



Assembly of Western European Union

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November-December 1993

IV

**Minutes
Official Report of Debates**

WEU

PARIS



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The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.



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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
KELCHTERMANS Lambert	CVP
KEMPINAIRE André	VLD
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
SARENS Freddy	CVP
SEEUWS Willy	SP
Van der MAELEN Dirk	SP

Substitutes

MM. DE DECKER Armand	PRL
GHEsqUIÈRE Ferdinand	CVP
LAVERGE Jacques	PVV
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
OTTENBOURGH Yvan	CVP
THISSEN René	PSC
WINTGENS Pierre	PSC

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOUCHERON Jean-Michel	Socialist
COLOMBIER Georges	UDF
COUVEINHES René	RPR
DUMONT Jean	Ind. Rep.
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GEOFFROY Aloys	UDF
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JACQUAT Denis	UDF
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KASPEREIT Gabriel	RPR
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
SCHREINER Bernard	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. BONREPAUX Augustin	Socialist
BRANGER Jean-Guy	UDF
BRIANE Jean	UDF
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DANIEL Christian	RPR
DECAGNY Jean-Claude	UDF
DENIAU Xavier	RPR
Mrs. DURRIEU Josette	Socialist
MM. EHRMANN Charles	UDF
HUNAUlt Michel	RPR
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LE JEUNE Edouard	UCDP
de LIPKOWSKI Jean	RPR
MASSON Jean-Louis	RPR
MIGNON Jean-Claude	RPR
PRORIOL Jean	UDF
ROGER Jean	RDE
VINÇON Serge	RPR

GERMANY

Representatives

Mr. ANTRETTER Robert	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
Mr. BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU

MM. BÜCHLER Hans	SPD
BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MENZEL Bruno	FDP
MEYER zu BENTRUP Reinhard	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TERBORG Margitta	SPD
Mr. VOGEL Friedrich	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

MM. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. JUNGHANNs Ulrich	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
LUMMER Heinrich	CDU/CSU
MAASS Erich	CDU/CSU
MARTEN Günter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. MASCHER Ulrike	SPD
MM. MICHELS Meinolf	CDU/CSU
NEUMANN Gerhard	SPD
PFUHL Albert	SPD
PROBST Albert	CDU/CSU
REIMANN Manfred	SPD
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHLUCKEBIER Günter	SPD
Mrs. von TEICHMAN Cornelia	FDP
Mr. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGNELLI Arduino	Socialist
ANDREOTTI Giulio	Chr. Dem.
BENVENUTI Roberto	PDS
BOSCO Rinaldo	Northern League
COLOMBO Vittorino	Chr. Dem.
DE CAROLIS Stelio	PRI
FERRARINI Giulio	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
LECCISI Pino	Chr. Dem.
MANISCO Lucio	Ref. Com.
MANNINO Calogero	Chr. Dem.
PAIRE Giacomo	PLI
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOli Ugo	PDS
PIZZO Pietro	Socialist
POLLi Mauro	Northern League
RODOTA Stefano	PDS
TATARELLA Giuseppe	PDS

Substitutes

MM. BATTISTUZZI Paolo	PLI
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
CALDORO Stefano	Socialist
CICCIOMESSERE Roberto	Radical
COVI Giorgio	PRI
DE PAOLI Paolo	PSDI
FAVA Claudio	Rete
FERRARI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
GOTTARDO Settimo	Chr. Dem.
GUZZETTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
LECCESE Vito	Verdi

MM. LIBERATORI Vittorio Socialist
 MESORACA Maurizio PDS
 RUBNER Hans SVP
 TABLADINI Francesco Northern League
 TRABACCHINI Quarto PDS
 VINCI Luigi Ref. Com.
 VISIBELLI Roberto MSI-DN

LUXEMBOURG**Representatives**

Mrs. ERR Lydie Soc. Workers
 Mr. GOERENS Charles Dem.
 Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle Soc. Chr.

Substitutes

Mrs. BRASSEUR Anne Dem.
 MM. DIMMER Camille Soc. Chr.
 REGENWETTER Jean Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS**Representatives**

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth Labour
 MM. DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob CDA
 EISMA Doeke D66
 van der LINDEN René CDA
 STOFFELEN Pieter Labour
 van VELZEN Wim CDA
 VERBEEK Jan Willem VVD

Substitutes

MM. DEES Dick VVD
 EVERSDIJK Huib CDA
 JURGENS E.C.M. Labour
 Mrs. SOUTENDIJK van APPELDOORN Marian H.J. CDA
 Mr. TUMMERS Nicolas Labour
 Mrs. VERSPAGET Josephine Labour

PORTUGAL**Representatives**

MM. AMARAL Fernando Soc. Dem.
 BRITO Raul Fernando Socialist
 CANDAL Carlos Socialist
 FERNANDES MARQUES Joaquim Soc. Dem.
 MACHETE Rui Manuel Soc. Dem.
 PINTO Carlos Soc. Dem.
 ROSETA Pedro Soc. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs. AGUIAR Maria Manuela Soc. Dem.
 MM. ALEGRE Manuel Socialist
 CURTO Abilio Aleixo Socialist
 MARTINS Alberto de Sousa Socialist
 POÇAS SANTOS João Alvaro Soc. Dem.
 REIS LEITE José Guilherme Soc. Dem.
 RODRIGUES Miguel Urbano PCP

SPAIN**Representatives**

MM. ALVAREZ Francisco People's Party
 CUCO Alfons Socialist
 FABRA Juan Manuel People's Party
 HOMS I FERRET Francesc C.i.U.
 LOPEZ HENARES José Luis People's Party
 LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO Santiago People's Party
 MARTINEZ Miguel Angel Socialist
 de PUIG Lluís Maria Socialist
 ROMAN Rafael Socialist
 SAINZ GARCIA José Luis People's Party
 SOLE-TURA Jordi Socialist
 VAZQUEZ Narcis United Left

Substitutes

MM. BOLINAGA Imanol Basque Nat.
 BORDERAS Augusto Socialist
 GRAU I BULDU Pere C.i.U.
 Mrs. GUIRADO Ana Socialist
 Mrs. MORENO Carmen Socialist
 MM. OLARTE Lorenzo C. Canarien
 PALACIOS Marcelo Socialist
 RAMIREZ Carlos People's Party
 ROBLES FRAGA José People's Party
 ROBLES OROZCO Gonzalo People's Party
 Mrs. SANCHEZ DE MIGUEL Ana Socialist
 Mr. ZAPATERO Virgilio Socialist

UNITED KINGDOM**Representatives**

MM. ATKINSON David Conservative
 BANKS Tony Labour
 COX Thomas Labour
 Dame Peggy FENNER Conservative
 Lord FINSBERG Conservative
 Mr. HARDY Peter Labour
 Sir John HUNT Conservative
 Sir Russell JOHNSTON SLD
 Lord KIRKHILL Labour
 Mr. LITHERLAND Robert Labour
 Lord NEWALL Conservative
 MM. RATHBONE Tim Conservative
 REDMOND Martin Labour
 Sir Dudley SMITH Conservative
 Sir Keith SPEED Conservative
 Sir Donald THOMPSON Conservative
 MM. THOMPSON John Labour
 WARD John Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ALEXANDER Richard Conservative
 BOWDEN Andrew Conservative
 CUMMINGS John Labour
 CUNLIFFE Lawrence Labour
 DAVIS Terry Labour
 DICKS Terry Conservative
 Earl of DUNDEE Conservative
 Mr. DUNNACHIE Jimmy Labour
 Sir Anthony DURANT Conservative
 Mr. FRY Peter Conservative
 Dr. GODMAN Norman Labour
 Baroness HOOPER Conservative
 MM. HOWELL Ralph Conservative
 HUGHES Roy Labour
 Baroness LOCKWOOD Labour
 Lord MACKIE of BENSHEI SLD
 MM. MARSHALL Jim Labour
 TOWNEND John Conservative

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 29th November 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (Doc. 1382).
5. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1388 and amendments).
6. Address by Mr. Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO.
7. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1388 and amendments).
8. Address by Mr. van Eckelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
9. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: enlargement of WEU: I. Creation of an associate member status; II. Accession of Greece; III. Creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*, Docs. 1390, 1391 and 1392).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 2.30 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The President declared the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Tributes to a former President and to a former member of the Assembly

The President notified the Assembly of the death of Mr. Badini Confalonieri, former President of the Assembly, and of Mr. van der Werff, former member of the Assembly.

The Assembly paid tribute to their memory by observing a minute's silence.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 7 had been ratified by that Assembly.

5. Observers

The President welcomed the observers from Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey and Ukraine.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session

(Doc. 1382)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business.

The draft order of business for the second part of the session was adopted.

8. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 40 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

*Standing Committee**France*

- MM. Briane, Jung and Kaspereit as titular members; MM. Couveinhas and Deniau as alternate members;

Belgium

- Mr. Van der Maelen as a titular member and Mr. Thissen as an alternate member.

*Defence Committee**Belgium*

- Mr. Pécriaux as a titular member and Mr. Van der Maelen as an alternate member;

Spain

- Mr. Lopez Valdivielso as a titular member; MM. Lopez Henares and Sole-Tura as alternate members.

*Political Committee**Belgium*

- Mr. Van der Maelen as an alternate member;

France

- Mr. Vinçon as a titular member and Mr. Boucheron as an alternate member;

Italy

- Mr. Polli as a titular member;

Spain

- Mr. Zapatero as a titular member; Mr. Alvarez, Mrs. Moreno, MM. Olarte and Robles Orozco as alternate members.

*Technological and Aerospace Committee**Luxembourg*

- Mr. Regenwetter as a titular member;

Spain

- Mrs. Guirado and Mr. Palacios as titular members and Mr. Borderas as an alternate member.

*Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration**Italy*

- Mr. Polli as an alternate member;

Luxembourg

- Mr. Dimmer as a titular member and Mrs. Brasseur as an alternate member;

Spain

- Mr. Homs I Ferret and Mrs. Moreno as titular members and Mr. Robles Orozco as an alternate member.

*Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges**Belgium*

- Mr. Van der Maelen as a titular member;

France

- Mr. Mignon as a titular member;

Italy

- Mr. Tabladini as an alternate member;

Luxembourg

- Mrs. Brasseur as a titular member;

Spain

- Mr. Sainz Garcia as a titular member; MM. Grau I Buldu, Ramirez Peri and Mrs. Sanchez de Miguel as alternate members.

*Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations**France*

- Mr. Bonrepaux as a titular member;

Italy

- Mr. Tabladini as a titular member;

Spain

- Mr. Robles Fraga, Mrs. Sanchez de Miguel and Mr. Sainz Garcia as titular members; MM. Grau I Buldu and Ramirez Peri as alternate members.

9. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting

(Presentation of the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1388 and amendments)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur.

**10. Address by Mr. Wörner,
Secretary-General of NATO**

Mr. Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Wörner answered questions put by Mr. Soell, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Lopez Henares, Antretter, De Decker, de Puig, Steiner and Hughes.

**11. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming
NATO summit meeting**

*(Debate on the report of the Political Committee
and vote on the draft recommendation,
Doc. 1388 and amendments)*

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Marshall, Rodrigues, Atkinson and De Decker.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Speakers (points of order) : Lord Finsberg and Mr. Atkinson.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Atkinson and others:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out the words "a possible enlargement of NATO:" and insert the following new text:

"the interest shown by the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and other applicants for membership of the Council of Europe, to join NATO:

(a) give urgent consideration to the enlargement of WEU by accepting Council of Europe member states as full members of WEU;"

Speakers: Mr. Atkinson, Lord Finsberg, MM. Baumel, Stoffelen and Atkinson.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Atkinson and others:

2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out the words "a possible enlargement of NATO:" and insert the following new text:

"the interest shown by the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and other applicants for membership of the Council of Europe, to join NATO:

(a) give urgent consideration as to how a closer relationship between WEU and the member states of the Council of Europe

who have expressed an interest in joining NATO can be achieved;"

Speakers: MM. Atkinson, Lopez Henares (point of order), De Decker, Baumel and Stoffelen.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 547)¹.

**12. Address by Mr. van Eekelen,
Secretary-General of WEU**

Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by Lord Finsberg, MM. Baumel, Hardy, Lopez Henares and Rathbone.

**13. Revision and interpretation of the Rules
of Procedure: enlargement of WEU**

I. Creation of an associate member status

II. Accession of Greece

**III. Creation of an observer status, a permanent
observer or guest member status**

*(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges,
Docs. 1390, 1391 and 1392)*

The report on the creation of an associate member status was presented by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur.

The reports on the accession of Greece and the creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status were presented by Mr. Ferrarini, Rapporteur.

The joint debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen, de Puig and Martinez.

The joint debate was adjourned.

**14. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The President proposed a change in the order of business for the next sitting.

The proposal was agreed to.

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 30th November 1993, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.

1. See page 16.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. <i>Martins</i> (Pinto) Roseta
MM. <i>Ghesquière</i> (Biefnot) <i>Ottenbourgh</i> (Kelchtermans) <i>De Decker</i> (Kempinaire) Pécriaux Sarens Van der Maelen	MM. Agnelli <i>Gottardo</i> (Andreotti) Benvenuti Bosco De Carolis Ferrarini Foschi <i>Guzzetti</i> (Leccisi) <i>Liberatori</i> (Manisco) Mannino Paire <i>Ferrari</i> (Parisi) Pecchioli <i>Tabladini</i> (Polli) <i>Battistuzzi</i> (Rodotà)	Spain MM. <i>Robles Fraga</i> (Alvarez) Cuco Fabra <i>Grau I Buldu</i> (Homs I Ferret) Lopez Henares Lopez Valdivielso Martinez de Puig Roman Sainz Garcia Mrs. <i>Guirado</i> (Sole-Tura) Mr. <i>Zapatero</i> (Vazquez)
France		
MM. Baumel Couveinhes Dumont <i>Ehrmann</i> (Jacquat) Valleix	Luxembourg Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	United Kingdom MM. Atkinson <i>Dunnachie</i> (Banks) <i>Marshall</i> (Cox) Baroness <i>Hooper</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir John Hunt Sir Russell Johnston Lord Kirkhill Mr. Litherland Lord Newall MM. Rathbone <i>Cunliffe</i> (Redmond) Sir Keith Speed Mr. Thompson
Germany		
MM. Antretter <i>Neumann</i> (Mrs. Blunck) Böhm <i>Reimann</i> (Büchler) Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler) MM. <i>Schluckebier</i> (Holtz) <i>Lenzer</i> (Kittelmann) Müller Soell Sprung Steiner Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	Netherlands Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. <i>Tummers</i> (De Hoop Scheffer) Stoffelen	
	Portugal MM. Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal) Machete	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	Netherlands
Mr. Seeuws	MM. Irmer Menzel Meyer zu Bentrup Reddemann von Schmude	MM. Eisma van der Linden van Velzen Verbeek
France		
MM. Alloncle Birraux Boucheron Colombier Galley Geoffroy Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Kaspereit Masseret Schreiner Seitlinger	Italy MM. Colombo Pizzo Tatarella	Portugal MM. Amaral Fernandes Marques
	Luxembourg Mrs. Err	United Kingdom Sir Donald Thompson Mr. Ward

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 547***on WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting***

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced that one of the main aims of the NATO summit meeting to be held on 10th January 1994 is to put an end to the uncertainty over the manner in which the security of Europe will be guaranteed in future decades – a matter of concern both for the nations of the Atlantic Alliance and for the peoples of the countries that have regained their freedom;
- (ii) Stressing the crucial importance for European security of maintaining NATO's credibility as major guarantor of the defence of Europe and of keeping an adequate American military presence on the continent of Europe particularly after the recent announcement by the Russian authorities of a new military doctrine;
- (iii) Disturbed by the differences that have recently emerged between Americans and Europeans on economic matters and world trade and also on questions of security policy and crisis management throughout the world;
- (iv) Convinced of the need to establish a new credible and stable transatlantic partnership based on:
 - (a) an American pillar which leaves no doubt about the importance it still attaches to maintaining peace in Europe and the security of the members of the Atlantic Alliance;
 - (b) a European pillar strengthened by a WEU that has achieved full operational status;
- (v) Convinced that the NATO summit meeting must examine the feasibility of a new allocation of rôles, risks and responsibilities between American and European members;
- (vi) Understanding that all Central and Eastern European countries wish to obtain reliable security guarantees;
- (vii) Convinced nonetheless that the definition of future relations between NATO and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe depends on:
 - (a) defining a priori new goals for the alliance;
 - (b) continuing the evolution towards democracy within the countries concerned;
 - (c) the peaceful settlement of problems of coexistence between the countries concerned, particularly with regard to minorities and border disputes;
 - (d) a closer definition of relations between NATO and a Russia which is still in internal upheaval and must not be placed in a position which it might believe to be a threat to its own security, but without there being any question of Russia being granted a right of inspection in Central Europe;
 - (e) the evolution of policy in Ukraine and the other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and their relations with Russia;
- (viii) Considering therefore that it is too soon to extend to other countries the security guarantees which full membership of NATO implies, but believing that any increase in the threat to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would at the same time constitute a danger for Western Europe;
- (ix) Convinced however that it is necessary initially to use the framework of NACC to strengthen confidence between Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and to examine whether the American proposal for a partnership for peace and the French proposals for developing bilateral relations can contribute to this aim;
- (x) Welcoming NATO's decision to participate if necessary in peace-keeping operations under the mandate of the United Nations and of the CSCE in areas outside the North Atlantic Treaty area and particularly in the conflict in former Yugoslavia;
- (xi) Deploring nevertheless the difficulties encountered in implementing a concerted approach both inside NATO and between NATO and the United Nations on ways and means of interaction between the two organisations, with particular regard to operational command;
- (xii) Recalling the urgency of determining procedures governing interaction between WEU and NATO in peace-keeping matters, in accordance with the Petersberg Declaration,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Present joint proposals to the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 for a new Atlantic partnership on the following basis:

1. In joint defence matters:
 - (a) study attentively, in consultation with representatives of Russia, the significance of recent Russian statements on the use of nuclear weapons and examine their consequences for NATO's defence concept;
 - (b) confirm the commitment of substantial American forces on the continent of Europe as an essential factor of European security and reassurance for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe;
 - (c) confirm the attribution to the United States of supreme command of NATO allied forces;
 - (d) strengthen the process of consultation under Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
 - (e) urge NATO to acknowledge the efforts made by European countries within the framework of WEU to strengthen their defence contributions, specifically:
 - the inauguration of the European Corps;
 - the work of the WEU Planning Cell;
 - the work of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG);
 - the importance of the work undertaken by the WEU Satellite Centre at Torrejón;
2. Within the context of the interest shown by the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and other applicants for membership of the Council of Europe, to join NATO:
 - (a) give urgent consideration as to how a closer relationship between WEU and the member states of the Council of Europe who have expressed an interest in joining NATO can be achieved;
 - (b) encourage all measures likely to strengthen confidence between Russia, Ukraine and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the framework of NACC based on the American proposals for creating a partnership for peace;
 - (c) at the same time intensify WEU's relations with the countries involved in the work of the WEU Forum of Consultation, by seeking to achieve greater cohesion with the work of the European Communities in Central and Eastern Europe;
3. In peace-keeping throughout the world:
 - (a) put the present consensus among the members of the Atlantic Alliance on a sound legal footing;
 - (b) make proposals on ways and means of interaction between NATO, WEU and the United Nations, particularly as regards operational command;
 - (c) reach an agreement with NATO for the latter to make NATO facilities available to WEU, as necessary;
 - (d) promote the formation in the framework of NATO of a special force capable of providing WEU commands and NATO commands with the appropriate means for their tasks;
4. In disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation:

propose a formula for task- and responsibility-sharing between WEU and NATO based on the past experience of the two organisations.

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: enlargement of WEU: I. Creation of an associate member status; II. Accession of Greece; III. Creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status (*Vote on the draft decisions*, Doc. 1390 and amendments, 1391 and 1392).
2. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1387 and amendments).
3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (*Presentation of the first part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council*, Doc. 1397) ; Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
4. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1387).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: enlargement of WEU

I. Creation of an associate member status

II. Accession of Greece

III. Creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status

(Votes on the draft decisions, Docs. 1390 and amendments, 1391 and 1392)

The joint debate was closed.

Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur, Mr. Thompson, Chairman, and Mr. Ferrarini, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft decision on the creation of an observer member status.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others:

1. At the end of paragraph I.2 of the draft decision, insert "without voting rights in plenary sessions".

Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Lord Finsberg and Mr. Thompson.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others:

2. In paragraph II.2 of the draft decision, leave out "and have" and insert "without".

Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Lord Finsberg and Mr. Thompson.

The amendment was agreed to.

In the absence of a quorum, the Assembly decided to postpone the vote on the amended draft decision on the creation of an associate member status until after the address by Mr. Poos.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft decision on the accession of Greece.

The draft decision was agreed to unanimously. (This decision will be published as No. 9)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft decision on the creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status.

The draft decision was agreed to unanimously. (This decision will be published as No. 10)².

1. See page 22.

2. See page 23.

4. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1387 and amendments)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Wintgens, Rapporteur.

Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Cunliffe and Mrs. Terborg.

Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speaker: Lord Finsberg.

The debate was adjourned.

5. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council

(Presentation of the first part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1397)

Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Poos answered questions put by Mr. Steiner, Sir Russell Johnston, Lord Finsberg and Mr. Valleix.

6. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: enlargement of WEU

I. Creation of an associate member status

(Vote on the amended draft decision, Doc. 1390)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft decision on the creation of an associate member status.

The amended draft decision was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 58 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions; 9 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This decision will be published as No. 11) ¹.

7. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries

(Debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1387 and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speaker: Mr. Antretter.

Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Müller, Rodrigues, Roseta, Ferrarini, Diaconescu (*Observer from Romania*), Kapsis (*Observer from Greece*), Konarski (*Observer from Poland*), Pahor (*Observer from Slovenia*), Mile (*Observer from Hungary*), Sutovski (*Observer from Slovakia*) and Böhm.

The debate was closed.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1 p.m.

1. See page 24.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Bosco De Carolis Ferrarini Foschi <i>Gottardo (Leccisi)</i> <i>Liberatori (Manisco)</i> Mannino Paire <i>Covi (Parisi)</i> Pecchioli <i>Trabacchini (Pizzo)</i> <i>Tabladini (Polli)</i> <i>Fava (Rodotà)</i> <i>Battistuzzi (Tatarella)</i>	Spain MM. Robles Orozco (Alvarez) Cuco Fabra <i>Grau I Buldu</i> <i>(Homs I Ferret)</i> Lopez Henares <i>Robles Fraga</i> <i>(Lopez Valdivielso)</i> Martinez de Puig Roman <i>Ramirez (Sainz Garcia)</i> <i>Zapatero (Sole-Tura)</i> Mrs. <i>Sanchez de Miguel</i> <i>(Vazquez)</i>
France MM. Dumont Valleix		
Germany MM. Antretter <i>Neumann (Mrs. Blunck)</i> Böhm <i>Reimann (Büchler)</i> <i>Schluckebier (Holtz)</i> <i>Lenzer</i> <i>(Meyer zu Bentrup)</i> Müller Soell Sprung Steiner Mrs. Terborg	Luxembourg Mrs. Err Mrs. <i>Brasseur (Goerens)</i> Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	United Kingdom Mr. <i>Dunnachie (Banks)</i> Baroness <i>Hooper</i> <i>(Dame Peggy Fenner)</i> Lord Finsberg Mr. <i>Cunliffe (Hardy)</i> Sir John Hunt Sir Russell Johnston Mr. Litherland Lord Newall MM. Rathbone Redmond Sir Keith Speed MM. Thompson <i>Alexander (Ward)</i>
Italy MM. Agnelli <i>Ferrari (Andreotti)</i> Benvenuti	Netherlands Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. <i>Tummers</i> <i>(De Hoop Scheffer)</i> Stoffelen <i>Dees (Verbeek)</i>	
	Portugal	
Belgium Mr. Van der Maelen	MM. Masseret Schreiner Seitlinger	Netherlands MM. Eisma van der Linden van Velzen
France MM. Alloncle Baumel Birraux Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Galley Geoffroy Gouteyron Jacquat Jeambrun Jung Kaspereit	Germany MM. Büchler Irmer Kittelmann Menzel Reddemann von Schmude Vogel	Portugal MM. Amaral Fernandes Marques Machete
	Italy Mr. Colombo	United Kingdom MM. Atkinson Cox Lord Kirkhill Sir Donald Thompson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the draft decision on the revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a view to the creation of a status of associate member (Doc. 1390)¹:

Ayes	58
Noes	3
Abstentions	0

Ayes

MM. <i>Robles Orozco</i> (Alvarez)	Mr. Ferrarini	Lord Newall
<i>Ferrari</i> (Andreotti)	Lord Finsberg	MM. <i>Covi</i> (Parisi)
Antretter	Mrs. <i>Brasseur</i> (Goerens)	Pecchioli
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman	MM. <i>Schluckebier</i> (Holtz)	Pécriaux
MM. <i>Dunnachie</i> (Banks)	<i>Grau I Buldu</i>	<i>Martins</i> (Pinto)
Benvenuti	(Homs I Ferret)	<i>Trabacchini</i> (Pizzo)
<i>Ghesquière</i> (Biefnot)	Sir John Hunt	<i>Tabladini</i> (Polli)
<i>Neumann</i> (Mrs. Blunck)	Sir Russell Johnston	de Puig
Böhm	MM. <i>De Decker</i>	Rathbone
Bosco	(Kelchtermans)	Roman
Brito	Kempinaire	Roseta
<i>Reimann</i> (Bühler)	Mrs. Lenz-Cornette	Sarens
<i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal)	MM. Litherland	<i>Wintgens</i> (Seeuws)
Cuco	Lopez Henares	<i>Zapatero</i> (Sole-Tura)
De Carolis	<i>Robles Fraga</i>	Sir Keith Speed
<i>Tummers</i>	(Lopez Valdivielso)	MM. Sprung
(De Hoop Scheffer)	Mannino	Steiner
Mrs. Err	Martinez	Stoffelen
Mr. Fabra	<i>Lenzer</i>	Mrs. Terborg
Baroness <i>Hooper</i>	(Meyer zu Bentrup)	MM. Thompson
(Dame Peggy Fenner)	Müller	Valleix
		<i>Alexander</i> (Ward)

Noes

MM. *Cunliffe* (Hardy)
Redmond
Soell

Abstentions

0

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

DECISION 9***on the revision of Rules 1, 9, 15 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure***

The Assembly,

DECIDES

I. To revise Rules 1, 9, 15 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure as follows:

1. *Rule 1*

In paragraph 2, after "Germany: 18", insert "Greece: 7".

2. *Rule 9*

In paragraph 1, leave out "eight" and insert "nine".

3. *Rule 15*

In paragraph 2, after "Belgium", insert "Greece".

4. *Rule 40*

In paragraph 2,

- after "The first and second of the permanent committees shall be composed of", leave out "thirty-four" and insert "thirty-seven";
- after "Germany 5", insert "Greece 3";
- after "The third, fourth, fifth and sixth permanent committees shall be composed of", leave out "twenty-six" and insert "twenty-eight";
- after "Germany 4", insert "Greece 2".

II. To include the changes in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the present decision in the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly the day the accession of the Hellenic Republic comes into force.

DECISION 10***on the creation of a status of permanent observer***

The Assembly,

- (i) In application of its Order 85;
- (ii) Considering that the declaration of member states of Western European Union, made at the forty-sixth meeting of the European Council held in Maastricht on 9th and 10th December 1991, and the declaration on WEU observers, issued at the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers held in Rome on 20th November 1992, led to the Assembly wishing to make the invitation to parliamentary observers from states that have become observers in WEU a permanent arrangement;
- (iii) Noting the creation of the WEU Forum of Consultation and the fact that countries participating in that forum are now permanent interlocutors in WEU,

DECIDES

1. To create a status of "permanent observer" in the WEU Assembly for representatives of observer countries in WEU and countries participating in the WEU Forum of Consultation;
2. To this end, to redraft Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure as follows:
" On the proposal of the Presidential Committee, the Assembly may admit representatives of parliaments of non-member states of WEU as observers. Its decision may be of a permanent nature, in which case observers from the states concerned shall assume the title of 'permanent observers'. These observers shall sit in the chamber but not be entitled to vote. They may speak with the authorisation of the President of the Assembly. "

DECISION 11

*on the revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly
with a view to the creation of a status of associate member*

The Assembly,

DECIDES

- I. To revise the Charter of the Assembly as follows:
 1. After the first paragraph of the preamble, ending " 5th July 1955 " , add a second paragraph as follows:

" In application of the decisions taken by the high contracting parties to the modified Brussels Treaty set out in the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992 and in the 'Document on associate membership of WEU of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey', signed in Rome on 20th November 1992; "
 2. At the end of Article II, add a new paragraph (c) as follows:

" (c) The Assembly shall admit delegations of representatives and substitutes from the parliaments of each associate member state of WEU and grant them prerogatives appropriate to the participation of those states in the activities of WEU without voting rights in plenary sessions. "
 3. Replace paragraph (a) of Article VI by the following text:

" (a) Ministers who are members of the Council, other Ministers of member states and Ministers of associate member states of WEU may be present at all sittings of the Assembly. Ministers of member states may be heard by the Assembly at their own request and ministers of member or associate member states at the Assembly's request. "
 4. Replace the first sentence of paragraph (a) of Article VII by the following sentence:

" The Assembly shall set up a Presidential Committee which shall consist of the President of the Assembly, who shall be Chairman ex officio, his predecessors as long as they remain representatives or substitutes of the Assembly without interruption, the Vice-Presidents, the chairmen of committees and one member appointed by each political group and by each delegation of an associate member state of WEU. "
- II. To revise the Rules of Procedure as follows:
 1. Replace the first sentence of paragraph 1 of Rule 14 on the Presidential Committee by the following sentence:

" The Presidential Committee shall consist of the President of the Assembly, who shall be Chairman ex officio, his predecessors as long as they remain representatives or substitutes of the Assembly without interruption, the Vice-Presidents, the chairmen of committees and one member appointed by each political group and by each delegation of associate member states. "
 2. After paragraph 2 of Rule 15, add a new paragraph 3 as follows:

" 3. Delegations of associate members shall participate without voting rights in the Standing Committee provided for in Rule 15 in accordance with the prerogatives deriving from their status. The number of seats allocated to associate members shall be as follows:

Iceland: 1
Norway: 2
Turkey: 3 "

Renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.
 3. After Rule 16, add a new rule on the status of representatives of associate members of WEU in the Assembly, as follows:

" Associate members

 1. Associate member countries of WEU shall be represented at sessions of the Assembly by a delegation of members from their national parliaments whose number shall be equal to that provided for in Article 26 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, i.e.:

Iceland: 3
Norway: 5
Turkey: 12

These representatives shall be called 'associate members of the WEU Assembly'.

2. The Rules of Procedure of the Assembly shall apply to the delegations of associate member countries of WEU, with the exception of the following rules and paragraphs:

- (a) Paragraph 1 of Rule 6 on the ratification of credentials shall not apply to the representatives of associate member states.
- (b) Rule 10 on the election of the Bureau shall not apply to the representatives of associate member states.
- (c) Rule 21 on the languages of the Assembly shall not apply to the official languages of associate member states.
- (d) Rule 29 on the debate on the annual report of the Council of Western European Union shall not apply to the representatives of associate member states.
- (e) Rules 30 on motions, 31 on amendments, 32 on the right to speak, 33 on procedural motions, 34 on the organisation of debates, paragraph 2 of Rule 35 on methods of voting, 36 on majorities and 42 on procedure in committees shall apply to the representatives of associate member states only in respect of debates in which they participate.
- (f) Paragraph 4 of Rule 35 on methods of voting shall not apply to the representatives of associate member states.
- (g) Rule 48 concerning the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly shall not apply to associate member states.
- (h) By a vote by absolute majority of the representatives of the modified Brussels Treaty powers, the Assembly may suspend immediately the application of some or all of the provisions governing the status of associate member of the Assembly immediately in respect of representatives of states whose actions cease to conform to the general aims laid down in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty."

4. Former Rule 17 becomes Rule 18 and subsequent rules are renumbered accordingly.

5. At the end of Rule 37 on the quorum, add a new paragraph 4 as follows:

"4. In all cases, the quorum shall be calculated in accordance with the number of representatives and substitutes authorised to take part in the vote."

6. In paragraph 2 of Rule 40 on the appointment of committees, insert "Iceland 1, Norway 2, Turkey 4" for the composition of the first and second of the permanent committees and "Iceland 1, Norway 2, Turkey 3" for the composition of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth of the permanent committees.

III. These amendments shall be included in the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Western European Union as soon as the document on associate members of WEU, signed on 20th November 1992, comes into force.

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Aleksandrov, Minister of Defence of Bulgaria.
2. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1387 and amendments*).
3. Political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the development of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1389 and amendments*).
4. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1993 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1399*).
5. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1994 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1383 and Addenda 1 and 2*).
6. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1398 and Addendum*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Aleksandrov, Minister of Defence of Bulgaria

Mr. Aleksandrov, Minister of Defence of Bulgaria, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Aleksandrov answered questions put by MM. Böhm, Hardy and Soell.

4. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1387 and amendments)

Mr. Wintgens, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Wintgens:

1. After paragraph (xiv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Consequently endorsing the Franco-German proposal of 12th November 1993 for creating a status of association with WEU for the parties of the Forum of Consultation which have already reached an agreement of association with the European Union and, when appropriate, for those which will reach such agreement, but regretting that the Ministerial Council of WEU, at its meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, did not adopt this proposal; ”

Speakers: MM. Wintgens and Stoffelen.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Wintgens:

2. Before paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Adopt before the NATO summit meeting a specific proposal to improve qualitatively its relations with its partners in the Forum of Consultation on the basis of the Franco-German proposal of 12th November 1993 so as to be able to start negotiations with the countries concerned in January 1994; ”

Speakers: MM. Wintgens and Stoffelen.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. De Decker and Mr. Ferrarini:

4. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Remind the countries of the European Community of their decision to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;”

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. De Decker and others:

3. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: MM. De Decker, Wintgens and Stoffelen.

Amendment 4 was agreed to.

Amendment 3 was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 548)¹.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Rathbone.

**5. Political relations
between the United Nations
and WEU and their consequences
for the development of WEU**

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1389 and amendments)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Hardy, Mrs. Fischer, MM. Müller, Rodrigues and Roseta.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Soell, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Soell:

1. At the end of paragraph (xviii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add the following words:

“but emphasising nevertheless that in practice the Security Council has introduced, since 1991, the possibility of intervening in

1. See page 30.

internal hostilities when they constitute a threat to the peace and security of other states;”

Speaker: Mr. Soell.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Soell:

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, delete “Make proposals for reforming” and insert “Study in detail the proposals made in the meantime with regard to reforming”.

Speakers: MM. Soell and Stoffelen.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 549)².

**6. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial
organs of Western European Union
for the financial year 1993**

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1399)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman, in place of Mr. Büchler, Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 550)³.

**7. Draft budget of the administrative
expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1994**

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1383 and Addenda 1 and 2)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft budget.

The draft budget was agreed to unanimously.

2. See page 32.

3. See page 34.

8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1398 and Addendum)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.

The motion was agreed to unanimously.

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 1st December 1993, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 5.45 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium

MM. *Ghesquière* (Biefnot)
De Decker
(Kelchtermans)
Kempinaire
Pécriaux
Sarens
Wintgens (Seeuws)

France

Mr. Valleix

Germany

MM. Antretter
Böhm
Mrs. *Fischer* (Bühler)
MM. *Schluckebier* (Holtz)
Lenzer (Meyer
zu Bentrup)
Müller
Soell
Steiner
Reimann (Mrs. Terborg)

Italy

MM. Agnelli
Ferrari (Andreotti)
Benvenuti
Bosco
Ferrarini
Foschi
Tabladini (Polli)
Visibelli (Tatarella)
Trabacchini (Rodotà)

Luxembourg

Mrs. *Brasseur* (Goerens)

Netherlands

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman
MM. *Tummers*
(De Hoop Scheffer)
Stoffelen

Portugal

MM. Brito
Rodrigues (Candal)
Roseta

Spain

MM. *Robles Fraga* (Alvarez)
Cuco
Fabra
Grau I Buldu
(Homs I Ferret)
Lopez Henares
Martinez
de Puig
Roman
Ramirez (Sainz Garcia)
Zapatero (Vazquez)

United Kingdom

MM. *Hughes* (Banks)
Marshall (Cox)
Baroness *Hooper*
(Dame Peggy Fenner)
Mr. Hardy
Sir John Hunt
Mr. *Cunliffe* (Lord Kirkhill)
Lord Newall
MM. Rathbone
Redmond
Sir Keith Speed
Mr. Thompson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium

Mr. Van der Maelen

France

MM. Alloncle
Baumel
Birraux
Boucheron
Colombier
Couveinhes
Dumont
Galley
Geoffroy
Gouteyron
Jacquat
Jeambrun
Jung
Kaspereit
Masseret
Schreiner
Seitlinger

Germany

Mrs. Blunck
Mr. Büchler

MM. Irmer

Kittelmann
Menzel
Reddemann
von Schmude
Sprung
Vogel

Italy

MM. Colombo
De Carolis
Leccisi
Manisco
Mannino
Paire
Parisi
Pecchioli
Pizzo

Luxembourg

Mrs. Err
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette

Netherlands

MM. Eisma
van der Linden
van Velzen
Verbeek

Portugal

MM. Amaral
Fernandes Marques
Machete
Pinto

Spain

MM. Lopez-Valdivielso
Sole-Tura

United Kingdom

Mr. Atkinson
Lord Finsberg
Sir Russell Johnston
Mr. Litherland
Sir Donald Thompson
Mr. Ward

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 548***on WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries***

The Assembly,

- (i) Reiterating its constant commitment to the establishment of a new order of security and stability throughout Europe as attested by the many reports it has prepared on this problem since the fall of the Berlin wall;
- (ii) Recalling in particular its Recommendations 511, 516, 526 and 528;
- (iii) Welcoming the creation of the WEU Forum of Consultation in which nine countries of Central Europe are participating;
- (iv) Noting, nevertheless, that the great majority of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe still consider that they have no firm security guarantees;
- (v) Aware of the risk of division of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into two groups of states, one of which would have the benefit of membership of western institutions, the other remaining outside;
- (vi) Deploring the inadequacy of information provided by the Council on specific co-operation implemented in the framework of the forum and on the political aims it is pursuing in that body;
- (vii) But welcoming the operational co-operation between WEU and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria for implementing the blockade on the Danube;
- (viii) Fearing, nevertheless, that fighting on the territory of former Yugoslavia might spread to neighbouring areas;
- (ix) Dismayed at the refusal of the Greek Government to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
- (x) Disturbed also by the unstable situation in several regions of the CIS and the uncertainty surrounding the foreign policy of Russia;
- (xi) Concerned by the ambiguity of Ukraine's policy, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons and its hesitation about ratifying the START I Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty;
- (xii) Inviting all the Central European countries in the Forum of Consultation to settle their problems of neighbourliness by peaceful means using the good offices of the appropriate European, Atlantic and worldwide institutions for crisis-management and peace-keeping;
- (xiii) Emphasising the importance of the forthcoming NATO summit meeting insofar as it must redefine the transatlantic partnership between allies and also establish a partnership of a new type with the countries taking part in NACC;
- (xiv) Stressing the importance of parallelism between the approach of the European Union and of WEU to the development of their relation with the Central and Eastern European countries after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty;
- (xv) Consequently endorsing the Franco-German proposal of 12th November 1993 for creating a status of association with WEU for the parties of the Forum of Consultation which have already reached an agreement of association with the European Union and, when appropriate, for those which will reach such agreement, but regretting that the Ministerial Council of WEU, at its meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, did not adopt this proposal,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Adopt before the NATO summit meeting a specific proposal to improve qualitatively its relations with its partners in the Forum of Consultation on the basis of the Franco-German proposal of 12th November 1993 so as to be able to start negotiations with the countries concerned in January 1994;
2. Define without delay the nature of its future relations with Austria (taking into account its relations with the Visegrad countries) and with Finland and Sweden (in view of their rôle in the Baltic

region), these countries being candidates for membership of the European Union, offering them means of co-operation corresponding to the specific situation of each one;

3. Study forthwith whether and to what extent circumstances allow Slovenia to be associated with the work of the Forum of Consultation;

4. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions it reaches on the two questions mentioned above;

5. Remind the countries of the European Community of their decision to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

6. Intensify the work of the Forum of Consultation by giving it a specific programme of work including, inter alia, the joint elaboration of risk and threat assessment;

7. Offer the Central European countries which are partners in the Forum of Consultation the possibility of taking part in the work of the Western European Armaments Group and all forms of European armaments co-operation;

8. Determine:

- the areas in which these countries can be associated with the activities of the WEU satellite centre;
- the conditions in which they can take part in meetings of WEU chiefs of staff and the work of the planning cell;

9. Examine what security guarantees it can give Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in face of the risks these countries are running because of the blockade on the Danube and study the possibility of granting them appropriate financial compensation;

10. Intensify its political dialogue with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Albania.

RECOMMENDATION 549***on political relations between the United Nations and WEU
and their consequences for the development of WEU***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that, with the end of the cold war, the East-West confrontation has been replaced by a series of different conflicts of a new type that have broken out in several areas of the world;
- (ii) Considering that it is now crucial to determine whether the United Nations can henceforth become the essential instrument for ensuring the prevention and settlement of conflicts and safeguarding peace in the world;
- (iii) Recalling that the year 1995, which will be the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the United Nations, will be of particular importance for the prospect of reforming the organisation;
- (iv) Recalling the importance of the United Nations and the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council for disarmament and non-proliferation with particular regard to the extension of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in 1995;
- (v) Welcoming the success achieved so far by the opening of the register of conventional arms kept by the United Nations enabling better supervision of exports of armaments at world level;
- (vi) Noting the considerable increase in requests to the United Nations in the last five years for peace-keeping operations;
- (vii) Noting that it lacks adequate financial, organisational, technical, military and political means for the effective conduct of these operations;
- (viii) Concerned at the alarming financial position of the United Nations, due to the late payment of contributions by the majority of the member countries;
- (ix) Noting, on the one hand, the desire of the United Nations to seek greater co-operation with "regional arrangements or agencies" in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter and, on the other hand, the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of WEU in this respect;
- (x) Noting, however, that, contrary to the United Nations, WEU is subjected to parliamentary supervision and, consequently, should consult its Assembly prior to any exchange of views with the United Nations;
- (xi) Recalling that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are based on the right of legitimate self-defence guaranteed by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and not on the provisions of Chapter VIII of that Charter;
- (xii) Consequently, convinced that WEU is an independent organisation, whose decisions are not subject to Security Council authorisation;
- (xiii) Convinced, nevertheless, that the fundamental political interest of WEU is to strengthen the vocation of the United Nations in playing the rôle of primordial instrument for maintaining peace in the world and to submit its activities to the views expressed by the United Nations;
- (xiv) Recalling the Petersberg Declaration, according to which WEU affirmed that it was prepared to support "the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peace-keeping activities, of the United Nations Security Council";
- (xv) Recalling also that the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the maintenance of peace in ex-Yugoslavia and particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina are addressed to "states, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements";
- (xvi) Consequently, dismayed that WEU does not consider it has been called upon to take coercive action on the pretext that the United Nations has made a specific request only to NATO;
- (xvii) Emphasising that any constructive evolution in relations between WEU and the United Nations depends on solving the problems that may arise from the fact that WEU represents the start of a progressive integration of Europe in defence and security matters, whereas the United Nations and its Security Council are based exclusively on the principle of the sovereignty of member states;
- (xviii) Noting, further, that the United Nations is intervening increasingly in the internal affairs of member states, whereas the Charter does not provide sufficient legal bases for doing so, but

emphasising nevertheless that in practice the Security Council has introduced, since 1991, the possibility of intervening in internal hostilities when they constitute a threat to the peace and security of other states;

(xix) Convinced that WEU and the bodies concerned with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union must co-operate and further co-ordinate their activities in preventive diplomacy and crisis-management and, possibly, place their means at the disposal of other regional organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Work out forthwith a new platform of European security interests on the basis of an assessment of the new threats and risks in the world and their consequences;
2. Define WEU's vocation in relation to the United Nations and the specific areas in which it can offer its assistance to the United Nations while retaining its independence;
3. Without waiting for the United Nations to make a specific request to WEU:
 - establish contact with the bodies concerned with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union in order to reach agreement on the areas of joint activity and the sharing of responsibilities in peace-keeping, with particular regard to preventive diplomacy and the consolidation of peace at the end of hostilities;
 - co-ordinate with NATO ways and means of sharing peace-keeping responsibilities between the two organisations;
 - instruct its planning cell to have a report prepared by experts on the requirements and time necessary for implementing coercive measures in former Yugoslavia with particular regard to available resources and necessary personnel;
 - instruct the Torrejón satellite centre to present a report on the capabilities and experience it can offer for peace-keeping, particularly in establishing facts, monitoring and early warning;
 - inform the Assembly of the results of these studies;
4. Study in detail the proposals made in the meantime with regard to reforming the United Nations and its Security Council with a view to strengthening its effectiveness in peace-keeping and improving WEU's participation in the decision-making process in the United Nations;
5. Give a new mandate to the representatives of the member countries of WEU at the United Nations headquarters in New York to hold regular consultations in order to co-ordinate their positions, particularly in the committees and working groups of the United Nations whose activities come within the framework of the responsibilities of WEU.

RECOMMENDATION 550***on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial year 1993***

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that:

- (a) the Council has communicated to the Assembly the budget relating to the transfer of the Secretariat-General from London to Brussels and the budgets of the ministerial organs for the financial year 1993;
- (b) the installation of the Secretariat-General and the Planning Cell in Brussels was accompanied by an increase of eleven in the number of staff of the Secretariat-General and the creation of three grade B posts in the Planning Cell;
- (c) the operating budget of the Planning Cell is included in the budget of the Secretariat-General as Section E;
- (d) the Director of the WEU Planning Cell, unlike the other subsidiary organs, does not have full responsibility for managing the budget of the Cell;
- (e) the Torrejón Satellite Centre is still in the organisational stage and is not fully operational;
- (f) the Director of the Centre has asked for authorisation to enter into multi-annual expenditure commitments to complete this organisational stage;
- (g) the study of financing the pension scheme for permanent staff has not yet been completed;
- (h) the affiliation of permanent staff of the Paris organs with the French social security system is proving very expensive, whereas the OECD has already adopted a private sickness insurance scheme that costs far less and the study conducted by the Council of Europe on the subject at first sight confirms the interest of this private insurance scheme;
- (i) furthermore, such a private insurance scheme has been adopted by the Secretariat-General for staff in Brussels as it had done for staff in London,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Inform the Assembly of any subsequent changes in the organograms of the WEU ministerial organs;
2. Ask the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee to examine, in the framework of its responsibilities and as it did for the ministerial organs, the changes to the organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly proposed in the 1994 budget;
3. Consider the expediency of separating the budget of the Planning Cell from that of the Secretariat-General and make its Director responsible for managing it;
4. Take every possible step to make the Torrejón Satellite Centre fully operational and, in this context, authorise the Director of the Centre to enter into multi-annual expenditure commitments where necessary;
5. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions of the study of the financing of the pension scheme;
6. Study the possibility of adopting a private sickness insurance scheme for WEU staff in Paris as it did for staff in Brussels.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 1st December 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. An operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation – Part One: Adriatic operations (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1396*).
2. Lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1395 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

A candidate had been proposed for the post of Vice-President, namely Mr. van der Linden.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. van der Linden was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

4. An operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation – Part One: Adriatic operations

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1396)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Sir Keith Speed, joint Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Hardy, Agnelli and Lord Newall.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Marten, joint Rapporteur, and Mr. Baumel, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 551)¹.

5. Lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1395 and amendments)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Hardy, Mrs. Fischer, MM. De Hoop Scheffer, Cuco, Tummers, Vacaru (*Observer from Romania*), Lopez Henares, Mrs. Bakogianni (*Observer from Greece*), MM. Pahor (*Observer from Slovenia*), Litherland, Brito, Philipov (*Observer from Bulgaria*), Agnelli, Lord Finsberg and Lord Mackie of Benshie.

The debate was closed.

Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur, and Mr. Baumel, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman:

1. In paragraph (*viii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “seemingly hurried”.

Speakers: Mr. Pécriaux (*point of order*), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. De Decker and Sir Russell Johnston.

The amendment was negatived.

¹. See page 38.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Pécriaux and others:

3. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 5.

Speakers: Mr. Pécriaux, Lord Finsberg and Sir Russell Johnston.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Ferrarini and Mr. De Decker:

2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in the period prior to its accession to WEU" and insert "in the framework of a wider agreement intended to reduce the tension in that region".

Speaker: Mr. Ferrarini.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares and others:

4. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add: "with the express decla-

ration by all concerned to renounce any expansionist policies and respect existing borders;"

Speaker: Mr. Lopez Henares.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 552)¹.

Speaker (point of order): Lord Finsberg.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.

1. See page 39.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Benvenuti Bosco <i>Caccia</i> (Colombo) Ferrarini Foschi <i>Liberatori</i> (Manisco) <i>Rubner</i> (Mannino) <i>Fava</i> (Parisi) <i>Tabladini</i> (Polli) <i>Trabacchini</i> (Rodotà) <i>Visibelli</i> (Tatarella)	MM. <i>Robles Orozco</i> (Fabra) <i>Grau I Buldu</i> (Homs I Ferret) Lopez Henares <i>Robles Fraga</i> (Lopez Valdivielso) Martinez de Puig Roman Sainz Garcia <i>Borderas</i> (Sole-Tura) <i>Zapatero</i> (Vazquez)
MM. <i>Ghesquière</i> (Biefnot) Kelchtermans Kempinaire Péciaux Sarens <i>De Decker</i> (Seeuws)		
France	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
MM. Baumel Geoffroy Kaspereit Valleix	Mrs. Err	MM. <i>Dunnachie</i> (Banks) <i>Cummings</i> (Cox) Baroness <i>Hooper</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Lord Finsberg MM. Hardy <i>Dicks</i> (Sir John Hunt) Sir Russell Johnston MM. <i>Cunliffe</i> (Lord Kirkhill) Litherland Lord Newall MM. Rathbone Redmond Sir Keith Speed Sir Donald Thompson MM. Thompson Ward
Germany	Netherlands	
MM. Böhm <i>Reimann</i> (Büchler) Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler) MM. <i>Schluckebier</i> (Holtz) Meyer zu Bentrup Müller Reddemann Soell <i>Marten</i> (Sprung) Steiner Mrs. Terborg Mr. <i>Zierer</i> (Vogel)	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. De Hoop Scheffer van der Linden Stoffelen <i>Tummers</i> (van Velzen) <i>Eversdijk</i> (Verbeek)	
	Portugal	
	MM. Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal)	
Italy	Spain	
MM. Agnelli <i>Ferrari</i> (Andreotti)	MM. <i>Ramirez</i> (Alvarez) Cuco	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	Luxembourg
Mr. Van der Maelen	Mr. Antretter Mrs. Blunck MM. Irmer Kittelmann Menzel von Schmude	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
France	Italy	Netherlands
MM. Alloncle Birraux Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Dumont Galley Gouteyron Jacquat Jeambrun Jung Masseret Schreiner Seitlinger	MM. De Carolis Leccisi Paire Pecchioli Pizzo	Mr. Eisma
		Portugal
		MM. Amaral Fernandes Marques Machete Pinto Roseta
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Atkinson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 551***on an operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation –
Part One: Adriatic operations***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the meeting of the WEU Council on 22nd November 1993 and the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 provide excellent opportunities to establish WEU's position as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Conscious of the efforts made by WEU and NATO to ensure a coherent arrangement for naval and maritime air operations in the Adriatic;
- (iii) Welcoming the Atlantic Alliance's willingness to accommodate a WEU presence in the previously NATO-dedicated headquarters in Naples;
- (iv) Much appreciating NATO's readiness to make its infrastructure available to WEU, at least on an ad hoc basis;
- (v) Regretting the WEU Council's failure to agree an appropriate budget for WEU's participation in operation Sharp Guard,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Actively prepare and promote WEU's position as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, and make this explicit at the forthcoming NATO summit meeting;
2. Negotiate a formal agreement with the North Atlantic Council for WEU's use of NATO infrastructure as appropriate for specific operations;
3. Urgently make available an adequate working budget for the WEU element on the staff of COMNAVSOUTH in Naples and for the WEU CONMARFOR at sea in the Adriatic;
4. Review its lines of communication with those involved under the aegis of WEU in the command and control of specific operations, notably in the Adriatic area and restructure links between itself and such subsidiary bodies, giving clear mandates and specific terms of reference to all concerned;
5. Ensure that the rôles of the Planning Cell, of the WEU Military Delegates and the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff in relation to those involved in operations on behalf of WEU are clarified, redefining tasks and responsibilities as a matter of priority;
6. Encourage member states to support Adriatic operations in all ways possible and publicise the achievements of operation Sharp Guard;
7. Pay tribute to the thousands of men and women from WEU and other alliance nations taking part in operations in the Adriatic area who, both at sea and ashore, are carrying out an almost thankless task, often in trying and frustrating conditions and ensure that such breaches of the embargo as are continuing elsewhere receive additional attention so that the efforts of the sailors of the allied nations are rendered worthwhile;
8. Explore, with the other member states of the WEU Forum of Consultation with maritime assets, the possibility of such assets being made available in support of operations in the Adriatic.

RECOMMENDATION 552***on lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that all the efforts of the international community to solve the conflict in former Yugoslavia have failed;
- (ii) Noting that the conflict in former Yugoslavia has shown clearly that in future there will be no possibility for EC member states to act independently in matters concerning peace and stability on the European continent;
- (iii) Convinced that Europe will have to develop an independent capability to act in defence of its own specific security interests, while recognising the continuing vital contribution of the United States to European defence;
- (iv) Considering that the EC, having realised that it had to give up its original mistaken objective of keeping former Yugoslavia together in a federative structure, has not yet managed to identify a clear political strategy towards the Balkans;
- (v) Noting that similarly international organisations such as NATO, the CSCE, the United Nations and even powerful countries like the United States have been unable to identify a clear and effective political strategy towards the Balkans;
- (vi) Noting that a peace agreement coming to grips with all conflicts in the region is the only viable way to deal with the dissolution of former Yugoslavia;
- (vii) Noting that in conflict-prevention apart from diplomatic and economic action, consideration must also be given to the possibility of preventive military presence through the deployment of peace-keeping forces;
- (viii) Considering that the seemingly hurried restructuring of armed forces in WEU member states in recent years may have to be reviewed in the light of Europe's inability to provide forces for long-term peace-keeping operations in its area of responsibility;
- (ix) Recognising at the same time that political will is naturally the first requirement for any operation involving military forces;
- (x) Noting that any peace agreement for the region must include rigorous provision for arms control, the reduction of armed forces and adequate enforcement provisions;
- (xi) Considering that the EC's regrettable difficulty in identifying its aims clearly has caused much fatal hesitation and many changes in its policy towards the conflict in former Yugoslavia;
- (xii) Noting that foreign and security policy are of little avail if they are not complemented by a defence policy;
- (xiii) Noting with satisfaction the creation of the Eurocorps and stressing the need for a European rapid action force;
- (xiv) Noting that, within Europe, recognition of new states requires a new approach which includes due appraisal of its security and the nature of the collective commitment to its integrity;
- (xv) Noting that recognition of a new state cannot be an end in itself and that the new state's ability to meet the criteria for recognition and the responsibilities resulting from this recognition must consequently be examined in depth;
- (xvi) Noting that the problems created by large movements of refugees clearly show that it is in the interests of European countries to have an agreed reception policy and, more important, to find a means of averting the conflicts which cause such movements,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Consider the establishment of a European rapid action force to which the member countries of WEU should make commitments including greater integration of training and equipment;
2. Implement the chapter of the Maastricht Treaty concerned with the joint foreign and security policy of the European Union as soon as possible, determine the rôle of WEU and set out terms for better integration of the foreign and defence policies of Europe;

3. Further develop the military contingency planning capability of the WEU Planning Cell, while at the same time including the widening of its intelligence access and powers of initiation;
4. Clearly identify threats to Europe's security and suggest preventive action at diplomatic, economic and military levels in part to provide practical assistance to the transition process in new democracies in order to avoid a reversion to past policies;
5. Emphasise to Greece the interest of its recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the framework of a wider agreement intended to reduce the tension in that region with the express declaration by all concerned to renounce any expansionist policies and respect existing borders;
6. Re-examine the respective tasks and rôles of the United States and its European allies in the maintenance of peace and security on the European continent and take the appropriate measures to ensure that under no circumstances will it be possible for a security vacuum to develop for lack of appropriate preparation, co-operation and co-ordination;
7. Provide the UNPROFOR command with the ways and means it is seeking to ensure compliance with all the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;
8. Suggest to the appropriate authorities that they should intensify low-level flights over Bosnia, particularly Sarajevo, as an effective deterrent to the repeated shelling of the civilian population, which results in daily slaughter.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 1st December 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>1. The European corps (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1400 and amendments</i>).</p> <p>2. Parliaments, military service laws and public opinion (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee</i></p> | <p><i>for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1386).</i></p> <p>3. Address by Mr. Juppé, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.</p> |
|---|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. The European corps

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1400 and amendments)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. Zierer, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Steiner, van der Linden, Thompson, Caccia, Eisma and Borderas.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Zierer, Rapporteur, and Mr. Baumel, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Amendments (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4) were tabled by Mr. Zierer:

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "European corps", leave out "while no such formal agreement has yet been concluded with WEU".

2. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Noting the existence of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for the use of the European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard, although no details have been released;"

3. After paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Aware of the recent Italian initiative envisaging a multinational ground force intended to enhance the operational significance of the abovementioned tripartite air and naval force;"

4. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Communicate to the Assembly the text of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for the use of the European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard and the text of the report on relations between WEU and forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);"

Speaker: Mr. Zierer.

Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 were agreed to unanimously.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 553)¹.

4. Statement by the President

The President replied to Mr. Rathbone's point of order raised in the ninth sitting of this session.

1. See page 44.

**5. Parliaments, military service laws
and public opinion**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and
vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1386)*

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Roman.

The debate was closed.

Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur, and Mr. Tummers, Chairman, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 92)¹.

The sitting was suspended at 4.30 p.m. and resumed at 5.35 p.m.

**6. Address by Mr. Juppé,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of France**

Mr. Juppé, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Juppé answered questions put by MM. Lopez Henares, Soell, Sole-Tura, De Hoop Scheffer, Lord Finsberg, MM. van der Linden and Ferrari.

**7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 2nd December 1993, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.

1. See page 46.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Benvenuti <i>Ferrari (Bosco)</i> <i>Caccia (Colombo)</i> Ferrarini Foschi <i>Gottardo (Leccisi)</i>	Spain
MM. <i>Ghesquière (Biefnot)</i> Kelchtermans		MM. <i>Ramirez (Alvarez)</i> Cuco Fabra <i>Grau I Buldu</i> (Homs I Ferret) Lopez Henares Lopez Valadivielso Martinez de Puig Roman Sainz Garcia Sole-Tura <i>Zapatero (Vazquez)</i>
France	Netherlands	
MM. Baumel <i>Hunault (Couveinhes)</i> Dumont	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. De Hoop Scheffer Eisma van der Linden Stoffelen <i>Tummers (van Velzen)</i> <i>Eversdijk (Verbeek)</i>	United Kingdom
Mrs. <i>Durrieu (Jeambrun)</i> Mr. Valleix		Mr. <i>Alexander (Atkinson)</i> Dame Peggy Fenner Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir John Hunt Sir Russell Johnston Lord Newall MM. Redmond <i>Dicks (Sir Dudley Smith)</i> Sir Donald Thompson MM. Thompson Ward
Germany	Portugal	
Mr. <i>Reimann (Büchler)</i> Mrs. <i>Fischer (Bühler)</i> MM. Meyer zu Bentrup Reddemann Soell Steiner <i>Zierer (Vogel)</i>	MM. Brito <i>Rodrigues (Candal)</i> Mrs. <i>Aguiar (Machete)</i> Mr. Roseta	
Italy		
MM. Agnelli <i>Rubner (Andreotti)</i>		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	MM. Rodotà Tatarella
MM. Kempinaire Pécriaux Sarens Seeuws Van der Maelen	Mr. Antretter Mrs. Blunck MM. Böhm Holtz Irmer Kittelmann Menzel Müller von Schmude Sprung Mrs. Terborg	Luxembourg
France	Italy	Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
MM. Alloncle Birraux Boucheron Colombier Galley Geoffroy Gouteyron Jacquat Jung Kaspereit Masseret Schreiner Seitlinger	MM. De Carolis Manisco Mannino Paire Parisi Pecchioli Pizzo Polli	Portugal
		MM. Amaral Fernandes Marques Pinto
		United Kingdom
		MM. Banks Cox Lord Kirkhill MM. Litherland Rathbone Sir Keith Speed

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 553***on the European corps***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the recent inauguration of the Strasbourg headquarters of the European corps;
- (ii) Aware that the European corps will not be able to carry out its three missions in full until the constitutional restrictions on the deployment of German troops outside national territory have been lifted;
- (iii) Noting that, in January 1993, the French and German Chiefs-of-Staff concluded an agreement with SACEUR on the use and tasks of the European corps;
- (iv) Noting the existence of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for the use of the European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard, although no details have been released;
- (v) Welcoming Spain's decision and Luxembourg's intention to join the European corps and noting that both Italy and the Netherlands have shown their interest in developments;
- (vi) Noting that Poland has made it known that it would like to be associated with the European corps;
- (vii) Considering that, for practical reasons, only a small number of different national forces could actively participate in an army corps, and that, as a consequence, more than one European corps may have to be established if more nations wish to contribute troops;
- (viii) Recognising the importance of the French-Italian-Spanish initiative to contribute to a pre-planned, ad-hoc, joint European air and naval force which would have an air and ground force deployment capability, ready to respond to WEU requirements and complementary to their deployment within the framework of NATO;
- (ix) Aware of the recent Italian initiative envisaging a multinational ground force intended to enhance the operational significance of the abovementioned tripartite air and naval force;
- (x) Noting the urgent need for a full list of forces answerable to WEU;
- (xi) Noting the success of the joint military exercise Ardente 93 in October 1993, a good example of an exercise designed to prepare for the missions which will be assigned to WEU;
- (xii) Aware that, as confirmed at the EC's extraordinary summit meeting on 29th October 1993, Western European Union will have to implement the various provisions embodied in the Maastricht Treaty and the annexed statements of WEU member states;
- (xiii) Stressing the need for WEU, as the European Union's defence organisation and as the European pillar of NATO, to have full operational status in order to be effective;
- (xiv) Convinced that the concept of "separable but not separate forces", which would enable WEU to act with the backing of NATO assets and infrastructure in the event of the United States not wishing to participate in a given mission, is the only reasonable and feasible solution to accommodate Europe's new security requirements;
- (xv) Noting that a new balance must be established in the Atlantic Alliance so that Europe will be able to assume a greater share of responsibilities for security in Europe and beyond;
- (xvi) Stressing the need to maintain the defence budgets of WEU member states at an adequate level in order to ensure the maintenance of meaningful European military capabilities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Provide itself with the means of action and draw up guidelines for any operation under WEU responsibility by concluding agreements with member states and NATO regarding the European corps and other forces which could be placed at WEU's disposal;
2. Urgently establish a full list of forces from member states which could be placed at WEU's disposal;

3. Communicate to the Assembly the text of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for the use of the European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard and the text of the report on relations between WEU and forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
4. Promote the early establishment of a European air and naval force in the southern area, enabling Europe to deploy military forces rapidly in that region in case of emergency;
5. Seek any solution allowing links between WEU and SACEUR to be strengthened;
6. In co-operation with NATO, agree on a joint staff concept in order to ensure a proper command structure in the event of specific WEU operations;
7. Provide the material means and necessary guidelines for the effective functioning of all WEU bodies which have been established to implement the Maastricht Treaty for WEU to become, in co-operation with NATO, the instrument of European security policy;
8. Enhance military co-operation with its partners in the Forum of Consultation in order to extend security towards Central Europe.

RESOLUTION 92***on parliaments, military service laws and public opinion***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendations 469, 534 and 535 in which the Council is asked:
- (a) to take steps to give practical expression to the European pillar of defence, in particular by encouraging the creation of multinational units, and to take action to allow, at an individual level, the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation and to serve as a useful recruiting incentive for their armed forces;
 - (b) to take every opportunity to ensure that the debate on reserve forces and national service benefits from the common fund of experience and requirements, to stimulate informed debate in member countries on revised rôles for reserve forces, as well as reductions in and possible restructuring of national service, and to invite WEU parliamentarians to participate in discussions on these topics;
 - (c) to ask the ministries of defence of member states to organise the dissemination of appropriate information regarding military matters to all parliamentarians and especially those who have no service background;
- (ii) Recalling Resolution 90 inviting the parliaments of member countries to encourage the participation of members of the WEU Assembly in activities dealing with European security and defence policy;
- (iii) Noting that reforms are being conducted in the member countries of WEU with the aim of reducing the duration of national service, changing its form or terminating it outright and that substantial reductions in the strengths of the armed forces are being made;
- (iv) Aware of the need to reform the armed forces in order to prepare them for the geostrategic conditions of the post-cold war era and the new tasks being assigned to them in the framework of multi-lateral operations by WEU, NATO and the United Nations;
- (v) Convinced of the importance of reinforcing the link between citizens and the armed forces with a view to achieving an integrated European defence capable of playing its full rôle as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and as the operational component of the European Union;
- (vi) Stressing the need to keep public opinion informed of what the reform of national service and the structure of the armed forces implies for the defence of Europe,

INVITES THE PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES

1. To hold debates on the reform of national service as appropriate and the structure of the armed forces, taking into account national requirements and also the overall requirements of European defence with due consideration for the reforms being conducted in member countries;
2. Taking into account the information drawn from debates in 1954, to encourage their defence and foreign affairs committees to co-operate with the defence and foreign affairs committees of the parliaments of other member countries of WEU, associate members and observers with a view to examining the present requirements of integrated European defence and, as necessary, the possibility of organising a European civil and military service;
3. To examine the harmonisation of legislation in member countries governing national service and the status of military personnel in order to reduce present differences and foster the exchange of personnel and the formation of European multinational military units;
4. To encourage the participation of parliamentarians, particularly those who are members of the WEU Assembly, in activities for informing the public about what the defence of Europe means and the need to pool defence efforts, resorting to the greatest possible extent to radio and televised means of communication;
5. To keep the WEU Assembly informed of their deliberations in this domain.

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 2nd December 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the consequences for Europe (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Doc. 1394 and amendments*).
2. Address by Mr. Zlenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.
3. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the consequences for Europe (*Debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1394 and amendments*).
4. The development of a European space-based observation system, Part II (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1393*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 40 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of the Standing Committee for Spain:

- MM. Cuco and Lopez Valdivielso as titular members and Mr. Zapatero as an alternate member.

4. Revision of Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure

(Motion for a decision tabled by Mr. Cuco and others, Doc. 1405)

The President informed the Assembly that a motion for a decision to revise Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure had been tabled by Mr. Cuco and others.

This motion would be referred to the Presidential Committee.

5. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and its consequences for Europe

(Presentation of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Doc. 1394 and amendments)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Lord Dundee, Rapporteur.

6. Address by Mr. Zlenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Mr. Zlenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Zlenko answered questions put by Mr. Borderas, Sir Donald Thompson, Lord Finsberg, MM. Lopez Henares, Alexander, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Eisma, Soell, De Carolis, Lord Dundee and Mr. Valleix.

7. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the consequences for Europe

(Debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1394 and amendments)

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Lopez Henares.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Lord Dundee:

1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (ix) and insert:

“ Welcoming the recent ratification of the START I Treaty by the Parliament of Ukraine ”.

Speakers: Lord Dundee, Mr. Lopez Henares.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Lord Dundee:

2. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, and insert:

“ Call upon Ukraine and Kazakhstan to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty ”.

Speakers: Lord Dundee, Mr. Lopez Henares.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Lord Dundee:

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ within the context of Cocom rules ” and insert “ to promote transparency in the transfer of equipment for civilian and military use ”.

Speakers: Lord Dundee, Mr. Lopez Henares.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 554)¹.

8. The development of a European space-based observation system, Part II

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1393)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Lopez Henares.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 555)².

9. Close of the session

The President declared the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

The sitting was closed at 12 noon.

1. See page 50.

2. See page 51.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Ferrari</i> (Colombo)	Spain
MM. Kelchtermans	De Carolis	MM. <i>Ramirez</i> (Alvarez)
<i>De Decker</i> (Kempinaire)	Foschi	Cuco
	<i>Caccia</i> (Leccisi)	Fabra
	<i>Gottardo</i> (Parisi)	Lopez Henares
	Pizzo	Martinez
France	<i>Tabladini</i> (Polli)	de Puig
MM. Dumont	<i>Trabacchini</i> (Rodotà)	Roman
Kaspereit	<i>Visibelli</i> (Tatarella)	Sainz Garcia
Valleix		Sole-Tura
	Netherlands	
	MM. De Hoop Scheffer	United Kingdom
Germany	Eisma	Earl of <i>Dundee</i> (Atkinson)
Mr. <i>Neumann</i> (Antretter)	van der Linden	MM. <i>Cummings</i> (Banks)
<i>Reimann</i> (Büchler)	Stoffelen	<i>Alexander</i> (Cox)
Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Bühler)	<i>Eversdijk</i> (van Velzen)	Dame Peggy Fenner
Mr. Soell		Lord Finsberg
Mrs. Terborg		Mr. Hardy
	Portugal	Sir John Hunt
	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Amaral)	Sir Russell Johnston
Italy	MM. Brito	Lord Newall
MM. Agnelli	<i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal)	MM. Rathbone
<i>Rubner</i> (Andreotti)	Roseta	<i>Dicks</i> (Sir Dudley Smith)
Benvenuti		Sir Donald Thompson
		MM. Thompson
		Ward

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Biefnot	Mrs. Blunck	Mrs. Err
Pécriaux	MM. Böhm	Mr. Goerens
Sarens	Holtz	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
Seeuws	Irmer	
Van der Maelen	Kittelmann	Netherlands
	Menzel	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman
France	Meyer zu Bentrup	Mr. Verbeek
MM. Alloncle	Müller	
Baumel	Reddemann	Portugal
Birraux	von Schmude	MM. Fernandes
Boucheron	Sprung	Machete
Colombier	Steiner	Pinto
Couveinhes	Vogel	
Galley		Spain
Geoffroy	Italy	MM. Homs I Ferret
Gouteyron	MM. Bosco	Lopez Valdivielso
Jacquat	Ferrarini	Vazquez
Jeambrun	Manisco	
Jung	Mannino	United Kingdom
Masseret	Paire	Lord Kirkhill
Schreiner	Pecchioli	MM. Litherland
Seitlinger		Redmond
		Sir Keith Speed

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 554***on the evolution of advanced technology in
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
and the consequences for Europe***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the process of change now taking place in the republics of the CIS, in particular in the economic, industrial and technological sectors;
- (ii) Noting that, while some problems have already been solved, a great many difficulties still remain;
- (iii) Noting that stability inside these countries depends largely on bringing up to date industrial and commercial structures and adapting them to the criteria of a market economy;
- (iv) Noting the particular importance of help from the West with advanced technology in CIS countries;
- (v) Taking into account the variety of initiatives which have proved to be successful and those other international programmes now being carried out or planned;
- (vi) Believing it is possible and desirable to improve and develop western assistance and co-operation in all these areas;
- (vii) Noting a number of further ways in which these areas can benefit from the West;
- (viii) Noting the obvious mutual advantages which arise between the West and CIS countries over advanced technology;
- (ix) Welcoming the recent ratification of the START I Treaty by the parliament of Ukraine;
- (x) Noting that Kazakhstan and Ukraine have not yet acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ask member governments to strengthen further their contacts with the member states of the CIS. This should be done not only at bilateral and multilateral level but also at regional and plant level where direct guidance can be given;
2. Urge the creation of a European data centre. At present, initiatives and endeavours often overlap and, even when they do not, the exchange of information is not as well-managed as it should be;
3. Encourage co-operation with the republics of the CIS in advanced technology to promote transparency in the transfer of equipment for civilian and military use;
4. Call upon Ukraine and Kazakhstan to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty;
5. Invite member governments to give their full backing to the International Centre for Science and Technology. It would be short-sighted to do otherwise, since the aim of this body is to prevent the growth of technologies of widespread destruction.

RECOMMENDATION 555***on the development of a European space-based observation system – Part II***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the inauguration of the Torrejón satellite centre and the start of the experimental stage of its activities;
- (ii) Considering, nevertheless, that this is a first step towards the final goal of implementing a European space-based observation system which would contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security;
- (iii) Satisfied that the memorandum of understanding between WEU and the French, Italian and Spanish Governments has been signed concerning the supply of Helios space images to the satellite centre;
- (iv) Welcoming the work done by the industrial consortium, i.e. the feasibility studies of the main system and the follow-up and analysis of this work achieved by the study management team;
- (v) Regretting that the Council has not taken into account Recommendation 523 of the Assembly with particular regard to the invitation to inform the Assembly regularly:
 - “ (a) about each stage of the entry into service of the satellite centre, its organogram and the progress of the feasibility studies;
 - (b) about criteria governing the choice of space industries to equip the centre and establish the observation system; ”
- (vi) Regretting that the software used for the equipment of the centre is not of European origin, that, furthermore, it is difficult to obtain more sophisticated versions of the software that would allow operational activities and, finally, that this software is not suitable for receiving Helios images;
- (vii) Believing, moreover, that the feasibility study confirms that the system is viable and corresponds to the specifications given;
- (viii) Strongly regretting that the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space, at its meeting on 27th October 1993, objected to the budgetary provisions regarding the activities of the study management team and of the industrial consortium in 1994;
- (ix) Believing that this decision in fact runs counter to the pursuit of the work of the team and of the consortium;
- (x) Considering further that co-operation in space matters with the CIS countries can be of very great interest for the two parties concerned and offer reciprocal advantages;
- (xi) Taking account of the fact that the aim of this co-operation would be to seek to use the technical and human resources of these countries for peaceful and preventive purposes;
- (xii) Considering that the European Space Agency has shown that it was prepared to provide technical assistance for WEU's programmes and activities in the framework of co-operation between the two organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Inform the Assembly of the criteria leading to its choice of equipment for the Torrejón satellite centre;
2. Keep the Assembly informed of the steps it expects to take to ensure compatibility between the software now in service with that to be introduced, in particular when the Helios system is operational;
3. Take appropriate decisions to avoid the slowing-down or paralysis of activities planned in 1994 for the study management team and the industrial consortium;
4. Foster co-operation with the CIS countries in space matters to the advantage of the parties concerned with the main aim of using for peaceful and preventive purposes the technical and human resources of these countries;
5. Contact the European Space Agency without delay in order to promote close co-operation between the two organisations in space matters.



II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 29th November 1993

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Tributes to a former President and to a former member of the Assembly.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Observers.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (Doc. 1382).
8. Changes in the membership of committees.
9. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting (*Presentation of the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1388 and amendments).
Speaker: Mr. Baumel (Rapporteur).
10. Address by Mr. Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO.
Replies by Mr. Wörner to questions put by: Mr. Soell, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Antretter, Mr. De Decker, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Hughes.
11. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting (*Debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1388 and amendments).
Speakers: Mr. Marshall, Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Baumel (Rapporteur), Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. Atkinson (points of order); Mr. Atkinson, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Lopez Henares (point of order), Mr. De Decker, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Stoffelen.
12. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
Replies by Mr. van Eekelen to questions put by: Lord Finsberg, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Rathbone.
13. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: enlargement of WEU: I. Creation of an associate member status; II. Accession of Greece; III. Creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*, Docs. 1390, 1391 and 1392).
Speakers: Lord Finsberg (Rapporteur), Mr. Ferrarini (Rapporteur), Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Martinez.
14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 2.30 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union which was adjourned on 17th June 1993 at the end of the sixth sitting.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

1. See page 15.

3. Tributes to a former President and to a former member of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – Before we begin our proceedings this afternoon, I have to inform the Assembly of the death on 3rd August 1993 of a distinguished former President of this Assembly, Mr. Badini Confalonieri.

Mr. Confalonieri was born in 1914 in Turin, and was a lawyer by profession. He was elected a Deputy in the first parliament of the Italian Republic, and subsequently held ministerial office in Italy.

He was a member of this Assembly from 1955 until 1972, and was its President from 1959 to 1960 and again from 1966 to 1969.

It is also my sad duty to inform the Assembly of the death of our former well-regarded colleague from the Netherlands, Mr. van der Werff,

The President (continued)

who was a member of this Assembly from 1972 to 1974 and again from 1981 to 1989.

I invite the Assembly to stand and to observe a moment's silence in memory of Mr. Confalonieri and Mr. van der Werff.

(Members of the Assembly stood and observed a minute's silence)

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of new representatives and substitutes nominated since the Assembly last met. Their names are appended to Notice No. 7.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and are attested by a statement of ratification which has been communicated to the President.

I welcome our new colleagues to the session.

5. Observers

The PRESIDENT. – I should like to welcome parliamentary observers from a large number of countries who have done us the honour of coming to follow our proceedings this week. They are from Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey and Ukraine.

May I wish a warm welcome to all of them, and also to members of the Permanent Council who are present at this part-session.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – Ladies and gentlemen, having given a warm welcome to those present, especially for the first time, and to the observers, whose numbers seem to be increasing all the time, may I say that we are particularly pleased to see observers from Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Slovenia and the Ukraine here because it is their first visit.

I also give a special welcome to our good friend Manfred Wörner, the Secretary-General of NATO, who will be addressing us as the keynote speaker later this afternoon.

We stand at a critical moment in the history of the transatlantic partnership. WEU's ministerial meeting last Monday in Luxembourg and this week's plenary session of the Assembly

present us with a unique opportunity, as Europeans, to decide what direction we would like NATO to take now and for the future. That future should be decided during the NATO summit scheduled for Monday 10th January in Brussels, and we shall hear a lot more about that in due course.

Our recommendations will be based on the report which Jacques Baumel, Chairman of the Defence Committee and Rapporteur for the Political Committee, will present to you in just a moment.

Before that, however, I should like to set the future perspective in a current context by giving you a short report on the events of the past few months, as seen from our headquarters here in Paris.

When you were kind enough to elect me last June I promised that I would be an active President and would do my best, with your help, to make sure that our voice is heard where it matters. To start the process I nailed my colours firmly to the mast in a policy speech in Brussels on 5th October and I am glad to report that that speech has been quoted to me extensively during subsequent meetings at the highest level, both in member and non-member countries.

I gave myself two immediate priorities: to work at developing contacts with the countries which are members of the WEU Forum of Consultation and to establish better, more sensible relations with our Permanent Council.

I am delighted to say that, with regard to the latter, the Council has made a number of efforts to take the Assembly's views into account, notably by inviting me for a stimulating exchange of views in early September and holding a very useful round-table discussion with our Defence and Political Committees in October. I should like to thank our indefatigable Secretary-General, Willem van Eekelen, for all his help. With his name I should like to couple that of Ambassador Roger Linster, the representative of our presidential country, Luxembourg, on the Permanent Council.

Luxembourg has been especially active in the first half of its presidency of WEU and it was a particular pleasure to pay an official visit to the Grand Duchy in October. I shall return to the subject tomorrow when welcoming our Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, to the Assembly. For the moment suffice it to say that Luxembourg is playing a major part in helping to guide WEU into its new rôle and is making a determined effort both to consult the Assembly and also keep us up-to-date with developments.

For example, the Luxembourg declaration issued last Monday and the discussions held by Mr. Poos with the Presidential, Defence and Political Committees on Tuesday were models

The President (continued)

of their kind and we are very pleased to have the associated documents concerning Adriatic and Danube operations and planning for the administration of Mostar. We are still less than happy, however, that the Council's annual report, the statutory instrument of the modified Brussels Treaty, should reach us far too late to be taken into account.

While on the subject of official visits, I must mention two in particular: to Hungary and to Romania. My combined aim in accepting invitations to Budapest and Bucharest was further to develop our links with two key countries of Central Europe and also to give encouragement to those representatives of WEU countries who are helping apply the United Nations embargo on the Danube.

It was for a similar reason – to express appreciation of their efforts – that, in October, accompanied by the Chairman of the Defence Committee, Jacques Baumel, I helicoptered out to the ships taking part in the Adriatic operations and visited the NATO-WEU headquarters in Naples to meet those involved. Those operations are described in a report to be presented by Günter Marten and Keith Speed on Wednesday morning.

The terrible saga of Bosnia continues and you have, of course, the opportunity to express your own thoughts on the subject here, especially during the debate on Sir Russell Johnston's remarkable report, which is scheduled for Wednesday morning. Even as I speak, the latest attempt to arrange a lasting solution for Bosnia is being negotiated in Geneva. Mr. Poos has promised to report on any developments when he addresses us tomorrow, after flying in from Geneva.

Meanwhile you will see from one of the documents that the Chairman-in-Office made available to us last week that WEU and its Planning Cell have been busy at the Council of European Union's behest in preparing plans for a possible administration of Mostar.

I must report an initiative that I made in the name of the Assembly concerning Sarajevo at the beginning of the month. On 4th November, I received an all-party delegation from the Bosnian Parliament who asked me to intercede on their behalf at the highest level to obtain an increase in low flying by NATO aircraft over Sarajevo. They told me that such flights had a deterrent effect on the daily artillery bombardments which inexorably claim more lives each and every day.

On 5th November at the inauguration of the European corps in Strasbourg, I brought the matter to the personal attention of the Secretary-General of NATO and the new SACEUR,

General George Joulwan, and also mentioned it to the French Minister of Defence, Mr. François Léotard. I have since written to the British Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Malcolm Rifkind.

This may appear to some as a mere drop in the ocean of troubles which beset Bosnia, but I hope you will agree that one cannot ignore such a *cri de cœur*, particularly when it comes from a politician, and anything which saves even one life is worth every effort being made to implement some plan. Hence the need, to my mind, to continue to provide humanitarian aid in the war-torn areas of former Yugoslavia, to try to rebuild confidence as well as attending to the physical needs, especially as winter has come early to the region. Whatever its merits or demerits, the United Nations embargo has been applied effectively at sea and on the Danube. It is this last theatre of operations which has caught my eye in particular, and no doubt yours, too.

It is WEU which has proved a pioneer here, in co-operation with three of our consultation partners. The memoranda of understanding signed between WEU and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, are the first steps towards a new and lasting relationship between WEU and the members of the Forum of Consultation. We have to build on this experience – an action which speaks louder than words and which the three countries concerned have been applying, often at considerable detriment to their own economic and political situations.

It is for this reason that I publicly welcomed French Foreign Minister Juppé and German Foreign Minister Kinkel's initiative in Poland on 12th November to develop a status within WEU for those countries of Central Europe which have or are about to have association agreements with the European Community. I am glad to say that the subject was included on the agenda for last Monday's ministerial meeting in Luxembourg and is now being actively discussed. Mr. Juppé will of course be addressing us on Wednesday afternoon and will, I hope, be elaborating on his proposals.

Tomorrow's debate on Mr. Wintgens's comprehensive report presents an opportunity to debate the issue and, I trust, to send a clear message on the subject to our ministers. In addition, I have convened a meeting of the Assembly's Standing Committee for next Thursday afternoon and invited the parliamentary observers from all the Forum countries to take part. Together we will examine effective ways for progress in the relationship.

Closer to home, as well as considering budgetary matters, where we hope there may be something of a breakthrough in a slight loosening in 1994 of the financial iron grip that the Council has imposed on the Assembly in past

The President (continued)

years, we shall be updating members with regard to the European corps and the development of a European space-based observation system.

With regard to that latter report, at the beginning of November I was accompanied by the Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, José Luis Lopez Henares, the Rapporteur, Jean Valleix, and members of the committee to Torrejón near Madrid to visit the WEU satellite centre. I should like to say a special thank-you to the centre's director, Barry Blaydes, and congratulate him and his staff, as well as the Spanish authorities, with the guidance of the Council's space group, on making the centre operational in record time.

In summary therefore, I hope you will agree that the presidential activity that I have described has been worthwhile. Some people regard such attempts to show the flag as at best unnecessary and at the worst indulgent, but I would hope that the results speak for themselves.

WEU's parliamentary Assembly, its President, its committees and its rapporteurs must be active, even hyperactive, to ensure political supervision of the future shape of European security and defence now that Maastricht is ratified and the European Union is almost a month old.

I thank all members of the Assembly for your support and especially our new Clerk, Henri Burgelin, and his team, whose enthusiastic and unswerving loyalty I have greatly appreciated in these first six months.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session

(Doc. 1382)

The PRESIDENT. – We now turn to the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly.

Is there any opposition to the draft order of business contained in Document 1382?

The draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly is agreed to.

We have a particularly full programme of business for this part-session. I therefore propose to the Assembly, in accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, that in all our debates there should be a time-limit of five minutes for each speaker, apart from the chairmen and rapporteurs of committees.

May I remind you that, in accordance with the same rule, this proposal must be decided by the Assembly without debate.

Is there any objection?

The time-limit is agreed to.

At this point I should mention that I do not propose to include any observers in the list of speakers for our procedural debate, this afternoon and tomorrow morning, on the reports from Lord Finsberg and Mr. Ferrarini. This debate is concerned with the rules of the Assembly and it is therefore not so appropriate for non-members to take part.

In the rest of our debates, however, as I have already indicated, our distinguished observers will be most welcome to take part, subject to the same five-minute time-limit as members of the Assembly.

May I also make a request to members of the Assembly which will help to ensure that our proceedings this week run smoothly? It would be a great help if any members who wish to ask for a roll-call vote at the end of a debate could warn the presidency in advance, either by talking to the clerks or by getting a message to us. In debates in which I have not had advance notice of a request for a roll-call vote, I do not propose to call attention to the possibility of a vote on each occasion. I have no intention of gagging anyone but if people feel strongly, they should let us know and there will be a roll-call vote.

8. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 40(6) of the Rules of Procedure I invite the Assembly to agree to the proposed changes in membership of committees contained in Notice No. 7, which has already been distributed.

Is there any opposition?

The changes are agreed to.

9. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting

(Presentation of the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1388 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Baumel of the report of the Political Committee on WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting, Document 1388, and debate. The debate will be resumed, and the Assembly will vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1388 and amendments after the address by the Secretary-General of NATO.

I call Mr. Baumel to present his report.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the treaty on European Union and the Maastricht and

Mr. Baumel (continued)

Petersberg declarations have had the welcome effect of updating the rôle of WEU. However, the difficulties involved in implementing the treaty have by no means been surmounted. The development of a European defence organisation in the context of WEU, as the Maastricht Treaty provides, has since then been delayed both by the slowness of the ratification processes and by the continuing uncertainty over the future development of NATO. The forthcoming NATO summit meeting is expected to end these uncertainties by defining: new guidelines for NATO; its relations with the former Warsaw Pact countries; a new European defence policy to face the threats that might re-emerge; the means of political and military action that NATO can place at the disposal of a policy to maintain or restore peace in Europe.

It is clear today that this very ambitious approach to the forthcoming summit meeting is faced with problems and calls for a number of cautious reservations. It is also clear that, after it, WEU will have to take the necessary steps to enable Europe to act in fields where NATO does not entirely meet its security requirements. As from now, however, Europeans must consult together in preparation for the NATO summit meeting, clarifying their views to the greatest possible extent and adopting common positions on their security requirements. This is why the Assembly, with the encouragement of the WEU Council, decided to include the present report, recognised by all in view of the date as of topical importance, among its orders of the day, the object being to ensure that WEU should appear not merely as an organisation enabling Europe to achieve what others have been unable or unwilling to achieve, as has so far been the case, but as the unmistakable voice of Europe in its own field, that is as a real pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and a real European defence organisation intent on playing a political rôle tailored to Europe's capabilities and security requirements.

The European members of the alliance all agree that the American military presence in Europe is an essential factor of stability and peace on the European continent, and will remain so for many years to come, being the only effective and credible defence organisation there is and having proved its merits for a period of over thirty years. The question now is: will the western structures that made it possible to safeguard peace in Europe and the security and freedom of the nations united in the Atlantic Alliance be capable of providing a similarly reassuring response tomorrow to the new challenges to European security and Atlantic solidarity which have arisen since the end of the East-West confrontation? There are many reasons for concern in this respect.

What therefore is at stake? The optimistic vision of a new world order based on the rule of law, which we thought was established after the Gulf war, has gradually faded away. On the contrary, the multiplication of regional conflicts and centres of crisis in a number of countries, which could affect the stability and security of neighbouring countries and also of an international community incapable of controlling them, faces us with the question of whether the world is not moving increasingly towards disorder and instability. The tragic example of Bosnia suggests it might well be. The inability of the European and United States governments to agree even on limited lines of action aimed at restoring peace to this region is the main reason for the failure of the United Nations, the CSCE, the Twelve, NATO and WEU to bring hostilities to a halt.

It would be most unfair to hold these various international bodies responsible since their weakness is due not to them but to the reluctance of their member governments to get involved and to affirm their political will. This situation, therefore, could well affect the mutual trust between Europe and the United States, since some people wonder whether the vacillating position of the United States in the Yugoslav crisis, sometimes changing from one week to the next, is not a tangible sign of how committed they really are to security in Europe insofar as the threat that a regional conflict would pose for Europe would not automatically be seen as a threat to the United States.

It is obvious to everyone today that the United States has its eyes not only on Europe but also on other vast regions of the world. The recent Seattle meeting provided ample evidence that America, justifiably, has to take an interest in the North Pacific and the future of Asia.

We need therefore to concern ourselves very seriously about the part that Europeans themselves should take in the defence of their continent. It is for this reason that the rôle of WEU should be restated on the eve of the NATO summit meeting, particularly since, if we want to sum up the problems to be discussed there, we must try to set down the vital questions we need to raise in Brussels next January.

For example, there are some priorities in the objectives which the European side should present.

First, our preferred order of importance is obviously as follows. While the restatement of the importance of the transatlantic link is an unquestionable priority, support for the defence and security dimensions of the European Union is its necessary complement. Next there is the formulation of principles for adapting the alliance to these new tasks, since it is a fact that the traditional NATO of the last ten or fifteen

Mr. Baumel (continued)

years is no longer as suited as it once was to meeting specific NATO requirements. New tasks have to be assigned to NATO and their inevitable effect will be to require a review of its operational doctrine and the reorganisation of its structures; ways and means will have to be explored of developing relations with new European partners, that is those of the East, a subject to which I shall return. Lastly, NATO has a new mission, namely the problems of disarmament and non-proliferation.

The forthcoming summit meeting should proclaim unreserved support for the security and defence dimensions of the European Union. It should launch changes to the operation of the alliance designed to enable the European allies to achieve better co-ordination among themselves, and also enabling WEU to use certain NATO resources if, as some people like to claim, WEU is to avoid playing a doubling-up rôle and duplicating existing structures which have already proved their effectiveness in the past.

On the other hand, given the way problems are developing in the East, the reaffirmation of a form of Russian sovereignty which has for some weeks now been restating the long-standing traditional interests of Russia and the warnings reaching us from Moscow, I do not feel we should consider the enlargement of the alliance to be an immediate priority.

The recent United States partnership for peace proposal would seem a sound basis for tackling these problems from now on. It represents a step forward and would certainly enable WEU to play a greater rôle in the rapprochement with the eastern countries.

I must also point out that in this area there are a number of new departures that should be examined with special attention.

In the documents I was given there is a new American concept, presented by Mr. Aspin at a conference held in Travemünde, namely that of a combined joint task force for peace-keeping purposes. In this proposal subordinate commands would be asked to designate a commander and a number of officers on their general staffs in advance to act as permanent emergency headquarters. In the event of a crisis, these headquarters would be activated and detached from the subordinate commands to carry out operations of a type considered necessary by the NATO authorities. This is a new and original concept for us to think about particularly from the European point of view.

These ideas need to be made clearer since nowhere is it said, although this may be an omission, that WEU as such could call upon the resources already created in this way or to come from NATO. We should therefore try to obtain

clear replies from the NATO authorities, before or during the summit. In any case, it is very unlikely that the meeting will reach decisions on so fine and critical a point. It is more likely to opt for a study of future solutions on the basis of these proposals.

We ought, however, to try to get replies on the following points. Will WEU be entitled to call upon this formation which, according to Mr. Aspin, would be reactivated only for operations deemed necessary by the NATO authorities and for circumstances not covered by Article 5? What would be the political conditions for activating these forces? Would the procedure be consultation with the United States or the Atlantic Council? Would the United States have the right of veto or not? Would the forces be assigned to both WEU and NATO? What would the military conditions be? Would United States personnel be kept or not on the pre-designated command structures? What would the nationality of the commanders seconded to the alliance's joint forces be? Would an indefinite right of inspection apply to each corps and senior command?

These are questions it would be best to raise in advance, since getting replies will be difficult and take time.

As regards problems with the East, I should like to revert to a few basic questions. The recent proposal for a partnership to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe might perhaps satisfy, or at least partly calm the anxieties of Russia, but it will inevitably increase doubts among the Central and Eastern European countries.

Even if there are no legal obligations, and even if it could be a stabilising factor in Central and Eastern Europe, any enlargement of NATO, whether it were limited to the Visegrad countries, or included others, or even went so far as to include the successor countries of the former Soviet Union, would seem to present a number of drawbacks. For the time being, it seems wiser to postpone any enlargement of NATO pending more favourable circumstances, particularly since this should enable WEU to play a more active rôle thanks to its Forum of Consultation and because of the opportunity it would offer of accommodating some of these eastern countries in search of security and stability in various forms of association.

As regards NATO, we should also consider the relations that NATO could have with the United Nations from the WEU viewpoint. Indeed I feel that one of the major objectives of the forthcoming NATO summit meeting should be to clarify NATO's position vis-à-vis the United Nations, with a view to strengthening, not weakening, NATO's authority. This raises a problem since, as you well know, our American partners

Mr. Baumel (continued)

are not keen on action under United Nations responsibility, preferring for their part to send their armed forces on peace-keeping missions only if their vital interests are at stake and if the missions are under the direction of NATO or a coalition of the type formed for the operation in Iraq.

The more broadly NATO is prepared to extend its field of action, the easier it should be for NATO to make its structures available to WEU. Firstly, this would avoid the build-up of conflicting structures and even the duplication of missions. Secondly, NATO might also take advantage of the instruments that WEU has under the modified Brussels Treaty to give the necessary political direction to peace-keeping operations.

The integrated military commands of the past, to which so many members have referred, can function validly today only if all the NATO member countries take part in the operations assigned to them. Yet there is no certainty that this will always be the case in peace-keeping or peace-making operations which are not necessarily covered in the Washington Treaty.

I shall conclude – rapidly in order not to abuse your patience – by trying to define the positions which we should defend at the forthcoming NATO summit meeting, first, with a view to achieving more harmony in relations between these two important organisations and second, in order to improve transparency and solidarity. It is very important for public opinion in our countries, given the disarray in which so many European nations are struggling, and the deep-rooted crisis threatening the very foundations of our society, that effective co-operation, with due respect for the legitimate interests of both organisations, should become established. This is the aim towards which we should strive, without any spirit of partisanship, and spurred only by one objective: efficiency. This, I believe, is what we could and should put forward not only for the forthcoming summit meeting but also for the development of a really European architecture of security and peace.

**10. Address by Mr. Wörner,
Secretary-General of NATO**

The PRESIDENT. – There are four speakers for this debate, but I ask them to hold their horses for the moment because I know that we all wish to hear our main guest this afternoon, Mr. Manfred Wörner, the Secretary-General of NATO. Before I introduce him, may I say that he has very kindly agreed to answer questions. If representatives indicate to the platform that they wish to ask questions, we will put them on the list.

Manfred Wörner needs little introduction because he is known to many of you personally. Suffice it to say that he is universally appreciated as the main architect of NATO's new strategy and he is certainly fully committed to refining that and putting it forward at the forthcoming NATO summit.

Manfred Wörner has always held open the door at NATO in Brussels for WEU and he has always had a soft spot for WEU, having once been associated with it. With our Secretary-General he has been instrumental in developing the complementarity between our two organisations.

Secretary-General Wörner, may I tell you that your audience today is composed of parliamentarians from all over Europe and they are in the hemicycle and in the gallery upstairs. I have rarely seen the gallery so crowded. You are the star attraction, as you well know, although you are a very modest man and would never admit it. May I ask you, please to take the floor.

Mr. WÖRNER (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – Mr. President, Excellencies and distinguished members of parliament. First, may I thank you for your kind exaggerations in respect of my introduction. It is an honour for me to be able to address such a distinguished audience and it is a special pleasure to do so after the excellent report of my dear friend, Jacques Baumel. I will try to give you an idea about the forthcoming summit and especially how I think it will handle and develop the relations between NATO and WEU. As you said, and as you mentioned in your introductory remarks, Mr. President, this is a crucial moment which both you and ourselves cannot afford to miss.

The cold war was an abnormal state of affairs, but an excellent compass.

Today, our security environment is no longer dominated by the cold war. That does not mean that we are entirely free to choose, but more than ever before, the degree of our security will be the direct result of our actions or non-actions. Regarding the transatlantic relationship, this means that it will largely be what we want to make it.

The outside pressure disappeared and, to a certain extent, that forced us together. We must decide what we deliberately intend to do with it.

It would be folly to assume that the transatlantic relationship could continue unaffected by the end of the cold war. But it is up to us to determine how much these changes matter in the end. We must therefore seize the opportunity provided by the ratification of the Maasticht Treaty and the NATO summit next January to forge a new transatlantic bargain.

What could such a transatlantic bargain look like? Basically, I see two essential elements: first,

Mr. Wörner (continued)

the Atlantic Alliance must continue to act as the primary forum for consultation to respond to new security challenges. Second, we Europeans must show more willingness to take security responsibilities in those crises which affect first and foremost European interests.

I believe that both parts of this bargain are within our reach. We have made substantial progress. Both NATO and WEU have already proven their relevance for the security and stability in the new Europe. In ex-Yugoslavia, for the first time in its history, NATO has acted outside the territory of its member states, in support of a peace-keeping mission and under a direct mandate from the United Nations, without having turned into an offensive alliance. That is the only wording in the report of Mr. Baumel that I would object to.

The North Atlantic Co-operation Council, in the two years of its existence, has steadily broadened its basis for projecting stability into Central and Eastern Europe, most recently by making peace-keeping a major part of its work.

WEU has also entered a new phase in its evolution through its rôle in enforcing the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube.

Only a month ago WEU participated in the first meeting of our ad hoc planning co-ordination group alongside representatives of the United Nations, UNPROFOR, and the EC presidency.

Eurocorps has been made available to both NATO and WEU in a way satisfactory to both organisations.

WEU's Forum of Consultation has provided an additional layer of dialogue with countries in Central and Eastern Europe, complementing our efforts in the NACC and those of the CSCE.

Indeed, the relationship with the CSCE is another issue which we have to address. Mr. Wim van Eekelen and I will fly to Rome late this afternoon or tomorrow morning to speak there.

But, let us be frank. Ex-Yugoslavia reminds us that such a new security order is still, alas, a very distant goal. Our organisations will have to act on the lessons of this terrible conflict and resolve to do better. To my mind there are eight particularly important lessons to be learnt, some of which are obvious.

The first lesson is that crisis-prevention is always preferable to crisis-management. The preventive deployment in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia is a good example of anticipating a crisis instead of reacting only after it has erupted. We should also do more to

respond to the situation in Kosovo; in other words, that might be the next hot spot.

Second, political solutions and diplomatic efforts, important as they are – we all know that some of those conflicts can only finally be dealt with politically and one has to find a political solution – will only work if backed by the necessary military power and the credible resolve to use it against an aggressor.

Third, if you cannot or do not want to help the victim of aggression, enable him to help himself.

Fourth, we need to have limited military options for limited political or diplomatic objectives. It is wrong to think only in categories of all or nothing.

Fifth, threaten only if you are determined to implement the threat.

Sixth, define the strategic objectives of your actions as early and as clearly as possible.

Seventh, avoid situations in which your own troops become hostages.

Finally, the most important lesson is, of course, that no international organisation can work efficiently without the political will and unity of its member nations. This is true as much for the United Nations as for the European Union, WEU or NATO.

If we observe these lessons, we can help prevent future Yugoslavias. We can then effectively move towards what one could call a new security order, even more so since our institutions have considerable potential which has yet to be fully realised. With the ratification of the treaty of Maastricht, the stage is now set for a common foreign and security policy of the European Union. The rôle of WEU as the bridge between NATO and the European Union is thus all the more highlighted by this important event.

Our forthcoming NATO summit should take the necessary decisions to give clear guidance for our co-operation. The summit will also serve as an important opportunity further to enhance the development of a European security and defence identity and to reaffirm the transatlantic link. This summit, to which WEU will undoubtedly make its distinct contribution – as you have just started to do – will be central, not only in laying the groundwork for the future relationship between our organisations, but also in defining a new transatlantic bargain between equal partners.

At the core of our efforts lies the question of how to rebalance the alliance so that Europe assumes a greater share of responsibility for security in Europe and beyond. It is essential that on both sides of the Atlantic a greater

Mr. Wörner (continued)

European rôle is not regarded as a threat but as a precondition of NATO's longer-term vitality. There, we have an opportunity. Why? WEU has an important rôle to play in this regard, and I see it as one of our greatest accomplishments that we have established a close working relationship between our organisations.

I want all those who participated to know that we are grateful for that. That is true, especially, of my friend Mr. Wim van Eekelen. We are working to improve it further. In the long run our overall objective is to develop structures which allow us to work efficiently together but which also enable the forces of the European allies to operate under WEU auspices when it is agreed that NATO should not be involved. That is essentially one of the messages that Jacques Baumel gave us. So what do we do now? We have to create practical, operationally sound arrangements in that respect. For example, we are looking at the concept of combined joint task forces for peace-keeping and other contingency operations. This concept would provide the alliance with mobile, multinational, tri-service headquarters, which could be detached from existing command structures for operations under WEU auspices. It could therefore meet the alliance's new crisis-management requirements and provide the basis for separable but not separate forces to accommodate the needs of the emerging European security and defence identity. A competing military structure in Western Europe is neither necessary nor possible. No one can afford such duplication in times of shrinking defence budgets. It could only be built up at the expense of existing structures. I believe that this view is now widely accepted.

It should be said that the concept of combined joint task forces is yet another indication of the flexibility of our integrated military structure. Events of the past year have clearly demonstrated how well this structure can adapt to the changing security environment. I firmly believe that, given the scope and complexity of operations required in former Yugoslavia, effective multinational involvement would have been even more difficult without NATO and its integrated structure. Moreover, the unity of command and control which it secures, its responsiveness to a changing political and military situation, and its visible demonstration of allied solidarity, make NATO's integrated structure an indispensable element of our security, regardless of new arrangements outside or within it.

That integrated military structure could also serve the variable geometry of nations participating in crisis-management or peace-keeping exercises. It is not necessary for all sixty member

countries to participate in an operation to prove the necessity for such an integrated structure. We can see that in former Yugoslavia and in other places. The more complicated the military operation becomes, the more essential is an integrated structure.

Some weeks ago I spoke to the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, about the possible implementation of a peace plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He openly and bluntly said: "The United Nations cannot do the job. You have to do it." All the detailed peace plans are drawn up by NATO, but they are so complicated that they could not be run without an integrated structure.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). – Again, it must be quite clear that the central institution where decisions affecting the security of our member states are taken is still NATO. This is not an artificial requirement. Quite simply it is logic which dictates this line of action, particularly as the operational forces I have just mentioned must always be made up of elements at the disposal of NATO. Obviously, joint decisions by WEU will find an increasing presence in consultations within the alliance. At the same time, these decisions will have to be flexible and open to discussion and of such a nature that they can be changed in accordance with our mutual interest in security. If the policy of *fait accompli* were to be given priority over negotiation and compromise, we could well be endangering the transatlantic links. Something which, in the short run, might appear to be an assertion of European identity would ultimately turn out to be only what it really was, namely a manifestation of Europe acting against its own interests; then we will have joint decisions taken by Europeans under European law. I can only welcome such a development. These will not be set but flexible decisions which it will be possible to discuss and modify.

Furthermore, it would be an illusion to believe that the challenges to security can be classified neatly under the two headings "American" and "European". Each side's rôle can vary according to the kind of crisis and the interests involved but essentially action will be taken jointly in all cases.

Our experience in Yugoslavia is a typical example. It has highlighted the scale of the challenges which crisis-management can now throw out and has made it clear that leadership and responsibility must be shared when European security is involved. So, Europe and North America still depend on each other and this shared dependence must be given concrete expression in our security arrangements. What matters is to organise our military structures so that they can adapt to the new "variable

Mr. Wörner (continued)

geometry" of crisis-management. This also implies a future contribution from countries which are not members of NATO, for example, through the North Atlantic Co-operation Council.

At the moment we are seeking new ways of enabling our partners to work better with the member states of NATO in a whole range of peace-keeping and crisis-management missions. For example, in their recent proposal called "partnership for peace" the United States envisages a network of bilateral arrangements between all partners in co-operation and the alliance. This is an American initiative but it will become an initiative of the whole alliance. We are now discussing it in preparation for the summit.

This proposal which has been favourably received by the alliance and by all member states is not a substitute for accession. It will be offered to all the co-operating partners and possibly to other interested European states. The degree of co-operation would, however, depend to a large extent on the partner countries themselves and would be determined by their individual needs. The result would be a whole network of flexible co-operative links within Europe itself and across the Atlantic, with nobody being excluded or isolated.

As regards links between NATO and WEU, what is needed in particular is: to define more fully the practical structural imperatives for a "separable but not separate" formula; to strengthen the links between the WEU Planning Cell and SHAPE; to define WEU's requirements so that they can be taken into account in NATO force planning; lastly, to arrive at compatible decisions on the future enlargement of our two organisations.

In my view this is very important. As some member countries of the European Free Trade Association will no doubt be joining European Union in the near future and since the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are anxious to strengthen their links with our organisations, both NATO and WEU will have to work out a political strategy to take account of these new requirements. There is no absolute need for us both to follow the same line of action but the strategies must be compatible. That is why they must be discussed with harmonisation as the goal. I believe that it is our historic duty to open our institutions to new members. Their place is in Europe and they must be firmly anchored to European structures. This is also an unprecedented opportunity to strengthen the community of democracies. In whatever we do, however, we must be aware of what is implied for each of our organisations. We must, of course, proceed in such a way that we do not

divide Europe but create a complete, enlarged and undivided Europe.

(The speaker continued in English)

Ladies and gentlemen, I said in the beginning that the cold war has forced a certain discipline on us. We knew that much was at stake and we proceeded carefully so as not to weaken transatlantic relations.

There are some who believe that in a post-cold war world a loosening of our transatlantic ties would no longer make much of a difference. They are wrong. Let us not succumb to these views. The success story of European integration owes much to the transatlantic framework that NATO provides. If we lose sight of this essential interrelationship, if we take a casual approach to our future, we could quickly find ourselves in the worst of all possible worlds: without a sound transatlantic relationship and without a dynamic European integration process. This would be damaging not only for Western Europe and North America. It would also gravely affect the political and economic transition of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, countries which urgently look for links to the political, economic and military institutions of the West for security and stability. There are delegations from such countries in this room. We cannot afford to disappoint them so we must be careful with transatlantic relations. We have to be careful not to damage but to develop them.

The transatlantic relationship is the most stable geopolitical asset on this globe. It brings together the world's two principal centres of democracy. They are also the two regions with the greatest global outreach and sense of global responsibility. How could we hope to achieve a more stable world or a more stable pan-Europe in the absence of their strategic co-operation? Lasting links require institutional anchoring beyond economic interdependence. NATO provides this political and military anchor. In times of increasing economic competition, which is natural, these links assume special relevance.

Finally, how can North America and Europe ever hope to deal with the new challenges, if not in common? For example, the challenges of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction far exceed the capabilities of any single nation and of any single organisation. They must be faced collectively or we will not succeed in facing them at all.

The essential precondition for further successful security co-operation between the Atlantic democracies is a greater European rôle. This is the key to NATO's future. Smooth and pragmatic co-operation between NATO and WEU must be our main objective in the months ahead. It is not only the key to a new transatlantic bargain; it is essential in projecting stability to our partners in Central and Eastern

Mr. Wörner (continued)

Europe and in providing the foundation for security in an undivided Europe. Thank you very much for your attention.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Secretary-General, for that challenging and thought-provoking address. There are a number of questions so, without further ado, I shall ask people to put their short questions.

I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, in the context of the debate that has opened on the report by Mr. Jacques Baumel, I would like to ask you whether you agree with me that during the present transitional phase, it is less important to look at formal headings such as association with NATO or association with WEU than to realise that the question of the security of the Central and Eastern European states, in the event of a serious threat, also concerns the security of Western Europe and the transatlantic area and that this should determine the approach of the governments of the NATO and WEU member countries. Do you share this view?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Mr. WÖRNER (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). – Personally, I share your view entirely.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – Secretary-General, you said that we could do better with regard to former Yugoslavia – amen to that. You also said that crisis-prevention was better than crisis-management and, I quote, that Kosovo may be “the next hot spot”. It is certainly the black hole in any pro-Serbian case and the most concerted example of repression of human rights in Europe. Given that, does it make sense to offer the Serbs the removal of sanctions in return for an agreement on Bosnia, leaving no leverage for Kosovo? What advice do you have for us on Kosovo?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Mr. WÖRNER (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – I am grateful for that question, but you put me in a delicate situation. At this very moment during our discussion, foreign ministers of the European Union are starting an attempt to bring about a political solution. Whatever comment I make in public could hamper their efforts, or I would say some meaningless things, which I do not like to do. Let me limit my remarks to one single issue because you started with it – Kosovo. Fortunately, they are now speaking of

suspension, not lifting any more. Secondly – I can only offer my personal opinion – we all know about the situation in Kosovo. There are many reports – objective reports – so I think the restoration of autonomy and of a decent human rights situation there should be one of the conditions for lifting the sanctions, but I will not go further than that. However, I stress again that that is a remark on my personal behalf which does not commit the alliance as such.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I, too, would like to congratulate the Secretary-General on the clarity of his speech.

Secretary-General, in view of your wide experience in NATO and your previous knowledge of defence matters, my question is this: Western European Union is not only a defence organisation, a fact which is often forgotten in that it is also an essential element in the process of European integration. Given the new challenges we are facing and the great changes which have to be made, my question is whether within NATO there is understanding of the fact that from a strategic viewpoint, European integration is absolutely essential in order to achieve more effective defence and greater co-operation between the North American and European sides of the Atlantic. This is the question, because rumours are circulating and there is concern about what is being called the renationalisation of European foreign policy. In conclusion, Secretary-General, I think NATO should see European integration as a vital requirement for our defence.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Mr. WÖRNER (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – This time I need not only answer the question on my personal behalf as a European, but I think that I can give you the answer for the whole of the alliance. There has been a development over the past years, especially in the past year, so that I can answer your question with a clear yes. We understand and we support the rôle of Western European Union, which has a double rôle inside the alliance as a European pillar of the alliance and outside “comme le bras armé de l’Union Européenne”.

I go one step further, as you ask. There is a clear acknowledgment or recognition of the fact that Europe has to move towards political unity. We accept it, and today I can even say that the Americans accept that. They have some concerns. Of course, in the long term that would involve a European defence. We are far from that at this very moment, but then again now we are going very far into the future. I think that it would not destroy the Atlantic Alliance. Of course, in such a situation you would have to

Mr. Wörner (continued)

completely restructure it, but still you would maintain the transatlantic framework.

There is only one thing which I would add. In developing those structures inside the transatlantic framework we should be careful on both sides not to create new suspicions. That means that we should be transparent, and consult on every single move. That is why I stressed in my opening remarks the need, if and when we introduce joint common positions, to do so not in a take it or leave it way but in a way which makes it possible to discuss them and, where necessary, modify them. Otherwise we would go against what I call the spirit or even the substance of transatlantic relations. Of course, we have to ask the same from the other side of the Atlantic, but that can be done. Never before has there been an opportunity as favourable as today.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, the two key concepts of a European security identity and European security interests keep recurring in the area of interaction of the organisations, as they do in your speech and the discussion. Following your interesting speech and several NATO statements, I would like to revert to this question. Various NATO statements have suggested that the development of a European defence identity could strengthen the European alliance. Am I correct in thinking you mean that the member countries of WEU should define their own security interests and put them before the alliance as their own contribution before the next NATO summit meeting?

Let me add another question. How do you evaluate the co-operation of WEU with the Eastern European states and what prospects do you think it offers for a useful division of work between the NATO Co-operation Council and the WEU Forum of Consultation.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Mr. WÖRNER (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). – On the first question, yes, you have understood me correctly. Before the next summit both the alliance as such and each individual member country must define its own interests so that they can be co-ordinated at the summit meeting.

On the second question, I believe that relations between Western European Union and the Central and Eastern European states form a valuable adjunct to the relations we have built up between NATO and these countries in the Co-operation Council. The NATO Co-operation Council is playing a useful part at the moment,

but there is still room for it to do more. Of course the summit will also have to say something about future membership. It will probably only make a statement of principle. But obviously this question will be there in the background.

I know that Western European Union is thinking along the same lines, having as you do the Forum of Consultation. I think that the relations of the Central and Eastern European states with that forum and with Western European Union will help tighten the overall network of relations, that is to say, bring the states of Central and Eastern Europe closer to the European institutions. So I welcome that. I find it helpful. However, we must take care to ensure that the whole process is co-ordinated.

The summit meeting did not take a final decision. We are discussing it in the alliance at this moment. Some people there see the normal procedure as membership of the European Union, followed by membership of Western European Union and then membership of NATO. Others see membership of NATO as quite independent of membership of Western European Union or the European Community. Whatever the case, we should ensure that these initiatives are co-ordinated. That does not mean that we all have to follow the same criteria and proceed at the same speed or in the same form. Association does not exist under NATO. But each of us must know what the other is doing, and that must be part of a long-term strategy, since at this point at least we have the same membership: all the member countries of Western European Union are also members of NATO. So a co-ordinated approach is obviously advisable.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General for being with us and for what you have said, because I remember a time when anybody who spoke of reactivating WEU was regarded as a bad Atlanticist and suspected of wanting to divide the alliance. Your presence here today symbolises the opposite and marks a very important moment in the history of our organisation which, despite the fact that it was at the origin of the Atlantic Alliance because it came into existence one year earlier and made its creation possible has since then been confined to a secondary rôle.

My question leads on from the one put to you by the previous speaker. The Atlantic Alliance summit is due very shortly on 10th January. I have the feeling that, in the face of the insecurity felt by certain Central and Eastern European countries, the Atlantic Alliance and WEU are in competition with each other. On the one hand, we have the American partnership for peace proposal and on the other we have the Franco-German proposal made in Warsaw. It is not very

Mr. De Decker (continued)

clear which option will finally be preferred. I believe that we are living a moment of history and that a window has been opened, particularly in our relations with the European superpower which Russia still is and will continue to be. Two things are necessary if the Atlantic Alliance summit is to succeed: first, the Americans must reaffirm their commitment to European security, as Mr. Baumel suggested in his report, and secondly there must be no beating about the bush on enlargement which you described as the alliance's historic duty or the accession, for example, of the Visegrad and Baltic countries to the Atlantic Alliance.

Any proposals from WEU for resolving this question immediately run up against the problem of European construction and expansion. For its part, the Atlantic Alliance has the security of Europe as its sole concern, rôle and mission. This being so, why should not clear proposals be made on 10th January setting out terms and conditions for the accession of certain Central European countries?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Mr. WÖRNER (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). – Mr. De Decker, personally I agree with much of what you have said, but I have to answer you as Secretary-General of the Atlantic Alliance.

To begin with, no decisions have been taken and we are still at the discussion stage. Faced with all the different national positions of which you are aware, we have to arrive at a consensus. At the moment I can neither predict nor even anticipate what this consensus will be. My personal view is that the summit meeting will have two main features: first a general declaration that the alliance is open without naming any candidates, and secondly, the partnership for peace. I do not think there will be any decision to accept a particular country and even I myself, who firmly believe – and am even totally convinced – that this is a historic task, doubt whether January is the right time to say yes to one country and no to another. Why? We are at a rather critical stage in the development of pan-European or Euro-Atlantic security. It is not a matter of vetoing the Russians, but of taking Russia's fragile internal situation into account. Care must be taken to ensure that Europe as a whole is not divided by any action of either the Atlantic Alliance or WEU. I am personally in favour of managing this process flexibly so as not to prejudice our overall objective, which as always is a new Euro-Atlantic security order. It will take time, but that is why the partnership for peace initiative is, in my view, a constructive and well-designed instrument which will enable the Atlantic Alliance and even WEU to move

closer. This is my personal opinion and even a kind of prediction.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – You are, of course, the Secretary-General of an international organisation, but after the events in Central and Eastern Europe, there was a feeling that NATO's working structures were changing a little with the formation of the famous NACC. There was a belief that NATO was going to concern itself with co-operation while the Central and Eastern European countries thought that the right place was the CSCE.

Do you think that NATO should concern itself with this area in the future? Do you think that it should involve itself more closely in co-operation or rather that it should confine itself to military matters? Do you think for example that it could look at the problem of co-operation in Yugoslavia?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Mr. WÖRNER (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). – The first point is that NATO has never been a purely military organisation. Right from the start it has also been a political organisation. It is my earnest hope that NATO will continue to be a politico-military organisation.

If you take away the alliance's political character you write it off completely. If you take away the military element you also have nothing left. It is much more than a military alliance; it is a community of values and interests, and a partnership.

Consequently our co-operation with the Central and Eastern European countries in NACC, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, is firstly specialised co-operation in areas where the CSCE has little to contribute, particularly in military matters. A look at our work programme shows that 80% of our activities are devoted to co-operation with military structures or are designed to extend the democratic order to the military structures of the new democracies. We can advise them and this is what we do. We are not therefore in competition with the CSCE. We complement its work and will continue to do so.

There is, however, also a political element, by way of consultation, in our co-operation with the Central and Eastern European states. There can be consultation in two places, in both the CSCE and the NACC. Why not? So long as the alliance tries to support the work of the CSCE, to back it up and not to work against it, this is bound to help the CSCE.

Finally, I hope that, just as we strengthened our links with the United Nations last month,

Mr. Wörner (continued)

we shall also strengthen them with the CSCE. I shall say so at its meeting in Rome tomorrow. The NACC and the CSCE should be looked on not as rival, but as complementary, organisations.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, I want to turn to an important passage in your speech where you spoke of the historic duty of gradually taking in new members. By this you meant NATO, but you did not exclude Western European Union. I assume that you meant both.

Mr. WÖRNER (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). – Yes.

Mr. STEINER (*Germany*) (Translation). – On the other hand, you know as well as we do that the need for security is very great, especially in the Central and Eastern European states. You said we must now consider carefully and precisely how to approach this question. Some of us, especially those whose security requirements are particularly great, naturally find such careful consideration rather slow. I understand from the answers you gave Mr. Antretter and Mr. De Decker that perhaps you think we are going too fast in Western European Union by including the question of the status of associate member in the discussion on the Rules of Procedure. Do you regard this endeavour of ours – entered on today's agenda – to take in associate members as precipitate, and if so, what precisely do you fear?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Mr. WÖRNER (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). – If I may first answer personally, I can quite definitely say: no, I am not worried about that. If I then reply as Secretary-General of the Atlantic Alliance, I will have to give the same answer I tried to give in my report, or whatever you want to call it. That is to say, we should co-ordinate among ourselves. That is not a delaying tactic. But we should make it clear to one another what our strategy is, what it looks like, what our views on co-ordination are and what aim we are pursuing here. All I asked for was co-ordination, and not for a delay in time. I still think that is as necessary as ever. For what do these states want? Since I am among those most widely travelled in these countries and talk to them a great deal – these days I spend 30% to 40% of my time in Central and Eastern Europe; that too is a sensational change in the habits of the Secretary-General of the Atlantic Alliance – I know that these states, whether they are WEU or NATO members, share the same concern: a guarantee of their security. That means we must co-ordinate our policies and must at least know

what we are doing and why we are doing it, no more and no less.

So it is not a delaying tactic – I would not have the slightest interest in that – but a manoeuvre designed to ensure that we do not awaken expectations that we cannot satisfy and that the policy pursued by the West, whatever instruments it uses, is consistent and that these states derive some benefit from it. I think that is what is most important.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hughes.

Mr. HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, the Secretary-General reminded us that the primary function of NATO is to consult and to maintain security. I think that we would all agree that the price of freedom is eternal vigilance, but does the Secretary-General not agree that the politicians have not made the most of the so-called peace dividend? I am thinking of the fact that unemployment is now bordering 20 million in the EC. Does he not feel that economic and social development and making better use of some of the defence industries, where so many workers are now redundant, would play a major part in bringing about a more contented populace, and in turn would be a major means of warding off future conflict?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Mr. WÖRNER (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – Since you do not see that as an alternative – at least that is how I understood your question – I can tell you that one of the problems which the alliance faces is the conversion of defence industries, especially in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. NATO's economic department is concentrating some of its efforts towards that objective, but you will appreciate the limits of such an undertaking. I do not go along with the idea that there must be a choice between social development and defence. We are all striving to achieve socially and economically sound societies which are also able to defend themselves against any outside threat. Fortunately, we can do so today with reduced means, but again there are limits. If you have talked to people in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe you will know what I am talking about. The pacifying and deterrent effects of our defence establishments will become apparent only if the alliance is seen as rock-solid and if there is solidarity inside it.

Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity of addressing this distinguished Assembly and I wish you and your work all the best both during this week and in the future.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wörner. You have been most generous with your time and we wish you well in the future, particularly in January.

11. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting

(Debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1388 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We now start the debate on the report of the Political Committee on WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting, Document 1388.

I call Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL (*United Kingdom*). – It is always an honour to follow the Secretary-General of NATO, but there are at least two disadvantages: first, the audience disappears extremely quickly when he stops speaking; and, secondly, his comments make any further remarks from me superfluous. However, being a politician and having made a few notes, may I say that that will not deter me from continuing.

I pick up one point that the Secretary-General made in reply to a question from one of our Spanish colleagues relating to the rôle of NATO. I was delighted that the Secretary-General said that NATO has never been purely a military alliance; it has always been a military-political alliance. It just so happens that during the cold war the military imperative was paramount and political considerations were of secondary importance. At certain times over the past 40 years, the fact that political considerations were secondary and that military considerations were paramount worked to the advantage of some member governments of the NATO alliance, but with the end of the cold war we are beginning increasingly to see political considerations coming to the fore in the alliance.

I congratulate Mr. Baumel, who is not in his place at the moment, on his excellent and well-balanced report. I had some reservations about the report, primarily before I read it, because Mr. Baumel and I come from different sides of the political spectrum and have different national perspectives, but I was delighted that the Political Committee was able to support the report and I hope that the Assembly will be able to do the same.

The report accepts that NATO will continue to be the main guarantor of security in Europe, but it correctly emphasises the need to remove some of the uncertainty surrounding future European security. To this end it makes three suggestions: first, it underlines the need for continued American military presence in Europe; secondly, it encourages the further development of a European defence identity which is both compatible with and strengthens NATO; and, thirdly, it addresses the alliance's future relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union.

The report also recognises that sharing must be a visible NATO principle: sharing of burdens, sharing of responsibility and sharing of decisions. As a consequence of that sharing, we shall expect the Americans to continue to maintain substantial and effective forces in Europe while the European allies must show that we are prepared to contribute commensurately. As Europeans, we have a responsibility and a duty to convince our North American partners that the Atlantic Alliance will benefit from a more co-ordinated European input, as exemplified by the work of the WEU Planning Cell, and the WEU Satellite Centre and the contribution made by a number of European multinational forces which have been declared available to both WEU and/or NATO. Two examples spring immediately to mind: the Eurocorps and the United Kingdom-Netherlands amphibious force.

Although the summit is unlikely to make a decision on the enlargement of NATO, it should make it absolutely clear that it will not accept any Russian veto over future security policies and arrangements in Central and Eastern European countries.

Although it is important to encourage democracy in Russia and to allay fears about the encirclement of Russia, Russia must not be able to gain by diplomatic means what it failed to continue to impose through military might.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – I should like to begin by saying how greatly we respect Mr. Baumel. I admire his erudition, his sense of responsibility, his strict methods of investigation and his intellectual honesty. This report is, however, informed by a conception of politics and history which is diametrically opposite to mine.

The difficulty in reaching a consensus stems from the fact that it is impossible to arrive at an agreed definition of NATO's new functions and objectives and of the rôle to be played by WEU. The fact that the summit scheduled for 10th January 1994 is at the request of the United States should give us pause for thought. Mr. Baumel quite rightly thinks that President Clinton's aim is to achieve a visible success for his foreign policy by reaffirming the importance of NATO as an instrument of American policy. The fact is that President Clinton's foreign policy has so far been fairly unsuccessful and has produced failures through which the American administration has lost prestige and credibility.

The text before the Assembly opens the way for increased intervention by NATO in our continent's affairs. As many Americans have reacted unfavourably to any commitment of United States military forces in former Yugo-

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

slavia and particularly in Bosnia Herzegovina, the parliamentary Assembly of WEU cannot reasonably welcome NATO's decision to intervene at some point in operations outside the area set by the North Atlantic Treaty and particularly in the fighting going on in former Yugoslavia.

At our June session, the Assembly adopted unanimously a recommendation to the Council in Mr. Marshall's report, with conclusions which are largely incompatible with the spirit and content of Mr. Baumel's report now being discussed.

May I remind the Assembly that Mr. Marshall stressed that the transatlantic contract which served as a basis for the traditional relationships between Western Europe and the United States was designed to ensure United States supremacy. We may wonder what kind of partnership is envisaged and what decisions it will be possible to take at the January summit to open the way to such a partnership seeing that what the United States seeks is hegemony. I quote from Mr. Marshall's report: "It is, however, not at all clear to what extent the United States and some European NATO countries will allow this European pillar to become more than an appendix to NATO and to gain some degree of independence."

The conditions which for forty years have justified the continuous strengthening of NATO no longer exist. This being so, why call up ghosts to make America's military hegemony in Europe even more obvious? The disaster in Somalia should turn our thoughts to the very real danger of confusion between humanitarian aims and strategic ambitions.

Any security policy should be based first and foremost on peaceful preventive machinery. Unfortunately since the Gulf war the idea that force should be used to defend or restore peace has gained ground. The results are negative and even dangerous.

The Maastricht declaration that WEU should be the European pillar of NATO remains an enigma. As Mr. Marshall recalled, WEU has so far been more an object than a subject. The difference is not, however, clear for me.

I do not believe that any enlargement of NATO can contribute positively to peace-keeping. On the contrary, I see in this proposal a source of future tensions in Europe and in NATO. At the same time, however, I am not very keen on the idea of extending unduly the operational rôle of WEU. In the present state of international turmoil, in which the United Nations are playing an increasing rôle, the progressive elimination of military blocs is, in my view, the essential condition for the establishment of real and lasting peace.

For all the reasons I have stated I shall be unable to vote for the recommendation in Mr. Baumel's report.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Baumel's excellent report has correctly identified the major issues to be discussed at the forthcoming NATO summit. In it he refers to the growing number of countries wanting to join NATO. They are the former members of the Warsaw Pact, a situation inconceivable four years ago. The report tells us that the Visegrad Four – the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary – are all extremely keen to join. For them, membership of NATO would end the security vacuum between the stable west and the unstable east. We know that Albania and Bulgaria wish to join to counter the threat and instability of the Balkans. We know that the Baltic states would certainly welcome the security of NATO membership against its enormous neighbour while Russia itself, having indicated its own interest in joining in the past, has more recently warned against any widening of NATO.

How then should the NATO summit respond to the situation, as it clearly must, to the demands from the new democracies to be better secured, because they cannot be ignored nor can they be discouraged? NATO has been uniquely successful in defending western civilisation. To extend its security commitments by enlarging its membership now, after nearly half a century of close political consultation, of integrated command and the transatlantic commitment to conventional/nuclear forces for common security would, in my view, be a great mistake. As Mr. Baumel implies, enlargement of NATO would encourage those in the United States of America who want an end to United States involvement in Europe. Enlargement to include the Baltic states and Poland would, we know, incur Russia's wrath and encourage her historic fear of encirclement. That is not in the interests of Europe now or in the foreseeable future and, in any case, these countries are now involved in NATO's North Atlantic Co-operation Council as well as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

We must, of course, encourage the spread of democracy in the rest of Europe, which NATO is pledged to defend for its allies, and acknowledge it when it has been achieved. As you know, this is being done through the Council of Europe which has welcomed seven new members from the Warsaw Pact, as well as Romania only two months ago. We must all hope that Russia's forthcoming elections will hasten its membership.

I hope that when NATO leaders meet in January they will recommend Western

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

European Union as the most appropriate collective European security organisation for the new democracies to join. Enlargement of WEU in that way would not contradict the Maastricht Treaty, which regards it as the European defence community of the future, independent of the European Union and NATO but with close links with both. Existing treaties with the United States and Canada would retain the basis for that essential transatlantic co-operation. It is with those points in mind that I have tabled two amendments to the draft recommendation. The first urges the forthcoming NATO summit to consider – I stress the word consider – that the new democracies of Europe who wish to join NATO should instead be encouraged to join WEU as it is the European security organisation. That proposal appears to be entirely compatible with the terms of the communiqué issued following the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg a week ago. I therefore hope that my first amendment will be the one supported by the Assembly this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Atkinson. I also thank you for dealing with your amendment in your speech which will save your having to speak again. I hope that you will be able to move it formally later.

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – My remarks on Mr. Baumel's excellent report follow on from the question I put a short time ago to the Secretary-General of NATO.

I must first congratulate Mr. Baumel on his very important report which comes at exactly the right time, that is just before the Atlantic Alliance summit which will unquestionably be of vital importance, not only for the security of Europe but also for defining the rôle of the alliance in Europe.

I share all the views expressed by the Rapporteur in his report except, as you will have understood when I spoke, after the Secretary-General of NATO, about the important question of enlargement and of how to respond to the security requirements of the Visegrad countries, the Central European countries and the Baltic states.

We must not become involved in a battle between organisations with the Atlantic Alliance and WEU each claiming the right to resolve this problem and each arguing that only it is geared to answering these questions and responding to these concerns.

Basically, my view is that both organisations should be involved at the same time. At this stage, it is easier to seek a reply to this question within the Atlantic Alliance which, in fact, has

only one mission and one *raison d'être*, namely the security of the continent of Europe in the context of transatlantic links, whereas WEU has become, particularly since Maastricht, the politico-military element in the construction of Europe and in the European Union. Consequently, WEU has a dual mission and a dual approach and only countries which we are sure will become full members of the European Union ought to become full members of WEU.

But I see from all the declarations made by the Central European countries – and I have just re-read the speech made by Vaclav Havel to the Czech Parliament – that they wish their security requirements to be met primarily through the Atlantic Alliance.

My view is that, because of its hesitation and our way of passing the ball backwards and forwards between Americans and Europeans, the Atlantic Alliance is failing totally to meet this security requirement. Meanwhile, Russia's attitude is hardening and by wasting time we are opening the way to a new Yalta based no longer on communism versus capitalism, if I may use the term, but on the longings and historic desire of greater Russia for hegemony, whether as the communist country it used to be or no longer communist as it is today.

If the NATO summit meeting is not to be considered a failure, a clear and definite response must be given to this demand for security and to the political void now being created in Central Europe. If this is not done, we shall be missing a historic opportunity and at the same time encouraging Russia to take a harder line and make things impossible.

For understandable reasons, the United States is at the moment looking at Russia much as a rabbit looks at a boa constrictor. If today the Atlantic Alliance responds by an invitation to accede, this will be done and we shall have accomplished as historic an act as the creation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 shortly after the war when we were weakened, shattered and impoverished countries, faced with economic problems and a security problem posed by Stalin. At that time, the United States had the courage to create the alliance and to open it to Western Europe. If we do the same today we shall save Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Decker.

That concludes the list of speakers.

Does the Rapporteur, Mr. Baumel, wish to reply?

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as this is an important debate I should like to make a few points without prolonging the sitting unduly. As we shall shortly be

Mr. Baumel (continued)

discussing the amendments tabled by Mr. Atkinson, I will not look at them at this point. On the other hand, after thanking Mr. Marshall for his speech which comes very close to the main lines of the report – and I welcome this convergence following the discussions in the Defence Committee – I should also like to thank Mr. Rodrigues, whose generous conception of political life and respect for ideas of every kind are well known to me. Of course we do not agree but we respect each other greatly.

Turning to Mr. De Decker's speech which I regard as the most important on the question of enlargement, my reply would be that very many of us here, starting with your Rapporteur, are anxious that the Central and Eastern European countries, which lack security, should be able to obtain a number of guarantees because of the close presence which they still regard as dangerous regardless of what we ourselves think.

If it had been possible, it would have been desirable that the January summit should be able to discuss and resolve this question. As you are perfectly well aware, Mr. De Decker, this will not happen. There is no point in entertaining illusions or false hopes; unless there is a complete turn around, which is always possible, the Brussels summit will only be discussing the enlargement of NATO in the form of the partnership for peace which has already been made public.

Consequently if you want these countries to join NATO first, which is what they in fact want, this will certainly not take place at the forthcoming summit. Rather than do nothing, it would be better to try to meet their expectations in part by suggesting they join WEU as an intermediate stage. This would be entering the holy places before finally reaching paradise.

I think above all that this question needs to be looked at in more detail; which countries could we admit? While it is obvious that some like the Baltic states raise no problems this is not true of others which can raise problems for NATO, which came into being as a defensive alliance against a common enemy. If we bring in large parts of Central Europe, may we not find ourselves faced not with fighting against a common enemy but by internal confrontations between the members of the enlarged alliance? Indirectly, that could also create problems for WEU.

My view is that any hardening of Russia's attitude will not be the result of our saying yes or no at the forthcoming summit meeting. I am among those who believe that some elements in states' foreign policies are unchanging and that history and geography respond naturally to the national attitudes of all states. After months of chaos and uncertainty, Russia is resuming its

traditional and historic rôle as a great eastern power, thanks mainly to an army which has remained relatively united and firm in the break-up of the Russian state and the former USSR. In time we shall see Russia returning to its imperial tradition which will extend further and further to territories which Russia regards as belonging to it by historic right. Its present intervention in Georgia is proof enough of this. Ukraine must be a subject of most serious concern. As I said at a meeting this morning its attitude is particularly worrying.

In my view, therefore, Russia's position will not be changed by whether or not we discuss enlargement at the NATO summit meeting. That attitude will progressively gain in strength in a direction that is easy to imagine.

Furthermore, enlargement to new members and to take on new responsibilities may raise a point of law which I shall not discuss today. It is the problem of loyalty to or the extension of the Treaty of Washington itself because, from that point onwards, we shall certainly be moving beyond the framework originally envisaged for the alliance.

My warmest thanks go to Mr. De Decker with whom I am yet again very close. In the case of WEU it is difficult to go further than we envisage but I do not believe that this should therefore be the time to recognise Russia's right of oversight on what she calls her immediate neighbours. That idea of a right closely resembles Mr. Brezhnev's theory of days gone by. We cannot accept such a claim.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel. I see that the Chairman of the committee would like to make a small contribution.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Your guess is right, Mr. President. I will restrict myself to two remarks. The first is traditional, but nevertheless well meant. I express my compliments and admiration for the work of Jacques Baumel who, in a few weeks, has presented an extremely complete report. I know him as a European and at least 100% Frenchman. In presenting the report, he made it clear that, according to some people, the recommendations would be too Atlantic while, on the other hand, others might think that they were too European. After fruitful discussion, we changed the text a bit and the present text was adopted with near unanimity. That was my second remark.

After our meeting with the Permanent Councils of WEU and NATO, we asked: which security guarantee can you give to Central and Eastern Europe and what is your perspective of a European security policy? We tried to give answers ourselves and as complete as possible. I hope and guess that the Assembly will support the work of Mr. Jacques Baumel and the Political Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – The Political Committee has presented a draft recommendation to which two amendments have been tabled. Representations have been made to me that we should take Amendment 2 first instead of Amendment 1. Under the Rules of Procedure, it is a little difficult to interpret that totally. However, I think that I will allow Amendment 1 to be moved first, although I understand that there are objections to that. I ask Mr. Atkinson to move his amendment.

I call Lord Finsberg on a point of order.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. If I may submit to you, the rules state very clearly that the amendment which differs most from the original text should be taken first. I submit that Amendment 2 qualifies here, because it goes extremely wide. It talks not merely about a closer relationship, it even goes on to say how that might be considered. Amendment 1 goes straight to one smaller change. If Amendment 2 is passed, Amendment 1 falls. I submit that, under the rules, Amendment 2 should be taken first.

The PRESIDENT. – I think that either falls if the first amendment is passed. I have looked at this very closely – I did not have notice of this until quite late – and I have also taken advice. The general wisdom is that there is not a great deal of difference. I do not know what the mover wishes to say in response to that challenge.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – My intentions are very clear. I am seeking a specific recommendation from this Assembly today in the form of Amendment 1. If that should fall, I will seek a more general recommendation for action arising from the NATO summit in Amendment 2. In the light of that, I submit that the order should be that in which I tabled the amendments – Amendment 1 first and Amendment 2 second.

The PRESIDENT. – In the circumstances it is difficult. However, I must rule that we take Amendment 1 first.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mr. Atkinson and others, reads as follows:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out the words “a possible enlargement of NATO:” and insert the following new text:

“the interest shown by the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and other applicants for membership of the Council of Europe, to join NATO:

(a) give urgent consideration to the enlargement of WEU by accepting Council of Europe member states as full members of WEU;”.

I call Mr. Atkinson to move the amendment. As he has spoken to it already, perhaps he could move it virtually formally.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – To clarify what I am proposing under Amendment 1, as Secretary-General Wörner confirmed to us this afternoon, the new democracies of Europe which are seeking early membership of NATO are unlikely to be offered that as a result of the forthcoming NATO summit. However, that summit cannot just ignore their demands. I propose that WEU is the most appropriate European security organisation for those new democracies to join. That is what I want the forthcoming NATO summit meeting to consider and that is what my first amendment proposes.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am sorry that I could not persuade Mr. Atkinson either in the United Kingdom or here not to press this amendment. This is a very dangerous amendment. There is a vast difference between NATO and WEU. We have just had the careful discussion about WEU at Luxembourg. One must also consider the Petersberg declaration. I do not believe – and I know that Mr. Atkinson does not – that it would be right for this to happen because it would almost certainly spell the end of NATO.

There is no doubt that the Americans would not go along with it, but that is not the major point. Western European Union nations – the European Union nations – have already considered this and they have said which countries should be full members and which should be associate members. What Mr. Atkinson is now suggesting would mean that any country which became a Council of Europe member should be accepted as a full member of WEU.

We already know that our request that Turkey and Greece should be admitted at the same time has been rejected by WEU because Turkey is not a member of the Community. None of the other countries is a member of the Community. If I may put it like this, Mr. Atkinson is being uncharacteristically illogical in asking us to make this change. However, his second amendment is much more practical and sensible. It talks about considering how there may be a closer relationship and that closer relationship may well be associate or observer status. However, what it cannot be – and I do not believe that any of my colleagues believe that it could be this – is full membership. That is not on the cards. Instead of having his amendment defeated, I hope that Mr. Atkinson will agree to withdraw it even at this late stage.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – The committee has not been able to look at this late amendment but I am in full agreement with Lord Finsberg. I think that this will open the door much too wide, firstly by listing which countries would be admitted as full members and secondly because we have taken steps to separate certain full members from certain other associated countries.

Consequently, I feel that this amendment is inappropriate and am against its adoption.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Neither the Political Committee nor the Defence Committee had the opportunity to discuss the amendment. Bearing in mind former discussions, as Lord Finsberg has already said, it would be fairly difficult to combine this amendment with the Maastricht Treaty and the declaration of Petersberg. Therefore, I conclude that all members are free to approve it but I would not act contrary to the treaty and the declaration.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Atkinson, you are not allowed to make another speech. Are you seeking to withdraw the amendment?

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Despite the comments of my three colleagues, I believe that the amendment is the way forward for a European security organisation. However, it is clear from what has been said that those who have prepared the report would wish to give further consideration to my proposal. At least the proposal has been debated for the first time in the light of my amendment and, therefore, I wish to withdraw it in favour of my second amendment which has been recommended by one of the speakers who has taken part in this debate.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – *Amendment 1 is withdrawn.*

Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr. Atkinson and others, reads as follows:

2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out the words “a possible enlargement of NATO:” and insert the following new text:

“the interest shown by the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and other applicants for membership of the Council of Europe, to join NATO:

(a) give urgent consideration as to how a closer relationship between WEU and the member states of the Council of Europe who have expressed an interest in joining NATO can be achieved;”.

I call Mr. Atkinson to move the amendment.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In moving my second amendment, if that is what you are allowing me to do, I hope that we can agree that neither NATO nor WEU can ignore the pleas of the new democracies better to protect and secure their new-found freedoms through some sort of alignment with the western alliance. So, the draft recommendation before us, as it stands, does not adequately address those pleas. My more modest second amendment seeks to address those appeals for greater European security on the part of the new democracies within the context of this Assembly and I hope that it will be approved.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*). – It is an important agreement and, for good reason, I beg you to read the exact text of the amendments. There is a little confusion, at least on my part. Please could you inform the Assembly of the exact content of the amendment and where it will be placed?

The PRESIDENT. – In the English text of the amendment it states:

“In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out the words ‘a possible enlargement of NATO:’ and insert the following new text”

which is then printed. That text will become (a) and (a) will become (b) and (b) will become (c).

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*). – Thank you very much. Now I understand.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment as Mr. Atkinson has now moved it?...

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the scope of Mr. Atkinson’s Amendment 2 is clearly less broad than that of Amendment 1. Yet I believe it is based on an a priori assumption that the member states of the Council of Europe may one day be able to join Western European Union.

In so doing Mr. Atkinson quite simply forgets the exact terms of reference and political will of the member states of the European Union, who, pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty and its annexes, have made WEU the military arm of the European Union.

That means that only those countries that are “eligible” to be members of the European Union are and will also be “eligible” to become members of WEU one day.

Therefore, as I explained in an earlier statement, although I am entirely in favour of

Mr. De Decker (continued)

enlargement by accepting a number of Central and Eastern European countries, for the reasons I gave earlier, I believe that the reasoning behind this amendment, which is the same as for Amendment 1, is too broad in scope and distances us from the real objectives which the member states of the European Union set out in the Maastricht Treaty.

That is why, although I recognise that calling for "urgent consideration as to how a closer relationship... can be achieved" does not really have any major implications – and the adoption of this text would not be a disaster – I personally intend to oppose it because the philosophy behind the amendment is based on membership of the Council of Europe and not on current or future membership of the European Union and the construction of European integration.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, while recognising the correct interpretation of our rule and Mr. De Decker's philosophy, I nevertheless think that, even though it has not been submitted to the Political Committee, this amendment with its more flexible wording and the opening it allows, could be adopted, with the Assembly free to decide, in order not to end up by rejecting the two others. This second amendment is much less binding and can provide a solution for the moment at least. We are inclined to favour it.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – The Political Committee did not examine this amendment. Frankly, my committee adopted a report and recommendations on relations with Central and Eastern European countries. In that framework our texts are more precise than this text, but it does not do any harm and has a sympathetic sound.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

May I remind members that one or two people on both sides were holding up their hands without cards. That is not permitted under the rules, as now everyone has to vote with a card and such votes should not be counted. Fortunately, it did not make any difference in that instance but we must stick by the rules. I declare the amendment carried.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1388, as amended.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

12. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary General of WEU.

It is always a delight to welcome our Secretary-General, Wim van Eekelen, to our Assembly. As a parliamentarian himself and a former member here he is able to appreciate the nuances of parliamentary and political life – as a Minister he had to cope with the realities. As Secretary-General he has to combine the two, something he does admirably and in a very positive fashion, with a great deal of good humour and infectious optimism. We always like to see him. He talks to us in good times and in bad – and I think this is one of the bad.

Mr. van Eekelen, please come to the tribune.

Mr. van EEKELLEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, honourable parliamentarians, ladies and gentlemen, the European Union has now been in existence for a month. It is already in the throes of a process of further integration and enlargement. WEU is moving ahead fast with its own development based on the Maastricht and Petersberg declarations. Its operational capabilities as the defence component of the European Union and as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance have been significantly developed. We are also able to place our work in the context of the European Union. The measures set out in the joint document on relations between WEU and the European Union, which the WEU Council of Ministers endorsed in Luxembourg on 22nd November, will enable our two organisations to work effectively together.

Moreover, the opportunities provided by article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty which enables the European Union to request WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union having defence implications, should be fully exploited. By this, I mean that requests from the Union should be made at a sufficiently early stage so that WEU, which brings together the Foreign and Defence Ministers' viewpoints, can beneficially influence the development of the common foreign and security policy.

¹. See page 16.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

I believe a successful fulfilment of the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty up to the 1996 review to be essential for the consolidation of stability and peace across the whole of Europe – our priority task before the end of this decade.

The Atlantic Alliance, for its part, will be undergoing further renovation in accordance with guidelines to be adopted at its forthcoming summit next January. We have been discussing that this afternoon.

The Luxembourg declaration adopted last week sets out clearly our collective views on what we expect from the summit. In particular, we trust that the alliance will continue its adaptation process in a way which takes account of the developing European security and defence identity. We therefore hope that the summit will endorse the principle that WEU should be able to use, not only European allies' forces and resources, but the collective assets of the Atlantic Alliance. This is indeed the only way to enable Europeans to take on greater responsibilities in the humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement fields without risking a costly duplication of effort.

The collective views in our declaration constitute, in my view, the first concrete example of a joint WEU position to be introduced into the process of consultation in the alliance. The joint NATO-WEU Council meeting on 14th December will be a valuable opportunity to consider together how these ideas can be taken forward. Our previous joint Council meeting in June enabled the combined NATO-WEU operation Sharp Guard to be set up in the Adriatic. From the WEU viewpoint, therefore, joint Council meetings are a very important means of consultation and co-ordination between the two organisations. Indeed, over the past year, WEU and NATO have succeeded, I believe, in achieving the necessary transparency. The task now is to give more substance to the concept of complementarity.

In 1991, at Maastricht, European leaders recognised that, notwithstanding their commitments entered into in the late forties, their Community needed to start building an autonomous defence structure for its own security needs. Even a fully fledged European Union would still need a dynamic and reliable Atlantic Alliance, the reverse being even more true.

The European Union will provide for convergence between economic and security and defence policies in an era when the theories of Clausewitz are making a comeback. Indeed, the use of military capabilities will be an extension of foreign policy by other means if and when action outside Europe is contemplated. The

objectives of a common foreign and security policy are wider than the mere protection of national independence and territorial integrity. With a strong CFSP, the European Union will offer advantages over the alliance, which might not always benefit from the same degree of convergence, between the political, economic and security aspects.

The CFSP should gradually become the conceptual framework for preventive diplomacy with military support or ultimately for military actions by the Union and WEU, as well as for the definition of its positions within the alliance, the CSCE and in its relations with the United Nations.

The global objectives in security terms for Europe are twofold: extended co-operation based on reciprocity and military transparency through confidence-building measures; and stability through preventive diplomacy, aiming at avoiding or at least containing conflicts deriving from border disputes, minority issues, and more generally from the emergence of the successor states to the defunct Soviet Union.

1993 will be seen as a crucial turning point in the debate on the new missions that European and Atlantic collective defence organisations will be called upon to assume. In 1994, their planning potential is likely to be even more put to the test by events in former Yugoslavia and the needs created by the proliferation of United Nations operations, as is their capability to mobilise a wide variety of assets.

I would like to pay tribute to the report by President Soell, who emphasised how important it was for WEU and NATO not to have to wait for the United Nations or the CSCE to ask us to act but to continue with our own organisation and planning activities with all the necessary vigour.

The changing geostrategic conditions in Europe call for fundamental adjustments, reflecting the fact that political requirements now prevail over the military and economic. They also derive from the need to bring the nations of Central and Eastern Europe politically and strategically into the rest of Europe. The political accession of those nations to western institutions is arguably a right and proper reward for their serious commitment to the rights of minorities and the principle that conflicts should be settled by peaceful means.

(The speaker continued in English)

I am speaking about the tragic crisis in Yugoslavia. Today the President-in-Office will come to you from the Geneva conference. I pay tribute to the impressive report by Sir Russell Johnston on the lessons to be drawn from this conflict.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

The question of enhancing WEU's relations with the Central European consultation partners – that has already been referred to this afternoon – will be central to the deepening of our dialogue with the nine new democracies in the framework of our Forum of Consultation. The forum should be developed as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, and we shall move beyond consultation. In its future work, it will place the emphasis on formulating mechanisms for crisis situations. It will develop co-operation on conflict-prevention and crisis-management. It will also review peace-keeping methods in the light of the experience acquired by individual countries, and joint training and exercises may also be envisaged to promote contact between members of the armed forces.

I emphasise the fact that, whatever decisions we reach on the idea for a new status for countries having concluded Europe agreements and whatever name we shall ultimately give it, we must be sure that WEU's work between now and our next ministerial meeting with our consultation partners in May is focused on identifying areas where concrete co-operation is possible. It is now the substance of these activities that really matters. The sanctions operations on the Danube show what can be done. There we operate together with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in one of the smallest but most effective operations in the context of the Yugoslav conflict.

It is indeed very positive that the Ministerial Council has decided to give a clear political signal for a further significant enhancement of WEU's relations with those consultation partners which have already concluded, or will soon conclude, a Europe agreement with the European Union. Of course, that perspective is rather different from that in the amendment which has just been accepted; it is not contradictory but involves a different emphasis. We emphasise our links with those partners which have concluded, or will conclude, a Europe agreement with the European Union. The aim of such a new step would be to allow them to participate in some WEU activities while being more closely associated with the deliberations on the conditions of European security. The practical arrangements have still to be worked out by the Permanent Council in the near future.

With regard to Mr. Wintgens's report, I point out that the approach follows the internal logic of European integration and cannot be interpreted as being directed against anyone. It is the process of European integration that we take forward step by step, perhaps too slowly for some, but, nevertheless, with determination which ultimately will bring all these countries into the European Community.

When a country becomes an associate member of the European Union, we can extend our Forum of Consultation arrangements correspondingly.

One other aspect that I should like to mention is the fact that, set up within WEU, the newly-created Western European Armaments Group – WEAG – inherits the tasks of the former IEPG. An agreement was reached whereby one observer WEU country – Denmark – and two associate countries – Norway and Turkey – could continue to play a full part in that framework. There is no difference between the types of membership in this instance. That institutional arrangement should help to achieve the objective of providing political impetus for European co-operation in the sphere of armaments, as already stated in the 1984 Rome declaration and reaffirmed more recently in the WEU Maastricht declaration where specific mention is made of studying a European armaments agency. It will be studied under the direction of the national armaments directors and, as a first step, an armaments section will be established within the WEU secretariat in Spring 1994. Equally, the functions of the Eurogroup, which are still relevant to present conditions, will be transferred to WEU before the end of the year.

The last challenge I would like to consider is the creation of effective instruments for conflict-prevention, crisis-management and peace-keeping. That is one of the most urgent tasks facing organisations such as NATO and WEU.

With regard to peace-keeping, the Petersberg declaration spelt out WEU's readiness to support, on a case-by-case basis, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE and the United Nations Security Council.

Military units acting under WEU authority can be employed for three types of mission: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, including peace-making. Militarily, that could mean a variety of things from preventive deployment – which is today very important in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and may be in the future elsewhere – military enforcement of economic sanctions, protection of areas and activities and implementation of peace plans.

As an organisation concentrating on defence and security, WEU has as its primary task to concentrate on the development of the military means available in terms of units, their combination and rotation, designation of headquarters and command and control arrangements. The difficulties encountered by member countries in

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

finding sufficient available peace-keeping forces for former Yugoslavia illustrate the need for pre-planning in that field.

The WEU Planning Cell is now drawing up, with the co-operation of member nations, lists of military units suitable for carrying out the missions defined at Petersberg. The aim is to identify rapidly deployable combinations of units, national or multinational headquarters and various other assets which, following the agreement of the nations and, where necessary, consultation with NATO, could be used for WEU operations. The planning cell will also plan the transport, communications and logistic support for those packages of forces and organise training exercises.

As for the forces answerable to WEU, the Council took note of a report on their relations with WEU which provides the key definitions and guidelines. The report addresses both common relations between forces answerable to WEU and WEU and specific relations with multinational forces which may become available for WEU.

In this respect, the endorsement by ministers of the texts setting the conditions for the use of the European corps in the framework of WEU is a significant step forward. I read the most interesting report presented by Mr. Zierer. My own preference will be for the present European corps to become Eurocorps No. 1, to be followed by a Eurocorps No. 2. There may be two others. In that way, we would acquire maximum flexibility which in any case will have to be the hallmark of all future operations of any security organisation.

For regional crises, in which the United States is prepared to make a substantial military contribution, today we all agree that NATO is likely to be the primary actor in Europe. But if such American participation – substantially, that is, with ground forces – is not forthcoming, it will be either for WEU or an ad hoc coalition to assume its responsibility. Therefore, WEU may play a rôle in European peace-keeping using NATO assets, although at the same time some independent action should not be ruled out, either.

Indeed, given the difficulties now encountered by the United Nations in the execution of its missions and the risk of its decision-making mechanism being blocked, the future European Union must be in a position to intervene on its own account and on its own decisions where its vital interests or its nationals might be under threat.

Another matter of concern for European countries will be how to maintain support for a sophisticated military capability if it becomes

increasingly clear that those forces are unlikely ever to be used, either for collective defence, because our countries fortunately no longer feel threatened, or for enforcement action, because the legitimacy of their deployment will be difficult to establish.

After two years in which our agenda has been somewhat overloaded by institutional issues, WEU is now in a position to give detailed consideration to issues vital to Europe's security, such as its defence structures, its capabilities, its defence specialisation and the harmonisation of defence policies. But if you ask me what I regard today as the most pressing security interests in Europe, I would point out in the medium term a kind of arms control arrangement in the Balkans to avoid a preponderant rôle for any single country there, and especially Serbia.

In this context, I am happy to note that the ministerial meeting of the CSCE which Manfred Wörner and I will attend tomorrow is on the verge of setting up a regional forum for discussing arms control in the Balkans. Equally, we have a vital interest in the position of the republics of the former Soviet Union and their capability to develop as healthy, independent democratic states. Lord Dundee's report discusses this question and I am happy that the Assembly will hear from the foreign minister of Ukraine in a few days.

Clearly we have to say to that country and to a few others that we are interested in their development in general terms, and not only in the fact that we hope that they will renounce their nuclear weapons and sign the non-proliferation treaty. Otherwise, if that is the only reason why we are interested in them, we will provide an argument for keeping the very nuclear weapons that we want them to dispose of.

WEU has overcome some of the difficulties that we encountered in our past. One hurdle, however, remains. It is now one year since the adoption of various texts on the enlargement of WEU and until ratification by the ten parliaments concerned of the protocol on the accession of Greece to WEU, Greece, Iceland, Norway and Turkey will remain active observers only and not take their places as full members or associate members around the WEU table. I therefore hope that when WEU Council Ministers next meet in May, the ratification process in their parliaments will have been completed, allowing those states formally to take up their positions.

In this context, I pay tribute to Lord Finsberg for the imaginative way in which he has applied the concept of full participation of associate members in our activities, which is the governing principle in the Council, and also to the work of the Assembly. It is very important to follow the line that he has sketched for the notion of WEU developing as the European

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

pillar of NATO. If we do not give substance to that in the Assembly, we shall fail to reach that objective.

Finally, the European Union will generate stability only if it creates the relevant political and institutional mechanisms to enable it to react appropriately to all threats to stability. Among the instruments already at its disposal, I consider that WEU is important thanks to its growing potential and fruitful association of soldiers and diplomats at all levels of our activities and decision-making processes. The European Union should use it whenever a proposed joint action has a security dimension. We are not looking for military solutions to today's problems. However, in today's Europe, military capabilities can play a rôle to underpin our objectives of peace and security. Thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Secretary-General, for that wide and most interesting survey. There are one or two questions if you would be kind enough to answer them.

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – You mentioned three rôles for WEU, including peace-keeping and peace-making. Are there any countries which are members of WEU which will not play 100% of their parts in carrying out those three rôles?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – In principle, all our member countries are prepared to participate in those three missions because that is what we agreed in Petersberg. As you know, Germany is, for constitutional reasons, unable to send its forces outside the NATO area. While we are all trying to establish what I sometimes call an umbrella of political cohesion and consensus, the actual application of an operation can be played out only by some. Sometimes there are other complications. Take, for example, the operations in Yugoslavia. Many countries participated in the naval embargo. Italy – and your Italian presidency organised it – is also participating in the embargo on the Danube. In the context of the United Nations, the Italians have been disqualified by the Serbs from participating in operations on the ground.

There are sometimes complicating factors. For example, although we have political agreements which everyone supports, in a factual operation there may be a smaller number of countries. That should be possible, but it means that our Planning Cell has a very difficult task. The same will apply to NATO. In today's world,

when we talk about actions outside our territory, it is such a political decision in each individual capital to participate that we are not 100% sure whether the country to which one has assigned a task is capable of fulfilling that task. We have to plan in a much more flexible way and apply the concept of redundancy in which we earmark different units from different countries for the same job. However, that is today's challenge. We live in a more political world.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – My congratulations, Secretary-General, on your excellent report. We are becoming accustomed to – and very much appreciate – the high-quality statements you unflinchingly make.

The question I want to ask is about the Planning Cell whose institution is unquestionably a step forward for WEU. However, when we went to Brussels with the Defence Committee and met the officials running the cell we rather had the feeling that this body, which is so important for WEU, had not been given the material resources, authority or, finally, responsibilities that it should have.

With regard to material resources I shall say no more. We were very surprised, however, that the "secure" equipment needed by the cell for secret communications had been supplied by France and Italy: the Planning Cell is operating in conditions of penury unbecoming a headquarters of this kind.

Also, or so we were told, the task to be accomplished is immense and the cell has hardly begun work on it. As you know perfectly well, because we have spoken about it, this includes drawing up lists of the forces available to the headquarters in order to have a forecast of what might be possible. Until this list is forthcoming the cell will obviously be working in the dark.

Lastly, I feel that the Planning Cell cannot operate by obeying orders like a kind of agency performing contracts. It should have freedom to work without waiting for instructions to do this or that and, when it does so, it is important that the matters it deals with should not be pending for weeks and months before being considered.

This is the impression we gained when we met the officials concerned – very responsible people, though for the moment somewhat at a loss in Brussels. It is up to you and others to make this excellent planning unit more effective.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I am sure that the

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

Director of the Planning Cell, General Caltabiano who is here amongst us today, highly appreciated your words of support, Mr. Baumel.

We all share your concerns but the situation may perhaps have improved a little since you paid your visit.

Naturally we are grateful to France and Italy for providing a major item of equipment because all WEU member countries are now in a position to use the same type of unit. For these confidential communications, more standardisation is necessary and now, thanks to these two countries, we have it. As far as equipment is concerned, therefore, I think we can say the problem has been solved.

As you say, the term "forces available to WEU" is interpreted somewhat differently from country to country. Several countries think it possible that WEU, in principle, should be able to select from all the forces we have whereas others say that some units are better suited to the three missions. We have already applied some selection at national level. The problem for the cell, now, is to define everyone's needs and also the availabilities of the national units a little more precisely. The process will take longer than forecast but we could at least make an energetic start on it.

You are quite right – units are needed that can be available quickly and therefore we need to be in a position to plan their transport, command and logistic support already – in peacetime.

As far as the mandate is concerned I would pay further tribute to General Caltabiano who has moved forward with some caution. The cell has been operational for a few months only and the activity itself is completely new. The agreement of member countries for its introduction is essential; we must not give the impression of going too far without specific authority from our Council.

The cell is working along two lines: general planning, that is, for general cases, without a precise scenario in a given geographical area, and next concrete cases – a process that is beginning to quicken its pace – for example, our embargo on the Danube. In the case of this embargo, the Planning Cell has been working for a year now on how to provide support for a peace plan. There has been discussion about a possible rôle firstly in Sarajevo and now in Mostar. Our cell has also worked on possibilities of sustaining a peace plan and providing a police force for the European Union administrator that might be appointed, to support infrastructure and logistics and the institution of medical facilities. The work of the cell under this heading has been very useful.

Personally I also think, but this now needs to be discussed by the Council, that a further step forward could be taken by making it clear that the mandate for these three missions is sufficiently broad and clear for the cell to be able to continue its work and develop scenarios and action potential on its own initiative. More generally, I fully understand the meaning of your question and I agree with what you have said as regards our common objective.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I was going to raise exactly the same matter as Mr. Baumel. In view of the Secretary-General's long reply I withdraw my request.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I am emboldened to ask this question because we were told earlier that openness and transparency were desirable. I am delighted to be able to take a moment of Sir Russell's time. My question relates to the point that he made earlier about the black hole of intense risk and the possibility of intensifying need. Have those responsible for the organisation considered the problems that are facing Europe's armed forces, and the effect of current needs upon their capability, both in terms of national and multinational formations? Is he sure that he can be confident about the capacity of our armed forces to meet the need and to maintain their existing commitments?

In particular, would he care to consider one of the more relevant and valuable developments in terms of European and alliance capacities through the Air Mobile Brigade, formed by the British, Dutch, Belgian and German components? Will he consider how that brigade, which might be very important to the tactical future of European military dispositions, can maintain or develop its capacity in the face of the need to second its personnel for other international commitments which, as Sir Russell reminded us, could seriously intensify?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – The two questions are at the heart of our preoccupations. First, I do not want to sound facetious but sometimes when people ask me, "Aren't you worried about all these reductions in defence budgets?", I reply that I am not so interested in the reductions as in what remains. What remains is also at the heart of Mr. Hardy's question. Is what remains sufficient for our needs, as outlined, in terms of peace-keeping, peace-making and humanitarian activities? It is somewhat strange that, three or four years ago, we were able to muster one million men, but today we find it difficult to muster

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

25 000 for the crisis in Yugoslavia. We should still have those men available, except that, for various reasons, the political will to use them is not there. That might be because they are conscripts and there are legal difficulties.

There are other reasons. I completely agree with the gist of the question – we should try to have fewer resources than we had a little while ago and should direct them to early availability. We should avoid duplication in manning. That is the most important matter, and it is being discussed at the NATO summit. It is a question of whether we are able to have sufficiently flexible arrangements.

I am happy that the American Government seems to support that fully. Today Mr. Wörner confirmed that. Perhaps AWACS resources could be made available to WEU, as could some headquarters functions. Then we would not need to have this discussion on matters that were raised a year ago in NATO circles – the question of NATO having the right of first refusal. We are not thinking of military action in those terms. We are consulting together or separately. It will become clear what the situation is, whether the Americans will participate substantially and whether it is to be in NATO or WEU. The same forces will be available.

The Air Mobile Brigade in Central Europe – Germany, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands – is a very important asset, but almost a year ago the four countries had already said that it was one of the units which, in my vocabulary, is double-headed. It is available for collective defence for NATO and for WEU missions. Similarly, the United Kingdom-Netherlands amphibious force – the marines – is available to both. That is the way forward. In that way we will not be duplicating forces. We will make them available.

The next question is how one commands and controls those units. I think that their headquarters should be so flexible that they can work in both directions. Mr. Wörner also mentioned that. The units should make existing assets available to WEU.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I would like, Secretary-General, to know whether the Planning Cell, which should be a basic element, is now being prepared. Do you plan to increase its resources in equipment and staff?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Yes and no. It is a

Planning Cell, not a command unit. If an operation is decided upon, its planning has to be worked out by the cell and approved by the Council. At that stage it might also be asked to designate this or that headquarters for the conduct of specific operations. It is for us to decide which members of the cell should work on the plan but there will be no major operations.

If one day we have one, two or three Eurocorps it might then be possible to decide something in the way of such an operational headquarters. WEU's big advantage is its flexibility in planning. If we were to make a separate military structure we would have serious difficulties with the alliance, we should be spending a lot of money unnecessarily and lastly we would have a major co-operation problem because we would not know which headquarters should be given priority. It is better to plan in the form of scenarios as we have just said: geographical situation, package of forces and command system.

There too, we will have a range of choices. We could use national headquarters, national command at lower level or possibly existing multinational commands, the Eurocorps headquarters or maybe others as well.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – For the most part, the Secretary-General's address was directed towards military affairs, but with the greater accent on crisis-prevention rather than crisis-management and with the knowledge of the tragedies in ex-Yugoslavia because of the lack of a common foreign policy, there must be a trend more towards diplomacy than military action. Does the Secretary-General see an increasing rôle for WEU in the formation of foreign policy in the context of the European Union and, if he does, how does he see that developing?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I think that our relationship with the European Union, which has been in limbo for the past year because the Maastricht Treaty was not ratified, is entering a formative stage. I do not know how the relationship will develop. I was a bit disappointed that the European Union did not envisage the possibility of a WEU rôle in Yugoslavia at the meeting which it had on 22nd November before our ministerial meeting. However, that is something which we must consider. It is foreseen in the documents that when the European Union discusses such questions I should be present, just as I am invited to the CSCE and NATO ministerial meetings. That has not yet been the case in the European Union context, but it has been agreed that it will happen.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

We shall be able to make a contribution to European Union deliberations, but the emphasis in political terms will be on a common foreign and security policy, because only the European Union is capable of providing convergence in relation to a political and foreign policy and to the economic measures that we can take in terms of sanctions or of support – the countries of Central Europe have much more need of economic support than of the military measures which have been envisaged or the guarantees that have been requested.

We have to look at this in the framework of the interesting arrangement by which WEU is an integral part of the European Union but at the same time maintains its autonomy as long as not all members of the Union are prepared to engage in military activities. If Austria, Finland and Sweden join, we shall have even more observers. We can act either in the context of a full foreign and security policy or in an autonomous rôle. The situation is not entirely neat, but international relations are never 100% neat and I think that this is a fairly ingenious arrangement. Then, in 1996, we shall see whether we need to take new steps or whether we can continue this arrangement for a further two years.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Secretary-General. As Mr. Baumel said, your speeches to us are always welcome and always interesting and you will see from the number of questions that we have had that the spirit of interest has been well maintained today. We are most grateful to you because you are a good supporter of ours. I thank you on behalf of the Assembly.

13. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: enlargement of WEU

I. Creation of an associate member status

II. Accession of Greece

III. Creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Docs. 1390, 1391 and 1392)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is a joint debate on three reports from the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges relating to the enlargement of WEU. After the Rapporteurs have presented their reports, the joint debate will be opened. It will be resumed tomorrow morning, when we shall also vote on the draft decisions presented by the committee.

The first report, to be presented by Lord Finsberg, is on the creation of an associate member status, Document 1390, The second report, to be presented by Mr. Ferrarini, is on the accession of Greece, Document 1391. The third report, also to be presented by Mr. Ferrarini, is on the creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status, Document 1392.

I call Lord Finsberg to present his report on the creation of an associate member status, Document 1390.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am not sure that I need to say very much this evening, because the Secretary-General has made the point that if we are serious about the Petersberg declaration we have to give full voting rights to the associate members. Nevertheless, I shall say something because it is important. First, I gather that there is a possible difference between the French and the English versions. The authentic version is the English one. I cannot be responsible for the translation into French.

Our present position is that we must create some status for the associate members which have been willed upon us by the Council of Ministers following the Petersberg declaration and the Maastricht Treaty. At present, we have only full members. It is clear that neither associate members nor observers can be entitled to 100% of the rights of full members. I do not believe that anyone in this Assembly would argue against that. Equally, because associate members are given a particular status by the declaration and because they are making a contribution towards the budget of the organisation, they must have rights to participate in and to vote on all matters except the annual report. They do not have the right to participate in the annual report itself.

Observer members do not have nearly as many rights as do associate members and therefore they are entitled to fewer rights in this Assembly. I believe that the document that I am presenting to you today – I acknowledge the immense assistance given to me in its preparation by Mr. Burgelin – tries to find a middle way that is both logical and practical. It is a compromise which I believe should be acceptable to the Assembly, bearing in mind the early discussions that we have had on this issue. There may be no logical reason for denying the right to vote in all matters, whether in committee or in the Assembly, to associate members – except on the one issue where they are barred by ministers from participation.

I remind my colleagues that this document arose out of Mr. Ward's report which, in itself, then gave rise to Order 85. The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was unanimous in recommending the document, as it was

Lord Finsberg (continued)

in recommending the later documents that my friend and colleague Mr. Ferrarini will produce. It is a package. I suggest that it is not possible, or correct, to pick out one item in that package and say that we cannot have it because, all at once, one would reduce the status of associate members almost to that of observer members. That was not the intention of Petersberg; it is not the intention of Maastricht, and it is certainly not the intention of Finsberg because it would not be in the interests of this Assembly.

I therefore commend Document 1390 to the Assembly in its entirety and I hope that it will be accepted.

I gather that two amendments may be moved. I shall reserve my comments on them in the hope that, after what I have said, the movers will consider that it would not be in our interests – our interests as an Assembly – for the amendments to be moved.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Finsberg for being admirably brief and concise.

I now call Mr. Ferrarini to present his two reports on the accession of Greece and the creation of a permanent observer or guest member status. For the convenience of the Assembly, may I ask you to deal with both together?

Mr. FERRARINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, following the Maastricht Treaty of 10th December 1991, the Chairman-in-Office of WEU asked the Republic of Greece in June 1992 to start negotiations for its accession to the modified Brussels Treaty. These negotiations were successfully completed and the protocol of accession was signed in Rome on 20th November 1992.

The protocol is due to come into force when all the full member states of WEU, that is the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty, have approved the protocol by their own national procedures. At the moment only the United Kingdom has approved the protocol but other members are about to do so; Greece will approve within the next few weeks, after the parliamentary recess caused by the recent elections. Greece will then become a full member of WEU and will have the same rights and obligations as all the other member states.

This means that the Assembly's Rules of Procedure will have to be amended so that the delegation from the Greek Parliament – seven representatives and seven substitutes – can discharge their duties in full, like all the other delegations from the signatory countries. Greek will become the Assembly's eighth official language. The question of limiting the number of official languages has been raised. This may become a prac-

tical problem at some future date but as things stand Greek must be treated in exactly the same way as the other recognised languages.

This being so, there is little room for interpretation or discussion. The terms and conditions derive directly from the protocol of accession to the treaty and the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Basically, the changes are the same as those made to the WEU Assembly Rules of Procedure when Spain and Portugal joined.

The proposed amendments relate to Rule 1, number of representatives, Rule 9, composition of the Bureau, and Rules 15 and 40, composition of committees.

During the discussion and drafting of this report, an attempt was made to dramatise the situation following the Greek elections and the entry into office of the new socialist government. Seeking, I believe, to make capital out of certain government statements, it was argued that Greece would be playing a destabilising rôle, particularly in the Balkans. In my view these fears are baseless and I believe that Greece, with its strong democratic and European traditions, will contribute decisively to a peace and security policy in Europe, starting with a solution for the problem of relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Turning to the question of observers and permanent observers, the enlargement of WEU, which was discussed in Maastricht by the European Council on 10th December 1991 and in Rome by the WEU Council of Ministers on 20th November 1992, is now of vital importance for the objectives of peace and security which are basic to our organisation, particularly in view of the vast changes which have taken place in Europe in recent years.

Arising from the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers in Rome in November 1992 and by the Standing Committee, also in Rome, in April 1993, which covered not only the accession of Greece to full membership but also the creation of associate member status, which is the subject of Lord Finsberg's report, for – so far – Iceland, Denmark and Turkey, of observer status for Denmark and Ireland, and finally, of permanent observer status for the nine countries of the forum, namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic.

The need to create observer status stems from the refusal of two member countries of the European Union to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty, although they wish to take part in the process of developing European integration in foreign and joint security policy as defined in the Maastricht Treaty.

Mr. Ferrarini (continued)

On the other hand, the need to create a permanent observer or guest member status in accordance with Order 85 of the Standing Committee, stems from the desire to enhance relations at various levels between WEU and the forum countries which have a vital part to play in Europe's peace and security but are at present living through a difficult period of transition.

One of the aims the Rapporteur set himself was to avoid creating a wide range of juridical statuses for participants in the activities of the Assembly as this would make the exercise of the presidency extremely difficult.

Another aim was to modify the Rules of Procedure as little as possible, seeing that the changes must be capable of dealing with unforeseen eventualities while at the same time anticipating future situations as fully as possible.

It was therefore thought appropriate to propose a single amendment to Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure allowing the existing status of observer to be extended to that of permanent observer thus confirming the principle that observers may speak but not vote in the Assembly.

I feel that this arrangement will meet in full the terms of Order 85 and Recommendation 536, and also the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers.

As regards attendance at committees, it will be seen that under the terms of paragraph 7 of Rule 42 of the present Rules of Procedure observers may be invited to attend without the right to vote, with the special recommendation which we should make as an assembly that this rule be interpreted in the light of WEU's changed situation.

This proposal therefore changes the Rules of Procedure as little as possible and allows the Assembly to decide terms for the participation of observers, without the need to amend the Rules of Procedure.

On this basis, the Assembly could for obvious reasons invite Denmark and Ireland to appoint parliamentary delegations with the same number of members as their delegations to the Council of Europe but without substitutes and the other forum countries to appoint a two-member delegation.

If it became necessary at some point to change this arrangement this could easily be done either by the Assembly itself or by bodies acting for it such as the Standing Committee and the Presidential Committee.

Basically, this is a flexible response to the rightful need for closer relations with these

states which are so important for the new balances in Europe; at the same time it recognises the need for the Assembly to continue its work speedily and effectively.

May I conclude by emphasising the historic importance of the decision which our Assembly is about to take for the enlargement of WEU and for the creation of a wider and fuller vision of Europe and its security embracing, of course, Western Europe but above all Central and Eastern Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we can be very pleased that it seems that Greece will fairly speedily become a member of WEU. Quite obviously, this will mean having to adapt the rules.

A number of years ago, Mr. President, we adopted texts that in particular stressed the link between WEU and NATO. It was held to be self-evident that all members of NATO would, where they were European countries, belong to WEU. The Heads of State in Maastricht have however decided otherwise. They have tried to reach a compromise, and one might say have tried to square the circle: a link with WEU on the one hand, and a link with NATO on the other. This does not make our job any easier; we now have to deal with three kinds of country interested in belonging to WEU – observers, associate members and full members. One way or another, we have to make a distinction. Observers must have different rights to full members; but there also has to be a difference between observers, who cannot vote, and associate members who should then have a partial vote. It is being proposed that the latter group should be able to vote only in committee meetings; I find this, to be frank, a pretty absurd solution – it means that a member of parliament may take part in the work of committees, but not in the plenary debate. One disadvantage of limiting the right to vote is that our colleagues from Turkey are disappointed at such a miserly offer, while others feel that it goes too far. Weighing this up, I think that this proposal is the only one that takes the middle course between two extremes: it is a very moderate and in no way revolutionary proposal, which also does right by NATO. I know that some countries do unspecified things that make membership of NATO hardly appropriate, and I would not wish to condone this.

I have known the time, Mr. President, when in many people's eyes WEU was moribund; no one took any interest in WEU. Now, a whole series of countries would be glad to join. Many countries would like to become members of WEU tomorrow, and members of NATO the

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

day after that. This is not of course something for the immediate, but the situation has certainly changed. I appreciate that the proposal we are looking at is for the here-and-now; within a limited number of years we, or those who follow us, will discuss again how to arrange matters.

Mr. President, this report concerns only the Rules of Procedure. That is important, but must not be exaggerated. The report is at the same time a symbol of further development. In closing, I would like to compliment Lord Finsberg and Mr. Ferrarini, who have produced balanced reports for which I shall be happy to cast my vote.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Throughout the debates on these reports in committee we all supported, first, the process of Greek accession and, secondly, the creation of observer status for those member countries of the Community who may join WEU, and we also favoured the existence of a new status of associate member for those who, without being full members, assist and co-operate in our work and towards achieving the aims of this institution. Two cohesive forces which are, in fact, one and the same, enabled us to work towards these aims; the first was support for the construction of Europe and the European Union. We accept the mandate that Maastricht contains and believe that the development and implementation of these reports is in line with the contents of the Union treaty.

The second element to which I referred is support for WEU. We want WEU to become the armed wing of the European Community, but we also want it to be a strong, dependable and efficient institution. And because we want it to be strong, efficient and dependable we wanted a clear line to be drawn to show which countries are full members and which countries are observers or, for the moment, associate members.

First, there is not one institution in the world where associate observer countries have exactly the same rights as full members. No institution in the world is organised in that way. And secondly, as Maastricht says, and as this is the way this organisation works, we must define the powers and area of competence of each of the parties involved. We feel that it is extremely important to have created the status of associate. We believe that this will enable the work of WEU to be much wider in scope than work carried out merely at Community level, and this is very important. However, although we believe that this is important, we also believe that there should be some differentiation; decisions have to be taken and member countries must take the

decisions which associate countries cannot take for them; just imagine, for instance, that in a few months' or years' time there are more associate countries than member countries. If associate countries had the same voting rights as full members, the situation could arise where associates were taking decisions over the heads of member countries.

However, I do not think we should be thinking in terms of actual countries. At the moment these countries are Iceland, Norway and Turkey, but it is not Iceland, Norway or Turkey we are concerned with. We are concerned with associate countries and, in a few years' time there will be other associate countries and most of us are well aware who those countries will be. We hope that these three countries, and all the others, will work diligently within our organisation with the sole restriction that they are not members and cannot, therefore, have the final word. They may take part in all our deliberations. They may certainly take part in all of our work, with initiatives and proposals, but we must not – at least this is our opinion – give them the ultimate right of decision. Consequently, we prefer to support an amendment which makes a greater distinction between member countries and associate countries, on the understanding that we are in favour of associate status. We believe that a great deal of progress has been made with the work of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, which has improved the position; all that remains is this question of voting rights which the French text quite clearly refers to as “voix délibérative”, whereas the English text refers to voting rights. We would be in favour of the French wording.

The PRESIDENT. – As the next speaker, Mr. Müller of Germany is not present, I will call the last speaker, who is Mr. Martinez of Spain.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am speaking now in my capacity as Chairman of the Spanish Delegation to this Assembly. We Spaniards became members later than some of you, and for various reasons were not one of the countries present at the organisation's inception, but became members at a time when membership of the organisation was being enlarged. It is therefore especially important for us, and gives us particular satisfaction to be present at this time to join in welcoming new countries and congratulating them on their accession. This certainly applies to Greece, which is a friendly country, close to Spain, with whom we will undoubtedly be in agreement in our organisation, not only on many matters of concern, but also in paying special attention to security in our continent, which contains the areas which affect us most closely, and in particular the Mediterranean. For

Mr. Martinez (continued)

a number of reasons, therefore, we are pleased with the conclusion reached in these reports, and in Mr. Ferrarini's report in particular, and are happy to be able to celebrate this important addition to our family, as full membership of Western European Union is extended to Greece. I hope to repeat this speech before the Spanish Parliament at the earliest opportunity.

Secondly, I would like to offer my congratulations and thanks to Lord Finsberg and Mr. Ferrarini for what they have achieved in such a sensitive area, and for the conclusions they have reached.

In my third point I would like to express my agreement with the statement made by my colleague Mr. de Puig a moment ago. I believe we all have a special responsibility to ensure that our organisation is dependable and thorough, because otherwise we will not be taken seriously by others. Consequently, not only because we respect ourselves, but also because we want others to respect us, we must be very thorough in our approach to the texts we propose and approve.

We are among those who want to see Western European Union enlarged to include those countries which we will be proposing in this forum today as associate members and others which we will propose as observers. These are countries which aspire to full membership, not only of this organisation but also of the European Union. We do not wish the European Union to be a limited club, but an institution which can count on the participation of those countries territorially situated along the line of the construction of Europe which accept the principles of pluralism and democracy on which our plan is based, and want to be part of it. We would like to see the European Union being enlarged to include those countries which are now or will soon become associate members and observers. We feel the greatest solidarity with such countries. I repeat: they have great aspirations to join us and to enjoy the same rights as we do. But we must not deceive them, or ourselves, nor must we continue with the relative deception in which the Council of Ministers has involved us. In the Council of Ministers the representatives of these countries will not have the same rights as ministers from countries which are full members. In the Council of Ministers, ministers representing member countries will vote, but associates and observers will not vote. The Council of Ministers has handed the Assembly a hot potato and we seem to have accepted it, but this is not responsible of us and will not be regarded as responsible by those on the outside.

We must therefore work towards ensuring that these associates and observers become full

members as soon as possible. Until then, I believe we must ensure that they can participate alongside us, including voting in committees, so that their contribution is tangible and their voice is heard, but not voting in plenary sessions of the Assembly or in the Standing Committee, because that would mean we were creating a fiction, and our resolutions would not always be taken seriously, even by those who, as observers or associates, could see that we in this organisation all have the same rights, whatever our status. With this one nuance, while welcoming everyone and reiterating our undertaking to work towards everyone becoming full members as soon as possible, we are also indicating how we shall vote on these amendments, which in my opinion improve rather than contradict Lord Finsberg's proposal and support the general thrust of his text.

The PRESIDENT. – We must now adjourn this debate.

14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I should like to propose a small change to the business tomorrow morning, with your co-operation. The order of business adopted earlier today provides for the debate on Mr. Wintgens's report to be interrupted at 11 a.m. for the address by Mr. Poos and to be resumed in the afternoon. In view of the large number of members who wish to speak in the Wintgens debate, I propose that we also continue the debate after Mr. Poos has finished. I think that that would be for the general good of the Assembly.

As there are no objections, that is agreed.

I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 30th November, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: enlargement of WEU: I. Creation of an associate member status; II. Accession of Greece; III. Creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status (Vote on the draft decisions, Documents 1390 and amendments, 1391 and 1392).
2. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1387 and amendments).

The President (continued)

3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (Presentation of the first part of the thirtieth annual report of the Council, Document 1397); Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
4. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries (Resumed debate on

the report of the Political Committee, Document 1387 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.)

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1993

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: enlargement of WEU: I. Creation of an associate member status; II. Accession of Greece; III. Creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status (*Votes on the draft decisions*, Docs. 1390 and amendments, 1391 and 1392).
Speakers: Lord Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Thompson (*Chairman*), Mr. Ferrarini (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Thompson, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Thompson.
4. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1387 and amendments).
Speakers: Mr. Wintgens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cunliffe, Mrs. Terborg, Lord Finsberg.
5. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (*Presentation of the first part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council*, Doc. 1397); Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Replies by Mr. Poos to questions put by: Mr. Steiner, Sir Russell Johnston, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Valleix.
6. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: enlargement of WEU: I. Creation of an associate member status (*Vote on the amended draft decision*, Doc. 1390).
7. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries (*Debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1387 and amendments).
Speakers: Mr. Antretter, Mr. Müller, Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Roseta, Mr. Ferrarini, Mr. Diaconescu (*Observer from Romania*), Mr. Kapsis (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Konarski (*Observer from Poland*), Mr. Pahor (*Observer from Slovenia*), Mr. Mile (*Observer from Hungary*), Mr. Sutovski (*Observer from Slovakia*), Mr. Böhm.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: enlargement of WEU

I. Creation of an associate member status

II. Accession of Greece

III. Creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status

(Votes on the draft decisions, Docs. 1390 and amendments, 1391 and 1392)

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the conclusion of the debate on the three reports from the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges relating to the enlargement of WEU.

The list of speakers was concluded yesterday and there remain only the winding-up speeches and the votes.

In the case of Lord Finsberg's report, the committee's draft decision amends the Charter of the Assembly and therefore the rules require

1. See page 20.

The President (continued)

that there should be a roll-call vote. May I urge all members present to ensure that they have signed the register, as otherwise they will not be eligible to take part in the roll-call vote.

We now begin with the replies by the Rapporteurs.

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be brief, because I think that only two points were made about the report. On going through the report of yesterday's debate, I found two kinds of speech: those from people who thought that what we were putting forward was broadly acceptable; and those from people who were worried that, by giving voting rights to associate members, we might swamp the Assembly. I think that people are under a misapprehension. In the case of associate members we are talking only about NATO countries and it has always been the wish of this Assembly that NATO countries, particularly Turkey, which is referred to in my report, should be full members and therefore should have full voting rights. If we do not go along with that, we shall be reneging on what we have said before.

I hope that those comments will enable colleagues who were somewhat doubtful to change their minds and agree to support the report unamended.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Finsberg.

Mr. Thompson, as Chairman of the committee, do you have any contribution to make?

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – First, may I apologise for the absence of the other Rapporteur, Mr. Ferrarini, whom I have just left in a meeting of the Defence Committee.

I compliment Mr. Ferrarini on the two reports that he presented. It is obvious that they are non-controversial since there have been no comments on them from the floor. He did an excellent job in preparing those reports and I assume that within the next twelve months Greece will become a full member of WEU.

The issues involved in associate membership are very important. Certainly since I have been a member of the committee, we have dealt with only modest changes in the rules – modest in the sense that there was nothing controversial about them. For example, when Spain and Portugal joined WEU we needed only to make the appropriate adjustments to the rules, and the same will apply to Greece. But the question of associate membership will be a significant change in the rules, which were drafted as far back as 1955. For thirty-eight years we have had only

modest changes, so it is important to have a good attendance in the Assembly when we consider this significant change.

My committee considered the report in detail – in fact, it was the longest sitting of the committee that I can remember especially in the context of the three countries that have been named: Turkey, Norway and Iceland. I tried to remind the committee, and I think members understood, that the question of associate membership goes somewhat beyond those three countries to the future of this organisation two, five or ten years from now. The creation of associate membership will give us some leeway. I appreciate the fact that Lord Finsberg has a difficult job with this report. The proposal means that we shall squeeze in a new stratum of membership between the current rôle of observer and full membership, and I think that in general Lord Finsberg did an excellent job.

In paragraph 3,2 (*h*), Lord Finsberg touched on an important point. I have gone through the rule book carefully over the past two days and nowhere can I find provision for expelling a member of the Assembly which is a signatory of the Brussels Treaty, and rightly so. But paragraph (*h*) provides that the Assembly can either refuse admission to an associate member or expel it. That will protect the Assembly if there are concerns about the activities or attitudes of associate members.

My committee endorsed the report in total.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for that useful explanation. Mr. Ferrarini is now in his place. Does he wish to sum up the debate?

Mr. FERRARINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The debate has revealed that there is no basic objection to Documents 1391 and 1392 and no amendments have been tabled.

I therefore thank all those who have taken part in the debate.

The PRESIDENT. – The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges has presented three draft decisions for adoption by the Assembly, one each contained in Documents 1390, 1391 and 1392.

Two amendments have been tabled to the draft decision in Document 1390. The amendments will be taken in the order in which they relate to the text, that is, 1 and 2.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others, reads as follows:

1. At the end of paragraph I.2 of the draft decision, insert "without voting rights in plenary sessions".

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman to move the amendment.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the report from Lord Finsberg is based on that by Mr. Ward, which was adopted by a majority. Mr. Ward's report proposed, among other things, giving associate members the right to vote in committees. I feel that Lord Finsberg's report should, as an outcome of this, have had to alter this rule of our Assembly's Rules of Procedure along the same lines. Yet the committee and the Rapporteur have gone further than this and given associate members a vote in the standing committee and plenary sessions as well.

One answer to the objection that the committee and Rapporteur have gone beyond what the Assembly expressed earlier might be that this is a matter of organisation and rules; one might let it pass, since the committee that deals with procedure naturally has the right to make proposals to the Assembly. However, I think my second argument is more important: like other colleagues I believe that a distinction has to be made between members and non-members of whatever organisation. In no single national or international organisation are those who are not members given the right to vote. I can see that a problem arises in respect of observers and associate members, and this is why Mr. Ward's report has chosen to give associate members a vote in committee. But a distinction must still be kept. Yesterday Mr. Martinez and Mr. de Puig emphasised that this involved the matter of respect for our organisation; how would the outside world react to an assembly that made no difference between full members and associate members? This would be impossible, even for our own credibility. The principle should be that members have a vote, while non-members can make their opinions known in the committees by putting their arguments forward. In this way, they may be able to win over their opponents. But they should not be involved in the final reaching of decisions by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I shall deal briefly with Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman's arguments and then say something about the rest of the amendment. Our document differentiates between members and non-members. That is perfectly clear, as is the difference between associate members and observers. Also, as Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman is perfectly happy that associate members should vote in committee, it is wholly illogical that they should not have the right to participate in the plenary when committee decisions come to the plenary. That would impair our credibility. If we accept the amendments, I believe that we shall dilute what we agreed yesterday in Mr. Baumel's report and also dilute our own earlier views.

I remind the Assembly that only yesterday the Secretary-General commended the Assembly for trying to find a way to do what the Council of Ministers has done. That was very helpful. We are talking about associate members who are members of NATO and the European Union. We wanted there to be a difference between full members and associate members and we have achieved that. The restriction that we are placing on associate members will ensure that they cannot vote on matters relating to the annual report as they will not have participated fully in that report in ministerial meetings. There must therefore be a meaningful distinction between full and associate members, between associate members and observers.

I remind colleagues that the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, which contains members of all political parties, was unanimous. I very much hope that the Assembly will adopt the report unamended and reject the two amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – The lack of time between the amendments being submitted to the Assembly and the conclusion of the debate means that there has not been time to call a meeting of the committee to consider them so I can merely repeat Lord Finsberg's comments – the committee unanimously endorsed the report and was quorate.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others, reads as follows:

2. In paragraph II.2 of the draft decision, leave out "and have" and insert "without".

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman to move the amendment.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*). – I shall not repeat the arguments that I put forward in relation to the first amendment as the same goes for Amendment 2.

I wish to respond to one aspect of Lord Finsberg's remarks. He told the Assembly that I had said that I was completely happy about associate members having voting rights in committee meetings. I did not say that; I merely said that, as the Assembly adopted John Ward's report, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges would have to reckon with that.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I heard very clearly what Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman said

Lord Finsberg (continued)

in her first item. I repeat that the committee looked at the whole issue and took a decision. If you examine the names on the document you will see that there is unanimity. I can only say that I do not believe that the amendments are doing any credit to the Assembly. If the Assembly now decides that it wants to accept the second amendment, it is merely compounding the damage that has already been done.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – I can only repeat the comments that I made earlier, and that is only time-consuming.

The PRESIDENT. – I advise the Assembly that, as I said earlier when we started our proceedings, when some were not in the Chamber, a roll-call vote is required on the draft decision as it amends the Charter of the Assembly, but for a roll-call vote we need a majority of members of the Assembly, that is 55, who have signed the register. So far this morning, fewer than 55 have signed, so we cannot vote yet. If the Assembly agrees – I stress this – I propose that the vote should be deferred until immediately after the address by Mr. Poos, when we should have good attendance by then. Do you agree with that proposition? Anyone against? That is agreed. Thank you very much.

May I urge all members who have not signed the register to do so as soon as possible.

I will not name names, but I saw one colleague sitting here in the previous debate who held up a piece of paper rather than a voting card. His vote was not counted. Fortunately, it was not material in winning or losing, but it is important that members use the card of the day.

I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft decision contained in Document 1391. There have been no requests for a roll-call vote on this, in which case we will proceed to the actual vote.

We shall vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft decision is adopted unanimously¹.

We shall now vote on the draft decision contained in Document 1392.

We shall vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft decision is adopted unanimously².

Congratulations to Mr. Ferrarini.

As I said, a roll-call vote will be taken at the end of the address and questions to Mr. Poos.

4. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1387 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the presentation by Mr. Wintgens of the report of the Political Committee on WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries, Document 1387 and amendments.

I call Mr. Wintgens to present his report.

Mr. WINTGENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in presenting this report on WEU's relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, I am addressing myself not just to all the members of this Assembly in an effort to win the maximum support possible for the work of our committee, but equally to the many observers from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe who are present here with us. The latter, I know, are particularly concerned by the considerations and reasons that have led me, as Rapporteur, and the committee to present the report and recommendation in the form that has been circulated to you.

However, I must first address a word or two to the WEU Council and the representatives of the member governments who have taken on the difficult task of developing and applying a coherent policy of co-operation with the countries I have just mentioned.

The initial intention behind my report was to reply to the first part of the Council's thirty-ninth annual report to the Assembly. I was not able to do so as the annual report reached the Assembly too late to be considered by the Political Committee. In any case, the short chapter of the Council's annual report dealing with relations with the countries of Central Europe unfortunately contains nothing new and consequently does not serve in any way to blunt our criticisms regarding the insufficiency of the information provided by the Council about practical co-operation within the framework of the Forum of Consultation or about the political objectives pursued therein.

It was not until 12th November 1993, as a result of the joint French, German and Polish initiative in Warsaw, that things began to move in the Council, a fact that will lead us to table several amendments to the recommendation. I will come back to these later.

What am I referring to here? The deep-rooted desire of Central and Eastern European countries for reliable security guarantees through

1. See page 22.

2. See page 23.

Mr. Wintgens (continued)

association with western security structures has for some time been one of the main subjects for discussion within the alliance and WEU. So far it has not been possible to find answers to satisfy all the countries concerned and, let me say from the outset that there was no way, disappointing though this may be to the representatives of the countries in question, that my report could supply a definitive answer either.

Our objectives were firstly to examine the situation in Central and Eastern Europe – a situation we might describe as volatile both in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe themselves and also their larger neighbour, Russia – and secondly to analyse developments in WEU in order to identify more clearly the direction the organisation should take if we are to strengthen our relations with these countries. We are well aware in this connection – and the report spells it out – that this issue is bound up with the nature of WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance as the European pillar of defence of the alliance and therefore that the approach the NATO summit takes as regards the alliance's future relations with the countries of Eastern Europe is one of direct concern to us.

Nevertheless, we have always emphasised the importance of a parallel approach by the European Union and WEU, which is an integral part of that Union, in developing their relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and more particularly so since the momentous date marking the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty.

Now it is precisely within this context that the Franco-German proposal of 12th November 1993 falls. It is aimed at “an association status that should be open to the partners in the consultation that have already signed an association agreement with the European Union and, when the time comes, to those that will have signed such an agreement”.

Notwithstanding the need to redraft the terms of the proposed status more precisely, this formula seems to me to take the right direction in its open nature whereby none of the partners in the Forum of Consultation is excluded.

The WEU Council was however unable to reach agreement on this proposal at the meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November, a fact which is hardly surprising since there seems to have been no consultation with the other WEU member countries beforehand. Moreover, the time was very short between 12th and 21st November.

However, the Ministerial Council requested the Permanent Council to “reflect on an enhanced status and its content, including the Franco-German proposal of 12th November, for

those consultation partners who had already concluded or would conclude a Europe agreement with the European Union”.

Although the fact that the Permanent Council was asked to study this proposal is a positive factor, the result of these reflexions will definitely not be submitted to ministers before the next meeting, scheduled for 9th and 10th May 1994, and we cannot anticipate the conclusions that the ministers will draw from the Permanent Council's report.

My feeling is that we should not set such a distant dead-line for reaching agreement on the implementation of the Franco-German proposal. It would be better to arrive at a common position in time for the NATO summit so as to be in a position to start negotiations with the countries concerned from January next year.

Such an approach is more than just desirable since a great deal of time has already been wasted. There should be no difficulty in recognising that this type of initiative from WEU is compatible not only with the American partnership for peace plan within the framework of the alliance, but also with the implementation of the Balladur plan for a pact for stability in Europe, the aim of which would be to guarantee frontiers and minority rights.

To those who might be wondering why the report from the Political Committee did not actually state that the time was ripe for granting Central European countries a specific status within the framework of WEU, I would reply that we preferred the pragmatic to the legal approach in which the risk of argument over terminology would have been inevitable.

The debate in the WEU Council is an eloquent illustration.

The expression “associate status” has already prompted reservations among certain member and associate countries and the Council now uses the expression “enhanced status” but the fact is that the Franco-German proposal, like the Luxembourg declaration of 22nd November 1993, defines the purpose of developing these closer relations with the countries concerned as their increased participation in WEU's work.

This is precisely what we propose in our report, the only difference being that the report and accompanying recommendation are couched in far more concrete terms.

We want the Forum of Consultation from now on to work to a structured programme including joint development of the assessment of risks and dangers that is essential for determining what form of security guarantee should be sought.

We propose that the countries in question should be allowed to participate in the work of WEAG and possibly be associated in the work of

Mr. Wintgens (continued)

the WEU Satellite Centre and we also propose that the conditions should be defined in which these countries might participate in the meetings of WEU Chiefs of Staff and the work of the Planning Cell.

The message contained in this report is therefore one of greater co-operation in very concrete and practical areas, which also encourages rapprochement at the political level. We believe that, as a result of all this, effective help can be given to the countries in question, and difficulties over forms of words avoided. This kind of pragmatic approach is necessary particularly in the case of the operational co-operation already in place between WEU and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria over the blockade on the Danube.

In this connection, the Luxembourg communiqué merely refers to the excellent co-operation with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania while the annual report welcomes the signature of the memoranda of understanding with the three countries which made it possible to set up an operation to assist in enforcing the embargo on the Danube.

I must, in passing, point out a serious omission in the Council's text. Nowhere does it include any reference to the fact that these three countries are paying dearly in economic, financial and political terms for an operation which also imperils their security. I have made this point in my report and I should like to repeat it here: these three countries are co-operating loyally with WEU and NATO without obtaining in return any kind of protection or guarantee against reprisals from the country on which the United Nations has imposed sanctions.

Hence my request to the Council that WEU should no longer go on turning a blind eye to this omission and should take practical steps to give the three countries assurances on security commensurate with the risks they are having to run. Furthermore, the Council should, as soon as possible, look at ways of providing them with financial compensation for the losses caused them by this activity.

So, as a member of the Assembly, I would like to tell the representatives of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria that the entire Assembly greatly appreciates their countries' firm commitment to helping WEU and the international community enforce the sanctions imposed by the United Nations against Serbia, and is very grateful to them.

In the course of preparing this report, the committee and the Rapporteur were able to visit several Central European countries and this allowed us to improve our knowledge of them

and understand better the frequently complex problems that continue to exist in some regions in this part of Europe.

The continuing economic difficulties in the majority of the countries in question are further compounded for one thing by problems of minority rights and in certain cases by border conflicts of which the causes are many and varied. However, in all the countries visited, the committee and the Rapporteur were met with expressions of a real determination on the part of political leaders to find peaceful solutions to these difficulties and some countries exhibited – it cannot be denied, with some justification – a growing impatience with the slowness of the process that should bring them closer to the structures of Western Europe in general and to its vital security structures in particular.

Any feeling they may have of rejection or lack of interest on the part of the West or any impression that the West is opposed to their aspirations, could have long-term repercussions on the way the political scenarios of all these countries unfold.

In my view, rapid implementation of the Balladur plan in parallel with WEU action could prove helpful in this connection, since an approach such as this under the aegis of the Twelve – rather than in the framework of the Council of Europe or the CSCE – would have the advantage of signalling clearly to the countries concerned the purpose of this action, namely, to prepare for their association with Western European institutions.

The situation remains disturbing especially in the case of Ukraine, a country requiring in-depth study. The Rapporteur had hoped to base such a study on a visit to Kiev which unfortunately did not materialise. The speech that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is to make to the Assembly on Thursday next is therefore of particular interest.

It is not my intention to refer to all the aspects of the written report not dealt with in this oral presentation – and we could go on discussing at even greater length the problems experienced by the countries bordering on those involved in the Balkan conflict. In conclusion, however, I should like to point out that this report falls within the context of the continuing commitment of the Assembly of WEU as a whole to help establish a new order of stability and security in Europe, a task for which WEU must take primary responsibility, but without yielding to the temptation of making impossible promises.

WEU is more than a union of defence. It represents a pooling of our destinies, a commitment to democracy, the concept of a way of life shared by the peoples of the West that make up that union and at the same time a goal that is both

Mr. Wintgens (continued)

vibrant and appealing to the peoples of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We have a responsibility to history not to disappoint such deep-felt yearnings towards the West and all it stands for.

Let me conclude with a question on which I leave you to ponder. Should not WEU, defence pillar of the former European Economic Community and now of the European Union announce the deliberate extension of its horizons by changing its name to Union for the defence or security of Europe, in other words from now on drop the "Western", and make it just European Union? There would then be a truer match between the name and the new, wider perspective within which we have decided to operate.

(Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – May I remind you that in accordance with a proposal by the President, the Assembly has decided on a five-minute limit on speeches. I urge you to comply with this decision.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Cunliffe.

Mr. CUNLIFFE (*United Kingdom*). – Madam President and friends, first may I congratulate the Rapporteur on an incisive and comprehensive report. It was a pretty strict analysis of historic events and also of the future initiatives that some of us believe are imperative if we are to deal with some of the problems that WEU inherited, and other problems that we have taken on board.

I suggest to the Assembly that that in-depth analysis in some respects echoes some of the sentiments and policies of western governments as they have come around to forming the framework of a reinforced additional collective security for this region and for the whole of Europe, including both West and East.

As was said yesterday, after the Maastricht Treaty, we believed that we ought to accelerate the process in many respects by taking initiatives that were both realistic and practical for the circumstances and environment that we found ourselves in. I want to comment on what the Secretary-General of NATO said yesterday on crisis-management. These days we are always in crisis-management in one way or another. I want to compare economic and military crisis-management. There is no point in raising the hopes of the nations that are newcomers to our Assembly on the basis of saying to them that we are all economically interdependent to a large degree without guaranteeing them collective security for their countries at some point in

time. One would be guilty of deception if one said that, in the long term that might be an objective, but that at present we have a framework of collective security for particular countries. With due respect, if one catalogues events – such as Greece and Macedonia, the Turkish-Cypriot problem and the British-Irish problem – to a large extent we cannot come to this Council with clean hands. Obviously, injustices have been perpetrated throughout the region, even within the democratic framework of Western Europe before the Eastern European nations evolved from their political chains.

Let us take a classic example of crisis-management, when NATO told the United Nations that it was not really NATO's problem, that it had no expertise in crisis-management, and that it was only a deterrent force. For thirty years NATO has acted purely as a deterrent. NATO has never been in on the political scenes that WEU finds itself involved in, and in the confrontations that take place, when aggression and intervention are necessary. NATO's rôle has been deterrence but no intervention. Now we have to embrace something within NATO and within the other defence organisations. We have to come together with a positive rôle.

We saw that the United Nations was at first paralysed with indecision about Yugoslavia. Then there were a series of pussyfooting operations, which were meaningless in the face of that terrible saga of appalling pain and misery inflicted on minority elements.

I am honestly of the view that unless we are able to act together as quickly as possible, especially after the summit, we will not have the right to raise the hopes of the newcomers to our European family.

In conclusion, we have to be seen to act. We can see and we can judge, but it is acting that matters in such situations. The sooner that we get a positive, permanent initiative, which will give some confidence to those member countries coming under our security umbrella, the better.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Terborg.

Mrs. TERBORG (*Germany*) (Translation). – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, we spent yesterday endeavouring to assign a new rôle to WEU in the security architecture of Europe, although – and this was almost tangible – the elegant words and phrases deployed in this attempt to find a new purpose created more insecurity than security.

The general view seems to be that WEU should be regarded as a staging post for states that cannot yet become NATO partners because of the need to consider the sensitivities of other

Mrs. Terborg (continued)

states and because WEU membership could be an excellent means of offering them a graduated security partnership.

All this is discussed against the backdrop of deploring the inadequacy of the information provided by the Council to our Assembly. If we are to define a new rôle, we should at least be given adequate information about the member countries' intentions; but I suppose we will have to wait till the summit – or even longer – for that.

Western European Union will have to perform some clever mental acrobatics in order to offer graduated security partnerships that take account of the neutral status of Austria, respect the Baltic interests of Finland and Sweden which want to join the European Union, promise security to the Central and Eastern European countries that cannot yet be given full NATO protection because of other, more dominant interests, and moreover are of such a nature as not to cause concern in Russia, the Ukraine or elsewhere.

The recommendation before us in Document 1387 by Mr. Wintgens describes this squaring of the circle very neatly.

If we then remember that, as we heard yesterday, our WEU is to become a kind of reserve intervention body for all those situations in which the more cumbersome NATO is not appropriate, we can see that we are saddling ourselves with a rather impressive security puzzle.

The idea of WEU giving a rapid and more flexible response to threatening situations will not only cause misgiving among the Central and Eastern European states we are now inviting to graduated security partnerships; it will also be a headache for the existing member countries – including my own country. Let me speak quite undiplomatically: a substantial number of my countrymen are against peace-keeping actions by the United Nations and would have the same consistent dislike for peace-keeping activities under WEU helmets in the danger areas of world politics. We have read Orwell too carefully. So if need be, we too will have to be offered a special form of security partnership.

The security cheques we are indirectly offering Central and Eastern Europe with today's recommendation are still not covered. I would like to know exactly what form they will take before endorsing them. I can already hear the objection that these are merely recommendations to the Council and that it is the Council that has to worry about them. But that does not really cheer me up either, just as our very limited influence depresses me anyway.

We, the Assembly, initiate something. We have no influence over the execution or scale of

what we have started. But we bear full co-responsibility, since we initiated the idea. That is what is making me hesitate today, as I would in comparable situations in the future.

(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I compliment Mr. Wintgens on a full and balanced report which contributes a great deal to our discussions. I have one specific remark to make and then some general ones. I hope that all concerned will be careful when reading paragraphs 78 and 79 of the report, because I do not think that Greece could be surprised if many other countries followed the words that the French Government have used.

At the moment, the nations outside WEU need some form of reassurance. Those new democracies are asking, understandably, "What protection do we have?" My question is, "From what nation within WEU do they require protection?" It is the chicken and egg situation. We have to find out what the fears are and why they have those fears and then separate those from the arguments that are growing almost daily, which are based not upon the old fears of aggression but upon nationality and minority issues and the like. They make life much more difficult in deciding how WEU could be of any assistance. To intervene in a civil war is very different from protecting a nation at its borders from an aggressor and I am not sure that we have addressed that issue in sufficient detail or depth.

It is unlikely that WEU will amend its treaty to permit full membership to many other countries, so what can we do to try to assuage the understandable fears of some of those countries? Regular meetings where those countries can express their worries and exchange ideas would be a good thing, based upon links with the Council of Ministers. But we are a parliamentary assembly and we need to set up some mechanism. In that regard, I compliment you, Mr. President, on arranging for the Standing Committee to meet later this week to meet representatives of some of those countries. We need to do that on a more regular basis so that the politicians and parliamentarians can sit down, perhaps at regular meetings of our Political and Defence Committees, to see where we can go and how it is possible to resolve the genuine fears that exist in the parliaments of those countries.

One of the difficulties in those countries is that the expectations that they had when they left the communist world were too high and they wanted to achieve them too quickly. It was a belief fostered by many people that the cessation of communism would mean almost immediate

Lord Finsberg (continued)

utopian prosperity, but we have seen how governments in Poland, Bulgaria and other countries have suffered as a result. We must make sure that we are not guilty of committing the same sin when we deal with the anxiety about potential aggression.

To sum up, I think that we must know on what those fears are based and we must try to find a way of answering those fears within our mechanisms. There is not much time in which to do it, and much as I compliment Mr. Wintgens, I am not sure that he has yet told the Assembly how we can do this. Of course, he does not pretend that it was his task to do so, but, following on from his excellent report, we must address that difficulty at the earliest possible moment.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is adjourned.

5. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council

(Presentation of the first part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1397)

Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

The PRESIDENT. – It is now time for the presentation by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the first part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council. Mr. Poos has kindly agreed to answer questions after his address.

You are, I believe, one of the WEU Council's longest-standing members. We are well aware of the energy that you and your country, Luxembourg, have committed to exercising the presidency of the Council in the past, and you have already fulfilled many of our high hopes of your present term.

The Assembly has always appreciated your unswerving commitment to parliamentary democracy as the essential foundation for Europe. Your unremitting efforts to ensure that WEU acts at all times according to this commitment have already enabled us to improve relations between the two organs of WEU, which seemed compromised when I took over the presidency of the Assembly last June. I think I can fairly say that we have each of us worked actively together to dispel misunderstandings and reconcile differing points of view and it is very largely thanks to you that we have made substantial progress and been able to set aside

many of the factors that jeopardised good relations between the Assembly and the Council. That was characterised by your performance last week in Luxembourg at the Presidential and Political and Defence Committees where you answered our questions and enabled us to have a thorough, integrated session. We are delighted to see you with us. We know that you have flown in from Geneva, where you had important talks about the future, as we did yesterday.

I invite you to take the floor.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, to speak to the parliamentary Assembly of WEU in the week following the first Council of Ministers under the Luxembourg presidency is both a privilege and a pleasurable duty. I therefore thank the Assembly and its President, Sir Dudley Smith, for this invitation. Responding to it is part and parcel of the strengthening of political relations between the Assembly and the Council that the Luxembourg presidency has included in its programme.

I should also like to thank Sir Dudley for his kind words with regard both to myself and to the Luxembourg presidency.

Following the Council meeting, I discussed the results with the Presidential Committee and the members of the Political and Defence Committees so that it was the WEU Assembly that first received information from us on the work of the Council. On that occasion, I referred among other things to the results of the meeting held on 22nd November in Luxembourg, when the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Twelve adopted a plan of action for former Yugoslavia.

As you know, in the knowledge that with the approach of winter a humanitarian disaster is impending, that the war and atrocities are continuing and that negotiations have become bogged down, the European Union has decided to launch a new diplomatic offensive.

For the present, this new initiative has three priorities: seeing to it that humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina is effectively dispatched and actually gets through, negotiating a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina and establishing a *modus vivendi* for the Croatia territories under the mandate of UNPROFOR.

Two other London conferences may be held in the medium term to look for a solution to all former Yugoslavia's other problems including that of Kosovo.

Yesterday, I attended the meeting in Geneva between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Twelve and Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman

Mr. Poos (continued)

and Milosevic. Mr. Karadjic and Mr. Boban also attended. Russia, the United States and the other members of the enlarged steering committee attended as observers. At this meeting, the European Union set forth its plan and heard the first reactions of the three Presidents.

As regards humanitarian action, a meeting on this subject was also held in Geneva yesterday afternoon with the main Bosnian military leaders in attendance. It was chaired by Mrs. Ogata. The President of the European Union and the European Commission described to the meeting the joint action undertaken by the Union.

General Cot and General Briquemont obtained the signature of the Bosnians to a joint declaration guaranteeing free movement for humanitarian convoys and authorising the use of force against uncontrolled parties.

It is too soon to hope for a definitive assessment of this new and ongoing stage of negotiation. Experience also warns us to exercise prudence. Too many hopes have been dashed and too many undertakings broken during this conflict.

On the other hand, two conclusions can already be drawn from our meeting yesterday.

The first concerns humanitarian action in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the declaration of 18th November last, when Mrs. Ogata was in the chair, was confirmed and supplemented by two other declarations setting out the undertakings of the different Bosnian parties.

The second concerns the negotiation of a peace plan. The three parties have agreed to resume negotiations in Geneva forthwith, on the basis of the progress made on the "Invincible" and the new action plan submitted by the European Union. Thanks to the European initiative, the Geneva negotiations have started up again.

The substance of our proposal is well known: we informed the three parties that the negotiation of a peace accord for Bosnia-Herzegovina had to be based on the results of the negotiations up to 20th September last.

We invited the Serbs to make further territorial concessions of a similar magnitude to those demanded by the Bosnian President in September. In return, sanctions would be phased out but on three conditions: an accord had to be signed, it had to be put into effect and observed and a modus vivendi had to be found for the Croatian territories.

Mr. Izetbegovic has been encouraged to accept the peace plan if the Serbs are prepared to make the concessions requested. The con-

tinuing support he is receiving from the international community justified that encouragement.

As for the Bosnian Croats, they were asked to confirm their agreement of September, including the grant of access to the sea for the Bosnian state. The European Union is aware of the valid grounds for the Croatian position regarding the full application of the Vance plan but Mr. Tudjman should for the present show a constructive attitude towards the establishment of a modus vivendi for the Croatian territories under United Nations mandate. This would include a cease-fire and confidence-building measures which should, among other things, improve communications throughout the region.

President Tudjman was also discouraged from launching further offensive action by the threat of the negative measures that might be taken against his country. Conversely, a conciliatory attitude on his part would induce the European Union to develop economic relations and co-operation with Croatia, including humanitarian co-operation.

Following yesterday's meeting, I think I can say that thanks to action by the European Union a new momentum has been created. The meeting has once again demonstrated that the European Union is not prepared to let itself be discouraged by either the complexity or the persistence of this terrible conflict and that, on the contrary, it is capable of imaginative action designed to restore conditions in which a process bringing peace and relief for human suffering may be set in train. However, as President Claes said yesterday morning, we must be clear on one point: in the end, the solution depends on the parties themselves. It is their fate that is concerned, and it is for them to understand this and draw the necessary conclusions.

Ladies and gentlemen, that leaves me to talk about the result of the last WEU ministerial meeting. The formulation of a European defence policy closely involving WEU - perhaps even, in due course, a common European defence policy - is designed precisely to equip Europe with the resources it needs to take up the challenges of the post-cold war period. This is admittedly a long-term task calling for long-term effort. However, the process is now back on track.

On 22nd November last in Luxembourg, the WEU Council of Ministers reached three decisions and issued an important final communiqué, the Luxembourg declaration. Before commenting on these decisions, may I remind you that the meeting concerned was a political "first". It was the first WEU Council of Ministers to meet after the entry into force of the treaty on European Union with the membership laid down in the declaration by the

Mr. Poos (continued)

extraordinary meeting of the European Council held on 29th October 1993. In other words it was the first occasion in which the Union was officially present at WEU as such. An important stage in the political construction of Europe has thus been reached.

There were three political dimensions to this first WEU ministerial meeting to be held after the entry into force of the treaty on European Union. First, our relations with the European Union were defined in a form which is entirely compatible with the development of our relations with NATO. In Luxembourg, we consulted as European allies with the NATO summit meeting to be held on 10th January next in view. Second, the prospect was opened up of a new type of link between WEU and its consultation partners. Third, we agreed on the conditions governing WEU's utilisation of the European corps in line with the progress made in strengthening WEU's operational rôle.

This is the order I shall follow in these comments on the main passages in the Luxembourg declaration.

With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1st November last there began a new stage in the process of creating a European security and defence identity. This has two important consequences for WEU.

The first is of a formal nature. With the entry into force of the treaty in view, the European Council meeting in Brussels on 29th October last approved a paper on legal and practical procedures for its implementation. This includes a chapter on common foreign policy and security, part of which concerns the future of relations with the European Union and WEU on the basis of the declaration issued by the WEU member states in Maastricht. Annex IV in this chapter focuses more particularly on WEU. It was approved by the Permanent Council on 26th October last, and the Luxembourg Prime Minister so informed the European Council. The WEU Council of Ministers confirmed the approval at their Luxembourg meetings.

The second consequence of the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty relates to the organic relationship between WEU and the European Union. From now on, WEU is part and parcel of – and has to develop with – the European Union. Standing ready to formulate and implement such decisions by the Union as have military implications, WEU will be the Union's military and operational arm.

The practical co-operation which already existed between WEU and the European Community is thus institutionalised and intensified. The two presidencies will play a vital part in this respect. The Belgian presidency and ours have

already worked together in preparation for the Brussels summit meeting and the Luxembourg presidency of WEU has no doubt whatsoever that the same co-operation will continue with Greece over the next six months. The two secretariats are invited to collaborate and to ensure the necessary transparency for the work done in the two organisations. In future, a European Union delegation, possibly including the European Commission, will take part in our studies on a common foreign and security policy.

Another step bringing the two organisations closer together was the decision taken in Luxembourg to reduce the duration of the WEU presidency to six months from 1st July 1994, thus making it the same as that of the European Union presidency. On the same occasion the Ministers invited the Permanent Council to give further thought to the harmonisation of the presidencies of the European Union and WEU.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as agreed in Rome and Maastricht, the Atlantic Alliance will remain the essential forum for consultation among the allies and the body in which the allies will agree on policies affecting their security and defence commitments under the Washington Treaty. Work is continuing on adapting the structures of the alliance to the new security requirements. Close working relations have developed in Brussels between WEU and the alliance.

Some weeks in advance of the important deadline of 10th January next – the date of the NATO summit – WEU ministers have reaffirmed the basic importance of a strong transatlantic partnership for the security and stability of Europe. Application of the Maastricht Treaty will make for greater cohesion in the European pillar and an increased European contribution to the alliance. The development of a European security and defence identity will be a vital feature of the regenerated and reinforced transatlantic partnership. In addition, these European processes will help to adapt the alliance to its new challenges.

The security of Europe remains inseparable from that of North America. Close transatlantic links and the continued presence of American forces in Europe are in the interests of all the allies and as vital as ever for the security of the alliance. In the event of any future crisis WEU and NATO should hold consultations, if necessary in joint Council meetings, to decide whether they need to co-operate and if so in what conditions. For the alliance, the NATO summit meeting will be a great opportunity to adapt its military structures and procedures to the new challenges of regional conflicts and crises and the changes will involve a greater rôle for the European countries.

Mr. Poos (continued)

We are aware of the need to plan specifically European options in addition to the cases of collective defence referred to in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. With this in mind, the WEU ministers look to the NATO summit meeting to approve the principle that WEU should be entitled to use not only the forces and resources of the European allies but also the collective facilities of the Atlantic Alliance, such as communications and transport systems, command facilities and headquarters. The WEU ministers considered that a deeper study should be made of the cases and conditions in which this principle should be applied, and of the possibility of making available at the same time specifically WEU operational capabilities as they are developed.

In their main thrust, the views expressed last Monday before this Assembly by the NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Manfred Wörner, are in line with the relevant passages in the Luxembourg declaration. I welcome this cohesion, and the assessment made of the threats facing us and of the efforts and resources required to deal with them.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, one of the most keenly discussed questions at the Council meeting was the development of WEU's external relations. For this I refer you to the Luxembourg declaration, and shall confine myself here to our relations with our partners in the Forum of Consultation. We are now in a position to embark on a decisive stage in the history of WEU's relations with its partners on the European continent. Now that we have the European Union in effective existence and a common foreign and security policy, our Central European partners are hoping that their relations with WEU will be strengthened.

In Luxembourg, Ministers welcomed the European agreements recently concluded. These provide a basis for increased co-operation with a view to membership of the European Union, thus opening up the prospect of accession to WEU.

In the Luxembourg declaration, WEU gave the right signal; Ministers invited the Permanent Council to think about an enhanced status for these countries and what its content might be. On 12th November, France and Germany made a proposal concerning those consultation partners who have already concluded or are about to conclude a European agreement with the European Union. This proposal should figure in the Permanent Council's deliberations. Under that heading, the Permanent Council will need to determine ways in which these countries could play a more important part in WEU activities and, in particular, participate in the initiatives and missions outlined in the Petersberg declaration.

The next ministerial meeting of our Forum of Consultation, to be held in Luxembourg on 10th May next, will provide an opportunity to review this study and thus to reach a new stage in the relations between WEU and its Central European partners.

The third feature of the decisions taken in Luxembourg was that WEU should be given the wherewithal to accomplish its aims. WEU will continue to develop its activities on the basis of the guidelines set out in the Maastricht and Petersberg declarations. It will require the military capabilities needed by its member states to perform their duties particularly for the missions specified in the Petersberg declaration.

In Luxembourg, the Ministers approved the report on the relations between WEU and the forces to come under its command. They welcomed the designation by member states of multinational and national forces which could be placed under WEU command if so decided by member states in full exercise of their national sovereignty and in compliance with their respective constitutions. The European corps, the (central) multinational division – consisting of Belgian, United Kingdom, Netherlands and German units – and the amphibious United Kingdom-Netherlands unit have already been designated as multinational forces under WEU command.

In Luxembourg, Ministers confirmed the adoption of the joint declaration on the conditions of the deployment of the European corps in the WEU context, and the relevant interpretations.

For the details of this operational feature of the Luxembourg decisions I refer you to the Luxembourg declaration of 22nd November 1993, but I would stress that the Luxembourg presidency already attaches, and will continue to attach, very great importance to the work of WEU in the peace-keeping field.

On 22nd November, Ministers were presented with a report by the presidency on WEU's general peace-keeping rôle and invited the Permanent Council to consider how further progress might be made in the study.

In this context, I would point out that next February the presidency will hold a WEU seminar on peace-keeping. Visitors to be invited will include the members of the Forum of Consultation. The Assembly will also be sent an invitation.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this is necessarily a brief outline but I hope that it covers all the ground.

To the Maastricht-Petersberg-Rome triad, we have now added Luxembourg as a new and important stage in the development of WEU as the defence constituent of the European Union

Mr. Poos (continued)

and a means of strengthening the European pillar of the alliance.

Substantial progress has been made. The Luxembourg meeting of the Council of Ministers has advanced us across a new threshold in the implementation of the Maastricht and Petersberg declarations. This new stage forms part of the important qualitative breakthrough achieved by the European Union thanks to the progress made in developing a common foreign and security policy and the provision of the resources it needs to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities of the post-cold war period.

I should not like to conclude without welcoming the presence, in addition to that of future associate members, of the parliamentary delegations from Ireland and Iceland. Their attendance and that of many delegations from other countries bears eloquent witness to the strong appeal of the WEU parliamentary Assembly.

I also wish to hail the critical yet constructive rôle played by the WEU Assembly. I have studied the Assembly documents with great interest and I admire the remarkable quality of the reports presented by the various committees. I am well aware that WEU has the only European parliamentary Assembly with responsibilities for defence. The Luxembourg presidency will continue to attach great importance to fruitful relations between the Council and the Assembly.

Within our one organisation, our duty is to lend strength to each other. Let us do so with commitment and trust. It is in these terms that I would like to reaffirm the presidency's support for the Assembly, which must continue to be WEU's political driving force and to represent the organisation to the world.

The PRESIDENT. – Many thanks, Mr. Poos, for that very interesting summary of what has been happening and for those assurances in your final words about the merits and usefulness of this Assembly and the co-operation with you and the permanent Assembly. We have a number of questions for you.

I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Poos, in your statement referring to the military forces to be placed at Western European Union's disposal in order to carry out its tasks, you also spoke of Eurocorps. Allow me to point out that Eurocorps was created in order to ensure that WEU had such forces.

You provided a number of items of information. One suggests that there is a binding agreement between Eurocorps and SACEUR

on recourse to Eurocorps. The reference in the Luxembourg declaration to the possibility of Western European Union deploying Eurocorps where necessary is not binding.

Do you not think it might be important to give Western European Union a right of access, in terms of intervention possibilities, that is just as binding as the agreement between Eurocorps and SACEUR?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, the purpose behind the constitution of Eurocorps is to avoid military policies becoming nationalist again. The question I have been asked concerns the extent to which WEU deployment of Eurocorps would be obligatory. Three possible scenarios can be imagined.

First, the European Union requests military engagement by WEU within a given radius after a threat to Europe and to the security of Europe has been identified. In this case, WEU decides to use Eurocorps and other forces available for action.

Second, after consultation with the allies, a condition in every case, WEU decides to deploy Eurocorps on its own initiative. As all WEU decisions are taken unanimously, no country can find itself in a minority. In this case, it will obviously be for the countries participating in Eurocorps to give the green light.

Third, a member state asks WEU to put troops at its disposal for a given crisis centre. In this case, the WEU Council will deliberate, take its decision unanimously and authorise the use of military force, possibly including Eurocorps.

It may well be that over the next few months we shall work out a method or procedure that is more detailed than the provisions in the Luxembourg political declaration regarding procedure and case by case conditions. I know that you are not asking for details on the political declaration by Ministers on 22nd November last. All I am saying is that this does not exclude the elaboration by the different headquarters of much more detailed instructions for use, if I may put it that way.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – On the question of former Yugoslavia, first on a question of fact, you said that the main military leaders were in Geneva, but according to the press General Mladic, who is surely the most important military leader, has boycotted the meeting. I should like to know the facts.

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

Secondly, in respect of Kosovo, where the most serious repression continues, can the Minister explain what leverage will continue on Serbia, to make it cease the repression, if sanctions are removed as part of a Bosnian agreement?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – It is true that General Mladic, the Serbian military leader, was unable to attend the Geneva meeting, but he never said he wanted to boycott it. In the joint declaration signed by the military leaders in the presence of General Cot and General Briquemont, Mr. Karadjic, the political leader of the Bosnian Serbs, signed the agreement in his place. We therefore have three signatures on this document: that of General Izetbegovic for Bosnia, General Petrovic for Croatia and Mr. Karadjic for the Bosnian Serbs. These decisions will be implemented in good faith. Paragraph F of the joint declaration makes express provision for the use of force against anyone attempting to prevent the free passage of humanitarian convoys.

As regards sanctions, our attitude was very cautious. They are a powerful lever that the international community can use to wrest concessions from the Serbs. They will not be lifted, just temporarily withdrawn, if three conditions – which I gave in my speech – are met. Action will be phased, so that the international community and the United Nations Security Council in particular will always be able to hold this sword of Damocles over the heads of the Serbian leaders.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to return to the subject of Bosnia and the Geneva meeting. The Chairman-in-Office said that an agreement had been signed between the political and military heads and that agreement would guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid, with the use of force if necessary. In answer to my colleague, Sir Russell Johnston, he then said that the main military man was not at the meeting. I have two questions. When have the military ever obeyed the political leadership in Serbia? Secondly if, as most of us believe, the document was signed in invisible ink by more than one of the parties, will we go through with the use of force and make certain that the convoys get through?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of*

Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) (Translation). – I share Lord Finsberg's scepticism. As I have said, too many signed agreements have been violated, and there is no certainty that the military leaders, the warlords, will obey the orders of the politicians. However, with the declaration that Mrs. Ogata has had signed by the three Bosnian parties and with the new document signed yesterday in Geneva, it is my view that provided we give UNPROFOR the necessary resources in men and equipment, it will be able to force a way through the roadblocks set up by uncontrolled local bands. In addition, as I have said, we still have the sword of Damocles of sanctions to force anyone trying to prevent humanitarian convoys from reaching their destination to see sense and give way.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, your speech this morning, after those by Mr. Wörner and Mr. van Eekelen yesterday, stresses the importance of the period we are now living through in terms of our external relations and especially those with NATO.

You referred in particular to a European security and defence identity. For this European identity there have to be two approaches, the Europeans', which is of course positive, and that of the Americans which needs to be at the very least welcoming, and if possible positive.

On the American side, is there not some reluctance to shout about our togetherness in the alliance? If so, why, and do you see any improvement on the way?

Once we have this European identity, we also need to have some of the resources of the alliance at our disposal, as you have said. Is there not some American reluctance here too, particularly with regard to the idea of an amphibian group? Can you reassure us on this point?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I think I can reassure Mr. Valleix. There may have been some reluctance in the past, but it was above all on the part of the United States administration, not at the political level. In addition, at both the political and the lower level, our relations with the Americans have greatly improved in recent months, as shown by the invitation of the President of the Permanent Council, Mr. Linster, to Washington and our countless contacts with the United States Permanent Representative to NATO and the United States Ambassador in Luxembourg. So there is very close and frequent consultation between the presidency of WEU, the WEU Permanent Council and the United States. This

Mr. Poos (continued)

consultation has put an end to any feeling of mistrust there may have been in the past.

The NATO summit meeting will confirm this vitally necessary co-operation between our organisation and NATO. We therefore have nothing to worry about in this connection.

The PRESIDENT. – I always feel encouraged when I hear our Chairman-in-Office speak and that is probably replicated among the members of the Assembly, because our guest today is well known as a supporter of WEU and of this Assembly. Thank you very much for coming here, Mr. Poos. We know that you undertake a tremendous amount of work and travel around a great deal, but you always have time to spare for our assemblies and meetings. You are much involved in the planning of the NATO summit in January. We wish you well and know that you will defend our corner. God speed you in your efforts.

6. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: enlargement of WEU

1. Creation of an associate member status

(Vote on the amended draft decision, Doc. 1390)

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft decision contained in Document 1390, as amended.

As part of this draft decision proposes an amendment to the Charter of the Assembly, under Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure an absolute majority of the Assembly's membership is required. A roll-call vote is therefore necessary.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Liberatori.

The voting is open.

(A vote was then taken by roll-call)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows:

Number of votes cast	61
Ayes	58
Noes	3
Abstentions	0

The amended draft decision is adopted¹.

7. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries

(Debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1387 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now resume the debate on the report of the Political Committee on WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries, Document 1387 and amendments.

I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report gives a good, if highly disturbing, survey of the many unresolved conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. It shows where the potential areas of conflict are situated; it reminds us of the situation of the minority groups in Central and Eastern Europe, while urging us to learn from the western community's disastrous failures in former Yugoslavia. The threat of escalation of the conflict in this part of our continent in 1989 was recognised far too late. That is why I believe we must pay particular attention to assessing the risks to stability in potential conflicts.

I believe this could be a useful beginning to co-operation with Central and Eastern European states in WEU's Forum of Consultation. On the basis of this co-operation, we should set up a kind of strategic analysis centre to assess the possible long-term implications even of apparently insignificant political changes. We must not forget that the conflict in Yugoslavia began with Serbia's annexation of Kosovo in 1989 and that the international community did not react adequately to that change at the time.

As another focus of co-operation with the Central and Eastern European states, we and the European Union should jointly help them convert their arms industries to civilian production.

However, the European Union would then have to be prepared to give products from the Eastern and Central European states greater access to its markets. I do not think it is in anyone's interest for these states to boost their arms exports on our own doorstep for purely economic reasons and thereby contribute to the destabilisation of certain regions or even to the further spread of dangerous weapons systems.

I think it would also be appropriate for the Forum of Consultation to examine the integration of the national armed forces in society, and the parliamentary control over them. As you know, our member countries have very different models for this. One of them – if I may allude to mine – is the German model of internal leadership, or of the uniformed citizen, which gives the soldier far-reaching rights if he is badly treated by his superiors and also makes

1. See page 24.

Mr. Antretter (continued)

the military leadership subject to strict control by the political leadership. I am sure that some of our experiences, for instance with the Office of the Commissioner for the Armed Forces in the German Bundestag, of our parliament's rights of control in the field of defence, could be of great interest to the young democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. For that reason alone, I think it would be a good idea to establish co-operation in security policy with these states in this area too.

On the basis of more intensive co-operation with the new states in the Forum of Consultation, we should establish a number of criteria relating to the long-term prospect of membership of the European Union. In my view they should include unconditional acceptance of the Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights and recognition of the European Court of Justice's case law, together with binding legal protection of the rights of ethnic and linguistic minorities. We know that the Council of Europe is currently seeking to strengthen the mechanisms for protecting minorities.

Mr. President, we should confront the Central and Eastern European states with the expectation that they will bring any conflicts between states before an international arbiter and accept the resulting decisions. This legal obligation is also contained in the revised Brussels Treaty, setting a minimum standard for peaceful conflict settlement. The Yugoslav tragedy must not be repeated. We note with sadness that the western community of states not only failed to prevent that conflict, but also failed in its crisis-management and long-term strategic planning, and that the parties to the conflict even succeeded in creating rifts between our governments.

That makes it all the more important for us to place co-operation in the Forum of Consultation on a substantial basis and articulate our expectations clearly. We must concentrate co-operation on areas in which we as Europeans, together with the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, can make our own contribution on the basis of our democratic experience and in accordance with our economic influence.

(Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, how simple the world was, when East and West were still opposed! There were well-defined fronts: the Warsaw Pact on the one side, NATO on the

other, with Greece and Turkey shoulder to shoulder on NATO's southern flank. It was a world in which you knew where you were.

The situation is now rather different. We find insecurity where we once had security. Conflicts are breaking out between nationalities, borders are being challenged – despite CSCE agreements – people are even prepared not to recognise states recognised by the United Nations. We are obviously heading towards general confusion.

Of course, there are also some positive signs, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, for instance. I hope the forthcoming NATO summit will go a step further. Another positive sign is the joint action by the Danube states of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary in implementing the blockade against the belligerents in former Yugoslavia.

There are also some real-life examples that should be a warning to us. The reality is that the debate has become very open. Looking towards the future development of WEU, if we consider accepting a country such as Austria as a member, we must make it clear that it cannot have a special status of permanent neutrality. We must make it clear that no one can opt out. Here I must contradict my compatriot Mrs. Terborg, who rightly said a moment ago – and this is in no way a criticism – that she represents a section of the population that is not prepared to take part in peace-keeping measures. We have seen this situation before in Germany, for instance during the United Nations actions against Iraq, when people hung white cloths from the windows, when they demonstrated against the United Nations and were not prepared to show solidarity against the aggressor. Ladies and gentlemen, if that is the rule, WEU and a European security alliance are not worth the paper on which the agreements were written. Just imagine, if there were rockets flying through the air – as they were during the Gulf war, aimed at Jerusalem – and people demonstrated, not against the aggressor, but against those who were trying to make peace!

When I look at the current situation in the Balkans – Mr. Antretter referred to it in connection with Kosovo – I must say that the term powder-keg is still applicable. Or what of a country like Greece – soon to become a member of Western European Union – which is directing its manoeuvres in the north against Macedonia and threatening Albania. It is clear from this that even a member country of Western European Union could initiate a new conflict.

I was in Salonika a week before the Greek elections. When I saw the mood there I felt as if I were back in the time just before the outbreak of the first world war, rather than in post-communist Europe.

Mr. Müller (continued)

When even a future member country of WEU – and I would like to mention this, too – does not take such actions seriously, when I read in today's papers that the terrorist PKK, which is now banned in Germany, is threatening to attack German installations, invoking the Greek Minister Pangalos who, they say, rightly warned against the German danger and said it called for terrorist action against Germany, then naturally I ask myself what kind of phantom debates we sometimes hold here in this Assembly.

It is the spectre of nationalism, not the spectre of communism of which Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels spoke in the Communist Manifesto in 1848, that is haunting Europe again. The problems of minorities, which we see especially in the Central and Eastern European states, are causing conflicts that can only be resolved if we in Europe all pull together, if we all find a common system of peace and do not try to go our own way. The problems can only be resolved jointly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Müller.

I remind the Assembly that the five-minute rule is in operation in this debate and in others so that everybody can speak.

I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. Wintgens has both my very high personal esteem and my respect for his intellectual ability, witness his thorough knowledge of big European issues, but I feel the committee has given him a herculean task. Simply by reading the recommendation and the preamble one can tell that the subjects covered are both numerous and widely different.

If I may, I would call the Assembly's attention to a basic question raised in the report, namely the Central and Eastern European countries' desire for reliable security guarantees. In my view guarantees should not reasonably go beyond the framework of possible external aggression. Yet today, such an eventuality seems paradoxically unlikely. With the exception of the area that was once Yugoslavia, there is no real threat in Europe – the Caucasus is in Asia – to the frontiers of any state whatsoever.

I have mentioned Yugoslavia precisely because the violence there has become endemic, and because the armed conflicts between the peoples of the former federation create special situations which can only be understood in terms of civil war.

The failure of the United Nations and the European Community to establish peace in that region has confirmed not only the existence of a real civil war, but also the historical responsi-

bility of those powers which, at different levels, have created conditions conducive to the outbreak of fratricidal conflict and its tragic prolongation.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have brief comments to make on two subjects dealt with in the report. The first concerns Hungary. I was one of the members of the Political Committee that visited that country. I was struck by the contradiction between the efforts being made by the present government in Budapest to present itself as champion of human rights and freedoms, and the continued existence of an attitude of exacerbated nationalism.

Mr. Wintgens spoke of the reference made by some parliamentarians to historical frontiers. Others say historical territories. The Hungarian republic makes no claim to any neighbouring territory, even if it has large Magyar minorities. But the nostalgic language so frequently used by the political leaders concerned explains why there must be some concern on our part.

I, personally, was surprised to hear it said in meetings with Hungarian parliamentarians that the government of Admiral Horthy, Hitler's faithful ally, was not a dictatorship but a parliamentary system. It is a shock, a big shock, to hear posthumous tribute paid to Horthy's memory in the presence of the Minister of Defence.

Briefly, on my next point, I agree with Mr. Wintgens when he recalls in the explanatory memorandum that the situation in Russia has remained unstable following the events of last October. I would add that this instability is unlikely to disappear, since there is no sign of change in the economic and social chaos prevailing in the largest and, in military terms, the most powerful country of the European continent.

With the legislative elections in Russia – called in totally abnormal circumstances – less than a fortnight away, Mr. Yeltsin's unpredictable policy switches inspire little confidence in his attempts at compromise.

Leaving aside his successive contradictory stances on the date of the presidential elections, I shall simply make the point that the draft constitution is a mirror image of his concept of democracy with the Russian President assigned more powers than those once held by the Tsar and by the Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party at the time of Stalin put together. I wonder too what the appearance of the Romanov imperial eagle on the rouble and on the Russian flag signifies.

Mr. President, to conclude I have to say that I cannot approve the recommendation contained in the report.

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

We must ensure effective protection for minorities. This means that the countries concerned should respect jointly-agreed commitments; the Yugoslav tragedy, which is a failure for the West, must not happen again. Conversely, in regard to Central and Eastern Europe, WEU has available an excellent instrument for co-operation, the Forum of Consultation. The forum should concentrate on a few major subjects; in it, the states of the European Union which are also WEU members will be able to contribute, calling on their democratic experience and their economic strength.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Rodrigues.

The next speaker is Mr. Roseta from Portugal.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to congratulate Mr. Wintgens, the Rapporteur, on his report, which covers the vast subject area given to him by the Political Committee, a subject area which incidentally, in my opinion, was too wide, as I shall explain.

The Council's initiative in June 1992 to initiate a dialogue with eight, and now nine, Central European countries resulted in the creation of the WEU Forum of Consultation, whose principal remit was to hold consultations on the security architecture and stability in Europe.

Obviously I agree that this forum should be enlarged to include Slovenia, as advocated by the recommendation we have approved today, but it is clear that our Assembly's relations with the parliaments of the countries concerned must also be intensified, and for this reason I welcome those who are with us today.

However, there should be no doubt that security is a complex matter, which is also related to economic and social reality and to human rights in all the countries of our continent. The eloquent promises which created unrealistic expectations have given rise to disillusionment in those who have seen no improvement in their standard of living or quality of life.

For these reasons all the European organisations and even NATO must ensure that the countries and peoples of Central and Eastern Europe do not feel that they have been abandoned. Combined with economic and social problems and the complex question of the rights of minorities, abandonment could open the gates to some easy paths, which would solve nothing, but would endow those taking such paths with a facile but ephemeral popularity: the awakening of nationalism, populism, nostalgia

for the recent or more distant past, which could lead to a harking back to the Belle Époque, at the beginning of the twentieth century, and which are as alien to our modern-day world as are the references we have heard to historical territory, historical borders etc.

By this means, political action would ultimately be diverted from its essential objectives, which are not to be found in past history. These are: peace within secure, internationally-recognised borders, the promotion of human rights, the well-being and improved quality of life of all peoples – not the bogus reparation of dubious historical injustices, rarely genuine and sometimes purely imaginary. Consequently, as Lord Finsberg said only yesterday, I think Mr. Wintgens's report could have gone further in explaining the reasons for the feelings of insecurity and anxiety which exist in Central and Eastern Europe, and even in trying to find answers to the question of how this feeling of insecurity and anxiety could be reduced.

In my opinion it would have been preferable to delve deeper into this question rather than widening the scope of the report to other areas; as the old French proverb says "qui trop embrasse, mal étireint". As I have already said in the Political Committee, I do not understand how we can claim to have dealt in half a paragraph with a matter as vast and sensitive as defining the future relations of WEU with Austria, Finland and Sweden, when practically no progress has been made. Finland and Sweden are not countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but of Northern Europe; this is something quite different and does not come within the scope of the report, which is WEU's relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The best proof that I am right is that the Political Committee is now going to devote some of its future studies to Austria, Finland and Sweden, whose future accession to the European Union and whose consequent future relations with WEU are worthy of more detailed study.

I would like to clarify my position on another matter: the Council should act – and here I am in complete agreement with the Rapporteur – not only to associate Slovenia with the work of the WEU Forum of Consultation, but also to intensify the political dialogue with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Albania. But it should be made clear that we cannot accept that Russia has any right to command or control the internal or external policies of Central European countries which are not in the Commonwealth of Independent States, whether in relation to their possible membership of NATO or any other matter. It is important that there should be no illusions concerning our position: we do not accept *capitis diminutio* in the sovereignty of these countries.

Mr. Roseta (continued)

As regards recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, an event which is certain to take place, I believe that some constitutional changes will have to be made in Macedonia together with a declaration of total respect for the frontiers of neighbouring countries, namely Greece.

Once such changes and assurances have been achieved, I do not think that anything can stop the recognition of an obvious reality: that this is an independent country.

I shall vote in favour of the report, in particular because of the excellent work Mr. Wintgens has done and the conclusions he has reached, which deserve my support.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Ferrarini.

Mr. FERRARINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I think it absolutely essential that this recommendation be approved and I wish to thank the Rapporteur for his untiring and solid work over the last few months.

The problem of the relationship between WEU and the Central and Eastern European countries is among the most important and difficult issues in terms both of peace and security and of the problems of European Union.

This response from our Assembly and the stand we have taken may be regarded as inadequate by some people and unclear by others but overall it is an essential response and statement of position.

The new democracies are looking to us, to the West, to WEU, to the Council of Europe and to NATO and to this unique opportunity and chance to complete the transition from dictatorship to democracy and from a centralised to a market economy. But this is not all. They are looking to us because for fifty years they have felt cut off from a historic and cultural heritage to which they feel themselves deeply attached because, while Europe is our land, it is also theirs.

These countries have security problems and not simply minor regional ethnic or frontier problems as some, in order to play them down, would have us believe. These countries have security problems because security means among other things complete freedom, independence and the right to self-determination, all of which seem to be threatened by various positions adopted by Russia.

When vetoes are imposed on the accession of these countries to NATO their freedom and the right to self-determination are restricted. When troops are kept on the territory of free and independent countries, on the pretence of defending

ethnic minorities, the freedom and independence of the countries concerned are restricted. When arms shipments which are destabilising whole regions, as in the Caucasus or former Yugoslavia are too lightly tolerated, there is a danger that this can end up as connivance and responsibility for such destabilising acts.

I am perfectly well aware that it would be wrong to pursue a policy aimed at isolating Russia as it would be counter-productive at all levels but, equally, we cannot allow Russia to dream of being a great power, in imaginary continuity with the past even though in changed political circumstances. Above all, we cannot agree that countries which for half a century suffered under an authoritarian régime imposed by force from outside should only feel themselves to be half free even when that régime has collapsed. This, moreover, is not only a question of justice and freedom, both of which are of themselves crucial for any statement of position; it is a matter of real and specific interest for Europe and its future.

If we succeed in creating a European security system which includes and guarantees Russia along with all the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, we shall achieve a great and exciting objective for ourselves and our children. Nor is it a question of opposing WEU to NATO but of fulfilling complementary rôles, matching the specific characteristics of the two organisations, with the aim of furthering détente and peace.

One last question. There is a point in the recommendation concerning relations between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which should be amended. When Sir Russell's report was discussed this morning in the Defence Committee it was proposed that judgments should be toned down by incorporating the problem of the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into a wider agreement not concerned with Greece alone and aimed at reducing tension in the area. When the Political Committee looked at this report there was not enough time to reach a decision.

May I on this point propose an amendment for the deletion of paragraph 5 of the recommendation and the amendment of paragraph 4 in accordance with what I have just said.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The next speaker is Mr. Diaconescu of Romania. You are very welcome here, sir.

Mr. DIACONESCU (*Observer from Romania*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to offer my warmest congratulations to the Political Committee for the report presented by Mr. Wintgens, which is the fruit of very hard work and a comprehensive study of the question of WEU's relations with

Mr. Diaconescu (continued)

Central and Eastern European countries, which has very special importance for us.

We have been particularly sensitive to the wording of paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation. This contains an extremely important proposal from the viewpoint of the countries concerned, since it takes into account the two essential aspects of the problem: the security aspect, by referring to security guarantees; and the economic aspect, by envisaging the possibility of appropriate financial compensation. Here I would stress that it is an outstanding feature of action by the WEU Assembly that its approach is a practical one, based on the real facts of the case.

I believe it is our duty to be on our guard against the risk of dividing Central and Eastern Europe into two groupings of states which would have different types of access to western institutions, at a time when, as shown by the report and the draft recommendation, all these states are in the same situation of lacking real security guarantees. I cannot emphasise strongly enough that the question of whether these countries are divided or united is of vital importance for the future of Europe.

Faithful to its historical traditions, Romania is proud of having maintained, by the consistency and realism which have characterised its foreign policy, a buffer zone of stability in a region hard beset by threats and tensions.

The reason for the wording of paragraph 59 of the report therefore appears to us all the more obscure: "Bulgaria and Romania may be considered as 'second zone' countries"; whereas paragraph 69 of the report contains an entirely different idea: "it should be recalled that Romania is firmly turned towards the West".

May I here also base myself on a comment by the President of the Assembly, Sir Dudley Smith, during his recent official visit to Romania, to the effect that my country has all the necessary qualifications to benefit from the status of WEU associate member, if only for the loyal way it has applied the Danube embargo.

With reference to the facts highlighted in paragraph 70 of the report, I should add that the application of the blockade has so far cost Romania approximately one-third of its annual income. You will therefore understand one of our major concerns, which is that our perception of security, and our contribution to maintaining security in Europe, also depend on our people's standard of living. We should like the western countries to share with us this concern, which is moreover common to all the countries of the forum which are taking part in applying the embargo.

In conclusion, may I stress Romania's determination to develop co-operation with WEU in all appropriate ways and in all areas of mutual interest.

Furthermore, convinced of the significance of parliamentary dialogue, I would insist on the importance of a more sustained and systematic exchange of information and on the need to devise a workable formula enabling the parliamentarians of the nine countries which are members of the Forum of Consultation to participate in preparing some of the reports drawn up by the Assembly on questions of common interest. The possibility should also be studied of allowing our national parliamentarians to take part in the work of committees, with the right to vote.

In conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, I share the view that by bringing together the countries of Western Europe, WEU has made any conflict in the region impossible; and that this experience should be extended in due course to the whole of Europe, and at a very early date to the member countries of the Forum of Consultation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Mr. Diaconescu was kind enough to mention me and to quote me. He was absolutely accurate in his quotation, but I ought to add for the record that I also said that it was not within my gift to be able to grant associate membership to Romania or any other country. That remains the case, but it is a matter that is always open for debate and argument.

I now call Mr. Kapsis from Greece, who is equally welcome here as an observer speaker.

Mr. KAPSIS (*Observer from Greece*). – May I express, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, the deep pleasure and gratitude we feel at being present in this chamber. We are here as observers for the time being but I hope that we will soon be full members.

I read the report very carefully and I agree that it is a fine piece of diplomatic art, generally speaking, and yet I should like to draw the attention of the meeting to some points.

Paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation states: "Remind the member countries of WEU of the joint decision taken by the Twelve on 2nd May 1992." Unfortunately, such a decision does not exist. At that time, a very informal meeting took place. The only decision has been taken in Lisbon, in which the committee expresses its readiness to recognise that republic within its existing borders under a name which does not include the term Macedonia. That has been the only formal decision of the Twelve.

Paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation states: "Urge Greece to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia without

Mr. Kapsis (continued)

further delay." Do we interpret that suggestion as a wish to withdraw from the procedures of the United Nations? As you know, the Security Council decided a set of procedures in order to reach a mutually-acceptable solution on the question of the name of the republic, the constitution and other points. After the interruptions caused by the elections in my country, that process is continuing once again. We shall work to find a solution, but I am sure that exercising pressure on Greece while at the same time giving a green light to the other side to continue its intransigent policy was not the wish of the Rapporteur of this committee. That is why I have taken the opportunity of drawing your attention to those two points.

At the same time, may I reassure our German colleague that we harbour no angry thoughts about our neighbours. All the military movements and exercises in my country are as a result of NATO plans. How can it be said that we are threatening our neighbours when we have 300 000 economic refugees from Albania? They get in and out of the country every day because it is impractical to patrol all our borders. We have about 500 000 Skopjeans coming in and out to do business and make some money. They are not threatened. They have to survive.

Our policy is to contribute to stabilising peace in our region, because if there is any crisis, it is not Germany, France or Britain which will suffer – Greece will suffer. We have the keenest interest in preserving peace in our area.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Konarski, Observer from Poland.

Mr. KONARSKI (*Observer from Poland*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have the honour of addressing you as a member of the new parliamentary majority in Poland, which consists of the alliance of the democratic left, to which I belong, and the peasant party. On behalf of this coalition, I wish to stress that the basic lines of Poland's foreign policy will be maintained.

We are unanimous in recognising that my country is called on to join the European Union as soon as it has fulfilled the required conditions. In view of the determination shown by Poland in its reform policy, we are convinced that these conditions will be fulfilled at a reasonably early date.

Poland's desire to belong to the western structures of Europe, where it has had its roots for the last ten centuries, is not only economic in nature but also, and above all, a desire for security. Throughout Poland's history, its security and even its existence have frequently been threatened. It is therefore particularly sensitive on this subject. Our security needs are vital. The

question is also urgent, particularly as it is impossible to foresee how the situation will develop in that part of Europe. Poland therefore wishes to be more closely associated with European and transatlantic security structures and to join them at the earliest possible date.

Bearing in mind the new context offered by the ratification of European Union, Poland hopes that WEU will grant it associate status as it is already an associate member of the European Union. It is our hope that associate status with WEU will enable Poland to participate fully in WEU activities.

In the joint declaration issued in Warsaw on 12th November 1993 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France and Germany, Mr. Alain Juppé and Mr. Klaus Kinkel said that they would work for the proposal of such a status for Poland at the WEU ministerial meeting to be held in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993. I wish to thank the French and German Governments and in particular Mr. Juppé and Mr. Kinkel for having made this proposal. Poland, however notes that the decisions adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers in Luxembourg are still far from meeting our expectations.

Poland hopes that the principles and content of association with WEU will be worked out at an early date. Poland is ready to make a contribution and submit its own proposals. WEU would thus have a new and credible associate member in Central Europe. I am convinced that such a status could be useful for the other Central European countries which are associated with the European Union.

Poland's association with WEU is a topical issue calling for urgent settlement, since it represents a key element in the process of creating and constructing European security. Poland is prepared to work with all democratic countries to ensure that none of the expected developments in the whole structure of European security will be directed against anyone. My country's membership of these structures would help to further the stability of Poland and of all Eastern Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Konarski. We are pleased to see Poland represented at this Assembly.

I call Mr. Pahor, Observer from Slovenia.

Mr. PAHOR (*Observer from Slovenia*). – I should like to say how pleased I am to address the Assembly.

In the present security vacuum, following the demise of bipolarity in Europe, Slovenia sees as the most appropriate form of ensuring its security and stability the establishment of multiple links with and incorporation into Europe, into both the European Union and existing security mechanisms.

Mr. Pahor (continued)

Conscious of the fact that the Republic of Slovenia cannot expect early full membership of WEU, I stress our interest in gradual integration into the Union's bodies, particularly its Assembly. I also emphasise our readiness to fulfil the rights and duties of a country with permanent observer status in accordance with Document 1392.

As an independent and stable state, which is not involved in the Balkan conflict, Slovenia believes that European organisations, including those dealing with security matters, should incorporate Slovenia. That would be an important factor for stability in this part of Europe, which should by no means end at the northern Slovenian border.

As our state is situated on the edge of a turbulent region, it is very important that security in Slovenia be preserved and even consolidated by the establishment of security links, which will have a positive impact on the security and stability of neighbouring areas in the region as well as in the whole of Europe.

I should like to thank the Rapporteur and the Assembly for debating relations with Central and Eastern European countries. This is an important contribution to the establishment of a new order of security and stability throughout Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Mr. Mile, although I do not know how to pronounce his name correctly.

Mr. MILE (*Observer from Hungary*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, it is no exaggeration to say that this meeting of the WEU Assembly might be of historic significance if members at last had the courage and political determination necessary to take decisions. With the forthcoming NATO summit meeting in January, WEU cannot allow itself to avoid taking practical decisions on the intentions of the Central and Eastern European countries with regard to security policy.

The treaty of association signed with the Council of Europe has created for Hungary a political basis which allows it to request either associate status or the establishment of similar machinery offering the same possibilities for co-operation.

You must of course be aware that Hungary is taking part in the Danube blockade and is co-operating fully in it. Hungary fully respects the embargo, despite the fact that it involves serious difficulties, mainly of a financial nature.

The recommendation adopted by the Assembly last December, following the report by Mr. Cox on associate status, was in our view a

very favourable element. It is however regrettable and even alarming to note that the decision has had no practical follow-up. Why has a decision voted by the Assembly not yet been implemented? To date no explanation has been given.

Hungary needs clear security guarantees. The murderous war being waged on our southern frontier and recent events in Moscow justify and heighten our concern. We wish to benefit for long years from such security guarantees through NATO participation but contrary to the fears expressed in various quarters, we are not relying on NATO to solve our problems with minorities. In our view, it is international organisations such as the Council of Europe and the CSCE, and bilateral agreements, which will enable us to find solutions.

During this Assembly meeting my colleague, Mr. Rockenbauer and I myself have made several specific, constructive proposals with a view to co-operation with WEU. We were naturally pleased to be invited to the Assembly, and to be offered opportunities to speak. Unfortunately, we have observed no progress as regards Hungary's co-operation and status.

Mr. Wintgens's report contains material which is encouraging, for example, paragraphs 7 and 9 of the draft recommendation – but does not go far enough, since it does not add to the opportunities made available by the co-operation already established. This is especially regrettable, since we are on the eve of the January summit meeting. Despite all its good features, the report needs some additions, but we welcome the swift reaction by Mr. Wintgens, who has made a constructive contribution in his Amendments 1 and 2.

A decision which would enable us to participate continuously in the Assembly and to work in its committees would give us the right to make proposals and the opportunity of an ongoing exchange of information. We are therefore reassured by the political promises of a status corresponding to that of associate member.

We warmly welcome Mr. Baumel's report on the forthcoming NATO summit; the proposals which concern us represent a serious step towards co-operation.

In Hungary we cannot agree that our region should become a peripheral European region, an area of friction and a source of destabilisation in Europe. All Hungary's foreign policy efforts are designed to involve our country more and more actively in the process of European integration, one of whose most important stages is precisely the establishment of effective co-operation with WEU. For this reason, I request your assistance in arriving at a reassuring decision which will set us on the road to progress.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Mile. I promise that I shall remember your name and how to pronounce it.

I call Mr. Sutovski, Observer from Slovakia.

Mr. SUTOVSKI (*Observer from Slovakia*) (Translation). – I would like to say a few words as the representative of a state that is a member of the Forum of Consultation of Western European Union.

Slovakia has clearly expressed its orientation towards the western community on several occasions, via its most senior representatives. The Slovak Republic regards itself as a trustworthy partner of the Western European and transatlantic structures.

We are a multi-party democracy, a constitutional state that respects human rights, including the rights of members of national minorities. We are transforming our economy into a market economy. The processes of political and economic change that began in our country in 1989 are irreversible. We are aware of the political and security-policy scope of the Western European structures. It is only natural that, as a partner who shares your cultural, historical, political and religious values, we should seek security guarantees here.

As one of the successor states of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Slovak Republic signed the European agreement on association with the European Union. Slovakia is seeking the ratification of that agreement in the parliaments of the member states of the European Union. Since its problem-free approval in the Council of Europe, this process seems to be running smoothly.

The Slovak Republic did not simply choose its orientation because it was tied by earlier international commitments, but also because it is trying to find its place on the side of the West. It identifies fully with the underlying western cultural and political values.

Slovakia's interest in co-operation and in eventual full membership of NATO and WEU is based on the fact that one cannot seek purely political and economic integration with the West without at the same time seeking security guarantees in its structures.

We regard as equally important our status as a member of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, NACC, and our seat in the WEU Forum of Consultation, which bring us closer to the European security structures.

We are following with great interest the discussions about the process of gradually transforming relations between WEU and NATO in order to adapt them to the new international conditions in the search for new forms of co-operation.

In our view it seems essential, even under the new conditions, for the transatlantic dimension of European security to remain intact, confirmed by the presence of the United States of America on the European continent.

If Europe is seeking new means of expressing the relationship between NATO and WEU, we believe that the process of forging a European security and defence identity should also be reflected at NACC level and made plain by WEU's partners in consultation, who are potential members of the European Union.

European integration needs adequate safety guarantees, even during the difficult stage of transformation. The process of our transformation and the essential reforms must take place in the framework of a secure Europe. That is why I think that a specific type of associate membership of WEU and NATO could be the solution.

Co-operation with WEU and NATO would then become a major economic incentive for Slovakia. It would give potential western investors a greater sense of security, which would speed up the spread of economic stability towards the East.

As for security, we would also emphasise that Slovakia is one of the four Visegrad countries. We are a country that is establishing friendly and co-operative relations with its neighbours. We believe it would be best to regard the Visegrad group as a specific geographical, strategic and economic whole.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I hope I have succeeded in giving the reasons why we are seeking co-operation with WEU and NATO.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Böhm.

Mr. BÖHM (*Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, towards the end of the explanatory statement he gave on his report, Mr. Wintgens referred to the special rôle of Ukraine in the context of a future pan-European peaceful order. Instead of Ukraine he could also have mentioned Belarus or the Baltic states as an indication of the kind of problems facing our future security policy in the former Soviet Union. Mr. Wintgens was also right to point out that we in Western European Union are a community with a common destiny, committed to democracy, and that, as a result, we have a common responsibility towards history. All that is correct, but it must be seen in context.

European history has taught us that peace outside one's borders can best be ensured by a stable democratic system at home. And so it was that the absence of democratic structures in Serbia and the might of a communist-led army triggered the terrible events in the Balkans. It is, therefore, the main task of European policy to

Mr. Böhm (continued)

construct a free, democratic system in the states of eastern and south-eastern Central Europe, in Eastern Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union; the representatives of the democratically-elected parliaments of the former communist states who have spoken here in today's debate are our best allies in that task.

So in these times we inevitably have to look at the special situation of Russia, at its future, and at how the Russian Federation sees its own rôle in Europe and in the geographical area of the former Soviet Union, now and in the future. Will the move towards democracy succeed? What will be the *raison d'état* of the new Russia? What aids to democracy can we offer?

Throughout the entire political spectrum in Russia, there are widely differing perceptions of Russia's future rôle: will Russia be a peaceful, democratic national state, or a hegemonic power intent on establishing a new version of the fragmented Soviet Union under Russian leadership, to which all the other newly independent former Soviet republics would have to subordinate themselves or be subordinated? This also entails the question of Russia's possible rôle in a pan-European peaceful order, and of how we should frame our policy towards Russia.

Unlike other European powers, Russia did not have colonies overseas, but overland. Over the centuries this has created the impression that the whole area was a self-contained national territory, which should for that reason be regarded and treated as a political unit. The Soviet Russian population policy also helped to foster this impression and the resulting attitude of mind.

If Russia continues to seek supremacy, we will find ourselves facing the risk of neo-colonialism, with all the explosive consequences that entails. The big question is whether the West will accept Russia as a hegemonic power. So far, the attention of the West has been directed almost exclusively at Moscow and its economic requirements, forgetting that the map of the former Soviet Union still contains more than a dozen other states with a rightful claim to security.

Apart from its nuclear potential, Moscow is now systematically using energy supplies, representing a major part of the economic structures of the former Soviet Union, as a means of making the former, nearly bankrupt republics toe the line and treating them on the lines of Russian provinces.

Quite recently, Moscow forced Ukraine to capitulate, offering energy supplies in exchange for the Black Sea fleet. Mr. Gratchev, the Russian Defence Minister, said: "Russia wants to safeguard its strategic interests in the Black

Sea region. It will not tolerate any loss of control over the Black Sea."

Looking at Georgia and the Baltic, we can see that Moscow has not altered its old attitude to these states either. While on the one hand Russia is claiming the succession to and supremacy in the area of the former Soviet Union, on the other hand it is denying all responsibility for the devastating consequences of Russian rule.

Ladies and gentlemen, we must direct our future policy towards the promotion of democracy and the market economy in the area of the former communist bloc. We must take steps to counter the risk that all the nations once oppressed by the Soviet Union will now be kept subject under the Russian flag. Russia must not continue to regard the territory of the former eastern bloc as close to home, that is to say as the sphere of interest of Russian supremacy.

The PRESIDENT. – I now suggest to the Assembly that we hold over the winding-up of the debate, that is, Mr. Wintgens's summary and the comments of the Chairman of the committee until this afternoon, when there will also be amendments before us. That will take place immediately after the address by Mr. Aleksandrov, the Minister of Defence of Bulgaria.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Aleksandrov, Minister of Defence of Bulgaria.
2. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1387 and amendments).
3. Political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the development of WEU (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1389 and amendments).
4. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1993 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1399).

The President (continued)

5. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1994 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 1383 and Addenda 1 and 2).
6. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial 1992 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and

debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1398 and Addendum).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1993

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Aleksandrov, Minister of Defence of Bulgaria.
Replies by Mr. Aleksandrov to questions put by: Mr. Böhm, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Soell.
4. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1387 and amendments*).
Speakers: Mr. Wintgens (Rapporteur), Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman), Mr. Wintgens, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Wintgens, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Rathbone (point of order).
5. Political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the development of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1389 and amendments*).
Speakers: Mr. Soell (Rapporteur), Mr. Hardy, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Müller, Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Roseta, Mr. Soell (Rapporteur), Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman), Mr. Soell, Mr. Stoffelen.
6. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1993 (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1399*).
Speaker: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman) in place of Mr. Büchler.
7. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1994 (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1383 and Addenda 1 and 2*).
Speaker: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman and Rapporteur).
8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1398 and Addendum*).
Speaker: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman and Rapporteur).
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

1. See page 29.

3. Address by Mr. Aleksandrov, Minister of Defence of Bulgaria

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day for this afternoon is the address by Mr. Aleksandrov, Minister of Defence of Bulgaria.

Mr. Aleksandrov is eminently qualified to address us today. Originally a lawyer, he has specialised in defence matters for the last twelve years, initially as a journalist writing on NATO, the Eurogroup and on defence in Western Europe, then as an expert in political science and as a historian. In December 1991 he became State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence and then Minister at the end of December last year.

Bulgaria is a founder member of the WEU Forum of Consultation and is co-operating wholeheartedly with WEU in applying the United Nations embargo on the Danube.

I am very sorry that until now, I have not been able to visit Bulgaria to see those operations

The President (continued)

although I have seen them in Hungary and Romania. I hope to repair that omission fairly early in the new year.

Bulgarian parliamentary observers have been attending the Assembly's sessions since 1990 and our Political Committee visited Sofia in March of this year. The links are growing and we should like to reinforce them still further. We are therefore very pleased indeed to break new ground by having the Minister with us and we are most keen to hear his views.

May I ask him to come to the podium to address us?

Mr. ALEKSANDROV (*Minister of Defence of Bulgaria*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour for me to be the first Bulgarian Defence Minister to be invited to address this distinguished audience. Had this happened two or three years ago, I would no doubt have spoken at length of the historic importance of the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the disappearance of the military bloc relationships and the new era in European affairs. I can assure you I would have found that much easier.

But unfortunately the meeting between you and the Bulgarian Defence Minister was somewhat delayed. The euphoria has died down. Today the people of Europe are taking stock of these historic changes, in the face of challenges that can no longer be tackled on the basis of the then clearly-defined criteria of the East-West division.

The proposition that European security is an inseparable whole has never been more topical and valid than it is today. Thousands of kilometers away from Paris and London, war is raging in Bosnia and Herzegovina; yet thousands of French and British soldiers are out there doing their duty. Americans, Danes and others are engaged in preventive activities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Spaniards and Germans are working side by side with Bulgarians, Hungarians and Romanians in an unprecedented WEU operation on the Danube. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of refugees and illegal immigrants, driven out by the blight of war or ruin, are flooding into the prosperous countries of Europe, where they create social tension and xenophobia. Of course these are only a few of the manifestations of the movement of those fundamental levels of the European theatre on which the future of the old continent depends.

Ladies and gentlemen, I assume you have heard enough speeches about the "architecture of Europe", about the "reciprocal links between institutions", about the "European pillar" of security, etc. Nor could it be otherwise, for these

concepts concentrate and focus the endeavours of politicians in the Euro-Atlantic region to find a solution to a range of complex political, economic, legal and military problems and, in my view, to modify their own way of thinking.

I do not pretend to offer a solution to these questions. I would simply like to discuss a few of them, which we regard as topical and which do at least exercise the minds of politicians and the public in Bulgaria. For reasons that are not egocentric, we are convinced that the acceptance of new members in NATO and WEU is no less important than the question of the relationship between their respective rôles and responsibilities. To go even further, we believe that it is extremely important, for their own sakes, for the states associated with the European Union to become members of these two military policy organisations. My German colleague Mr. Volker Rühle was right to say that "if we do not export security now, we will soon have to import instability".

Ladies and gentlemen, the question of reintegrating the victims of Yalta in Europe is not just a matter of pragmatism and far-sightedness, but also of the highest political morality and sense of responsibility.

Broadly speaking, there are three issues: firstly, whether the state in question wants to become a member of WEU and NATO; secondly, whether it can become a member; and thirdly, whether WEU and NATO actually want that state as a partner and ally.

I shall begin with the third problem, which concerns the accession of the Yalta states, as I call them, to WEU and NATO. Whether WEU and NATO actually want them as members is a matter of some delicacy, because its solution falls within your terms of reference and will be realised on the basis of your assessment. I will not conceal from you that surprise is growing in Bulgaria over the attitude of several WEU states towards the Bulgarian question. The Bulgarian case for joining Europe is either little known, or people do not want to know more about it. While Washington and Tokyo are well aware that Bulgaria has lost more than three billion dollars as a result of the embargo, and know what that loss means, some people in Europe are still saying: that's not possible. It would seem that regardless of all this, the European Union is still pursuing an essentially anti-Bulgarian policy to prevent the practical association of Bulgaria after the signature of the European treaty. The solemn declarations and charters on security, democracy and a unified Europe are simply filed away with the meat and wine accounts. Or could the reason lie elsewhere?

Were Spain and Portugal accepted into NATO following the collapse of their dictatorships because of a direct external threat to their

Mr. Aleksandrov (continued)

security? Hardly. Were they accepted into the European Community because their economies were on the same level as those of Germany and France? Hardly. And could the Greek economy in the 1970s, when Greece was accepted into the EC, even measure up to the economies of some of the then socialist countries? Hardly. Yet the integration of these states was a natural act of support for their democratic processes, in the name of the democracy and prosperity of Europe as a whole.

The people of Bulgaria – and they are not alone in this – have not yet given a definite answer to the question as to who will obtain greater dividends from the operation on the Danube: WEU, which is seeking a new rôle in European security, or Bulgaria, whose security was not improved by all this.

Ladies and gentlemen, I very much hope these are only temporary misunderstandings. What I am telling you is not meant as a sign that Bulgaria is weakening in its resolve to make a contribution to European security, quite the contrary. At this point let me say that we are following the discussions being held within WEU as a result of the Franco-German initiative of 12th November this year with the greatest attention, and count on seeing practical results in the very near future.

On the first of the three questions I mentioned above, I can be quite brief. Yes, Bulgaria does want full membership of NATO and WEU. The national institutions – president, government, parliament – have repeatedly and on every possible occasion confirmed this interest and their conviction that there is no alternative. There is objective justification for this interest, for in spite of Yalta, Bulgaria has remained an inseparable component of European politics, history and culture. After all – and here I am speaking in my capacity as Defence Minister – Bulgaria has remained loyal to the European military tradition. When I say military tradition I am looking back into the past which, though not with equal benevolence, is nevertheless common to the people of Europe in one form or another.

On the question of the feasibility of membership of either organisation, we certainly do not regard the military and technical aspects of the problem as decisive. We are looking at the various possibilities through the prism of the common contribution we are capable of making.

Although Bulgaria is situated in the Balkans and shares the difficult history of the peoples of that area, it has no ethnic problems, compared with other states – and not just the states of Central Europe. Bulgaria has no border disputes with its neighbours. Its value system is identical with that of most European countries. And

moreover, as a member of the Council of Europe and an associate member of the European Union, the principles and practices of the Bulgarian political system are consistent with those of the WEU member countries.

These are the objective facts enabling us to state that Bulgaria represents a factor or island of stability in the Balkans. They also form the objective basis for the security policy Bulgaria is pursuing in that region. By maintaining close relations of co-operation, including military co-operation, with Greece and Turkey – both of which are NATO members – we have jointly transformed the former front line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO into an area of stability and security. With its strict refusal to become involved in the Yugoslav conflict in any way, and as a front-line state in terms of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, Bulgaria is even now shouldering its responsibility for security in the region. What Bulgaria still regards as something that ought to interest its western partners on principle, and what it is doing quite consciously and deliberately, is to appear as a predictable and fairly positive figure on the Balkan stage against the background of an otherwise complex equation of interests and objectives.

Let me emphasise once again that according to our concept of integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures, the question of security guarantees, to which we attach fundamental importance as a matter of principle, is inseparable from our perception of the individual contribution we can make, because to us collective guarantees mean collective responsibilities. Bulgaria is not just holding out its hand for help. It is offering security and co-operation.

Ladies and gentlemen, political Europe, the United States and Canada are preparing for the NATO summit in Brussels: you as participants, we as partners, but united by a common desire to live in a secure world. The American partnership for peace plan and the European ideas in this area form a good basis for the transition to a new phase of co-operation, in which the ideas of Coudenhove-Calergy will be translated into practice.

Regarding our actual contacts with WEU, we see the joint operation on the Danube as an excellent beginning which must be taken further. Similarly, relations under the existing partnership need to be institutionalised and activated.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, when we speak of European integration we cannot ignore the example set by France and Germany. The two European colossi, whose wars claimed millions of lives, are today laying the foundations of a joint army, together with Belgium, Spain and other European countries. That is not just an inspiring example but also evidence that after

Mr. Aleksandrov (continued)

the unification of Europe there can no longer be any impediment to the very closest co-operation between its peoples – not directed against anyone, but for the sake of their own prosperity.

The PRESIDENT. – The Minister has kindly said that he will answer questions.

I call Mr. Böhm to ask the first question.

Mr. BÖHM (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Aleksandrov, I am most impressed by the warning you addressed to the Europeans in the West. I sympathise with your disappointment at developments in recent years, where you pointed out the contradiction between the fine words to be heard in the West and the real situation in relation to the former eastern bloc states. I am also most impressed by the trust you continue to place in the intentions of the West and hence also Western European Union.

This brings me to my question. You spoke of the victims of Yalta. I agree: none of the nations that fell victim to the Yalta decision ever voluntarily chose the communist system. It was forced upon them. I am thinking of the countries that formed a community of suffering under the communist system, the Poles, the Czechs and Slovaks, the Romanians, Hungarians and Bulgarians, for example. Let me ask you: what other possibilities do you think exist, if the future trend does not go in the direction you and I hope it will, namely that the West offers those states a good security guarantee? For example, do you think there would be any chance of these states attempting to form their own defence community?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ALEKSANDROV (*Minister of Defence of Bulgaria*) (Translation). – In theory that is a possibility – I have spoken of it on several occasions – but I think it would be fairly difficult, if not impossible. One cannot build a line along the German-Polish border or in any other geographical area that would separate those countries from the West.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – May I first convey the regrets of my colleague Tom Cox who, you will recall, produced the report which was of such interest and welcome assistance to your country. My colleague has had to return to London but he maintains his deep interest in Bulgaria.

My question is brief. I think that several members of the Assembly share my anxiety, which is that many of the Eastern European countries that are associating themselves with us in this, and other European institutions, may

take the view that by associating themselves with WEU they are securing a firm security guarantee. Do you accept that the search for the peace dividend in Europe and elsewhere imperils the maintenance of the defence capacity and makes it more difficult for us to sustain support for international authority or to provide, in the medium term, an adequate guarantee of security for the member states which have been here for quite a long time?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ALEKSANDROV (*Minister of Defence of Bulgaria*) (Translation). – One cannot speak of military aid here in the real sense of the word. You know about the technical problems which make such aid almost impossible. What is much more to the point is psychological, intellectual and moral support, which can be very important to our country. That is all we want for the moment.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Aleksandrov, I agree with what you said in reply to Peter Hardy's question. Of course we as an assembly do not decide how Bulgaria and the other states heavily involved in the Danube blockade are to receive compensation. That will be decided elsewhere. We are still only beginning to look at this question. The United Nations does not have a compensation fund, either, for the damages suffered by states heavily involved in embargoes imposed by the United Nations, as your country generously is. I would like to ask you whether, even if it is not possible to compensate you in kind for the amount of damage you estimate, you could not call for other forms of compensation instead, such as better credit facilities from the World Bank or other banks that have financed specific development projects in association with the European Community? Could that not be a form of compensation for you? Could you give any actual figures in this respect? If you cannot do so yourself, perhaps your government could do so on an international basis. Could this not be a way for you to obtain a certain amount of material help, material compensation, for what you have lost so far?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ALEKSANDROV (*Minister of Defence of Bulgaria*) (Translation). – That is more a question of finance and economics than of defence. Let me give you an example. It is no secret that Bulgaria is in a tight spot, economically speaking. We have twelve billion dollars of debts. The blockade has cost us three billion dollars. That gives you some idea of our situation. Of course we will fulfil our obligations to the last. You need not worry about that. But I cannot give the kind of answer you expect. I

Mr. Aleksandrov (continued)

cannot produce the precise economic figures you expect at this moment. I am sorry.

The PRESIDENT. – May I thank you, Minister, for giving such an interesting address. Only a few years ago, it would have been entirely fanciful to suggest that a leading minister from Bulgaria would address our Assembly, or that the whole of Europe would have opened up, or would be coming to Paris to play a part in future planning and in the co-operation needed to ensure security in Europe. As you said, you are breaking new ground. You are a minister of a country with many problems but which we regard as extremely important for the future of Central Europe and which, as you reminded us, has played a very important rôle in implementing the embargo on the Danube. For that, WEU is extremely grateful.

We hope that this is only the first of several visits that you will pay us during your time as a minister, and we are extremely happy to have been able to welcome your Bulgarian deputation here. We look to your deputation to play an important rôle as observers.

4. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1387 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now conclude the debate on the report of the Political Committee on WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries, Document 1387 and amendments.

The list of speakers was concluded this morning, which leaves the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the committee to speak.

I call Mr. Wintgens.

Mr. WINTGENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen – and I include the many parliamentarians attending as observers – I shall begin by replying at the same time to all the speakers who have criticised our report for not going far enough.

Of course we would have liked to go further but clearly we have perhaps gone too far in certain cases and we could be criticised for that. Nevertheless, we were determined to go as far as possible in order to move ahead because many contacts involving the committee, myself and the committee secretary wholly convinced us that it was the earnest desire of the people we met to take part as quickly as possible in the construction of European security and defence based on WEU.

We had no wish to indulge in catch-phrases such as market economy because they have

proved very disappointing. We were determined to be realistic and pragmatic and the report was drafted on that basis.

I shall now reply to the various speakers who, I hope, will excuse me for not being able to answer all their questions, because a number cover the same ground.

I share Mr. Cunliffe's regret concerning earlier injustices, particularly in Macedonia. We shall return to that point. These former injustices are not only a matter for regret but must above all be given much more emphasis. They must be taken into account so that they can be relieved if not stopped altogether. You say that we must act. I thought I said so but I repeat that the report is deliberately pragmatic. I therefore thank you, Mr. Cunliffe, for going along with the report.

To Mrs. Terborg I would simply say that we – and myself first of all – share her caution but not to the point of inaction. We took a few risks which I think had to be taken.

I will answer Lord Finsberg on three points.

I will first reply specifically concerning paragraph 78 of the report. It is fully covered by our sixth recommendation calling for a specific programme of work including inter alia the joint elaboration of risk and threat assessment. He says that this is too weak.

I will answer him next in general terms by inviting him to make a list of all the concrete and practical measures in the report which I have just summarised.

May I go over them quickly. We want the Forum of Consultation to work in future in accordance with a specific programme including inter alia the joint elaboration of risk and threat assessment; our aim is to offer the Central European countries which are partners in the Forum of Consultation the possibility of taking part in the activities of the Western European Union armaments group; we are looking for areas in which they can be associated with the activities of the WEU Satellite Centre and we propose that the conditions be determined in which they can take part in meetings of WEU chiefs of staff and the work of the Planning Cell. Quite clearly our intention was to be practical and pragmatic.

The next question is more basic and more pointed. Lord Finsberg asked how are the fears of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe to be relieved. I would now ask him a question: could President Clinton himself do it?

I believe that we are entering a decade which requires and will continue to require a great deal of patience. On the historical scale what are ten years except for those who are seeking change? We are not crossing a vast ocean with calm seas

Mr. Wintgens (continued)

but rather sailing around an isthmus with reefs everywhere – reefs what is more, that do not stay in one place.

I would first ask Mr. Antretter to accept my apology for briefly failing in my duty by not listening to him but courtesy is sometimes difficult when one person asks you a question when you should be listening to another. I think, however, that I understood the main points of your speech. You were quite rightly worried about potential future conflicts. The report could not be more explicit on that point.

Its conclusions clearly take this into account by stressing the vital importance of co-operation between the Central and Eastern European countries, the need for a peaceful settlement of the problems at their frontiers and the question of protection for minorities which could lead to further conflicts. Everyone knows that this last problem affects virtually all the countries with which we are concerned!

Thank you, Mr. Antretter, for in fact having supported our proposal to promote in the forum the creation of a centre for arbitration and the analysis of strategies. I hope, Mr. Antretter, that I have in spite of everything fulfilled my duty to you.

I do not share Mr. Müller's nostalgic look back to a Manichean world. Admittedly we are living in troubled times but they are basically less dangerous and, what is essential, undoubtedly closer to our democratic ideals. He is frightened by the violence of the demonstrations in Salonika. As a German, albeit from the south of his country, he perhaps finds it difficult to accept such violence. I think we must look at it in relative terms; people's outward reactions are not the same in the north and the south.

Nevertheless I share his concern at the upsurge of nationalism and he is right to say that we are threatened by its spectre. It could become a kind of escapism which some people need in order to make up for serious economic and social shortcomings. Clearly we cannot accept this prospect and for that reason we must question ourselves about what we are really doing to help these peoples economically and socially. I believe that our report seeks to offset the major difficulties resulting from the embargo imposed by three East European countries. It is a positive contribution in that direction.

To my friend, Mr. Rodrigues, I would answer that our global views of history, geography and politics are not always the same. He dared to say that conflicts are unlikely. My reply is that the instability of Russia is certainly a cause for concern which he must share. Is the instability of Ukraine, the third world nuclear power whose

political problems are far from being resolved and whose economic situation is desperate, a factor likely to render potential conflict unlikely?

Need I add, and there could be further additions, that the problem raised by Hungary of Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania and the problem of Romanian minorities in Moldova, to mention only these, create situations which at some time in the future could lead to conflict?

You of course made an exception with which we all agree when you spoke of Yugoslavia. On this point, however, I would like to take advantage of the moving speech made by the Bulgarian Minister of Defence, Mr. Aleksandrov, and remind Mr. Rodrigues that we have shared some appeals for help.

We were, Mr. Rodrigues, with the committee in Bulgaria when the Bulgarians raised what is for them the very important problem of the substantial Bulgarian minority living in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. There are Bulgarians belonging to the same family living on both sides of the frontier with the father on one and the children on the other but we were told that, faced with a military threat, it would be difficult for Bulgaria, because of the pressure within the country not to retaliate.

I agree completely with Mr. Roseta that Slovenia is one of the countries with the best chance of finding its feet. We may perhaps hesitate a little because Slovenia is a former Yugoslav republic and consequently this might mean showing it a lot more kindness as compared with the sufferings of the others. However, I agree that Slovenia nevertheless fulfils the objective conditions warranting such a step.

I know that you have often and quite rightly discounted the stirring of nationalist feelings. You say that these are words from the past in which some politicians take refuge when faced by economic and social difficulties. As I have already said I share this view for the same reasons as you yourself. Such language must be made unlawful, of course, but we have to live with it and that is our problem.

We have a slight misunderstanding. You ask whether Sweden and Finland should be involved in our concern for the eastern countries. We have done so quite simply because these countries are now playing and we hope will continue to play an important rôle in the revival and development of the Baltic countries. The same very clearly applies to Austria, in relation to the Visegrad group. This is something on which we may perhaps one day agree.

I have just mentioned the association of Slovenia with the forum. I will come back to the question of Macedonia later because amendments have been tabled on the subject.

Mr. Wintgens (continued)

To Mr. Ferrarini I would like to express my gratitude for concurring with the conclusions of the report. We must "not lose hope for Billancourt" says Jean-Paul Sartre. Nor must one for all the states of Central and Eastern Europe. I repeat we must accept that the task is very great and that the work will be difficult and lengthy.

I take up in particular Mr. Ferrarini's proposal concerning the problem of Macedonia. He says that he wants to tone down judgments. He maintains, as I would like to believe, that the amendments have been tabled with that end in view. If you allow I will come back to this problem later.

I should like to thank Mr. Diaconescu for his explicit support of the ninth recommendation in the report which is designed to respond to an appeal from the three countries concerned. Paragraph 59 is not a statement of position; as he has voiced a criticism, it is simply an account of the facts as we saw them, even if they are to be regretted. This is not included in the report because it was not for us to regret or not regret. We diagnosed the facts and we think we have reported them objectively. The committee gave us its unanimous backing. Mr. Diaconescu's wish that the parliamentarians from the nine countries should help draft the Assembly's report is clearly an objective which we are entitled to share but the time is still far from ripe. It can be held in reserve and not jettisoned just because now is too soon. That at least is our view.

My answer to Mr. Kapsis, who said that the paper dated 2nd May quoted in the report does not exist, is that there really is an official document of the European Economic Community of May 1992. I have it here. I assume that in the meantime Mr. Kapsis has been able to get a copy. The aim of the report was to be objective in evaluating the potential risks. That seems to me to be the intention throughout.

To Mr. Konarski I would like to say that we are glad the political changes in Poland imply no change in foreign policy. To go along with him, I believe that I have properly and adequately stressed the importance of the Warsaw proposal of 12th November last. He is still not satisfied and rightly so. Unfortunately he will continue to be so for some time yet. I repeat that we have embarked upon a slow and painstaking process. This must be so if we wish to succeed and any undue haste would unfailingly create even more serious problems.

What is there to say to Mr. Pahor except to confirm our view that Slovenia is certainly one of the best placed – if not the best placed – country; consequently the second recommen-

ation in the report should give you every satisfaction, Mr. Pahor.

My answer to Mr. Mile who wondered about associate status in the construction of a defence programme and reminded us of the blockade on the Danube, is that we were in no way insensitive to his appeal. Everyone who took part in preparing and drafting the report is very sensitive to this "Mitteleuropa" idea. We are very well aware of this recentralisation of Europe which had moved too far towards the West. That is the view we take and I think the report is clear enough.

Mr. Sutovski, you of course raised the question of what is to happen to Slovakia. The report refers explicitly to that country's praiseworthy efforts to move towards democracy, and to promote economic and social change. We know that Slovakia has found itself in difficulties after having inherited very serious handicaps which it has to overcome from common history and coexistence with the Czech Republic over several decades. Nevertheless we had to record the fact that a degree of instability cannot be ruled out because Slovakia has a minority government and has a problem which must be watched regarding the protection of minorities. We came away with the conviction that Slovakia was making a strong and significant effort in that direction. It must be able to handle and overcome its difficulties.

Mr. Böhm, you have taken us to task for having named Ukraine as the country where the problems are most acute. We did so simply because in our view Ukraine is really faced by the most acute problems and has the most uncertain future. We would add that it should not be a matter of indifference that Ukraine is a very big country and, as I have already said, the third world nuclear power. We should also have named the Baltic countries. We named Ukraine on the same basis as we could have named other countries which have emerged from the former USSR and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

As for Russia, we can only hope that it will change. I believe it has embarked upon what is necessarily a democratic process. Firm evidence and proofs are there. But who can really and seriously be sure of unswerving progress in that direction? Nobody could say that for sure. The speaker confirmed the various analyses given in the report and even enlarged on them beyond what I was able to do under the terms of the remit to our committee, which was to confine ourselves to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

I will stop there because we could discuss these problems with which we have been deeply concerned for many months at much greater length.

Mr. Wintgens (continued)

One speaker said our report is ambitious but the description is inappropriate: it was an exciting report to write because all the parts of the jigsaw interlock. The approach therefore had to be made while realising the difficulty and I would even say the boldness of the project. Fourteen speakers have proved the timeliness and – I hope I am not being immodest – interest of the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wintgens.

Would the Chairman of the committee like to say something?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – First, I must express my admiration for the tremendous and excellent work of the Rapporteur. I have one remark which underlines the importance of the report: the Political Committee had six meetings to prepare the report. The report is very relevant, especially during this session, bearing in mind the communiqué of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg and the forthcoming NATO summit.

What is at stake is what we can get the western free world to offer – in the field of security – to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. No formal or absolute guarantees can be given.

In fact, we discovered their disappointment in Central and Eastern Europe at our evasive way of treating them. In Europe and in NATO we try to make concrete the means by which we should improve the form of consultation. I do not have to repeat those concrete measures. It is our opinion that that form of consultation should be strengthened, deepened and improved. Quite apart from its history, the Franco-German proposal, as it is known, is very relevant. It is essential that, as long as NATO is not willing to accept these countries for various reasons, we in Europe make concrete what we can offer. In one way or another our document could and should improve the tendency – perhaps in the Committee of Ministers – to arrive at a concrete elaboration of relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Research is not a bad thing – we spent a lot of time on it – and, on the contrary, the report and recommendations are good. I therefore commend the recommendation to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – The Political Committee has presented a draft recommendation to which four amendments have been tabled.

The amendments will be taken in the order in which they relate to the text – that is, 1, 2, 4, 3.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mr. Wintgens, reads as follows:

1. After paragraph (*xiv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Consequently endorsing the Franco-German proposal of 12th November 1993 for creating a status of association with WEU for the parties of the Forum of Consultation which have already reached an agreement of association with the European Union and, when appropriate, for those which will reach such agreement, but regretting that the Ministerial Council of WEU, at its meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, did not adopt this proposal;”

I call Mr. Wintgens to move the amendment.

Mr. WINTGENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – As we have several times heard, a significant or even important event occurred on 12th November last and had to be included in our discussions; I refer to the Franco-German and Polish meetings in Warsaw which culminated in the proposal to create “an association status that should be open to the partners in the consultation that have already signed an association agreement with the European Union and, when the time comes, to those that will have signed such an agreement.” We add in our amendment that we regret that “the Ministerial Council of WEU at its meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993 did not adopt this proposal”.

The aim is to enable these countries to participate as fully as possible in the activities of WEU, as they all wish, and to harmonise the parallel changes which have become complementary, with the historic ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

That is why we have proposed Amendment 1.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does anyone oppose the amendment?...

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to say anything?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – The committee is in favour of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

Amendment 1 is agreed to unanimously.

Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr. Wintgens, reads as follows:

2. Before paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Adopt before the NATO summit meeting a specific proposal to improve qualitatively its

The President (continued)

relations with its partners in the Forum of Consultation on the basis of the Franco-German proposal of 12th November 1993 so as to be able to start negotiations with the countries concerned in January 1994;”

I call Mr. Wintgens to move the amendment.

Mr. WINTGENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – As you will all have understood, Amendment 2 also refers to the Franco-German proposal of 12th November. It would indeed be useful to widen discussions before the summit meeting of NATO in January 1994, which will be an important milestone on the way to our objectives.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anyone object or wish to speak against the amendment?...

What about the Chairman of the committee?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I am in favour.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to unanimously.

Amendment 4, which has been tabled by Mr. De Decker and others, reads as follows:

4. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Remind the countries of the European Community of their decision to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;”

With this we can also take Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr. De Decker and others, and reads as follows:

3. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – With your permission, Mr. President, I will speak to Amendments 4 and 3 at the same time.

The PRESIDENT. – That will be in order.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I should like to begin by congratulating Mr. Wintgens on his report which was difficult to write because of the complexity of the subject and the number of Central and Eastern European countries affected by the problems discussed.

Because of the excellence of the report, I did not speak this morning. I did, however, table Amendment 3 with Mr. Péciaux and Mr.

Ferrarini late this morning after a meeting of the Defence Committee which I chaired. At that meeting members of the Greek Delegation asked to speak on Sir Russell's report on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which parallels Mr. Wintgens's report in some ways.

I tabled Amendments 4 and 3 because I wished to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that Greece, because of its special position in our Assembly, was perhaps unable to take part in the drafting of these two reports or as much as it would have liked in drafting Mr. Wintgens's report. I also wanted to draw attention to the fact that the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is particularly difficult for Greece, a point on which the Greek representatives spoke movingly in the Defence Committee.

As a Balkan country, Greece is particularly concerned with the peace and quiet of the region. Since the recommendation in Mr. Wintgens's report calls on Greece, as a member of the European Union, to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, this – being a decision of the Council of Ministers of the European Union – must be implemented through the European Union or the European Community, as decided on two occasions in May and June 1992.

We must keep to this context because undoubtedly it was in the European Union that member countries were requested to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a recommendation hedged around with several conditions regarding in particular the name to be given to this independent state and the political considerations to be taken into account, for example, those connected with the continuing territorial demands of this former Yugoslav republic.

My Amendment 3 is very simple, Mr. President. It proposes the deletion of paragraph 5 of the recommendation that urges Greece to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, while Amendment 4 proposes the redrafting of paragraph 4, which calls on the member countries of WEU to recognise the former Yugoslav republic but, if amended, would urge the members of the European Union – including therefore Greece – to put this recommendation of the Council of Ministers into effect.

Mr. President, Mr. Wintgens's report claims that it will have a calming effect on this particularly sensitive, excitable and disturbed region of our continent. This is the intention behind the amendment tabled by Mr. Péciaux, Mr. Ferrarini and myself which I ask you to approve.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose Amendments 4 or 3?...

The President (continued)

That is not the case.

What is the opinion of the Rapporteur?

Mr. WINTGENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I cannot accept this amendment because the report and its recommendations were approved by our committee unanimously with one abstention, so that we are committed to their wording.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – So there is no point in having plenary sessions any more!

Mr. WINTGENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I am the Rapporteur and I am keeping to that rôle. You are completely free to say what you like. I cannot and this is the view of all my fellow committee members.

I would like to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that we have taken no stand on the fundamental point in dispute between Greece and this new republic, which is its name. Very diplomatically we kept to the wording adopted by the United Nations when the problem was discussed there. We did not go any further.

It is our view, however, that in order to bring some calm into the heated situation in the Balkans, which is the source of many potential conflicts, Greece should make a gesture. It would be equally helpful if Macedonia did the same in regard to its name but I am going beyond my remit.

On behalf of the committee and as Rapporteur, I ask the Assembly to reject Amendment 3.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – The committee discussed the possible changes in the text on 8th November and this morning and, after intense discussions, we concluded that the wording as it stands is correct. What is at stake is not just the fully understandable feelings of Greece, the fully understandable feelings of the people of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or the feelings of members of the Council of Ministers who took the decision one and a half years ago. We must balance all those different feelings and we have no wish to act unpleasantly. We see Greece as part of our family now and sometimes in families we express our wishes to other members. That is our style and I do not see what is wrong with it.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1387, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We will vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

I congratulate the Rapporteur.

I call Mr. Rathbone on a point of order.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. It may be of interest to you to know that during this debate and all previous debates, as far as I can ascertain, none of the speakers from the floor of the Chamber – including the rapporteur or chairman of the committee involved – have been shown on the internal television set in the hallway. Viewers have been blessed with a perfect picture of yourself and the clerks and of anyone else who happens to be with you. That is, of course, very enticing but it does not sit happily with those who are speaking. Except when someone is speaking from the podium, people outside the Chamber see on the television set something that has no significance for the debate in progress. In normal circumstances, that would not be important but in a parliamentary assembly it is terribly important to be able to see the person speaking as well as to listen to what that person is saying. I hope that the television coverage from the one fixed camera that is pointing directly at you can be changed or that at least one other camera can pick up anyone who is speaking from the floor. Perhaps the change could even be made before the start of business tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I was not aware of that fact but even my vanity does not extend to having a camera trained on me all the time. I am very interested to hear what you say. I shall have the usual suspects arrested immediately. Seriously, it is a good point. If there is any point in having a camera it must be to focus on

¹. See page 30.

The President (continued)

the main speaker at any given time, on the rapporteur or any individual who is making a contribution. Otherwise, we might as well not have a camera. I shall take up the matter with the Clerk's department and let you have an answer tomorrow.

5. Political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the development of WEU

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1389 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Soell of the report of the Political Committee on political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the development of WEU, with debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1389 and amendments.

I call Mr. Soell to present the report.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report I have submitted on behalf of the Political Committee and which that committee adopted unanimously, together with the draft recommendation, is primarily an attempt to clarify the political and legal aspects of relations between the United Nations and Western European Union. As regards the other aspects, especially the military and technical organisational aspects, I would refer you to the very comprehensive report submitted by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman at the June part-session, and the recommendation we adopted by a large majority at the time.

We find ourselves in a situation in which, as in the decades after 1945, we first have to get used to the fact – and when I say we I mean East and West – that the principle of collective self-defence, in accordance with Article 51, has been generally accepted as also applying to alliances. It will take us a similar length of time and we will have to undergo similar learning processes, now that we are moving on to a period of collective security, with many problems and many errors from which we should learn.

So much for the general background.

Another reason for this report and its orientation is the correspondence between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of Western European Union. As some of you will remember, on 1st April 1993 the Secretary-General of the United Nations wrote to all the regional organisations and "arrangements", as they are called in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, asking them

how regional organisations could contribute to peace-maintaining and peace-keeping efforts, with particular reference to the consequences in the humanitarian field. WEU replied to this letter, as did the European Community and the Council of Europe; I am mentioning only these two organisations, that are closely linked with us. NATO also replied.

The report is an attempt to describe the whole spectrum of activities to date, from preventive diplomacy to measures to restore peace, not in some abstract terms but through examples of current activities in which WEU countries in particular are involved. Let me refer you specifically to the wording of paragraph 16 and to paragraphs 17 to 26.

Since 1988 there have been 15 new peace-keeping operations – compared with 13 between 1948 and 1988. According to current estimates, some 80 000 troops are engaged in peace-keeping operations. Since 1988, a number of WEU countries have been providing a substantial number of United Nations troops for eight of these 15 new operations.

We must remember – and this became clear in Mr. De Decker's report on Somalia in June – that so far there has been no co-ordinated action in the framework of WEU. It is true that this question is now being discussed in the Council. But there is no co-ordination, for instance, on the question of the withdrawal from Somalia of the United Nations troops provided by some WEU member countries. That is one of the requirements set out in the draft recommendation. In future we should aim at a minimum of political, and of course also military and technical, co-ordination.

The report also discusses the United Nations' endeavours in the field of arms control and disarmament, especially as regards nuclear proliferation and missile and chemical weapons proliferation. Efforts to prevent proliferation as far as possible are acutely necessary. Thanks to their experience and the resources available to them, the countries of Europe can make a considerable contribution here and we call on them to do so.

During the Rapporteur's visit to the United Nations, we had in-depth discussions with the head of the disarmament department on the success the conventional arms register has now achieved in the United Nations. It covers up to 95% of weapons exports by the major nations.

This kind of publication is a very important means of supervising future weapons exports more closely. At this point I want to emphasise once again that a great deal remains to be done and that Europeans in particular should endeavour to obtain some competence here – this need not necessarily be discussed within WEU but could also be considered in the framework of the European Union.

Mr. Soell (continued)

The question of national sovereignty is a tricky one, as is the current de facto reinterpretation of the United Nations Charter by the Security Council. Anyone who is familiar with the Charter knows that pursuant to Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 7, not only do all the members have sovereign equality, but paragraph 7 specifically states that the United Nations may not intervene in domestic matters. Meanwhile, this reinterpretation by the Security Council, for example to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq in spring 1991, has led to a major change of practice in cases in which domestic conflicts or civil wars of all kinds have had grave consequences for the security and peace of other states, for example, by causing waves of refugees in vast numbers.

The majority of WEU countries supported this trend. But we must realise that not only does it raise legal questions but it also involves considerable political risks. The report discusses this, and it is a point that we should always remember in this context.

The report also discusses the political and legal question as to how far the Brussels Treaty and the states that signed it represent a regional organisation within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. We have not delivered a final opinion on that. And I am glad the Political Committee has also adopted a unanimous approach. Like the Secretary-General of WEU in his letter of reply, we believe we should not commit ourselves on this question.

Let me indulge in a short historical reminiscence. The original 1947 Dunkirk Treaty that preceded the Brussels Treaty referred specifically to Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. That reference was omitted from the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the modified 1954 Brussels Treaty. There are, however, a number of references to the United Nations Charter and the obligations under it in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty, and especially in Article VIII and also Article V, which directly concerns the automatic involvement of the alliance.

In conversations with the Rapporteur and on earlier occasions, for instance in discussions with the external affairs committees of national parliaments over the past year and a half since he submitted the Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General has stated very pragmatically what regional organisations or "arrangements" are. He rightly emphasised – and he has considered this question before – that Chapter VIII is formulated very broadly. Originally he had perhaps intended – as suggested by occasional remarks – to use Chapter VIII and reference to that chapter as a means of restricting to some extent

the rather liberal application of the right to collective self-defence under Article 51, paragraph 1, because all activities undertaken by regional organisations pursuant to Chapter VIII would require a United Nations mandate. He has since dismissed this idea, which was voiced in public here and there, and now says: the United Nations are involved from start to finish, and share in determining the nature, scale and timing of the intervention, only in cases in which individual states, an informal group of states or formally concluded alliances wish to receive a mandate from the United Nations.

There is virtually nothing to be said against this. But let me repeat: we have concluded that it would be sensible not to give a definitive answer to this legal question, but to emphasise that WEU remains an instrument for the collective self-defence of its member countries, from which the right to collective emergency aid may be derived in specific cases. Of course that must always include a national proviso, because the automatic application of the alliance under Article V cannot refer to the latter case.

Let me make a penultimate remark concerning the clarification of the still very vague Maastricht Treaty provisions on the common tasks of permanent members of the Security Council which are signatory states of both the WEU and Maastricht treaties. They are supposed to protect the interests of the European Union there. That is a very wide field. But it is clear that in view of the current state of the European integration process, no general agreement could have been reached on more extensive provisions.

It is on this question of protecting the interests of the European Union in the United Nations that we as a parliamentary assembly have a problem, since the United Nations, being simply an organisation of states, does not have any parliamentary control: how are we as an Assembly to protect our rights in this respect? We will have to make further, intensive efforts if we are to exert even an indirect influence on policy-making. That also applies to what I said about our co-ordination, which will have to be increased in future.

In the concluding part of our draft recommendation we point out that we do not just need a further definition of the current challenges, going beyond The Hague platform and beyond the wording of the Petersberg declaration. We have put forward a few suggestions regarding organisational and technical aspects in particular. We should make use of the bodies that are slowly taking shape in the framework of WEU's infrastructure, the Planning Cell and the Torrejón Satellite Centre. We should also make appropriate use of national information systems to prepare for such peace-keeping activities and scenarios and to train the necessary staff. I think

Mr. Soell (continued)

there is still a lot of work to be done here within the WEU Council of Ministers as well.

There should also be joint, regular consultations between ambassadors to the United Nations in New York. That is part of it. NATO now has a permanent observer within the committee on peace-keeping operations. As it expands, WEU should consider whether to do the same. Under the present system, the ambassador of whichever country is chairing the Council is responsible for this kind of co-ordination. I have heard that so far, except on one occasion, the WEU states have not met in New York. Perhaps that situation can be remedied in the coming months and years.

It has also become clear that we are lagging behind in many respects – I need only compare the ideas set out by the North Atlantic Co-operation Council in the summer on the subject of co-operation between NATO and the United Nations with what the WEU Council and its Secretary-General have produced so far. That too should be an incentive for us to work much harder. The Assembly is trying to make its contribution with this report. I ask you to support it by approving the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Soell.

The debate is now open and I call first Mr. Hardy from the United Kingdom.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome the report and congratulate the Rapporteur. The report deserves the wholehearted support and endorsement of this Assembly and of each of our member states. It provides a great deal of information and, in looking to the future, it spells out the intensity of need and it reminds us of the scale of current activity in which the United Nations is engaged.

Many of us have been concerned about and interested in the United Nations for a very long time. Through the years of that interest, there has often been dismay that its decisions have been dismissed, its very existence at times derided, and its capacity to a very large extent disdained. However, it has survived and it is now seeing its sixth decade. Its survival may have been assisted by the cold war, for at least that provided a measure of stability in Europe. However, since the cold war, the lid has been raised and chaos has emerged in an almost ever-increasing intensity. The challenge that mankind faces is, to a very large extent, now greater than could have been envisaged a few years ago.

The more cautious and prudent say that the United Nations should not bite off more than it can chew – and there is a great deal in that. However, it must have teeth. If it has teeth, the possibility exists that its jaws will need to be

exercised less; the very capacity will be a deterrent to the events and incidents that we have seen so frequently. If it is to be effective, it must also develop and it must be seen increasingly as not being excessively dependent on the superpower. I am not criticising the United States because without the United States the United Nations would be meaningless today. However, we cannot allow the spirit of the international community to be regarded as the creature of one power, even if it be the superpower.

It is therefore right for Europe to play a much larger part. Indeed, I believe that we have a moral obligation to do that. The greatest challenge facing the United Nations lies in former Yugoslavia and the problems of that area exist, not so much because of the faults of those who live in Yugoslavia, but because of the faults of political perception, the failure of crisis management, the woeful political misjudgment and the errors which have taken place in Europe's attitude to that part of the Balkans over the past ten years or more since Tito died. Our failure in Yugoslavia places a greater moral obligation on Europe to ensure that, if we have failed, we do not allow the United Nations to do so.

Many politicians, of whom I am one, welcomed the peace dividend. We still hear people talking about peace dividends, but what peace? What peace is there in our globe when our populations cannot count the number of areas of conflict, killing, slaughter and suffering; where risks of potential conflict outnumber the very long list of conflicts which currently exist and where the scale of international terror and international horror are such that they provide a threat to the economic buoyancy and prosperity not only of the planet as a whole, but of Europe in particular? Our trade routes are threatened and our stabilities are not enhanced by the suffering – even by that on the most distant shores.

I believe that we are right to see an increasing scale of interest in United Nations affairs. I welcome the establishment of the Council of Europe United Nations sub-committee. I was very pleased to suggest that the sub-committee which I chaired – the Sub-Committee on Terrorism – should be replaced by a sub-committee which would look at the United Nations because it seemed to me to be better to try to shut the door before the horse bolts than to try to control the horse after it has escaped.

That means that Europe is beginning to take the United Nations more seriously. It is essential that it should do that. I hope that the Assembly, even in the most informal way, will maintain a close accord with the activities and involvement of the Council of Europe's sub-committee.

Without the United Nations, human life, cheap as it already is, will become ever cheaper. Without the United Nations and its devel-

Mr. Hardy (continued)

opment, the quality of human life will be even more disfigured. Without the United Nations, I do not believe that anyone can see a peaceful future for our planet and Europe has an enormous responsibility to safeguard that posterity.

The PRESIDENT. – The Chair recognises Mrs. Fischer from Germany.

Mrs. FISCHER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I think you have all felt how much has changed in recent years and how much movement there has been. I am therefore most grateful to Mr. Hartmut Soell for the report he has submitted. It is a very comprehensive and thorough report, and it is good, because it shows where the errors lie and what the difficulties are. I think – and in this respect I entirely agree with Peter Hardy, which is a rare event – that this report really does deserve to be circulated widely.

The resolution in which the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to place the question of balanced representation and an increase in the number of Security Council members on the agenda of its 48th session was a decisive one. We have the opinions of the member states before us. The discussion on the future structure of the United Nations has entered a crucial phase. But the same applies to the debate on the structure of WEU, including the question of demarcation or co-operation with regard to NATO.

Any predictions about the future structure of the United Nations will require two kinds of farsightedness. Those concerned must be able to extrapolate on the basis of current strategies and reactions to them, but also to foresee possibilities that still seem unattainable at this time.

From whatever perspective we look at the restructuring of the United Nations organisation and the structure of WEU, the main obstacle now and in future is how to translate political commitment into practical action. In the past few years, we have all seen how difficult that is, and we shall continue to see this in future. In this connection, I need not refer to any particular centres or countries.

In view of the new peace-keeping opportunities after the collapse of the Soviet empire, the member states of the United Nations favour a commitment more comprehensive and further-reaching than would once have been conceivable in the international community. Yet the same world that has shown so much enthusiasm for the principle of collective action is proving unable actually to take the appropriate measures in all matters, whether financial or organisational, technical or military, not to mention the political difficulties. The very scale

and complexity of peace-keeping operations make it essential to open up new means of co-operation with regional organisations such as WEU. I am referring here to the statements and opinions of Mr. Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations, who obviously sees things rather differently from the Political Committee of WEU. It might be quite interesting to examine this too, more closely in the course of the next few years.

The members of WEU are among the technological leaders of the world. Highly-developed modern technologies could be put to use in peace-keeping operations.

I would refer here to the fact that the decision to use troops on the ground is of course far more serious than the decision to try to establish and maintain peace by the use of modern technology.

No conflict in which international troops are deployed is like any other. While the United Nations are responsible for peace-maintenance and peace-keeping throughout the world, the operational field of WEU is restricted to Europe. We have debated a great deal. The report submitted by Hartmut Soell on behalf of the Political Committee is another contribution to that debate. But WEU must decide what it wants to be: a regional organisation, a strong arm of the European Union, a strong arm of CSCE or NATO. For our part, we will have to show our commitment to decisions of this kind, for we share the responsibility for what happens.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we will soon be celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. Those familiar with world history will know that fifty years is a relatively long stretch of time for such an institution to survive. Let me remind you, for instance, that even within the close confines of those European powers which played the decisive rôle during that century, the so-called Holy Alliance did not last fifty years after the Congress of Vienna. It only survived a relatively short time, from 1815 to 1848.

The United Nations was originally created for reasons other than those reflected in the tasks it has to perform today. We all know that the United Nations Charter still contains what are known as the enemy-state clauses, directed at Italy, Japan and Germany. This is perfectly understandable when you look back at the historical origins of the United Nations.

Today the situation is quite different. We need an international organisation because the problems of the world concern all the nations on this earth. They are no longer confined to individual countries or continents. The population

Mr. Müller (continued)

pressure, the food situation in the world, the environmental problems in the world, to cite just a few, are challenges that now have to be resolved by the international community. Looking only at the problem of proliferation, which Mr. Soell also brought up, we can see very clearly what dangers the international community has to overcome today. So I welcome the first steps in that direction in the form of the register of weapons. The initiative came in part from the German IPU delegation.

When we speak of WEU – as Mr. Soell noted – we must also remember that the original nucleus of WEU, the Dunkirk Treaty, referring to Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, had very specific objectives. So there were very specific objectives at that time too, just after the end of the second world war. Meanwhile, WEU has also changed.

What I regard as most important to WEU's perception of itself is the request made in paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation, calling on the WEU Council to define its own security interests as soon as possible. We must be clear about what we as WEU want. If we are not, we will be unable to play an appropriate rôle in the framework of the United Nations. If the Maastricht Treaty, within which WEU is intended to play a special rôle as the security policy arm, is to have any meaning at all, it is essential for WEU to define its own security interest platform in order to play any part at all in the United Nations. Obviously this kind of self-perception does not yet exist. In the case of the Yugoslav conflict, we learned the hard way that the common security interests of the WEU countries had obviously not been defined clearly enough. This gap must be filled soon, because the reform of the United Nations is an important precondition for our ability to control the future of this planet.

The rôle the United Nations will play will depend largely on the rôle regional associations can play in the framework of the United Nations. That is why it is not enough simply to appeal to the United Nations finally to fulfil the tasks that we expect that organisation to fulfil, or to demand – however justified that demand may be – the reform of the United Nations. All that is quite right, but if something reasonable is to emerge from these demands, we as WEU must basically know what we ourselves want and what we can offer within the United Nations as a European contribution, a contribution to collective security, a contribution to the future of our planet. We have to do our homework first. Only then can we turn in the wider context to the tasks we all want to fulfil. So we must not just make demands, but must also make our own contributions to the debate.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – The Rapporteur has done the work which could be expected from such a talented person. Mr. Soell, former President of our Assembly, is first and foremost a serious historian who understands the great problems of contemporary Europe and of mankind and tries to study them as a political expert.

He starts with some very clear thoughts on highly complex questions affecting all our peoples and goes on to look at the problems posed by political relations between WEU and the United Nations. The new challenges which the United Nations will have to take up on the eve of the third millenium face us all with another challenge, namely to hold a free and frank debate on a number of questions closely linked with the future of mankind.

Like tens of millions of Europeans I am worried by the changes which are steadily distancing the United Nations from its humanitarian vocation and the spirit of the Charter.

We can, for example, learn something from the situation created in Somalia. The so-called "restore hope" operation was conducted under the aegis of the United Nations but planned, organised and commanded by the United States. The vast majority of the troops involved in the first phase were American.

The facts are well known; the initiative presented as a humanitarian aid enterprise became a colonial-type war. Things have gone so badly that when President Clinton spoke to the General Assembly of the United Nations he blamed the failure on the United Nations. In this polemic address the President of this great republic reaffirmed in the clearest terms his country's determination to hold on to leadership indefinitely as the nation predestined to guide and save humanity. Even more seriously, making more and more accusations against the United Nations, President Clinton added that, for the future, the United States reserved the right to intervene unilaterally when and if it thought necessary.

Ladies and gentlemen, I wonder what purpose is served by the United Nations when unforeseeable decisions may be taken by the only superpower left which has announced its determination to use force to serve its own interests and possibly bypassing the United Nations, as was even repeated a few days ago at an American university.

On the one hand the United Nations is becoming a tool while on the other its prestige and credibility are threatened by very harsh criticism when the results of so-called United Nations peace operations turn out to be failures.

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

Mr. Soell reminds us that United Nations interventions in civil wars deemed to be a threat to international peace and security raise a new problem when they are followed by coercive action. This happened in Somalia. In the Horn of Africa, United Nations forces went beyond the terms of paragraph 7, Article 2, Chapter VII.

Experience shows that it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between peace-keeping operations which require the consensus of the parties involved and coercive operations claiming to pursue humanitarian aims.

To my mind, by no means the least merit of Mr. Soell's work is that it opens the way for detailed consideration of the situations which are driving the United Nations to depart a little more each time from its humanitarian and universal vocation and therefore from the objectives set by its Charter and embodied in the declaration on the right of nations to peace approved in November 1984.

Everyone on earth is suffering from this distortion of the rôle of the United Nations. A further delicate problem arises in respect of relations between the United Nations and WEU, because of the contradictions stemming from the fact that two permanent members of the Security Council – France and the United Kingdom – which are also members of WEU and of the European Community, may, as Mr. Soell says, find themselves faced with conflicting responsibilities to the United Nations and to the European organisations of which they are members.

My high opinion of Mr. Soell's efforts to clarify what are sometimes fairly obscure matters concerning the rôle of the United Nations, the danger of its becoming a political tool and relations between WEU and the United Nations does not prevent me from in some cases having a different view on the preamble as a whole and on the recommendations to the Council. Nevertheless, in view of the overall importance of the report as food for thought on the fundamental problems of our times I shall vote for the text now before us.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, while I have the floor I would like to congratulate Mr. Soell most warmly on his excellent report.

On what grounds has the United Nations carried out 15 peace-keeping missions since 1988, compared with 13 in the previous 40 years?

Our reason is that we have entered a period of localised instability in some areas of the world, particularly in Africa, the Balkans and the

Middle East. Underdevelopment engenders situations of conflict. It is easy to mobilise against a foreign or even domestic enemy, seeking scapegoats to try to justify the unjustifiable: misery, hunger, tyranny, civil war.

Civil war in many countries of the south: this is the disturbing problem which confronts us, even more than conflicts between nations. There is a re-emergence, a resurgence of the "warlords", those feudal lords whose aim is to conquer territory or even the whole of their country by war for their own benefit, giving rise to the familiar succession of atrocities, provoking a vigorous reaction in public opinion in democratic countries which are not prepared in this day and age to witness the killing and mutilation of both children and adults, or their physical disappearance through hunger and disease, or the spread of ignorance and great ecological and other disasters.

I would like to praise the important rôle played by the United Nations Organisation and, contrary to what some speakers here seem to have been saying, I would like to say that some of the operations have been extremely positive; not all of them, of course, but some.

I recall, among others, the cases of Cambodia, of El Salvador, of the Western Sahara and now, too, of Mozambique, where attempts are being made to rebuild a country which, with the exception of some coastal towns, has collapsed through a civil war which left all the remaining population totally abandoned.

I also hope – and Portugal has done all it could to bring this about, just as in Mozambique – that a positive solution will finally be reached in Angola, bringing to an end countless years of suffering for a whole nation torn apart by a very cruel civil war.

For all these reasons it is incomprehensible that many member countries of the United Nations are not up to date with their financial contributions to that organisation. We need to ask: what are peace and security worth to those countries?

The member countries of WEU have, therefore, contributed towards sustaining the United Nations and especially towards its peace-keeping operations, as the report demonstrates, and we must continue to do so, because peace and security in the world are inseparable, they must be defended everywhere, and human values are universal.

Chapter IV of Mr. Soell's report on the modified Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations is worthy of comment. I agree with the Rapporteur's conclusions: if WEU cannot be considered a regional organisation for the purposes of the United Nations Charter, then relations between WEU and the United

Mr. Roseta (continued)

Nations can and must be seen as a process leading to closer and increasingly effective co-operation.

In my view it is in the interest of WEU member countries that the credibility of the United Nations be maintained, to enable them to secure peace wherever it may be threatened. I think, however, that the value of preventive measures should be appreciated: if diplomacy and other preventive action can avoid external conflict or even civil war, there may be some loss of media spectacles, and some television channels may lose audiences, but we will certainly gain a great deal in terms of human life and people's well-being. We must therefore always strive to avoid conflict, and our first target must be to prevent the proliferation of arms, as has already been mentioned.

It is not in the interests of member countries of WEU, either, that the United Nations should be involved in the foreign policy of a single country, as this would obviously affect their credibility.

I therefore agree that the Council be recommended to work out a platform of European security interests, because there is no doubt that we will have no security unless we guarantee it to others, particularly in neighbouring areas, such as the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East. Nor should we forget that appropriate action must include areas which fall outside the competence of WEU and which I feel ought to have been developed further in the report; I am referring to social, cultural and environmental matters, and to the raising of educational and technological standards. This necessitates co-operation with other organisations, such as the European Union, the Council of Europe, etc.

The Council of WEU must, therefore, define our organisation's vocation in relation to the United Nations and the specific areas where WEU could offer to act, while retaining its independence.

One final note: it is curious that my criticisms of the draft recommendation will be superseded by Mr. Soell's Amendments 1 and 2. Indeed, although it is true that in its Charter the United Nations is given no legal basis for intervening in a country's internal affairs, it is also true that the Security Council introduced this possibility in 1991 in cases where there is a threat to general peace and security or to the peace and security of neighbouring countries.

Finally, in paragraph 4, I could not agree with the original version, whereby the Council of WEU would be responsible for formulating proposals to reform the United Nations and its Security Council. This is obviously the responsibility of the member states, not of WEU.

I therefore approve the proposed amendments and shall vote in favour of them.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Rapporteur wish to reply to the debate?

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am glad that the contributions to the debate have tended very much in the same direction and have provided supplementary pointers in many respects. I agree with Peter Hardy that in the long term the United Nations cannot continue to rely largely on the resources of one world power, the United States. In the report I tried to supply, in sober terms, a reminder of Europe's moral duty to give more support to the United Nations and its activities.

Coming now to what the second speaker said, in democratic societies we see a natural tendency towards non-intervention unless the very survival of their own country is at stake. That is what I always reply to those who say, in cases such as the Gulf war or the action in Somalia, that the industrialised countries have intervened too soon. Democratic societies and governments that have to answer to a democratic public are prepared to intervene only when interests relating to, or perceived as relating to, survival coincide fully with the defence of the code of values, that is to say human rights, and the basic interests of other nations. Such cases are rarer than we now dare to hope, in view of the new challenges.

There is another point that is even more problematic. It arose in connection with the very honest and open speech by the Bulgarian Minister of Defence, Mr. Aleksandrov. We decided on a number of sanctions in the framework of the United Nations and we made a certain amount of technical material and personnel available to implement these sanctions. But so far we have not been in a position to compensate even in part for the economic losses suffered by other countries that are undergoing a difficult process of economic restructuring. That is a very important question; we cannot resolve it now at this level. We should all urge our own governments in our own parliaments to make some compensation in the matter of Bulgaria's international debt. This applies not just to Bulgaria, but equally to Romania and Hungary, which are also hard hit by the sanctions.

So in this context the problem of non-intervention should not just be regarded as a practical problem, but also as a problem of non-compensation for the damage caused by such sanctions. Sanctions can indeed be an important means of persuading certain governments or conflicting parties to desist, without resorting to military intervention. The discussion that took place early this week in Geneva showed clearly that sanctions can be a valuable instrument.

Mr. Soell (continued)

The same applies to the instrument of preventive diplomacy. This takes me to the statement by Mr. Müller, who rightly emphasised the need to define common security interests. Of course, preventive diplomacy includes a joint analysis and common perception of the real situation in the areas of conflict. That is the precondition for common decisions and common action. So far, as Europeans and also as a European Union, we really are still underdeveloped in this respect. In the case of conflicts close by, we seem to have reverted to the outlook of national diplomacies, projecting their own national historical experiences on to the area of conflict. Results have differed greatly. This applies not only to open conflict but also to its early background, which has basically become even more important. Prompt political and economic intervention at that early stage is essential to any meaningful action. Otherwise we get situations in which both the existing alliances in the West and the United Nations come under too much strain in terms of the demands made on them.

Mr. Rodrigues referred to President Clinton's speech before the United Nations, in which he tried on the one hand to unload some of the responsibility on to the United Nations, while at the same time reserving the Americans' right to take unilateral action in future. That is one of the contradictions with which not only we Western Europeans but the Americans too have to live, because the democratic public in our countries is extremely sensitive to any setbacks in such actions. That too forms part of the learning process to which I referred at the beginning of my report.

It will be very important – and in this context let me refer you once again to the report on Euro-American, that is, transatlantic co-operation that I drew up a year ago – to place transatlantic co-operation on a wider basis and not just confine it to the formal definition in the NATO treaty. In the long run that no longer suffices, in view of the great variety of interests and of new challenges.

Mr. Roseta rightly spoke of the problem of weapons exports. In talks with me, and no doubt also with other colleagues who had personal conversations with him, and in discussions in the external committees in which he was often represented last year, the Secretary-General has said: we are currently in the process of cleaning up the weapons export activities that have been going on for decades in East and West. That costs 1% or less than 1% of the profits made from those weapons exports. And yet we are under enormous financial pressure; I said something about that in the report, too. We cannot even fulfil these minimal tasks. It is up to us, as national parliamentarians, to keep a constant

critical eye on the weapons export practices of our own countries and check whether they comply with these principles. I am thinking very much of my own country, which, according to official figures at least, has become the third largest weapons exporter this year, even if half the exports go to allied countries. In any case, this remains an enormously important question. We can only be successful in this field in the long term if we ourselves adhere to a code of conduct that can then serve as a model for others.

Let me thank you again for your contributions to the debate and the points you raised and ask you to endorse the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to say anything?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Just one additional remark, thanking and complimenting the Rapporteur, Mr. Soell. I shall try to avoid one misunderstanding, that is to say that this report is of interest to the Assembly and of interest to the Council of Ministers perhaps next year. The report is of urgent interest to the Council of Ministers because, in a way, it is a report on the forthcoming NATO summit. Perhaps what happens there is, inter alia, a discussion between the United States of America and Europe about the division of tasks focused on these relations.

This is a report about our first line – on the one hand, the European Council, and the United Nations on the other hand. The report is rather concrete in inviting communication and co-operation with the European Council and with NATO, and using our own Planning Cell much better in relation to the former Yugoslavia and using our Torrejón satellite system. In many ways, the report and the recommendation include many practical suggestions for our representation at the NATO summit. In this context, I can explain that, most probably, my committee will present at the next session an evaluation of the NATO summit, bearing in mind what we have decided here. Therefore, we meet each other. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – The Political Committee has presented a draft recommendation to which two amendments have been tabled.

The amendments will be taken in the order in which they relate to the text, that is, 1, 2.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mr. Soell, reads as follows:

1. At the end of paragraph (*xviii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add the following words:

“, but emphasising nevertheless that in practice the Security Council has introduced,

The President (continued)

since 1981, the possibility of intervening in internal hostilities when they constitute a threat to the peace and security of other states;”

I call Mr. Soell to move the amendment.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have already pointed out in my report that from a purely legal point of view Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter quite clearly forbids any intervention in domestic affairs. However, as a result of further developments in practice, and the Security Council decisions since 1991 in particular, other possibilities now exist in the event of domestic conflicts, though these must be subject to strict criteria, above all whether such internal conflicts have serious implications for the peace and security of other states. That was the justification for the resolution on the protection of the Kurds in northern Iraq, for instance.

I ask you to vote in favour.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does anyone wish to oppose this amendment?...

That not being so, does the Chairman of the committee have any comment?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – In favour.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to unanimously.

Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr. Soell, reads as follows:

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, delete “Make proposals for reforming” and insert “Study in detail the proposals made in the meantime with regard to reforming”.

I call Mr. Soell to move the amendment.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to take up a point made by Mr. Hardy. We now have such a wide spectrum of proposals on the reform of the United Nations, especially with the Secretary-General’s proposals in the Agenda for Peace, that it must be very much in the interest of the WEU member countries to examine these proposals carefully and if possible to derive a common position from them. That is our primary concern. It has been reformulated in that sense.

I ask for your agreement.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does the Chairman wish to comment?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – In favour.

The PRESIDENT. – No one wishes to oppose?...

I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to unanimously.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1389, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

6. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1993

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1399)

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the presentation by Mr. Büchler of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1993, with debate and vote on the preliminary draft recommendation, Document 1399.

Is Mr. Büchler here?

The following order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1994.

I am now advised that Mr. Büchler is held up in Germany and cannot be here. I think that it would be for the convenience of the Assembly if Mr. Rathbone, who is very much in touch with these things, dealt with both reports. With your agreement, I will ask him to speak to them. Do you agree? Any objections? That not being so, I ask Mr. Rathbone to make his speech, please.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you very much for allowing me to move this

1. See page 32.

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

report in the name of Mr. Büchler who, unfortunately, is becalmed by the foul weather.

This report is on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the current year. There has been some delay in bringing the report to the Assembly. It is usually moved in June, but we had some delay in getting the information needed. It has been a particularly complex year for Western European Union because of the transfer of the Council and the Secretariat-General from London to Brussels.

The uncertain political context in which we are living only allows analysis of the budgets and not consideration of whether the organs of WEU, the organisation of WEU or the funding for WEU are correct or adequate for present and future aims.

The move to the new Brussels headquarters has raised questions which are still outstanding, most particularly enormously financially important questions about the sale of the old building and the future status of the new headquarters, with a possible change of ownership. It is interesting to note that budgets can be approved even when substantial budgetary uncertainties remain to be resolved. It is worth underlining that point.

Another element of the Secretariat-General's budget, which is of course very obvious, is the very large increase due to the move to Brussels. That is an indication of "Where there's a will, there's a way". Where there is a need to provide budgets to do what ministers require to be done, those budgets are provided irrespective of the very necessary requirements of each of our national governments to contain expenditure.

It is worth making another point. The Secretariat-General's budget met enormous delay in the approval process. That is a problem which we have experienced in the past, and it is something which the Assembly should draw to the attention of the Council of Ministers. It is almost impossible to run an organisation with such delays. I believe that it makes it very difficult to run such organisations, and it would make it very difficult for this organisation should we need to have half-yearly reviews of the budget which has been applied for and which has been granted.

There are six recommendations in this document. I will not go through each of them, but I believe that members of the Assembly would do well to note them, and I ask members of the Assembly to support them.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rathbone, for taking on the task of presenting the report which Mr. Büchler was due to present. We fully understand why he cannot be here.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1399.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation. Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

7. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1994

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1383 and Addenda 1 and 2)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Rathbone of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1994, with debate and vote on the draft budget, Document 1383 and Addenda 1 and 2.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – To clarify matters, Mr. President, what we have just passed is the draft recommendation expressing our opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1993. The next item on the agenda relates to the draft budget for our Assembly for 1994. This is of terrific pertinence to the Assembly. It is closer to our hearts and something over which we have had considerable difficulties in the past.

The draft budget for 1994 was prepared in July. It reflected the political aims as best they could be identified in this fast-changing context of political developments in Europe, not least of course the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and declaration since then. It is worth pointing out that this was in accord with the schedule outlined in Order 80 and it has been followed this year to a better degree than in any previous year.

This has led to the draft budget being prepared by 8th July and it has been facilitated by better understanding and better discussions by the Budget and Organisation Committee and by the Council. I thank you, Mr. President, for the way in which you facilitated that in your discussions with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council. You deserve the Assembly's gratitude for that.

¹. See page 34.

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

As colleagues will have identified, the budget includes staff increases, a requirement identified in the Committee of Experts' report of 1990, and regradings. Details of those and details of the way in which the Office of the Clerk should be developed to meet the increasing needs of that Office are outlined in paragraphs 5 to 12.

Colleagues will be particularly helped in their understanding of what we are talking about by Appendix II which provides an organogram detailing the new posts and the upgradings which the draft budget included. It also includes operating cost increases to meet the needs of the accession of Greece to WEU, the need to fund the increasing work of committees, most particularly in respect of their developing contacts with the European Parliament, NATO, the North Atlantic Alliance, the Council of Europe, the parliaments of observer and associate countries, national parliaments and to cope with the developing rôle of WEU in the CSCE and in other ways. It also includes cost increases to continue the process of equipment modernisation.

The total increase from 1993 to 1994 represented an operating budget increase of 8.43%. With our papers this afternoon, colleagues will have found a budget amendment – Addendum 1 – which was produced in September to meet one specific only, namely the new salary scales for permanent and temporary staff as recommended by the inter-organisation studies section on salaries and prices, mentioned in paragraph 2 of the draft budget. That was approved by the Co-ordinating Committee on Remuneration and by the Council, with effect from 1st July 1993.

That addendum reflects only those reformed scales and their effect on 1994, and no other changes to the original draft budget are included in that addendum.

Subsequently, Addendum 2 has been prepared which represents a redraft of the budget following consideration by the Budget and Organisation Committee on 22nd October and on 12th November. At those reviews, the committee recommended an operating budget at a growth rate of only 4% as opposed to the 8.4% originally requested by the Assembly. That was the basis for working out a revised budget for next year, and that basis was approved by the Council on 16th November.

The details of the revisions needed in order to meet that are outlined in the explanatory memorandum which includes the postponement of some staff additions and the postponement of the reorganisation of the Office of the Clerk. It also includes the reduction in the number of upgradings and it reflects the complete lack of cost allowance for the accession of Greece,

which will now almost inevitably not have to be met until at least the end of 1994 at the very earliest, and probably not until into 1995. However, it allows for increases in travelling and subsistence for official journeys to which I made reference when referring to the original draft budget.

Colleagues may wish to compare the actual figures in this addendum, which appear in Appendix III with the original draft budget in respect of Appendix VI of Document 1383.

That is all that I have to say by way of explanation. I hope that it has clarified what is inevitably a rather complex subject. I would like to say yet again what a marvellous advance it is to have the budget prepared and considered, and its basis agreed by the Council, and therefore to be able to prepare properly for the presentation of next year's budget in good time for our Assembly's consideration at this meeting. That has not been the case in the past, but I hope it will always be the case in the future.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rathbone. I am sure that we all subscribe to the sentiments that you have just expressed, but may I also thank you for your kind remarks about me.

No member has shown any wish to speak in the debate and therefore we shall go straight to the vote.

We shall now vote on the draft budget contained in Document 1383 and Addendum 1 and Addendum 2.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft budget.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft budget for the financial year 1994 is adopted unanimously.

8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1398 and Addendum)

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the presentation by Mr. Rathbone of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the accounts of the administrative

The President (continued)

expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1398 and Addendum.

I call Mr. Rathbone to present the report.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I can be very brief. As colleagues will see in the certificate of the auditor, he says among other things: "As a result of this examination, my opinion is that these statements faithfully record the book-keeping operations for the financial year and that these operations were in conformity with the budget estimates..."

With that in mind, I beg to move the motion for adoption by this Assembly of Document 1398 and Addendum dated 16th November.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

We shall now vote on the motion to approve the final accounts set out in the Addendum to Document 1398.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The motion is agreed to unanimously.

**9. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 1st December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. An operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation – Part One: Adriatic operations (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1396).
2. Lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1395 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 5.45 p.m.)

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 1st December 1993

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
4. An operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation – Part One: Adriatic operations (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1396*).
Speakers: Sir Keith Speed (*joint Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Agnelli, Lord Newall, Mr. Marten (*joint Rapporteur*), Mr. Baumel (*Chairman*).
5. Lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and*

vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1395 and amendments).

Speakers: Sir Russell Johnston (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mr. Cuco, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Vacaru (*Observer from Romania*), Mr. Lopez Henares, Mrs. Bakogianni (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Pahor (*Observer from Slovenia*), Mr. Litherland, Mr. Brito, Mr. Philipov (*Observer from Bulgaria*), Mr. Agnelli, Lord Finsberg, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Sir Russell Johnston (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Baumel (*Chairman*), Mr. Péciaux (point of order), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. De Decker, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Péciaux, Lord Finsberg, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Ferrarini, Mr. Lopez Henares, Lord Finsberg (point of order).

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – I have received notice of the resignation of Mr. De Hoop Scheffer as a Vice-President of the Assembly.

The Netherlands Delegation has proposed the candidature of Mr. van der Linden to replace him.

The nomination has been properly made and in the form prescribed by the rules.

If there is no objection I propose that the election of Mr. van der Linden as a Vice-President should be by acclamation in accordance with Rule 10 (7).

Is there any objection to the nomination?...

I believe that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare our colleague Mr. van der Linden duly elected a Vice-President, and his seniority will, as required by Rule 10 (7), be determined by his age.

4. An operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation Part One: Adriatic operations

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1396)

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the presentation by Sir Keith Speed of the report of the Defence Committee on an operational organisation for WEU – naval co-operation – Part One: Adriatic Operations, with debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1396.

1. See page 37.

The President (continued)

I call Sir Keith Speed to present the report, which is in two parts.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I have the honour to present the report and recommendations in my name and that of Mr. Marten. I begin by thanking Mr. Cameron and the Defence Committee for all their support and help.

As you said, Mr. President, the report is in two parts. The first deals specifically with the Adriatic and the second, much larger part, deals with maritime and naval matters for Western European Union, especially the merchant fleets, which are very important, possible new areas of naval command and possible out-of-area activities. However, that will come later next year.

The explanatory memorandum attempts to give a full and detailed account of the various events leading up to the embargo and the Adriatic operations. The Adriatic embargo is, of course, called Sharp Guard. The various resolutions of this Assembly and of the Council led to various joint exercises and the establishment of Sharp Guard on 15th June this year. It is, in fact, a WEU-NATO joint operation with single command and control. It has certainly been fully and effectively operational for the past six months. Its duty is to monitor and enforce compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, especially 713, 757, 787 and 820. In other words, its duty is to prevent unauthorised shipping from entering the territorial waters of Serbia and Montenegro. The organisation of the units and operations, both maritime and air, are fully explained in the explanatory memorandum. I believe that it is a most successful and professional operation and the embargo was 100 % successful in terms of the sea. I think that we can all take pride in the professionalism of the seamen and airmen involved.

Recommendation 7 calls for embargoes elsewhere to receive the same attention and, indeed, to make them as efficient as the maritime embargo.

In this Assembly and in previous assemblies, we have heard various justified complaints about the raw materials and arms that are getting through to Serbia. They are not getting through by sea although they are clearly getting through by other means. It is extremely important that not only this Assembly but everyone involved ensures that United Nations resolutions are properly complied with in this regard.

Over the past few days, the Assembly has heard some encouraging and positive remarks from the Secretary-General of NATO, from our Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, and from Mr. Poos, the Foreign Minister from Luxem-

bourg about positive NATO-WEU co-operation. That is clearly the way forward. It is in the light of those remarks, of the ministerial meeting held in Luxembourg last week and the forthcoming NATO summit on 10th January, that we present this report and one or two specific ideas.

It is true that there is excellent co-operation in the Adriatic between NATO and WEU. I believe that that is due in no small part to the very positive "can do" attitude of the naval COMNAVSOUTH and the NATO Commander-in-Chief in the area. We are very impressed with their helpful and constructive approach in all WEU requests. It is also due in no small part to the excellent support given by the Italian navy in particular and the Italian Government in general. I pay a warm tribute to what they are doing in giving all the necessary back-up and a great deal of logistical support to our ships there.

However, the point of the report and the recommendations is that the back-up, excellent though it is, cannot always be taken for granted. The operation in the Adriatic may be the first of many similar operations in which we shall not necessarily have the same helpful NATO Commander-in-Chief on the spot or we may not always have the same host support that we have had from Italy.

I believe that there are a great number of grey areas – indeterminate areas – in the relationship between Western European Union and NATO which we should look at and address. For example, it is not really effective to have some local commanders – WEU commanders – literally having to dig into their own pockets for various items of essential equipment because we have not addressed how certain items and aspects of logistic support are to be financed from Western European Union. Recommendations 1 and 2 are general and self-explanatory and, I hope, uncontroversial.

It is in recommendation 3 that we come to the important point that we must try to wipe out the grey areas and have a proper and sensible relationship so that there is no unnecessary duplication. It would be crazy for WEU to pay for equipment that NATO or the national forces already have. Equally, where something special is required, either by way of, for example, personal computers for the captains of WEU ships so that they can operate effectively with other WEU units in the area, or by way of communications equipment or indeed other logistic practical support of that kind, there should be a proper understanding of how NATO or the host country will provide it, and there should be a small – I stress "small" – budget from WEU to pay for it. For example, there is now an active WEU operational cell working in the NATO headquarters in Naples, and even a silly thing like the travel budget of officers and key per-

Sir Keith Speed (continued)

sonnel to travel to and from Brussels is not addressed at the moment. We should look at that.

In respect of the practical matters – I stress that we are talking in terms of at the most tens of thousands of pounds, not hundreds of thousands or millions of pounds, it has to be got right. It is intolerable that in this and any other security organisation we should depend on individual service-men or women to fund things out of their own pockets in this way.

Clearly, we need, as we said in the recommendations, rather better lines of communication and lines of authority between, in this case obviously, the units in Naples that are controlling ships in the Adriatic, and other places like Brussels, the Ministry or the Council, the satellite agency, the chiefs of defence staff and the various other units that we now take for granted in WEU. However, I am afraid that at the moment all those lines of communication are blurred to say the least, and in some cases almost non-existent.

Where we have an ongoing operation, as we do in the Adriatic, it certainly seems to the Rapporteur, myself and the Defence Committee that those lines of communication should be properly set up and organised. Clearly, the Planning Cell in Brussels is very important in that regard.

Coming to recommendation 7, it is very important that we recognise that there are nearly 13 000 men and women – sailors and airmen – working for NATO and Western European Union. I almost call them the forgotten fleet. Understandably, the efforts of our ground forces in former Yugoslavia receive most of the publicity, headlines and television pictures. I suppose that is right because there are a lot of them there and they are in the greatest danger and face the greatest hardship. They are doing a job that is right up front in publicity terms.

But if the embargo is important, as the United Nations and we think it is, and if it is being enforced 100% by very professional sailors and airmen, as it is in the Adriatic, and there is a significant proportion of our own WEU ships, it is time that we gave more publicity and told our own public that we are involved in this joint and extremely effective operation.

I go further. This job is wearisome and is increasingly meeting very bad weather at this time of year. It is to an extent boring, but it is certainly not without its dangers. If certain ships were within missile range of the coast of former Yugoslavia there would be problems for them. The job has to be done. Many thousands of ships are plying the Adriatic. The figures are in the explanatory memorandum.

I would like to suggest that at this time of year, a message of good will, support and thanks should be sent from the Assembly to the units operating in the Adriatic – the sailors and airmen there – and also the units operating in a similar and effective way upon the Danube, again under our aegis and banner. That would be an appropriate and timely thing to do and it would at least show that the parliamentary Assembly is very conscious of the hard work and dedicated professionalism of our service sailors and airmen in performing that vital task to, I hope, bring an end to the dispute in Yugoslavia.

In that message, we could express the hope that they have a very happy Christmas, thank them for what they are doing and express the hope that their task will not need to continue for much longer in future, although some of us are pessimistic about that.

In a nutshell, I hope that the Assembly will concur with that. I hope that the report can be passed unanimously by the Assembly. There are no major problems that cannot be solved by common sense and good will. We have tried to point out a number of areas where communications and equipment need a small but important budget so that when WEU undertakes those operations they can be done efficiently, expeditiously and need not always rely upon the good will of others, which is forthcoming in abundance in this case, but which might not be in future. I beg to move my report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Keith. You have made an excellent suggestion. Unless there is any dissension – and I cannot believe that there would be – it is a very good idea that we should implement your good will message to the people operating the WEU element in the Adriatic. I will attend to that myself after the sitting.

The debate is now open.

The first speaker is Mr. Peter Hardy of the United Kingdom.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be extremely brief because the point that I wanted to make has been endorsed by you, Mr. President. Recommendation 7, to which Sir Keith Speed refers, is entirely justified. Members of the committee will know that when we discussed Sir Keith's report, I referred to dogs and described the security arrangements in the Houses of Parliament.

Every day, sniffer dogs ensure that there are no explosives. Members of the House of Lords, and certainly members of the House of Commons, are then safe.

The dogs will work effectively only if they are encouraged. They will only maintain their activity if, from time to time, they are allowed to

Mr. Hardy (continued)

find what they are looking for. That is when their handlers praise them. In this case, as Sir Keith reminded us, our sailors, playing an equally important if not more important part – depending on the value that one places on the security of politicians – daily perform their task just as successfully as the sniffer dogs have performed their task in parliament for the past six, seven or more years, but they have not received the reward of encouragement, of public adulation, which they deserve.

I entirely endorse the point made by Sir Keith, and which you have also recommended, Mr. President. However, I have a rather suspicious mind. Why have not our governments or the Council of Ministers been as emphatic in their commendation of those sailors as they should have been? The answer may be very simple. A year or two ago, I asked the Chairman of the Council of Ministers – I think that it was the Italian Foreign Minister – whether he would accept that a lot of matériel was getting through despite the efforts of NATO and ourselves and of some member states and aspirant member states. He agreed that that was the situation. He was then asked whether, if that was the case, we could have some evidence that the Council of Ministers was taking a proper interest in the matter. He said that it was. He went on to admit that the Council of Ministers had a great deal of information about the scale of the breach of embargo that was taking place. He was then asked whether it would publish that information, but he emphatically refused to do that.

The best way to commend those sailors is to make it clear that their record is first class, but that the following people or governments are responsible for betraying their splendid effort. While they have sewn up the Adriatic, and while the Danube may now be secure, matériel and ordnance in very substantial quantities are still getting into former Yugoslavia. It is a disgrace that we can down-play the successful efforts there because we do not wish to see attention drawn to the failures elsewhere.

The best tribute that we can offer those sailors is to ensure that their efforts are complemented in other parts of our continent to make the operation the comprehensive success that it should be. Certainly let us send our commendation in the way that the Rapporteur suggested. Let us hope that when part two of the report is produced, the sailors will already have been aware of our commendation and that their efforts in the Adriatic will be matched everywhere else.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

The next speaker is Mr. Agnelli of Italy.

Mr. AGNELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should first like to welcome the excellent report presented to us, which unlike others is based on original research and not on the kind of journalistic information which in many cases has been found to be misleading.

I greatly appreciate this report both for its account of operations to date and for the conclusions arrived at, thus enabling WEU to take account of experience in the Adriatic for its own future development.

I am greatly interested by what is said about the success of the operations. Regarding what Mr. Hardy said, I should like to recall that mention was made here twelve months ago of some possible violations but if I am not mistaken these were not violations by cargo ships; rather it was recognised that it was somewhat difficult to intercept speedboats involved much more in smuggling than in breaking the blockade.

On the other hand as regards action by the various naval units to blockade cargo ships, so far as I know there was not one case of the embargo being broken; at worst, there was sometimes uncertainty about some ships changing course to certain ports, when their cargoes were not particularly suspect. I believe however that in such cases the navies carried out their duties properly by stopping vessels which might have been carrying goods covered by the embargo and I believe that in such cases they were right to make the vessels change course even when the declared ports were not the same as those which were blockaded because in many cases the named port of destination was totally false. For example, Croatian vessels carrying explosives showed Trieste as their port of destination but nothing was known about them there. In my view it was more than justified to stop the vessels in such cases and for the same reasons I think we should congratulate those who acted for Europe as a whole.

I therefore consider the information in the report to be conclusive and final; it has also dispersed the doubts still felt twelve months ago when the operation was starting and WEU did not have all the necessary resources.

Let us remember that the Planning Cell only came into being on 1st October 1992 and did not become fully operational until April. If we take account, therefore, of the conditions in which our units had to operate, we must recognise not only the high professionalism and great sense of duty of those who operated in the name of WEU; we must also recognise that the WEU structures which are not yet fully consolidated have the potential for substantial development. It is on this point in particular that I wish to pay full tribute to the exceptional work

Mr. Agnelli (continued)

accomplished by the Planning Cell not only in the Adriatic but also along the Danube. The riparian countries along that river – Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria – appealed to us because they were unable to provide the necessary resources and the Planning Cell had to investigate on the spot in order to produce the required technical information.

I believe therefore that we have a very important lesson to draw from this operation through which WEU has steadily acquired more experience and knowledge of the situation.

I think that we should not only be grateful to the Rapporteurs for this excellent report but that we should also take due account of the recommendations. Other speakers have recognised the validity of paragraph 7 and I would like to recall the arguments in favour of paragraph 4 because, having seen the work of which the Planning Cell is capable and observed the problems as regards lines of communication, it is clear that we must act first and foremost to establish adequate lines of communication without which much harder work would undoubtedly be required.

We must therefore strengthen all the structures of WEU where this is possible without duplicating because we must welcome the possibility that units under NATO command may be made available. There has been one example; the efforts of Admiral Vandini and Rear-Admiral Coviello have been praised. I think that these are not exceptional cases but rather I believe that we can offer them as exceptional models for all other occasions.

The PRESIDENT. – I am sorry to interrupt, Mr. Agnelli, but you have overrun your time.

Mr. AGNELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I have already spoken in favour of the recommendation; I simply wished to explain why I think paragraph 4 should be given particular emphasis. Finally, therefore, I can give my full agreement.

The PRESIDENT. – I recognise the speaker's enthusiasm and I make allowances. However, the trouble is that if people exceed their time, that is unfair on the following speakers. I ask members to remember that there is a five-minute rule.

The last speaker in this debate is Lord Newall of the United Kingdom.

Lord NEWALL (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be extremely brief. I support the report by Sir Keith Speed and Mr. Marten on the organisation of naval co-operation. It is an excellent and detailed report. I agree with Mr. Agnelli, in so far as an enormous amount of research has been done. It is one area of operations in the Adriatic which has been tried and has succeeded through

the efforts of the people on the sea. Obviously it needs some formalisation, structure and, more importantly – as was mentioned and brought out in the report – a better budget. They are having great trouble finding the money to do anything. The reference to the Planning Cell is also very important. We have heard that they have no grounds for initiatives and if we do not tell them what to do they will sit there twiddling their thumbs.

Publicity for the people in the Adriatic is now limited in the newspapers. I also recommended that we support very strongly Sir Keith's recommendation to send a Christmas message because they very much deserve it.

Like other speakers I look forward to part two and heartily welcome the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for being commendably brief, Lord Newall. I understand that the Rapporteur does not wish to respond to this short debate, but that his co-Rapporteur, Mr. Marten, would like to say a few words.

Mr. MARTEN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Sir Keith Speed has presented our report to you. I thank Mr. Hardy, Mr. Agnelli and Lord Newall for their statements and their opinions on this report.

The boycott has been respected 100%. The sea route has been closed. The sailors are doing outstanding work in the Adriatic. I like Sir Keith Speed's idea of sending them a telegram of thanks for their services.

But what is the situation in former Yugoslavia? I am more and more deeply concerned about the approach Europe as a whole is taking to this most terrible of all genocides on European soil. To date more than 200 000 Bosnians have died, including some 30 000 children. The law of the jungle prevails more than ever, causing intolerable suffering and massacres among the civilian population. We saw it yesterday, and again today: winter is imminent and the situation in the country is disastrous. Serbian troops have now blocked the supply of natural gas to Sarajevo. Bosnian Croat troops are impeding the arrival of aid convoys, with the results that we see on television. The airport in Tuzla is closed because of Serbian pressure. The airport in Sarajevo is also still being obstructed. In many towns and communities, electricity and water supplies have been completely cut off. Urgently-needed diesel fuel for emergency machinery for disaster actions and hospitals virtually no longer arrives. There has been none for weeks, even months. The food shortage has now led to an average weight loss of twenty-five pounds per person in Sarajevo. In other besieged towns the situation is even more catastrophic. There the people are starving to death.

Mr. Marten (continued)

The aggression by Serbian soldiers against the civilian population in the besieged towns and villages is cruelly supported by heavy artillery fire, machine gun fire and widespread sniper fire. This is the second winter. We are seeing terrible pictures on television, too.

I think it is up to the statesmen of Europe and to us in this Assembly finally to take effective action to deal with this situation. Insofar as this Assembly can make any recommendations, it has done so, and they are now before you. We are also being asked to make a financial contribution, so that the measures proposed by Sir Keith Speed can be paid for. I urge you to approve the report, and in particular to campaign back home in your own countries so as to ensure that the funds we in WEU consider necessary are indeed made available.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman of the Defence Committee wish to speak?

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – I shall be very brief. In committee the report was approved by twelve votes to none, with one abstention. The committee thought very highly of it and on their behalf I urge the Assembly to adopt it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. You will have understood the tone of feeling on the report. There are no amendments. Therefore I propose to put the draft recommendation in Document 1396 to the vote.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

I congratulate the Rapporteurs.

5. Lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict

*(Presentation of and debate
on the report of the Defence Committee
and vote on the draft recommendation,
Doc. 1395 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Sir Russell Johnston of the report of the Defence Committee on lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict, with debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1395 and amendments.

1. See page 38.

I call Sir Russell Johnston to present the report.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – To begin, I would like to thank my colleagues on the Defence Committee for enabling me to undertake this report and for their constructive advice. In particular, I should like to thank our Secretary, Floris de Gou for his hard work – he did a lot of that – and also for his good-humoured but nevertheless acerbic criticism.

Writing in the British Sunday Telegraph this week, their correspondent Patrick Bishop, after describing Lord Owen's tough talking at Geneva and the threat of United Nations withdrawal, penned this sad little paragraph: "The prospect of a withdrawal is unlikely to meet much opposition from the soldiers serving with UNPROFOR. Any enthusiasm for the job has long evaporated after prolonged exposure to the behaviour of Serbs, Croats and Muslims alike."

Soldiers, or most soldiers – in former Yugoslavia one has to qualify everything – like to think that they are enlisted in a just cause, fighting for the good against the bad. Now, as matters slide into chaos, the hapless United Nations peace-makers are witness to so much horror and bestial cruelty from all sides that they are numbed.

I have seen some of it. I travelled along the road from Osijek to the west, seeing all those fine, well-spaced houses, just like houses in Switzerland, Austria or the south of Germany; they were once like that but now they are blackened, burnt out and pillaged, their former Croat occupants dead or raped, one knows not where.

I have watched the Serbs excavate a mass grave, the air full of the smell of rotten flesh oozing off the skulls of things – things is the only word – that were once ordinary people. I have spoken to Muslims, huddled in camps, terrified and hopeless.

I begin my speech like that because, as the last speaker said, it is right and necessary to remind this Assembly, which tends to deal with abstract questions, principles, force dispersal and contingency plans, of the raw dreadfulness of what is happening on our continent. I believe that we could have averted it, if we had had the will. It is still going on. It is cold in Paris now, but there are warm houses and food. In Sarajevo, there is snow and no heating, and an average of 12 people are hit by snipers every day.

Mostar is a horror, Srebrenica, where General Morillon made his brave gesture, has slid from the news. I had the honour of spending a couple of hours with General Morillon while preparing this report and all that I can say is that there is un homme comme il faut. Srebrenica is now a cesspit of misery.

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

In the beginning, it was different and simpler. The declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia following clear referenda and the Serbian – one could better say the Milosevic – response to use the JNA to try to re-establish a unity which was never real from the very creation of Yugoslavia after the first world war, on the basis of Serbian supremacy, were not recognised as such, despite the example of Kosovo. The siege and subsequent destruction of Vukovar appalled the world.

I remember in December 1991 flying to Zagreb in a little aeroplane with medical supplies paid for by a millionaire who felt that what was being done was simply inhuman. I may tell colleagues that the millionaire was a Greek. The traditional Greek sympathy for the Serbs was far less important to him than the fact that great wrong was being done. One of the hopes that we have in Europe is that we can say goodbye to nationalist politics.

I continue to believe – and expressed the opinion openly at the time – that at that stage it was possible to halt the emerging crisis. A swift ultimatum to the Serbs saying, “Stop, or western aircraft will take out your gun emplacements within 48 hours” could have altered the whole scenario and prevented Dubrovnik, Sarajevo, Mostar and all the rest which followed. Certainly specifically to exclude force as we did was an enormous mistake and an enormous encouragement to Milosevic. The will was not there.

One cannot legislate for will, but even if it had been present, as far as I can make out, I think that we lacked the technical capacity. If you look at paragraphs 132 to 138 of my report, you will find that the offer of NATO protective air power for UNPROFOR was made on 10th June this year. The first air support exercise was on 18th August – not 48 hours, but two months later.

Recommendation 1 provides that we must possess the capacity to act swiftly – a view that General Morillon held strongly. Recommendation 2 is that we have to move to majority decision-making in the European Union on foreign and security issues because, as we have seen, the alternative is prolonged vacillation. The ability to decide and the capacity to implement is what my report seeks.

We must evolve the ability to predict problems better and know what we are going to do about them if they happen. On Monday, Manfred Wörner said, “We should be able to respond to the situation in Kosovo”. I asked him how he did not know it is not good enough.

We have no clear guidelines on the recognition of new states. The two French-inspired proposals on the table originated by Badinter,

who made an admirably sane contribution early in the crisis, and Balladur are good: a court of conciliation and a stability pact. But, astonishingly, the French are joining the British in opposing a definition of national minority rights. Kosovo is the best example. For myself, I think that the argument for self-determination is unanswerable: in terms of homogeneity it is a southern Slovenia and the behaviour of the occupying Serbs – that is the only adjective – has left scars that will take generations to heal.

We must also have a much more concerted approach to sanctions. As was set out in the previous debate, the implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic and on the Danube is a notable success story, but the position on land is different. The principal economic cost of imposing sanctions falls on Greece, Romania, Albania, Macedonia, Hungary to a degree and Bulgaria, none of which is in a position to bear that cost. There should be a clear system of compensation.

I mentioned Macedonia. Amendments have been tabled to recommendation 5, so I shall say only a word on this issue. I hope that, as we approach the next century, all of us will become less preoccupied with names and symbols than we are today. I hope that that will move more into the area of academic disputation.

Despite the conflict areas that I have listed, we shall probably not be faced with exactly the same problems again, but one does not know. Certainly, throughout the Yugoslav crisis, we have regularly back-pedalled. As I say in paragraph 143, the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a new state was recognised, “After which it was neither protected nor allowed to defend itself with appropriate means”, should never be repeated. We must have common guidelines on refugees and I think that it was wrong to reject the German proposal for a system of allocation.

Throughout the past three years we have looked again and again at the old question: what is right and what is politic? What is politic has won all the way. Well, not entirely. The Germans attracted a lot of criticism for pressing the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia when they did. Looking back, I think that the effect of that was neutral, but I also accept that it was the right thing to do, linked as it was to pressure on Tudjman concerning human rights, which Germany was uniquely able to bring to bear.

After all, Slovenia is first in the queue for the European Community after the existing applicants. With understanding, patience and restraint, all the republics of former Yugoslavia could have done well, as Slovenia certainly will. We have been witness to such tremendous waste.

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

Earlier I spoke of the need to improve our decision-making. Of course, this also involves our relationship with the United States. As I say in recommendation 6, there was a security vacuum early in the crisis and this must not be allowed to repeat itself. I remember, during an early discussion of these issues in the Defence Committee, our Chairman Jacques Baumel remarking perceptively, as he always does, that if this experience teaches us anything it is that Europe waits on America's decisions and if America cannot decide, as it could not at the beginning, we do nothing.

Paragraph 26 of my explanatory memorandum expresses it clearly: "The major lesson of the conflict in former Yugoslavia is that the EC has reached a point of no return in the development of a common foreign and security policy. Member states are aware that they have a common responsibility for peace and stability in Europe. They will have to act accordingly". Mr. Baumel also raised the question of the Planning Cell with our Secretary-General, Willem van Eekelen on Monday, so I need not spell out its importance again.

In life we often wish that we could do things over again. As a community, we have done a great deal in the humanitarian area and I salute the soldiers of many countries, most significantly of France and the United Kingdom, for this. But politically I wish that we could start again. Of course, we cannot, but I hope that this report will make a small contribution to the analysis that we need of where and how we failed.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Russell, for a most interesting speech.

The debate is now open, and the first speaker is Mr. Peter Hardy of the United Kingdom.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall make a brief speech but I first wish to say that, although Sir Russell and I have disagreed from time to time about the detail of his assessment and analysis of the problems of Yugoslavia, I do not disagree with him this morning. I congratulate him on a splendid speech in which he brought the stench of horror and the scent of reality to Paris. I hope that the Assembly will pay particular attention to the recommendations that Sir Russell offered, and I shall make passing reference to three of them.

First, I understand that there is some doubt about and hostility towards recommendation 5, which deals with Macedonia. I ask everyone to consider Sir Russell's words carefully because he refers to the interest of Greece's recognition: instead of making a sweeping demand, he allows for the flexibility and sensitivity that is sometimes expressed.

Secondly, the most important recommendation in a practical sense is recommendation 6. I urge the Assembly to ensure, as far as possible, that serious consideration of the matter is well in hand before 1994 is halfway through.

Thirdly, as for recommendation 8, from an early stage, many of us called for no-fly zones and for air supervision of the conflict. When an interception capacity was provided, it dramatically reduced the number of flights but I and others will recall seeing on television that helicopters appeared to be moving with impunity into the mountains around Sarajevo when it was being heavily shelled. Those serving in the area at the moment – I have a friend among them – and who are providing the air exclusion capacity deserve our commendation. However, it might be useful if, from time to time, that interception capacity were taken to its logical conclusion – there would not only be a continuing reduction in the number of incursions but the more martial incursions might cease without too great a delay.

I conclude by referring to the problem that may develop in 1994: Kosovo. Sir Russell finished his visit to Yugoslavia deeply concerned about Kosovo. From what he said, I believe that he is anxious about the fact that no one appears to have made adequate preparation to prevent the horror extending into that part of former Yugoslavia. We should pay particular attention to his words because the report is a sane report on an insanity of which Europe should be ashamed. Former Yugoslavia's problems represent the failure of European political perception and of European crisis-management and, unless heed is taken of the recommendations offered in the report, that insanity will persist for much longer.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Fischer.

Mrs. FISCHER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I begin by thanking Sir Russell Johnston very warmly for his unusually thorough and informative report, which will serve as a history book in years to come, describing the events in and around former Yugoslavia. I have re-read the documents we adopted here in June last year. One year later we have not made much progress. The situation is very much worse. This is the second winter in which the people in former Yugoslavia are suffering incredible torment.

In my view, the reputation of our security institutions and the much-invoked system of interconnected organisations has been damaged, because they managed neither to end the war nor in the end to provide effective aid. This applies in principle to the United Nations, the CSCE, the European Community or European Union, NATO and also WEU. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is becoming more difficult. There is no end in sight to the aggression. Talks

Mrs. Fischer (continued)

have been and are still being held in Geneva on the offer made by – at present two – EC foreign ministers to ease the embargo against Serbia in return for the Serbs reducing their territorial claims somewhat; but as you all know from the news, there is little hope.

United Nations representatives fear hunger riots in Bosnia unless a change is achieved soon. I am quite certain this change can no longer be brought about by appeals, nor even by sanctions. Humanitarian aid must reach the people, if necessary under military protection and if need be by the use of armed force. Yesterday I spoke of technical possibilities which would certainly enable the humanitarian convoys to get through without the use of ground troops. But their use would be appropriate, not only because of the current dreadful situation, but also because we realise that unless the planned measures are implemented, it is probable that our own security interests will be directly at risk for a long time to come. Think of the situation in Krajina.

The prospect of a war spreading within the region and beyond that region cannot be overlooked. We have not made much headway with all our talks about European conflict-prevention. Others elsewhere will feel encouraged into imitation tomorrow or the next day if ethnic cleansing entails as little risk as it has done to date. It is not impossible that the killings in and around Bosnia-Herzegovina, in former Yugoslavia, might spread to epidemic proportions and drag the rest of Europe, meaning all of us, in their wake. We all know that the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina feels oppressed, and the two million Albanians in Kosovo are deprived of their rights. The longer the conflict rages, the greater the danger that Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey will be sucked in. But borders drawn by murder, torture and expulsion will never be peaceful.

In the CSCE charter, all the CSCE states undertook not to change borders by force, nor to recognise borders changed by such means. The conflict in the Balkans is a test case which will show whether we are serious enough about creating peace to consider using and actually to use effective means of coercion to achieve it. Not to carry out planned measures now, would simply mean confirming and reinforcing existing strategies. One cannot make entire regions Muslim-, Croat- or Serb-free and then expect others – whoever they may be – to look after the refugees.

Unspeakable pain and misery have darkened our world twice already this century, just because we Europeans – no matter who and for what reasons – were unable to resolve our conflicts. I speak as someone who had to learn a

great deal in and after the war. We must learn at last genuinely to resolve our conflicts in Europe too.

Only last year the United States declared that it was prepared to contain and end this conflict jointly with the Europeans. Meanwhile, American policy-makers have classified the Balkan conflict as a regional conflict and may consider – as suggested in an interview – using military means in support of ending the conflict. But that presumes that we Europeans are prepared to do the same. I think we now have a last chance to unite in putting an end to the killing.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The Chair recognises Mr. De Hoop Scheffer of the Netherlands.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, shame vies with impotence as we once again this morning discuss the drama of what was formerly Yugoslavia. I think that politicians have to say “shame yes, impotence no”, if only for the sake of those who play the main part in this drama.

I want to compliment Sir Russell Johnston on a clear report that calls a spade a spade and does not cover up the problems. The report is right when it asks what we can learn from the drama in Yugoslavia; to put it another way, what can and must we do better in the future?

Lesson 1 from the drama in former Yugoslavia is that there is a need for integrating policies. Policies on security, aid and refugees are all so closely interwoven that very close co-operation between all the organisations concerned is today more essential than it ever was.

Lesson 2 is, as Sir Russell Johnston rightly says, that at the present moment neither the European Union, nor NATO, nor WEU has a clear strategy for the Balkans. Not only have we thrown overboard a number of moral values that we thought we always held dear, but from the political viewpoint we have exempted ourselves from the criteria that ought to govern all political dealings.

Lesson 3 is – and this cannot be stressed enough – that the absence of any serious threat by the international community to use force if agreements are not kept has paralysed us. This is as true of the ministerial meeting of last Monday as it is of all the previous ones. There was once again, so I have been told, a deathly hush when the question was raised in the European Union of sending more troops, if only so as to be able to undertake humanitarian duties.

Lesson 4 is that restructuring our armed forces has, in the Netherlands at least, shown

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued)

that even operations like those in former Yugoslavia call for troops with proper armour and adequate weapons. In the Dutch airborne battalion that is soon being sent out there, the emphasis was initially on mobility and speed. As our British and French friends have found from experience, you cannot send troops to former Yugoslavia without armoured vehicles and fairly heavy weaponry.

Lesson 5 is that political unity is the basis for any successful political dealing. The criticism that Sir Russell Johnston levels at our Greek friends in his report is wholly justified. Making comments about Germany, as a member of the Greek Parliament has recently done, goes beyond all bounds. Being a member of Western European Union has both benefits and obligations. As far as we are concerned, the new Greek Government should have an opportunity to arrive in harmony at a solution to the problems of recognising Macedonia – officially I ought still to say the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Our national parliament will soon be debating the formal approval of Greek accession to Western European Union; whether my party, the Christian Democrats, votes for or against will depend on how ready the Greek Government is to shift its standpoint on these matters. It will not surprise you, Mr. President, to hear me appeal loudly to everyone to support the carefully-worded recommendation 5 in the report.

Lesson 6 is that Europe urgently needs an integrated policy on immigration and refugees. The third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty needs to be extended energetically. It all has to do with security, and thus with the work and tasks of WEU. The integrating of policies I spoke of earlier should also take shape here. The way refugees from former Yugoslavia are distributed round the European countries is, to say the least, uneven.

To conclude, I shall, as should be plain from what I have been saying, gladly vote for the recommendation, and I strike a sorry balance. If ministers care to re-read the recommendations from this Assembly and earlier reports by Sir Russell Johnston – and I recall a report that I myself made to the Assembly rather longer ago – they will find in them points they could have seized to produce a policy that could have better stood the test of political criticism. We too, as parliamentarians, share some responsibility for this; we have no cause in this Assembly to pat ourselves on the back. Reports like these must continue to be made, Mr. President, for the sake of Kosovo, Sandjak and Macedonia. They hold a mirror up to us, and offer us lessons for the future. I can only close by warmly complimenting Sir Russell Johnston once again on his

sincerity, his honesty and his deep concern in the face of this drama. We need more politicians like him.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

The next speaker is Mr. Cuco of Spain.

Mr. CUCO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the length of time which has elapsed since the start of open hostilities in former Yugoslavia, and the particularly ferocious nature of the conflict from the very beginning, give us sufficient perspective to extract the necessary elements for analysis and be able to draw lessons, as in the title of Sir Russell Johnston's report, from this bloody war.

First, this is a new type of conflict, as are many of the long series of inter-ethnic armed conflicts which have arisen or are in progress today, from Moldova to Tajikistan, with numerous particularly virulent outbreaks in the Caucasus. Faced with what is, I repeat, a new type of conflict, not only the major world powers such as the United States, but also the most prominent international organisations, such as NATO and the CSCE and even the strictly European organisations, have all voiced their doubts and disagreements and shown the limitations of their ability to act.

As Sir Russell Johnston shows so well in his report, Yugoslavia has demonstrated what is the first, and possibly final, lesson, namely that in future it will not be possible for the members of the European Union to act independently of one another where matters of peace and security in Europe are concerned.

However, it is not my intention, Mr. President, simply to make general comments concerning events in former Yugoslavia, but rather to make the Assembly aware, as it is I am sure already aware of the terrible Bosnian experience, for instance, of another scenario in the region which could, given the current state of affairs, become an area of imminent conflict. I am referring to Kosovo where, in the opinion of Manfred Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO, there is a very serious acceleration of events, as he stated in reply to a question from Sir Russell himself in this Assembly on Monday.

Deprived of their autonomous status by the nationalist Serb authorities, the Albanians of Kosovo, who constitute 90% of the population, are now being subjected to further severe repression. Both the International Federation of Human Rights in Helsinki and the Austrian section of Amnesty International have just revealed that, since 1989, 95% of the state enterprises in Kosovo have come under Serbian control. Only 20% of those Albanians who were previously in employment have kept their jobs. Serbian educational reforms have brought about

Mr. Cuco (continued)

the dismissal of over 22 000 Albanian primary school teachers and over 900 university lecturers; this accounts for practically all Albanian university professors in Kosovo. Albanian-language newspapers and editorials have come under Serbian control. Faced with repression on such a scale, thousands and thousands of Albanians are fleeing the area, fearing for their safety and for their lives, because, in the view of the International Federation of Human Rights in Helsinki, there is clearly a perfect coexistence between the civilian Serb extremists and the Yugoslav regular army.

Mr. President, it is my opinion that in this way a new path is being opened up for the familiar process of ethnic cleansing. If, as Mr. Manfred Wörner stated in this very Assembly only two days ago, we must give priority to preventive policies to avoid useless recriminations at a later date, we must first be aware of what is actually happening in Kosovo. We must foresee the not-so-hypothetical consequences of open conflict in the region, we must study while we still have time the pressures and type of pressure which must be brought to bear on Belgrade to attempt preventive action in Kosovo. I repeat: last Monday, in this very house, the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Manfred Wörner suggested, albeit in a personal capacity, that the re-establishment of autonomy in Kosovo and full recognition of human rights ought to be an essential condition of lifting sanctions on Serbia. Mr. President, I believe that this is a good starting point, although of course it is not the only possible course of action.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cuco.

The next speaker is Mr. Tummers of the Netherlands.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I want to begin, Mr. President, by offering my sincere compliments to the Rapporteur; though I must say that by making our speeches which repeat themselves and each other we are running the risk of descending into platitudes.

Today's Figaro talks, like our Rapporteur, about "the case of Yugoslavia". This shows a certain detachment, as if it were an example from which we should draw lessons for the future. In this way, we are however also stepping back from the harsh, everyday realities, and dodging the realisation that Yugoslavia should really be a lesson to us.

During the second world war people gave thought to what should happen afterwards, and to what could be done about the evil of militarism and so on. During the cold war our attitude changed, however; there was no talk then of forestalling a future situation, perhaps because no one could predict when a fresh situ-

ation might arise. It was only when the explosion came in Yugoslavia that we started to worry about the conflict spreading round our continent.

Our attitude towards Yugoslavia has shown up how fragile our civilisation is. We have been unable to work out an overall policy on developments in Central Europe. Our powerlessness is entirely due to the inability to anticipate I spoke about a second ago.

And then I want to make the point that we are in danger of getting caught up in over-abstract ideas about defence matters. The speech by the NATO Secretary-General earlier this week was an example of short-term econometric thinking in this area, far removed from everyday life. Le Figaro talks about the fin de siècle main issues that warrant our attention. I, at all events, would include among these essential issues the need to take an overall look at developments on our continent. We must, of course, continue to provide humanitarian assistance: but we cannot be satisfied with that, for we need also to do something about our historic shortcomings in this respect.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Tummers.

Our next speaker is one of our observers at this session, Mr. Vacaru from Romania.

Mr. VACARU (*Observer from Romania*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is my honour and pleasure to express the great satisfaction of the parliament and government of Romania at the official visit to our country of the delegation from the WEU Assembly led by its President, Sir Dudley Smith, in November and those of Professor Soell, a former president of the Assembly, and a delegation from the Political Committee headed by its Chairman, Mr. Stoffelen, in the spring of this year.

Quite apart from the joys of traditional Romanian hospitality and our pleasure in entertaining famous people, we had the feeling of continuous parliamentary dialogue with WEU and fellowship within Europe, that great fraternal Europe which is the hope of us all.

In the same vein, may I also extend my warm congratulations to Sir Russell Johnston on his very comprehensive report, which is all the more remarkable in that it combines a thorough knowledge and profound analysis of the subject with a keen perception of possible interactions throughout this turbulent region.

The report brings out clearly the fact that the relationship established by WEU with at least three consultation partners – Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary – for the purpose of strengthening the embargo on the Danube, has now developed beyond consultation and flowered into real, practical and active co-operation.

Mr. Vacaru (continued)

It has also prompted the thought, first, that at some time in the future the WEU Forum of Consultation might be converted into a forum of co-operation on the major problems of security and stability in Europe and, second, that instruments such as protocols of co-operation might be introduced under international law between WEU and each of the Central European states. The purpose of all these measures would be to avoid a repetition of the present tragic bloodbath in south-east Europe.

In the strict way in which it has enforced the Danube embargo, Romania has shown its resolve to fulfil its international obligations. We feel that the understanding developed in the context of the Forum of Consultation with joint peace-keeping operations or humanitarian missions in view represents a sound basis for cultivating co-operation at European level. In order to heighten Romania's capability for this purpose, the Supreme Defence Council has initiated a number of measures including the formation of three special-purpose battalions – the first to be operational in 1994, and the next two in 1995 – with a peace-keeping rôle. We shall be very grateful for any support that WEU member states are prepared to give us in this connection.

Bearing in mind the description of events in paragraph 147 of the report, a fact worth recalling to mind is that the Romanian Senate has decided to set up a sub-committee on the question of the Yugoslav crisis, working under its Foreign Policy Committee and responsible for providing parliamentarians with timely and objective information on developments in the situation.

The results of our co-operation being what they are, I am able to confirm that Romania is ready and able to host a WEU documentation and information office with its headquarters in Bucharest; the office would have the unconditional support of the Romanian authorities and all necessary facilities. The ambassador in Bucharest of the country providing the presidency of WEU could co-ordinate the activity of this office and I take this opportunity to ask for the President's support for the project.

To conclude, may I remind you of the importance of the meeting between the Romanian President and the WEU Secretary-General in Brussels in February 1993, at which Romania expressed its interest in becoming a member of WEU in due course, a step which is seen as an essential guarantee for Romanian security.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Vacaru. We are pleased to see you and your colleagues from Romania here today and for the whole session.

The next speaker is Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. President. First allow me to congratulate Sir Russell Johnston most warmly on his excellent report, full of information and ideas which make it a valuable aid to understanding the tragedy being lived out in former Yugoslavia; it will, I am sure, serve us and many others as a reference source for information and ideas about this problem.

Mr. President, there are many lessons we can draw from careful observation of the events in former Yugoslavia. In view of the limited time available to me, however, I will limit myself to two essential considerations or lessons.

The first is the conviction, based on the facts as we see them, that there is the possibility of an explosion of armed conflict between civilised countries which have been neighbours and have coexisted for centuries, countries between which conflict could lead not only to armed confrontation, but also, and this is the most painful part, to the basest and most repugnant acts of violence and savagery.

Mr. President, all this should lead us to the conclusion that not only are political reasoning and conviction essential to achieve a peaceful solution to the existing conflicts and those which, given human nature and the nature of society, will undoubtedly exist in the future; we must also have available to us the appropriate instruments and organisations, such as Western European Union, which are operative and effective, and an adequately-developed doctrine to deal with violence. Possession of such an organisation and resources could be, and remain, a deterrent to potential aggressors.

The second lesson, Mr. President, which is related to the first to a certain extent, and is within the European arena, is the need for a common security and defence policy. The question Sir Russell Johnston asks at the beginning of his report is: could this war in Yugoslavia have been avoided? This is the question which causes us all distress and bitterness. I think that the sorry experience of two years of impotence in the face of such cruelty and destruction, with divisions, differences of opinion, hesitation, lack of political will to take decisions and run the necessary risks, lack of foresight concerning the effects of certain movements and attitudes, has served only to encourage and foster aggression which, once unleashed, as history has shown us so frequently, sets in motion an endless chain reaction which is very difficult, if not impossible, to control. The apathy and perplexity experienced in the face of a conflict of this nature within Europe, on the doorstep of what is today the European Union, could lead us, and does in fact lead some, to blame European integration as

Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)

ineffective when in fact, Mr. President, the reaction should be quite the opposite. It is precisely the inadequacy of the union, the lack of integration in defence mechanisms and of a unified policy on external affairs which, in our view, has impeded the adoption of a preventive stance at the appropriate time, which could, perhaps, have avoided these evils.

We consider both these positions to be dangerous and mistaken. If Europe has not yet demonstrated the desired and necessary effectiveness, this is not because of the current process of integration but rather, as I have just said, because that process is not sufficiently intense; the lesson to be learned from this is that we must speed up the integration mechanisms provided for in the Maastricht Treaty. Western European Union must adopt the relevant decisions, not limiting itself to discussing and adopting decisions, but with the conviction that this must be done vigorously and without delay – as advocated in the draft recommendation.

The other mistaken position to which I referred, Mr. President, is the idea that this is a peripheral problem which does not affect us, because it is not within the European Union. This is a big mistake. Events in the Balkans directly affect Europe and the problem must be solved before it is too late. We must develop an appropriate security strategy which includes that area in the context of our vital European interests and, furthermore, acknowledges the connection with the European Union. This is why Sir Russell Johnston's reference to Greece, without appraising his opinions one way or the other, was correct. This is another of the very important lessons we must learn from this unfortunate conflict. Greece, a member of the European Union and poised to become a full member of Western European Union, a friend and ally, is experiencing some problems, from what we hear. We must clearly define the principles under which this membership is to be effected, so that integration does not give rise to problems, but forms the basis for the solution of problems, observing the principles of respect for present-day borders and the abandonment of all expansionist policies.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Mrs. Bakogianni of Greece. I apologise if I have not pronounced her name correctly.

Mrs. BAKOGIANNI (*Observer from Greece*). – On behalf of the Greek Delegation, I should like to clarify some points in Sir Russell Johnston's report because they worry Greece very much. Paragraph 33 of the report incorrectly states that Greece has used the veto in the European Community to stop the recognition of FYROM, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Greece has never used the veto because

we did not need to. We merely explained Greece's position and the problems that we have with the new republic being an independent state and not having changed some of its main ideas since the beginning, some 35 years ago. We therefore never had to use the veto, because the EC unanimously passed four resolutions upholding Greece's position.

I shall not speak about the Badinter commission because my colleague Mr. Kapsis explained it yesterday. However, in our opinion, paragraphs 34 and 35 also present Greece's position incorrectly. Greece is concerned not only with symbols or history, as Sir Russell said, but is very much concerned about the future. We cannot accept the fact that the new independent state's constitution clearly states that it must feel responsible for people who live outside its borders. It is a point that is not dealt with to any great extent in discussion of the Macedonian issue but it is very important with regard to the rôle that the independent state can play in the future. We are very much afraid that, if such ideas linger, they will simply help to destabilise further the southern part of the Balkans.

Paragraphs 37 and 38 refer to a story that has long been dealt with in the press and which concerns the embargo and whether Greece has done its duty. Ambassador Napolitano has repeatedly acknowledged Greece's commitment to the strict implementation of the embargo and prompt co-operation with all parties involved. That was what Greece tried to do from the very first moment.

May I remind the Assembly that Greece has incurred large costs in relation to the embargo, but we followed the EC regulation completely and even changed our domestic legislation so that people who did not want to adhere to the embargo were punished, as the new legislation was much tougher than before.

Paragraph 42 is very important to us. Greece has never pulled out of United Nations negotiations because we strongly believe that the problem must be solved through such negotiations, which are still taking place. That is the main reason why we believe that recommendation 5 of Sir Russell's report should be deleted because it would send a message to the Greek people that they would find hard to understand.

Greece is trying to do all that it possibly can to work towards peace and stability in the area. We believe that, at this moment, WEU could send a message to the Greek people that they are understood and that everyone should work together for peace. I think that we represent various political parties but that we all feel the same about this issue.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your contribution.

The President (continued)

The next speaker is Mr. Pahor from Slovenia.

Mr. PAHOR (*Observer from Slovenia*). – I should first like to congratulate Sir Russell Johnston on his very comprehensive report. Secondly, I am sorry to have to emphasise how pessimistic I am about the near future in the Balkan conflicts. War will continue, and we shall witness a human catastrophe.

Speaking frankly, I think that the international community should have intervened more intensively at the beginning of the war. It was then that the international community should have recognised the conflict as the aggression of one sovereign state against another and sought to impose appropriate sanctions or take appropriate measures. However, that is, unfortunately, history. Slovene diplomacy has advocated not only peace-keeping but peace-making operations, if they are necessary to support humanitarian aid. However, we should be grateful to all the soldiers of different nations who are doing their utmost to help those unfortunate people.

Let me repeat that Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be divided into three states. I am convinced that the international community should clearly state its political goal when intervening in the Balkan crisis. Is it to prevent Bosnia-Herzegovina becoming an independent state, to create three different states or to separate three nationalities into three small countries? In the longer term, we are thinking about only one real independent state, which would be Muslim.

I am afraid that we are dealing with a crisis that will not stop tomorrow and which will have a great influence on the stability or otherwise of this part of Europe. I should like to underline how important it is to prevent the conflict spreading. The report emphasises the fact that the situation in Kosovo fully justifies international action in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter.

The Republic of Slovenia is working for international co-operation and co-ordination based on preventive diplomacy, a culture of dialogue, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the rejection of the use of force as a means of resolving international conflicts. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Litherland.

Mr. LITHERLAND (*United Kingdom*). – I join in the congratulations to Sir Russell Johnston not only on the report but on his graphic description of former Yugoslavia in what I found to be a moving presentation.

One lesson that has been drawn from the Yugoslav conflict is that many can be wise with hindsight and I have heard politicians with far greater knowledge of military matters than myself insist that if only we had acted at the outset – countries in unison, with determination, showing that we had the power and the will to use that power if necessary – the situation would not have deteriorated to these appalling depths of misery and human carnage that we now witness in former Yugoslavia. But we did not, and now we reap the consequences.

I hope that we have learnt – this report points it out – that prevention is better than finding a cure. But I wonder whether the people involved in the new talks taking place in Geneva have learnt any lessons from the Yugoslav conflict. When one reflects on the alternatives, the only conclusion to which any right-minded person could come is that there must be an agreement. If there is no agreement, it is estimated that 1.5 million people dependent on aid will go hungry and a great many will perish from starvation. As always, it will be the infirm, the elderly, the very young and the vulnerable who will perish. If agreement is not reached, the severe winter conditions bringing snow and below-freezing point temperatures will prevent aid arriving in time to stop the appalling suffering.

Some of the proposals, such as the surrender of 3-4% of land by the Bosnian Serbs, appear to observers from afar to be a small price to pay when one considers that over 100 000 people have so far been killed in this brutal war. Will they consider that sanctions imposed on Serbia could be relaxed so as to stop inflation passing the 45 000% record set by the Weimar Republic 70 years ago? Will they consider that Croatia could face sanctions, or that the Muslims could have the United Nations troops withdrawn? Will they consider Lord Owen's comments that Bosnia will be left to the misery and mayhem of a no-holds-barred war?

Regrettably matters are not as simple as I have just described. We all know that the Serbs place great stress on the value of the prize lands which the Muslims will want in eastern Bosnia and the strategic importance of north-west Bosnia. The Muslim-Bosnian army has gained a number of victories in recent times against the Croats and may not entertain any suggestion that would halt this advance. Lord Owen warned that the Bosnian Government and their military forces have a new confidence and enough arms to fight through the winter and even launch a spring offensive. According to military observers, assistance is arriving to check the Muslim advance. There have been sightings of Croatian troops equipped with heavy mortars moving up country from the Adriatic coast and of military helicopters, and

Mr. Litherland (continued)

the former commander of the Croats' special forces is the new head of the Bosnian-Croat forces.

The scenario does not represent a move towards peace but a continuation of this brutal conflict. Can we ever have any sense when ethnic passions are so intense? As one United Nations source said last week, "the normal human spirit of optimism and hope was ground out of us a long time ago. We can only wait and see". What a sad acknowledgement of failure. If Western European Union, as the report suggests, can show the way, identify future threats and move rapidly with preventive action at diplomatic, economic and military levels to provide assistance, we may never see the like of this savage war again. Unlike that United Nations source, we must retain hope and optimism. I welcome the report.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Brito.

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to begin by offering my congratulations to Sir Russell Johnston on the quality and timeliness of his report on the lessons to be drawn from the Yugoslav conflict. I say timeliness, because it was necessary to reflect on the reasons for the failure of the international community's efforts, seek fresh ideas and promote other initiatives. And I say quality, because we have before us a full, precise and candid document, which provides this Assembly with the information and knowledge it needed in order to be able to analyse the various aspects of this matter.

As our Rapporteur says, a number of different reasons and situations contributed to the international community's failure to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. However, there was one situation which proved decisive, in my view, and this had to do with the policy of deterrence used.

In fact it is obvious to me now that it was this policy that failed, and the reason it failed is that NATO and WEU did not grasp the fact that, once the Warsaw Pact had collapsed and the USSR had split up, it was necessary to redefine the aims and nature of their rôle quickly, adapting them to the new world situation.

You will tell me that NATO and WEU did try to change. Well, this may be so, but in reality neither one of them did so in any significant way. In fact, both NATO and WEU continue to be essentially defensive organisations. Moreover, WEU is facing serious organisational problems, even in its present functions, not having permanent resources of its own, and this considerably reduces its ability to take action. In my view, two essentially defensive organisations could never constitute a real and credible threat, when what was asked of them was in fact offensive action.

Problems of adaptation are still evident today in the difficulties experienced by western governments in justifying to the public the drafting of troops to territories outside member countries of the alliances.

Clearly, western public opinion will never condone situations such as those taking place on Yugoslav territory, but it is a big step to go on from there to say that the security and vital interests of every European country are threatened in Yugoslavia.

I do, however, believe that a policy of deterrence which fails as an instrument of threat could succeed, even in the present situation, if it were used as a preventive strategy against the emergence and spread of new conflicts. The signing of security and defence treaties between NATO, WEU and such European countries would be one element of this type of strategy.

As Sir Russell Johnston said in his report, initiatives must be in proportion to responsibility. If, as Europeans, we are not prepared to send forces to re-establish peace in Yugoslavia, we must moderate our positions and give up the idea of exercising military influence beyond the borders of the alliances to which we belong.

For all of the foregoing reasons, I would like the international community to continue to support the peace conference on Yugoslavia to find a solution to the conflict, because I still believe that dialogue and negotiation are the best way to achieve peace.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Brito.

I have a request to speak from another observer, Mr. Philipov from Bulgaria, and I call him.

Mr. PHILIPOV (*Observer from Bulgaria*). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we Bulgarian parliamentarians are pleased and grateful to be here for the third consecutive time to discuss thoroughly and painfully the problems connected with the Yugoslav crisis. We agree with all the fine words of appreciation by earlier speakers and with the Rapporteur, Sir Russell Johnston, who made a very touching and fine speech.

Allow me to stress three points in two minutes. First, what are the lessons to be learnt from the Yugoslav conflict? We consider that the draft recommendations do not correspond fully to the vast and very comprehensive information and conclusions in such a fine report. Our opinion is that the lessons for all of us should, in the first instance concern ethnic and economic matters and, after those lessons are understood, we should consider the military point of view. The Yugoslav crisis has a strong impact and is a severe blow to our understanding of the contemporary world and the

Mr. Philipov (continued)

problems that we have to face on our common and very small piece of land called Europe.

Secondly, we note paragraph 154 of the report, which states, "a reasonable system may have to be worked out for the international community to compensate countries which are hit most severely by an embargo against an important neighbouring trade partner, as happened during the Gulf war". We consider that such a system must be similar to the rules, procedures and financial support for the United Nations peace-keeping operations, otherwise all future embargoes will create new difficulties and new injustices for innocent countries such as those in our native Balkan region.

The third point comes from the address of the Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. van Eekelen. In the middle of his speech he said, "But if you ask me what I regard today as the most important pressing security interests in Europe, I would point out in the medium term a kind of arms control arrangement in the Balkans to avoid a preponderant rôle for any single country there".

Our delegation, my colleague Mr. Slatinski and I, consider that if that recommendation is not officially written in the final draft of the report on the Yugoslav crisis, it must be taken into consideration in the near future, with proper initiatives and actions by WEU. Such an arms control arrangement will be a strong step and a contribution for security not only for the Balkans but for all Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Philipov. You and your delegation are certainly most welcome here.

I call next Mr. Agnelli of Italy.

Mr. AGNELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it seems to me that the report is very one-sided and fails to recognise the arguments favouring the Serbs which have recently been put forward. I refer to the recent votes in the Council of Europe, of which we are all members, approving Mr. Fluckiger's recommendation which reminded us that six hundred thousand Serb refugees had fled into Serbia and Montenegro. These six hundred thousand refugees had to flee from threats from the other parties who should therefore be accused.

I should like to make a number of points, beginning with paragraph 13 of the report and to know whether the famous memorandum of 1987, which really dates from 1986, has been properly understood. I wonder whether there has been any really detailed analysis of the text which is highly critical of the communist government. It is one of the first anti-communist

declarations at the time when Tito's régime was, so to speak, becoming flabby. Furthermore, this text is well enough known because it was published in 1992 in the French review *Commentaires* and again in 1993 in the Italian review *Limes*. It was seized by Tito's secret police so that quite apart from the view we may take of the substance, it was an uncirculated text – I repeat that it was seized by the secret police – which means that it could have had no political influence. This seems to clear up one point.

I also note the strange contradiction between what is said in paragraph 29 and in paragraph 208. The second of these conflicts with the first which argues that Europeans should encourage the Serbs who wish to grant autonomy to Kosovo. I personally can agree with this because I am in favour of self-determination for peoples but paragraph 29 says that Germany should be thanked for having persuaded the Croations to recognise rights to the Serbs not recognised to them by the 1990 Croatian Constitution. Here I can put the following question: if we were faced by a situation where the Serbian republic of Krajina wanted independence, why not treat Krajina like Kosovo? To me there is a major contradiction because two different standards are being used: either the idea of autonomy should be dropped in both cases or a decision should be taken in favour of self-determination. Recently Croatia has also refused the autonomy proposed for Istria. This demand was supported by an independence party, the Istrian democratic assembly, backed by 72% of votes. What should I argue from Sir Russell's report? That instead of turning to the Zagreb government or the European institutions, the Istrians should turn to Germany? It is stated, in fact, that thanks to Germany's intervention Croatia changed its own constitution. Is this therefore what should be done? Quite frankly, I fail to understand.

In my view other paragraphs are also open to the same criticism, just as I believe that our Greek colleagues' criticisms of the paragraphs concerning them are justified. Unfortunately the recommendations do not take account of these considerations, so that I can vote for everything except the fifth paragraph, as we cannot tell the Greeks what they should do when they know very well what that is, a point on which the Greek speakers spoke very convincingly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Agnelli.

The penultimate speaker is Lord Finsberg of the United Kingdom.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am glad to follow Mr. Agnelli because I find his speech thoroughly discordant. First of all, I want to compliment Sir Russell on a first-class report. It is interesting that within this Assembly, the

Lord Finsberg (continued)

three British political parties have been united on what he said more than two years ago. Peter Hardy, Russell Johnston and I believed that intervention at that time could well have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Having said that, there is not much more that we can do except follow the advice that he has given.

I listened with great care to what was said by our Greek representative when she said that it was not true, in paragraph 42, to say that Mr. Papandreu said that Greece would pull out of the negotiations. I wonder whether it is also untrue that Mr. Papandreu in presenting his government's programme to parliament on 23rd October 1993 said that his policy was based "on the concept of a united Hellenic space including Cyprus, the Aegean, Greek Macedonia and Epirus... Turkey would always be the enemy number one and Greece would never recognise a state bearing the name of Macedonia or one of its derivatives". Is it also untrue that Mr. Pangalos made that disgraceful insult to Germany? I am bound to say that I hope that, unless there is the most abject apology from Mr. Pangalos, the Bundestag might take a very long time to ratify the protocol giving Greece full membership of this Assembly.

If a country which is recognised by the United Nations decides to set itself in accordance with human rights principles, it cannot be right that members of the European Union do not carry out their proper intentions of giving full diplomatic recognition at the earliest possible moment. Many of us know that one of the reasons why Turkey is only an associate member is due to some of the behind-the-scenes blackmail at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, carried out by one particular country which I will not name. However, I doubt whether anyone would fail to recognise the country I have in mind.

I want to refer specifically to one paragraph in Sir Russell's report. Paragraph 203 is probably the most important paragraph of all. Basically, it states that everything that we have tried in Europe has failed. The CSCE failed not because there were not good intentions, although if I remember my Latin correctly, *facilis descensus averno* – the road to hell is paved with good intentions – and, as Sir Russell said in his opening speech, it is a hell on earth in former Yugoslavia. However, what do we do now?

We have heard here and we have heard in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg that Europe is not prepared to recognise any change in territory produced by force. However, the agreement which is now being discussed again in Geneva will give territory as a result of aggression. How can we as parliamentarians and democrats – how can any country – believe the word of nego-

tiators or politicians if they go back so violently on something?

The Paris Charter made that very clear, and we are all signatories to that charter. However, each of us commends the negotiations.

Of course I believe that the Bosnians were correct to say that they could not accept the last proposals on the table. Another 4% still means territorial gains against the wishes of the citizens, and by force. Let us not kid ourselves. Let us not sit back and say that it would be wonderful if this latest agreement, as Mr. Poos said, holds and if, as I have said before, it has not been written in invisible ink. However, what do we do as democrats?

I believe that all we can do is hope that our governments will listen rather more carefully to their members of parliament who I think are, frankly, slightly more in touch on these issues with ordinary people. We are listening to diplomatic language. I have never been a believer in diplomatic language. One point in Mr. Agnelli's speech with which I agreed is that brutalities have been committed on all three sides. Having said that, the major aggressor has always been the Serbs.

Again, I am sad to see the comment in Sir Russell's report which states that Mr. Papandreu says that "He was elected on a nationalist programme promising resistance to the Turkish threat", and that "Greece must not betray Serbia, its long-term friend". If Serbia is carrying out genocide, no country who supports it is fit to be a member of any democratic assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Finally, last but certainly not least, Lord Mackie of the United Kingdom.

Lord MACKIE OF BENSHE (United Kingdom). – It would be curious if I were to disagree with my colleague Sir Russell Johnston in respect of the report. I certainly do not do that. In fact, I support it passionately. Sir Russell has called a spade a spade. He has done that in eloquent language and he has researched the text of his statement and produced sensible and forward-looking proposals which we should all back.

I will not speak for long, as I have already said everything that I was going to say. However, it is quite extraordinary that here we are in Europe and in NATO, with an organisation which faced up to the might of the Warsaw Pact, but we cannot find the political will or the mechanics to use it to keep the peace in Europe. That is an extraordinary situation, and Sir Russell is absolutely right when he says that it is entirely due to the lack of political will.

I am rather older than most of you and I remember clearly the events leading up to the

Lord Mackie of Benshie (continued)

last war. There is no shadow of doubt that, even at the eleventh hour, it could have been stopped in 1938. However, the political will was not there.

Here we are now, in 1993, with the experience of two appalling wars behind us and our governments – and I am deeply ashamed of all the governments in Europe and of our own government – are afraid to take the necessary steps to use force, of whatever sort, to stop the bloody genocide that we see going on.

The best thing that we can do here is to send a clear message, as my colleague Lord Finsberg said, to our governments at this important time when we have a summit coming off in NATO which, surely to God, will give it a purpose and direction to follow. If, from this Assembly, we get near 100 % backing for this resolution that would be a clear message to them that, if members of parliament are not afraid to face up to the responsibilities, for goodness sake let governments do so.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Lord Mackie.

That concludes the debate.

I call Sir Russell Johnston to reply.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – First of all, I want to express my gratitude to all those members who spoke kindly about my report. I will not refer to each one individually. Instead, in my short response, I would like to concentrate on two speakers because they both expressed concern. I want to refer first to Mrs. Bakogianni and then to Mr. Agnelli.

May I say first to Mrs. Bakogianni that if all Greek politicians made speeches about this issue as she did, we would not have any trouble. She made a very restrained, laid-back and reasonable speech. I do not deny that at all; not that I agreed with everything that she said, but she did not speak in an aggressive way, which can hardly be said of our former colleague, Mr. Pangalos. I see Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman glaring at me. That always means that I have done something wrong. I must have mispronounced that name. We know who I am talking about even if I have mispronounced that name.

Mrs. Bakogianni should recognise that what I say in my report about Greece comes at the end of a long period of time during which many people have begun to feel that, to put it mildly, Greece has been a bit unreasonable.

For example, I never mentioned in my report or speech the oil embargo that Greece imposed on Macedonia, which did catastrophic damage for some months.

As to the business of the veto, she said that there was never a veto and I have heard that argument before. What happened? We all know what happens at European Community meetings. The representative of one country does not stand up or hold up a hand and say, "I veto this proposal". It does not work that way. The veto is never exercised, but there is an understanding that one member does not agree. In Lisbon, Mr. Mitsotakis went to a meeting that was prepared to recognise Macedonia and said, "If you do that, my government will fall and you will get Papandreou." That is what happened. That was the reality. There was a veto, but it was not done in a formal fashion.

Secondly, Mrs. Bakogianni said that Greece was doing everything that it could to lower the temperature. One did not get that impression during the Greek elections, I fear. I am certainly not critical of Greece's concern about its security. It is very much entitled to be concerned. However, I am unsure about the weight that Greece appears to be giving to the elements in the Macedonian constitution which still remain. We must remember that the constitution had already been changed as a consequence of pressure from the European Community. I do not think that her fears are justified, but one has to recognise when people are afraid.

I give the Assembly advance warning that I shall be prepared to accept Amendments 2 and 4 – the Ferrarini and the Lopez Henares amendments. In both cases, they bring more balance to recommendation 5 and I am prepared to accept that. I understand what the Greek representative said about the need not to increase the heat on the question, but to reduce tension, and so I accept both those amendments.

Finally, I did not entirely understand everything that Mr. Agnelli said. However, I accept that the document produced by the Serb intellectuals – mentioned in paragraph 13 of the report – was critical of Tito and of the communist administration. Essentially, it was a nationalist document. I remember having a long talk about the Serbs with some Albanian nationalists in Pristina. We were in the middle of the war and we were telling each other that not all Serbs are bad, which is obviously the case, and asking why there is such tremendous nationalism in Serbia. The Serbs are worse than the British and the French, and that is saying something. The fact is that in that document, with which former President Cosic was very much involved, the entire Serbian intellectual class were committed to the concept of greater Serbia.

Mr. Agnelli also said that I was making a contradiction between Kosovo on the one hand and Krajina and Istria on the other. I had no intention of doing so. As I understand it, there is

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

a strong case for autonomous or self-rule of some kind for Istria. I am certainly not arguing against that, nor am I justifying some of the extremely nationalistic approaches that President Tudjman made, especially in the early stages.

I certainly think that the Serbs have some cause for concern in Krajina. That is true, but that does not justify what the Serbs subsequently did in Bosnia. It may be an explanation but it is not an excuse, and the two are very different.

Otherwise, I am grateful to all members who contributed to the debate and I again recommend the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Russell.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to add anything?

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – In my turn, too, I would like to congratulate our Rapporteur on this excellent report, which I have studied with great care. Not only does it contain well-founded political arguments but it is also a thoroughly reliable historical study of this tragic conflict that will have a long life as a reference document in our archives.

The Rapporteur has not confined himself to a review of the facts. He has gone to the area, sometimes at the peril of his life, to see how the situation really was. Not only is he an excellent parliamentarian – we know this, since he is our colleague – but this report has shown us that he is also both courageous and warm-hearted.

The discussion which followed this very important report was in every way worthy of our Assembly. Its level was very high and its tone high-minded. Although this is not customary, I thank all speakers for their helpful contribution on this tragic subject which deeply affects us all.

I may add that we are well aware of the kind of argument that the two countries involved are given to, nor are we taken in by certain verbal manoeuvring. You all know what I mean.

This is why I hope the Assembly will show its confidence in the report and approve it unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – The Defence Committee has tabled a draft recommendation to which four amendments have been tabled.

The amendments will be taken in the order in which they relate to the next – and that is, 1, 3, 2, 4.

If Amendment 3 is adopted, Amendments 2 and 4 fall.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, reads as follows:

1. In paragraph (*viii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “seemingly hurried”.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on a point of order, can you tell us which amendments will fall if the others are adopted?

The PRESIDENT. – To make things clear, I said that if Amendment 3 is adopted, Amendments 2 and 4 will fall. We are dealing with Amendment 1 which Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman is moving.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman to move the amendment.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to move my Amendment 1, which seeks to delete the words “seemingly hurried” from paragraph (*viii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation. These words give the impression that our governments and parliaments have taken decisions in an irresponsible way. I cannot judge how decisions were reached in other countries, but I cannot imagine that it was any different there from in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, government and parliament gave very careful thought to what they ought to do about the defence budget and the armed forces. Possibly the decision-making went somewhat faster than was expected, but that was the result of political developments.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in spite of my friendly feelings towards Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, I cannot agree with her today. Basically, I feel that after the iron curtain's collapse and the Gulf war various European countries took decisions to restructure their armed forces that were a little hasty and allowed too little time to go by.

I have the profound feeling that the Gulf war was the tree that hid the forest. When the war broke out, and with no iron curtain any more, governments in Europe felt that all future wars would be of the Gulf war type requiring highly mobile, professional forces which could be moved about over great distances.

Today, we clearly run the risk of long drawn-out wars in Europe demanding massive forces if they degenerate. I am particularly well placed to say so, since I can tell you categorically that the restructuring of the Belgian armed forces was over-hasty so I am not criticising your country but my own.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Rapporteur of the committee wish to speak?

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I certainly do not wish to suggest that the Government of the Netherlands is irresponsible, but with respect to Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, I think that there is quite a lot of evidence that in most of our countries we reacted too quickly after the fall of the Berlin wall and our politicians raised hopes too rapidly of some vast peace dividend, which has not been realised. I am holding an article from *Le Monde* today which says: “Un rapport du Sénat dénonce une armée de terre peau de chagrin.” That report criticises the state of preparedness of the French forces. Although France makes more contributions to international peace-keeping than any other country and clearly has well-organised armed forces, there is criticism in France, too, and I think that the modest words “seemingly hurried” should remain.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is negated.

Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr. Pécriaux and others, reads as follows:

3. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 5.

I call Mr. Pécriaux to move the amendment.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, although I did not take part in the general debate, I should like to associate myself with the congratulations for the Rapporteur, Sir Russell Johnston. In his wisdom he thanked the French and United Kingdom military forces in place. With another form of wisdom, I would include all the other European partners, who are there because representatives of Luxembourg, Belgium and other countries are also Europeans on mission in difficult circumstances. In other words I should like the congratulations to go to a wider circle.

I now turn to my amendment.

There is no question that it was handed in at a suitable time, since Mr. De Decker and myself drafted a similar amendment for the report on Central Europe, tabled by Mr. Wintgens yesterday.

Yesterday, we were De Decker, Pécriaux, Ferrarini; today we are Pécriaux, De Decker, Ferrarini.

In other words we see the problem in the same way and we should like the Assembly in its wisdom to avoid raising the problem referred to in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation

simply by deleting it. This would certainly improve the climate of the discussions which have just been resumed in Geneva and would also give our Greek colleagues who spoke yesterday and today time to listen in to the views of the Assembly. They would then be able to report to their country and parliament on the climate of discussion here, which we have all felt as being one of firm resolve and which will certainly commit WEU and the European Union.

In this connection, our Greek colleagues are faced with a heavy responsibility, since it is Greece that will very shortly take over the presidency of the European Union.

Given all these circumstances, I feel very strongly that they must be given the opportunity to say how they feel themselves, in other words to voice their agreement with the Assembly.

I therefore urge that paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation be deleted.

The PRESIDENT. – I have had notification from Lord Finsberg that he wishes to oppose this amendment and at least one other person has been raising his hand. Under the rules, we are allowed only one speech for and one against an amendment, so I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – It is somewhat strange that two of the signatories to the amendment have also signed the motion, which was adopted by thirteen votes to zero with one abstention. I wonder whether people read what they put their names to in committee if they then move an amendment as serious as this. It is appeasement. It is saying that we are scared to declare that Macedonian recognition should take place before accession. Does anyone disagree with that? They cannot. As I said in my speech, Macedonia is a member of the United Nations and it should have the earliest possible diplomatic recognition by all the states of the European Union. If we remove this paragraph we shall be saying, perhaps we do not think this is quite so important. I believe that it is important and I hope that we shall reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I spoke on this question when I wound up the main debate, so I shall not repeat myself. It seems to me that in accepting Amendments 2 and 4 I have made a reasonable compromise and I wish to retain the paragraph itself.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is negated.

The President (continued)

I am not being perverse, but we have rules and we should implement them. One member was voting without any card at all and two members voted with out-of-date cards, which are a different colour from the ones being used today. It did not make a material difference to the outcome, but it might do one of these days, so it behoves all of us to use the right cards when voting.

Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr. Ferrarini and Mr. De Decker, reads as follows:

2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in the period prior to its accession to WEU" and insert "in the framework of a wider agreement intended to reduce the tension in that region".

As Sir Russell Johnston has said that he is willing to accept the amendment, would the two gentlemen be prepared to move it formally?

I call Mr. Ferrarini to move the amendment.

Mr. FERRARINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Assembly has rejected deletion of paragraph 5 but I think that it will be able to accept the amendment I have tabled together with Mr. De Decker and I am pleased to note that the Rapporteur has already spoken in favour. This amendment is based on the same philosophy as the amendments which we approved yesterday in the case of Mr. Wintgens's report on WEU's relations with the Central and Eastern European countries.

The problem of recognition for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is a real one but, precisely because this new state is in an explosive, high-risk area we must move very cautiously. I think it unfair to face Greece with what sounds like an ultimatum and to link recognition to approval of the protocol of accession to WEU. A short time ago we listened to our Greek colleagues' views, argued with style and intelligence, and I think we must take them duly into account.

Recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia cannot be a problem for Greece alone. If our aim is to try to reduce tension and the threat of war in the area it is absolutely necessary to declare that such recognition must take place in a wider context and with wider agreement, which must include the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia itself and the international organisations, starting with Western European Union.

Acceptance of my amendment therefore means confirming the wishes already expressed yesterday by the Assembly on the same subject.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

Amendment 4 which has been tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares and others, reads as follows:

4. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add: "with the express declaration by all concerned to renounce any expansionist policies and respect existing borders;"

I call Mr. Lopez Henares to move the amendment.

Mr. LOPEZ-HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Though Sir Russell accepts Amendment 4, I feel I should explain to the Assembly very briefly why I am maintaining it. Like Sir Russell, I consider it compatible with Amendment 2.

May I explain the reasons for Amendment 4, which has been drafted with particular care. Mr. President, it is my view that at the present time paragraph 5 is necessary.

The primary aim of the amendment is to state very clearly the principles we consider as important as regards the recognition of Macedonia by Greece. We reaffirm that we must maintain the principles of the Helsinki declaration, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the declaration of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs on 16th December 1991. We must even include those contained in the recent declaration by Edouard Balladur in Copenhagen last June and in the Charter of Paris. In every case these have all unfailingly defended the principle of respect for frontiers and the need to seek a peaceful solution to conflicts.

We must therefore state explicitly that these are conditions that we consider necessary and appropriate. This amendment should be combined with the amendment we have just approved, which sets out in broad terms the spirit in which we should handle the situation. I urge the Assembly to approve Amendment 4 unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1395, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

The President (continued)

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

When I opened the proceedings of the Assembly I said that the report was remarkable, a fact that has been underlined by Sir Russell and our debate. Our congratulations are due to him.

Before I announce the orders of the day for this afternoon, may I say that it would be a great help if, as Mr. Juppé, France's Foreign Minister, is to address us this afternoon, anyone wishing to ask an oral question could give as much notice as possible to the Chair. There is no need to wait until Mr. Juppé starts, or finishes, his address. We should be delighted...

Lord FINSBERG *(United Kingdom)*. – I presume that that would not prevent anyone asking a question on a subject arising out of Mr. Juppé's speech.

The PRESIDENT. – Not at all; it is purely for his convenience so that we have an idea of how many questions there will be. We do not seek to inhibit anyone because we are only too well

1. See page 39.

aware of the fact that controversial issues can arise from speeches and that they may spark a question.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The European corps (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1400 and amendments).
2. Parliaments, military service laws and public opinion (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1386).
3. Address by Mr. Juppé, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 1st December 1993

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. The European corps (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1400 and amendments*).
Speakers: Mr. Zierer (Rapporteur), Mr. Steiner, Mr. van der Linden, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Caccia, Mr. Eisma, Mr. Borderas, Mr. Zierer (Rapporteur), Mr. Baumel (Chairman), Mr. Zierer.
4. Statement by the President.
5. Parliaments, military service laws and public opinion
6. Address by Mr. Juppé, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.
Replies by Mr. Juppé to questions put by: Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Soell, Mr. Sole-Tura, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Lord Finsberg, Mr. van der Linden, Mr. Ferrari.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. The European corps

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1400 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first order for this afternoon is the presentation by Mr. Zierer of

the report of the Defence Committee on the European corps, with debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1400 and amendments.

I call Mr. Zierer to present the report.

Mr. ZIERER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to read you a few excerpts from my report, which is before you. I have entitled this report the European corps – the start of a European security and defence policy.

Since the end of the cold war, East-West confrontation and related political changes, the requirements for a European security policy have changed dramatically. Today, the deterrence and defence capability built up against the former Soviet Union is of less importance than a general crisis- and conflict-prevention and management capability, even if the mere existence of powerful military forces in the successor states of the Soviet Union still remains a possible source of danger for many years to come. Military means of peace-keeping and peace-enforcing must remain a last resort, yet they still have to be taken into account.

The civil war in the Balkans has dramatically brought us Europeans up against our short comings in these areas of action and has accelerated efforts to establish an effective strategy of war-prevention and crisis-control. We know

1. See page 43.

Mr. Zierer (continued)

today that we have failed – and not least because we in Europe were unable to agree on the steps to be taken. This prepared the way for horrible massacres and also allowed a brutal aggressor to occupy foreign territory without being punished. We allowed annexation. War in Europe became possible again. Since then, the old security policy adage that armed conflicts must be nipped in the bud is once more gaining importance.

Ladies and gentlemen, we must take note of the fact that the United States cannot and does not wish to play its full rôle as world policeman any longer. The United States cannot in its own right shoulder the responsibility of intervening in every area of violence in this troubled world. Its military and financial resources could not bear the strain, nor can it any longer obtain a politically-sound public consensus on this subject. The question of European responsibilities therefore arises with a new and unfamiliar acuteness. Europe is no longer a divided continent under direct threat from a powerful enemy. Consequently, Europeans are now free to defend themselves with their own forces against new risks and dangers.

On the other hand, NATO needs to shoulder new tasks, in particular as regards its relations with the states of the former Warsaw Pact. In this framework, the rôle of European countries within NATO should also be redefined. Task-sharing in the alliance according to geographical areas of responsibility and according to the degree of challenge would enhance the effectiveness of the organisation. This means reinforcing the European pillar and developing an autonomous European security and foreign policy, not competing with but complementary to NATO, providing the European Community with urgently-needed coherence in foreign and security policy. WEU, which almost forty years ago was already on the verge of being given the rôle of Europe's security and defence organisation, presents itself as the authority to establish and lead this security policy aspect.

For the time being, we Europeans are not capable of managing a protracted and distant military conflict on our own without the help of the United States and all its options. The necessary weapons, guidance and logistical systems are lacking. The weapons systems used by European NATO member states are very different and incompatible in terms of ammunition and spare parts. Soldiers of one country can do nothing or very little with the weapons and equipment of another allied country. This leads to limited efficiency and diminished combat value, and also higher costs because of the obligation to keep multiple stocks and separate logistics. On top of this, there are considerable

difficulties owing to the use of various languages and different methods of training. In the future, therefore, we need the highest possible degree of standardisation of European national armed forces and extensive co-operation.

When, on 14th October 1991, President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl told the then President of the Council of Europe, Ruud Lubbers, that, as a contribution to increased European responsibility for security and defence, they intended to form a Franco-German corps in which armed forces of other WEU member states could participate, this did not meet with unanimous agreement. The United States was immediately afraid that this would drive a wedge between the allies. A more self-contained action by Europeans in security and alliance questions aroused worries in the United States lest American interests and the influence of the United States in Europe be jeopardised. There was also concern that Germany, together with France, which since as early as 1966 was no longer taking part in the military organisation of NATO, might loosen its ties with the alliance. American fears have since been dispelled by a number of statements emanating from everyone concerned, and in particular the so-called SACEUR agreement.

The La Rochelle agreement concluded on 22nd May 1992 establishes the schedule for setting up a 35 000-strong European corps by 1995. At the same time, it explicitly invites other countries to participate: the defence ministers are charged "to gain the participation of other WEU member states in the European corps". "The corps can be deployed for the common defence of the allies according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or according to the Brussels Treaty. It can also be charged with measures for keeping or restoring peace and it can be deployed in the framework of humanitarian actions." It continues: "National contributions to this unit do not affect the existing obligations towards other organisations."

Consequently, on 1st October 1993, the command staff was established with a German general as its first commander. Readiness for the deployment of certain staff with the Franco-German brigade in humanitarian actions is planned for 1st January 1994. On 1st July 1994, staff headquarters and the supporting staff battalion should be ready to start work while on 1st October 1994, all the subordinate and associated troops should be prepared for full deployment. The capabilities of the European corps – interoperability, divisibility, force projection, operational availability and endurance – ensure its usefulness for crisis-solution and conflict-management.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am coming to the end. A new European security architecture,

Mr. Zierer (continued)

which has to be established in close co-operation with the Atlantic Alliance, will have to be closely involved in political and economic developments in the countries of the former Soviet sphere of influence. The CSCE could also contribute to this when it is given a new mandate and it could prepare the ground for a future enlargement of NATO. It would be quite disastrous to consider the United Nations, NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, WEU and the Council of Europe and all the options concerned with these institutions as being in competition with each other. All these institutions are connecting parts in the building of a common European home and in the establishment and preservation of peace and stability in Europe and the world.

It would also be fatal to consider the European corps and the European component as being in competition with the regular alliance. The goals which we have set ourselves can be reached not through rivalry but through complementarity and task-sharing within the alliance and within Europe. With this complementarity, we can achieve a new burden-sharing with the United States, a burden-sharing which is adapted to the new and changed conditions. Nobody would think of diminishing the American influence and even less of forcing them out of Europe. Any form of American military presence in Europe is always welcome, but at the same time Europeans clearly understand that in the future we will have to rely more upon ourselves. A start has been made with a better and more effective European security and defence policy. We must make a success of this modest beginning. It is in all our interests to ensure that what happened in Yugoslavia can in no circumstances be repeated.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we are discussing the report by Mr. Zierer on the European corps at a very timely moment as regards the formulation of a parliamentary opinion on the military capacity required by WEU if it is to fulfil its obligations. This is particularly true in the context of the tasks of Western European Union as defined in the Petersberg declaration.

This is also a good moment for discussion of the excellent report before us, because only a few days ago, on 22nd November, the WEU Council of Ministers met in Luxembourg and strongly emphasised in its declaration the urgent need for Western European Union to develop its operational capacity further.

Basically I agree with that; however, I find the words “develop further” rather problematic. Surely, only something already visibly present in its initial stages can be further developed. But on close inspection, what is indisputably present is certainly also very modest.

However, what does now appear to be present is the very clearly formulated political resolve of the WEU Council of Ministers set out in the Luxembourg declaration to convert Western European Union into the European pillar of the alliance forthwith. This intention is further underlined by the unqualified statement in the Luxembourg declaration that the European corps, the multinational division and the amphibious forces of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have been declared as forces answerable to WEU. That is welcome.

There has been some doubt about the assignment of the European corps, because in January 1993, that is early this year, the French and German chiefs of general staff reached an agreement with NATO-SACEUR on the deployment and tasks of the corps. So far there had been no binding agreement of that kind with Western European Union. The official declaration made by the Council of Ministers should now have cleared up any doubts.

It is also worth noting that the WEU Council of Ministers told the NATO summit meeting in January that it expected collective assets of the Atlantic Alliance, such as communications systems, command facilities and headquarters to be made available to Western European Union in future. That is an unequivocal statement which could hardly be worded more plainly and also encourages hope of a commensurate conversion of words into deeds. That is why I shall not say that, though I hear the words, I have no faith. But I know that, as usual, the details are the problem. When I asked the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Poos, about this yesterday, he agreed unreservedly.

That is why our draft recommendation is still very topical, in spite of the Luxembourg declaration. Our recommendations to the Council set out very clearly and practically the present need for action and our expectations as the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union. In particular, the recommendations in paragraphs 1 to 5 are so important that we should continue to pay keen attention to their implementation.

Trust is a good thing, but parliamentary control is better in this case because of its great importance to the future of our organisation. We must face up to our joint responsibility.

So I suggest that we appoint one, or if possible two, rapporteurs, who will hold us to this subject at our June and December sessions next year by submitting further interim reports.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. van der Linden.

Mr. van der LINDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I would like to begin, Mr. President, by complimenting Mr. Zierer on his report, which comes just at the right time; it shows a development that we shall be discussing frequently in the years ahead.

The Eurocorps, which attracted so much criticism when it was formed, is today rightly seen as an important political initiative by France and Germany. In my country too it was looked at askance, though I did not support that view. On the contrary I urged in my national parliament partly for political reasons – it even came up during the ratification procedure for the Treaty of Maastricht – that the Eurocorps should be seen as something positive. Today it is clear that the coming into being of the Eurocorps offers an important opportunity, a chance. I believe this is one of the most important political developments we have seen since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

A further important political aspect is that this development has brought France closer to NATO. This, too, I am glad to see as a positive political fact.

Today, Mr. President, the Eurocorps is seen as an opportunity to give practical substance to the European pillar of NATO, and a chance to give substance to the Maastricht Treaty. That is, besides, an urgent necessity. Since the fall of the Berlin wall we have been faced with quite different responsibilities. Europe has to reforge itself, and to make itself ready for the future. This involves fresh forms of collaboration, and I feel certain that the Eurocorps is a good example of this. In the long term, integrating defence is an essential condition for peace and security on our continent. This peace and this security will, I believe, be attainable only if we integrate Europe further. Against this background I would like to emphasise yet again the connection there is between economics and politics, between economic and monetary union on the one hand and European political union on the other. The first is a precondition for the second. At the same time, we must not look at foreign defence policy separate from the economy.

There is another reason for welcoming the Eurocorps – the changing rôle of the United States in the world. Like Mr. Zierer, I feel it is very important that the United States should remain linked to Europe inside NATO. In my opinion Europe must be prepared to pay more for this. We should be ready to spend more, if the United States want to maintain political and military ties with Europe. This means, at the same time, that Europe must show greater decisiveness, and must present itself as a single negotiating partner. If this does not happen, then we

must fear that Europe will be relegated to the world sidelines. This is why I am glad to see a growing interest among other EC countries as well to play a part in the Eurocorps. Mr. Zierer mentions Belgium and Spain in this connection, but he says also that we shall in the future need to have more military units that can operate under the Eurocorps. I feel this is an important step along the road leading to a European defence community.

Finally, Mr. President, may I voice the hope that Germany can make the constitutional changes needed for the Eurocorps to be able to be employed in the situations indicated by Mr. Zierer. Possibly one could, in the longer term, talk about using it in situations that must be seen as going beyond the cases mentioned in this report.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – May I add my congratulations to those already given to Mr. Zierer on the excellent and forward-looking report, which analyses the problems and some of the solutions relating to the creation and expansion of a European corps, especially in the practicalities of its development and operational responsibilities.

Prior to the dramatic change in the political and security situation, when the communist régime dominated Central and Eastern Europe, it was fair to say that, in many aspects of security, we in Western Europe – with the activities of WEU and the practical, long-standing co-ordination of NATO forces, geared to facing a possible challenge from the Soviet Union – felt reasonably satisfied that any challenge from the eastern bloc could be responded to successfully.

The NATO countries – especially with the involvement of the United States – stood guard over almost all of Western Europe. Little sleep was lost over the possibility of a full-scale attack from the East. How that situation has changed almost overnight! Suddenly, the apparent potential enemy has virtually disappeared, and for some time the western alliance was left somewhat confused as to how it should respond to the changing situation. The Gulf war and the conflict in Bosnia became part of the catalyst, directing thinking to the future of European security. Developments since then, in particular this report, have shown the way to respond. The dream of economic co-operation in bearing fruit, and the need further to develop security co-operation is epitomised in these recommendations.

There are clear signs that the United States is considering seriously its rôle as part of the western alliance. Recent indications of its increased economic interest in its neighbours across the Pacific – my guess is that that will be

Mr. Thompson (continued)

followed by an interest in security issues in the Pacific basin – its reluctance to become too involved in Bosnia, its desire to decrease its commitment to peace-keeping in Somalia, and to reduce the defence budget, are all pointers to changing United States foreign and security policy. I do not criticise this change, but I recognise the need to respond to it.

One of the major issues in education in the United Kingdom at present is the question of bullying in the school playground. I recall that a good defence against the bully was to have someone on your side big enough to deal with the big one on the other side. Such has been the situation for the past 40 years in the European arena. Now the big one on the other side is suffering from a loss of influence and power and possibly from malnutrition and is unable to protect what were its friends; and, because of that change, the big one on our side may be losing some of its interest.

Happily, some of the Warsaw Pact nations now embracing democracy want to change sides and become part of our organisation eventually. But disputes still prevail, so this seems to be the appropriate time for collective security arrangements to evolve, depending a little less on external support and developing a more localised structure to maintain and improve the strength of European security. Many aspects need to be recognised as necessary elements of the new concepts of the European corps. Both the report and the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg seem to be considering a progression towards greater integrated training policies, including efforts to develop a common language among the forces that become part of the European corps. That will be a major problem. We must also try to assimilate as far as possible equipment and weaponry. Those issues appear to have widespread support in the Council of Ministers.

It is a matter of great concern that there may be difficulties in responding to paragraph (xiv) of the draft recommendation, which emphasises the need to maintain the defence budgets of WEU member states at an adequate level. It may be worth while to obtain information regarding the defence budgets of all participating nations – perhaps that exercise could be undertaken by one of our committees following acceptance of the report. As you will be aware, the United Kingdom Government stated only yesterday that it intends to cut its defence budget by a further £760 million – £260 million in 1994-95 and £500 million in 1995-96 – which will have a significant effect on the United Kingdom's attempts to maintain an adequate level of support and to retain its responsibilities towards meaningful European military capabil-

ities. I also feel strongly that in Britain we are spending too much on nuclear weaponry and not enough on front-line forces.

Nevertheless, this report, when endorsed by the Assembly, as I am sure it will be, can be a pointer to an efficient and competent element of European security.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Caccia.

Mr. CACCIA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to thank the Rapporteur for introducing the basic idea that what is involved is no longer a problem of defence but a problem of security and security is threatened from several directions in a rapidly changing situation which may lead parliamentary assemblies to change their attitudes as well. Today we representatives of the voters are also faced by financial multinationals which have no country. The Romans said that money has no smell because it has no country or points of reference.

I believe that the Eurocorps, as a response to security problems, offers the best prospect for strengthening Europe which has recently made great efforts and is continuing to do so. In many cases, however, the friends with whom we collaborate often defend their own interests. When the WEU committee visited the Department of State in the United States they were told that WEU can be an ideal organisation for winning popular support but this is a restrictive interpretation of our rôle.

If we are to resolve these problems we must be clear about how the Eurocorps should be organised. Until now in Europe there have been close bilateral and trilateral agreements between neighbouring countries in the same geographical area. What is needed, however, is active participation starting with a joint general staff to provide a command through which the separate forces can agree, to create a sense of a Europe determined to guarantee its security through its own efforts and with its own political will. If the agreements between France and Germany and the understandings of the kind envisaged between France, Spain and Italy for the Mediterranean become effective, it will be possible to set up organisations in which all the countries of Europe can co-operate for its defence.

Today we have a Planning Cell which can only plan but cannot devise a strategy. Co-operation between the United States and NATO will allow increased participation by organisations responsible for meeting any threat to Europe's security. To that end, it is necessary to tackle some of the subjects covered in the part of the report which I would like to stress. For example, our armed forces are burdened by the problem of the crisis affecting all European defence industries. Strength and courage are needed to harmonise

Mr. Caccia (continued)

all the industrial areas at European level and to achieve greater co-operation at a time when restructuring and conversion are going ahead. Speedier action is needed because history moves so quickly that we members of this Assembly are liable to find ourselves lagging behind events. Every one of us should work to remove the last suspicions, so that the Eurocorps described in the report is given the speediest possible response so that we can join freely and independently with other countries which live by our own democratic values.

To this end, Italy is playing an active part and has agreed to provide substantial forces as recorded in paragraph 4 of the document approved by the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg. Other states should devote as much attention to the question so that they are ready when the need arises. A reply must be given involving everyone not only in words and in parliaments but in defensive structures.

Once approved, the document before us – and I can also accept the amendments which have been tabled – will be a powerful political reminder to our governments. The Eurocorps cannot wait. We no longer have a single threat but a whole series of small threats which can jeopardise what has so far been only the economic unity of Europe. When everything is threatened there is a danger that we shall no longer have the unity we have so long awaited.

In this situation, accession to the Eurocorps will enable all states to compare experiences so making unity easier to achieve. We have recently witnessed the former Soviet Union, forgetful of earlier signs, turning minds back to the concept of greater Russia maintaining its own forces and energies. We must be afraid of this; we must understand that everyone's history and past is always a motive for giving a different answer from the one that might reasonably be hoped for. Even in the operations in the Adriatic we have run into some difficulties because of the two separate naval forces. What is needed, on the contrary, is that we should give the same answers and here our parliaments could well give our governments a strong reminder and reply in clear terms on the organisation of a Eurocorps which will keep our fundamental values intact.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I too welcome the recent establishment of the Eurocorps headquarters at Strasbourg, though I am aware that for the moment this corps cannot undertake all tasks. This has, of course, partly to do with the limitations imposed by the constitution in Germany; and for that reason I would

urge our German colleagues to intensify the debate on this in the German Parliament so that German troops can be used for peace-enforcement duties outside their own territory.

After the Maastricht Treaty, it is now clear that WEU has formally become the defence pillar of the European Union. I feel that the Eurocorps is most explicitly marked out to be an instrument for WEU to use – at all events more so than multinational military units working in co-operation, such as the Dutch-German-Belgian-British multinational unit or the British-Dutch amphibious unit.

Yet I have to say that the Netherlands was initially hesitant about the Eurocorps, because a corps like this could weaken co-operation within NATO. I can remember Mr. van der Linden and I both speaking against it. In the Dutch newspaper *De Telegraaf* of 26th November, there is a report that the Netherlands has tried to station a liaison officer with the Eurocorps in Strasbourg, but that according to the Secretary-General of WEU this has been refused because the Netherlands is not expected to make any positive contribution to the building up of this corps. It is indeed quite logical that Strasbourg should turn this liaison officer away; but I do hope – and this was the outcome of the debate in the Dutch parliament on the foreign affairs, defence and NATO budgets – that the German-Dutch army corps will in 1995 be brought under the Eurocorps. With this in view, liaison officers could do useful work in Strasbourg until that date.

Happily, the Dutch Government too is taking an increasingly positive attitude towards the Eurocorps, though at the moment it is still not possible, because of a lack of capacity, actually to take part in it; involvement is still indirect, via the Dutch-German army corps. In the Netherlands, too, there is however a realisation that the United States is very keen on a European defence unit being created; so I hope that the European Union's foreign and defence policy will soon take shape, in part on the basis of this Eurocorps. I hope, too, that besides France, Germany, Belgium and Spain the other eight member states of the European Union will in the long run take part in this corps, and that eventually – after 1995 – sixteen member states of the European Union will be involved in it.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – A political decision has already been taken that Spain will participate in the European corps and the Minister of Defence has recently confirmed Spain's support for a technical study to determine the type and number of units which will make up the European corps. Exchanges of view have taken place recently with both French and German representatives at Toledo and

Mr. Borderas (continued)

Granada respectively in a very constructive spirit. Since Spain's accession to WEU, it has always supported all European initiatives concerning a European security policy and the European corps. I therefore give the report my unreserved approval.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Zierer.

Mr. ZIERER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your contributions to the debate. I note from them that there is a broad consensus and no opposition to the report.

Let me briefly reply to a few of the comments made. Mr. Steiner is right to say that the European corps must be developed further, to become a genuine European pillar. As for the proposal concerning the "forces answerable to WEU", I think we should discuss this question in depth at the session in June next year.

Mr. van der Linden spoke of a positive evaluation, and rightly believes that the European corps can bring France closer to NATO again. He calls for solidarity in Europe and regards the European corps as a step on the way to a European army.

Mr. Thompson emphasised the need for more independence and more co-operation in the logistical field.

Mr. Caccia discussed internal security, a very important subject. He also spoke of the current crisis in the weapons sector and its effects on the labour market. That too is a kind of economic threat. He too was in favour of consolidating the European corps more quickly.

Mr. Eisma discussed the problems involved in the deployment of the European corps, with specific reference to Germany. He said the corps was still not fully ready for deployment. There is some truth in that. There is still no consensus in the Bundestag. We are still waiting for our supreme court, the Federal Constitutional Court, to give its final ruling. Presumably – and here I am addressing Mr. Eisma again – there will have to be several European corps one day.

Mr. Borderas said that Spain backed the efforts to establish a European corps and also saw the need to develop it further. He said that the ministry was currently discussing whether to make individual units available.

Thank you for your contributions. I note that they are largely in favour.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall begin by adding my congratulations for the report presented to us. Most speakers have stressed the value of this ini-

ative, which met with early difficulties accompanied by some doubts, on the basis of a joint Franco-German declaration.

With the gradual addition of further details and thanks in particular to an agreement reached with NATO, some European partners realised that this is a move designed not to thwart NATO but, on the contrary, to add usefully to Europe's defence at a time when it is the duty of Europeans to make a greater contribution to their defence.

We welcome Spain's recent decision to contribute to the formation of this Eurocorps which already includes Germany, France and Belgium. It is our earnest hope that other countries will join.

We also welcome the initiative taken by Italy which has proposed to set up a ground unit within the Mediterranean fleet-air component.

A matter requiring consideration will be the equipping of this Eurocorps with the resources it still tragically lacks as regards transport, logistics and, of course, information. Subject to these reservations, however, we must welcome this report.

I will conclude by saying that the Defence Committee has approved the report and the amendments which are to be discussed.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Zierer.

Mr. ZIERER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the amendments must be looked at as a whole. They are not so much changes as additions to the report. These additions are available separately. If you have any queries, please let me know so that I can make brief comments.

The PRESIDENT. – The Defence Committee has tabled a draft recommendation to which four amendments have been tabled, all four in the name of the Rapporteur.

The amendments will be taken in the order in which they relate to the text – that is, 1, 2, 3, 4.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mr. Zierer, reads as follows:

1. In paragraph (*iii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "European corps", leave out "while no such formal agreement has yet been concluded with WEU".

May I suggest that you move Amendment 1 and speak to all of them together, and you can then move the other three formally. Does that suit your convenience?

Mr. ZIERER (*Germany*) (Translation). – The first amendment concerns paragraph (*iii*) of the preamble and calls for the deletion of the phrase "while no such formal agreement has yet been concluded with WEU". This joint declaration now exists.

Mr. Zierer (continued)

Amendment 2 adds the following paragraph, after paragraph (iii):

“Noting the existence of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for the use of the European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard, although no details have been released;”

Amendment 3 adds the following new paragraph after paragraph (vii):

“Aware of the recent Italian initiative envisaging a multinational ground force intended to enhance the operational significance of the above-mentioned tripartite air and naval force;”

That has also been discussed in committee and approved.

Amendment 4 adds the following new paragraph after paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper:

“Communicate to the Assembly the text of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for the use of the European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard and the text of the report on relations between WEU and forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);”

These are the additions to the text.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your co-operation. I now put Amendment 1 to the vote and then you can move the others formally.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to unanimously.

Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr. Zierer, reads as follows:

2. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Noting the existence of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for the use of the European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard, although no details have been released;”

I call Mr. Zierer to move the amendment formally.

Mr. ZIERER (*Germany*) (Translation). – I move the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to unanimously.

Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr. Zierer, reads as follows:

3. After paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Aware of the recent Italian initiative envisaging a multinational ground force intended to enhance the operational significance of the abovementioned tripartite air and naval force;”

I call Mr. Zierer to move the amendment formally.

Mr. ZIERER (*Germany*) (Translation). – I move the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is agreed to unanimously.

Amendment 4, which has been tabled by Mr. Zierer, reads as follows:

4. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Communicate to the Assembly the text of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for the use of the European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard and the text of the report on relations between WEU and forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);”

I call Mr. Zierer to move the amendment formally.

Mr. ZIERER (*Germany*) (Translation). – I move the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is agreed to unanimously.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1400, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

1. See page 44.

The President (continued)

You will be gratified to know, Mr. Zierer, that that has been carried unanimously. Congratulations.

4. Statement by the President

The PRESIDENT. – Yesterday afternoon Mr. Rathbone raised a point of order about the television coverage of speeches in the chamber. He asked whether at least one other camera might pick out those speaking from the floor.

I understand that the study made some time ago by the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly with a view to installing a television system in the lobby revealed that the installation of a mobile system would involve considerable expenditure which could not at present be met from the Assembly's budget.

However, following the request of Mr. Rathbone, a further study is to be made to ascertain whether technological progress would now allow the problem to be resolved at reasonable cost.

Some of you may have noticed the young man with a camera who pointed it at members as they spoke. An attempt has been made today to make better use of the fixed camera. I hope that the difficulties will now be resolved and certainly by the next session in the spring. This was a useful point and I am grateful to Mr. Rathbone for calling our attention to it.

5. Parliaments, military service laws and public opinion

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1386)

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the presentation by Sir Russell Johnston of the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on parliaments, military service laws and public opinion, with debate and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1386.

I call Sir Russell Johnston to present the report.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I can tell the President that I have my voting card with me this afternoon, and that proves that old dogs can learn new tricks!

This report is clearly not controversial. There are no amendments and, when I last looked, there was only one name on the speakers' list. I hunted for Mr. Roman for a short time, but he is clearly lightly armed and is taking evasive action.

However, the report is concerned with matters which are extremely important to the development of an integrated European defence and ways in which parliamentarians like ourselves may influence the process. Indeed, unusually, it invites parliaments and not governments to take action. It also provides useful comparative information about how the different countries within WEU approach the question of military service and the nature and form of parliamentary and public involvement.

Before turning to some of the issues covered by the report, I would like to pay a very special and warm tribute to the Secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, Paulo Brito, for the thorough and time-consuming work that he has given to the report. We are very fortunate to have the quality of some of the new people coming in, as well as the old ones.

Referring back for a moment to this morning's debate – and I am pleased to see that Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has not disappeared – the report gives an even more effective response to her suggestion that I was being unfair in talking of a seemingly hurried restructuring of armed forces in WEU because it paints a picture in paragraphs 28 to 39 of considerable reductions in military strength in all our countries. Those reductions were embarked upon fairly quickly following the removal of the Soviet threat and under the lash of economic constraint and, I would argue, without taking full account of the growing demands for peace-keeping, far less of the necessary relationship between us, in fulfilling these requirements in Europe in an integrated way.

I refer to that specifically in paragraph 37 which states, "Faced with these plans for reform, one may wonder what forces WEU with its present membership will have after 1998 in order to exercise to the full its rôle of defending the interests of the member countries". That is perhaps an understatement of real potential difficulties ahead so I repeat the point in paragraph 61.

Much of the paper deals with national service and public reaction to it. Britain and Luxembourg are the only two countries to have actually abolished national service, although the Netherlands proposes to abolish it over five years. All other countries are reducing the length of the service. It must be observed, I am afraid, that the shorter the service, the less effective it will be. The shorter the time you have someone in the military services, the less able you will be to train him or her.

Britain's abolition of national service has been a success. We now have very effective and highly motivated armed forces – a fact well demonstrated in the Falklands and in the Gulf. The

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

object of making the reform was to achieve this, but it of course benefited greatly from widespread public support – support which one observed in other member countries as well.

Luxembourg has long exchanged the martial activity which characterised much of its turbulent history, and which can still be seen in those vast, ancient fortresses, for highly successful diplomacy. It has absolutely nothing to do with this report, but one must take all the opportunities that one gets and so I shall take this one to pay tribute to Luxembourg, a very small country but one with a political system of quite remarkable efficacy. Mr. Poos has been one of the best Chairmen-in-Office with whom this Assembly has dealt.

The argument for having all professional forces is, from a military point of view, more and more persuasive, as soldiers, sailors and airmen become highly skilled technicians, as well as fighters. I was slightly amused when I looked at the French opinion poll, mentioned in paragraphs 49 and 50, in which various people were asked for their views on national service. The question whether it was important to allow young people from different social classes to know each other received the support of only 17% of those questioned. I have always recognised that the United Kingdom is probably a more stratified society than France. In the United Kingdom, the social argument was one of the main arguments; the argument had nothing to do with the military issues and everything to do with the fact that people would mix.

I vividly remember when I was doing my national service and I was engaged in that somewhat arcane art form of bulling my boots – it is not entirely easy, I can assure you – and I was succeeding. Beside me in the next bed was a young chap who had been the captain of some small private school, where presumably everyone had done exactly what he told them to do. He could not do it. My boots were there, gleaming like moonlight on a lake at night and his were plain, dirty black. Eventually he burst into tears. I thought that that was probably quite good for him. Although I am a liberal I sometimes have realistic views about things. Although the social consequences of national service – integrating the population – having nothing to do with the military appraisal, they are not unimportant.

The public's clear reluctance to send conscripts to areas of danger, such as Yugoslavia, is another aspect that is germane in determining one's views towards national service. The tests of public opinion in the report are rather limited. In France and Italy the sample was small. It was a little larger in Portugal, but was

still small, so the risk of being inaccurate was perhaps quite large. I am told that opinion polls have a possible area of doubt of about 6% in either direction. If one is dealing with a sample of only 1 000 there is a considerable risk. It has to be said, and I shall say it to those three countries in turn, that the tests have to be taken regularly to make them valuable because the trend is more important than the snapshot.

There is a contradiction between the common public assertion that the first duty of military service is to assure the defence of the country – specifically France or Portugal – and the growing acceptance of European integration. We have just debated the Eurocorps. May I offer you one thought: the logic of integrated defence is the end of individual defence. I am not saying that one can immediately apply Adam Smith to the military machine. Nevertheless, we cannot escape the logic of union, which is the division of responsibilities and the sharing of burdens. In the end that means that every country does not have to have an air force, a navy or tanks and so forth. We should bear that in mind as something that we have to direct the thinking of the public towards.

In conclusion, I draw your attention to the recommendations. You will notice that in recommendations 1 and 2, which are linked, the emphasis is on the overall requirements of European defence. We do not yet look at things in that way but we will have to do so. I shall quote recommendation 2 because you are the people who will have to try to implement it and it recommends that member countries should “encourage their defence and foreign affairs committees to co-operate with the defence and foreign affairs committees of the parliaments of other member countries of WEU, associate members and observers with a view to examining the present requirements of integrated European defence”.

By and large, that is not something that we do. One can argue – indeed it is in part argued in the debate – that the degree to which parliamentarians have any genuine input in defence policy is very limited. Executives and governments hold those things very close to their chests. Very often we go through various pretences that that is being done, when it is not in any real way. If it can be done, it will have to be through the defence and foreign affairs committees of our parliaments.

Recommendation 3 mentions “the harmonisation of legislation in member countries governing national service and the status of military personnel”.

For example we will eventually have to reach a point where pay is equivalent in our armies, air forces and navies. Conditions will have to be comparable. One cannot operate a union in any

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

other way. Perhaps that is looking a long way ahead, but that is what we should try to do in this Assembly.

I know that the report is perhaps not one calculated to raise passions, but boring things are usually both good and necessary. With that in mind, I commend the report to you, but more importantly I ask that if you pass it, and it looks as if you will, you do something about it. In other words, go back to your parliaments and try to bring about the recommendations that I hope that you will all accept.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Russell.

The debate is open.

I ask Mr. Roman to address us.

Mr. ROMAN (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to congratulate Sir Russell Johnston on this report and to give him some encouragement because I imagine this must have been an exhausting day for him. This is the second report he has presented to the Assembly in one day.

I sincerely believe that it is a guide for the future, just as a report of this nature on a subject such as this and in an organisation such as WEU should be. New perspectives are opened up for all of our national parliaments with proposals for the near future. I can only applaud the report's proposal that when a reform of national armed forces takes place, account should be taken of the need to contribute to European rather than purely national defence requirements; until we realise that the defence of European and that of national interests go hand in hand we will not make any progress in the construction of Europe, or in defence.

Similarly, the proposal concerning the possibility of organising a European civil and military service is imaginative. I would ask Sir Russell and Mr. Tummers to give this matter of a European civil service more thought and perhaps let us have a more concrete proposal from our committee in due course.

Reference is also made to a matter upon which we have just been commenting, namely the creation or constitution of European multinational military units.

If we are realistic, we must accept that the suppression of national service, the constant demands for its reduction, the considerable increase in the number of conscientious objectors and the emergence of rebellion as an organised movement are steadily gaining ground with a substantial proportion of public opinion.

These phenomena cannot be ignored and making merely defensive attempts to solve them

or serving up old arguments will not, in my view, produce any concrete result. At the same time, and this is the other side of the coin, we find no difficulty in recruiting regulars for the armed forces. What is happening? In all those European countries where national service is compulsory, with the exception of Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, the same reasons apply as those that have already been mentioned here: the end of the cold war which is affecting the whole of Europe although each country has its own specific threats, the peace dividend and the economic problems which today all governments are faced with. To these I would add very well-informed public opinion. Admittedly there is a widespread and clear understanding, which is evident from the findings given in the report, that armed forces are absolutely necessary for national and European defence, not only for their military rôle but also for the broader purposes of civil defence, but, with the increasingly sophisticated nature of the equipment, the fact that national service interrupts the lives of young people and the clash between military discipline and a society which is very definitely different, compulsory national service is not perceived as essential, at least by a large proportion of public opinion.

I think that it is a good report because it goes some way towards what young people today want and feel. It is not for nothing that Sir Russell is Chairman of the Council of Europe's Sub-Committee on Youth and Sport. And these comments apply not only to young people but to all important sectors of the population and the armed forces themselves. I speak as someone whose country has made a great effort to bring about a shortening of national service, which is nine months in Spain at the moment. In a few years' time the Spanish army is expected to consist of 50% regulars and 50% conscripts.

However, I do not believe that it is our place, as politicians, to annoy people. Neither parliament nor governments exist to impose unpopular measures; they only impose those which cannot be avoided. Some are unpopular because they are unfair, others may be unpopular because the public is not sufficiently well informed about them and this is something we need to give attention to, just as the report does; another reason may be that the subject is not presented to the public from an interesting viewpoint. We politicians have to take our share of the responsibility for this when we have, in a manner of speaking, to row against the tide.

As politicians we are not here to annoy, but, in as rational and appropriate a manner as possible, to reconcile interests which at first sight appear to be almost irreconcilable: national defence, armed forces immediately on call and of proven efficiency, the training of young people, sexual equality with, as a consequence, a

Mr. Roman (continued)

greater share of women in the armed forces, etc. Each age finds a different balance between these different elements.

I believe, and this brings me to my conclusion, Mr. President, that the proposals for greater co-operation on a European scale in both civilian and military fields and the creation of European multinational units both lead in the same direction and open the way to more attractive projects for the young people of Europe; if we can keep one step ahead of our day-to-day preoccupations, we will be able to map out the future. With a little foresight, we will reach our destination in time.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

Do you wish to speak again, Sir Russell?

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, very briefly, because Mr. Roman made an excellent contribution and I thank him for it. He is right to point up the suggestion of the European service which is contained in paragraph 63 of the report and I should have emphasised it. As he said, it is a signpost for the future and we are talking about looking ahead.

We intentionally did not deal with conscientious objection in this report. This is more an issue for the Council of Europe and I understand that a report on the subject was referred back to its Legal Affairs Committee following representations by Greek members.

The PRESIDENT. – Does Mr. Tummers wish to say anything?

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have asked for the floor because the only member to have spoken on this issue addressed his remarks to me. I too would like to compliment the Rapporteur and the committee secretary on their work. Together, they have already run a contest, and they wanted to run it again. As we have seen, no points were scored against them.

It has just been said that there is no question of this being a controversial report, but I am still not so sure about that. I do not believe that just because there was only one person listed to speak we can assume that the report is not controversial. Clearly there is much that can be said about it, one way or the other, and I hope that this will happen mainly in our national parliaments. As we know, the report will under the rules of our committee be submitted to the parliaments.

Where my own country is concerned I can say that the heir to the throne was interviewed on television recently, and showed himself clearly in favour of keeping national military service. He cannot yet take the throne; we are waiting to

see what happens now in our republican monarchy.

The texts of the reports are always, at the end of the session, looked at in a meeting of our committee to see whether they should be sent on to the parliaments. Tomorrow morning I shall propose that this time, exceptionally but for good reasons, the text from Mr. Roman be attached to the report.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft resolution contained in Document 1386.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft resolution.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft resolution is adopted unanimously¹.

We now have a credibility gap of 55 minutes. Mr. Juppé, the French Foreign Minister, cannot be with us until 5.30 p.m. I therefore propose to suspend the sitting until 5.25 p.m.

(The sitting was suspended at 4.30 p.m. and resumed at 5.35 p.m.)

6. Address by Mr. Juppé, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France

The PRESIDENT. – We come now to the address by Mr. Juppé, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.

May I say that the Assembly of WEU is always pleased and interested to welcome a speaker representing the French Government, both because France is our host country, of course, and because it has also played an important and original rôle in NATO and European affairs. France has made a great contribution to reactivating WEU. This interest is of special importance today since this is the first time the Assembly has had the privilege of being addressed by Mr. Juppé and because the French Government has shown itself to be particularly aware of an issue that is currently at the forefront of our concerns, namely the integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into a system able to provide a permanent guarantee of security for Europe as a whole.

Mr. Balladur, the French Prime Minister, has made certain statements on the subject to which

¹. See page 46.

The President (continued)

we have listened most closely. Minister, you and your German colleague, Mr. Kinkel, together put forward a proposal at the last Ministerial Council of WEU for the use of our organisation for just this purpose. We are informed that the WEU Council intends to examine this proposal, which is on the agenda of the next ministerial meeting in May.

Sir, the Assembly hopes that your speech today will help to clarify further the nature of those proposals and the implications for WEU of their being put into effect. Furthermore, you will not be unaware that the involvement of an ever-widening circle of countries in the work of WEU presents us with a number of material difficulties which we are unable to resolve without the active assistance of our host country. The commitment shown by France to ensure that WEU participates fully in the new European security order is taken as an assurance that we will continue to receive such generous assistance. We will therefore also be particularly attentive to anything that you may have to say on that subject.

I know that you have had a very busy day and that, at no little personal inconvenience, you have been able to reach us late in the afternoon, for which we are grateful. Therefore, I have very great pleasure in welcoming you here, despite your many commitments, and in asking you to take the floor and address the Assembly, Mr. Juppé.

Mr. JUPPÉ (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have very great pleasure today in addressing your Assembly for the first time, even though I must say that recently my workload has been very heavy. I was, however, able to look at some of the subjects I propose to deal with at yesterday's ministerial meeting of the CSCE and at the Luxembourg meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers a few days before.

Now I am here, I would like to take the opportunity to applaud the highly important rôle played by the Assembly in the increasingly crucial debate on the security of the European continent. It is essential that the peoples of Europe participate in this debate as they do through WEU, a forum which is unique in our continent. The packed diplomatic timetable to which I have just referred is evidence of the interest, not to say urgency, of the questions you have to discuss, and also their ever-changing nature, or fluidity as I would almost call it.

The contours of a European defence policy, to which we all aspire, are gradually emerging, but from the outset I should like to stress the increasing importance of WEU as part of the architecture of European security.

We have come a long way since 1987, when on the initiative of the French Government, WEU confirmed its vitality by adopting The Hague platform. The entry into force of the European Union exactly a month ago gives WEU new scope for development. To quote from the treaty, WEU is an integral part of the development of the Union. The Luxembourg ministerial meeting drew the conclusions necessary to follow up on this decisive step.

The procedural relations between WEU and European Union have been laid down: the duration of the WEU presidency has been set at six months, and this will mean that on 1st July 1995 Spain will hold the joint presidency of the two organisations. I hope that before then a decision will have been taken on the harmonisation of the presidencies as called for in the Maastricht declaration.

We have also taken action on the provisions of the treaty on European Union regarding WEU's operational capabilities. The joint declaration by France, Belgium and Germany, confirmed by WEU, fleshes out the proposal made by the states participating in the European corps and shows our determination to help on the development of WEU's operational capabilities. The agreement with NATO signed at the beginning of 1993 is a further illustration of our commitment, alongside our allies, to our common defence.

WEU and its Planning Cell need to rely not only, of course, on army units but also on a command capability. The multinational force, involving at least three WEU countries, thus takes on its full political and military significance.

It is also in terms of the extension of the European Union that we hope relations between WEU and its eastern neighbours will develop. Here I refer to the status of association for the members of the Forum of Consultation, whose representatives I greet here today.

You asked me, Mr. President, to tell you more about the idea brought up for the first time at the three-cornered meeting between my colleague, Klaus Kinkel, myself and our new Polish colleague. The purpose of this initiative is to launch a study of rules for an association status which would be open to states that have already concluded an agreement of association with the European Union and, thereafter, to others as and when they conclude such an agreement. Such a status would entitle countries to participate on a wide scale in WEU activities. Opening our doors to admit these countries is a European Union priority. The granting of WEU associate status forms part of the European future which we wish to see unfold and which will include security for countries associated with the Union.

Mr. Juppé (continued)

Let there be no misunderstanding. I know that the term of association has hitherto been used in WEU for NATO member countries. In this connection, I wish – should this be necessary – to reassure the representatives here today of Turkey, Iceland and Norway. There is no question of any change to the status they at present enjoy. However it is surely not necessary, since no exclusivity has ever been given to the term, to refuse to use a word which very satisfactorily describes the nature of the relationship we wish to establish with our eastern neighbours. When we open the door to our consultation partners it should be in conditions of clarity and with no hesitation or mental reservation. Our action is exclusively European. It is directed against no one and detrimental to no other project. I would most strongly emphasise that it is in no one's interest to answer the expectations of our European neighbours by rejection or even just disregard. It is the credibility of the European Union, together with the stability of our continent, that is at stake.

Our proposal for a conference on stability, and the formula for association that will go with it already points this way. The Luxembourg declaration adopted last week refers to the Franco-German initiative and to the enhanced status which I have just mentioned. We are convinced that, accompanied by our partners in the Forum of Consultation, we can now go forward. We are ready to define the content of this enhanced status, which admittedly still belongs to the future, just as we are ready, in another field and another forum, to play our part in the definition of the partnership for peace.

May I again make clear that there is no competition and even less contradiction of any kind between these two ideas. Just as the Atlantic Alliance wishes to meet the security requirements of the Eastern European countries, though fully aware that it is not possible to offer them partnership, or to be more precise, full membership in the present state of affairs, so WEU and the European Union wish to draw these same links closer. For my part, I see a very clear parallel between a partnership for peace open to all, which should favour this rapprochement, and the granting of enhanced status to a number of Central and Eastern European countries.

This is, in fact, no great novelty, as some were saying after our Warsaw meeting. May I remind you that the Council of Ministers of what had not yet become the European Union, in the transitional text they adopted on the stability initiative, referred to the possibility of association with WEU and used this very term – and this was 4th October last. So we were already thinking along these lines at that stage in our

deliberations. The European Council held in Copenhagen in June last sent a message to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the effect that these countries were due one day to enter the European family, the Community family, the European Union. In the meantime some of them would be offered the status of association with the European Union.

At the same time the European Union has been working on this proposal for a stability pact which will take shape at the meeting of the European Council in Brussels in December. The European Union considers that within the framework of this stability pact, countries which conclude among themselves good neighbour agreements, to be subsequently guaranteed multilaterally in the stability pact, would then be candidates for association with WEU. As you can see we are going back to an idea which has already been launched, and which has, I feel, the merit of both consistency and logic.

As provided in the declaration by the Nine in Maastricht, WEU is also making a specific contribution to preparations for the alliance summit meeting. In Luxembourg we adopted a communiqué in which a section deals with this subject. We have therefore, following the normal practice, officially launched a process of consultation among ourselves. This will continue, one occasion being the joint meeting of the Permanent Council of WEU and the North Atlantic Council, to be held on 14th December, shortly before the alliance summit meeting.

This communiqué stresses the consequences of the emergence of a Europe of defence, and establishes a principle, that is, the right of Europeans, in the framework of WEU, to use the resources they make available to the alliance, without such use being subject to conditions which would relegate European action to a secondary rôle.

These studies will be continued by the Sixteen with a view to opening the way to a genuine reform of the alliance, whose forthcoming summit will be an important milestone. In my view, a strong transatlantic partnership presupposes that each partner has the same confidence in the others as it has in itself. On the occasion of this summit, we shall once again stress the great importance we attach to the transatlantic links which unite our countries with the United States, and our strong hope that a European security and defence identity will take shape in this context through the intermediary of WEU. I have, moreover, observed for some time very positive developments on the part of our American partners, some of whose proposals, including that for joint combined task forces which will be separable but not separate forces – to take only one example – are entirely on the lines of this firm statement of European identity within a regenerated alliance. It is, however, still

Mr. Juppé (continued)

necessary that while showing this trust in our partners, we the Europeans should have full confidence in ourselves and state calmly and clearly our intention to meet our responsibilities to the full in the framework of this firm regenerated alliance with North America.

It is thus with an open mind that we approach the forthcoming alliance summit. Here in WEU, you are better placed than anyone to convey this message of trust and openness to public opinion in our countries; it is you who can best ensure Europe's rightful place in future, now that the treaty on European Union has entered into force.

In conclusion, allow me to tell you the reasons for my optimism and confidence at this stage of events on the European continent. A colleague, more accustomed than I to WEU ministerial meetings, told me last week in Luxembourg that things were gradually taking shape, and that meetings which even only a few years ago were held well out of the limelight are now attended by all our ministers for foreign affairs and ministers of defence, moved by a real desire to make progress.

As I have said, the European corps has become a reality. Its headquarters were recently inaugurated in Strasbourg. It will attract other forces, since a great number of countries wish to join it – too many perhaps, as we were wondering this morning at the Franco-German summit meeting. The difficulties, complexity and even confusion are considerable and for those who are not specialists in these questions the different bodies concerned may appear to overlap.

I nevertheless believe that we can see this architecture of European security to which I have referred gradually emerging, having at its summit the major law-making organisations – the only ones entitled to decide on the use of force. I mean the United Nations and its Security Council, or the regional organisations which have responsibilities in this field under Article VIII of the Charter.

Then there is the CSCE – which we discussed yesterday – and the Atlantic Alliance, confirmed in its original mission and with its transatlantic link at full strength, but at the same time regenerated, taking on new responsibilities for peace-keeping operations and capable for that purpose of devising organisational models which are more flexible and original than those we were accustomed to up to 1989.

Then there is the European Union, now firmly advancing along the road it traced out for itself at Maastricht and in which WEU will be the institution representing the security and defence of the European Union. The task still before us

is, naturally, huge, but in my view prospects are becoming brighter and the objectives more sharply focused. I hope that in the work which remains for us to accomplish if we are to achieve these great ambitions, the WEU parliamentary Assembly will, as it always has done, contribute its wise counsel and its power to influence public opinion.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister. We have a few questions but before I ask for the first, I must tell members that I have received complaints about the length of questions asked during the session. There has been a request that they should be more concise and I should be grateful if you could co-operate.

I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I should like to thank the Minister for being with us and for the information he has given us.

You made a very full statement reviewing all the challenges now faced by Europe. It seems to me, however, that you said nothing about the Mediterranean. Yet the French Government has recently announced that it plans to convene a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean. As you know Spain has been very keen on this idea for a long time. Has a timetable already been set for this conference and what is your point of view?

The PRESIDENT. – Minister, would you prefer to reply to each question separately or all together at the end?

Mr. JUPPÉ (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – If you agree, Mr. President, it would be better if I answered each speaker separately rather than all speakers together.

The PRESIDENT. – Of course.

Mr. JUPPÉ (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – France is a Mediterranean power and is therefore greatly interested in anything that can enhance first the Mediterranean dimension of European Union and secondly, collaboration and co-operation between the countries along the shores of what we sometimes call our sea.

Today more than ever the challenges are obvious. I am thinking in particular of the instability affecting certain Maghreb countries including the extremely difficult and highly unpredictable situation in Algeria, but I could quote other examples if I continued my journey along the Mediterranean.

We are therefore most anxious to take part in any kind of co-operation capable of bringing the countries on either side of the Mediterranean closer together. You know that there are already several places where co-operation takes place.

Mr. Juppé (continued)

One example is what is known as the "five plus five" procedure through which representatives from the member countries of the Arab Maghreb union and a number of European countries come together round the same table. Unfortunately this procedure is now stalled, because to the south of the Mediterranean, if I may say, we have Libya whose behaviour and refusal to accept Security Council resolutions obviously create problems.

Another move was made more recently by the Egyptian Government suggesting a Mediterranean forum bringing together a number of countries. A first meeting was held in Cairo a few weeks ago. This means that we are only at a very preliminary stage and that it is too soon to think about results.

The idea of a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean, to strengthen links between our countries, has been mooted several times, in particular last week at the Franco-Spanish summit in Toledo and Madrid and at the Franco-Italian summit in Rome.

At those meetings it was agreed that France, Spain and Italy would look into the idea of a new initiative to reactivate co-operation around the Mediterranean. We are only at the stage of ideas and I cannot give you details of any timetable or procedures but in any case, our three countries have reaffirmed their political will and I think that it must produce results in the coming months because of the challenges I mentioned at the start of my reply.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, George Kennan, the former United States Ambassador in Moscow, wrote in February 1946, that is to say before the cold war officially began, to the effect that when the wolves growled in Moscow, western chancelleries trembled.

Do you agree with me that some western governments also exhibited this metaphorical reaction when a number of Eastern and Central European countries asked to join NATO in recent months?

Second question: if Moscow reacts in the same way to the idea of these states becoming associate members of WEU, what guarantee is there that western governments will not also behave in the same way?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. JUPPÉ (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – I doubt whether there is much trembling in the western chancelleries and certainly not in Paris. At the same time I understand your concern.

Today, we are faced with a difficult situation. New democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are asking us for security guarantees. Over the last few months I myself have visited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Other members of the French Government, including in particular the deputy Minister for European Affairs, Mr. Alain Lamassoure, have visited Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia. Nor, of course, can we forget the Baltic states. Everywhere the request is the same.

We must find some reply to this need for security. Is the way through early membership of NATO as these countries are wondering? Indeed, setting aside circumlocutions or general considerations and looking to those who use the most vigorous language, their demand is unquestionably membership of NATO.

It is not my view that President Yeltsin's growlings are the sole reason for not agreeing to that demand in that form at the moment. I think that there are several major objections.

The first is that any over-hasty enlargement of the alliance might "dilute" it and be damaging to what is still one of its present missions, which is to act as a defence system for its members in application of Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington.

I do not, of course, wish to look on the black side but Europe has not become a stable and peaceful continent, or not yet at any rate. We must not therefore abandon or dilute this original mission of the alliance. You will see that this is not connected with the growlings of any eastern bear but is a concern of our own.

The second matter of concern which I perhaps share with you is that we must not by over-hasty enlargement recreate a bipolar system in Europe. Anything which might result in the actual exclusion of Russia or a feeling of its being excluded from the collective security system we are trying to construct would be counterproductive.

We therefore have to steer between these two reefs which is not easy. This is what justifies the initiative I spoke of a moment ago, namely the partnership for peace proposed by the United States in preparation for the forthcoming summit. This is an interesting idea which needs to be fleshed out; it is still vague and the contents are not very clear but the general philosophy directed to everyone is understandable.

This also justifies our proposal for a study of closer associate status – a word which does not frighten me – for those countries with WEU. This proposal has aroused great interest. Only yesterday in Rome several ministers from the Baltic countries told me that they attach great importance to this question.

Mr. Juppé (continued)

The third reply relates to your concern about peace-keeping operations in Europe and more specifically in the territories of the former USSR now known as the CIS.

Here we have a problem and we were made fully aware of the difficulties yesterday at the ministerial meeting of the CSCE. In substance, Russia argues that she cannot remain indifferent to certain critical situations in her near neighbours and that if she does not react nobody will do so in her place so that she is justified in engaging in peace-keeping operations. The western partners reacted by saying that no peace-keeping operation anywhere in Europe or elsewhere can be launched at the whim of any particular state. There must be some basis in law and some international institution must declare that international intervention is needed at that time to restore or maintain peace. As I said a few moments ago, the only source of legitimacy must be either the Security Council of the United Nations or a regional organisation within the meaning of the United Nations Charter, namely the CSCE.

In this area we must make clear the rôle of the CSCE.

When I left Rome late yesterday afternoon to travel to Bonn and the Franco-German summit meeting, we had reached no agreement on this point. The Russian Minister was very outspoken. I have no wish to "take him off" because it is always foolhardy to do so in diplomacy. He did, however, ask us to give him carte blanche and to help him in meeting the cost of peace-keeping operations in the former USSR. That is a bit simple or a bit too much.

The outgoing Swedish president of the CSCE had drafted a kind of code of conduct setting out political objectives for such operations together with criteria, procedures and, in particular, duration. The CSCE must move in that direction and no peace-keeping operation on the continent of Europe must be possible without authorisation and the effective monitoring by observers of the way such operations proceed.

These are my three answers to the points you raised: partnership for peace, closer links with the Forum of Consultation in WEU, and monitoring by the CSCE to use the term now apparently used for all peace-keeping operations on the continent.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Sole-Tura.

Mr. SOLE-TURA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Minister, I would like to ask you a very specific question. What rôle do you envisage for the French nuclear strike force in the general context of a common defence policy for European Union?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. JUPPÉ (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – That is the sixty-four thousand dollar question.

I shall be brief. This is not because the reply is not clear but because, as I would remind you, the French Government is reviewing and updating its strategic doctrine. A white paper is in hand. It will be published early next year and will clarify a number of ideas.

At the moment, I will simply say, first, that the defence of France's vital interests and territorial integrity is based and will continue to be based on the nuclear deterrent. We are therefore fully determined to retain a deterrent force strong enough to play its full rôle.

Secondly, the existence of this French nuclear deterrent and its modernisation over the years has sometimes been thought inconsistent with other alliance systems. This view has long been abandoned. For many years it has been realised that the existence of a French deterrent force, naturally operating under France's sole responsibility, as is right, contributes to the security of the whole continent and the whole of the European Union. These two factors remain valid whatever updating may result from the white paper.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – All theoretical models for European security become to some extent superficial when, as in the case of Yugoslavia, it is seen that the political will to do anything at all is no more than an illusion. For the umpteenth time Europe, the Union, has threatened to use force if the parties do not keep to the agreements they have made. These agreements are in part the outcome of initiatives taken by the French Minister and his German colleague; I have every admiration for them. But what is there left for us to do to prevent the European Union becoming a laughing-stock, through announcing plans and then not following up the threats of military force that lie behind them?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. JUPPÉ (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – This is not how I analyse the negotiations in former Yugoslavia. It is wrong to say that we did not carry out the threats made; the truth is the opposite: we did not really make any threats. We even said the reverse. I have no wish to rewrite the history of these events but if there was any mistake or failure it was to have said at one point – when stronger words of dissuasion from the international community might have had more effect – we shall confine ourselves to humanitarian operations and will not use force. This was not

Mr. Juppé (continued)

making threats, it was on the contrary removing the threat.

Where are we today? Two somewhat opposite faults have to be avoided. The first, and I know that nobody will make this mistake very easily, is to be satisfied with ourselves. Quite obviously the way these terrible events have gone ahead is a matter of shame for the international community and no doubt for Europe. The opposite extreme would be to beat our breasts despairingly and to scourge ourselves. Europe has taken on certain responsibilities.

Without indulging in chauvinism and undue self-satisfaction, may I say that France has assumed its responsibilities. Today it has 6 000 men on the territory of former Yugoslavia. It is not alone: Spain, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are also there. As I speak there are more than 10 000 troops in Croatia or Bosnia and to look at what may be a more sordid but important aspect, we have spent a lot of money and will continue to do so. If European Union were not doing what it is doing today, particularly by way of humanitarian aid, the suffering would be much greater than it already is. Like all of you I am moved, shattered and shocked by what I see on the television every evening but I cannot agree that the European governments should have mud thrown at them because, I would ask, who has anything else to suggest than what we have done and what we are proposing today? What would the single alternative solution have been? Apparently it would have been to send 300 000 troops to fight in Bosnia in order to drive out the aggressors. Who has ever been ready to do that apart from those offering unstinted advice in various quarters?

In these circumstances my German colleague, Klaus Kinkel, and I tried to restart the negotiations which had been bogged down since the end of September. We made a number of suggestions covering two points. The humanitarian aspect first of all. As winter has come – we are told that it is coming but unfortunately it has arrived – we must enable the convoys to get through not only by air but also overland, because in very many cases lorries are more useful and effective than aircraft.

I think I can say that in Geneva, on Monday, after a full day of negotiations we made some progress and obtained an undertaking signed by all the parties and warlords present – or the military commanders as they like to call themselves – not only to refrain from blocking these convoys by violent military action but also to put an end to the administrative niggling, which very often holds up the convoys for hours if not for days and days. They also undertook to recognise that, as they guaranteed passage for

these convoys, uncontrolled elements outside their authority were responsible for blocking passage. They agreed that the international community and more precisely UNPROFOR would then be entitled to use force on the ground or in the air to clear a passage for the convoys in accordance with the Security Council resolutions in force.

I will not dwell on the humanitarian aspect but last Monday we took an important step forward, even if it was not completely satisfactory, particularly because we failed to persuade Mr. Karadjic to lift his veto on the reopening of Tuzla airport. We did not give up, however, and we shall go on trying to persuade him. Without deceiving myself unduly I think, overall, that the movement of humanitarian aid may be improved over the coming days and months.

The second element in our proposal is political. As Mrs. Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, said last Monday in Geneva, humanitarian convoys are no substitute for peace. The objective is not to continue humanitarian aid indefinitely. The aim is to make peace. That is why we tried to sketch out a plan. What is it?

I do not wish to over-elaborate but we did spend hours and hours on the subject. Basically, the plan is as follows; we shall ask the parties to sign as soon as possible an agreement based on the outline worked out last September aboard the warship *Invincible*. In that spirit we spoke as follows to the various warring factions: we told the Serbs that they would have to make further territorial concessions on the scale demanded by the Bosnian negotiators last September; we also told them that in Krajina they would have to accept a *modus vivendi* and confidence-building measures, meaning an effective cease-fire, that they would also have to allow UNPROFOR to carry out its mission in full and would have to agree to the restoration of rail and road communications, pipelines and so on pending a final settlement.

If you do that, we said, we are prepared to submit to the United Nations Security Council – because the decision cannot, of course, be taken by the European Union – a plan for the progressive controlled suspension, and ultimately lifting, of sanctions. I was very surprised to read in a headline in some papers that Germany and France were proposing that sanctions be lifted. This was not what was recommended. We proposed a settlement combined, if appropriate, with – I repeat – a procedure for progressive controlled suspension over a trial period. If this succeeds on the ground then we will finally propose the complete lifting of sanctions and the re-entry of Serbia after a resumed London conference.

Mr. Juppé (continued)

From the Croats we asked the same things, namely the acceptance of a modus vivendi and confidence-building measures in Krajina.

Lastly, we said to the Bosnian authorities: if you get these additional territorial concessions which are a legitimate demand, if humanitarian aid can really get through and if overall agreement is reached we think that you should then move towards signing this agreement.

This was what was said.

What are the chances of success?

As you are aware, negotiations were resumed immediately after this conference which was attended by the Twelve together with American, Russian and Canadian observers. They have been going on continuously in Geneva since the day before yesterday. That is something in itself, the threads have been picked up. I have no wish today to make forecasts or to weigh the reasons for optimism or pessimism. Nevertheless, it seems to me that progress has been made towards a settlement in Krajina and that the plan set out by European Union for confidence-building measures followed by a final settlement at a second and then a third London conference, is taking shape.

Against this, there are two sticking points. The first is the question of access for any future Muslim republic to the sea. The second is the problem of territorial concessions. I believe that we must keep up pressure on the parties and the negotiators to break the log jam so that we can then look at a fuller settlement in accordance with what has been planned.

For what it is worth this is what we have done. I repeat my first question: who has a better proposal? I am willing to take any better peace plan and any bolder and more effective suggestion. We must play this card for all it is worth and with conviction in the hope that it can bring about progress in this tragic situation which is so shattering for all of us.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Now a question from Lord Finsberg of the United Kingdom.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Juppé, you have just said that you came back from Geneva and that the military leaders – the warlords – have all signed a document. Do you believe that the document is any more valuable than the other 38 that have been signed, particularly in the absence of the chief Serbian military man? How do you reconcile what you have just said with the Charter of Paris, which says that it is not permissible for any territory to be transferred except by agreement, and not by force? Yet our negotiators are saying in Bosnia, “ You

must lose more than a third of your territory ”. If this is seen by the rest of the world as meaningless as it has been so far, how can we hope that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will have any prospects for the future?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. JUPPÉ (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – I shall reply very briefly to these two questions.

My answer to the first, Lord Finsberg, is in the next few weeks or months. This will be more effective.

This was the first time for a paper to be signed in these circumstances in the presence of the twelve foreign ministers of European Union, the American representative, the Russian representative, the heads of UNPROFOR and the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. It is true that General Mladich was not there but Mr. Karadjic signed and committed the Serbian part of Bosnia.

A second matter for thought, Lord Finsberg. Do you know – and I hope that you will not take me wrong – of any single war which did not end with territorial adjustments? I would like you to name one.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Juppé. I know that you are hard-pressed, but we have two more questions and I hope that they can be kept short. Are you prepared to answer them?

Mr. JUPPÉ (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – I shall try to answer briefly, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. van der Linden.

Mr. van der LINDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I thank the Minister for his introduction, and join in his expressions of optimism and confidence in a policy that leads towards a European architecture in the area of defence. How does the Minister see this in the long term? Can one really talk about a fully-integrated defence if it does not include the nuclear component?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. JUPPÉ (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – This is unfortunately a question which I cannot answer briefly. I would refer you therefore to what I said a short time ago about optimism and confidence. I said that I could see the main lines of this future architecture beginning to take shape and I identified three levels. Having said this I am fully aware of all the obstacles still in our way.

As I said in the strongest terms a short time ago I believe that the Atlantic Alliance retains all of its vocation and mission as the collective

Mr. Juppé (continued)

defence system for its member states. As things stand at the present this is undoubtedly the essential point. At the same time we must create systems through which peace-keeping operations can be carried out under international control which implies, as I said, reform of the alliance and a bigger rôle for the CSCE.

Finally there is WEU, about which I will add something I did not say to start with.

Committing nobody but myself, my personal view is that European Union will not really achieve the full personality and identity which we have been feeling around for over a period of thirty or forty years until it has its own defence capacity agreed with its allies within a renewed Atlantic Alliance.

From this standpoint, what is happening in former Yugoslavia is extremely revealing. If European Union had been able to deploy 40 000 or 50 000 troops on the ground in time, things would probably not have turned out as they in fact have. For me, therefore, the objective is clear: European Union will become more than an idea and more than an economic fact when it has achieved its own defence identity through Western European Union.

I believe that we all share this aim. Much remains to be done. We have a European corps. This is an embryo, but well-formed embryos develop. In it I shall declare my faith and confidence.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Ferrari.

Mr. FERRARI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, I should like to return for a moment to the question of sanctions. It seems to me that this problem, as you already mentioned, is the new element in the plan worked out by the European Union ministers for putting an end to what is happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Yesterday, in connection with the work of the CSCE in Rome I attended an interview given by the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who seemed to me to rule out the possibility of accepting sanctions.

How is this inflexible American attitude to be reconciled with the plan worked out by the foreign ministers of European Union?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. JUPPÉ (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – I do not share your pessimism on this point.

Admittedly, the first American reaction was cool, not to say hostile, when the Franco-German initiative which has since become a European Union initiative, was announced. This was no doubt because we did not explain

ourselves properly. We have all been at pains to correct this error by many contacts with our American friends including in particular the Secretary of State. Contacts were made by me, Klaus Kinkel and the presidency of European Union. Following these explanations, America's position changed.

In Rome, I did not hear Mr. Christopher say that he was opposed to the lifting of sanctions. In bilateral talks, due to be resumed tomorrow in Brussels, he even told us that he did not rule out the plan for the progressive controlled suspension of sanctions.

The American position has therefore moved, with some hesitation no doubt, but, if the process started last Monday in Geneva succeeds, I am convinced that our American friends will not stand in its way and will fully understand the philosophy underlying our proposal.

I should like to mention a last point which suggests that this initiative is a small break in a particularly cloudy sky. Other countries concerned by the fighting have also moved and have reacted more positively. I am thinking in particular of a number of Muslim countries.

To be honest a number of Muslim countries have, as you know, rather been attacking us for many months. Their view was that the only answer to the Yugoslav conflict was to lift the embargo on arms so that the belligerents could be restored to equality. This was a logical argument but its consequences had to be very carefully weighed.

I shall not name any of the states concerned but several have recently let us know that there had been developments in the Muslim world. Several of them who have close links with the Bosnian authorities have taken the view that our proposal was balanced and that if it succeeded and the territorial concessions legitimately demanded by the Bosnians were obtained, a process of discussion leading to signature should be started. I also find this reassuring.

To sum up, I would say that while the Americans are admittedly cool they are not hostile, that the Muslim world has moved its position and is prepared to support this initiative if it can make progress over the coming days.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Minister, for your speech. The refreshing optimism that you expressed about the defence and security future of Europe, and particularly the rôle of WEU, is I am sure echoed by most, if not all, members of the Assembly. As you will appreciate, there have been many debates this week about that and the forthcoming NATO summit. Thank you also for your frankness in answering questions. We have had a very good and poignant debate today about Bosnia-Herzegovina and the various manifestations surrounding that problem. It is always a special

The President (continued)

treat for us to be able to have a Minister who is right at the forefront of these matters to come and speak to us.

Every day is a heavy one for ministers at a senior level, as all politicians know. However, this has been a particularly heavy day for you. In fact, the past two or three days have been heavy. We very much appreciate your courtesy in coming to us late in the day to make a speech and answer questions so freely. We hope that this will not be your only attendance here and that you will come back and keep us informed. Thank you very much.

**7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 2nd December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the consequences for Europe

(Presentation of and debate on the report tabled by the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Document 1394 and amendments).

2. Address by Mr. Zlenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.
3. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the consequences for Europe (Debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1394 and amendments).
4. The development of a European space-based observation system, Part II (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1393).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 2nd December 1993

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
 2. Adoption of the minutes.
 3. Changes in the membership of committees.
 4. Revision of Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure (*Motion for a decision tabled by Mr. Cuco and others*, Doc. 1405).
Speaker: The President.
 5. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and its consequences for Europe (*Presentation of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee*, Doc. 1394 and amendments).
Speaker: Lord Dundee.
 6. Address by Mr. Zlenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.
- Replies by Mr. Zlenko to questions put by*: Mr. Borderas, Sir Donald Thompson, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Alexander, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Eisma, Mr. Soell, Mr. De Carolis, Lord Dundee, Mr. Valleix.
7. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and its consequences for Europe (*Debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1394 and amendments).
Speakers: Mr. Lopez Henares, Lord Dundee, Mr. Lopez Henares, Lord Dundee, Mr. Lopez Henares.
 8. The development of a European space-based observation system, Part II (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1393).
Speakers: Mr. Valleix (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lopez Henares.
 9. Close of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 40(6) of the Rules of Procedure I invite the Assembly to agree to the proposed changes in membership of committees contained in Notice No. 12 which has already been distributed.

Is there any opposition?

The changes are agreed to.

4. Revision of Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure

(Motion for a decision tabled by Mr. Cuco and others, Doc. 1405)

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Cuco has tabled a motion for a decision to revise Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure.

This motion will be referred to the Presidential Committee.

1. See page 49.

5. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and its consequences for Europe

(Presentation of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Doc. 1394 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the presentation by Lord Dundee of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on the evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the consequences for Europe, Document 1394 and amendments.

I call Lord Dundee to present his report.

Lord DUNDEE (*United Kingdom*). – It is a great pleasure to introduce the debate on this report on the evolution of advanced technology in CIS countries. To investigate and work upon that subject has been a very stimulating and rewarding task. At the outset, however, I should point out the limitations of what has been written. Owing to the very wide terms of reference, inevitably, component themes could not be treated in great depth. Nor, owing to recent events in CIS countries, was it possible to visit them while writing. Nonetheless, although disparate and wide-ranging in its scope, we may agree that the real purpose of an inquiry such as this is fairly simple and precise. That purpose is to examine how advanced technology in the CIS can best evolve to promote economic stability throughout Europe and hence also to serve the interests of world peace.

We look forward a great deal to hearing from the Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Mr. Zlenko, whose country has been working towards the aim of peace and stability and whose government has recently ratified the START I Treaty.

Although the title of this report does not mention it, we should perhaps first consider manufacturing industry in the CIS which is other than advanced technology. For clearly if the aim is to promote stability, all parts of the economy and not just some of them must then evolve.

What then is the state of industry and manufacturing as a whole in CIS countries and how much scope does there appear to be for its evolution? Within the CIS, and before going very far, we find some obvious differences. Certain areas, including those in Russia and Ukraine have indeed shown encouraging signs. Not surprisingly, armed conflict has prevented progress in Georgia and Armenia, and there has been very little change in the economies of Central Asia.

And even where there are now hopeful signs, the economic background is still rather negative. This is caused by a distribution system which continues to be incompetent and by the problems of adapting inefficient systems of pro-

duction from the old command economy. What is perhaps less noticed by us are some inherent strengths. For example, in many areas, notably in Russia, the work force is extremely able and highly skilled.

Yet, if that is so, and given the political will in CIS countries to embrace the market economy, we might well ask why progress has not been already much faster than it has. To some extent, the answer to that is a lack of confidence, not so much in the market theory of running a profitable business, but simply in how to go about running it at all. That is why direct bilateral links, technical assistance and the know-how fund are so important.

Whenever advice and guidance are given and in particular when given directly to the business and industry concerned, improvements in efficiency become evident.

The International Centre for Science and Technology will soon be situated in Moscow, principally in order to prevent the growth of technologies of widespread destruction. However, that body could also come to help a great deal with training CIS plant and management as it is the right kind of institution in which those who are themselves trained and experienced to advise CIS manufacturing industry can come together to work as part of their own career structure.

Then there is the present way in which help of one kind or another tends to come from the West. In themselves, the agencies, ventures and initiatives are always well intentioned and very often effective. However, as we are only too well aware, many endeavours overlap, information is sometimes unco-ordinated, and thus results are not as good as they could have been. If set up internationally and backed by G7 countries, a data centre receiving and disseminating information could do much to correct these faults.

If structured in the right way, such transparency of information would be able to strengthen rather than streamline the creative impulse and its methods of giving help to the CIS from the West.

Another question is our own understanding in the West of the commercial context of advanced technology in the CIS. This is simply to grasp the mutual advantage which is already there and which can steadily improve. As we know, in the CIS there is much excellent and sophisticated equipment either cheaper than obtainable elsewhere or even not otherwise available at all, and which thus, when sold, brings back to the CIS much-needed hard cash.

Therefore, it goes without saying that we should encourage the CIS to nurture and build up the manufacture and sale of these valuable assets. In so doing and implicitly, we have to avoid confusing that aim with two parallel

Lord Dundee (continued)

objectives. The first is how best to convert military into civilian production. Here, of course, the distinction is self-evident between military production, which should be discouraged where it is redundant and uncompetitive, and advanced technology of any kind which should be actively encouraged if it can command a competitive price.

Another source of confusion, this time to do with the avoidance of armed conflict, is that between military arsenals which we all agree should be reduced, and CIS advanced technology where competitive, which we noted should be nurtured and increased.

Sometimes there is a misconception that more advanced technology would stand in the way of reduced military arsenals. Not only is that a misconception since the endeavour to de-escalate arms is not impeded by supporting advanced technology, we can also see conversely that a successful reduction of arms would in fact assist enormously the evolution of advanced technology itself.

On another level, of course, arms control and market success are closely linked through the same new experiment with confidence and trust. In this case, however, it is not so much that confidence and trust is required in the theory of a free market economy – that theoretical commitment has already been given. Instead, it is confidence and trust in the stages of new processes as they are shown and gradually proven to work. If that consideration applies to manufacture and trade, so it also applies to related issues whether they be arms reduction, the monitoring of arms sales, the formation of a European nuclear policy and, not least, the practice of collective security through the Open Skies Treaty.

Clearly, the engendering of confidence within the CIS can be greatly assisted by improved western methods from without. Principally, these demand better co-ordination of initiatives and more direct involvement with industry at regional and plant level. While the context of that trust, as we have just discussed it, is the evolution of technology, equally its more lasting feature and reward will be the evolution of stability and mutual respect in Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Dundee.

**6. Address by Mr. Zlenko,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine**

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the address by Mr. Anatoly Zlenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

It is a great pleasure, Mr. Zlenko, to welcome you to the Assembly this morning as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

Mr. Zlenko was appointed Minister in 1990 and he brought to the post a wealth of previous diplomatic experience. As members know, Ukraine occupied a key position between Central Europe and its Russian neighbour with whom a number of vital issues have been under discussion, in particular the division of the former Black Sea fleet and the vexed question of nuclear weapons.

Minister, this is the first time that we have had the real pleasure of welcoming a Ukrainian Minister and observers from your country, from your parliament. We look forward very much to your address. I understand that you have generously offered to answer questions. If members can indicate their wish to ask a question to the platform during your speech, we will call them. Will you please come to the podium, Mr. Zlenko.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, let me first express deep gratitude to organisers of the session, to the WEU Assembly and secretariat for the opportunity to take part in today's meeting and to address you.

This is not the first time in my career that I have spoken to a high-level political gathering in Paris. But it is the first time – and I am really happy about this – that I speak as Minister for Foreign Affairs of an independent Ukraine directly to the session of the WEU Assembly. Could this have been possible five or six years ago? Undoubtedly not. That it is possible today is one more practical sign of the tremendous changes that we are witnessing in modern European political life.

I have the honour to represent here a new, very young European state, although it has a very old and mainly tragic historical experience. On 1st December 1991, that is barely two years ago, a nationwide referendum approved by a 90% vote the act proclaiming the independence of Ukraine. Thus has been corrected the deepest historical injustice when one of the largest European nations was doomed through centuries to live, work and develop without having real national statehood. It was the Ukrainian nation which happened to create a thousand years ago a strong and influential mediaeval European state – Kyiv Rus, European monarchs were seeking to establish family links with the reigns of ancient Kyiv. Kyivan Princess Anna, the Queen of France, is but one example of the deep-rooted historical ties between Ukraine and bigger Europe. It was a Ukrainian hetman – actually the national political leader – Pylyp Orlyk, who back at the beginning of the 18th century worked out the draft of one of the first

Mr. Zlenko (continued)

European democratic constitutions, based on the principle of the balance of powers. The name of the famous Ukrainian hetman can be now found in the name of a locality near Paris, where one of the Paris airports is situated.

In recent years, Europe has seen a flow of radical political, ideological and psychological changes. Today's Europe is dramatically different from what we had only five years ago. And in this context, without any exaggeration, one may state that the very appearance of an independent 52-million Ukraine proved to be one of the biggest geopolitical novelties in modern Europe, since the times of Yalta and Potsdam. This makes us in Ukraine feel great responsibility for the gradual and organic involvement of the young Ukrainian state into Europe as a natural and reliable democratic partner. These tasks are among the first priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy.

Speaking generally, the end of global confrontation, the collapse of the former communist bloc and the succeeding disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about new dimensions for Europe in different spheres. Now, with the end of the cold war, we can speak about the absence of a total war danger and of feeling more secure in our world. On the other hand, new risks and dangers have appeared on the scene which influence the European security dimension. To name only a few of these new risks and dangers, I would simply mention the imbalance of security comfort in the western and the eastern parts of the continent, numerous local conflicts, open and hidden territorial claims, all of which represent a large potential challenge to overall European security and stability.

That is why Ukraine pays the greatest attention to the issue of creating a reliable, comprehensive, all-European security system. Ukraine's membership in such a system, we believe, will ensure the necessary external guarantees of our national security.

Such a system, as we see it, must be really comprehensive and embrace all countries of greater Europe without exception. It also must include reliable instruments and mechanisms of conflict-prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes. We think that the working out of the framework of such a future all-European security system must be a concerted joint exercise. By saying concerted and joint, I mean that a result that might satisfy everyone can be achieved only with the direct and full participation of every interested nation and by taking due account of each nation's national security interests. If we fail to meet the legitimate security concerns of any state, we shall face new challenges and potential instabilities.

Ukraine, therefore, stands against the creation in Europe of new military-political blocs. We did not sign the CIS Tashkent collective security treaty back in May 1992, because we see the existence of different and non-co-operative security institutions in Europe to be counterproductive and even dangerous for the new European security architecture. Instead, we see the real necessity of improving the effectiveness and ability to accommodate the new realities within the existing European structures.

Overall stability and security throughout Europe can be achieved only through close co-operation and by establishing modes of interdependence among such institutions as CSCE, NATO, NACC, WEU, European Union and the Council of Europe. For these ends, a proper approach to accommodating the traditional collective security system to new realities has to be worked out. And here, of course, special importance should be attached to the development of such structures as CSCE, NATO and WEU.

I do not see a pure coincidence in the fact that my road to today's Paris WEU Assembly session is framed by yesterday's end of the CSCE ministerial meeting in Rome and tomorrow's NACC ministerial meeting in Brussels.

CSCE has in fact gained a sort of second breath after the end of the cold war and is now trying hard to define its new rôle and make its activities more effective. We are very much interested in speeding up this process, although, as any big international structure, CSCE has its own inertia and is a bit slow in movement.

NACC is a brand new political phenomenon, but nevertheless it has already shown its promotive perspectives. It is clear that in NACC many new democratic countries, especially those of Eastern Europe, see primarily their meantime access to NATO activities. And it is also clear that many countries of Central and Eastern Europe still distinguish their mode of thinking between NATO and NACC.

It is not a hidden fact that many East European countries today pay great attention to the issue of NATO enlargement, viewing it as the best possible solution to meet their national security interests requirements. I presume that this issue will be one of the most topical on tomorrow's NACC meeting's political agenda.

And now we are here, at the Assembly session of another very important security structure – WEU. Important questions come to one's mind when seeing this incidental coincidence: are these security arrangements competing ones? Do they have the potential really to become interlocking institutions, aimed at solidifying all-European stability and security? And, what is the rôle of the new East-Central European democracies in this process?

Mr. Zlenko (continued)

I believe the first question should be answered with a definite no. It is no time and there is no place in modern Europe to have competition in security structures. With the same reasoning, a definite yes should be said to the second question. It is a real fact that we still do not have a definite answer to the third question.

Our view on the subject of Central and Eastern Europe's ties with existing security structures is based on several important considerations. First, let me recall what President Mitterrand of France said a year ago: Ukraine is a 100% European state. Secondly, we see Ukraine as an organic and inseparable part of the Central and Eastern European region. Thirdly, we presume that a single all-European security space can be created only by securing regional stability in Central and Eastern Europe and by providing this region's organic linkage with Western European security structures.

I want to point out, in this respect, that the so-called differentiated approach taken by WEU, in establishing links with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, is viewed by some observers as a policy of defining the new borders of Europe. Maybe these estimations are far enough from real policy, but at the same time, they pose some questions, and they do so for Ukraine also.

In order to move aside such questions, I want to clarify one important point: by negotiating a treaty on partnership and co-operation with EC, Ukraine is taking only the first step. It is our plan – although not very immediate – to seek in future full membership of the European Union or what may come out of it.

Ukraine is firmly convinced that European economic identity is the issue of big political significance, and both East and West are to work hard to achieve that identity. On the other hand, some kind of European security identity must also be achieved to set up this new European security architecture. WEU is a remarkable institution to exert influence on this process. Ukraine is very much interested in co-operation with WEU in that field.

I think that Ukraine's participation in the WEU Assembly with observer status as the initial step would create the possibility of starting a real process of co-operation. We are deeply convinced that wide perspectives exist for such co-operation between WEU and Ukraine.

I see the fields of such co-operation, for example, as the defence conversion, aerospace and rocket industries and so on. Ukraine today is indeed a country with a militarily over-weighted economy, with a huge military industrial complex amounting to one-third of the

former Soviet Union military-industrial complex. It has advanced technologies in some very specific and advanced fields.

On the other hand, Ukraine does strive to lessen this military burden on the economy. The military doctrine of Ukraine, approved recently by our parliament, is a good confirmation of that point. Ukraine wants to be a reliable partner for every European state in securing a more stable, less dangerous and more prosperous continent for all Europeans, and is trying to put that into practice.

One of the very recent signs of such an approach is the ratification of the START I Treaty by the Ukrainian Parliament. World opinion on that very event is contradictory and I want to stress that sometimes one may even see misinterpretation of the facts.

The Verkhovna Rada – our parliament – decision on START ratification is a real and extremely important step towards the future non-nuclear status of Ukraine. Conditions set by the parliament reveal the real situation which we are facing: Ukraine was constantly drawing the attention of all interested parties to the fact that today our country is not in a position to cover the process of denuclearisation with our own forces and resources. Ukraine needs sufficient international assistance – political, economic and technical. Having inherited the third largest nuclear weapons potential, Ukraine found herself in a unique situation, which has no precedent in world practice. Ukraine has solemnly declared – and it never took back this declaration – that her choice is to become a non-nuclear state in future. This goal remains unchanged. But the outside world should definitely understand that we need some international help to meet our legal and absolutely natural requirements concerning Ukraine's national security interests.

Let me once again express my gratitude for the opportunity to address you at this session. I hope that contacts between Ukraine and WEU will become regular and mutually useful.

In fact, our goal is, I hope, common: to build a new stable and secure Europe. Let us not miss any opportunity to get closer in fulfilling this noble task.

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to questions. As I call the names of delegates, I shall also mention their countries so that you know where they are from.

The first is Mr. Borderas of Spain.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. Zlenko, thank you very much for being here with us. I appreciate your demonstrating your knowledge of my language.

We heard through the media this morning that at the meeting of the Council of Ministers

Mr. Borderas (continued)

of the CSCE in Rome yesterday they agreed that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should set up the supervisory body monitoring the peace-keeping and peace-making measures which Russia is to undertake to put an end to the conflicts between countries of the former CIS. What is your opinion of this decision, Minister?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*) (Translation). – I can answer this question without any difficulty because I was present at that last meeting of ministers. My reply is as follows.

The problem which arises in using forces for peace-keeping operations is a rather thorny one. It was discussed in the meeting yesterday. Having used the expressions peace-keeping and peace-making yourself, you will be aware that these are two different things, and I believe that yesterday's session focused its attention on the first expression: peace-keeping.

The meeting recognised the need for a monitoring mechanism, although the mechanism was not set up yesterday; we simply began to give it serious thought. My position, and that of my country, is that we are in favour of creating such a mechanism to monitor peace-keeping forces, but at the same time we feel that such forces should be established on a multinational basis. We do not wish to give one country a unilateral privilege. We are aware that some countries are eager to acquire the status of the only country capable of establishing order in different territories, the first of such territories being the former Soviet Union.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Donald Thompson.

Sir Donald THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome you, Minister. I am fortunate to have in my constituency, in a town called Todmorden, a significant Ukrainian presence. Those people have enriched my life for the past twenty years. They are a credit to Ukraine and their children are a credit to the United Kingdom. I would have been disappointed had a Ukrainian not started his speech with a small history lesson. That has always been the case for the past forty years and we delight with you in your independence. We know how long you have wept and struggled for that independence.

Can I now tell my constituents that Ukraine is sufficiently politically and economically stable to play a major part in the new Europe?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*). – That is a very difficult question. At

present we are living in a period of transition. We have been independent for only two years and we have faced many problems not only politically but economically. It is extremely difficult to switch from a planned administrative economy to a free market economy without experience and without a sound social basis. However, we are proud that the political stability in my country gives us a chance to fulfil that difficult task.

I repeat that we need the understanding of our partners not only on the European continent but in the world as a whole. We need concrete assistance, and I do not mean just direct financial assistance or cash. We need universal assistance – advice, concrete suggestions and proposals – as well as financial and technical assistance. We need to acquire many new specialists to be involved in economic reforms and we need many other things.

But everyone understands that in two years – it is a very short time – it is impossible to overcome all the obstacles on the way to a free market economy. You will understand that we are under some economic pressure, although I shall not develop that theme now.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I believe that about 25% of Ukrainians are in Moldova which, as you know, is seeking a new status in Europe, particularly as a full member of the Council of Europe. As there are some in Moldova who seem to wish to become – as they would say – reunited with Romania, what problems do you envisage for the very large Ukrainian minority in Moldova?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*). – You are right to say that many Ukrainians live in Moldova, and there are also Moldovans living in Ukraine. In fact, even more Moldovans live in Ukraine than Moldovan Ukrainians live in Moldova. We are in permanent contact with the leaders of the Ukrainian minority in Moldova and we try to help them to solve their problems without intervening in the internal affairs of this new, independent state. We try to resolve its cultural problems, including those relating to schools, newspapers, broadcasting, and so on.

The question concerns the possible reunification, or unification, of Moldova and Romania. In my view, that trend is less acute than it was when the Moldovan independent state was first proclaimed, although some politicians try to play the Romanian-Moldovan card and exploit the problem to gain power and influence from that weaker but still extant trend. According to my information, the Moldovans in general are not yet prepared for unification. However, we follow the trends in Romania, and

Mr. Zlenko (continued)

we have seen some effort directed towards unification, or reunification, of the two states – only time will tell.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I would like to join the President in expressing my great satisfaction at having Mr. Zlenko here with us. I think it fair to say that the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is an historic landmark which moves us all.

Your speech, Minister, covered so many subjects with such sincerity that there are many questions I would like to ask; however, because there is so little time available, I am going to concentrate on just two. Obviously the principal concern for both ourselves and an organisation such as ours is security in Europe. The day before yesterday, Spanish newspapers carried a report that in Kiev President Kravchuk had said, “we do not view nuclear weapons as weapons but as material wealth and we demand compensation for them”. My question is, “What does Mr. Kravchuk mean by this?” It is true, and we understand this, that Ukraine is in need of solidarity and assistance, but a strict interpretation of this statement could lead one to believe that if Ukraine is not satisfied with the price of nuclear weapons, it will not join in the necessary process of denuclearisation to which he referred in his speech. The second question, very briefly, Mr. President, is this: there are rumours that Ukraine’s huge nuclear arsenal, which is, we hear, controlled and maintained jointly with the Russian Federation, for well-known reasons, is in difficulties, and the question is whether Ukraine can give assurances about the control and maintenance of nuclear weapons for the peace of mind and security of the other European countries?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*) (Translation). – To answer your first question, yes, the President did say what you have just read out, and I myself said the same thing in Rome yesterday. You are aware that for us nuclear weapons represent material wealth. You know that the warheads of these missiles contain uranium, which is very valuable. In agreement with Russia and other countries, we are looking into the possibility of obtaining compensation for the wealth contained within the warheads. I should like to say that during the last year a number of tactical nuclear weapons have been transported from Russian territory. Without compensation, these tactical nuclear weapons represent a value of over ten million dollars. Ukraine received nothing for these weapons. Now we are seeking possible compen-

sation. You will understand that we are obliged to buy the necessary components for our nuclear power stations from Russia, and we have to pay a lot of money for them. On the one hand, we are sending this asset to Russia, and on the other hand, we have nothing in return. In this case we are not insisting, and we do not consider nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory to be a military matter which could strengthen our defence. We do not entertain the thought of using these weapons, nor have we any possibility of using them. We would simply like to find a solution to this problem of obtaining something for the wealth contained in the nuclear warheads.

The second question was whether we can secure and maintain these weapons. I would like to say that administrative control, but administrative control only, is in the hands of our army. The nuclear button is now in Moscow, and we do not intend to gain control of this. We are concentrating our attention on the security of these arms situated on our territory and on maintaining them correctly. You will be aware that, on 3rd September, we signed an agreement with Russia on guaranteeing and servicing these nuclear weapons. We now have to begin working in accordance with this agreement. We are in constant contact and are able to ensure the location of these nuclear weapons on our territory.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Alexander.

Mr. ALEXANDER (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that answer, Minister, and further to the comments in your very thoughtful address about mutual co-operation in security matters, does your country have independent armed forces? How many Russian forces are still on Ukrainian soil? What progress is being made towards the removal of all Russian forces from your country?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*). – I would like to tell you that, in accordance with the decision taken by our parliament, the process of creating our own army started two years ago. We have our own national army. We have our own national military doctrine, which is defensive. Of course, I would like to tell you that, practically, we do not have the Russian army on Ukrainian territory. At the same time, I would like to tell you that those nuclear weapons that are located on Ukrainian territory are operationally under Russian control. I was surprised yesterday, listening to my colleague in Rome, the Russian Foreign Minister, when he appealed to the conference and said that ratification by the Ukrainian Parliament of the START I Treaty is a danger because it resumes the cold war. I remind you that that is absolutely untrue because the nuclear button is still in Russian hands in Moscow. We

Mr. Zlenko (continued)

have limited control. It is only administrative control over the nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory.

In this connection, I would like to tell you that if some nuclear weapons, or not some but all the strategic missiles in the territory of Ukraine, are operationally under Russian control, you can consider that there are some Russian army or not Russian army. This is as we decided at the CIS summit. This strategic army is still under CIS control, but unfortunately in practice they are under Russian control.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – Like all of us, Minister, I very much welcome your presence and speech. As the Minister knows, following the Maastricht Treaty, Western European Union has become the defence arm of the European Community or European Union. The Minister said in his speech that he wished to associate Ukraine with Western European Union, perhaps eventually joining it with some observer status or whatever on the way. Does that mean that he sees Ukraine as part of the European Union at some time in the future?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*). – I would like to confirm what I have just said. We are looking for co-operation with Western European Union. Our military doctrine is defensive. To reply exactly to your question, we have to see the future system of collective European security. In this connection, we see the future conception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as a new conception, which possibly creates a new system of collective European security. I am sure that those intentions, or the intention of some former socialist countries to be incorporated with NATO, oblige – or force – me to think seriously about the conceptual changes of NATO. I am absolutely sure of that. If that process is to be developed in that direction, we will have a chance to see ourselves as a part of this integration process. I do not know how long that process will take but I am sure that, perhaps tomorrow, at the next session, or at the future ministerial session, or at the January summit, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will clarify those things. I am convinced that that process has already started.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*). – To show you that this Assembly does not consist only of Spanish and United Kingdom representatives, I will address you in Dutch. I am afraid you will need

your earphones because I do not think that you understand Dutch.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – I would like to thank you for your speech, which shows great frankness. You spoke, in particular, about a pan-European security system. What in your opinion does it mean for stability in Eastern Europe if your country commits itself more closely to the European Union or WEU than your neighbour the Russian Federation? Would it promote stability in the Russian Federation if you were to become a member of one of the Western European organisations?

And when do you think Ukraine will accede to the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*). – It is difficult to imagine that WEU and NATO will open the door for Ukraine without satisfying the interests of Russia. I hope that you are aware of the new Russian military conception. At this stage, they do not consider the possibility of joining NATO and WEU. However, even in Russia there are many politicians with different views on this process. In my country, there are also different approaches vis-à-vis the future membership of NATO and WEU.

I will reflect the opinion of the different groups which are considering the possibility of future membership of these two organisations. One group is looking for membership. The second group is also looking for membership, but with some reservations. Officially they think that if NATO will change its conceptual approach and switch gradually from military to a more military-political union organisation, it would be more or less possible to unite all those with different views on membership and to start the process of approaching those two organisations – and mainly the first one.

When we talk about my country's future membership, I believe that this conceptual approach has already started. It gives us a chance to be closer to co-operation with NATO and to see the possibility of resolving together a system of collective security. We need understanding and we are looking for that consultation and to resolve some practical issues. That is our ground for joining those two organisations in the future.

I am very pleased that the first steps have been taken. We are observers at WEU and we are very pleased to be guests at your Assembly. This gives us a chance to be closer, and better to understand the common goals which face our continent.

The second question related to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The parliament ratified

Mr. Zlenko (continued)

the Lisbon protocol without Article 5 which refers to adherence to NPT. Thanks to the enormous effort of the government and the President in this decision of parliament, you will find one very important provision which says that the implementation of the START treaty opens the way to the adherence to NPT. I am sure that it will not be long before we adhere to NPT.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, let me begin by saying that your appearance here shows that the Presidential Committee took a very good decision in inviting you. Let me assure you that the majority of this Assembly does not accept any Moscow theories about “foreign neighbours” or any other form of Russian Monroe doctrine. The majority of this Assembly is well aware that the critical moment for the member governments of WEU and for this Assembly will be when, in the course of the process of association with a view to membership of the European Union, Western European Union also observes the logic of this process, and Moscow then opposes it, in line with earlier Soviet positions. That is when the decisive debate will take place. We hope we can make our contribution towards ensuring that our governments continue to pursue their aims of association. That is what I wanted to say before putting my question.

In its comments last week on your parliament’s decision, the Russian Government stated that in future it would no longer be in a position to guarantee that the strategic nuclear weapons stationed on your territory could be deployed. My question is this: is it the case that a substantial number of missiles are still aimed at targets in Western Europe? What is meant by the Russian Government’s statement to the effect that following this parliamentary decision it would no longer be in a position to guarantee that these missiles could be deployed? Does it mean that Western Europe is more secure because these missiles are no longer in working order?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*). – Thank you for your question. I have already tried to comment on the new military doctrine in Russia. From my few comments, it seems that you understood that of course that doctrine is of great concern not only to my country, but to many others. However, I do not want to comment further. Unfortunately, there is a paradox in that we do not know towards which countries those missiles located in Ukraine are directed.

That is a paradox. From one side we hear the criticism that Ukraine represents a great danger

for many nations. From the other, we hear that we do not have the problem of those missiles. I suppose that your country is also among those in the zone of possible bombardment.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*). – I suppose so too.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*). – Yes, you too, and me too. However, as I told you, the nuclear button is not in our hands. We do not have any intention of taking operational control over these nuclear missiles. Our concern is how to prevent their possible use from our territory. My President is doing many things to try to obtain control over their non-use from our territory. That is why we have decided to obtain the status of a non-nuclear power. We have taken the first step – it is not the last – towards obtaining non-nuclear status, and we shall continue to do it gradually and consistently. Perhaps, thanks to our efforts, your nation and the others will be saved, because we intend to liquidate those nuclear missiles as soon as possible.

We would like to liquidate them on the basis of the following reservations, according to the decision taken by my parliament. The first is a guarantee of national security. The second, which is no less important, is possible financial assistance. The economy of my country is in a difficult state. Unfortunately, every year we spend about 15% of our budget on liquidating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. We do not need to have to face the problem of nuclear missiles alone which represent a great danger. We would like to resolve all the issues on the basis of the interests of my people.

We would like everyone to understand that it is in the interests of all nations in Europe and of the international community to assist Ukraine to cope with this very difficult task.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. De Carolis.

Mr. DE CAROLIS (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, on behalf of the Italian Delegation, I would like to thank you warmly for the information you gave the WEU Assembly concerning the new Ukrainian democracy, approved by referendum, thus belying in large measure the words of a great renaissance Florentine who maintained that the less you know the more you suspect.

You spoke about European and international security requirements and identified the dangers still in the way of achieving the global security which you, speaking for your new democracy, want to see achieved; these dangers can be lumped together as territorial claims, major challenges, ethnic wars, and the weaponry still in place over a large part of European territory.

Do you not think, may I ask, that there is a contradiction in your country’s irrevocable decision to become a non-nuclear state – which I

Mr. De Carolis (continued)

welcome – despite the presence of so many nuclear weapons?

Furthermore, how long do you think it will take to demobilise the huge contingent of armed forces stationed in your country? The fact is that we cannot place all our hopes in NATO because it is my view, in the light of the information provided by Washington last summer, that it will not be easy in the near future for NATO to provide the umbrella for all the countries needing protection. This will also be true as a matter of economic necessity as I think that, after the forthcoming summit, the sharing of costs will be demanded with the result that a NATO presence in the new democracies will become much more difficult.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*). – Of course you have a reason. I am sure that you view our national security not only through our military ambitions – I would put the ambitions in parenthesis – but through economic stability and the success of our economic reforms. We try to consider national security universally. At present we are not thinking about membership but about possible co-operation – I stress the co-operation – with some western European organisations. At the same time we are thinking about the possibility of a positive solution to our membership of the European Union. The first step is already on the way – we are just about to sign an agreement on partnership and co-operation with the European Union. There are different prognoses. Perhaps in several years – or it may be ten, fifteen, or twenty – we will be members, but we are on the way to resolve the difficult issues.

I do not want to develop my vision of national security philosophically because it is a delicate and sensitive issue. I touched upon it slightly in my address and have already replied to some questions on that important issue. Your request reflects important different opinions in my country. You are right, but you must understand that everything is changing in the world, and I am sure that that process will continue. If we find grounds for understanding and for future co-operation which satisfy the interests of not one but all nations in this continent, we shall be on the right path and will satisfy the interests of all countries, including mine.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Dundee.

Lord DUNDEE (*United Kingdom*). – I join others in thanking you warmly for coming here today and for the reassurances and commitments that you have been able to give about European co-operation and world peace. You have already answered some questions on WEU, but since we are debating a report this morning

from the Technological and Aerospace Committee, would you like to outline what kind of help WEU might be able to give you in the period ahead?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*). – Of course, as we are at the beginning of the process of setting up our new state, we need a lot of things. First, it is very important to us that you recognise the existence of the new independent European state. Secondly, you must understand the wishes and basic needs of that new nation. Thirdly, on the basis of those things, perhaps you can find ways of assisting us. For example, WEU could organise seminars, conferences, symposiums or round tables to consider all aspects of the problems faced by my nation in promoting economic reform. We may also need financial assistance in the form of investment. We are looking for credits and for new technology, and so on. On that basis, we shall find a common interest which will satisfy not only the people of my country but the members of WEU. As a European state, we are looking for co-operation with different European countries and structures.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, we are sorry to keep plying you with questions, but we are encouraged by the wealth of information in your replies.

Mr. Soell mentioned a new Monroe doctrine and the difficulties we therefore experience in our NATO contacts with the CIS countries, yours in particular as one of the most powerful members of the CIS.

In addition, given the existence in your country of nuclear bases which could – quite against your will – represent a threat to peace, we asked you a series of questions on the subject.

This morning we also have a report to be presented by Lord Dundee on possible co-operation with CIS countries like Ukraine in the field of advanced technology, including its defence applications and I myself am due to speak on our plans for the development of the European space-based observation system.

Against that background, my question is this. Do you envisage the possibility – a subject I take the liberty of raising in this Assembly – of space co-operation between your country, which, along with Russia and Kazakhstan, has made great advances in this field, and WEU member countries.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ZLENKO (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*) (Translation). – It is true that we are exploring the possibility of co-operation.

Mr. Zlenko (continued)

Ukraine is engaged in a wide range of activities in this field. It is no secret that we produce a large quantity of space equipment, and, in particular, highly sophisticated missiles. We are actively seeking co-operation, not only with WEU as a group, but also with its individual member countries.

As you know, there is unfortunately a Cocom ban on such co-operation and I therefore thank you for raising the question. Today, Ukraine is ready because Cocom has embarked on a process of change and we are looking for every kind of co-operation in the space field.

In the space co-operation field, Ukraine is also inviting France to co-operate in the field of aeronautical production. Here too, our products are highly sophisticated. For example, Ukraine occupies both second and third places among the world's producers of aircraft engines.

We are therefore ready to enter into negotiations in this field, and also to consider developing aerospace co-operation, not for military but solely for peaceful purposes.

The PRESIDENT. – The number and depth of the questions will have indicated clearly to you, Minister, the great interest that your address has excited in the Assembly. I became a member of the Assembly in 1979 and if, in the early 1980s, I had said that within a decade we would hear an address from the Foreign Minister of Ukraine and that Ukraine would be a separate country, my colleagues would have regarded me as a case for being taken away by men in white coats. No one then would have dared to think of the break-up of the Soviet empire and everything that has happened since, including the troubles that you mentioned.

Your people are very highly regarded. My fellow countryman, Sir Donald Thompson, paid a deservedly warm tribute to your fellow countrymen who live in his constituency. Throughout the world Ukrainians are both accepted and liked.

We wish your country well in the future as you move towards even greater independence and to play your part in the scheme of things. Your coming here has broken new ground. We are glad that you have observers here and we are thankful that the entire focus of this Assembly has been on Central and Eastern Europe and the fact that more and more people are coming into the debate and the consensus on European security.

We are delighted to have you with us. I know that you are an old hand from this part of the world, albeit in a different context, and we always admire tremendously speakers who can answer questions in several languages. You have the good wishes of our Assembly.

7. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the consequences for Europe

(Debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1394 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We now turn to the debate on Lord Dundee's report on the evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States and the consequences for Europe, and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1394 and amendments.

In the debate I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am sure there are many members of the Assembly who would like to have spoken in praise of the excellence of Lord Dundee's report and in agreement with the contents of the report.

On the other hand, Mr. President, the participation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in the proceedings has, in my view, proved to be the best adjunct to Lord Dundee's report, because many of the replies to the numerous questions we asked fitted perfectly within the context of the report, which has been enormously enriched by the Minister's presence as a result.

Mr. President, I hope you will permit me, for the general enlightenment of the Assembly, very briefly to express the committee's gratitude to Lord Dundee for his dedication in drawing up this report. Clearly there were problems in that, because of the current situation, we were unable to make the visit originally planned to the Russian Federation. In spite of this, the report has reached some very valuable conclusions which, I repeat, have been reaffirmed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. These concern the need to intensify co-operation, which should not simply remain an aim, one that we frequently discuss, but must be converted into actual, practical co-operation. For this reason the draft recommendation asks the Council of our organisation to play a leading rôle in promoting this bilateral and multilateral co-operation in the very important area of advanced technology.

We must try, above all, to foster such a relationship with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States because, as we have just said, these countries have a high level of sophisticated technical and scientific knowledge; for security in Europe and in order to be able to establish security measures, such co-operation is essential. Consequently, Mr. President, I will conclude by saying that we congratulate Lord Dundee again on behalf of the committee. I am not sure whether we should do

Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)

this now, Mr. President, but we have to discuss the amendments; if this is not the right time, I will conclude here and we will do that later.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Lopez Henares, for being so helpful. The Technological and Aerospace Committee has presented a draft recommendation to which three amendments have been tabled by Lord Dundee.

They will be taken in the order in which they relate to the text – that is, 1, 2, 3.

Amendment 1 reads as follows:

1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph *(ix)* and insert: “Welcoming the recent ratification of the START I Treaty by the Parliament of Ukraine”.

I call Lord Dundee to move the amendment.

Lord DUNDEE (*United Kingdom*). – The amendment was tabled because the original draft was out of date. At the time of writing, Ukraine had not ratified START I.

The PRESIDENT. – Do you wish to speak, Mr. Lopez Henares?

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – The committee supports the amendment tabled by Lord Dundee unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to unanimously.

Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Lord Dundee, reads as follows:

2. Leave out paragraph 4 to the draft recommendation proper, and insert:

“Call upon Ukraine and Kazakhstan to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty”.

I call Lord Dundee to move the amendment.

Lord DUNDEE (*United Kingdom*). – Amendment 2 serves exactly the same purpose as Amendment 1; it is merely in a different part of the text. It takes account of the fact that Ukraine has now ratified START I.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Again, Mr. President, the committee supports the amendment unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to unanimously.

Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Lord Dundee, reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “within the context of Cocom rules” and insert “to promote transparency in the transfer of equipment for civilian and military use”.

I call Lord Dundee to move the amendment.

Lord DUNDEE (*United Kingdom*). – At the time of drafting, no announcement had been made about the future of Cocom. Since then, a definite commitment has been made to wind it up, hence the proposed amendment which takes account of that decision.

The PRESIDENT. – Do you wish to speak, Mr. Lopez Henares?

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – The committee has agreed to support this amendment unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is agreed to unanimously.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1394, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

8. The development of a European space-based observation system, Part II

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1393)

The PRESIDENT. – The last order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Valleix of the report of the Technological and Aerospace

1. See page 50.

The President (continued)

Committee on the development of a European space-based observation system – Part II, with debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1393.

I call Mr. Valleix to present the report.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, with the approval of Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman of my committee, may I suggest that reports such as mine and that of Lord Dundee should be presented at some other time during the proceedings. There is an incompatibility in taking such reports at this stage in the part-session, as compared with the importance of our statements thereon, given that we are discussing events of today of profound practical concern to WEU. I shall comment very briefly on my report, since the attendance and the unanimity of the committee's decision seem to indicate that we are in agreement on our general lines of thought.

We are here concerned with what is actually WEU's first practical achievement. WEU has brought a space-based observation centre, the first, of course, of its kind in Europe, into action under its own direct control. This is not just a technical event in the space field, it is also a general achievement, concerning as it does the creation of a new system now run by WEU under the authority of its Council.

As a parliamentarian, may I remind the Council – and thank it for kindly noting the message – that in these circumstances, we wish to be much more fully involved than in the past in exchanges of information. Mr. Pedregosa, the clerk who helped me so much and who had very great difficulty in assembling the necessary documentation, will bear me out on this.

The centre was officially inaugurated on 28th April last. We are therefore right up to date. Located not far from Madrid, it has been operational since the inaugural date. With a view to the inauguration, a memorandum was signed the day before by three countries, France, Italy and Spain. With WEU's support this set out the rules of operation with a view to the launching of a new Helios satellite in December 1994, provided all goes well. Helios will give Europe its first military capability and also exchanges of information enabling Europe to make maximum use of the satellite. This agreement is important because of the prospects it opens up for substantial progress in the future. We are currently working on data purchased from the SPOT, ERS and Landsat satellite programmes. Helios will increase the possibilities substantially using advanced technology, the details of which I do not propose to describe at this juncture. As I have said, Helios is a joint French,

Italian and Spanish programme, in which optical observation satellites are used for military purposes for the first time. The development possibilities for our project are thus considerable.

For the centre to be able to start up the equipment had to be made operational. A first comment on this point is that the equipment was ordered by an industrial consortium led by Aérospatiale in a contract placed with Marcol, a United Kingdom firm which became Cray Systems Limited on 1st January 1993. Some items of the equipment are giving problems which will have to be dealt with and on which we will have to come to an agreement. Briefly, they are as follows.

The software for the chosen hardware is American. Some people might say, why not, but the fact is that we are a European organisation and you will remember that in an earlier report, we hoped that the introduction of these programmes would provide an opportunity to strengthen the weak points of the European industry, namely data processing and interpretation. This is in fact the main purpose of the Torrejón centre. Let us therefore revert to it and make sure that the partnership receives all the necessary reassurances from Marcol. We discussed this matter thoroughly with Mr. Blaydes, the Director of the centre, in committee; the points on which we seek reassurance relate to the possibility of interfacing with available European hardware so that development will proceed on increasingly Europeanised lines. This is very important.

My second comment about the centre is that aside from the need that we have to have a clear understanding, the aim is not merely to set up a school or training centre, but to have an operational centre supplying data matching the three basic purposes assigned to it: disarmament monitoring, crisis-management – both of them military objectives – and, in the civil field, exchanging information on the environment, including meteorological data, warnings of natural disasters, accident prevention, etc.

The centre is now operational, and I take this opportunity of thanking the committee's Chairman for allowing us to see it when the committee met in Madrid a few weeks ago.

The real problem is to be clear among ourselves as to how our capabilities should be developed so as to give Europe a degree of autonomy and an identity of its own. Torrejón provides one of these capabilities.

You are, of course, aware that our action in this field concerns both space – obviously – but also the ground, since it is a matter of processing satellite data, furnished by nominal low-orbiting satellites, small very low-orbiting satellites known as data relay satellites, DRS, and

Mr. Valleix (continued)

data transmission satellites in geostationary orbit. The ground-based data are relayed to this processing, archiving and interpretation centre, the system control centre, a central station, etc.

We must not lower our sights as regards technical organisation, technical design and the increasingly rapid collection, processing and interpretation of data.

As regards the monitoring of disarmament treaties, an interval of two or three days between one satellite pass and the next may be taken as normal. As regards crisis-monitoring, the period should obviously be reduced to twenty-four hours or less if possible. When we are able to process and interpret satellite data in half a day or even in a few hours, we shall not only have just an item of information but data upon which tactical action can be based. This is what we should be aiming at.

As you know, to achieve these ambitious objectives we have to have the Assembly's backing in dealings with the Council of Ministers, and that backing has to be forceful, not tentative. As you know, during the Gulf war Europe was in the dark, so to speak, and had, by and large, to rely on American facilities for the high-speed provision of data. The time has come, and it is only normal, that within NATO, which is now rightly reappraising its rôle, and within a WEU which must now carve out a more positive position within this huge North Atlantic defence system, Europe should also equip itself with resources giving it greater autonomy. I do not mean absolute independence, because we form part of a close-knit western team in which it is naturally to everyone's advantage to rely on each other. However, even vis-à-vis our American partners, it is only logical for Europe to be able to meet its own obligations.

As I have said, the centre's missions are both military and civil. Europe has all the industrial capabilities it needs to perform them. They are listed in the report. We have satellite launch systems: Ariane 4 today and Ariane 5 in the near future. Commercially the reliability of Ariane 4 is declared as 92%, but it is in fact 94% to 95%. That of Ariane 5 is claimed in advance to be 96%. We have satellite telecommunications systems, meteorological satellite systems and earth observation satellite systems. A whole series of programmes has been started and they are operating very successfully: Ariane, Eutelsat, Meteosat, SPOT, ERS. In the near future we shall have Helios, etc.

We must also consider what will be the strength of political will behind this programme – which has its price – and whether we should be exploring the possibility of dialogue or joint programmes. The exchange we have just had with

Mr. Zlenko was very important, and I thank you, Mr. President, for having invited him here. There are very many problems in this part of Europe. His address can only encourage us in the view that, with such a responsible speaker to talk with, it will be to our advantage to carry on with the dialogue and even – why not? – envisage joint programmes.

I take the liberty of guiding you along this path, since in the space field, as Mr. Zlenko has just reminded us, the possibilities for exchange and trade are vast. I also believe that with countries such as Ukraine which constitute an involuntary threat to the world because of the nuclear missiles on their soil, the building of bridges and the forging of close links with Western Europe, particularly with an organisation such as WEU, may be one way of strengthening these countries in fields where they have special skills. It may also enable them to take a more firmly balanced position in Moscow's direction, and thus arrive at a clearer understanding and be able to avoid the Monroe doctrine.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are the general comments I wish to make, but another message we should absorb from this report, as proposed in the recommendation, is that the initiative, unique of its kind for WEU, now being taken and to be developed in the future, should set an example which will be followed in other fields.

We should also stress our determination to strengthen our links with the Council with a view to achieving a broader and more rapid exchange of information, to make use of the interface facility so that when the time comes we can be sure of being able to exploit the Helios network, due to become operational in one year's time, to the full and, naturally, to provide the necessary finance.

On this subject I have a prayer on my lips: let us be firm and insistent that the Council secure the necessary funding from WEU countries. It should be noted that programmes are already being submitted by the industrial operations group for the second phase, for which a reasonable estimate is 8 million ecus, and it would be best to avoid any interruption in the unfolding of this particular programme.

This is not simply a debate on technology. What is at stake is the fashioning of the first of WEU's instruments giving it command of disarmament control in Europe and a crisis-prevention capability, to say nothing of development possibilities in the civil field. If it takes this step, WEU will clearly confirm both its vocation and its capability, not only to take decisions but also to start new developments.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

In the present discussions in NATO, it will also be important to make it clear, using all the possibilities that are ours by right, that we mean to go through with this programme and, I trust, take it further.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

The debate is open.

Would the Chairman like to say something?

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, briefly, I would like to inform the Assembly that the Technological and Aerospace Committee is focusing its attention on this area in the interests of security, not only because of its name, but because it really does regard space as a vital strategic factor. The Assembly is well aware that the Torrejón Satellite Centre, which was inaugurated only this year and which we visited recently, was the result of an Assembly initiative, approved by the Council. For that reason, the Technological and Aerospace Committee maintains constant vigilance and attention in relation to the centre. Mr. Valleix's report, which he presented in a splendid speech, is full of ideas and goes far beyond purely technical matters, entering in great depth into the political field. The report calls for the Torrejón centre to be constantly monitored, because, having created it, we must strive to ensure its maximum efficiency. We should not be content to let matters stand; this should be just the first step towards a fully European security system.

As I have said, Mr. Valleix's words have far-reaching political implications because, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as the saying goes, knowledge is power. And though this is a universal truth, it is especially true in the field of security and defence.

Mr. Valleix stated that during the Gulf war we were unable to see what was happening, but to have a security system of our own will help to improve our security, and that is why the committee is continuing to study this matter. On the other hand, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the draft recommendation also emphasises the advisability of co-operation with the Commonwealth of Independent States. Once again, this ties in splendidly with the speech made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

Finally, it calls on the Council not to permit the critical economic situation to lead to a reduction in the pace of the industrial consortium's work, and advocates close relations with the European Space Agency.

In conclusion, Mr. President, although the Assembly has had important debates on this question with reference to the report, the com-

mittee supports and applauds the draft recommendation tabled by Mr. Valleix.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1393.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We will have a vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

9. Close of the session

The PRESIDENT. – Ladies and gentlemen, that brings us to the end of a session which has been interesting and well worthwhile. I would like to thank those who have stayed to the very end this morning to help get the business through. That is certainly appreciated. This is the end of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly and I think that we have broken a lot of new ground during that time. Indeed, I do not think that I have ever seen the gallery so full during the days of the session.

On your behalf, I would like to thank the staff for what they have done for us, and the interpreters. There is one person whom I would like to mention particularly, and that is the gentleman sitting on my left. He is Mr. David Beamish from the Clerk's Department of the House of Lords. He is of invaluable help in advising, directing and assisting the chairmen. We could not manage without him.

His predecessors have always played a significant part in these proceedings. He has come to the end of his stint, and will give way for one of his colleagues, but I would not like him to go away without all our thanks for what he has done.

I now declare closed the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

(The sitting was closed at 12 noon)

¹ See page 51.



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