not need to discuss it or put it in a recommendation. It is in the modified Brussels Treaty

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

proper, so it should be left out here. It is above discussion and by putting it in the recommendation, we risk opening a discussion on Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. I read in the explanatory memorandum to Mr. Soell's report the reason behind its inclusion, but unfortunately we are adopting not the explanatory memorandum but the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone want to oppose the amendment?...

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Blaauw has made the case against the amendment, not for it. We are debating a document called "A European security policy". Article V of the treaty is clear: we had better read it so that people can understand what they are being asked to delete. "If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the parties so attacked all military and other aid and assistance in their power."

I suggest that it would be crazy to remove that from the report, which merely states the security position in Europe.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I must protest at that. Lord Finsberg is twisting my words. I said that Article V is sacrosanct to the Liberal Group.

The PRESIDENT. – That is a matter for debate. Lord Finsberg is as entitled to his view as you are. Although I welcomed you back, Mr. Blaauw, you seem to have come back in a stormy mood.

I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this committed move that we have just witnessed makes it clear once again – as I suggested in my summary – that precisely because we would like a great many new members to join, in no circumstances do we want the competence and substance of Article V, which forms the very heart of the treaty, to be weakened in any respect. What it actually refers to is known to every member. We know that with regard to the accession of a country, the Council of Ministers has already excluded very specific cases, for whatever reasons, however understandable they may be. At any rate we should emphasise the significance of Article V, which has an external significance, just as internally it makes WEU into a system of collective security. That is why I am in favour of keeping to the Political Committee's version.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mr. de Puig and others, reads:

1. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 6 and insert:

"Make arrangements without further delay for granting Slovenia associate partner status;"

I call Mr. de Puig to move the amendment.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. Benvenuti, who also signed this amendment, wishes to speak to it, Mr. President.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen. This morning, we heard President Kucan's address, we listened to the debate and in particular the speech by Mr. Fassino who had given prior notice of this amendment and, on the same subject, we have now heard the wise words of Mr. Soell. With this amendment we are not seeking so much to pronounce one way or the other on the issue of substance – I am referring to the dispute between Italy and Slovenia – which is at present blocking the accession of Slovenia to the European Union and WEU. We are, in fact, seeking rather to assert a principle which should apply in this as in other cases, namely that no bilateral issue can block either the development of multilateral relationships in general or the process of European integration in particular. On the contrary, as President Martinez quite rightly said in his letter to the Ministers of the European Union countries, it is our view that especially at this level of multilateral relationships and European integration the parties in dispute can and must reach a solution.

The only point of substance which should matter to us is whether Slovenia satisfies the parameters; and it seems to me that this morning's debate plainly showed this to be the case. Slovenia is a member of the United Nations, of the Council of Europe and of NATO. Naturally, like Mr. Soell, I hope that both sides will act wisely; but this is what we are trying to lay down as a principle in this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does anyone want to oppose the amendment?...

I call Mr. Mitolo.

Mr. MITOLO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I shall vote against the amendment tabled because my political party, which supports the present Italian Government, believes that the dispute with Slovenia should be settled as a matter of priority. I believe that I am keeping faith with my political views in taking that stance.

Mr. Mitolo (continued)

The opinion that bilateral relationships should not exclude any development of multilateral relationships is worthy of respect but also one which could very well be met by argument to the contrary. It is difficult for a family to take in someone with whom a member of the same family is in continuing dispute. It would appear to me wiser that the outsider should join the family when he has settled all his problems with all members of that family.

It is not true that Slovenia can today be considered to be conforming with the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly as regards its internal legislation seeing, in fact, that the Prime Minister of Slovenia said a short time ago that an amendment had been proposed to the constitution which is still not to the standard of European constitutions as regards principles of ownership and the restoration of property to private individuals.

We Italians know how we had to pay in 1945, 1946 and 1947 when we were forced to hand over our land and a kind of ethnic cleansing began; let us not forget this! I consider, therefore, that there is no choice but to vote against this amendment which, not by accident – as I would stress while respecting my colleagues to the full – has been tabled by a group of Italian members of parliament in opposition to the present Italian Government.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Political Committee has adopted this amendment. I see no reason why we should not adopt it. I am in favour of concluding the debate as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT. – I cannot allow the other member who wishes to oppose the amendment to speak. That is at my discretion, and we are running desperately short of time. I am sorry.

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Amendment 5, which has been tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Liberal Group reads:

5. In paragraph 7, after “European security” insert “in connection with the Noordwijk preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy”.

I call Mr. Blaauw to move the amendment.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I move this amendment to dispel the weird impression that the report was written before the Noordwijk meeting was held. It is a good idea to keep it in line with the preliminary conclusions of that meeting.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you once again.

I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – This amendment was adopted unanimously by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 5 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

Amendment 6, which has been tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Liberal Group, reads:

6. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “the success of the conference on the” and insert “a meaningful”.

I call Mr. Blaauw to move the amendment.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – The Liberal Group wanted to reinforce the wording of paragraph 9, and for that reason changed the wording, as set out in the amendment. This gives us much more the effect at which we were aiming.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The amendment would insert the word “meaningful” before “success”. If success did not have meaning, it would not be successful. Therefore, the word is superfluous and the amendment should never have been tabled.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I am very sorry, but the amendment would leave out the word “success”, so that the paragraph would then read: “contribute actively to a meaningful stability pact in Europe”.

The PRESIDENT. – There you have it.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment? ...

Does the Chairman wish to speak?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – After discussion the committee adopted this amendment unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 6 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

Amendment 7, which has been tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Liberal Group, reads:

7. In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper leave out from “arrange” to the end of the paragraph and insert “for WEU members to act in a more co-ordinated fashion in the Security Council of that organisation;”

I call Mr. Blaauw to move the amendment.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – We understood that there was some misdrafting in paragraph 11, and the amendment reflects what was meant by the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

Does the Chairman wish to speak?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – The committee adopted this amendment unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 7 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

Amendment 7 is agreed to.

As Amendment 7 has been agreed to, Amendment 2 falls. We therefore now proceed direct to Amendment 8.

Amendment 8, which has been tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Liberal Group, reads:

8. Leave out paragraph 13 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Blaauw to move the amendment.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I withdraw the amendment, after discussion in the Political Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1439, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

We shall now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1439.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft order.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

1. See page 24.

*The draft order is adopted*².

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to give an explanation of vote, since this is the only chance I shall have. I say to Mr. Blaauw that I in no way intended to impugn his honour. I accepted the honourableness of all he said, but I felt that what he said resulted in something different. I do not think that he realised that, but in no way did I mean to imply anything to his discredit.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. We are all friends again now – that is excellent.

The Defence Committee has tabled in Document 1445 a draft recommendation to which four amendments have been tabled.

Amendments 1 and 2 have been withdrawn, so we shall start with Amendment 3.

Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase, reads:

3. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (x) and insert:

“Noting that European armed forces are increasingly called upon to perform humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks and that defence budgets of European countries must consequently provide for a sufficient level of armed forces to carry out these tasks;”

I call Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase to move the amendment.

Mrs. GAIOTTI de BIASE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the first part of the amendment recognises the rôle of the armed forces in providing humanitarian aid and action to maintain peace, while the second part looks at the concept of credibility. This concept, therefore, has to be applied to the duties which we today recognise as appropriate for the armed forces. In other words the amendment has not the slightest effect on the budgets of individual states.

I think, therefore, that the amendment can be approved as it recognises the important function of the armed forces in terms of the duties which today we all recognise as essentially the maintenance of peace in the world.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Does Mr. Baumel or the Rapporteur have a view?

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee studied this amendment this morning and approved it, subject to a minor change which affects only the French version and has been approved by the proposer, Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase. The committee approved it unanimously.

2. See page 27.

The PRESIDENT. – I see that the mover acquiesces in what Mr. Baumel says. Thank you.

I now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

Amendment 4, which has been tabled by Mr. López Henares, reads:

4. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Give further thought to common security and defence policy, leading subsequently to the drafting of a white paper" and insert "Give further thought as soon as possible to a common security and defence policy, so that a white paper may be drafted forthwith".

I call Mr. López Henares to move the amendment.

Mr. LÓPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I shall speak very briefly. I have tabled this amendment solely with a view to speeding up the adoption of a recommendation proposed by Mr. Baumel for the drafting of the white paper on European defence. The Council of Ministers recently announced that it would call a summit meeting on European defence. But first, thorough study and consideration are required. The white paper on the possibilities of, and dangers inherent in, a European defence, needs to be written as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – I wholeheartedly approve this very wise and useful amendment, which the committee approved unanimously this morning.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1445, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

5. The future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1437)

The PRESIDENT. – We have at last reached the next order of the day, which is, despite the lateness of the hour, the presentation by Mr. López Henares of the report submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on the future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón, Document 1437.

I call Mr. López Henares to present his report.

Mr. LÓPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I shall be very brief in view of the short time available, but the report needs a brief introduction since it concerns a very important matter.

(The speaker continued in Spanish)

One of the contributions made by Mr. Baumel's splendid report and recommendation is to insist on the need for our organisation to become operational. This is something we have been saying for some time. What would it mean to be operational? It would mean having the capability to act immediately and effectively and to do this, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is absolutely essential that we have proper intelligence. These days, information via satellite, using existing procedures, is particularly effective and indispensable.

Constant innovation in the field of technology means that it is possible to have high-definition images providing real-time information over millions of square kilometres in a few minutes.

Nothing in the 1967 Space Treaty prohibits keeping satellites on monitoring missions and consequently this type of observation is completely legal. To this end, and on the basis of this assumption, Mr. President, in 1991 the Council of Ministers decided, at the Assembly's request, to establish the Satellite Centre; it was subsequently decided to locate it at Torrejón, an air base some 20 km outside Madrid. In view of the fact that the Centre was established on a provisional basis and that until 1996 it will continue to be experimental, the WEU Council has to take a decision concerning the permanence of the Centre. Conscious of this and at the suggestion of some of its leading members, the Technological and Aerospace Committee, which I have the honour of chairing, decided during an observation visit to Washington, to draw up as quickly as possible a report informing the Council of the Assembly's view, which would enable it to take a decision on this matter on 14th November, or later at a future meeting early in 1995. This was why we set to work immediately, gathering documentation and making a special extended visit to the Centre, where we met the

1. See page 29.

Mr. López Henares (continued)

director, Mr. Barry Blaydes, and the different heads of department and spent time learning about its achievements to date.

On the basis of these reports we reached the conclusion that the Centre which, having been inaugurated as recently as 1993, is still in its infancy, has done some valuable work. All new installations are complicated. The Centre has benefited from the contributions of various experts from different countries in order to maintain quotas and it is managed by a steering committee consisting of representatives from the nine member countries.

According to the Noordwijk declaration, on the recommendation of the Space Group, the Council of Ministers will take a decision at its meeting in April next concerning the permanence of the Centre or possibly its transformation and, of course, the appropriate steps to assure its improved operation. Mr. President, after this analysis we have concluded that the Centre is absolutely necessary, as we will have the opportunity of seeing tomorrow from the splendid report produced by Mr. Valleix, who is also a member of our committee, on the need for a complete satellite system. This Centre is the foundation stone, the first step towards our own intelligence system, if we are sufficiently courageous to take the decision to proceed with this. Without it, I repeat, this organisation will always be reliant upon intelligence provided by others.

Mr. President, the most interesting information for the Assembly's purposes as far as the Centre is concerned is that its two basic missions are the interpretation of images provided by the SPOT and LANDSAT satellites and shortly by the Helios I satellite; these images are received not only via optical impulses but also by ultra-violet and infra-red rays and by radar, which enables images to be received even in adverse atmospheric conditions.

As you are aware, early next year the Helios programme will put Helios I into orbit and, with technology developed in Europe in this joint Italian, Spanish and French project, this will result in an increase in the number of images received. The users of the Centre will be WEU itself and any member states who wish to use it; to date, six of the nine member states have requested information not only of a military nature, but also concerning civilian matters associated with monitoring the earth.

On numerous occasions, and especially recently, we have insisted on the need for a European identity; indeed, several speakers have repeated this today. This is not simply for its own sake, but out of absolute necessity if we want to be able to carry

out joint actions which will lend strength and coherence to our action as the appropriate organisation. The Torrejón Satellite Centre is one example, indeed the only one of its kind, of such multinational co-operation for an essential operation in the area of defence.

Mr. President, we know, or so it would seem, that this matter of integration in European defence will be difficult. However, it is absolutely necessary. Consequently, as I have already said, and I repeat, it is necessary to break out of this situation, to see whether the white paper enables us to remove the blockage and realise that between the two radical alternatives for implementing a European defence policy, namely on the one hand firmly maintaining national positions with full respect for those positions or, on the other hand, a very advanced, integrated programme, there may perhaps be a middle way. This is what I am advocating. It would involve joint action, and part of this, of course, would be that WEU would have a satellite centre, just as one day it should have an army corps, with specific plans and an appropriate staff, all of which have been mentioned here today.

Mr. President, I will conclude by saying that for all these reasons, whether technical, such as I have just briefly explained, or political, with regard to our organisation's contribution, the Torrejón Centre with the necessary improvements, to which Mr. Baumel with characteristic critical insight alluded this morning – critical proposals which we must welcome – with such improvements a centre such as the one at Torrejón, which has just made a start, with the appropriate facilities, is essential for WEU. We must therefore give it our support; indeed that is the aim of the recommendation to the Council to grant the Centre permanent status in the near future, Secretary-General, because naturally its present temporary status promotes anxiety among its employees and, understandably, a lack of faith in the future.

In conclusion, Mr. President, happily there have been no amendments and I deduce that this indicates complete agreement with the text of the report; I therefore request the Assembly to give this report its unanimous approval.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. López Henares.

The debate is open.

I call Mrs. Guirado.

Mrs. GUIRADO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, at a rather late stage of the afternoon, perhaps because we have been listening to some inspiring debates, it would be appropriate to recall that the purpose of the report presented by Mr. López Henares is to analyse the work of something which we in Europe have put into operation in a very short time, and to analyse something

Mrs. Guirado (continued)

which has existed for such a short time might seem rather a difficult task.

Let us refresh our memories a little; the decision of the WEU Council of Ministers to establish a satellite monitoring centre was taken in June 1991. So from June 1991, here we are in November 1994 actually monitoring what has been achieved. This is not long at all, especially when we are analysing something so complex.

All day long colleagues have been speaking about important matters and I would like to recall some of the comments made by two members of this Assembly. Mr. Martínez spoke today about security as a factor in peace-keeping. There is no doubt that without security there can be no peace. Insecurity always takes us this way and the war in the former territories of Yugoslavia is a very clear example of this.

However, for me what Mr. Baumel said was also very important: he denounced the temporary nature of what we in Europe have constructed. When we build, it does not seem natural to build something of a temporary nature, nor does it seem natural that its temporary nature should make its future uncertain. I imagine that taxpayers like to know that when their money is invested in a particular project, that project will continue and will be what we sometimes too frequently call, in market terms, profitable.

The fundamental purpose of the Torrejón de Ardoz Centre in Madrid is to be a component of the European space system. What makes the Centre so important? Some of us have already had the opportunity to visit it, and observing its operations without an expert to explain them did not help us to understand its fundamental importance, but what makes it important is that it is the only centre of its kind in the world. We in Europe have finally taken a step forward, ahead of the great powers such as Russia once was and the United States continue to be. We have created a centre which is unique in the world and today we are rather uncertain as to what its future might be. It would be absolutely inexcusable if its future did not match the expectations it aroused at its inauguration.

However, the Centre does not only undertake military tasks; it has a dual function, which is to train experts – we all know that experts cost a fortune these days – to train good specialists in any of these areas. But it also has a rôle in the verification of peace agreements and monitoring the skies to observe movements in one place or another.

It has another fundamental mission, which is monitoring the earth. Norway has just informed us, today, that it does not wish to join the Euro-

pean Union because it is also concerned that all of us should have a greater sensitivity to the environment. This is one of the rôles of the Torrejón Centre. Yet none of the countries which support the Centre has given much thought or made much reference to monitoring the environment, which will be our only legacy to future generations and unless we take remedial action we may be passing it on in a sorry state.

In my view the report, if we read it the wrong way round, contains what appears to be a contradiction, but is not. It says: "Judging very favourably the ... tasks assigned"; that is to say, the work achieved is judged in the report. Very good, very favourable, has achieved everything it was set, but then the report says: "Regretting, however, that ... tasks assigned to the Centre are few and far between". Again the report faces us with the facts: we have invested taxpayers' money, we have worked hard, we have done something unique in the world, but in the end, however unique, however marvellous, we are unable to make it fully operational. In our capacity as parliamentarians, and so that this does not happen again, like the incidents that happened today when the President of the Council of Ministers comes to explain to us, we ought to ask for explanations on the basis of this report, why the countries have not done more, not assigned more tasks, or more of their resources, so that the Centre can carry out all its work under the best possible conditions.

I think Mr. López Henares's report deserves the approval of this Assembly, not only because it has been extremely well drafted, but because it deserves the appreciation and gratitude of this Assembly for having the courage to judge technical achievements in a very short time, while denouncing the lack of interest which some countries have shown or the lack of use some countries have made of the Centre itself. Mr. López Henares has taken a very brave step in producing this report. That is why the Spanish representatives are supporting it, not because the Centre is located in Spain, but because, regardless of its location, at last we have been able to establish something important. From this point of view, my congratulations not only to the committee, but also to Mr. López Henares.

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the debate.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1437.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

The President (continued)

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

*The draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

6. Change in the orders of the day

The PRESIDENT. – In view of the lateness of the hour, I propose that the remaining orders of the day be taken tomorrow morning at the beginning of business.

Is that agreed?

It is agreed.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 30th November 1994, at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day.

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 1429).
2. Evolution of the Assembly's logistical requirements to take account of enlargement (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1438).
3. Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the

financial year 1995 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft supplementary budget, Document 1441).

4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1428 and addendum).
5. The situation in Bihac and the need to strengthen WEU (Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1450).
6. The development of a space-based observation system – Part III (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1436).
7. Co-operation between European space research institutes (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1434 and amendment).
8. Address by Mr. Caputo, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.)

1. See page 31.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 30th November 1994

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Change in the membership of a committee.
4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995; Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995 (*Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 1429, 1441, 1447 and 1448).
Speaker: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman and Rapporteur).
5. Evolution of the Assembly's logistical requirements to take account of enlargement (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1438).
Speakers: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman and Rapporteur), Lord Mackie of Benshie.
6. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts*, Doc. 1428 and addendum).
Speaker: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman and Rapporteur).
7. The situation in Bihac and the need to strengthen WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1450).
Speakers: Mr. Roseta (Rapporteur), Lord Finsberg, Mr. Rodrigues, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Korakas (Observer from Greece), Mr. De Decker, Mr. Domljan (Observer from Croatia), Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout, Mr. de Lipkowski, Mr. Mitolo, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Pécriaux, Lord Mackie of Benshie (point of order), Mr. Roseta (Rapporteur), Mr. de Puig (Chairman); (explanation of vote): Mr. Soell, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Rodrigues.
8. Address by Mr. Caputo, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
Replies by Mr. Caputo to questions put by: Mr. Pahor (Observer from Slovenia), Mr. Davis, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Latronico, Mr. Benvenuti, Mr. Sole Tura, Mr. Tusek (Observer from Austria), Mr. Parisi.
9. Change in the orders of the day.
10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

1. See page 35.

3. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT. – The United Kingdom Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of a committee:

Political Committee: Mr. Terry Davis as an alternate in place of Dr. Norman Godman.

Is it agreed?

It is so agreed.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995

Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995

(Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts, Docs. 1429, 1441, 1447 and 1448)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Rathbone of the report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary

The President (continued)

tary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995, Document 1429, debate and vote on the draft budget.

Mr. Rathbone has tabled a previous question on this draft budget on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration which has been distributed as Document 1447.

If the Assembly agrees to Mr. Rathbone's motion, the subject of debate will be removed from the agenda and from the register of the Assembly.

Mr. Rathbone has, on behalf of his committee, also tabled a motion for an order on the draft budget, Document 1448.

Rule 3(1) of the Rules of Procedure requires that the previous question be put to the vote immediately after the presentation of the relevant committee report.

I therefore propose that Mr. Rathbone present his report formally and I suggest that he then should speak to both his motion for the previous question, Document 1447, and his motion for an order, Document 1448, at the same time.

Under Rule 33, only the proposer of the previous question and one speaker against the motion may speak; and the time available to each speaker is five minutes.

The previous question and the motion for an order will be debated together.

I call Mr. Rathbone to speak.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I start as you suggested, Mr. President, by moving the previous question and the motion for an order, which stand in my name, on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

There are some background points which colleagues would like to have to this question of budgets this year. On the budget itself, the Assembly's requests were relatively modest in comparison with Assembly draft budgets in previous years and the draft budget for WEU organs for 1995.

This was even despite the fact that ministers, in their Kirchberg declaration, had pressed the Assembly to welcome associate partner countries and improve the status of the associate member countries' delegations. I believe that that is an important point of principle in all our discussions of the budget for next year and for the future.

The 1995 budget could be described as an effort to take account of the financial implications of the Council's encouragement to invite this greater participation from countries of Central and East-

ern Europe – whose participation we have seen in our debates at this meeting.

That drive translates into a twofold strategy of communication. The first is non-member countries participating in the work of the Assembly – reflected in the budget heads connected with communication as a whole – missions of parliamentarians and staff representation costs, upgrading of the chamber, and so forth. The second is to do with the wider public, via the media, via the creation of a B5 post in the press and information service, increased postal and electronic communications costs, and better translation services.

The proposed budget which we have put forward represented an increase over 1994 of only 7.7%, even after allowing for the increased rôle and responsibilities which the Assembly has to undertake.

There have been three meetings in recent months of the Committee on Budget and Organisation – equivalent to the committee which I am honoured to chair, within the Secretary-General's domain. They took place on 10th and 31st October and 24th November.

I was a little confused, in that, contrary to last year, when we were told to take out those items which were contingent upon actions being taken – most particularly the arrival of Greek colleagues – and hold them back for a supplementary budget, this year the supplementary budget was requested simultaneously for consideration with the ordinary budget, and that had to be put in hand.

Unfortunately, however, at those meetings, there was no discussion of the need for new posts; there were only minor questions about the need for commitments to support extended contact programmes reflecting the requirements of the Kirchberg declaration. Various questions were raised on detail and minor adjustments were requested, together with some reductions in the proposed increase.

All of this was in spite of your own committee's strong endorsement of the original budget proposals, in the belief that this was the basic minimum needed to do the Assembly's job properly in 1995. I therefore have to report to colleagues that, unfortunately, no agreement was reached in the Budget and Organisation Committee, even with the help of our good friend, the Chairman of that committee, who I am glad to see here this morning, and without that agreement, no opinion was given by the Council.

I move now to the supplementary budget for 1995, which is the outcome of a process of consultation and discussions between the Assembly and the Council, first through officials in the most helpful way, and then between politicians. That was initiated way back in the spring of this year.

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

The aim of this dialogue was to obtain additional space for the Assembly – for example, the offices on the second and third floors of the wing just behind us – and resources which would enable better use to be made of a finite space – for instance, in this chamber – in order both to accommodate the delegation of a new member country, Greece, and the associate partner countries, and to make better use of the available space within the chamber by introducing an electronic voting facility, as described in the supplementary budget proposals.

There were two parts to the supplementary budget. The first deals with the direct consequence of Greece's accession to WEU, soon to take effect – we look forward to welcoming them – and secondly session services, language services, furniture and equipment.

The Greek part represents a budget increase of 2%, and this seemed to cause no difficulties for the members of the Budget and Organisation Committee, who indicated their agreement in principle. The second part of the supplementary budget provides for the introduction of electronic voting in the chamber, which risks collapsing in on itself if the current principle of one member, one seat, is maintained. The thinking behind that proposal was set out in paragraph 15 of the supplementary budget document.

These adjustments represent a budget increase of 9.8% – a small proportionate increase when compared with the inevitable costs of relocating the Assembly or holding our meetings in other places – as you, Mr. President, pointed out in your introduction yesterday.

It must be stressed here – I believe that it is important to accent this – that this is a one-off, non-recurrent expenditure and that the cost of consumables for this type of installation is controllable. However, the Budget and Organisation Committee did not see the need for such adaptations, and no agreement was reached upon them.

What is overlooked in this negative reception, I believe, is the fact of life that membership of any parliamentary assembly is absolutely nothing if it is impossible for members to participate in its work and for the Assembly to operate effectively and efficiently. That is all the more anachronistic when the enhanced rôle of the Assembly has been urged on it by the very ministers and government representatives who then react negatively to the funds required.

It is a peculiar coincidence that the fortieth anniversary of WEU which we celebrate this year is the occasion for these administrative and budget difficulties.

That leads me to hark back to the very beginning and draw the Assembly's attention to a point in Sir Russell Johnston's excellent draft booklet on WEU, which points out on page 47 of the English version: "The Assembly's activities are not just an echo of those of the WEU Council, since they reflect the Assembly's political independence. This proved possible from the very outset with the backing of the Council, as voiced by the then Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Spaak, in his speech to the Assembly at its first meeting: 'We (the Council of WEU) have been determined to leave you the greatest possible freedom, relying upon your experience and your wisdom ... We consider that the organisation and working methods of the Assembly ... are matters for its own decision'." Obviously, that runs completely contrary to what we are now finding.

It is also a peculiar coincidence that the last time that the Council was unable to give an opinion on our budget request in time for consideration at this Assembly meeting was when you were in my post as Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in 1985, Mr. President. Those two peculiar coincidences are the background to the problems that we face today.

For all the reasons that I have given and, as I indicated to you, Mr. President, before the session began, and according to Rule 33 of our Rules of Procedure, on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and with the committee's unanimous support, I should like to move the previous question, Document 1447, which has been distributed.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rathbone, for explaining everything so well.

Does anyone wish to speak against the two motions that Mr. Rathbone has moved?...

I see no indication that anyone is against it. Therefore we may proceed to vote on Mr. Rathbone's motion, the previous question, Document 1447, as we have to put the motion separately.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The previous question is agreed to unanimously.

As the previous question has been agreed to, the subject of the draft budget for the financial year 1995 has been removed from the agenda and the register of the Assembly.

We shall now vote on the motion for an order contained in Document 1448.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft order.

The President (continued)

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call? ...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The motion for an order is agreed to unanimously¹.

5. Evolution of the Assembly's logistical requirements to take account of enlargement

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1438)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Rathbone of the report submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Document 1438, debate and vote on the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Rathbone to present his report.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you. This document and the recommendations it contains are a backdrop to the budget request that we have not debated.

It seems to me that there are three requirements for a viable and vigorous Assembly, particularly an international parliamentary assembly. First, there has to be a chamber in which members can exchange views and debate issues in which language is not a problem and in which they can vote easily and accurately. Secondly, there is a requirement for a chamber which can accommodate associate members, observer members and other categories of member or participant. Thirdly, there should be a chamber in which the public can, with reasonable facility, view the proceedings of elected members, in the interests of openness and answerability.

In addition, a parliamentary assembly location has to provide basic offices and administrative facilities for members and for the Assembly's loyal and hard-working staff and for the specialist committee work in which both are engaged – indeed, that is much of the work that we, as members of the Assembly, undertake.

It was, therefore, with foresight that last year the committee requested this logistical report and recommendations. It was also somewhat in reaction to the difficulties faced in meeting the requirements of the new membership of Spain and Portugal two years previously.

I shall not attempt to review the whole document; I shall just draw colleagues' attention to the

table of contents which show how we have analysed the composition of the Assembly, its past and new requirements and how we have projected requirements for the future, both for the Assembly and for the Office of the Clerk.

Some advances have already been made and I should like to pay particular compliment and thanks to the Institute for Security Studies as much of the agreement about the steps which can be taken, and have already been taken, has been achieved with its help and co-operation.

In Appendix V of the report, you will see that an agreement was struck that office 202 should be made available for the Greek representatives when they arrive here. That has already been done. I would like to thank the Secretary-General for giving up that part of this building for such an important purpose.

It was also agreed that we would be able to use office 317 and the Institute reading room and library during our Assembly sessions and that is already in hand. It was also agreed that the room currently occupied by the telephonist would be able to be used by the Assembly, and that is being put in hand at the moment.

It was further agreed, with the co-operation and indeed financial help of the Institute, that meeting room A down the back corridor will be transformed from its present meeting room layout to a conference room layout, which would enable approximately 100 people to work there. I am glad to report to the Assembly that the budget for that work has been approved and the work is due to start next week, after this Assembly meeting has finished. We hope to be able to use that room from the end of January.

It is with that short introduction that I ask for the Assembly's support and endorsement of these recommendations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rathbone.

No names have been submitted by anyone wishing to take part in the debate, but I am perfectly willing to allow comments.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (*United Kingdom*). – I simply want to back up my Chairman on one particular point, as I am a member of the committee. I refer to the point about the chamber. If we look round now it is clear that there are many empty places. The committee made the extremely sensible suggestion that to use these properly, an electronic method of voting, which means that members can be identified wherever they are, would free a large number of spaces in the chamber so that people could be accommodated properly. That might even free the gallery for observers instead of their being tucked away looking at television screens outside. That sensible and practical solution has not been taken up. We are not

1. See page 36.

Lord Mackie of Benshie (continued)

asking for the luxury and elegance of the Council's headquarters in Brussels which is a former bank of great magnificence where one wades through deep pile carpet and looks at elegant meeting rooms where I can sleep happily for hours on end. I find it difficult to sleep here, even after lunch, as the seats were made for a small species of Japanese and not for large Scots. So our sensible suggestion has not been carried. I think that it was extremely foolish of the committee and the Council and I trust that they will put it right.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Mackie.

Does anyone else wish to make a brief comment before we move on?...

That not being the case we can vote on the report.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1438.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call? ...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously¹.

The next order of the day was to be the presentation by Mr. Rathbone of the report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the supplementary draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995, Document 1441, debate and vote on the supplementary draft budget.

As the Assembly has agreed to Mr. Rathbone's motion for the previous question, Document 1447, this item has been withdrawn from the agenda of the session. We will therefore proceed with the next order of the day.

6. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1428 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administra-

tion on the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1428 and addendum.

I call Mr. Rathbone to present his report.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I apologise to you and our colleagues for still being with you, but it will only be for a moment. This is an official step that we have to take each year to approve the auditor's report and the final accounts for the previous year. The only reason for saying something on this report is that I believe that an answer should be given to a comment by the auditor, which was endorsed by members of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, concerning the discrepancy between the original budget voted and the final accounts following a number of transfers between budget heads and sub-heads authorised by reference to the Assembly's budgetary autonomy.

That is entirely allowed within the Assembly's own budgetary autonomy. It reflects various aspects of the management of the Assembly's budget, some of which are of long standing, others more recent and connected with enlargement.

It should be stressed that the Assembly's budget structures are developed without reference to the Assembly's precise programme of work, which was not available at the time of preparation. Colleagues will remember that the budget is prepared, in the first instance, during the spring of the previous year to which it applies. The programme of the Assembly's work is based on a half-yearly cycle and is variously implemented over the budget year. The budget is, therefore, not so much a forecast as an attempted estimate based on experience.

On the second point, the effect of enlarging WEU has been more frequent meetings by parliamentarians, committees and staff, especially within the Central and Eastern European countries and, as I said in my previous submission, that reflects the whole thrust of WEU activity, both in the past and the future.

At the same time, our budget can be adjusted only gradually, for two reasons: first, because the present administrative procedures for its examination discourage major structural adjustments and, secondly, because programmes and their implementation fluctuate from year to year. Experience has shown that the number of interpreter days, for example, may vary either way by more than 50% from one year to the next.

With that brief explanation, I hope that the Assembly will approve the final accounts for 1993, and I so move.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for that explanation, Mr. Rathbone.

1. See page 37.

The President (continued)

I have not been notified of anyone who wishes to comment, so we shall now vote on the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 in the addendum to Document 1428.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on the motion.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call? ...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The motion is agreed to unanimously.

Congratulations to Mr. Rathbone for getting all his business through unanimously.

7. The situation in Bihac and the need to strengthen WEU

(Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1450)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Roseta of the report by the Political Committee on the situation in Bihac with a debate and a vote, Document 1450. I hope that the actual report will be distributed during the debate.

I am in some difficulty, however, because Mr. Roseta does not appear to be present. In those circumstances, I have no alternative but to suspend the sitting. I regret that because it disrupts the proceedings, but I shall suspend for five minutes.

(The sitting was suspended at 10.35 a.m. and resumed at 10.40 a.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

The Political Committee this morning agreed to the text of a revised draft recommendation. There were considerable changes to it and hard work is under way to get it right. The committee was hoping to present the report to the Assembly before the start of the debate, but we cannot wait around for that. I have therefore suggested that we start the debate – we know what it is about and the Rapporteur will explain it. I have asked that the text be distributed, both in English and in French, as soon as it is available. It will be circulated in due course as the debate proceeds.

We now come to the motion on Bihac and I am advised that Mr. Roseta will move it on behalf of the Political Committee.

I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – In preparing the draft recommendation which I am presenting, I have done my best to take the debate in the Political Committee on Document 1446 into account concerning the situation in Bihac, tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Liberal Group.

Yesterday, our Belgian colleague tabled an additional document, Document 1449, signed by a number of members of the Assembly, containing a motion for a recommendation on the need to strengthen WEU in the light of the worsening situation in former Yugoslavia. I have tried to include some parts of this in the committee's own text.

The situation in Bosnia is truly scandalous and is even the worst scandal that Europe has known since the end of the last war. It should be stressed that to start with all parties to the conflict hesitated and took up regrettable positions but that then the Bosnian Serbs took the bit between their teeth and violated the Bihac area declared to be a safe zone, the situation being even worse today now that the Belgrade government has changed its attitude.

We are facing a situation which has historical roots of the grimmest kind. Some countries, even on our continent, still think that a people's well-being and wealth are measured by the extent of the territory. This is wholly an idea from the past. Last century, there were agrarian societies whose wealth depended on the extent of their territory. The bigger the territory, the greater their production of wheat and the other cereals they grew. I repeat, however, that the seizure by force of an area which is becoming bigger every day is an idea beyond understanding in a modern view of human life, individual rights and progress itself based on intelligence, the development of every human being, production capacity and technology; the basic political target must be the well-being of everyone and in particular of minorities.

Our anger stems from our absolute refusal to return to this, the conquerors' concept of wealth and progress. This concept, which perhaps has its roots in prehistory and antiquity has destroyed Europe and triggered dozens of European civil wars, must be condemned out of hand, lest a new and terrible Pandora's box be opened.

I have sought to express our indignation at the events on the ground and at what is, unfortunately, the passive attitude of the competent organisations and governments which have allowed the situation to become so bad that today no one dares do anything any longer. Every day new ideas are put forward and this morning I have even heard from the other side of the Atlantic a proposal for a Serbo-Serbian federation. What does that mean? It points to our disarray and the impasse we have reached through the lack of political will of which I have already spoken.

Mr. Roseta (continued)

Only a small part of the proposals made has not been taken up by the committee and I shall not dwell on the preamble to the draft document just tabled. It calls the Council's attention to our concern about the present situation and the profound differences now apparent between the United States and its European allies regarding the measures to be taken to enforce compliance with Security Council resolutions and to restore peace to the regions concerned. These differences are perhaps one of the explanations for the lack of political will which has been noted. But our organisation, made up of representatives of the people, must proclaim its determination to do everything to prevent a fresh massacre taking place on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

I turn now to the conclusions of our draft recommendation. There may be some criticism that they are not specific enough but what is important is the expression of our political will to use all appropriate means to prevent further massacres and to end the fighting in Bihac. We must make it clear to the Council and international organisations other than our own that massacre, rape and genocide by ethnic cleansing are not to be tolerated. As a political body, we call on all the governments and competent international organisations to make one last effort to find a political solution to the conflict taking into account the negotiations in progress on the basis of the contact group's proposals. The international community must make its will known by opposing with great determination and firmness those responsible for prolonging an unjustifiable and senseless war.

These are the basic elements of our draft recommendation.

I do not believe that we can go any further as a consultative parliamentary body. What we must do is tell the Council that it should consider as a matter of extreme urgency the timeliness of using all appropriate means to prevent fresh massacres and end the fighting.

Some members will regret that the text is not more specific. My view is that beyond this strong recommendation, the only thing we can do is to agree and arrive at a consensus because there is no majority which could agree on any particular means of action. What is important is first to tell the Council and the world that we are very angry and secondly, to make clear our political will for the fighting to be ended. Otherwise, like so many others, our recommendation would remain a dead letter.

From Mr. De Decker's second draft, I have also taken the recommendation that the Council should "accelerate the process of strengthening Western European Union by providing it with

satellite intelligence means and strategic transport and units of combined forces". There may be criticism that I am only reproducing the words of many recommendations from the Assembly, but as our forebears said, *quod abundat non nocet* – you cannot have too much of a good thing. That is why I have again stressed these major aspects of the strengthening of WEU.

Yet again, the situation in former Yugoslavia proves that the strengthening of WEU is necessary. Indeed, it is essential – for former Yugoslavia and possibly one day, life being what it is, for some other part of Europe – in order to prevent difficult situations from becoming running sores and creating insoluble problems for us.

In conclusion, I have tried to square the circle. I do not think I have succeeded because it is difficult to do anything new on the subject. I have tried to strike a balance between the different views. I am therefore proposing something realistic to you because extreme proposals are not as effective as those which stem from a wider political will, even if in the very nature of things the choice of appropriate means must be left to others. This is the cruel law by which parliamentarians live.

I hope that the recommendations I am putting to you will not be forgotten and become a dead letter. To achieve that, there has to be very wide support from the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Roseta.

The debate is now open.

I call the first speaker, Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate my friends Mr. de Puig and Mr. Roseta on working so hard to produce something for us to discuss this morning. No one could object to the text, but that is as far as I feel able to go.

Most colleagues sitting here this morning were present at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg some eighteen months ago when the European negotiator, Lord Owen, stated firmly and publicly that no territory taken by force could be recognised in this case. How far we have slipped since then, despite passing resolutions at WEU, the Council of Europe, NATO and the United Nations!

So let us recognise our total impotence and our shame. I was delighted to note that during his in-and-out visit yesterday the Chairman of the Council of Ministers used those very words: impotence and shame.

I remind the Assembly – that is necessary because of the difference between it and our governments – that it was also about eighteen months ago when my friends Peter Hardy, my British Socialist colleague, and Lord Mackie of Benshie, my Liberal colleague, and I said that the only

Lord Finsberg (continued)

way of stopping the conflict spreading was for action to be taken forthwith, and for the western world to say that any plane seen in the skies over former Yugoslavia would be shot down, and any tank rocketed. At the time, the overwhelming bulk of the planes and tanks were Serbian, and there was little prospect of harming innocent civilians.

No government was prepared to do this, and the situation has inexorably worsened. There are certain similarities here with the way in which the League of Nations fluttered its hands at the time of the Spanish civil war. It was not an identical parallel, but it was enough to make one think. How many people in this chamber would have said two years ago that the moral and military might of the United Nations could not prevail against a breakaway tribe in a European country? That would have been inconceivable, yet here we are today with this harmless resolution.

Of course my friend Mr. Roseta is right. We have to say something, but let us not think that what we say will make one iota of difference to the Serbs, who are quite determined to pursue their murderous expansionist policies, because they know that in the end the United Nations, NATO and WEU are not prepared to stop them.

Understandably, the spectre of body bags is affecting the Americans. They are happy to talk about financing the operation – perhaps even supplying planes – but they want to put no men on the ground. I do not blame President Clinton; he had to respond to a decision of Congress when taking action over the embargo. Indeed, it is said that he could not over-ride Congress's decision. Nevertheless, his action puts all our troops on the ground, engaged in humanitarian work, in real danger.

Is there anything we can do? Yes, there is. Colleagues will have seen General Rose on television in the past few days saying that they could not take out the tanks because of fog. You will also have seen the Serbian armoured train firing into Bihac. Even in fog it is possible to detect an armoured train, because it is known where the rails are. So why at least was the railway line not bombed and the train caught? Experts will say that one needs observers on the ground – but surely not to find a railway line.

My last word is this. If we were really serious, the one possible way of stopping this and saving Bihac would be for WEU, NATO and the United Nations to bomb the headquarters in Pale of the Serbian-Bosnian administration: take out their power stations, bomb the bridges. That is the only action that might – might – bring them to their senses.

We will have to vote for this document when we see it. I will do so, not with a heavy heart but in

the knowledge that it ain't going to do more than cut down a few more trees to provide the paper.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The next speaker is Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in order to analyse a crisis like the one we are debating, it is first necessary to try to understand it.

The first reactions of European governments, institutions and political leaders with special responsibilities are linked by a single common denominator: recognition of the fact that the main powers in Europe, the United Nations, NATO and the United States all bear heavy responsibilities in the tragedy unfolding on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

I should like to quote as a caricature of the crisis the opinion expressed by Senator Bob Dole, the future majority leader in the United States and a possible candidate for the White House. He says we are witnessing the complete collapse of NATO. Meantime the Secretary for Defence, William Perry, suggests that the Blue Berets should be withdrawn from Bosnia.

The origin of the present crisis lies in the dismemberment of former Yugoslavia, planned and organised with complicity on all sides. It must be remembered that Germany's rôle was decisive in the pressure to recognise Slovenia and Croatia.

After first abstaining from the great debate on the unfolding of the crisis in the Balkans, the United States, under the Clinton administration, suddenly changed from the rôle of spectator to outright interference. The change took place in Brussels in 1994 at the NATO summit, which is the basic reference for relations with WEU. The announcement of surgical air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs was only the prologue to action which showed that Washington had decided to act as arbitrator in Bosnia and throughout the Balkans without committing a single soldier on the ground. This policy was confirmed when the White House called the Muslims and Croats to the American capital to sign an imposed agreement which revealed profound ignorance of the region's problems. After the air strikes, which had been awaited for some months and did not produce the results expected by the chiefs-of-staff, Washington extended this move to assume leadership and took the decision announced in advance to withdraw from the embargo, a decision which has now been followed by the German CDU. Washington argued that the Muslims must be encouraged. These words, and the decisions taken by Congress, were interpreted as an invitation to attack. The tragic results are well-known. Instead of helping to bring peace closer, the North American strategy led in practice to a murderous extension of the war.

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

Ladies and gentlemen, last October at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, I, together with other members of the Assembly's Political Committee, heard the triumphant announcement of early new air strikes to be directed shortly against diversified targets without prior warning. I would stress that this decision was taken before the United Nations Security Council had any knowledge of it or could reach a decision.

I recall this incident because it shows that the United Nations is becoming increasingly subordinate to NATO, that is the United States.

Mr. President, some of our colleagues favour the imposition of solutions by force in Bosnia, with WEU playing a major operational rôle either with forces from the European Union countries or with NATO forces placed under its command under the terms of the Brussels declaration of January 1994. In Bosnia, WEU would be doing the job that NATO has not been able or has not wished to do. The evolving situation in Bosnia proves that there is no military solution.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am stating categorically that the option of military solutions under United Nations, NATO or WEU control is a non-starter. It would only aggravate the tragedy in Bosnia. It has to be remembered that French and British troops account for more than half of the 22 000 UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia. Any escalation of intervention would trigger serious political crises in Western Europe and at the same time could well ignite the Balkan powder keg.

I say again, that it must not be forgotten that the irresponsible policy of air strikes inseparable from the dual-key system has only helped to embitter relations between the United States and their European allies. NATO is today prey to such serious and complex contradictions that even such an Atlantic-minded newspaper as the *Figaro* defined them as schizophrenic.

Ladies and gentlemen, while paying tribute to the author of the draft recommendation, Mr. Roseta, for his splendid efforts to produce a compromise text on the situation in Bosnia, I shall vote against. In my view, any draft which leaves the door open to military intervention by NATO or WEU in Bosnia is unacceptable and dangerous. The outcome of any such intervention would be a terrible political, social and possibly military disaster. The way to peace in the region is through political negotiations, however difficult and long-winded they may be. Barbarity should not be met by barbarity. The only way to bring peace closer in the area is by way of an international conference for security and reconstruction with all the European countries concerned taking part.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

For the second time this morning, the Chair recognises Lord Mackie of Benshie on behalf of the United Kingdom.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (United Kingdom). – I speak for the second time, in very different mood. I regret that I cannot speak on behalf of the United Kingdom, since I disagree with what our government has done.

I believe that we face immense dangers because of the attitude of WEU countries, particularly the main protagonists: Britain, France and Germany. A series of lies and deceptions by the Serbs have gone unpunished, practically unnoticed, and they now, of course, have the perception, which appears to be absolutely right, that the western powers, in the shape of Britain, France, Germany and Holland, do not mean what they say: and that therefore all they need to do is manoeuvre to get their own way, to keep the territory conquered by force and with the utmost brutality.

We in the West, and our governments, seem to think that, if we carry out humanitarian work, that is all that is needed. I do not for a moment decry the work being done by volunteers and by our troops in former Yugoslavia – it is magnificent. But it must be awful for fighting troops to carry on as they have to do with the Serbs while aware of the total lack of political will of their governments. It is a situation fraught with enormous dangers.

I am probably one of the oldest members in the chamber and I well remember the situation in Spain. I was young, but I was keenly interested in politics at the time, and I recall the embargo on arms to the government side, while the Italians and the Nazis in Germany poured arms into the other side. That is exactly the situation we see in Bosnia today.

It is unacceptable to table a resolution which does not say firmly that we wish force to be used to protect what is, after all, a declared safe haven. What the devil does that description mean, if we are not prepared to use force to maintain it?

In the words of Mr. Baumel, who I hope will speak later, what is NATO doing with a force that is supposed to contain 200 divisions of the former Soviet army, when it cannot resolve what is not a civil war but a brutal act of ethnic aggression in former Yugoslavia? I do not know what the resolution will say, but I look forward to it with a little foreboding after Mr. Roseta's speech, although he said many good things.

Unless we declare openly to our governments that we as parliamentarians – and as elected members who are in close touch with their electorate – are prepared to ensure that promises are kept, if necessary by the use of force, we shall be sending a message to the Serbs other than that the parlia-

Lord Mackie of Benshie (continued)

mentarians in this Assembly feel that perhaps things have gone too far.

It is no good our saying that in future WEU will be firm and guarantee peace. Unless we act now, our future promises will come to the same end as the promises that were made to us previously in this chamber.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Mackie.

Everyone has been very good and co-operative so far, but we have no fewer than nine remaining speakers. Therefore we must impose a reasonable time limit. I ask for your co-operation in trying to observe that so that we can eventually get through the list of speakers.

I have also asked for the text to which Lord Mackie referred to be distributed as quickly as possible. I understand that the French version has been finished and that it is now being translated into English. When both versions are ready they will be circulated.

Without further ado, I call the next speaker, Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, long speeches on the situation facing us would be pointless. As has been said, and it is perhaps pointless to repeat it too often, the sad fact is that we are forced to recognise our increasing powerlessness.

This being so, we should be careful to avoid any intemperate judgment and any statement going beyond the facts. This might salve our consciences and give us the feeling of doing something useful but I think the facts must be looked at rationally and clearly.

We have to accept that the United Nations is powerless. It would, moreover, be hypocritical to blame the United Nations for everything that has gone wrong for, after all, the United Nations includes all our governments and if the Security Council and the Secretary-General cannot intervene as we would like, it is because they themselves are answerable to the governments.

It is perhaps a little unhealthy that governments, whether European, American or third world, should play the game of passing the baby when ever the strain becomes too great.

NATO too is powerless, as is proved by the fact that when its leading member does not wish to act, NATO does not act. There is no point in blinking the fact that, in what has happened in former Yugoslavia, the United States have from the outset and for their own reasons seen no point in intervening as a major power.

We Europeans are powerless and divided. It is too easy to attack the Americans and to salve our consciences in that way. After all it is we who should be intervening first before anyone else.

What has happened? In 1990, 1991 and 1992 we also let events take their course. As one previous speaker said quite correctly, it might have been possible to intervene then with a much better chance. Today everything is too late, too far gone and too weak. Let us therefore draw a line and see what can be done.

By us, not much. We are about to approve this draft recommendation and I think it vital we should. I thank and congratulate Mr. Roseta and the Chairman of our Political Committee for having succeeded in a matter of hours in drafting a document which at least allows us to say what we think and to suggest certain solutions.

Looking ahead, the consequence will be a serious transatlantic crisis. For the first time in fifteen years we are probably going to be faced by a very major crisis between Europeans and Americans, among Americans themselves and among Europeans themselves. The result will be to weaken the United Nations and to harm all humanitarian work throughout the world.

If we are not careful the result will be the possibility of more Yugoslavias in Europe. Because it will be an awful temptation for some ambitious and nationalist statesmen to follow the example set them, faced with which we have been unable to react.

That is all I have to say, Mr. President. My thanks to Mr. Roseta. I shall vote for this recommendation without illusions and with great sadness but because it is, all the same, better to say something without being sure of getting satisfaction than to stay silent in the face of such a tragedy.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for that helpful contribution, Mr. Baumel.

The next speaker is Mr. Korakas, an observer from Greece.

Mr. KORAKAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we Greeks and other people living in the Balkans are most directly concerned as you will all recognise.

As was said very eloquently yesterday by the President of Romania, Mr. Iliescu, there is no military solution.

I shall be brief but I should like to recall the facts. Before Yugoslavia broke up we forecast that the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and foreign intervention in Yugoslavia would not bring peace but would on the contrary embitter the situation. That is the position four years later.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – You are forgetting past history!

Mr. KORAKAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – I believe that we must draw certain conclusions from this in the interests of the peoples of former Yugoslavia, the Balkan countries and Europe. We made the forecast at the time, nobody listened to us, bringing us to where we are now.

Unquestionably, no foreign military intervention from any source will produce a viable solution.

As regards the action taken by NATO and the United States, it has to be recognised that this went ahead without anybody asking for it. That is why its continuation, even with increased violence, as is proposed in some quarters, will only make the impasse worse.

Let us suppose that NATO or WEU undertake large-scale military intervention and even bomb Bosnian Serb positions. What would this achieve, other than the massacre of thousands of people and of course, the use of a lot of weapons? There can be no doubt about this, I am sure. Hand on heart, we should all agree.

Furthermore, it is certain that any such intervention would further envenom what is already an extremely tense situation. It would risk spreading the fires of war in the Balkans and possibly later throughout Europe.

That is why the old saying, *Si vis pacem para bellum*, (if you want peace, prepare for war) is outdated and ineffective and needs to be replaced by a contemporary principle, *Si vis pacem para pacem*, (if you want peace, prepare for peace).

It would be really absurd to believe that there is a military solution. So, if we want to help to bring peace to the region we must bend all our efforts to getting the warring parties together and opening the dialogue and do everything we can to promote a Balkan conference in the spirit of the Final Act of Helsinki which, it has to be said, was not designed to overturn the régimes holding power in the eastern countries but to bring peoples together and consolidate peace.

The challenge we should now take up is to say no to military intervention, to have confidence in the peoples of the Balkans, to deliver them from foreign intervention and to leave them to reach agreement. This is a proposal we intend to table again before it is too late.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Mr. De Decker, who initiated this debate by asking for an urgent procedure on Monday.

Mr. De DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Thank you for mentioning that I am the prime mover in these two motions. To me it was incon-

ceivable that this session of the WEU Assembly should go ahead without our taking a stance on the continuing tragedy of former Yugoslavia.

As long as two and a half or three years ago, I asked for a special session of our Assembly in reaction to the start of the crisis in Yugoslavia. At that time, if Europeans had shown the very least degree of unity, if we had not looked back at history and our experience in the last world war we might perhaps have been able to prevent many deaths and many tragic events.

In any case, we must react to the situation because Europe is losing everything through this war. It is losing its soul and ultimately its *raison d'être*. We started to build Europe with the basic idea that we would never again go through what we experienced during the second world war. It is all starting again and we are doing practically nothing; we cannot prevent things getting worse. We are losing our soul and above all, we are paying a disastrous and unacceptable moral price which I fear will have repercussions, as Mr. Baumele has just said, on other conflicts because our weakness can give ideas to many other political adventurers.

Through this crisis, the whole of Europe is losing its credibility and, what is more, such important institutions as the United Nations are incapable of imposing their own decisions. Lord Mackie recalled that the Atlantic Alliance had to be capable of halting two hundred Russian divisions; today, however, it is incapable of resolving a problem in an area with scarcely more than four million inhabitants. Its credibility is at stake.

I have tabled these two motions because two extremely serious events have taken place. On 11th November last, the United States Government decided to take no further part in enforcing the embargo on arms for Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is a very serious political act; it is a political mistake; it is a fundamental error of American diplomacy. Furthermore, reading a succession of reports which do not say the same thing, it may be wondered whether the United States of America still has a foreign policy as regards security and in particular the security of Europe. This decision is particularly serious because it was taken unilaterally without the allies being consulted. By this attitude, the United States has revealed a deep split within the Atlantic Alliance. I fully endorse what Mr. Juppé said on 12th November, when, speaking for the French Government, he wondered whether the Atlantic Alliance was capable of handling security problems in Europe after the end of the cold war. At the time of the cold war, the two blocs opposing each other meant that the Atlantic Alliance was quite simply essential, not open to dispute and redoubtably effective. Now that the problem to be faced is no longer a general war in Europe but crises in various parts of its ter-

Mr. De Decker (continued)

ritory, it emerges that the United States almost always takes a different view from us so that the Atlantic Alliance is deeply divided and this proves the outstanding value of our WEU.

The second very serious event is clearly what is happening in Bihac. This cannot be allowed to go on without reacting yet again when, as at Sarajevo, all the means needed to respond are available. I shall not be over-pessimistic as some previous speakers have been because I continue to believe that there are possible responses. In the Yugoslav crisis there are three possible solutions but two are, in my opinion, completely impracticable.

The first would be to withdraw UNPROFOR and to leave former Yugoslavia; this would be putting out the light, closing the door and ignoring the massacres which would follow. This is a completely impossible solution as the consequence would be to spread the fighting to the whole of the Balkans and possibly further and to release a flood of refugees over the whole of Western Europe with the political and electoral consequences that it could have in our countries.

The second solution would be to withdraw the UNPROFOR troops and for NATO to intervene on its own, that is to trigger a war and thereby try to impose a political solution. This is unrealistic because neither the Atlantic Alliance nor our publics nor our governments are prepared to commit the 100 000, 200 000 or 300 000 troops who would be needed to achieve this solution even were it within our scope.

The only solution, therefore, is to use UNPROFOR. Here, I note that its commanders, first General Cot and then General Briquemont and General Rose, a Frenchman, a Belgian and a Briton, have all three asked for more men, more resources and greater fire power. No government has responded favourably to these military commanders on the spot.

My proposal – and I am happy that the document should mention it even if it takes a less firm stance because it is a compromise text – is to call for the reinforcement of UNPROFOR to which further troops could be added through NATO whenever it became necessary. The Chairman of our committee has quite rightly drawn our attention to this point.

These events demonstrate more than ever that WEU must be developed and must as quickly as possible be given a real operational capability so that we can respond whenever necessary, alone if appropriate, and outside the Atlantic Alliance if need be, but of course, in compliance with international law as laid down by the United Nations.

I, in turn, would like to thank the Rapporteur and Chairman of the committee, who have succeeded in submitting to us a text which at least has the advantage of existing and enabling us to express our views because it is inconceivable and unacceptable that we should remain silent on the subject.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I have invited the next speaker to come down from the gallery. I think that it is important that we allow the voice of Croatia to be heard.

I call Mr. Domljan, an observer from Croatia.

Mr. DOMLJAN (*Observer from Croatia*). – Thank you Mr. President. Ladies and dear colleagues, we in Croatia are looking at the position around Bihac with great concern. It is not only that Bosnian Serbs continue to defy the international community, but they are supported by the rebel Serb forces from Croatia. In fact, the Bihac pocket is attacked from three sides – by Bosnian Serbs, Croatian Serbs and rebel Muslim forces who joined the Serbs. It is not a matter of military superiority, as somebody said recently. It is not a matter of the superiority of one side over the other, but of being attacked from three sides by more and better-equipped armies. The Bosnian army, which is in the Bihac pocket, is cut off without a regular supply of ammunition, food and other logistical support.

The worst and most unacceptable fact is that Croatian territory is used for launching attacks against other internationally recognised countries. Croatia has protested, but more or less in vain. It is now quite clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina is exposed to open aggression, not only from Serbia, but from occupied parts of Croatia. We must not allow ourselves to be fooled any longer. Serbia and Serbs in general must not be rewarded for aggression, but punished. They must be forced to stop killing civilians and destroying towns and villages. Genocide must not be tolerated.

Is it really true that the international community is unable to stop the aggression or is there a complete lack of political will to do anything? Do we agree to the unprecedented statement made here yesterday by President Ilescu that what is going on in Bosnia is not even a religious war? I am sure that all of us here disagree with such a statement and such a description of what is happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We all know that Muslims exist and that they are the main target of attack and subject to mass killings and ethnic cleansing.

Croatia is co-operating with the international community. It has signed the Washington Agreement and has accepted the plan put forward by the contact group. Croatia refrained from intervening when the rebel Serbs from Croatia attacked Bihac. Croatia is still prepared to be patient in order to

Mr. Domljan (continued)

help the international community and the contact group to do something and to take some additional, firm and decisive steps to stop aggression and killings and to save Bihac, which must not be allowed to fall, to be destroyed or its inhabitants to be slaughtered. Bihac must not become a second Vukovar.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Domljan for your timely intervention.

I next call Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout.

Mrs. GELDERBLOM-LANKHOUT (*Netherlands*). – Thank you. In my country and in Europe next year we celebrate the fact that fifty years ago we promised each other that we would never again have war. It is happening again – what have we done with our promise? Two hours away on a plane, killings are happening again.

I fully agree with Mr. van Mierlo – the sentiments were eloquently rephrased by Lord Finsberg – that we are ashamed. What shall we answer our children when they ask, not what cannot be done, but what can be done? Some fifty years ago Jews begged the international community to bomb the train knowing that they would be killed. It was not done. Now, we could bombard, not the train, but the railroad. However, that is not done. Why do not we make a greater study of what can be done? Why do not we, who sit here and make speeches, deliver the police force that is being requested for Mostar? Why are we considering withdrawing our *casques bleus*? If we make speeches here it gives us a responsibility to act in our national parliaments and remind ourselves that what happened fifty years ago must never happen again and our promise must not become an empty one.

The PRESIDENT. – I next call Mr. de Lipkowski.

Mr. de LIPKOWSKI (*France*) (Translation). – The tragedy we are discussing underlines yet again the shame and powerlessness of the international community in this terrible affair. I shall not go back over the past: others have already done so. We could have taken military action right at the start in a number of ways on the spot to prevent the tragedy. We did not do so and we shall not do so but it is clear that neither the United Nations, nor NATO nor WEU will opt to take decisive military action. I do not want us to add to this crisis the spectacle of our political differences as is happening. I am referring to the inadmissible attitude of the United States which, by withdrawing from the embargo arrangements, has given a fresh kick-start to the war. The first lesson of this is that this crisis between the United States and Europe is probably, with a due sense of proportion, the worst since Suez because there has never

been such a wide gulf between them. In a world which now has only a single focus of power, the United States is behaving with totally unacceptable disregard because it has both gone against United Nations resolutions for which it voted and broken a consensus within NATO in which it had joined. We cannot remain dependent on a nation which behaves in this way and as others and Mr. De Decker most strikingly of all have said, this justifies the political and military emergence of our organisation. This is probably the only thing on the credit side from this crisis; it has made us much more aware that WEU is more indispensable than ever so that we do not have to depend solely on the decisions of the great American power, provided we show ourselves to be united because it would be dreadful and prejudicial to the credibility of our organisation if divisions appeared between Europeans. At a time when we are seeking to assert ourselves it would be extremely dangerous to weaken ourselves by allowing disagreements to appear between us. I say this speaking as a friend to our German friends, who I regret to say, appear to be lining up with the United States in this matter and asking that the embargo be lifted.

Over the next few days we shall be discussing this question in a number of international bodies. The contact group is meeting in Brussels on 2nd December, with Germany taking part; on 5th and 6th December the CSCE will be holding a ministerial conference in Budapest; in the meanwhile, Mr. Juppé and Mr. Douglas Hurd will have been in Belgrade; next Thursday and Friday, there will be a ministerial meeting of the NATO countries. Therefore now or never is the time to show in these different international bodies, that WEU speaks with one voice. What would be the use of all our discussions this morning if, over the next few days, we show ourselves to be divided at meetings which will most certainly be discussing the tragic events in Bihac. It would then be pointless to say that we are emerging politically and militarily on the international scene. Now or never is the time to show that facing the United States there is a European power which knows what it wants and what it is saying.

What should this European power be saying? It should be saying what has been so well expressed by our excellent Rapporteur, Mr. Roseta, and included in the draft recommendation. Mr. Roseta has made a remarkable intellectual effort with the help of the Chairman of the Political Committee to show that a political solution is absolutely essential and that WEU should throw all its weight behind such a solution.

For all these reasons, if we do not adopt unanimously the views expressed by Mr. Roseta, what credibility would we have over the next few days in the various international bodies? How could we

Mr. de Lipkowski (continued)

say that "WEU thinks that ..." if some of its leading members do not agree on the position adopted? We must assert ourselves; our credibility is at stake.

I therefore solemnly appeal to our colleagues who abstained or who voted against in the committee, so that a unanimous vote can shortly be given in favour of the draft recommendation which we discussed this morning in the Political Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

I call Mr. Mitolo.

Mr. MITOLO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall not conceal from you or from all my colleagues that I am both exasperated and disappointed as I get up to speak. By a series of coincidences, shuttling between the European Parliament, the Italian Parliament and the various assemblies over the last three years, I have regularly come up against a number of motions or resolutions concerned with the problems of former Yugoslavia and in particular with the most serious of those problems. The bald truth is that votes and decisions in words are taken on these subjects every time, and regularly we come back the next time to the same debates, the same subjects and the same expressions of condemnation. Powerless to help, we stand by watching genocide in action and peoples massacred caught up as they are in events we all interpret one way or another but for the most part condemn because without the slightest doubt they have to be condemned.

I am really embarrassed at having to give my modest support, a vote for a recommendation for the umpteenth time, convinced as I am – I hope previous speakers will forgive me for saying this as I respect their erudition, intelligence and serious sense of responsibility – that yet again we shall be voting to no purpose. How is it possible for us to have so organised a world and a powerful, armed alliance like the United Nations with its vast potential at both political and strictly military level, and yet be forced to acknowledge that the whole world, for all its organisation, is being laughed at by a little army and a small group of politicians still in charge of Serbia; how is it possible that peoples' hopes that peace will be restored in the Balkans should be dashed yet again?

As Latin has been used, I will observe that once again, *dum Romae consultitur Saguntum expugnatur*, (while they are talking in Rome they are fighting in Saguntum): too much chatter and too few effective, serious and well-informed decisions, even if we know that some decisions involve pain and suffering but help to resolve certain situations. Otherwise, the principle of *vae victis* (woe to the vanquished) still applies and balances

of power ultimately prevail. That is our bitter conclusion when we find today that the United States is virtually abandoning responsibility and is no longer prepared to collaborate with the European forces directly involved in the maintenance of peace in that area.

I shall say no more as I agree with most of the speeches we have already heard. I congratulate Mr. Roseta and Mr. de Puig for their magnificent work but have to admit that I shall be voting sick at heart and feeling very bitter and exasperated.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

I now call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – Most of what one could say has already been said in the debate, so I take the floor merely to support the text of the document and to commend the efforts of the committee.

It is true that we all feel impotent, as Lord Finsberg said so clearly, but we should also feel responsible. We cannot just come here and blame our governments. They are no more than what we tell them to do – that at least is how it should be in democratic states under the rule of law. So it is not governments' fault, it is ours. We must face up to the responsibility.

Sometimes I am not too impressed by what some of our colleagues have to say. Listening to my friend Mr. Rodrigues I had the feeling that he has become an orphan – he has lost his God, but fortunately he still has the devil with whom to keep faith. It matters not whether the devil is Germany, NATO, the Americans or Europe. At least he is there, so we may still have something to believe in.

Were it not for the fact that dogmatism has been shown to lead to chaos and nothingness, I might feel jealous of those with dogma. For those like us who believe in neither God nor devil, it can be almost tempting to envy some people's dogmatism.

We are responsible now for what is to be done, not just for what has been done or has not been done. We are talking about a political solution, as proposed by the so-called contact group of Europe, the United States and Russia. It was a precise plan, submitted to all the belligerents. It was unsatisfactory for everyone, because it fulfilled no one's expectations, but it was a compromise – not as an end in itself but as a moment for challenging events and making people live in peace once again.

Even if it was not satisfactory, the Bosnian Government accepted it; only one party to the conflict, the Bosnian Serbs, challenged the international community – world opinion – by not accepting a reasonable compromise.

Mr. Martinez (continued)

We have to return to that compromise – there is no other way. It is the plan of the international community, and those who have refused to accept it are challenging international opinion – challenging us.

What can we do? Those who support a political solution believe that it should be reinforced with arguments powerful enough to ensure that it is implemented: anything else would be wishful thinking. We cannot afford wishful thinking when, every day, people are being killed.

We cannot consider bombing an airport so carefully that we avoid the planes which are dropping napalm on Bihac. It was probably more difficult to avoid the planes than to destroy them. We exercise such care in avoiding those planes because we wish to protect a political solution and not have to launch an invasion.

We face a paradox. We have to use force to make sure that the political solution is implemented. The blue helmets are in danger, and will be in even more danger, and we are doing a good humanitarian job. But we must allow the blue helmets to take serious measures to defend themselves.

My only comment on what others have said is that we have to use Belgrade, which said that it accepted the contact group plan. It is not a question of trusting or not trusting: it is a question of needing to trust, and of implementing the measures necessary to make Belgrade do what it said it would. We have not tried very hard.

United States policy is erratic, which should not surprise us: the Americans are observing their own priorities, as they have done for years. We need more Europe, more consistency. As our Dutch friend, Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout said, this must never happen again, and we cannot afford one step backwards.

So: more Europe, more consistency, more support for a political solution, but one with strength behind it and probably military action. We have the technological means: we cannot seriously believe that fog prevents our bombing a target. Planes land in fog in all our cities. How can we accept such an explanation?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Martinez.

The next speaker is Mr. Pécriaux.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, two highly political points have been made. The first concerned our duty, that of reflecting what our populations feel, expressing it here in this forum, and if necessary reminding the Assembly that we are elected by the people, as Mr. Caro liked to say.

As an elected representative of the people, very much aware of the feelings of the electorate, may I say that Belgium knows what it is talking about when it comes to humanitarian intervention. The work it has done in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia has been described as outstanding and exceptional. In tragic situations of this kind we have our own humanitarian sensibilities. This means, and here I agree with Mr. Martinez, that we can immediately imagine what such situations mean for United Nations blue beret troops and hostages.

My next point is that I wonder whether we are really actors and decision-makers. We meet here in an international assembly chosen by national elections; each of us represents his national parliament. So I would remind you all that the decisions we take here may not necessarily be endorsed by national parliaments.

We must all recognise what our power consists of. We are neither national governments nor national parliaments but their representatives, even if in this WEU forum we may think we have power to act or decide. Let us not forget this.

Another question is whether our analysis, based on a western viewpoint, is complete. Much was said this morning about the rôle of the United States and of each individual country. I would also remind you that some of us went to Russia on an official mission to meet the Russian authorities. Mr. Roseta, who headed the mission, can bear out what I say. There are some great actors – I weigh my words – and influential personalities in the political arena in former Yugoslavia, who have a contribution to make. In particular, we met one outstanding politician who took part in the negotiations.

To conclude, I still believe profoundly and sincerely in a political solution to the conflict and it is the approach we should advocate in our representations with all concerned. We must really urge the contact group to go all out for a political solution, where this is possible, provided that all the actors are involved. If the number of actors or decision-makers has to be increased, then so be it. But I repeat, let there be careful consideration before any action is taken which might bring tragic consequences.

I will conclude by recalling Mr. de Lipkowski's view, which I share. We must try to act unanimously in this parliamentary Assembly and sound a warning with the authority we command but bearing in mind the authority we do not have.

Let us approve the draft recommendation even if we are not all entirely satisfied with it. As far as I am concerned, I am in favour of the power of conversation and political dialogue.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I shall now ask Mr. Roseta briefly to sum up. I shall also ask

The President (continued)

Mr. de Puig to speak, for reasons that I gave a few moments ago.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (United Kingdom). – I raise not a point of order, but a point of information. I do not care much for the recommendation, but I would support it if the committee would make it clear that, considering the timeliness of “using all appropriate means”, it includes, if considered so, the use of force.

The PRESIDENT. – Perhaps that point can be addressed by the Rapporteur when he responds.

I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (Portugal) (Translation). – Thank you everyone for your very kind words, and particularly for the understanding you have shown for this very difficult task. Without the firm and resolute support of Mr. de Puig, Chairman of the committee, it would have been impossible to reach a conclusion in so short a time. Naturally I am also grateful to the secretariat for its help but Mr. de Puig's was decisive in enabling us to reach an acceptable solution. As Mr. De Decker rightly said, it would have been inconceivable in the present situation to meet for a week, and not express our view on the gravity of what is going on. Thanks to you all, our Assembly will be able to declare that view today.

Naturally I myself am not entirely satisfied. Political texts tend to be a compromise. Widely differing positions have been voiced, but what is important is the Assembly's determination that the Council and other organisations be asked to find a solution to this problem, at two levels, as I shall explain.

I thank Lord Finsberg, who knows better than I do, of course, the uneasy burden borne by parliamentarians. Parliamentarians express a will, they try to mobilise public opinion and governments, but they have no power, in fact, to act. We draft documents, we play politics, but we have no power to perform miracles or go into action.

Mr. Baumel well knows what I mean and I agree entirely with what he said. As everyone knows, politics is the science of the possible. In the present situation, with the powerlessness of the United Nations, NATO, etc. and the attitude of our governments, confirmed only yesterday in this forum by the Netherlands Minister, the President of the Council, and by the ministers of other countries, all we can do is to see what can be done and at least not remain silent in the face of tragedy.

I also wholly agree with Mr. De Decker. He set out clearly the three possible solutions and then explained how two were completely impossible. To quote what he said, it would be entirely

impracticable to withdraw the UNPROFOR troops and leave Bosnia, or to have NATO or other military forces intervene. The only solution really left is to strengthen UNPROFOR and seek a political solution by appropriate means.

I thank Mr. Rodrigues for his kind words. I also spoke of our individual responsibility in recent years for the aggravation of the situation in former Yugoslavia. We are not historians. History will be judge of what has happened and we ourselves shall be judged, as will our governments and the organisations we referred to.

It is easy to condemn human rights violations, genocides and holocausts perpetrated in the past. Everyone condemns them today and agrees that they must never be allowed to happen again. The problem is our accepting here and now what is happening today. Historical condemnation is for historians. They can help us understand what happened in Europe in the past.

The question that I ask you, Mr. Rodrigues, is what do we do? If one people attacks others, if it seeks to annex land and kills tens of thousands – or even millions as has happened – of innocent people, what should we do? We should always look for political solutions up to the last possible point. Then, if political solutions will not work we come to the two levels referred to in the draft recommendation, which perhaps you have not understood.

The text recommends making “one last effort to find a political solution to the conflict, in view of the negotiations in progress on the basis of the proposals of the contact group” and consideration of “the timeliness of using all appropriate means to prevent further massacres...”. Do you think that public opinion in Europe will go on accepting the slaughter of what may – why not? – be millions of people, as in the past, without doing or saying anything? Paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation does not propose a non-political solution to the conflict. It recommends the Council to consider the timeliness of using other means to prevent massacres.

Mr. Korakas is right to suggest we should replace the precept: *si vis pacem para bellum*, by: *si vis pacem para pacem*. This is excellent advice, but only valid if everyone obeys it. We cannot let some people disobey and take advantage of it to conquer and kill.

I fully understand what the observer from Croatia said. I shall make no comment on what Mr. de Lipkowski and Mr. Pécriaux said, since I fully agree with them.

The important thing is to have a position expressing a clear political will with the Council assessing the means required. As I said a short while ago, the Council will be answerable like any other

Mr. Roseta (continued)

executive political body and our governments will be answerable, not only to history, but to their peoples, national parliaments and even to us.

With the President's permission, I should like to say now, so as not to have to speak again, that I accept the oral amendment that Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman wants to table. This is to amend the words "one last" in the second line of paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation, to read "a new", the point being that it is better to ask for "a new effort" to find a political solution to the conflict rather than "one last effort", which could give rise to varying and confused interpretations.

In conclusion, I thank you for your help in performing this almost impossible task. Ultimately, however, it is you who are responsible, not I, since you chose me. With the help of the committee, your own and that of Mr. de Puig, I think that we shall succeed in approving a wording which is not empty, but has content and expresses political will, for that is the parliamentarians' rôle – to express political will.

The PRESIDENT. – We are very much up against time. I ask you, Mr. de Puig, to be extremely brief and then I shall put the matter to the vote.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as Chairman of the committee I would like to begin by thanking all the members of the committee for the contribution they have made, and everyone who has spoken in the debate today. I am grateful not only for their speeches, but for their understanding and flexibility. First, Mr. Roseta was prepared not only to seek a positive compromise, but also to show flexibility in his willingness to change the original text and find a formula which met with everyone's approval.

Mr. President, I do not have a lot to add to the thoughts and analyses of my colleagues, but I would like to mention one matter which I feel affects me, indeed all of us, personally.

Throughout the debate on Monday, yesterday and today, in the committee, the words hypocrisy and cynicism have been used on several occasions. There has been talk of cynical attitudes or hypocritical attitudes, with reference to the stance taken by one person or another. What I would like to say is that the document which is the fruit of our labours is neither cynical nor hypocritical. It would have been both hypocritical and cynical to have produced a resolution calling for military intervention, because we know that this is not possible, that military intervention means sending 200 000 men and that is not possible. It is not possible, because our governments would not agree to it, because our parliaments would not agree to it, because it would not have been appro-

ved here in this plenary meeting. It would have been a cynical gesture.

Mr. De Decker, who is the initiator of the draft recommendation we are discussing today, has indeed been good enough to be the initiator, but has also been good enough to be neither cynical nor hypocritical, and has altered the original proposal to send multinational forces to Bosnia so as to find a balanced formula which would not result in our having to request what is literally impossible and hypocritical.

On the other hand, however, and here I have to mention the intervention of our communist colleagues, even in a peaceful speech there is also cynicism and hypocrisy. Today we cannot rule out the possibility of serious coercion against the aggressors. It is not being neutral to say only political means, only a political solution, when we are dealing with a group which is not interested in politics, but only in aggression and weapons. To support only political discussion and rule out the possibility of action, coercion, deterrence by force is, in my view, to take a stance which is neither realistic nor neutral. It is encouraging barbarism and in actual fact it is not being neutral, but supporting one camp. We tried to find a formula which was neither hypocritical nor cynical.

Mr. President, I will conclude by saying that our document is an appeal to the international community to use all available means to oppose the barbarians, knowing as we do that military intervention is not possible, that a military solution is not possible, but knowing, at the same time, that there is the possibility, for example, of putting pressure on NATO.

There is a rôle for NATO which it has not so far played, without further decisions, either in the United Nations or in our organisation; this is a rôle it could play, and could already have played, as Mr. Martinez said, by means of bombing missions which were more military exercises than actions, and we could have put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, who are mainly responsible for the situation, and prevented the massacres that have taken place.

For these reasons, Mr. President, I appeal for the support of the entire Assembly, including the very few representatives who voted against this text in committee, because the text represents the balanced, but firm, stance which is called for at the moment both by the situation and by this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1450.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules and Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly will vote by roll-call on the draft recommendation.

The President (continued)

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call? ...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

*The draft recommendation is agreed to by a substantial majority*¹.

I shall allow Mr. Soell and Mr. Hardy to make very brief explanations of their votes.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I very much regret that at the end of my time in this Assembly, to which I have belonged for more than ten years, I had to vote no on such an important subject. At the same time I respect all those who share with me the sadness and bitterness we have now been expressing for more than three years in various debates. I know that many members share my perception and have also set it out in resolutions.

Two and a half years ago, when this Assembly elected me its President, I said: safe areas must be protected, otherwise the relevant United Nations decisions are pointless. That includes using the necessary means, i.e., destroying heavy weaponry wherever it may be located. I still think that is the right thing to do. That is why I could not vote for this draft recommendation.

A common perception of the real situation – which, as I said yesterday and the day before, is the only prerequisite for a common security policy – means not misrepresenting it. To our Greek colleague who said a moment ago that this conflict had been provoked by foreign intervention, all I can say is: that is absurd. There may have been tactical errors after the conflict began, committed by the government of my country, for instance, and which I have criticised. But you have to read what the communist nomenklatura in Belgrade said in the 1980s to inflame this conflict. When he was deposed in 1987, Mr. Stambolic told his successor as prime minister in Belgrade, Mr. Milosevic: if you back nationalism in order to stay in power when the great changes come, you will destroy not just Yugoslavia but the very existence of the Serbian people.

When there are calls for the Serbs to win back, so to speak, historical territories as well – Kosovo for instance – I wonder about the logic of Greek policy, on the one hand criticising the reference to the Star of Vergina with respect to Macedonia, which does in a sense imply a historical claim to Greek territories, and on the other hand supporting the Serbian policy, which is precisely to lay

historical claim to territories now inhabited by others. I do not understand that logic.

I repeat: I have respect for those who voted differently from myself. I could not do otherwise than vote against.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I did not put my name on the list of speakers because I believed that the British members who had their names down to speak would say words that were acceptable to my colleagues and me. But as the debate developed and one read the report, I came increasingly to the view that this is an occasion on which one can justify using the word, “pathetic”.

There has been a certain amount of criticism of the United States, but even American politicians who may have spent \$20 million on their re-election are entitled to say, “This is on Europe’s doorstep; what has Europe done about it?”

During the debate, we have had calls for conferences. There have been innumerable meetings – which some of us have attended in the Council of Europe – where we have seen an absolute lack of wisdom. It is reasonable to point out that the Americans might rightly have said that if Europe is prepared to have European people protected by Bangladeshi soldiers with only one rifle between four men, then Europe must be sick. America is entitled to say that European organisations have had adequate information.

Some of us have raised the question about member states of the European Community allowing the embargoes to be breached. But when chairmen of the Council of Ministers of this organisation say, “Yes, we have all the information but it will remain confidential” and we can produce only a report that means nothing – the Rapporteur and Chairman have more or less acknowledged that their governments and parliaments will do nothing about it – we are entitled to say that it is pathetic and I rather regret that I voted for it.

The PRESIDENT. – I have been notified that Mr. Rodrigues wishes to speak and, provided that he is brief, I shall call him.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – I also voted against the draft recommendation in committee, where I explained that it contained an insurmountable contradiction. One cannot at one and the same time say a solution must be political and open the door to a military solution, as is implied in several paragraphs.

Mr. Roseta asks what must be done. History will one day judge. I am against military intervention: the more intervention projects there are in former Yugoslavia, the worse will be the results

1. See page 38.

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

and the greater the disaster. Every intervention, every air attack, every shot, produces disastrous results.

As regards the use of the words hypocritical and cynical, in association with the word communist, let me make it clear to avoid any misunderstanding, that at no time in committee or in my speech have I used these terms about members of the Assembly. I am proud to be a communist, but I believe that people should respect each other whatever their ideological differences. Yesterday I paid tribute to Mr. Soell, whom I consider as an example of dignity in this Assembly, though ideologically we are at opposite poles. People can understand each other, agree, talk to each other and be friends, even if their ideas are worlds apart and it is that, incidentally, that will one day make peace possible in Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – I apologise to our guest, Mr. Livio Caputo. If I had known that the debate was to continue for another twenty minutes I would have adjourned it. I had high hopes of it being over shortly after mid-day, but it has proved otherwise.

8. Address by Mr. Caputo, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy

The PRESIDENT. – We are pleased to see you here, Mr. Caputo, representing your Minister, Mr. Martino who, much to our disappointment, was unable to be with us. In my opening speech yesterday I noted that Mr. Martino is presently the Chairman-in-Office of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. I imagine that he will be very much involved in next week's summit in Budapest. It seems as though the CSCE is about to undergo some considerable reorganisation. It represents a gathering of European states on a wide scale – there are now more members in the CSCE than there were members of the United Nations at the outset.

We are pleased to see Mr. Caputo here today and we shall be interested to hear from the Italian presidency, particularly about the CSCE. Italy, like all our countries, is a prisoner of its geography. We all know how effective Italy has been on the western shore of the Adriatic in hosting and organising a range of operations involving former Yugoslavia.

Mr. Caputo, your personnel have been very much in the front line on the Danube. Many of my colleagues and I were impressed by the Commandant of WEU operations, Colonel Angelo Cardile and his multinational team when we visited Calafat in Romania three weeks ago.

The wider Mediterranean area is of particular concern to you at present, as it is to us in the WEU Assembly. I hope that we shall be lending our support to the new attempt to give substance to a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean next year.

I call on you, Mr. Caputo, to address us. I understand that you are prepared to answer questions – we have some for you. I repeat that I am sorry to have kept you waiting.

Mr. CAPUTO (*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour for me to be able to attend this meeting of the WEU parliamentary Assembly which gives me a chance to explain on behalf of the Italian Government and the Minister, Mr. Martino, who unfortunately is unable to speak today and has asked me to convey his warmest greetings to you, Mr. President, and to all the members of parliament here present, the basic lines of Italian policy regarding the new structure of European security and more especially regarding WEU. I should like to give a special greeting to the new Italian parliamentary delegation which is attending this Assembly for the first time and to hope that their work will be constructive and fruitful. I see that the delegation was active this morning when one of the problems vital to Europe was debated and I can say that after hearing the last speaker, I believe that the Italian Government can endorse in full the objectives of the motion just approved.

Italy is very interested in the decision-making process which has been going on for some years with the aim of adapting the structures of European security to the changed international realities. This complex and difficult process will take a long time and be just as lengthy and laborious as the process of establishing European security was after the second world war.

In the light of what has been happening over the last few days, we do not wish to abandon what can be defined as security achievements, including the political commitments painfully entered into in the CSCE. Nor is it our intention to abandon the integrated approach to threats to our security which has been hammered out over the almost fifty years of existence of the Atlantic Alliance. There are a number of reasons why today we need to face our security problems together. These reasons are as follows. (a) Despite the distressing events of recent days, that approach has produced positive results, for the West at least, in recent decades. (b) The strength and credibility of the structures to which various states belong, all of the same nature and determined to meet their defence problems jointly, have grown. (c) We need to aim at lower defence costs based on combining the forces of a number of countries for the purpose of greater effectiveness and political credibility.

Mr. Caputo (continued)

It may be objected that faced with the crisis of the last few days, when there has even been talk of a possible split in the Atlantic Alliance, these remarks may seem to have been overtaken by events. I do not accept this and maintain that the same principles are still valid today and that is why we continue to give them our support. But, as I have said, we have to adapt the existing structures, as we are doing, to the new realities. And here it is above all WEU that has to be involved. Everyone knows that for a long time WEU was called the sleeping beauty of European security. In recent years, however, the situation has changed and we have all recognised the need to reactivate the organisation; it was, in fact, in Rome in 1984 that thought was given for the first time to strengthening and enhancing the structures of WEU.

Since then, Italy has taken a leading rôle in both debate and action to further the reactivation of the organisation. It has never been our idea to replace NATO which retains all its central rôle as the linchpin of our defence and the principal forum for consultation and transatlantic collaboration in the matter of security. We must recognise, however, that as the threat has in fact changed, Europeans must take on increased responsibilities not only for national defence but also for the maintenance of peace and stability both in Europe and worldwide. In earlier speeches, I sensed a feeling of frustration which we all share and which we must all seek to remove.

Europe must therefore acquire a higher profile; changes in the field of security must go ahead side-by-side with the extension of co-operation in all the other sectors covered by the Maastricht Treaty. This is already the case, both in the foreign and security policy of the European Union and in the framework of WEU. These developments cannot fail to have repercussions which we hope will be positive and constructive at Atlantic level also. That is why we think it logical that WEU should benefit from the structures and commands which NATO is ready to put at its disposal, particularly under the plan which still has to be worked out in full for combined joint task forces.

We cannot ignore the institutional aspects, regarding which we believe a great deal has been done. If some prominence is to be given to WEU it may derive from the fact that up till now structural changes have been given greater emphasis than operational changes. Recently, the main WEU agencies have suddenly undergone substantial changes. I am referring to participation by our European and Atlantic partners in the work of WEU as associate members, observers and associate partners. This is a development which we welcome provided it is quite clear that there must

be a measure of balance between the cost and benefits of such enlargement. I take the opportunity to welcome, for the first time here, parliamentarians from the countries from the old Forum of Consultation which are about to become formally associate partners of WEU. It is our belief that, through their presence here, they must become net contributors to collective security and not simply beneficiaries of it. Unquestionably, their association with the decision-making organs of WEU, such as the Permanent Council and the Ministerial Council, constitutes an unprecedented advance, as compared with the state of confrontation which existed only a few years ago and with what is happening today in the other European and transatlantic organisations.

In parallel, somewhat later, the status of the associate members was raised by the Kirchberg declaration.

The adaptation of institutions is not yet complete, moreover. The referendums held in Austria, Sweden and Finland on accession to the European Union will clearly have implications for WEU. I can only express the Italian Government's regret that Norway, which was the country nearest to WEU, has not for the time being joined the European Union. The first three countries named will be able to opt to join the organisation as full members or like Denmark and Ireland become observers. In the course of a recent visit to the new member countries, I was struck by their great interest in our organisation and the possibility that their position may evolve quickly.

As I said earlier, the changes cannot be confined to WEU's institutions. Thought must also be given to the new functions defined in the Petersberg declaration, which are additional to the contribution to the common defence under the terms of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.

In order to win greater credibility, WEU will have to demonstrate to everyone that it is in a position to do something practical, particularly in crisis situations. The results already achieved cannot be ignored: the Sharp Guard operation in the Adriatic and the enforcement of the embargo against former Yugoslavia along the Danube – two operations to which Italy has made and will continue to make a leading contribution – are the first tangible evidence of an operational capability.

I believe that the WEU Planning Cell must be strengthened and in particular that it must be given an intelligence section, able to keep a watch at close range on crises as they arise and continue and to prepare in advance measures for submission to decision by the Council in particularly urgent cases and circumstances. It is only by increasing the potential of this cell that the avai-

Mr. Caputo (continued)

lable forces, as they are usually called, will be able to win greater credibility and to remove the impression which today is perhaps particularly justified that it only exists on paper. In addition to strengthening the Planning Cell, we see four basic areas for development: the availability of multinational forces such as the European corps at immediate readiness, the naval air force, the rapid deployment force and other forces made available by member states, whose terms for use have to be decided; the availability of command structures which can be speedily activated and the possibility of using NATO facilities particularly as regards intelligence. The Italian Government therefore believes that with a view to giving Europe a greater economic and industrial interest, WEU should have an independent satellite surveillance capability, without in any way distrusting the United States and the willingness of Washington to release the available information, for one thing because of its greater economic and industrial interest for Europe.

But what has been done to date is not enough. The changing international situation requires the creation of flexible instruments to be used in the different international scenarios. In the Italian Government's view high priority must be given to humanitarian aid. We have all seen pictures of the horrific crisis in Rwanda and have been frustrated to see how impotent the European multinational bodies, including WEU, were to deal with that catastrophe. It was precisely that disaster which led Italy to call at the G-7 summit in Naples for the formation of a humanitarian task force and it is with great satisfaction that we note that WEU was the first organisation to respond positively to that call.

The establishment of a humanitarian task force has therefore been approved in principle; it will now be for all the partners to collaborate in laying the foundation for an initiative which, in our opinion, should be put into operation as quickly as possible.

We see a proper balance between operational developments and institutions as the essential prerequisite for the harmonious development of this organisation.

We hope, therefore, that by the date of the 1996 intergovernmental conference, due to take place under the Italian presidency of the European Union, there will be a whole wealth of experience and ideas which will enable us to take a major leap forward.

We must therefore develop operational capabilities and at the same time extend future options including as a key element the current discussions on a European defence policy. In our view, the

document approved by the Council of Ministers at Noordwijk provides an excellent starting point and we are very pleased that while it was being negotiated it was given greater substance and made more incisive. It is a balanced document dealing, as it must, with the strictly European dimension side-by-side with the transatlantic dimension; the major outreach towards Central Europe over the last few months is matched with equal status by that towards the Mediterranean which is of vital importance, not only for us Italians but also for Europe as a whole. The link between what is happening in foreign policy and in security policy is essential; the important discussions in the security group of the JFSP on the interests of European security, on Central Europe and on the Mediterranean must, as the document says, find a more strictly political and military response within WEU. Not least of all, we appreciate the acceptance of Italy's proposal that the text in question should also cover the delicate question of the nuclear deterrent. The fact that this is a sensitive issue does not mean that we can ignore it if we wish to deal realistically with the subject of European defence.

The CSCE has perhaps the potential to make an important contribution to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. In this context, I would stress its indispensable activity in the field of preventive diplomacy and crisis-management: the Baltic countries, Moldova, Ukraine, Tajikistan and Georgia are all areas where Italy's chairmanship has been actively involved.

Two areas of conflict are, however, at present concentrating the efforts of the CSCE. These are former Yugoslavia as a whole and specifically Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a long-term mission has recently been set up in Sarajevo and where we hope that in the very near future the CSCE will be able to nominate the ombudsmen for whom the constitution of that country provides, although after recent events this may seem less important. There is also Nagorno-Karabakh, where increasing efforts are being made to set up a possible CSCE multinational force to maintain peace and to replace the exclusively Russian forces operating there at present. On this point, I can tell you that a change is taking place in Moscow's attitude which should fairly quickly lead on to the formation of such a force.

Lastly, I would like to record that over the past twelve months relations between the CSCE and WEU have been strengthened and consolidated, in particular, by way of information provided by the presidency to the Brussels Council. We must in any case focus our efforts on a number of essential aspects, including a clearer definition of relations with the United Nations for which the CSCE should be a key partner in preventing and resolving regional crises, rationalisation of the

Mr. Caputo (continued)

CSCE structures to enhance its conflict-prevention and crisis-management functions, a more complete system of security standards by the final drafting of a code of conduct, the harmonisation of commitments and the planning of security negotiations for the Balkans. In this respect, we hope to be able to make substantial progress since the Budapest summit.

In view of the gravity of the events which have occurred and are still going on today in former Yugoslavia, I decided not to devote a central part of my speech to the question raised yesterday by the head of a friendly state invited to this Assembly, from whose speech a number of somewhat disconcerting facts emerged. I have no wish to become involved in disputing the terminology used by President Kucan, although it does not seem correct to me to argue that Italy is using unfair tactics against Slovenia. The Slovene question is a real problem which can and must be resolved by a frank dialogue on clear bases. Two basic principles of Italy's position which I should like to reiterate can help us achieve this objective. The first is that Italy has never made any territorial claims against Slovenia. We believe, therefore, that this question was resolved by the Osimo Treaty; we would also point out, however, that this treaty was signed by Italy with a state which no longer exists, which was then totalitarian and did not recognise private property.

Consequently, the problem of the status of property confiscated from 350 000 Italians, who then had to leave the territory handed over to former Yugoslavia, can be reviewed on the basis of new circumstances as provided for in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention. This is the sole issue and in my opinion it is not a question of revanchism as was said yesterday, but rather a question of human rights and restoration of former homes as required by the Vancouver Convention.

The second principle is that we sincerely want Slovenia in Europe. The Slovenes are our neighbours; we have long-established relationships with Slovenia and intend to develop other economic, cultural and human links. This process cannot, however, be regarded as automatic; entry into Europe, in fact, means accepting its values and principles and it is exclusively on the basis of those values that we have conducted our negotiations with Ljubljana and intend to bring them to a conclusion as soon as possible.

I should like to conclude by expressing our warmest appreciation and thanks to the retiring Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, for his successful efforts during his term of office.

I should also like to offer my best wishes to the new Secretary-General, Mr. Cutileiro.

WEU is an organisation which is consolidating and needs a firm guiding hand which we are sure we have found. This meeting also sees the end of the Netherlands' six-month presidency of WEU. As Italy held office for a year until June 1993, we are only too well aware of the committed work done by the Netherlands for which we wish to offer our thanks.

Last of all, I must welcome the future Portuguese presidency. We have already started to collaborate on the basis of our experience. We shall be glad to continue and extend it and offer our best wishes for every success in this mission.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Caputo.

We have a number of questions and I would ask those concerned to please ask questions and not make speeches.

The first one comes from Mr. Pahor, an observer from Slovenia.

Mr. PAHOR (*Observer from Slovenia*). – Slovenia remains committed to the development of the best possible economic and other relations with your country. However, we are firmly decided not to step back in response to the unjust Italian claims.

The Slovenian Government announced a procedure regarding the purchase of real estate by foreigners. Are we right in believing that Italy now welcomes that decision by agreeing to the mandate for the start of negotiations on 19th December in Brussels?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. CAPUTO (*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – We welcomed the decision taken by the Slovenian Government on 30th September last, to introduce, before the conclusion of negotiations with the European Union, an amendment to the constitution permitting European Union citizens to buy property in Slovenia. We certainly believe that it is on the basis of that undertaking that the European Union should negotiate.

We made every effort to add a bilateral declaration to the unilateral decision which simply tables an amendment. It does not approve it. The terms of such a declaration had already been agreed by the foreign ministers of the two countries at Aquileia.

Subsequently, the Slovenian foreign minister was disavowed by his government and yesterday we were somewhat disconcerted to learn that he was not even authorised to conclude the agreement. Clearly, in a totally confused situation like this, arising from a virtually unprecedented step – a foreign minister disavowed by his own government – we are seeking clarification of the situation before taking any decision.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

We now have a question from Mr. Terry Davis.

Mr. DAVIS (*United Kingdom*). – At the beginning of your address, you referred to our debate this morning on Bosnia and the recommendation that was carried almost unanimously. Will our debate and the recommendation make any difference to the attitude of the Italian Government towards the situation in Bosnia?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. CAPUTO (*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*). – I think that our feelings about Bosnia are more or less the same. The recommendation has a certain validity, but it is often another matter to carry out the recommendations. As I said from the podium, we sympathise with all that you have said. At the moment, we do not know what else we can do in our brief term of office to stop what is happening. As our foreign minister said at the General Affairs Council in Brussels, the Russian proposal has a certain validity and on that basis action could be taken. Very shortly in Belgrade, the Italian Government will explore what is happening and what can be done.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The next question comes from Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Does the Italian Minister accept that a treaty is binding and that to try and change it after forty-odd years and link it with something totally different is as unacceptable to this Assembly as is the attitude of Greece towards Macedonia?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. CAPUTO (*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*). – I am afraid that you have got your dates wrong. This is not a peace treaty; it is the treaty of Osimo of 1975 and the Rome Agreement of 1983 in which the property issues were settled as was the destiny of the free territory of Trieste. I do not want to waste the time of the Assembly with a long story about how this came about. However, Osimo and Rome were not peace treaties but agreements which we consider to be absolutely valid, the exception being the destiny of the property confiscated by the then communist régime, which did not recognise private property – even that of its own citizens, let alone foreigners. That can be reviewed under clause 62 of the Vienna Convention due to the changed circumstances.

I repeat for the umpteenth time that we ask only the following: first, the Slovenian constitution must be amended to recognise the right of foreigners to buy property – it must be amended anyhow if Slovenia wants to enter Europe. We are interested in our exiles but we accept that the

benefit will be extended to all European citizens. Second, we seek that the confiscated property that is still in state hands and has not been allotted to any private citizen is returned to its original proprietor in exchange for the amount in dollars agreed in Rome in 1983, and of which only a limited amount has so far been paid. Third, should a Slovenian citizen sell his house, which originally belonged to an Italian citizen, if that Italian citizen so wishes, he has the first right to buy it.

I do not think that those are revengeful demands. Rather, they are inspired by a desire to redress a wrong that was committed in the area at the time.

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Latronico.

Mr. LATRONICO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. I should like to put two questions to Mr. Caputo. I understand why you did not make too much of a point of the language used by President Kucan. In his speech yesterday, however, President Kucan said that Italy was “blackmailing” Slovenia in connection with its efforts to become an associate member of the European Union: do you think the word “blackmail” is appropriate in the present circumstances?

My second question: we have learnt today that the Slovenian Government is proposing to hold a referendum among Slovenian citizens on the claims and aspirations of Italians who were forced by communism to abandon their land and property. Do you think that such a referendum is a legitimate and democratic instrument and in line with the principles for the settlement of international disputes and the recognised rights of minorities?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. CAPUTO (*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – My feeling is that to talk of blackmail in this case is not only a misuse of language but a downright provocation. We consider simply that Slovenia, which recognised the change in circumstances in the exchange of notes of July 1992, by which it declared itself heir to the treaties of Osimo and Rome, should demonstrate its willingness to bring itself into line with the usages, customs and habits of the European Union which it hopes to join.

Clearly, it is within the powers of any government to decide to hold a referendum but I wonder whether this is compatible with the undertaking already given by the Slovenian Government to table an amendment to its constitution. In any case, I do not think it right to interfere in the internal decisions of the Slovenian Government and I therefore leave it to those responsible to decide whether such a move is appropriate in this case.

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Benvenuti.

Mr. BENVENUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In your speech, Minister, you referred to the fact that there is a substantial European consensus and quite rightly underlined the rôle which Italy has played and is still playing. My question is, therefore, do you not think that Italy, which rightly performs the rôles you have mentioned and seeks quite properly to protect its own interests, should avoid entangling its own foreign policy in a dispute with neighbouring Slovenia to the point of making the accession of that country to the European Union and hence progress towards European unity, dependent on the solution of that dispute?

Do you not think that it is a question from the past which, though it must be faced and resolved, should not prejudice the future like this? Do you not think, finally, that both Italians and Slovenes should in the end express words of wisdom and that this question, which has once again been debated at length and in great detail, should find a fair solution in the European context?

I believe that the interests of Italy, Slovenia and Europe lie in that direction. If I may say so, Minister, the very fact that a few moments ago you took the trouble to reply on this point shows to some extent how it limits and conditions the international profile of our country in Europe and in the world.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. CAPUTO (*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I see that our parliamentary opposition is active even here, taking the opportunity to go further and at greater length into a debate we have already had in the Italian Parliament.

I would first like to make it clear that we do not believe that this dispute with Slovenia – which I repeat was not started by the present government but re-emerged two years ago before the events in Bosnia gathered speed – can in any way be confused with what is happening. They are two separate issues which must go ahead separately. I am glad that you, Mr. Benvenuti, recognise that our requests to the Slovenian Government are justified and this encourages me to pursue them further. I do not agree, however, that our linking of progress of negotiations with Ljubljana with the accession of Slovenia to the European Union blocks this process. I believe instead that before welcoming with open arms – I would again repeat – a new country into the European community, the ground must be cleared of all doubts and misunderstandings dating from the past which we surely all ought to bury but which, as we see, sometimes come back to the surface.

And I would like to repeat here words which I have used several times when speaking to the Slovenian negotiators: we have a long marathon to run together. Before running this marathon, we

would wish that the wound – a moral wound – which our country suffered and still feels should be healed and to that end we seek the collaboration of the Slovenian Government.

I reject, once again, the word revanchism which was used yesterday. Ours is simply a claim for justice in what, without using too violent an expression but one which is now current has been, all things considered, one of the first ethnic cleanings in that part of Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Sole Tura.

Mr. SOLE TURA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Under-Secretary of State, you have given a general review of the European political scene. Do you not think that starting a row with Slovenia – a sensitive area in Europe and a row which could become a frontier dispute, since political forces in Italy are also in the government majority – might generate more conflicts likely to lead the region, and Europe as a whole, into a situation of general crisis with no way out? Let me now ask you a question which may be blunt but is of great concern to me. You signed an agreement with Yugoslavia and you want to change this one with Slovenia. Did you sign the agreement with Yugoslavia because it was a strong country and do you wish to revise the agreement with Slovenia because it is a weaker country?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. CAPUTO (*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – This question seems to me irrelevant. At the end of the war, we ceded eight thousand square kilometres of land to Yugoslavia, thus settling the situation arising out of the second world war. We signed the agreement because across the table we had a communist government which did not recognise private property. We could not discuss a problem with that government which for us, I repeat, was the same as a human rights problem. We are now dealing with a government which is sensitive to this problem and from which we expect a gesture of goodwill towards Slovenia. Returning a few old houses against payment in dollars will not be a tragedy for Slovenia but will allow investors to be attracted and an area to be reconstructed which needs it. The situation as settled by the peace treaty will not be affected in any way.

I also reject the argument that this matter could generate more conflict in Europe. I would just remind you that Russia, which annexed Finnish Karelia after the second world war, is now very pleased that the 450 000 Finns who left the territory are today able to come back and buy houses which once belonged to their families.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Tusek, an observer from Austria.

Mr. TUSEK (*Observer from Austria*) (Translation). – Mr. Caputo, in your address you also spoke of the changes that will occur in the European Union and in particular in Western European Union as a result of the accession of the new member states, Sweden, Finland and Austria. In this context, you referred in decided terms to the importance of Austria taking further steps. My question here is: what possible further steps do you think these new members of the European Union could take in the coming years, and what should we do in anticipation of the 1996 intergovernmental conference, in which we want to be actively involved?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. CAPUTO (*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – During a visit to Vienna a few weeks ago I found that Austria is particularly interested in WEU, perhaps more so than the Scandinavian countries. I believe that the new member states of the European Union must slowly move towards membership of Western European Union, because that is in the general interest. No one will urge them to hurry, but we believe – and we are hearing the same thing nowadays in relation to the different interpretations of European security from our countries and America – that the member states of the European Union should eventually all become members of WEU as well.

If we were to achieve that, we would probably be able to make great progress in the field of European security. It is likely that we would then have a Europe more capable than it is now of taking its own decisions in the field of security.

The PRESIDENT. – At the end of a marathon sitting I call Mr. Parisi.

Mr. PARISI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, I have to say, frankly, that you have proved yourself to be a not only careful but brave journalist in guaranteeing the continuous expression of our country's foreign policy towards the Community and the alliances. You regretted there was no opposition but as the people's representative I found myself agreeing with you on many points regarding foreign policy.

I have noted that, on the subject of the dispute with Slovenia, neither the opposition parties nor members of the government have said anything disputing our right to act in support of the aspirations of our minorities. I would add that, yesterday, President Kucan lost a great opportunity to prove the maturity of the young Slovenian democracy by failing to give adequate reasons in reply to the constructive requests made by both the majority now governing Italy and the opposition. Some of the requests for details made by Mr. Fasino illustrate the point.

I would like to ask you the following question. As Aquileia will be resumed – and the arrangements for parliamentary elections in Slovenia have probably caused any reference for serious negotiations to be lost – is it true that similar problems with Croatia show that it would be possible to repeat that example with Slovenia in a quieter atmosphere, not poisoned by opposing electoral positions, with Italy not resolving the problem bilaterally, thereby putting our country into a more defensible position and creating conditions in which the problems can be resolved in agreement with all other countries, bearing in mind that what looks like a veto at European Union level is in fact an inevitable postponement even if we accept Slovenia immediately? I hope we do, since the free movement of capital and therefore of assets appears to me to be one of the essential factors for restoring rationality to the solution of the specific problem we are discussing.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. CAPUTO (*Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – This was what we hoped. After the Aquileia agreement, we were on the point of lifting our reserve. Having to deal with a government which disavowed its own foreign minister who later accused his own government of being prey to a kind of senseless, nationalistic frenzy, caused us to think and pause again. I would nevertheless like to assure the questioner that we intend to take the negotiations off ice as soon as possible, as soon, that is, as we have guarantees that Slovenia is serious in saying that it wishes to open its property market to all European citizens and affirms that it can consider an Italian request which, I repeat, was made two years ago and has been the subject of long negotiations in special committees and therefore, is nothing fresh even for that country.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister, for bearing with us after a late start and an even later finish. You addressed us admirably and fluently in Italian, French and English. I only wish that there had been a greater variety of questions; they tended to concentrate on Slovenia – although I recognise that strong views on that subject are held on all sides. Still, we appreciate your visit. I was pleased to hear what you had to say about the Satellite Centre and the need for that sort of facility. Your support for it is most welcome.

Thank you very much indeed for coming here today.

9. Change in the orders of the day

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the remaining orders of the day be taken this afternoon.

**10. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. with the following orders of the day.

1. The development of a European space-based observation system – Part III: (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1436).
2. Co-operation between European space research institutes (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1434 and amendment).
3. Transatlantic co-operation on European anti-missile defence (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1435).
4. The readiness and capabilities of airforces in WEU member states (Presentation of and

debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1444).

5. The WEU Institute for Security Studies (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1430).
6. Western European Union (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Document 1431).
7. Address by Mr. Balladur, Prime Minister of France.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak? ...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.25 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 30th November 1994

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. The development of a European space-based observation system – Part III (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1436).
Speakers: Mr. Valleix (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Alexander, Mr. Borderas (*Vice-Chairman*).
4. Co-operation between European space research institutes (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft resolution*, Doc. 1434 and amendment).
Speakers: Mr. Galley (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Buteiko (*Observer from Ukraine*), Mr. Galley (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Borderas (*Vice-Chairman*), Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase, Mr. Galley, Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase.
5. Transatlantic co-operation on European anti-missile defence (*Presentation of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1435).
Speaker: Mr. Atkinson (*Rapporteur*).
6. The readiness and capabilities of airforces in WEU member states (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order*, Doc. 1444).
Speakers: Mr. Hardy (*Rapporteur*), Lord Newall, Mr. Borderas, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Hardy (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (*Vice-Chairman*); (explanation of vote): Mr. Mitolo.
7. Address by Mr. Balladur, Prime Minister of France.
8. Change in the orders of the day.
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.30 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments? ...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. The development of a European space-based observation system – Part III

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1436)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on the

development of a European space-based observation system – Part III and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1436.

I call Mr. Valleix to present his report.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we are in fact picking up where we left off this morning, partly because that debate ran on into this afternoon, and also because, perhaps contrary to appearances, the present order of the day has in essence something in common with the debate on Bihac. We are, if I may say so, bogged down in feelings of powerlessness and shame, and lack both the will and the means to act. Hence the connection I make between our only too real powerlessness today and the facilities which WEU must acquire if it truly wishes to carry out its mission.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, you will also have noted that it is not by chance that the Technological and Aerospace Committee is tabling three reports on space matters. Yesterday, it was the Chairman of the committee himself, Mr. López Henares, who spoke on the Torrejón centre. He cannot be here today and I therefore thank Mr. Borderas, on behalf of the committee, for taking his place. Today we have two reports to consider, one on the development of a European space-based observation system, and the other on co-operation between European space research

1. See page 41.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

institutes. Both follow on from the report submitted yesterday. Mr. Atkinson, who is also a member of the committee, will deal with anti-missile defence.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is right that after the Torrejón centre – the first system actually set up under WEU's authority – we should continue in this direction. Yesterday's security debates brought home the fact that we must have not only a sound defence strategy but also good logistics and a good intelligence system. The Gulf war and the tragedy in former Yugoslavia remind us of this urgent need.

Ladies and gentlemen, I shall not go over the whole report; you have it, and I hope you have been able to study it. As always in our case with highly technological subjects, this report is not going to prompt a very lively debate, which I regret. Thank you nevertheless for being here and for reading the document.

Before briefly reviewing the document and presenting its conclusions, I want to make one point: in space matters, there is still some misunderstanding. It is clear that not enough is known about the military side, and that, in practical terms, international agreements prevent any possibility of military activity in space. This is for security reasons, but I am one of those who think that Star Wars helped to unfreeze the situation in the East-West confrontation and brought about the thaw in 1989. It is important that we should be able to distinguish more clearly between the military and civil sides of space developments.

In satellite data-processing, the Torrejón centre has a two-fold rôle: military intelligence and disarmament control under the agreements of 1989-1990. We refer to this at the beginning of the report, when we refer to the CFE-1 and CFE-1A agreements. Today however, the European Space Agency and our industrial space-based activities need to be given greater recognition for their capacity to process military data as well. The question is open and WEU should draw attention to it.

My second comment before going on to the technological aspect is that the subject as a whole calls for considerable political will, which is already difficult to summon up, and the will for defence, which is more difficult still. Today, using the peace dividend is more popular than working up defence budgets.

I should like to draw your attention to two aspects. The first concerns European co-operation, about which there has to be no misunderstanding. Co-operation must remain truly European. We need it, as I have just said, both for capital resources and for running costs. Only by

co-operating can we produce really modern programmes, but they are still costly. I hope no-one will object if I quote Torrejón as an illustration.

In a scenario based on a French idea, our European partnership proved efficient except that, when the first contract had to be passed with the British prime contractor, the software was subcontracted to our great American allies. This was very nice, but went outside Europe. It also resulted in incompatibilities at the data-processing level.

I hope that shortly, by means of an agreement concluded with our European partners in the form of a memorandum of understanding signed between France, Italy and Spain, we shall be able to put this right. It is one of the contradictions we need to avoid in future.

Other co-operation difficulties are those encountered in the production of Hermes, which had to be abandoned, developing Helios II and programming Osiris, an observation satellite which is essential if we wish to keep our lead in the space field. This is a highly topical subject, since the Franco-German summit meeting yesterday and today, is dealing with it. Chiefly involved are Aerospatiale (France) and the German industrial group DASA.

To conclude on co-operation, I urge you to ensure that the necessary efforts are made to give effect to the political will for defence. If we look at our budgets, and I am not referring to my country, which is somewhat better placed than others, it is not with budget leftovers that we will be able to support the relatively ambitious programmes we will finally agree on in WEU, as for example the one on which we are shortly to vote.

May I remind our governments and the public that there is a difference between security, which might be achieved by civil defence, and defence itself, which presupposes good and loyal backing in the form of good treaties signed in good faith and sustained by the necessary resources.

That brings me to the technical aspects. Reading the report you will see that I refer to recent changes making the need for decision especially urgent. In the space field, it is a question not only of controlling disarmament in our Europe, but also if possible of forestalling and controlling crises. This is more difficult, as present events cruelly remind us.

Civil objectives are now added to our military objectives in space. A change in intention or in the use of data is enough to switch from the military to the civilian field.

The report refers to known satellite programmes. As you know, there is a basic difference between observation satellites and communication satellites. For the former, optical and radar

Mr. Valleix (continued)

systems are the basic features of reference. For the latter, we must not forget that nothing can be done in a modern military headquarters, including the links with decision-making structures, i.e. the political authorities, without a satellite system.

The report reviews military space programmes in France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy. We do not put them in any order: that is not the problem. By contrast, we must aim at a form of European co-operation that is difficult to bring about. While progress is fairly rapid in the civil field, it is more limited, though it does exist, in the military field. Our rôle, and this is partly the purpose of the report, is to speed it up, in particular by inter-state co-operation – my reference is to the Osiris radar satellite, which is one of our concerns at this time.

We also mention the observation system proposed by WEU and refer to the proposals made by the Eucosat association, which seem to us to be of interest.

Here let me say that the European position is all the healthier, and therefore more important, in that both NATO and our major American allies and partners are sometimes affected by uncertainty and hesitation in this sphere. As a result, it is our duty, both for our own sake and that of western co-operation, to make the production of such sophisticated resources as we are capable of developing our own responsibility.

I shall not revert to the Satellite Centre.

Ladies and gentlemen, in the recommendations contained in this report, I suggest that WEU's Space Group should be converted into a project for a European space-based defence system, which might in turn become a European space defence agency.

We allude to the need to strengthen co-operation among our space industries, and in that connection to foster research in the field of early-warning satellites. This afternoon, Mr. Atkinson will deal with anti-missile defence and if we wish anti-missile defence to be as effective as possible, that is to say as far upstream as possible, we have to have early-warning satellites. We also suggest more be done on navigational satellites, together with both the United States and Russia and lastly, we refer to micro-satellites, a sector not to be overlooked and which, advisedly, our Spanish friends are looking into.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, these are the main thoughts I wished to put before you.

Please bear in mind that in our debate on these subjects we are concerned not only with the technology of production projects, which we consider important for the defence of Europe, but also with

the fact, which I repeat, and it is brought home to us every day – this morning's reminder was a somewhat cruel one – that space defence is inseparable from our attachment to democracy. To preserve it, we must have the necessary means to defend it. We already have the required intelligence and technological skill. We also need the financial and therefore political will.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

I call Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, first I would like to offer my warm thanks to Mr. Jean Valleix, who has been my friend and collaborator in this committee for many years, for his report. Our committee really has spent quite some time now dealing with this question. I myself had the pleasure, at a colloquy in Rome on 27th and 28th March 1990, of virtually making an entrance into this very complex matter. What Mr. Valleix said this morning was a very precise, very apt and very up-to-date description of the current situation and contained a great number of very encouraging recommendations and I am particularly grateful to him for that.

I would like to make a few comments to outline the security policy framework of all these ideas.

My first comment is that the states of Central Europe – and of course this applies in particular to Germany – are no longer front-line states, but will for the foreseeable future – I think one may say – no longer be within the reach of an opponent capable of space-usurpation and strategic operations. That too must necessarily influence our thinking.

Secondly, all of us in Central Europe are allies, partners, not to say friends, and are therefore involved in achieving the objectives of the European Union and of the transatlantic defence alliance. We have to concern ourselves with that aspect of transatlantic co-operation too – and I think all these reports we are discussing this afternoon are very closely connected.

Thirdly, our geostrategic situation has therefore changed in security policy and defence policy terms. Conflict in Central Europe is unlikely and only conceivable in the event of a radical reversal of the current trend.

But – and this is my fourth introductory remark – at the same time as all these improvements, there is a growing danger of regional crises and conflicts. Today, during the debate and decision on the recommendation on Bihac, we saw once again how dramatic events can occur virtually on our own doorstep.

One basic precondition for our ability to take action in relation to foreign and security policy,

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

and also economic and development policy, is the strategic observation gathering system that we are considering again today. We need to have some kind of independent prognostic capability, not subject to departmental limitations. This is not just a matter of defence policy, for we must also look at some of the most complex questions of modern technological development in this context. We need this prognostic capability simply to enable us to take autonomous decisions, not least in our Western European Union.

Early crisis identification also offers a chance of forestalling crises and preventing conflict; that is an important component of this strategic observation system. We need across-the-board basic security policy data that provide us with early indicators of critical developments so that we can introduce political crisis-management in good time.

We need basic data on military policy and military capabilities. We need information that can enable us in the alliance to distinguish the options for action at an early stage and that leave time for military planning with a view to identifying the necessary defence measures.

This strategic observation should also help us to verify arms control agreements – Mr. Valleix places great emphasis on that in his report – and to control proliferation, something we have to deal with in this unstable world – or at least in certain parts of the world.

Let me conclude by setting out a few requirements relating to the basic features of this kind of strategic intelligence. First of all it must be comprehensive, and it must also be continuous. Comprehensive means that in future, in a dynamically changing environment, we must be capable of looking at political, economic, sociological and technical and scientific questions on a worldwide, integral basis. Continuous in this context means that first we must lay the foundations and then we must ascertain as rapidly as possible what the actual situation is and whether it has changed in relation to earlier findings.

Strategic observation must in principle be all-inclusive – that is the third factor – and independent of the weather or time of day. We can only secure a comprehensive view if the gathering of information is basically unrestricted in terms of space or time, i.e., if we can achieve worldwide day and night surveillance of the earth and if we can also do so at the main centres of action.

Furthermore, strategic observation must be targeted. It must serve the security interests of the alliance.

Lastly, strategic observation must also have qualitatively and quantitatively satisfactory resources

and manpower at its disposal; in part, of course, on the basis of national independence, but also in close co-ordination with those of the allies, in order to be effective within the framework of the alliance.

I refer unambiguously to national independence, because unilateral dependence on other states for the supply of information is not confidence-building, owing to the risk that the information – if any – may be supplied selectively and against a quite specific background. That could produce the risk of decision-making being deliberately influenced, which would certainly not create the necessary confidence.

This strategic observation system must closely involve allied and friendly nations, since a labour-sharing approach to this task will create mutual trust and also transparency.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am sure we are nowhere near the end of our work with regard to these complex matters. I think we all know fairly well just what is required and what possibilities we have. But it will be up to us here in the Assembly, not just in the responsible committee, to take the essential political decisions.

(Mr. Pécriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Alexander.

Mr. ALEXANDER (*United Kingdom*). – In his speech to the Assembly yesterday, our President referred to the importance of having an autonomous capability for satellite observation. He referred to the Torrejón Satellite Centre, which was also referred to by Mr. Valleix in his excellent and comprehensive introduction to this report.

Few people could disagree with the object of having such a centre and I therefore welcome the report. What we are seeking to have is a total European space system that will take in early warning and defence intelligence. The defence aspect is vital. Intelligence has always been a fundamental aspect of successful defence, and the committee on which I have the honour to serve has also recognised that. In the future, space will be an increasingly powerful tool in the defence of our respective countries and in maintaining peace in the world. The further upstream you can perceive a defence threat, the better able you are to counter it, if it should come.

Perhaps one day Europe will have its own defence system – I make no judgment on that. But because of the possibility, it would be unwise to do other than accept this report and welcome its possibilities for the future.

I believe that the work of such a centre must be regularly evaluated and that the Assembly should

Mr. Alexander (continued)

hear about it. It should know about the cost, and respective countries should know what the cost is to them. It is vital that we carry our people with us if this important work is to be continued. It is not just the defence possibilities that are exciting but the meteorology prospects; monitoring environmental changes; perhaps assisting in agricultural planning; and monitoring illegal traffic, particularly drug traffic – the possibilities for the future are vaster than we can imagine today. In the same way, what is happening today and what is possible today could not have been imagined ten years ago.

So let us give the report a fair wind. We should support Mr. Valleix in his comprehensive introduction to what is happening and give him the Assembly's full support today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply to the speakers?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I leave it to the Vice-Chairman of the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Borderas, Vice-Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, together with the reports presented by Mr. Galley and Mr. Atkinson, and also Mr. López Henares, whose report was approved yesterday, this report is a prime example of the work of this committee. The four reports drawn up by the Technological and Aerospace Committee and presented to this Assembly are evidence of the intense activity which has taken place in the committee during the last six months, starting with the committee's periodic visit to the United States of America, which facilitated the drafting of some parts of the reports presented here today.

I have had the honour of chairing this committee since Mr. López Henares was obliged to leave for Madrid. I would also like to comment, because as Chairman and as a member of the Spanish Delegation I think it is of interest, on the possibility of a colloquy on the future European satellite system, organised by the Technological and Aerospace Committee, to be held from 22nd to 24th March 1995 in the Canary Islands.

Preceded by a visit to the Torrejón Satellite Centre in Madrid, the colloquy will take place in the Canary Islands, where there are many places of interest, such as the Satellite Tracking Centre in Maspalomas on Gran Canaria, and the Canary Islands' astrophysical observatory, established with support from the European Union.

I would also like to thank MM. Valleix, Galley, Atkinson and López Henares for their dedication in writing these reports and also officials of the Assembly who have made such intense activity possible, and Mr. Pedregosa in particular, as secretary of this committee, because the committee really has worked very hard. During yesterday's debate in the plenary meeting of the Assembly there was much talk of the inescapable and urgent need for a European defence policy, for a white paper in support of it, and for a single, effective and determined stance.

On the other hand, the WEU Council has asked the Space Group to prepare a proposal for the spring 1995 meeting with a view to creating an independent European satellite system. This proposal should include a draft agreement with a list of essential elements which would have to be accepted and approved by the present members of Western European Union.

This is the subject matter of the reports produced by Mr. Valleix and Mr. López Henares and also by Mr. Galley, who is our next speaker and who will talk about co-operation between European space research institutes.

Mr. Atkinson will also present his report at this part-session; it deals with other matters, but forms part of a coherent whole, because satellite observation helps in setting common objectives and drawing up programmes for European anti-missile defence, in the interests of Europe and its overseas allies.

Finally, let me say that the Technological and Aerospace Committee discussed this report and the others we are about to hear, and accepted it unanimously.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. I hope for a positive outcome from the reading and approval of this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1436.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is agreed to¹.

1. See page 42.

4. Co-operation between European space research institutes

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1434 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on co-operation between European space research institutes and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1434 and amendment.

I call Mr. Galley to present his report.

Mr. GALLEY (*France*) (Translation). – May I begin by thanking the WEU staff and in particular Mr. Pedregosa, who spent several months drawing up the report, and thus enabled us to work in the best possible conditions.

The report in my view comes exactly at the right time, since today we see an extraordinary difference between space co-operation in the civil and military sectors. Military space is a field in which our continent lags very much behind the United States, the consequences of which we have been able to assess since the start of this part-session. It must therefore be regarded as one of the main fields of our activity.

I sought at the beginning of the report to present the situation in each country. You will find an exhaustive analysis of what is being done in Europe: in each national context, I have tried to bring out the co-operative activities, be they inter-state co-operation or co-operation within programmes such as those of the European Space Agency.

Although the list is complete, we regret that Belgium and Portugal did not provide us with the information we asked for.

There is a special section in the report for the European Space Agency and its work in deference to the fact that, firstly this is one of the oldest forms of European co-operation since it goes back to 1962, and secondly, it is a major European success, our confidence now being strengthened by several months' close observation.

The European Space Agency works on each programme with the aim of taking it to completion, an aim it generally achieves. In addition, over the years, it has tried to involve the maximum number of countries as is true of the present distribution of the Agency's centres. Its nerve centre is in Noordwijk in the Netherlands and two other centres are in Germany, at Darmstadt and Cologne. ESRIN, in Frascati not far from Rome, is a basic data-processing unit.

ESA's desire to distribute both its tasks and operational centres among a number of countries, bearing constantly in mind the need for a fair

return on the financing contributed by each country to the Agency, is therefore apparent.

To a certain extent, the welcome decision to set up the Torrejón Centre rounds off the organisation. There is indeed no reason whatsoever – if the conclusions I am about to put to you are adopted – why this Centre should not eventually take its place in the ESA complex. We can only congratulate ourselves on what is the successful outcome of a WEU idea, and an undeniable technological achievement.

In section III, I describe the present state of European co-operation and note that since national research institutes are planned as national bodies, it is assumed they give priority to serving national interests. It should also be noted that throughout Europe there are differences between different countries' space sectors and the political importance governments ascribe to specific fields. Another point is that national space research institutes are also engaged in other fields of research, such as aeronautics and energy, thus widening their field of view considerably.

I felt it necessary in this report to highlight existing examples of co-operation between national space research institutes outside the ESA. These programmes are very important and involve a number of countries. I refer to SPOT – with whose extraordinary success we are all familiar – Vegetation, Helios I, from February 1995 onwards, and then Helios II, IASI and SAX.

Moreover, in the framework of the EUCLID research and technological programme, the feasibility study of optical satellites is extremely promising.

At this point I should like to emphasise the following. The aeronautics institutes of seven European countries – Germany, Spain, France, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom – have decided to associate their aeronautics activities, and several of these institutes also have activities in the space sector. It therefore seems very clear to me that this example in the aeronautics sector could be usefully followed in the space sector, thus implementing and giving substance to the Maastricht Treaty, which states the need to co-ordinate efforts relating to research and technological policy.

I now come to my conclusions. It is clear that space activities have as a general rule developed in accordance with national interests, in sectors chosen by our countries for their political and economic importance.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, as an event in itself, to a large extent brought bipolarity and the space race to an end. It is clear from Mr. Atkinson's very complete and documented report that the United States has perhaps come to a halt in the

Mr. Galley (continued)

upward spiral of its spending, but is still continuing its work.

In the framework of space policy, the defence sector is of very special importance because it is vital to national sovereignty.

If this interest is still there today, despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat, it is for two reasons. The first is that disarmament makes necessary a new and technologically far more sophisticated type of armed force to which – as we have seen in our discussions – space is increasingly important. The second is bound up with the verification of disarmament agreements and the physical absence of new threats, though we have spoken about those which might arise in the Mediterranean. Verification calls for increasingly complex systems. We know that considerable progress has been made, particularly in high-definition observation systems. In his excellent report, Mr. Valleix notes that Helios I is capable of a one-metre degree of resolution and Helios II, programmed for the year 2000 onwards, will be capable of a resolution of some 50 centimetres. This gives you an idea of the scale of progress in various fields. So today we have an extraordinary instrument at our disposal thanks, I repeat, to European technology.

From the political point of view – and the committee agrees – I therefore consider that there is a very clear consensus on the need for and timeliness of international co-operation in space, mainly in view of the almost unsurmountable difficulties faced by each of our nations in meeting the very great cost of space projects.

As I said in my report, European co-operation in space has materialised in programmes carried out in the framework of the European Space Agency, to which should be added other programmes conducted in parallel by a number of European countries.

European co-operation in space, as I have defined it, is exemplary, and there is no sector which has been as Europeanised as space technology in the civil field. It could be shown that achievements in the civil field have been the origin of a number of advances in the defence field.

My conclusion, for which I have the agreement of the members of the committee, is as follows. The situation is one of great contrast. The co-operation policy it has successfully and continuously followed over thirty years sets Europe now in the forefront of civil space activities, rivalling the United States. I am thinking here of launchers, telecommunications and earth observation.

At the same time and probably because there has not been enough – if any – co-operation, mili-

tary space achievements lag a long way behind those of the United States and Russia. There are various reasons, probably related to the differences between our countries in both objectives and the ways to achieve them.

But to look reality in the face, as we have been doing since the beginning of this part-session, the synergy between the civil and military fields is considerable, not only in the United States and Russia, but also, and this I can confirm, in China.

The conclusion I draw is clear: on the basis of clearly-defined aims, as was so successfully the case with the Torrejón Centre, we must draw up specific programmes with European security the objective, as defined by the Maastricht Treaty.

To do this, first we must follow the example of the European Space Agency and its worldwide achievements, and second, whenever one of our countries defines a project, even at the national level, it should try to put it before its European allies and explore all possible forms of partnership. Lastly, and this is the most important point, we must think about how to establish close and wide-ranging synergy between the civil and military space sectors.

I now come to the committee's recommendations.

The committee recommends creating a study group composed of representatives of governments and national space research institutes with the following aims:

- lay the foundations for an overall European space strategy;
- promote a more rational use of available resources in order to avoid as far as possible not only competition, but above all, duplication of effort and expenditure, which still happens in too many cases;
- establish the bases for close co-operation between national space research institutes similar to that already existing between them in the aeronautics sector;
- give priority to the military space sector in order to develop European independence in space matters – an aim fully recognised by our Assembly – and also to take account of the fact that military applications of space are essential to our survival. Imagine what it might mean for Europe, for all our countries, to have available advanced military surveillance facilities for the territory of former Yugoslavia, instead of depending on other countries in a great number of sectors. At present our possibilities for action are considerably curtailed, as we have seen for ourselves today, with the change in position of the United States;

Mr. Galley (continued)

- lastly – a vital recommendation – study the possibility and expediency of amending the European Space Agency Convention so as to enable ESA to devote its efforts also to the military space sector. It would be a pity for us not to benefit from the extraordinary capacities of the European Space Agency, and its wealth of possibilities, by making use of them in the military field once we can agree to consider the military field as the priority.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase.

Mrs. GAIOTTI de BIASE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to congratulate Mr. Galley on his excellent report. I agree with the main drift of his presentation and with the statement that military applications of space in large measure coincide with civil applications in the article in the recommendation proper, to which I have tabled an amendment. This also takes account of the fact that such military applications are increasingly less of an offensive character and are concerned much more with intelligence, communications and data and their completeness and good timing.

Of course, we all know full well that in the history of modern research, and not only modern research, military requirements have almost always guided and anticipated civil applications as well. Today, however, this frankly seems less necessary from the military standpoint particularly if we look at the progress achieved by research for civil purposes in that area.

Why, therefore, exclude a priori a change in the balance of traditional thinking on priorities without, however, penalising the military applications of research? My amendment deletes the reference to military priority but has no intention of excluding it to any major extent. It is, in fact, tabled with a view to strengthening and not weakening the draft resolution; on the one hand, it avoids and prevents the emergence of disputes which are always possible concerning the development of combined military and civil research and on the other, it enhances the possibilities for co-ordination between the European Space Research Institute and the European Space Agency.

I would ask the Rapporteur, therefore, to regard my amendment not as conflicting with his excellent report but as helping to contribute to the success of his proposals. The basic objective is as indicated by the Rapporteur, namely, European autonomy in the matter of defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, first let me congratulate Mr. Galley on his report, which has once again demonstrated his great expertise in this field. I unreservedly support his appeal for the development of a common European strategy, and I know this is also fully endorsed by all the committee members.

We sometimes find it difficult to hold political discussions about the space sector. Many people advance very superficial arguments: how can you expect financing from us when – to put it very tritely – we have quite enough problems here on earth, when we have labour market problems, when we have social security to worry about! But I think it is our task – and this report makes a major contribution to it – to canvass repeatedly for the space sector; for it is not only of technological interest, but also extremely important in terms of foreign policy, and I would even say that international co-operation in high technology has now reached a level where it is becoming a foreign policy factor in the truest sense of the term, quite apart from any technical and scientific questions.

I am also grateful to Mr. Galley for openly raising a matter that is usually only touched upon very gingerly and which applies to the whole area of high technology, namely the synergies between the civil and military fields. To take a very simple example, a carbon-fibre compound can be used just as easily in an Airbus, to mention a European development, as in a fighter plane.

Let me offer a few further arguments on behalf of the prospects for aerospace here in Europe. It is one of the great challenges of our times, for both scientific and economic purposes, and it demands a high level of technological efficiency and a willingness to work together worldwide because it sets such extraordinarily high demands. If in future we in Europe, as developed industrialised countries, want to be able to compete in the world in global markets, we will also have to master this important cross-sectional technology, we will have to consolidate our own position. That can in fact only be done through international partnership, which must of course extend beyond Europe.

I would like to discuss three developments.

First, following the collapse of the socialist system and the end of the political and economic East-West confrontation, aerospace technology has of course – I admit that – lost its place as the spearhead of system competition; let me refer you to the Sputnik debates. But at the same time there is now a greater chance of global co-operation and the subject has acquired a new political dimension and quality, which also opens up new strategic opportunities for future aerospace policy.

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

Secondly, let me give a few examples of practical applications. Direct television transmissions from the remotest corners of the earth, international telephone connections – a huge market with an incredible future potential – the exchange and transfer of commercial and banking information, aircraft and shipping navigation via relay satellites, weather forecasting, climatic and environmental research, all these show that aerospace technology is now well advanced and has crossed the threshold enabling it to be applied on an extremely broad front. So we are no longer talking just of technically and scientifically demanding projects of significance in the laboratories or in the economic development departments, but of substantial market products that will help us to strengthen our economic position in Europe in the future.

State support for aerospace – and it cannot go by without that – may therefore have to take a somewhat different approach in future. Apart from public responsibility for the necessities of life, state support will have to concentrate more on economic usefulness. That also means a stronger commitment on the part of industry to safeguarding Europe's economic position, as a particular priority.

Thirdly, as regards European co-operation...

(The sitting was suspended at 4.30 p.m. and resumed at 4.45 p.m.)

(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – While I was out of the chamber making a presentation I was deeply disappointed to hear that the sound system had broken down, as you all know too well. I hope and believe that it has now been repaired, particularly in view of what is to take place later this afternoon. I apologise to Mr. Lenzer, who was in full flow, and I ask him to take the floor again.

Mr. LENZER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. I was trying to indicate the importance of space flight by making three points and since some of my words may have been lost, I shall begin again with the third point.

I would point out that Europe has made particular progress in the field of carriers, which are of course of decisive importance if we want to maintain our hold on this market – commercial satellites, for instance, – and that with the Ariane launcher, which now provides 60% of the carrier capacity on the world market, we have a quite excellent workhorse among carriers, and one which can certainly hold its head up worldwide. We must consolidate that position. That will be an important task, and one that can be achieved

through international co-operation, and also with the participation of the various national aerospace organisations, despite the budgetary constraints facing all our member states.

I think that Europe must now define its general position on space in the civil and military field – and that is also the purpose of this report. We must play our part in the world market. We are, after all, participating in the international space station, which in turn means we must discuss appropriate burden-sharing. We also want to work in close partnership with the Russian co-operation potential, drawing not only on our previous experience with manned space flight and the relevant programmes for its application, but in particular on experience of transport capacity.

Since we must now examine viable alternatives that are also convincing in terms of their later use, Europe will have to meet the challenge of realistically assessing the extent to which the development and use of such programmes will be financially affordable at a later stage.

Let me conclude with an appeal to us all: this costs a lot of money. We will constantly have to find arguments to justify this to our citizens, but I believe we have plenty of good arguments on our side.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Lenzer.

I now call Mr. Buteiko, an observer from Ukraine.

Mr. BUTEIKO (*Observer from Ukraine*). – May I thank Mr. Galley, the Rapporteur, and congratulate him on his comprehensive, informative and valuable report. Paragraph 200 of the report states that “space research has generally developed in relation to national interests and with the aim of achieving supremacy or at least of obtaining a certain political standing”. That is true. Now that bipolarism and opposition between two different social systems has ended, it is high time for fundamental changes in approach both to philosophical and practical deeds in space exploration and the utilisation of its results. It is in the interests of European nations as well as the whole world to give up all stereotypes in psychology, which were based mainly on the presumption – I may be wrong, but this is what I believe – that European co-operation in space exploration should be, to a certain extent, limited to the space institutions of Western Europe.

I am convinced that more attention should be paid to co-operation between the space institutions of Western European countries and Eastern European states including Ukraine.

It is well known that Ukraine's culture has deep European roots. It may be appropriate in this great city of Paris to say that for centuries the kings of this country have been sworn in on a bible

Mr. Buteiko (continued)

brought from Kiev, Ukraine. Ukraine is tied to Europe by strong spiritual and democratic traditions. The written constitution that embodied democratic principles of the distribution of power between executive, legislative and judicial branches was created by the Ukrainian leader Pylip Orlic in 1710 – when his son was Marshall of France.

Ukraine has developed a strong industrial base for space exploration. During Soviet times the best missiles, including Zenith, were built in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine. It would be a waste of human experience and resources to ignore Ukrainian experience in that sphere. It would also be illogical were Ukraine to develop close co-operation with the United States space institutions under the agreement signed recently in Washington while at the same time being ignored by European space institutions. I am convinced that that will not happen.

I am pleased to see that the resolution states that a working group should be established in which representatives of my country and other Eastern European countries would be invited to participate.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does the Rapporteur wish to say anything?

Mr. GALLEY (*France*) (Translation). – I heard Mr. Lenzer's view of launcher programmes and the importance he attaches to them. The achievement which will, I trust, fulfil our hopes – the Ariane 5 programme in late 1995, which will open up launching opportunities for Europe unparalleled by Ariane 4, themselves much appreciated according to Mr. Lenzer – could open new doors and offer us new opportunities.

I would like to remind the observer from Ukraine, with whom I have especial sympathy, not only that the draft resolution invites WEU associate member countries, associate partners and observers to participate in the study group but also that paragraph 199 of the report urges the Commission to encourage co-operation between the national space research institutes including the countries of Eastern Europe and yours in particular. The need for this co-operation is therefore included in the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman of the committee wish to say anything?

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – As Chairman of the committee I would like to express my thanks to Mr. Galley for presenting his report. I would like to refer to the previous speech and stress the enormous complexity of the infrastructure required for aerospace policy at the present time; the degree of technological versati-

lity in so many areas, as Mr. Lenzer pointed out, and also the consistency with and relevance to the other reports, as I mentioned in my previous speech. That is all.

The PRESIDENT. – Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase, reads:

1. In the draft resolution proper, leave out paragraph (e) and insert:

“take account, in developing Europe's autonomy in defence matters, of the fact that military applications of space in large measure coincide with civil applications;”

I call Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase to move the amendment.

Mrs. GAIOTTI de BIASE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have already given some of my reasons for the amendment. Since then, agreement has been reached with Mr. Galley on a form of words which the Rapporteur appears to accept and might be willing to explain.

If Mr. Galley wishes, he can explain the reasons; I do not wish to waste any more of the Assembly's time.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Galley, Rapporteur of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, to speak.

Mr. GALLEY (*France*) (Translation). – During the suspension of the sitting we discussed this matter with Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase and reached the conclusion that her amendment was in the same spirit as the wording we were defending, because it supports the idea of synergy, to which I attach great importance. In the circumstances, paragraph 1 (e) of the draft resolution could be amended to read: “give priorities to the military...”

The PRESIDENT. – Are you happy with that, Madam?

Mrs. GAIOTTI de BIASE (*Italy*) (Translation). – The sense of the amended text which we have agreed is that instead of thinking of a conflict between military and civilian priorities, the special priorities of the military sector are recognised.

The PRESIDENT. – There seems to be general agreement on that.

I will now put this oral amendment to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The oral amendment is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft resolution contained in Document 1434, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft resolution.

The President (continued)

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

*The draft resolution, as amended, is agreed to unanimously*¹.

Congratulations to Mr. Galley.

5. Transatlantic co-operation on European anti-missile defence

(Presentation of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1435)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on transatlantic co-operation on European anti-missile defence and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1435.

I call Mr. Atkinson to present his report.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, next year North Africa will be swept by revolution from one end of the southern Mediterranean to the other. It has already begun. Today's civil war in Algeria will lead to an Islamic fundamentalist government.

Within weeks, perhaps days, that revolution will be exported to neighbouring Tunisia where the Ben Ali government will fall and the banned Islamic Renaissance party will take control.

Before Europe and the United States will have had time to respond, Muslim radicals in Egypt will incite the mob to overthrow the government of President Mubarak. Immediately the border between Egypt and Gaza will be pulled down as Islamic brothers embrace. Israel will mobilise and its army will be on full alert along all its frontiers.

In response President Clinton and NATO will order warships to the eastern Mediterranean and will send troops to support King Hassan in Morocco, whose country will become destabilised by the flood of refugees from Algeria and will itself be threatened by revolution.

Meanwhile waves of boat people will descend upon the shores of southern Europe fleeing the anger of the new Islamic régimes. As a precaution, governments throughout Europe will order the immediate arrest of known Islamic exiles and sympathisers. Demonstrations both for and

against the new régimes will follow. There will be riots in the cities of Europe, with much bloodshed.

Unable to believe their luck, President Kadhafi and the Ayatollahs in Iran promise to reinforce the new régimes. Fearing retaliation from NATO and Israel all of them will request the immediate supply of missiles of all kinds. Having taken delivery of large quantities of NoDong ballistic missiles from North Korea, both Iran and Libya have more than enough to go round, in addition to the hundreds of Scud B, Scud C, Al-Fatah and Tondar 68 medium-range missiles they have long held, to share in the defence of the new Islamic republics. In addition, they will press North Korea to speed up the manufacture and supply of its longer range RoDong missiles which are already on order.

Apart from Israel, there is only one direction upon which these missiles located along the entire southern shore of the Mediterranean will face: that is the continent of Europe.

Mr. President, this is no fantastic doomsday worst case scenario on behalf of aerospace industries, or designed to capture headlines for this debate today. This is a logical consequence of the warnings of Chancellor Kohl that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa is the major threat to Europe today; of Prime Minister Balladur, who has warned that a fundamentalist revolution in Algeria would be the leading threat facing his country; and of our colleague Mr. Baumel, who warns, in his excellent report to us yesterday, that the volatile situation in North Africa may result in a direct threat to Europe's southern flank.

In other words, Mr. President, there exists a potential threat to Europe which may become a reality in the immediate future and for which we are not prepared. It is for this reason that I believe this debate on my report today – on anti-missile defence in Europe – represents one of the most important and immediate challenges facing WEU.

This report is, of course, not the first in this field. As the explanatory memorandum points out it carries forward the work of the Technological and Aerospace Committee upon which Mr. Lenzer reported in 1992, and of the Rome symposium on anti-missile defence of last year. It takes account of the extremely successful visit of the committee to the United States in July this year when we learnt much about the progressive downgrading of American research and development in this field, from the original Reagan concept of a strategic defence initiative that is space-based to the much more modest Clintonesque pursuit of a ground-based theatre missile defence.

I want to use this opportunity to pay tribute to the excellent organisation of this visit by Colonel Scott Willey, of the United States Air Force, who is observing this debate today. I also want to thank

1. See page 43.

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

the secretariat of our committee for its extremely valuable help in compiling this report.

Mr. President, the conclusions I drew from our visit only confirmed my view that the effective abandonment of the research and development of a space-based defence shield by the Clinton administration was complacent, premature and dangerous; and that to rely increasingly on non-proliferation and the missile technology control régime is short-sighted and represents wishful thinking.

And so I am encouraged that there is today a growing awareness on the part of NATO's WEU member states of Europe's proximity to many of those countries that possess, or who are developing and acquiring ballistic missiles; and of our vulnerability to accidental, unauthorised or even deliberate launches. As a consequence, NATO is urgently studying anti-missile defence systems to defend Europe and its troops deployed overseas.

What alarms me is that, as my report makes plain, individual WEU member states are undertaking their own feasibility studies into missile defence instead of co-ordinating their policies and agreeing on the sources and nature of the threats facing Europe today in order to decide how collectively to respond.

Mr. President, it is the aim of this report to put that situation right by calling for a clear policy on the part of WEU, as the future European defence community, for the anti-missile defence of Europe, with the help of the United States.

The recommendations before us are I hope concise and clear. We want to be told what progress has been made by the special working group of the Council of Ministers on the anti-missile defence of Europe in response to the conclusions reached by the Rome symposium one and a half years ago.

We want to know what are the risks to Europe reported to the special working group by the meeting of experts so that we can agree a joint position on the definition of threat to our security.

We want WEU member states to adopt the same approach in their national policies and in their legislation towards the missile technology control régime, on the régime to replace Cocom, and on the exportation of armaments to third countries.

We repeat the calls of Mr. Baumel and Mr. López Henares in their reports to us yesterday, and of Mr. Valleix and Mr. Galley today, for the development of a European space-based observation system and early warning system which are essential for effective anti-missile defence.

We want much closer co-operation between WEU and the United States of America on the

basis of equal partnership and burden-sharing on those anti-missile defence systems ranging from exo-atmospheric to endo-atmospheric, from airborne to ground-based, to be able to counter every threat to Europe and our transatlantic allies. Upon such partnership, a much closer relationship between WEU and the newly restructured American Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation must be sensible.

Mr. President, in conclusion, the proliferation of ballistic missiles on a large scale as well as the spread of weapons of mass destruction to be used with those missiles, is giving our regional adversaries a political and military leverage that was inconceivable at the beginning of this decade. This represents the greatest challenge to the defence of Europe today, as well as to our ability to defend Europe's interests elsewhere in the world and most notably the Middle East.

If we do not have the capability to respond effectively to these threats, then we will be deterred from taking that action against Saddam Hussein and his kind in the future and our enemies will know that they can have their way without a shot being fired.

If WEU is to have any meaning at all in the defence of Europe and its interests in the world, it must acquire an anti-missile defence system as soon as possible. That is the message of my report and the recommendations before this Assembly today. I hope that they will be given total and unanimous support.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Atkinson, for a fascinating but sombre report that has given us all plenty to think about. I echo your comments about Colonel Scott Willey of the United States Air Force who offered us the greatest possible support when the WEU delegation went to the United States.

We have no speakers down for the debate, so without further ado, I will put this to the vote. Mr. Atkinson has covered the ground adequately.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1435.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is agreed to¹.

1. See page 45.

6. *The readiness and capabilities of airforces in WEU member states*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1444)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee on the readiness and capabilities of airforces in WEU member states and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1444.

I call Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur of the Defence Committee, to present his report.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I am delighted that the Defence Committee decided to embark upon this report last December, and I accepted the rôle of Rapporteur.

I am unable to present to the Assembly a report which provides an adequately detailed assessment, and the one conclusion that I do reach is that we need, as a result of that assessment, to carry out a further detailed and comprehensive analysis of the condition of our respective air forces before very long, in order to assess the capabilities after that modest period, and to see what improvements take place.

There are a whole raft of concerns, some of them developed as a result of the debate this morning, in which a number of members of the Assembly, in very good faith, assumed that the respective air forces of our organisation could take out railway lines, tanks or whatever without difficulty. Unfortunately, one has very real doubts about the capacity of our air forces to carry out a job which most people in the Assembly felt was relatively slight.

There is a whole variety of needs and anxieties. Although I could not claim that the report is absolutely comprehensive, I believe that it provides sufficient evidence to justify particular concerns and to identify particular needs. I hope that I have presented this clearly.

Among the concerns is the undoubted fact that there is one area of need which justifies anxiety. That is the concern of member states to effect economies. Obviously, maintaining an air force is a very expensive business. Aircraft are expensive, the equipment which is needed to maintain them can be very costly, and the services of skilled, highly qualified and committed people do not come at all cheaply. Yet, if the air forces are to be maintained, they will have to have good people both to fly the aircraft and to maintain them.

But it is not sufficient merely to have an air force, merely to have expensive aircraft, if they do not engage in adequate training. There is real doubt as to whether the quality of training in a

number of member states is anything remotely approaching adequate.

I know – we have debated this in the past – that low flying can be a very unpopular activity; but if aircrew are not experienced in low flying they are unlikely to possess the ability to survive in a hostile environment. If they cannot survive in a hostile environment, one has to question whether the air force is valuable at all.

Then there is the question of effecting savings in such a way as to benefit the taxpayer. This may sometimes lead governments to engage – as some Western European countries now engage because there is no alternative – civilian aircraft for transport purposes.

However, military transport aircraft are sometimes necessary in order to fly into a hostile environment, and one cannot with any sense of responsibility earmark civilian aircraft and civilian aircrews for that purpose. In any case, the civilian aircraft are unlikely to have the capacity to deflect missiles or employ electronic counter-measures or have aircrew who are trained to have a chance of survival following commissions of that kind. Therefore, reliance upon the civilian aeroplane is irresponsible.

We also have the temptation to rely on the services of civilian contractors. There is a place for them – it is essential that there is proper budgeting and a competitive spirit within the national services – but if we rely upon civilian contractors who are employed from Monday to Friday between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., there are real dangers in the event of a crisis.

In any case, although it is difficult to value, it is appropriate that we retain in our services the quality and number of uniformed personnel who can maintain the ethos of the service. One cannot put that into a balance sheet, because it is difficult to value, but if the military is to maintain its quality, the politicians need to have regard to the importance of maintaining the ethos which uniform, tradition and commitment to service provide.

We heard from one or two members this morning the suggestion that Europe could go it alone in military activity – that we could if necessary manage without the superpower. The fact remains that, in terms of early warning defence, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, that is plainly impossible.

The table in my report shows that only Britain and France possess – and then only in relatively small numbers – the Sentry aircraft that are essential to a broadly based and independent rôle. Our reconnaissance and early warning AWACS capacity in Europe as a whole is negligible.

We also heard about taking out targets in areas such as Bosnia, where offence to decency and

Mr. Hardy (continued)

European stability is offered. It may be possible on a sunny day that many of our air forces have that capacity, but the report demonstrates, I hope very clearly, that Europe as a whole does not possess adequate all-weather strike capability for its air forces.

For them to operate without ground control, without at least that capability, would make most of those missions abortive; or, if the aircrew are not adequately trained, costly, perhaps in human life. If we do not regard human life as important, let me remind the Assembly that aircraft are very expensive and cannot be thrown away like peashooters.

I therefore suggest that the Assembly should embark upon a very serious assessment of the situation over the next two years, and I should like very much to suggest and emphasise that it would be extremely useful for the Assembly to work with the WEU Planning Cell.

I made a brief visit to the Planning Cell in Brussels in July. It seems to me – I believe that this was recommended in the report presented by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman – that the accord, relationship and understanding between the Assembly and the Planning Cell could be more emphasised.

If we are to embark on the sort of assessment that my study revealed to be absolutely necessary, it would be highly desirable for that relationship to be extended in the direction to which I pointed.

If I may say, Madam Speaker – I am sorry, Mr. President, I was imagining that I was in the House of Commons – we are seeing some good signs. Earlier this month, we saw the first air force exercise under the auspices of WEU. It did not embrace all member states, but a number of them were engaged in exercise Purple Nova, which was the first of its kind. We should see more such exercises.

We should also welcome the recent decision to establish the Franco-British air unit, which will be commanded by a French general and centred upon Northwood in the United Kingdom. That is valuable, but we should not beguile ourselves by assuming that it serves and represents the whole organisation, because it plainly does not.

France and Britain have borne the overwhelming brunt of the burdens accepted by Europe in recent peace-keeping exercises and in the humanitarian cause. Today, French and British aircraft are based and flying in the Gulf, in Turkey and in former Yugoslavia. French and British aircraft have been involved – in the French case they were civil aircraft under contract – in supporting the humanitarian cause in Rwanda. It has put enormous additional burdens, not merely upon our

respective countries, but upon the personnel who are involved.

I pointed out in the Defence Committee only a week or two ago that people from a number of RAF front-line units today are spending twice as much time abroad as they were two years ago – perhaps more time abroad on unaccompanied tours than when the cold war was at its most intense.

Some members of the Assembly still believe that the end of the cold war meant the end of anxiety. It was pointed out by Mr. Atkinson during the last debate that the causes, risks and dangers of instability in the world are increasing and that the cold war contributed to stability. Since the end of the cold war we have seen the horrors of Yugoslavia and in a few more months a few hundred thousand people more may die.

We are talking about very grave matters and I suggest to the Assembly that we have to maintain air forces which can meet more than the purposes of national defence. To be quite blunt and without wishing to cause offence, many of our member states could not even contribute adequately to that for themselves.

We have to maintain air forces which can fulfil international need by denying the skies to aggressors. That rôle has been touched upon several times in debates here and, apart from the Americans, that rôle has been performed by the British, the French and the Dutch, as was demonstrated in the recent attack on the airfield at Udobin in former Yugoslavia that was taken out of commission by a clinical exercise which we may have to repeat there and in other parts of the world in the years ahead.

We need to have a capacity to deny the skies, but we must also recognise that it is not possible in modern terms to engage in land activities without adequate capacity to control the skies and prevent attack upon our troops on the ground. It is, of course, essential that we have adequate capacity to ensure that such troops are supplied.

I regret that the report is not sufficiently comprehensive to have allowed me to write authoritatively about the rotary wing element of our various air forces. Although I discovered that we possess within WEU more than 800 military helicopters, member states did not specify the purpose to which their helicopter inventories could be devoted. We need more detailed appraisal of that.

There was one further omission and I owe it to Sir Keith Speed of the United Kingdom to put right. Other members who have been involved in the navies of our various member states will want this point to be made. The report was about air forces, but members will fully appreciate that in a

Mr. Hardy (continued)

number of member states very significant air forces are possessed by the navy. The report was devoted to air forces and not to navies, but I would hate the Assembly to imagine that I did not properly appreciate the worth and quality of helicopters such as the Sea Harrier and the Sea King and other aircraft possessed by the British Royal Navy and the navies of a number of member states, not least that of the Netherlands.

That omission may have to be remedied when the more detailed and fuller appraisal that I hope the Assembly will approve, and which is dealt with in recommendation 1 and the draft order before the Assembly this afternoon, is carried out.

It may be that a number of members may feel that they ought not to vote for a report which might demonstrate national weakness. That would be to adopt an attitude of gross irresponsibility. We should be prepared to point out need, in the interest of a proper alliance and ensuring that Europe can pull its weight in the world.

It has long been our practice to rely on the security which a superpower can provide. I am not in any way anti-American, although I have never been given to effusive and enthusiastic support of our ally because, ultimately, we have to assume that self-interest will be the final arbiter of political decision and if that is the case it is ridiculous and irresponsible for Europe to imagine that we shall always be able to rely on the support of the United States, which is increasingly beginning to realise that Europe has a population 50% higher than that of the United States and has economic resources, if properly managed and applied, to provide a sufficiency of economic capacity to allow Europe to bear a greater share of the burdens of its own security.

We are not concerned merely with Europe, as the previous report allowed us to appreciate. The changes in North Africa are such as to create future anxiety; the disposal of the huge armoury of the Warsaw Pact is also a factor that should not be ignored. The Soviet Union built some extremely effective war planes in quite substantial numbers and it is not inconceivable that these could be obtained and deployed by those who would be happy to provide a threat to European security.

For all those reasons, we have an obligation to remind our governments that they have to maintain an adequate air capacity and that it should be modern, efficient and well-trained.

I shall not speak for much longer as there are other serious matters before the Assembly this afternoon, but it is also reasonable to draw the attention of the Assembly to the inventory presented in the tables attached to the report. It reveals that many of our air forces possess rather old air-

craft. I recall being taken to task in the committee because I used the words, rather antiquated. One of my British colleagues said that I should call a spade a spade and that if aircraft were obsolete we should say so. Many of the air forces in Western Europe have aircraft which are very obsolete indeed, if it is possible to apply a superlative to that word.

Indeed, they are so old that I wonder whether they are ever allowed to fly, except straight and level round the airfield on a sunny afternoon. That is not what air forces at the end of the 20th century should be about. The tasks which they may have to face are perilous and require extremely high levels of skill, and the aircraft and advanced equipment that they contain require very professional servicing and maintenance. Those matters are crucial and we cannot rely on the United States to do that job for us.

The report is not particularly cheerful. I hope that it is responsible and I trust that the Assembly will act sufficiently responsively this afternoon as to approve it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy. I may not be the woman Speaker of the House of Commons, but I know some of the difficulties that you had in compiling your report. I am sure that the Assembly would wish to congratulate you on the dedication that you have shown in producing an interesting and relevant report.

We have three speakers to add to the gloss that you have already put on this matter. The first is Lord Newall.

Lord NEWALL (*United Kingdom*). – I know that we are short of time, so I shall be brief as usual. Mr. Hardy's eloquence is superseded only by his report. Although his speech was probably longer than his report, the report is nevertheless important.

I have had many discussions with various members, and they all agree that, in most of our countries, cuts in defence budgets are too severe. They have resulted in stretching many of our capabilities too far in many instances. Units must sometimes borrow from one another to fulfil tasks and many commanders are wearing two or even three hats at the same time.

If the world were always at total peace, it would be a wonderful world. We have heard from Mr. Atkinson, with his chilling scenario of what might happen, and his report is also to be commended. However, we know that reality at present is different. The report mentions some examples: northern Iraq, the Gulf, and Bosnia, which is currently one of our biggest headaches. There are many others, such as Angola, Cyprus and Somalia. Some have come and gone and some are still there. Tomorrow, who knows where it may be necessary

Lord Newall (continued)

to intervene in order to save hundreds or even thousands of lives. Never has there been a greater need for internationally integrated forces to be able to train, react and work together for the ultimate benefit of the world at large.

The rôle of the air forces of WEU is well brought out in this report, showing the strengths as well as the weaknesses of member states. What is also brought out is the fact that even more importance should be given to the people who actually use modern machines of war. That is a vital factor, for without the human skills to operate them properly, those intricate instruments of battle are just pieces of useless metal.

Cutbacks in personnel and finance have often reduced the training of many of our pilots, not to mention the training and experience of our soldiers on the ground. In these days of smaller but none the less turbulent and costly wars, international co-operation and joint training are absolutely essential, and not enough is yet being done. It does not really matter under what umbrella the forces are serving: United Nations, CSCE, NATO, WEU or any other. We must be prepared to send rapid reaction forces anywhere that is necessary, and I fear that some of our ministers in our countries are dragging their feet in organising such military co-operation.

However, it is good to see in the report the list of joint exercises that have been taking place since 1991, and those are to be commended. But often, too few countries take part actively and only send observers. The recent exercise at the beginning of this month, Purple Nova, which Mr. Hardy mentioned, is an example of what is needed, although the results of that exercise have yet to be published.

Franco-British military co-operation has paved the way for further joint action, and that is being developed. The new combined air forces' Planning Cell between France and the United Kingdom will also be very useful, especially if it develops to include other countries, as is expected. We look forward to the success of that new initiative, signed recently between Great Britain and France at Chartres. At present, it is only a Planning Cell, but it is a really good start.

Mr. Hardy mentioned the aging of many of the aircraft, which has concerned him considerably and rightly so. That is a more domestic matter in the first instance. However, if old aircraft are used in a joint operation, their reliability and capability to operate could be called into question and, with a possible lack of spare parts, the efficiency of the whole operation could be put into jeopardy.

So air defence and its operational capability is an extremely important issue. Nevertheless, aero-

planes alone cannot win a war, as has been so fully demonstrated by the happenings in Bihac. So, although the report is about air forces, members must be left in no doubt that coupled with that is the importance of all forces being fully equipped, maintained and, even more important, jointly exercised, to provide a peace-keeping and humanitarian rôle in order to save lives.

This report is excellent as far as it goes, and I hope that a follow-up report will fill in some of the gaps in the future.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Newall.

The next speaker is Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – I read Mr. Hardy's report with great interest and I would like to take up four very specific points among the many in the report.

The first concerns the whole issue of low-altitude flights, which poses a considerable problem in many European countries, including my own, because they unleash a tremendous public outcry owing to the disturbance caused by this type of flight to the population, and those places in Europe which are densely populated. This has already been raised in an earlier report, three or four years ago I think, and it was a very thoughtful piece of work. I think this problem is still topical and should be examined in more depth.

The second point concerns the development, production and shared use of flight simulators. I do not believe this point has been sufficiently developed in Mr. Hardy's report and I think further thought should be given to this aspect; these are technical constituents which can make considerable savings in terms of personnel, energy and financial resources, not to mention the nuisance referred to earlier, caused by other types of flight such as low-level flights. What is more, this is a high-technology area which these days calls for collaboration between different companies and different countries.

My third point relates to the European fighter aircraft, EFA or EFA 2000, a very advanced project, for which the first prototypes have been approved in the United Kingdom. This is a joint project between the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy, which is a very important contribution to the aircraft of the future and also to the European aircraft industry itself.

Finally, there is the European transport aircraft. This is a more remote, but nonetheless important project which needs to be developed, and on which we are greatly dependent, largely because of the proliferation of rapid intervention forces and the need to deploy forces far away from European frontiers, or frontiers within Europe. There is an obvious need for such aircraft, since no European country is well equipped in this area at the moment.

Mr. Borderas (continued)

For all these reasons I think that the subject of air forces – their development, the training of manpower, etc. – is very complicated, difficult and costly, as others have pointed out before me. However, I believe that it is a matter to which we should give our attention at future meetings and in future reports, and doubtless both the Defence Committee and the Assembly itself will take account of this.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Borderas.

I call Lord Mackie, a distinguished veteran flyer of yesteryear, who is not necessarily speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (United Kingdom). – I am glad that I was not described as antiquated – when I look at modern aircraft I sometimes feel that way.

Some things do not change. In his report Mr. Hardy has highlighted the fact that one must have uniformed ground crew able to service aircraft under battle conditions. It is no good having many aircraft if they are unserviceable. They must be at a state of readiness – and kept that way. Mr. Hardy emphasised that it is all very well to have aircraft serviced swiftly and competently by civilian personnel, but that is not enough to cope with battle conditions.

In the previous debate 200 beautiful brains and eloquent tongues were silenced and grounded by a breakdown in the broadcasting system here. Without that system the Assembly ground to a halt. It was because there were technicians on the ground that we were able to start again. It is vital that any air force of whatever time – but certainly today with our high-tech instruments – has able personnel who can service the aircraft. That admirable point was brought out in Peter Hardy's commendable report.

Governments have always saved money by cutting flying hours. Mr. Hardy has provided some valuable information – he has assembled the number of flying hours in the various air forces. It is crucial that air crews, both navigators and pilots, have plenty of flying experience. That point was well brought out in the report.

The issue of low flying is also vital. I am happy to say that we have much low flying in Scotland where there are a number of air forces. We put up with it happily knowing that it is essential for the well-being of the armed forces and our future safety.

Mr. Hardy also said that he should make another report and compile more information, which would be immensely valuable to us in the Assembly, and the Council and to the governments of our countries. I congratulate Mr. Hardy on his excellent report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Mackie. I am afraid that in order to complete the programme tomorrow I have had to draw the line at any other speakers – the list closed at lunchtime. I apologise to anyone affected by that, but I am sure that everyone will understand the difficulties. I should like us to dispose of Mr. Hardy's report before the French Prime Minister addresses us.

Would you like to make a brief reply, Mr. Hardy?

Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). – I shall first reply to my colleague, Mr. Borderas, by saying that I am well aware of the need to use simulators and other modern technology in training. It is expensive to buy, but a great deal cheaper to operate than aircraft.

I had the privilege of attempting to fly the Tri-Star simulator that the airforce owns which is identical to the one owned by British Airways and used in the training of pilots of large Tri-Star aircraft. If one were to seek to fly the Atlantic in a Tri-Star whose pilot's training had been restricted to the simulator one would not be eager to check in to fly on that aircraft. Anyone who did so would certainly adopt the Italian practice of bursting into applause when the aircraft made a safe landing.

On the subject of low flying, I mentioned the Planning Cell, for which I have considerable respect. I had a conversation with one of the cell, Group Captain Bill Rimmer of the Royal Air Force, who was station commander of RAF Cottesmore before he went to Brussels. RAF Cottesmore is devoted to multilateral training of the Tornado air crew of Germany, Britain and Italy.

The British put up with the low-flying training of the German and Italian trainees at RAF Cottesmore, and must continue to do so. It is not reasonable for us to accept that our German or Italian colleagues can train as pilots – including training in low-flying skills – but that there should be no opportunity to practise and maintain those skills when they have completed their training. If those pilots and navigators are to survive they must have low flying training. If they do not, we shall perhaps be asking them to engage in operational activities for which they are ill-equipped. That would be irresponsible action on behalf of those responsible for any national air force.

I am extremely grateful for the comments of Lord Newall. Although I believe that his experience is largely related to the army, he has made important contributions. I offer one challenge to members, some of whom will recognise that air-to-air refuelling is an essential skill and capacity that must be maintained to extend the range of operational aircraft. Members should inquire about the air-to-air refuelling capacity of their national air forces. If they were to do that and all

Mr. Hardy (continued)

the answers were compiled members would probably be surprised, if not astonished.

Lord Mackie of Benshie will be aware that I appreciate his interest in this subject and very much welcome his endorsement of my report. As the President said, Lord Mackie has more knowledge and experience of such matters than anyone else in the Assembly. If Lord Mackie believes that my report is commendable, I am grateful and obliged to him.

Lord Mackie stressed one vital fact – that we must maintain uniformed personnel and not allow the excessive contractorisation or privatisation of parts of our services. That is a danger in a number of member states, including my own. I hope that Lord Mackie's comments – which I trust more than complemented my modest comments – will have some significance and will exercise the degree of influence that his experience deserves.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlamman, Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as Vice-Chairman of the Defence Committee I would like to say a few words on our committee's approach to this report. As Mr. Hardy writes in the report, he could not include all the data he had hoped to discuss in it. For that reason the Defence Committee initially thought it could not yet present the report to the Assembly. But the Rapporteur managed to convince the committee, agreeing to incorporate all the information that was missing from this report in a subsequent one. In my view the Assembly should therefore regard this report as a first step towards the complete report that Mr. Hardy will present at later sessions of this Assembly. Lord Mackie has also recommended this course to Mr. Hardy and the Defence Committee. We are happy to agree.

At this point I can inform the Assembly that the Defence Committee has unanimously adopted Mr. Hardy's report. I would ask the Assembly to do the same.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1444.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously¹.

I now call Mr. Mitolo, to speak in explanation of the vote. I ask him to keep it very brief because we are within minutes of the arrival of the French Prime Minister.

Mr. MITOLO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, a few brief words to say that I voted in favour of Mr. Hardy's report, appreciating as I do his serious approach and sense of responsibility. I am less appreciative, however, of a comment, which perhaps slipped out during his reply, saying that it is an Italian habit to applaud pilots, in what connection I do not know. As for myself, as an old Italian fighter pilot, it is my practice to base my remarks on experience and that of the Italian air force and airlines in peace and war is worthy of the greatest respect.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1444.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft order.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is agreed to².

Congratulations to Mr. Hardy.

That completes this part of the business. There is still some other business to follow, but I intend now to adjourn the Assembly for five minutes. The French Prime Minister is due within three or four minutes, when I will bring him in. I will have the bells rung once we are ready to proceed. I ask members to be back in their places in good time.

(The sitting was suspended at 5.50 p.m. and resumed at 6 p.m.)

7. Address by Mr. Balladur, Prime Minister of France

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the highlight of our day's proceedings – indeed, probably the highlight of this session's proceedings.

1. See page 47.

2. See page 48.

The President (continued)

It would be very disingenuous and gauche of me to try to introduce our very distinguished guest. I will merely say that, in the time that he has been Prime Minister of France, Mr. Edouard Balladur has made a tremendous impression, not only in his own country but in the countries of Europe, many of which are represented here today.

He is a man whose capacity for seeing the future and for discerning things is renowned. That was exemplified only today in the latest issue of *Le Monde*, when he talked about many European issues, particularly defence and WEU.

Like all top statesmen, Mr. Balladur is a very busy man. He has just flown in from Bonn, and he has some very important appointments of state immediately after speaking to us. Understandably, therefore, he is not in a position to answer questions after his speech.

We are very grateful to him for coming to talk to us, because we know lesser men who call off in these circumstances, because of their heavy schedule. He has been a good friend to us before – he supported the reception that we had in the spring at the *Assemblée Nationale*, and we were grateful to him for that.

Without further ado, I ask you, Prime Minister, to address us.

Mr. BALLADUR (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great privilege for me to be able to address the only European parliamentary Assembly empowered to deal with the subjects of security and defence.

The fact that you are at one and the same time members of our national parliaments and in most cases specialists on defence questions enhances the quality and authority of your Assembly's work. A mere glance at the agenda for this session and the subjects covered by the reports presented is sufficient to show that you are concerned with questions at the heart of our continent's defence problems.

In two areas, in particular, you have shown the way by taking initiatives which have later been confirmed by intergovernmental decisions: I am referring to co-operation in the space field and the opening of WEU towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. For many years, your Assembly has been proposing the creation of a European satellite surveillance system and been inviting representatives from the Central European countries to attend debates. As you know, these two lines of action have also been adopted by the Council of WEU, in particular on France's initiative.

I welcome this opportunity of reiterating that France's European policy gives high priority to

the creation of a defence and security identity commensurate with the capacity and power of the members of the European Union, as I had occasion to write just yesterday in the French press. I am glad to tell you that the French presidency of the Union, due to start in a month's time, will direct all its efforts towards this target because the new realities of the situation in Europe daily provide greater reason for this long-term enterprise in which WEU must, of course, be the keystone.

I should like to offer you some thoughts about the next few stages in the European defence timetable.

Today we are faced by two central questions: what more can we do together as member countries of WEU? What can we do with our Central and Eastern European partners who are seeking to join us?

Doing more together as signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty means working for the future emergence of a European defence as recommended by Mr. Baumel's report. The target is therefore ambitious and involves many intermediate steps but the important thing is to have it clearly defined right from the start.

I believe that this is one of the most vital necessities of the years to come. The ambition must be shared by all Europeans but it is for France to make every effort to show the way. It owes this to its history which has by turns seen it at the heart of the rifts and reconciliations of our continent. It owes it to what we inherited from General de Gaulle who restored our country to its position among the first in Europe and the world.

France has decided that as from January next security should be one of the first priorities of its presidency of the European Union. As you know better than I do, ladies and gentlemen, this will not be achieved in six months; our hope is to add a few bricks to a building for which the foundations have already been laid and which is now beginning to take on clear form; our wish is also to create greater awareness of the need for this enterprise.

At a time when the countries of former Yugoslavia are falling deeper and deeper into the horrors of civil war and the strongest rule by force, how can we fail to understand that people in all our countries are deeply disturbed? How can we fail to understand that they are saying to us, their governments, leaders and representatives: what is the value of this European ambition which has given us peace and prosperity for the last fifty years if its basic values are treated with derision a few kilometres beyond our frontiers? We must not underestimate the doubts, worries and sometimes the indignation of our publics.

Mr. Balladur (continued)

The European Union cannot be isolationist on its own continent. More than anyone else, it must work for stability and security throughout Europe. It was for this reason that as long ago as April 1993, I suggested a stability pact, which has since taken on more definite form, and I hope, will come to fruition in the next few months. This is a preventive measure to which I shall return shortly. Europe must, however, also have the means to intervene when prevention has failed and weapons are blunted. This is regrettable, more difficult and more dangerous but the brave thing to do is to say that it is necessary.

Above all, ladies and gentlemen, it is a matter of political will. Here again, let us remember – and it is a Frenchman speaking to you, so I hope you will forgive me for the reference – the example of General de Gaulle who, with a few men and a shadow army, won against those who wished to give up. Where there's a will, there's bound to be a way.

This is not, however, solely a question for Europeans. It is also one for our American allies who made the liberation of Europe possible fifty years ago and who, as we must all admit, have since guaranteed its security.

Their contribution to the strategic balance of our continent is still vital. The ideals of liberty and democracy which we share with them are still the strongest unifying force of the alliance to which we all belong. I want the alliance to remain strong and vigorous. In my view, it is always on the agenda.

Even so, must Europeans always have to wait for an American decision to know what they can do as regards security? Is it not possible to think of sharing rôles and drawing up new rules for the game?

The case of former Yugoslavia affords proof of the very understandable American hesitation to commit troops on the ground when crises arise in Europe. I am not criticising, I am simply noting a fact. If I were American, I would perhaps feel the same.

It has to be admitted, however, that the implications of this state of affairs have never been faced. Europeans and in particular the member countries of WEU have individually and in stages sent men to the territory of former Yugoslavia in the service of the United Nations. Their effort is deserving of praise because, in all, the main strength of the forces deployed has consisted of over 15 000 men. Nevertheless, these European contingents have not been merged into a single force and WEU as such has performed only a marginal rôle, as we must all recognise.

Why are Europeans holding back? I should like to suggest a possible explanation – which as I

recognise is no more than that. When these contingents were deployed in 1992-1993, did not Europeans have the idea that the United States might intervene? Did they not feel that by combining and acting independently they might in some way have given a sort of negative signal to their allies across the Atlantic? Were they not, so to speak, keeping a seat for a guest who failed to turn up?

Just let us imagine now that these 15 000 men had acted together as a coherent group. The European Union's influence on the conflict would have been quite different and much more decisive.

It is pointless to rewrite history now but the lessons need to be drawn. Europeans must realise that they will have to face certain crises in Europe alone. They must prepare themselves to do so and be ready to accept full responsibility.

Do not get me wrong. Not for one moment is there any question of breaking or weakening the transatlantic security link. The common defence of Europe must continue to be planned with our American allies.

I hope that tomorrow, as yesterday, the United States will still be prepared to send their troops to defend their allies' frontiers. Not out of friendship alone, although friendship counts or should count in the lives of nations, but because these are also the frontiers of their own values and ultimately of their own security.

Crisis-management is, however, something quite different. Europeans must be able to decide and act for themselves because experience shows that they alone can have, or want, or actually have a major interest in performing that rôle.

I call, therefore, for a close dialogue, in an atmosphere of trust, between the United States and Europe on a clearer sharing of responsibilities in our continent. A major step forward was taken in just such an atmosphere, last January, at the most recent NATO summit. This debate must go on, avoiding unilateralism on either side of the Atlantic as this would affect confidence itself. Here again, let us not find unhappy precedents in the Yugoslav affair. You all understand that I am referring in particular to the lifting of the arms embargo.

We must also realise that we Europeans cannot go into this debate unless we have the resources we need to meet our responsibilities.

The creation of these resources is not a priority in the institutions' discussions. In the past, theoretical disputes have too often taken the front stage. I wrote these words yesterday and I now repeat them here. What is now essential is to know what joint effort the European states are prepared to make in practice.

Mr. Balladur (continued)

You will have understood that I favour a pragmatic approach. Are a number of European countries, united by the same security guarantee, prepared to cultivate effective joint military co-operation bilaterally or in small groups? If they are and their European ambition is clear, it will then be easier to decide the question of institutions.

Here, it seems to me that substantial results have been achieved in the last few years.

The first and now familiar initiative is the European corps. This Franco-German project has become a European reality. Our Belgian, Spanish and Luxembourg partners have joined us to provide a multilateral basis for this army corps whose military credibility now matches its political visibility.

By virtue of the size of its contingents, the creation of a permanent general staff at Strasbourg and the strength of the underlying political will, the European corps is making an exemplary contribution to plans for European defence. It has never been its ambition, however, to monopolise European defence.

This first achievement had to be followed by other similar initiatives. Through two projects for air and land forces, this is what we have done with Italy and Spain. The defence ministers recently met in Seville to give fresh impetus to these projects so that they can be submitted to WEU in the spring of 1995. I hope that by then plans can be finalised between the three countries.

Lastly, the recent creation of a Franco-British European air force group complements these projects, both geographically and functionally. In this case also, a permanent general staff will be set up to prepare the way for a wide range of international operations involving humanitarian tasks and the maintenance or restoration of peace.

These three multinational forces or planned forces can be fully complementary. All three arms – land, sea and air – are involved. These forces, present in the central European theatre in the shape of the European corps will, given their mobility and their Mediterranean dimension, be capable of intervening in the most remote theatres and in particular for humanitarian or peace-keeping tasks.

Each of these forces is internally consistent and has its own operational credibility. They will be able to develop more clearly-defined relations with WEU or NATO, as the European corps has and as the Franco-Spanish-Italian and Franco-British forces will be able to.

It can well be imagined that these forces may form more direct links so that they can intervene together if necessary, because they complement each other. This should be the next step in our co-

operative efforts because there is, indeed, a risk, namely that the proliferation of institutions or more accurately, organisations involving a variety of countries, fields and theatres and with a variety of weapons will in the long run create confusion. The time will come when we shall all – I actually think this time has already come – feel the need for better organisation and greater cohesion. This can only be achieved through WEU.

What can the framework for this co-operation be? The countries providing these troops will of course have to discuss this with each other. It is still too soon to make definite proposals when the forces are not yet fully operational. But, among the various circles of enhanced European co-operation which should in the future enable Europe to go ahead with greater flexibility, there clearly emerges the circle of countries which want to establish a common defence. This circle, to use the word I prefer, clearly has its place within WEU. Naturally, it is open to everyone who wishes to join.

The formation of multinational forces is not sufficient to implement such a project. The equipment, logistics and intelligence so necessary for managing the crises which face us must also be available.

Here, space co-operation can play a decisive rôle as is stressed in the remarkable report of your Technological and Aerospace Committee presented by Mr. Valleix. That is why France has been working towards that end for many years. With its Spanish and Italian partners, it launched the Helios I programme which, as from next year, will be supplying high-resolution pictures to the WEU European verification satellite centre. Further progress will be made with the Helios II programme and the implementation of the Osiris programme.

This is an operational, technological and industrial project which will emancipate Europe in some measure in the matter of space reconnaissance. I say emancipate deliberately. I discussed the subject yesterday evening and as late as this morning with Chancellor Kohl at the Franco-German summit just held in Bonn. I have every hope that here too the determination of our two countries will enable Europe to take a further step towards equipping itself with the operational resources that it lacks.

Here I will mention just briefly the need for a stronger drive for arms co-operation. This is being helped by the formation of new groups or associations of European companies which have their own industrial and financial logic. The development should be encouraged because it goes hand-in-hand with more rational economic and budgetary arms programmes. This co-operation should also lead on ultimately to the creation of a real European armaments agency for which France and Germany have decided to lay down the first markers.

Mr. Balladur (continued)

Finally, the political will should be strong enough to favour a European choice. This is what happened a few months ago when the Horizon frigate programme was launched. I hope that the same choice will be made for the production of the future transport aircraft for our forces. To sum up, ladies and gentlemen, the European members of WEU must marshal their efforts in two directions: firstly, they must not seek to produce everything themselves in their own country because no one will succeed; secondly, where co-operation is concerned, preference must be given, without aggressive nationalistic posturing to European co-operation over any other kind. If these two conditions are fulfilled, the European armaments industry will have real content, depth and significance. If they are not, the result will be different.

The other great question before us is what our policy can be towards our Central and Eastern European partners in the matter of security and defence?

This question has links with our plans for European defence in the case of the countries seeking to join us, but here and now we must look at the transition now facing us.

The enlargement of the western defence organisations, namely, WEU and NATO, is now on the agenda. As you know, each of these organisations has its own logic.

The enlargement of WEU will follow from that of the European Union. Cohesion between the European Union and the organisation destined to become its military component, namely WEU, must be encouraged. The drive towards Europe, within which the security dimension is now an integral part, must be brought to final conclusion.

This subject will have to be considered in conjunction with the great 1996 debate at the inter-governmental conference which will have to discuss any necessary changes to the European institutions. This date is fixed for us by the declaration of the WEU countries annexed to the European Union treaty. It is also fixed by the date 1998, when we have to review the modified Brussels Treaty.

While the enlargement of WEU has its own logic, it will have to be considered in conjunction with that of NATO. The question for Europeans, in fact, will be to decide whether they are prepared to share a security guarantee with one of their neighbours, in other words to guarantee its frontiers without doubling up with an American guarantee. A yes answer would mean a major shift in the balance of Euro-Atlantic security. Do we want this? Are our peoples ready for it?

For the time being, let us not seek to link the enlargement of WEU and NATO together too

rigidly, but let us bear fully in mind the repercussions of the one on the other.

What will be the main lines of this debate on the enlargement of the defence organisations?

Firstly, we understand and share the aspirations of our Central and Eastern European partners to live within the same security space. Quite clearly, the security of the Central European countries is inseparable from that of France. As I am speaking for France, this is not simply a moral solidarity but a realistic perception of our own interests. The enlargement of both the Atlantic Alliance and WEU within the next few years is well within sight. This we announced clearly both at the Brussels summit of the Atlantic Alliance in January 1994, and at the European Union summit in Copenhagen in June 1993.

Enlargement must strengthen and in no way weaken the alliances, which means that every member country will have to contribute to the combined strength. The security guarantee must hold good for all members of the alliance. It will not be an alliance between western countries and Central European countries but among all the member countries and especially among the Central European countries themselves after they have joined these organisations.

It must also be remembered that the principal aim of these enlargements is to increase stability and security in Europe. The enlargement of the security organisations must be seen as a natural development by everyone on the continent in the same way as the enlargement of the European Union which is now seen as a natural and desirable development. It would be wrong to impose artificial delays but it would be equally mistaken to set an arbitrary timetable. We must gear our progress to that of the debate and to developments over our continent as a whole.

One last principle which may appear obvious; when the time comes, enlargement must be a complete success and seen to be so by all member countries and their peoples. Security, which guarantees our freedom, is our most precious possession. We cannot allow ourselves to start a process without the full and wholehearted support of our countries and the representatives of our peoples. In the past, we have seen too many security commitments which have not been met because they were not based on the realities of the day or backed by a firm resolve which is to some extent the same thing.

In the case of NATO this principle is true for Europe but also for the United States. I am almost tempted to say particularly for the United States, because their specific responsibility in the enlargement of the alliance is quite clear. The worst thing would be to press too soon for a debate, only to find out that its outcome was not approved by the United States Congress.

Mr. Ballardur (continued)

Provided we can conduct a clear and reasoned debate, I am optimistic about its outcome. In the conditions I have outlined, our continent will enjoy a deeper and more lasting peace when the alliances have been enlarged.

Regardless of when this comes about, we can strengthen co-operation with the Central and Eastern European countries here and now. In addition to bilateral relations, there are several possibilities open to us.

The partnership for peace, which is not even a year old, can be extended. At pan-European level, the CSCE can also be strengthened and transformed into a real, fully operational international organisation. It is my hope that the summit on 6th December next will breathe fresh life into the CSCE, which is the only institution where the European Union, together with the United States and Russia, can work towards the unity of Europe as a whole and create conditions for dialogue and for the mutual trust necessary for lasting peace.

As I am addressing the Assembly of WEU, I should like to say a little more about two specifically European projects.

First, the stability pact. You know that the intention is to build up a network of good neighbour agreements between Central European countries in order to guarantee their stability and to eliminate, as far as possible, all sources of future conflict.

This exercise in preventive diplomacy has been going well for the last twelve months. Basically, it is linked to the enlargement of the European Union but it will have even greater influence on the enlargement of the security organisations which it will favour. An interim meeting of ministers is due to be held next week in Budapest in conjunction with the CSCE summit. France proposes to hold the closing meeting at the end of March. I hope that by then the good neighbour agreements still outstanding will be concluded and that the pact will provide a new focus for stability on our continent. I call upon the countries involved to make a further effort to that end.

We can, however, go further in the case of the Central European countries seeking to join the European Union. We can compare ideas on the challenges to European security because we have to face them together even though we do not yet belong to the same alliance. The first aim would be a joint analysis of these challenges.

This is the purpose of the white paper on Europe and security, which I have suggested WEU should produce, in conjunction with the associate and observer countries.

What are our ideas about the new security threats or risks?

What are the best ways of meeting them?

What are the principles on which we intend to base Europe's future security?

We can look for the answers together. The WEU countries took up this proposal at their recent ministerial session. I am pleased to note that our Central and Eastern European partners responded favourably to this move and in my view this is concrete evidence of the solidarity which must unite us.

Ladies and gentlemen, one of the main challenges now facing us is to resolve the problem of European security.

The Yugoslav crisis reminds us that unfortunately peace and security do not naturally form part of history and this is also true of Europe which is nearing the third millennium. It is for politicians, parliamentarians and governments to persuade our publics of the vital need to work harder in that direction.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am greatly honoured by the invitation to address you and I would like to thank your President and Bureau.

I would have liked to have spent more time on what might have been an exchange of views on the oh so-difficult problems of our future. Your President has told you that unfortunately this is not possible for me today but if you allow me I would like to offer you some thoughts on the future of our continent.

The first obvious point is that the European Union must be enlarged. For the Union, it is a moral duty with both political and economic advantage. It is unthinkable that the countries seeking to join us and share our values which have freed themselves from the oppressor, should be refused. The timetable, form, method and rate of enlargement are open to discussion, but as I see it, the objective can no longer be questioned.

The second point is that Europe is enlarging; there are already fifteen of us in the European Union and no doubt there will be more in five or ten years' time, this enlargement must take place through structures which will undoubtedly differ from Europe working at six, nine or twelve-power level. Decisions are not taken and authority is not shared in the same way when there are twenty or twenty-five as when there are six or nine. All of us must therefore think hard about the discussions due to start in 1996.

The third point is that, in my view, the structure of this Europe is far too complicated.

There are too many overlapping organisations, whose geographical spheres and areas of authority are entangled. I am well aware that every one of them has its history, traditions and reason for existence. There is no question of using the knife to destroy the solidarity which has been built up over past decades. At the same time, Europe must

Mr. Balladur (continued)

be understandable to all its citizens. I would even say that Europe must also be more understandable for the people who have to govern it, including lawmakers, parliamentarians, as you are, or members of government. In the years ahead, we shall, therefore, find we have to simplify the institutions.

The fourth point is that much has been done at economic level over the last forty years. In economic, monetary and financial matters and in agriculture and commerce, the European Union has made great advances. I am not saying that there is nothing more to do; undoubtedly, the Union has still to make further progress, particularly in monetary matters. From now on, the great challenge for the Union will be to win greater political clout. This will not be possible unless its military rôle for defence and security is enhanced.

This, ladies and gentlemen, is where Western European Union and your Assembly are called upon to play their full rôle.

There can be no question of making a break with anybody as I have already said and now repeat. I am keener than anyone on Euro-American solidarity. It is, nevertheless, true that the European Union which has a population of 350 million and after enlargement will have not much less than 500 million, which has the highest production figures in the world, which is the first trading area in the world and is, moreover, the home of very old states and wonderful old civilisations – that this Europe, as I said – cannot forever rely on others for its security. From now on, the great target for Europe's future is that we should ourselves take more responsibility for our own security.

This is difficult. We have our traditions, our alliances and our favouritisms, which history has left to each of us. If we do not ourselves take charge of our security, there will be no security in Europe and the European Union will remain an economic organisation – which is good – but without political or defence content. I believe that this would be to fail and curtail what has been our European ambition, or at least France's ambition, from the very start.

Having said this, ladies and gentlemen, I have not, by doing so, given answers to the many problems facing such an effort and no one is more aware of this than me. The aim is, however, clear and it is in your field that efforts must be stepped up from now on.

If this cannot be done with all the members of the European Union together, there must be no hesitation in starting to go ahead more gradually with those able and willing to do so. That is my proposal.

Believe me, I have made this proposal without any intention of excluding anybody for any reason

whatsoever but solely as a pragmatic and effective approach. I fully understand the reasons certain states may have for not wishing to go ahead as quickly as the others. I could have used the verb to evolve because to progress means to make progress and some people may consider that to evolve is not to progress. Let us not go into semantics. I fully understand all the reasons but the states which want to co-operate more closely must be able to do so provided they do not do so by closing the door, but on terms allowing everyone to accede and co-operate.

Furthermore, what does the history of Europe over the last half-century teach us? It is that the most determined must make the start; then the others always finish by joining in when those who started first have succeeded. That is why starting first means equipping oneself with everything needed for success.

So I come back to my introduction: all this is a matter of political will. If we all wish it, Europe, over the next ten to fifteen years, can and must become not only a much bigger entity, allowing countries in difficulties to accede to our system of values and economic and social progress, but also an entity ensuring political security, physical security and stability for our continent.

In other words, the great ambition for Europe's future is very largely in your hands, ladies and gentlemen. This is the appeal I make to you.

The PRESIDENT. – The applause in the chamber clearly shows you, Prime Minister, our response to your heartening and penetrating analysis of the European defence situation. It was good of you to mention the two important reports by our colleagues, Mr. Baumel and Mr. Valleix. It was also encouraging to hear you mention the Satellite Centre in Spain, upon which we place so much store. And it was helpful of you to mention the Western European Armaments Group, which will have an important rôle to play in the coming year because of France's involvement in it, and the push that France will undoubtedly put behind it.

We noted the care with which you dealt with the delicate but important question of future American relationships with Europe, and I am sure I speak for practically everyone when I say that we echo your call for a dialogue in depth to get them right. There must be no false assumptions or immediate decisions. The matter is far too important to us all when it comes to long-term strategy. It was fascinating to hear your analysis of events. As I said when we began, this is a very busy time for you and, politically, an important time in France. It is also an extremely difficult time for Europe, with the festering sore of former Yugoslavia exercising statesmen in all our countries.

The President (continued)

We know the weight of the difficulties, so we are extremely grateful to you for coming here to talk to us so forthrightly and so energetically about these problems.

It only remains for me, Sir, on behalf of the Assembly, to wish you Godspeed in all your endeavours.

8. Change in the orders of the day

The PRESIDENT. – We are not having any anticlimaxes after that splendid speech from the Prime Minister of France. I must remind you that time has not permitted Mr. Roman and Sir Russell Johnston to present their reports. I suggest that they be deferred until tomorrow morning.

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 1st December 1994, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The WEU Institute for Security Studies (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1430).
2. Western European Union (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Document 1431).
3. WEU's relations with Russia (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1440).
4. Address by Mr. Kozyrev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia.
5. WEU's relations with Russia (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1440).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak? ...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.50 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 1st December 1994

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes
3. The WEU Institute for Security Studies (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1430).
Speakers: Mr. Roman (Rapporteur), Mr. Pastusiak (Observer from Poland), Mr. Masseret (Chairman).
4. Western European Union (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order*, Doc. 1431).
Speakers: Mr. Masseret (for Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur), Mr. Sinka (Observer from Latvia), Mr. Tusek (Observer from Austria), Mr. Paasio (Observer from Finland).
5. WEU's relations with Russia (*Presentation of the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1440).
Speaker: Mr. Baumel (Rapporteur).
6. Address by Mr. Kozyrev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia.
Replies by Mr. Kozyrev to questions put by: Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Jeszenszky (Observer from Hungary), Mr. de Lipkowski, Mr. Rodrigues, Sir Keith Speed, Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout, Mr. Sole Tura, Mr. Pastusiak (Observer from Poland), Mr. Antretter, Mr. Baumel, Mr. de Puig, Mr. De Decker.
7. WEU's relations with Russia (*Debate on the report of the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order*, Doc. 1440).
Speakers: Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Buteiko (Observer from Ukraine), Mr. Böhm, Mr. Averchev (Observer from Russia), Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Sinka (Observer from Latvia), Mr. Sole Tura, Mr. Baumel (Rapporteur), Mr. de Puig (Chairman).
8. Close of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. The WEU Institute for Security Studies

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1430)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-

tions on the WEU Institute for Security Studies and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1430.

I call Mr. Roman to present his report.

Mr. ROMAN (*Spain*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I am going to try to be brief and to the point in the hope that, in the words of Baltasar Gracian, a Spanish writer of the baroque period, “good and short is twice as good”.

I would like to begin by expressing two sentiments: the first is one of satisfaction, because the report I am presenting has been approved unanimously by the committee and so I hope that it will be similarly adopted here in the plenary meeting. Secondly, I would like to say how much I appreciate the help and co-operation of the staff of the Institute and, of course, our secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

I believe that we are building a future here in WEU; this is an interesting project for the future at a time when – and these are the contradictions and paradoxes of today's Europe – the present fills us with sadness on many occasions and with concern and a feeling of impotence on others. However, one of the reasons we have to be hopeful is the speech Mr. Balladur made yesterday afternoon, which opened up new avenues to us.

1. See page 51.

Mr. Roman (continued)

What are we dealing with this morning? This is a recommendation to the Council to transform the Institute for Security Studies into a security and defence academy. I am not going to go into the origins, the tasks, the structure and the activities of the Institute for Security Studies because it is something you already know and can find in the report I am presenting. The Institute does very important work with a lightweight structure and a budget of a little over fifteen million French francs which have enabled it to develop its activities in a most satisfactory way. What work has the Institute done to date? It has worked well and has achieved the aims for which it was created. Five years after starting work, the Institute has made a considerable contribution to its intended purpose: the emergence of a European awareness of security and defence matters, and it has helped in projecting WEU along new paths toward enlargement during that period; it has published some excellent reports and held interesting seminars.

However, this new framework which we are all building together in Europe calls for a new, more ambitious instrument, one with a more distinctive personality and greater resources, and such an instrument is precisely what the report is concerned with, namely the European security and defence academy, an academy with a tripartite function: research, education and training, and we believe that this is the appropriate time and form. I say appropriate time, because in the period between 1996 and 1998 we will need to adapt our structures to whatever changes may result from the intergovernmental conferences looking into the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. At the same time, we will be faced with the expiry of the modified Brussels Treaty. As a result, we see the time for change as being between 1996 and 1998, which gives us sufficient time to establish the European security and defence academy. As to the form, well, I also think this is the moment. To begin with we are asking for more fluidity in relations between the Assembly and the Institute. We want more information, more co-operation and more access for parliamentarians to unclassified documents. Without the approval of the Council on each occasion and greater goodwill on the part of the Institute, the Assembly and its representatives – and we are all elected representatives – cannot benefit from something which is paid for by the citizens of the member states.

Finally, the Assembly wants to be closely involved in the process of creating or converting the Institute into an academy. In approving this recommendation the Assembly is deciding to give the Institute more influence, greater resources for its work, co-operation and contacts with other European institutes specialising in this area and, in particular, with those countries into which Wes-

tern European Union is extending, most especially the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; and with another area of interest for Western European Union, the Mediterranean and near East.

Transforming the Institute into an academy, and this is something of which the Council ought to be aware, will require more resources, greater financial means and also an intensification of relations with the Assembly. I do not think it is necessary to advance any more arguments than we have already in support of closer relations and more collaboration; after all, it is the member countries which bear the costs of the Institute's activities. The Assembly ought to be able to benefit from the Institute in the same way as the Council. We think this is a reasonable demand.

We receive the Chaillot Papers, which are remarkable publications, and we are also invited to many seminars organised by the Institute, but what we would like is more collaboration, more documents and more advice.

I am about to finish, Mr. President. I do not think that either the Council or the Institute can deny this spirit of greater transparency, openness and collaboration; it is fair and balanced and I think it meets with the wishes, or what will be the wishes, of the entire Assembly to extend or convert the Institute for Security Studies into something more, namely the European security and defence academy, which is a project for the future of the whole of Europe and which I think deserves the unanimous support of the Assembly of Western European Union.

Mr. President, we are moving forward one step at a time, but that is how progress is made. And today we are taking another important step with this expansion of the ambitions of Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Roman.

The debate has attracted only one speaker, Mr. Pastusiak, an observer from Poland.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Observer from Poland*). – Being both a parliamentarian and an academic, I read Mr. Roman's report with great interest and attention.

The WEU Institute for Security Studies is not the only international security studies institute in Europe. There are, for instance, the Institute for Security Studies in London and the SIPRI Institute in Stockholm, among other institutes of international membership.

The WEU Institute, however, is unique in its task of developing and promoting the concept of a European security identity. It occupies a visible and important place on the map of European research. Taking into consideration the Institute's

Mr. Pastusiak (continued)

modest budget, it was able to develop ambitious publishing activities as well as organising seminars and conferences on topics vital to European security issues.

I should like also to commend the leadership of the Institute, particularly Mr. John Roper, Director of the Institute, for developing active and creative relationships with countries that are not members of WEU, including the countries of East and Central Europe.

As both a parliamentarian and a professor of international relations, I should like to submit certain suggestions and criticisms, with the intention of increasing the rôle and the effectiveness of the WEU Institute.

An organisation such as the Institute should be engaged in theoretical research, developing the concept of a European security identity and alternative models of European security systems; it should also be engaged in applied research, working out suggestions for the decision-makers.

In that respect, I was amazed to read in Mr. Roman's report that the Assembly is not entitled to place research projects directly with the Institute. It can do it only through the Council, and it is up to the Council to accept or reject proposals from the Assembly. Unfortunately, there have been many rejections. The Institute is located in this building, just two floors above us, yet in order to place a project in the Institute, the Assembly has to go all the way to Brussels.

Many distinguished members of the Assembly have prepared excellent reports and they will prepare many more in future. I cannot imagine that the rapporteurs of the Assembly should be denied the right to profit from the work, the expertise and the resources of the WEU Institute for Security Studies in the preparation of their reports.

Finally, there is a proposal to transform the WEU Institute into a European security and defence academy. That is very ambitious, but it will not be an easy undertaking. First, such a move requires time and substantial additional resources. Secondly, it should not be done at the expense of conceptual creative research that the Institute is now carrying out and, thirdly, the educational tasks of the future academy should concentrate on teaching not young students, but teachers and educators in security. It should also concentrate on teaching medium-level decision-makers from many European countries. The academy should train the future promoters of our European security identity in advanced security studies.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pastusiak.

I call Mr. Masseret, the Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mr. MASSERET (*France*) (Translation). – I would like to thank Mr. Roman for his excellent report and draw attention to the close co-operation between our committee and Mr. Roper, Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies. Mr. Pastusiak has just made some extremely pertinent remarks, especially on the authorisation which has to be obtained for the Assembly's orders.

In conclusion, I hope that Mr. Roman's excellent report will be approved by our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Masseret. We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1430, which seems relatively uncontentious.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is agreed to¹.

Congratulations, Mr. Roman.

4. Western European Union

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1431)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on Western European Union and vote on the draft order, Document 1431.

I call Mr. Masseret, the Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to present the report.

Mr. MASSERET (*France*) (Translation). – I am presenting the report prepared by Sir Russell Johnston, who has been detained by other commitments elsewhere.

The committee felt it necessary to update the brochure on WEU published in 1993, because of recent developments in our organisation following the Petersberg meeting, namely its enlargement to include not only member states of the European Union and NATO, but also Central European countries. You will also recall that the meetings of the Council in Rome in May 1993 and at Kirchberg in May 1994 sanctioned these

1. See page 52.

Mr. Masseret (continued)

changes. Sir Russell Johnston has worked well to produce a document which is educational, readable and easy to understand, and which explains how WEU came into existence, how it has developed and how both the WEU Council and the Assembly function. It is a very interesting document for anyone who does not have an in-depth knowledge of the Assembly, the Council and WEU itself, and it should be distributed and publicised.

With the committee's agreement, Sir Russell Johnston has drawn up a draft order requesting the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to ensure, first, that with the assistance of national delegations the brochure is published in the languages of the WEU member states and secondly, that it is updated on a regular basis, which includes taking account of any important developments which might affect WEU itself between the present time and its publication.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Masseret.

I call Mr. Sinka, the observer from Latvia.

Mr. SINKA (*Observer from Latvia*). – Thank you for this opportunity to speak. I am a member of the Latvian Delegation and, without wishing to sound patronising, as Latvia is one of the voting countries I always automatically feel that I speak on behalf of my Estonian and Lithuanian brothers and sisters. I hope that they do not object.

I am grateful to this august Assembly, particularly to you, Mr. President, for helping us to achieve our associate partner status. It was a culmination of the work of a very useful seminar held in Warsaw early in February. On 6th May, the Council of Ministers then approved that status. Earlier proceedings of this Assembly have given us anxious moments because we are not clear in our minds as to exactly what our status gives us. So many observers and possible associate members are now present, and that factor alone should give weight to our future. The point should be clarified, and the sooner the better.

I have heard several people say that we must allow time to pass before we become full members of the European Union or WEU. The three Baltic states and Poland have had to wait all these long years – about fifty years – and now we must wait a further period. It has turned out to be a very long time and I fervently hope that the waiting period will be reduced to the minimum.

One of the problems of our times seems to be forgetfulness, either inadvertent or deliberate, of history. For instance, President Iliescu referred to the new republics of the Baltic states. Perhaps he and others forget that in 1939-40, when we were occupied by the Soviet Union, we were full mem-

bers of the League of Nations, and had been so for quite a time. Europe was plunged into the second world war by an unholy alliance between two member states that had been expelled from the League of Nations. So there you are. That was Latvia's political contribution until 17th June 1940, internationally. There is still a beautiful mural painting in Geneva, Switzerland, which testifies to the presence of the Latvian Delegation in the League of Nations.

Economically, in 1939-40 we were successfully competing for a British market, for instance, side by side with Denmark, so we were already adding our weight, albeit in a small way and as a small country, to the development of international co-operation as it was in the 1930s. We know the end of that unfortunate story, but we are now trying to recover our lost tracks. In a sense, we started to walk and were then cruelly interrupted.

We have already joined the combined efforts with Estonia and Lithuania to build a peace-keeping battalion. Britain, the Nordic Council countries and Germany are involved in creating that peace-keeping battalion. We have also joined the partnership for peace programme and have signed the agreement on it. We have joined the European Union's free trade area from 1st January next year. Our difficulties are great but we want to be again, as we have always been, a north-western country.

I apologise for saying that those problems, questions and concerns should become the concerns of this august company. I hope that we are not simply kept somewhere on the sidelines but are considered full and responsible members of this Assembly in the near future.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Sinka. I well remember the fascinating official visit that I paid to your country, as well as to two other Baltic states in the summer. Your representatives are all welcome as observers here, with an eye to the future.

The other speaker on my list is Mr. Tusek, the observer from Austria.

Mr. TUSEK (*Observer from Austria*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I am very grateful to the Rapporteur for drafting this excellent report, which gives a new representative at this Assembly an excellent insight into the nature and organisation of WEU's activities.

Since the Rapporteur referred to enlargement, allow me to set out in real terms Austria's basic position as regards further participation in Western European Union. Austria has already ratified the treaty of accession to the European Union and deposited it in Rome. We firmly expect to be a member of the European Union as from 1st January 1995, i.e. in a month's time. It is our aim to parti-

Mr. Tusek (continued)

participate fully in Western European Union as from that date, i.e., early in 1995, initially – and I emphasise initially – as an observer. It is not our intention as an observer to sit in a corner or stand aside and simply watch what our partners are doing. Instead we want to participate actively and constructively in its committee work and make a positive contribution.

I know this is not just up to us. That is why I hope that Western European Union will make it possible for us to participate in this way on a pragmatic basis.

We regard observer status as an interim solution, and we will use the time until the 1996 inter-governmental conference to examine in what form we can become more closely involved in WEU. We are fully aware that the most natural form of participation is full membership.

The PRESIDENT. – I have one late addition, Mr. Paasio of Finland, who would like to make a brief contribution.

Mr. PAASIO (*Observer from Finland*). – I thought it proper to say a few words on behalf of Finland. A small Finnish Delegation has been attending these meetings for several years. Finland, like Austria, has decided by referendum and a decision of parliament to join the European Union from the beginning of next year. We are happy about that decision.

Parliament had also urged the government to apply for observer status in WEU. I could repeat the words of my Austrian colleague – from now on Finland is to become an active observer in Western European Union. But our president, government and parliament have emphasised that Finland is not looking for any new security solutions at this time in Finnish and European history. We are not closing any doors.

We humbly say that we could not predict ten years ago what was to happen in Europe. Equally, we are unable to predict what is to happen in Europe in the next ten years. That is why we say that we will not close any doors and fully respect the different approach taken by our close friends from the Baltic states and Poland. I am sure that we can continue to maintain excellent relations, even in this august Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. We are delighted that the representatives of both Austria and Finland are here, taking an interest and an active part in our proceedings. We look forward to seeing you increasingly and hearing your contributions in the future.

That is the end of the debate. Mr. Masseret has said that he does not wish to reply, for which I am grateful.

We shall now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1431.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft order.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

*The draft order is agreed to unanimously*¹.

5. WEU's relations with Russia

(Presentation of the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1440)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Political Committee on WEU's relations with Russia, Document 1440.

I call Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur of the Political Committee, to present his report.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, should we establish relations between WEU and Russia? That is the question facing us today. And the reply to that question is obviously yes. Why?

It is because, in the present circumstances, WEU is the only western organisation which has no institutionalised relations with Russia, whereas the European Union has just signed a wide-ranging co-operation agreement which provides, inter alia, for political dialogue aimed, pursuant to Article 6 of that agreement, to “bring about an increasing convergence of positions on international issues of mutual concern, thus increasing security and stability”.

Yes, WEU must establish relations with Russia, because Russia is a member of the CSCE – as much a member of it as the United States. Yes, because NATO, after creating what is known as the NACC, proposed the partnership for peace, which is open to the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe but also to Russia and the CIS states. Yes, because we are involved in a great competition on the basis of the stability pact to improve the diplomatic position in Europe, with the participation of Russia, in particular by establishing preventive diplomacy and good neighbourly relations, and legislating on the question of minorities.

1. See page 54.

Mr. Baumel (continued)

To say yes is not enough. We still need to determine the aim, nature and scale of WEU's potential relations with Russia. They have to be decided on the basis of the calling and terms of reference of WEU, which is increasingly becoming the military component of the European Union, and in relation to its rôle as the European pillar of the alliance, since our organisation is moving ever closer towards a new European security system that is different, totally different in kind from the partnership for peace proposed by NATO.

Russia cannot remain indifferent to this very different approach, nor is that the case. We need only look at the marked differences between Moscow's attitude to the proposals to join the partnership for peace, which Russia finally agreed to sign, not without major reservations and profound internal opposition, and its sympathetic approach to the proposals for dialogue and co-operation with WEU. In the one case, perhaps wrongly, the proposals were seen as some sort of device to extend the security problems up to the borders of Russia; in the other, conversely, the extremely useful aspects of our co-operation were taken into account.

Bearing in mind these considerations, our approach obviously excludes both Ukraine and Belarus, but it includes the three Baltic states. That is the major difference that must be borne in mind.

In fact, we must not only define the good neighbourly relations that should henceforth be established between Russia and WEU in the new geo-strategic architecture of Europe. In the present international situation – which is worrying – we must also redefine the rôle which both WEU and Russia could play in the management of European and international problems.

It was in that spirit that our Political Committee recently visited Moscow to meet a number of major Russian political figures. The impression we gained was both curious and contradictory. It showed that much remained to be done to increase reciprocal knowledge and understanding. It is true that after seventy years of ideological isolation and intellectual battering, it is not surprising that public opinion and the leadership in the former Soviet Union have a rather limited and paradoxical view of the rest of the world. There still seems to be a somewhat confused sense of distrust of the western world, a kind of schizophrenic fear of encirclement, of isolation, and a rather bizarre impression that the whole world has joined forces against Russia.

We are facing a situation which is slowly improving, but in which there are still a number of black spots. True, the elections of 12th December 1993

and the adoption of a new democratic constitution represent some steps forward, however inadequate, towards genuine democracy. True, this constitution provides for a multi-party system, a market economy and civil rights for all the citizens of Russia.

But we still have to ask several questions. First, who really governs this colossus whose reach extends from Belarus to Vladivostok and from the North Pole to the subtropical regions? Who governs it? President Yeltsin, his government, the Duma, the more or less unseen pressure groups, certain more or less nationalist or conservative groups, the large industrial militarist apparatus that still survives in this fragmented and disintegrating society? Who governs it? Probably all of them, to a greater or lesser degree.

In effect, the western observers who study Russia are under a kind of optical and geographical misapprehension. I have noticed over the past fifteen years that most of the observers who speak of Russia, the former USSR, confine themselves to a glance at westernised Russia, what some people in fact refer to as the more or less civilised Russia, totally forgetting the Russia beneath the surface, and even more so the far distant Russia. It is no good judging from the picture suggested by large towns like Moscow and St. Petersburg; beyond them, hundreds of kilometres away, the situation remains the same and has hardly changed for four or five years; beyond them lie the immense horizons of Siberia, where strong centrifugal forces come into play as far as the Pacific Ocean and the city of Vladivostok, where the Asian influence is much stronger than the western Russian one.

In that fragmented society, we have to know who plays what rôle. Let me just dwell on one point, so as not to prolong my statement unduly. Within that society, what part is or will be played by the former Soviet army, now the Russian army? The situation is complex.

On the one hand, we have to understand the humiliation and discontent of the officers and soldiers who once belonged to one of the two international giants, who were in a particularly favoured situation in a large part of Europe, and who regarded themselves as the great victors of the second world war. Today, they are returning home to live in poor housing or even in tents in some regions. That is certainly a cause for frustration and discontent that must not be disregarded.

On the other hand, there is the problem of the delicate political balance, together with the fragile balance of power between the ex-communist conservative influence, the ever decreasing number of liberals and democrats and above all the representatives of a very disappointed and disillusioned public opinion, which considers that the experiment has largely gone wrong already. I need

Mr. Baumel (continued)

hardly mention the mafia racketeers as they are called, who indisputably play their part in everyday life and in Russian society.

We also need to look at the economic situation. We should not be surprised at the major imbalances and the economic disarray. A dirigiste society, a state-run society has to be transformed into a market economy by leading civil servants, engineers, economic decision-makers who have no idea what a western economy is, who really are like Martians who have come down to earth, who need to be mentally re-educated if they are to tackle the new problems, which become all the more acute as the hardships reveal difficulties and at times lead to failures, as we have seen.

This surrealistic picture is complicated by a problem we must certainly bear in mind: the insolent display of wealth by certain parvenus in the midst of the acute poverty of many sections of the population.

To conclude this all too brief sketch, I am not forgetting the moral and mystical approach that lives on in Russia. For many Russians today, as in the past, Moscow is still the third Rome, after Rome and Byzantium. A certain secular messianic fervour continues to go hand in hand with a defensive attitude towards the corrupting West, in order to save the true Russian soul. This is promoting a revival of pan-Slavism and the great tradition of the past, so well represented by that courageous great writer, Solzhenitsyn. These are deep-seated trends within society, and we must take them into account when we come to pass judgment on Russia.

Lastly there is the everlasting problem facing Russia, which is that, not being a genuine state, not being a nation, and because it is a real melting pot of a hundred different nationalities and thirty separate languages, the move from the age of the Mongols to the imperial age was very difficult. Today Russia must stop being an imperial state and become a mediating state. But this is a difficult transformation, which will require a political, economic, strategic and above all mental readjustment. So we must view the question of relations with Russia clearly and with understanding. We see it far too much from our western angle. But we must not forget that Russia is at the centre of a Euro-Asiatic system. In addition to its European concerns, it is naturally also concerned with protecting its interests and security in relation to Asia, from the Chinese giant which is becoming more and more of a rival, to Japan which is claiming the Kuril islands, to the soft centre of Russia, the Muslim republics of Central Asia, and the Turkish-speaking world which is re-constituting itself and has already become one of the main centres of influence, more or less in liaison with Turkey.

That is why we must examine our relations with this great power in an extremely realistic spirit.

And we must certainly not forget that in the space of four years Russia has retreated by 500 kilometres and that after two centuries it has returned to the frontiers of Ivan the Terrible. Just imagine what it would mean to any of your countries to move your frontiers back several hundred kilometres from where they were only a few years ago. That largely explains the disarray, the anxiety and the forces of reaction apparent in Russian society.

Furthermore, instead of this imperial state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the CIS, supported by only eleven of the fifteen republics of the former USSR, is now establishing itself, not without difficulty, pursuant to the Minsk Charter which provides for equality, collective security and economic co-operation. But some CIS countries cannot help suspecting the main successor state, Russia, of trying by this means to restore its special relationship with them and even recover its sovereignty.

Of course we must look at Russian foreign policy in the light of its major, long-term interests.

First, it has long-term interests in relation to the Caucasus, as a result of the many wars that have been waged over a period of a century. The Caucasian wars, with which no one in the West is very familiar, were among the important events of Russian history for a whole century.

Of course we must also take account of its relations with Asia, its relations with Turkey, its relations with the United States, which the Russians find deeply attractive but at the same time deeply disturbing. There is a strange love-hate relationship between America and Russia. It is against that background that we Europeans must now define our diplomatic relations with Russia.

These diplomatic relations with Russia must be inspired by a very simple rule. Of course Russia has its place in Europe. It must have its whole place, but nothing but its place. There can be no question of giving it any kind of control, still less any right of veto over part of this liberated Europe, unless we want a second Yalta, which I do not think anyone wants.

So we need to make a kind of deal with Russia to enable it to recover the influence it must have in Europe by natural means, but without exercising any form of sovereignty or dominance that does not, nowadays, comply with respect for international law.

We are no longer in the era of Brezhnev's shared sovereignty, in Prague. We are certainly not in the era when the Soviet army was laying down the law in Warsaw, Budapest and Berlin. We are looking towards a new Europe in which Russia must

Mr. Baumel (continued)

participate, provided it respects the rules and pays its dues, the conditions for joining any club.

It is in that spirit that we must view this useful co-operation between Western European Union and Russia, taking account of a number of problems.

First, we believe that as regards security, WEU has a specific rôle to play alongside NATO, and alongside the CSCE, where it is clear that Russia is seeking to play a dominant rôle. For it is also clear that Russia has two major assets within the CSCE: the right of veto – a veto that led to the demise of the Polish diet – and the skilful use it can make among the forty-odd member countries of a few convenient customers, enabling it to play a rôle that goes beyond its true interests.

We are not the CSCE. We should not be the CSCE. And in no circumstances can the CSCE be responsible for European security policy as Russia would wish. Conversely, we must take account both of Russia's permanent interests and of its legitimate concerns.

We must realise that the dignity of this great people must be respected, and not even contemplate the idea of driving them out of Europe. The worst mistake we could make for future generations would be to drive Russia back towards Asia, just as it would be a great mistake to give it back the rôle it has lost. Between these two extremes, we must try to establish a climate of understanding, confidence and genuine partnership.

Since I do not want to delay the debate, let me point out that the report we are presenting to you includes a number of recommendations which I regard as fundamental and which I propose to go over with you now. They form the essence of our draft recommendation.

We must offer Russia permanent co-operation and go beyond co-operation to make genuine provision for a dialogue that will lead as soon as possible – I am weighing my words here – first to informal and then to institutionalised co-operation. Then, by gradual steps, we will be able to involve Russia in building a European security system, without which there can be no real balance in Europe.

One of the vital points is to help Russia to take part in the great campaign against nuclear proliferation and nuclear dissemination, which are two different concepts. We must help Russia to destroy all possibility of using fissile material or certain vital components for the benefit of terrorist movements or states, by dismantling its missiles, to which its approach is still too timid. This is the cause of enormous anxiety, for although Russia is seen to be in a sorry economic state, it does pos-

sess 20 000 nuclear warheads! That means it has the most terrifying arsenal in the world, alongside America. Under these conditions, it is clear that we must try to offer Russia the necessary co-operation.

It is essential for the WEU Council to draw inspiration from the broad lines of this report, so that it can propose this co-operation, this dialogue, these exchanges, at Council level, and with the necessary authority.

In that spirit, and above and beyond the institutional provisions, we believe that meetings between Russian and western leaders, between Russian members of parliament and parliamentarians from WEU or the Council of Europe, are an extremely important means of improving understanding between our two countries.

We became aware of that during our latest stay in Moscow. The fact that we were able to talk to members of the Duma, who had lived totally imprisoned by a particular ideology over a period of seventy years, opens up new horizons and helps lessen the distrust, the prejudice, I would even say the hostility. We show ourselves in our true light and discover the true nature of the Russian people and its representatives behind the stereotypes that are so often created for us.

We now have the honour to receive the foreign minister of Russia. I would urge you to approve the proposals contained in the draft recommendation that are aimed at creating the necessary relations of confidence, esteem and justice between WEU and Russia, so that our organisation and Russia can establish a dialogue based on trust, with a view to stability, security and peace on our continent.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Baumel.

We now adjourn the debate following Mr. Baumel's speech.

There is a fair list of speakers who will take the floor after the address by Mr. Kozyrev, who will be addressing us in just a moment. I remind members that, because of the time we are glad to devote to questions to our distinguished visitor, they must limit their contributions to five minutes in the debate that follows. It is my intention to impose that limit fairly vigorously, otherwise our agenda will go astray.

6. Address by Mr. Kozyrev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Kozyrev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia. This is the first time that we have been addressed by the Minister for Foreign

Mr. President (continued)

Affairs of Russia and I extend to him a very warm welcome on behalf of us all.

First and foremost, it illustrates clearly the evolution of relations between the countries of Europe over the past ten years. Our Assembly was the first of the institutions referred to as western to begin exchanges of delegations with the parliament – first of the Soviet Union and, subsequently, of the Russian Federation – which we found most encouraging and which developed as time went by.

I should also like to add that we have always been most grateful for the co-operation of the Russian Embassy here in Paris in its endeavours to promote good relations. I am delighted that my friend the Russian Ambassador is present to assist and support his Minister.

At the root of all our exchanges over the years was the search for détente. That is no longer so today, but we are looking for understanding and co-operation which is necessary in the Europe of the future. Indeed, it is extremely important that we look after, foster and improve the relationship with Russia as the months and years go by.

Although WEU is still based on an alliance treaty which, at present, has been signed by ten countries, it is now associated in various degrees and ways with fourteen other European states and later there will be seventeen. As a result, Russia is now a neighbour of WEU – one in whose stability, security and economic development we have a direct interest, as well as providing guarantees of the continuity of its foreign policy.

We are also aware that none of the questions raised at present by peace-keeping and peace-making in Europe can be settled without the active participation of Russia. This was referred to by my colleague, Mr. Baumel, in his interesting speech a few moments ago.

Finally, at a time when former Yugoslavia is torn by internal conflicts of which we have heard so much during our debates this week, we appreciate enormously Russia's present endeavours to restore peace there. We all know that it is a horrendously complicated matter, but all countries – and men and women of goodwill – have to apply themselves to it and, despite the criticisms of the media, who always seem to know the right answers to everything, we need to make progress with the best possible co-operation.

The fact that you have agreed to speak to our Assembly and, one hopes, to deal with some of the problems that face you and Russian foreign policy and the organisation of European security speaks volumes for the progress that has been made in recent years. Although we have had

deputations and visits by individuals before, we have not had a visit by a foreign minister. That makes us even more delighted. I would be most grateful if you would come to the podium to address us.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*) (Translation). – Mr. President, distinguished deputies, thank you for your invitation to address the Assembly of Western European Union. I hope that it will not take much time for us to find common language with each other because I am also a member of parliament – Russian State Duma. I am sure that my voters who live in our northernmost Murmansk circumscription are interested in unity, stability and partnership in our continent just as much as voters in southernmost regions of Europe. There were no differences on this issue between me and my twelve opponents in the election campaign.

I am sure that Russians, as well as other European nations, will not follow ultranationalists who call for a march to the South. Such adventurers can be found in any society. Instead, the Russian people will strengthen the emerging trend towards political and economic stabilisation on the basis of a democratic constitution and on the basis of partnership with the West, the East and the South.

Distinguished deputies, Russia believes that co-operation with WEU holds good prospects for strengthening European peace.

The interaction with Western European Union, as well as the strengthening of the European link of our co-operation with the West, is a policy for rather than against. For the realisation of security interests of Russia, other European states, all our western partners, including the United States. But the fact remains, we, the Europeans, should take care of ourselves in the first place.

We see the development of the dialogue between Russia and WEU in a positive perspective. But it should be oriented towards a more active search for common approaches to key problems of security in Europe and neighbouring regions.

I note with satisfaction that the Russian and WEU approaches to the Bosnian crisis are very close to each other. Here is the essence of the Russian approach: the problem must be solved by political means; it is necessary to give a firm rebuff to those violating United Nations Security Council resolutions on the Bosnian settlement regardless what party initiated these violations. Any such measures should be applied strictly within the framework of the Security Council decisions and under its control; an adequate positive response by the United Nations Security Council is required to every step of the parties to the conflict facilitating the establishment of peace. The Belgrade decision to close its border is exactly such a step which should facilitate a gra-

Mr. Kozyrev (continued)

dual lifting of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

We believe that lifting the arms embargo would cause the conflict to escalate further, pose grave risks to the civilian population and to organisations in the field, leading to a situation in which United Nations forces had to withdraw. I admit that to present the Russian position, I have stolen away the formula from the last declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers. We, just as our British and French partners, intend to withdraw our peace-keeping contingents if the arms embargo is lifted.

We appreciate the decision of the WEU member states to fill a gap in the system of controlling the enforcement of the embargo that has emerged as a result of the recent United States decision.

Distinguished deputies, everyone who has visited Bosnia or any other country in conflict – from Angola to Afghanistan – knows what a terrible threat landmines pose to the civilian population. I witnessed tragic consequences of their massive use both in Tajikistan and Karabakh. In the United Nations, Russia and the WEU countries have repeatedly called for the limitation of international trade in this type of weapon. Therefore, I am particularly pleased to read outright here the following decree by the President of Russia:

“On the moratorium on export by the Russian Federation of anti-personnel mines

Considering that the moratorium on export of anti-personnel mines will permit to substantially limit the proliferation of this type of weapon of indiscriminate action, I hereby decide:

1. To declare, effective 1st December 1994, a three-year moratorium on export by the Russian Federation of anti-personnel mines which are not equipped with self-destructive mechanisms and are not detectable by mine-detectors.
2. This decree takes effect 1st December 1994, and is not retroactive.

President of the Russian Federation
B. YELTSIN”

I hope that all other countries producing these weapons will follow Russia's suit.

In Central Europe, Russia and the WEU nations have a common interest: consolidation of security and stability.

The relations between Russia and Central European countries are now based on completely new principles. There is no talk now about elder and younger brothers, and there are no traces of the Brezhnev doctrine. Russia condemned the invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia by Soviet

troops. We have signed treaties with all states of the region establishing relations based on equality of rights, and on recognition of territorial integrity of each other. We have completed the withdrawal of a half a million strong force from East Germany and Central Europe. This in itself is an unprecedented security-building measure in this region. The new Russian military doctrine sets the strength of the armed forces within the limits of reasonable defence sufficiency.

All this makes speculation about a Russian threat to Central Europe totally irrelevant. We are prepared, however, to take additional steps to strengthen security in this region. Specifically, Russia could provide, together with its western partners, security guarantees for the Central European countries.

Local conflicts in the CIS territory pose a serious threat to European security. Quite often Russia alone has to carry the burden of peace-keeping in the Commonwealth area. However, some self-styled strategists who have never been, say, to Karabakh or to Abkhazia go as far as asserting that lack of stability is better than the Russian presence!

There is no need to prove the immorality of such assertions in the situation when conflicts in the Caucasus have already killed tens of thousands of persons! I prefer to dwell on the purely strategic aspects of the problem. And here, I believe, Russia and the WEU nations may find common ground.

It is appropriate to draw the following analogy: Russia understands your concerns about threats growing just at the threshold of Western Europe. They include the conflict in former Yugoslavia, as well as the intensifying political onslaught by extremism and fundamentalism from the South. We consider it natural that members of the United Nations and the CSCE use all available means to oppose these threats.

We have another security problem in common: the Middle East. It is very important to prevent the peace area which is formed here from being undermined by intolerance and terrorism. We are prepared for close co-operation aimed at maintaining stability in the Mediterranean.

But just in the same way, we are also concerned by threats to the security of Russia. Conflicts raging at the threshold of our home have already forced about three million refugees to emigrate to Russia. The export of crime to Russia is on the rise. Almost one-third of all serious crimes in Moscow are committed by those who have come from the hot spots of the CIS.

Under these circumstances, we simply have no choice but to pursue an active peace-making policy.

The main result of our efforts is the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of negotiations

Mr. Kozyrev (continued)

in Trans-Dniestr, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

I want to emphasise that we act everywhere with explicit consent or by request of legitimate authorities and conflicting parties. Therefore, any talk of a legitimacy deficit in Russian peace-keeping efforts is groundless. We do not need any mandates or permissions. However, we welcome, and moreover demand, assistance in peace-keeping.

Unfortunately, no international organisation has yet been able to provide us with assistance that could be at least comparable to our own efforts. All their contributions do not go beyond sending a handful of observers. And all this happens when Russia has sent into the zones of conflict within the CIS peace-keeping forces numbering fifteen thousand servicemen.

We are in favour of a solid participation of the United Nations and the CSCE in peace-keeping operations. Unfortunately, the CSCE has failed to give a clear answer to our requests. This is not a fault of the all-European process but rather its drawback. The CSCE clearly lacks a solid legal and organisational basis which could make it a truly operational instrument of European peace-keeping. I hope that the Budapest summit will stimulate the evolution of the CSCE into a fully-fledged all-European organisation.

In general, we propose to start constructing a new model of pan-European security. Such a model could give a new *raison d'être* to existing international institutions. For instance, NATO, which was born in response to the division of Europe, could promote partnership leading to European unity, if only the alliance is not used to draw new dividing lines. Europeans themselves, including WEU, should take care of the unity of Europe.

What concrete steps could Russia and WEU undertake to promote co-operation? Briefly speaking, by means of implementing proposals contained in the report, WEU's relations with Russia. Many of these initiatives are useful and quite timely.

On my part, I would like to propose the following.

First, we could establish joint groups of experts from Russia and WEU on all European security problems mentioned in my address. The military could also take part in the work of such groups, first of all dealing with peace-keeping.

I propose also to hold extensive consultations on the architecture of European security. These consultations seem appropriate in the light of the forthcoming review of security and defence policies of the European Union to be held in 1996.

Second, we are ready for practical co-operation with the WEU nations on the following issues: holding of joint naval exercises of the fleets of the WEU nations and Russia with the purpose of bettering their interaction in peace-keeping operations; providing on a commercial basis the WEU Satellite Centre with photo information from our satellites; using on a commercial basis Russian aircraft by the pool which was set up by the WEU nations within the framework of the Open Skies Treaty; developing the WEU idea on the European tactical anti-missile defence and, as a starter, studying the possibilities of creating a Europe-wide satellite surveillance system; establishing direct contacts between the state company Rosvooruzhenie and the European Armaments Group within WEU; developing scientific exchanges. One should not forget that Russia has top rate, and, in some areas, unique scientific, technological and production potential which can be used both for strengthening security and for conversion.

Third, I propose to set up the Russia-WEU Consultative Council. It could be charged with co-ordinating bilateral co-operation in all the spheres: political, parliamentary, military-technical and scientific.

I am sure that our practical co-operation will help to strengthen European security on a completely new basis, on the basis of partnership between democratic states of the East and the West.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Minister, for your speech and for the interesting announcements that you have made.

You kindly agreed to answer questions, so without further ado I shall call the first one.

I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr President. I have two questions for Mr. Kozyrev. First, how does he justify the policy of the maintenance of spheres of influence at the expense of the sovereignty of neighbouring independent states by both his country and the United States? Secondly, what does he expect might happen when Russia's ultimatum to Chechnya expires shortly?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*). – I do not think that either Russia or the United States maintains or seeks to maintain spheres of influence in the sense of domination or neo-imperialism. Both countries exert much influence on world affairs, particularly in areas such as the Middle East, where we are both recognised as co-sponsors of the peace process. I admit that there is some sphere of influence there, but I believe that that benefits and shores up the independence of those states.

Mr. Kozyrev (continued)

We also maintain special relations with some regional organisations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, where, again, we promote and respect the independence and sovereignty of the member countries. All this would be unthinkable without Russian support. We also promote co-operation and economic integration in neighbouring states, to the benefit of our country and of theirs.

Chechnya is an internal region of Russia in which gangs are carrying out their criminal activities. Order will be restored there in accordance with the Russian constitution.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The next speaker is Mr. Jeszenszky, an observer from Hungary.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Observer from Hungary*). – Minister, I recognise you as an old friend of Hungary, and I warmly welcome your remark, repeated here today, to the effect that you and your country regret the crimes of the past. As you well know, there were more Russian victims of communism than any other victims.

I believe that Hungarians, together with the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe, are the best friends of democracy in Russia. By our success we can contribute to the success of democracy in your country. Crucial to that success, we believe, is the need to join western institutions. I know that you have similar plans in mind.

The report prepared by the Assembly on relations with Russia states, among other things, that among Russians there is a “fear of isolation and being sidelined by the European institutions, persistent mistrust of NATO and hostility to the enlargement of NATO towards Central Europe”. Jointly, I think that we can do a great deal to dispel all this mistrust.

How much can we do to dispel the decades of brainwashing that led many Russians to believe that NATO and its European member countries are the enemies of Russia? Surely a joint effort is needed to overcome that misunderstanding.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*). – Thank you; I am glad to have the opportunity to meet old friends here. We have shared a great many experiences in the democratic process in our countries and in bringing together our two countries after the cold war. I remember that we first met when I was in the Russian opposition under Mr. Yeltsin in the Soviet Union. We established a clear understanding of the fact that democracy would be the basis of our new good neighbourly relationship.

In this Assembly you probably meet parliamentary colleagues from Russia who represent various points of view, as is only natural in a democratic state. Certainly, quite a few people in Russia feel residual anxiety about relations with the West and have difficulty coping with the new situation. There is also a legacy of resentment on the other side towards Russia – suspicions linger in the West. That, too, is only natural.

How should we cope with all this? I believe that we are already on the right track. We are in a sort of partnership with NATO. Later today I plan to meet our NATO colleagues in Brussels and with them to initiate a programme of partnership and co-operation, to be known as the Russia-NATO partnership programme, within the framework of the partnership for peace.

This programme will include dozens of co-operative projects. Today I presented the Assembly with a number of ideas; we would welcome any other ideas on pragmatic co-operation with WEU. By means of such projects, people will come to see the practical benefits of co-operation. I have already mentioned the fact that marines in my constituency are seeking experience of joint manoeuvres with NATO and other western forces. That is a practical idea of the sort that can lead us out of suspicion. As our military forces work together more and more, we shall discover that we are not enemies and that we can co-operate daily on a person-to-person basis. So my answer is to continue with practical co-operation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I next call Mr. de Lipkowski.

Mr. de LIPKOWSKI (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Kozyrev, I was very pleased to hear you say that it is your wish that the CSCE, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, should play a more effective rôle in the European security architecture. Could you please tell us, briefly, which reforms you will no doubt be recommending at the Budapest summit to make this organisation more effective?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*) (Translation). – Well, we proposed a whole set of ideas to the general effect that the CSCE, which is a conference, in other words a forum on security and co-operation, should become an organisation. We would be in favour of adopting a charter for the CSCE. Of course, the CSCE's documents, particularly those signed at the highest level, are politically binding on the signatory states. I hope that very soon, in Budapest, we will be able to sign understandings at the level of heads of state.

However, as you parliamentarians very well know, parliaments always attach considerable

Mr. Kozyrev (continued)

importance to the documents submitted to them for ratification, particularly when it is a matter of deploying large military contingents. Apparently, for example, discussions are going on on whether there could be a CSCE operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. We are in favour but I can already see our government creating some difficulties about authorising a despatch of troops not based on a ratified document but on a declaration, important though it may be, by the heads of state, and other CSCE documents. I have given you what seems to me the most relevant example, but one could quote others.

The CSCE was set up in 1975 to bring East and West together. Today, therefore, it needs to perform as an organisation with a strong legal and physical foundation, enabling it to carry out peace-keeping operations effectively, for example, or protect human rights in a new situation.

An important point is that the principles of the CSCE on human rights should have helped in the past – my Hungarian counterpart will confirm this – to safeguard democratic principles, and ultimately helped those fighting against the totalitarian régimes in the Soviet Union, Hungary or elsewhere. It would be important today for these principles, this authority of the CSCE, to be used in the struggle against aggressive nationalism for the protection of human rights and above all, the rights of the ethnic minorities because that is where the threat to Europe lies today. In short, we see a whole series of very concrete tasks for the CSCE and we would like them to be assigned to it no later than the Budapest summit.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. Kozyrev, you have once again very clearly explained the fundamental principles of your foreign policy. However, I would like to ask you the following question: why is it that, at times, there are contradictions between Russia's previous stance on important issues – and I am thinking of the Gulf war in particular and of air strikes in Bosnia – and its votes in the Security Council?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*) (Translation). – Could you give a concrete example?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – For example, before air strikes took place in Bosnia, Russia was hostile to this and then, in the Security Council, contrary to the stance it had taken, it voted in favour of air strikes. During the Gulf war, Russia declared itself to be in favour of

lifting the arms embargo. Then, once a new exclusion zone had been declared and there was a concentration of troops on the borders of Kuwait and Iraq, Russia's vote in the Security Council was not consistent with its declarations concerning what ought not to be done in the Gulf region.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*) (Translation). – I think the best thing would be to try, in a few words, to sum up the present situation. As regards Bosnia, we voted in favour of a whole series of resolutions and so far we have not used our right of veto once. So I cannot quite see when we are supposed to have had this "sharp confrontation" with the other members of the Security Council. Nevertheless, we have our viewpoint which is that air support should be carried out strictly in the framework of United Nations operations and its purpose has to be to protect UNPROFOR, i.e. the United Nations forces. It must not constitute participation in the war in support of either of the warring parties. It would then become a different operation and the peace-keeping forces, which are simply not prepared for war, would then become an easy prey.

If war breaks out, they have to be withdrawn and we have to think of doing something else, as in Vietnam or Afghanistan. Our experience of this kind of thing is too painful. We would not take part in such an operation. At the same time, our representatives in the peace-keeping operation are in Sarajevo and other highly vulnerable areas, which is why it is extremely important for us that everything that happens comply with UNPROFOR's present mandate, including air strikes. We are carefully watching events at the level of the Security Council. All this refers to Bosnia.

As far as Iraq is concerned, we would say and do the same. We consider that Iraq has to meet the Security Council's demands and we should use the resources we have to force Baghdad into compliance. A month ago I went to Baghdad and took part in a sitting of parliament, in order to persuade its members to recognise Kuwait in every respect, including recognition of its international frontiers which, as you know, was one of the Security Council's main requirements. This is logical because the reason why Iraq attacked Kuwait four years ago is that Iraq considered it to be, not an independent country, but the nineteenth province of Iraq. I think this is a significant advance and in its resolution the Security Council considers it to be a major step forward by Iraq in the direction of peace and the application of the Security Council's resolution. The further Iraq goes along this road – the meeting of the Security Council's requirements – the nearer it will come to resuming its normal place in the international community. It is, I think, the wish of all of us that the Iraqi people be part of the community of peace-loving

Mr. Kozyrev (continued)

nations and that the Iraqi authorities should pursue a policy of peace since this would bring about the lifting of the sanctions currently imposed on the country. So here, too, we say the same thing and we act in the same way.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Sir Keith Speed.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – Minister, as a former navy minister of my own country and a former naval officer, I welcome your remarks about joint naval exercises with WEU navies. Would you consider taking that a stage further? If those exercises are successful, as I am sure they will be, will you consider from the Russian point of view an exchange of personnel – officers and petty officers – to serve for certain periods in ships of WEU units, and similarly, WEU officers and petty officers to do periods of service in Russian ships? That would be a very positive step forward, and might even please your constituents.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*) (Translation). – This is envisaged in our plans. We have already spoken, incidentally, with the Deputy Minister for Defence and accept your proposal with pleasure. All that remains is to put it into practice and for that we are ready.

The PRESIDENT. – The next question is from Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout.

Mrs. GELDERBLOM-LANKHOUT (*Netherlands*). – I am grateful to have the opportunity to ask two questions. I was pleased to hear your clear intention to help us in Europe. We are all extremely concerned about maintaining peace and I am sure that your people share that concern. We have had an emergency debate on the situation in Bihac. I fully understand that, if the arms embargo is to be lifted, we have to reconsider the blue berets. What will Russia do if the arms embargo is not lifted and the Serbs take over Bihac and continue to make safe havens totally meaningless words? We are all ashamed and I am sure you join us in that, but what will your country do? Can you elaborate a little further?

My second question concerns the constant stream of rumours that Russian soldiers – not officially, but because they have no jobs – are joining the Serbian forces. In my country if someone does that he loses his citizenship. Can you explain how Russia is treating this problem?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*). – Bihac is another tragic example of the Bosnian tragedy. The Bosnian Serbs rejected the map and plan produced by the contact group. We

have to cope with that fundamental difficulty, so the position of the Belgrade Serbs is crucially important. We succeeded in persuading them to challenge their brethren in Bosnia-Herzegovina and close the border. To my mind that is the main factor which, hopefully, sooner rather than later, will press the Bosnian Serbs to recognise the peace plan. In the meantime, in August and this month, the contact group called for the maintenance of the cease-fire agreement between the parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is no substitute for a final solution for the acceptance of the map and plan, but we are trying to press the Bosnian Serbs into agreement. It is important to maintain the cease-fire.

What happened in Bihac has, unfortunately, happened in other areas when the Muslims or the Bosnian Government, in desperation or because they had received some promises, continued offensives which failed because they miscalculated the military situation. The Serbs, of course, took the opportunity to begin counter-offensives and exceeded the boundaries. We then have such tragedies one after the other.

I shall not go into specific details which are being discussed in various fora and in the Security Council, but the contact group which meets tomorrow should insist, as should the security guards, upon the cessation of hostilities and the strengthening of the safe areas monitored by the United Nations.

I was in Belgrade and I know that President Milosevic of Serbia supports the idea. As both sides now speak favourably of it, it is important that we seize the opportunity and establish a cease-fire while we start working out a final solution.

Mercenaries are a universal problem; unfortunately there are many, not only in former Yugoslavia but in other parts of the world. There are mercenaries all over the conflicting zones of the former Soviet Union. It is forbidden by Russian law and there is a penalty, but we all know that it is extremely difficult to prove who is a mercenary when there is fighting in one country or another, so we are wrestling with this international problem that deserves more attention and co-operation and should probably be one of the topics on our mutual agenda.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. The next question comes from Mr. Sole Tura.

Mr. SOLE TURA (*Spain*). – In your interesting speech, you mentioned the Mediterranean zone as one of your concerns, but will you develop the point a little more? How do you view your specific rôle as a country, especially the organisation of global peace and security in the Mediterranean zone?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*). – The Mediterranean has been on the European agenda for a long time, along with the CSCE effort. There is a new challenge in the Mediterranean, brought about by Muslim fundamentalism in Algeria and elsewhere, which threatens the stability of the entire area. There is also the Middle East, with its problems of terrorism on the rise and threatening the peace process, so there is a multi-dimensional problem of Mediterranean security and stability. We are co-operating with the United Nations in the Security Council and within the political G-8 and other fora. The problem deserves more attention and could be one of the topics for discussion between us. I understand that next year there will be an international conference on the Mediterranean in which we are eager to take part.

The PRESIDENT. – The next question is from Mr. Pastusiak from Poland.

Mr. PASTUSIAK (*Observer from Poland*). – Poland is an associate member of the European Union and, along with other countries, is aspiring to full membership of WEU. Taking into account the number of practical considerations in co-operation between Russia and WEU, will you elaborate on the Russian position on the enlargement of WEU, especially with reference to the admission of Central Eastern European states into WEU?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*). – First of all, it is up to Poland and the organisations to which it applies for membership to decide, but, of course, we all live in the same Europe and we are all in the same boat. Unfortunately we do not see only the beautiful girls all around; there are many difficulties and new challenges – such as those to which we have just referred – as well as all the ghosts of suspicion and ambiguity. That is why we are voicing our opinion so loudly. We have an excellent opportunity to do so, provided by the partnership arrangement with NATO and the associate membership of Poland and our countries.

The type of new relationship that we are looking for with WEU opens up new vistas for practical co-operation. Even today, we have mentioned many things that remain to be done. We are only at the beginning of that practical co-operation.

So my answer is, let us do at least something and see out the present period. Many aspects will then become much clearer to our military and civilian authorities and our people. They will have got to know each other much better and we shall have found out whether we should join, how we should transform the organisations themselves, and how to evaluate our societies, military doc-

trines and other matters. The natural answer that comes to mind is that we should co-operate and have a real partnership with real substance for a meaningful period, after which we shall be in a much better position to decide whether to join and how to proceed in organisational matters.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Kozyrev.

The next speaker is Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Kozyrev, next year we will be reviewing the non-proliferation treaty. We note with great concern the erosion of the non-proliferation régime and hope that all the responsible states will draw the necessary conclusions from the signs that certain states in crisis areas are building up a nuclear weapons potential capable of military use. I would be interested to know Russia's attitude to the forthcoming review of the non-proliferation treaty. I would also be grateful if you would inform us what steps the Russian Government is taking to ensure at national level that no third countries obtain access to nuclear information or nuclear material.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*) (Translation). – More than anything else, we are in favour of ensuring that the revision of the non-proliferation treaty relates to only one aspect: how quickly it can be applied. We want there to be no delay. We do not want the treaty to be revised in any other way and we will oppose any revision or weakening of the treaty by every possible means. Non-proliferation requires constant attention and firmness. We hope that Ukraine and the other former Soviet republics that are independent today and have nuclear arms on their territory that have to be destroyed under the SALT I and SALT II treaties, will soon subscribe to the NPT as non-nuclear states in clear and committed fashion.

As to our own domestic affairs, we have a pretty strict set of rules. I believe the question of access to the Russian Federation's arsenals, which is completely out of the question, does not even arise. As regards exports of nuclear materials, the rules are very strict.

Recently, as you know, certain information was nevertheless going the rounds on traffic in materials of this kind, but they did not come from Russia; certainly, there is no convincing proof that this traffic originated in Russia. Some of these materials were found in Germany, which is why we pursue the most active and concrete co-operation at the level of the relevant technical bodies and special services, including those in Germany, the United States and practically every other country interested, in order to find a way of countering this extremely dangerous phenomenon –

Mr. Kozyrev (continued)

the illegal movement of or traffic in certain nuclear materials.

The PRESIDENT. – I still have four questioners on my list and have had a number of indications from others in the hall that they wish to ask questions. I am sure that you will agree that it would trespass unfairly on the Minister's time to go on and on, so I intend to restrict the list to the four final questioners, with apologies to those who have been unable to get in.

The next questioner is Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – In my capacity as Rapporteur of the draft under discussion which will, I think, be approved by a majority of our Assembly, if not unanimously, I have three questions to put to Mr. Kozyrev.

First, in the context of dismantling weapons of mass destruction, what plans do you have for the progressive removal of your vast stockpiles of chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction?

Second, yesterday in this forum the French Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur, mentioned a security and stability pact adopted by the European Union. What is the position of the Russian Government with regard to this stability plan and to specialist round tables on the Baltic states in particular?

Third, the Assembly would be interested to hear your explanation of the present and future situation in that part of Europe known as Kaliningrad. What are Russia's intentions there?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*) (Translation). – With regard to chemical weapons, you know that we signed the relevant convention and we respect the obligations it imposes. Nevertheless, the volume of chemical materials accumulated by the Soviet Union and destined for destruction is unfortunately too big. The population is very concerned at the prospect of possible environmental pollution when the work is being done. In short, we are faced with a number of financial, technical and social problems and it should be noted that we are solving them in co-operation with some of our foreign partners. I am convinced that this complex question could become a channel for co-operation between WEU and Russia.

As regards the security pact – Prime Minister Balladur's initiative – we talked about this problem on my very recent official visit to Paris. I think the initiative is useful and we welcomed it from the very beginning. It could lead to the holding of a highly important colloquium next spring

and become a significant feature of the process of pan-European construction and the CSCE. As to round tables on the Baltic states, we were interested from the start in the fact that the Balladur plan assigns special attention to the problem I have referred to of the ethnic minorities. This problem is extremely acute in some Baltic republics, Estonia and Latvia, where a number of pieces of legislation and, more still, administrative procedures could indeed be regarded as discriminatory or at least having the effect of harming the rights of the non-indigenous population – not only the ethnic Russians, but also the Belarussians, Finns, Jews and so on. This is why it would be very useful for the stability pact and the Baltic round tables to result in these problems being examined. We agree with Mr. Balladur that Russia should take a very active part in this.

Lastly, as regards Kaliningrad, this is, as you know, Russian territory and I do not think the problem calls for special discussion here.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, I believe this positive and constructive contribution in relation to the political and geostrategic matters we are discussing will dispel some of the doubts we had concerning Russia's position. I am grateful to the Minister; this is an important moment in the deliberations of our Assembly.

We have had meetings with Russian delegations and had detected certain usurpations on the part of Russia on some matters: they were talking about strengthening the CSCE as opposed to NATO. Today, however, we have heard a much more constructive, positive and open approach to the NATO process. So my question is this.

Are we to understand, as I believe I understood, that Russia no longer has any reservations regarding NATO's enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe?

Are we to understand that Russia has accepted that NATO will continue to be the only military alliance, and that if it is not to be seen either in Russia or anywhere else as an enemy, the best solution is to join the organisation?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*) (Translation). – I do not know what could have made anyone think that we were proposing to transform the CSCE into an authoritative organisation – there was never any idea of hierarchy in our proposals. We made the point that the CSCE should play a central rôle in the European process because it is the most polyvalent organisation and the only one to which all countries already belong. It is the organisation with the broadest mandate.

Mr. Kozyrev (continued)

Actually, NATO, for example, was set up in opposition to the Warsaw Pact, to contain communism, etc. At the moment, communism is no more and, in its papers, NATO consistently states it needs to find new tasks, to change, etc. All this appears in NATO's own documents. It is not our personal viewpoint.

The CSCE, for its part, is based upon a set of principles and decisions which, without any change, are still very relevant today, e.g. democracy, human rights, the rights of ethnic minorities, etc. This is why the CSCE would today appear to be the best prepared and most polyvalent organisation, well-suited to provide a kind of basis for the unification of Europe and to become the nerve centre of that process.

Even so, that does not mean to say it has to have hierarchical power over the other organisations or that it has to constitute an alternative to those organisations. On the contrary, all the other organisations – NATO, WEU and the CIS – have first to act in conformity with the principles of the CSCE – there can be no doubt about that – and second, they have to find their place in the new Europe and make their contribution to solving its problems. Personally, I have never said anything else which is why I do not know where the opinion could have come from.

Next, let us take the question of the enlargement of NATO. Of course, we do not look at NATO as even a potential enemy. That is what we have said and what President Yeltsin and the Russian authorities said when we were still part of the Soviet Union and we have confirmed it on many occasions since. The problem is that NATO is a mixed military and political union to which Russia does not belong. It is not designed to be against Russia but without Russia. If it begins to extend to the west without us, numbers of the public, unfamiliar with NATO, could get a certain feeling of isolation. Lastly, one could wonder why an organisation set up to fight communism is extending towards the East and coming nearer to our frontiers.

I emphasise to you that this is indeed a military-cum-political organisation – not cultural or economic but military and political – stretching out towards our frontiers at a time when communism has gone. It could well serve our communists' ends and this is one of the reasons why I, personally, am against it, not as a minister but as a member of parliament. I present my apologies because there may be communists here, but our breed of communists and nationalists are somewhat different from those of Western Europe. So we have what in my mind are fairly reasonable concerns which could be allayed by dialogue and partnership.

We are, today, discussing plans for co-operation with WEU. Let us start this co-operation going, even to a limited extent, and organise some manoeuvres. The men in our navies will get to know each other better and understand that they are in no way enemies but allies. Even so, Rome was not built in a day and I see no reason for any haste in taking such decisions. We are against rushing things, it never gives good results.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. De DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – At the beginning of this year, the WEU Assembly gave me the task of drawing up a report on the future of nuclear arms. In preparing this report, adopted by the Assembly in the June part-session, I visited Moscow, Washington, Paris and London. At that time, I was struck by the different approaches to this matter in Washington and Moscow.

While the Americans seem nowadays to be completely prepared to accept the logic of massive nuclear disarmament, going far beyond the START agreements, which would leave the United States with no more than several hundred nuclear warheads – and I had this impression in both the Democrat and Republican camps, at various levels of the American administration and at the Centre for American Studies – at the same time I felt that in Moscow there was considerable reluctance to agree to accept this logic of nuclear de-escalation. I even detected certain reservations on the part of the Duma with regard to ratifying the START agreements.

Mr. Kozyrev, what are Russia's objectives with regard to the reduction of nuclear weapons, which is the only way to genuine peaceful coexistence throughout our continent?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. KOZYREV (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia*) (Translation). – Perhaps we have different sources of information and different partners. You perhaps deal with American congressmen. I deal with the American administration and, without wanting to put a spanner in the works, let me quote an example people know about. When we were concluding the SALT II agreements, we proposed ceilings for nuclear warheads of under 2 000 and even 1 800-1 700 units for both sides. The United States first put forward a figure of 4 700, but we finally agreed, with much difficulty, on a ceiling of 3 500. For all that, we have not withdrawn our proposal to reduce warheads to 2 000. It is still on the negotiating table. Not being able to achieve any other result, we simply agreed to set the ceiling at 3 000-3 500. We declared unilaterally, however, that we would not necessarily opt for this ceiling. In the treaty – and this is the difference between SALT II and SALT I – we stated that this would only be a possible ceiling. It is not compulsory for either party to have exactly

Mr. Kozyrev (continued)

3 500 warheads. The two sides can have as many as they want. This being so, we do not yet know how many warheads we will finally have.

Therefore, if your inquiries and contacts show that Washington is now ready to go much further, this is very good news because President Yeltsin made a proposal on these lines last September before the General Assembly. Unfortunately, although the United States' reply for the moment is still constructive, I cannot say that it is really positive. In what you have said, therefore, you have given me information that really gives me hope.

Incidentally, there is unquestionably opposition in our Duma – noisy opposition – as regards not only SALT II and SALT I, but also co-operation with the West in general. All of you know this all too well. Has Mr. Zhirinovskiy for example, come to see you? His visit would have caused you exquisite pleasure because he is a case on his own and I must say that much of what he says always suggests the existence of a medical rather than a political problem. I say the same thing at home, so do not think I would say anything different if he were here.

The PRESIDENT. – Our last questioner has kindly withdrawn his question because it has already been answered – it was not about Zhirinovskiy. As one who had a face-to-face confrontation with him in Strasbourg, I wholeheartedly second what our distinguished guest has just said about him.

I would be failing in my duty if I did not, on behalf of the Assembly, thank you very much for your great contribution to our proceedings this morning. The relaxed and intuitive way in which you answered questions impressed us all.

We have had many visiting ministers in our time, some of them skilled in not answering questions and dodging the issues; but you have been frank with us and given us a most interesting speech. Sitting here, I have been thinking just how unbelievable it would have been even seven or eight years ago that such a session would be held here. We have indeed made tremendous advances. With men like you, I am sure that the future of Europe will be a good one. Thank you so much for coming.

(Mr. van der Linden, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

7. WEU's relations with Russia

(Debate on the report of the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1440)

The PRESIDENT. – The last order of the day is the debate on the report of the Political Commit-

tee on WEU's relations with Russia and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1440.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, once again Mr. Baumel has taken on a difficult task, in which his wide knowledge and understanding of the great problems afflicting our continent are evident from beginning to end. I congratulate him. The particular merit of his report lies, perhaps, in his assessment of the current situation and the problems that exist in Russia. While presenting a general diagnosis of the present position, Mr. Baumel has also taken advantage of the committee's October visit to Moscow to gather a wealth of information on the Russia of today.

Let me say that I intend to abstain from broaching here a fundamental question on which I am not at all in agreement with Mr. Baumel: the rôle of WEU which is inseparable from the ambiguity of its relations with NATO. However, I disagree strongly enough to justify my abstention from voting.

I will restrict myself to drawing your attention to one or two fundamental questions. The first concerns the nature of power in Russia. In order to understand events in that great country and to see where it is going, we need to ask who governs Russia today, and what is the rôle of the army? Mr. Baumel posed these two questions with sensitivity.

Ladies and gentlemen, the real power in Russia is held by groups who work behind the scenes. By their very nature and aims these groups, which have close links with mafia-like elements, operate through the finance ministries and privatisations. On 3rd October, Black Tuesday, the rouble suddenly and inexplicably lost a third of its value against the dollar. This made fortunes for some and revealed the fragility of the government and the strength of the invisible power of groups whose business is done in the shadows.

Mr. Baumel also speculates about the rôle of the army. When our committee visited Moscow we met several military personnel, most of whom were parliamentarians. I recall that they were all very reticent about the rôle of the armed forces. Perhaps it was through a sense of loyalty and pride that none of them made the slightest mention of the existence of the special troop units which had replaced the traditional army in matters of security and repression in the region around the capital. This praetorian guard of 52 000 men, frequently written about in the Russian press, has become the best-equipped, most highly-trained and most highly-paid élite military force in the country. Its officers' living conditions are much better than average. According to the daily, Neza-

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

vissimaia Gazeta, a non-commissioned officer earns as much as, if not more than, a colonel in the regular army. The government is apparently planning to establish similar élite forces in the St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg areas.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am reminding you of these facts to emphasise that, in a country with an authoritarian régime where the government is weak and the economy dominated by the activities of a number of mafia-like groups, the existence of an invisible praetorian guard is a factor to be taken into consideration in any assessment of possible political developments in the country.

Mr. Baumel has presented us with four possible scenarios.

According to my information, it is unlikely that President Yeltsin will remain in power or that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will be put into the Kremlin, given the increasing isolation of the government. Of 450 deputies in the Duma, only 52 voted against a motion condemning its policies. Even people like Mr. Gaidar and Mr. Fyodorov who have long supported Mr. Yeltsin's policies are now attacking him in the press. The fragmented opposition lacks organisation and has no chance of attaining power. It seems more probable that the régime's presidential candidate will be appointed by the powerful economic lobbies which hold the real power. However, a general deterioration in the situation before the elections cannot be discounted. This is a country where the minimum wage has increased by 32 000 roubles, or \$11 a month, where the average wage is less than 120 000 roubles, which is less than \$40 a month and industrial production has fallen by 26% this year. In Moscow, 60% of consumer goods are now of foreign origin. The drift into chaos is therefore obvious to the visitor.

Mr. Baumel has drawn our attention to the threat to the unity of the federation and to the action of centrifugal forces in a number of regions. This is a timely warning, for the danger is very real; the situation in the north Caucasus is becoming explosive.

There is, in addition, the illegal entry of over a million Chinese into southern Siberia and the eastern maritime provinces, creating a very complex situation, in particular where the border is contested by China.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am drawing attention to these situations because they demonstrate the limits of a dialogue on European security with a permanently unstable central power which is increasingly contested by the Russian people.

The reaction of the commander of the 14th Russian army stationed in Trans-Dniestr to the agree-

ment signed with Moldova, foreseeing the return of this army to Russia within three years, is characteristic of the dangerous contradictions which bring the branches of power into conflict. General Lebed immediately declared the agreement to be inapplicable and absurd, adding that his troops would remain in southern Moldova. I quote this incident because General Lebed is now the most popular officer in the Russian army, according to a recent survey. Some of his colleagues would like to see him come forward as the presidential candidate at the next elections.

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Baumel was right to emphasise the positive aspects of contacts between our Assembly and Russian parliamentarians. However, we must never forget that the central power in Russia is no longer a credible partner in discussions of international affairs. It is maintained in office by the force of inertia. The real power is in the hands of the invisible groups.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The next speaker is Mr. Buteiko, an observer from Ukraine.

Mr. BUTEIKO (*Observer from Ukraine*). – The time allocated to speakers is rather limited, so I shall confine myself only to some comments on the report.

The report, Document 1440, submitted by Mr. Baumel, is a good example of how WEU makes serious efforts better to understand what is going on in the countries which appeared after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. An attempt to formulate some guidelines for the development of relations with such new states on an individual basis should be welcomed. One may express the hope that such an approach will be extended to other newly independent states, such as Ukraine.

The report contains a thorough and penetrating analysis and is definitely a success for the Rapporteur: I congratulate Mr. Baumel. While praising the report highly, I would also express the wish that some minor but important corrections should be made to the text of the draft recommendation. Since the document is to be issued by members of parliaments, it would be wise to use precise language.

Paragraph (i) of the preamble describes the Russian Federation as “the main successor to the Soviet Union”. In my opinion, the words “the main successor” should be replaced with the words “one of the successors”, and I appeal to the Assembly for its support for this suggestion.

The description of Russia as the main successor would contradict the Vienna Convention of 1978 on the succession of states in respect of treaties, and the Vienna Convention of 1983 on the succession of states in respect of state property, state debts and archives.

Mr. Buteiko (continued)

Those two conventions, the major international documents in this field, contain basic customary rules which should be applied in respect of the succession of states. They do not envisage the existence of main or secondary successors. All successor states are equal in legal terms.

Guided by these rules, the newly independent states which appeared as successor states after the collapse of the former Soviet Union empowered Russia to play the rôle of the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council only by their joint decision at the summit in Alma-Aty in 1991.

The principle of equality of all successors to the former Soviet Union was also embodied in numerous other agreements adopted within the CIS, including the agreement on the division of the property of the former Soviet Union, signed in Moscow on 6th July 1992. Under that agreement, signed by the President of Russia and other heads of state, all the property overseas of the former Soviet Union, including infrastructure of merchant marine and civil aviation, buildings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gold and diamond reserves, and space facilities, should be divided into shares.

Ukraine's share is 16.7%. Since, according to some sources, the market value of foreign property of the former USSR is estimated at more than \$300 billion, the Ukrainian share would be about \$50 billion. Similarly, our share of the gold would be not less than 45 tonnes; for diamonds, Russia has not presented any figures.

Up to now, that huge amount of property, which far exceeds the Ukrainian debt for oil and gas, has been unilaterally taken and used by Russia. That issue is to be solved by negotiations, which I hope will be successful. But in case the negotiations fail, under the agreement that I have cited the matter can go to international arbitration.

If that were to happen, establishing the definition of main successor in the WEU recommendation would give Russian lawyers additional arguments in support of their case. That would be unacceptable and unfair. Similar considerations could apply also in respect of the Black Sea fleet.

The concept of the main successor might also put Russia in an awkward position. Such wording in the WEU recommendation could be used by certain political forces to mean that Russia, as a main successor, should be responsible and liable for Stalinist purges; for the Chernobyl catastrophe; and for organising artificial starvation in Ukraine, which led to the deaths of more than eight million people. I am informed that Russia does not want to take such burdens.

Since the recommendation deals only with Russia, it is doubtful whether it would be appropriate to cite the CIS in this context. In this connection, paragraph 33 of the report rightly says that the CIS "is not a state; nor does it include supranational elements." It would therefore be more precise, in my opinion, to refer in paragraphs (xvi) and (xvii) in the preamble to the draft recommendation not to "territory of the CIS" but to "territories of the countries participating in the CIS".

I appeal for the Assembly's support for this proposal to insert the suggested changes in the text of the preamble. I submitted amendments along these lines in writing yesterday, and they are available in the secretariat.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Böhm.

Mr. BÖHM (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Baumel's report is an impressive document and in particular, I think, a successful assessment of the situation in the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States. As was only to be expected, the report reflects the great uncertainty we all feel when we look at the situation in the former Soviet Union.

The conclusion I draw from Mr. Baumel's report is as follows. The future of the territory of the former Soviet Union will be decided in Russia itself. As constituted at present, Europe can have very little influence on it. If we cannot manage to bring peace to the war-torn territory of former Yugoslavia, in the middle of Europe, it is even less likely that Europe is currently in a position to influence events in Russia.

The form of Russia's participation in Europe or co-operation with Europe will be determined by the road it chooses to follow. Will Russia become a democratic nation-state which, like France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Germany, is – to a greater or lesser extent – in favour of European integration on principle, or will Russia make its own imperial claims in future, revealing aspirations to hegemony in the area of the former Soviet Union? Will Russia aim at a close rapprochement with Europe, including forms of integration, or will we have to adjust to a collaboration in which peace and co-operation are regarded as more or less distant goals?

The foreign minister of the Russian Federation spoke today of distrust, and there are indeed many grounds for distrust vis-à-vis trends in the Russian Federation and in the area of the former Soviet Union.

It has been obvious since 1993 that pronounced moves towards hegemony, the doctrine of near abroad and Moscow's special interests in the area of the former Soviet Union have become a major component of Russian policy.

Mr. Böhm (continued)

In paragraph 41, Mr. Baumel refers to statements by the head of foreign intelligence, Yevgeni Primakov. I would like to quote a further statement by Primakov. He said that the reintegration of the former Soviet republics was not a distant objective but an indisputable fact. Many Russian documents already describe the external borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States as external Russian borders. Mr. Baumel points that out too.

I was most impressed by what Mr. Buteiko from Ukraine said just now. I can only underline his fears, and I share his view that Russia's attitude towards Ukraine and towards Belarus will become a test case as to whether Russia wants to become part of the community of democratic states in Europe or not.

I do not want there to be any misunderstanding about whether this Russian attitude reflects a peaceful or hostile attitude towards that community. On the contrary! But we will have to seek other forms of peaceful coexistence, depending on which way Russia decides. It is obvious that Russia will have to decide whether it wants to integrate and use its cultural, intellectual and later on no doubt its economic strength in Europe, or whether it wants to use it to make imperial claims, and intends to reconstruct an imperial power on the territory of the former Soviet Union. I am firmly convinced it cannot do both.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude by pointing out and emphasising once again that Russia will determine its own road. It would be a good idea if in so doing it took a critical look at its communist and colonial past. The countries that meet together in Western European Union have learned their lesson from the terrible mistakes of European history: they shape their future together and have jointly repelled the attacks of totalitarian communism. In Western European Union it has been possible to turn the defeated enemy and aggressor into a fellow supporter of the common defence. This is a magnificent example, and one that should have a strong influence today on Russia's decisions for the future.

In that spirit, I would find it extremely welcome if co-operation could be established between the Russian Federation and Western European Union.

(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Böhm. This is your farewell to our Assembly. You have been here for a number of years and we wish you well in your future activities.

We now come to Mr. Averchev, the observer from Russia. As his interpreter has gone to the

press conference with the minister and cannot be in two places at once, Mr. Averchev has agreed to speak to us in English. Having heard him before, I do not think that this will cause too much difficulty.

Mr. AVERCHEV (*Observer from Russia*). – First, I congratulate Mr. Baumel on his balanced and penetrating report. It was an especially difficult and challenging task as Russia is in the process of fundamental and indeed, revolutionary change. It is a country in the process of searching for a new self-identity.

In Russia we now hear many voices after seventy years of silence. Of course, it is easy to distort a picture and to paint it in very bright colours. It is quite understandable, therefore, that I stress that the report is quite balanced.

We often hear that Russia may return to the imperial road of development. I should stress that, perhaps for the first time in many centuries, Russia – as a people and as a nation – has a chance to develop and define its own future, not as an imperial nation, but as a democratic European nation.

From that perspective, may I remind you 83% of people within Russia's present borders are now Russians. We are now relieved from the burden of the empire and see opportunities to return Russia to a normal European democratic state.

Mr. Baumel said that Russia is not only European but Asian. That is true. But although it is Asian in terms of its geopolitical position, culturally it is a European nation. Whether the Russian people live in the European part of the country or the Siberian forests, they are still European people. From that perspective, we have a good chance of reuniting our nation around our national interests and actively to build our relationship with all European organisations. That process is currently going on and I am happy to participate in making the first steps towards building a relationship between the Russian Parliament and WEU.

Recently, Russia signed an agreement with the European Union. It is time to harmonise and correlate our steps in developing our relationship with WEU and the European Union, because I understand that, in 1996, WEU will be integrated with that European organisation. So our parliament is already actively involved in a relationship with the European Parliament and now with the parliamentary Assembly of WEU. The more we discuss our common problems of security, the less we shall be in danger of getting distorted the perception of what is going on in my country.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Averchev.

I now call Mrs. Fischer.

Mrs. FISCHER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Baumel's

Mrs. Fischer (continued)

report shows great expertise and gives an excellent analysis of the current situation, for which we should be very grateful.

The collapse of the Soviet empire has radically changed the geostrategic situation and calls for far-reaching adjustments both in the Atlantic Alliance and on the part of the European institutions, including the security policy and the military dimension of WEU. The confrontation between the two power blocs has given way to forms of instability which are difficult to predict and for which there are no simple solutions.

That is why I shall be glad if WEU can find ways of establishing a dialogue with the two chambers of the Russian Parliament, the parliamentary assembly of the CIS and the parliaments of Belarus and Ukraine.

We know that a country's respect for human rights, separation of powers and constitutionality are the cornerstones of every democracy. One of the main objectives of the future policy of the European Union and hence of WEU as well must be to encourage, accompany and support the newly emerged states on the road to democracy. NATO took the first steps with its partnership for peace offer.

But that is no more than first aid. Further, vigorous efforts are needed to break down distrust in the changing political landscape on the European continent. At the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the CSCE, in Budapest, that organisation will have to be strengthened and converted into a specialised instrument for conflict-settlement and peace-keeping. Here WEU can make a substantial contribution.

There are, however, many reasons why European security policy cannot abandon its ties with America. Quite apart from that, the European Union's common foreign and security policy, CFSP, could call for support for the democratisation and economic liberalisation of Russia and Eastern Europe. The Council of Ministers of WEU would also be an obvious choice, should the EU still be unable to reach agreement.

We need resolute and rapid action. If the West fails to help build up democracy and a social market economy in Russia and the new democracies, we could see the rebirth of a dictatorial régime and the chance of creating confidence and security in Europe would be lost for the time being. Then the West would have to admit that, even if it had won the cold war, it had wasted the chance of helping to shape the vital basis of security in Europe.

There are unmistakable signs that following the collapse of the Soviet empire, Russia is re-thin-

king and re-organising its sphere of influence. To enter into a dialogue with Russia and its western neighbours and seek co-operation with them at this stage would, in my view, make a major contribution to the establishment of a lasting peace in Europe. And that is our common task.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mrs. Fischer.

I now call Mr. Sinka, the observer from Latvia.

Mr. SINKA (*Observer from Latvia*). – I wish that the statements by Mr. Böhm, Mr. Rodrigues, our Ukrainian friend and our Russian colleague could have been heard by more people than are now present. I am not reflecting on the quality of those present.

We heard what Mr. Baumel said about instability in Russia at the present time, with people not quite knowing who is in charge, who is saying what, and what is really happening. We have also just heard a very honest statement by our Russian colleague. Indeed, it coincides with what Alexander Solzhenitsyn said, that the Russian people are still looking for their lost soul. We all hope that they will recover it pretty soon.

We also heard an otherwise acceptable statement by Mr. Kozyrev, in which he repudiated the Brezhnev doctrine and referred to some nasty things that happened during the Stalin era. However, he referred in a reply to some human rights violations in the Baltic states, which I emphatically reject. We had an excellent minority rights law before the war which even gave our ethnic minorities the right to be represented in our parliament. That is a unique law. We also have the usual laws on human rights, so I do not think that it was a fair remark.

The repudiation of the Brezhnev doctrine did not, unfortunately, go as far as repudiation of what happened in June 1940, when the three Baltic states which, as I said earlier, were members of the League of Nations, were occupied and annexed. Unfortunately, that fact has not been repudiated by Moscow and we are still waiting for that. Nor has Moscow repudiated the fact that, under Stalin in 1944, the USSR annexed what was in our case a large part of Latvia's territory – 2 000 square kilometres.

Annexation of Estonian territory also followed under Stalin. The actions were illegal and were apparently repudiated by Russia, but Russia says nothing at present. We are still waiting.

As for military co-operation, we have been left with the unfortunate legacy of what amounts to a military base – the early warning station at Skrun-da. Latvia has something to offer WEU in terms of space research and early warning systems. But that piece of land – with 2 000 potential personnel – does not form part of our sovereignty. That

Mr. Sinka (continued)

is to be rejected. If Russia sincerely wants to cooperate, it should not have an early warning station aimed against the organisation that we want to join.

There are many loose ends left unresolved. I sincerely hope that Russia will find its true democratic place in this world at the end of the twentieth century and that imperialism, whatever its shape and appearance, will become an anachronism.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Sinka.

I call Mr. Sole Tura.

Mr. SOLE TURA (*Spain*) (Translation). – I would like to start by congratulating the Political Committee and Mr. Baumel in particular, on the report we are discussing, which is of a very high standard.

The problem under discussion is almost the same as one we have already discussed in the Council of Europe, which relates to the precise limits of Europe. Clearly, the discussion in the Council of Europe was not the same as today's, because we are not talking about exactly the same dimensions. There we were discussing European space in relation to human rights; here we are discussing problems associated with military and strategic space. However, perhaps the option we took with this report is the only one possible, which is to admit that a defined space exists – a defined military and strategic space – which is the Commonwealth of Independent States – and within that, to contemplate special co-operation with Russia and also, on some matters, with Ukraine and Belarus.

I say that this is the only possible way of approaching the problem today, but it does not have to be the definitive solution and I do not think that is how we see it; that would mean accepting that the CIS space is autonomous and consequently accepting that within that space Russian military forces, for instance, could intervene exclusively, so that we would cease to be concerned with the solution of any problems there, such as the one in Nagorno-Karabakh which was referred to earlier.

So it is a temporary solution, which leaves serious problems unresolved, not only the possible autonomy of WEU as the military arm – so to speak – of the European Union, but also whether or not we ought to allow a defensive and political space differing from that of the rest of Europe to become established in Russia.

In my view this is the big question, which we cannot resolve at the moment, but will have to resolve in the future. The report takes an important step forward, in trying to establish effective

collaboration with that space. However, at some time in the future, and I do not think it will be very long, we will have to confront the other problem, which is to identify the true dimensions of the defensive military space of Europe as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur of the Political Committee, to reply.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – May I begin by thanking the speakers in the debate, each of whom has made a very useful contribution. Unfortunately, in view of the late hour I cannot reply to them on individual points.

I note the high quality of the discussion which opened this morning in the presence of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I shall, however, comment generally in reply to those who spoke.

To the Russian observer, Mr. Averchev, I would say that of course Russian culture is more European than Asian. Fortunately so! But Russia's geopolitical and geographical situation is such that it has to cope at one and the same time with its European front, its problems to the south and those to the east. We are very much aware of the Russian Government's difficulties in solving these problems.

May I particularly thank Mrs. Fischer. Her speech was very useful, since she went into some very interesting political issues.

I apologise to Mr. Buteiko, who has been trying since yesterday to get some amendments made to the text. Unfortunately, our Rules of Procedure do not allow us to adopt his proposals. Let him rest assured that this is not a matter of a systematic or political refusal; we have made no assessment of the substance of the changes he wanted to see. The only obstacle is the procedural problem.

The PRESIDENT. – I am obliged to Mr. Baumel for that explanation as I think that our Ukrainian colleague did not understand that we were not discriminating against him – we have the same rule for everyone with observer status.

I call Mr. de Puig, the Chairman of the Political Committee.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – The Assembly as a whole should be very grateful to Mr. Baumel for the work he has done on this impressive report. It is not only the work of a great parliamentarian and eminent politician, but above all, that of an outstanding expert on Russia. He succeeded in convincing us in the committee by his great erudition, and his speech in the Assembly was masterly. Merely reading his report convinces one of the quality of his analyses of the problems of Russia. Above all, he concentrates on

Mr. de Puig (continued)

the problems of today and Russia today, not those of yesterday.

I therefore thank you very much indeed, Mr. Baumel, for your work, which has produced a magnificent report and the two very interesting drafts before us. Our debates and the report show the importance of Russia and the fact that in a geostrategic context, one cannot overlook its rôle in matters of security and defence. Similarly, we have reached the conclusion that WEU is prepared to take account of Russia's rôle in the framework of European security.

I am very pleased to note that the speech and replies by Mr. Kozyrev fully coincide with the proposals, draft recommendation and draft order submitted by Mr. Baumel. Better still, this debate broadens the practical possibilities for co-operation and dialogue between our organisation and Russia. I welcome this and I am sure that this morning will take its place as a major political event in the history of our Assembly.

I therefore ask all our colleagues here present – the quantity may not be there but the quality is – to vote enthusiastically in favour of the two drafts.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig. I echo your words – I think that we have had a most successful day.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1440.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is agreed to ¹.

We shall now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1440.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft order.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is agreed to ².

I congratulate the Rapporteur and the committee on their success.

8. Close of the session

The PRESIDENT. – Ladies and gentlemen, we have now reached the end of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session of the Assembly. I thank you all for your attendance and for the general goodwill exhibited throughout the week. The proceedings have been highly successful and we have had one of our more upbeat sessions. We can take a good deal of comfort from it.

I declare the second part of the fortieth ordinary session closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.)

1. See page 55.

2. See page 57.

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
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